

TO: USAID/BHR/OFDA (Mariza Artificio-Rogers)  
FROM: Evan C. MacGibbon  
SUBJECT: OFDA Participation in Operation Joint Endeavor - Lessons Learned  
DATE: 22 February 1996

As part of my exit briefing to OFDA on my participation in NATO Operation Joint Endeavor as a humanitarian advisor (HUMAD) to the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia and Hercegovina, I developed a list of "lessons learned" for future reference. I must emphasize that these "lessons learned" are from my viewpoint only. I am certain that Tom Frey and Ron Libby have provided their own assessments of their participation that includes their own lists of lessons learned. I hope that the merging of all our viewpoints will facilitate OFDA planning for participation in future military peacekeeping/peace implementing operations that involve humanitarian relief operations.

I have divided this paper into four sections. The first is a summary of HUMAD operations. The second provides background information on the Dayton Peace Agreement and IFOR's mandate. The last two sections cover OFDA participation in the "planning" and "deployment" phases of this operation. I have also included a brief "overview" for each phase of the operation to highlight factors that I believe influenced the decisions we made. I understand that these are just a few of the factors that influenced decisions, but from my perspective they are the most important. I realize that the brevity of these "overviews" might raise questions that are not covered in this paper. If so, please do not hesitate to contact me at 703-548-8573.

#### **SUMMARY:**

Operation Joint Endeavor is not a military peacekeeping/peace implementing operation that involves civil/military collaboration on humanitarian relief projects, such as in Northern Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda or Haiti. In the early planning stage, however, an assumption used by USAID/OFDA to develop a strategy to support IFOR was that it would be. Although this was not the case, I think that this assumption stuck and influenced the way we approached our relationship with IFOR.

Although AFSOUTH integrated the HUMADs into the Plans and Policy staff during the planning phase, we became more isolated from day to day operations as the deployment got underway. This was not an effort by the military to "marginalize" the HUMADs, but a normal progression/evolution of roles. The military was conducting civil/military operations, **not** humanitarian operations. They did not need HUMADs to advise them on how to do their job. (Ron and I would argued, though, that they did need our advice on how to communicate with the humanitarian community).

The HUMADs did make a significant contribution to IFOR. I believe that our participation in the planning process was the primary reason that IFOR's deployment did not disrupt humanitarian relief operations. Without our advice, the CIMIC would not have established procedures prior to deployment to coordinate/deconflict military and humanitarian traffic, to allow civilian use of military bridging, to allow non-IFOR personnel to fly on IFOR aircraft, or to establish general policy guidelines on what IFOR would and would not do for the humanitarian community. Within the first month of deployment, the NGOs did not raise any issue to the IFOR CIMIC that had not already been discussed/staffed prior to deployment. It is interesting to note that the international community did not complain that IFOR was inhibiting their ability to conduct their programs. Their only complaints I heard were that IFOR was not giving them all the "support" they were accustomed to getting from UNPROFOR. (NOTE: One UNPROFOR's primary missions was to provide support to humanitarian operations. Support such as: providing drivers and vehicles to transport relief supplies; providing escorts for convoys; storing fuel for humanitarian organizations, etc.) The CIMIC's biggest task was educating NGOs that IFOR mission was different than UNPROFORs. IFOR was not in the business of providing them logistical support!

There were problems with IFOR CIMIC operations. But most revolved around poor communications between the IFOR and ARCC CIMICs, UNHCR and the NGO community, and the military and the international community. In fairness to all, the quick change in missions from covering the withdrawal of UNPROFOR to implementing a peace agreement left little time for detailed planning. To complicate matters, this was a NATO, not a U.S. operation -- with a larger NATO agenda. In addition, it was a bureaucratic nightmare with a minimum six levels of staff, not to mention the influence of individual national defense staffs on operations. Add to all this the fact that telecommunication facilities were overtaxed, office facilities were insufficient (especially in Sarajevo) and, it took over two months for U.S. civil affairs personnel to fully deploy.

In the end, The HUMADS did make a real difference. The CIMIC would have been overwhelmed if we had not identified key issues that needed to be resolved prior to deployment. Although the civil affairs officers were intelligent and hard working, they just did not have the experience base to draw on. For many, this was their first deployment. We got them up and running and headed in the right direction. After that it was up to the CIMIC to manage civil military operation.

In conclusion, I would not do anything different. From the initial development of a support strategy in July 1995 to the decision to terminate the assignment in February 1996, I think we made the right decisions. I do have a feeling, though, that some individuals were concerned/apprehensive about the direction in which the HUMAD operation was headed. I think we could have avoided most of this if we had done a better job of "educating" others on what IFOR's mission was in relation to USAID/OFDA's. If you look at IFOR's mission as part of the humanitarian operation, your conclusions will be 180 degrees from mine. I hope, though, that I get my message across. This was a very successful operation. If USAID/OFDA did not develop and sell the HUMAD concept to the interagency back in July 1995, IFOR's deployment would

have disrupted humanitarian relief operations and caused considerable confusion within the humanitarian community.

## **BACKGROUND: The Dayton Peace Agreement/General Framework Agreement, Paris**

Before proceeding with a discussion of the lessons learned, it is critical that readers understand that the Dayton Peace Agreement/General Framework Agreement Paris clearly and purposefully established separate but parallel mandates for the military and civilian sector. IFOR's mandate is set forth in Article 1, para 1(a) of Annex 1-A (Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement) which states that:

" The United Nations Security Council is invited to adopt a resolution by which it will authorize Member States or regional organization and arrangements to establish a multinational military Implementation Force (hereinafter "IFOR"). The Parties understand and agree that this Implementation Force may be composed of ground, air and maritime units from NATO and non-NATO nations, deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina to help ensure compliance with the provisions of this agreement (hereinafter "Annex"). The Parties understand and agree **that the IFOR will begin the implementation of the military aspects of this Annex** upon the Transfer of Authority from the UNPROFOR Commander to the IFOR Commander, and that until the Transfer of Authority, UNPROFOR will continue to exercise its mandate."

The civilian sector's mandate is set forth in Article 1 (High Representative), para 1 of Annex 10 (Agreement on Civilian Implementation of the Peace Agreement). This paragraph states that:

"The Parties agree that **the implementation of the civilian aspects of the peace settlement will entail a wide range of activities including continuation of the humanitarian aid effort for as long as necessary**; rehabilitation of infrastructure and economic reconstruction; the establishment of political and constitutional institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina; promotion of respect for human rights and the return of displaced persons and refugees; and the holding of free and fair elections according to the timetable in Annex 3 to the General Framework Agreement. A considerable number of international organizations and agencies will be called upon to assist."

Based on the Dayton Peace Agreement, therefore, **the civil sector under the High Representative, not IFOR, is responsible for "coordinating the activities of the civilian organizations and agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina to ensure the efficient implementation of the civilian aspects of the peace settlement."** Although IFOR is not involved in civil sector activities, the SACEUR (General Joulwan) stated in the NATO Campaign Plan for Civil Military Operations in Support of the Peace Implementation Plan (enclosure 1) that

"the success of concurrent (civil/military) operations conducted by an extensive array of governmental and non-governmental agencies is **critical** to the execution of a NATO exit strategy." Although IFOR links its success (read withdrawal from Bosnia in about 12 months) with the success of the civilian sector, it does not want to be drawn in by international pressure to supporting or conducting civil sector activities. This could lead to "mission creep" and prevent IFOR from pulling out on schedule. The SACEUR further stated in the Campaign Plan that IFOR needs "**to leverage and facilitate the capabilities of government and non-governmental agencies to preclude NATO involvement in anything except the military aspects of the Peace Plan.**" In essence, the civil/military mission was to "create an environment which will facilitate the exit of NATO forces."

## THE PLANNING PHASE

### OVERVIEW:

On 12 July 1995 the planning phase for USAID/OFDA involvement in Operation Joint Endeavor began with the first meeting of the Humanitarian Assistance Working Group (HAWG). (NOTE: The second meeting of the HAWG was chaired by Tim Knight - DART Zagreb Team leader who was in Washington). Based on this meeting, Bill Garvelink (OFDA Deputy Director) sent an E-Mail to Nan Borton (Director, OFDA) on 13 July in which he provided a strategy for implementing the USAID Administrator's recommendation for supporting a planned NATO deployment to Bosnia (enclosure 2). Bill recommended that USAID/OFDA:

- Draft a humanitarian assistance annex/Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) annex.
- Attach one or two OFDA personnel to NATO AFSOUTH (Allied Forces South) planning staff in Naples, Italy.
- Identify specific individuals to accompany the NATO forces when they deployed to Bosnia to withdraw UNPROFOR troops.

In regards the second tick, Bill commented that, "What the military will not like, but which is essential, is attaching folks to the force commander and the field commanders (General Zinni always says OFDA has not been fully effective in the past because it did not attach a humanitarian advisor to the force commander or operations guy like Zinni who was in Somalia and he is right.)"

On 17 July, based on Bill's strategy, Tom Frey was first sent to Zagreb, Croatia to work with the DART, to review issues related to NATO troop deployment to Bosnia. On 28 July Tom went to AFSOUTH Headquarters in Naples, Italy to work in the Contingency Initiative Branch (CIB) of the Plans and Policy Division (CJ-5) of the Combined Joint Staff. Tom's primary task was to assist the AFSOUTH planning group in completing OPLAN 40104. In this capacity, Tom reviewed the OPLAN for humanitarian related issues; he advised AFSOUTH on humanitarian

issues related to military planning for the Former Yugoslavia; he acted as a representative for humanitarian organizations; and he developed the scope of work for the humanitarian advisors who would deploy with NATO to implement OPLAN 40104 (enclosure 3). Tom departed Naples for Washington on 14 September 1995.

On 28 September, Nan sent a letter (enclosure 4) to the AFSOUTH Chief of Staff (LTG Carter) with the following recommendations:

- Continue contact between OFDA's Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) located in Zagreb and AFSOUTH planners as the situation in Former Yugoslavia develops.
- DART members will visit AFSOUTH as requested, to offer further support to AFSOUTH humanitarian planning efforts.
- USAID/OFDA will provide AFSOUTH Humanitarian Advisors for deployment with AFSOUTH Theater Headquarters if the OPLAN is implemented.

On 24 October, LTG Carter accepted Nan's recommendation to attach humanitarian advisors to the NATO IFOR to help support activities related to the operation of the IFOR Civil Military Cooperation Centers. In addition, LTG Carter approved the following scope of work for the Humanitarian Advisors (HUMADs):

- Advise the planning staff (CJ-5) in your area of operations on all humanitarian matters that might affect military operations. Advise how military operations might affect humanitarian matters.
- Provide CJ-5, through Civil Military Cooperation assets (CIMIC), a point of contact with UN agencies, international organizations and non-governmental/relief organization.
- Facilitate operational discussion between CIMIC assets and relief organizations to ensure NATO military actions are coordinated, where appropriate, with relief organizations.
- Assist in validating humanitarian assistance requests from relief organizations.
- Assist the CJ-5 in prioritizing humanitarian assistance requests based on relief organization requirements and military operational requirement.
- Recommend methods to provide/enhance military support to relief organizations without denigration of operation capabilities.
- Recommend support actions for relief organizations that enhance military operations.

On 7 November, Tom Frey and Ken Koon returned to AFSOUTH Headquarters. On 13 and 14 November Tom went to Geneva to brief members of the US mission to the United Nations. Tom also accompanied BG Tom Matthews (Commander of the 353rd Civil Affairs Unit) on a round of meetings with key UN personnel. The General was in Geneva on a fact finding trip for the NATO SACEUR, General Joulwan (enclosure 5).

**ON 21 NOVEMBER THE DAYTON PEACE AGREEMENT (DPA) WAS SIGNED.** NATO OPLAN 40104 to withdraw UNPROFOR troops from Bosnia was replaced by NATO OPLAN 40105 to implement the military aspects of the DPA -- **two entirely different missions.**

On 20 and 27 November, respectively, Ron Libby and I arrived at AFSOUTH Headquarters to begin our tour as humanitarian advisors to the IFOR. Upon our arrival, Tom and Ken returned to Washington. Ron and I worked with the CJ-5 planning staff to identify potential "crunch points" that could affect humanitarian operations when IFOR deployed. In addition, we came up with a "list" of questions (enclosure 6) that we knew the humanitarian community would ask IFOR as soon as they deployed. This list is really just common sense questions, but it gave the military planners something concrete to focus on and let them know before hand what sort of questions they would receive. Although the planning phase had not ended, the CIMIC needed to prepare now for executing the revised OPLAN. From these questions, Ron and I prioritized areas/issues that needed to be addressed prior to deployment (enclosure 7). These were:

- Logistical Coordination/Prioritization.
- Resource deconfliction.
- Security
- Access
- Communications
- An identification system for humanitarian staff and vehicles.

Our number 1 priority, though, was establishing procedures to deconflict IFOR and humanitarian convoy traffic so that there would be no disruption in the flow of humanitarian supplies when IFOR deployed. We were concerned about this issue since a logistics officer on the AFSOUTH CJ-4 logistics staff had told us that IFOR planned to "control" all the roads. On 6 December, Colonel Bob Phillips (Chief, IFOR CIMIC) and I flew to Zagreb and met with the head of the IFOR Joint Movement Control Center to stress the urgency of initiating a process to ensure movements coordination among IFOR, humanitarian assistance organizations and government authorities (enclosure 8). Although UNHCR and WFP had already arranged to place liaison officers with the JMCC in Zagreb, this meeting highlighted the urgency of this requirement.

## **LESSONS LEARNED DURING THE PLANNING PHASE:**

- **Attach an OFDA officer to the military planning staff as early as possible.** It works. There is no doubt that Tom Frey's work at AFSOUTH over the summer enabled IFOR to deploy with no disruption to humanitarian relief operations. The military planning staff that Tom worked with was well versed on humanitarian operations when Ron and I arrived in late November. They knew all the "buzz" words and were firmly wedded to the need to coordinate the parallel humanitarian and military missions.

- **Stay flexible. Planning assumptions and plans change.** The role of the HUMADs evolved during the five months between the time Bill created the initial strategy for OFDA deployment of HUMADs to Naples in mid-July and our actual deployment into the theater in mid-December. Specifically, NATO plans precluded the military from initiating or supporting humanitarian operations with one exception. The DPA states IFOR can "assist the UNHCR and other international organizations in their humanitarian missions . . . on request." Thus, there was no requirement for OFDA and the military to join forces to support/conduct humanitarian/civil action projects as in Northern Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, or Haiti. In fact, ARRC OPLAN 60405 (enclosure 9) states that "combat support and combat service support force levels in OPLAN 60405" are designed to implement/enforce the military tasks of the Peace Plan and support the withdrawal of UNPROFOR. **Any international political pressure, which causes this NATO mission to be adapted to that of Nation Building or to focus on humanitarian assistance . . . will require a fresh plan to address the impact on the new missions, especially the Civil Affairs and logistics implications."** Although General Zinni believed that not having an HUMAD attached to the force commander in Somalia made OFDA less effective, BG Matthews would not say this about the ongoing operation since collaborating on humanitarian operations is not one of his responsibilities. OFDA and the military are not members of the "same team a" they have been on past humanitarian relief operations.

- **There is more than one "plan."** For this operation there was at least three: one each for every headquarters, i.e., SHAPE, AFSOUTH, and the ARRC. Get copies of all planning documents. We focused all our time and effort on working on the civil affairs annex to OPLAN 4010/5 at AFSOUTH. We were unaware that the ARRC planning staff had produced its own Civil Military Co-operation (CIMIC) annex to its OPLAN 60405 in November. In addition, BG Matthews wrote the Campaign Plan for Civil-Military Operations (CMO) in Support of the Peace Implementation Plan in November. These documents are critical since they provided the direction for civil affair's operations at the IFOR and ARRC. If Ron and I had been aware of these plans in Naples, we would have understood what the civil affair's mission was and how the leadership planned to accomplish it. Without seeing these plans we started the operation using different sheets of music. This led to some discord as Ron and I used OPLAN 40105 and the DPA as our information base, whereas BG Matthews relied on the SACEUR's Campaign Plan. To complicate matters, the ARRC CIMIC relied on the civil/military annex to the ARRC OPLAN.

- **Ensure that UNHCR and WFP provide liaison officers to work with the military**

**movement control elements to coordinate and deconflict convoy operations.** Since together UNHCR and WFP operate over 95 percent of all humanitarian traffic, they need to be represented in the movement control center. Representatives from both organizations were in place in the JMCC in Zagreb when we deployed in December. As a result of this preplanning, there were no problems with UNHCR or WFP convoy operations.

- **Answers as many questions as possible, and get the answers agreed to and down in writing, before the operation begins.** Although most of our time in Naples was spent on writing the plan, it was important to spend time planning how the CIMIC would carry out the plan on deployment. The best thing we did was to identify potential issues/questions that the NGO community would raise and have answers to them before deployment. Some questions were easier than others to answer and some, like developing policy on standby flights for non-IFOR personnel (enclosure 10) and the use of the Sava River pontoon bridge by humanitarian agencies (enclosure 11), took several weeks to staff. Perhaps the most important policy paper that IFOR released was its policy on military assistance to humanitarian organizations and civilian commissions (enclosure 12). This paper answered most questions NGOs would have on what IFOR would and would not do. It was a much used reference during the early stages of deployment to inform NGOs of IFOR's mission.

- **Drive the CIMIC agenda.** By providing the CIMIC staff with the above list of issues and questions, we set the agenda during the planning phase and the beginning of the deployment. In essence, we identified what needed to be done and set the priority. The CIMIC leadership was glad that we provided issues to focus on. IFOR used these policy issues to reinforce the separation between the "parallel missions" and to reinforce from the outset that IFOR would not get involved in humanitarian operations.

- **Make sure that you have a copy and know the applicable "terms of reference" inside and out -- in this case, the Dayton Peace Agreement.** This sounds obvious, but copies were rare in AFSOUTH and without the "bible" how can you understand what the rules of the game are? Unfortunately, none of the 300 plus U.S. civil affairs officers (and I think I am safe to say this includes BG Matthews) had a copy of, had seen, or had read the DPA before they got to Zagreb. The same hold true for most IFOR officers.

## **THE DEPLOYMENT PHASE**

### **OVERVIEW:**

On 11 December 1995, The IFOR CIMIC deployed from Naples to Zagreb, Croatia. Colonel Bob Phillips was in charge of the CIMIC that consisted, at this point, of 17 multinational officers

organized into a Policy and Plans Branch, and Operations Branch and an Administration Branch.

Shortly after the IFOR CIMIC deployed to Zagreb, Ron went to Sarajevo to join up with the ARRC CIMIC. Originally, we had wanted to have Ron join the CIMIC team in Germany and deploy with them to Sarajevo. The Chief of the ARRC CIMIC, however, did not want to have Ron move to Sarajevo until they were sure that there was adequate office and housing space. At this point it was starting to become clear that Ron was not considered part of the ARRC CIMIC "team." (NOTE: This point is discussed later.) It was important, though, that Ron got to Sarajevo to help the ARRC build ties with the humanitarian community. Indications were that nothing was being done to inform NGOs in Sarajevo of IFOR's plans. Ron needed to get the ARRC to initiate action to begin building the bridge between the two communities. We contacted the DART and it provided an apartment and working space for Ron in Sarajevo. With a room and a place to work, the ARRC CIMIC could no longer object to Ron joining the CIMIC in Sarajevo.

On 25 December, BG Tom Matthews arrived accompanied by the first onslaught (approximately 20) of U.S. reserve civil affairs officers from the 353rd Civil Affairs Unit. Before BG Matthew's arrival, no one knew what role he would play in CIMIC operations. Within the first few days, however, the AFSOUTH CofS decided to remove the CIMIC branch from the CJ-5 Plans and Policy Branch and create a new CJ-CIMIC Branch under BG Matthews. Col Phillips was then designated as his deputy. It took another month for personnel fluctuations to subside for the IFOR CIMIC to finally solidify as an organization. Current organization charts for the CJ-CIMIC in Zagreb and Sarajevo are at enclosure 13). **It must be noted that it took almost two months from the initial IFOR deployment in mid-December for the U.S. civil affairs structure to arrive in theater and begin operating as a cohesive staff.**

Operations in the IFOR CIMIC went smoothly during the initial deployment phase. This is due to two factors. First, Colonel Phillips knew what the CIMIC needed to accomplish and how to accomplish it. He provided the direction that the reserve officers needed and never let up. Second, Ron and I had previously identified issues in Naples that the CIMIC needed to resolve and had broken them down into individual tasks that needed to be completed ASAP. This included setting up a mechanism for managing standby passengers on IFOR flights, procedures for crossing military bridges, medevacating civilians on IFOR aircraft, and coordinating convoy movements in Bosnia. In addition, the CIMIC, within a week of our arrival, began to hold coordination meetings twice a week with the NGO community. This kept everyone up to date on the IFOR operation/security issues and provided the best means to pass out information, coordinate issues and to answer NGO's questions. These were CMOC meetings with the emphasis on cooperation rather than operations! CIMIC operations at IFOR Headquarters were working well. **It is interesting to note that most of the civil/military interactions that took place in the IFOR CIMIC during its first two months of operation were requests to fly on IFOR aircraft or to cross the SAVA River Bridge. These were by far the most "pressing" issues and are good indicators of the level of involvement/impact IFOR was having humanitarian operations.**

At the ARRC CIMIC in Sarajevo, Ron was having a different experience. The ARRC CIMIC had overall responsibility for civil/military operations in Bosnia. Each of the multinational divisions assigned to the ARRC (French, British and American) had a CIMIC center and subordinate centers down to the brigade level. The U.S. was providing most of the civil affairs officers for the CIMIC centers in the British and American divisions. Some U.S. offices were also going to be deployed with the French division. The U.S., as is customary, came in and "took charge." For security reasons they restricted access to their facilities, in some case facilities occupied by UN agencies. Feathers were ruffled. In addition, civil affair's teams were conducting assessments without first establishing contacts with the IOs/NGOs operating in their area. Communications between the military and the civil sector were poor or nonexistent. There were a lot of growing pains. The humanitarian community was turned off by the U.S. military "we are in charge" attitude. Both Ron and I were frustrated trying to "advise" the civil affair's officers on the need to develop better communications with the civilian sector. We advised and advised and advised. In the end, both Ron and I were satisfied that we provided the advice. It was up to the civil affairs to accept or reject it.

In fairness to the military, I believe that many of these problems had to do with getting civil affairs operation organized at the beginning of an operation. The CIMIC was so overwhelmed with startup problems with personnel, facilities, lodging, etc., that it took most of the leadership's energy dealing with non mission-related issues. The bureaucracy surrounding the deployment consumed the IFOR CIMIC. With that said, however, I could not believe how unprepared most of the civil affairs officers are who are participating in this operation. This was the first time I had worked with civil affairs. Their lack of even basic knowledge of the players in the international community, such as UNHCR, WHO, WFP, UNICEF, etc., concerns me. As I already pointed out few, if any, of the civil affairs officers had read the DPA before deployment. How can you prepare for a civil affairs mission if you do not even know the ground rules? (They were not available at the deployment processing facility at Ft Bragg). Ron often commented that anyone participating in this operation needed to first locate Bosnia on a world map!

In early January 1996, Ron and I ran out of advice to give on humanitarian-related issues and without realizing it, began to provide advice on how the military should conduct civil affairs operations. This was where the problems were. But it was not our job to tell them how to do theirs. Frustrations built. It took a while for me to realize that we had crossed that line and assumed the role of civil/military advisors. Believe me. The military did not see us in that role or want us in that role. At the same time, though, I saw that the military was eager to use me as a "go-between" IOs/NGOs and the CIMIC. Instead of the civil affairs officers going out and establishing the contacts with these organizations, they looked at me to do so. When I saw myself becoming the conduit between the two groups, I knew that my presence in the CIMIC organization was turning into a liability. I was becoming a crutch. That was ironic since the CIMIC message from the very beginning was that IFOR had to stay out of civil sector activities so that it would not become a crutch for the civil sector. The bottom line was that the civil sector would never succeed, if IFOR did its job. I think this message applied to the HUMADs also. We needed to stay out of the civil affairs operation.

In a meeting with Bill Garvelink on 2 February 1996, Colonel Phillips agreed with my assessment that Ron and I had successfully accomplished what we had set out to do - IFOR had deployed without disrupting humanitarian relief operations and had remained steadfast in its position that humanitarian and military operations are separate, parallel missions. Colonel Phillips supported my recommendation that our job was finished and Ron and I departed Zagreb on 8 and 9 February, respectively.

#### **LESSONS LEARNED DURING THE DEPLOYMENT PHASE:**

- **The biggest problem IFOR had during deployment was the lack of cohesion/stability in the CIMIC organizations.** The IFOR CIMIC went through four reorganizations and personnel changes before it began to operate as an effective staff. All this was brought on by the slow deployment of U.S. reserve civil affairs officers to the theater. The last personnel were scheduled to depart from FT Bragg on 11 February -- two months after the IFOR CIMIC deployed. You cannot run an operation without people. Even though, in the end, the U.S. civil affairs was over staffed, at the beginning personnel shortages and the fluctuation in staffs was felt throughout the CIMIC operation.

- **The second biggest problem IFOR had before and during the deployment was the lack of information shared/contact with the NGO community.** Establish contact with as many IOs and NGOs as possible before the operation begins to give them a point of contact for information, coordination and/or deconfliction. IFOR did a good job of working with the major players (UNHCR, WFP, ICRC) prior to deployment, but we did not do as well with contacts with individual NGOs. Tom prepared a draft letter in late mid-November that could have facilitated this contact (enclosure 14). However, it was lost in the shuffle and was never sent out. If it would have gone out to all humanitarian organizations, I know it would have relieved a lot of the uncertainties on the part of the NGO community of what impact IFOR would have on humanitarian organizations.

- **The U.S. missed an excellent opportunity to educate the reserve civil affair's soldiers at Fort Bragg on humanitarian operations in Bosnia and what their mission was.** Most soldiers arrived like "babes in the woods" and had no clue of what was going on politically, socially, culturally or operationally vis-a-vis the civil/humanitarian sector. The problems that the U.S. civil affairs units had coordinating with the international community should never have occurred. This is their bread and butter. The military needs to review how they train their civil affairs personnel for specific operations. They also need to be better educated on the roles and functions of the international community in humanitarian relief operations. Whatever USAID/OFDA could do to strengthen the U.S. civil affairs training base would pay big dividends in future joint operations.

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From: William Garvelink@BHR.OFDA@AIDW

Subject: Concept of the Atwood recommendations

Date: Thursday, July 13, 1995 9:10:43 EDT

Attach:

Certify: N

Forwarded by:

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We have three actions to implement almost immediately: One is to draft the humanitarian plan or annex to Oplan 4104, the second is to attach one or two of our people to NATO in Naples and the third is to identify the number and specific individuals to be deployed in support of NATO forces supporting an UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia. All three are linked and can be pursued simultaneously.

1. Humanitarian plan or annex to Oplan 4104

The first meeting of the Humanitarian Assistance Working Group (HAWG), or whatever we call it, occurred yesterday and the next one, chaired by Tim, will be Monday morning. Hopefully this task, given the pace of events, can be completed in two weeks or less.

We want to produce one deliverable out of this. It should be a humanitarian assistance annex (the military will be more comfortable if we call it a CMOC annex but this is really too narrow of a definition of what we want) to Oplan 4104. We should write what we want and then have someone put it into a user-friendly format for the US military and NATO. We should be careful, though, that format does not drive substance.

I would suggest that we want three things out of the document:

-a Plan for how NATO should deal with humanitarian assistance organizations (UN, IOs, NGOs) on the ground; how NATO can facilitate humanitarian assistance activities without detracting from its military mission. We may want a bit of a two-track system. We want our humanitarian advisors to assist NATO forces but we also want to support directly the American contingent on the ground too. How we mesh the two will be Tim's problem.

-a plan for the deployment of humanitarian assistance advisors with NATO forces. That would include a CMOC and an OFDA person attached to it. What the military will not like but which is essential is attaching folks to the force commander and the field commanders (Zinni always says OFDA has not been fully effective in the past because it did not attach a humanitarian advisor to the force commander or Ops guy like Zinni was in Somalia and he is right.) We should make sure we have someone with all the decision-makers up and down the line, beginning in Naples. In fleshing out this part of the plan, decisions will have to be made on the role of ECHO. More realistically, the recommendation to involve or not involve ECHO should be made on Monday and then see if principles and ECHO buy it. Keep in mind that ECHO decisions on staff deployments have been slow. I suspect it is better to work with ECHO than individual country relief offices because none has the human resources.

-a strategy for the actions which NATO, and the US forces in particular, can undertake which will facilitate humanitarian assistance programs in a post

UNCLASSIFIED  
DRAFT

SHAPE  
10 November 1995

CAMPAIGN PLAN FOR CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS (CMO) IN SUPPORT OF THE PEACE  
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

(U) REFERENCES:

- a. United Nation Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) XXX dated \*\*\*\*\* 1995.
- b. North Atlantic Council (NAC) Decisions of 29 September & 11 October 1995.
- c. Supreme Allied Commander Europe's (SACEUR) Initial Strategic Guidance of 301740Z SEP 95.
- d. SACEUR's Supplementary Tasking for Peace Implementation DTG 011945Z OCT 95.
- e. SACEUR Concept of Operations dated 11 October 1995.
- f. CINCSOUTH OPLAN 40104 (4th Revise).
- g. ACTWARN / ACTREQ 001/OCT 95 DTG 121807Z OCT 95.
- h. Allied Command Europe (ACE) Directive No. 80 - 62, 22 Sep 95 (Draft Revision) ACE Doctrine for Peace Support Operations. (NACC / PFP U).

1. (U) Situation

a. (U) General.

(1) (U) Purpose. This Civil-Military Campaign Plan is designed to support the overall theater strategy and to complement the Military Campaign Plan. This plan provides the civil-military strategy and identifies the ends, ways and means to ensure success. The primary focus of civil-military assets will be support to the tactical commanders in their execution of the Peace Plan, promoting mission legitimacy and stimulating civil support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) mission. However, the success of concurrent operations conducted by an extensive array of governmental and non-governmental agencies is critical to the execution of a NATO exit strategy. This plan provides a framework for creating a unity of effort, a shared vision, and a structure to conduct civil-military operations (CMO) supported by a cohesive civil information strategy.

(2) (U) The Plan is designed to ensure that NATO can achieve an appropriate civil-military end state, while staying within the constraints of the military mission. This plan provides the means for NATO to influence priorities and activities of civilian agencies, resource civil-military requirements with civilian assets, escalate critical civil-military issues and to facilitate and leverage civilian capabilities to the maximum extent possible.

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(3) (U) Transition to end state will be a transparent activity if we constrain the role of civil-military operations to facilitation, information management, knowledge transfer and inspiring a unified effort with civilian, governmental and non-governmental agencies.

b. (U) Area of Plan Coverage. This plan covers all countries within the designated geographic area of responsibilities for Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) as agreed to by the United Nations (UN) and NATO to support operations in the Former Yugoslavia (FY).

c. (U) Friendly Forces. A large and mature infrastructure of non-military agencies involved with humanitarian relief, reconciliation, restoration, reconstruction and nation assistance exists within the theater. As the Peace Plan is implemented the number and capability of these organizations is expected to grow within the theater. The lead agencies for relief and reconstruction are:

(1) (U) United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). UNHCR is the lead United Nation (UN) agency for humanitarian assistance in the FY. UNHCR coordinates programs, with its implementing and coordinating partners for food, medicine, clothing, shelter, and social services. UNHCR is also mandated to provide protection and assistance to refugees and displaced persons to help those who desire to return to their homes when security conditions permit.

(2) (U) United Nations Political and Humanitarian Assistance (UNPHA). This organization was formerly known as United Nations Civil Affairs (UNCA). Consistent with the terms of the Peace Plan and Constitutional Agreement, UNPHA administers the restoration of civil and governmental functions and services; assists in executing a joint United Nations (UN) - NATO public information program; and advises and monitors the establishment of a credible criminal justice system.

(3) (U) International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The ICRC is responsible for monitoring and inspecting Prisoner of War Camps, providing humanitarian assistance and tracing refugees and refugee family members.

(4) (U) European Community Task Force. Responsible for conducting selected humanitarian assistance and infrastructure repair tasks within the FY. Serves as the coordinating agency for European Community funded non-governmental organizations (NGO) within Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (B-H).

(5) (U) Western European Union (WEU). The WEU is expected to play a significant role in infrastructure rebuilding in the FY.

d. (U) Assumptions.

(1) (U) UNHCR has the resources and maintains the lead in humanitarian assistance, refugees and displaced persons operations.

(2) (U) WEU will take the lead in economic and infrastructure reconstruction.

(3) (U) NGOs and International Organizations (IOs) will continue providing services at least at the level provided prior to Implementation Force (IFOR) deployment.

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(4) (U) Roles, responsibilities and commitments of national governments, et. al., will be defined or established co-incident with the Peace Plan.

(5) (U) Support from governmental and non-governmental agencies will become more robust as the Peace Plan is implemented.

e. (U) Commander's Vision. Develop, concurrent with the NATO military mission, a theater-wide, synchronized effort by governmental and non-governmental agencies to create an environment which will facilitate the exit of NATO forces.

f. (U) Commander's Intent.

(1) (U) To facilitate SACEUR's implementation of the provisions of the peace agreement within the guidelines of OPLAN 40104X.

(2) (U) To create a unity of effort among the national governments and other government agencies (OGAs), NGOs, and IOs operating in the theater area of operations (TAOO) and involved with humanitarian relief, reconciliation, recovery and reconstruction.

(3) (U) To create a civilian coalition at the NATO level to work in concert with NATO's implementation of the Peace Plan

(4) (U) To leverage and facilitate the capabilities of governmental and non-governmental agencies to preclude NATO's involvement in anything except the military aspects of the Peace Plan.

(5) (U) To facilitate civil-military cooperation within the TAOO.

(6) (U) To establish civil-military coordination at all levels of operations through and including battalion.

(7) (U) To establish a process for effective, theater-wide assessment of critical civilian support structures, resources, and systems. To provide an escalation process to address civil-military issues and requirements.

(8) (U) To synchronize and harmonize civil information programs with civilian and governmental organizations supporting the Peace Plan and end state transition.

(9) (U) To facilitate an expeditious transfer of civil-military requirements to the appropriate civilian organizations.

(10) (U) To build indigenous confidence in the transition plan to facilitate NATO's exit strategy.

2. (U) Mission. On order, conduct CMO in support of SACEUR's implementation of the Peace Plan. Promote cooperation with the civilian population, governmental and non-governmental agencies. Leverage the capabilities of civilian agencies. Create a parallel, unified civilian effort in support of NATO Peace Plan implementation. Be prepared to respond to humanitarian, public safety and public health contingencies.

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3. (U) Concept of Operations.

a. (U) Ends, Ways, and Means.

(1) (U) Ends. Create a CMO environment which will ensure successful transition of operations from NATO to the Host Nation (HN) and/or other civilian agencies, within the time constraints of the peace implementation plan.

(2) (U) Ways. NATO provides a secure environment and a specific window of time during Peace Plan implementation, for the HN and other civilian, and UN agencies to coordinate and implement humanitarian assistance operations, reconciliation, infrastructure reconstruction and restoration activities.

(3) (U) Means.

(a) (U) An effective CMO structure and process from Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) through the battalion level.

(b) (U) A Theater Advocate at SHAPE, supported by a robust Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Center / Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) staff to create a civilian coalition in support of the Peace Plan, and provide a means to resolve theater and above the theater civil-military issues.

(c) (U) Joint Commissions (JCs) at the IFOR, ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), and division levels to resolve Peace Plan issues.

(d) (U) CIMIC Centers / CMOCs at the IFOR, ARRC and division levels to establish coordination between IFOR and civilian authorities, NGOs, and UN agencies.

(e) (U) A Civil-Military Information Plan to facilitate public cooperation and NATO operations.

4. (U) Execution. NATO will create an environment and provide a designated period of time for the HN, NGOs, IOs, and OGAs to conduct humanitarian relief, reconciliation, restoration and reconstruction activities. CMO will facilitate and create a unity of effort as these agencies implement life saving, life sustaining, life enhancing and population stability operations, restore public safety, public administration, judicial and economic systems. To the extent these agencies achieve these ends, they will restore self-government and promote public confidence in IFOR transition.

a. (U) Levels of Support. Priority of effort will be:

(1) (U) Level I - Life Saving. Provision and restoration of the most fundamental human needs and services - food, water, shelter and emergency medical care. Elimination of threats to public safety (e.g., explosive ordnance disposal, including mine awareness). Resolution of Displaced Persons, Refugees and Evacuees (DPRE) issues and potential mass movement of civilians.

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(2) (U) Level II - Life Sustaining and Public Order. While basic human needs are met, critical public facilities and services are absent or poorly functioning. Facilitate restoration of power, water, sewage, medical facilities, police, fire, mass transit and air operations systems.

(3) (U) Level III - Life Enhancing. Facilitate operations to build local government self-sufficiency and coordination with national level structures, restoration of education, economic and judicial systems.

**b. Tasks by Phase.**

(1) (U) Phase I - Preparation and deployment. This phase begins with receipt of authorization from the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to begin planning.

- (a) (U) Develop supporting plans to the CMO Campaign Plan.
- (b) (U) Identify and prepare CMO force structure to support the Campaign Plan.
- (c) (U) Establish Theater Advocate Organization.
- (d) (U) Identify and train Joint Commission (JC) personnel. Train JC members in negotiating skills and techniques. Ensure technical proficiency in all aspects of the Peace Plan.
- (e) (U) Conduct CMO assessments of theater and UNHCR, NGO, and IO capabilities.
- (f) (U) Establish liaison with UNHCR, ICRC, NGOs and IOs to insure minimal disruption of existing relief operations during deployment.
- (g) (U) Develop an effective civil-military information strategy for all phases of the Campaign Plan.
- (h) (U) Deliver rules of engagement (ROE) and cultural training, to include a calendar of significant dates. Deliver status of forces agreement (SOFA), if implemented.
- (i) (U) Provide CMO legal training to commanders and key personnel.
- (j) (U) Monitor peace process and activity in TAOO.
- (k) (U) Coordinate Campaign Plan for all sectors.
- (l) (U) Develop current DPRE topology. Identify projected / potential DPRE movement.
- (m) (U) Develop CMO policies.
- (n) (U) Establish CMO essential elements of information.

(2) (U) Phase II - Entry. This phase begins upon the signing of the Peace Agreement, given a pre-determined date established in the execute order.

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- (a) (U) Movement liaison with UNHCR.
  - (b) (U) Update DPRE current operations and potential for mass movement.
  - (c) (U) Deploy civil-military assets as part of enabling force.
  - (d) (U) Implement CIMIC Centers / CMOCs.
  - (e) (U) Implement Joint Commissions (JCs).
  - (f) (U) Implement supporting CMO reporting, information systems and architecture.
  - (g) (U) Update CMO assessment.
  - (h) (U) Execute civil-military information strategy to minimize refugee movement in theater and to minimize deployment impact on civilian commerce and relief operations.
  - (i) (U) Monitor IFOR impact on existing relief efforts.
  - (j) (U) Set CMO expectations.
  - (k) (U) Implement civil-military information programs to support public safety, e.g., mine awareness, and keep public informed of IFOR activities and Peace Plan implementation.
- (3) (U) Phase III - Implementation. This phase begins upon Transfer of Authority (TOA).
- (a) (U) Monitor all levels of JC and CIMIC Center / CMOC activity.
  - (b) (U) Maintain liaison with all affected civilian organizations.
  - (c) (U) Leverage capabilities of IOs, NGOs and OGAs to support Civil-Military Campaign Plan objectives.
  - (d) (U) Support Peace Plan boundary establishment/resettlement programs.
  - (e) (U) Facilitate civil organizations prioritization/restoration of level 1, level 2 and level 3 services and operations.
  - (f) (U) Establish conditions for the transition / reallocation of CMO assets as appropriate.
  - (g) (U) Formalize and prioritize plan for HN, NGOs, IOs and OGAs in anticipation of transition operations.
  - (h) (U) Facilitate the restoration of /or the creation of a democratic form of governmental infrastructure.
  - (i) (U) Deconflict resource competition with NGOs, IOs and OGAs.

(4) (U) Phase IV - Transition to Peace. This phase begins within one year or as detailed in the Peace Plan.

- (a) (U) Build public confidence in NATO Transition Plan.
- (b) (U) Execute transition agreements to civilian agencies.
- (c) (U) Transition JCs / CIMIC Centers / CMOCs to civilian authority/agencies.
- (d) (U) Reduce military presence as civilian authority expands its control.
- (e) (U) Reduce the military support to drive self-reliance by HN.
- (f) (U) Monitor HN's ability to accept increased responsibility to sustain itself.
- (g) (U) Implement information strategy to support NATO transition.
- (h) (U) Continue to plan for contingency operations.
- (i) (U) Coordinate with UNHCR, NGOs, IOs, and OGAs to minimize disruption of relief operations during NATO exit.
- (j) (U) Develop joint transition information plan with HN, UNHCR, NGOs, IOs and OGAs.

(5) (U) Phase V - Exit. This phase will occur within one year after entry or as detailed in the Peace Plan.

- (a) (U) Complete transition to HN/civilian control.
- (b) (U) Coordinate with UNHCR, NGOs, IOs and OGAs to minimize disruption during NATO exit.
- (c) (U) Resolve claims, legal, environmental, and property transfer issues.
- (d) (U) Complete withdrawal of CMO assets.
- (e) (U) Deliver joint transition announcement with UNHCR and other significant civilian organizations.

d. (U) CMO Information Campaign. General

(1) (U) An effective Civil-Military Information Campaign is essential to the success of CMO. To the extent that this campaign plan can be harmonized and synergized with governmental and non-governmental agencies it will enhance our unity of effort approach.

(2) (U) NATO must set and shape expectations from the outset of the operation. Gaining and maintaining public support for NATO, and building public confidence in the transition plan will support our exit strategy.

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(3) (U) Commanders at all levels must be aware that positive actions, if not communicated properly, could jeopardize the success of the Peace Plan implementation. It is always important to consider how the indigenous population may interpret an action. Examples of programs and actions that may require inclusion in Civil-Military information programs are:

- (a) (U) Sanitation/burning (could be mis-constructed as loss of control or intentional burning when viewed from a distance).
- (b) (U) Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) activities (could be viewed as loss of control, renewal of hostilities).
- (c) (U) Movement of refugees (could be interpreted as forced movements).

5. (U) Command and Signal.


a. (U) General. Civil-Military assets and structures are established to support the Commander's assigned missions and NATO policies. Responsibility for CMO remains with the tactical commander. The command operations officers are responsible for planning and integrating the overall operations effort. All Civil-military plans, policies and programs will be coordinated with the unit operations officers.

(1) (U) Civil-Military force structure, deployment and resourcing within the theater are the responsibility of the IFOR Commander.

(2) (U) Establishment, locations and staffing of JCs and CIMIC Centers / CMOCs within the theater are the responsibilities of the IFOR Commander.

b. (U) Command Relationship Architecture.

Theater Advocate



c. (U) Missions, Assignments, Organization and Staffing.


(1) (U) Theater Advocate.

(a) (U) Mission. The Theater Advocate provides NATO oversight to CMO throughout the theater. Through coordination with governmental and non-governmental agencies, the Theater Advocate will support and facilitate the parallel civil, multinational unity of effort concept with a team of civil affairs functional specialists who will provide complete staff support to monitor and influence civilian recovery activities within the theater.

(b) (U) Assignment. HQ SHAPE

(c) (U) Organization and Staffing.

## Theater Advocate



### (2) (U) Joint Commissions (JCs)

- (a) (U) Mission. Joint Commissions provide a focal point for IFOR and the factions to facilitate implementation of the military tasks associated with the Peace Plan. JCs are not intended to serve as a forum for discussions outside the scope of military issues, or to re-negotiate previously resolved issues.
- (b) (U) Assignment. Established by IFOR Commander.
- (c) (U) Organization and Staffing. Established by IFOR Commander.
- (d) (U) Command Relationship. Established by IFOR Commander.

### (3) (U) CIMIC Centers / CMOCs.

- (a) (U) Mission. The CIMIC Center / CMOC is a coordination center established to assist NATO in anticipating, coordinating and facilitating those civil-military functions and activities pertaining to the civil population, the local government, OGAs, IOs, and NGOs. In this theater, where a mature and effective humanitarian relief and assistance infrastructure is in place, the CIMIC Center / CMOC can ensure daily and appropriate assignment / transition of responsibilities to non-NATO agencies / organizations.
- (b) (U) Assignment. Established by IFOR Commander.
- (c) (U) Organization and Staffing. Established by IFOR Commander.

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- (d) (U) Command Relationship. Established by IFOR Commander.
- (3) (U) Civil-Military Operational Planning Teams (OPTs), Tactical Planning Teams (TPTs), and Tactical Support Teams (TSTs)
  - (a) (U) Mission. These teams will ensure effective Civil-military cooperation below the Division by establishing liaison with local leaders, UNHCR and UNPHA representatives.
  - (b) (U) Assignment. Established by IFOR Commander.
  - (c) (U) Organization and Staffing. Established by IFOR Commander.
  - (d) (U) Command Relationship. Established by IFOR Commander.

**GEORGE A. JOULWAN**  
General, U. S. Army

OFFICIAL:

TRIP REPORT FOR ASSIGNMENT AS HUMANITARIAN ADVISOR TO NATO  
JULY 17-SEPTEMBER 14, 1995  
THOMAS FREY

**Type of Assignment:**

- Humanitarian Advisor to NATO's Southern Command (AFSOUTH) in Naples
- First time OFDA has ever assigned a person for an extended assignment to any NATO command or office
- Assignment was a result of USAID offer (through OFDA) to send a Humanitarian Advisor to assist NATO with humanitarian aspects of its planning efforts

**Length of Assignment:**

- July 17-28 in Zagreb, Croatia working with OFDA DART Zagreb, reviewing pertinent issues related to possible NATO troop involvement in Former Yugoslavia
- July 28-August 22 in Naples, Italy assisting with NATO AFSOUTH planning group's efforts to complete OPLAN 40104 "Determined Effort," the plan dealing with NATO support to the withdrawal of UN Protection Force troops from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina
- August 22-25 in Rheindahlen, Germany at a meeting of US Army civil affairs officers and representatives from French military, UK military and US European Command who will be involved with civil-military activities during a NATO troop deployment to Former Yugoslavia. Also in attendance, representatives from:
  - Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)
  - NATO's Allied Forces Central Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) Headquarters, the HQ that would lead the French, UK and US divisions into Former Yugoslavia
  - UNPROFOR
- August 25-September 5 in Naples continuing with support to AFSOUTH planning efforts
- September 5-September 8 in Zagreb updating and reviewing activities with DART Zagreb
- September 8-September 14 in Naples completing my planning effort

**Purpose of Assignment:**

- Review NATO OPLAN 40104 for humanitarian related issues
- Advise AFSOUTH on humanitarian issues related to military plans for FY - Assigned to:
  - Plans and Policy Division (General Burns)
    - Contingency Initiatives Branch: Group responsible for "whatif" ideas and for pulling operational plans together
- Educate military planners on humanitarian issues

- Act as a representative for humanitarian organizations
- Develop scope of work and identify number and placement of humanitarian advisors if NATO implements OPLAN 40104

**Results of assignment:**

- Macro: small impact
  - HA issues overshadowed by dynamic events
    - Tuzla refugees
    - Fall of Zepa
    - Croatian-Federation Agreement
    - Fall of Krijna
    - Sarajevo market attack
    - Commencement of NATO air strikes and RRF actions
    - U.S. peace initiative
    - Use of Tomahawk cruise missiles
    - Constant review of the validity or the need for change of OPLAN 40104
- Micro: successful
  - Offered changes to the OPLAN 40104
  - Educated several key planners on HA missions in FY and HA concerns
  - Presented Humanitarian Advisor concept to the planning elements of the Allied Forces Central Europe Rapid Reaction Corp (ARRC) and to Civil Affairs Officers at a meeting at ARRC HQ in Germany
  - Raised the visibility of civilians in military planning effort by visiting several AFSOUTH planning offices and through just being visible at meetings and briefings
  - Discussed and reached consensus on HA issues with SHAPE (Brussels) CIMIC CHIEF Colonel Bob Phillips, who wrote the original Civil-Military Annex for 40104
  - Shared DART Sitreps with military planning offices dealing with land issues (convoys, refugees)

**Recommendations from Assignment:**

- Constant staffing at AFSOUTH not needed
- Maintain contact with AFSOUTH
- Travel to AFSOUTH if Peace Enforcement Plan (diplomatic plan) is approved and military develops Peace Enforcement Plan
- If and when military plan is implemented, offer 2-3 Humanitarian Advisors to AFSOUTH for placement with Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Planning Cell (CJ-5) and at CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation) Center, both will be at the CINC's HQ
- Internal to OFDA - Define working relationships of Humanitarian Advisors to DART/Zagreb and OFDA/Wash

The following scope of work was offered for review to NATO AFSOUTH as a description of how a Humanitarian Advisor could offer support to NATO troops during a deployment into Bosnia-Herzegovina. As of this date (10/10/95) NATO is still reviewing it.

HUMANITARIAN ADVISOR SCOPE OF WORK

US Agency for International (USAID)  
Bureau for Humanitarian Response (BHR)  
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)

Scope of Appointment: You have been appointed, upon execution of NATO military operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as a humanitarian advisor to the NATO force commander to whom you are assigned. The purpose of this appointment is to provide advice and expertise on humanitarian relief issues. It is expected that your main effort will be to assist the NATO force commander to whom you are assigned, by providing assessments of the impact of humanitarian issues on plans and operations; and by interfacing with the UNHCR, international organizations and non-governmental organizations that operate throughout your force commander's area of operations.

Term of Appointment: The term of this duty appointment is at the discretion of USAID/BHR/OFDA and the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH).

Basis of Appointment: It is understood that all travel, living and lodging expenses, to, in and from the point of interface with NATO forces will be borne by USAID/BHR/OFDA. All salary expenses during the term of this appointment will be borne by USAID/BHR/OFDA. Forward travel to the area of operations is the responsibility of AFSOUTH. You will be considered attached to the force commander for support requirements. Operational costs associated with tasks while performing the terms of this appointment (i.e. supplies, transportation and communications) are the responsibility of AFSOUTH.

Requirements: The area within this operation where your expertise is deemed most appropriate will be with deployed U.S. forces or if acceptable and feasible, with forces from another troop contributing nations. Your responsibilities will be to closely integrate into the Civil-Military Cooperation Center at your assigned headquarters and perform the following:

- a. Advise the planning staff (CJ-5) in your area of operations on all humanitarian matters which might affect military operations. Advise how military operations might affect humanitarian matters.

- b. Provide CJ-5, through Civil-Military Cooperation assets (CIMIC), a point of contact with UN agencies, international organizations and non-governmental organizations (hereafter referred to as relief organizations).
- c. Facilitate operational discussions between CIMIC assets and relief organizations to ensure NATO military actions are coordinated, where appropriate with relief operations.
- d. Assist in validating humanitarian assistance requests from relief organizations.
- e. Assist the CJ-5 in prioritizing humanitarian assistance requests based on relief organization requirements and military operational requirements.
- f. Recommend methods to provide/enhance military support to relief organizations without denigration of operational capabilities
- g. Recommend support actions for relief organizations which enhance military operations.

Assignment Locations: You will be assigned to one of the following locations within the force structure:

- a. Theater headquarters
  - Planning element (CJ-5)
  - Civil-Military Cooperation Center (CMCC)
  - Logistics element (CJ-4) (as required)
- b. Allied Forces Central Europe (ACE) Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) (as required)
- c. Quick Reaction Force HQ (as required)



U.S. AGENCY FOR  
INTERNATIONAL  
DEVELOPMENT

SEP 28 1995

Lieutenant General William G. Carter III  
Chief of Staff  
AFSE  
PSC 813  
Box 132  
FPO AE 09620-0132

Dear General Carter:

I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for allowing the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) to participate in the AFSOUTH planning process for OPLAN 40104. As you know, Mr. Tom Frey from my staff recently completed a temporary assignment with the Plans and Policy Division at AFSOUTH, as a humanitarian advisor. Mr. Frey remarked in his debriefing on the high quality and professionalism of the multi-national NATO staff with which he was associated. During his debriefing, he offered the following recommendations:

- Continue contact between OFDA's Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) located in Zagreb and AFSOUTH planners as the situation in Former Yugoslavia develops.
- DART members visit AFSOUTH as requested, to offer further support to AFSOUTH humanitarian planning efforts.
- Provide AFSOUTH Humanitarian Advisors for deployment with AFSOUTH Theater Headquarters if an OPLAN is implemented.

I have just returned from a trip to Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina on which I accompanied Mr. J. Brian Atwood the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), who also serves as President Clinton's Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance. We viewed first-hand the suffering of the victims of this war. We also closely followed the rapid pace of diplomatic efforts being undertaken and realized that a peace agreement may be accepted in the near future by the three major parties in the conflict. This could be followed closely by a deployment of NATO

forces. USAID through OFDA is identifying and preparing individuals who, upon AFSOUTH request, would be made available as Humanitarian Advisors to NATO forces. The following attachment is a scope of work for a Humanitarian Advisor. It is offered for your review.

Humanitarian Advisors could provide NATO commanders with useful, positive assistance in the effort to coordinate the important parallel missions of NATO forces and the relief community which already operates throughout the Former Yugoslavia.

I know that the development of the positive working relationship between OFDA and AFSOUTH, recently strengthened by Mr. Frey's close collaboration with the AFSOUTH planning staff, can lead to the effective support and assistance to those victims most in need as a result of the tragedy still unfolding in war-torn Former Yugoslavia.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Nan Borton", written in a cursive style.

Nan Borton  
Director  
Office of Foreign Disaster  
Assistance

# ATTACHMENT

## HUMANITARIAN ADVISOR SCOPE OF WORK

US Agency for International (USAID)  
Bureau for Humanitarian Response (BHR)  
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)

Scope of Appointment: You have been appointed, upon execution of NATO military operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as a humanitarian advisor to the NATO force commander to whom you are assigned. The purpose of this appointment is to provide advice and expertise on humanitarian relief issues. It is expected that your main effort will be to assist the NATO force commander to whom you are assigned, by providing assessments of the impact of humanitarian issues on plans and operations; and by interfacing with the UNHCR, international organizations and non-governmental organizations that operate throughout your force commander's area of operations.

Term of Appointment: The term of this duty appointment is at the discretion of USAID/BHR/OFDA and the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH).

Basis of Appointment: It is understood that all travel, living and lodging expenses, to, in and from the point of interface with NATO forces will be borne by USAID/BHR/OFDA. All salary expenses during the term of this appointment will be borne by USAID/BHR/OFDA. Forward travel to the area of operations is the responsibility of AFSOUTH. You will be considered attached to the force commander for support requirements. Operational costs associated with tasks while performing the terms of this appointment (ie. supplies, transportation and communications) are the responsibility of AFSOUTH.

Requirements: The area within this operation where your expertise is deemed most appropriate will be with deployed U.S. forces or if acceptable and feasible, with forces from another troop contributing nations. Your responsibilities will be to closely integrate into the Civil-Military Cooperation Center at your assigned headquarters and perform the following:

- a. Advise the planning staff (CJ-5) in your area of operations on all humanitarian matters which might affect military operations. Advise how military operations might affect humanitarian matters.
- b. Provide CJ-5, through Civil-Military Cooperation assets (CIMIC), a point of contact with UN agencies, international organizations and non-governmental organizations (hereafter referred to as relief organizations).

## ATTACHMENT

### Page 2


- c. Facilitate operational discussions between CIMIC assets and relief organizations to ensure NATO military actions are coordinated, where appropriate with relief operations.
- d. Assist in validating humanitarian assistance requests from relief organizations.
- e. Assist the CJ-5 in prioritizing humanitarian assistance requests based on relief organization requirements and military operational requirements.
- f. Recommend methods to provide/enhance military support to relief organizations without denigration of operational capabilities
- g. Recommend support actions for relief organizations which enhance military operations.

Assignment Locations: You will be assigned to one of the following locations within the force structure:

- a. Theater headquarters
  - Planning element (CJ-5)
  - Civil-Military Cooperation Center (CMCC)
  - Logistics element (CJ-4) (as required)
- b. Allied Forces Central Europe (ACE) Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) (as required)
- c. Quick Reaction Force HQ (as required)



# COORDINATION OF PARALLEL MISSIONS



16 November 1995

MEMORANDUM

FROM: USAID-OFDA Liaison to AFSOUTH

TO: Political Advisor to CINC-AFSOUTH

SUBJECT: Status of USAID-OFDA Liaison Function

1. Following the end of my initial TDY to AFSOUTH (28 July to 14 September), Ms. Nan Borton, Director of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) sent a letter to General Carter thanking him for allowing OFDA participation in AFSOUTH's planning process for OPLAN 40104. In that letter she proposed to continue supporting AFSOUTH efforts by offering further support to AFSOUTH humanitarian planning efforts and to provide AFSOUTH with Humanitarian Advisors for deployment if an OPLAN was implemented. She also offered a Humanitarian Advisor Scope of Work for review. This letter is attached.
2. General Carter answered Ms. Borton's letter on 24 October, accepting Humanitarian Advisors to help support activities related to the IFOR CIMIC Centre. This letter is also attached. Ken Koon and I have returned as a result of General Carter's letter. To this point we have been working with CIB in Plans and Policy to review and offer inputs to the CIMIC Centre process in OPLAN 40104X.
3. Ken and I will only be here through next week, but we will be transitioning with Ron Libby and Evan MacGibbon, two highly qualified field people.
4. Ron has spent considerable time working with the military during complex emergency situations including Northern Iraq (Provide Comfort), Somalia (Provide Relief and Restore Hope), Former Soviet Union (Provide Hope). He has extensive field experience working with the U.N., ICRC, and NGOs. His most recent field assignment was as a Logistics Officer/Military Liaison working with OFDA's Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) in Former Yugoslavia.
5. Evan MacGibbon has worked with the DART in Former Yugoslavia for over two years. He has knowledge of all the key factions and organizations that will have to be dealt with to make sure that humanitarian-military are well coordinated. He is also personally aware of the dangers inherent in this operation, having spent seven weeks trapped in Sarajevo, this past spring, when the winter peace fell apart.
6. Both Ron and Evan are prepared to deploy with IFOR for 3-6 months.

15 November 1995

MEMORANDUM

FROM: USAID-OFDA Liaison to AFSOUTH  
TO: Political Advisor to CINC-AFSOUTH  
SUBJECT: Trip to Geneva 13-14 November 1995

Here is review of purpose, attendees and main points of meetings I attended in Geneva 13-14 November. On the 13th I met by myself with those listed. On Tuesday, I accompanied Brigadier General Tom Matthews (Commander 353rd CA Battalion), a EUCOM CA officer, a Major from the 353rd. They had been sent to Geneva by General Joulwan on a fact finding trip. Tom Armand and Kirk Ressler from the USUN Mission also accompanied General Matthews' party. My trip to Geneva was at the request of the USUN Mission.

1. Meeting: USUN Officer Kirk Ressler

Purpose: Review my activities as Humanitarian Advisor to AFSOUTH and set a schedule for further meetings

Main Points:

- Reviewed my activities at AFSOUTH during initial TDY
- Reviewed my current and planned activities during present TDY

2. Meeting: UNHCR Neill Wright Special Advisor  
(Military/Logistics)

Purpose: Review my activities as Humanitarian Advisor and as about concerns of UNHCR relating to NATO deployment.

Main Points:

- Not comfortable with the NATO planning he has seen so far (mainly at ARRC and Brussels)
- Coordination process needs to start NOW to reduce problems at implementation point
- Neill may be sent to AFSOUTH as UNHCR Advisor

3. **Meeting:** UNHCR Desk Officer (Logistics) Special Operations  
Former Yugoslavia Boonshan Sangfai

**Purpose:** Review my activities as Humanitarian Advisor and  
as about concerns of UNHCR relating to NATO  
deployment.

**Main Points:**

- Questioned why UNHCR has to continually provide "briefs" to different military groups associated with Former Yugoslavia. Why can't they share this information? (He's going to Brussels next week)
- World Food Program may begin to use commercial trucking to bring in relief supplies, reducing need for convoys but increasing uncoordinated commercial traffic on limited roads system. (According to Anne-Willem Bijelefeld, UNHCR would push to have WFP hold off on this at least until Spring).
- Concerned about where coordination points would be with NATO and how/when does NATO intend to get the word out on what it is planning, not just to UN but also the NGOs.
- As a Logistics officer he was concerned about port and road access congestion.

5. **Meeting:** Ambassador to US Mission to the UN

**Purpose:** Exchange of ideas on the peace plan and the  
implications to the U.S. military and NATO

**Main Points:**

- Ambassador had sat in on Ogata-Joulwan meeting and heard then say, NATO in and out in 12 months and UNHCR out in 24 months
- Ambassador felt that it would very difficult to pick-up and carry on the good things that UNPROFOR had been doing. Finding, hiring and paying for those important elements will be difficult.
- How will the civilian side work? Now and after one year? Who will run it? All of these remain unanswered questions.
- General Matthews said that General Joulwan had sent him to start finding out from some of the main civilian relief and coordination agencies what and where their main activities were. He also said he wanted to share with those agencies, in broad terms, the General's plan to work with them, through the CIMIC Centres and through a Theatre Advocate, who will work on political, civil, and military issues to resolve, broker, and help develop civilian coalitions to take on these missions after the 12 month window of opportunity organizations would be in place to continue to move the peace process forward.
- Matthews emphasized that

6. Meeting: UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) Geneva  
Director Martin Griffiths

Purpose: Discuss potential involvement by DHA in a post-  
UNPROFOR environment

**Main Points:**

- General Matthews made his main points as mentioned in Ambassador's meeting.
- DHA has the skills and ability to offer support to the develop of the "High Rep/SECOOR".
- Mr. Griffith was meeting later in the morning and was going to propose a organizational structure for the civilian side. He was proposing that DHA could assist in the areas of administrative and program support.
- DHA also may offer to set up an "OSOCC" On-Site Operations Coordination Centre to assist in coordination of UN, NGO, and International Organization activities. (Note: General Matthews plans to set up a CIMIC Centre to perform this function. I disagree with Matthews. I feel this is a civilian function not a military function to perform.)
- Mr. Griffiths said he envisioned a "High Rep" with three parts:
  - External Affairs including:
    - Public Affairs
    - Host Gov't. Rep.
    - IFOR Rep
    - Donor Gov't.
  - Liaison (this would be the Senior Coordination Group) including:
    - Military
    - Humanitarian Affairs
    - Human Rights
  - Civilian Coordination including:
    - Administration
      - Logistical support
      - Secretariat
    - Program
      - Info sharing
      - Financial tracking
      - Policy/Planning
    - OSOCC
- Problem with all of this is:
  - UN hasn't been asked.
  - And if they are can the nations and NATO live with some potential reporting relationships and authorities that may be retained by the UN.
  - And finally who pays??

7. **Meeting:** UNHCR Anne-Willem Bijleveld, Special Envoy for the Former Yugoslavia and principal staff dealing with Former Yugoslavia

**Purpose:** Gather information on UNHCR operational activities and to learn of UNHCR's concerns about a NATO deployment

**Main Points:**

- General Matthews made his same points as in the Ambassador's meeting.
- Matthews requested detailed information on UNHCR activities in Former Yugoslavia, from which a CIMIC data base will be built which eventually will include all humanitarian organizations. Bijleveld's comment was that a data base was a nice idea but it will be impossible to gather info on all of them.
- All agreed that the exchange of liaisons officers will be important.
- Neill Wright said it would be important to set up a CMOC now to give UNHCR and other relief organizations a focal point in NATO
- Bijleveld is still concerned about road maintenance in post-UNPROFOR environment, especially with winter approaching.
- With signing of a peace plan, UNHCR presence will change. No more responsibility for ID's, license plates
- UNHCR still hoping for "Tunnel System" for road security rather than convoy escort
- UNHCR will want updates on security situations.

8. **Meeting:** ICRC Angelo Gnaedinger, ICRC Delegate General for Western Europe and the Balkans and principal staff dealing with Former Yugoslavia

**Purpose:** Gather information on ICRC operational activities and to learn of ICRC's concerns about a NATO deployment

**Main Points:**

- ICRC is eager to learn NATO's mandates, structures, procedures and plans so ICRC can build their planning and coordination mechanisms now.
- General Matthews again presented his purpose for the meeting
- Very soon, ICRC Relief Coord from Zagreb will come to Naples to meet with NATO planners to talk about transportation, warehouses, convoys etc.
- ICRC sees a great difference of relief activities between Serb side and Croat-Muslim side. ICRC works very hard to help on both sides and be as transparent and neutral as possible.
- ICRC would never ask for NATO security or travel in a UNHCR convoy.

- Problems ICRC has in carrying out it's operations in Serbska Republic:
  - Strong regional feelings
  - Military against civilian leaders down to the village level
  - Lack of cohesion Pale vs. Banja Luka for leadership
- ICRC will keep its distance from NATO but they cooperate.

## DECONFLICTING FORESEEABLE PROBLEMS WITH CIVILIAN/MILITARY OPERATIONS

### 1. NATO/IFOR DEFINING THEIR MISSION TO THE CIVILIAN AND HUMANITARIAN COMMUNITY.

- Upon request, what types of assistance will IFOR provide for humanitarian relief community and will they prioritize these requests?
- How and to whom does the humanitarian community request assistance from IFOR?
- What and how will IFOR assist Refugee/Displaced in returning to their homes? What kind of security will IFOR be provided for those people going home and when they get home?
- Road clearance and maintenance - where/when/how/what
- Security - what type of security will IFOR provide to the humanitarian community?, Where and how is it available? How is it requested? Is there areas where IFOR will not provide security (i.e. in corridors of separation only, inside B-H only?, etc.)
- Will IFOR allow Humanitarian workers to ride on IFOR aircraft? What is the procedures and who will be the contacts? What are the requirements/limitations?
- Will IFOR haul cargo for humanitarian relief organizations? What priority will emergency relief supplies have?
- What is contact links/system to NATO by the humanitarian relief organizations - Civilians? How and where?
- If civilians or humanitarian relief workers have problems with IFOR operations or personnel, does IFOR have an official system to get resolution or seek retribution?

#### ADVANTAGE:

- Deconflict expectations of the humanitarian or civilian community as to what IFOR's intent and responsibilities are.
- It will deconflict possible problems and provide a

better working environment for IFOR personnel.

-- It will provide a contact system to handle problems.

**2. I.D. - For interrelationships with IFOR and relief workers**

-- Military identifying Humanitarian/civilian (picture I.D.)

-- Military identifying Humanitarian/civilian vehicles  
(license plates)

[options - UNHCR carding]

**ADVANTAGE:**

--IFOR will need a system to identify Humanitarian workers for numerous reasons - coordination, cooperation, transport, etc. These cards should be screen to assure validity. Check points, getting on IFOR facilities, riding NATO aircraft, etc.

**3. Logistical coordination - air, sea, and ground.**

-- Build a cooperative system that all parties (Humanitarian, IFOR, and Governments can work with - A WRITTEN system would minimize misunderstandings, provide points of contact and present a quick coordination system to deconflict problems if and/or when they arise.

-- Air will be controlled by IFOR over B-H but there will be Humanitarian flights and private flights that will need deconflicting. What will IFOR system be?

-- Ports are controlled by the hosting country's - there is no ownership by IFOR and coordination is essential to insure smooth operations and prevent confliction.

-- Roads and custom clearances remain the responsibility of the hosting Government. Good coordination systems by all parties will provide the least amount of problems between the humanitarian relief operations, civilian personnel and supply movement and IFOR operations.

4. Civilians riding on NATO aircraft - Humanitarian relief organizations, press, Embassies, etc.

-- Provide a system that will allow authorized civilians to ride on NATO aircraft.

**ADVANTAGE:**

-- Provide assistance to Humanitarian operations (IFOR aircraft flying anyway-seats would be on available basis) - continue a vital UNFP function.

--Less private aircraft to deconflict with - If IFOR flights are not available for Authorized Humanitarian, press or diplomatic personnel, these groups will provide their own.

-- This would also provide some PR between IFOR and the relief community.

5. CIMIC personnel - Provide a written plan of action/responsibilities to minimize extension of responsibilities and to clarify functions.

**ADVANTAGE:**

-- fully inform CIMIC personnel what the IFOR mission is and what CIMIC responsibilities are.

-- prevent mission creep

-- prevent confusion on what role CIMIC's are to play in relationship to humanitarian operations.

6. ROAD MAINTENANCE - Who is doing what, where?

-- Identify what roads IFOR will maintain

-- Identify Bridges or road structures IFOR will reconstruct.

-- Define what road maintenance means (snow clearance, paving, etc.)

-- Define what IFOR is willing to assist communities/humanitarian organizations with?

-- Determine/define a transitional road maintenance system for road maintenance responsibilities?

-- Will IFOR provide professional assistance to assess road structures, buildings, etc. (engineers, etc.)? What limitations will there be (i.e. area, structures, etc.)

**ADVANTAGE:**

-- This will deconflict the misconfussion the civilian/humanitarian organizations have on what IFOR is willing to do? This will help the Civilian/humanitarian community to organize and identify what roads they must maintain. This will also spell out what the military intentions are as related to road maintenance. This will also provide the potential for a smooth transition to civilian road maintenance responsibilities.

**7. Demineing - IFOR monitoring demining**

-- What does "monitor the demining" mean?

-- How will IFOR demine the country of B-H

-- How will Civilians or humanitarian workers request demining.

-- Will IFOR check for mines, on request?

-- Will IFOR provide mine awareness courses?

**ADVANTAGE:**

-- clear up aspectations or the confusion concerning IFOR's role in the demining program.

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## **TASKINGS**

21 Nov 95

It is understood that NATO deployment and operations will effect humanitarian relief operations, local commerce, and private transportation. The CIMIC (Civil Military Coordination) Centers will be the points of contact for all civilians operations to deconflict and coordinate the cooperative efforts. The following points are those areas where deconflicting may be necessary. These activities may constitute a large part of time devoted to coordination with humanitarian operations.

1. **I.D.** (Identification) system for humanitarian relief workers/equipment.

Past Civil/Military UNHCR has been providing UNHCR licensing of vehicles and UNHCR identification picture cards for humanitarian workers. This has provided identification for humanitarian workers at check points, on roads, and provides a identifying verification of humanitarian workers traveling on UNFR and other military aircraft. This has also provided identification to allow neutral worker so as to cross faction force lines. UNHCR has indicated they would like to get out of this business of carding and licensing. However the need still exists for verifying identities of humanitarian workers to NATO troops and factions. NATO or UNHCR will need to continue this program. This has been recognized as extremely important in past Civilian/Military operations.

- a) Personal Identification (Carding)
- b) Vehicle licensing

2. **LOGISTICAL COORDINATION/PRIORITIZATION** (emergency vs general vs civilian commerce) the coordinating system with NATO through (CIMIC).

There will be competing demands for the use of transportation routes (airports, roads, ports). B-H is bouncing back quickly through private commercial entrepreneurs who are providing a variety of supplies and goods. Bosnian citizens, internally displaced and refugees, are trying to return home. The humanitarian emergency needs are continuous: Development programs are escalating in the hopes of rebuilding the minimal infrastructures of the country. And now NATO troops will be deploying and UNPROFOR troops will be departing. Balancing the use will be politically sensitive but essential to maintain basic humanitarian survival, and for the country to begin standing on its own feet. A system for CIMIC to tie into and how others may tie into CIMIC is essential.

- a. Ground transport
- b. Air transport
- c. Sea transport
- d. Rail transport

3. **RESOURCE DECONFLICTION** (costs, personnel, resources)

A past problem in civil/military operations occurred when the military comes in and pays much higher prices for resources. This causes numerous problems and strongly hinders, delays or stops the humanitarian programs that are on going. This problem can have long term effects even after the military operation ends. It is essential that costs and resources be coordinating so as to deconflict resource availability.

- a. Contracts for equipment and services
- b. Wages/personnel
- c. Facilities
- d. Fuel
- e. Long term deconfliction programs/costs
- f. Port use

#### 4. SECURITY -

Security is important to all participants. Many humanitarian workers will think that NATO will secure the entire country and will become the police. Current up-to-date information is essential to maintain coordination and cooperation with humanitarian workers. NATO must consider that people will be working in and outside of "NATO control zones". This means people may need to provide their own security outside of the "NATO control zone" but will need to cross the "NATO control zone" with their security. CIMIC will need to coordinate the development of a system/plan that is acceptable to humanitarian workers and "ALL" NATO troops to deconflict any possible misunderstandings and problems.

- a. Briefing systems
- b. Convoy escort (inside vs outside of NATO control area)
- c. Personal escort (" " " " " " " ")
- d. Road block/check points - human. personnel/equipment
- e. Demine assistance (inside vs outside NATO control areas)
- f. Air support

#### 5. ACCESS -

Access has been a problem to many areas because of extortion by the local militia groups. Many of these problems may not go away with a NATO deployment to Bosnia. However a consistent system with NATO troops at all check points would help prevent NATO and other operators additional problems. Preventing access because of security or any other problems is not likely to be a NATO function other than notification. International Committee of the Red Cross (I.C.R.C.) is a special case as to the humanitarian laws passed by the Geneva convention.

- a. NATO restrictions/sensitivities
- b. NATO vs UN assistance to Bosnian Gov.
- c. Custom clearance
- d. I.C.R.C.

## 6. *COMMUNICATIONS*

Communications is important for security, coordination, efficiency and keeping people informed. At present, there is a UN communication system that has been established and has provided HF and VHF frequencies and a radio contact security system for NGOs and UN organizations. International organizations (ICRC, IFRC) have their own systems but also utilize the UN system. UNPF and UNHCR were responsibilities for this system and its up keep and coordination functions. NATO will need to evaluate the system to see if they may need to acquire some responsibilities to maintain the systems success. Hopefully there is little change to the existing system but it will be necessary for a CIMIC's communications to be linked with this system. The coordination or reporting with the international humanitarian operations is essential to deconflict information going to the press and heads of state.

- a. Changes to the current UNHCR/UNPROFOR system (frequencies, localities, etc.) ("IF")
- b. CIMIC to/from Humanitarian workers (locations, radio frequencies, times available, etc)
- c. NATO being the lead reporting on security and UNHCR/Humanitarian operations reporting on the humanitarian situations.

7. Information is essential to coordinate operations. For NATO and the rest of the world to coordinate operations there is information that must be shared. Most UN and all NGO personnel do not have security clearances. To cooperate and coordinate information it will be essential that NATO information be declassified, whenever possible, to allow sharing of information.

- a. Provide Humanitarian organizations with timely unclassified information necessary for coordination.
- b. Coordinate NATO response to civilian requests for information.
- c. Determine the relationships between different CIMIC Centers and their operating procedures. Provide civilian organizations with this information ASAP.

Coordination with the humanitarian is essential but it is also important not to get intensively involved in their programs. This is an area that mission creep is common because of the humanitarian good will aspect. Understanding local customs and assisting NGOs is a preferred approach.

7 Dec 1995  
COL Phillips/2176

## MEMORANDUM

TO: Chief of Staff

THROUGH: CJ5

SUBJECT: Civil-Military Movement Coordination (40105)  
Meeting; 06 DEC 95, IFOR Joint Movement Control  
Center, Zagreb

1. IFOR CIMIC and UNHCR LNO met with the Director, Commander for Support's Joint Movement Control (JMCC) and UNHCR's Zagreb office. Participants at Encl. 1. A second related meeting occurred with Mr. Julian Harston, Senior Political Advisor to the SRSG.
2. The purpose of the meeting was to stress the urgency of initiating a process to ensure movements coordination among IFOR, humanitarian assistance organizations and government authorities and to recognize the limitations of the logistics/transport infrastructure within the region relative to demands through the Spring 1996.
3. The IFOR CIMIC UNHCR LNO presented the position that movements coordination must take into consideration the realities of transit/host nation government sovereignty, the requirement to maintain humanitarian relief operations, the imperative for a rapid IFOR deployment and the necessity to develop a movement coordination structure prior to TOA on 19 DEC.
4. A process to achieve such a coordination structure includes:
  - a. Approach by UNPF Civil Affairs to appropriate ministry-level governmental authorities with the aim of having the governments (transit states and both entities at B-H) identify a point of contact to convene a movements coordination conference inclusive of government, IFOR movement coordination authorities and key humanitarian assistance movement coordinators. Separate conferences would occur for each nation/entity involved.

[Note: Initially, the realities of the political situation will require separate conferences for each

of the B-H entities. As the B-H government evaluates, separate entity coordination structures would be replaced by a central Ministry of Transport.]

- b. NLT 14-15 DEC 95. Conduct of meeting, chaired by the government/entity representative to establish the structure and a supporting system and procedures to coordinate, prioritize and allocate the logistics infrastructure IFOR, humanitarian assistance and other civilian movements. The concept for IFOR representation envisions that Cdr for Spt JMCC will focus on transit states and ARRC Movement Operation Center will address B-H.
- c. NLT 18 DEC 95. Conference participants issue formal instructions to their respective subordinate levels and required lower/local levels coordinations initiated.
- d. At TOA. The coordination system becomes operational. Conferences convene to address other transport infrastructure issues (ex. road maintenance).

5. Colonel Race, Director JMCC agreed to brief Commander for Support on 6 DEC 95 and seek approval to support the proposed process, UNHCR representatives agreed with the proposal and will brief their authorities.

6. In the second meeting, Mr Harsfan agreed to support a UNPF CA approach to governments, if IFOR decided to execute the proposal. UNHCR agreed to provide a UNHCR Logistics Officer as LNO to the JMCC. Director, JMCC agreed. Director, JMCC will accept a World Food Program LNO.

7. If HQ IFOR decides to execute this proposal the Purpose and Principles at Enclosure 2 should guide any discussions among government, IFOR and humanitarian organizations.

8. Recommendations

- a. Pending Commander for Support concurrence, execute the proposal.
- b. Approve the Encl. 2 Purpose and Principles.

  
William R Phillips  
COL US A  
Chief IFOR CIMIC

Enclosure:

1. List of Participants
2. Purpose and Principles.

Copies to:

UNHCR LNO

Director JMCC

CJ4

Cdr for Spt CIMIC

HQ ARRC CIMIC

HQ ARRC MOC



Enclosure 1

IFOR CIMIC/UNHCR/JMCC  
Civil-Military Movements Coordination Meeting

Participants

Mr. Mike Aitchison	Senior Logistics Officer UNHCR-Zagreb
Col C. Berder	Deputy Chief CIMIC HQ IFOR
Maj Steve Collins	IFOR Information Campaign (HQ IFOR)
CPT Castley	IFOR Joint Movement Control Center
LtCol Stewart Douglas	Military Liaison Officer to UNHCR
Maj Herman De Kleine	Military Liaison Officer to UNHCR
Mr. Evan Mac Gibban	Senior Humanitarian Activities Advisor to HQ IFOR
COL W. R. Phillips	Chief, CIMIC HQ IFOR
COL A. Race	Director, IFOR Joint Movement Control Center
Maj Bryan Smith	Head, Operations Coordination Cell, UNHCR-Zagreb
Mr. Neill Wright	UNHCR Senior Liaison Officer to IFOR

Movements CoordinationPurpose

To establish a process to ensure movements coordination among government authorities, the Implementation Force and major humanitarian assistance organisations and to recognize the limitations of the logistics/transport infrastructure within the region relative to demands through the Spring 1996.

PRINCIPLES

1. Ultimate responsibility lies with sovereign states, including the responsibility for ensuring that freedom of movement and avoidance of delays as laid down in the peace plan.
2. Transit/host nation governments should lead in the process of movement coordination.
3. Adequate humanitarian relief operations must continue. This includes the efforts of international, governmental non-governmental and commercial traffic essential to maintain/sustain life.
4. The Implementation Force must deploy as rapidly as possible to establish a credible base for implementation of the military aspects of the peace plan.
5. It is in the interest of transit/host nations to ensure rapid Implementation Force deployment and continuance of humanitarian relief operations.
6. Normal movement coordination organizations should participate in the movement coordination structures (Governmental Ministries of Transport, UN/IFOR Movement Control Centers, UN agencies [ex. WFP] and Major NGOs).
7. Prior to UN/IFOR TOA, UNPF CA should lead in establishing government contacts to facilitate establishment of a movement coordination system. Transit/host nations should identify points of contact and method of contact at national and municipality levels.
8. Civil movement must be considered in the coordination process (as represented by the transit/host nation government).

9. Openness of movement information is vital to effective coordination.

CIVIL MILITARY CO-OPERATION (CIMIC)

- REFERENCES:
- A. ARRC OPLAN 60405.
  - B. ANNEX K(CIMIC) to CINCSOUTH OPLAN 40405 dated Oct. 95
  - C. UNHCR Handbook for Military on Humanitarian Operations

1. (NU) SITUATION

- a. Intelligence. See OPLAN 60405 A.
- b. The Dayton General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Peace Plan). The Peace Plan follows the traditional UN format with Civilian Aspects including a Constitutional Agreement and a Agreement on the Military Aspects.

(1). The implementation of the Civilian Aspects of the Peace Plan, and associated civilian tasks, is the primary responsibility of the High Representative and is clearly defined in the Peace Plan.

(2). CS and CSS force level requirements in OPLAN 60405 are designed to implement/enforce the military tasks of the Peace Plan and support the withdrawal of UNPROFOR. Any international political pressure, which causes this NATO mission to be adapted that of Nation Building or to focus on humanitarian assistance (outside the supporting tasks defined in Article VI to Annex 1-A), will require a fresh plan to address the impact on the new mission, especially the Civil Affairs and logistic implications.

- c. Civil and Military Organisations. See Annex A.

d. Displaced Persons and Refugees. There should be no large scale, uncontrolled civil population movements during this operation. However some 'directed' large scale movement could occur as a result of direct action by one entity wishing to gain an advantage over another. This could restrict or impede military operations due to competition for limited real estate and limited routes. Additionally as a result of the Peace Plan and the desire to return home there will be population movement controlled by the UNHCR and governments repatriation programmes.

- e. Attachments and Detachments. See Annex B.

2. (NU) COMARRC's INTENT. See OPLAN 60405.

3. (NU) MISSION. To provide CIMIC support to the ARRC OPLAN 60405.

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4. **(NU) EXECUTION.**

a. Concept. The concept is to strengthen the existing UNCA structure early. Initially using in place UNPROFOR G5/S5 officers, and by G+4, the NATO Military-Civil Co-ordination Officers (MCO)<sup>1</sup>. Establish Civil Military Co-operation Centres (CIMIC Centres)<sup>2</sup> down to Bde level. Provide input for 'Shaping the Operational Environment'<sup>3</sup>. Prepare to facilitate and enable CIMIC aspects of Joint Commissions (both civilian and military) and the deconfliction of civilian interference to the implementation/enforcing of the Peace Plan as needed. Host Nation Support (HNS) is provided by G5 cells in HQ COMMZ FWD (RSC) and HQ ARRC REAR see SUPLAN 67105 and SUPLAN 60405 C.

b. Phases. This is a five phase operation.

(1). Phase I - Preparation. Now to G Day. HQ ARRC and UNPROFOR with the international organisations identify CIMIC tasks and requirements. Assign responsibilities. With UNHCR and UNPROFOR research potential population movements and routes. These CIMIC tasks flow into the next phase depending upon individual deployment times.

(2). Phase II - Entry. G Day to TOA. Some of these tasks may apply to enabling staff during phase 1. Prior to TOA establish COMARRC's CIMIC structure by strengthening the in-place UN organisation and establishing CIMIC Centres. Once established, collect, analyse and assess civilian, local political and humanitarian information. As appropriate, commanders at all levels make initial contact with their civilian counterparts. Identify any requirements which may be needed in order to facilitate the clearance or repair of utilities vital to the implementation of the Military Agreement. Identify local Civil Action(Community)Projects and be prepared to continue them within capabilities.

(3). Phase III - Implementation. The priority during this phase is CIMIC support to implementing/enforcing the Military Agreement and the withdrawal of UNPROFOR. Additionally, within the limits of the assigned principle tasks and available resources, and on request, fulfil supporting tasks associated with the civilian aspects of the Peace Plan. The intent is that a number of Commission and organisations (see Annex A for details), under the direction of the High Representative, will have responsibility for specific civilian aspects of the Peace Plan. i.e. The Commission for Displaced Persons and Refugees and the UNHCR Repatriation Plan will control all aspects including movement of Displaced Persons and Refugees. The CIMIC requirement is to facilitate close co-operation at all levels to deconflict/harmonise these activities with the military tasks of implementing/enforcing the Military Agreement.

(4). Phase IV - Transition. Co-ordination with the High Representative, international/national Commissions, organisations, agencies, NGOs and PVOs continues. CIMIC Centres now focus on post conflict issues as directed. Identify and prepare to hand over to appropriate civilian/military organisation(s).

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<sup>1</sup> MCO are NATO officers, FR CIMIC Liaison Officers or US Civil Affairs officers, reporting through the normal chain of command, working and collocated with the UN Civil Affairs co-ordinators. Their role is to establish/develop links with local civilian agencies, and local civilian community leaders.

<sup>2</sup> The CIMIC Centre provides a focus for all CIMIC activity in the AOR. This does not imply the collocation of organisations & agencies, and some LOs. It provides a meeting place where the military have access to civil organisations and to overcome problems associated with the civilian lack of familiarity with military procedures. In the past this centre has been known as a Civil Military Operations Centre (CMOC) however it has no operational tasking authority; that remains with G3 Operations.

<sup>3</sup> 'Shaping the operational environment' ensures that COMARRC does not just accept the operational environment into which he deploys combat formations, but exploits early access, to influence it to his advantage.

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(5). Phase V- Exit. Handover to appropriate civilian/military organisation(s) as appropriate. Redeploy on order.

c. Task Allocation.

(1). Phase I.

(a). HQ ARRC. Inform the Parties and Entities to the Peace Plan of COMARRC's CIMIC Centre functions and contacts. Provide CIMIC information for the Perception Group. With UNHCR and UNPROFOR research potential population movements and routes.

(b). Divisions. Inform the Entities to the Peace Plan about your CIMIC Centres functions, locations, points of contacts and establish 'hotlines'. Collect and decimate CIMIC information up the chain of command. Identify and establish rapport with the local civilian authorities of the Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina and Republika Srbska within Area of Responsibility.

(c). G5 UNPROFOR. Identify and advise on any non IFOR contributing national G5 staff that wish to remain and work for IFOR. Identify any UN civilian organisation, agency, or NGOs/PVOs who want to withdraw with the non IFOR elements of UNPROFOR Task Sectors to attach UNPROFOR G5/S5 staff to UNCA offices until arrival of NATO MCO.

(2). Phase II.

(a). COMARRC Liaison Team (AFSOUTH FWD). Establish CIMIC liaison with UNPF, UNPROFOR AFSOUTH and all civilian officials including the High Representative and staff (when appointed), UNCA and the organisations and agencies associated with the civilian aspects of the Peace Plan once activated.

(b). HQ ARRC FWD enabling party.

1. Be prepared to receive the FR CIMIC Liaison team.
2. Be prepared to receive and brief, US Civil Affairs Team, FR and US MCO.
3. Establish COMARRC's CIMIC Centre.
4. Integrate UNPROFOR G5 as they become available, into the HQ.
5. Task Divisions/Sectors for civil, and political information and analyse/assess it for the Perception Group, with G3, CS, PSYOPS, Legal and Media Ops.
6. Identify the current level of military assistance to the aid agencies. Together with UNHCR plan to ensure that current levels of humanitarian aid are met.
7. With respect to Zones of Separation and Areas Of Transfer:
  - (aa) Identify the civilian authorities responsible.

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(bb) Assess the possible movement of any civilian population out of the Area Of Transfer and destination.

(cc) Issue guidance on the IFOR relationship to the civilian population during the hand over phase, including IFOR responsibilities and areas to avoid.

(dd) Assess with aid agencies the level of humanitarian aid if required

8. With respect to GORAZDE:

(aa) Identify critical humanitarian aid requirements in the villages and towns on the designated routes, where the Serb civilian population has the potential to hinder freedom of movement to/from GORAZDE.

(bb) Assess and plan with the aid agencies to ensure sufficient is humanitarian aid provided in order to avoid any problems.

9. Identify and establish a rapport with the civilian authorities of the Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina and Republika Srbska.

10. Determine potential problems in civilian areas vital to COMARRC's implementation of the Military Agreement.

11. (aa) In particular the Repatriation of refugees/DPs. Timely vision is required of the detail the UNHCR repatriation plan and the Parties repatriation plans to enable deconfliction.

12. Determine the civilian officials and organisations and agencies who will be associated with the civilian aspects of the Peace Plan and establish a rapport.

(c). G5 UNPROFOR.

1. Be prepared to accept and link COMARRC's enabling G5 staff into the UNPROFOR civil-military co-ordination structure.

2. After TOA be prepared to collocate with HQ ARRC FWD/MAIN.

(d). Divisions.

1. Be prepared to accept attachment of US Civil Affairs(CA) Teams or the FR CIMIC LO teams (FR DIV only).

2. Be prepared to subsume UNPROFOR Sector civil military co-ordination structure, establish CIMIC Centres.

3. If not already in place, deploy MCO.

4. Complete the establishment of liaison to all Civil structures in Area of Responsibility.

5. Analyse and assess civil, humanitarian and political information in order to determine potential CIMIC problems. In particular:

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(aa) With respect to Zones of Separation and Areas Of Transfer, Identify the civilian authorities responsible, assess the possible movement of any civilian population out of Areas Of Transfer and their destination, with aid agencies determine the level of humanitarian aid if required.

(bb) With respect to GORAZDE. Identify critical humanitarian aid requirements in the villages and towns on the designated routes, where the Serb civilian population has the potential to hinder freedom of movement to/from GORAZDE

6. Identify current local Civil Action (Community) Projects.

7. Before TOA be prepared to assist and or observe the conduct of local negotiation and mediation using existing mechanisms, including MCO.

(e). MCO. Under the command of the Sectors:

1. Establish/develop and run links to local civilian agencies, local government and community leaders, including those concerned with refugees/DPs, reconstruction and policing, using established UNCA structures and relationships.

2. Gather information vital to the ARRC's implementation of the Military Agreement and local attitudes to UN withdrawal and IFOR participation, and pass it quickly up the chain of command.

3. After TOA be prepared to assist in the conduct of local negotiations.

d. Phase III. Use the civil military co-ordination structure to:

(1). Assist in the implementation of Zone Of Separation:

(a).

(b).

(2). Assist in the implementation of Areas of Transfer:

(a).

(b).

(3). Assist in the implementation of Refugee and Displaced Persons repatriation:

(a).

(b).

(4). Monitor The levels of humanitarian aid.

(5). Support the withdrawal of UNPROFOR.

(6). Continue local Civil Action(Community) Projects.

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(7). Be prepared, on order, to dispatch teams including local civil or military leaders, to a point of tension or conflict to defuse the situation. This could involve for example, in co-ordination with G3, a show of military resolve with a display of combat power.

e. Phase IV.

(1). Co-ordination with the High Representative, international/national Commissions, organisations, agencies, NGOs and PVOs continues.

(2). CIMIC Centres now focus on post conflict issues as directed.

(3). Maintain links with and monitor the situation, of all civil agencies.

(4). Identify and prepare to hand over to appropriate civilian/military organisation(s).

f. Phase V.

(1). Handover to appropriate civilian/military organisation(s) as appropriate.

(2). Redeploy on order.

5. (NU) CO-ORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:

a. G5 Priorities.

(1). Establish COMARRC's CIMIC structure.

(2). Identify the current level of military assistance to aid agencies. Together with UNHCR ensure that planned humanitarian aid levels are met.

(3). Co-ordinate CIMIC aspects of the Campaign Plan as required by the theatre CIMIC guidelines.

(4). Monitor and report civilian activity and reaction to NATO's implementation/ enforcement of the Peace Plan and UNPROFOR withdrawal through the ARRC CIMIC structures.

b. For the legal rights and freedom of movement of civilians, see Section 2 (Legal), ROE and the UN/NATO mandate.

6.(NU) SERVICE SUPPORT. Including HNS, see SUPLAN 60405C.

7.(NU) COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

a. HQ AFSOUTH (FWD) CIMIC Centre is at ?

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b. Location of ACOS G5 is HQ ARRC FWD/MAIN.

c. Points Of Contact (see Annex A).

**List of Annexes:**

- A. UN civil and military organisations and agencies.
- B. ARRC CIMIC structures.

ANNEX A TO  
SUPLAN 60405 B  
CONOPLAN 60105  
DATED NOV.95

CIVIL AND MILITARY UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATIONS.

1. United Nations Peace Force (UNPF). UNPF is the collective name for the three semi independent UN missions in the Former Republic of YUGOSLAVIA(FRY): the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO) in CROATIA, UNPROFOR in BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA(B-H) and the Former YUGOSLAV Republic of MACEDONIA (FYROM). UNPF is a mixture of political, civil, and military organisations without a conventional military command and control structure. Its mission is derived from a large number of Security Council Resolutions which allocate tasks ranging from facilitating/escorting humanitarian aid operations, to observation and the protection of safe areas. These tasks are subject to differing perceptions from force contributing nations, the warring factions, neighbouring countries, and the rest of the world! The humanitarian aid operations are conducted by UNHCR and a large number of Non-Government Organizations(NGOs) whose efforts are sometimes loosely coordinated by UNHCR as the lead humanitarian organisation. The UN agencies and NGOs have differing and often conflicting aims, objectives, and views. Individuals within the civil organisations have a variety of motives from pure altruism to concerns that this operation is their livelihood. The UN battalions come from a variety of nations. They have varying military capabilities and effectiveness and are generally organised and trained on a mission specific basis. Some of these nations have affinity or sympathy for one or other of the factions.

2. Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). The Office of the SRSG is in ZAGREB CROATIA. The SRSG is the principal UN official and responsible for mediating between the parties to the conflict and for co-ordinating the activities of UNPF. The latest UN mandate has reorganised UNPF with an additional Assistant Secretary General (ASG) for each of the entities of CROATIA, B-H, and FYROM. Each of these ASG's report both to SRSG and to UNNY and are supported by UNPHA (see TAB 1).

3. Division of Information and Office of the Spokesman. The division provides information to the public about the mission, mandate, and activities of UNPF through a wide variety of means. Staff members produce television and radio programs, as well as publications and information products in SERBIAN, CROATIAN, AND OTHER INDIGENOUS languages. The office of the Spokesman provides timely and accurate information to the local and international media about developments in the mission area.

4. Division of Management and Administration. The DMA is a UN civilian service that provides administrative and logistical support to UNPF and controls UN Funding.

5. Military Battalions and Headquarters. The UNPF Force Commander has his headquarters at HQ UNPF in ZAGREB. Separate commands exist for CROATIA, BOSNIA and HERZEGOVINA and FYROM each with its own commander to whom Sector Commanders report. Each national

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battalion commander reports to its Sector Commander in its area of deployment. An extensive G5 staff organisation exists in UNPROFOR, down to battalion level.

6. High Representative. Will be appointed constant with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, to facilitate the parties, to the Peace Plan, own efforts and to mobilise and as appropriate, co-ordinate the activities of the organisations and agencies involved in the civilian aspects of the Peace Plan. It is expected that the working practices required by the High Representative will need a robust civil affairs co-ordinating structure, similar to the current UN Civil Affairs structure, throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.

7. Civilian Commissions/Committees. There will be a number of Commissions/Committees established to implement the civilian aspects of the Peace Plan. They are:

- a. Regional Arms Control lead by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
- b. Election Commission lead by OSCE.
- c. Arbitration Tribunal lead by the High Representative.
- d. Human Rights Commission lead by OSCE.
- e. Refugees and Displaced Persons Commission lead by UNHCR.
- f. Commission to Preserve National Monuments lead UNESCO.
- g. Commission for Public Corporations lead by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
- h. Transport Corporation leads on transportation facilities, such as roads, railways and ports, and other Public Corporations as established.
- i. International Police Task Force lead by a Commissioner co-ordinated and guided by the High Representative.

8. The United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR). See Tab 2

9. United Nations Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL). See Tab 3

10. United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). UNICEF assists in meeting the survival and developmental needs of women and children in the areas of nutrition, health, domestic needs, psycho-social rehabilitation, water, sanitation and education. In addition, UNICEF professionals provide training and guidance to local welfare officers, teachers, and social workers in the specialised treatment of child trauma resulting from war conditions.

11. The World Health Organisation (WHO). WHO is the primary UN agency for health concerns, including monitoring and evaluation, support to war victims and rehabilitation services. WHO assesses the needs of local hospitals and medical centres in the FY and helps provide them with equipment,

training and supplies. WHO also assists in selecting cases for medical evacuation in locations where local hospitals are unable to provide the required care.

12. The World Food Programme (WFP). The WFP is the primary UN food aid organisation in FY and is responsible for co-ordinating the official international food aid relief effort.

13. International Committee of the Red Cross(ICRC). See Tab 4.

14. European Union Monitoring Mission (known as ECMM) -Tab 5. The ECMM is in a unique position in Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in that they were invited as a monitoring mission before the UNPF mandates and have absolute freedom of movement guaranteed by all the factions in accordance with Memorandums of Understanding and Protocols currently endorsed by all sides in FRY. They maintain this freedom by operating impartially on all sides of front lines, with a network of local contacts, which will prove invaluable after any cessation of hostilities. They have a first class, but insecure, communications network.

#### APPENDICES:

1. UNCA Organisation in B-H.
2. UNHCR Organisation in B-H.
3. UNCIVPOL Organisation in B-H.
4. ICRC Organisation.
5. ECMM Organisation.

# UNCA ORGANISATION IN BH

APPENDIX 1 TO  
ANNEX A TO  
SUPLAN B TO  
CONOPLAN 60405  
DATED NOV/95

## UNCA OFFICE SARAJEVO

Chief of Mission  
Antonio PEDAUYE ASG  
SPAO David HARLAND  
A-HPHA Ken BISER  
VSAT 155-7203 fax 7220

### SECTOR SOUTH WEST

GORNI VAKUF  
William TOWNSEND  
VSAT 154-7427 fax 7479  
Total 4

ZEPCE  
Antonia DOLAR  
VSAT 154-7537 fax 7539  
Total 2

ZENCAMSKO  
Erid BURKE  
VSAT 156-7103 fax 7110  
Total 2

VITEZ  
Hiroko MIYAMURA  
VSAT 154-7316 fax 7318  
Total 2

BUGOJNO  
Bronwen MORRISON  
VSAT 154 7526  
Total 2

MEDJUGOJE  
R MIRANDA-RAVOS  
VSAT 154-7502 fax 7503  
Total 2

MOSTAR  
Magnus BJARNASON  
P. 387 88 318675 fax 658  
Total 2

TOMISLAVGRAD  
Jeroen SENNEF  
VSAT 152-7818 fax  
Total 1

JABLANCA/KONJIC  
Charles ANYIDHO  
VSAT 154-7543 fax 7543  
Total 1

BIHAC  
Merrick FALL  
VSAT 154-2282 fax 2478  
Total 5

### SECTOR SARAJEVO

SARAJEVO  
Victor BEZOUCHENKO  
VSAT 155-5605 fax 5656  
Total 4

### SECTOR NORTH EAST

TUZLA  
Robert GATHUNGU  
VSAT 156-7034 fax 7185  
Total 6

VARES  
NYK  
VSAT 156-7161 fax 7160  
Total 2

BIJELJINA?  
Aspiration?

### OTHER

BANJA LUCKA  
NYK 099-418521  
Total

GORAZDA  
Brian SADLER VSAT 155-7560  
Total 3

PALE?  
Aspiration?

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UN Civil Affairs (UNCA). The UNCA supports the ASG and is responsible for the conduct of UN political, legal, and humanitarian matters. Its main task is to co-ordinate the mediation process between the parties. In field offices, UNCA Co-ordinators maintain contact with local authorities and civic leaders; organise meetings on economic and humanitarian issues; assist detainees, refugees and displaced persons; facilitate and support prisoner of war exchanges. The UNCA structure represents vital co-ordination links for any NATO operation.

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## UNHCR ORGANISATION IN B-H

SECTOR SOUTH WEST	SECTOR NORTH EAST	SECTOR SARAJEVO	OTHER
GORNJI VAKUF Military LO VSAT 154 7414 Total 1	TUZLA Salvatora LOMBARDO 075 215122 Total 7	SARAJEVO Damaso FECI Mark CUTTS 071 654326 Total 9	BANJA LUKA Vladimir TSIOURKO 078 46647 Total 7
ZENICA Monique TOUFFECI 072 31412 Total 10		UNPROFOR LO Leendert VISSER 071 654326	PALE Nicholas WAIT 387 71 783967 fax 785347 Total 2
MOSTAR/MEDJUG Jakob AMMOM 088 32080 Total 1			GORAZDE Eddie O'DWYER Total Local 3
MEDJUDORJE Gerry HULMEI 088 642096 Total 8			
BIHAC DANAWEWEE MOBITEL 099 41 042 Total 5			

**The United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR).** UNHCR is the lead agency for humanitarian assistance in the FY. UNHCR co-ordinates programmes, with its implementing and co-ordinating partners, for food, medicine, clothing, shelter, and social services. UNHCR is also mandated to provide protection and assistance to refugees and displaced persons and to help them return to their homes when security conditions permit. UNHCR is an essential partner with regard to minimising NATO military involvement in humanitarian operations.

# UNCIVPOL ORGANISATION IN B-H

APPENDIX 3 TO  
ANNEX A TO  
SUPLAN 60405B  
CONOPLAN 60405  
DATED NOV 95

## UNPROFOR

SARAJEVO  
Valdimir RUBNIKOV  
071-644565 Total 11

### SECTOR SOUTH WEST

GORNJI VAKUF  
Sector SW Total 2

### SECTOR NORTH EAST

TUZLA  
Sector NE Total 2

### SECTOR SARAJEVO

SARAJEVO  
Esa MIKKONEN  
Airport 071-460550 Total 7

### OTHER

GORAZDA  
Miroslaw POWALSKI  
Britfor Total 4

**United Nations Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL).** UNCIVPOL are unarmed police officers who, in co-ordination with local authorities, maintain public order in UNPFs areas of responsibility. by monitoring with the local police force, they ensure that policing is carried out without discrimination and in full respect of human rights. The CIVPOL Commissioner reports directly to the SRSB.

# ICRC ORGANISATION

APPENDIX 4 TO  
ANNEX A TO  
SUPLAN 60405B  
CONOPLAN 60405  
DATED NOV 95

## ZAGREB DELEGATION

ZAGREB  
Head of Del - Alex BRAUNWALDER  
071-652407 Total

KNIN  
Office Gregory FILLINGER  
078-63738/60541 Total

BIHAC  
Office Bernard GUEDEL  
077-520306 Total

VELIKA KLADUSA  
Office Andre TOMBET  
077 77571 Total

SPLIT  
Office Franziska AEBI  
021 361366 Total

OKUCANI  
Office  
078 828009 Total

## SARAJEVO DELEGATION

SARAJEVO  
Head of Del - Beat SCHWEIZER  
071-652407 Total

ZENICA  
Office Corinne PERRIRAZ  
072-418675 Total

TUZLA  
Office WH Ariane TOMBET  
075-232767/766 Total

MOSTAR  
Office Michele BRAUEN  
088-311754 Total

JABLANICA  
Office  
088-753097 Total

## PALE DELEGATION

PALE  
Head of Del - Jaudio BARANO  
071-786 262 Total

BANJA LUCKA  
Office Erich Duerst  
078-11096/11010 Total

TREBINJE  
Office  
089-23892 Total

BIJELJINA  
Office Jun-Luc METZKER  
076-473010 Total

GORAZDA  
Office Stephane BIRCHMEIRER  
Sat. C 58149228 7030 Total

NOTE: This only shows the Head of Delegation or Office, totals of international and local staff- to follow.

**International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).** The ICRC is an independent, international organisation with the mission to safeguard civilians inside areas of conflict, monitor and inspect Prisoner of War Camps, provide emergency humanitarian assistance, trace refugees and refugee family members and arrange the exchange of bodies for Warring Factions.

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ARRC CIMIC ORGANISATION

1. Attachments.

a. HQ ARRC FWD/MAIN. 1 x US CA Operational Planning Team (10 personnel). Provides Staff for HQ ARRC CIMIC.

b. HQ ARRC FWD/MAIN. 1 x FR CIMIC LO Team (3 personnel). Provides language support, direct link to FR CIMIC LO Teams in B-H and staff for HQ ARRC CIMIC.


c. ARRC MCO's. 14 teams of 2 x USCA or FR CIMIC staff officers. They Provide the NATO strengthening of the existing UNCA offices. Responsibilities see para 3.

(1). FR locations; SARAJEVO, Sector SARAJEVO, MEDUGORJE, JABLANICA, and MOSTAR.

(2). US locations; TUZZLA, VARES, GORNI VAKUF, BUGOJNO, ZEPCE, ZENICA, VITEZ, BIHAC, TOMISLAVGRAD.

(3). Possible locations in Republic SRBSKA are BANA LUKA, PALE and BIJELJINA.


OFFICE MANNED US CA \* BY FR CIMIC LO \*



- d. HQ ARRC RSC(COMMZ FWD). 1 x US CA Tactical Planning Team (5 personnel). Provides CIMIC staff support for COMMZ FWD.
- e. MN DIV SW. 1 x Tactical Planning Team (10 personnel) part to move with 3 UK Div the remainder to arrive in Theatre in line with Div HQ deployment.
- f. MN DIV N. 1 x Tactical Planning Team (9 personnel) move in line with 1 US AD deployment.
- g. MN DIV SE. 1 CIMIC LO Team (3 personnel) to move in line with 6 FR Div deployment. 6 x CIMIC LO Teams matched to each Bde.
- h. MEU/CRF?. 1 x Tactical HQ Support Team (5 personnel) to move in line with MEU.

2. ARRC CIMIC Structure.

### CIMIC STRUCTURE




3. CIMIC CENTRE.

- a. CIMIC Centres provide meeting places at various levels where the military can contact civilian organisations and where civilian representatives will find a convenient access into IFOR overcoming any problems associated with a lack of familiarity with military procedure.
- b. Tasks.
  - (1). Liaise with, and act as a focal point for, all civilian organisations and agencies within AOR on a 24 hour basis.
  - (2). Collect CIMIC information.
  - (3). Orchestrate any local CIMIC activities.
  - (4). Assist and advise on the deconfliction of humanitarian operations with military operations.

- (5). Monitoring CIMIC situation and conducting daily 'Up-date' briefings.
- (6). Identify and monitor local low level Civil Action Projects.

c. Structure. The structure of a CIMIC Centre is to be tailored to meet local needs. It must be collocated with the headquarters it serves commensurate with OPSEC rules. In all cases there is a requirement for sufficient communications and computer aids to enable the CIMIC staff to conduct its duties in an efficient manner. The CIMIC Centre at HQ ARRC Fwd will be housed initially in a 18 x 36 tent. The proposed layout is below:



Legend: Del - Civil phone LC - Computer  
PI - Printer x - Chairs

4. MILITARY - CIVIL COORDINATION OFFICERS(MCO). MCO are NATO officers, FR CIMIC LOs or US CA, reporting through the normal chain of command, working and collocated with the UNCA co-ordinators. their responsibilities are as follows:

- a. To co-operate with and assist UNCA.
- b. To develop and establish rapport with local civilian agencies.
- c. To develop and establish links with local government and community leaders, including those responsible for refugees and displaced persons.
- d. To collect civil/political information, such as population movements and local attitudes on IFOR deployment, and ensure its quick and accurate passage through the chain of command.
- e. To identify utilities and resources vital to support the IFOR military tasks associated with the Peace Plan.
- f. To contribute to Civil Action Projects.
- g. To act as Point of Contact (POC) at a point/area of tension/conflict, and to assist in local negotiations/mediations as required.
- h. Maintain-log of daily contacts, activities and status of co-ordination issues.
- i. To be prepared to conduct briefings as required.

AIRLIFT (PASSENGERS)  
MOVEMENTS PROCEDURES FOR NGOs / IOs

### GENERAL INFORMATION

The following information is provided to help clarify the procedures for coordinating movement between IFOR, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and International Organizations (IOs). The intent is to provide clarity to all and to minimize interference and confusion for all concerned. These procedures may be modified later, based on experience, better weather, completion of deployment, expansion of civilian services or other factors. Initially however, by publishing these procedures IFOR hopes to establish a basis of understanding on how to access its movement organization.

### AIR BOOKING (PASSENGERS) PROCEDURES

UN, IOs and NGOs with operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina may apply for seats on IFOR aircraft. This will be on a space available basis, with IFOR personnel having first priority. There are now scheduled "channel" flights which depart daily except Sunday. The current schedule is attached at Appendix A, and it is subject to change without notice.

#### *Procedure*

1. The form attached at Appendix B is the format to forward personnel space available transportation requests. They must be received by the CIMIC Centre not later than 72 hours (3 days) prior to the flight and not earlier than 120 hours (5 days) prior to the flight.
2. A separate form will be required for each flight for each organization. The first name on the list will be considered as first in priority in terms of available spaces. All travelers should be aware that they:
  - a.) must carry an identification card for the organization which sponsored him or her.
  - b.) will be required to sign a "Release of Liability" statement prior to travel. Copy is attached at Appendix C.
  - c.) are not guaranteed a return flight and that they must resubmit separately for their return. The same procedures apply.

d.) may not carry more than 1 piece of luggage, with that not to exceed 66lbs (33kg).

3. Based on the large number of potential groups interested in flights, the following method of communicating these requests is organized.

a.) The UNHCR is the channel through which all UNHCR card holders will communicate their requests. UNHCR will consolidate the requests, and pass a prioritized list to CIMIC.

b.) Other organizations may fax their applications directly to the CIMIC Centre. These organizations are: International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM), European Community Task Force (ECTF) or EC Humanitarian Office (ECHO), the World Bank, and UN agencies, eg., WFP, WHO, UNICEF, UNESCO. These requests will be merged with the UNHCR forwarded requests, and in the absence of other information, priority will be decided by a first come, first served basis.

c.) Recognizing that more organizations will arrive, or that one may have been omitted, if there are questions contact the CIMIC Centre.

4. Typically, by 2100 hours of the day prior to the flight, the JMCC Air Cell (385 / 01- 177 743) personnel will know how full the aircraft will be. They can be contacted as to whether or not space-available passengers can reasonably expect to fly the next day. It is important to cancel your request if your plans change and you will not be flying. This can be done through the JMCC Air Cell number listed above. Please also inform the CIMIC Centre as a courtesy. Your failure to cancel may mean that another person is denied space.

#### ***VIP, Press, and Special Request Movement***

VIP movement requests should be passed directly to the Protocol office. Press requests are considered in accordance with the policy issued by PIO "Media Travel on IFOR Aircraft" dated 2 Jan 96. Press requests should be passed directly to PIO. Other requests should be passed to CIMIC.

#### ***Contacts***

1. The IFOR CIMIC Centre can be contacted as follows (for applications not routed through the UNHCR):

a.) Phone inquiries: (385) (01) 180 011 ext. 2734

Zagreb, Croatia

Please indicate that you wish to speak with the operations section regarding space-available airlift.

b.) Fax: (385) (01) 180 264 or 180 011 ext 2264

(a recording answers and asks you to wait briefly while it connects you to the fax. If it does not work at first, connect manually.)

2. UNHCR Point of Contact: Zoran Ivanovic

a.) Phone inquiries: (385) (01) 6129 504

Please indicate that you wish to speak with someone regarding space-available airlift. (Alternate: Bryan Smith - ext. 538)

b.) Fax: (385) (01) 6129 557

for applications routed through the UNHCR

3. IFOR COS Protocol: (385) (01) 180 011 ext. 2664/2704

Staff Sergeant Kayser - (until they have a direct fax, inquiries can be faxed to the CIMIC Center and they will be passed.)

4. IFOR PIO: (385) (01) 180 011 ext. 3011 (phone and fax).

4. JMCC Airlift Cell (Zagreb): (385) (01) 177 743.

To find out how likely it is to get a seat, one can call at 2100 hours or later the night before the flight. Cancellations will be accepted at this number as well.

## CHANNEL FLIGHT SCHEDULE

### IFOR / NATO CHANNEL FLIGHTS

#### ROUTE 1 - FLIGHT NUMBER - IFP 40

<u>MON, WED, FRI</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>ARR</u>	<u>DEP</u>
	RIMINI		0635
	ZAGREB	0745	0845
	TUZLA	0940	1010
	SARAJEVO	1045	1115
	SPLIT	1150	1250
	NAPLES	1415	1515
	RIMINI	1625	

Minimum of 30 seats are available out of Zagreb (for all purposes).

#### ROUTE 2 - FLIGHT NUMBER - IFP 50

<u>TUES, THURS, SAT</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>ARR</u>	<u>DEP</u>
	RIMINI		0400
	NAPLES	0510	0610
	ZAGREB	0745	0845
	TUZLA	0940	1010
	SARAJEVO	1045	1115
	SPLIT	1150	1250
	RIMINI	1335	

Minimum of 20 seats are available out of Zagreb (for all purposes).

#### ROUTE 3 - FLIGHT NUMBER - IFP 60

<u>DAILY (except Sunday)</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>ARR</u>	<u>DEP</u>
	RIMINI		1430
	SPLIT	1510	1540
	SARAJEVO	1630	1700
	TUZLA	1740	1810
	ZAGREB	1905	2005
	RIMINI	2105	

Minimum of 20 seats are available out of Sarajevo (for all purposes).

ALL TIMES ARE GMT - LOCAL TIME IS ONE HOUR LATER

All flights are subject to change on short notice.

**APPLICATION FOR FLIGHT ON IFOR AIRCRAFT**

<b>NAME OF SPONSOR ORGANIZATION</b>		
<b>Contact Details at Sponsor Organization:</b>		
Working Hours	Outside Working Hours	
Tel:	Tel:	
Fax:	Fax:	
<b>Flight Date:</b>	<b>Departure Airfield:</b>	
<b>Flight Number:</b>	<b>Destination Airfield:</b>	
<b>NAME</b>	<b>APPOINTMENT</b>	<b>ID CARD NUMBER</b>

This application must be faxed to the IFOR CIMIC Centre, Zagreb, Fax: 385/(01) 180264 at least 72 hrs before the flight date. Even if approved, your passage is not assured, and there is no commitment to provide a return flight.

A separate application is required for each flight, including the return flight.

The passengers must be shown in order of priority.

Each passenger must carry an identity card for the organization which has sponsored him when reporting for the flight. Baggage will be restricted to 1 bag weighing no more than 66 lbs.

Flights are subject to change on short notice

Neither applications nor amendments to applications will be accepted by telephone.

**TO FIND OUT WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SPACE AVAILABLE TO FLY, CALL JMCC AIRLIFT CELL 385/ 01- 177 743 AFTER 2100 HOURS. THIS NUMBER IS MANNED 24 HOURS A DAY. Cancellations will be accepted telephonically at this number.**

**GENERAL RELEASE FROM LIABILITY IN CONNECTION WITH  
TRAVEL BY PASSENGERS ON IFOR AIRCRAFT**

I, the undersigned, desire to travel as a passenger on IFOR aircraft. I fully understand my travel on IFOR aircraft is solely for my own convenience and benefit. I recognize and acknowledge such flight(s) may occur in areas of and/or under conditions of extreme risk. Therefore, in consideration of my being permitted to travel as a passenger on IFOR aircraft, I hereby:

- (a) Assume any and all risks to my person and personal property during such travel;
- (b) Agree for myself, dependents, heirs, estate, executors, administrators, representatives and assigns that IFOR, its officials, employees, and/or agents shall not be responsible for any loss, damage, injury or death which may result to me or my personal property during such travel;
- (c) Agree for myself, dependents, heirs, estate, executors, administrators, representatives and assigns to indemnify and hold IFOR, its officials, employees, and/or agents harmless from any and all claims, actions, demands or rights which I may have on account of any such loss, damage, injury or death.

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Date)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Signature of passenger)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Witness)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Print name of passenger)

## AIRLIFT (PAX) MOVEMENTS PROCEDURES

### INTERNAL PROCEDURES

1. Upon receipt of a transportation request the date and time of receipt should be noted.
2. Requests will be collected and consolidated and a single prioritized list provided to the JMCC. (The JMCC has agreed to accept the form generated here for this purpose.) This list should merge UNHCR provided names and any received directly at the CIMIC Centre. In the absence of any further information, priority will be decided on a first come, first served basis.
3. Note the time which the final list is passed to the JMCC Airlift Cell.
4. Contact the JMCC everyday approximately at 1600 to find out which if any space-A passengers will be able to fly the next day.
5. Upon receipt of special requests, they will need to be "walked through the system" using the coversheet attached at II-A.
6. Attached at II-B is a list provided by the UN JMCC showing positions that had previously enjoyed VIP and Priority One flight access. It is likely that many of these same positions will still enjoy access to space on aircraft. Coordinate with the protocol person in the IFOR COS office (Sergeant Kayser, ext. 2664 or 2704) who will work with the SRSG office to determine how important it is to fill these requests, and whether they should get priority which would supercede IFOR personnel.

22 Jan 96

**PROCEDURES FOR CROSSING THE IFOR BRIDGE AT ZUPANJA  
FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND AID AGENCIES  
EFFECTIVE FROM 1 FEB 96**

Step 1. If your organization is on the following list, go direct to step 3.

UNHCR (INCLUDING ORGANIZATIONS SPONSORED BY UNHCR)	
WHO	
WFP	
UNICEF	All major Embassies
UNESCO	Dubrotvor
ICRC	Caritas
IFRC	Merhamet
ECMM	US Aid
ICTY	ODA
ECTF	
ECHO	
OSCE	

Step 2. If your organization is not on the above list, contact CIMIC Centre Operations Section Zagreb Tel 180011 ext 2734, who will advise if your organization can be added to the list, and make the necessary arrangements with JMCC.

Step 3. Contact 27th Trans Bn Kaposvar (tel 0049 - 171 - 225 - 1534) **at least 48 hrs in advance**

27th Trans Bn will make necessary arrangements, and will advise on crossing times and local procedures

Priorities will be on a first come first served basis

**The organization requesting crossing remains responsible for meeting any Croatian or Bosnian regulations, and complying with international procedures**

Any difficulties experienced with booking or crossing procedures, please call Surface Section in JMCC (Zagreb) Tel 177751

NOTE:

IFOR ACCEPTS NO LIABILITY FOR ANY INJURY SUFFERED BY ANY PERSON, OR DAMAGE SUSTAINED BY VEHICLE OR EQUIPMENT IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE USE OF MILITARY BRIDGES

IFOR POLICY ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS AND CIVILIAN COMMISSIONSINTRODUCTION

1. The IFOR mission is to execute the military tasks enshrined in the Peace Agreement. Fundamental to our success are the separation of warring parties and the restoration of a peaceful environment which will allow the Civilian Commissions to progress in a number of areas towards the development of normal democratic society in Bosnia Herzegovina (B-H). During the early part of the military operation at least, the Humanitarian Relief organizations (headed by UNHCR) and other International Organizations (such as ICRC) will need to continue operating in B-H to provide their essential services.
2. The military mission is separate from the civilian/humanitarian mission, but it cannot be held in isolation from the civilian process. There will inevitably be the need to co-ordinate, co-operate and at times assist some civilian organizations. Moreover, there is a synergy between the two that may be of mutual benefit.

AIM

3. To dictate policy lines for IFOR support to civilian and humanitarian organizations.

OPERATIONAL BACKGROUND

4. Article VI of the Dayton Agreement (DA) includes the following text:

"3. The Parties understand and agree that the IFOR shall have the right to fulfill its supporting tasks, within the limits of its assigned principal tasks and available resources, and on request, which include the following:

- (a) to help create secure conditions for the conduct by others of other tasks associated with the Peace Settlement, including free and fair elections;
- (b) to assist the movement of organizations in the accomplishment of humanitarian missions;
- (c) - to assist the UNHCR and other international organizations in their humanitarian missions;
- (d) - to observe and prevent interference with the movement of civilian populations, refugees, and displaced persons, and to respond appropriately to deliberate violence to life and person;"

5. IFOR has the right to become involved in these issues, but expectations from organizations and individuals for co-operation, assistance and protection will exceed our ability to meet them. The greatest risk in interfacing with the civilian organizations will be to raise hopes of what assistance we can provide. A clear understanding at all levels of our policy on this issue will help to avoid creating unrealistic expectations. In addition, the limited duration of the IFOR mission will make some longer term tasks inappropriate.

## ISSUES

6. UNHCR Issues. UNHCR will benefit from deconfliction/co-ordination between their road traffic and IFOR military traffic. Other issues may arise, such as the administration of aid worker passes and the method of interfacing with IFOR. We would expect them to be most interested in the availability of escort and security, particularly for returning refugees, and if we anticipate providing assistance, what mechanism will be put in place for request and approval.

7. ICRC Issues. ICRC may seek assistance with the movement and security of released prisoners; they will expect a mechanism to be available for request and approval. See Supp Guidance 2-95 to 40105 dated 21 Dec 95.

8. Other NGOs. IFOR advises that subordinates, where possible, should encourage NGOs to co-ordinate their requirements through UNHCR.

9. Civilian Commissions. We should expect Civilian Commissions to seek assistance through the Joint Civilian Commission system, which will introduce the request to us through its link with the Joint Military Commission. We do not have an insight into their likely requirements from Civilian Commission, but the principles which are developed for other civilian organizations will apply. At IFOR the main points of contact will be the CJ CIMIC. Other key players are the Theatre Engineer, JMC Secretariat and CJ5/CJ3.

## POLICY LINES

10. During Phase II and III, the CIMIC Centre staffs throughout the IFOR chain of command will need to make contact with a variety of organizations and develop working relationships with them. It is essential that in those early visits we demonstrate that we are aware of their concerns, and that we have addressed or are addressing the issues. Agreements which may be precedent setting will be co-ordinated with CJ CIMIC.

11. Although the provision of assistance, particularly the provision of physical security, may not be specifically authorised, it may be unavoidable. The failure of the military to provide assistance when requested by a humanitarian organization may be significant to the peace process as a whole. Although the potential extent of the security task is not quantifiable, it is one which will need to be addressed.

12. The provision of information and general co-ordination is encouraged. Active liaison is also expected.

13. Policy lines are:

a. Security.

## IFOR UNCLASSIFIED

- IFOR will consider requests of a non-repeating, case by case basis, for escort and security for specific operations (such as the repatriation of refugees to a sensitive area, or prisoner return) which emanate from UNHCR, ICRC or IPTF. We give no guarantee that requests will be met, but will provide assistance whenever possible where life is expected to be at risk.

- IFOR will co-operate with continuing or developing communications in the field between IFOR formations and UNHCR, ICRC and IPTF, within IFOR's capacity.

- IFOR will **NOT** provide continuing security to refugees/displaced persons once they resettle.

- IFOR will **NOT** provide routine escorts for aid or personnel movement.

### b. Transport.

- IFOR will co-operate with Humanitarian Organizations and Government Departments to co-ordinate and deconflict the road traffic.

- IFOR will **NOT** provide drivers for humanitarian missions.

- IFOR will **NOT** provide vehicles for humanitarian missions.

### c. Use of Military Facilities.

- IFOR consider requests for the use of military facilities (for example use of military bridges) where that use is safe and does not interfere with military requirements.

### d. General.

- IFOR will **NOT** store fuel for humanitarian organizations.

- IFOR will **NOT** control heating fuel.

- IFOR will **NOT** monitor elections.

- IFOR will **NOT** provide credentials for non-IFOR personnel.


- IFOR will **NOT** become involved in economic reconstruction.

### e. Liaison.

- IFOR CIMIC will provide contacts at CIMIC Centres at IFOR, ARRC, Divisions and Brigades so that organizations may raise queries at the appropriate level.


# CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION


## HEADQUARTERS, IMPLEMENTATION FORCE ORGANISATION




# CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

## IFOR-ZAGREB CIMIC CENTRE






# COMARRC's CIMIC STRUCTURE



COMARRC's  
CIMIC CENTRE  
SARAJEVO  
COL SCHOON, LTC NARDELLI  
MAJ JOANNSON, MAJ BRAITHWAITE-EXLEY  
VSAT 155 7260 FAX 7228

~~ARRC  
CIMIC OPS  
KISELJAK  
LTC BANJA, LTC ROSE  
VSAT 154 8368 FAX 8310~~



MND NORTH  
CIMIC CENTRE  
TUZLA  
MAJ CIAMPINI CPT WARBUG  
VSAT 156 7075 FAX NYK

MND SOUTHWEST  
CIMIC CENTRE  
GORNJI VAKUF  
LTC CASWELL  
VSAT 154 7413 FAX 7479

MND SOUTHEAST  
CIMIC CENTRE  
SARAJEVO (MOSTAR)  
LTC LEROY, CPT PARENT  
VSAT 151 3284 FAX NYK

MEMO SENT TO GENERAL BURNS RECOMMENDING SOME ACTIONS BY AFSOUTH TO ADDRESS THE HUMANITARIAN RELIEF SITUATION AND

MEMORANDUM TO: CHIEF, CIB, CJ-5

FROM: HUMAD

SUBJECT: Civil-Military Cooperation with U.N. Relief Agencies, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) and International Organizations (IO).

1. Situation.

a. U.N. relief agencies, NGOs, and IOs currently move approximately 21,000 metric tons of relief supplies into the Former Yugoslavia (FY) each month. When a peace agreement is reached, they will begin to organize for the return or resettlement of up to 2.7 million internally displaced people in Bosnia, up to 800,000 from neighboring countries of the FY and the return or resettlement of refugees in other European countries. European governments may also push for rapid repatriations.

b. U.N. relief agencies, NGOs, IOs, UNPROFOR, and IFOR will require use of the same infrastructure in the FY with potential for significant impact on one another's operations if not coordinated. Humanitarian assistance operations are subject to frequent changes in response to the rapidly changing political and operational environment in the FY. Consequently, information concerning movement routes, schedules, supply warehousing, relocation of displaced civilians, and other humanitarian operations is perishable. To be successful coordination must start early and be continuous.

c. The many humanitarian organizations are autonomous and will not operate under IFOR authority. Neutrality for these organizations is vital. Some have expressed concern that although IFOR will deploy as a neutral force, it will be perceived as an occupation force. Therefore, some of these organizations may establish a cautious relationship with IFOR. However, they can be expected to cooperate and be responsive to any efforts by IFOR to coordinate with them. Already, the World Food Program and UNHCR has contacted NATO to initiate coordination. Several others have expressed concern to USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) that coordination is needed and they are uncertain how to proceed.

## 2. Shaping the Operational Environment.

a. Uncoordinated activity between humanitarian organizations and IFOR has the potential to impact IFOR operations through conflicting efforts to use the same roads, port facilities, warehouses, landing fields, etc. Such conflict could also disrupt the flow of vital relief supplies into the FY. Establishing a mechanism now to begin coordination will greatly enhance IFOR's operational environment and maintain the effectiveness of humanitarian operations.

## 3. Recommendations.

a. AFSOUTH has requested activation of a provisional Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Centre. This is an important first step. The internal organization of NATO and IFOR will be confusing for most humanitarian organizations. The CIMIC Centre should become the only point of contact for all U.N. relief agencies, NGO, and IO agencies. We recommend it provide the following functions:

(1.) The Centre should be the conduit for information flow; insuring that appropriate communication exchange occurs between IFOR components and civilian organizations.

(2.) Provide civilian organizations procedures to effectively coordinate activities with IFOR.

(3.) Insure all information going to humanitarian organizations is cleared for release, correct, timely, consistent, and properly disseminated.

(4.) Establish a network with civilian organizations from which it can obtain current information about their operations and insure it is disseminated to potentially effected IFOR elements.

(5.) Validate all requests that come into NATO from civilian organizations.

(6.) Monitor and track the status of all requests and agreements between IFOR and humanitarian organizations.

b. A memorandum to civilian organizations explaining the CIMIC Centre and its function is also recommended. Attached is a draft for your consideration. We can assist in dissemination of such a memorandum by providing names and addresses of key communication points within the humanitarian relief community.

#### 4. Concept for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination.

### DRAFT

a. IFOR will establish Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Centres at critical locations. The CIMIC Centres will be the sole point of contact for civilian coordination of humanitarian assistance operations with IFOR. CIMIC Centre staff will make the necessary contacts with IFOR command and control elements such as the Joint Movement Control Centre and Commanders potentially affected by coordination activities.

b. After deployment, CIMIC Centres will be established at several locations in the IFOR area of responsibility (AOR). Each will provide linkage with specific regional headquarters. However, IFOR recognizes the need for early coordination. To facilitate this a provisional CIMIC Centre (will be established on \_\_\_\_\_) (has been established) at IFOR's predeployment headquarters in Naples, Italy. All civilian humanitarian organizations who now have or expect to have operations in the former Yugoslavia are encouraged to establish communication with this Centre. Future information affecting humanitarian assistance will be disseminated to organizations that maintain liaison with IFOR's CIMIC Centre.

#### 5. Coordination Instructions.

- a. CIMIC Centre address:
- b. Hours of operation:
- c. Phone number:
- d. FAX:

LETTER DRAFTED BY HUMADS FOR USE BY AFSOUTH IN ADDRESSING THE DESIRE BY THE HUMANITARIAN RELIEF COMMUNITY TO COORDINATE/CONTACT NATO/AFSOUTH. (AS OF 11/21 THIS LETTER HAS NOT BEEN ISSUED)

## **DRAFT**

(AFSOUTH HEADING)

1. General. Until a formal peace settlement is achieved and NATO member nations concur on deployment operations, all planning is preliminary and hypothetical. However, the Commander, Implementation Force (COMIFOR) is committed to close coordination with U.N. relief agencies, Non-government organizations (NGOs), and International Organizations (IOs) to maintain the flow of humanitarian relief and to achieve a secure environment. In the past several years the courage and dedication demonstrated by U.N. relief agencies, NGO and IO personnel has been admirable. NATO's deployment will ultimately establish conditions necessary for greater and safer freedom of movement. This memorandum provides preliminary guidance to achieve necessary humanitarian assistance coordination. This guidance is general and will evolve with greater detail as the mission becomes more specific. The patience and cooperation of all U.N. relief agencies, NGOs and IOs is appreciated.

2. Assumptions.

a. All parties will agree to a peace settlement requiring cessation of hostilities, respect of mutually agreed borders and internal boundaries, and withdrawal of forces to respective territories.

a. IFOR will implement the military aspects of the Peace Agreement.

b. The UNHCR will continue to be the lead organization for humanitarian relief and the return of refugees and displaced persons.

3. Priorities for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination.

a. IFOR will give priority to implementing the military aspects of the Peace Agreement. The first priority for coordination with civilian humanitarian organizations will be to deconflict the deployment of IFOR elements and humanitarian relief efforts including use of roads, port facilities, airfields, etc.

b. After deployment IFOR will continue to coordinate activities with civilian humanitarian organizations and will consider requests for additional IFOR assistance when it does not conflict with the primary military mission.

MEMORANDUM FOR

FROM COMIFOR

SUBJECT: Coordination with Civilian Humanitarian Relief Organizations.

1. Numerous civilian humanitarian relief organizations will attempt to coordinate their activities with IFOR. Post deployment coordination will occur through CIMIC Centres IAW Annex K, OPLAN \_\_\_\_\_. Predeployment coordination will be through IFOR CIMIC Centre activated on \_\_\_\_\_ at Naples, Italy.
2. IFOR elements that are contacted directly by civilian humanitarian relief organizations should be referred to IFOR CIMIC Centre, (Address), phone \_\_\_\_\_, FAX \_\_\_\_\_.
3. Elements that already have started coordination with these organizations will report to the CIMIC Centre, NLT \_\_\_\_\_, the following information:
  - a. Which civilian organizations have established contact.
  - b. What information has been exchanged.
  - c. Agreements or commitments between IFOR elements and civilian organizations.
  - d. Civilian POCs.
  - e. Military POCs provided to civilian organizations.