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CSOs Framework Evaluation

MPA 2010 Capstone Project

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

For our graduate capstone project at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, the USAID Office of Democracy and Governance (DG) requested that we evaluate the civil society framework in Constituencies for Reform: Strategic Approaches for Donor-Supported Civic Advocacy Groups (i.e.1996 document) and provide recommendations on how to update it, based on the 2010 DG assessment framework and other contemporary theories of change. In accordance with this request, this report will analyze each section of the original document, including:

- Civil Society and Democratic Governance
- A Logic for Strategic Assessment
- The Role of Civil Society in Democratic Transitions
- Creating the Enabling Environment for Civil Society
- Sectoral Reforms
- Strategic Sequencing: Initiating and Consolidating Reform

In lieu of the final section, ‘Recommendations on Priorities and Sequencing of Donor Investment,’ this report will provide recommendations throughout its analysis. Additionally, this report will conclude by discussing ‘Donor Funding and Program Evaluation.’

Civil Society and Democratic Governance

In this section of the 1996 document, USAID differentiates between Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), which are “non-state organizations that can (or have the potential to) champion democratic/governance reforms,” and Civil Advocacy Organizations (CAOs), which are non-state organizations that proactively “advocate, educate, and mobilize attention around major public issues.” Despite this precedent, the 2010 DG assessment framework does not use the term CAO. Instead, the 2010 DG assessment framework proffers a broader definition of CSO/NGO, which incorporates all organizations that “organize, advocate, or provide social services (or some combination thereof) in the public sphere.” To resolve these differences, this report will evaluate recent theories of change and provide recommendations on how USAID can update its definition of CSOs/NGOs.

A Logic for Strategic Assessment

USAID’s 1996 framework for civil society development uses a five-step process that identifies necessary structural reforms, assesses the supply of organizational resources in civil society, and evaluates the arenas and institutions that civil society must use to execute reform. In comparison, USAID’s 2010 DG assessment framework uses a four-step process to identify key

democracy and governance DG problem(s) and distribute resources to DG areas with the greatest potential impact. To resolve these differences, we recommend that USAID should revise its civil society development framework by adopting four structural changes. First, USAID should incorporate an asset-based, rather than problem-oriented, approach in step one. Next, USAID should move step two in the 1996 document to step four. Third, USAID should combine steps three, four, and five, from the 1996 document, into step two. Then finally, the revised strategic logic should consider the operational and programmatic environment of USAID as its third step. These revisions will allow USAID to improve the efficiency and efficacy of its civil society and DG framework by consolidating assessment criteria, enhancing the interoperability of terminology, juxtaposing the problem-oriented approach with an asset-based framework, and facilitating information sharing across USAID projects.

The Role of Civil Society in Democratic Transitions

Analysis of this section in the 1996 document falls under two broad categories: structural and contextual. The structural analysis focuses on the organizational design of this section, whereas the content analysis evaluates the theories in this section and their lack of variability. Structurally, the section delves almost directly into case studies, without giving the reader context through an overview of the topic. While case studies are a useful way of illustrating the general points in the section, the extensive number of cases and amount of detail used distracts from the overall message. In addition to structural issues, there is a lack of variability, depth, and breadth to the factors that influence the role of civil society in democratic transitions. Specifically, the 1996 document only used these four variables to evaluate the role of CAOs in democratic transitions, while failing to provide sufficient context or a theoretical basis. To address these issues, this report suggests that USAID consider the nature of civil society itself and the theories of Larry Diamond, when developing country-wide investment strategies. In specific, Diamond posits that five internal structural characteristics affect how civil society influences democratic transformation: the goals and methods of CAOs, the level of organizational institutionalization, democratic practices within CAOs, a pluralistic civil society and a close-knit civil society.

Creating the Enabling Environment for Civil Society

In the 1996 document, USAID emphasized the role of two factors – local government reform (i.e. decentralization) and protection/expansion of the public realm (i.e. human rights) – in the development of an enabling civil society environment. This report agrees that both of these factors are important to civil society development, but it also recommends that USAID should consider the role of government accountability, CSO autonomy, and organizational transparency. Specifically, USAID should adopt the environmental indicators from the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action (AAA), which includes five systemic and three CSO-specific factors. Then, USAID should compare these indicators with publicly available indices that evaluate national levels of governance, civil rights, economic development, and the rule of law, such as CIVICUS Civil Society Index (CSI), the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index, and Worldwide Governance Indicators. This method of informational crosschecking and peer-review will enhance the veracity and consistency of USAID country assessments.

Sectoral Reforms

The 1996 document claims that sectoral reforms affect democracy and governance in three ways. First, sectoral reform may create autonomous countervailing power centers. Second, this autonomy can produce spillover effects that generate systematic reform. Lastly, in extreme cases, these autonomous centers may provide safe havens for reformers to organize. Based on these considerations, the 1996 document includes five sectors of reform: the environment, business, labor, gender and CAOs/NGOs. Our first recommendation is that CAOs/NGOs should instead be considered the unit of analysis, and the framework should emphasize how the other sectors affect CAOs/NGOs. Second, we found that the 2010 assessment incorporated only two of the sectors named in the 1996 document; therefore, this report urges USAID to update them in accordance with recent developments. We recommend that USAID consider basing a sectoral analysis on the strategic priorities of the Department of State-USAID Joint Strategic Goal Framework, which will provide a rational and consistent assessment structure. Finally, both traditional and social media are emerging as critical new tools in DG promotion. We recommend that DG craft an overall media strategic plan, allowing for the current state of technology in each country.

Strategic Sequencing: Initiating and Consolidating Reform

The 1996 document proposes four different stages in democratic transition: Pre-transition, Early-transition, Late-transition and Consolidation. It also states that democratic transition is “uneven, messy, and subject to setbacks,” so it does not actually proceed on a linear path. Although the 1996 document admittedly “oversimplifies reality,” it enables USAID to formulate a CAO investment strategy in each transition stage. Therefore, given our previous recommendation to synthesize USAID’s DG and civil society frameworks, this report urges USAID to merge the “Contextual Factors” from step one of “A Logic for Strategic Assessment” with “country type and political trend” from the 2010 DG Framework. This revised design will allow USAID to base its recommendations on a contextual analysis that incorporates political transition phases. In addition, to improve the sustainability of CSOs, this report explains how USAID can foster a civil society environment that promotes financial independence.

Donor Funding and Evaluation Methodologies

Considering that civil society is a major component of donor expenditures, one would expect donors to use rigorous evaluation metrics. However, in reality the opposite is true, because CSO funding often depends on the historic organizational structure of multi and bilateral institutions. For example, multilaterals often delegate grant decisions to country offices and specific departments, where there is less accountability to headquarters, while bilateral donors typically favor relationships with NGOs from their own countries. Although USAID acknowledges its lack of monitoring and evaluation, their efforts to date have mostly focused on either specific projects or a global perspective, which is creating a gap in country and regional analysis. To resolve this disparity, this report discusses several evaluation methodologies that USAID should consider implementing, including CIVICUS CSI and the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project.

ACRONYMS

AAA – Accra Agenda for Action

CAO – Civil Advocacy Organization

CSI – Civil Society Index

CSO – Civil Society Organization

DAC – Development Assistance Committee

DEC – Development Experience Clearinghouse

DG – Democracy and Governance

EDGE – Evaluating Democracy and Governance Effectiveness

ERB – European Radio for Belarus

GONGO – Government-organized Non-governmental Organization

M&E – Monitoring and Evaluation

NGO – Non-governmental Organization

ODA – Official Development Assistance

OECD – Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

USAID – United States Agency for International Development

USD – United States Dollar

USG – United States Government

INTRODUCTION

The term “civil society” has been used to describe a wide variety of organizations and societal movements within a given political entity. It has no standardized meaning across various theorists, government actors, analysts, or donor organizations, yet they all rely on civil society to implement their strategic agendas. For USAID, “encouraging development of a politically active civil society” is the third of four strategic pillars for guiding the investment levels of donor money.¹ Precisely how the primary US donor organization for international development incorporates the tenets of civil society in its actionable policy initiatives is the subject of the 1996 USAID Program and Operations Assessment Report No. 12 by Gary Hansen, Constituencies for Reform: Strategic Approaches for Donor-Supported Civic Advocacy Groups (i.e.1996 document).

For our graduate capstone project at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, the USAID Office of Democracy and Governance (DG) requested that we evaluate the civil society framework in 1996 document and provide recommendations on how to update it, based on the 2010 DG assessment framework and other contemporary theories of change. In accordance with this request, this report will analyze each section of the original document, including:

- Civil Society and Democratic Governance
- A Logic for Strategic Assessment
- The Role of Civil Society in Democratic Transitions
- Creating the Enabling Environment for Civil Society
- Sectoral Reforms

¹ The other three respectively, as stated in USAID’s Guidelines for Strategic Plans, are: Promoting meaningful political competition through free and fair electoral processes; enhancing respect for the rule of law and human rights, and; fostering transparent and accountable governance.

- Strategic Sequencing: Initiating and Consolidating Reform

In lieu of the final section, ‘Recommendations on Priorities and Sequencing of Donor Investment,’ this report will provide recommendations throughout our analysis. Additionally, we will conclude by discussing ‘Donor Funding and Program Evaluation.’ Specifically, we believe that the new civil society framework should be considered a sub-assessment within the overall DG assessment. When a DG assessment is completed within a country, if it is determined that civil society is a key sector of interest, a subsequent civil society assessment should be commissioned.

CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

Review of the 1996 Document

Hansen begins the 1996 document by emphasizing that a “vibrant civil society is an essential component of a democratic polity.” This core principle of USAID is based on the assumption that civil society enables the creation of autonomous power centers that promote government *accountability* by resisting authoritarianism and encouraging a “transition from statist to market-based economies.” However, development of these autonomous centers is contingent upon genuine empowerment of the impoverished, disenfranchised, and/or marginalized sectors in society, and a practical form of decentralization that supports a “divestiture of social and economic functions” designed to empower the administrative and political function of local communities. Therefore, these factors must be synergistically assessed to determine the level of sustained *participation* in the population and the generally defined meaning of citizenship within the regime.

It is with this in mind that Hansen expounds upon the role of civil society in effectively fostering democratic reform in client nations by delineating assessment towards an interrelated, two-part paradigm that presents a case-specific outline of the relationship between society and the state. Furthermore, Hansen stipulates that USAID should focus its resources on “that wide range of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) engaged in civic action and education, public policy advocacy, and the monitoring of government activities.”

Since the purpose of Hansen’s effort is to demonstrate the necessity of developing a strong civil society as a primary means of ensuring a proper balance in the aforementioned state-

society relationship, he proceeds to give a two-tiered definition of civil society. First, he defines Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) as:

non-state organizations that can (or have the potential to) champion democratic/governance reforms. They are the engines that can generate the public push for reform. They can work to consolidate reform by helping to hold the state accountable for what it does.

This definition includes all nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that “engage in humanitarian relief or economic and social development activities either at the micro or macro level.” In comparison, Hansen defines Civil Advocacy Organizations (CAOs) as non-state organizations that analyze policy issues, ensure government accountability, and publicly advocate for democratic reform.² These advocacy-based organizations include strong participant groups, such as labor unions and business/professional organizations, which perform a multitude of important tasks in regulating the state-society balance. Thus, by distinguishing between CSOs/NGOs and CAOs, Hansen provides a more “operational perspective” for donor investment strategies, while also delineating between organizations that “play different roles in support of democratic reforms.”

Review of the 2010 Document

When examining the 2010 draft of Conducting a Democracy and Governance Assessment: A Framework for Strategy Development one can see the continued reliance on Hansen’s contextual analysis of the organizations that constitute civil society. For example, it clearly stipulates that USAID should focus on “those non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with the greatest impact on democracy and governance,” which by function must organize,

² This last point is emphasized as the most important in that, positive social change, by method of participant political action, tends to emerge not from the state itself, but from a confluence of diverse yet effective sectors of the society at large.

advocate, and/or provide social services in the public sphere.³ Significantly absent, however, is the classification of CAO from the 1996 document. Instead, the 2010 DG assessment framework subsumes CAOs within a broader definition of CSOs/NGOs, which includes recognition of political organizations, universities, think tanks, and advocacy NGOs that promote democracy and governance.⁴

Recommendations

One important, albeit simple, question faced by our group relates to the importance of the distinction made by Hansen: should USAID reintroduce a more stringently defined classification of civic-based organizations in order to further delineate its funding allocations? To provide an answer it first becomes important to understand the theoretical underpinnings for the specific policy initiatives in question. The following paragraphs will attempt to integrate the practical dimensions of identifying proper beneficiary civic organizations with the conceptual ideology that has shaped such criteria since civic society development has become a primary focus for democratization efforts.

At the core of Hansen's argument is the conceptual idea that legitimate, sustained democracy, by USAID standards, requires a robust and powerful civil society. It is an idea that is based on the proposal that political benefits are incurred by a dense network of apolitical, or quasi-political organizations crossing otherwise wide societal gaps among factions by associations of interest and intent. It is an idea largely borrowed from the concept of civil society as "dense but segregated horizontal networks" capable of sustaining intra-group

³ Dininio, Phyllis. "Conducting a Democracy and Governance Assessment: A Framework for Strategy Development. DRAFT" USAID, 2010. 36

⁴ For a more intensive examination of this practical development see USAID. "Civil Society Groups and Political Parties: Supporting Constructive Relationships," Office of Democracy and Governance Occasional Paper, March 2004, Office of Democracy and Governance Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, 11 June 2010 <http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/pnacu631.pdf>.

cooperation but also being able to act as “networks of civil engagement that cut across social cleavages [to] nourish wider cooperation” by Robert Putnam, which had begun to dominate the field.⁵

What, for Hanson, begins as holding the state *accountable*, in theory becomes a stabile participatory society that is unhindered by government oppression. However, by endorsing CAOs in lesser developed countries (LDC) as “engines that can generate the public push for reform,” Hansen is also presenting a somewhat contradictory model of civil society; as counterweights to oppressive state power, CAOs produce a zero-sum game, in which a stronger civil society attenuates the state. The problem with this concept is that it fails to account for the character and potential impact of specific CSO types. Simply put, the contradiction claims that a strong civil society will augment a state’s ability to govern effectively; but it is necessary to develop a strong civil society in order to weaken the authority of the state as a defense against oppression.

While on the surface it may seem a mundane issue of “labeling,” the 2010 definition of the relevant organizations as CSO/NGOs actually presents a structural flaw on every level of assessment. Hansen’s further delineation of CAOs was in fact a mechanism designed to fuse the otherwise contradictory elements of both sides of the civil society argument and, as a result, every practical application further outlined in the 1996 Report was based entirely on the specific distinction he presented. By reintegrating the broader meaning that includes those entity types that Hansen sought to separate, current DG operatives in the field who have been relying on the

⁵ Putnam, Robert. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1993. 167. While there were others publishing as part of the same school of thought, including Lewis Diamond who will be cited later in this piece, Putnam’s work in [Making Democracy Work](#) and later [Bowling Alone](#) were at the forefront of this movement among social sciences and for the purposes of brevity will be the primary example used herein.

1996 document for other important areas of assessment are basing their assumptions on the same structural flaw.⁶

There is, at least, a common understanding that democracy cannot exist without basic associational life. Based on this fact, civil society is a necessary pre-requisite before democratization can occur in areas where none has existed before, and dissipation or dismantling of civil society in an existing functional democracy can signal looming instability.⁷ Therefore, this report urges USAID to address the underlying contradiction in the 1996 and 2010 definitions of civil society by adopting a new theoretical basis for its methodology. While this report does not recommend that USAID return to a more stringent CAO designation, we do believe that USAID should develop a more coherent definition of civil society that better integrates the contradictory elements in civic theory. Any such theory must contain the ability to see civil society as a network of associations that integrates the agencies of state power without fostering the anti-political dynamic of the zero-sum.

Furthermore, holding to the existing framework makes the generation of social capital an end unto itself without examining the political underpinnings of what an abundance of social capital can mean. If indeed the purpose of the DG office is to foster the development of stable democratic governance in lesser developed countries, then its efforts at developing civil society in these countries has thus far been missing a crucial aspect of the question involved. That is, not whether a strong civil society is an important factor for promoting democracy but rather, what particular kind of civil society is important *for* promoting democracy. Therefore, as a subsidiary recommendation for this section, we believe that the updated definition we suggest must

⁶ For a more intensive explanation of this structural flaw as well as the theoretical inefficiencies that form its foundational elements, see [Appendix A](#) at the end of this report.

⁷ Chambers, Simone & Jeffrey Kopstein. "Bad Civil Society." *Political Theory* Vol 29 No. 6. December 2001. 837-865 838.

necessarily incorporate consideration of what particular characteristics of “civic capital” target organizations are likely to engender beyond the simple identification of “uncivil” society organizations.

Suggestions for Further Study:

The following is a short list of some of the more prominent authors with applicable ideas on the subject of civic engagement and civil society that have developed around and since the authorship of the 1996 document. Please note that these are merely suggested starting points for further development and not emphatic endorsements of one particular line of thinking:

Chambers, Simone & Jeffrey Kopstein. “Bad Civil Society” Political Theory, Volume 29 No, 6, December 2001. 837-865

Edwards, Bob & Michael W. Foley. “The Paradox of Civil Society.” Journal of Democracy Volume 7 No. 3, 1996; 38-52

Tilly, Charles. Trust and Rule. Cambridge MA: Cambridge University Press. 2005

Walzer, Michael. “The Civil Society Argument” in Dimensions of Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, Community. Chantal Mouffe, ed. London: Verso 1992, 89-107.

A LOGIC FOR STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT

In Constituencies for Reform, USAID provides a *strategic logic* for determining investment priorities in civil society. This *strategic logic* deductively evaluates the status of civil society and democratic reform with a five-step process that identifies necessary structural reforms, assesses the supply of organizational resources in civil society, and evaluates the arenas and institutions that civil society must use to execute reform. In comparison, the 2010 DG assessment framework uses a four-step process to identify key DG problems and distribute resources to DG areas with the greatest potential impact. Based on our analysis of both documents, this report concludes that USAID should revise its civil society *strategic logic* by adopting steps that resemble the current DG assessment framework. These changes will enhance the interoperability of terminology and facilitate information sharing by aligning evaluation criteria across methodologies.

The 1996 *strategic logic* is a five-step process that (1) analyzes the major obstacles to democratic political development, (2) proposes solutions to remedy these problems, (3) identifies CSO types and constituencies that have an interest in supporting democratic reform, (4) assesses and enhances the organizational skills and resources that facilitate execution of the reform agenda, and (5) evaluates the accessibility and effectiveness of institutional mechanisms and arenas that enable CSO development. This framework also incorporates a *tactical logic*, based on contextual factors and inductive reasoning, to complement the deductive *strategic logic*. Specifically, this model focuses on the local history of democratic governance and the ongoing political trend as important factors in the growth of democracy.


Compared to the *strategic logic* in the 1996 document, the 2010 DG assessment framework has a different structure and focus. Instead of five steps, the DG assessment uses a four-step process to design new DG strategies at the outset of a new country program and to reorient current DG assistance portfolios at the end or beginning of strategy periods. According to this framework, DG assessments should include: (1) an analysis of the problems relating to democracy and governance in a country, (2) an identification of actors and institutions that are likely to support or resist democratic reforms and improvements in governance, (3) consideration of the USG's and USAID's interests and resources, and (4) programmatic recommendations. Thus, both the 2010 DG assessment framework and the 1996 *strategic logic* rely on a problem-oriented approach that focuses on identification of key issues as the first step.

Despite this similarity, there are substantial differences between the designs. For example, the 1996 *strategic logic* offers solutions during its second step, whereas the 2010 DG assessment framework provides a recommendations list. Additionally, the *strategic logic* evaluates CAO types, functions, institutional mechanisms and arenas during its last three steps, whereas the DG assessment identifies key actors and institutions in its second step. Finally, the *strategic logic* fails to account for the interests and resource constraints of the U.S. government (USG) and USAID, whereas the DG assessment considers these issues during its third step. We believe these structural differences are confusing and inefficient. Therefore, to resolve these discrepancies, USAID should revise its *strategic logic* for civil society development by mirroring the 2010 DG assessment framework.

First, step 1: 'contextual analysis and problem identification' should incorporate an asset-based, rather than problem-oriented, approach. Since the DG framework already identifies key DG problem areas, this change will enable the civil society framework to map existing "gifts,

skills and capacities” that USAID can utilize while promoting civil society development.⁸ Next, USAID should move step 2: ‘reform agenda’ in the 1996 document to step 4: ‘outlining the proposed strategy.’ This adjustment will emphasize that strategic recommendations are the ultimate outcome of this analysis. Third, USAID should combine step 3: ‘CAO types’, step 4: ‘CAO functions’ and step 5: ‘institutional mechanisms and arenas,’ from the 1996 document, into step 2: ‘identifying key actors and institutions.’ Consolidating these steps will enable the revised *strategic logic* to use a four-step design that is similar to the DG assessment framework. Then finally, the revised *strategic logic* should incorporate step 3: ‘considering USAID’s operational and programmatic environment.’ This new step will account for the interests and resource constraints of USAID and develop strategies according to its organizational strengths and weaknesses.

⁸ Building Communities from the Inside Out: A Path Toward Finding and Mobilizing a Community's Assets. The Asset-Based Community Development Institute. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University. Pg. 4.



We recommend that USAID include the following steps from the 2010 DG assessment in the revised civil society framework: Step 1: ‘contextual analysis and asset identification’ should use five contextual factors – geography and natural resources, demography, socio-economic endowments and cleavages, historical legacies, and country type and political trend – to assess five elements of civil society development – consensus, rule of law, competition and political accountability, inclusion, and administrative accountability and effectiveness. Next, step 2: ‘identifying key actors and institutions,’ should analyze the interests, skills, mechanisms, resources, and strategies of ten actors and institutions – civil society, the legal system, the legislature, the executive, local governments, political parties and electoral institutions, the media, other non-state actors, and the international community. In addition to these formal actors and institutions, the assessment team should also consider the impact of informal networks

between individuals and institutions. Then, step 3: ‘considering the operational and programmatic environment of USAID,’ should consider six donor issues – U.S. foreign policy and broader USAID development interests, current USG and USAID civil society programs, the assistance programs of other domestic and international donors, the resources of USAID, and the comparative strengths and weaknesses of USAID. Finally, step 4: ‘outlining the proposed strategy,’ should summarize the first three steps of analysis, postulate a hypothesis for civil society development, propose systemic and sectoral reform objectives, provide illustrative examples, explain critical assumptions, and include sequencing recommendations. These revisions will allow USAID to improve the efficiency and efficacy of its civil society *strategic logic* and DG assessment framework by consolidating assessment criteria, enhancing the interoperability of terminology, juxtaposing the problem-oriented approach with an asset-based framework, and facilitating information sharing across USAID projects.

THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS

This section of Constituencies for Reform examines the principle of CAOs being a substantial contributory factor in positive democratic development by focusing on their role during periods of transition. Additionally, the practical application of the theories discussed is evaluated through case studies of the five countries in order to account for the differences in practice that have occurred in each due to varying levels of internal political and civil dynamics across the wide spectrum of democratic development. As such, we would place this section within Step Two of our new Strategic Logic framework, Actors and Institutions, so that this assessment can be combined with context, USAID’s and USG’s resources, to inform USAID country strategies.

Current DG practices operate on the accepted notion that the role of CAOs in democratic transitions is based on four variables: 1) severity of previous authoritarian regime, 2) earlier democratic openings and their fate, 3) present democratic openings and 4) CAO role in opening public realm. This is illustrated through case studies from the five countries of interest: Bangladesh, Chile, El Salvador, Kenya and Thailand, with extended case studies of Chile and Thailand. The following chart, taken directly from the chapter, summarizes the intersection of the variables and the nations of interest.

Variable	Bangladesh	Chile	El Salvador	Kenya	Thailand
Severity of previous authoritarian regime	Most severe in mid-1970s and early 1980s	Very oppressive in 1973, then gradually milder through 1980s	Most oppressive in early 1980s, then gradually less so	Increasing severity during 1970s	Cyclic severity in early and late 1970s and early 1990s
Earlier democratic openings and their fate	Early and late 1970s openings suppressed	Viable democracy 1930s -1970s, ended by coup	Cycle of openings and suppressions, 1930s-1980s	Donor-initiated 1991 opening later closed	Mid-1970s, late 1980s openings ended by coups
Present democratic opening (Circa 1994)	Anti-Ershad movement, December 1990	Plebiscite, October 1998	Peace Accords, January 1992	Partial opening in 1991	Democratic uprising, May 1992
CAO role in opening public realm (circa 1994)	Little developmental CAO involvement	CAO think tank safe havens	Largely precluded by civil war	Limited involvement	Contribution to 1992 democracy movement

Source: Hansen, Gary. "Constituencies for Reform: Strategic Approaches for donor-supported Civic Advocacy Groups." USAID Program and Operations Report No.12. February 1996. CDIE. 11 June 2010

Critical Analysis

Our analysis of this section falls into two broad categories: structural and contextual. Structural analysis critiques the organizational structure of the section and the drawbacks therein, while content analysis critiques the theories in use and their lack of variability.

Structurally, the section delves almost directly into case studies, without giving the reader context through an overview of the topic. Also, while case studies are a useful way of illustrating the general points in the section, the extensive number of cases and amount of detail used distracts from the overall message.

In addition to structural issues, there is a lack of variability, depth and breadth to the factors influencing the role of civil society in democratic transitions. Specifically, the 1996 document only used these four variables to evaluate the role of CAOs in democratic transitions, and it failed to provide context or a theoretical base. For example, the following is the introductory paragraph for the third variable:

The third variable is the nature of the present democratic opening in the sample countries. For Chile this was a gradual and peaceful process whereby the Pinochet regime allowed discussion and debate leading up to the October 1988 plebiscite on the future of the dictatorship.

Also, the variables themselves are not entirely accurate. The last variable discussed out of the four, the role of CAOs in opening the public realm, should not be considered a variable- it is actually the outcome of interest. How the state ranks in regards to the first three variables determines the fourth variable.

Just as the analysis was broken down into structural and content analysis, so too are the recommendations, which follow.

Structural Recommendations

Based on the aforementioned problems of limited context, excessive case study details, and number of cases, we have several suggestions for improvement. First is a matter of

presentation: case studies should be in boxes throughout the chapter, not within the text, in order to differentiate between general information and theory about the topic and its application in specific countries. Second, the case studies should be less dense, without great detail, and fewer in number. For the purposes of a general framework document, the level of detail in the 1996 document is not necessary, and can in fact be a detriment. For more extensive detail we recommend the USAID website host longer case studies for interested parties. These suggestions follow the structure of the new DG assessment, which is important when attempting to create continuity between related documents.

At the end of this analysis, there are examples of case studies that might work for a future iteration of the paper. The first, Chile, is a summary of the case study found at the end of the chapter, gleaned down to the highlights. The second is a case study of The Democratic Republic of the Congo, taken from the OECD report “Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness.”

Content Recommendations

The first of several recommendations for improving the content is to be more specific about what is a variable that influences the role of civil society in democratic transitions, and what is the actual role that civil society plays in said transition. As was mentioned in the analysis, the last variable, CAOs role in opening the public realm, should not be a variable, but should be the outcome. That point is made within the text on page 25, but it should be clearer in the chart and in the brief discussion of the variables in the beginning of the section.

In addition, detailed definitions of the variables and how they relate more directly to the role of CAOs in democratic transitions would have been helpful in achieving a general understanding of the concepts. The second variable for example, “earlier democratic openings and their fate,” is ambiguous. When considering the relative importance of this factor, several

questions regarding specificity arise: What actually constitutes ‘earlier?’ Ten years? Twenty? If it was farther back than that, does it lose its potency, as current civil society leaders may not remember it? Does the length and level of the “democratic opening” affect current CAOs? Consider that a loosening of rules governing freedom of association for a six month time period would certainly not have the same effect on modern CAOs as would a 5 year time period of democratic rule. Issues such as these only represent a small portion of the ambiguity that might lead to problems of interpretation.

Therefore, while assessment teams can only infer broad rules and context from the case studies, a more comprehensive discussion of the variables and their definitions, combined with general descriptors of cause and effect, would provide a better understanding of the context and avoid ambiguity. By design, the 1996 document is meant to be a framework of understanding civil society, utilized for application in specific circumstances of identifying its role in supporting the democratization process and the factors that influence it. In order for the document to be “generalizable,” it must contain adequate guidelines.

At this point in our assessment we believe a conceptual overview of modern civil society as outlined by noted political theorist Larry Diamond would offer a useful counterbalance to the theories already employed. In this section of the 1996 document, civil society is treated as one homogenous entity that moves and influences government, when in fact a flourishing civil society has a plurality of organizations representing divergent and often conflicting interests.

As an example of the way one organization subdivides CSOs, the Asian Development Bank identifies eleven distinct types of CSOs: community-based organizations, development NGOs, faith-based organizations, foundations, international NGOs, labor unions, nongovernmental organizations, people’s organizations, professional associations, research

institutes and social movements.⁹ They also break CSOs down by function: service-delivery CSOs, Representation CSOs, advocacy and policy input CSOs, capacity-building CSOs and social function CSOs.¹⁰

CSOs with differing functions play different roles in democratization, and it is crucial to understand the roles and interests of all of the key players in order to plan USAID's strategy and tactics in this arena. To illustrate, Diamond's discussion of differing CSO types demonstrates how some organizations advocate directly for democratization, while some further the process through promoting

democratic attributes, such as tolerance, moderation, a willingness to compromise, and a respect for opposing viewpoints. These values and norms become most stable when they emerge through experience, and organizational participation in civil society provides important practice in political advocacy and contestation.¹¹

As per Diamond, five features of internal structure and character influence the role civil society plays in democratic transformation, beginning with the goals and methods of society. Developing democracy is easier if there are not militant interest groups that aim to take over their competitors by antidemocratic methods. Second, a high level of organizational institutionalization contributes to a stable democratic regime, as they facilitate stability, cooperative networks, accountability, and responsiveness to constituents. Third, in order to foster democracy, associations must practice democratic decision-making and leadership selection. Fourth, a pluralistic civil society fosters democracy, as long as the society isn't so pluralistic that

⁹ Édes, Bart W., Ed. "CSO Sourcebook: A Staff Guide to Cooperation with Civil Society Organizations." Asian Development Bank. 2009. Asian Development Bank NGO and Civil Society Center. 11 June, 2010
<<http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/CSO-Staff-Guide/>> 2-4.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Diamond, Larry Jay. Towards Democratic Consolidation. Johns Hopkins University Press: Journal of Democracy, Vol. 5, No. 3. July 1994. June 11 2010
<http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=1&ved=OCBcQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fmuse.jhu.edu%2Fjournals%2Fjournal_of_democracy%2Fv005%2F5.3diamond.pdf&ei=FGkSTLGGE8Gblgfj25HdBw&usg=AFQjCNEZP7fUGaoCF1piXkqsYX5KFVKuww> 8.

it is fragmented and impossible to organize. Fifth, civil society functions best when it is “dense,” so that people can be members of more than one organization in order to foster partnerships and networks across civil society.¹²

Certainly, there are elements of this theory that might not be universally applicable, or, as in the case of the third feature, that organizations themselves must be democratic, may not necessarily be one that USAID agrees with. While a labor union may need a democratic structure to support legitimacy, the same may not be true for all civil society organizations.

The more centralized governance structures are likely to be more flexible and responsive in the face of organizational crises, but their membership may at times feel disenfranchised. The decentralized model can make any type of organizational change impossible to orchestrate. Their research showed that ‘there is clearly no one size fits all governance structure for national federated organizations, and organizations performed well at every point on the governance continuum.’¹³

Therefore, the question is not whether an organization has a democratic structure, but whether it has a democratic structure if that is the structure that would best serve its goals. If an organization promoting democracy can better do so with a hierarchical structure than a democratic one, that might be appropriate. This is why it is also important to study and assess the internal structure of individual CSOs. According to the report from the March 2006 Ottawa conference organized by the Canadian Foundation for the Americas, “CSOs must maintain high standards and incorporate democratic principles of transparency, accountability, pluralism, justice and collaboration into their own work.”¹⁴ Whether or not the governance structure of the

¹² Ibid, 11-13.

¹³ Enzo, Alan. “Strategic Planning and Governance Issues in Civil Society Organizations.” Tennessee State University. 2008. Department of Business Administration, Business Administration Student Research. 11 June 2010 <http://www.tnstate.edu/library/eresearch/busadmin/ba_student/3/batwo.pdf> 13.

¹⁴ Cole, Laurie and Caroline Lavoie. “Civil Society in the Promotion and Strengthening of Democracy in the Americas: A Vision for the Future.” Conference Report. Ottawa, Canada, 1-2 March 2006. FOCAL: Canadian Foundation for the Americas. 11 June 2010 <http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Misc/Groups/Conference_Report_English.pdf> 7.

CSO allows them to do that is a key factor when assessing individual CSOs and the overall character of civil society in general. The closer they are to that ideal, the more able they will be to promote and consolidate democracy.

While this list is not comprehensive, we believe that these features might be useful when analyzing the role civil society plays in democratic transitions, and that the idea of analyzing the internal structure of civil society as well as its role in the aggregate within the nation might yield more workable information for USAID.

Case Studies

The following are examples of case studies of Chile and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The Chile case study was one in the 1996 document that was paraphrased in order to give an example of the level of details necessary compared to the level of detail presented in the Hansen document. The second example, the DRC, was taken directly from the OECD report, “Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness,” and perfectly illustrates our idea of a functional case study.

Case Study: Chile

After a military coup in 1973 which overthrew the democratically elected government of President Salvador Allende, the authoritarian regime ruled until 1988 when an election voted the military government out of power. The election was due in large part to advocacy by CAOs, beginning with a grassroots mobilization in 1975, with the creation of the Academy of Christian Humanism by the Catholic Church. The Academy provided cover for outside organizations to donate to social services in Chile, and was an umbrella organization that supported 8 separate

research programs and employed 320 academics. The academy started study groups for academic topics such as economics, international affairs, women's studies, etc., and these study groups eventually formed CAOs. By the 1980s, repression had begun to relax, so these opposition groups began to formulate leftist but pragmatic ways of restoring democratic governance. Instead of confrontation, the opposition forces used compromise and strategic thinking to accomplish their goal, working to get a "no" vote to extend the mandate of the military government in 1988.

Case Study: Democratic Republic of Congo¹⁵

CSOs and the election process in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In 2007, the Democratic Republic of Congo went through a peaceful and transparent electoral process in which CSOs played a number of important roles, including the following:

- Congolese churches, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other associations trained 60 000 civic educators across the country to raise awareness of the stakes surrounding the election, covering subjects such as democratic principles, citizens' electoral rights, and electoral rules and regulations, using a number of supportive tools such as community radio, posters and comics;
- CSOs also played a crucial role as election observers across the country, working through a CSO Cadre de concertation de la société civile pour l'observation des élections.

Their efforts helped to elicit a high level of participation, with over 25 million individuals registering to vote in the lead-up to the elections.

¹⁵ OECD. "Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness: Findings, Recommendations and Good Practice." OECD Better Aid Series. OECD Publishing: Paris, 2009. June 11 2010
<<http://browse.oecdbookshop.org/oecd/pdfs/browseit/4309081E.PDF>> 49.

CREATING THE ENABLING ENVIRONMENT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY

Factors, considerations and assessment criteria

In the 1996 document, USAID emphasized the role of two specific factors – local government reform (i.e. decentralization) and protection/expansion of the public realm (i.e. human rights) – in the development of an enabling civil society environment. While this report agrees that both of these factors are necessary for civil society to flourish, we also believe that USAID should consider other, additional, factors when analyzing the environment in which civil society operates.

If the state genuinely seeks to create an enabling environment for civil society, it is reflected in both the legislative framework and political system. Among the cases of decentralization in the 1996 document, only the government of El Salvador genuinely sought to decentralize. For example, the government implemented a Municipal Code that encouraged transparency amongst municipal officials and mandated the creation of open town councils, which USAID later supported with development funds (i.e. the Municipalities in Action program). Despite this policy, there was still a problem with crowding out autonomous civil society groups by dominant “pro-government” actors (GONGOs or QUANGOs). Therefore, in countries where the government seeks to maintain centralized control over provinces and local governments, USAID should focus on how pro-government actors influence CSO development.

Another consideration for USAID is that in many developing countries, politics is more of a lucrative business than a service to the public. As a result, in many developing countries there is currently a system of “competitive authoritarianism,” which resembles civil society

without exhibiting important characteristics, such as autonomy, underlying civic values, and integrity.¹⁶ Therefore, as CSOs become more integral to government monitoring and policy planning/implementation, USAID should articulate whose interests CSOs represent and if the CSOs in a country actually practice autonomy and integrity.

Another problem that USAID assessment teams should consider is the need for local funding through membership-based or charity-based organizations. If there is insufficient funding locally, CSO reliance on external funding may lead to public distrust. This is likely to breed cynicism among beneficiaries regarding donor intentions and undermine the sustainability of donor-assisted projects by focusing CSO strategies on short-term benefits.

Based on these considerations, we urge USAID to consider the limited capacity and resources of local organizations, societal trust (e.g. trust in civil society organizations), the work ethic of the bureaucracy, the nature of the state (i.e. the lack of service provision and preferential treatment of privileged groups at the expense of the general population), and the relationship between politics and business. In addition, USAID should incorporate a more thorough stakeholder analysis that maps the interactions between GONGOs and the overall legitimacy of specific CSOs. Then finally, the 1996 document fails to mention CSO transparency, even though transparency is critical to improving the legitimacy of CSOs. To address this issue, we believe that USAID should encourage and promote more CSO accountability by requiring audited financial statements and annual public reports be widely accessible to the public (i.e. online).

¹⁶ McMillan, John and Pablo Zoido, "How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru." Center on Democracy, Development, and The Rule of Law/Stanford Institute on International Studies Working Papers. 11 August 2004. CDDRL/Stanford IIS. 11 June 2010 <http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/3823/Montesinos_0421.pdf> 5.

Donors across the world have been searching for consensus on the factors that enable civil society development since the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA).

They currently agree on the following list of systemic factors:¹⁷

1. Effective functioning of democratic parliamentary systems that provide for effective representation of popular opinion and create opportunities for advancing agendas of joint interest between CSOs and Members of Parliament
2. The quality of the legal and judicial system, which can provide the assurance and means for just settlement of conflicts
3. Freedom of the press, and freedom of expression more generally
4. Conditions to ensure the protection and promotion of human rights, such as the right to peaceful assembly and association, and the right of access to information

The degree of decentralization, and the extent to which there exist opportunities for dialogue and collaboration, between CSOs and decentralized government bodies

Other aspects of the enabling environment that are more specific to civil society include:¹⁸

1. Structures and processes for citizen participation and multi-stakeholder dialogue between and among CSOs, governments, elected representatives, donors and the private sector
2. CSO-specific policies and legislation
3. Taxation regulations, including charitable status provisions and tax benefits to promote individual or corporate philanthropy
4. Regulations and norms to promote CSO transparency and accountability to their constituencies¹⁹

Although donors continue to dispute the importance of some of these criteria, this report urges USAID to consider this list of systemic and CSO-specific factors, as a starting point, when updating the 1996 civil society framework. In addition, to reduce its dependence on CSO self-assessments, USAID should compare the results of participatory country assessments, such as CIVICUS CSI, with publicly available governance indicators, such as Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI), Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index, World Bank's

¹⁷ OECD 2009 96. Both subsequent lists are taken from this source.

¹⁸ OECD 2009 98.

¹⁹ OECD 2009 98.

World Governance Indicators. When evaluating human rights, USAID should consider incorporating the reports from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, national human rights organizations (including Ombudsman), international/local media organizations, and international courts. We also recommend that USAID adopt the practice of quality assurance, in which country reports are subject to peer-reviews that check if a “balanced and relevant set of international and national data sources has been used, whether the data has been ‘triangulated’ or cross-checked, and how the data has been interpreted.”²⁰

Case studies of good practices

Prior to the Accra Accord, the Advisory Group that was preparing the recommendations for the high level meeting presented several examples of good practices in creating an enabling environment for CSOs. We recommend that USAID incorporate these case studies, expanding them, as illustrative examples in the revised civil society framework.

Examples of CSO engagement in policy dialog and service delivery in South Africa include:

1. constitutional provisions for public participation in the National Assembly, the National Council of Provinces, and the provincial legislature;
2. the repeal of repressive legislation and an overall reorganization of the security environment;
3. the passage of the Non-Profit Act, which officially recognizes civil society, and provides for supportive mechanisms to advance CSO accountability;
4. replacement of a 1978 law that restricted CSOs’ fund-raising capability by new legislation to facilitate resource flows to CSOs;
5. creation of a national fund to support citizens’ participation; and an affirmative action program to increase women’s participation in political affairs.²¹

²⁰ DFID. “Country Governance Analysis.” How-To Note. February 2007. DFID. June 11 2010 <[http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/JBRN-737J8E/\\$file/dfid-humanitarianaction-feb07.pdf?openelement](http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/JBRN-737J8E/$file/dfid-humanitarianaction-feb07.pdf?openelement)>

²¹ OECD 2009 102.


Alternatively, Croatia's strategy for creating an enabling civil society environment involves:

1. strengthening the capacities and levels of CSO participation in the development and monitoring of public policies;
2. improving mechanisms and standards for multi-stakeholder consultation in policy processes, in line with European Union standards;
3. drafting and adopting a Code of Good Practice on Consultation; and establishing an Economic and Social Forum;
4. considering improvements to the current legal framework, such as new laws that create institutional, fiscal and social incentives, through tax benefits and revised regulations, that promote individual philanthropy and corporate investments in social development partnerships and foundations.²²

²² OECD 2009 103.

SECTORAL REFORM

In reviewing the 1996 document, we determined that the sectors, environment, labor, gender, CAOs/NGOs, and business, may not be completely in line with current USAID priorities. In fact, the 2010 DG assessment only lists two sectors, business and labor. Therefore, we recommend USAID reassess its list of CSO sectors. To accomplish this objective, we suggest that USAID delineate sectors of civil society based on the foreign assistance framework, which is a part of the joint Department of State-USAID strategic goal framework, depicted in the figure below.



Source: US Dept. of State-USAID Joint Summary of Performance and Financial Information Fiscal Year 2009

We believe this recommendation will allow USAID to avoid an arbitrary choice of sectors, as assessment is to be done in a wide variety of sectors and not just those directly related to democracy and governance. In addition, this method of sector assessment will align the strategic goals of U.S. foreign assistance and maintain consistency in programming.

Moreover, as the strategic framework is updated regularly, DG will have an up-to-date list of relevant sectors for its programming and country assessments. Combined with the relevant sectoral indicators for each of the priority areas in the strategic framework, this will become a foundation for building a solid M&E system.

As a next step in the CSO assessment, we recommend institutional mapping exercises to determine which CSOs are “genuine” civil society organizations (by assessing their mission, organizational structure, transparency, and sustainability). Specifically, detection of QUANGOs/GONGOs should be a major focus of this assessment. As for the typology of CSOs, we find that assessing the linkages among various CSO actors, the strength of their network and specifics of the organizational arrangements in the network will be more productive than focusing on the issues of their categorization (i.e. NGO, Foundation, community organization, etc.).

In addition to a sectoral assessment, we recommend that media, both traditional and social, be incorporated in a similar way, as a factor that crosses all sectors and influences the state of civil society in them. This will be discussed further in the subsequent section. Since we recognized an overreliance on case studies within the 1996 document, we have focused on the overall media characteristics in the following section. However, for illustrative purposes,

Appendix B contains several relevant recent case studies from the USAID New Media and International Media Development.

Media and Civil Society

Civil society is the setting for public interaction, a social and political forum for citizen engagement. As such, the mechanism for determining the strength and volume of such engagement is the domain of the media. Therefore, as an underlying determinant in this subsection, we choose to emphasize the argument that “media have become the social space where power is decided.”²³ What follows is a brief examination of the role played by both traditional and alternative forms of media in processes of democratization, as well as some initial recommendations for the development of an updated assessment strategy necessary for USAID.

Traditional Media

Communication networks that are established and operated by mass media are a vital element of civil society, because of the control media has over public perception. Without a “free and balanced” system of political communication accompanying democratic institutions, government corruption and civic oppression become imminent dangers to any body politic. The subsequent correlation of this within market domains create vacuums of “accurate business information” that ideally are disseminated through the media necessary for simultaneous market development.²⁴

As the most broadly accessible form of traditional media, radio presents a significant level of importance. In many lesser developed countries, access to television among the general

²³ Castells, Manuel; “Communication, Power and Counter-power in the Network Society.” *International Journal of Communication* 1:1 2007 238-266. <<http://ijoc.org/ojs/index.php/ijoc/article/view/46/35>> 1.

²⁴ Reljic, Dusan. “Who Builds Civil Society? Civil Society, Mass Media and Democracy in Post-Communist Countries”. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. Working Paper No. 131. January 2004. DCAF. 11 June 2010 <http://www.iskran.ru/cd_data/disk2/rr/029.pdf>.

population is limited at best, making the relatively inexpensive cost of establishing a radio station the key medium for development.²⁵ Specifically, keeping radio out of government control is a vital step in stabilizing democratic institutions and checking authoritarian state dominance.²⁶

In many cases however, television has proven an effective tool to check power, as can be noted in the following example:

Case Example: Montesinos in Peru

In 2000, a huge corruption scandal imploded the Peruvian government of Alberto Fujimori, when a videotape was broadcast by a local TV channel in which his secret-police chief, Vladimiro Montesinos, bribed opposition politician Alberto Kouri with USD \$15,000 per month. In the following days, more videotapes were broadcast showing that Montesinos was systematically bribing judges, politicians, news media owners and every single “checks and balances” institution that underpins a democratic system. Montesinos kept detailed records of the pay-offs on videotapes, written contracts and receipts, to enforce and manipulate anyone who did not fulfill his or her part of the agreement. This evidence prevented President Fujimori from dismissing Montesinos from the government.

Implicit in this example is the importance of identifying which of the democratic checks and balances are critical to a resilient democracy as a crucial element of media analysis. In this case, analysis of the amount of money “invested” by Fujimori’s government between 1998 and 2000 in an effort to assure reelection for a third term showed that television channels were receiving the most bribes by a margin of at least US \$2.7 million per month. Significantly, nine out of ten television channels were on Montesinos’ pay roll, with the tenth being the outlet that broke the story, demonstrating that “television was the priciest of the checks by order of magnitude.”

Source: “How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru”. John McMillan and Pablo Zoido (2004)

Alternative (Social) Media

There are three basic components of social media: social interfaces (viral, community engagement, electric broadcast or syndication), concepts (art, information), and media (physical,

²⁵ Reljic 2010.

²⁶ Collier, Paul. The Bottom Billion. New York: Oxford University Press 2007 148.

electronic, or verbal). Examples of social media include social bookmarking, wikis, blogs and various types of instant “note-passing” tools such as SMS, texting, and Twitter.²⁷ Indeed, one of the major accomplishments of the convergence of media and internet devices such as computers and mobile phones is that it has positively affected many people, especially the younger generation, which are already consuming and interacting with the news, broadcast, and entertainment media in different ways.²⁸

In what Manuel Castells calls “the rise of mass self-communication,” there is more discussion of “communicative power” among members of civil society, particularly those of the developing world.²⁹ Communicative technologies, such as a combination of the “internet, mobile telephony, and other new technologies,” have sparked the media revolution in the developing world as one of the biggest catalysts attributed to the change in the political, economic and societal landscape.³⁰

Innovations in communication technologies have exponentially increased the accessible “space” in which the public sphere thrives. Revolutions in media capabilities throughout the developing world have been fueled by, and in turn have served to fuel, technological advances in mobile communications, internet and broadband avenues such as blogs, wiki’s, and other innovations that have come to be collectively identified as “Web 2.0.”³¹ However, the implied inclusiveness of this proliferation of communication technologies is subjective at best and bears further examination. The resulting fragmentation of pre-existing media markets offer obvious advantages for those sectors of the citizenry who would otherwise be marginalized, but other

²⁷ Reljic 3.

²⁸ Reljic 2.

²⁹ Albrow, Martin et. al. “Global Civil Society 2007/8: Communicative Power and Democracy.” Sage Publications: London. 2008 149.

³⁰ Albrow 149.

³¹ Albrow 149.

dangers become apparent as the “digital divide” of access elicits questions of the reliance on social media as a possible restriction of the same public sphere USAID is seeking to expand.

Conclusion

The dynamic of open communication is a fundamental element of liberty based on the core principle of democracy that is freedom of expression. However, what is often overlooked is the mutually reinforcing dichotomy of this principle. First, is the ability for one to speak freely, but the effect of “statement” is wholly dependent on the second, the ability for such speech to be heard.³²

In this context, understanding the media debate means understanding the quintessential role of communication as a dispersant of information in the cause of creating and maintaining a sustainable democratic society. However, it is problematic to operate on the assumption that simply creating the space for an open media will strengthen democratic institutions. Rather, it is important to focus on growing issues of media concentration, marginalization of various impoverished population sectors, corporate and government domination of media outlets, and various other impediments to overall message reception.³³ Any such attempt at fostering a forum for civic engagement, must first be concerned with how such space is provided and, perhaps more importantly, by whom.

Recommendations

Currently, USAID media documentation and strategy is ad hoc; documents exist about cell phone usage, but the most up-to-date strategy document is from 1999. We would recommend initially that USAID combine their efforts into an overall media strategy. This updated document is supposed to be a standalone document that USAID staff use to assess the

³² Albrow 157.

³³ Albrow 160.

state of civil society, meaning it should incorporate all pertinent information regarding media. Media technologies are intertwined, so it is more efficient to address the intersections and interconnectedness of media types at once and further integrate them into a more strategic overview of implementation.

The first step in building a country media strategy must be to assess the current state of technology in the nation. Much of this information is available from a multitude of USG and international sources.³⁴ Based on the technology level, including cell phone usage and internet penetration rates, a targeted strategy can then be developed. Given this assessment, we recommend developing a framework for action that incorporates specific levels of technological access a target country exists within as defined by the aforementioned framework analysis.³⁵ This type of framework will assist USAID staff in developing strategic plans based on comprehensive data and accepted actions.

³⁴ See for example agencies and organizations such as the CIA, UN, World Bank, etc.

³⁵ For example, if there are cell towers but cell phone usage is low, distributing cell phones or partnering with organizations that deliver cell phones might be a viable strategy.


STRATEGIC SEQUENCING: INITIATING AND CONSOLIDATING REFORM

According to the 1996 document, opportunities and initiatives to promote reform through civil society depends on the stage of democratic transition. Therefore, donors must understand the specific needs of host countries in the transition process in order to better customize their support to CAOs and improve the DG environment.

The 1996 study proposes four different stages or phases in the democratic transition: Pre-transition, Early-transition, Late-transition and Consolidation. It also states that democratic transition is not a “linear progression” in which a country continuously evolves and moves forward from one stage to the next one; instead, it is usually “uneven, messy, and subject to setbacks”. A host country, therefore, could be passing through a transitory phase and require CAOs to concurrently perform actions that are suitable for different stages in democratic transition.


Although the 1996 document admittedly “oversimplifies reality,” it enables USAID to formulate a suitable CAO investment strategy in each transition stage. Therefore, given our previous recommendation to unify USAID’s DG and civil society frameworks, we suggest that USAID should merge the “Contextual Factors” from step one of “A Logic for Strategic Assessment” with “country type and political trend” from the 2010 DG Framework. This revised design will allow USAID to base its recommendations on a contextual analysis that incorporates political transition phases. Instead of concurrently analyzing the stage of political transition and making recommendations, as in the 1996 framework, USAID should determine its ultimate recommendations using transition phases as one consideration.

A visual representation of the classification system proposed by USAID in the DG assessment is shown below.



On the vertical axis, countries are differentiated by the level of democratic governance, which ranges from authoritarian states to consolidated democracies; whereas, on the horizontal axis, countries are distinguished by the level of social stability, including crisis or stable situations.

If both frameworks are combined, the visual aspect would be as it is shown in chart # below.



The same document indicates that USAID does not have much of a presence in authoritarian and semi-authoritarian states. In these situations, the 1996 document suggests that USAID further analyze the specific context within these countries by utilizing the questionnaire in Annex 1 of the DG assessment. Moreover, in the pre-transition phase, the 1996 document establishes that donors should be concerned with preserving and expanding organizational resources of CSOs. For instance, authoritarian governments may repress advocates and not allow reforms to progress. CAOs in such countries can provide refuge to internally exiled reformers through protection, employment, and legal aid. It is also important for CAOs to promote dialog, coalitions and consensus within the CSO community, as part of its reform agenda. Subsequently, interaction between CAOs and the government should also be promoted. The 1996 document indicates, however, that building constructive dialog and collaboration

between CAOs and the government divides the CAO community, as some CAOs might be more willing to dialogue with the government than others organizations.

In response to changes in authoritarian and semi-authoritarian states in the early-transition stage, CAOs should be prepared to act quickly and boldly once the government opens a window of opportunity.³⁶ The 1996 report mentions that previous roles and tasks performed by CAOs might change considerably in this new stage; therefore, donors should be prepared to support them and create a more “favorable enabling environment to enhance the growth, autonomy, and contributions of civic advocacy organizations and of civil society in general.” For example, CAOs might promote citizen participation in elections and/or perform election administration and/or monitoring.

Most countries that receive DG funds from USAID are “New and Fragile Democracies,” at risk of backsliding or stagnation. The 1996 document places these democracies in the late-transition period, in which new rules for democratic governance have been established and the main concern is to ensure that political actors and governance institutions start conforming to them.³⁷ In order to accomplish this, donors should promote partnerships between government and civic advocacy organizations to put in place the appropriate governance check and balances.

Lastly, in the consolidation phase, democracy has culturally penetrated society, and there are mechanisms and capacity to adapt and manage key reform issues.³⁸ The DG assessment uses four electoral provisions to differentiate between a “Liberal democracy” and consolidated democracy: “a) Absence of reserved domains of power for the military or other actors not

³⁶ Dininio 76.

³⁷ Dininio 7.

³⁸ Dininio 8.

accountable to the electorate; b) Horizontal accountability of office holders to one another (checks and balances); c) Extensive provisions for political and civic pluralism, as well as for individual and group freedoms; and d) A rule of law in which legal rules are applied fairly and consistently across equivalent cases.”³⁹

According to the 1996 report, at this point donors should ensure the sustainability of CAOs in “conducting the current functions of monitoring rule enforcement and mobilizing citizens and communities in support of reform agendas.”⁴⁰ In the first three phases, CAOs partner directly with donors by receiving financial and non-financial resources to accomplish their objectives. Then, in the consolidated phase the role of CAOs change; resources from international donors should decrease, while domestic sources should concurrently offer proportional resources.

At this point, CAOs must adopt customer oriented approaches that move away from international donors and focus on citizenry, private and public sectors. To accomplish this objective, CAOs must convince society and the government of their importance to the democratic transition, as they garner funding from private and public organizations. Therefore, CAO should develop activities and services that provide reliable sources of revenue, rather than depend on international donors.

There are essentially three broad revenue categories for CAOs: “(1) governing funding, (2) private giving, or philanthropy, and (3) self-generated income.”⁴¹ First, government support

³⁹ Dininio 8.

⁴⁰ Dininio 8.

⁴¹ Moore, David. “Laws and other mechanisms for promoting NGO financial sustainability.” 2005. International Center for Not-for-Profit Law. 11 June 2010 <http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/pubs/Financial_Sustainability.pdf> 1.

could arise from tax exemptions and direct financing (via budget subsidies, grants and contracts). Secondly, private philanthropy could support CSOs through cash donations, in-kind donations, developing community foundations, and providing volunteers.⁴²

Additionally, CSOs can generate their own revenue stream by charging service fees for consulting; charging membership fees for basic service and information delivery to constituents; and collecting returns on investments, such as interest, dividends and capital gain that may arise from managing endowments.⁴³

Finally, in order to facilitate local support for CAOs, the government should introduce legislation that promotes financial donations from the private sector to NGOs. The absence of such legislation will undermine the financial sustainability of CAOs in the future.

CAOs Sustainability

Financial sustainability is “the ability of civil society organizations (CSOs) to secure the resources they need to carry out their basic mission over an extended period of time.”⁴⁴ We recommend that USAID should encourage income diversification and favorable legal and cultural mechanisms and institutions by incorporating autonomy and risk minimization into this definition. This will allow CSOs to enhance their capacity in the long-term.

On the other hand, the enabling environment for CSO sustainability is the result of a combined effort of the government, international donors, the private sector and the CSO

⁴² Moore 1.

⁴³ Moore 1.

⁴⁴ “Toolkit on CSO financial sustainability” USAID – Management Systems International (May 2007) DRAFT.US Dept. of State-USAID. “Joint Summary of Performance and Financial Information Fiscal Year 2009.” April 2010. 11 June 2010 <<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/138975.pdf>>.

community. For instance, international donors should express concern about financial viability with CSOs at the outset, build CSO capabilities, enhance their public image, and encourage a culture of philanthropy and volunteerism within the host country.


Democratic transition stage	Expected environment	Donors' Priorities	Recommended actions
Pre-transition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CAOs operate in an environment of government repression and hostility toward calls for political reform 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To provide support to safe havens where reformist groups take refuge, employment, protection, and legal aid in the face of government harassment and persecution • To define the autonomy of civic advocacy organizations in general, and support the CAO community in resisting excessive government intrusion • To begin cultivating a dialog within the reformist community in developing coalitions, consensus on reform agendas, and strategies for political reform • To sponsor forums in which open public discussion of social and economic development takes place 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support safe havens • Strengthen nonpartisan CAOS • Enhance NGO/CAO enabling environment • Facilitate elite dialog on reform agenda • Support sectoral reform • Foster national and international community linkages • Increase donor coordination
Early-transition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political opening in which an authoritarian regime concedes in some demonstrable way that legitimate rule depends on popular consent • Rival political elites seek a new consensus for a more open political system 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To prepare CAOs to act with vigor and speed, as events may move very rapidly in the early transition phase • To engage CAOs in a wide range of labor-intensive voter education and registration programs • To monitor elections and even participate in election administration • To begin building a network of support for fundamental political reform beyond the small cadre of activist organizations that survived state repression in the pre-transition era • To create a more favorable enabling environment to 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Launch voter education campaign • Undertake election administration monitoring • Facilitate elite consensus on systemic reform • Support creation of NGO/CAO sector self-governance • Protect nonpartisan CAO base • Create incentives for CAO financial sustainability

	<p>enhance the growth, autonomy, and contributions of civic advocacy organizations and of civil society in general</p>	
<p>Late-transition</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A fundamental redirection of a more open political system is under way • New rules for democratic governance have been agreed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To ensure that political actors and governance institutions begin conforming to the rules for democratic governance agreed • To promote civic education • To monitor compliance with new rules for democratic governance • To build partnerships between government and civic advocacy organizations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Institute civic education • Build CAO-government partnerships • Enhance CAO watchdog roles • Expand CAO nonpartisan base • Strengthen CAO organizational capacities • Support reforms in trailing sectors
<p>Consolidation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Basic and operational rules have been essentially agreed upon • Mechanisms to ensure political participation and government accountability are in place • Deepening of democratic governance within the culture and institutions of society • Growing capacity of society and government to adapt to change and deal effectively with major problems of reform 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To ensure sustainability of CAOs in conducting the ongoing functions of monitoring rule enforcement and mobilizing citizens and communities in support of reform agendas • To create a supportive policy environment and building bridges between public interest associations and in-country funding sources 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthen CAO links to international community • Create incentives for CAO financial sustainability

Source: Table summarizes recommendations provided in USAID Program and Operations Report No.12. Constituencies for Reform: Strategic Approaches for donor-supported Civic Advocacy Groups. Gary Hansen, CDIE (Feb 2006). PN-ABS-534, Pp. 1-8 and 7

CIVIL SOCIETY FUNDING

An analysis of official development assistance (ODA) by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) reveals an interesting overall funding picture of civil society. In 2008, members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and multilateral institutions approximately committed USD 15 billion dollars toward the government and civil society sector. Only assistance for debt relief received a larger amount. Accounting for 77% of the government and civil society assistance, the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and Sweden, as illustrated in the chart below, are the top donors within the DAC countries. The main multilateral institutions are the European Commission and the International Development Association.⁴⁵



Source: OECD DAC International Development Statistics

Additionally, CSOs in developed countries play two separate but related roles: they serve as sources of funding and channel money to other CSOs.

First, CSOs that function as donors can raise considerable sums from private contributions. OECD “estimates that CSOs provided USD 20-25 billion of their own resources to developing country partners in 2006, compared to official flows of about USD 104 billion,”

⁴⁵ OECD DAC International Development Statistics. 3 June 2010 <<http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/>>.

which includes debt relief.⁴⁶ The powerful impact of civil society organizations, therefore, cannot be overstated. In fact, some of the largest NGOs have budgets that surpass those of bilateral donors. The Save the Children Alliance, for instance, gives more toward development assistance than the government of Finland, and World Vision International, with a budget of over USD two billion per year, outspends Italy.

Second, CSOs in developed countries funnel both public and private funding to partner organizations in developing countries. Accounting for the public monies has proven especially difficult, because of “inconsistencies in reporting to the OECD-DAC, the absence of data on flows intermediated by multilateral or government recipients of aid, and lack of data on decentralized flows from official donors directly to developing country CSOs.”⁴⁷ While donors have recently been working to untie aid, through such agreements as the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, CSOs receive major portions of public development assistance. In the 2004 fiscal year, USAID allocated 25 percent of the budget to U.S. NGOs. As of 2007, both Norway and Belgium provided CSOs 20 percent of the budget; Sweden allocated 17, and 23 percent by CIDA. Overall, CSOs are estimated, as of 2006, to either receive or channel approximately 10 percent of the total official development assistance.⁴⁸

Approach to Monitoring and Evaluation

With civil society accounting for such a significant amount of donor expenditures, one would expect to find strong evaluation plans to assess the effectiveness of the funding. However, the opposite is true. Although most donors require periodic evaluations of CSO programs, in Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness, the OECD acknowledges a general “lack of information on donor funding to and through CSOs” and a “lack of any mechanism for assessing

⁴⁶ OECD.

⁴⁷ OECD.

⁴⁸ OECD

the overall impact of CSO activity on development results in particular countries.”⁴⁹ To address these issues, the Paris Declaration implemented a policy of “results-based management that is based on iterative learning and adaptation” and introduced “results-monitoring mechanisms that empower the ultimate beneficiary of aid.”⁵⁰ These policies will prevent donors and governments from using upwards accountability – from recipients to donors – as “instruments of control,” by encouraging “downward accountability towards citizens and beneficiaries.”⁵¹ In addition, the Paris Declaration advocated for performance management frameworks that use “indicators of institutional and social change,” such as “promotion of women’s rights and gender equality... access to education and primary health care.”⁵² This will augment program-based approaches that focus primarily on government reform and service delivery.⁵³ Then finally, the Paris Declaration promoted “mutual accountability for aid effectiveness” by supporting “greater institutional commitments to transparency and more inclusive processes.”⁵⁴ This will enable CSOs to foster “mutual accountability at national and global levels” by introducing “higher standards of access to information and transparency regarding aid flows and policies.”⁵⁵

Following the Paris Declaration, in Civil Society and Practice in Donor Agencies, Griffin and Judge found evidence that CSO funding and evaluation is dependent on the historic organizational structure of multi and bilateral institutions. For instance, multilaterals delegate grant decisions to country offices and specific departments, while there is little control at headquarters. The World Bank, as an example, appropriates funds through country offices, recipient governments, and internal departments. While such a structure supports flexibility and

⁴⁹ OECD 36.

⁵⁰ OECD 36.

⁵¹ OECD 36.

⁵² OECD 36.

⁵³ OECD.

⁵⁴ OECD.

⁵⁵ OECD.

local expertise, it sacrifices organizational goal cohesion. In fact, “many may not know the exact volume of funds channeled to CSOs via country offices.”⁵⁶

Similarly, bilateral donors not only allow major discretion by country offices but also favor traditional relationships with NGOs from their own countries. The rationale for maintaining relationships has evolved to include building partnerships between northern and southern NGOs, minimizing “fragmentation and duplication of work of different NGOs,” and reducing donor transaction costs. For instance, the Netherlands is considering the far-reaching action of awarding fewer grants and instead encouraging NGOs to form consortiums for large long-term grants. The Nordic+ donors are also assessing the possibility of multi-donor funding at the country level, which would consolidate the relationship between southern NGOs and northern donors.⁵⁷

Project Evaluation

Although USAID recognizes the lack of monitoring and evaluation of civil society programs, their efforts to date have either monitored specific projects or given a global perspective, which is creating a gap in country and regional analysis. For instance, final reports of USAID implementers are not comparable, due to a lack of shared indicators. This allows implementers to present data in favorable terms, which creates more of a marketing rather than a results-based report.⁵⁸

Additionally, process evaluations are often employed to assess the impact of projects after the projects have been completed, but there are a number of difficulties. First, since crucial

⁵⁶ Griffen, Janice and Ruth Judge. “Civil Society Policy and Practice in Donor Agencies: an Overview Report Commissioned by DFID.” INTRAC. May 2010. DFID. 11 June 2010
<<http://www.intrac.org/data/files/resources/681/Civil-Society-Policy-and-Practice-in-Donor-Agencies.pdf>>

⁵⁷ Griffen.

⁵⁸ Interview with Brian Scholl.

evaluation data may not have been collected during implementation, evaluators will struggle to recreate the data to determine effectiveness. Second, process evaluations are completed in an ad hoc manner, meaning it is not a strategic evaluation technique. Next, there is no concrete methodology. Evaluators are able to establish their own criteria, which makes it impossible for USAID to strategically apply the results in other countries. Lastly, the abilities and expertise of the consultants vary greatly. USAID has to balance familiarity in the country or region with evaluation experience.⁵⁹

To address the issues associated with project evaluation, we would like to echo the recommendation by the National Research Council, which states that USAID should commit additional resources and attention to increasing ex-ante monitoring and evaluation mechanisms at the project level “to demonstrate whether such evaluations can help USAID determine the effects of its DG projects on targeted policy-relevant outcomes.”⁶⁰ Considering evaluation issues before executing projects will likely raise initial costs, but it will also lessen the need for process evaluations and will allow USAID to eliminate projects with negative results. We are encouraged by the current work on impact evaluations occurring in the Evaluating Democracy and Governance Effectiveness (EDGE), but believe it should serve as only a beginning in creating the base necessary to determine best practices.

At the global level, the Democracy Assistance Project was intended to evaluate democracy and governance.⁶¹ While the results provide some useful general evaluations of the type of environments in which USAID DG is most effective, it fails to illustrate which projects

⁵⁹ Interview with Brian Scholl.

⁶⁰ Committee on Evaluation of USAID Democracy Assistance Programs. *Improving Democracy Assistance: Building Knowledge through Evaluations and Research*. National Academies Press: Washington, DC, 2008. National Research Council. 11 June 2010 <<http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12164.html>> 3.

⁶¹ Democracy Assistance Project. University of Pittsburg, Vanderbilt University, USAID. 11 June 2010 <<http://www.pitt.edu/~politics/democracy/democracy.html>>.

are effective and why. For instance, one training project could actually be having a negative impact, but because the net DG results are positive, the program continues to be used. This reinforces our recommendation to create a more rigorous evaluation system, but it also points to the importance of institutional learning of best practices.

Currently, the tool to for sharing institutional knowledge is the Development Experience Clearinghouse (DEC). The DEC publishes reports, but fails to aggregate results in an applicable way. We recommend that USAID create a centralized data management system to share information within USAID and with other development organizations, including donors, foundations, universities, and private sector initiatives. This is within the National Research Council recommendation that USAID should rebuild “institutional mechanisms for absorbing and disseminating the results of its work and evaluations, as well as its own research and the research of others, on processes of democratization and democracy assistance.”⁶² Of course such an ambitious recommendation is beyond the scope of the DG office. The office, however, can generate a system to aggregate basic program data (e.g. location, amount of funding, type of program, number of participants, etc.) and provide quantifiable results.

A user-friendly means, such as mapping, would help present the data more clearly. For instance, an electronic map, such as Google Earth, could have pins that illustrate where a program is being completed, and the pertinent information could appear when one scrolls over the pin. The establishment of a database for the system to extract pertinent information for the map will automate the use of the same information in other materials. InterAction is currently developing a Google Earth compatible map, with the location and information pertaining to projects being completed by its members. By utilizing a neutral program, other development institutions can contribute their own layers of project information in the future, with no

⁶² Ibid pg 4

additional cost for maintenance. While a map will only allow for a simple snapshot of the situation in the country, divorced from the environment of the country, having some information that one could juxtapose countries would create some basis for comparison.

Now that we have discussed the importance of evaluations, assessments of the overall conditions of the country are also crucial in understanding the situation in each country. The DG team has indicated their preference for creating their own assessment framework, but we thought it would be helpful to highlight previously developed assessments in the next section. We hope these will either provide strong components, such as indicators, that can be incorporated into a future USAID assessment or use a framework in its entirety.

CIVICUS CSI as an assessment and country programming tool

CIVICUS, an alliance of civil society organizations, developed the CSI Index, a “participatory needs assessment and action planning tool for civil society.” The CSI index evaluates the state of civil society as perceived by CSOs. This is balanced through the assessment of CSOs by external stakeholders, such as the government, the private sector, the media, academia, international NGOs and donor organizations. Dimensions of the assessment are as follows: civic engagement, level of organization, practice of values, perceived impact and the external environment. The latter is represented by a circle surrounding the CSI diamond, representing the factors that directly affect the CSOs, but over which they have no control. The results of these quantitative assessments are reflected in the civil society diamond, with scores aggregating only quantitative data, in order to avoid the arbitrary assignment of scores.

The assessment is participatory, and is led by a national coordination organization that organizes broad consultations with the stakeholders throughout the entire CSI process. The implementation team and the advisory council, which may or may not be comprised of local

experts, determine the objectives of the CSI to reflect local needs and specify the methodology for primary data collection. Among the tools employed are: surveys of CSOs and external stakeholders, population survey, regional focus groups, and case studies the most salient issues confronting the civil society. The main focus of the CSI process is to collect comprehensive data, which is then used to construct score indicators and prepare country reports on the local perception of civil society. Besides the report and CSI diamond, the participatory process results in a policy action brief. Reflecting the results of the assessment exercise, the local civil society determines the list of actions to “rectify weaknesses and promote strengths.”

The CSI defines civil society as “the arena in society between the state, market and family where citizens advance their common interests.” Therefore, the Index addresses both positive and negative aspects of civil society, providing for explicit examination of its “uncivil” aspects.

The main weakness of the CSI is its aggregated nature, as it does not allow for program- and organization-level comparisons, and non-random selection of the respondents. Using CSI as a tool for not only determining baseline, but also reliably measure country progress in terms of CSO development, would require donor coordination on country- and program-levels. An alternative would be to construct a new tool that would extend CSI methodology to incorporate indicators that will make it useful for the purposes of project-level impact assessment.

Another useful framework is developed by Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project. This framework relies on a system of national accounts when analyzing the “scope, structure, financing, and role of the private nonprofit sector” in countries around the world and quantifies the importance of the non-profit sector, as a subset of civil society. However, before

implementing this methodology, USAID need to reconcile any differences in organization/sector classification, and incorporate measures of organizational activity and collaboration.

It is beyond the scope of the current project to provide a specific framework and methodology to use when conducting country assessments and impact analysis of civil society. However, we recommend that USAID adopt a common framework for assessing, monitoring and evaluating the impact of USAID country assistance on civil society development.

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APPENDIX A: Civil Society – A Theoretical Assessment

Introduction:

The term “civil society” has been used to put label to a wide variety of societal movements that describe the social dynamics of a given political entity. It is a designate that holds no standardized meaning across various theorists, government actors, analysts, or donor organizations, yet is amorphously utilized by all of the above as a foundational element to specific processes of action. For USAID, “encouraging development of a politically active civil society” is the third of four strategic pillars for guiding the investment levels of donor money.⁶³ Precisely how the primary US donor organization for international development incorporates the tenets of civil society in its actionable policy initiatives is the subject of the 1996 USAID Program and Operations Assessment Report No. 12 by Gary Hanson, Constituencies for Reform: Strategic Approaches for Donor-Supported Civic Advocacy Groups.

Summary Review: 1996 – Civil Society and Democratic Governance:

Hanson begins his report with an overview on “Civil Society and Democratic Governance,” which he builds around a core principle of USAID, as stated in its guidelines, that “a vibrant civil society is an essential component of a democratic polity.” Furthermore, Hanson stipulates the Agency’s concentration of its resources in this area on “that wide range of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) engaged in civic action and education, public policy advocacy, and the monitoring of government activities.” It is with this in mind that Hanson expounds upon the role of civil society in effectively fostering democratic reform and

⁶³ The other three respectively, as stated in USAID’s Guidelines for Strategic Plans, are: Promoting meaningful political competition through free and fair electoral processes; enhancing respect for the rule of law and human rights, and; fostering transparent and accountable governance.

development in client nations by delineating assessment towards an interrelated, two-part paradigm that presents a case specific outline of the relationship between the state and the society it governs.

For the state, this relationship is examined by way of *accountability*, in which the levels of recognition by the state are gauged in strengthening the organizational capacity of society, building autonomous centers of social and economic power capable of resisting a re-emergence of authoritarianism, and “that the transition from statist to market-based economies can be more effectively consolidated with the growth of advocacy groups that champion such reforms.” This is to be synergistically assessed by an examination of the levels of sustained *participation* in the population and the generally defined meaning of citizenship within the regime. As put forth by Hanson, this includes a genuine effort of empowerment for those sectors of society that are impoverished, disenfranchised, and/or marginally considered. It is also contingent upon a practical form of decentralization that supports a “divestiture of social and economic functions” designed to empower the administrative and political function of local communities.

Since the purpose of Hanson’s effort is to demonstrate the necessity of developing a strong civil society as a primary means of ensuring a proper balance in the aforementioned state-society relationship, he proceeds to give a two-tiered definition of what civil society is; beginning with a broad perspective of the concept *writ large*, in which he states “the elements of civil society will play different roles in support of democratic reforms;” followed by a more concentrated “operational perspective” fitted by design to provide a realistic focus for donor monies and programs of investment. For this purpose, says Hansen, civil society is defined as:

...non-state organizations that can (or have the potential to) champion democratic/governance reforms. They are the engines that can generate the public push for reform. They can work to consolidate reform by helping to hold the state accountable for what it does.

Strong participant groups, such as labor unions and business/professional organizations, performing a multitude of important tasks in regulating the state-society balance, are the prescription offered against tyranny and corruption. These are groups that Hansen has labeled Civil Advocacy Organizations (CAO) due to their seeming ability to:

- Engage in public advocacy
- Analyze policy issues
- Mobilize constituencies in support of policy dialogue
- Serve as “watchdogs” in ensuring accountability in performance of government functions
- Act as agents of reform in strengthening and broadening democratic governance

Indeed it is the last point that Hansen emphasizes as the most important in that, positive social change, by method of participant political action, tends to emerge not from the state itself, but from a confluence of diverse yet effective sectors of the society at large.

Summary Review: 2010 – Civil Society

When examining the 2010 draft of Conducting a Democracy and Governance Assessment: A Framework for Strategy Development one can clearly see the continued reliance on Hansen’s contextual analysis of the institutional entities that constitute civil society. Section 6 of Step II in the analyst assessment strategy outline stipulates the methodological objective when assessing civil society; the focus should be on “those non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with the greatest impact on democracy and governance.”⁶⁴ By functional design these must organize, advocate, or provide social services (or some combination thereof) in the public sphere in order to be considered for allocation.

⁶⁴ Dininio 36.

Significantly absent however, is the CAO categorization offered by Hansen in the 1996 report. In order to better define the distinction between the types of organizations operating within the unit of analysis, Hanson introduces this term as a means of differentiating these specific types of civic organizations from the more conventionally recognized Civil Society Organizations (CSO). These are more frequently referred to as the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that “typically engage in humanitarian relief or economic and social development activities either at the micro or macro level.”⁶⁵ CAOs, for the purposes of his study, are limited to those organizations that proactively “advocate, educate, and mobilize attention around major public issues.”⁶⁶ Yet these criteria, as noted above, are included in the 2010 definition of NGOs and infused with a broader political perspective denoting the important role these organizations (identified in the draft as universities, think tanks, and advocacy NGOs) play in the political dynamics involved with democracy and governance.⁶⁷

During the undertaking of this assignment one important, albeit simple question faced by our group is: how important is the distinction made by Hansen? Should a more stringently defined classification of civic-based organizations be reintroduced in order to further delineate funding allocations? To provide an answer it first becomes important to understand the theoretical underpinnings for the specific policy initiatives in question. The following section will attempt to integrate the practical dimensions of identifying proper beneficiary civic organizations with the conceptual ideology that has shaped such criteria since civic society development has become a primary focus for democratization efforts.

⁶⁵ Hansen, Gary. “Constituencies for Reform: Strategic Approaches for donor-supported Civic Advocacy Groups.” USAID Program and Operations Report No.12. February 1996. CDIE. 11 June 2010
<http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/pnabs534.pdf>

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ For a more intensive examination of this practical development see Civil Society Groups and Political Parties: Supporting Constructive Relationships; Office of Democracy and Governance Occasional Paper, March 2004. Found at http://www.usaid.gov/our_work//democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/pnacu631.pdf

**TRUST NETWORKS, GOVERNING DYNAMICS, AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN
PRACTICE:
A Problematic Theory of Assessment**

At the core of Hansen’s argument is the conceptual idea that legitimate, sustained democracy, by USAID standards, requires a robust and powerful civil society. It is an idea that is based on the proposal that political benefits are incurred by a dense network of apolitical, or quasi-political organizations crossing otherwise wide societal gaps among factions by associations of interest and intent. Since the authorship of the 1996 report was the result of the growing acknowledgement at the time that developing sustainable elements of civil society is a fundamental aspect of democratization efforts and therefore must necessarily be incorporated in DG strategy assessments, it is helpful to understand what prominent ideas on the subject existed for Hansen to draw from.

In Making Democracy Work, Robert Putnam describes civil society as “dense but segregated horizontal networks” capable of sustaining intra-group cooperation but also being able to act as “networks of civil engagement that cut across social cleavages [to] nourish wider cooperation.”⁶⁸ The primary virtue of civil associations, for Putnam, is their ability foster social capital by way of socializing their participants into generalized norms of trust and reciprocity.

Furthermore:

If horizontal networks of civic engagement help participants solve dilemmas of collective action, then the more horizontally structured an organization, the more it should foster institutional success in the broader community. Membership in horizontally ordered groups (like sports clubs, cooperatives, mutual aid societies,

⁶⁸ Putnam, Robert. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1993. 167

cultural associations, and voluntary unions) should be positively associated with good government.⁶⁹

This stems originally from Alexis de'Tocqueville's referral of political associations as the "great free schools to which all citizens come to be taught the general theory of association" that act as an all important barrier to "either despotism of parties or the arbitrary rule of a prince."⁷⁰ Yet Tocqueville necessarily included free political associations as the progenitor of civil associations rather than its result, as seemingly espoused by Hansen's definition.

However, while clearly identifying the presence of "free political association" in his paradigm of what civil society is, Putnam in a sense divorces his theory from Tocqueville in that he removes the dynamics of partisan faction from the essence of what drives civil society, suggesting that such associations polarize the process and therefore inhibit the true sense of stable democratic autonomy as defined by his "horizontal networks of civic engagement." It is to this type of latticed community network that Hanson ostensibly ascribes to when he points out in the 1996 report's one and only footnote that:

The definition of "civil society" in this assessment does not include political parties, primarily on the grounds that their primary goal is to *take over* state power rather than *influence* it as with the organizations that are subject to this report.

Of course, this is not to say that Hanson advocates the abolishment of political parties, only that the organizations that should be concentrated on by USAID and other donor groups should be reflexive by nature and not directly affiliated with the operations of the state. It is here that Hanson's prescription becomes problematic, even paradoxical.

⁶⁹ Putnam; 175. In Making Democracy Work, Putnam points to the rise of this phenomena as the reason for the economic and social successes in northern Italy; while in Bowling Alone, he attributes the steady atrophy of these types of organizations for the economic and social decline in the US over the last several decades.

⁷⁰ De'Tocqueville, Alexis. Democracy in America. New York: Doubleday. 1969. 193, 524.

By purposely endorsing these CAOs as the primary focus of civil development in lesser developed countries as “engines that can generate the public push for reform,” Hansen is also presenting an abject and somewhat contradictory model of civil society as a counterweight to oppressive state power. This turns the development of civil society in the form of CAOs into a zero-sum game in which a stronger civil society equals a weaker state. In its simplest form, this overview claims civic engagement *sans* direct political involvement, as the ultimate check on the state by devolving centralized authority and ultimately, taking from the state its ability to inhibit individual freedoms. Fundamentally, this is a neoconservative⁷¹ principle by which the aforementioned “social capital” generated by a strengthened network of CAOs decreases state authority. What, for Hanson, begins as holding the state *accountable* for its actions, in theory becomes a stabilized participatory society unhindered by government oppression. Take, for instance, the following passage from the DG webpage:

Resilient democracies depend on a political culture that values citizen engagement, tolerance, and respect for human rights. Many societies lack such values and behaviors. For instance, some political cultures may encourage religious and ethnic fissures to dominate civic life, while a culture of citizen deference may reinforce authoritarian trends. The Civil Society Division plays a lead role in advancing knowledge about strengthening democratic political cultures. This includes supporting civic education programs in the formal education sector and for adults, and highlighting democratic principles in worker education programs.⁷²

⁷¹ As originally developed by noted political theorist Leo Strauss and later elaborated on by his protégé Alan Bloom and not to be mistaken for the more recent connotation of neo-conservatism as practiced by such political actors as Paul Wolfowitz, William Kristol, and Dick Cheney. These later ideas, ensconced within the writings of the Project for a New American Century (PNAC) are derivative evolutions of those offered by Strauss and Bloom, shaped and formatted to fit a specific political agenda. For elaboration on the origins of the theory see: The City and Man by Leo Strauss, and the interpretive essay attached to Alan Blooms translation of Plato’s Republic.

⁷² USAID, Civil Society: Strategic Focus.
<http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/technical_areas/civil_society/civ_strategy.html>

It is the basis for a pluralist argument claiming that increasing variety and membership of these “dense social networks” bridges the large “social cleavages” to the point of making society better regulated. The “culture of citizen deference,” a social dynamic identified as a pathway to “reinforce authoritarian trends,” is in fact an endorsement of the zero sum, state vs. civil society argument.

It is here that the contradiction takes salient form. On the one side, what Hansen has borrowed from the Putnam line of thinking seeks to advance these “dense social networks” that do not directly affiliate themselves with political governance in order to enhance the bridging capabilities of civil society over the cleavages inherent within a population. Yet on the other side, the intended result of this is to provide civil society with enough strength to act as a counterbalance to state authority. However, Putnam’s argument is that the social capital that this would generate “as embodied in horizontal networks of civic engagement, bolsters the performance of the polity and the economy, rather than the reverse: Strong society, strong economy; strong society, strong state.”⁷³ Yet, in the 1996 document, Hansen attempts to reconcile this with the opposing “civil-society-as-counterweight” paradigm.⁷⁴ Simply put, the contradiction claims that a strong civil society will augment a state’s ability to govern effectively; but it is necessary to develop a strong civil society in order to weaken the authority of the state as a defense against oppression.

The point we wish to stress however, is that precisely how a state in question governs cannot be guaranteed by this conceptual fusion. Holding to this framework makes the

⁷³ Putnam 1993; 173, 176

⁷⁴ This is indicative of previous works on civil society as offered by such academics as Samuel Huntington (Third Wave) and Mancur Olsen (The Rise and Decline of Nations), referencing such examples as the Solidarity movement in Poland during the mid to late 1980s whereby strengthened networks of labor unions forced the authoritative state to acknowledge and concede various authoritative elements of control to the burgeoning civically organized social movement.

generation of social capital an end unto itself without examining the political underpinnings of what an abundance of social capital can mean. If indeed the purpose of the DG office is to foster the development of stable democratic governance in lesser developed countries, then its efforts at developing civil society in these countries has thus far been missing a crucial aspect of the question involved. That is, not whether a strong civil society is an important factor for promoting democracy (indeed, a student of democracy and governance would be hard pressed to find any theorist from Aristotle to Madison to Dahl that would say otherwise); but rather, what particular kind of civil society is important *for* promoting democracy.

The civic organizations elicited by Putnam and ascribed to by Hanson, by the definitions used to delineate their value, are not always “good.” In this sense, one particular example of a CAO (by its strictest definition) in the US could be the KKK. Yet another, more contemporary example could be Hutaree, the “Christian” militia group that was plotting the overthrow of the US government as recently as 2009. Both are in fact examples of an organization that proffers lessons of trust and solidarity among its members, whereby they seek to influence the relationship of the state to society by method public spiritedness and self-sacrifice. Their goal orientation however, is just not the particular type of influence that is defined by multivariable societal inclusion and reciprocity⁷⁵ ensconced in the ethos of democratic civility. Rather, the influence these organizations actively seek is that of particularist exclusion.⁷⁶ Indeed, the KKK and Hutaree group are prime examples of a civic advocacy group that functions in a manner contrary to democratic ideals.

⁷⁵ This would include the recognition of outside citizens and an inherent acknowledgement of the validity of differing, even oppositional, opinions within the social/political sphere. Chambers & Kopstein 839.

⁷⁶ Associations that will aggressively seek to suppress differing ideas and values by method of violence, hate promotion, bigotry, anti-Semitism, xenophobia, etc. Ibid.

Yet, in a stabilized democracy based on extended generational experience with constitutional and societal development of civic engagement such as the US, concerns over either of these groups gaining enough traction to topple the existing government are miniscule. However, in underdeveloped countries in transition, possessing only nominal prior experience with democratization, this should indeed be of great concern. One example of the dangers of such a group in areas of USAID interest is Hamas. By acting as a quasi-legitimate organization delivering goods and services to the Palestinian people that were not being provided by the existing government, Hamas was quite successful in generating enough social capital to be elected by western promoted standards, and effectively placing control of the government in the hands of an acknowledged anti-western, terrorist organization.

As it exists, the civic development requirements of the DG are concerned primarily with the responsive effectiveness of institutions in the greater framework of developing a stable civil society without paying particularly close attention to the possible negative characteristics that some of these institutions might organize around. By relying heavily on Putnam *et al* in 1996, Hansen subliminally placed the focus of resource allocations on developing the strength and responsiveness of civil society as an institutional pillar of democracy building, while de-emphasizing the equally important factor of civic character.⁷⁷

Conclusion:

While academic debates abound on exactly how much influence a developed civil society will have in creating and maintaining a stable democratic regime especially as to whether or not the two are indeed mutually exclusive, they all agree that for all intents and purposes the negative hypothesis of this debate can be considered an absolute. That is, democracy cannot

⁷⁷ Edwards, Bob & Michael W. Foley. "The Paradox of Civil Society." *Journal of Democracy* Vol. 7 No. 3 1996 41.

exist in a vacuum devoid of any form of associational life; the practical application of which is two-fold. First, for purposes of engendering democratization where none has existed before, developing civil society is a definite pre-requisite and; second, any dissipation or dismantling of civil society in an existing functional democracy would invariably signal its impending demise.⁷⁸

Based on this fact, we concur that civil society is a necessary pre-requisite before democratization can occur in areas where none has existed before, and that the dissipation or dismantling of civil society in an existing functional democracy can signal looming instability. Therefore, this report urges USAID to address the underlying contradiction in the 1996 and 2010 definitions of civil society by adopting a new theoretical basis for its methodology. While this report does not recommend that USAID return to a more stringent CAO designation, we do believe that USAID should develop a more coherent definition of civil society that better integrates the contradictory elements in civic theory. Any such theory must contain the ability to see civil society as a network of associations that integrates the agencies of state power without fostering the anti-political dynamic of the zero-sum.

Furthermore, holding to the existing framework makes the generation of social capital an end unto itself without examining the political underpinnings of what an abundance of social capital can mean. If indeed the purpose of the DG office is to foster the development of stable democratic governance in lesser developed countries, then its efforts at developing civil society in these countries has thus far been missing a crucial aspect of the question involved. That is, not whether a strong civil society is an important factor for promoting democracy but rather, what particular kind of civil society is important *for* promoting democracy. Therefore, as a subsidiary recommendation for this section, we believe that the updated definition we suggest must necessarily incorporate consideration of what particular characteristics of “civic capital” target

⁷⁸ Chambers & Kopstein; 838

organizations are likely to engender beyond the simple identification of “uncivil” society organizations.

APPENDIX B: CASE STUDY SUMMARIES⁷⁹

The Orange Revolution and New Media

In November 2004, Ukraine was preparing for presidential elections that would pit regime-backed Victor Yanukovych against the anti-corruption reformist challenger Victor Yushchenko. Like most Post-Soviet countries, Ukraine had serious problems with corruption throughout the 1990s. Elected to the presidency in 1994, Leonoid Kuchma had presided over a state administration responsible for extensive corruption. Kuchma's presidential tenure was to end in 2004, however, so his regime handpicked a successor—Yanukovych—to continue the autocratic legacy.

The opposition, however, was also preparing for the election. Buoyed by popular support for the pro-transparency reformer Yushchenko, the opposition coalesced against the regime. But this campaign was markedly different than the preceding ones. The organizers made intentional use of new media technologies to circumvent the official state media's pro-regime messaging. The internet provided a new space that the state could not control. Following the second round of voting in November, the announced results differed significantly from exit polls, leading opposition groups to stage protests.

In one prominent example prior to the election, the opposition used the internet to distribute a video that would otherwise have had little impact. The video showed a campaigning Yanukovych being hit by an egg and melodramatically falling to the ground. The Yanukovych campaign immediately cried foul and claimed he was physically assaulted with a camera battery. After the video surfaced and was circulated, the Yanukovych campaign was both literally and

⁷⁹ This appendix is taken directly from the USAID report: *New Media and International Media Development: A Resource Guide*/

figuratively left with egg on its face. Online forums and news sites also became hubs for pro-democracy advocates to voice their opinions and spread their message when the state-controlled media would not allow such dissent.⁸⁰

In addition to internet organizing, SMS text messaging with mobile phones was employed. The pro-democracy group Pora set up a system to use text messaging technology to organize their demonstrations and disseminate information.⁸¹ Estimates of mobile phone access in Ukraine in 2004 stand at 29 percent, while internet penetration was much lower, covering as little as 2-4 percent of the population.⁸²

This example suggests that, even in countries where technological access is low, new media have a role to play in providing access to information.

European Radio for Belarus: Multi-platform Programming

Under the authoritarian government of Alexander Lukashenko, Belarus has proven to be a very difficult environment for the development of independent media. Most of the newspapers, radio and television are controlled by Lukashenko and the state apparatus. State monopolies control news printing and distribution services. Independent news outlets that have managed to survive are sometimes on the receiving end of government harassment and threats. In this environment, journalists are generally discouraged from openly criticizing the regime.⁸³

In 2005, with the support of international donors, a group of independent Belarusian journalists came together to start what would become European Radio for Belarus (ERB), a news

⁸⁰ Joshua Goldstein, "The Role of Digital Networked Technologies in the Ukrainian Orange Revolution" (December 20, 2007), Berkman Center Research Publication No. 2007-14, 12.

⁸¹ A Case Study on the Civic Campaign PORA, and the Orange Revolution in the Ukraine, Civic Party Pora, December 2005.

⁸² Goldstein, "The Role of Digital Networked Technologies," and Focus: Ukrainian Mobile Market Boom May Soon End, Cellular-News, August 8, 2006.

⁸³ Belarus - Annual Report 2008. Reporters Without Borders. 25 New Media and Media Development: A Resource Guide for Europe and Eurasia

and entertainment radio station tasked with providing accurate and interesting programming to Belarusian citizens. ERB broadcasts a traditional FM radio station from Poland into Belarus and over satellite. But the radio station wanted to expand their reach beyond traditional markets and target their intended audience: younger demographics.

In conjunction with traditional broadcast technologies, ERB has pursued a multi-platform approach, whereby the radio station has also developed a companion website to increase its audience reach. ERB's online presence complements their traditional terrestrial and satellite broadcasting by offering enhanced programming options and a multimedia experience for viewers. The website allows users to listen to the broadcast programming over the internet for 24 hours a day, and download recorded programs for later use. The website also contains more extensive news articles with regularly updated content on world and local events, as well as politics. This news-oriented content is integrated along with the entertainment-centered music and cultural programming, providing potential listeners and readers with multiple reasons to visit the site.

The ERB web design also integrates its entertainment content with more news-oriented material by utilizing several new media web technologies. Website viewers are encouraged to interact with the station by sending in messages via instant message or Skype (internet phone service) and the site hosts contests with prizes for winners. News stories can be read online, or delivered to subscribers via RSS feeds—a form of internet syndication that allows new content to be delivered directly to the user. ERB has also used the social networking site MySpace to reach potential listeners. News and music programs are also distributed as podcasts, so they can be accessed on personal devices at another time.

This web design and integration of news content with entertainment is a strong example of the kinds of techniques that should be used to reach younger audiences. Studies exploring the reasons youth access the internet have consistently shown entertainment (music, pop culture, video) to be a top priority, with news and information also ranking high.⁸⁴ Given this, media development projects should be encouraged to follow the multi-platform approach. Including new media technologies can effectively utilize limited resources and attract younger audiences who may not engage with traditional media in any significant way.

YouTube Reporting in Armenia

When the Armenian government used violence to crack down on opposition protesters in February 2008, Armenia's online media quickly became a major source for accurate, on-the-ground reporting. Following the February 19 elections which left the opposition and several outside observers claiming irregularities and fraud, demonstrators took to the streets to protest Armenia's ruling government. On March 1, along with issuing a state of emergency, President Kocharian enacted a media blackout. Under the crackdown, the media was only allowed to report on official information provided by the government. Armenia's online media, which had been a source of independent news and information, also came under attack. The government, in conjunction with the Internet Society of Armenia, blocked access to independent websites reporting inside the country, as well as foreign media outlets like Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, which was forced to broadcast over short-wave radio.

Despite the media blackout, the internet remained a crucial space for accurate information. A1+ TV, one of Armenia's critical pro-opposition media outlets, began operating its

⁸⁴ For example, a recent Pew Internet & American Life Project found the most common online pursuit among teens to be visiting websites about "movies, TV shows, music groups, or sports stars." *Teens and Social Media*, Pew Internet & American Life Project, Washington DC: December 19, 2007; also see the 2007 CAICT Survey, "Central Asia + Information and Communication Technologies (CAICT) Project, University of Washington.

own YouTube channel and received an estimated 60,000 visitors on its website.⁸⁵ The media blackout was also extended to prominent independent and opposition news sites as the government systematically blocked access to these internet IP addresses. As a result of this blockade, the Armenian blogosphere became a central hub for reporting on the demonstrations and providing information about what was happening in the capital city of Yerevan.

Blogs such as Armenian Observer and Unzipped took the opportunity to shoot video footage of the protests and post the videos online. This community of blogs also worked to share video footage generated by other groups—documenting instances of police violence and reporting on the demonstrations themselves. Further, when the government unilaterally began blocking the IP addresses of opposition and independent sites, Armenian Observer posted valuable technical instructions on alternative ways to access the information.

Despite official levels of internet penetration standing at less than 6 percent in 2006, the government considered these independent online voices a danger (World Bank ICT Statistics). The Armenian government also blocked access to the entire YouTube site, apparently considering the videos of the demonstrations being posted by citizens too threatening. This suggests that just as the Armenian case reveals the power of ordinary citizens to use the internet to circumvent state-imposed controls, governments will increasingly want to control access. As online video production gains traction as a form of both citizen and traditional journalism, that authoritarian governments will increasingly use their resources to block access and filter content, limiting the possibilities of the internet to support independent media.

⁸⁵ Onnik Krikorian, "Caucasus: Armenia & Georgian Blogosphere Assessed," Global Voices Interview, June 13, 2008.

APPENDIX C: PRESENTATION SLIDES