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KHIA MARKETING PLAN

2009-2010

Developed by USAID/ Jordan Tourism Development Project II

June 2009

KHIA TRANSPORT PLANNING &
ROUTE NETWORK DEVELOPMENT

JUNE 24, 2009

Developed for

شركـــة تطويــر العــقبة

AQABA Development Corporation

GBTI Contract No.	EPP-I-00-06-00013-00
Task Order No.	EPP-I-02-06-00013-00

This publication was produced by the USAID/Jordan Tourism Development Project II for the Aqaba Devolpment Corporation.

This publication was produced by the USAID/Jordan Tourism Development Project II, under the direction of Ibrahim Osta, Chief of Party.

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ACRONYMS

ADC	Aqaba Development Corporation
AOC	Air Operator Certificate
ASEZA	Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority
A&P	Advertising & Promotion
CARC	Civil Aviation and Regulation Company
CIP	Commercially Important Passengers
DOC	Direct Operating Costs
EU	European Union
G&A	General and Administrative
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
IPO	Initial Public Offering
JAR	Joint Aviation Requirements
JHA	Jordan Hotel Association
JTB	Jordan Tourism Board
KHIA	King Hussein International Airport
KD	Kuwaiti Dinar
Km/s	Kilometer/s
LLC	Low Cost Carrier
MICE	Meetings, Incentives, Conferences and Exhibitions
MOTA	Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities
Pax	Passenger/s
PR	Public Relations
PSO	Public Service Obligation
QAIA	Queen Alia International Airport
RJ	Royal Jordanian Airlines
RPK	Revenue per Passenger Kilometer
SME	Small and Medium Enterprises
TO	Tour Operator
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States
USP	Unique Selling Proposition
VFR	Visiting Friend and Relatives
VIP	Very Important Person
VP	Vice President

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The current "leap forward" in terms of high quality accommodation capacity will transform Aqaba from a small centre serving mainly domestic and close markets to a destination that urgently needs to develop new expanded international markets. King Hussein International Airport (KHIA) will be the key gateway in delivering Aqaba's future customers. Accordingly, the Aqaba Development Corporation (ADC) is in the process of transforming KHIA in Aqaba from a small provincial airport into a major airport that will more effectively support the immense developments planned in and around Aqaba city and to eventually provide a second gateway to Jordan.

Current and future planned investment is rapidly transforming Aqaba into a resort destination of scale. Considerable development has already taken place, which will boost the supply of hotel rooms, apartments and villas. These developments include the Saraya, Ayla and Marsa Zayed projects and the expansion of Tala Bay which, when completed, will greatly change the character of Aqaba as a destination for both foreign and domestic visitors. These developments will add more than 3,500 quality hotel rooms, especially in the five-star category. Additionally, the National Company for Tourism Development has plans for the development of quality public beaches and additional three and four-star hotels that will also greatly enhance the destination's appeal to a wide audience of tourists. Two new golf courses are under development, along with conferencing facilities and business parks. Each of these developments will incorporate considerably enhanced tourism infrastructure for the destination and Aqaba will become a highly desirable destination for based holidays by foreign tourists who will want to stay to enjoy the delights of the city and the Golden Triangle (including Petra and Wadi Rum). Over time, Aqaba with its open skies policy can serve as a second gateway to Jordan, with tours beginning in Aqaba.

The role of King Hussein International Airport

KHIA has a critical role to play in the success of Aqaba as a destination and in sustaining the new investments underway. For example, in order to achieve a room occupancy rate of 67% in five years, arrivals into KHIA need to increase by 2,000 round trips annually. This translates into an average of six round trips per day year-round by 2015. While Aqaba has normally relied on traditional source markets, the increasing demands of its new status as an emerging destination and its Red Sea and Golden Triangle advantages necessitate that it now looks for greatly expanded and distinct markets to be attracted directly to Aqaba, particularly through charter and low cost carrier (LLCs) services.

ADC has already engaged Changi Airport Consultants of Singapore, which has developed a Master Plan for the airport (KHIA Final Master Plan Report, August 2008). This describes plans for the future growth of the airport and the surrounding infrastructure over a development period of 20 years (from 2008 to 2028). The Master Plan "provides guidance for future development of King Hussein International Airport (KHIA) that will satisfy the aviation demand in a logical, sustainable and cost effective manner, while addressing environmental and land use issues." Additionally, ADC has engaged Avia Solutions, an experienced UK-based aviation consulting firm to seek a partner to operate KHIA on an on-going basis.

Key Objectives of KHIA Marketing Plan

- Increase air service to KHIA/Aqaba quickly to meet hotel occupancy requirements of new hotel developments and generate 2,000 additional annual round trips by 2015 (167 flights per month, 35 flights per week, 11 flights per day – every day of the year).
- Maintain current Tour Operator/Airline customers
- Extend reach through new Tour Operator/Airlines and LCC airlines

The KHIA Marketing Plan is one of the important pillars in ADC's efforts to enhance and enlarge the overall business climate in the Aqaba area. This will be achieved through a comprehensive and integrated development approach including the air transport contribution to the future growth of tourism and business in the city and the surrounding region. Successful implementation of the KHIA marketing strategy described herein will result in considerably more aircraft movements at the airport and increased visitors to Aqaba. This marketing plan does not differentiate KHIA and Aqaba as the two are inextricably connected. KHIA will be the catalyst in marketing Aqaba as a destination and will engage all stakeholders as partners in its marketing efforts – these will include ASEZA, ADC, the Jordan Tourism Board (JTB) and all local hoteliers, restauranteurs, tour operators and ground handling agents, and operators of various touristic facilities. Accordingly, the success of Aqaba as a destination is reliant on the cooperation of all stakeholders and KHIA will liaise closely with all the key stakeholders as it implements the plan.

Important factors influencing KHIA marketing strategy

1. The need to rapidly increase air Service to KHIA/ Aqaba to meet hotel occupancy requirements of new hotel developments. This challenge will need to generate 2,000 additional annual round trips by 2015; 167 round trips per month; 35 round trips per week; 6 round trips per day – every day of the year;
2. Maintain and embed current Tour Operator/ Airline customers and if possible expand their capacity, frequency and length of stay;
3. Greatly extend and deepen the reach of Aqaba the destination through new Tour Operator/ Airlines and LCC airlines;
4. Ensure KHIA can efficiently handle increased operation and passengers and remain the lowest cost airport in the region;
5. Worldwide tourism is depressed so competitive airports are cutting rates even further to attract more short-term business;
6. ADC's and KHIA's overall strategy to increase the value of the destination must remain the main focus, while efforts are made to attract other market segments at the same time;
7. The decline in the number of charter flights and passengers since December last year must be reversed;
8. Some source markets from last year have not repeated this year so far and Aqaba must know why;
9. Some new source markets have been identified this year and some previous source markets are up, providing a growth opportunity that must be quickly built on;
10. Largest single recorded source market comes from Egypt, but this is a distortion as they are mostly day-trips to Petra with reduced benefit to the local tourism economy;
11. Overall hotel occupancy last year declined compared to a year earlier, pointing to the beginning of the dilutionary effect and indicating a major need to generate growth and new demand;
12. Need to reduce the effects of seasonality and to increase the average duration of stay;
13. Quantity of four and three-star, and other accommodations are on the increase;
14. Tourism infrastructure needs to be improved, e.g. public beaches, night life, family-oriented entertainment to attract visitors in numbers commercially viable for new carriers to start serving Aqaba KHIA.

Recommendations

1. Immediately introduce a revised and refocused short-term incentive program to encourage existing airlines and new airlines to operate more flights as quickly as possible. Refine and introduce longer-term incentive program from 2010 or 2011.

2. Immediately instigate a targeted 'sales blitz' to contact major European and regional LCCs, and major European tour operators that do not currently feature Aqaba in their programs. Until the KHIA marketing team is in place and fully active, this could be undertaken by external resources.

3. A KHIA Marketing Department is to be established as quickly as possible (refer to KHIA structiore Marketing Department KHIA structure)'.

4. Personnel to be recruited and fully briefed on all that is happening in Aqaba and at the airport. This includes AZEZA's vision and plans for Aqaba and KHIA, and they must become fully conversant with the Aqaba Marketing Strategy and KHIA Marketing Plan.

5. Ensure that KHIA can handle no less than two arriving flights simultaneously and maintain a good standard of customer service for the passengers, who must all be accommodated in the arrivals hall.
   a. It is recommended that the immigration 'booth' be relocated to the end of the arrival hall from the side – this would be easier to see and to access If necessary, build an additional temporary structure to accommodate this.
   b. Ensure all participants at the airport, immigrations, customs, security, police acknowledge the importance of tourism to the community and at all times behave in a warm, courteous, helpful and welcoming manner.

6. The image, spirit and brand of Aqaba should be better representedin the airport. This can be undertaken in various ways, including considerably more destination advertising by ASEZA than is currently available, in the form of posters and light boxes. Brochure racks with local information, attractions, experiences and must do's should be clearly visible in the arrivals area.

7. Need car-rental and hotel booking facilities for independent travelers, especially LCC passengers.

8. Rather than add an additional Commercially Important Passengers (CIP) lounge, it is recommended that any/all available space be dedicated to passenger-oriented facilities.

Prior to proposing the marketing plan, an analysis of Aqaba as a destination is included. It examines the current business the destination enjoys and examines it, followed by the airport's business and Aqaba's competitor group. Market Research is a vital part of the ongoing plan and an outline research plan to achieve this is discussed stressing the importance of accurate data and its interpretation. PR and advertising are also mentioned in the ongoing plan. The plan will conclude with an example of a Route Proposal for an airline that can be used as a model and template for going forward. The plan recognizes the need for significant increases in air service activity and tourist numbers and that the appeal of Aqaba should be inclusive rather than exclusive. The plan recommends a philosophy that a broad approach will be necessary for the immediate future so as to achieve the numbers necessary.

The Table of Contents describes each section in the Marketing Plan and each is briefly summarized below:

The environment in which KHIA will market

Airlines are presented with many more 'opportunities' than they have time to examine in detail or have aircraft and resources to operate. It is therefore necessary for an airport/destination to present a more compelling case than the alternatives in order to secure additional air service. The section describes the different planning approaches taken by traditional and Low Cost Carrier airlines (LCCs), and by the tour operators with their charter airlines. It describes the key decision-making factors for airlines and outlines the elements of a successful marketing presentation. The actual Marketing Plan itself contains the following sections:

Aqaba the Destination – Issues for consideration

The plan describes how the KHIA Marketing Plan supports the overall Aqaba marketing strategy and ADC's vision for the future of the city and the region. It describes how Aqaba is currently visited mostly by tourists taking a Jordan tour that originated in Amman.

Hotel availability, Occupancy and Arrivals

Next, the plan examines Aqaba's hotel availability, occupancy and arrivals data. There will be a considerable increase in the availability of accommodation, especially five-star hotels, over the next two years and through to 2015. But while last year was excellent in terms of air tourist arrivals, the occupancy figures from ASEZA show that there were half a million available room-nights in all hotel categories and nearly one and a quarter million available bed-nights. Even allowing that some of the lower category hotels may not have reported accurately, there was still a large inventory of hotel beds available in Aqaba last year. This section also examines where the air visitors came from and identifies that the largest source market is currently Egypt, and these are mostly day-trip tourists that do not contribute greatly to Aqaba's or Jordan's economy.

King Hussein Int'l Airport Marketing Plan

Current Business

The airport's current airline business is examined and it shows how while 2008 was a 'stellar' year, it was equaled in 2006. In between, 2007 was an extremely poor year. There is no evident reason apparent from the statistics available but it is clear that from the latter part of 2008 through the first quarter/third of this year, there are fewer charter flights than last year. While several source markets have shown considerable growth, Scandinavia for example, others have declined and in some cases there is no business so far. There have been no flights so far from France or Russia, for example.

Competitive Destinations/Airports

The plan briefly examines and describes Aqaba's and KHIA's competitive destinations and airports. It shows that the Marketing Plan must consider its competitors not from the perspective of how the destination perceives them to be (i.e. the destination does not want to be compared with Sharm el-Sheikh or Dubai, nor does it want to replicate the touristic experience there) but from how the tour operators and potential customers

perceive the competitive destinations. In that regard tour operators selling packages to European tourists and the tourists themselves will not yet perceive Aqaba as being distinctly different from other Middle Eastern/ Gulf destinations, nor from other North African and Mediterranean destinations. So part of the marketing task is over time to clearly differentiate Aqaba as a unique and 'boutique' and somewhat up-market destination appealing to higher value tourists, as well as those that are more cost-conscious. It encompasses both the relaxing beach/water sport experience and the easy access to some of Jordan's most marvelous historical, cultural and geographically stunning sites. The Golden Triangle, together with the Dead Sea, is unique and they are all within easy reach of Aqaba.

Market Research & Data Gathering

This section stresses the importance of market research, data gathering and a PR/Advertising & Promotion campaign for the destination. There is not currently a great deal of reliable statistics at the airport, and this needs to be addressed. The new marketing department will need to gather considerable data and information, not just about KHIA's current and potential customers but, equally importantly, about its competitors' customers. Successful marketing is based upon considerable knowledge and that will be one of the main roles for the marketing department.

Marketing Campaign

This section outlines how a Route Proposal would evolve, how the relationships with decision-makers are established and nurtured over time. It describes the types of industry conferences and events at which the marketing department should participate in order to cement existing relationships and to develop new ones. It discusses how sales visits will be arranged and executed in order to deliver the actual Route Proposal presentation to the decision-maker. It concludes by suggesting there may be an opportunity to consider branding the airport in order to establish an identity that over time becomes synonymous with Aqaba and the strength of the destination. It concludes by describing the Stakeholder Partnership Relationship, between KHIA and all the stakeholders.

KHIA Marketing Development Structure

This captir looks at the possible formation of a marketing department at the airport, and suggests main possitions and their basic descriptions

Target Airlines & Tour Operators

The last section of the marketing plan recognizes that there is an urgent need to begin bringing additional air traffic to KHIA and Aqaba. It lists a number of Europe's key LCCs and a number of major UK, French and Scandinavian tour operators that are not presently participating in the Aqaba market. There are undoubtedly others, but the list included should be sufficient to start with. It is proposed that until the KHIA Marketing Department is established and personnel recruited and fully active, that this short-term 'sales blitz' be undertaken by external contacted resources.

Example of an Airline Route Proposal Presentation

This section presents an example of a typical Airline Route Proposal Presentation will be developed and can be used as a template in future.

II. THE ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH KHIA WILL MARKET

The marketing plan for King Hussein International Airport (KHIA) should be regarded as just one in a number of important elements in a comprehensive and integrated plan necessary to support and sustain the rapidly expanding destination of Aqaba. Aqaba is the attraction and is positioning itself as a destination for based holidays and as a second gateway to Jordan. At this stage in Aqaba's transformation, developing an effective route network for KHIA and promoting it serves as an important lead initiative in securing Aqaba's future success.

Attracting airlines and tour operators to KHIA requires establishing the attractiveness of Aqaba as a destination. This means that:

a) Aqaba is a desirable and compelling destination in its own right; and

b) Aqaba can conveniently serve as a gateway to the larger Jordan destination.

Additionally, carriers need to be convinced that there is a sufficient pool of passengers that may elect Aqaba as a destination or entry point to support a viable commercial operation of airlines. Aqaba's international and regional value proposition as being fully competitive must also be demonstrated. Once the above are established, airlines or tour operators will then consider the operational factors of electing it as a destination or entry point, such as the costs of flying to Aqaba and other related issues. Incentives and local efficiencies are important in diluting recessionary factors and sharing the risk involved in opening a route or charter series to serve Aqaba.

Four critical elements in successful aiport promotion are proposed in the airport marketing plan (cost, service, partnership and destination), the first three of which (a, b and c below) are within the airport's direct management control, while the fourth and most important (d) is beyond their control. These are:

a) Cost of operating at KHIA

One of the key factors that impacts carriers decision to elect an airport to operate at is cost of operation. The cost of operating at the airport includes charges for landing, lighting, parking, navigation, as well as aircraft and passenger handling (currently provided by Royal Jordanian at KHIA).

b) Passenger handling

KHIA must possess the capacity and service quality to provide a quick, comfortable and passenger-friendly experience. The first and last impression all passengers will have of their experience in Jordan/Aqaba is of the airport and a poor experience can impact negatively on their entire holiday experience. It is therefore vital that the services and facilities at KHIA be of a high standard. It is known that KHIA airport authorities have in the past allowed special amenities to facilitate the MICE sector and this can be an important selling proposition.

c) Partnership

As Aqaba is the attraction it is important that all the stakeholders and interests combine in a result-driven partnership to plan for and drive growth. Without this full engagement, model success will be diminished.

d) Destination attractiveness

Demand for Aqaba as a destination or as a gateway to the larger Jordan experience is the single most important factor that would lead airlines and tour operators to elect it as the destination of choice. This element is outside the airport's control and the destination itself must satisfy its visitors' expectations and needs. The airport, however, must be fully functional and competitive among competitor markets for targeted segments in order to succeed as a destination of choice. This is the most important element from an airline's perspective as the attractiveness of the destination ultimately determines the viability of passenger volumes.

Accordingly, the airport marketing plan and presentations to specific airlines must demonstrate the following:

- There is currently no flight catering facility at KHIA (very occasionally VIP or other flights might request catering from one of the hotels). This is a gap that may have to be examined in time as passenger numbers increase.
- There is no tax on fuel (ASEZ being a tax-free zone), so there is little likelihood that a cost-saving could be passed on to airlines by the fuel supplier. It does nonetheless imply that fuel may be less expensive at KHIA than at competitive airports.

- A sufficient motivating interest in Aqaba exists
- Sufficient passenger numbers can be competitively attracted
- KHIA is an excellent airport from the passenger perspective and is an affordable, safe and efficient airport from the airline operational perspective.

1.APPROACH AND RELEVANCE AT KING HUSSEIN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

For optimum effectiveness, the approach to airport marketing must be highly customized and responsive to the target customer's requirements. This will differ depending on the type of market served and the type(s) of traffic targeted. For example, an airport serving a large metropolis with a healthy mix of leisure and business opportunities will most likely concentrate its marketing efforts on traditional legacy carriers that have both economy and business cabins to satisfy the needs of each market segment. Smaller destinations with a high dependency on leisure travel (such as Aqaba) will need to concentrate their marketing efforts on tour operators and their charter airline partners, and on the low cost carriers (LCCs), which offer only a single class of service. Other destinations may market to both these carrier types. Aqaba's unique tourist infrastructure, that combines the beach experience and the 'living Arabic city' with the integral attractions of Wadi Rum and Petra, characterized as "The Golden Triangle", require that it initially adopts a marketing approach aimed at attracting additional traffic through charter services and LCC airlines.

It is likely to be beyond the timeframe of the current Aqaba Marketing Strategy (2010-2015) to realistically and successfully approach any major legacy carriers (other than Royal Jordanian) – but that will ultimately be determined by the amount of inbound business that can be attracted to the destination. As the character of Aqaba changes over time with the new Saraya, Ayla and Marsa Zayed developments, and the expansion of Tala Bay, as well as with the introduction of sophisticated MICE facilities, there may be an opportunity in due course to revisit the viability of attracting some of the major European and regional airlines. Meanwhile, it is recommended that all the regional airlines be contacted relatively quickly to establish working contacts and to establish Aqaba KHIA on their 'radar screens,' with a focus on LCCs in key source markets with the highest liklihood of considering Aqaba as a destination.

KHIA operates in an Open Skies air service policy, which means there are no restrictions on airlines from any nation offering service there. This enables LCCs, for example, to plan scheduled service in the knowledge that there would be no regulatory restrictions.

It is an essential tenet of developing the KHIA marketing plan to understand the rationale for airport marketing and what factors motivate airlines (and tour operators) to consider serving a destination. Figure 1 briefly outlines the key factors of airport marketing as it relates to King Hussein International Airport and the destination of Aqaba.

Aqaba should adopt a marketing approach aimed at attracting additional traffic through charter services and LCC airlines.

Figure 1 - Key Essentials of Airport Marketing

What is airport marketing?

- A planned proactive effort to influence Airline/Tour Operator choice and selection in route planning/ air service decision-making, with the objective of securing new, expanded or improved air service to the destination
- Presents a positive and comprehensive business case to persuade decision-makers to deploy aircraft resources in favor of your destination rather than to alternative destinations
- Communicates the strengths of your airport and destination while dispelling negative misconceptions
- Offers incentives and defines unique selling propositions that can be offered by the destination
- Shares marketing information on size of market, target segments, past performance, trends and insights

What are the key objectives of airport marketing?

- Maintain existing services
  - Monitor service performance: frequency, regularity, passenger numbers and operational integrity, so as to be aware at the earliest time of any problems, challenges or opportunities that may arise
  - Maintain regular contact with airlines/tour operators and be ready to assist with the range of problems, difficulties, challenges or opportunities
- Promote growth by improving existing services.
  - Additional frequencies
  - Larger aircraft types – with more seats
  - Better timed flights with better connections
  - Increased cargo capacity (probably not particularly relevant at Aqaba)
- Secure new services
  - New markets through existing airlines
  - New airlines

Why should KHIA need to engage in air service marketing?

- Air networks play a critical role in economic, business and tourism growth and therefore competition for air service is intense
  - Airlines and tour operators have sophisticated systems that they use to compare and rank destinations competitively against each other
  - Airports and destination partners are becoming increasingly proactive in seeking to attract airline business
- Airports are best suited and best placed to lead efforts to attract and retain air service.
  - Best positioned to bring together stakeholders including businesses, hotels, product providers and services

What are the benefits to KHIA?

- Increased airport revenues through fees and concessions
- Regional economic benefits
  - Higher occupancy at hotels and accommodation providers
  - Increased spend in the local economy and community
  - Increased local employment
  - Growth of tourism-related and other small businesses and services
  - Additional direct and induced financial benefit

2. SCHEDULED AIRLINES AIR SERVICE PLANNING PROCESS

The planning process differs between network/legacy carriers versus niche carriers/LCCs. Whereas the network carriers, which are mostly the long-established national carriers together with the major US carriers (referred to collectively as 'Legacy' carriers), have highly sophisticated and complex planning processes, the niche and LCC carriers tend to be much more nimble, flexible and responsive. The ability of network carriers to add new services is often constrained by the size of their fleet. Among larger airlines, the size of fleet is often fixed for longer periods of up to five years, and beyond. Some shorter term adjustments to fleet size may be possible in certain circumstances by adjusting planned retirement dates of existing aircraft or through leasing (often seasonal).

The process of each of the two generic airline types is summarized in Figure 2. It demonstrates the more formal and involved process of the network carriers versus the simpler approach adopted by the niche/LCC carriers. This does not imply that the niche/LCC carriers do not also employ a serious planning process, nor that they do not consider the same important issues as the network carriers, rather it demonstrates that their process is more active, streamlined and quicker and their planning horizon tends to be shorter. Figure 3 illustrates the difference in this process.

Figure 2 – Considerations for Airline Route Planning Process

Network Caarriers	Niche (LCC) Carriers
Highly formal planing process	Less formal planning process
Centralized planning with less input from the field	Rely extensively on input from the field
Multiple levels of planning with different time horizons	Usually a single decision-maker, or few
Expansion decisions driven by long term strategy	Generally growth and opportunity driven
Contractions driven by short/medium terms economics	Contraction is not usually in their vocabulary
Heavy focus on passenger mix and yield	Heavy focus on volume, and ancillary revenue

Figure 3 – Illustration of Airlines Route Planning Process



Carriers route planning considerations

Yet, network airlines and many niche (LCC) carriers share common key decision criteria. First and foremost, **these airlines need to determine whether the proposed service will provide a positive, viable and profitable contribution to the airline's network.** This is weighed against how this opportunity (in this case KHIA) ranks against other proposed routes under active consideration from competing destinations. Figure 4 presents a detailed decision-making process for airlines when considering a new route.

Figure 4 - Considerations for a New Route Selection

When evaluating a proposed new route, airlines need to establish the commercial viability of the new route and compare it to the attractiveness and potential profitability of competing destinations. More specific considerations include:

Does the proposed route fit the airline's strategy?

- Fit with the carrier's geographic focus?
- Fit with market focus – e.g. leisure vs business?
- Stand-alone service vs hub-focused?
- Complement or compete with existing competitive destinations or with airline partners' destinations?

What are the competitive implications?

- How developed is the market
- Does the market already have powerful, entrenched competitors?
- How might they react? Can the carrier withstand 'retaliation'?
- Can the carrier gain 'first-mover' advantage over its competitors?

Are there other barriers to entry? Are they surmountable?

- Regulatory limitations – Bilateral Air Service Agreements, slot availability etc.
- Congestion at the airport
- Facility limitations – gates, parking positions, terminal space etc.

Does the market have major growth potential?

Is the risk/reward calculus acceptable?

- Potential risks – market, operational, security, safety

Does the airline have the right equipment to serve the proposed route?

- Appropriate range capability
- Suitable payload – small enough to enable frequent service, but big enough to enable competitive unit costs

Will the proposed service be operationally feasible?

- For example, are aircraft turn-round times acceptable and achievable?

3. CHARTER SERVICE AND TOUR PROGRAM PLANNING PROCESS

Planning for charter services differs from the process employed by scheduled airlines. Charters are principally driven by the requirements of tour operators, which feature destinations in their brochures rather than selecting their own destinations. Increasingly, charter airlines are becoming part of, or enjoy a close relationship with, tour operators; although there remains numerous independent charter airlines used by the tour operator community. Effectively, tour operators drive the capacity and destination planning process, and the charter airlines merely supply the 'lift'.[1]

Planning for an upcoming season commences well in advance of the actual travel season. The larger tour operators begin their **planning cycle a full calendar year or more ahead of the beginning of the season.** Smaller tour operators that service specific markets may require less planning time. Typically, the northern hemisphere summer tourist season is April to October (7 months) and the winter season is November to March (5 months). The program brochure is the principal selling tool for the major tour operators (both printed and web-versions). It is the brochure publication that determines the date by which the planning cycle must be completed. Figure 5 demonstrates the likely planning cycle for European tour operators for summer 2010 season and winter 2010/2011 season.

For both seasons, the planning cycle commences 14 months before the season. Pricing is finalized approximately 10 or 11 months ahead and the brochure launched about 8 months ahead. A second edition is usually launched just before the season starts and there are often adjustments during the season. The examples above show 'late date' editions being issued shortly after the season has commenced. Of course, with the growth in use of the Internet as a primary route to market, tour operators are now able to promote 'specials' throughout the season and can adjust pricing and inventory to suit the realities of the situation.

Planning the tour program

Tour program planning is a relatively straightforward process:

- The tour operator considers market conditions, economic conditions, disposable income projections and the appetite for new destinations or holiday types;
- The tour operator makes capacity decisions for each selected destination based on relatively straightforward criteria;
- Historic demand, revenue and margins, satisfaction levels to customers and projected future demand growth;
- Evaluation of the quality, price and room availability of the hotel properties;

Charters are principally driven by the requirements of tour operators, planning their season (and destinations) a full year in advance

Figure 5 – Illustrative Planning Cycle for a Typical European Tour Operator

Commence planning	Pricing finalized	Brochure launched	2nd edition	"Late date"	
Feb'09	May/Jun'09	Sep'09	Mar'10	Jun'10	Summer 2010, /April - October

Commence planning	Pricing finalized	Brochure launched	2nd edition	"Late date"	
Aug'09	Oct/Nov'09	Feb'10	Sep'10	Dec'10	Winter 2010-2011, November-March

1 'Lift' is often used in the tour operating environment to describe the action of charter airlines carrying their passengers.

- Tour operators seek to attract demand for their package tour programs – not simply passengers on aircraft, (as do the airlines).

Therefore, the destination's touristic attributes (facilities, attractions, cleanliness, friendliness, climate etc.), as well as the quality and value of the accommodations, are of critical importance. Across most types of tour operator programs, room rates, the quality of accommodation and availability of activities tend to be the most important criteria in the planning process. Collectively, the destination's attractiveness, appearance of the beach, room availability and perceived value to customers are ranked next in importance. These are followed by incentives, newness of accommodations, and local amenities and activities. Attractiveness to high-end customers is the least important criteria in general. It must be noted that this will be a much more important criteria for Aqaba, which has a considerable percentage of five-star properties and has specifically targeted higher-value and more discerning customers as its main target market.

For tour operators, room rates, the quality of accommodation and availability of activities tend to be the most important criteria in the planning process.

Airlift planning and pricing

The purchase and pricing of air carrier 'lift' is also a relatively straightforward process for tour operators:

- For major integrated European companies (such as TUI and Thomas Cook) the 'lift' will often be provided by the tour operator's own airline
- Independent charter airlines are usually contacted by tour operators requesting a quotation for a series of charter flights or for ad hoc charters
- Charters rarely market particular services or recommend destinations to tour operators in advance
- Charter airline pricing is usually cost-plus
- Strategic pricing to beat competitors' price or volume-discounts are not widespread practices among charter airlines.

Methods KHIA can employ to attract charters and tour operators

There is a probable opportunity to attract tour operator business and charter air service by focusing on reducing costs and adding value. Based on interviews with the Jordanian trade and understanding charter airlines business models, the following considerations are critical:

- Incentives remain very important to tour operators.
  - Virtually all tour operators acknowledge that incentives can make an important difference in planning tour programs;
  - Incentives can enable tour operators to carry out additional market-level activity to attract more customers or to share risks in new destination development
  - **Types of incentives can include a combination of grants or subsidies, aircraft seat guaranties, funds for the tour operator to market the destination and hotel room discounts**
  - Incentives could be provided by ASEZA, hotel owners/operators and/or other local stakeholders
- Revenue Management' pricing at hotels in slack periods
  - Adopting a revenue management approach to hotel room pricing can stimulate off-season visitor traffic and revenue, to tour operators as well as hotel owners. The concept is to offer lower prices on rooms that would otherwise remain unsold[2].
  - Restrictions or 'fences' can be applied to reduce the chance of diluting demand for regularly-priced rooms such as:
    - Advance purchase requirements
    - Off-season travel only
    - Mid-week travel only
    - Limited to new source markets
    - Minimum stay requirement
    - Only available through certain distribution channels – for example destination/hotel website; in conjunction with specific newspapers/ magazines; etc

2 During interviews, hotel managers noted that hotel owners are apprehensive about off-season pricing, yet opting for yield management as opposed to number of guests.

- Air cargo (although this is likely to be limited by passenger baggage and turn-around time at Aqaba). Revenue from cargo can sometimes supplement passenger revenue and if considerable, could enable the operator to reduce seat price. There are a number of companies in Europe that specialize in re-marketing space on charter aircraft.

4. AIRLINES' ECONOMIC DECISION-MAKING CRITERIA

Having completed their route planning analyses described above, scheduled airlines concentrate their final consideration on the potential economics of the route.

Revenue potential

Revenue generation potential is the driving decision-making criteria for carriers. Such considerations include:

- Potential market yields: revenue per available-seat-kilometer (RPK) is the industry standard comparison factor
- Overall passenger revenue at projected yields
- Potential cargo revenue: This is likely to be limited by the amount of passenger baggage and the short turn-around times typically required by LCCs.
- Potential route revenue contribution to the airline's network
- Potential revenue from passengers traveling beyond the airline's hub(s). This is unlikely as LCCs concentrate almost exclusively on point-to-point traffic. Thus, the notion of co-marketing of Aqaba with another destination is not a viable proposition.

Cost factor

Airlines next consider the cost of operating the proposed route. These costs include both direct operating costs (DOC), which are costs only incurred if the aircraft is actually flown, as well as fixed costs that are incurred irrespective of whether the aircraft is actually flown. These costs include:

Figure 6 - Comparative Pricing of Regional Airports

	KHIA	Eilat	Sharm el-Sheikh
Landing	$ 275	$ 538	161.70
Terminal Nav.	$ 22	$ 39	$ 165
Total all Charger	$ 297	$ 577	$ 327
	Day	**Night**	
RJ Ground Handling	**$ 1.655**	**$ 2.069**	

Direct Operating Costs

Fuel, cockpit and cabin crew allowances, maintenance, landing/parking charges, handling charges (passenger and aircraft), over-flight and navigation charges, and catering. These costs are calculated specifically for the proposed route.

Fixed Costs

Aircraft ownership/rental, insurance, cockpit and cabin crew salaries, sales and marketing, in-flight entertainment, G&A. These costs are allocated to the proposed route on an agreed basis (could be distance flown, or hours flown, depending on how individual airlines care to do the calculation).

The pricing mix considerations

Airlines can achieve high load[3] factors by lowering yields, or can achieve high average yields and a 'favorable' passenger mix by sacrificing load factor. The key is to achieve a satisfactory balance between onboard loads and yield. This is, in part, dependent on elasticity of the market and on the behavior of the competition. Airline planners must understand not only traffic trends, but also market demand characteristics such as purpose-of-travel (for example leisure vs. business). Different passenger segments have different sensitivities to service attributes and price.

Notably, the larger the aircraft, the lower the cost per available seat-kilometer. Therefore larger aircrafts are often deployed on very price-sensitive routes/markets. However, if the aircraft is too large the airline risks overcapacity and may need to compensate by reducing frequency. This may reduce the attractiveness of the service and result in lower yields and revenues. Therefore, this is a factor not only for airlines choosing a destination, but also a consideration for KHIA to understand the profile of carriers and the mix of their fleet to determine potential fit with Aqaba and the likelihood of a successful marketing pitch.

Profitablity considerations

Each proposed route will ultimately be evaluated by its contribution to the airline's overall profitability. These considerations include whether route revenue will exceed route cost, and the route's overall contribution to network profitability from the point-to-point service revenue. Since margins are low in the airline industry, carriers will pay attention to every incremental gain in revenue generation or saving in cost that a destination/airport can offer. Finally, and most importantly, carriers will consider if there are alternative routes that offer a better return on investment.

In addition to a route being profitable, carriers will consider if there are alternative routes that offer a better return on investment

5. PROACTIVE AIRPORT LEVERAGE – Prodding the carriers

Airports, such as Aqaba's KHIA, have some leverage in helping airlines decide on the viability of proposed routes, and KHIA needs to provide compelling information about Aqaba as a destination in collaboration with ASEZA and JTB. Information is extremely important to airline route planners, particularly at larger airlines that are faced with the task of evaluating a great number of route proposals from competing destinations at any given time. **As they often do not have the time or resources to develop a complete profile of every destination, a proactive airport differentiating its destination from competing ones can be a powerful factor in the airline decision-making process.**

3 Load is the industry term for the number of seats filled versus available seats.

6. PRESENTING A COMPELLING DESTINATION MARKETING PROPOSAL

Airline planners require specific information to aide them in evaluating a new route or destination. These include:

- Local/regional drivers of air travel demand: socio-economic characteristics, businesses, community-of-interest factors (e.g. ethnic populations)
- Local area attractions for inbound tourism
- Characteristics of the market (purpose of travel)
- Traffic flows and historic growth trends
- Cost-per-turn round to the airline, including airport charges (air carriers, particularly LCCs, are very price-sensitive)
- Projections of the proposed route's traffic and financial results

Sharing an Airline's Risk

Airlines operating to new routes need to be provided guarantees that potential losses will be covered by an untried destination. Incentives can take the form of seat guarantees and up-front investment in source market promotional support.

Moving up on airlines' priority destinations

In a fiercely competitive market, destinations not only need to make a compelling case for their attractiveness, but must demonstrate that they are more commercially attractive than a multitude of competing destinations. Therefore, a destination risk-sharing with a carrier can move a route higher on an airline's 'shopping list' very dramatically.

Risk-sharing incentives

Incentives are increasingly sought by airlines. These take various forms such as seat guarantees, in-market promotional support through an upfront co-marketing investment, and discounts on operating charges. However, the route will eventually have to be successful in its own right, otherwise it becomes a drain on the destination and carriers will lose interest due to lack of profitability. Airlines are unlikely to open a route based solely on risk-sharing or marketing support without a clear indication that the future outlook for that market is strong.

The power of peer success

One of the most important strengths an airport can leverage is its reputation for success among airlines currently operating at that airport. Airlines are highly prone to the notion that success breeds success and their confidence level increases by the presence of well-known carriers in that route. KHIA securing its first LCC will enhance its chances of attracting additional airlines.

Figure 7 - Elements of a Successful Marketing Presentation

Local market area selling points

- Demographic and economic strengths
- Significant air traffic generators
-

Overview of the air service market

- Current services
- Traffic growth
- Airline market shares
-
- **Strategic fit with target airline network**
- Market size and growth
- The opportunity – current service gaps
- Comparison to airline's existing markets

Airline route profitability forecast

- Passenger and cargo traffic
- Revenues, expense, operating profit

Make a persuasive business case – provide evidence that the market can generate enough traffic at sufficient yield, at sufficiently low costs.

III. AQABA THE DESTINATION – Issues for Consideration

The review of the Aqaba Marketing Strategy and the results of meetings[4] with representatives of KHIA management, ASEZA, ADC, JTB, and the tourism trade pointed to specific issues that need to be dealt with to strengthen the performance of the airport. These are in addition to issues requiring correction at the destination level discussed in the Aqaba Marketing Strategy. The following are key points raised by the trade in relation to KHIA and its operation:

- Until now, few local and foreign tour operators view Aqaba as a destination in its own right[5], thus marketing focus has been lacking. There are few operators that operate year-round and few that bring tourists staying more than one week in the destination[6] . Most tourists visit Aqaba as part of their tour staying only 1-3 nights.
- The incentives and supports provided by ASEZA to support traffic and route development need to be re-focused on low cost carriers and charters.
- Many foreign tourists arrive from Egypt and Israel (Sharm el-Sheikh, Taba and Eilat) to visit Petra and Wadi Rum. Access is currently made very easy for these tourists, despite their meager contribution to the local economy.
- Awareness of the destination is narrow and based on too few source markets to cope with current and planned expansion.
- Aqaba is a based as well as a visit destination and the average duration of the visitor stay in Aqaba is too short (notwithstanding the recent success generated from the Scandinavian market).

The leap forward in room/bed capacity at the 5* and 4* level is the chief factor that elevates a town to a destination from the view point of tour operators, and by extension airlines. The massive increase in capacity in Aqaba will make it marketable as a destination, but particularly poses the challenge of having to quickly generate visitor demand to fill the 3,500 hotel rooms coming on the market now and in the following few years. Following is a brief analysis of hotel occupancy and availability in Aqaba.

1. AQABA HOTEL AVAILABILITY

Figures describing the number of hotels, rooms and beds, by category of property for 2006, 2007 and 2008, provided by MoTA, are summarized in table 1 below[7].

Table 1 - Aqaba Hotel Rooms Available Per Classification Grade

	2006			2007			2008					
Aqaba	No. of Hotels	Rooms	Beds	No. of Hotels	Rooms	Beds	No. of Hotels	Rooms	Beds			
Five Stars	2	490	804	2	490	804	3	826	1476	23%	42%	
Four Stars	3	554	1.000	2	305	564	4	658	1.250	19%		
Three Stars	6	480	1.026	7	544	1.200	7	588	1.288	17%		
Two Stars	9	565	1.158	9	568	1.235	9	631	1.385	18%	46%	
One Star	8	142	338	8	155	362	8	422	896	12%		
Total Classified	**28**	**2.231**	**4.326**	**28**	**2.062**	**4.165**	**31**	**3.125**	**6.295**	**84%**		
Apartments C	3	137	382	2	97	302	2	97	302	3%		58%
Suites C	1	21	142	1	59	118	1	59	268	2%	12%	
Unclassified Hotel	14	257	651	14	257	661	14	257	661	7%		
Total Others	**18**	**415**	**1.175**	**17**	**413**	**1.081**	**17**	**413**	**1.231**	**16%**		
Total Aqaba	**46**	**2.646**	**5.501**	**45**	**2.475**	**5.246**	**48**	**3.538**	**7.526**			

Source MoTA.

4 results of meetings

5 Among those domestic tour operators that we met, only one tour operator markets Aqaba as a destination and has done so successfully to Scandinavia, which has produced excellent numbers of tourists for Aqaba in the last twelve months with an average duration of stay of 10.2 nights. This greatly exceeds the overall Aqaba average of 2.4 nights and clearly demonstrates that Aqaba can be marketed as a destination in its own right.

6 See separate report on Framework for Airport Marketing Department at King Hussein International Airport (JTDII)

7 Comparing these numbers with those provided by ASEZA, the latter are slightly higher in the 5 and 4 star categories, but they are considerably lower (almost 50%) in the 3, 2 and 1 star categories. This clearly identifies the need for both organizations to agree on a collection methodology or identify one source for numbers.

The data in the table has been updated and corrected to include the Marina hotel and the total number of classified hotels available in 2008. The table shows that in 2008, 42% of all rooms (including classified and unclassified) were in the five-star and four-star categories (23% five-star and 19% four-star). Accordingly, nearly 60% of all rooms were in the three-star and below categories, and the unclassified categories. These current proportions will change rapidly as the new five-star developments come on stream in the period ahead as shown in the projections below.

Table 2 summarizes data provided by ASEZA and shows the number of hotel rooms by category projected between 2008 and 2015. It includes the additions of hotels and rooms in all categories that are currently known to be planned. The forward looking picture has changed considerably from the current situation above. Whereas in 2008 just 23% of rooms were in the five-star category, by 2009 this has increased to 36% and by the time the five new Saraya properties open their 1,200 rooms around mid 2011, the percentage will have increased to 53%. Availability of four-star rooms will increase in both 2012 and 2015 at which time it will represent 22% of total rooms. By 2015 five-star and four-star properties will collectively represent 75% of all rooms in Aqaba. This assumes there is no further development of properties within the other categories, which is unlikely to be the case.

Table 2 - Aqaba Hotel Rooms Planned

	2008	2009	Percent	2010	Percent	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
5*	960	1.480	36%	2.969	53%	2.969	3.269	3.269	3.569	3.569
4*	764	939	23%	939	17%	939	1.109	1.109	1.109	1.509
3*	544	544	13%	544	10%	544	544	544	544	5444
2*	535	535	13%	535	10%	535	535	535	535	535
1*	148	148	4%	148	3%	148	148	148	148	148
Total All*	**2.951**	**3.646**	**89%**	**5.135**	**92%**	**5.135**	**5.605**	**5.605**	**5.905**	**6.305**
Total 1-4*	**1.991**	**2.166**	**53%**	**2.166**	**39%**	**2.166**	**2.336**	**2.336**	**2.336**	**2.736**
Total 1-3*	**1.227**	**1.227**	**30%**	**1.227**	**22%**	**1.227**	**1.227**	**1.227**	**1.227**	**1.227**
2* Hotel Suites	123	449	11%	449	8%	449	449	449	449	449
Total 1-4*	**2.114**	**2.615**	**64%**	**2.615**	**47%**	**2.615**	**2.785**	**2.785**	**1.785**	**3.185**
Total 1-3*	**1.350**	**1.676**	**41%**	**1.676**	**30%**	**1.676**	**1.676**	**1.676**	**1.676**	**1.676**
Total All	**3.074**	**4.095**		**5.584**		**5.584**	**6.054**	**6.054**	**6.354**	**6.754**

Source: ASEZA Tourism Directorate

AQABA HOTEL OCCUPANCY

There are no forecast occupancy targets, but based on MoTA figures, the following was the position in 2008.

Table 3 2008 Aqaba Hotel Occupancy Rates

	5 Stars		4 Stars		3 Stars		2 Stars		1 Stars		Total	
	Rooms	Beds	Rooms	Beds	Rooms	Beds	Rooms	Beds	Rooms	Beds	Rooms	Beds
Annual daily availabilty	9.912	17.712	4.980	9.408	6.804	12.404	7.121	15.476	5.064	10.752	33.881	65.752
Annual total availabilty	301.523	538.799	151.492	286.191	206.978	377.330	216.621	470.780	154.047	327.076	1.030.661	2.000.176
Rooms/beds occupied	230.471	385.031	56.638	97.027	48.572	77.548	116.068	210.917	37..292	67.238	489.041	837.761
Occupancy rate	76.4%	71.5%	37.4%	33.9%	23.5%	17.1%	53.6%	44.8%	24.2%	20.6%	47.5%	40.4%
Rooms/Beds unoccupied	**71.052**	**153.768**	**94.854**	**189.164**	**158.406**	**288.782**	**100.552**	**259.863**	**116.755**	**259.838**	**541.620**	**1.162.415**

There is some question as to the accuracy of reporting from some of the lower classified hotels but it is felt that the overall picture is relatively accurate. As Table 4 shows, the five-star properties filled three quarters of their rooms and just over 70% of their beds throughout 2008. While this should produce a profitable result, it still left one quarter of their rooms and nearly 30% of beds unoccupied. Conversely, none of the other categories came even remotely close to achieving good occupancy levels. Only the two-star properties managed to exceed 50% in room occupancy with most being in the 20% to 30% range. Overall, over half a million hotel rooms and nearly one and a quarter million bed-nights remained unoccupied in Aqaba during 2008. Allowing for some inaccuracies in the reporting, this was a considerable inventory of rooms and beds that remained unsold. The low level of occupancy has continued through the first five months of 2009, according to figures recently released by ASEZA.

Over half a million hotel rooms and nearly one and a quarter million bed-nights remained unoccupied in Aqaba in 2008.

Table 4 - 2008 Aqaba Hotel Occupancy Rates By Category

Aqaba Hotel Occupancy, January - May 2009	
3, 4, 5 Stars	44%
1, 2 Stars	34%
Unclassified	53%

Unclassified hotels: Golden Tulip, Days Inn, Classic Hotel, Maswadi Plaza, My Hotel
Source: ASEZA Tourism Directorate

2. AQABA HOTEL ARRIVALS

Table 5 provided by MoTA shows the breakdown of arrivals and nights spent in classified hotels, by country of arrival between 2005 and 2008.

Table 5 Aqaba Hotel Occupancy By Origin - 2008

Night and arrivals in classified hotels							
	Region	Aqaba 2005	Aqaba 2006	Aqaba 2007	Aqaba 2008	Ave.	Av. nts
Nights	African	6.714	1.701	3.063	2.854	0.3%	2.4
Arrivals	Countries	2.433	849	1.047	1.174	0.3%	
Nights	American	17.131	16.942	17.099	26.400	3.0%	2.1
Arrivals	Countries	6.313	7.679	7.469	12.832	3.0%	
Nights	Arab	80.096	60.899	52.571	65.051	7.5%	1.9
Arrivals	Countries	45.092	30.387	31.650	33.532	7.8%	
Nights	Asia and Pacific	16.670	11.563	10.949	22.290	2.6%	1.6
Arrivals	Countries	8.354	6.200	5.477	14.169	3.3%	
Nights	European	276.573	177.407	163.822	311.493	35.9%	2.2
Arrivals	Countries	112.103	86.788	77.085	143.698	33.6%	
Nights	Japan	385.645	446.983	354.074	440.605	50.7%	2.0
Arrivals		213.710	262.823	189.987	222.016	51.9%	
Nights	U.N.	466	1	157	-		
Arrivals		106	1	94	-		
Nights	Total	783.295	715.496	601.745	868.693		2.0
Arrivals		388.111	394.727	312.809	427.421		

Source: Ministry of Tourism & Antiquities

In 2008, half of all Aqaba arrivals and half of all room-nights were Jordanians. This shows an exceptionally high dependency on the domestic market. This high dependency will have to change as the accommodation base expands rapidly and opens up the need to attract a much higher proportion of traffic from strategic markets in Europe, USA and Asia. Slightly more than one third were Europeans and arrivals/room-nights from regional Arab countries were about 8%. Europeans stayed an average of 2.2 nights, Jordanians 2.0 nights and those from the neighboring Arab countries 1.9 nights. Excluding Jordanian arrivals and nights, European visitors represented 71% of nights and 65% of all 'foreign' arrivals and the Arab countries represented 15% of both. This clearly demonstrates that in the current circumstances for Aqaba, opening up strategic new markets is critical.

Excluding Jordanians, European visitors represented 71% of nights by foreigners in Aqaba hotels during 2008.

IV. KING HUSSEIN INT'L AIRPORT MARKETING PLAN

1. INTRODUCTION

The KHIA Marketing Strategy is designed to complement and integrate with the overall strategy of developing and marketing Aqaba as a destination being championed by ASEZA. Currently, Aqaba is primarily visited mainly by foreign tourists as part of a tour of Jordan that commences and ends in Amman. As well, it is viewed as a destination in its own right[8] by few foreign or domestic tour operators. The developments that are taking place right now, together with those planned for the medium and longer term, will change the touristic nature of Aqaba considerably. In 2006 there were only 800 Five Star hotel rooms in Aqaba; by early 2011, there will be 3,000 and by 2015 there will be 3,500. Similarly with the Four Star hotels; in 2006 there were 1,000 rooms and by next year that number will increase by 50%. There are more developments in planning stage that will add further quality Four and Three Star rooms to the city's inventory to meet ASEZA marketing objectives.

Aqaba, both as a possible second gateway to Jordan and as a destination, must be supported by the marketing efforts at the airport to bring additional air service to King Hussein International Airport as quickly as possible.

The new national hotel classification system championed by the Ministry of Tourism & Antiquities (MoTA) emphasizes the attainment of a new level of quality and ensures adherence to strict, internationally-recognized service, facility and quality levels that justify a certain star rating. Implementation of this system, coupled with training and development, are likely to improve the quality of product and service at all hotels, particularly in the lower classifications and amongst those that are not currently classified. These efforts will improve the attractiveness of these lower grade accommodations and will appeal to more European tourists.

Management at KHIA recognizes the unique role the airport plays in underpinning the destination and encouraging additional air services. The plan fully supports the concepts and efforts described in the Aqaba Marketing Strategy spearheaded by ASEZA which establishes the overall marketing strategy for the destination. Whereas the Aqaba Marketing Strategy is designed to inform tour operators and individuals of the touristic benefits of Aqaba as a destination for holidays and leisure travel, in addition to being an integral part of the Jordan experience, the KHIA Plan is aimed directly at boosting the air network and service frequency that will deliver tourists and travellers to the destination. It is targeted at major tour operators and their associated charter airlines, as well as scheduled and low cost airlines that can be attracted to serve Aqaba and its hinterland via King Hussein International Airport.

The KHIA Marketing Strategy is aimed directly at boosting the air network and service frequency that will deliver tourists and travellers to Aqaba by targeting tour operators, charter airlines and Low Cost Carriers. Priority is to develop new air service links in 2009/2010.

Since this is the first planned marketing activity by the airport, there is an immediate need to encourage additional air service links in the period, 2009/2010. The plan therefore prioritizes and specifies actions that can be taken quickly. Once the airport's marketing department is established and appropriate personnel are recruited, it will be important to evolve the Strategy and to develop a more detailed implementation plan as well as a longer term plan covering a five-year period mirroring the National Tourism Strategy as well as the Aqaba Marketing Strategy[9] implemented by ASEZA.

It is important to stress that the airline marketing function is central to all aspects of the tourism business. It drives the marketing plan and interacts with operations and numerous stakeholders including the tourism authorities and the private sector.

8 Among those domestic tour operators that we met, only one tour operator stands out as marketing Aqaba as a destination and has done so successfully to Scandinavia, which has produced excellent numbers of tourists for Aqaba in the last twelve months with an average duration of stay of 10.2 nights. This greatly exceeds the overall Aqaba average of 2.4 nights and clearly demonstrates that Aqaba can be marketed as a destination in its own right in specific markets.

9 See separate report on Framework for Airport Marketing Department at King Hussein International Airport.

2. STRUCTURE OF THE KHIA MARKETING STRATEGY

Informed by the Aqaba Marketing Strategy and the analysis under the section *Aqaba The Destination* above, the Strategy analyzes the current business that the airport and the destination enjoy and examines airports and destinations in Aqaba's competitor group. Market Research is highlighted as a vital part of the ongoing Plan and an outline research plan to achieve this is discussed stressing the importance of accurate data and its interpretation. Public relations and advertising campaigns are also discussed, followed by an example of a Route Proposal for a prospect airline that can be used as a model and template going forward by the KHIA marketing team. The plan recognizes the need for significant increases in air service activity and tourist numbers and that the appeal of Aqaba should be inclusive rather than exclusive. Therefore, the Strategy recommends a philosophy that a broad approach will be necessary for the immediate future so as to achieve the numbers necessary and must be fused with the Aqaba marketing strategy currently undertaken by ASEZA.

3. KHIA AT A GLANCE

KHIA has a design capacity of about one million passengers per annum, so it is currently operating at considerably below its capacity. Notwithstanding the overall available capacity, according to several of the tour operators interviewed, the arrival and departure facilities at the airport are such that it is extremely uncomfortable to accommodate more than three concurrent flights (two arrivals and one departure, or one arrival and two departures), in any one hour period[10] . There is little that can be done structurally in the short term to increase the capacity however, airport management are currently considering steps that could be realistically taken to increase this in the short term. For example, it may be possible to relocate some office space to increase the available space for arriving and departing passengers, or it may be possible to quickly and relatively inexpensively, erect a temporary structure to accommodate greater numbers of passengers at the same time. Implementation of the the long term Changi Master Plan will alleviate these current capacity constraints, but this will not occur in the near future.

It is noted that at present the airport is quiet, clean and uncluttered. The arrival facility for processing immigration could possibly be moved to make access a little easier. The baggage retrieval area hosts a bank and arrival duty free shop. The departure process is relatively straightforward and not unnecessarily onerous. Once passengers have cleared security and immigration, there is a comfortable lounge area in which to wait for departure. The area includes a gift shop, cafeteria and duty free shop. The image, spirit and brand of Aqaba however, should be better represented, this can be undertaken in various ways including considerably more destination advertising than is currently available, in the form of posters and light boxes. Brochure racks with local information, attractions, experiences and must do's should be clearly visible in the arrivals area.

4. CURRENT BUSINESS

There is a lack of accumulated historic statistics and what is available is in hardcopy, the accuracy of which could not be verified. Thus, data available up until the beginning of 2009 may not be fully reliable, though does present a picture of what went before. As of 2009, statistics are maintained in a computerized form and, while not yet accessible through Microsoft Excel, they have been compiled to represent accurate data for the first four and a half months of 2009.

Table 6 shows aircraft movements (landings and takeoffs) for each of 2008 and January to March 2009. It includes domestic scheduled movements (Royal Jordanian flights between Amman and Aqaba) and the international charter flights, which are those that bring tourists from foreign source markets.

10 We are advised that, from a passenger comfort perspective, the airport is able to handle three aircraft in a one-hour period, two arriving and one departing or vice versa. During our due diligence interviews this view was contradicted by many tour operators, which expressed the view that two concurrent arrivals have resulted in passengers waiting on the tarmac until there was room in the arrivals hall to accommodate them.

Table 6 Passenger Movements in 2008 and Q1 2009

Historical Passenger Aircraft Movements 2008

Month	Domestic Scheduled Passenger Aircraft Movements	International Charter Aircraft Movements	Total	Chtr vs last year
Jan	116	198	314	28
Feb	114	159	273	48
Mar	120	225	345	121
Apr	120	251	371	133
May	124	162	286	47
Jun	118	130	248	62
Jul	124	121	245	37
Aug	124	174	298	32
Sep	104	116	220	-48
Oct	124	237	361	85
Nov	120	248	368	37
Dec	124	160	284	-109
Total 2008	1.432	2.181	3.613	473

Historical Passenger Aircraft Movements 2009

Month	Domestic Scheduled Passenger Aircraft Movements	International Charter Aircraft Movements	Total	Chtr vs last year
Jan	120	167	287	-31
Feb	112	128	240	-31
Mar	120	185	305	-40
Total 2009	352	480	832	-102

Source: KHIA

Air Traffic Analysis

Since RJ effectively operates twice daily there is no change year-over-year in domestic scheduled passenger movements. However the two tables show an alarming trend in the charter operations for the last month of 2008 and to date in 2009. Charter activity had been significantly above 2007 for the first eleven months in 2008 (+40%), except in September. But the numbers declined in December and were below the previous year for the first three months of this year. This clearly indicates a declining charter market, at least in the first quarter of 2009. This is at least in part due to the decline in tourism worldwide.

During the first quarter of 2009 there were 102 less charter flights than during the same period in 2008.

A good 2008, but ...

The success of 2008 is demonstrated in the following tables of passenger numbers between 2002 and 2008. Interestingly, 2006 saw a virtually identical number of international charter passengers as in 2008. Nonetheless, the total for 2008 was achieved despite the number of international charter flights being lower than in 2007 in September and December.

While 2008 was a robust year for charter movement in KHIA, there was no increase over the number of arriving passengers in 2006.

Table 7 – Historical Passengers Traffic

Historical Domestic Passenger Traffic

Year	Passenger	Change
2002	32.620	
2003	35.016	7.3%
2004	38.149	8.9%
2005	37.279	-2.3%
2006	52.446	40.7%
2007	45.357	-13.5%
2008	63.489	40.0%

Historical International Charter Passenger Traffic

Year	Passenger	Change
2002	11.488	
2003	550.692	341.3%
2004	89.173	75.9%
2005	107.882	21.0%
2006	129.390	19.9%
2007	73.344	-43.3%
2008	129.288	76.3%

Source: Aqaba Airport Management

Challenging 2007

In contrast to 2006, 2007 was a remarkably poor year with only 2002 and 2003 having recorded a lower number of international charter passengers. The figure for international charter passengers in the table above for 2008 is not the same as in the following table (+-6%). This may be because we have removed some charter activity from the table below as they did not represent regular and considerable traffic. Also the data collated was unreliable at that time. Nonetheless, the totals are sufficiently similar to permit reasonable judgments.

The following tables show the tourist arrivals and departures for 2007 and 2008 from the KHIA hardcopy database. Only those airlines that brought in at least 500 annual passengers in 2007 and/or 2008 have been included.

Who brought the business

There are several operators that brought several hundred passengers in one or both years, and a multitude of very small operators, private and executive operators, that each brought a small number of visitors. It is unlikely that any of these would be dependable sources of business going forward, so they have been excluded from the table. The marketing tactics proposed need to be focused and are therefore predicated on the Pareto Principle that 80% of the business will come from 20% of the sources. The total for these operators for 2008 was 31% higher than in 2007 and this substantiates the evidence from the interviews that 2008 was the stellar year[11] (for airport passenger movements) to date.

In the statistics for the year to May 13th 2009, the airport management has already removed all non-commercial operators. The report highlights the activity of those that are producing respectable numbers of visitors. The data was compiled on an arrival and departure basis but for brevity only the total is shown below in Table 8.

Table 8 - Aqaba Airport Arrivals by Operator – 2007/2008

	2007			2008		
	Arr.	Dep.	Total	Arr.	Dep.	Total
JORDAN AVIATION	1.676	1.672	3.348	354	0	354
ALEXANDRIA AIRLINE	5.016	5.085	10.101			
PETROLEUM AIR SERVICES	15.880	13.414	29.294	19.501	17.722	37.223
AIR MEMPHIS	142	0	142	5.995	4.954	10.949
EUROFLY	4.976	4.064	9.040	6.836	5.962	12.798
NEOS AIR	57	0	57	2.608	2.388	4.996
LUFTHANSAA/L	357	398	755			
GIR JET	3.827	3.460	7.287			
AUSTRIAN A/L	1.448	1.446	2.894	612	562	1.174
GB AIRWAYS	3.250	3.225	6.475	2.296	2.654	4.950
FIRST CHOICE	179	180	359			
ADRIA A/L	352	484	836	827	559	1.386
JET AIR FLY	625	542	1.167	3.401	2.828	6.229
AIR MEDITRIAN	343	194	637	3.972	3.746	7.718
BULGHARIAN A/L	128	249	397	118	298	416
MALEV AIRLINE	0	178	178	461	827	1.288
DAGHESTAN A/L	3.685	5.532	93217			
SYBERIAN AIRLINE	1.3820	1.337	3.157			
UNITED RUSSIAN FEDERATION	0	502	502	496	1.793	2.289
SOUTH A/L				1.091	1.513	2.604
VLADIVOSTOK AIR	227	192	419			
TRANS AERO	1.067	689	1.756	4.662	4.680	9.342

11 Arrivals were up by 32% and departures by 30%.

Table 8 - continued

	2007			2008		
	Arr.	Dep.	Total	Arr.	Dep.	Total
ITEK AIR	1.665	1.529	3.184	513	117	630
KRASNOJARSKY A/L	268	259	527			
ATLANT SOYUZ	661	465	1.126	124	164	288
RUSSIAN TRANSPORT COM	167	0	167	322	375	497
AMESTERDAM AIRLINE				189	272	461
CZECH AIRLINE				347	347	694
EURO AIR POST				239	260	499
FLYING DOLPHIN AIRLINE				1.274	648	1.922
KYRGYZTAN AIRLINE				1.097	648	1.745
MONARCH AIRLINE				1.604	1.533	3.137
SCANDINAVIAN AIRLINE				2.771	2.795	5.566
THOMAS COOK AIRLINE				1.303	1.243	2.546
TOTAL	47.836	45.289	93.143	63.013	58.888	121.901

In the statistics for the year to May 13th 2009, the airport management has already removed all non-commercial operators. The report highlights the activity of those that are producing respectable numbers of visitors. The data was compiled on an arrival and departure basis but for brevity only the total is shown below in Table 9.

Up to May 13th there were a total of 37,386 arriving and departing passengers carried by the operators. Clearly SAS and Petroleum Air Services are the biggest producers, with Thomas Cook Belgium, Eurofly Italy and Monarch UK also bringing sizeable numbers. Air Memphis, Austrian, and Royal Jordanian have also been very active.

If passenger numbers achieved until May are projected to the end of 2009 they would total to 102,000 passengers for the year. This would represent a decrease of 16% over the total of the commercial airlines listed in the previous table for 2008 in Table 8. A decrease of this magnitude is supported by the interview results which universally stated that this year has seen declining numbers. When the figures for June become available it may be that June has been an especially poor month as one Five Star resort reported only a 25% occupancy expectation for the month.

Table 9 – Details of Arrivals and Operators for January – May 2009 at KHIA

TOTAL					
Carrier	Flights	Pax	Transit	Average	Aircraft
Air Mephis	18	1750	0	97	DC9/A320/MD83
Eurofly Italy	42	4339	1176	103	A320/G4
Jetairfly Belgium	12	438	804	45	B737
Monarch UK	32	3816	0	119	A320
Austrian Vienna	12	1251	0	104	A320/321/B737
Petroleum Air Services	236	9193	0	39	DH7/8
Royal Jordanian	22	1711	568	78	A320/321/310/E175
SAS	64	9568	0	150	B737
Thomas Cook Belgium	45	5220	950	116	A320
Total	**483**	**37386**	**3498**	**77**	

Source: KHIA

It is important to understand not just who the airline customers are at KHIA but, also, the source markets of the passengers arriving on these flights. Usually these will be same but tour operators will often engage charter airlines from other countries so we have reviewed the key source markets for 2008 and year-to-date 2009 in Table 10.

This table shows that KHIA's main market so far in 2009 is again the Egyptian market. Petroleum Air Services continues to bring tourists from the Egyptian resort of Sharm el-Sheik for, mostly one-day trips to Petra, while Air Memphis brings tourists from Cairo. It is interesting that the SAS charter flights from Stockholm, Olso and Copenhagen have already exceeded by far the total for the whole of 2008 and are now almost equal to all Egyptian arrivals. Jetairfly and Thomas Cook, too, have already brought two thirds of the total of last year from Belgium. Austrian, too, although comparatively small numbers, has exceeded last year and Monarch has brought nearly half of the total of UK last year.
Worryingly, there are so far no flights or tourists from Russia, which was the third largest source market last year, or from any of the former CIS countries or from the former eastern bloc countries. Nor have there been any arrivals so far from France, UAE or Netherlands. One tour operator responsible for the excellent numbers from Scandinavia since last year has recently signed agreements to bring regular charters from Siberia during the coming winter. Given the right incentives, the company advised that they could extend their charter series to year-round operations.

Proactive planning by KHIA in new market development

Some of the decline, in some markets, is most likely due to the current economic situation throughout the world, but it will be very important for the new marketing department to understand why there are large gaps in the source market table. As well, it will be important to seek new source markets, not just to replace business that may have gone elsewhere, but to extend the reach of Aqaba even further. The major hotel developments opening in the coming 18 months of at least an additional 1,200 rooms will need to be filled very quickly to sustain those investments. Certainly many of the existing source markets will be attracted to the new product, but new source markets must be made aware too. In the region, wealthy residents of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE and Qatar for example might all be targets for the excellent facilities of Saraya.

Also, the new marketing department must explore the possibility of existing tour operators bringing charters from additional cities in the source countries. For example, in the UK many tour operators operate

Table 10

	2008	2009*
EGYPT	48.172	10.943
ITALY	17.794	4.339
AUSTRIA	1.174	1.251
UK	8.087	3.816
SLOVENIA	1.386	
BELGIUM	8.775	5.758
FRANCE	7.718	
BULGARY	416	
HUNGARY	1.288	
RUSSIA	12.616	
KYRGHYSTAN	2.375	
NETHERLANDS	461	
CZECH REPUBLIC	694	
UAE	1.922	
SCANDINAVIA	5.566	9.568
Total	**118.444**	**35.675**

*NOTE: 2009 JAN TO MAY 13th

Up to mid May 2009, there were no arrivals into KHIA from France, Netherlands, Russia or former CIS.

to the same destination from several regional cities as well as from the London area. Manchester in north England is the second largest source market in the UK. But there is considerable charter activity from many cities in UK, including Birmingham, Leeds/Bradford, Newcastle, Bristol, Glasgow, Edinburgh and Belfast. Manchester remains the most likely second source city/airport in the UK and this should be pursued with existing UK tour operators. The same may be true in other European source countries as well. For example, in Germany charters may be organized from Frankfurt, Berlin, Munich, Stuttgart, Dortmund etc. In France, Lyons may be considered a second source city/airport. In Spain, charters may come from Barcelona (Catalonia) as well as from Madrid. The smaller source countries such as Austria, Netherlands, Belgium are not likely to support service from more than the capital city area.

Tour operators in the countries that have recently acceded to the European Union should all be contacted as their middle class populations (those with the propensity and ability to travel) will be increasing over time. In 2004 the following joined the EU: Malta, Cyprus, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. As well, the EU recognizes three official potential candidates in Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey, and a number of unofficial potential candidates in the western Baltic nations of Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia. While it may be some time before large numbers of residents of some these smaller and less developed and less wealthy nations may be able to afford sophisticated vacations, KHIA would be a leader in establishing relations with these destinations ahead of competitive airports by contacting their airlines in anticipation of their wealth and propensity to travel growing over time.

Aqaba should explore existing operators bringing business from additional cities in the source countries.

5. COMPETITIVE DESTINATIONS / AIRPORTS

Both the National Marketing Strategy and the Aqaba Marketing Strategy identify Jordan and Aqaba as boutique destinations specializing in selected niches, well suited to more discerning and higher-value tourists. Strategies will be developed to target special interest groups and to attract these types of customer. The general public may well consider and compare Aqaba to many destinations with which Aqaba itself may not wish to be compared. It is certain that Aqaba neither wishes to nor should it emulate either Sharm el-Sheikh or Dubai, but European tourists considering their vacations in the region will most likely not differentiate until a strong and distinct image of Aqaba is established in the marketplace. This is understandably the role of ASEZA's tourism marketing department.

Yet, the issue of competitive destinations and airports must be considered not so much from the perspective of Aqaba's marketing strategies but from the perspective of which other destinations tour operators might decide to send charter flights to, or to which airports the LCCs might consider flying scheduled services. From these perspectives, both tour operators and LCCs might consider Aqaba's competitors to include any of the following:

- The major Greek Islands
- Italian Riviera resorts
- Malta, Cyprus, Crete, Antalya
- North Africa – Marrakech, Fez, Casablanca, Algiers, Tunis, (possibly soon Libya, with its Roman ruins at Sabratha and Leptis Magna)
- Egypt- Alexandria, Cairo, Hurghada, Sharm el-Sheikh, Eilat
- Middle East – Beirut, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat

The following table 11 describes key commercial attributes of many of the airports at destinations mentioned above.

Table 11 – Details of Competitive Airports in Europe

Details of Competitive Airports in Europe, Passengers 2007 Data				
Airport	Passengers		Number Airlines	Numbers Destinations
	Domestic	International		
Santorini	359.000	369.000	12	16E
Crete Heraklion	1.100.000	4.339.000	26	57E
Corfu Kerkyra	306.000	1.704.000	16	39E
Rhodos	831.000	2.793.000	20	47E
Mykonos	214.000	208.000	12	11E
Malta Luqa	-	2.975.000	19	53*
Cyprus Larnaca	-	5.266.000	38	50*
Marrakech	219.000	2.272.000	14	24*
Casablanca	881.000	4.899.000	22	69*
Algiers	1.382.000	2.420.000	12	66*
Tunis	205.000	3.687.000	21	52*
Tripoli	-	-	18	55*

Details of Competitive Airports in Europe, Passengers 2007 Data				
Airport	Passengers		Number Airlines	Numbers Destinations
	Domestic	International		
AlexandriaCairo	40.000	689.000	14	18*
Cairo	2.404.000	10.072.000	43 + 15 dom	86*
Hurghada	431.000	5.514.000	15	21*
Sharm el-Sheikh	851.000	5.564.000	18	26*
Eilat	1.091.000	19.000	Arkia	TLV
Ovda	2.000	61.000	Aeroflot	MOW
Beirut	-	3.326.000	43	50*
Dubai	-	33.481.000	107	131*
Abu Dhabi	-	6.565.000	24	76*
Muscat	353.000	3.697.000	26	37*
Antalya	2.550.000	15.160.000	25	57*

Source: Air Transport Intelligence

* Malta, 3 destinations in Africa; Cyprus 1 Africa, 9 ME; Marrakech 1 A, 1ME; Casablanca 30E, 32 A, 6ME, 1NA; Algiers 21E, 37A, 6ME, 1NA, 1 Asia; Tunis 30E, 15A, 7ME; Tripoli 19E, 29A, 7ME

* Alexandria 2E, 5A, 11ME; Cairo 32E, 26A, 20ME, 1NA, 7Asia; Hurghada 17E, 4A; Sharm el-Sheikh 21E, 5ME, Beirut 23E, 10A, 17ME; Dubai 34E, 23A, 53Asia, 34ME, 1LA, 7NA, 2SP

* Abu Dhabi 18E, 8A, 30Asia, 18ME, 1NA, 1SP; Muscat 2E, 1A, 21Asia, 13ME

6. POPULAR EUROPEAN CARRIERS AIRCRAFT

The majority of charter flights and LCC flights in Europe are operated with Boeing 737 family aircraft and with Airbus 320/321 family aircraft. The table in Figure 12below summarizes the maximum passenger capacity (in a single class configuration) and the maximum range (assuming sea level take-off and standard weather conditions). The table also includes details of other Boeing and Airbus aircraft that are also used within the European short-haul and medium-haul environment.

Figure 8 - Aircraft types

	Aircraft	Passengers	Max Range
Boeing	737-600	110	5.648km
	737-900ER	180	5.000km
	757-200	228	7.222km
	757-300	280	6.787km
	767	200+ - 300+	10.415 - 12.223km
Airbus	320	164	5.700km
	321	199	5600km
	300-600	298	7.700km
	310	247	9.600km

Source: Boeing and Airbus websites
Note: Maximum range assumes sea level take-off in standard conditions

The Boeing range map includes the 737 aircraft currently in production. It is based on an assumed operational base at Dubai but it is easy to see that if the base were moved 1,300 miles northwest to Aqaba, the range would include all airports in west, north and eastern Europe, including Scandinavia and Finland. The whole of the Middle East/Gulf region is in range, as are destinations in south Asia.



The Airbus range chart for the A320/321 aircraft shows the typical seating capacity (in a two-class configuration) and the range of each aircraft. The A320 is capable of about flying 3,000 nautical miles which is 5,700kms and the A321's range is almost the same. The smaller A319 has a much longer range, 6,800kms, but only carries 134 passengers in a single class configuration, which is usually too small for economic charter operations.

All of the competitive destinations shown above are within range of the B737 and A320/321 aircraft, as well as the larger aircraft from each of the manufacturers so there is no hindrance to service to those destinations. The volume of international passengers is testimony to the attractiveness and the success of these destinations[12] .



Distance to select markets

Table 13 below shows the distances, in kilometres, to Aqaba from various points in western and northern Europe, and in North Africa that are identified as being potential competitors. All of these destinations, together with any destination in the Middle East/Gulf region can be easily served with either the Boeing or Airbus aircraft.

Table 13 – Distance in Kilometres to Aqaba

Distance in Kilometers to Aqaba			
Rome	2.436	Helsinki	3.494
Milan	2.872	Vienna	2.589
Brussels	3.463	London	3.779
Amstrerdam	3.529	Manchester	4.159
Paris	3.490	Glasqow	4.247
Frankfurt	3.148	Marrakech	4.099
Munich	2.859	Casablanca	3.046
Copenhagen	3.387	Tunis	2.431
Stockholm	3.542	Algiers	2.104
Oslo	3.829		

The competitive airports/destinations, therefore, have no technical advantage over Aqaba, nor does Aqaba have any technical advantage over them. Thus, Aqaba's proposition to tour operators/charters and to LCCs will need to be commercially and financially based.

12 The figures for Eilat and Ovda airports appear doubtful and further research would be needed to verify the numbers.

7. KHIA MARKETING OBJECTIVES

The principal objective of the KHIA Marketing Department is to increase the amount and frequency of air service to Aqaba airport in support of establishing Aqaba as a destination in its own right and of eventually making Aqaba a viable second gateway to Jordan. Specific goals to be achieved include:

- *Encourage existing airlines to increase frequency of flights*
- *Attract new airlines from new source markets to fly to Aqaba*
- *Position KHIA as one of the main gateways to Jordan*

Increasing Air Access

As part of achieving its marketing objective of increasing air access into Aqaba, KHIA should adopt a multi-pronged approach:

- Existing airlines would be encouraged to increase frequency, operate from additional airports (in different markets) and/or increase size of aircraft (with more seats).
- New airlines would be encouraged to operate from new source markets or/and to increase frequency from existing markets (in addition to service provided by existing airlines).

Critical Note

It is not the objective of the KHIA marketing strategy to simply switch existing business from Amman, as there would be no net gain to Jordan from such an approach.The goals is to increase overall traffic to Jordan through KHIA so that both Aqaba as the destination and Jordan as a whole benefit.

8. KHIA MARKETING RESEARCH FOR DECISION SUPPORT

Active Market Research

Information and knowledge are the cornerstones of any marketing plan. Without an understanding of the market and the customers, both current and potential, it is not possible to develop a meaningful marketing plan. It will not be possible to identify and target the key prospects nor to develop compelling propositions for them. The market research requirements at KHIA are relatively straightforward and are limited, initially at least, to five broad areas:

1. **Gaining a better understanding of the current airline customers and their motivations (and expectations) for operating to KHIA.**
   - Who are they, how often do they operate, which months, aircraft types?
   - Why do they operate at KHIA? Is it determined by their tour operators, or are they involved in the decision process?

This builds a picture of what is drawing airlines to operate to Aqaba. Of course, the charter airlines mostly operate as directed by the tour operators so the research would be directed to the tour operators more than the charter airlines. There are no current LCC operations, so this research would be restricted to the existing customers.

2. **Understand which LCCs and charter airlines are not operating at KHIA and, in the case of the LCCs, why not?**
   - Understand which tour operators that feature the Middle East/Gulf region do not currently include Jordan and Aqaba in their portfolio and why.
   - Examine the LCC and tour operator markets in detail and establish a database of all potential prospects.

This research would be conducted through email/ phone interviews or, in the case of major tour operators, charters and LCCs in major source markets by personal appointment. The result will be a catalogue of information that describes and analyzes the tour operator/ charter airline business in current and potential source markets. This database must be continually updated and becomes the source of the airport's targets for its marketing campaign.

3. **Understanding exactly how many passengers arrive at KHIA, where they originate; and the purpose-of-their visit.**

This will help KHIA understand visitor profiles and motivations and can serve as an important source of information for the ASEZA tourism marketing effort as well.

4. **Maintain updated information on Aqaba developments and destination offering.**

In order to be able to successfully pitch KHIA, a compelling presentation about the Aqaba destination is required. Accordingly, it is important to fully understand the touristic proposition (and over time the development of business opportunities) at Aqaba, and surrounding region and the plans for further development. This is vital in order to always present the most current information to airline planners. Therefore, the Airport Marketing Department must participate fully in the local marketing activities and be always fully aware of touristic trends and developments that affect the attractiveness of the destination. The knowledge gathered concerning the airport's own market and that of its competitors guides the marketing efforts and keeps it focused on valuable source markets and airlines.

5. **Competition analysis.**

A fifth requirement is to learn what is happening at competitive destinations and airports. This will include which airlines are operating there, how frequently, what aircraft types, etc. Such research will reveal the identities of the source markets of those destinations. As well, information regarding tour operators serving those destinations would enable the KHIA marketing department to strengthen its target list.

Key Questions for KHIA Market Research Department

- Who are KHIA's current airline customers?
- What has attracted them to fly to KHIA?
- What would encourage them to fly more often, or from additional airports?
- Are there more airline (and tour operator) opportunities in those countries/regions?
- What would need to be done to attract them?
- Which airlines are operating to competitive airports?
- Why are they flying there and what would attract them to consider Aqaba?
- Where are the tourists coming from?
- How are they purchasing and what are their motivations?

Importance of Statistical Records

The preceding sections presented relevant statistics currently available at the airport regarding aircraft and passenger arrivals; from MoTA regarding historic hotel occupancy; and from ASEZA regarding forecast hotel and room development. No further relevant information for KHIA is currently available. Yet, these tables form the basis of the statistical database to be developed by the KHIA marketing department. The accuracy and regularity of this data is vital to maintaining an accurate and usable database which provides accurate and up-to-date information and knowledge, and on which informed decisions can be made and strategies and tactics developed.

9. MARKETING CAMPAIGN DESIGN & EXECUTION

Winning a new route is a complex task, typically involving lengthy sales cycles and communication channels with many people within the airlines and with tour operators. Pursuit of an airline target is generally on a 'campaign' basis requiring many calls over a lengthy period. In order to retain focus to the route development effort, it is recommended that the KHIA Route Development Team adopts a campaign style management process. The following tables indicate the range of typical actions and processes involved in a simple route delivery campaign and can be used as templates by KHIA. The example below is principally for an airline campaign so for 'airline', read 'tour operator/s' as appropriate, and not all items on the check list will be applicable in each case.

Once the research and analysis is completed and the airline/tour operator targets are identified, it remains to design and implement the marketing campaign in pursuit of the targets. It would be structured and executed along the following lines:

It is recommended that the KHIA Route Development Team adopts a campaign style management process to win a new route.

Part 1: Management Information Gathering for Route Target

- Understanding airline structure, key personnel of influence and decision makers.
- Understanding existing airline perceptions and opinions of market opportunity.
- New route "Business Case" – understanding traffic potential for airline and likely route viability. Review existing market data. Design, script and produce presentations and documents for airlines (or tour operator/s as appropriate).
- Identify and assess the competition for the new air service (i.e. other markets that the airline may be considering)
- Assess your airport's unique selling points – demographics, accessibility to market, hotel availability, touristic facilities and developments, economic development etc.

Part 2: Strategy and Action Planning

- Set direction of 'attack', what is the key thrust required to win service, for example tour operator support, financial support or tourism development.
- What actions are required and who undertakes them?
- Required involvement of others, and third parties such as government, trade associations and tourism authorities.
- What enabling support 'tools' are needed for example route support and incentive programs, marketing actively, regulatory change?
- Campaign budgeting – what, if any, is the investment that may be required to win new air service, e.g. route support/marketing incentives, cost of additional survey data if required.
- Program of campaign.
- Feedback on market intelligence re updated airline opinion and strategic activity.

- Development of the campaign plan and acting as campaign manager.
- Meeting with target airline/s, locally, regionally, head quarters, presenting route opportunity.
- Meeting with key corporate companies to gain support/commitment.
- Meeting with leisure market/tour operators to gain support/commitment.
- Meeting with ground product providers and hoteliers to gain support.
- Attend relevant route development events and meeting airlines.
- Host/hospitality for target airline/tour operator/s in Aqaba.
- Build and maintain airline relationship and dialogue, outside of formal meetings.
- Undertake follow-up actions, such as supplying further market information to airline, as required.
- Meet and lobby regulatory bodies, at both ends of the route.
- Negotiate price and support arrangements.
- Support operational start-up.
- Assist with launching sales and marketing activity.
- Campaign progress reporting revision, change direction if required.

10. MAINTAIN TRADE RELATIONS

As shown in the campaign plan above, meeting with the airline/tour operator representatives is a key part of the Route Campaign process. Route development events provide a useful forum for Route Development managers to meet with the airline representatives to discuss new route opportunities. As a consequence, it is recommended that KHIA team considers attending some of the Route Development events that take place during the year. Many of the events specialize in a particular geographic market, therefore it is may be that responsibility is also split geographically within the team. Table 13 presents a list of Route Development events during 2009/2010 (these are annual events and attendance each year helps to build relationships and a network of contacts). Not all of these events would be applicable for participation by KHIA, but the table shows where and when the main Route Developments events are planned in the coming year.

Table 13 – Route Development Events 2009/2010

Event	Venue '09	Month
ACI Jumpstart	Montreal	May / June
World Route Development Forum	Beijing	September
World Travel Market	London	November
FIT	Buenos Aires	November
Network Latin American	TBA	December
USA TOA	Benff	December
Event	**Venue '10**	**Month**
FITUR	Madrid	January
Routes Americans	Lima	February
BIT	Milan	February
ITB	Berlin	March

11. SALES MISSIONS IN SUPPORT OF NEW BUSINESS

In order to support New Business development and the pursuit of identified airline/tour operator targets, it is recommended that a series of well planned Sales Missions are undertaken, whereby the Route Development Manager holds a series of meetings with the representatives of the target airline/tour operators in order to present the opportunity. These missions should be planned and structured so that several targets in the same geographic region are approached consecutively. It is also recommended that this activity be coordinated with the JTB who may be in a position to support the setting up of meetings in selected markets.

12. PR / ADVERTISING & PROMOTION

Public Relations and, advertising & promotional activities are useful in supporting the marketing campaign for KHIA. As part of the broader Aqaba Marketing Strategy, it would be appropriate to coordinate such activities with ASEZA tourism division, as the principal of the Aqaba Tourism Marketing Strategy execution. Such coordination would prevent any conflicting or contradictory messages from the two entities. After all, KHIA's role is to support the overall marketing activities of the destination. Certainly the airport is the ideal catalyst for the actions but it is best to not act in isolation but through partnership. Overall, the key recommendation is for KHIA to focus on public relations and promotional activities as opposed to advertising. There will be many milestones and notable events over the coming years as the Airport Master Plan is implemented and rolled out. There will be many opportunities for the issue of press releases, or for advertising/promotional activities in conjunction with ASEZA's tourism marketing campaign. The first public relations opportunity will likely be the establishment of the new airport Marketing Department and the appointment of the staff. While it is not appropriate to make public the target airlines and tour operators, it is appropriate to signal the expansionary plans of Aqaba and KHIA. The whole process of route development marketing will offer many opportunities for public relations and promotion actions. Attendance at some of the Route Development events would be ideal opportunities for PR and promotional activities.

The key recommendation is for KHIA to focus on public relations and promotional activities as opposed to advertising.

13. BRANDING

KHIA should consider adopting brand considerations and methodologies by setting out the values the airport plans to achieve and developing brand messaging. This is an ideal time as:-

- The Airport development Master Plan will result in dramatic change over an extended period of time
- Successful implementation of the Route Development Plan will result in additional air service at KHIA, be it additional service by incumbent airlines or/and new service by airlines not currently operating in Aqaba
- KHIA is an integral part of the overall Aqaba Marketing Strategy and the Saraya, Ayla and Marsa Zayed developments will all have an impact on the perception of the airport by passengers passing through it

Practical Branding Considerations

Branding is an expensive and longer term activity but brand considerations can be adopted immediately as a preparatory exercise that can be deepened and accelerated at any stage. Professional assistance is always necessary before adopting any branded approach. Work for the immediate future could include:-

- Assessment of current internal and external perceptions of KHIA and its brand values
- Assessment of existing market position and identification of target position
- Allocation of financial and management resources to support research to underpin a deeper understanding of market and customer requirements and perceptions
- Setting out future timeframes for the achievement of branding for the destination of Aqaba

14.ESTABLISH STAKEHOLDER PARTNERSHIP PLAN

The task of successfully developing Aqaba as a destination requires an 'all hands on board and helping' collective approach. Management of stakeholder relationships is of importance in terms of air service development on a number of levels:

- Political support can be useful from a bilateral perspective and in reinforcing commercial contacts made by KHIA
- The Jordan Tourism Board through its missions, Market-Based Representatives, trade shows and other activities
- Local tourism trade can provide practical support and marketing engagement, such as participate in and fund joint sales calls to airlines and tour operators
- Tourism Authorities in source markets may have promotional budgets that may be used in support of new air services on the basis of generating reciprocal inbound tourists from Aqaba's airport. This joint promotion opportunity is possible, but difficult to construct.

The more strategic relationships should be managed by the head of the Airport, such as with relevant government bodies and JTB. It could be that other members of the new team could assume responsibility for relationships with the local tourism community to ensure engagement message unity. In terms of new 'stakeholders', the opening of new JTB overseas tourism representation offices in growth markets such as Russia, China and India, for example, would provide a useful point of contact in establishing the relationship with local carriers and tour operators and could be used to facilitate sales missions to those locales. Figure 9 describes the relationship between the existing and new stakeholders and the KHIA Route Development Team.

Figure 9 – Relationship with Stakeholders



15. ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT APPROACH

It is probably useful to adopt an Account Management approach to managing relationships with the airlines and tour operators. This is the process through which the relationship between KHIA and the major airline and tour operator clients and targets is managed and developed. To establish and develop the relationship, it is necessary for both parties to communicate and meet regularly throughout the year. Prior to initial meetings it is vital that the 'Account Manager' has developed a detailed understanding of the client, their business and the value, or potential value to KHIA.

Initial meetings with the key decision-makers should take place in their home office and, in the case of airline contacts; these meetings can be supplemented by meetings at the regular route development meetings that take place throughout the year. These events provide airports with a very cost-effective way of meeting regularly with both their current clients and also with potential new clients to discuss existing route performance or the introduction of new service and/or frequencies.

16. INTERIM MARKETING ACTION

There is an urgent need for implementation and action to increase passenger/customer numbers to Aqaba. The challenge is that securing a new carrier is a process that requires a long lead time, which is exacerbated by the present downturn. Until the marketing department of KHIA is established and personnel recruited, appointed and trained (as necessary) it is recommended that a program should be initiated using outsourced expertise. The purpose of this interim move should be to:

- Perfect the customized proposal and value proposition that Aqaba/KHIA can offer;
- Make contact with selected airlines and charter operators and gather the critical contact information and putting Aqaba/KHIA on the radar;
- In conjunction with the JTB, research the tour operator market in European source markets identifying target tour operators, their countries of operation, holiday types offered, areas of specialty, profiles of customers, and select the initial best prospect targets;
- Specify and initiate market research that will assist a better understanding of how Aqaba is perceived in the marketplace;
- Begin building the local stakeholder partnership that will be necessary to underpin the comprehensive marketing campaign.

V. KHIA MARKETING DEPARTMENT STRUCTURE

The Marketing Department's main role is to market the airport (and therefore the destination) to existing and new tour operators and airlines with the objective of securing additional air service to KHIA, and Aqaba. Its energies are directed by this over-riding key objective. It is likely that it will also have responsibility for 'consumer' marketing, including Public Relations, an airport Loyalty Program (incentive program) in due course, Timetable production, management of the airport website and the development of electronic marketing (to the degree that it is appropriate at KHIA) etc. While these are important and necessary functions, they are supportive to the primary function of eliciting additional air service and need to be fully integrated with that central objective.

1. STAFFING REQUIREMENT

The size and scope of an airport's marketing department is generally in direct proportion to its operational activity and the aspirations of the airport. Currently, KHIA handles a very small amount of commercial traffic. In 2008, commercial traffic totaled 2,181 charter movements (arrivals and departures) and 1,432 scheduled movements, being 7% of total aircraft movements at the airport[13] (primarily the twice-daily flights by Royal Jordanian between Amman and Aqaba). The 2,181 commercial charter flights

Manchester Airport

Marketing dept staff: around 30
2008 passenger traffic: 21.4 million
Number of airlines served: 59
Number of destinations: 114

equate to a year-round average of six movements per day, or three arriving and departing aircrafts. This is a very small base of commercial flights but provides plenty of opportunity to expand the network.

The magnitude of KHIA's current activity and its future likely commercial activity is such that the initial department composition need be only small but must be highly qualified and creative. The Aqaba Marketing Strategy 2010 – 2015 calls for an additional 398,254 annual tourist arrivals by air by the end of the strategy period. At an average of 200 passengers per flight, the strategy envisages an additional 1,991 roundtrips per year, which is almost double the total of commercial charter flights in 2008. In fact the number of passengers per flight is likely to be fewer than 200, based on the most common aircraft types in use by European charter

airlines and Low Cost Carrier (LCC) airlines. These are the Boeing B737 and Airbus A320. The aircraft of these types most typically used by such airlines have between about 160 seats and 200 seats. Charter and LCC airlines would expect to operate at year-round load factors of about 85% so the average number of arriving passengers per flight on these aircraft types is likely to be about 135 to 170. Of course, some flights would be operated by somewhat larger aircraft, Boeing B757 and B767 and Airbus A300 and A310, but these would be a considerable minority. So to be realistic the following table considers the number of additional flights needed at different average occupancy levels.

Table 14 – Comparison of average seats per flight

Arrivals	Av. Seats	Nbr, Flts	Per mnth	Per week	Per day
398.254	200	1.991	166	38	5
	180	2.213	184	43	6
	160	2.489	207	48	7
	150	2.655	221	51	7
	140	2.845	237	55	8

13 According to KHIA figures, 2008 total movements were 29,683 comprising 2,181 charter, 1,432 scheduled, 1,329 military and 24,741 other movements (including private and training academy light aircraft, VIP flights, Royal flights and all other types of flights).

At the lowest number of average passengers, there would need to be an additional 2,845 roundtrips per year, 237 per month, 55 per week and 8 per day which means a total of 11 flights per day with the current average of 3 roundtrip flights per day. Whatever would be the actual average number of passengers, there remains a considerable job for the new marketing department in researching, targeting and soliciting additional air service (see table 14).

2. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

The proposed structure for the new department is comprised of three specific skill sets:

Head of Business Development

The head of the department should ideally have a mix of airport and airline experience and will have held executive, or at least senior management, positions for a number of years. He or she should have some experience or knowledge of both LCC and charter operations, preferably in the European environment. They should be familiar with the specific requirements of Aqaba and KHIA, or be able to familiarize themselves very quickly. From experience, good airline professionals who can adapt to the airport environment work very well since they empathize with the airline mind set and understand the planning motivations and expectations. They are, thus, able to position presentations and proposals in a compelling way and are able to understand and address questions and objections with authority. Similarly, experience of the tour operating arena would be very helpful, but it is rare that someone has both tour operating and airline or airport experience. It should be sufficient that they have dealt previously with tour operators in either an airline capacity or airport capacity, or both. This person needs to be well presented, must speak and write good English; have good analytical skills; understand all industry terminology and be numeric – negotiating the right deal is fundamental in today's market.

Analytical Position-*Research & Analysis*

The analytical position is much more about data gathering and analysis, reviewing competitive activity, looking at market growth and trends, monitoring both airline performance and the distribution channels of airlines operating at the airport, and elsewhere. It is important to understand such airline techniques as revenue management - scheduled airlines may prefer to maintain high yields at the expense of passenger numbers, which may be good business for the airline but low passenger numbers are not intrinsically good news for airports. This person also needs to be able to monitor any market incentives that are in place and is often the person controlling the departmental budget. This person should have research experience, as well as marketing knowledge – preferably in the tourism/airline/airport sectors – also good command of English; must have good analytical skills and be proficient with computer business applications.

Executive Position-*Route Development*

The Executive position is a combination of route development and analysis and therefore needs to combine the functions and required skill sets of the two roles outlined above. This is frequently an idea position for someone with a few years of experience in the tourism business and with a Travel or Tourism degree.

With a small team such as this to start, it may be appropriate to add another person (an Account Manager) once the detailed action plans are established to be able to split the responsibility for different markets geographically, or otherwise. The Head of the Department might concentrate on European airlines and tour operators while the Account Manager might concentrate on regional airlines and, eventually, tour operators and airlines elsewhere, south Asia for example. Specializing in this way enables the individuals to more quickly establish relationships with the various decision-makers and to maintain more regular contact with them. As well they would generally become the 'face' of the airport in each region and at appropriate industry conferences and events they would attend. It is not necessary at this stage to define this as it will evolve naturally based in part on the specific skills and experiences of the individuals recruited.

VI. TARGET AIRLINES AND TOUR OPERATORS

As discussed above, the mainline 'Legacy' carriers are unlikely to be targets in the initial period. That said, it is recommended that contact be made quickly with all airlines in the region to at least identify that Aqaba is expanding and transforming and that KHIA is interested in discussing air service with them. In these cases, the Open Skies regime at Aqaba is important to stress. These would include, Saudi Arabian Airlines, Kuwait Airways, Wataniya, Gulf Air, Oman Air, Emirates, Etihad, Qatar Airways, MEA, Syrian Arab, Egyptair/ Express. All of these airlines, except Emirates, operate short-haul aircraft as well as medium and long-haul aircraft so would be readily able to consider Aqaba as a destination.

1. ROYAL JORDANIAN

Royal Jordanian remains the only major scheduled carrier, operating a twice daily service between Amman (QAIA) and Aqaba (KHIA), once in the morning and once in the early evening. The flights are currently operated by Embraer Regional Jets, ERJ195 (with up to 100 seats) or ERJ175 (with up to 72 seats). On occasions, RJ has substituted its larger Airbus A320 aircraft but they are not used regularly on the route. We are advised that they have operated Bombardier Q400 turboprops on the route, which are very much cheaper to operate, but that passenger reaction to the aircraft was negative. During interviews for this project, RJ noted that this route is the most unprofitable on its network and would be unlikely to continue in operation without the subsidy being provided by Aqaba airport. That said, RJ would be prepared to consider additional frequency on the route if subsidies were also available on any such additional flights; but this is not a commercial way for them to run their business. These flights do not offer particularly good connections to European flights on all days of the week.

As well, RJ has recently experimented with a once per-week flight between Amman and Paris that routed through Aqaba in both directions on a Saturday. This service commenced only in October 2008 and was withdrawn in the middle of June 2009 due to lack of support. RJ's VP of Sales & Services has advised that the French tour operators that had assured they would support the flights with considerable tourist numbers failed to produce the volume that was promised. It could be that the economic recession has dampened the expected demand and that in time the operation will again be commercially viable. We were assured by RJ that they are open to this type of service on any route that could be shown to support the traffic volumes necessary to cover the variable costs of the operation (versus the costs of operating to Amman nonstop). The new marketing department must stay in close contact with Royal Jordanian.

2. LCC AIRLINES OPERATING IN / SERVING THE REGION AND PROSPECTIVE TOUR OPERATORS

The following sections present LCC Airlines for KHIA to target as well as prospective tour operators that may produce visitors to Aqaba.

LCC AIRLINES IN THE REGION

There are several LCC airlines in the Middle East/Gulf region, all of which could be approached. These are:

Established by an Amiri decree issued by the Ruler of Sharjah. Services were launched with flights to Bahrain, Kuwait Lebanon, Oman and Syria, but were quickly expanded to Afghanistan, Cyprus, Greece, India, Nepal and Turkey as well as destinations in Central Asia and the countries of the Gulf Co-operation Council. Air Arabia's IPO in March 2007 was fifty per cent oversubscribed, and had the effect of reducing the shareholdings of the carrier's major institutional investors by floating 55 per cent of the airline's capital, since reduced. Air Arabia transformed from a Limited Liability Company (LLC) to a Public Joint Stock Company (PJSC) on 19 June 2007, becoming the first publicly owned airline in the Arab World. In November 2007 Air Arabia assumed managerial control of Casablanca-based Region Air Lines. As part of the co-operation between the two carriers, Regional Air Lines was rebranded and switched to a low cost model of operations, effectively creating a new hub for Air Arabia, at that time planned for Rabat, Morocco. Also in November 2007, the company signed an agreement with Airbus to purchase up to 49 A320 aircraft. On 20 January 2008 Air Arabia effectively opened its second hub at Kathmandu, Nepal through the launch of flyyeti.com, a new low cost carrier created as a joint venture with Yeti Airlines, which has subsequently ceased operations. The network was extended to Southern Europe on 22 April 2009 with new services between Sharjah and Athens. Air Arabia has been extremely successful and carried 1,760,000 passengers in 2006, 2,700,000 in 2007 and 3,560,000 in 2008. The airline has been profitable since 2005 with net results of $27.5mn in 2006, $76.81mn in 2007 and $138,79mn in 2008.

العربيـــــة للطـــــيران
airarabia.com
Be Smart. Pay Less. Fly More.

Date established:
03 February 2003

Date operations started:
29 October 2003

Privately-owned start-up low-cost carrier initially operating "Premium Low Priced" services from Bahrain to Alexandria, Beirut, Damascus, Dubai Kuwait and Mashad. Services were launched using a fleet of three, two-class Airbus A320s. Plans call for the expansion of services to destinations within the countries of the Gulf Co-operation Council, Middle East, Levant and the Indian sub-continent. Services to India were launched on 26 May 2008 with a flight to Cochin. The network is expected to serve 14 destinations by April 2008, rising to 25 by 2010. No passenger numbers or financial results are so far available for Bahrain Air.

طيران البحرين
Bahrain Air

Date established:
02 July 2007

Date operations started:
03 February 2008

Date established:
Mar 2008

Date operations started:
01 Jun 2009

Emirates' start-up low-cost subsidiary. Services are initially focused on linking Dubai with cities in the Middle East, GCC and India. The airline later plans to extend the network to Iran, Eastern Europe and North & East Africa. The government of Dubai announced the formation of a new low cost airline in March 2008, as a subsidiary of flag carrier Emirates. The new carrier was created with launch capital of US $67 million. On 26 June 2008 the airline was named 'flydubai'. In July 2008 flydubai ordered 54 Next-Generation 737-800 aircraft from Boeing. They were to be fitted with 189 economy class seats. In March 2009 the airline announced that it would operate from Dubai International Airport's recently modernized and enhanced Terminal 2. After receiving its AOC on 25 May 2009, the airline launched services from Dubai on 1 June 2009, starting with services to Beirut, followed by Amman on 2 June, Damascus on 8 June and Alexandria on 9 June 2009.

Date established:
Jun 2004

Date operations started:
30 Oct 2005

Low-fare airline operating scheduled services on linking some of the most popular business and leisure destinations in Bahrain, Dubai, Egypt, India, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey through two main hubs in Kuwait and Dubai. The Kuwait Cabinet approved the launch of Jazeera Airways in November 2003. The carrier was duly formed by the Boodai Group as Kuwait's first private low-fare airline in June 2004, following a successful IPO which offered seventy per cent of its capital. Operations were launched on 31 October 2005 with services between Kuwait City and Dubai. On 8 February 2007 Jazeera introduced operations from a second hub, becoming the first low-fare airline to operate from Dubai International Airport. Initial services linked Dubai with Bahrain, with six further routes added on 27 March 2007. Further new hubs are expected. Jazeera doubled its capital to KD 20 million in late 2007 through a rights issue to existing shareholders. In February 2009 the airline announced that it had sold and leased back its entire fleet of eight Airbus A320's to its newly created leasing operation. This provided extra funding which made the carrier "Cash rich and free of debt". Jazeera carried 1,180,000 passengers in 2007 and 1,400,000 in 2008. The airline made a net profit of $8.66mn in 2006, $8,08mn in 2007 and $16.7mn in 2008.

Date established:
April 2006

Date operations started:
25 February 2007

Saudi Arabia's first low cost carrier, offering ticketless, no frills, single class domestic services to over twenty destinations throughout the Kingdom from Riyadh's King Khaled International Airport. International routes serve Alexandria, Amman and Beirut. In addition to linking major cities the privately-owned carrier also operates over twenty Public Service Obligation routes across the Kingdom. Other activities include all business class VIP shuttle and charter flight services under the "Al Khayala" brand. Nas air was established in April 2006 by the NAS Group of Companies with investment from Abraaj Capital. It received Saudi Arabia's first private air carrier license on 5 December 2006. The first flight took place between Riyadh and Jeddah on 25 February 2007. The initial network served five cities from Riyadh. In October 2007 nas air commenced flights on 21 public service obligation routes, in accordance with the Air Traffic Privatization Act. In June 2008, the Saudi investment company Kingdom Holdings Company acquired a 30 per cent shareholding in parent company, National Air Services, whose other airline interest is Kayala Airline. International services were launched on 23 July 2008 from Jeddah and Riyadh to Alexandria, Amman and Beirut. No passenger numbers or financial results are yet available for nas air.

Privately owned Saudi low-cost airline operating scheduled domestic services linking Riyadh with Abha, Damman, Gizan, Jeddah and Madinah. Regional charter services are also flown. Founded by Investment Enterprises Ltd, which is chaired by HRH Prince Bandar bin Khalid al Faisal. Established with initial investment received from around thirty major Saudi private and institutional investors. Regional charter services to Abu Dhabi and Sharjah were introduced in November 2007, followed by Amman in December 2007. In its first year of operation, Sama carried 600,000 passengers but the 2008 figure is not yet available. No figures for financial results are available.

Date established:
February 2006

Date operations started:
18 March 2007

LCC AIRLINES IN EUROPE

There are a great number of LCC airlines operating throughout Europe, so for this initial sales activity it is proposed that only some of the larger of these is approached. Some or all of the following airlines could be approached initially.

LCC AIRLINES IN EUROPE

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One of Europe's largest low-fares airlines, operating over 600 routes, from more than 25 European bases to over 26 European countries. Established by the late Dr. Tony Ryan and his family. Launched services with a flight between Waterford and London Gatwick, operated by a 15-seat Bandeirante twin-turboprop. Launched services to Dublin from London Luton in May 1986. BAC 1-11-500s were wet-leased from Tarom in 1987 to expand the UK and Irish network to 15 destinations. Regional routes were also introduced using ATR-42 turboprops. By 1990 and despite three years of rapid growth in both fleet and routes, the company had accumulated losses of £20 million. After a substantial restructuring, Ryanair was re-launched under new management in 1991, adopting the low-fares business model which had proved so successful in the US for Southwest Airlines. Regional routes were discontinued in 1991 and the by following year the route networked had been reduced from 19 to six, while frequencies on the remaining routes had been significantly increased. European services were launched in 1997, with services from London Stansted to Stockholm Skavsta and Oslo Torp, and from Dublin to Paris Beauvais and Brussels Charleroi. The airline was floated on the NASDAQ stock exchange in 1991 and valued at US $500 Million. In early 2001 the airline invested US $100 million to establish its first European 'mini-hub' at Brussels Charleroi Airport, from which to operate services to French, Italian, Irish and UK destinations with a based fleet of four Boeing 737s. In early 2003, Ryanair acquired London Stansted-based low-fare operator buzz from KLM and integrated buzz services into its own. In May 2007 the company won the tender to operate the Dublin-Kerry PSO route from the Irish Government. Ryanair is among the largest of all airlines operating in Europe and carried 42,510,000 passengers in 2006, 50,930,000 in 2007 and 57,650,000 in 2008.It has been consistently profitable and achieved net results of $518mn in 2006, $686.8mn in 2007 and $147.7mn in 2008 (a year which saw most airlines worldwide returning significantly negative results).

Date established:
May 1985

Date operations started:
July 1985

Date established:
18 October 1995

Date operations started:
10 November 1995

One of Europe's largest low fare airlines, operating frequent daily scheduled services for both leisure and business passengers, to more than 280 routes between over seventy major cities across Europe. Stelios Haji-Ioannou launched easyJet with two leased aircraft operating from London Luton on routes to Glasgow and Edinburgh. Operations from Liverpool Airport began in 1997. EasyJet acquired a 40 per cent stake in TEA Switzerland in March 1998. The airline was floated on the London Stock Exchange in October 2000. It completed the acquisition of Go Fly Aviation (established by British Airways in May 1998) on 10 December 2002. The FL Group acquired an 11.5 per cent stake in the airline in October 2004, which was increased to 16.18 per cent in October 2005, before being sold off on 5 May 2006. Blackrock Investment Management acquired a minority share in the airline in August 2007. On 25 October 2007, easyJet announced that it had agreed to acquire GB Airways for GBP 103.5 million (US $212 million) in cash. The deal received Office of Fair Trading approval and was expected to be completed in January 2008. The GB Airways fleet was fully integrated under a new European AOC by 31 March 2008. Operations from Manchester Airport were launched on 29 September 2008 with a service to Alicante. easyjet has shown continual growth and carried 27,970,000 passengers in 2006, 30,070,000 in 2007 and 37,570,000 in 2008. Also consistently profitable, the airline's net results were $170mn in 2006, $301 mn in 2007 and $164mn in 2008.

Date established:
11 July 1978

Date operations started:
28 April 1979

Operates low-fare seat only and inclusive tour flights to holiday resorts in the Mediterranean, Canary Islands and North Africa, as well as to major European cities from over 15 German airports. An extensive domestic network is also served. Air Berlin originally aimed to provide 'blanket coverage' of Germany with services from a range of 'fringe' airports all over Germany. Seat only services were introduced in 1998, reducing the company's reliance on tour operators. The highly successful 'Mallorca Shuttle' seat only service from a dozen German cities, led to seat only services being made available on all routes. Through the IPO issued on 11 May 2006, Air Berlin became the second German airline to list on the SDAX stock exchange. Air Berlin acquired the remaining shares of dba Luftfahrtgesellschaft on 17 August 2006, and phased out the dba brand during 2007. On 27 March 2007, Air Berlin announced the acquisition of a 49 per cent stake in Swiss carrier Belair and a 100 per cent stake in long-haul carrier LTU, which will be used to introduce Air Berlin long haul passenger and freight services to new destinations, including China. Both acquisitions received regulatory approval during August 2007. Air Berlin introduced an extensive domestic network following the integration of former dba routes from 1 April 2007. DBA continued to operate three Boeing 737-300s as a division of Air Berlin until its official closure on 30 November 2008. On 20 September 2007 Air Berlin agreed to acquire holiday carrier Condor, from Thomas Cook in two stages commencing in February 2009, subject to regulatory approval. In March 2008 the German anti-trust authority Bundeskartellamt advised the airline that it was likely to block the merger with Condor. On 11 July 2008 Air Berlin and Condor mutually agreed to abandon all merger plans. On 10 October 2008 the airline operated its first ever turboprop services, between Düsseldorf and Stuttgart, operated by the first of ten new Bombardier Dash 8 Q400 aircraft. In March 2009 Air Berlin and TUIfly sealed a cross ownership agreement whereby each carrier would acquire, on 1 October 2009, a minority stake in the other. As part of this arrangement, Air Berlin agreed to wet lease 17 aircraft from TUIfly for ten years. Air Berlin will operate these aircraft to operate 100 former TUIfly city routes between 45 cities. In March 2009, the acquisition of a minority stake by Turkish carrier Pegasus Airlines' parent company was agreed, receiving regulatory approval the following month. Air Berlin's passenger numbers have shown consistent growth and in 2006 the airline carried 25,560,000 passengers, 28,210,000 in 2007 and 28,560,000 in 2008. Its profitability has not been so consistent and after a loss of -$145 5mn in 2005, it made a net profit in the next two years, $63.7mn in 2006 and $28.9mn in 2007, before declaring another net loss of -$110.2mn in 2008.

Date established:
2002

Date operations started:
27 October 2002

Low fare airline serving 70 destinations throughout Europe from its main base at Cologne / Bonn and hubs throughout Germany, including Berlin, Dresden, Hamburg, Leipzig, Munich and Stuttgart. Established as the low cost carrier subsidiary of Eurowings, it launched services in October 2002 from Cologne/Bonn, Berlin Schönefeld, Dresden, Leipzig and Munich to 35 European destinations. Talks on a potential three-way merger with Condor and TUIfly in July 2008 were replaced in August 2008 with talks on a possible merger with Condor. In December 2008 German flag carrier Lufthansa agreed to buy Germanwings from Eurowings. The deal was completed on 1 January 2009. Passenger numbers have been relatively constant in the last three years, being 7,090,000 passengers in 2006, 7,890,000 in 2007 and 7,620,000 in 2008. No financial results are available.

Date established:
01 June 1967

Date operations started:
05 April 1968

Monarch Scheduled
Date established:
March 2002

Low-cost division of Monarch Airlines, Monarch Scheduled operates flights within Europe.
Monarch Airlines is one of the UK's largest charter carriers operating on routes to Europe, USA, the Caribbean, India, Africa, serving mainly leisure destinations. Also operated a scheduled service (under the Monarch Scheduled brand) from London Luton, Gatwick, Manchester and Birmingham to Mediterranean destinations and the Canaries. Scheduled services were added on 5 July 1986. Traffic has grown recently with 3,130,000 passengers carried in 2006, 3,630,000 in 2007 and 3,850,000 in 2008. Following an excellent $9.74mn net profit in 2007, the airline did well to survive the downturn in 2008 returning a net result of $0.14mn.

Date established:
May 1955

Date operations started:
October 1995

A division of Air Berlin PLC, offering frequent scheduled flights on long and medium-haul routes. LTU is unique among German carriers in offering passengers a universal two-class system, even in the low-fare sector. Charter flights are also flown. Destinations are located in the Mediterranean, the Americas, East Africa, South Africa and the Far East. LTU was founded as Lufttransport Union, the present name being adopted in 1956. In 1992 LTU acquired a 25 per cent stake in Spanish charter carrier LTE International Airways. During 1998 SAirGroup took management control of LTU. In July 2000 SAir announced a three-year restructuring plan which aimed to reduce LTU fleet by 25 per cent, switch to an all Airbus fleet, and to find a new partner. In August 2000 SAir unveiled a new partnership for LTU with German tour operator Rewe Touristik. In February 2006, Intro Verwaltungs GmbH, the investment company which owned low-cost carrier DBA acquired a 60 per cent stake LTU. It later sold 24 per cent of its shares to LTU managing director Jurgen Marbach. On 9 June 2006, Intro announced that it acquired further shares from Rewe, and now held 76 per cent of LTU. Air Berlin agreed to acquire LTU on 27 March 2007, receiving German Cartel Office approval on 8 August 2007. LTU carried 5,600,000 passengers in 2006, 5,800,000 in 2007 and 4,570,000 in 2008. No financial results are available.

Date established:
17 January 2002

Date operations started:
20 March 2002

Low-cost division of bmi British Midland, operating domestic scheduled services linking over eight UK and Jersey destinations from hubs at East Midlands, Birmingham, Cardiff and Manchester, as well as international services to two dozen European destinations. It began operations with a first flight between East Midlands and Malaga in 2004. Now operates an all Boeing fleet of 148-seat 737-300s and 131 seat 737-500s. Operating under its own AOC since 2004. The airline carried 4,070,000 passengers in 2006, 4,290,000 in 2007 and 4,080,000 in 2008. Financial results are currently included in parent bmi's results.

Date established:
July 1972

Date operations started:
30 March 1973

The German-based arm of TUI AG, operating scheduled and charter passenger flights primarily on an intra-European route network serving around 80 destinations in 17 countries. Originally formed as Hapag-Lloyd Flugzeug, part of the tourism group TUI AG, which was in turn owned by Preussag. Gained federal authority to merge with Bavaria-German Air in January 1979. In October 2000 Hapag-Lloyd became the first airline to operate the winglet-equipped Boeing 737-800. On 28 April 2005 Hapag-Lloyd re-branded as Hapagfly with the aim of strengthening its internet presence and boosting its seat-only business. On 31 August 2006 parent company TUI AG announced its intention to merge all its constituent airlines throughout Europe under the 'TUIfly' brand. As an initial step, Hapagfly and low-cost sister carrier Hapag-Lloyd Express (HLX) began an amalgamation process from mid-Jan 2007. By mid April 2007 Hapagfly and HLX were operating under the new joint TUIfly brand, while continuing, for the time being to operate on separate AOCs. Plans, both to merge all TUI carriers during 2008 and a possible three-way merger with Condor and Germanwings, considered in the summer of 2008, did not materialize. In March 2009 TUIfly and Air Berlin sealed a cross ownership agreement whereby each carrier acquired a minority stake in the other. As part of this arrangement, TUIfly agreed to wet lease 17 aircraft to Air Berlin for ten years. Air Berlin will operate these aircraft to operate 100 former TUIfly city routes between 45 cities. 9,340,000 passengers were carried in 2006, 9,840,000 in 2007 and 10,560,000 in 2008. No separate financial results are available.

Transavia.com is a low-cost Dutch operator providing scheduled and charter services to leisure destinations. The scheduled network serves 26 destinations from hubs at Amsterdam, Eindhoven and Rotterdam, while charter services are flown to more than 60 destinations throughout Europe, the Mediterranean, North Africa and the Middle East. Transavia was formed as Transavia Limburg, later becoming known as Transavia Holland. In 1986 the name was changed to Transavia Airlines, and it was the first airline to take advantage of the world's first open skies agreement signed between the UK and Dutch governments. Transavia started operating the route between Amsterdam and London Gatwick, its first scheduled service, on 26 October. During 1991 the airline's major shareholder, Nedlloyd, sold its 80 per cent holding to the Dutch national carrier KLM. In 1992 Transavia became the first airline to gain the JAR145 certificate and in March 1997 it was the first airline to gain the JAR-OPS 1 certificate. In 1998 it was the first carrier to operate domestic services in Greece following a change in Greek aviation law. In June 1998 Transavia took delivery of the first of twelve 737-800s. In summer 2000 it started scheduled services from Amsterdam to Catania, Naples and Pisa in Italy. In June 2003 KLM acquired the remaining 20 per cent of Transavia, making the company 100 per cent KLM owned. In January 2005, the brands of Transavia and Basiq Air merged. On 2 January 2006 the company adopted the 'transavia.com' brand. Transavia carried 5,140,000 passengers in 2006, 5,420,000 in 2007 and 5,500,000 in 2008. The airline is profitable with net results of $27.3mn in 2006, $16.7mn in 2007 and $10.3mn in 2008. Transavia also has subsidiaries in Denmark and France.

Date established:
1966

Date operations started:
17 November 1966

Hungary-based carrier operating low cost scheduled services linking Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Slovenia with points in the Mediterranean, UK, Ireland, Germany, France, Italy and Scandinavia. Founded in Katowice, Poland in 2003 by former Malév CEO Jozsef Varadi as a privately-owned low cost carrier. Services were launched from its operating base at Katowice in May 2004. The company was reorganized on 4 September 2004 as a subsidiary of London-registered Wizz Air Ltd. An investor group led by Indigo Partners LLC, founders of Singapore-based low cost carrier Tiger Airways, became the largest shareholder in December 2004. Budapest became the second operating base in June 2005. Rapid expansion followed, with new Polish operating bases established at Warsaw and Gdansk before the end of the year. December 2005 also saw the creation of a new subsidiary carrier, Wizz Air Bulgaria, based in Sofia with a single A320 transferred from the parent company. The Romainian capital, Bucharest became the sixth operating base in June 2007. January 2008 saw the opening of a fourth Polish operating base at Poznan. A new, eighth hub was opened at Cluj, Romania in May 2008. A second subsidiary carrier, Wizz Air Ukraine, was established at Kiev Borispol in July 2008. Timosoara became the airline's tenth operating base, and third in Romania, in February 2009. Wizz carried 3,000,000 passengers in 2006, 4,200,000 in 2007 and 5,900,000 in 2008. It has not yet become profitable, having lost $5.2mn in 2006 and $2.8mn in 2007; results for 2008u are not yet available.

Date established:
September 2003

Date operations started:
19 May 2004

Date established:
March 1963

Date operations started:
1964

Meridiana is Italy's largest privately owned airline, serving domestic and European destinations. 1991 also saw the launch of the first international services, to Barcelona, Paris, London and Frankfurt. On 26 December 2006 Meridiana acquired a 29.95 per cent stake in growing leisure carrier Eurofly, through the acquisition of 4 million Eurofly shares from Spinnaker at €4 (US$ 5.30) per share. In March 2008 Meridiana announced that it would increase its stake in Eurofly from 38.3 to 46.1 per cent through acquiring further shares from Spinnaker. Meridiana carried 4,690,000 in 2006 and 4,600,000 in 2007; 2008 figure is not yet available. The airline was profitable in 2006 and 2007, with net results of $5.93mn and $1.51mn respectively. 2008 result is not yet available.

Date established:
6 March 2006

Date operations started:
29 January 2007

Russia's first low-cost carrier launched services in January 2007 with a flight from Moscow Vnukovo to Sochi. SkyExpress plans to fly throughout Russia but was initially licensed for scheduled services from Moscow to Murmansk, Rostov-On-Don, Sochi and Tyumen, as well as domestic and international charters services. Established by Boris and Alexander Abramovich, owners of Kras Air, in March 2006. Fares started at US $19, with meals and refreshments available at extra cost. Operating only Boeing 737 Classics, fitted with leather seats and designer interiors. SkyExpress was granted an AOC for domestic scheduled services, valid for two years on 4 December 2006. A five-year license has also been awarded for domestic and international charter flights. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) acquired a twenty per cent shareholding for US $ 10 million in December 2006, and expects to double this investment. In December 2008 Vitaly Vantsev acquired a 39% shareholding in the carrier. The airline carried 680,000 passengers in its first year of operation and 1,040,000 in 2008. P&L figures are not available.

Date established:
26 May 1989

Date operations started:
26 February 1990

Eurofly is based in Milan, Italy and operates scheduled services and inclusive tour charters to Europe, Central America, Africa, and the Middle East. Established in 1989 (45 per cent Alitalia, 45 per cent Olivetti, 10 per cent San Paolo Finance) after Alitalia recognized the need to develop the leisure travel market. In 1998 long haul operations were launched. The airline was acquired by Alitalia in 2000, so as to become the flag carrier's charter arm. In 2003 the company was privatized with 80 per cent of the shares being sold to the Effe Luxembourg investment fund. In July 2004 Effe Luxembourg became the sole shareholder, after acquiring the remaining 20 per cent of the shares. On 25 December 2006 Meridiana acquired 29.92 per cent of Eurofly's stock from the investment group Spinnaker Luxembourg at €4 (US$ 5.30) per share. In March 2008 Meridiana announced that it would increase its stake in Eurofly from 38.3 to 46.1 per cent through acquiring further shares from Spinnaker. eurofly carried 1,490,000 passengers in 2006 and 1,880,000 in 2007. It lost money in both those years, -$36.8mn in 2007 and -$30mn in 2007. Figures for 2008 are not yet available.

Operates low cost flights in on 11 domestic and nearly 120 international routes in Scandinavia, Europe and the Middle East. On 1 September 2002 the airline launched low-fare operations linking Oslo with Stavanger, Bergen, Trondheim and Tromso using a fleet of Boeing 737-300s. On 5 April 2003 low-cost flights were extended to destinations in Spain and Portugal. During the summer of 2003, the network was expanded with flights to the Norwegian cities Alta, Harstad/Narvik, Bodø og Aalesund, and international routes to London and Stockholm. Low fare services expanded quickly, with 3.3 million passengers being carried during 2005..The airline's passenger numbers have grown in recent years, having carried 5,110,000 passengers in 2006, 6,360,000 in 2007 and 7,520,000 in 2008. While the airline enjoyed a healthy net profit of $14.5mn in 2007, it had lost -$3.4mn in 2006 and again-$1.3mn in 2008.

Date established:
1963

Date operations started:
January 1993

EUROPEAN TOUR OPERATORS

The following are a selection of major European tour operators that may actively produce visitors to Aqaba.

UNITED KINGDOM

SCANDINAVIA

FRANCE

ANNEX A - LIST OF MEETINGS

Date and Venue	Title	Attendees
Monday June 8, Aqaba Airport	Mr. Nasir Majali, Airport Operations Director Capt. Suleiman Obeidat, Chief Commissioner/CEO, Civil Aviation Regulatory Commission Sameer Abu-Alfoul, Director Air Navigation, KHIA Ms. Mona Hawa, Marketing & Tourism Director, ASEZA	2
Wednesday June 10, Aqaba	Mr. Michael Nazzal, Chairman, JHA MR. Alexander Bieber, GM, Sheraton Hotel Mr. Naif Zureikat, GM King Hussein Bin Talal Convention Center Mr. Khaled S. Burghan, Investment & Tourism Advisor to Mayor Of Amman Ms. Belinda Ohanoglu, Corporate Affairs, Royal Jordanian Mr. Omar Massarweh, Manager Project Development Transportation & Infrastructure, ASEZA	Siyaha team
Thursday June 11, Amman	Mr. Nayef H. Al-Fayez, Managing Director, JTB & Mr. Fayiz F. Khouri, Deputy Managing Director, JTB	3
Sunday June 14, 2009, Aqaba	Eng. Munir Asad, GM Aqaba Airport Mr. Omar Al-Manha, Airport Director (retired 06/18) Mr. Nasir Al-Majal, Airport Operation Manager Mr. Adna Rawashdeh, Airport Administration Manager	
Monday June 15, 2009, Aqaba	Dr. Belal Al-Bashir, Deputy Chief Commissioner & Commissioner for Investment, ASEZA Mr. Larry Hearn, COP, Aqaba Community and Economic Development Martin Russ, GM Marina Plaza Hotel, Tala Ms. Mona Hawa, Marketing & Tourism Director, ASEZA Bay	3
Tuesday June16, 2009, Aqaba	Mr. Bashar N. Salman, Project Monitoring Manager, SARAYA Mr. Imad N. Fakhoury, Deputy Chairman & CEO, ADC Mr. Shadi Al-Majali, GM, SARAYA Ms. Helen Van Wengen, GM, Saraya Realty Muhannad Hamed, Discovery	2

Date and Venue	Title	Attendees
Wednesday June17, Aqaba	Mr. Hashem Burdini, GM Aqaba Sky Travel & Tourism Mr. Ghassan Nasser, Operations Manager, RSICA (former participant in Jordan/Aqaba tourism promotion) Mr. Khaled Darwish & Mr. Thaer Darwish, Owners Sindbad Yacht Cruises & Water Sports Mr. Peter Hoesli, GM Movenpick Hotel Ms. Layali Nashashibi, Director Communications & PR Movenpick Hotel Mr. Dave Emerson, Manager and Mr. Omar Barakat, Sales & Marketing Manager, Royal Aero Sports Club of Jordan	1
Thursday June18, Aqaba	Mr. Kareeem Nofal, GM Bridge Travel Mr. Peter Schiess, GM Radisson SAS Hotel Ms. Gill Balchin, Incoming Manager, Above & Below Adventures	1
Sunday June21, Amman	Mr. Munir Nasser, International Traders Ms. Jumana Hassan, Manager Handling Contracts Jordan, Royal Jordanian Michael Nazzal, Chairman JHA Mr. Abdul Hakeem Al Hindi, MD, JHTEC	1
Monday June22, Amman	Mr. Mohammad Masri, GM NTCTD Mr. Nizar Steitieh, Executive Director, Atlas Travel Mr. Mohanad Malhas, MD Abercrombie & Kent	3
Tuesday June 23, Amman	Mr. Shadi Majali, GM SARAYA AQABA	3
Wednesday June 24, 2009Mr.	Mr. Omran Dakkak, MD Dakkak Tours International Mr. Hussein Dabbas, VP Sales & Seervices RJ Mr. Bishara Sawalha, GM Tania Tours	2 1 3

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