

OFFICE OF FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE
UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

UPPER VOLTA DROUGHT DISASTER

Situation Report and Recommendations

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SUMMARY

This report to the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID) is the result of a mission undertaken to Upper Volta during the period of February 17 to March 12. Our task was to investigate the current drought emergency, determine what assistance was pledged by other donors and to recommend appropriate U.S. Government response. The team was to pay special attention to an emergency program proposal from Catholic Relief Services for an additional 8,277.5 MT of emergency food.

In accomplishing this mission, the team covered over 1,500 kilometers by 4 WD vehicles and visited offices, warehouses and Maternal Child Health (MCH) Centers of Catholic Relief Services, as well as other PVO's working in the drought affected areas. We met with officials of the Government of Upper Volta both in Ouagadougou and in the regions. Among the major centers visited were Bobo-Dioulasso, Banfora, Dedougou, Ouahigouya, Gorom-Gorom and Kaya.

Meetings were held with all of the major donors to determine their views of the emergency and the response which they were planning. The list of persons met and institutions visited is contained in the body of the report.

In our briefing by the USAID mission staff we were given a very detailed analysis. The mission generally concurred with the GOUV deficit figure of 117.707 Metric Tons of cereals.

In our meetings we heard a variety of points of view, ranging from "There is no shortage, it's a distribution problem" to "Why are you people still talking when anyone can see that we have a disaster which is rapidly getting worse?".

(The latter a paraphrase of an emotional outburst from an American newsman).

After listening to many opinions, some backed by data and some by hunch, and after considering the relative consequences in case of error, the team has decided that 117,707 MT is a reasonable, prudent and defensible working figure. There is no absolute guarantee of the accuracy of the production statistics available, and this makes an irrefutable position impossible.

One donor took the position that the real deficit is only 50,000 MT. Should this lower figure turn out to be correct and the anticipated contributions arrive, there will be a slight surplus after all pledges are in. If this year's rains fail again, this surplus will be extremely valuable and timely. Should the rains be adequate for a good harvest, steps should be taken to put the surplus into a security stock against future needs. This will prevent a drop in price and a consequent production disincentive. If, on the other hand, it was agreed that the problem was minimal and no actions taken, while the large deficit was in fact real, the consequence would be large-scale hunger with starvation a certain result. The team is convinced that the situation is serious; action must be taken and time is of the essence.

The timely delivery of 10,000 MT of red sorghum from Title II which has been approved is crucial. To distribute it through the GOUV National Cereal Board - OFNACER (Office National des Céréales) - targeted at the major food deficit regions is also the most effective and fair means of distribution. Monetizing it avoids creating a dependency mentality, strengthens the local structures, and generates a significant sum of local currency. This will then be programmed jointly by GOUV and USAID to fund projects developmental in nature such as soil and water conservation, and possibly drought relief projects.

The team also endorses the mission request for an additional 5,000 MT of sorghum or corn provided that it can arrive and move out before the next harvest is in. Should this not be possible, it should only be sent if the harvest is once again below normal.

The major portion of the team's attention was devoted to an analysis of the Catholic Relief Services Emergency Program Request and a study of the present CRS/U.V. organization.

We visited CRS offices and warehouses in Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso, Maternal Child Health Centers, and proposed Food-for-Work sites in the rural areas. The team found CRS to be well organized and capable. Twenty one of the 60 local staff have been with CRS for over five years or more, seven of whom have served for over 10 years. They are knowledgeable on their programs and well trained in their responsibilities. The records appeared to be in good order; the warehouses were among the best the team had ever seen, both in terms of structure and management. The MCH Centers are operated by GOUV Ministries, and church or civic groups but are supplied and supervised by CRS. For the most part they are in rural settings and primitive in structure. Teachers and clerical personnel, however, obviously understood their tasks and performed competently. Mothers are also instructed and participate in proper food preparation. ^{IP}The rations of the regular CRS MCH program are based upon the assumption that the families have a marginally inadequate diet at home and the food received from CRS is intended to give mother and child an extra nutritional boost. If the food available to the family is seriously below standard, a health deterioration results, especially in the children. There are already reports of increased malnutrition in some centers and the real effects of the drought are still to be felt as the families' food stocks run out.

The team therefore fully endorses the CRS and mission request for an additional 8,277.5 MT of food with the admonition that haste be made in the formal approval and shipment. CRS does have some stocks in country from which they could begin to work when assured that further stocks are on the way. It reportedly may be possible for CRS to divert some shipments to Upper Volta, a means of expediting the operation. This option is strongly recommended in view of the seriousness of the developing disaster, and the transport time lags involved.

Although at least 6 different options for funding the CRS emergency operation have been discussed, the team considered only three as having any possibility of approval and realization.

1. Counterpart Funds. One option is to use a portion of the funds obtained from the monetization of the emergency sorghum. The advantage would be to reduce the pressure on the diminishing funds available to OFDA. The disadvantage is the delay in fund availability (approximately 60 days from commodity arrival to fund availability). CRS would have to work from its own cash available until these funds actually began to flow. The question thus centers around whether CRS actually has sufficient funds available. Another question concerns the willingness of the GOUV and the USAID mission to earmark about 17% of the monetization proceeds to this operation.

2. OFDA Funds. The obvious advantage would be the quick infusion of funding which would enable FFP to approve the food request and CRS to begin mounting their operation. Given the fact that negotiations between the GOUV and the mission on the Transfer Authorization have just begun some delay will be inevitable. Thus this may be an important factor. The

disadvantage would be that OFDA funds which are seriously depleted would be strained still further.

3. A Mixture of Funds. A third option to consider would be a mix. For example CRS might contribute by waiving their customary overhead. OFDA might contribute \$100,000 to CRS to begin the operation with the remaining \$215,000 to come from counterpart funds when monetization has been achieved in July. This has the advantage of providing start up funds for CRS, and lessens the pressure on OFDA resources. The disadvantage is that even so, agreement likely cannot be formally concluded until the negotiations of the Transfer Authorization are completed with the GOUV.

It is essential that OFDA and the mission treat this as a priority matter, and agree between themselves on what funding mode will used. Only then can CRS begin seriously to organize their emergency operations.

Introduction

The present food crisis in Upper Volta is primarily the result of the failure of the 1983 growing season's rains. In most of the country they started late and ended early, leaving the fields full of plants with stalks of shrivelled grain.

On August 15, 1983 after only 11 days in office the President of Upper Volta directed that a study be made immediately of the national food situation.

On December 13, 1983 the Minister of Rural Development GOUV wrote to the American Ambassador requesting emergency food assistance. On December 30, 1983 President Sankara issued a decree creating the National Commission to Combat the Effects of the Drought in Upper Volta. On December 30, 1983 Catholic Relief Services submitted a "working paper" to USAID/UV requesting an emergency food intervention of 8,562 metric tons of Title II commodities. This was to include 7,525 MT of cornmeal and 1,037 MT of vegetable oil. They also requested \$315,000 to cover the distribution costs. On January 9, 1984 the American Ambassador cabled Washington, formally making a determination that a state of disaster existed. This was followed on January 10, 1984 by another cable requesting Title II assistance of 10,000 MT of red sorghum, 5,000 MT corn and the 8,562 MT cornmeal and vegetable oil for CRS.

On January 18, 1984 CRS submitted a supplemental Annual Estimate of Requirements and an amended Operational Plan for an emergency program, requesting a total of 8,277.5 MT of food and \$341.775 (adjustment based on further calculations).

The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance of USAID dispatched this team to Upper Volta to conduct an analysis of the Upper Volta food situation including:

1. An assessment of the need for an emergency food program and location of beneficiaries;
2. A recommendation on the level of USG assistance required;
3. An evaluation of the logistics and related management issues of the CRS proposal with a view on most cost effective means of delivery of foodstuffs to those most in need, and/or recommended alternative(s);
4. A review of GOUV capabilities, commitments, and actions to alleviate the severity of the present food crisis and aid the security of emergency operations in particular;
5. A review of commitments by other donor countries or international organizations;
6. An analysis of cost reduction possibilities through alternative transport routes;
7. An assessment of effects of an emergency food aid project on market prices, incentives/disincentives to the farmer in the short and medium term, as well as creating new food aid dependence in the longer term;
8. A recommendation on appropriate source and mix of funds for meeting inland transportation costs (with particular consideration of monetizing PL 480 food commodities; and
9. An analysis of emergency needs other than food.

The team arrived in Upper Volta to begin the mission on February 17, 1984 and completed the study on March 12, 1984.

What follows is our report, which covers the following subjects: the food and agriculture situation, including nutritional considerations, an analysis of the CRS program (including management issues and logistics). It ends with a look at budgetary and finance issues raised during our mission here. Finally there are listed our itinerary, persons met and institutions visited, and the annexes.

The Food and Agricultural Situation

This section discusses the food and agriculture situation in Upper Volta in some detail, covering issues of supply and demand, and production and imports. It contains information on marketing and distribution, the role of the National Cereal Board, and the price structure. The present chapter also details the government's own self-help measures, the response of the international donor community, and the deteriorating nutritional outlook.

A) Agriculture

As in so many other African countries, agriculture forms the base of the Voltan economy and employs 85-90% of the economically-active population. Per capita GDP (1982) was \$210. Upper Volta agriculture consists of about 600,000 small plots owned by individual farmers according to a traditional land-tenure system. The size of plots varies according to the population density of the area; farms tend to be smaller in the Mossi Plateau region (north of Ouagadougou) for this reason. Only about one-third of the nation's arable land is exploited - ~~this is~~ about 3 million hectares out of a potential 9 million. A principal reason for this is that much of the fertile land lies in river or stream valleys and these are the breeding areas both for black flies and mosquitoes. Populations have moved out of these areas to avoid getting river-blindness (onchocerciasis) and malaria. This phenomenon represents a serious constraint to agricultural production in many areas.

Another production constraint is the fact that approximately 1 million Voltans have migrated abroad to work (mostly to Ivory Coast). As these persons are generally young men - ordinarily the engine of a country's agricultural productivity - this lack of a strong rural labor pool has a negative effect on grain production. On the positive side, their remittances represent a large portion of the country's available foreign exchange. It is not clear however that the advantages accruing from these incoming funds (8% of GDP) outweigh

the opportunity costs in agricultural production foregone because of the smaller labor pool left in rural Upper Volta.

A recent World Bank report* notes that, especially in the Mossi Plateau, there is "declining fallow, rapid deforestation, and deteriorating soil fertility" due to population pressure. The report goes on to say:

"Most of the available agricultural land consists of shallow soils which are easily eroded and depleted of organic matter by traditional methods of cultivation".




Thus, the resource base of the country is seen to be small. The literacy rate is estimated to be about 20%, and access to educational facilities is extremely limited. All of this makes for a low-productivity subsistence agriculture, both for food crops and forage for the livestock sector.

The main grains grown in Upper Volta are dry land crops: white sorghum, red sorghum, millet, and corn. There are several varieties extant and planting must take place by mid-July because of photo-sensitivity. Production varies considerably from region to region. The country grows some fruits and vegetables for export to Europe (cauliflowers, green beans, and strawberries) which are raised as cash crops. Staple grains are the bulk of the food intake for the majority of the population in the rural areas. These peasant farmers use traditional methods both for culture and for storage, and post-harvest losses are estimated at about 10%.

The following charts clearly demonstrate the drop in aggregate grain production this year in the affected regions.


* Upper Volta, Country Economic Memorandum, Report No. 4040-UV (5 Sept. 1983)

NET CEREAL PRODUCTION FOR SELECTED REGIONS, 1980/81...1983/84



NET CEREAL PRODUCTION FOR SELECTED REGIONS, 1980/81...1983/84 cont.

D. HAUTS BASSINS/COMOÉ




Rainfall

There is a close correlation in Upper Volta between the rainfall received and the yield of basic grains (which are not irrigated). Because rains are so localized it is difficult to pinpoint an average rainfall for the country. Nevertheless, the usual amount of rainfall is up to 1100 mm. in the Southwest, 900 mm. below an east-west line centered on Ouagadougou, and about 600 mm in the northern areas of Sahel and Center-North.

This past year, however, the already dry north - whose agricultural production is marginal in the best of times - received only 60%-70% of normal rainfall. In the southwest it was only 80%-85% of normal thus depriving the country as a whole of the usual surplus generated in this area. (The same was true in northern Ghana, directly adjacent to the affected area in southwest Upper Volta. For details see OFDA's report on the Ghana Food Shortage Disaster - Dec. 1983). The rainfall pattern for 1983 and the correlation with production are shown on the 3 following charts.

RAINFALL PATTERN APRIL-OCTOBER, 1983

(COMPARED TO 1982)




UPPER VOLTA



RAINFALL AND PRODUCTION CORRELATION

1983



UPPER VOLTA



FAILURE OF PASTURAGE

SEVERELY BELOW AVERAGE

NEAR AVERAGE

The chart below traces the quantitative relationship between the rainfall and agricultural (grains) production on the last five crop seasons. (Source: WFP)

	<u>1979/80</u>	<u>1980/81</u>	<u>1981/82</u>	<u>1982/83</u>	<u>1983/84</u>
<u>Average rainfall</u>	739 mm	709 mm	749 mm	617 mm	593 mm
<u>Production (in 000 MT)</u>	1,193	1,039	1,274	1,207	1,135



This however does not take into account the importance of the distribution of rainfall, which varied widely both spatially and temporally. The rainy season started late and ended early. This had the effect of delaying planting and of stunting the sorghum and millet crops because rains did not arrive at the crucial vegetative and flowering phases, in the growing cycle. Corn was similarly affected. Total grain production this year was estimated at 1,135,000 MT. of which approximately 930,000 MT is available for human consumption. This is about 35% below normal, according to the USDA's Economic Research Service.

Net production per capita has been on the wane since 1982 in Upper Volta. From a high of 170 kg/cap. in 1982 to 156 kg/cap. in 1983 to 136 kg/cap. in 1984, production per person has dropped steadily. This year, grain production per capita is only 80% of what it was two years ago. Absolute and per capita production of staple foods at such a level is, simply put, a prelude to disaster. Net per capita production is summarized graphically on the following chart.

PER CAPITA NET DOMESTIC PRODUCTION

1980/81...1983/84

KG/CAP.



1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

In the Sahel Province, production was only 45% of 1982, which itself was down from 1981. In Yatenga, grains production in 1983 amounted to just 64% of the previous year. Center North province's production was about the same in 1983 as in 1982, but reached a level of only 65% of the 1981 crop. These three provinces are traditionally deficit areas, but this year their deficits rose enormously.

The southwest, on the other hand, is in normal times the breadbasket of the country. The regions of Hauts-Bassins and Comoe this year produced just 71% of their normal yield. For Upper Volta, this spells catastrophe for the national cereals situation, because the deficit regions in the north are dependent domestically on the more productive -and always in surplus- southern areas. This year the surplus in these provinces and in nearby Volta Noire is very low.

The OFDA team had the opportunity to travel extensively and visited the principal deficit production areas. We thus were able to talk with a variety of local officials, farmers, missionaries and others "on the ground". They all confirmed the situation described above, i.e. that the harvests in their districts ranged from bad to worse.

A map detailing the regions visited by the OFDA team is contained in Annex A1. In addition to this, we were able to fly over other districts (including Soum, Bam, and Namentenga in the north) to view the crop, water, and vegetation situation from the air. We went as far north as Oursi on the Mali border, where an aerial view revealed frankly that the desert is advancing southward like a yellow ^{earthen} ~~earthen~~ tide.

B) Food Outlook

Naturally, in view of the national production situation described above, the amount of food available to the population this year is lower than in recent years. The northern areas are particularly affected, as they had per capita production much below the national average (about 100 kg. in the Sahel Province, for instance).

The national food outlook is not only a matter of production however, though grains production remains the basic determinant. Other factors must be taken into account. The stocks of grains this year are estimated at 113,000 MT. Of this, 13,000 MT are in the hands of the National Cereal Board (OFNACER) for distribution. The remaining 100,000 MT rest with the private sector, either on-farm stocks or in the hands of merchants. Commercial imports are seen to be 60,000 MT. The Voltan Milling Company is importing 30,000 MT of this, which will be processed into flour. The GOUV is importing on a commercial basis an additional 30,000 MT from Niger and Nigeria. (The bulk of this will be paid for by the use of various counterpart funds made available to OFNACER by the major donors).

Food aid represents the final component of the food supply side. It is estimated at 77,487 MT ^(grains only) according to the latest information available. Details of this are contained in a table later in this section. Total food supplies then, consisting of production plus stocks plus imports plus food aid, add up to 1,385,868 MT.

On the demand side, consumption needs on a national scale (based on a population figure of 6,582,000 and a per capita consumption rate of 190 kg annually) are estimated at 1,250,500 MT. To this must be added post-harvest losses and seed needs for the next season. This is usually estimated at 15% of production: 170,308 MT. (This figure may be conservative considering the high losses

experienced by farmers using traditional mud or straw 'silos'). Industrial and animal feed use is counted at 15,000 MT. The reconstitution after this season of the ^{20,000MT} National Food Security Stock - which is being drawn down now to respond to the emergency - is considered essential by the Government. Total demand therefore adds up to 1,456,158. When the total demand is balanced against total supply, the net deficit comes to 70,290. This is below the deficit estimated by the government in December (when it launched its appeal) mainly because of food aid pledges received since then. The OFNACER stock has been drawn down in the same period from 17,000 MT to 13,000 MT. A recapitulation of the national food balance for 1984 is shown in the following chart.

NATIONAL FOOD BALANCE (Metric Tons)

SUPPLY

A) Total cereal production	1,135,381
B) Private stocks	100,000
OFNACER stocks	13,000
C) Commercial imports	60,000
D) Food aid pledged	77,487
E) Total food supplies (A+B+C+D)	1,385,868

DEMAND

F) Consumption needs	1,250,850
G) Post-harvest losses, seed needs (15% of production)	170,308
H) Industrial and feed use	15,000
I) National Security Stock	20,000
J) Total food demand (F+G+H+I)	1,456,158

E minus J (deficit) - 70,290

Aside from the decrease in production this year, there has been a significant drop in the marketing and distribution of food grains. Not only have the normal surpluses not ~~materialized~~ ^{materialized} in the southwest and west, but they are not being transported to the traditional deficit regions in the north where they are needed. This is mainly due to problems in OFNACER.

The National Cereal Board's objectives include the following: a) to stabilize grain prices; b) to provide low prices for the consumer; c) to regularize the operations of merchants; and d) to enforce a system of official prices. There are questions about the ability of OFNACER to have a significant effect on prices at all - even in bumper-crop years - because the amount of grain that it buys and sells has never exceeded 3% of production. Leaving this aside, it appears from our talks with a variety of sources that OFNACER's present commercialization campaign is operating well below the target, i.e. just 10,100 MT in the past three months out of a projected 30,000 MT. The main reason for this is that prices are being set at artificially low levels. This year's official prices are set out in the following table, with figures for past years included for comparison.

	<u>OFNACER Consumer Prices</u> (in CFA Francs per kg)				
	1979/80	1980/81	1981/82	1982/83	1983/84
Millet	57	69	80	80	90
Sorghum (white)	57	69	80	80	88
Maize	57	69	80	80	88

Compounding the problem is a new phenomenon - the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs). The CDRs, introduced last year by the new government, are "vigilante" groups organized at the behest of the local governments. Their political functions are beyond the scope of this paper, but in terms of grain marketing they zealously go into local market-places in order to enforce the

official (OFNACER) prices. When a merchant is found selling above the official price, the authorities are called, the seller is reprimanded, and a CDR member will then stand by and watch while the merchant's remaining grain is sold at the government - decreed price. CDRs are supposed to stop grain from leaving the country and register market transactions of grain as well. It is a system that is bound to result in gross economic inefficiency.

And so it has: basic food grains have disappeared from many markets. Both farmers and merchants are holding on to stocks in many areas. This is not entirely due to the low official prices. Farmers are uncertain that the next harvest will be a good one. Merchants on the other hand may be waiting until real prices rise still further. But there is no doubt in the minds of close observers that a significant factor in the marketing system's breakdown this year has been the non-viability in the free market of the official price system.


The merchants who traditionally move the grain from surplus areas in Upper Volta to deficit areas are not interested in doing so at the official price. Producer prices were set at 66 CFA Francs per kg this year, and the spread between that price and the sales price of 88 CFA Francs per kg is not enough to motivate the market. Merchants have to pay transportation costs (including the rising price of gasoline) as well as storage and handling expenses.

A more realistic estimate of actual prices was seen by the OFDA team as we traveled around the country and visited various markets. We noted grain prices between 30% and 50% ^{above} ~~of~~ the official prices in our informal survey. The following chart using USAID/UV data, shows the same trend taking place in three locales. Bobo Dioulasso, the central market of the surplus area, has the lowest

prices as might be expected. Dori, on the other hand, in the far north has grain prices above 150 CFA Francs per kg. - 170% of the government price.

ESTIMATED CONSUMER PRICES FROM PARTIAL DATA FOR SELECTED MARKETS

CFA/KG.



c) Government Initiatives

The GOUV has not depended solely upon outside assistance nor did it wait for outside experts to identify the fact that a disaster was in the making.

As early as August 15, 1983 (after only 11 days in office) the president ordered a review of the national food situation to determine whether there would be a serious food shortage and if so, its extent.

On November 8, the Minister of Rural Development announced at an FAO meeting in Rome that there was a serious problem in the offing.

On December 30, the President issued a decree creating the National Commission to Combat the Effects of the Drought. This commission is chaired by the Minister of Rural Development and includes 8 senior members of other ministries. There are also Provincial Commissions responsible to the national commission. The tasks of the Commission include:

- 1. Coordination of the activities and tasks aimed at reducing the negative effects of the drought in Upper Volta.
- 2. Coordination of national or foreign operations geared to combat the effects of the Drought.
- 3. Definition of the interventions to be carried out in the affected areas and provision of the necessary means to national and provincial structures.
- 4. Management of the means placed at its disposition in the action against the drought.

A "Select Committee" has been created, chaired by the Minister of Rural Development and including representatives of the major international donors. This is essentially a coordinating committee.

The GOUV

Solidarity

~~The~~ has created a Caisse de Solidarité (Solidary Fund) to receive contributions from government employees and private donations. At the time of this report they have collected an estimated 700 million CFA (\$1,750,000). These funds are being used for grain purchases for the worst-stricken areas in the north.

It

~~The GOUV~~ has negotiated a commercial purchase in Niger of 30,000 MT to be distributed through the OFNACER network in the next few months.

The government also launched an appeal to the international community for emergency food assistance. The results of this are discussed below.

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D) Donor Response

In view of the disastrous harvest in 1983 and considering the self-help measures undertaken by the government itself, the international donor community has pledged a total of 77,487 MT in cereal food aid and an additional 10,982 MT of non-cereal food aid (vegetable oil, milk powder, and meat/fish). Other food aid is expected to be pledged in the future ~~as~~ since the government has requested it, but these totals are correct as of mid-March 1984.

By a wide margin, the largest single donor is the United States. The U.S. donation includes 21,376 MT through the CRS regular program and 10,000 MT through the emergency program, for a total of 31,376 MT. This is more than 35% of the total food aid in the pipeline this year. This calculation does not include the American contribution through the World Food Program, an additional 5,532 MT. Nor does it count the proposed 8,277.5 MT under the CRS emergency program or the additional 5,000 MT proposed under the emergency government-to-government program, as these are not yet approved. If these latter two are added, the U.S. bilateral total food aid donation to Upper Volta this year rises to 44,653.5 MT of 101,746.5 MT, or 44% of the total.

Other major donors include the Federal Republic of Germany (6,500 MT), France (4,000), EEC (6,400 MT) and WFP (8,301 MT regular program and 10,000 MT emergency program). Details of these donations are set forth in the table on the next page.

DONOR PLEDGES TO UPPER VOLTA - 1984

(All figures in metric tons)

DONOR	GRAINS				Oil	DSM	Other	Arrival	Remarks
	Rice	Sorghum/Millet	Corn	Wheat					
Kuwait	1,080							Jan.	Received
Japan	3,012							Feb.	Received
FRG		4,000	2,500					May	Sorghum from Niger
France			4,000					June	Via Abidjan
Holland				3,700				March	Via Abidjan
Belgium				1,500				May	To be milled at Bobo Dioulasso
EEC		6,400						April	To be distributed in Sahel (From Niger)
Canada		3,500						April	From Niger
USAID (emergency)		16,000						May	6,000 from Niger (from counterpart funds) 8,000 via Lome, 2,000 via Abidjan (from US)
CRS (regular)			13,020 Cornmeal		2,974	5,382		Throughout 84	Via Abidjan
Adventists	1,000				100			?	Via Lomé
Mennonites			1,000	1,000				?	Origin: Canada
WFP (regular)		5,000 SFSC	532 Cornmeal	243	842	873	811 Fish/meat	Throughout 84	Via Abidjan
WFP (emergency)		10,000						April/May	From Niger
TOTALS	5,092	39,900	7,500	6,443	3,916	6,255	811		
		5,000 SFSC	13,552 Cornmeal						

Total Grains: 77,487

Total non-grains: 10,982

These totals do not include the proposed 7,505 MT cornmeal and 772.5 MT oil for CRS emergency program.

The total food aid in the pipeline this year to Upper Volta from all sources represents just 7.8% of total domestic grains production. If approved, CRS emergency program will constitute only 72/100 of 1 percent of the base national production. It is thus difficult to expect any effect on market prices whatsoever. This is further assured by the fact that all of the proposed CRS food will be distributed outside market channels to MCH centers, Food-for-Work projects, and to the poorest people in the case of general relief.

In the category of general relief, the food provided is not foreseen to have any effect on the market because the beneficiaries essentially are not in the market - they have minimal ^{or no} purchasing power. As for the food to be distributed through FFW projects, ~~it~~ ^{we} would ~~be~~ argue that there will be encouraged a net increase in agricultural production by the projects undertaken. These will include the construction of small water-retaining dams and "diguettes" and other activities that will improve soil and labor productivity in the coming crop season. Therefore, far from being a disincentive to agricultural production, at least a portion of the food aid in question will make a direct contribution to an increase in agricultural production. We feel that, because the emergency program under discussion will ~~last~~ for only five months, there is little chance for "dependency" patterns to be established among the recipient populations. If Upper Volta was in surplus this year, and if there were "dumping" of huge amounts of food aid into the market, then a disincentive effect on production and prices might be expected. In the context of a 70,000 MT food deficit, however, it is impossible to argue that this will be the case.

E) Nutrition Situation

In Upper Volta, as in other countries, CRS assesses the nutritional status of the recipients through its Growth Surveillance System (GSS). Weight of the child is plotted on the Master Chart on a matrix that indicates the percentage of weight for age based on the Harvard Standard. The percentage is then graphed on an easy-to-read individual growth chart that is kept by the mother so she can follow the progress of her child.

Master chart data indicates the monthly nutritional status of the group of children participating in any given MCH/CRS-affiliated program. These data (per cent below 80 percent of standard) are analyzed at CRS by center and then by region. So over time, changes ^{are discernible} in the nutritional status ^{of} groups of participating children, ~~are discernible~~ ^{usefulness}. The ~~use~~ ^{usefulness} of these data for evaluating the impact of the CRS program is, however, limited. With time, children graduate from the program, new children enter, and the total number can increase or decrease significantly. Also, as center data are aggregated, totals then include centers that just opened, in addition to those in the program for a long period of time. Aggregate data also blur regional or center-specific trends. More importantly, these data do not account ^{directly} for other important variables such as harvest deficits, water supplies, diseases or cultural feeding practices.

Nevertheless, certain trends can be seen in the aggregate data collected by CRS since 1980.

Number of Children below 80% of Weight for Age (in %)

	January	April	July	October
1980	41	47	42	42
1981	41	46	42	45
1982	44	53	44	41
1983	41	47	45	45

The range of children below 80% of standard over the four-year period is between 41 and 53 per cent. However, each year, between the months of April and June, there is a significant deterioration in nutritional status of participating children.

This decline is due to low food stocks (just before the growing season), sudden increase in temperatures (ranging in the ^{40°s C}~~40s~~) and low supply and poor quality of water. Because of the combined effect of these factors, children tend to suffer from more illnesses, particularly diarrhea. These diseases and dehydration result in loss of body weight.

The relatively poor harvest in 1981 is reflected in the April 1982 data. The Mossi plateau and Sahelian areas had percentages of 53 and 49 below standard respectively. The area to the north and west of Ouaga experienced a rate of 59 percent below standard during this month.

In contrast, data from January over the four year period shows the lowest number of children below standard. During this season, the food stocks are relatively high and there is usually an adequate supply of water.

Given the time lag in collection and analyzing Master Chart data from 115 centers, the effects of the current famine and drought are not yet reflected in the CRS data. December 1983 data indicated a country average of 44 per cent below standard, but a high of 50 per cent in the eastern area and 49 per cent in the north and Sahelian areas. Details are set out in Annex A2.

A significant decline is underway now in the nutritional status of children. In a normal year, the decline takes place. This year, the food deficit is just beginning to be felt. From our conversations with farmers around the

country, it is clear they are now just beginning to use the last of their harvest. Some have already started to eat grain usually reserved for next season's planting. Also, water supplies around the country are at a drastically low level. River basins and ~~barrages~~^{dams}, usually holding some water in March, are already completely dry. The combined effects of the usual ~~decline~~^{drop} in calorie intake, the current food deficit, the low water supply, and increase in diseases lead to the conclusion that there exists already a significant decline in nutritional status, which will be reflected in the data of CRS - as well as the daily lives of thousands of children - as the months go by.

According to the Ministry of Planning and Cooperation, 17.3% of Upper Volta's population is between the ages of 0 and 4. An additional 13.3% is between the ages of 5 and 9. Thus, fully 30.3% (almost one-third) of the total population consists of children 9 or under. (This is not atypical of developing country population profiles, but it is noted to demonstrate that Upper Volta's children constitute an important part of the population).

The infant mortality rate in Upper Volta is about 198 per 1000. Broken down further: for infants less than one year old, it is 286/1000, and for infants between 1 and 4, the rate is 245/1000. These rates are among the highest in the world. Rural pediatric health problems stem from a number of causes: tropical diseases including meningitis, lack of clean water, little access to health care facilities, lack of proper hygiene and sanitation practices, endemic diarrhea, etc. All of these conditions are aggravated by the lack of proper diet. A child's physical ability to fight off infection and disease is adversely affected by a low caloric intake. Thus, the Ministry of Health reports that the leading causes of infant mortality are malaria (40.5%) measles (26.1%) and diarrhea (19.2%); other major causes are whooping cough (11.9%) and

meningitis (4.5%). It can be safely said that all of these diseases (both in incidence and severity) are aggravated by malnutrition, kwashiorkor, marasmus, and edema. There are only 3,650 hospital beds in the country (1 bed per 1,700 persons) and 1 doctor per 57,550 persons. These indicators are very low, even by African standards, and show the general state of health care.

The government in its report on "An Integrated Project on Infant Mortality" (Jan. 1984) admits that malnutrition is in the first rank of serious public health problems:

"In economic, social, or numerical terms, infant malnutrition is directly responsible not only for a high percentage of illnesses, suffering, and deaths, but also the deterioration of the physical, mental, and psychological state of the target population. Pre-school age children are very vulnerable to the effects of malnutrition..."

As this segment of the population is the one at which the CRS program aims, it is the view of OFDA team that the proposed emergency program be undertaken as soon as possible.

Between 10% and 15% of children 1-5 years old exhibit signs of kwashiorkor. The CRS regular program is designed only as a supplement to the normal diet in order to raise protein/calorie consumption among vulnerable groups ~~up~~ to more acceptable levels. As the food base this year is declining - especially among the poor as food prices rise - the need is all the more urgent for the extra calorie input that would be provided by the additional 8,277.5 MT under discussion.

In 1983, CRS reached an average of 72,815 children every month as well as 38,781 pregnant or nursing mothers through its MCH centers. Under the emergency CRS proposal, 55,000 children and 55,000 ^{mothers} will receive extra rations.

Also 60,000 persons will get rations under food-for-work projects and another 60,000 will be fed under general relief programs. We believe that this intervention proposed by CRS represents a worthwhile and timely effort that will make a difference between life and death for many of the beneficiaries.

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F) Conclusions

Upper Volta, one of the poorest countries in the world, has an agricultural base that is weak and provides just self-sufficiency under normal conditions. With a total rainfall amounting to drought conditions, a widespread crop failure occurred in major food staples in 1983. The hardest hit areas are to the north and northeast of Ouagadougou and in the extreme southwest.

Compounding the production problems are a series of problems in supply: Specifically, marketing and distribution of the little grain that is in surplus in some regions. Because of adverse pricing policies by the new government, the amount of grain entering the market is way below what would otherwise be possible. Thus real prices, when given a chance, have risen to very high levels for basic foods.

Many people - the poorest Voltans - have been priced out of what sparse market there is for food. The net effect of a severely deficient harvest and a serious disruption in food marketing has been a steep drop in the cereals available for consumption. (See Annexes A3^a and A4). As usual, members of vulnerable groups are the first to suffer from this food shortage. Alarming statistics are already beginning to reach donor agencies ^(concerning) the spread of malnutrition. As it is now just the beginning of the "lean season", the problem can only get worse as the months go by.

For all of the reasons described in the food, agriculture, and nutrition sections above, we believe that a disaster has existed in Upper Volta for some time. The challenge now is to avert as much as possible of the human

suffering involved. Part of this challenge can be met by a timely response ^{through} ~~by~~ the provision of emergency food aid, both through CRS and on a government-to-government basis.

Catholic Relief Services

Program

Catholic Relief Services began its program operations in Upper Volta in 1960 and has continued without serious interruption since that time.

Their regular program for FY 1984 includes the utilization of PL 480 commodities (non-fat dry milk, plain cornmeal, and vegetable oil) in the following program categories:

1. Maternal-Child Health, in which 55,000 mothers and 75,000 children are involved in a program of nutrition and health education, including monthly weighing of their babies. Both mother and child receive a ration to supplement the food which they have at home. These centers are under the auspices of the ministries of Health, Social Affairs, and Rural Development, Catholic and Protestant churches, and some local civic groups.

2. School Feeding, where lunches are provided to 230,000 children enrolled in primary schools.

3. Young Farmers Training Centers which involve 27,000 young people in food-for-work activities during their 5 month training course.

4. Food-for-Work in which 5,000 workers and 5,000 dependents are engaged in a variety of FFW activities, (described in Annex B-8.)

5. Welfare Assistance which provides relief to 8,000 handicapped and destitute persons served mostly through churches and local government organizations.

On January 18, 1984 in response to the disaster appeal, CRS submitted a supplementary AER (Annex B-2) and an amended Operational Plan for Emergency Title II Assistance. (Annex B-1). It includes:

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1. Maternal-Child Health providing additional rations to 55,000 mothers and 55,000 children in the drought affected areas of Upper Volta.
 2. Food-For-Work, permitting the participation of an additional 10,000 workers and 50,000 dependents in the same general areas.
 3. Direct Relief Assistant for an additional 60,000 persons.

The programmed rations in the MCH Category are based on recommendations in the CRS emergency manual "A FOOD AND NUTRITION PROGRAM FOR DROUGHT/FAMINE AREAS" developed in 1978 by Dr. C. CAPONE, CRS Medical Advisor. As stated, the food which the mothers and children receive in the regular program are to supplement their normal diets in the home. It is obvious that given a serious food shortage at home, there would inevitably be a declineⁱⁿ the nutritional progress of the participants. Hence the emergency supplement is aimed at boosting the family diet to maintain them at near normal dietary levels.

For some years a number of PVOs have been active in rural areas of Upper Volta. Their efforts are geared toward conservation of soil and water, reforestation, improved agricultural production practices, better grain storage, grain banks and credit programs for small farmers who many times fail to qualify for regular institutional lending. A group of PVOs working in the Sahel region have formed a coordinating body called Sahel '84, to pool resources and information as together they respond to the problemsⁱⁿ their area of operations.

OXFAM is involved in training farmers in an ingenious program of water harvesting which involves circling their fields with small earthen or rock walls called "diguettes". This prevents water run-off when rains are heavy.

The program is showing signs of success as other farmers in the region are now adopting this technique. This type of program could be replicated in other areas by other PVOs given the necessary resources. In the CRS Emergency Program budget an item of \$22,500 is included for tools. These PVOs could provide a natural outlet for a significant part of the CRS Food-for Work component.

CRS has begun discussions with other PVOs working in the target areas to identify additional food-for-work opportunities. Should the food-for-work requests eventually exceed the amounts available, CRS might then shift a portion from Direct Relief Assistance to Food-for-Work. There is certainly no shortage of projects to be undertaken in these areas and there is an abundance of well-managed PVOs willing to begin the work.

Management

The team visited CRS offices and warehouses in Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso as well as visits to 6 MCH centers. The staff are knowledgeable and competent and combine a good mix of Voltans and expatriates throughout with several Voltans at senior staff levels. Of their staff of 60 Voltans 21 have served with CRS over 5 years, 7 over 10 years and 2 over 15 years.

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Their program records appeared to be in good order and were adequate for good program management. They were able to produce the necessary records to answer all program questions posed by the team. They have good program supervision with supervisors and end-use checkers who visit their centers regularly. In sum the program is well-managed. Given CRS' evident good management of their regular program the team has no reservation as to their ability to manage the proposed Emergency Program competently.

Budget and Finance

Catholic Relief Services operations are funded from several sources, among them:

1. Basic Budget support from CRS New York
2. Participants' Contributions
3. Sales of Containers
4. Outreach Grant from AID/FFP
5. Government of Upper Volta (for inland transportation from freight terminals to CRS warehouses).

In order to implement the emergency program they have requested from AID the sum of \$341,775. This is detailed in their budget proposal (Annex C-1). The team examined the original budget, carefully suggesting that it be presented in more detail. The present proposal is the result. The team is satisfied that the items are appropriate in nature and in scale and are the result of solid planning and deliberation.

The major issue centers around the best means of funding this item. At least 6 options have been proposed. The team, however, felt that only 3 of them had any real possibility of implementation.

1. Counterpart Funds. One option would be to use a portion of the funds obtained through the monetization of the 10,000 MT of sorghum. The sorghum is being sent under Title II Emergency use and therefore the use of any

any funds generated is governed by the Emergency regulations (and not Section 206 rules). These state inter alia that "Use of proceeds from sales in emergencies is normally limited to the coverage of local transportation costs or project activities directly related to emergency relief of rehabilitation". (AID Handbook 9, Chapter 9, Paragraph A5). Thus, AID regulations on this subject clearly give priority to the generated funds being used for transport costs or relief activities. So the use of the counterpart funds from the sale of the 10,000 MT sorghum can legally be used, and in fact are "normally limited" to the coverage of the transport costs associated with emergencies, like the proposed CRS 8,277.5 MT.

In our talks with USAID/UV we discussed the use of counterpart funds at some length with the mission's agricultural economist. He has been involved for almost 5 years in the negotiation and management of counterpart funds generated by the sales proceeds of OFNACER. As such, he is quite knowledgeable about the views of the government on counterpart funds and on the means of negotiation of complicated financial arrangements, including blocked accounts, with the government officials responsible.

From him, we learned that the use of these counterpart funds is indeed a possible option. The terms of the agreement should ^{be} clearly spelled out in advance. A monthly reporting requirement should be included. If the sorghum arrives as foreseen at Ouagadougou by 15 May, it can be distributed through the OFNACER system by the first week of June. Reporting can then begin two or three weeks later. The fund generated by the sale of the sorghum ought to be deposited in the prescribed counterpart account by 20 July, if past experience is any guide. Even given a month delay in the deposit, the money would still be available by mid-August for release to CRS.

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The amount of money concerned here (\$315,000) represents about 17% of the total funds expected to be generated by the sorghum sales. Thus, if the entire transport costs of the CRS emergency project were to be covered by these counterpart funds, there would still be 83% of the money left over for joint programming by the government and USAID for a variety of other purposes.

CRS has indicated its willingness to wait until August to get the money in local currency from OFNACER. They will meanwhile operate the emergency program on funds in hand during the summer. CRS believes that the truckers who will transport the food are willing to be paid in August. As this transport cost represents fully 82% of the overall CRS proposal, the amount of money that CRS would need to "float" over the summer would be limited to \$56,300 (i.e. the non-transport component). The CRS director have feels that this is entirely feasible.

The OFDA team feels that this option is a real possibility given the timetable described above. CRS agrees to this arrangement. The team sees no reason to think that the government will refuse to take part in this arrangement, given the fact that it has negotiated similar agreements in the past, and given the fact that the CRS program is considered by the government to be important and timely.

A sample of a past Transfer Agreement is included in Annex C-2 for reference. The memo of Mr. Kelly (FFP monitor) concerning this subject is included as Annex C-3 for reference. If this option is chosen, the mission should be instructed by the AID/W to negotiate such a transfer authorization with all possible speed, given the gravity of the food situation.

The government, more than anyone is aware of the seriousness of its plight this year. There is every reason, therefore, to expect a speedy response by government agencies to the proposal for a transfer authorization that would include budgeted funds for CRS emergency operations. The scarce resources of the OFDA would not be expended where, as in this case, there are other viable alternatives and local sources of funding available.

2. OFDA Funds. The obvious advantage would be the quick infusion of funds to permit the Food for Peace Office to approve the request and for CRS to begin mounting their operation. The disadvantage is that OFDA funds, on which many demands are being made would be reduced still further.

3. A Mixture of Funds. The third option to consider would be a mix. CRS might consider waiving their customary overhead. OFDA might facilitate quick start-up by a grant of \$100,000 to CRS with the remaining \$215,000 to come from the counterpart funds when finally available. It must be noted however that this option would likely encounter some delay pending the negotiations of the T.A. and be contingent upon the agreement of the GOUV as in option 1. The start up funds; however would be available on agreement as opposed to 60 days later.

The OFDA team feels that the above options describe the three funding choices that have real possibilities of implementation. We strongly recommend that both AID/W and AID/UV make this matter a top priority in the days to come. This decision will avoid delays in the rapid response of the U.S. government to Upper Volta's food, water, and human disaster.

Storage in the port of Abidjan is about 25,000 tons, much of which is unused at this point. The CRS transporter, SAG (Société Africaine de Groupage), has additional warehouse space up to 10,000 MT. Abidjan has more warehouse space - both "in-bond" at the port and in the private sector around the city - than any other port in the region. Shipping losses of CRS food aid through Abidjan have been in the past two years about 0.8% of the total commodities shipped. This is a very good record for an African port, and probably reflects efficiency on the part of CRS and its forwarding agents. For all of the reasons above, we find that the port of Abidjan can handle the proposed additional food aid without any problems.

Togo's port Lomé on the other hand is used for transit of food to Upper Volta by WFP and by other donor organizations to some extent for project supplies. Lomé also serves as the main port of entry for Niger. Niger, however, is not importing much food this year and its overall (non-food) imports are down as well. Lomé is reported to be running at about 60% of port capacity, as both transit traffic for Niger and domestic imports are at reduced levels.

There exists (as at Abidjan) a large amount of unused warehouse space. Both CRS and WFP representatives in Lomé reported recently that their port losses are at a 1-2% level. As business is down in the Togo port in general, there is now an excess of trucking capacity, willing and able to undertake transport of food stuffs from Lomé to Ouagadougou and other points in Upper Volta. The distance between Lomé and Ouagadougou by road is 997 km; and from the border at Bitou to Ouagadougou is 283 km. It is important in programming food through Lomé to remember that adequate lead-time must be given in notifying all parties. Authorities require that all documentation for transiting food be strictly in order. (This includes "phytosanitary" certificates, customs exemptions, etc.). Estimates by SOCOPA and SOAM - the two major forwarding agents in Lomé -

LOGISTICS AND INFRASTRUCTURE

This section is divided into several parts, which treat the ports, the rail-road, road transport, warehousing, and food accounting. At the end are found a summary and some conclusions.

A) Ports

The principal port for Upper Volta's imports is Abidjan (Ivory Coast), with Lomé (Togo) taking a secondary role. Abidjan handles approximately 80% of total Voltan imports and exports. There are no ports in Upper Volta itself as its rivers are not navigable. Bitou is the point of entry for goods from Lomé while Niangoloko is the point of entry for freight entering via Abidjan.

The port of Abidjan is presently operating at 40-45% of capacity for a number of reasons. First, Ivory Coast is undergoing a recession as the price of oil drops. Both Mali and Upper Volta (much of whose imports flow through Abidjan) are still suffering adverse effects from the world recession. In addition, political uncertainty on the part of the private sector in Upper Volta has cut normal commercial imports of consumer and industrial goods by a significant margin. The net effect has been to reduce total traffic through Abidjan.

With its modern unloading facilities (both cranes and bulk-handling), Abidjan port is capable of discharging about 25,000 MT per week. There is no shortage of available docking space. In addition, Moulins d'Abidjan has its own dock with bulk-handling equipment capable of evacuating an estimated 2,000 MT/day. This grain is offloaded directly into the adjacent milling and bagging facilities. Rules of the port dictate that priority be given to the docking of ships containing relief supplies; these rules were promulgated in 1974 during the Sahel drought crisis.

indicate that it would take about 3 weeks to offload and deliver 5,000 MT of sorghum to Upper Volta.

The outlook is good, therefore, for the delivery of the 8,000 MT sorghum arriving in May in Lomé for the emergency in Upper Volta. If there is additional need for food aid beyond what is optimum for Abidjan, it is certain that Lomé can be used safely and efficiently.

B) RAILROAD

As a landlocked country, Upper Volta is largely dependent on its rail link to the sea, the Regie Abidjan-Niger (RAN) railway. The RAN is owned jointly by the governments of Ivory Coast and Upper Volta, and carries a major portion of the latter's import/export traffic. It presently runs 1,150 km. north and east from Abidjan to Bobo-Dioulasso to Ouagadougou, where it has its terminus. Despite its name, the portion of the railroad running east to Niamey, Niger has never been constructed. About 515 km of the RAN's meter-gauge line are within the territory of Upper Volta.

CRS presently offloads about one-third of its total program tonnage at Bobo-Dioulasso for distribution in the provinces of Hauts-Bassins, South West, and Volta Noire. This will decrease to about 20% for the emergency program (150/MT cornmeal and 154.5 MT oil) because the most seriously affected areas are to the north and east of Ouagadougou. The portion of food unloaded at Bobo-Dioulasso will be forwarded to the areas around Diebougou and Banfora, as well as Dedougou/Tougan/Nouna near the Mali border in Volta Noire. In these localities, unusual food deficits have occurred this year.

The security of the Bobo-Dioulasso portion of the food shipments is increased by the fact that the principal warehouse complex of CRS is located along a rail spur of its own. This makes possible direct offloading from the 40-ton railway wagons to the adjacent warehouse, the capacity of which is about 2,500 MT. The SAG maintains another warehouse with a capacity of 5,000 MT.

The remaining 80% of the emergency food shipment will continue on to Ouagadougou (approximately 6,004 MT cornmeal and 618 MT oil) and be offloaded at the rail terminal. From there it is transferred (usually directly) to the CRS warehouse outside of town. If not (for instance if trucks or work gangs are not

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immediately available) it is sent to the SAG warehouse nearby in the rail yard on a siding (capacity 3,500 MT) in transit to the CRS main warehouse or to distribution centers.

The RAN has a railhead in the port of Abidjan which facilitates quick and safe intermodal transfer of CRS food commodities in the guarded port area. Rail cars are put under seal with leaden Ivorian customs seals upon loading for transit to Upper Volta. These seals are only broken upon arrival and discharge at the rail stations of Bobo Dioulasso and Ouagadougou. From the sources consulted in Ouagadougou, ^{it was learned that} the capacity of the rail line to run food aid freight to Upper Volta is about 3,000 MT per week. (This is 3 trains of 25 wagons apiece). In emergency conditions this could be increased another 15% because of the present under-utilization. No shortage of wagons is foreseen.

C) ROAD TRANSPORT

In general the team found the roads in Upper Volta to be in good condition, with about 1,500 km of paved all-weather highways. The surfacing of the road to Ouahigouya from Ouagadougou is almost finished. (This will be a key link to the north in relief operations). An additional 7,500 km. of gravel/dirt roads exist in varying states of good repair. During the dry season, few if any routes in the country pose problems for transport of food aid or relief supplies.

Directly after rains, however, there are delays experienced on the secondary roads. The country, for these dirt roads, uses a system of rain barriers (which close the road to traffic for 24-48 hours) until the road dries sufficiently for general use. Fully-loaded trucks present special problems in these cases. Upper Volta's government reasons correctly that short delays experienced in trucking are preferable to having the roads severely rutted or damaged by vehicles with heavy loads. This is not to say that the roads are impassible to food aid traffic during the rainy season. But food aid operations during the period July/August will be slowed and will probably be more expensive. Transporters charge more for operations undertaken on secondary and tertiary roads during these months. The operations will be slower (in terms of tons/day delivered) for two reasons: a) delays experienced at the rain barriers by large trucks, and b) the use of smaller, lighter trucks for transport in order to get around these delays. (In this category are 5-, 10-, and 12-tons trucks and pickups).

Trucking operations - in any season - are possible directly from the ports of Abidjan and Lomé. From Abidjan, the cost of delivery to Ouagadougou is about 10% above the rail rate. From Lomé, the delivery cost to Ouagadougou is about \$70 (28,000 F.CFA) per ton. Both routes (Lomé-Ouagadougou and Abidjan-Ouagadougou) are paved all the way. The road distance from Lomé to Upper Volta's

capital is 997 km, and the distance by road to Ouagadougou from Abidjan is 1,291 km. (Abidjan-Bobo Dioulasso is 935 km). Talks with transporters indicated that in case of need, trucks could move about 3,000 tons per week from Abidjan to Ouagadougou without major problems.

CRS operates an efficient trucking operation for its regular program using contracts with private sector truckers. The rate for food aid transport is 40 CFA (\$0.10) per ton per kilometer. Thus, a large truck going from Ouagadougou to, say, Ouahigouya would cost:

$$40 \text{ CFA} \times 20 \text{ tons} \times 182 \text{ km} = 145,600 \text{ CFA } (\$364)$$

This ton per kilometer rate is very favorable. Under the regular program, distribution centers within 100 km of the CRS warehouses in Bobo Dioulasso and Ouagadougou come to pick up their foodstuffs. Delivery costs to centers beyond those 100-km radii are paid by the CRS Outreach Grant. The Upper Volta Food for Peace/Title II Evaluation - Final Report (September 1981) noted that "...the Outreach Grant has resulted in more efficient transport arrangements and improved reliability of deliveries".

The proposed emergency food would be transported by truck from the CRS warehouses in Bobo-Dioulasso and Ouagadougou to the distribution centers (in the case of MCH and school-feeding) and to the project sites (in the case of food-for-work projects and general relief). ^{Since} ~~As~~ CRS has run efficient trucking operations here for several years, no unusual problems are expected to result from 8,300 MT of food added to the program this year. Because of a general economic recession, there now exists excess trucking capacity - both at the domestic and the regional international levels - so procurement of the additional trucking capacity under new contracts will be facilitated. Losses in transport are expected (as in the past) to be minimal. These losses are in any case the responsibility of the transporters during the time between the issuance of

the food at the central warehouses and the reception at MCH centers and other project sites.

The Government of Upper Volta in August of 1983 (during the rainy season) undertook food transport operations to the north through OFNACER. The result was that OFNACER's truck fleet was able to move and distribute 4,000 tons over rural dirt roads in a period of 8 weeks. This indicates that emergency food transport operations can be undertaken successfully even at the height of the rainy season. It is hoped that the CRS food will arrive before the onset of the rainy season. But if this is not the case, the team feels that transport operations are feasible in spite of the rainy season, albeit at additional expense and with more logistical problems.


CRS, in calculating its transport costs, has used a rate of 50 CFA per ton per kilometer. We feel that the use of this slightly higher figure is justified because:

- 1. Gasoline prices are expected to rise this year, thus adding to truckers' costs;
- 2. Transporters have a 10% surcharge on some routes in the rainy season;
- 3. Some direct roads may be blocked during the rainy season, ~~thus~~ resulting in circuitous (longer) routing of trucks in order to accomplish timely delivery of food aid supplies.

In any case, CRS will pay only for bills actually presented to it by the transporters concerned (for actual tonnages moved and kilometers driven). If the total transport bills are less, then a lower level of funds will be expended. The OFDA team closely examined this aspect of the CRS proposed, as the transport component represents fully 82% of the direct cost of the total proposal. The \$258,672 budgeted here is a reasonable projection in our

view. It is based on the factors described above and represents the maximum expenditure level for emergency food aid transport under the proposed project. The following chart outlines the division of responsibilities for the total transport costs in this case.

CRS EMERGENCY PROGRAM
RESPONSIBILITY FOR TRANSPORT COSTS



D) Warehouses/Storage

CRS maintains warehouses at the central locations of Bobo Dioulasso and Ouagadougou. Its warehouses at Bobo Dioulasso handle about one-third of tonnage of the regular program, with the other two-thirds passing through the main warehouse at Ouagadougou. Under the proposed emergency program, however, Bobo Dioulasso will handle only 20% of the total and Ouagadougou the remaining 80% (1,655.5 MT and 6,622 MT respectively). The team had the opportunity to visit all of the CRS warehouses in the country.

At Ouagadougou, the CRS warehouse is located 6 km. south of town at "Ouagarinter", an industrial park owned by the Chamber of Commerce. The C-of-C rents the 4,000 square meters to CRS for 2 million CFAF (\$5,000) per month; the government pays half of the rent. This modern warehouse, built in 1975, is the best food aid warehouse either of the team members had ever seen any where in the world. We were frankly astonished; we looked for features lacking or things amiss. We found none.

The capacity of this warehouse is 10,000 MT. Access is through 5 large doors located on the loading dock at regular intervals. (This means that 5 trucks can load or unload simultaneously). All food - cornmeal, oil, milk powder - was stored on pallets in neat stacks up to the recommended height. The warehouse showed itself to be scrupulously clean, and was equipped with working electric lights and fire extinguishers. Clear plastic panels, uniformly spaced in the ceiling, permitted daylight to enter the floor space. Theftproof ventilation grates extended around the walls about 5 meters up.

Outside, the warehouse was equipped with rain spouts jutting out a good distance from the roof. (This keeps moisture from collecting near exterior walls in the rainy season). The land surface around the warehouse was graded slightly

downward away from the building for similar reasons. The loading dock was at a 1-meter level above the ground, and is made of concrete as is the floor inside.

Record-keeping both in the stacks and the main ledgers was meticulous. We asked the chief warehouseman during our visit exactly how many tons of each commodity was presently on hand. In five minutes, he told us the answer. He and his three subordinates are equipped with small Sharp calculators. Under the CRS proposal, two new warehousemen will be added here, as well as provision for twenty additional day (casual) laborers. Certainly, these new personnel will be adequate for management of the proposed additional food aid. This warehouse and its operations could be used as a "model warehouse" in a food aid management text book.

Nearby in another section of the Ouagarinter complex, the new CRS main warehouse is almost complete. It being built on land donated by the government, using funds under successive outreach grants, for about \$500,000. It should be in service sometime in the next few months. The storehouse is approximately the same size as the other rented warehouse (3,265 square meters) and has a capacity of 9,000-10,000 MT. When finished, the warehouse and adjacent grounds will contain an office, a hydrant, a well, and a self-contained generator for electricity. It is entirely fenced in. At this point, the roof is being put on; little else remains to be done before CRS can begin to use the new facilities. CRS regular program costs overall are expected to drop by \$30,000 per year as the new warehouse comes into full use.

In Bobo Dioulasso, the CRS has seven warehouses. One is located adjacent to the CRS regional office in the same building. Another is in town, put at the disposal of the CRS by the Ministry of Health. A third is obtained free from

Catholic
the local/mission. Four additional warehouses, grouped together in a complex rented from Michelin Company, complete the available CRS storage space.

At the complex of warehouses rented from Michelin, the space consists of four warehouses in a row in a large old building. It has the advantage of being located on a rail spur, thus easing delivery and assuring greater security for the food. CRS commodities are unloaded directly from the rail wagons into the warehouses. The rent for this space is relatively cheap - 4 million CFAF (\$10,000) per year. The electric lights worked, the loading dock was in good repair, and the doors secured by heavy-duty "Vachette" locks. A spot check on the accounts showed them to be in good order with the same "stack card" stock system in use as at Ouagadougou. Pallets were in use, and the food was well-stacked. Each of three warehouses contained a different commodity - oil, cornmeal, milk powder - for simplicity of accounting. All were clean. The fourth contained a mixture of commodities, the overflow from the others.

At the CRS office, another warehouse contains milk and vegetable oil. It is not yet palletized, and only half of the space is lit electrically. The floor where the oil is stored is of dirt; the other half, containing milk cartons, is concrete. Additionally, several hundred 55-gallon barrels of soybean oil are stored outside on the CRS grounds, which are well-guarded at night. (The cartons of oil, which weigh 21 kg, are all stored inside warehouses).

The Ministry of Health warehouse in Bormokote neighborhood was visited and found to be in good condition with food (dried skin milk only) and record-keeping in good order. However, pallets were not in use and ventilation was lacking. Finally, the warehouse at the Catholic mission was found to be infested. It is probably the oldest building still being used as a CRS storage

depot. Evidence was seen of insect pests, both Tribolium Confusum and Sitophilus Granarius, in the cornmeal. This cornmeal was however segregated in this warehouse which contained only DSM besides. (These insects do not attack DSM). The spoiled flour, which probably totalled 2,000 kg, was awaiting a spoilage (phytosanitary) certificate before being evacuated and sold for animal feed.

It should be noted that CRS is in the process of consolidating its storage space in Bobo Dioulasso, and will soon be moving out completely from these latter two warehouses as other space in town becomes available. No new food is being deposited in these warehouses, and stocks are being drawn down. All foodstuffs for the emergency program are expected to pass through only the Michelin warehouse complex on the rail line, so storage problems are not anticipated.

E) CRS Food Accounting System

We examined the CRS food accounting system which is set out in detail in Annex B-4.

If follows standard CRS procedures as set out by headquarters. The system constructs a "paper chain" that begins before the arrival of food in the port of Abidjan and ends at the CRS food distribution centers. Thus, there is a written record of the whereabouts of every bag or carton or drum of CRS food at all times.

Upon close examination, the system of record-keeping was shown to be meticulous, with all documentation in order. Part of the reason for this is the long experience that CRS has in this country, and part of it is due to good management practices. As referred to above, many of the key local staff have been working with CRS for several years.

The essential parts of the accounting system by which CRS keeps track of its commodities are in sequence the following (all of which state a description of the commodities, the number of items and the weight):

- a) bill of lading - shipping document issued at point of origin.
- b) ex-tackle survey - done at Abidjan by an independent surveyor and covers the goods between the ship and the railroad car.
- c) "Connaissance terrestre" (land bill-of-lading) prepared by SAG to report on its transport activities.
- d) way bill - prepared by SAG to document the transfer of goods between SAG's warehouse and CRS' warehouse.
- e) stock control ledger - retained in each warehouse to detail all entries and ~~exists~~^{exits} of food.

f) daily envelopes - kept by warehousemen in each warehouse to detail stock arrivals and issuances on a daily basis. It is sent to CRS ~~control~~ ^{central} record keeping every day.

g) Commodity receipt - advance notice/delivery order - This form is sent by CRS to beneficiary insitutions to inform them that their food is at the warehouse. The staff of the beneficiary center then takes this paper to the warehouse, and collects the amount specified thereon. In the case of truckers' contracts for delivery, it serves as the waybill to the final destination.

Aside from the above forms, there are additional checks on the state of the food and its delivery, including ~~fully~~ ^{tally} cards, stock cards, commodity status reports, internal loss reports, monthly field reports, and end-use checks. Two additional end-use checkers are to be hired under the CRS proposal to handle the anticipated work load resulting from the extra food. The job of an end-use checker is to visit MCH and other project centers and sites to verify the number of recipients, stock levels, and storage conditions. This is an important but often neglected part of the range of food aid - control activities. Other food programs have no provision for end-use checkers.

Losses

The loss rate for CRS commodities has in the past been very good. An analysis of the losses (of all kinds) for the past eight calendar quarters reveals losses ranging from 0.9% to 5.7% of the total food aid shipped. The average loss for this 2-year period was 2.7%, which must be considered adequate under African conditions. Many of the losses, we were informed, stemmed from faulty or weak packaging (i.e. broken bags or oil cans) rather than theft or "missing". This is understandable, in view of the long journey which the food bags or cartons ~~or~~ ^{or} drums must make by ship, rail, and truck. Shipping losses have been

about one-third of total losses, and constitute 0.8% of the total amount shipped between January 1, 1982 and 31 December 1983.

Internal losses - from all sources - constituted the other two-thirds of the losses. This category includes losses in truck transport, and in warehouses by leakage, or insect infestation. One reason that CRS' losses are low is that damaged bags are not permitted to enter the warehouses. The food must be reconditioned in sealed containers - usually by SAG - before it can be logged into the warehouse. This is a very good idea as it eliminates ~~floor~~^{floor} or food on the floor and thus cuts down on problems with insects, birds, and rats.

The following table details the food losses by CRS in recent years:

Record Losses of CRS Title II Commodities
(in metric tons)

FY Quarter	Type of Loss				
	Shipping	Internal	Total	Total Shipped	%
1/84	58.5	72.5	131	4,804.2	2.7
4/83	50.3	126.2	176.5	3,720.6	4.7
3/83	31.8	112.1	143.9	4,208.9	3.4
2/83	23.9	41.3	65.2	5,636.4	1.1
1/83	43.1	63.5	106.6	6,989.5	1.5
4/82	57.3	111.1	168.4	2,948.1	5.7
3/82	0.5	27.0	27.5	2,981.9	0.9
2/82	39.4	98.8	138.2	6,412.8	2.1
Totals	304.8	652.5	957.3	37,702.4	
Average	38.1	81.6	119.7	4,712.8	2.7

F) Conclusion

The OFDA team considers the proposed emergency operations by CRS to be feasible. An additional 8,277.5 MT of cornmeal and oil is entirely manageable by the CRS staff under the proposed plan. In view of its good record on commodity management and long experience in Upper Volta, the CRS will be able to deal with the challenge of a program expansion that represents a 38% increase in tonnage received and distributed. The regular program here is the single largest CRS regular program in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the staff is doing a good job running it from a logistics and transport point of view.

The following table recounts the total CRS food imports for the last five years:

	<u>CRS Food Imports 1979-83</u> (in Metric Tons)
1979	21,853.5
1980	20,087.6
1981	23,429.9
1982	19,947.5
1983	19,501.8

Because the port of Abidjan is operating below capacity, no port problems are anticipated. The rail line, in turn, has the required wagons available to move the food. Truckers in Upper Volta - and in Ivory Coast and Togo - are looking for business. Freight transport here now is a buyer's market. Storage space is plentiful, and CRS storage warehouses are in good shape. It is paradoxical that the region's economic troubles have freed up the infrastructural resources that make it easier to cope with the present disaster... In summary, we believe the CRS emergency proposal to be realistic and well-planned on the logistics side.

ITINERARY

- 17 Feb. Arrive Ouagadougou, meet with US Embassy and USAID officials
- 19 Feb. Overflight of Sahel and North Provinces, visiting Dori, Gorom-Gorom, Oursi, Djibo, and Ouahigouya.
- 20 Feb. Visit to projects and villages in North Province; and return to Ouagadougou by road.
- 21/25 Feb. Talks with CRS and donors
- 27/28 Feb. Talks with donors, National Cereal Board, CRS
- 29 Feb. Leave for Bobo-Dioulasso - Hauts-Bassins
- 1 Mar. Talks with CRS Bobo, local authorities, visit to Banfora area.
- 2 Mar. Tour of Volta Noire and Center-West, arrive Kaya in Center-North Province.
- 3 Mar. Tour of Center North, return to Ouagadougou
- 5/10 Mar. Continue talks with USAID Mission, interview with Ambassador, draft report.
- 12 Mar. Give mission-wide summary briefing of team conclusions
- 12/13 Mar. Depart Ouagadougou.

List of Persons Met and Institutions Visited

A. U.S. Embassy

Mr. J. Walker, Ambassador

Mr. L. Pringle, DCM

(at USAID)

Mr. E. Melaven, Director

Mr. L. Heilman, Deputy Director

Mr. J. Becker, Agriculture Officer

Mr. D. Smith, Agricultural Economist

Mr. C. Kelly, Food for Peace Monitor

Mr. M. Rugh, Program Officer

Ms. P. Lerner, Assistant Program, Officer

Mr. K. Mullally, Project Officer, Forestry

Mr. R. Bloom, Project Officer, Agriculture

Ms. H. Gunther, Project Officer, Agriculture

B. Diplomatic Missions and Donor Representatives

Ms. M. Verville, 1st Secretary, Embassy of Canada

Mr. R. Vander Hoek, Sahel Coordinator, Embassy of Netherlands

Mr. G. Fontaine, Economic Counsellor, Delegation of the EEC

Mr. M. Champanet, Economic Counsellor, Embassy of France

Mr. W. Benthe, Chief of Security Stock, OFNACER (F.R.G.)

Mr. C. Guérineau, Consul of Belgium

Mr. F. Valère-Gilles, Deputy WFP Representative

Mr. S. Walsh, WFP Assistant Project Officer

Mr. P. Wright, OXFAM

Dr. Sheila Garnett, Save-the-Children (UK)

Mr. R. Otter, Save-the-Children (UK)

- Mr. P. Leconte, International Center for Development Research (France)
- Mr. J. Pasela, Country Director, Save the Children (USA)
- Mr. D. Miller, Deputy Vice-President, Save the Children (USA)
- Mr. A. Barry, Project Manager, Save the Children (USA)
- Mr. R. Toews, Agricultural Development Consultant
Mennonite Central Committee (Dedougou)
- Mr. D. Round, Foster Parents Plan Int'l (Kaya)
- Mr. M. Fanghaenel, Director, Foster Parents Plan Int'l (Kaya)
- Mr. A. Rakotondaso, World Council of Churches, Sahel Team

C. Government Officials

- Mr. M. Tapsoba, Secretary General, Ministry of Rural Development
- Mr. J. Sawadogo, Director, National Cereal Board
- Mr. L. Ouedraogo, Deputy Director, National Cereal Board
- Mr. N. Kologo, Prefect of Gorom-Gorom
- Mr. W. Ouedraogo, Chief, OFNACER (Ouahigouya)
- Mr. M. Sereme, Director, Regional Development Organization (Banfora)
- Mr. S. Edogo, Director, Regional Development Organization (Dedougou)
- Mr. S. Traore, Chief Extension Agent (Dedougou)
- Mr. B. Belem, President of Village Council (Bougouré)

D. Catholic Relief Services

- Mr. D. Piraino, Director
- Mr. M. Jones, Program Assistant
- Ms. S. Hahn, Senior Supervisor, Food and Nutrition Office
- Ms. P. Hagerty, Assistant Supervisor, Food and Nutrition
- Mr. C. Diendrabeogo, End-Use Checker (Bobo-Dioulasso)
- Ms. J. Awa, trainer (Gassan)

E. Others

Ms. S. Sundberg, Elliot Berg Associates

Mr. C. May, University of Michigan, Center for Research on Economic Development (CRED).

Ms. M. Huber, University of Michigan researcher

Mr. B. DuPuch, SAG Transporters

Rev. S. Yameogo, Federation of Evangelical Missions and Churches

Mr. P. Widmer, Mennonite Central Committee

Mr. R. Barokas, WASH Team (Water for Sanitation and Health)

Dr. R. Isley, WASH Team

Mr. R. Sawadogo, Caritas

Rev. J. Antoine, Liaison and Studies Office, Catholic Church

Mr. A. Nacro, Surveyor, CRED project (Ouahigouya)

Dr. D. Long, USAID/S&T Washington

Dr. A. Buck, USAID Epidemiologist

Mr. V. Weyman, WASH Team Leader

Ms. L. Harkins, Peace Corps (Dedougou)

ANNEXES

A) Food, Agriculture, Nutrition ^{and} and Outlook

- 1) Districts Visited by OFDA team
- 2) Number of Children Seen at CRS Centers under 80% H.S.
- 3) Per Capita Cereal Consumption 1980/81 - 1983/84
- 4) Per Capita Cereal Availability 1980/81 - 1983/84

B) CRS Program

- 1) CRS emergency program request
- 2) Supplemental AER
- 3) Food Administration - CRS staff organigram
- 4) Title II Food Commodity Management System
- 5) Job description of personnel managing Title II PL-480 fund commodities
- 6) Breakdown - Estimated Program for Emergency Food
- 7) MCH centres - Distances from central warehouses
- 8) CRS FFW - Description


C) Budget/Finance

- 1) Revised CRS budget
- 2) Sample Transfer Authorization for Title II Commodities
- 3) Kelly Memo Re Counterpart Funds

Number of Children Seen at CRS Centers and the Number of Children under 90% of the Harvard Standard, 1983


1983	JANVIER	FEBRIER	MARS	AVRIL	MAI	JUN.	JUILLET	AOUT	SEPT.	OCT	NOV	DEC	
OUAGA	26367 41%	29554 45%	33209 46%	26198 47%	30908 52%	33133 49%	35193 46%	27016 45%	26245 45%	30215 45%	30304 45%	29909 44%	
EST.	4610 47%	1253 44%	4202 51%	2500 56%	4392 58%	5964 54%	5135 57%	4509 50%	3300 53%	3310 55%	3395 54%	1959 50%	
OUEST + SUD.	3307 47%	1110 49%	1928 52%	3058 50%	3223 55%	2015 56%	2058 54%	1857 57%	1465 48%	2241 51%	2964 50%	1191 45%	
CENTRE-NORD + SAHEL	15254 43%	12980 47%	16045 46%	13669 50%	12728 53%	14714 57%	14574 49%	11598 48%	10501 51%	9677 54%	11650 55%	13887 49%	
HAUTE-BASSIN	6940 30%	6918 26%	6322 32%	7130 38%	6362 38%	5810 37%	3951 37%	3636 36%	4122 32%	4629 36%	4836 34%	3287 32%	
VOLTA NOBLE + SUD OUEST	4810 30%	7645 33%	7751 35%	5946 35%	6882 38%	6872 36%	8090 34%	8003 37%	7849 37%	7066 37%	7901 37%	6118 36%	
COMTE	3092 34%	2883 31%	2827 33%	2503 36%	2772 37%	2937 36%	2831 34%	1940 33%	2575 33%	2116 30%	2637 30%	2422 23%	
TOTALE	64380 41%	62343 41%	72284 44%	61004 47%	67270 49%	71445 47%	71832 45%	58649 44%	56057 44%	59249 45%	63687 45%	58665 44%	
Effectif et pourcentage mois									80%				
REPORTABLE CENTERS													

PER CAPITA CEREAL CONSUMPTION FOR SELECTED REGIONS, 1980/81...1983/84



PER CAPITA CEREAL AVAILABILITY

1980/81...1983/84



UPPER VOLTA PROGRAM
CATHWEL

ANNEX B-1

67

OUAGADOUGOU

B. P. 469

Tél. 354-87 TOUS SERVICES

Tél. 355-03 BUREAU DIRECTEUR

TELEG CATHWEL

BOZO-DIOULASSO

B. P. 539

Tél. 904-31 BUREAU

Tél. 904-60 MAGASIN

18 January 1984

Emerson J. Melaven
Mission Director
USAID
B.P. 35
Ouagadougou
Upper Volta

Dear Emerson :

As agreed upon at our meeting of 10 January 1984 we are enclosing a supplemental AER and amended Operational Plan for an emergency Title II food request relating to the drought/famine situation in Upper Volta. A budget has been included in the Operational Plan.

This submission is basically the same as the "Working Paper" we presented to you on 30 December 1983 with two slight changes. First, the amount of oil requested is reduced from 1037 MTs to 772.5 MTs due to calculation adjustments. Second, the grant request has been increased from \$ 315,000 to \$341,775. The amount of \$26,775 has been added for CRS/NY Overhead calculated at 8.5%.

We thank you for the support you given us on our request and if you have any further questions please feel free to contact us.

Sincerely Yours,



David F. Piraino
Program Director

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CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES-USCC

UPPER VOLTA PROGRAM

TITLE II PL 480

FY 1984 FOOD PROGRAM

AMENDED

OPERATIONAL PLAN

I. Element of Operation

A. Identification

1. No CHANGE

2. Organization and Staff

David F. Piraino, Program Director

B.P. 469 Ouagadougou, Upper Volta

Devotes 80% of time to Title II activities

Other Title II Supervisor Staff :

Yembi Ouédraogo (Voltaic) Director Bobo-Dioulasso Office

Susan Hahn (American) National Supervision Food and Nutrition

Béatrice Kam (Voltaic) Assistant Supervisor F&N Program

Esther Zongo (Voltaic) Assistant Supervisor F&N Program

Sr. Marie Cecile Toé, (Voltaic) Assistant Supervisor F&N Program

Françoise Trogno (French) Assistant Supervisor F&N Program

Françoise Crelerot (French) Assistant Supervisor F&N Program

Helene Baron (French) Assistant Supervisor F&N Program

Patricia Haggerty (American) Assistant Supervisor F&N Program

Mark Jones (American) Program Assistant

Grégoire Ouédraogo (Voltaic) Chief, Projects Office

Philippe Biyen (Voltaic) Food and Transport Supervisor

B. Area-Scope-Conditions of Operation

1. No CHANGE

2. No CHANGE

3. Last sentence should read : This program for FY 1984 will reach 230,000 students.

4. No CHANGE

5. Should read : All food programs are country-wide with the exception of the emergency program.

6. No. CHANGE

7. No CHANGE

8. Emergency Program. A food crisis began developing in Upper Volta following a late start and early abrupt end of rains during the May-October 1983 farming season. The rains began in most regions late in June and ended abruptly in early August, resulting in an extremely poor harvest in most northern areas and a loss of up to eighty percent in other localities.

On 15 August 1983 after only 11 days in office, President Sankara requested a study be conducted on a potential food deficit. This study predicted a deficit of 400,000 MTs. On 8 November 1983 at the Rome FAO meeting on famine in Africa the Minister of Rural Development said Upper Volta would have a 300,000 MT food deficit based on a consumption of 215 kgs/person/year. On 17 December 1983 the Minister made a public statement that based on a consumption of 190 kgs/person/year there would be a deficit of 120,000 MTs (this lower consumption figure was insisted upon during negotiations with the international donor community). The PVOs in Upper Volta through SPONG their coordinating organization, have estimated a deficit of approximately 300,000 MTs. This estimate is based on experience gained during the droughts in the '70s and information received from their field offices and contacts. These food deficit figures do not take into account food that must be found for thousands of famine-stricken people coming into northern Upper Volta from neighbouring countries.

A large deficit was also anticipated by CRS personnel visiting MCH centers, schools and project sites in late October 1983. During the October - December period, numerous rural parish priests have come to CRS to inquire about possibilities for emergency food. Two diocesan coordinators have already submitted written emergency requests to CRS. Contacts with various international organizations, such as USAID, WFP, OXFAM Save the children etc., also indicate that there is a severe shortage of food.

Based on Government statistics, see attached tables A and B, nine out of 11 districts (not counting AVV) will experience severe deficits. Table A shows the gross deficit or surplus in each of the districts as well as in the Aménagement des Vallées des Voltas (AVV). Table B provides the net food availabilities and requirements. The difference between the two shows a net deficit of 120,000 tons.

In addition herders are having a difficult time to feed and water their stock. There is very little available for the animals to eat and many of the water sources that are normally available for watering into March, April and May have already dried up at the beginning of January. The GOUV is encouraging the sale of older bulls and non-productive animals. The sale price, however, has dropped down to 40,000 CFA for a cow and Niger has put a tax on animals transiting their country in an effort to save the Nigerian meat market for their stock.

Immediate holding actions taken by the public authorities to avoid a catastrophe between now and the anticipated 1984 harvest include three series of appeals : a) financial contributions from national salaried workers and businessmen, as well as current resident expatriates ; b) national inter-district solidarity between those fortunate who have had surplus harvest and those who have had none ; c) international emergency food aid - whether bilateral, multilateral or non-governmental organizations such as CRS.

National salaried workers, businessmen and women and resident expatriates are pledging money. One village in Western Upper Volta is known to have donated more than one ton of grain to a locality in the North. Some international donors intend to provide emergency wheat, rice, sorghum ... The World Food Program has pledged three thousand tons of food. At present it appears the international community will pledge approximately 10,000 tons. CRS also surmises that much of the national financial contributions, if not all, may wind up being used to transport the international emergency food aid from the two main cities of Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso to villages.

The Director of Cabinet of the Minister of Rural Development said to CRS on December 29, 1983 that any amount of donated food it can bring will be appreciated by the GOUV and especially by those who will not be able buy food at subsidized prices.

CRS has been operating a program in Upper Volta since 1960. During this time it has responded to numerous Drought/Famine situations similar to the present developing situation. For example in response to severe crop failures in 1977 almost 12,000 MTs of Title II food were distributed in 1978 beyond normal program levels with over 10,000 MTs

distributed through the Food and Nutrition Program and 1800 MTs distributed for welfare assistance. A USG grant of \$ 250,000 was also received for Food Transport Assistance and Program Supervision and Administration. Overall this Nutrition Intervention Program was executed extremely well with only minor losses and relatively few problems.

Throughout the programming period of this request, CRS intends to retain its role of a Sponsor Agency while the responsibility of the operation of the program is given to local agencies. The agreement with the GOUV gives CRS the position of an independent importer and supplier of food commodities with the title to the food supplies being retained by CRS until the commodities are utilized by the recipients.

In Drought/Famine situations CRS intervention plans are made on the assumption that when the famine is officially recognized (as it has been in this case), there will be a generous response from the international community either through bilateral or multilateral governmental aid programs. CRS sees its role as being complementary to the official governmental programs and does not intend with its intervention to replace all or part of those relief activities that are to be carried out by governmental institutions and agencies. The CRS program, however, can complement the official mass relief program by operating under more select criteria and structure distribution to the neediest categories of beneficiaries, i.e. the youngest section of the population, women of child bearing age and welfare cases. In addition food can be programmed to food for work projects, particularly those in agriculture, to assist selected needy areas reinforce their efforts to increase agricultural production.

Since the mass relief efforts of the government cannot be expected to be targeted to the age group that is in greatest need, the structured and systematic nutrition intervention program of CRS along with the agricultural and welfare components, targeted to a selected group, play an important and priority role in a Drought/Famine situation.

Most of the emergency food in this request will be distributed to the nine deficit districts and the northern part of the Volta Noire district through Maternal Child Health centers that already collaborate with CRS (See Table C for a list of centers by region). These centers present an ideal mechanism to distribute additional quantities of food. First, the capacity to receive, stock and distribute food is already well established. Second, young children and mothers, the recipients, are vulnerable to malnutrition in general, but especially in times of famine. Third, the young children will be monitored through the growth surveillance system to assure that they are receiving a share of the food.

In times of famine the dietary deficit of the child and mother increases and consequently, the normal ration for the Food and Nutrition Program becomes inadequate in that it no longer meets the nutritional needs of the child nor economic needs of the family. The most important element of the Emergency Nutrition Intervention Program, therefore, is an increase in the supplementary ration to the level where the nutritional and economic needs are met. In fact this emergency program will retain the character of a Food and Nutrition Program for the most vulnerable section of the population in spite of the fact that a sharing of the food supplies will take place among other members of the child's family. Throughout the programming period, the goal will remain to prevent malnutrition through education and growth surveillance in combination with economic aid to the family, i.e. the Title II food package. At no stage does this MCH emergency intervention take the role of a food relief activity.

Specifically CRS proposes to make available to 55,000 mothers and 55,000 children already enrolled in the MCH program an additional 9.5 kgs each of cornmeal and .75 kgs each of oil for a period of five months, April - August 1984. This ration would be in addition to the regular programmed AER ration and would result in each mother/child (family) receiving monthly 23 kgs of cornmeal (one bag) and 3.5 kgs of oil (one tin). The total amount of food required for this distribution would be 5,225 MTs of cornmeal and 412.5 MTs of oil.

Some of this emergency shipment will be used for the Ministry of Health recuperation centers (CREN). CRS has already assisted these centers with money to purchase locally available protein-enriched foods. These centers will surely have an increase in the numbers of severely malnourished children and the food will be needed to feed both the children and their mothers.

The Food for Work program would involve local private or government organizations interested in developing agriculture or related projects with needy people located in the nine designated deficit districts. These projects could take the form of communal fields, land preparation and planting, and water projects. Over a five month period this program would distribute 1,150 MTs of cornmeal and 175 MTs of oil to 10,000 participating families or reach approximately 60,000 beneficiaries. The family ration would consist of 23 kgs of cornmeal and 3.5 kgs of oil. In addition tools would be provided where needed through the grant requested for tool purchases. This FFW program would therefore not only provided immediate economic and nutritional assistant to needy families, but also be an incentive for increased agricultural production.

The General Relief Program would supply food assistance to recipients who are unable, either temporarily or permanently, to be self supportive. The individual monthly ration would consist of 4 kgs of cornmeal and .5 kg of oil and provide assistance to 60,000 people. For families based on six people the monthly ration would be 23 kgs (one bag) and 3.5 kgs of oil (one tin) per month. The total account of food requested is 1,150 MTs of cornmeal and 175 MTs of oil. The distribution would be carried out by local government and private organization such as centers run by the Ministries of Social Affairs, Rural Development, and Catholic Dioceses and parishes.

The control, warehousing, records transport and procedures will all be handled with the systems established and operating under the regular CRS Title II program. This system has been in place many years and has proven to be effective. CRS/Upper Volta has already managed programs of 30,000 MTs or more with the system and personnel that are now in place. This is more than the requested total of 27,500 MTs for FY'84 made up by the 19,000 MTs of the regular AER and 8,500 MTs of the emergency request.

A distribution plan will be prepared by 15 March 1984 detailing centers by name and location, number of recipients, dates for delivery and quantities of food. This plan will be based on a minimum of two deliveries per center and take into consideration center size, storage capacity, accessibility and staff competence. It is anticipated that the first deliveries will be made in early April and it is therefore essential that the food arrive in-country by the end of March. The rainy season normally begins by the middle of May and limits accessibility to centers. CRS will, however, have approximately 800 MTs of regular stock that could be distributed if the emergency food is late in arriving, and later be reimbursed with the emergency food.

The center food receipt, storage and distribution will be closely coordinated with the CRS Food and Nutrition Supervisors. Each center will be contacted by a CRS Food and Nutrition Supervisor, who will carefully plan the emergency program with center personnel. The distribution plan to recipients will be carefully planned. Depending upon local conditions this plan may vary from complete separation of distribution of emergency food from normal distribution to full integration.

The Food for Work and Welfare programs will be handled by the CRS Projects Office. This office is responsible for planning, developing and supervising the on going Food for Work and Welfare Programs. The Food for Work projects will relate to agriculture and water projects with the goal of increase crop production for the 1984 harvest. CRS will accept requests for projects in these areas from the GOUV, church, private and PVO's working in the food deficit areas.

The welfare program will concentrate on the most severely affected areas trying to provide relief assistance to those people who cannot afford to buy or have access to food. The GOUV, church and private organization will be contacted to determine where these areas are and the best infrastructure to use for distribution of this assistance.

76 Direction des Services Agricoles
 =====
 Production Agricole

CAMPAGNE AGRICOLE 1983-1984
 Estimation du déficit brut par ORD (provisoire)
 16 Novembre 1983

Organisme d'Encadrement	Population	Consommation 190 kg/ht/an	Production (tonnes)	Perles et se- mens 15 % de	Déficit ou Excédent (tonnes)
Centre	1 103 000	209 570	190 680	28 602	47 492
Centre-Est	473 000	89 670	57 893	13 184	15 151
Centre-Ouest	921 000	174 990	1-2 553	21 383	53 820
Centre-Nord	738 000	140 220	97 718	14 658	57 160
Est	475 000	90 250	36 380	12 957	16 627
Yatenga	619 000	117 510	69 578	10 437	58 459
Volta-Noire	742 000	140 980	174 915	25 237	+ 7 098
Bougouriba	417 000	79 230	65 094	12 764	6 900
Hauts-Bassins	476 000	90 440	118 238	17 736	+ 10 062
Comoé	205 000	38 950	37 112	5 557	7 405
Sahel	413 000	78 470	41 190	6 179	43 459
AVV	-	-	4 030	605	-
Total	6 582 000	1 250 580	1 155 381	170 308	288 933

CAMPAGNE AGRICOLE 1983-1984
ESTIMATION DE LA SITUATION ALIMENTAIRE (Céréales)
au 16 - 11 - 1983

RESSOURCES (Tonnes)	EMPLOIS (Tonnes)
<u>STOCKS</u>	<u>1. CONSOMMATION</u>
- OFNACER (STABILISATION ET SECURITE). 16.826	- 6 582 000 x 0,190 1 250 580
- Commerçants Privés (1) 100.000	
- Stocks des Producteurs	
<u>PRODUCTION</u> 1.135.381	<u>2. Pertes et Semences (15 % de la Production)</u> 170.308
<u>IMPORTATIONS CONTROLEES (2)</u>	<u>3. Autres utilisations (industrie et bétail)</u> 15.000
- Importations Commerciales	
- G.M.V. 30 000	
- Autres 30.000	
<u>IMPORTATIONS CLANDESTINES</u> P.M	<u>4. Exportations clandestines</u> P.M
<u>AIDES ALIMENTAIRES</u>	<u>5. Reconstitution du stock de Sécurité</u> 20.000
- JAPON (riz) 3.012	
- KOWEIT (riz) 1.080	
- US-AID (riz) 3.000	
<u>PROGRAMMES ALIMENTAIRES REGULIERS</u>	
- PAM 6.000	
- CATHWELL 12.882	
TOTAUX : 1.338.181	TOTAUX : 1 455 888

Estimation
Prévision d'importation
contrôlée

DEFICIT : 117 707

Source : D.S.A. OFNACER.
Direction du Commerce

120 000 T

ANNEX B-2

AID 1550-3 (9-69) SUPPLEMENTAL - EMERGENCY PROGRAM TITLE II, PL 480 COMMODITIES ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF REQUIREMENTS - FY 1971

BUDGET BUREAU NO. 24-R0051 APPROVAL EXPIRES JUNE 1973

1. COUNTRY UPPER VOLTA
2. COOPERATING SPONSOR CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES

3. GROUP OF RECIPIENTS	4. NUMBER OF PERSONS	5. NUMBER MO. OPR.	5a. NUMBER DIST. PER YR.	6. PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION											
				a. <i>Cornmeal</i>				a. <i>oil</i>				a.			
				b. NUMBER PEOPLE	c. RATE KGS	d. (000) KGS	b. NUMBER PEOPLE	c. RATE KGS	d. (000) KGS	b. NUMBER PEOPLE	c. RATE LBS.	d. (000) POUNDS	b. NUMBER PEOPLE	c. RATE LBS.	d. (000) POUNDS
Mothers/Orphanages/Children MCH	55 000	5	2	55 000	9.5	2 612.5	55 000	.75	206.25						
School Feeding MCH CHILD	55 000	5	2	55 000	9.5	2 612.5	55 000	.75	206.25						
Other Child Feeding															
Econ./Comm. Dev. (Workers)	10 000	5	2	10 000	3.8	190.0	10 000	.6	30.0						
Econ./Comm. Dev. (Dependents)	50 000	5	2	50 000	3.8	950.0	50 000	.6	150.0						
Institutions															
Health Cases															
Refugees															
Relief	60 000	5	2	60 000	3.8	1 140.0	60 000	.6	180.0						
7. Total Persons	250 000			250 000			250 000								
8. Total Requirement for FY 1971						7 505			772.5						

ADJUSTED REQUIREMENTS FOR SHIPMENTS (000 pounds)

9. Quantity on hand June 30, 1969			
10. Quantity received July 1 through Dec. 31, 1969			
11. Quantity on hand Dec. 31, 1969			
12. Quantity due from current FY program plus quantity received since Jan., 1, 1970			
13. Total (Line 11 and Line 12)			
14. Projected Distribution Jan. 1 through June 30, 1970			
15. Estimated Inventory, June 30, 1970			
16. Desired operative reserve			
17. Adjusted Total Requirements for FY 1971		7 505	772.5

18. Size and type of Pack required (as percentage of total on Line 17)	SIZE	PERCENT	SIZE	PERCENT	SIZE	PERCENT	SIZE	PERCENT
		25 kgs.	100	25 kgs.	100			


18a. Are extra containers desired? Yes No

19. Submitted by (Field Representative) : Signature *David Olivier* : Title *Program Director* : Date *January 1971*

20. Reviewed and Recommended by US AID or Embassy : Signature : Title : Date

21. Cooperating Sponsor Approval : Signature : Title : Date

22. ISC/A.I.D.-Washington Approval : Signature : Title : Date



CRS/UPPER VOLTA TITLE II FOOD COMMODITY
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

ANNUAL ESTIMATE OF REQUIREMENTS (AER) - The purpose of the AER is to program and seek US Government approval for all PL 480 food requests for each fiscal year.

CALL FORWARD - A request for that part of the PL 480 food approved under the AER which is deemed necessary for a given quarter of the fiscal year.

PLACEMENT OF ORDER - A document originating from CRS/NY requesting the required Title II commodities from the USDA.

NOTICE OF AVAILABILITY - Presents shipping information on the commodities as ordered from the USDA.

FIRST NOTICE OF ARRIVAL - A telex from CRS/NY citing pertinent information regarding the imminent arrival of food commodities. Our response is a telex to our shipping agent in Abidjan (SAG) giving information concerning how the food is to be divided between the Ouaga and Bobo offices. It also requests that an independent ex-tackle survey be done. Surveys are always done by commodity.

BILL OF LADING - Official shipping documents for food commodities.

ATTESTATION - Official document originating from CRS/NY, declaring quantity, value, weight and origin of commodities.

IMPORT AUTHORIZATION - With the information taken from the Attestation, CRS/UV completes this document which is then signed by the Minister of Commerce and allows the food to be brought duty free into the country.

ATTESTATION OF DESTINATION - A document completed by CRS/UV used in forwarding food commodities from Abidjan to CRS/UV.

EX-TACKLE SURVEY - Done by an independent expert in Abidjan. It covers discharge from the ship, transfer through customs warehouse to SAG warehouse to the loading on train for transport to UV.

Received with the survey are copies of summaries made by the expert summarizing conditions of commodities at time of loading onto railroad cars.

LETTER OF LITIGATION - A letter from the transport company (RAN) to SAG declaring condition of commodities upon their arrival in country.

CONNAISSEMENT TERRESTRE - Copy of a document prepared and used by SAG stating weight of shipment and total value of commodities in CFA including SAG transport costs, shipping cost and the value of the commodities themselves. Used by CRS/UV for making claims

CERTIFICATE OF FOREIGN RECEIPT (CFR) is submitted to Program and Supply, CRS/NY to verify that a shipment was received free of customs, duties and other levies and tolls.

WAYBILL - Control form issued by SAG/UV acknowledging quantity and condition of commodities during transfer from their warehouse to CRS warehouse.

A. JUSTIFICATION OF LOSS - Following receipt of food commodities according to the Waybill this document is drawn up by CRS/UV and serves to document the quantity of food lost in transfer between warehouses.

SURVEY REPORT - A second independent survey is performed once food is received in country. It serves to document condition at off-loading from railroad cars.

TALLY CARD - Shows the reconciliation of a packing list. (PL)
(Blading quantity, amount received, losses in transit, % of losses)

STOCK CONTROL LEDGER - This ledger is kept by the chief warehouse manager and documents the following : arrivals by PL ; distribution, stock and internal losses by commodity, distribution of commodities by program and sales of unfit food.

STACK CARDS - Cards maintained by warehousemen which shows receipt and distribution of commodities in warehouse by stack.

MASTER SHIPPING LEDGER - This ledger contains all information regarding a shipment ; origin, arrival, quantity, weight, value, distribution, losses, etc.

DAILY ENVELOPES - These envelopes are kept on a day to day basis by the warehousemen. It contains all documentation regarding receipts and deliveries as well sale of unfit food. It is used by the chief warehouse manager to document the STOCK CONTROL LEDGER.

COMMODITY RECEIPT - ADVANCE NOTICE/DELIVERY ORDER

This form serves as advance notice informing the consignee about the quantities of Title II commodities allocated to consignees distribution center (s). Upon receipt of this form at consignees warehouse it serves as the control form (delivery order) by which the commodities are released to the project holder. A signed copy is returned to CRS verifying receipt of all commodities.

COMMODITY STATUS REPORT (CSR) - At the end of each month a physical inventory is made of all stock in CRS/UV warehouses. This information coupled with distribution reports provides the basis of a monthly CSR. Receipts and internal losses are also shown. A quarterly CSR is prepared for USAID.

INTERNAL LOSSES - Transit losses (excluding ocean losses) are determined by the two survey reports which are done for each arrival. Claims are made against the shipping company for losses occurring in port transit sheds. For losses occurring in transit between the port warehouses and consignees warehouses the forward agent (SAG) is responsible and claims are made by CRS/UV against SAG. In the event a loss occurs during transit from consignees warehouse to project holder claims are made against the transporter. The CRS/UV

rogram uses almost exclusively private transporters for delivery of commodities to centers. They are not payed for this service until they return to the CRS office with a signed copy of the delivery order showing all Title II commodities were received at the project center in their entirety as well as in good condition. All losses occuring in transport are deducted from the amount to be payed for the transport.

For losses occuring in centers, claims are made against the person responsible. Only when a verified theft with police report is submitted are no claims made.

LOSS REPORT/LEDGER - All internal losses are reported to the local USAID mission on a loss report from. A loss ledger is kept on all losses which also contains pertinent information regarding subsequent claims. Further a loss report is compiled on a quarterly basis and submitted along with the CSR to USAID.

MONTHLY FIELD REPORTS - All programs are required to submit a monthly progress report. This report serves to verify number of recipients, receipt and distribution of food commodities and when appropriate (MCH centers) a summary of recipient contributions.

END-USE CHECKS - An end-use check office is maintained which performs end-use checks in all recipient centers and projects. For the MCH and school feeding program a form is completed which documents recipient levels, storage conditions and stock levels. It is accompanied by a narrative report. For Food for Work projects and General Relief assistance a narrative report is prepared following a visit by a member of the end-use check office.

JOB DESCRIPTION OF PERSONNEL MANAGING TITLE II PL 480 FOOD COMMODITIES

1. MARK JONES - Coordinates all Title II PL 480 food activities.
2. MICHEL OUEDRAOGO - Responsible for Title II PL 480 documentation (COFR, CSR, etc.) and claims against SAG. RESPONSIBLE FOR MASTER SHIPPING AND CLAIMS REGISTER.
3. PHILIPPE BIYEN - Collaborates with SAG, customs and Ministry of exterior Commerce. Coordinates transport/warehousing activities.
4. MADY OUEDRAOGO - Coordinates all warehousing activities. Responsible for STOCK CONTROL LEDGER, verifying DAILY ENVELOPES and sales of unfit food.
5. DJENEBA SOW - Secretary for all personnel in Shipping and Control and responsible for claims against shipping agent in Abidjan.
6. BABA SERMET - Assistant to P. BIYEN and responsible for food distribution to all centers. Makes claims against transporters and manages school transport contributions and sales of empty containers.
7. NABA KANZIA - Prepares COMMODITY RECEIPT - ADVANCE NOTICE/DELIVERY ORDERS for school feeding program. Requires calculation of rations and verification of agreement.
8. BIHOUN NANSOA - Prepares COMMODITY RECEIPT - ADVANCE NOTICE DELIVERY ORDERS for school feeding program. Responsible for the ledger registering the issue of the CR-AN/DO's.
- 9, 10, 11 + 12. - Responsible for the reception, stocking and dispatching of Title II food commodities at the warehouse, They must complete the DAILY ENVELOPES and STACK CARDS.
13. Total of four. 2 day, 2 night.
14. Some are permanent others hired according to need.
15. GEORGES OUEDRAOGO - Coordinates the activities of end-use checkers. Responsible for the use and distribution of Title II food commodities.
- 16 + 17. Makes visits to distribution centers reporting on stocks, storage and verifying recipient levels. Makes claims against centers when unjustified losses occur.
18. Two more end-use checkers will be hired if GFDA grant is approved.

BREAKDOWN-ESTIMATED PROGRAM FOR EMERGENCY FOOD

REGION	GENERAL RELIEF		FOOD FOR WORK		DISTANCE FROM OUAGA
	Cornmeal	Oil	Cornmeal	Oil	
CENTRE	148	23	119	19	200 km
CENTRE-EST	47	8	38	6	350 km
CENTRE-OUEST	168	27	197	31	223 km
CENTRE-NORD	178	28	143	23	229 km
EST	53	8	42	7	531 km
YATENGA	182	29	214	33	256 km
SAHEL	136	21	159	25	400 km
	<u>912</u>	<u>144</u>	<u>912</u>	<u>144</u>	
					DISTANCE FROM BOBO
BOUGOURIBA	110	17	152	24	195 km
COMOE	118	19	76	12	195 km
	<u>228</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>228</u>	<u>36</u>	
TOTAL	1 140	180	1 140	180	

COLLABORATING MCH CENTERS

REGION	SECTEUR MEDICAL	No. CENTRES	No. RECIPIENTS (EST)
CENTRE	I	40	31,000
EST	II	4	4 000
BOUGOURIBA	III	4	700
YATENGA	IV	4	1 200
CENTRE OUEST	V	6	1 100
CENTRE NORD	VIII	20	12 800
SAHEL	IX	1	200
CENTRE EST	X	2	2 000
COMOE	XII	6	2 000
		87	55,000

M C H C E N T R E S	Kilomètres
Boussé	60
Dapelogho	38
Doulougou	67
Guirgho	67
Ipelcé	55
Kombissiri	42
Koubri	18
Mogtedo	85
Pissi	47
Ziniaré	35
Boassa	15
Donsé	40
Loumbila	18
Manega	55
Nakamtinga	40
Nioro	30
Ourgou	52
Saaba	12
Diébougou	138
Ingaré	226
Sangha	22
Laju	155
Namsiguia	172
Watinoma	104
Sabcé	93
Tangaye	122
Tema-Boken	106
Tikaré	139
Zimtenga	150
Kongoussi	112
Dori	260
Banfora (SEFPD) (FC)	85
Banfora	85
Banfora (ORD)	85
Kankalaba	160
Toécé	73
Koudiérou	32
Boulbi	12
Bilbalogho	95
Gonsé	25
Tambaga	480
Pièla	240
Manni	248
Ramdollah	209
Ziga	206
Tabo	180
Pissei	190
Bieha	200
Bangassé	117
Koala	220

M C H

MCH	CENTRES	Kilométrages
	Wattinona	136
	Boulaa	189
	Bourzanga	152
	Guibaré	85
	Kiéka	182
	Koutoumtinga	93
	Rooko	100
	Sanwi	115
	Mané	100
	Silmidougou	100
	Zabré	185
	Gounghen	180
	Kiembara	280
	Tougan santé	235
	Yé	228
	Gomboro	232
	Bangassogo	256

CRS/Upper Volta Food for Work Program

Food for Work is a program intended to give food to needy households in return for productive activities. These productive activities are carried out through socio-economic development projects which have independent objectives. Development projects emphasize public rather than private benefit and are designed to alleviate the causes for assistance. The group or village requesting to participate in a FFW project is expected to provide all the materials and labor required for project completion.

To date FFW projects have been executed in the regions of Ouagadougou, Koudougou, Bobo-Dioulasso, Ouahigouya and Kaya. The projects supported were in the sectors of water, agriculture, training and road building. Support was also provided to the CFJA program which has an enrollment of 27,000 students. This government program provides agricultural training to young farmers. It does not lead on to secondary schooling and is felt to be appropriate for the needs of the rural population.

The FFW Program is run out of the CRS/Upper Volta Projects Office. The head of this office, Gregoire Ouedraogo, and his assistant, Alain Sawadogo, have the responsibility of reviewing all FFW requests. After a review of the project to evaluate its feasibility, priority, location, community involvement, contribution and benefit, a recommendation is made to the Program Director. Once a project has been approved, the project holder is advised in writing and the food is made available. A report is required after the project is completed as usually projects are less than three months in duration.

If the emergency food request is approved an additional FFW and General Relief Program Supervisor will be hired. The above system will be used in screening projects for the emergency program with priority projects in water and agriculture located in the deficit regions.

PROPOSED BUDGET

OFDA GRANT

1. PL 480 Title II Commodity Movement Costs :

Transportation -

8,278 MTs x \$.125/MT x 250 km = \$ 258,700

2. Commodity Storage Costs :

Renting Warehouse -

4,000 MTs x 2 1/2 months x \$.50/MT/Mo. 5,000

3. Commodity Administration Costs :

Office Supplies -

Photocopy Machine + Paper (SHARP SF - 755) 2,500

Printing - 4 Pads Bordereaux 4 Pads Facture at \$20/Pad 160

Paper, Registers etc.. 125

Pens, Pencils etc.. 160

Desks 2 x 125 250

Chairs 8 x 40 340

Bank Charge (1 CFA/1000 F CFA) 375

3,810

Salaries -

Warehousemen 2 x 5 months x \$225 = \$ 2,250

Warehouse Laborers 20 x 60 days x \$2/Day = 2,400

End-use Checkers 3 x 5 months x \$200 = 3,000

Food Distribution Clerks 2 x 5 months x \$225 2,250

FFW x General Relief Supervisor 1 x 5 month x \$300 1,300

11,400

Travel -

Per Diem 2-End-use Checkers x 50 trips x \$15/trip \$1,500

Per Diem 3-F&N Supervisor x 50 trips x \$15/trip 2,250

Pol/Maint Vehicles 250 trips x 250 km x \$.15
(6km/litre at \$.68/litre = \$.12/km for Pol + \$.03/
km for maint.) 9,375

13,125

Trip to Port (Abidjan)

Air Ticket

240

Per Diem 3 days x \$75 =

225

465

4. Tools for Agricultural Projects

<u>Item</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Unit Price</u>	<u>Total Price</u>
Wheelbarrow	200	\$ 65	\$ 13,000
Bucket	550	3.50	1,925
Handle for Bucket	550	1.40	770
Hoe	550	5.65	3,110
Digging Bar	50	26.50	1,325
Tamping Bar	50	19.00	950
Machette	200	2.20	440
Watering can	25	31.25	780
Rake	100	1.70	170
Saw	6	5.00	30
			<u>\$ 22,500</u>

5. CRS/NY Overhead at 8.5%

26,775

Grant Total

\$ 341,775

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AGENCY
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

U.S./AID

OUAGADOUGOU, UPPER VOLTA

UNITED STATES ADDRESS
WASHINGTON, D.C.
20548

non Attribution

INTERNATIONAL ADDRESS
OUAGADOUGOU
BOULEVARD DE L'INDEPENDANCE
BOITE 5
OUAGADOUGOU, UPPER VOLTA

TRANSFER AUTHORIZATION

Program Classification: AID No. 686-XXX-000-3615
Section 206 Program Approval Date:
May 12, 1982

Executive Vice President
Commodity Credit Corporation
U.S. Department of Agriculture
Washington, D.C.
Program Title:
Grain Marketing
Development-Upper Volta

In accordance with the provision of Title II, PL 480 (as amended), Section 1.201 of Executive Order 12220, and IDCA Delegation of Authority No. 5 effective June 27, 1980, Commodity Credit Corporation is hereby authorized to transfer and deliver food to Upper Volta in an amount not to exceed \$1,996,000 pursuant to the following instructions:

1. Quantity - Metric Tons not to exceed:

<u>Previous Total</u>	<u>Increase</u>	<u>Total to Date</u>
-	6,000	6,000

2. Commodities to be shipped:

<u>Code</u>	<u>Commodity</u>	<u>Amount Metric Tons</u>	<u>Estimated Value \$</u>
045.9015	Grain Sorghum	6,000	756,000

6. Program Objectives, Use of Commodities, and Conditions of Transfer

A. The commodities authorized herein are contributed by the United States Government (USG) to the Government of Upper Volta (GOUV) to assist the Government of Upper Volta (GOUV) in the attainment of food self-sufficiency.

B. The purpose is to: (a) increase cereal production and provide food security in rural areas; and (b) to improve the basis for policy and operational decision making in food grain marketing. The immediate objectives of the project are: (1) to improve the ability and operational efficiency of the Office National des Cereales (OFNACER) to buy and sell grain in rural areas; (2) to upgrade OFNACER's ability to allocate storage facilities in a manner which maximizes efficient use of its resources; and (3) to make a systematic diagnosis of Voltaic grain marketing with the objectives of determining how the private sector's extensive capital stock and entrepreneurial talents can best be utilized in a mixed system.

C. The GOUV is to sell grain under this Transfer Authorization. The following costs and prices were used in determining the final selling price, the gross proceeds and the net proceeds for all commodities sold.

(CFA/Kilogram)

1. Net proceeds to be deposited into blocked account - Buying price of local red sorghum	50.0
2. Maximum allowable charges for handling and sales of cereals:	
Internal Transportation and handling	8.5
Office administrative and selling costs	<u>13.15</u>
Selling Price	71.65

D. The minimum selling price for all commodities sold is 71.65 F CFA/kg or 3,250 F CFA/sack. If the grain is sold at a price higher than 71.65 F CFA/kg, then the net proceeds to be deposited will be the selling price less 21.65 F CFA/kg.

F. The net proceeds will be deposited into the blocked transitory account BIV No. 36-280.094-Z. No funds generated from the sale of grain delivered in 1983 will be released until the following conditions have been met:

1. OFNACER has deposited the sum of 73,932,316 F CFA agreed to in the agreement concerning the deposit of the net proceeds generated from the sale of Agricultural Commodities furnished to the National Cereals Office and the Government of Upper Volta during the years 1977 through 1980, or provided justification acceptable to USAID as detailed in this agreement.

2. The first two installments of 53,595,353 F CFA each have been deposited into the PND account No. 403-10-027 as agreed upon in the agreement concerning repayment of outstanding balances of proceeds of sales of Agricultural Commodities furnished to Upper Volta by the United States of America.

3. A current accounting in form and substance satisfactory to USAID, by OFNACER for all funds previously released from the blocked account BIV No. 36-280.094-Z has been submitted to USAID.

When these conditions are met, funds from this account will be released to BIV account No. 36-290.039-W to establish a rolling fund for the purchase of local grain and to BIV account No. 36-290.040-Z to provide support to OFNACER in the construction of up to 30 warehouses throughout the country and to provide support for local and third country training of OFNACER employees. All transfers from the transitory account to the disbursement accounts will require the agreement of the Director of USAID/Upper Volta or his designate.

F. The following line items will be considered as allowable expenditures under "Office Administrative and Selling Costs" provided that proper justification is presented to USAID and such justification is in accordance with AID regulations: "Salaires du Personnel, Main d'Oeuvre Occasionnelle, Indemnites de Deplacement, Charges Sociales sur Salaires, Frais Medicaux Pharmaceutiques, Autres Charges Sociales, Loyers et Charges Locatives, Entretien-Reparation Materiaux de Bureau, Entretien-Reparation Mobylettes, Petit Outillage, Etudes-Recherches, Electricite, Eau, Remuneration d'Interim et Honoraires (for actual services rendered), Primes d'Assurances, Transport et Fournitures de Bureau, Documentation Generale, Frais des PTT, Frais d'Actes et de Contentieux, Interets des Emprunts, Interets des s/c et Depot Credit, et Frais de Banque et de Recouvrements."

The following line items will be considered categorically as non-allowable under "Office Administrative and Selling Costs": Indemnites de Logement, Indemnites Diverses, Toutes Taxes, Carburant-Lubrifiant, Entretien-Reparation des Vehicules, Jetons de Presence, Indemnites de Responsabilites, Missions et Receptions, Cotisations et Dons."

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G. The USG will supply the commodities herein provided and pay costs of ocean transport and inland transportation to designated points of entry in Upper Volta, as well as of any independent survey reports required.

H. The proceeds generated under this Transfer Authorization, after payment of internal transportation and handling costs, sales commissions to non-OFNACER employees and allowable office administrative and selling costs, are to be used as an integral part of AID project 83C-0243. They are, therefore, subject to all terms and conditions of said project agreement.

I. The GOUV through the Ministry of Rural Development (MRD) will establish a working group which will examine and report to USAID by Aug. 31, 1983 on the process whereby agriculture production policy is formulated and coordinated with interministerial commissions dealing with national food and rural development policy.

J. USAID has noted with satisfaction the GOUV's promotion of farmer incentives for food crop production in recent years through its official prices for those crops. However, the rise in official buying prices has in certain years tended to lag behind the increases in the general price level, causing the producer price to fall in real terms in those years. Accordingly, the GOUV agrees to set its official producer prices for sorghum, millet and corn, taking into account, among other factors, the effect of inflation both in terms of raising the farmers' cost of production and in causing the farmers' terms of trade to deteriorate.

The GOUV will prepare by September 30, 1983 a report explaining how inflation and other relevant factors are taken into account in setting the official producer price, and also explain how the official producer price acts as an incentive to farmer production. In the report the system of competitive purchases of a target quantity by OFNACER will be compared to alternative systems such as a guaranteed support price system in terms of stimulating the production of millet, sorghum and corn. A copy of this report will be submitted to USAID/Upper Volta by September 30, 1983.

K. The GOUV agrees to keep USAID/Upper Volta fully informed concerning the status of commodity receipts, quantity sold, the quantity stored, amount deposited into the Counterpart Funds, and uses of rolling fund via quarterly reports. The GOUV will provide complete and accurate details as requested. Representatives of the USG will be permitted to audit and have access to all records pertaining to the use of commodities provided by this Transfer Authorization.

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7. This Agreement is prepared both in English and French. In the event of ambiguity or conflict between the two versions, the English language version will control.


FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

3/1/83
Date

Julius W. Walker, Jr.
Ambassador

REQUEST AND ACCEPTANCE: The assistance described in this authorization is hereby requested and the terms and conditions of this agreement and of AID Regulation 11,44 F.R. 34034-34045; (attached and incorporated herein by reference), except as otherwise specifically provided herein are hereby accepted.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF UPPER VOLTA
*Pour le ministre des Affaires
le Secrétaire Général*




27.5.83
Date

Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation

07 JUIN 1983
Date

Minister of Plan




Date

Minister of Economy and Finances

14 AVRIL 1983
Date


Minister of Rural Development



19 MAI 1983

15/4/1983
Date

Director General OFNACER



memorandum

DATE: January 30, 1984

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: C. Kelly, OAG/FFP

SUBJECT: Use of Funds Generated under Title II Emergency and Sections 206 Assistance.

TO: John A. Becker, ADO

In reviewing the guidance provided in Handbook 9 there appears to be a small but significant difference in the justification which is used to provide Title II Emergency assistance from that used to provide Title II Section 206 assistance. Overall Title II commodities are made available to meet famine or other relief requirements, combat malnutrition, promote economic and community development and for feeding programs outside the U.S. (Hb 9, Chapter 1A (3)). This directive, based on the language used in PL 480, implies a first preference for relief assistance. It has generally been the case that emergency needs override other uses of Title II assistance and this is specifically the case for Section 206 assistance, which is drawn from the Title II Emergency Reserve.

Monetization of Title II Emergency Assistance is an exception, rather than the rule, and should only be considered where funds are not available for logistics costs or the sales system is the only effective means of distribution. On the other hand Section 206 assistance is provided for monetization, with the funds generated to be used in specific development activities aimed at alleviating the causes for the need for food assistance. The use of funds generated by the sale of emergency food aid is normally limited to covering logistics costs or "project activities directly related to emergency relief and rehabilitation". In addition, "local currencies may be authorized for development purposes that will help alleviate the causes of food shortage for which the commodities are authorized" in selected situations (Hb 9, Chap 9, A (5)).

In the establishment of a joint programming activity with the GOUV on Emergency and 206 funds, it appears that the Emergency funds should first be used for logistics and relief and rehabilitation and then for food shortage reduction activities of a developmental nature, while 206 funds are targeted for a development type activity from the beginning. On a practical level, as the same financial and accounting controls apply to both types of assistance (Title I with realism), both types of funds can be managed under the same joint programming mechanism with the realization that emergency funds are first for emergency uses (which can include



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