HAITI ENVIRONMENT STRATEGY

FIRST DRAFT

USAID ENVIRONMENT TASK FORCE TO HAITI

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Executive Summary

With the return of constitutional government to Haiti, hopes are high that this trouble-ridden island nation will enter a new phase of its political, social, and economic history. There is a spirit of optimism in the country which opens a window of opportunity to development agencies whose efforts have heretofore been sabotaged by political corruption, lethargy, and chaos.

Convened in the context of this new optimism, USAID's Administrator charged the Environment Task Force to Haiti to outline an environment program strategy for consideration by USAID and other donors based on need and absorptive capacity without regard to funding source or availability.

The team spent two weeks in Haiti conversing with key actors at all levels of the development scene: from the U.S. ambassador, the USAID Mission Director, and the Ministers of Agriculture and Planning in Port-au-Prince, to NGOs and farmers in remote villages, with a view to identifying priorities for environmental action.

The Task Force found what it had expected: despite the incredible difficulties caused by the 1991 coup and the ensuing embargo USAID/Haiti has succeeded, principally through the creative use of PVO and NGO outreach strategies which it developed in the 1980's, in continuing a flow of substantial humanitarian and environmental benefits to rural and urban communities, through its Productive Land Use Systems (PLUS) program, its Jobs Creation program (JOBS), and other efforts, at a time in which most other institutional actors were either absent or paralyzed. This ongoing program is a solid base on which to build a strategy for the environmental restoration of Haiti.

The proposed strategy involves four strategic approaches. First, to help create the necessary policy, legal and institutional conditions for environmentally sustainable economic development. Second, to build on the Mission's portfolio to quickly launch a high-impact program. Third, to carefully fit the strategy into the plans of the Government of Haiti (GOH) and the major donors for environment activities in Haiti, already resulting in cooperation and a good possibility of joint funding of key elements of the strategy. Fourth, to integrate environment with the other major elements of USAID's overall strategy for sustainable development including: women's programs, family planning, education, democracy and economic growth.

The centerpiece of the Task Force's proposed strategy is the Haitian Foundation for the Environment (HFE). Interest generated from funds placed with the Foundation by multiple donors (or through special pass-through arrangements) will be available to local groups for environmentally related projects. Where the FHE will differ from most other similar funds is in its decentralized operational mode based at the country's 27 arrondissements. Environmental grants will be made to local NGOs, farmers associations and

even local offices of government agencies under the priority framework established by the highly participatory National Environment Action Plan.

The Task Force has identified activities under two simultaneously implemented elements:

Element 1: Environmental Governance--Establishing the conditions for long-term environmentally sustainable development

- Establishment of an endowed Haitian Foundation for the Environment to make community-managed environmental grants.
- Development of a National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP), which will serve as the framework within which priorities will be set for project financing through the FHE and other environmental programs.

Element 2: Building Momentum--Quick startup of high impact interventions

- The immediate reactivation of USAID's Agroforestry II tree planting program with at least 25 million trees planted on privately controlled farmland in the next three years.
- The expansion of USAID's creative hillside farming program (PLUS) into a wider geographic area, with more effective post-harvest market linkages.
- The continuation of USAID's JOBS programs to clear clogged irrigation ditches, repair farm to market roads, remove solid waste from urban sites and repair urban sewer and storm drainage systems.
- Expansion of USAID's activities in the critical ecological area of Pic Macaya National Park, and possible expansion of these activities into three new ecosystems.
- Assistance to the private sector to produce and disseminate up to 80,000 fuel efficient charcoal stoves.
- Introduction of low cost household pollution prevention technologies into urban areas and urban environmental planning services.
- Environmental restoration of barren hillsides by establishing legal usufruct rights with rural women's groups, private holders and farmers associations.

The Task Force recommends that the USAID Missions and other donors cautiously increase support to GOH ministries while maintaining the bulk of program efforts through the well-tested NGO and PVO cooperators. But even more significantly, in our search for indigenous routes, we are proposing a more decentralized approach in which the major

decisions will be made by commissions of local elected authorities and local civil and religious leaders rather than by politically-appointed, central ministry personnel.

The budget required for the proposed strategy is estimated to be $112.7 million. The funding recommendations are based on the assumption of a three year program (though some activities might be designed for longer or shorter periods). Approximately $30 million is destined for urban activities. The Task Force identified several possible innovative funding solutions for a considerable portion of the total. This includes use of PL 480 Title I and Title II local currency funds, application to the Global Environment Facility for the Ecosystem Protection Component, and several smaller sources of central funding, e.g, Parks in Peril and Appropriate Technology International.

The Task Force urges rapid action particularly on those segments of the proposal that could be jeopardized by unnecessary delay. Because the nurseries that produced seedlings with USAID funds in the '80s are still present, though dormant, over a million new trees could be on Haitian peasant land during the Spring rains of 1995 if funds for that are approved immediately. The unique JOBS program, which is pumping essential funds into an impoverished economy at the same time that it provides important services to the urban and rural environments, will end by summer unless steps are taken to quickly increase its funding.

A. Introduction

1. Problem Statement

Haiti's extreme environmental problems undermine its prospects for achieving political stability, food security, and sustainable economic development. Massive deforestation has resulted in soil erosion which has become one of the major constraints to agricultural production for both local consumption and trade. Erosion loads rivers with sediment, undermining infrastructure (dams, roads and irrigation systems), increasing the potential for disastrous floods, and smothering coral reefs which support Haiti's economically important fisheries and tourist potential. In urban areas, inadequate solid waste and sewage disposal threatens health, pollutes aquifers, and destroys coastal resources.

This environmental crisis is exacerbated by three fundamental factors--population pressure, poverty, and weak national and local governance. These are leading to irreversible environmental degradation and increased economic hardship and must be addressed for environmental restoration and sustainable development of Haiti.

Population pressure is causing a serious overuse of natural resources, in both rural and urban areas. With an annual population growth rate of 1.9 percent, Haiti's population is projected to rise from 6.9 million in 1990 to 16.4 million in 2020. Approximately 73 percent of Haiti's population of 6.9 million live in rural areas and practice agricultural activities. The majority of this population is concentrated on steep hillsides with poor soils. Thus, while only 29 percent of Haiti's land area has been determined suitable for cultivation, population pressure has resulted in 46 percent of the land being cultivated. In the words of one seasoned anthropologist, Haiti has "crossed the threshold to an absolutely insufficient scale of operations".

While less than 30 percent of Haiti's current population live in urban areas, urban population is growing at an annual rate of 4.2 percent, more than twice the national growth rate. Estimates predict a rise in Haiti's current urban population of 2.2 million to 9.4 million by the year 2020, 6.0 million in Port-au-Prince alone. This has and will continue to put extreme pressure on water, waste water and solid waste management, and coastal ecosystems.

Poverty reduced the options of farmer's to short-term survival strategies which result in increased land degradation affecting women in particular who provide most of the homestead farm labor. In the quest for food security and income, farmers have sold fruit trees and even tree stumps as fuelwood or charcoal and replaced them with annual crops in areas inappropriate for agriculture.

In urban areas, lack of water and sewer services results in severe health impacts accounting for 75 percent of infant deaths, 50 percent of deaths of children 1-4 and 20 percent of all other deaths. Lack of water is a particular hardship for the poor due to the substantial percentage of family income they devote to its purchase. Less that one quarter of the population in Port-au-Prince has access to sewer which are largely absent in Haiti's other municipalities.

Weak national and local governance is legendary throughout Haiti. In urban areas, weak governance and lack of institutional capacity has failed to address basic public services such as urban planning, provision of potable water, solid waste disposal, wastewater management and health care. Financial constraints, absence of cadastral data, and untrained staff of municipalities have prevented the planning and implementation of public works.

The weakness of public sector institutions can be found in an over-centralized administration; poor management; unclear, conflicting, and unenforceable regulations; and weak planning leading to poor resource allocation and the absence of community participation in implementation of programs and projects. Local institutions are not held responsible and accountable for the financial management of funding, resulting in an unwillingness by lenders to fund the public sector which has forestalled investments in the country's environmental rehabilitation, and created a complete dependence on externally-funded institutions and mechanisms to deliver basic public services. The recent political crisis has further deteriorated this already weak capacity and led NGOs and grassroots organizations to curtail programs due to lack of funds and/or political violence. The result is a modern colonial state, where Haitians have transferred the management and destiny of their resources to foreign entities.

2. Proposed Environment Program Strategy

The restoration of a popularly-elected democratic government presents a singular opportunity to address Haiti's environmental crisis and lodge civic awareness and control beyond the isolated household into public institutional life at both the local and national levels so that, in a generation or so, in the vision of the strategy, **environment is no longer a major constraint to achieving broad-based, sustainable economic development.**

The long-term objective of the proposed environmental strategy is **to restore and sustainably manage Haiti's environment and natural resources.** The program will have a direct impact on the strengthening of local and national governance, enhancement of food security, improvement of health, employment, and private sector-led economic recovery by addressing Haiti's environmental and developmental crisis in a sustainable manner. It is fully consistent with President Aristide's and USAID's priorities and commitments in these areas.

The proposed strategy involves four strategic approaches:

- to help create the necessary policy, legal and institutional conditions for environmentally sustainable economic development;
- to build on the Mission's portfolio to quickly launch a high-impact program
- to carefully fit the strategy into the constitution and action plans of the Government of Haiti (GOH) and also takes fully into account ongoing and planned programs of

bilateral and multi-lateral donors for Haiti (included either as part of the multi-donor supported Emergency Economic Recovery Program for Haiti or as parallel developmental programs);

- to integrate environment with the other major elements of USAID's overall strategy for sustainable development including: women's programs, family planning, education, democracy and economic growth.

The proposed program focuses on three major root causes of environmental degradation--poverty and lack of economic opportunities, poor governance, and rapid population growth. The first two of these are addressed directly, while the third will be addressed through awareness raising and linkages between environment program participants and family planning programs.

The program strategy avoids the "top down" approach of past programs by supporting interventions derived from consensus building by Haitian civil society. The program's activities will be responsive to both national and local level priorities and will be increasingly managed and implemented by Haitians whose futures are most directly affected by their success or failure.

The proposed program serves as a catalyst to mobilize and leverage the financial resources and investments by donors, the private sector, NGOs, and private citizens which will be required to combat environmental degradation and achieve sustainable broad-based economic development. The Task Force recommendations build upon the considerable experience and comparative advantage of USAID and others in environmental protection, natural resources management, economic development, and related areas in Haiti and elsewhere.

The Task Force has identified two simultaneously implemented action elements. The first creates the required conditions for long-term success in environmental restoration and sustainable natural resource management. The second element contains a set of comprehensive, interrelated, and mutually reinforcing interventions which remediate critical environment problems and restore degraded natural resources.

Program Element 1: Environmental Governance--Establishing the conditions for long-term environmentally sustainable development

- Establishment of an endowed Haitian Foundation for the Environment to make community-managed environmental grants. The HFE will serve to move away from the PVO centered approach developed by the donors during the Duvalier regime to a strategy of greater local community control over resources.

- Development of a National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP), which will serve as the framework within which priorities will be set for project financing through the FHE and other environmental programs. The NEAP will also be a vehicle for raising awareness of environment and development issues and to carry out a process of environmental policy and institutional dialogue and reform.

Program Element 2: Building Momentum--Quick startup of high impact interventions

- The immediate reactivation of USAID 1980's tree planting program and the outplanting of at least 25 million trees on privately controlled farmland in the next three years.

- The expansion of USAID's creative hillside farming program (PLUS) into a wider geographic area, with more effective post-harvest market linkages.

- The continuation of USAID's JOBS programs to clear clogged irrigation ditches, repair farm to market roads, and remove solid waste from urban sites.

- Expansion of USAID's activities in the critical ecological area of Park Macaya, and possible expansion of these activities into three new ecosystems.

- Assistance to the private sector to produce and disseminate up to 80,000 fuel efficient charcoal stoves.

- Introduction of low cost household pollution prevention technologies into urban areas and urban environmental planning services.

- Environmental restoration of barren hillsides by establishing legal usufruct rights with rural women's groups, private holders and farmers associations.

The proposed program confronts the catastrophic degradation of Haiti's natural resources. However, major complementary programs supported by USAID, other donors, and the GOH are also needed which directly address the root causes of environmental degradation. Such interventions, which are outside the scope of this program, must include fundamental reform of governance, private sector and microenterprise development, family planning, health, and education. Without such complementary programs it is not possible to achieve sustainable environmental restoration and natural resources management in Haiti.

In fact unless the government and population of Haiti, along with their partners (donors, NGOs, private sector), fully commit themselves to Haiti's environmental restoration and rational resource management, the country's food security, economic and social development, and political stability could all be seriously undermined.

B. Expected Outputs

1. Quantitative Outputs

a. 25 million trees distributed, with at least 125,000 farm families benefiting from tree distribution.

b. 45,000 hectares of hillside land under sustainable agricultural production with appropriate soil and water conservation measures

c. 83,000 farm families assisted in sustainable agricultural production and environmental management with a total of 415,000 beneficiaries

d. 20,000 urban families benefiting from mitigation of urban pollution in pilot areas

e. 306,000 person months of short-term employment with 100,000 different people employed

f. (from JOBS program only) irrigation systems (47,000 hectares rehabilitated), drainage systems (1,700 km cleared), terraces (300,000 meters constructed), gully plugs (70,000 meters constructed), farm-to-market roads (1,220 km) rehabilitated, solid waste management (2 million cubic meters removed and safely disposed)

g. one major rain forest ecosystem, two marine ecosystems protected, and a transnational biosphere reserve sustainably managed

h. 80,000 fuel efficient charcoal stoves sold to low-income households in Port-au-Prince with 120,000 metric tons of charcoal conserved

i. 60 women's groups with secure access to public lands and assisted in sustainable agricultural production, marketing and environmental management

2. Process, Governance, and Institutional Outputs

a. a national environmental fund created with four local governance councils established; grants awarded for environmental activities

b. increased national and local level awareness of environmental issues

c. key policy and legislative reforms carried out

d. institutional reforms carried out

e. improved national and local level governance

f. enhanced institutional capacity of government institutions, community organizations and NGOs

g. increased community, private sector and NGO participation in natural resources management

h. national environmental action plan completed and funding commitments secured

C. Program Element 1: Environmental Governance--Establishing the conditions for long-term environmentally sustainable development

1. Haitian Foundation for the Environment

With the emergence of legitimate popularly-elected government in Haiti, the international assistance community can now begin exploring new funding channels that are more indigenous than the expatriate PVO route, but more decentralized than the Port-au-Prince ministries through which some donors formerly preferred. The proposed mechanism is a Haitianized variant of the National Environmental Funds (NEF) that have been initiated over the last five years in more than 20 countries. There will be two operationally distinct elements: (1) a permanent, centralized endowment and grant-making fund and (2) a decentralized project proposal and implementation mechanism. The fund would be managed out of Port-au-Prince by a Board of Directors including Haitian government, PVO/NGO, and donor representatives. This fund and its Board will be called the Haitian Foundation for the Environment (HFE). As is true of NEFs found in other countries, the interest generated from this Fund (or special pass-through funds earmarked by a donor for implementation, not endowment, purposes) will be available to local groups for environmentally related projects.

The FHE will differ from other similar funds in its decentralized operational mode. Four communes (township level units of local governance) will be selected for a pilot program. In each of the communes the FHE will support the creation of a Commission Locale pour L'Environnement a l'Arrondissement (CLEA). Each CLEA would be composed of local government and non-government leaders.

The major function of these CLEAs would be to make grant awards to local organizations (communes, NGOs, women's groups, farmers associations, an local GOH ministry officers) submitting acceptable environmental management proposals, in line with** guidelines to be established based on the framework of the Haitian Environmental Action

Plan. Though the endowment will be established for environmental purposes, some of the funds will be set aside for women's groups and family planning activities.

2. National Environmental Action Plan

The National Environmental Action Planning (NEAP) process will (1) identify priorities for action, (2) determine long-term investment needs and mobilize funding to meet these, and (3) obtain the sustained commitment of the GOH to undertaking difficult policy and institutional reforms necessary for sustainable environmental management. Environmental education, participation, and consensus building on the part of broad representation of Haiti's society will be crucial elements of the NEAP to secure the necessary popular support for its implementation. In concert with the elaboration of a long-term environmental strategy, select policy and institutional reform will also be implemented during the next six to nine months to take advantage of the unique opportunity for governance reform presented by the restoration of President Aristide.

A donor consultative group, under the coordination of the United Nations Development Program, has been working with officials of the legitimate government, both prior to and after the restoration to power of President Aristide, on the NEAP. The GOH, with multi-donor support, is ready to begin NEAP preparation in January 1995. Once formally adopted the NEAP will serve as a basis for planning specific projects to be funded by the FHE and through parallel interventions.

D. Element 2: Building Momentum--Quick startup of high impact interventions

1. Tree-planting

The task force recommends reinstatement of the USAID-financed nursery-cum-outreach system developed in the 1980's by the Pan American Development Foundation and CARE. The system is based on the following core components: (1) production of large volumes of easily transportable root-trainer micro-seedlings in 30-40 strategically located nurseries; (2) distribution of tree seedlings gratis to farmers who request them; (3) farmers provide the land and the labor to plant and maintain the seedlings.

The trees are integrated into the Haitian peasant farming system in conjunction with vegetative and mechanical measures of soil conservation. The project will emphasize the economic value of wood and fruit as locally marketable commodities and the concomitant rights of village men and women to own and harvest, when and how they see fit, the trees which they have planted. The task force recommends immediate reactivation of this wood-flow to its 1990 level: some ten million seedlings per year.

2. Sustainable Hillside Agriculture

The Productive Land Use Systems (PLUS) project is extending soil conservation measures such as gulley plugs, contour barriers and terraces while simultaneously increasing farmer productivity, income, and food security by introducing new and improved crop varieties and market linkages. Since 1993, PLUS has reached more than 22,000 farm families representing over 132,000 rural beneficiaries. In April 1994 an assessment team determined that there would be significant negative consequences if the project were to end in December 1994 as originally planned and recommended that it be extended for another five years. The Task Force strongly supports that recommendation and proposes, if funding allows, additional geographic expansion as well as the activation of a PLUS marketing component.

3. JOBS: Urban and Rural

The Mission has supported a jobs creation program since August, 1993, that has had several important impacts. First and foremost, it has generated income and jobs for the rural and urban poor. This, in turn, has had numerous linkages to the economy and the environment. For example, the irrigation canal component has led to increased agricultural output in plains areas and removal of solid waste has improved the health of all Haitians, particularly the urban poor. The Task Force concurs with the Mission's desire continue the JOBS program.

The Haiti Jobs Creation Project will create an additional 300,000 person/months of immediate and useful employment and provide needed cash income to benefit 100,000 of Haiti's most impoverished, jobless men and women. The JOBS project will address three types of activities: (1) transport infrastructure and road maintenance; (2) agricultural infrastructure, e.g., irrigation systems, canals and retaining walls in rivers and streams; and (3) urban environmental activities emphasizing garbage collection, location and development of dump sites, and drainage ditch cleaning.

4. Ecosystem Protection and Development

Since 1987, USAID has supported the protection and development of the Pic Macaya National Park and adjacent watersheds. the Task Force recommends an expansion and extension of USAID/Haiti's ongoing Targeted Watershed Management project at Pic Macaya National Park. Proposed Interventions include: (1) reinforce the Pic Macaya National Park interventions to encompass the northern and southern slopes of the park; (2) support integrated conservation and development programs in key ecosystems including The Arcadins and Barraderes-Cayemites (marine reserves) and Morne La Visite (as part of a transnational biosphere in collaboration with the Dominican Republic); (3) support nation-wide environmental awareness and educational activities.

5. Urban Charcoal Demand Reduction

This three-year intervention will promote the mass adoption in Port-au-Prince of improved-efficiency charcoal burning stoves based on an improved model of the Kenya Jiko stove. The project will assist private sector Haitian firms and small-scale entrepreneurs to mass produce and market the stoves at a competitive price. All transactions will take place at market rates and no subsidy or credit will be provided to purchasers. The project will support a multi-media stoves awareness and market stimulation campaign.

In addition, a small portion of this activity's budget will be used to explore other energy conservation and renewable energy strategies. For example, small quantities of extruded fiber fuel will be imported from the U.S. to test its suitability and consumer acceptance as a charcoal and fuelwood substitute. Propane and butane pricing policies will be analyzed and a policy dialogue will be held with the government to explore the feasibility of breaking the gas monopoly held by Shell Oil Company. Alternative energy sources such as photovoltaics for health clinics and biogass generators will be explored.

6. Urban and Industrial Pollution Reduction and Land Development

This three-year activity will enable the poor to reduce the amount of waste they produce and minimize their reliance on the government for environmental services. It will also support the government's land planning and urban and industrial development capacity. The project will address urban environmental issues through: (1) introducing available technologies such as composting pit latrines and contamination-free cisterns; (2) mobilizing NGOs and the government in Haiti to orchestrate the process; (3) developing government capacity to monitor and enforce urban and industrial environmental regulations; and (4) promotion of industrial pollution prevention activities among private sector enterprises. Projects will be initiated in the capital, Gonaives, Cap Hatien and Les Cayes affecting 30,000 families or 150,000 persons and 10-15 industrial plants.

7. Degraded Land Management

During a three year period the Degraded Lands Initiative (DLI) will finance a minimum of eight major subprojects to restore degraded land. Unlike the PLUS and earlier agroforestry projects which focus(ed) on securely-held agricultural land, DLI will focus explicitly on larger land tracts that is "insecurely" held by those occupying it, either because of *de jure* State ownership, collective kin ownership, absentee ownership, or some other encumbering condition. DLI will try a variety of intervention options to develop one or more models which might finally provide a workable solution to the problem of degraded "non-private" land in Haiti. Each subproject will include a combination of technologies (soil conservation, forage management, reforestation) to be used on the land in combination with a set of incentives.

Institutions or groups will be invited to propose measures for dealing with specific tracts of degraded land that make explicit arrangements for four design components: (1)

resolution of proprietary issues; (2) technical configuration; (3) installation incentives; and (4) maintenance incentives. At least two or three of the subprojects will be explicitly targeted to rural women's groups as the principal protagonists.

F. Summary: Estimated Three-Year Program Budget

Program Activity	Budget (million U.S. $)		
Element 1:			
Tree Planting		12.0	
Sustainable Hillside Agriculture	24.0		
Jobs: Urban and Rural (1 year only)	20.0		
Ecosystem Protection		8.0	
Urban: Environmental Services Demand Reduction		17.0	
Urban: Charcoal Demand Reduction		1.2	
Rural: Common Property Resource Management			4.0
Element 2:			
Haitian Environmental Fund		25.0	
Element 3:			
National Environmental Action Plan (includes near-term policy reform and environmental awareness)	1.5		
Program Budget Total	112.7		

G. Conclusion: Costs of No-action

From the point of view of the American people:

- The cost of Haiti's political instability to the U.S. has been substantial. The U.S. government spends an estimated $300 million a year on the Haitian refugee issue alone; the costs of the military intervention have not yet been calculated.

- Were this program not to be funded, the US government would fail to capitalize on quick startup and high impact activities which it, and only it, is in a position to successfully launch. USAID was a somewhat solitary figure continuing a flow of assistance during very dark years; now that representatives of other nations and institutions are flooding into Haiti, it would be most unfortunate if USAID did not

take an aggressive public lead in the launching of high visibility, high-impact interventions which it alone is in a position to carry off.

From the point of view of the Haitian people:

- Without the USAID TREES project, at a projected survival rate of 50 percent, Haitian hillsides would lose 12.5 million trees. And because these trees will be owned by farmers, farmers will forfeit the income which would have been achieved from the sale of the wood or the fruit from these trees.

- JOBS manages to funnel about $0.70 of every U.S. dollar directly to poor Haitians. At an annual output of $20 million, the poorer sectors of Haitian society would be deprived of some $14 million dollars per year. Equally serious would be the productive losses from the irrigation canals that would not be cleaned, and the marketing losses from the secondary roads that would not be maintained. Because the project is so successful at funneling money, a negative decision would have serious negative consequences on the income of thousands of Haitian families.

- A cessation of PLUS inputs, focused on environmentally sound food production. Haiti's long term food security and economic development, so heavily dependent on its farms, fisheries, coastal resources, and tourism potential which are strengthened, not only by PLUS, but by many elements in the program being proposed here. Over 400 lives were lost through flooding and landslides which came in the wake of the rains of November, 1994. Such unnecessary loss of life will be reduced as a result of this program's interventions.

- The social and political loss to Haiti should also be factored into the equation. The proposed program would strengthen a range of democratic institutions, reinforcing democracy in Haiti: NGOs, farmers groups, women's associations, and mechanisms of civil governance. With the restoration of constitutional government, Haiti has the opportunity to develop democratic institutions. USAID's ongoing and proposed interventions strengthen this process. A decision not to implement could produce losses in these areas to Haiti.

Appendices: Detailed Activity Descriptions

Activity Title: **Haitian Foundation for the Environment**
Funding Required: $25 million from USAID; at least an equal amount from other donors; private contributions.
Source of Funding: Supplemental Request; other donors; Haitian Citizens

I. Overview

USAID/Haiti's approach of providing assistance through NGOs which emerged in the early 80's as a tactical maneuver to bypass predatory Duvalierist ministries, has had dramatic short term advantages. With the emergence of legitimate popularly-elected government in Haiti, however, USAID must begin exploring new funding channels that are more indigenous and sustainable than the expatriate NGO route, but more decentralized than the Port-au-Prince ministries through which most funds were formerly channeled. Effective programming through grass roots channels will be best accomplished by modest but long-term funding coupled with organizational development.

II. Activity Description

A. Proposed Interventions

The mechanism of choice is a Haitian variation of the National Environmental Foundations (NEF) that have begun to make their appearances in the developing world. There will be two operationally distinct elements: (1) a permanent, centralized endowment and grant-making fund and (2) a decentralized project proposal and implementation mode. The multi-donor fund would be centrally managed by a Board of Directors including Haitian government, PVO/NGO, and donor representatives. This fund and its Board will be called La Fondation Haitienne pour l'Environnement (FHE). As is true of NEFs found in other countries, the interest generated from this Fund (or special pass-through funds earmarked by a donor for implementation, not endowment, purposes) will be available to local groups for environmentally related projects.

Where the FHE will differ from most other similar funds is in its decentralized operational mode. The communes--i.e. the municipal entities and adjacent rural sections into which the territory of Haiti is divided--are grouped into 27 arrondissements. Four of these will be selected for a pilot program based on the creation of a Commission Locale pour L'Environnement a l'Arrondissement (CLEA) in each. Each CLEA would be composed of: (a) the 4 or 5 popularly elected communal mayors in that arrondissement, (b) representatives (at least one linked with the Church hierarchy - if appropriate) of the most influential NGOs in that arrondissement, and the Departmental Directors for Environment, Agriculture and Public Works, chaired by the arrondissement's vice-delegue.

The major function of these CLEA would be to make grant awards to local organizations (communes, NGO's, women's groups, farmers associations, an local GOH ministry officers) submitting acceptable environmental management proposals, in line with guidelines to be established based on the framework of the Haitian Environmental Action Plan. Though the endowment will be established for environmental purposes, some of the funds will be set aside for women's groups and family planning activities. The two major outputs of this process will be (a) the establishment of a permanent centralized fund, free from fluctuating vagaries of centralized ministries and external donor agencies, earmarked for the restoration of the Haitian environment, and (b) the creation of mechanisms that, for the first time in Haitian history, involve autochthonous public sector and private sector leaders in the design and implementation of projects to restore, protect, and manage their local environment.

B. Policy Agenda

The FHE supports and builds on the Aristide government's stated desire to decentralize control over the development process. Clear definition of central government's role and its relationship to NGOs will have to be defined. Legal recognition of the Foundation will be required.

C. USAID Management Implications

The FHE development will require one half FTE of a PSC. A technical assistance contract or cooperative agreement will be needed to support the FHE during its formative years.

D. Relationship to other Donors

Other donors will be expected to participate in the development and funding of the FHE. The World Bank has expressed an interest in putting funds in the Foundation. There are no similar environmentally oriented foundations extant or planned for Haiti.

III. Activity Preparation

A. Analysis and Design

Approximately four person months of technical assistance will be required to examine laws, funding prospects, governance procedures etc.

B. Participation Plan and Prep Schedule

Design will require up to four months to complete.

Activity Title: National Environmental Action Plan
Funding Required: 1 million
Source of Funds: USAID/Central (LAC)

I. Overview

Haiti lacks a comprehensive, long-term strategy and plan of action to address the range and magnitude of the country's environmental problems. The National Environmental Action Planning (NEAP) process will identify priorities for action, determine long-term investment needs and mobilize funding to meet these, and obtain the commitment of the Government of Haiti (GOH) to undertake policy and institutional reforms necessary for environmental restoration and sustainable natural resource management. Such a strategy is urgently needed to guide decisions and investments by the GOH, donor agencies and other parties. To secure the necessary popular support for its implementation, broad participation and consensus-building by Haiti's society is a crucial element in the strategy's preparation. In concert with the elaboration of a long-term environmental strategy, select policy and institutional reform will also be implemented during the next six to nine months to take advantage of the unique opportunity for governance reform presented by the restoration of President Aristide.

II. Activity Description

A. Proposed Intervention

President Aristide has made the preparation of a NEAP a high priority and has demonstrated his commitment to pursue appropriate policy and institutional reform. A donor consultative group, under the coordination of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), has been working with officials of the legitimate government, prior to the restoration to power of President Aristide, on issues related to the NEAP (They have not yet convened since the government's return, but reportedly remain committed to doing so). The GOH, with multi-donor support, is ready to begin NEAP preparation in January 1995. Raising the awareness and understanding of Haitians of environmental issues is important if they are to effectively contribute to the NEAP preparation as well as policy and institutional reform. Environmental awareness and educational interventions will therefore be supported. Specialized studies, national and provincial level conferences, workshops, and pilot activities will be undertaken to ensure the relevance of investments and policy reform. Support will also be provided for upgrading the GOH's planning and policy development capabilities (through training, technical assistance, and improving environmental information systems). Once in place the NEAP will serve as a major basis for planning specific projects to be funded by the FHE and through parallel interventions. Planned outputs include:

- National Environmental Action Plan
- Selective Policy Reform

- Institutional Reform and Strengthening
- Heightened Environmental Awareness

B. Policy Agenda

The NEAP focuses on policy, legislative and institutional dialogue and reform. This will be a major outcome of the NEAP process.

C. USAID Management Implications

The NEAP development will require one half FTE of a PSC. A technical assistance contract or cooperative agreement will be needed to support the NEAP process.

D. Relationship to other Donors

Other donors will be expected to participate in the development and funding of the NEAP. A donor coordination body has met before the restoration and inter-donor discussions are well advanced.

III. Activity Preparation

A. Analysis and Design

Approximately 20 person months of technical assistance will be required to support the NEAP process.

B. Participation Plan and Prep Schedule

The NEAP SOW will be drafted in December 1994 and the entire process should be complete in 12 to 18 months.

Activity title: Tree planting (First draft: Jerry Murray)
Funding required: $12 million over three years
Source of Funds: Supplemental Request; Monetized PL480.

I. Overview

For more than ten years, USAID/Haiti, through its Agroforestry Outreach Project, utilized an NGO outreach strategy to achieve a high volume of output in trees (some 60 million) and in number of farm families directly reached (some 200,000). The approach was based on NGO-mediated seedling production, and an outreach system which guaranteed small farmers full ownership and harvest rights over all trees planted on their land. Farmers provided two of the three traditional factors of production (their land and their labor); the project provided the third: capital converted into seedlings by NGO-managed nurseries. Depending on region and project year, farmers willing to allocate part of their land and labor to trees received in exchange an amount varying from 75 to several hundred seedlings (mostly wood, some fruit) free of charge.

Though trees were the central element of the project, in its latter years the project (particularly in the Southern region) had shifted into the promotion of hedgerows, alley cropping, gulley plugging, and other soil conservation pursuits. The project also had begun shifting, where appropriate, into backyard nurseries managed by the farmers themselves. The project, which had received acclaim by most evaluators and international renown as a showcase project, lasted 10 years and was to be continued in the form of "AFII".

A sudden shift in USAID policy occurred in 1991 as new mission management forbade further free distribution of seedlings and changed the emphasis of the project into the current PLUS strategy, which is more agricultural than silvicultural in focus. PLUS has intensified and expanded the soil-conservation interventions introduced by AOP and AFII and added much needed agrarian interventions (such as improved seed). An unnecessary and unfortunate result of this mandate, however, was the sudden closing of more than 30 regional hardwood tree nurseries and a reduction of the number of wood trees planted to less than 10% of its AFII level.

Interviews with those involved in implementation of both strategies fortunately reveal that 1) the hillside farming achievements of PLUS can be preserved in a broader effort that reinstates a serious tree flow -- i.e. that there was no need to close nurseries to field PLUS; 2) the nursery and outreach personnel, the potting material, and seedling containers for some 13 million trees, are still in storage from AFII and, with funding, could be reactivated into <u>immediate</u> tree production.

Given the high priority placed by the Aristide government on trees, and the expressions of support in that direction coming from the Vice President of the U.S., the objective of this

proposal is assist USAID/Haiti once more to become a major actor in the flow of trees onto Haitian land.

II. Activity Description

A. Proposed Interventions

With a $12 million dollar grant USAID will support the outplanting of 25 to 30 million seedlings onto Haitian peasant land using strategies that evolved in AOP and AFII in the 1980's and early 1990's. The approach is based on:

1. the use of a mixture of fast-growing hardwood trees and some fruit trees which small and medium farmers can incorporate into their farming system with little opportunity cost to normal agrarian pursuits;

2. a collaborative agreement with farmers by which they will provide land and labor while the project will provide in exchange, free of charge, up to several hundred NGO-produced seedlings per participating family;

3. an "umbrella NGO strategy" by which USAID will deal directly with two NGO's (PADF and CARE). PADF will enter into subcontracts with dozens of local NGOs around the country to establish nurseries and outreach/monitoring systems. CARE will prepare its own seedlings and hire its own extensionists.

The nurseries will employ a "root trainer" system and the bulk of the seedlings produced in these nurseries will be wood trees. The use of backyard nurseries initiated under AOP and AFII and continued during PLUS will be maintained as a supplement to the centrally produced seedlings. These backyard nurseries have emphasized, and will continue to emphasize, the production of fruit trees.

As with its predecessor project, the "dendritic" outreach system of PADF in which PADF's regional offices link up to several NGOs in a region, provides an ideal model. Each of the local NGO's contracts with farmers in several villages to serve as animators and information gatherers for a modest recompense. Each animator in turn links up with other farmers for both recruitment and technical assistance purpose. Farmer participation is totally voluntary. Once underway the project will elicit local species preferences and the content of nurseries will reflect these farmer preferences.

As was the case under AOP and AFII, the Ministry of Agriculture will be kept fully informed of the project's activities, but the implementation mode will continue to be non-governmental in character.

B. Policy Agenda

A major potential policy constraint to the implementation of this activity is the presence, at least on the books, of impediments and taxes to wood cutting which act as a disincentive if mechanically applied to trees planted and managed by farmers on their own land. Because they were weakly enforced, these regulations did not impede tree planting under AOP and AFII. But they must be examined and revised.

C. USAID Management Implications

Past experience indicates that, at the most, only one full time person will be needed in USAID to backstop the entire project, a role often filled through a PSC.

D. Relationship to Other Donors

At the moment, USAID is virtually the only contender for a currently unoccupied donor niche: outplanter of millions of trees a year. USAID itself occupied that niche until recently. The strength of this proposed project is that it would allow USAID to reoccupy that vital niche which the Mission itself had created.

III. Project Paper Preparation

A. Analysis and Design

Tree planting activities can and should be reinstated immediately, by following the procedures and utilizing the NGOs that were functioning when the tree-planting component was interrupted. Several key design issues have vetted: (a) Survival rates: There are solid data indicating that the survival rate of the root-trainer micro-seedlings is quite high after a year--50% and getting higher as the project progressed. (b) Farmer demand for seedlings: Throughout the entire twelve year life of the two projects, demand for project trees among farmers bordered on the feverish; the project could simply not produce seedlings fast enough to meet the demand. (c) Markets for wood produce: The market for charcoal and lumber has increased (catastrophically, some have said) during the years of political chaos. (d) Technical feasibility: The nursery supplies and personnel are still present in country and can be quickly mobilized back into action. In short there is no need to delay project onset while lengthy feasibility studies are carried out. Only a simple financial issue remains: the most recent costs of nursery inputs to permit exact projection of the amount of seedlings that could be outplanted for $12 million. This question could be resolved simply in two or three days with phone calls and faxes.

There are, however, four major design features which must be explicitly incorporated if USAID is to replicate its earlier achievements.

1. Non-governmental implementing mode. If USAID succeeded where others failed, it was because of its NGO implementation mode. Contradictory messages are now being heard regarding the intent of the Aristide government with respect to participation in projects. Damien reportedly has no desire to become involved in project implementation, but rather sees its role as "coordination" and "supervision" which would be appropriate for USAID support. If it expects any replication of the tree output of the 80s, then USAID must preserve the non-governmental character of its tree strategy, particularly in the short-term.

2. Free-of-charge seedlings. Another pillar on which the project will rest is a "contract" by which farmers supply land and labor, and the project supplies seedlings. There is a widespread willingness on the part of farmers to risk some good land and to invest some labor in the planting of this new "wood crop"; as documented by the unprecedented participation of 200,000 rural families in unremunerated tree planting during the 1980s. But with the exception of a small number of farmers and a small number of seedlings, rural Haitians do not and will not invest cash in hardwood trees. Their scarce cash is invested rather in agrarian or livestock ventures. Thus, the best design strategy on this issue is to continue the policy of free seedlings.

3. Centralized nurseries as the major seedling producer. One issue of concern within USAID Haiti and PLUS project personnel was whether massive distribution of tree seedlings would be a "competing strategy" with the establishment of backyard nurseries under PLUS. In fact, the two strategies were already compatible under AFII. It is widely recognized that backyard nurseries will never achieve the volume of output required to make a dent in Haiti's ecology or demand for tree products, and that a revival of centralized wood-seedling producers is necessary in that regard. As it is being designed this project should be based on the assumption of NGO root trainer nurseries.

4. Hardwood trees, not fruit trees, as project focus. The observation of farmer preferences for fruit tree species for backyard nurseries under the PLUS project gave rise to the notion that fruit trees might be the route to go. This is in part due to the emphasis on a "farmer driven" rather than "agenda driven" approach in USAID projects. However, when considering a massive tree planting program, a number of factors also must be factored into the equation. These include: market size vs. supply; market fluctuations; risk aversion and the influence of policy on land use decisions. Intensive farmer demand for wood trees drove AOP and AFII. Furthermore, all farmers must harvest their fruit at the same time; markets are limited and easily saturable. Most farmers will rationally plant only a small number of fruit trees. There is a guaranteed market for charcoal and lumber, and it is large; farmers have the freedom to harvest wood when they wish. Wood trees can plug farmers directly and aggressively into Haiti's feverish lumber and charcoal markets; This does not mean that markets for fruits and fruit products shouldn't be identified and developed under PLUS or another mechanism, but rather that the importance of hardwood species should not be overlooked based on current "farmer demand". As it is being redesigned, therefore, the project, should continue to emphasize (as AFII did) the voluminous outplanting of hardwood

seedlings from centralized nurseries and the production of fruit in backyard nurseries more under direct farmer control.

5. Integration with PLUS. The consensus of implementers of PLUS is that a revived tree planting project should emphatically not be limited to PLUS' restricted geographical areas but should be open to farmers anywhere in Haiti. In addition, it is felt that a new project would insist on at least some zones of intensive and visible vegetative cover and soil conservation in any region where the project is functioning. Ideally, for quick startup purposes the tree planting should be headed by the same NGO actors -- PADF and CARE -- that managed AOP and are now managing PLUS. However personnel from both of these agencies recommended that the tree planting should be done as a separate project within each of these agencies, with its own director and outreach personnel in order not to conflict with PLUS outreach strategies. To merge it administratively with PLUS could prove to be a strain on PLUS and a straight-jacket on the tree planting project.

E. Participation Plan and Preparation Schedule

Time could be gained and energies spared if the outstanding AFII Project Paper prepared in 1989 under DESFIL were used as the takeoff point for designing the tree planting component. The major actors in the design should be the AFII implementers: PADF and CARE.

If an expedited approval for this activity can be granted, trees could be in the ground by April of 1995. This would presuppose immediate design action in the month of December 1994. Such speed of action would probably be unique in the history of global developmental interventions. It is hoped that the highest levels of USAID decision making, in Haiti and in Washington, conspire to generate this unique but desperately needed speed.

Activity Title: Sustainable Hillside Agriculture/PLUS project
Project Number: 521-0217
Funding Required: $24 million, $18 million of which is authorized.
Source of Funds: Supplemental request; Monetized PL-480.

I. Overview:

Although an integrated environmental strategy would logically seek to attract people away from fragile hillsides, the fact remains that today, over 70% of Haiti's population reside there, caught in a vicious cycle of poverty and environmental degradation. A second best strategy then for relieving the need to put more land into inefficient use is to intensify production, increase farmer income, and encourage conservation practices. USAID/Haiti's Productive Land Use System (PLUS) project works to conserve Haiti's natural resource base by providing extension support to small farmers, encouraging ecologically- and economically-sound crop production systems which result in sustainable increases in farm productivity and income. An outgrowth of the Agroforestry project, PLUS has made some visible impacts in rural Haiti, both ecologically and economically.

The Environmental Task Force proposes to strengthen and expand USAID/Haiti's Productive Land Use Systems (PLUS) project to reach 415,000 beneficiaries by 1997. In addition, the Task
Force suggests that the project be modified to strengthen farmer income generation and adoption of appropriate land use practices by a) a modest increase in market and post-harvest activities and b) stronger linkages with existing post-harvest, marketing and appropriate technology research institutions and USAID projects. The Task force strongly believes that increased income generation is key to sustainable natural resource management by minimizing the need to clear additional fragile land for agriculture and fuelwood.

This activity supports the strategic objective of the Haitian Environmental Strategy by directly reducing on-going natural resources degradation on privately owned rural hillsides and by breaking the cycle of poverty which drives people to manage resources in a desperate, unsustainable way. By introducing soil measures and improved agronomic inputs and management techniques which result in greater productivity, the project is addressing both poverty and production constraints. It is expected that our proposed expansion of PLUS activities will result in 83,000 farm families (415,000 beneficiaries) having 45,000 hectares under sustainable management.

II. Activity Description

A. Project Background:

The Productive Land Use Systems Project is the result of a major re-design of the Agroforestry (AFII) project which was originally authorized in 1989 at $30 million over five

years. Following the coup d' etat that ousted President Aristide in September 1991, USAID suspended assistance to Haiti and consequently the project. During this period, AFII was evaluated and redesigned. In October of 1992, AFII was reactivated as PLUS with a new implementation approach and focus on agronomic interventions. However the newly designed project maintained the original PACD of December 1994, despite the fact that between the suspension and reactivation of field operations a total of 15 months elapsed.

PLUS has been operating for a year-and-a-half within the parameters of the 1992 redesign. In April, 1994, an external assessment team found that the project had made great strides in achieving the desired impacts of increased adoption of soil and water conservation practices and increased farmer income. Based on these findings, USAID/Haiti submitted and received approval on a project amendment which would extend PLUS with the same goal and purpose for five years from December 31, 1994 to December 11, 1999. As an interim step, the Mission also extended the current PACD by one year from December 31, 1994 to December 31, 1995 to allow continuity in implementation during design and negotiation of the present amendment. While the goal and purpose of the project remain unchanged, existing outputs and purpose-level indicators have been revised to reflect and increased level of effort and expanded geographic coverage. This includes a greater emphasis which will be placed on marketing, institutional sustainability, local tree nurseries and seed banks.

B. Proposed Interventions

1. geographic expansion

PLUS practices have proven effective in coupling economic incentives with conservation to reduce hillside degradation. These practices need to be made available to a larger number of farmers. The Environmental Task Force supports the current amendment which proposes two types of geographical expansion: 1) to expand "concentrically" within the four regions presently supported by PLUS, by gradually moving into communities adjoining those already receiving assistance, which is highly cost effective, and 2) for PLUS/CARE or another implementor to move into a new region, the Grande-Anse department. This second area of expansion will entail additional start-up costs but is expected to yield productive returns.

In addition to supporting expansion under the current amendment, the Environmental Task Force also recommends expansion of PLUS activities into new regions above and beyond what is planned under the current amendment. This recommendation is based on field observations of project interventions, review of project EOPS and interviews with project staff and farmers, all of which indicate that the project is achieving success in improving land use management and natural resources conservation. It is also based on the positive absorptive capacity of the current grantees of the project, who are willing and able to expand rapidly into certain areas given additional resources.

Under the Environmental Strategy for Haiti, the Task Force is recommending that PLUS be expanded to at least two new additional areas. These might include: along the North Coast of the Grand-Anse easterly from where CARE or another grantee will be operating; Tiboron into South Peninsula (which includes the important coastal barrier of Pic Macaya); the upper part of the Central Plateau near Hinche Pignon, and along the lower elevations of Pic Macaya's southern slope near Saint Mathurin to mitigate the effects of soil erosion on an important dam and on the productive valley of Les Cayes.

Although there may be other areas of environmental or economic importance, PLUS maximizes benefits in areas where there are existing farmer groups or where the creation of such groups are possible. This is important, given the high cost of this intensive project approach, and it would make the best use of the Agency's resources.

2. Marketing Support

As PLUS succeeds in increasing agricultural production and contributing to increased food security, overcoming constraints related to marketing and income generation becomes obvious. Evidence shows significant economic returns can be gained by reducing transaction costs and by making even marginal investments in value-added and post-harvest technologies. Farmers, processors and buyers need to be linked through information, agreements, and roads. Farmers need to reduce labor costs and production losses through simple value-added processing technologies. Road rehabilitation through the JOBS program has had a significant impact on reducing transaction costs and improving market access in some areas. From an environmental standpoint, it is particularly important that crops which result in increased natural resource conservation, such as wood, fruit, forage and fodder species, have a market value so that they will be more readily adopted by farmers.

Based on the April 1994 assessment, the PLUS project amendment recommends increased marketing support through the addition of a few "marketing agents" which will build the capacity of farmer groups and NGO's to market collectively through the existing systems (Madam Sarahs and regional markets) and to explore new market avenues (exports and processing). The details of how this will be implemented however, remain vague to the Task Force and the level of effort/resources currently proposed seems inadequate. The Task Force sees some moderate increases and streamlining in this area as critical, but no so much as to over-burden the project. Proposed interventions would:

- help identify crops with potential for local, national, regional and in some cases, international markets consistent with land use limitations.

- introduce appropriate scale processing and packaging for products bound for local national and regional market.

- support adaptive post-harvest research geared to specific problem-solving needs of small scale agricultural producers, women's groups, cooperatives or small-scale business for key crops.

The Task Force feels that this can better be achieved by:

- tapping existing appropriate technologies in processing, packaging and marketing, rather than expending too much effort on research. For example, centrally-funded USAID projects such as post-harvest CRSP, SUSTAIN, Global Bureau earmark for Appropriate Technology International, as well as the expertise and experience of International Agricultural Research Centers (IARCS) and national research centers such as CATIE an FHIA.

- linking PLUS marketing activities with other USAID and donor programs in micro-enterprise and small-scale business development.

C. Policy Agenda

Policy reform will not directly be a part of this activity. Nevertheless there are a number of policies within the current Rural Code which are (or have the potential to be) disincentives for sustainable hillside agriculture, tree planting and farmer organization. These regulations have either not been enforced at all or they have been used as tools of abuse, coercion and income by local governments. These include: regulations which require government approval of tree harvest; taxes on tree harvest and wood product transport; market taxes on agricultural products; tradition of lack of freedom of association, and to date, a tradition within the Ministry, to focus on promoting capital-intensive row crops as opposed to low-input integrated farming systems. There is also ample opportunity to create incentives for conservation, such as providing tax credits to individuals who adopt conservation practices.

D. USAID Management Implications

The Mission currently has a Haitian project officer for the PLUS project who receives technical oversight and back-stopping from two U.S. Direct Hire personnel in the Mission's Economic Growth Office. No additional personnel would be required for the proposed expanded PLUS activity.

E. Relationship to other Donors

USAID has been the only donor providing assistance in sustainable hillside agriculture for the last few years. The World Bank Forestry and Natural Resources Project, which had been approved and appraised prior to the coup, contains an agroforestry component. Although this project has been officially canceled by the World Bank, it may be reactivated

by July 1995 at the earliest, according to its new task manager. The agroforestry components of the WB project includes support for research (through what was the MOA's Directorate of Natural Resources and its Forestry Resource Service of the GOH) with collaboration with PLUS NGO's as well as separate NGO contracts to extend agroforestry technologies in the upper elevations of Belle Anse in southeast Haiti and south of La Visite Pine Forest Preserve--areas in which PLUS is not currently operating. The contracts for agroforestry production have a duration of 4 years with a $630,000 budget for the first 2 years. However, the WB Project task manager expressed dissatisfaction with the current design of the project as well as an interest in eliminating the agroforestry component. Further tracking of this WB project should be pursued.

In addition to the World Bank interest in a similar activity, the PLUS Project Officer expressed that the IDB and the GTZ had expressed interest in conducting similar work in the Artibonite area.

III. Project Paper Preparation

Project paper preparation will entail a second amendment to the PLUS project. As noted, the recent amendment for PLUS expansion has been approved, although funding has not been received.

A. Analysis and Design

Analysis is needed to identify new areas for project expansion and determine the desirability and viability for moving into those areas. This includes exploring the limitations and comparative advantages of the implementing organizations; the presence of farmer groups or potential for organizations in the areas; and other known PLUS criteria. For the marketing component, the ease of linking up with centrally-funded USAID projects must be further explored. In addition, further analysis and design is required to link family planning at an appropriate level into the extension system.

B. Participation Plan

The Key stakeholders currently involved with PLUS are USAID/Haiti, CARE, the Pan American Development Foundation (PADF) and the Southeast Consortium of International Development (SECID). An issue is whether or not the Project Amendment is being put up for re-bidding.

C. Preparation Schedule

The preparation of the project paper will depend on funding availability.

D. Resource Requirements

Tentative design team members might include one or two consultants with experience in marketing and program design two weeks in Haiti to work with the PLUS Project Officer, the Deputy Director of the EG office in USAID/Haiti and the implementing institutions.

Activity title: JOBS: Urban and Rural
Project number: To be determined
Funding required: $20.0 million
Source of funds:

I. Overview

Activity Purpose: The purpose of this activity is to continue to generate income and jobs for Haiti's poor that will result in reconstructing Haiti's deteriorated infrastructure and stemming
further rapid decline of national natural resources and the physical environment. Few, if any, would dispute the problems of unemployment and underemployment which have been endemic. Before the elections unemployment was estimated to be around 50 percent. The figure shot to 80 percent largely because of the embargo against Haiti implemented after the 1991 coup. The embargo had a major impact on economic performance, rural and urban employment, and rural sector decapitalization that, in turn, have accelerated the already rapid pace of environmental degradation.

The Mission has supported a job creation program that has had several important impacts. First and foremost, it has generated income and jobs for the rural and urban poor. This has had numerous linkages to the economy and the environment. Second, the projects funded (roads, soil conservation, irrigation canals, and solid waste management) that have had beneficial environmental and secondary job generation impacts. For example, the irrigation component has led to increased agricultural output in the plains.
Road projects connect farmers to markets increasing productivity and farm income. Removal of trash and management of solid waste improves the health of all Haitians, particularly the urban poor and reduces pollution of coastal and underground water resources.

The activity supports USAID/Haiti's Recovery Program, a fundamental pilar is the JOBS Program. An increase in the JOBS program supports economic recovery in that it will repair roads and irrigation systems among restore other productive resources.

II. Activity Description

A. Proposed Interventions

The Haiti Jobs Creation Project is a works project that will create 300,000 person/months of immediate useful employment and provide 25,000 full time jobs. These jobs will be provided to Haiti's most impoverished men and women over the next year. This activity will complement the 290,000 person/months of employment created over the next eight months. The JOBS project will include three sub-projects which are as follows:

- Transport infrastructure and road maintenance. Construction of secondary and tertiary roads and small bridges that facilitate farm to market commerce and access to financial, marketing, distribution, health, education and other essential services;

- Agricultural infrastructure. Irrigation systems, canals and retaining walls in rivers and streams all of which are key to reactivating and increasing agricultural production, preventing flooding and conserving water and soil.

- Urban environmental activities emphasizing garbage collection, location and design of dump sites, particularly in coastal zones, drainage ditch maintenance,gutter cleaning, etc. which are vital to protect environmental and health conditions.

In addition, preliminary estimates have been made of the quantitative outputs that the jobs could yield based upon the experience of the ongoing JOBS program. They are, as follows:
1220 kilometers of rehabilitated roads; 1730 kilometers of canals cleared canals, 340 kilometers of streets cleaned; 2 million cubic meters of debris moved; 4700 hectares of improved and irrigated land; 570,000 meters of contour canals built and 95,000 gully plugs built. Many of these improvements will make agricultural lands more productive and reduce the effects of pollution on urban residents and related environments.

B. Policy Agenda

The JOBS program was to provide short term employment relief while economic conditions stabilize and improve. Nevertheless there have been some beneficial impacts on the Ministries responsible for the facilities. The component on irrigation canals stimulated a process whereby the Ministry of Agriculture was required to select priorities and begin to think about policies on how to maintain them. Another case in point is solid waste management where the JOBS program is involving the solid waste agency on tough policy and implementation issues such as siting a new dump for Port-au-Prince, developing a strategy to phase in user fees, and organizing communities to manage localized trash and debris problems. The indirect effects of the works projects are the policy deliberations.

C. USAID Management Implications

The project at its current size is managed by a PSC. Doubling the program would require an additional FSN. The reason is that the proposed increase would require another contractor to manage the expansion of jobs and outputs.

D. Other Donors

Other donors (with the exception of limited involvement by the Canadian Government and perhaps a few other bilateral program) generally are not emphasizing job programs.

There have been some discussions with multilateral development banks to support NGOs to carry out these activities. However, it is unlikely that they will engage on a PVO jobs project, or if support is forthcoming, it is likely to be very modest.

III. Project Paper Preparation

A. Analysis and Design

The project may be increased by amending existing or issuing new Cooperative Agreements. This Planning Assistance component of JOBS is to be evaluated shortly and the Pan American Development Foundation (PADF) and Cooperative Housing Foundation (CHF) components are to be evaluated in the Spring. One issue might be delivery capacity. However, there are numerous other NGOs such as CARE who are not involved in the JOBS program who could quickly build up to take a share of the workload. Another issue that might be reviewed might be the targeting of public works. Previously, most of the job generation projects were in more rural locations. Given the concentration of unemployed in urban settings combined with the very poor infrastructure and health conditions, the Mission might consider examining more closely how to distribute activities differently.

Activity Title: Ecosystem Protection and Development
Proposed Project Mechanism: Amendment to USAID Haiti Targeted Watershed Management Project (521-0191)
Funding Required: $8 million over three years
Possible Source of Funds: Supplemental Request; Global Environmental Facility

I. Overview:

The protection and sustainable management of Haiti's remaining forests, wetlands, mangroves, coral reefs, and biodiversity is crucial for the country's social and economic development. Significant employment and income could be derived from sustainable long-term development of tourism, fisheries, and other coastal resources. Haiti's remaining forests and biodiversity provide important social and economic benefits (tourism, stabilization of water regimes and watersheds, and potential agricultural, medicinal and industrial uses). Key ecosystems, unique to Haiti, are threatened with irreversible loss, the consequences of which would be catastrophic for Haiti as well as represent a significant loss to mankind.

Since 1987, USAID has supported the protection and development of the Pic Macaya National Park and adjacent watersheds. Other donors have funded limited ecosystem activities. Innovative approaches of integrated conservation and development (ICD) have been successfully tested in Haiti. These respond directly to the local populations' needs to meet food security and revenue requirements while obtaining strong local commitment to the protection and sustainable management of key ecosystems and adjacent areas. Environmental awareness has been integral to the success of these efforts. International and U.S. NGOs and universities have in-depth knowledge of Haiti's environmental and related economic development issues. Their extensive experience in Haiti and elsewhere in ecosystem protection and development could readily be tapped for expanded programs in Haiti. Collaborating with local government institutions, local NGOs, communities, and the private sector, they could mount appropriate programs in critical ecosystem areas before these are irreversibly degraded or lost. USAID has a strong comparative advantage among the donor community in addressing policy reform, ecosystem research, environmental awareness, community and private sector development, and establishing sustainable funding mechanisms (endowments, debt-for-nature) to address ecosystem protection and sustainable management.

II. Activity Description

A. Project Background

Since 1987, USAID Haiti has supported ecosystem protection and watershed management activities in the Pic Macaya area in the Southern peninsula of Haiti through the Targeted Watershed Management Project. **Pic Macaya** is the last remaining major rain forest in the country and also the watershed for seven rivers which provide the water supply for Haiti's most productive agricultural area, the Plaine des Cayes. In 1983, the area was

declared a national park (Parc Macaya). The park, of 5500 hectares, contains a rich and unique fauna and flora with a high degree of endemism.

USAID supports the protection and rehabilitation of the natural ecosystems, biological diversity, and natural resources of Parc Macaya and the surrounding areas through the promotion of ecologically sound agricultural practices. Improving livestock, food crop, and vegetable production will help meet the local population's food and income needs while reducing pressure on the park. The original project had two components: 1) Proje Sove Te (PST) - Project Save the Soil-, a buffer zone development and watershed management effort implemented by four Haitian NGOs: Developpement Communautaire Chretien d'Haiti (DCCH), Integrated Rural Development (IRD), Organization for the Rehabilitation of the Environment (ORE), and Union des Cooperatives de la Region du Sud (UNICORS), with technical assistance from the U.S.-based Associates in Rural Development (ARD) and 2) the Macaya Biosphere Reserve (MBR), an ecosystem protection and rehabilitation element implemented by the University of Florida (UF).

The military coup of September 30, 1991 triggered the suspension of all project activities. The Macaya Biosphere Reserve activity ended in May 1992 and Proje Sove Te efforts officially ended by September 1992. The University of Florida, however, has managed to continue some conservation and environmental education activities related to Pic Macaya with MacArthur Foundation funding. In September 1992, USAID, in response to an unsolicited proposal from UNICORS to conduct limited activities in and around Park Macaya, extended the project through September 1994 and awarded UNICORS a contract. The project has recently been extended through March 1996. Technical assistance is provided to UNICORS by the World Wildlife Fund through USAID Washington's Biodiversity Support Program (BSP).

B. Proposed Interventions

Building upon the successful efforts and lessons learned of the Targeted Watershed Management Project and the University of Florida/MacArthur Foundation Conservation Project in Pic Macaya, and in view of the urgency of halting irreversible degradation of key ecosystems in Haiti, the Task Force recommends that USAID expand and broaden its ecosystem protection and development efforts in Haiti. Specifically, funding is proposed to:

- reinforce the Pic Macaya National Park interventions to encompass the northern and southern slopes of the park;

- support integrated conservation and development programs in key ecosystems including The Arcadins and Barraderes-Cayemites (marine reserves) and Morne La Visite (as part of a transnational biosphere in collaboration with the Domincan Republic); and

- support national environmental awareness and educational activities.

Pic Macaya: Despite the accomplishments of the Targeted Watershed Management project and MacArthur Foundation Conservation project in Pic Macaya, the integrity of the park can only be maintained if buffer zone and watershed management efforts are broadened to include the northern and southern slopes of the park. In general this reflects an extension of geographic area of current interventions without fundamental change in activities supported. Support for additional biodiversity research would be considered if deemed essential for the protection and management of the park.

Marine Parks or Reserves: Coral reefs rank among the most biologically productive and diverse of all natural systems. They provide food and shelter for resident and migratory species, protect coastal property from tropical storm damage by acting as self-repairing breakwaters, and offer a storehouse for potentially valuable species. Haiti's mangrove wetlands are important reservoirs of plant and animal species, and contribute to the diversity and ecological significance of the coastal marine environment. They protect adjacent estuarine and nearshore marine ecosystems, provide essential habitat to a wide diversity of wildlife, especially birds, and offer vast breeding and nursery grounds to reef fish.

Haiti needs a coastal resources plan to provide the framework for policy and investment decisions by the Government of Haiti, international donors and private sector entities. Such a plan could apply criteria developed elsewhere to select critical coastal areas for priority attention. Selected areas might include habitat for commercially important fish and shellfish species, rare and endangered species, areas of unusual scenic value as sites for present or future tourism, and proposed sites for mariculture. Protection and management of coastal marine habitats and marine parks, can be effectively used for both public education and research, and to replenish depleted breeding stocks of valuable but vulnerable fish and shellfish species that quickly disappear from heavily fished areas.

Two priority sites for Marine Parks or Reserves have been identified--the Arcadins, and the Barraderes-Cayemites Marine Reserve. The Arcadins are a group of small islands with adjacent reefs approximately seven miles from the nearest point of land and 36 miles north of Port-au-Prince. Surrounding the islands are a large and diverse specimens of marine life. The Arcadins are also a traditional local fishing ground, with the coral reefs and seagrass beds providing excellent fish habitat. This area could provide a renewable fisheries habitat, a means of educating the public to better conservation practices, and an attraction to tourists. The Barraderes-Cayemites Marine Reserve is considered to be one of Haiti's most outstanding coastal areas, including a shallow bay (Barraderes) and an archipelago of islands (Cayemites). The bay is lined with extensive mangrove vegetation. The archipelago contains small and spectacular cays which dot an extensive reef system between the larger island and the peninsula of Barraderes. The reef resources are reported as among the richest and most spectacular of the Caribbean region.

Transnational Biosphere: La Visite National Park, established in April 1983, is located high in the western part of the Massif de la Selle. The park, within its 2200

hectares, contains savannah, pine forest, montane cloud forests, the remnant of an endemic juniper forest, many endemic plants, the headwaters of two major rivers, a number of waterfalls and small canyons, thus making it an area of unique and varied natural beauty. It contains one of the two remaining endemic land mammals on the island, the hutia, and approximately twenty-three bird species which are highly endangered. Despite its status as a national park, no concerted effort is currently underway to ensure its protection. Potential exists for collaboration with the Dominican Republic in creating a transnational biosphere.

Environmental Awareness and Education: The project would fund national awareness and educational programs on the unique patrimony of Haiti, the major causes of environmental degradation, the importance (economically, socially, and other) of sustainable management of Haiti's unique ecosystems and other natural resources, and actions the public can take to reduce environmental degradation and help restore Haiti's environment. Interventions might include use of the mass media, introducing environmental education within school curriculums (USAID currently is planning on some of this within its elementary education programs), study tours to countries in Central America or the Caribbean, NGO and community environmental awareness and environmental advocacy activities.

In summary, the proposed ecosystem program would support biodiversity research, park protection, environmental awareness and education, limited infrastructure development, buffer zone development (agricultural and other viable economic activities to reduce pressure on ecosystems), watershed management, policy dialogue and advocacy, NGO and GOH institutional strengthening, environmental monitoring and information management, and strategic planning.

Special efforts would be undertaken to obtain private sector financial support (both Haitian and U.S.) and collaboration in ecosystem protection and management given the high importance of these resources to economic and business development related to tourism and fisheries. Additional resources would also be mobilized from International Conservation Organizations, U.S. Universities, NGOs (Smithsonian), and, if feasible, through debt-for-nature swap mechanisms in connection with the establishment of a national environmental fund. Several U.S. and international organizations which may participate in the implementation of this program include: the World Wildlife Fund, Inc. (WWF), The Nature Conservancy (TNC), the World Resources Institute (WRI), the Wildlife Conservation Society of the New York Zoological Society, and the University of Florida.

C. Policy Agenda

In conjunction with the preparation of a Haiti National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP) various policy and long-range strategic planning issues will be examined. These may include: the need for a national ecosystem protection and development plan; how to address resource tenure so as to achieve ecosystem protection and sustainable resource

management; how to achieve resettling of populations living within National Parks; the degree to which revenue generated through ecotourism or biodiversity prospecting will directly benefit local communities; the degree to which non-governmental organizations will be given the authority to oversee the protection and development of ecosystems (with a minimal role and resource requirement expected from the national government).

D. USAID Management Implications

The Mission currently has a Haitian project officer for the Targeted Watershed Management project who receives technical oversight and backstopping from two U.S. Direct Hire personnel in the Mission's Economic Growth Office. No additional personnel would be required for the proposed expanded ecosystem activity. However, if a large portion of the proposed Haiti environmental initiative is funded the Mission may require additional environmental specialists (U.S. and Haitian).

E. Relationship to Other Donors

USAID will ensure maximum coordination and collaboration with other donor efforts in ecosystem protection and development. The World Bank, as a key component of its planned 1991 Forestry and Environmental Protection project (which was canceled but is currently under consideration for possible redesign and initiation in 1995), had ecosystem protection interventions including in some of the geographic areas being proposed for USAID activities. This is not viewed as a problem given the overall needs for ecosystem protection/development efforts in Haiti. Should USAID fund programs involving ecosystems which the World Bank had identified as priority, the World Bank could adjust its project accordingly. Other donors also represent potential partners in ecosystem programs (e.g., the UNDP in its support to environmental awareness and institutional strengthening of GOH organizations; possibly the German's in buffer zone development).

III. Project Paper Preparation

Project paper preparation will entail an amendment to the Targeted Watershed Management Project. The design will also assess to what extent support could also be channeled through existing centrally-funded USAID programs (i.e., Biodiversity Support Program).

A. Analysis and Design

Analysis would need to focus on several issues. These include, but are not limited to: final ecosystem selection for inclusion in the program based on economic, biodiversity and other relevant criteria; needs for reinforcement of national and local institutional capacity (government and NGO); prospects for joint financing with other donors, private sector or non-governmental organizations; lessons learned in Haiti and elsewhere in coastal zone

development as well as integrated conservation and development programs which can be employed; key policy constraints; how to ensure sustainability of funding to enable long-term protection and management of ecosystems; how to ensure a sense of "ownership" on the part of the local people for ecosystem protection and sustainable development interventions; extent of coastal zone and park development, and implementation mechanisms. The design would identify specific interventions to be supported within three years. In addition, it would provide recommendations on longer-term program interventions and related funding requirements in recognition of the time normally required for ecosystem protection and development. This, along with mid-term project evaluations, would guide USAID and/or other donors in future budget allocation decisions in support of this activity.

B. Participation Plan

Extensive consultation would be undertaken with representatives of the Government of Haiti, international conservation community, donor agencies, local NGOs, Haitian private sector, community organizations, and local government officials during design. Seminars/workshops, site visits, and meetings would be used to obtain necessary input to ensure the proposed program is feasible and has a high chance of being successfully implemented and sustained once external support ends.

C. Preparation Schedule

Subject to approval of funding, design could be quickly initiated for obligation of funds in FY 95.

D. Resource Requirements

The design team would tentatively include specialists in coastal resources development, ecosystem protection and management, tropical agricultural production and marketing, resource economics/environmental policy. Haitians who are specialists in these areas would be utilized to the extent possible, with Global and LAC Bureau and contract specialists employed as needed. Three to four weeks is required for the design at an estimated cost of $30 thousand.

Activity title: Urban Charcoal Demand Reduction
Project number: To be determined
Funding required: $1.2 million over three years
Source of funds: Global Bureau, Supplemental

Rationale: The World Bank has estimated that 30 million trees are cut in Haiti each year. Many, if not most, of these are destined to become charcoal. Under the most extreme conditions, such as in Haiti's northwest peninsula and under the recent trade embargo, rural inhabitants have no alternative income choice than to convert tree stumps or even fruit trees into charcoal. In such cases, even massive energy substitution investments by donors will have but modest impact on wood harvesting for charcoal. Reduction of charcoal demand will be an important component of environmental restoration of the country.

In 1990, the World Bank estimated that Port-au-Prince accounted for 71 percent of the 280,000 metric tons of charcoal burned nationwide that year. The charcoal stoves widely used in Haiti are among the least efficient in the world. Charcoal purchase now accounts for between 25 and 40 percent of low-income budgets.

For over a decade in Kenya, Thailand and other countries small, artisan-made, improved cookstoves have been sold to tens of thousands of lower-income households. These stoves have been tested as achieving charcoal efficiencies of at least 40 percent. Give the rapid rise in charcoal prices in Haiti the buyers of these stoves will recover the cost of these inexpensive stoves in fuel savings in less than one month.

Assuming a 50 percent market penetration expected to be reached in five years (with just three years of project support) working in Port-au-Prince alone, USAID can help Haiti save at least 120,000 metric tons of charcoal roughly equivalent to the standing volume on 3,500 hectares of mesquite scrub land. Reforestation of this land would require a minimum of four million trees at a cost of nearly $2 million or just about twice the cost of this project.

Proposed Intervention: The intervention will promote the mass adoption of improved-efficiency charcoal burning stoves to the urban markets of Port-au-Prince. A cooperative agreement will be provided to a PVO to manage the project. The PVO will assist private sector Haitian firms and entrepreneurs to mass produce and market the stoves and support a multi-media stoves marketing campaign.

In addition, other fuelwood saving strategies will be tested during this three year project. For example, small quantities of extruded fiber fuel will be imported from the U.S. to test its suitability and consumer acceptance as a charcoal and fuelwood substitute. Propane and butane pricing policies will be analyzed

and a policy dialogue will be held with the government to explore the feasibility of breaking the gas monopoly held by Shell Oil Company.

Activity title: Urban Pollution Reduction and Land Development Planning
Project number: To be determined
Funding required: $17.0 million
Source of funds: Supplement, Outyear OYBs

I. Overview

Activity Purpose: The purpose of the activity is to empower the urban poor to protect the environment with the support of NGOs, government and business. Haiti's urban population is projected to increase from 2.2 million in 1990 to 9.4 million in 2020. There is no way that cities and towns will be able to provide even the most minimal services for even a quarter of the urban population in 2020. People cannot afford traditional urban services (e.g. sewers, water connections, etc.). Investment capital is and will continue to be scarce. Furthermore, institutions lack the capacity to address spiraling demand driven by an exploding population. Managing pollution and waste produced by poor urban households needs to be totally rethought. This project will set in motion an innovative way to address pollution. It will focus on providing information to get people to change behaviors that produce pollution, to introduce emerging low cost technologies to address waste at the household and community level and promote policies of the government to facilitate responses to pollution problems. Inaction will result in accelerated deterioration of coastal zone and marine environments, the quality of underground and ground water resources and environmental health conditions.

The activity is consistent with USAID's approach to environmental issues as expressed in the Strategies for Sustainable Development, issued March, 1994. That document concludes that "the causes of environmental degradation often are the result of underlying pressures of poverty and population. The strategy goes on to express concern for "the abiding impairment of human health due to air, water and soil contamination from industrial, agricultural and household activity.

The proposed new activity will pursue actions by the government that affect land and services made available to the poor but primarily it will pursue the involvement of the poor as active agents in managing and solving their own urban service requirements.

The USAID/Haiti Recovery Program is underpinned by a set of actions and desired outcomes that relate to this activity. However, the interventions proposed herein would be of a systematic, strategic nature to help address the issues raised by hyper-urbanization and the absence of public service systems. The activity also is recommended by the Environmental Task Force as a priority intervention.

II. Activity Description

A. Proposed Interventions

This approach will attempt to develop a comprehensive strategy to create new options and skills that enable the poor to address environmental concerns in communities. The new activity will consist of four primary interventions: 1) It will use the knowledge, attitude and practices (KAP) methodology so successfully used by USAID health and population programs. It will be deployed to educate beneficiaries on the link between household waste, how waste can be managed, and options available to reduce its impacts. The methodology will target as well the community builders and artisans who play a critical role in shaping the physical environment; 2) It will use the low cost technologies that have emerged to manage liquid and solid wastes, erosion and household water services. Cutting edge technologies developed in Africa, the Americas and Asia such as the Vented Improved Latrine, household composting, community and on-site erosion control and the like will be deployed; 3) NGOs will be used as the institutions to foment specific community projects whose technologies will spread after pilots are initiated; and, 4) engage local officials and government on the policies for which they are responsible that actually preclude the urban poor from receiving desperately needed environmental and sanitation services.

The essence of the activity will be the pilot activities that are funded, their impact on behavior and how these technologies are picked up and adopted by NGOs and people. It is proposed that four communities be selected: Le Cayes, Cap Hatian, Gonaives and Prot-au-Prince. They are all growing rapidly and located in coastal zones abutting adjacent water systems. The pilot projects are expected to directly affect 12,000 families or 60,000 people assuming an average household size of 5. Individual and small community waste water systems will be tested along with household and community composting and solid waste management and water delivery networks. There will be jobs generated but the amount will be estimated during activity design.

B. Policy Agenda

The policy agenda will focus on the government in terms of land use planning and the standards and approaches it adopts that effectively reduce the level of service they provide and the people who are served (e. g. mainly middle and upper income families). Another important concern is the role of government in planning the location of low income settlements and shaping land markets which deny most people access to land. The result is very high density squatter areas that exacerbate pollution concentration and unsanitary health conditions and squatting on environmentally sensitive, fragile, disaster-prone areas.

A second focus will be the PVOs and community groups themselves. Currently and in the future they will continue to carry out a broad range of poverty alleviation activities.

Their integration of these concepts, practices and techniques will further spread the impacts of this environmental project.

C. USAID Management Implications

The project will require the services of one US or FSN PSC who will be supported by the G Bureau, especially its RHUDO office located in Jamaica.

D. Other Donors

The other donor community is largely oriented to capital intensive infrastructure and/or institutional strengthening of parastatal utility or waste management agencies. The donor community is likely to look to local government as an emerging potential means for upgrading environmental and health services for urban residents. This activity is designed to facilitate communities and households themselves to take small scale incremental actions to mitigate pollution impacts. Since growth of poor and illegal squatter communities is projected to grow almost exponentially, it is in those settings that pollution is likely to be most severe. Few donors will address this problem in the way this activity proposes.

III. Project Paper Preparation

A. Analysis and Design

Although the framing of the problem and approach may seem new, USAID has had some considerable experience in this type of endeavor, particularly WASH now called the Environmental Health Project (EHP), particularly in Africa. Even though there is some experience, there are issues to be explored. The approach relies heavily on NGOs and community groups with few available resources. Residents in marginal communities already generate incremental investments in shelter despite their limited incomes. The assumption is that they will invest over time in on-site facilities to collect and treat household wastes once they develop the necessary knowledge, attitudes and practices. Government responsiveness to land and urbanization issues is also assumed, particularly as it relates to reducing standards to make services more affordable and have them impact more families with the same quantum of resources. Also, the government will be critical to address urban land planning occupancy and tenure issues.

Also to be explored are the status of alternative technologies that will allow residents to build or buy low cost facilities. What are they? Are they affordable? Are they socially and culturally acceptable?

B. Participation Plan

The stakeholders are the ministries, parastatals managing services, municipal officials, NGOs and the urban poor. Those who plan and regulate as well as implement urbanization and shelter programs. Engineers, construction companies and building trades as well as government agencies have resisted low cost technology approaches in principal as standard sewer and waste water management techniques are considered to be the appropriate solution to pollution mitigation. Gaining acceptance of these groups will be important as part of the policy dialogue. Health workers in the health ministry, generally, have been more inclined to accept these concepts on the part of the government.

Numerous NGOs have carried out limited activities in latrine building and related health facilities. They have not been exposed to the range of methodologies and concepts proposed herein. Nevertheless, they will be engaged on the design and development of this activity because they work with poor Hatian communities and have experience on how to introduce new knowledge, attitudes and practices.

Most important are the communities themselves, many of which are organized such as Cite Soliel which would allow the concepts to be discussed with poor urban beneficiaries.

C. Preparation Schedule: February, 1995; complete Summer, 1995.

D. Resource Requirements

Budget requirements: $100,000 PD&S.

Activity title: Degraded Lands Initiative
Project number: To be determined
Funding required: $4 million over three years
Source of funds: Global Bureau, Supplemental

II. Overview

USAID/Haiti's breakthroughs in tree planting and soil conservation have been dome on privately owned land, on which owners with reasonably secure tenure plant trees or implement other protective measures on land which they themselves will own and harvest. Both the earlier Agroforestry Project and the current PLUS project, despite impressive achievements, have had to focus, by their very nature, on good agricultural land.

This leaves a serious ecological and programmatic gap. Despite 40 years of program effort, it can be safely said that no agency has yet devised a sustainable strategy for motivating Haitians to restore and protect land that has become too degraded for agricultural use. The dilemma is that such degraded land, whether owned by the State, or retained in common by kin-groups for collective grazing purposes, is encumbered by insecure or ambiguous land tenure arrangements. Individuals refuse (logically) to invest in improvements on the land because they have no guarantee that they, and not others, will benefit from their investments. Past projects have succeeded in briefly terracing or reforesting such degraded land through wage labor or food-for-work mechanisms. But after disbursal of wages free ranging livestock have inevitably eaten the seedlings and demolished the rock walls. The result is a situation highly frustrating to development agencies: the major project impacts during the past 40 years have been on reasonably decent agricultural land. In contrast the infamous "lunar landscapes" that dominate the Haitian countryside have continued to expand and degenerate, mocking the efforts of USAID and all other agencies to restore them to vegetative cover.

New approaches are clearly needed. A project will be funded which permits a variety of new approaches, from the Haiti Civilian Conservation Corps recently proposed by a senior USAID agroforester, to a model based largely on women's groups.

III. **Activity Description**

A. Proposed Interventions

During a three year period the Degraded Lands Initiative (henceforth to be called DLI) will finance a minimum of eight major subprojects to restore degraded remove land from the category of "degraded". Unlike the PLUS and earlier AFII projects which focused on securely held agricultural land, DLI will focus explicitly on land that is "insecurely" held by those occupying it, either because of State ownership, collective kin ownership, absentee ownership, or some other encumbering condition. Unlike PLUS and AFII, DLI will also explicitly target larger stretches of land rather than the discrete plot model utilized by the other projects.

DLI will be explicitly experimental in nature, trying a variety of intervention options, in the hope of stumbling onto a model or models which finally provide a workable handle on the problem of degraded land in Haiti. A "technomotivational model" will be proposed for each subproject: i.e. a combination of technologies to be used on the land packaged in a given cluster of incentives.

DLI will also be "proposal driven". Institutions or groups will be invited to propose measures for dealing with specific tracts of degraded land. In this regard every subproject proposal will have to make explicit arrangements for four design components.

- Resolution of proprietary issues. The incentive package will be heavily dependent on the tenure of the land. In the case of State land long term performance contracts, granting usufruct rights over the land, can be granted to individuals or groups who agree to restore the land to productive use. In the case of degraded commonly-owned kin land, contracts must be negotiated with broad kin groups. In the case of absentee land, landowners must be approached and induced to negotiate an arrangement to improve their land. Each subproject will have to propose models for dealing with the proprietary dilemma that confronts its targeted region.

- Technical configuration. Each proposal will have to propose a combination of vegetative and mechanical interventions and which land use practices will be sustained afterwards. On some land trees and crops will be appropriate; silvopastoral configurations may be more appropriate on other land. Each proposal must deal with this.

- Installation incentives. The proposal will have to state who will be the agents of the restoration and what incentives will be made available to them to first restore the land with vegetative or mechanical interventions. Subprojects using a CCC model or JOBS model will be based largely on wage labor. Subprojects using a "farming systems" model -- i.e. an arrangement in which participants are not wage laborers but quasi-owners of what is being done -- will use other incentive packages and might want to avoid wage payments. Most subprojects may end up using a strategic combination of both approaches. DLI will not be doctrinaire on this matter, but will rather encourage experimentation.

- Maintenance incentives. The major achilles heel in Haiti to wage labor arrangements has been the maintenance of trees or terraces once planted or installed. Any project proposing wage labor will have to be quite convincing and explicit about how the structures will be maintained during years 2 and 3 of the project.

We propose (as guidelines) that at least two or three of the subprojects be explicitly targeted to rural women's groups as the principal protagonists. This sector of Haitian society, which has constantly impressed outside observers as the most dynamic and energetic, is consistently marginalized by project portfolios which, despite intentions and efforts to the contrary, ends up working mostly with males as the direct participants.

We further propose that at least two of the subprojects be done in the CCC mode that has been proposed by Benge for several years but not yet acted upon. This mode in its simplest form deals more with installation than maintenance issues; but the model can be "Haitianized" to work in the context of Western Hispaniola.

We propose that at least half of the subprojects will have to be done in direct collaboration with national or local public sector agents (e.g. Ministry of Agriculture), but that half of the subprojects may be done in the NGO mode which has worked so well for USAID/Haiti in the 80's and early 90's, i.e., DLI will not legislate in favor of either approach but encourage both to continue.

Because this project may be slower to start up, it could link up nicely to the FHE component that has been proposed by the Environmental Task Force. It could be proposed that at least two of the subprojects be earmarked for implementation under the FHE model that is currently being developed.

B. Policy Agenda

The success of this initiative would be increased if the Haitian Government began examining at least three policy domains:

- Formalizing the category "degraded land". Currently there are no sanctions against degrading one's land. Land is private property and the owner is at liberty to destroy it ecologically (or leave it in a destroyed state if he/she inherited it in that manner). The State might try to establish technical criteria for identifying a tract as "degraded land" and devise policies that creative incentives (preferable to sanctions) to remove the land from that category.

- The use of absentee land. With the upsurge in emigration during the past twenty years and the increasing dependence of many rural areas on overseas remittances, the category of absentee land has taken on greater statistical importance. (No precise data, of course, exist on the matter.) Since it is worked by renters, sharecroppers, or other non-owners, the incentives to improve the land are weak. In the Camp Perrin area, however, PLUS farmers have begun negotiating creative arrangements with absentee owners that make it worth the while of all parties to permit restoration of the land. Such arrangements are almost impossible, however, in the case of absentee landlords living overseas. As part of its policy formulations on "degraded land", the GOH might consider policies specifically targeting degraded absentee-owned land, creating incentives to make it worth the while of local groups to remove the land from the degraded category. (The State might possibly consider at least mild sanctions for absentee landowners who refuse to take measures, or let others take measures, to remove their land from the degraded category. A variant of this suggestion was found in the earlier mentioned Civilian Conservation Corps Proposal).

- Livestock depredation. In its current operational mode, the local livestock regime, much more so than the agricultural regime, is the major enemy of environmental restoration. Destructive agriculture, it is true, is generally the force which first degrades the land; but it is free ranging

livestock which most directly militate against efforts to restore the land. The guiding policy hypothesis should be that it is both desirable and possible for local goat and cattle owners to feed their animals without sabotaging the efforts of neighbors to remove their land from the "degraded" category. Policy studies should then be undertaken to formulate alternative solutions to the livestock depredation issue.

C. USAID Management Implications.

For this experimental project to work the COP has to be a Haiti-wise Creole speaker with experience in the nuts and bolts of both Haitian villages and project offices. No unusual management burdens are foreseen for USAID itself beyond ordinary project management requirements.

D. Relationship to Other Donors.

To our knowledge there are no other donors currently planning this type of intervention. It will be a new experiment. As successful models are developed other donors would be encouraged to replicate the intervention in other areas.

IV. Project Paper Preparation

A. Feasibility Studies and Design Issues

Several other activities proposed by the Task Force are continuations of activities that have already been started by USAID/Haiti, and no long feasibility studies are needed. In this case of this Degraded Lands Initiative, however, we are on new program and project terrain. Feasibility probes should be done in several parts of Haiti to get a sense of specific types of land that might be restored and the actors who might lead this process.

B. Preparation Schedule

Unlike other projects recommended by the team, this should take at least six months to prepare carefully.