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THE U.S MORTGAGE MARKET: THE GOOD, THE BAD AND THE UGLY

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THE U.S. MORTGAGE MARKET: THE GOOD, THE BAD AND THE UGLY

JORDAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (SABEQ)

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BANKS ON THE INTERNATIONAL MORTGAGE MARKET CRISIS

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The U.S. Mortgage Market: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly

Warren Coats and Sarah Hargrove
June 22, 2008



What Crisis? Introduction and Overview

Large Mortgage Loan Losses

- US and European banks declared write-offs of \$372 billion
 - Citibank - \$43 billion
 - UBS - \$38 billion
 - Merrill Lynch - \$37 billion
 - HSBC - \$20 billion
- AIG posts \$13 billion losses first half 2008
- Since last July, 7 of the largest US banks have written off ½ their combined profits since 2004



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Major shake-up in the industry

- CEOs replaced
 - Merrill Lynch
 - Citigroup
 - Bear Stearns
- Bear Stearns fails
- Lehman Brothers replaces CEO and CFO
- Bear Stearns traders arrested for fraud



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Overview of what happened in U.S.

- Big increase in mortgage securitizations
 - 1968 – 40%, 2006 – 77%
- Housing price bubble
 - Average price doubled from 2001 to 2006
- Big increase in non-conforming loans
 - Alt-A, Jumbo, Subprime
 - 2001 : 32% vs. 2006 : 59%
- Bubble pops
 - From June 2006 to March 2008 prices **decreased 18%**
- Mortgage delinquency & foreclosures sky rock
 - 1Q 2008 + 181 bps Prime, +1,066 bps Subprime
- Financial markets seize up: credit disappears
- Lessons learned




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The Good

Growth in Home Ownership

Long Trends in Home Ownership



Source: Census Bureau



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Home Ownership Elsewhere

- Spain – 85%
- UK – 69%
- France – 55%
- Germany – 42%



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Contributing factors in U.S. - Demand side

- Attractive products
 - 20 to 30 years payback with 80% - 90% LTV
 - Level payments: maximum 33% of income
- Efficient and low risk
 - Low interest rate spread
 - Low transaction costs
- Multiple products tailored to borrowers
- Home equity loans allow homeowners to monetize equity values in houses



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
Contributing factors in U.S.- Supply side

- Standardization and Securitization
 - “Conforming” credit worthiness standards and terms
 - Securitization
 - Mortgage backed securities (MBS)
 - Distributes risks
 - Liquidity risk (short-term deposits funding long-term loan)
 - Credit risks (pooled)
 - Fees for originating and servicing
- New breed of mortgage bankers and brokers
- Home equity loans provide adjustable rate secondary liens at higher rates




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
Structured Finance: Plain vanilla agency securitizations




Restructuring of structured finance added additional complexity



Restructuring of structured finance with CDOs added leverage



Increased leverage led to credit derivatives: Credit default swaps



By 2006, huge expansion of mortgage securitizations

- Non-agency origination was more than 45% larger than agency origination
- Non-agency issuance of \$1.033 trillion was 14% larger than agency issuance of \$905 billion...a combined almost \$2 trillion
- Credit default swaps soar to over \$45 trillion



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Subprime mortgages became the rage due to higher rates

- Definition: Loans to those with weak credit history or qualifications (FICO < 660)
- Tend to be lower income families (US policy for Freddie and Fannie!)
- Availability of special terms made home ownership a reality
 - No down payment
 - Adjustable rates with early low payments (“teaser rates”)
- Historical defaults relatively low < 2%



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The Bad

Housing Price Bubble

- Average annual price increase 2000-2005
 - Los Angeles + 20%
 - Miami + 18%
 - Dallas + 5%
- Ratio home price/income end 2006 (like a P/E multiple for evaluating the stock market)
 - L.A. : 11.4
 - Dallas : 2.7



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Erosion of underwriting standards

- Subprime borrowers
- Adjustable rates
- No down payment
- No or low Doc

Gathering perfect storm



Interest rates low, credit spreads narrow, everyone reaching for yield, and speculation that housing prices will continue to rise!



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Mortgage loan originations (\$millions)

	2001	Share	2006	Share
Agency	1,433	35%	1,040	23%
Jumbo	430	10%	480	11%
Alt-A	60	1%	400	9%
Subprime	190	5%	600	13%
Total	4,114	100%	4,526	100%




Increased supply fed the pipeline for securitizations



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Vulnerabilities: Principal-agent


- Underwriting standards applied
- Assets are as warranted
- Fiduciary standard of care: act in best interests of investors



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Vulnerabilities: Model error

- CRA paid by arranger
- Reliance on models
- Ratings for structured assets different from corporate bonds
- Valuation problems



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Vulnerabilities: Predatory lending and borrowing (fraud)




- Misrepresented income
- Unsophisticated
- Overstated appraisals

- Misrepresented risks
- Did not confirm income
- Tailored payments



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Vulnerabilities: Adverse selection



- Arranger and originator have more information on asset quality
- Lower standards not applied
- Tendency to keep better assets on own books
- Misrepresentation of quality of assets
- Paid by volumes



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Vulnerabilities: Moral hazard



Ancillary
Credit Enhancement
Servicing

SPV/Asset
Manager or
Servicer

Fees
f(outstandings)

- Mortgagor responsible for taxes, insurance and upkeep
- Servicer has interest in keeping asset on books
- Tendency to inflate expenses



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The Ugly

Prices hit with reduced demand and increased supply



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The bubble pops

- Housing prices declined 17% from July 2007 to March 2008




Source: *Fortune*, June 9, 2008

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Delinquencies increased


**Trends in Mortgage Delinquencies
(Total Past Due)**



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
Mortgage foreclosure rates responded

Trends in Mortgage Foreclosures



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Spreads increased and valuations plummeted




Foreclosures and revaluations led to bank losses

- US and European banks declared write-offs of \$372 billion
 - Citibank - \$43 billion
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- Since last July, 7 of the largest US banks have written off ½ their combined profits since 2004



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UK fares the same...leads to nationalization of Northern Rock



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
Financial markets freeze up

- Flight to quality
- MBS trading dead...valuation difficult
- Commercial paper market dead
- Banks build up/hoard liquidity
- Cannot unwind credit derivatives—difficult to assess exposures to counterparties




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Where were the bottlenecks?



Where were the bottlenecks?



Fed provides liquidity support

- Fed intervenes with liquidity
 - Lowered discount rate premium (dud)
 - Term Auction Facility and
 - Term Securities Lending Facility
 - Primary Dealer Credit Facility
- New facilities have longer maturity and broader collateral
 - Fed injects \$150 billion



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
Monetary easing may help, but at a cost

- Fed funds rate cut from 5.25% in August 2007 to 2.0% on April 30 2008
- Inflation increased from 2.4% in February 2007 to 4.2% in May 2008
- Dollar depreciated 37% from Nov 14, 2005 to April 22, 2008




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Effective Federal Funds Rate




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Change in CPI from year ago



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USD/Euro exchange rate responds



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Policy Objectives and Lessons

Objectives

- Mortgage Securitization - reduce the weaknesses without reducing the benefits
 - Strengthen underwriting standards and oversight in the market
 - Simplify structured finance, reduce leverage, increase transparency
 - Don't bail out losers, but contain spillovers



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Lessons for risk management

- Settlement capacity did not keep pace with market developments—who is the counterparty?
- Concentration risk not captured/monitored
- Liquidity contingency planning not sufficient
- Models are imperfect—need subjective interpretation
- Reputation risk is a real risk— Private label SPVs are really not “off balance sheet”



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The perfect storm....or extreme tail event

- Adverse interaction between
 - High leverage
 - Market liquidity
 - Valuation losses
 - Capital of financial institutions
- Assumptions of static environment incorrect
- Effect of individual firms risk reduction efforts increased systemic risk



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Lessons from those who best weathered the storm

- Integrated risk management systems and culture
- High level aggregation of exposures across different business segments
- Valuation models “tested” by selling limited assets in market
- Firm-wide liquidity planning factored in worst case scenarios and repurchase of mortgages



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Is there any light at the end of the tunnel?

- Need for realignment of incentive systems
- Need for more accountability
- Further housing price adjustments
- Have new data sets for future modeling
- Clearinghouse for CRTs
- Increased capital and liquidity buffers



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What does this mean for the Jordanian housing market ?

- Be aware of the pitfalls and enforce accountability along value chain
- Housing markets are local but always have cycles
- Gross positions are as important as net ones
- Risk assessment process is key for any new products



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Questions??



Thank you for your attention....



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