

THE IMPACT OF CIVIC EDUCATION PROGRAMS ON POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC ATTITUDES

FINAL REPORT

(Contract No. AEP-5468-I-00-6012-00, Delivery Order No. 5)

Prepared for U.S. Agency for International Development

January 27, 1998

Christopher A. Sabatini, PhD
AAAS Fellow
Center for Democracy and
Governance, U. S. Agency for
International Development

Gwendolyn G. Bevis
Management Systems International

Steven E. Finkel, PhD
Management Systems International

e-mail: lcooley@msi-inc.com

Table of Contents

Table of Contents

Executive Summary	iii
I. Overview of Study	1
A. Purposes of the Study	1
B. Scope and Execution of the Study	2
C. Outline of the Report	3
II. Civic Education Programs	5
A. Definition	5
B. Content	5
C. Methods	7
D. Adult Programs Studied	8
III. Study Methodology	11
A. The Research Model	11
B. Overview of Research Methods	16
C. Adult Survey Instruments	16
D. Adult Sampling	18
E. Analysis of the Adult Data	19
F. Adult Focus Groups	24
IV. Results of Adult Data Analysis	25
A. Overview	25
B. Self-Reported Evaluation of Programs	26
C. Political Participation	28
D. Civic Competence	38
E. Democratic Values	43
F. The Impact of Participatory Methods	52
V. Recommendations For Adult Civic Education Program Design	54
VI. Study of School-Based Programs	58
A. Programs Studied	58
B. Study Methodology	60
C. Results	65
VII. How to Evaluate Civic Education Programs	87
A. Measuring Impact: Pre/Post Test or Treatment/Control?	87
B. Adapting the Questionnaires	89

Annexes

- A. Adult Questionnaires (for Dominican Republic and Poland)
- B. School Questionnaires (for Dominican Republic and Poland)
 - Student
 - Teacher
 - Director
- C. Focus Group Guides (Poland only)
 - Adult
 - Student
- D. Bibliography

Executive Summary

In 1994 the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) spent over \$23 million on civic education programs as part of its efforts to support democracy. If we were to include projects that can be considered civic education, but are not tracked by the Agency as such, voter education campaigns and information dissemination for example, this number would be considerably greater. Evaluations of the direct impact of civic education programs on target populations have been few, however.

This study therefore has two goals:

- 1) Provide empirically grounded recommendations and guidance on when and how civic education can best be used to meet strategic goals of democracy programs in terms of design, implementation, methods, and target populations; and
- 2) Produce and validate a practical assessment tool to measure the impact of civic education for USAID operating units and implementing partners.

The study examines three basic questions: Does civic education affect people's democratic orientations? If so, in what ways? And under what conditions are civic education programs most effective? In order to better target, design, implement and measure the impact of civic education programs, we need to answer these questions first. This report attempts to do that by assessing civic education programs conducted over the past several years in two countries, the Dominican Republic and Poland.

Democratic civic education typically seeks to provide citizens with the knowledge, skills and values necessary to promote reform, build a civic culture and increase participation. Consequently, the study looked for impact in the following areas: civic competence (knowledge, skills, and a sense of political efficacy); democratic values (including tolerance, support for political rights, support for democratic liberty over social order, system support, and social capital and trust); and participation (in a range of political activities for adults, or a range of school and extracurricular activities for students). The study controlled for income, education, age, and sex. It also controlled for rural/urban location, previous political interest, and media exposure -- factors outside civic education that are associated with political socialization. Given that one goal of the study was to compare programs for impact and to derive implementation and programming recommendations from these comparisons, the study examined differences between programs with regard to content, methodology, intensity, and time since treatment.

The primary method used in the study was surveys, with questionnaires reflecting the areas of impact and other factors listed above. In both Poland and the Dominican Republic, the survey questionnaire was given to a representative sample of individuals that had participated in the civic education programs under study (a treatment group) and a representative sample of individuals that had not participated (a control group). Large samples, and a complex sampling design, enabled a thorough analysis of the relationships between the dependent variables, civic education programs, and demographic and other factors. In all, the study examined eight separate adult, informal programs in the two countries, four in the Dominican Republic and four in Poland, and four separate school-based student programs, two in the Dominican Republic and two in Poland.

The results of our analysis of the civic education programs studied are varied and complex. Several clear patterns emerge from the adult data, however, with regard to the impact of both civic education in general and the specific programs.

- Generally, the civic education programs studied demonstrated the greatest impact on the level of participation.
- Increased levels of participation are strongly related to the presence of channels of and opportunities for participation.
- Analysis of results revealed notable fade-out effects of civic education on participation over time.
- Increased participation does not appear to be directly associated with increases in civic competence and/or democratic values.
- The effects of civic education on civic competence were mixed.
- The immediate impact of civic education on democratic values was inconsistent and generally small in magnitude.
- In some domains, civic education programs had different effects on men and women, with women usually gaining less overall.

Generally, these results indicate that civic education may not have as broad an impact on the democratic attributes of individuals as is often expected. What then do these results mean in terms of the design and implementation of civic education programs? Based on its findings, the report proposes the following recommendations:

- If the goal of civic education is to increase democratic political participation, the surest way to do so in the short term is to build acts of political participation, such as meetings with local officials, directly into the civic education program.
- In implementing civic education, designers and programmers need to emphasize the creation or provision of channels of participation or working through existing networks to promote participation.
- Civic education programs should focus on themes that are immediately relevant to people's daily lives.
- Donors and civic education implementors need to be aware of the negative effect of time on participation and to consider how to address it.
- If a program seeks specifically to mobilize women, program designers need to look at the deeper and broader barriers to women's participation. Generally, programmers should have modest expectations for civic education "compensating" for disadvantages among target groups, at least if all other environmental factors remain unchanged.

- Civic education programs should include a heavy dose of participatory methods, such as simulations and role-playing, in their implementation.
- Donors and civic education implementors need to be cautious about the extent to which they can affect democratic values in the short term.
- Donors should require that civic education programs include an impact monitoring plan. The use of quantitative methods is strongly recommended. The final section of this report provides information on how the study can be replicated or adapted.

Analysis of the student data indicated that the four programs studied had rather limited, and varied, impact:

- In Poland, modest positive effects were found in a number of areas, including participation in school clubs and in discussions of politics at home, general knowledge, and belief in the right of dissent.
- The programs studied in Poland had a modest negative effect on trust in others.
- In the Dominican Republic no significant differences between treatment and control students attributable to treatment were found in any area.
- Data from the Dominican Republic does indicate that the two programs studied, both of which aimed to establish student governments and to encourage student participation in these governments, were reasonably successful in their aims.
- The extent of program implementation in both countries varied highly: differences between control schools and treatment schools in civics course content and teaching methods were not uniformly large.
- Factors other than civic education were consistently better predictors of differences between students in civic competence, values and behavior. Family and school environment, in particular, were more important.

These findings regarding formal civics education point above all to:

- Just reforming civics classes or curricula in a school may not be enough. Donors need to look at working at the broader level of school environment beyond just civics reform.
- Bring parents into civics activities or school activities, and stress the importance of the family environment in reinforcing or canceling out civic attitudes.
- School activities, such as student government and more extra-curricular activities, can be effective means to increase student participation--even beyond civics courses.
- Affecting changes in girls and in students from lower income families may require a special effort.

- Follow implementation, and ensure that the methods, curricula, and design proposed are fully carried out in the classroom.
- Be aware of the difficulty of effectively implementing a broad-based curriculum reform program. Consider carefully the possible trade-off between breadth of impact/numbers of teachers trained, and depth of impact.
- Build assessment into the program.

I. Overview of Study

A. Purposes of the Study

The purpose of this study is to examine three basic questions: Does civic education affect people's democratic orientations? If so, in what ways? And under what conditions are civic education programs most effective? In order to better target, design, implement and measure the impact of civic education programs, we need to answer these questions first. This report attempts to do that by assessing civic education programs conducted over the past several years in two countries, the Dominican Republic and Poland.

In 1994 the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) spent over \$23 million on civic education programs as part of its efforts to support democracy. If we were to include projects that can be considered civic education, but are not tracked by the Agency as such, voter education campaigns and information dissemination for example, this number would be considerably greater.

Surprisingly, in spite of the amount of money USAID has invested in this area, little effort has been made to assess the impact of these programs on target populations. Most of the evaluations of civic education have looked at implementation and management issues: numbers of people trained, quality of teachers, quality of materials, etc. The team identified only one effort to measure the fundamental issue: did civic education affect the individuals who were trained in a significant way?¹

Some argue that the effects of democratic civic education are long-term and diffuse, and therefore that the impact of democratic civic education is difficult to evaluate. It is our contention that it can — and should — be measured. The argument for supporting democratic civic education is that it will provide citizens with the knowledge, skills and attitudes necessary to promote reform, build a civic culture, and increase participation. Crucial to this argument is the assumption that civic education will first affect the individual so that he or she will think and act differently. This study posits that if the primary goal of civic education is to foster democratic citizens by changing the knowledge, skills, attitudes and, ultimately, behavior of participants, we should expect — at least on some of these dimensions — measurable changes in the short term. We should expect, as a result of civic education, citizens to know more about their political system, feel more civically competent, and participate more.

To be sure, capturing discrete and subtle changes in areas such as skills and attitudes is difficult. But it is not impossible. A long line of social science research, particularly in political science, has devoted itself to measuring aspects of citizenship (knowledge, attitudes, skills, and behavior). Over the past decades this research has expanded and refined our capacity to test for and measure these characteristics.

It is also argued that the impact of civic education NGOs lies in these NGOs' broader social and institutional functions. As this argument goes, civil society groups that engage in civic

¹During the course of this study, USAID/Zambia commissioned an evaluation of civic education activities there. This study is being conducted by Michigan State University. Reference: Bowser, Georgia, Joseph Temba, Philip Alderfer, and Michael Bratton. "The Impact of Civic Education on the Knowledge, Values and Actions of Zambian Citizens." A research report prepared for USAID/Zambia, February 1997.

education are important for their existence as organizations, generating dialogue and opening up political space in society. This may be true, but it confuses the impact of the activities that civic education groups engage in (and receive funding for) with the benefits of having a civil society. While civic education NGOs may be important as organizations, what we look at in this study is the primary objective of civic education programs: instilling democratic values and behavior in those they train.

Given how much is invested in civic education, measurement of the impact of programs is essential. As USAID and other donors have moved to results-based reporting, and performance-based budgeting, civic education has proven to be particularly difficult to measure. USAID does monitor the civic education activities it funds, primarily at the output level. USAID has also conducted special studies or evaluations that have included civic education. But previous quantitative studies of civic education programs have typically focused on numbers of people trained, telling us little about how it affected them and ignoring issues of quality versus quantity; and qualitative studies have drawn conclusions based on limited observations — anecdotal evidence or case studies. While good background, these studies do not give us an idea of the scope of the impact.

Questions of what themes have the greatest impact, which target groups respond better to civic education, and what social and institutional factors contribute to increasing participation can only be answered definitively by rigorously evaluating program impact. Thus, this study is intended to provide statistically valid research that can assist project design and program evaluation.

In sum, this study has two goals:

- 1) Provide empirically-grounded recommendations and guidance on when and how civic education can best be used to meet strategic goals of democracy programs in terms of design, implementation, methods, and target populations; and
- 2) Produce and validate a practical assessment tool to measure the impact of civic education for use by USAID operating units and implementing partners.

As with any program assessment, there is the possibility that what is revealed differs from program expectations. Nevertheless, understanding the extent of programs' success in achieving their stated goals is critical to designing more effective strategies and programs and managing for results.

B. Scope and Execution of the Study

This project looked at two types of programs in Poland and the Dominican Republic. In both countries we examined a set of programs aimed at adults and a set of in-school programs aimed at children. We refer to the former, adult programs as “informal” programs because they are often implemented through non-governmental organizations (NGOs). We refer to the latter, in-school adult programs as “formal” programs because they are implemented through the formal school system. These sorts of programs are what we typically consider “civics” classes. In all, the study examined eight separate adult, informal programs in the two countries, four in the Dominican Republic and four in Poland, and four separate school-based student programs, two in

the Dominican Republic and two in Poland.

The study was conducted by a core team of four people. The team leader, Christopher Sabatini, was an American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) Fellow working in USAID Global Bureau's Center for Democracy and Governance (G/DG) from 1995 to 1997. Christopher Sabatini is now the Senior Program Officer for Latin America and the Caribbean at the National Endowment for Democracy. The other three team members were contracted by Management Systems International (MSI) through a G/DG contract with the firm. The other team members were:

- Gwendolyn Bevis, an independent consultant specializing in democracy and governance, with particular experience in Asia and with legal awareness/advocacy programs;
- Steven Finkel, a professor of political science at the University of Virginia who specializes in survey design and data analysis, and in research questions relating to political participation and democratic values; and
- Diana Gonzalez, an independent consultant specializing in education, with particular expertise in Latin America.

MSI also contracted two specialists in survey research among children in Poland, Barbara Frączak-Rudnicka and Anna Wilkomirska.

At important junctures in the study — in the design phase, after preliminary analysis of results, and when the synthesis paper was in draft — the team solicited the input of a Working Group composed of USAID Democracy Officers and representatives of partner organizations concerned with civic education.

The project lasted from October 1996 to February 1998. The study and the final report were wholly supported with funds provided by the USAID Global Bureau's Center for Democracy and Governance (G/DG).

C. Outline of the Report

This report has six main sections. Section II, which follows, provides the background of the study. It defines civic education and provides a typology of civic education activities based on content and method. These divisions become important when we later compare the impact of specific programs, because we use these categories to make distinctions between the programs. This section also provides background on the specific adult civic education programs examined in the Dominican Republic and Poland. Section III reviews the research methods used. It outlines the research agenda and explains the survey questionnaire that was used with adults in the field, the sampling methods, and the focus groups. Section IV describes the team's analysis of the survey and focus group results for adults from both countries. Section V provides recommendations, based on the adult study, concerning civic education programming — content, methodology, target groups, and strategy. Section VI covers the student study, including design, implementation, results and recommendations. Section VII provides guidance on how USAID and other donors and partners can measure the impact of their own civic education programs, including variations by cost and complexity. Last, the report includes a series of annexes that provide detailed information

about the different elements of the study.

II. Civic Education Programs

A. Definition

The term civic education has come to include a number of disparate activities — from mass media campaigns to student exchanges. Before embarking on the study of democratic civic education, the team's first task was to define it. The definition serves to limit the field of inquiry, as well as provide the basis for further distinction among the programs that make up democratic civic education.

The *International Encyclopedia of Education* defines civic education in the following way:

Civic education is broadly concerned with development of citizenship or civic competence by conveying the unique meaning, obligation, and virtue of citizenship in a particular society or the acquisition of values, dispositions, and skills appropriate to that society. (2nd ed., Vol. 7, p. 767)

We can further qualify this by specifying that *democratic* civic education seeks to develop citizens in a democratic society — as distinct from other societies. Thus, democratic civic education typically seeks to convey a specific set of values thought to be essential to democratic citizenship: values such as tolerance, trust, and compromise. And, just as many conceptions of democracy emphasize the expectation that the democratic citizen will be active in politics, democratic civic education often seeks to instill the skills, dispositions and values necessary for a *participatory citizen*.

In sum, what we define as democratic civic education — and what will be the focus of this study — are those programs that explicitly seek to convey democratic values and/or promote the knowledge, skills and values necessary for democratic participation. This definition captures the broad array of USAID-funded formal and informal democratic civic education programs. To be sure, not all USAID-funded democratic civic education programs seek to promote all of these aspects of democratic citizenship. But all democratic civic education programs are in some way concerned with the transmission of knowledge, skills and values to develop democratic citizens.

B. Content

We can make further distinctions within the category of democratic civic education — distinctions that will be necessary to understand and compare civic education programs. Two main differences divide democratic civic education programs: the content of the program and the methods used.

At a general level the content distinction turns on whether the activity seeks to build participation indirectly by instilling relevant knowledge, skills and attitudes in participants, or to build participation directly by mobilizing people to participate immediately. With this in mind, democratic civic education programs can be grouped in this way:

- **Formal Civics Education:** Incorporated into the formal school system, these programs often weave teaching about democratic institutions, principles and practices into courses that emphasize national identity and unity.

- **General Civic Knowledge, Values, and Skills:** Often informal courses, these programs seek to increase knowledge of democratic principles and a country's democratic institutions and practices. They promote such democratic values as compromise and tolerance. They may also teach skills in a limited fashion. The emphasis is on workshop learning, with the idea being that the transfer of basic knowledge, values and skills will translate into participation outside of the classroom. It is based on the idea that there is a basic set of attitudinal and knowledge-based prerequisites to participation.
- **Issue-Based or Rights Knowledge:** Usually informal courses, these seek to raise awareness of particular political issues, and to increase knowledge of democratic, political, and human rights. They may also teach skills useful for addressing the issues at hand. Trainees may be encouraged to participate, but actual participation is not necessarily an element of the program. Issue-based programs deal with issues such as corruption. Rights programs are typically focused on groups whose rights are seen to be unfairly limited, i.e. women, certain ethnic groups, the economically underprivileged.
- **Voter Education:** These programs educate citizens on how to register and vote, and promote the sense of civic duty to vote, monitor the elections, and respect the outcomes.
- **Civil Society Creation/Mobilization:** These programs seek to mobilize citizens and build a constituency for civil society. In the classroom the emphasis is on issue awareness and conveying knowledge of the political system and rights. Civic education in these cases is used as a means to generate participation in a particular civil society organization, to build and mobilize membership.
- **Community/Group Problem-Solving:** These seek to promote knowledge and skills for the exercise of rights and the use of democratic processes/institutions for specified purposes. This can include, for example, programs in local communities to increase participation in local government or efforts to develop local community groups' ability to address community issues. Participation is immediate and focused. Classroom work may be limited.

Often, one democratic civic education program may cross several of these categories. For example, a community/group problem-solving activity may also involve educating citizens on their rights and responsibilities. But the focus here is on the role of participation in the training. Does the program seek first to instill democratic values and/or a set of skills? Or does it immediately mobilize participants? Does it concentrate on exhorting participation in the future, or does it provide structures for participation in the near-term?

C. Methods

The methods employed in addressing these objectives and conveying content vary, and we can make further distinctions between civic education programs on this basis. The broad distinction is between passive and active teaching methods, i.e. between those that present information and those that involve participants as a part of the training. This distinction cuts across the content/objective category of programs: a variety of methods can be employed in different programs with the same objective. Typically, methods fall into the following categories:

- Lectures: These may be to large audiences or small, on particular topics/occasions — such as introducing participants to new legislation — or as a regular part of civics classroom teaching.
- Small group work: More interactive than lectures, this will emphasize discussion, and may involve building skills in problem-solving, analysis, team-work, and the like.
- Forums: Also more interactive, these typically revolve around larger group discussions of particular themes. These often represent a later stage of training in which trainees interact with local government officials, for example.
- Dramatizations: These are plays on civic issues that are watched by trainees.
- Simulations/role-playing: Trainees enact political situations in which they might find themselves, such as negotiating with a local government official.
- Training of Intermediaries: This can involve the training of trainers to carry out grass roots education activities, as well as the training of citizen election observation teams.
- Community Organizing: Activities in this category focus on mobilizing the community towards a particular goal, such as promoting open town halls in local government, or carrying out particular community development projects.
- Materials Distribution: Typically the activity centers around the distribution of information, such as pamphlets, comic books, etc.
- Mass Media: This involves the primary use of television, radio or the print media to convey the desired message.

Again, methods often overlap. Events like dramatizations, forums and lectures often involve the distribution of materials. Community organizing activities can involve forums. Nevertheless, such distinctions will enable us measure the extent to which the use of participatory training methods affects impact.

An additional important consideration related to methods is the intensity of training — its duration and repetition. Programs vary in the number of sessions (classes or meetings) held. A particular variation is training of trainers. We can hypothesize that the training of trainers will be relatively more intense than the training provided to others by the "core" trainees.

D. Adult Programs Studied

1. Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic was chosen as our first case study country for a number of reasons. The primary one was the scope of the USAID Mission's civil society program. Under both the civil society program and elections support for the 1996 elections, the Mission has worked primarily with local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) rather than with international NGOs.

According to the Mission, over 40 percent of the grants provided under its civil society program have gone to supporting local democratic civic education efforts. In addition, for the 1996 elections the Mission worked strictly through local NGOs and was instrumental in creating an umbrella NGO. These NGOs engaged in comprehensive voter education programs whose activities included forming groups of citizen monitoring teams to observe the election. The scope of democratic civic education programs allowed the team to examine a variety of different activities and their impacts. Moreover, since the most recent USAID Civic Education program has been in effect since 1992, we were able to compare the effect of different programs over time.

Two other factors influenced the selection of the Dominican Republic as the first country case study. First, for comparison purposes the previous regime was a fitting case. Coming out of a period of semi-authoritarianism, the Dominican Republic was closer in terms of its political history to a number of cases in Latin America and to the Philippines. Second, the relatively small size of the Dominican Republic eased data collection for this first study.

The team used two criteria to select projects to study. First, we wanted a broad variety of programs in terms of both objectives and methods so as to allow for comparisons. Second, the group that implemented the activity had to have participant lists so that participants could be located for the survey. The following is a brief description in terms of content and methods of the types of programs that the team studied in the Dominican Republic:

Participación Ciudadana (PC): PC is a national NGO that, for the 1996 presidential elections, created another group, called La Red de los Observadores Electorales, to train youth and adults to serve as election observers in 1996. The project first trained a group of core community leaders (in Santo Domingo). These leaders then returned to their communities and recruited new members of PC whom they also trained. Training included general democratic values education as well as instruction in elections monitoring, mostly through seminars and materials distribution. For the 1996 elections, PC trainees were selected to serve as election observers in the Red and to help in the quick count. This program ran from 1995 to mid-1996. PC activities continued into 1997, still focused on elections. This program may be classified as both voter education and civil society creation/mobilization. We call this program "PC" because the Red de los Observadores Electorales group was organized under the auspices of PC, and there were some participants in the sample (14%) who were exposed to PC and Red training sessions but did not eventually work as election observers.

Grupo Accion por la Democracia (GAD): A civil society creation/mobilization program, GAD implemented a two-step civic education program. The first phase educated people on basic rights and obligations in a democracy, primarily through a lecture format. The second phase brought these people together to hold a series of national and local issues fora to discuss problems and solutions in the areas of justice, health, education, etc. The two phases were intended to create a national NGO with a network of local branches outside of Santo Domingo and to mobilize citizens to participate in these new structures. The civic education phase ran from November 1995 to October 1996, with the "national agenda" phase extending until December 1996.

Asociación Dominicana para el Desarrollo de la Mujer (ADOPEM): ADOPEM is a local women's NGO that trained women community leaders in women's rights, democratic values, democracy in the family, and self-esteem, using a classroom/workshop format and emphasizing knowledge. This program ran from January 1996 to January 1997. It is primarily a rights knowledge program, although it also sought to instill general democratic values.

Radio Santa María (RSM): A general civic knowledge, values and skills program, this project, through a central NGO affiliated with Radio Santa Maria, trained intermediaries (typically leaders of rural towns) who then conducted civic education in their local communities. The subject matter focused on civic knowledge and values, such as rights and duties in a democracy, the importance of participation, and democracy in the family. For the direct participants (trainers) the program used materials distribution, lectures, forums and dramatizations; for indirect participants the program relied on lectures and materials distribution. RSM ran two consecutive projects, from 1994 to 1995 and from 1995 to December 1996.

2. Poland

Poland was selected as a contrast to the Dominican Republic. As a post-Communist country, civic education efforts would presumably face a somewhat different set of conditions, such as distrust of neighbors (due to the tradition of assigned housing). At the same time, the team understood Poland to have a range of programs that could be considered civic education, funded by USAID, USIA and other donors.

The team identified four programs that reflect interesting differences in objectives and implementation approaches. Note that a key criterion for selection is the presence of lists. However, in the first three projects described below (FSLD, Dialog and Lublin) the NGOs only maintained lists of the leaders who participated; community members who participated were not recorded on lists. We were able to interview the latter type of participants using a survey technique known as "snowball" sampling, which we describe in Section III.D.

Three of the projects are concerned with community problem-solving and encouraging cooperation among citizens and government, a popular approach to democratic development in Eastern Europe and countries of the former Soviet Union. Very generally speaking, they follow a similar pattern: problem identification, meetings for residents, identification of "leaders", the formation of (informal or formal) groups of community members, and efforts to solve the problem.

Foundation for Support of Local Democracy (FSLD): FSLD's mission is to promote local self-governance, primarily through training for local government officials. The Civic Participation Project, a community/group problem-solving project, was implemented in 22 relatively small towns, beginning in 1994 and ending in 1995. The objective was to "enhance civic education and encourage citizens to act for the benefit of their local communities." After initial surveys of barriers to participation and local problems, FSLD chose project leaders in each site. They received training in practical knowledge and skills necessary for participation, such as team building, negotiation, and how government works. These "leaders" then brought together citizens in their communities (informally or in formal groups) to work on solving particular local problems.

Dialog Project (also run by FSLD centers): A community/group problem-solving project, the Dialog program was implemented in seven large towns, beginning in the first site in 1991, with the most recent site becoming active in 1995. The objectives are to encourage the activity of citizens and increase their influence on local issues, and to encourage cooperation among citizens and local government. Dialog staff identified a key problem in each site, for example, public safety, and conducted information campaigns on the problem. Dialog then invited citizens and government officials to workshops dealing with the issue. These workshops also taught such skills as team building, communication, and working with government, and included such techniques as

role-playing. "Leaders" who emerged from these workshops then returned to their communities to organize citizen groups to deal with the problem.

Lublin Neighborhood Revitalization Program: A community/group problem-solving project begun in 1991, the Lublin Neighborhood Revitalization Program is on-going in two lower-income neighborhoods in Lublin. The objective is to engage residents in the rehabilitation and development of their neighborhoods and to build a working relationship between residents and city officials, and thus to build a sense of responsibility and trust. The city provides significant funding for infrastructure improvement, but citizens must set priorities and contribute to the renovations. Regularly scheduled public meetings were held (but not training *per se*), and motivated residents along each street became contact persons, organizers and representatives to link residents with the city as planning and rehabilitation proceeded.

Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights — Human Rights School: A rights knowledge program, this 240 hour, six-month course covers such topics as the content of Polish law and the structure of Polish legal institutions, the philosophy of human rights, and details on particular rights. Helsinki presents a contrast to the above three programs in several respects: a) it targets elites — the minimum criterion for admission is a university degree; participants are lawyers, doctors, teachers, prison officials, police officials, etc.; b) it encourages trainees to pass on what they've learned in their local or professional communities but does not specify how or include skills training in teaching, etc. (except in an optional workshop); and c) it relies primarily on lectures, rather than the group work and simulations employed (at least occasionally) in the meetings of the community problem-solving programs described above. It was initiated around 1992.

III. Study Methodology

A. The Research Model²

As outlined above, democratic civic education concentrates on either one or a combination of the following areas: knowledge, skills, political efficacy, values, and participation. Not coincidentally, these also form the set of characteristics that a long line of social science research has argued characterize democratic citizenship (see Box 1).

1. Civic Competence

“Civic competence” refers to a set of traits that characterize a participatory democratic citizen: knowledge, skills, and a sense of political efficacy.

a) *Knowledge*: At the most basic level, most democratic civic education programs seek to increase citizen's knowledge of the political system as a means to empower them. Democratic civic education typically seeks to increase participants' knowledge of basic democratic rights, how democracy works, the structure of his/her political system, the role of the individual in a democratic society, and basic information about political parties and incumbent politicians. Sometimes, more focused civic education will concentrate on increasing knowledge about specific issues such as corruption or women's rights.

b) *Skills*: Projects can seek to enhance skills necessary to participate either directly, as in programs that teach skills, or indirectly through civil society mobilization activities. Skills such as public speaking, problem-solving, critical thinking, group mobilization, and working with others, are often an important part of these democratic civic education programs.

c) *Efficacy*: Democratic civic education programs seek to "empower" citizens to exercise their rights or, in political science terms, to instill a sense of efficacy. Democratic civic education programs attempt to transmit efficacy in two ways: indirectly through classroom or workshop teaching (in knowledge-oriented programs) or directly through organizing and mobilizing people to participate (in civil society mobilization or community problem solving programs). The assumption in the latter case is that participation will build people's sense of political efficacy. Efficacy is the key link between knowledge and sustained participation. It is the sense that citizens feel they can, collectively or individually, do something to improve their condition and that the system should respond.

2. Democratic Values

Democratic civic education also tries to inculcate values, either directly or indirectly. Since Tocqueville scholars have argued that democratic values are essential elements of a democratic society. Typically these values include:

a) *Tolerance*: How much citizens are willing to tolerate opposing opinions and accord procedural democratic liberties, such as the rights of free speech and association, to others is critical to maintaining peaceful political competition. Some scholars assert that tolerance is the fundamental value necessary for the successful operation of a political democracy.

²Modifications of the model made for the student study are noted in Section VI.

b) *Support for Political Rights*: Similarly, how much citizens are willing to support basic democratic rights is essential for a democracy. Scholars have developed the notion of "rights consciousness" (Gibson, 1992) to capture the extent to which citizens endorse the extension of democratic liberties unconditionally, or believe these rights should be applied only in certain situations. Examples are the right of individuals to criticize the government, the right to vote and the right to organize groups to ask the government to change laws.

c) *Support for Democratic Liberty versus Social Order*: Support for democracy entails acceptance of some uncertainty over the outcomes of participatory political processes. Ultimately, the survival of a democracy may hinge on the support citizens give it under the assaults it may endure. In moments of crisis, will citizens support an authoritarian solution or will they stand by democracy?

d) *System Support*: More than supporting democracy in the abstract, citizens must also support the basic institutions of a democracy, including the judiciary and legislature. They should believe that the basic rights of citizens are well protected by the system, and that politicians as a class are governing in the best interests of all the people.

e) *Social Capital and Trust*: Use of the term social capital to describe inter-personal trust has gained currency recently with a series of studies spawned by Robert Putnam, but scholars since Tocqueville have argued that trust among citizens is a critical underpinning of democracy. Trust shapes the extent to which citizens are willing to cooperate with one another, tolerate opposition, and ultimately agree to live with the uncertainty of the democratic system.

3. Participation

All democratic civic education is ultimately about promoting behavior change. Typically this means that participants will, over the long term, be more democratically engaged and will participate in the system.³ Sometimes programs also focus on more passive forms of democratic behavior, such as interest in discussing and following politics.

4. A Causal Model of Civic Education

The relationship between civic competence, values and participation is borne out by research on public attitudes and democracy. Numerous studies have demonstrated that individuals who are more knowledgeable about the political system, possess basic skills that enable them to participate, feel more efficacious, and hold democratic values, are those who are more likely to participate (see Box 2).

The question is, does democratic civic education have an impact on these characteristics of democratic citizenship?

First, does civic education build civic competence? Do those who have been exposed to civic education know more about the political system and their rights? Do they possess more civic skills? Do they have a greater sense of efficacy?

Second, to what extent does democratic civic education affect values? Are those who have

³ Verba, Nie and Kim (1978) define political participation as "legal acts by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of government personnel and/or actions they take."

been exposed to civic education more tolerant? Do they support democracy? Do they trust the current institutions? And do they trust their fellow citizens more?

Third, do they participate more?

Finally, what are the relationships between civic competence, values and participation? For example, is increasing knowledge sufficient to promote participation? Can participation be increased on a sustainable basis without changes in civic competence and/or values?

The assumptions underlying civic education can be easily displayed in a simple model. Figure 1 outlines the basic causal assumptions of democratic civic education programming. Democratic civic education programs either seek to affect knowledge, skills and efficacy sufficiently to affect participation or they seek to increase participation directly. This research project then, seeks to test these links, namely (a), (b), and (c).

5. Additional Variables

Vital to this model are the additional variables the analysis will control for and take into account. These factors are listed in the two boxes at the bottom of Figure 1. Controlling for these factors serves two functions. First, the body of research on civic competence and democratic values has demonstrated a strong relationship between socioeconomic status and the other factors listed to the right (our "dependent variables" — knowledge, skills, efficacy, values and participation) (see Box 2). Those who are more likely to be civically competent (know more about the political system, possess civic skills, feel efficacious), possess democratic values, and participate, are predominately in upper socioeconomic brackets; they tend to have higher levels of formal education, and they tend to have a higher median income than the rest of the population. Gender and place of residence (rural or urban setting) have also been shown to affect participation rates. Thus, one of the questions that this study had to explore is whether civic education can sufficiently overcome the typical educational, income, age, gender, and regional barriers to civic competence and participation.

Second, we discovered in the course of analyzing the data that these factors were, for the most part, also related to the likelihood that an individual would participate in a civic education program. Most of the programs we studied did not draw from all strata of the population. Instead, in most of the civic education programs studied, the participants tended to have higher levels of education and income than the national average. Because socioeconomic factors may also be related to **why** a respondent would be exposed to civic education, we needed to determine whether the effects of civic education existed over and above socioeconomic status.

For these reasons, in the data analysis the study controlled for a number of factors typically seen to influence civic competence, democratic values, and participation:

- income;
- education;
- age;
- sex;
- rural/urban;
- previous political interest; and

- media exposure.

The latter two allowed the team to control for factors of political socialization outside of civic education that may affect the "dependent variables" of knowledge, values, etc.

In addition, in its early field research the team discovered that in the case of the Dominican Republic and Poland, many of the adult programs used existing networks in civil society to recruit participants into civic education activities. This again raised the problem of self-selection. For that reason, we needed to be able to control for people's previous participation in civil society, to be sure that the effects found were the result of civic education and not of participation in civil society before the program. To address this, in both countries we also controlled for membership in a wide variety of voluntary associations, such as peasant associations, community groups, unions, church groups and the like.

Last, as explained above, one goal of the study was to compare programs for impact and to derive implementation and programming recommendations from these comparisons. For this, we also needed to take into account differences between programs when analyzing the data. The lower right box in Figure 1 lists these factors:

- Program methodology: Were interactive methods used in teaching? Was there tolerance of differing opinions in the workshops? Were participants encouraged to participate?
- Time since treatment: When was the last time the participant attended a civic education activity by the specific organization?

B. Overview of Research Methods

To measure the impact of civic education and explore the reasons underlying results, the team used a combination of quantitative and qualitative research methods. We provide an overview of our assessment methods here; details on more technical methodological issues can be found in the Methodological Appendix (Annex X).

Literature Review and Preliminary Interviews: Team members performed an extensive review of the literature at the outset of the study. They also interviewed representatives of key organizations funding or implementing civic education regarding these organizations' goals and activities.

Preliminary Field Work: For each country a team member made at least one visit to the country to identify and characterize the projects to be studied, by content, focus, intended goals, and teaching methods, and to collect other qualitative background information. The team made a total of four individual visits to the Dominican Republic to select the programs to study, research each program in depth, and identify and brief the local polling firm. In Poland, the team made one visit to study the programs and hired two consultants in-country to assist with information gathering and oversight of the surveys and focus groups.

Surveys: For each program the team conducted surveys of comparable treatment and control groups. The questionnaires used, the sampling, and the data analysis processes are described below.

Focus Groups: To provide more qualitative background information, the team also arranged for focus groups with representatives from each of the programs studied. These were conducted in Poland after the data analysis to explore issues raised in the quantitative analysis in more depth. Delays in polling in the Dominican Republic prevented the holding of focus groups there.

C. Adult Survey Instruments

Through a long line of research on political attitudes and behavior, survey methods have advanced to the extent that we can now test the qualities described above (see Box 3). Numerous studies have measured citizen knowledge, skills, efficacy, levels — as well as modes — of participation, and a variety of democratic values, including tolerance, system support, and social trust. In addition, recent survey research has developed a new method to test skills, relying on respondents' self assessment of how they perform a variety of civic tasks. Recent research on democratic culture has also tested new ways of measuring support for political rights and social capital. The team drew largely from this body of research and survey methods in designing the questionnaire to be used for this study and in analyzing the data from the surveys. We also created questions to address particular aspects of the programs studied.

The questionnaire sections correspond to the areas in which we would expect to find differences between program participants and non-participants (the dependent variables). The adult questionnaire was divided into six sections each with a subset of questions:

1. Civic Competence:
 - knowledge of political figures, institutions and processes;
 - knowledge of rights;
 - self assessment of democratic skills; and
 - efficacy.
2. Democratic Values:
 - tolerance;
 - support for political rights (rights consciousness).
 - support for democratic liberty; and
 - support for women's participation.
3. Social Capital and Institutional Trust:
 - system support;
 - social capital (inter-social trust); and
 - institutional support.
4. Participation:
 - levels of participation, in such activities as voting, campaign work, campaign contributions, contacting local and/or national officials, attending meetings and demonstrations, serving as volunteers on government boards, and working on community problem-solving/development activities.
5. Program Implementation:

To measure differences in program methods and the exposure of the respondent to civic education, the adult questionnaire also included modules for each of the civic education programs, asking about:

- the teaching methodology;
- when the respondent took part;
- how the respondent felt it affected him/her and how much he or she learned;
- and
- how satisfied the respondent was with the program.

These questions get at how participatory the methods used were, how intensive training was, the time elapsed since training, and self-reported impact.

6. Demographics:

Finally, the adult questionnaire includes questions on the key characteristics we needed to control for. It ends with a section covering income, education, sex and place of residence and other demographic factors. The adult questionnaire also includes questions on the other accepted predictors of participation — political interest and media exposure, and a battery of questions on group membership.

(See Annex A for the complete questionnaires.)

After a basic questionnaire was written, the team adapted it for conditions and programs in the Dominican Republic and Poland. In particular, knowledge questions and the modules on the programs were tailored to each country. Translations of these specialized versions of the questionnaire were then pre-tested and further refined in each country.

D. Adult Sampling

In both Poland and the Dominican Republic, the adult survey questionnaire was given to a representative sample of individuals that had participated in the civic education programs under study (**a treatment group**) and a representative sample of individuals that had not participated (**a control group**). Over 1800 adults in each country were interviewed altogether, and these large sample sizes enabled us to produce reliable statistical estimates of the differences between participants and non-participants for all eight programs that were selected for analysis. We discuss the advantages and disadvantages of our procedures and of alternative methods of assessing treatment effects Section VII of this report. Time and cost limitations prevented the group from doing a pre- and post-test evaluation of participants.

To conduct the surveys, MSI sub-contracted polling firms in both countries. In the Dominican Republic, the sampling and surveys were conducted by the *Instituto de Estudios de Población y Desarrollo* (IEPD), the statistical office affiliated with PROFAMILIA. In Poland, the sampling and surveys were conducted by *Ośrodek Badania Opinii Publicznej* (OBOP), a commercial polling firm. The G/DG-MSI team provided guidelines to the in-country polling firms concerning the sampling methods, and oversaw the translation of the questionnaires and the design of the focus groups. In addition, because of distance, MSI contracted two survey/education specialists in Poland, Anna Wilkomirska and Barbara Frączak-Rudnicka, to work with the polling firm in getting project lists and training interviewers. All of the data analysis was conducted by the

G/DG-MSI team in the United States.

In both countries, adult treatment samples were drawn primarily from the lists of participants provided by the implementing organizations. In four cases, only partial lists were maintained of the leaders or trainers.⁴ In those cases, the survey firms sampled from the lists, then used the "snowball" method to get the names of other individuals that participated in the programs from the original interviewees. For example, to obtain participants from the Polish Dialog program, the leaders were sampled first, and then at the end of the interview every other respondent was asked to provide the name of one participant in his/her group. In the cases where there were more complete lists, the names of respondents were drawn randomly from these lists.

In the Dominican Republic, the total size of the adult treatment group was 1,003. In Poland, the total size of the adult treatment group was 965. Both treatment group samples in the two countries included participants in the eight programs studied (four in each country). See Table 1a&b for a complete breakdown of adult treatment and control in the Dominican Republic and Poland.

The team and the survey firms designed the adult control samples in each country to allow the team to make valid comparisons between groups and sub-groups and to control for different factors. To do this, in both countries we conducted a stratified random national sample. In addition, in the case of more localized or targeted programs, we oversampled in those target populations beyond the national sample. In the Dominican Republic, the control sample totaled 1,034. Of this, 695 was a stratified random sample of the national population, and 339 were oversamples in the four different areas where Radio Santa Maria and the ADOPEM activities were concentrated. In Poland, the control sample totaled 1,073. Of this, 442 was a stratified random sample, with 77 drawn from oversamples of university graduates so that comparison for the Helsinki program could be made, and a 553 person oversample in the regions where the Civic Participation, Dialogue and Lublin projects operated.

E. Analysis of the Adult Data

In conducting the data analysis the team used a variety of measures to test impact and the interaction of the dependent variables with demographic factors and civic education. For each of the variables described above (knowledge, skills, tolerance, participation, etc.), we created a scale that averaged the scores of respondents in the specific treatment group and the control group specific to that project. The scales in each country were generally very high in terms of their measurement reliability; the exact scores can be found in the methodological appendix.

To test the impact of civic education and the relationship of impact to specific factors we followed two steps. First we compared the difference between the means for the treatment group and the means for the control group for each of the measures. The means were then calculated controlling for the various demographic factors listed above in page 14. These differences were then tested for statistical significance in a statistical procedure known as "analysis of covariance" which produces a comparison of means between the groups after adjusting for pre-existing differences

⁴ These groups were: Radio Santa Maria project in the Dominican Republic, and the FSLD, Dialog and Lublin projects in Poland.

Table 1a**DOMINICAN REPUBLIC**

Project Name	Treatment		
	Location	Size	How sampled
Participación Ciudadana	national	250	random, from lists
GAD	national (except Santo Domingo)	247	random, from lists
ADOPEM	La Vega, San Pedro de Macoris, San Cristobal, Herrera, Sabana Perdida	201	random, from lists
Radio Santa Maria (direct) ⁵	La Vega	152	random, from lists
Radio Santa Maria (indirect)	La Vega	153	snowball from RSM- Direct participants
Control			
	Location	Size	How sampled
National		695	random stratified
La Vega		189	random
San Pedro de Macoris		50	random
San Cristobal		50	random
Herrera		50	random
Sabana Perdida		50	random

⁵ As noted earlier, the Radio Santa Maria project was a training of trainers activity. The implementing organization only maintained lists of the "direct" participants or trainers that it trained. After interviewing the "direct" participants, the interviewers would ask for names of "indirect" participants they had trained who would then be interviewed. This second set constitutes the "indirect" respondents.

Table 1b
POLAND

Treatment			
Project Name	Location	Size	How sampled
Foundation in Support of Local Development — Civic Participation Project	23 sites [Kepice, Miastko, Nowy Dwor Gdanski, Paslek, Susz, Morag, Ostroda, Jeziorany, Korsze, Lidzbark Warminski, Chojna, Maszewo, Skwierzyna, Pyrzyce, Belzyce, Krasnystaw, Jozefow, Brzozow, Biecz, Przeworsk, Dobczyce, Zabno, and Mzdowo]	250	leaders: random, from lists (45) participants: snowball (205)
Dialog Project	7 sites [Bialystok, Sopot, Kielce, Opole, Rzeszow, Olecko, Bedzin]	354	leaders: random, from lists (240) participants: snowball (114)
Lublin Neighborhood Revitalization Project	2 neighborhoods in Lublin (Bronowice, Kosminek)	156	leaders: random, from lists (13) participants: snowball (143)
Helsinki Human Rights Foundation	National	205	random, from lists
Control			
	Location	Size	How sampled
	National	443	random stratified
	23 sites of Civic Participation Project	185	random, in each site proportional to size of town
	7 sites of Dialog Project	174	random, in each site proportional to size of town
	Lublin (neighborhoods of Bronowice & Kosminek)	194	random, in each site proportional to size of neighborhood
	National — University graduates to compare with Helsinki sample	77	random (added to the 25 university graduates in the national control sample)

between the groups on other variables.⁶ A statistically significant difference between the means for the treatment and control groups was interpreted as the impact of civic education. The methodological appendix provides more details on these procedures.

Second, to test the relationship between these differences and different characteristics, such as program methodology and time since treatment, we tested the interactions between these factors and the mean scores to see if there was any effect. We examined the mean level of our dependent variable for non-participants and then for participants at different levels of these variables (e.g. those trained less than six months ago and those trained more than six months ago) to determine whether these types of factors had any influence on the impact of civic education programs.

The questions that were used for the scales were drawn from a number of different sources and have been used in numerous social science/survey-based research projects to measure these characteristics. (See Section III.C. and Box 3 above.) The scales that we used were a combination of questions. These were:

- *Political Participation*: The questionnaire asks if respondents participated in a number of political acts in the last year, such as attend a municipal meeting, work in their community to solve a problem, etc. The total number of acts that each respondent participated in was then added up, and a mean score was calculated for treatment and control groups. The list totaled ten different political acts and thus the scale goes from 0-10.
- *Political Knowledge*: The questionnaire asks four questions about the political system. To create the scale, we added up the correct answers for each question (correct answers counting for one and wrong answers counting 0) and calculated the mean scores for treatment and control groups. The scale goes from 0 to 4.
- *Rights Knowledge*: The questionnaire asks four questions about political rights under existing laws or the constitution. We added up the answers (correct answers counting for one and wrong answers counting 0) and calculated the means scores for treatment and control groups. The scale goes from 0-4.
- *Civic Skills*: The questionnaire contains six questions asking the respondent to compare him or herself to others he or she knows in doing things such as solving problems, and communicating ideas. We counted an answer of “better than” as two; an answer of “same as” as one; and “worse than others” as zero. We then added up these scores and divided by six to create a scale from 0-2.
- *Efficacy*: The questionnaire asks three standard questions on efficacy, all asking the respondent to agree or disagree on a four-point scale to a series of questions concerning their views of their influence on the political system. The more efficacious answers were counted as one and the scores for all three questions were added to create a scale from 1-4.
- *Tolerance*: The questionnaire asks nine standard questions to test the respondent’s willingness to extend freedoms of association, participation and speech to different political groups. Answers are on a four-point agree/disagree scale. More tolerant answers were added and

⁶ We assumed that differences that were significant at the .05 level were statistically meaningful, and that the chances of observing such differences in our sample if there no true differences in the overall population were less than 5%.

then averaged for treatment and control. The scale is from 1-4.

- *Women's Participation*: Respondents were asked to react to two questions about the desired level of participation of women in politics. One asked if women should participate in politics more, less or the same as they do now. The other asked whether the man or the woman should have more say in household decisions, or if they should have equal say. The answers were totaled to create a scale of 1-3. Higher scores indicate higher levels of support for women's participation in the political system.
- *Support for Democratic Liberty*: The questionnaire asks two questions concerning the respondent's support for the value of liberty versus social order on a four-point agree/disagree scale. The answers were totaled for a scale of 1-4.
- *System Support*: Respondents were asked four questions regarding the extent to which they support the political system, its institutions and its politicians as a class. Their answers were added together to create a scale of 1-4, with higher scores indicating higher levels of support for the system.
- *Institutional Trust*: Respondents were asked how much they trusted a total of ten institutions, including the legislature, the police, and the church. We created a scale of trust by adding the number of institutions in which the respondent had "complete" trust. The scale runs from 0-10. Higher scores indicate higher levels of institutional trust.
- *Social Trust*: Respondents were asked how much they trust six different categories of people (family, local politicians, etc.) — "a lot," "somewhat," "very little," or "not at all." We created a scale of social trust by adding up the number of groups in which the respondent had "a lot" of trust. The scale goes from 0-6. Higher scores indicate higher levels of social trust.

To measure *time since treatment* we asked if the respondent could recall the last time s/he was involved in a named civic education activity. Answers were in three-months blocks, "1-3 months ago", "4-6 months ago", "7-12 months ago", and "more than a year". To measure the *number of times the respondent was treated*, we asked if s/he recalled "how many" workshops or courses s/he had attended. Answers were "one", "two", "3-5", and "more than 5". To measure the *extent of participatory methods*, we asked trainees to tell us which of the following methods were used in the programs they attended (breaking into small groups, staging plays or dramatizations, playing games, problem-solving, and simulations or role-playing), and whether they had much opportunity to express their own views in the program. The scale ran from 0-6.

As noted above, we controlled for demographic factors, such as sex, level of education, and group membership, and for political interest and media exposure. Exact wordings for all these questions can be found in Annex A.

F. Adult Focus Groups

Focus groups were conducted in Poland after the data analysis was completed. The intent of the focus groups was to fill in the information provided by the surveys — to explain the results and any outstanding questions. Focus groups were conducted for each of the programs studied. The protocol used for Poland is in Annex C. (Delays in polling in the Dominican Republic

prevented us from conducting focus groups there.)

Based on the survey results, the team used the focus groups to explore several questions in particular:

- The reasons behind participants' political participation or lack thereof: opportunities/barriers and levels of interest;
- How civic education related to participants' political participation: relevance of program and material;
- Participants' attitudes toward democracy and the existing regime in their country; and
- The reasons for participants' trust or lack of trust in their fellow citizens.⁷

The findings of the individual focus groups have been woven into the conclusions that follow.

⁷ The last two topics were included based on analysis of the data demonstrating lower levels of system support and social trust for participants in civic education. This finding is discussed in the following section.

IV. Results of Adult Data Analysis

A. Overview

The results of our analysis of the adult civic education programs studied are varied and complex. Several clear patterns emerge, however, with regard to the impact of both civic education in general and the specific programs.

- The civic education programs studied demonstrated consistent effects on participation, and an especially large impact on participation in Poland. These effects varied greatly depending on the content of the programs in both countries.

- Increased levels of participation were strongly related to three factors: 1) The presence of channels of and opportunities for participation was a strong predictor of whether people participated or not. These may be pre-existing group memberships, and/or direct mobilization of civic education trainees by the civic education programs or their implementing organizations usually to work with local governments. 2) Increased participation appears to be related to mobilization around particular goals rather than general democratic norms. 3) Increased participation was also strongly related to programs that promoted more direct participation compared to those that emphasized workshop or classroom-based approaches.

- Analysis of results revealed notable fade-out effects of civic education on participation over time, however. That is, the effect of civic education on participation may not be sustained after the initial exposure.

- Also, increased participation does not appear to be directly associated with increases in civic competence and/or democratic values.

- The effects of civic education on civic competence were mixed. The study found limited but measurable increases in levels of knowledge of the political system. The programs studied were less consistently effective in improving the other areas of civic competence, political efficacy and skills. There are, however, important differences in these areas between programs that will be highlighted below

- The immediate impact of civic education on values appears to be generally small. While some programs did affect levels of tolerance and support for democratic liberties, the overall effects were inconsistent and relatively small in magnitude. The effect of civic education on institutional trust and system support was, overall, negative: in both Poland and the Dominican Republic, individuals who had participated in civic education tended, overall, to be less trusting of the government.

- The civic education programs had different effects on men and women in several areas of civic competence and democratic values. In the Dominican Republic civic education had a weaker effect on women's political participation than it did on men's political participation.

B. Self-Reported Evaluation of Programs

Participants believed the programs to be largely successful. As Graphs 1 and 2 demonstrate, over 98% of participants in the Dominican Republic and 93% in Poland reported that they were either somewhat or very satisfied with the programs they participated in. Similarly, 96%

in the Dominican Republic reported that the activities increased their knowledge either somewhat or very much, while in Poland 79% made that claim. (Graphs not shown.) Almost half claimed that the activities had increased their participation in the community — over 48% in the Dominican Republic and over 43% in Poland. (See Graphs 3 and 4)

However, these results rely exclusively on self-reporting. They provide little evidence that participants have in fact done these things, and they fail to compare the attitudes and behaviors of participants with non-participants. It is worth knowing that respondents *liked* the programs and believed them to be successful, but to determine the programs' true effect we need to rely on treatment-control methods and a much broader range of questions.

C. Political Participation

1. Overall Effects

It was in political participation that the programs had the most consistent impact, specifically those programs in each country that focused on mobilization and organization. Our analysis of the results from the two countries and eight programs led us to the following hypothesis: **political participation may be fostered through programs that emphasize direct political participation and programs that specifically provide the motivation, fora and structures to participate — either through creating civil society organizations or by linking groups directly to local government structures. Programs that emphasized classroom or workshop based methods without accompanying efforts at mobilization demonstrated weaker effects.**

This hypothesis is borne out by comparison of the results from the two case study countries. Graphs 5 and 6 summarize the results from the Dominican Republic and Poland respectively. The scale measures the extent to which civic education has increased overall participation of the trainees. It measures how many political acts (out of 10) each respondent reported participating in during the last year. It thus indicates not simply whether respondents participated, but also measures how much they participated in a series of typical political acts, and how treatment respondents compared to the general population and to the respective program specific control groups..

In the Dominican Republic overall, those who had not taken part in any civic education program participated on average in about 2.41 acts; those who did take part in a civic education program reported participating in 2.80 political acts. Between one third and one half of a behavior change, or about a 16% difference between treatment and control groups overall, can therefore be attributed to civic education. (See the methodological appendix for a description of a statistical measure, d , which indicates the amount of standard deviation change in a dependent variable that is associated with a treatment. In this case $d = .19$). The difference is statistically significant and indicates some measurable impact of civic education. But civic education did not succeed in creating a dramatic rush of political participation over and above the national average.

These total numbers obscure some important differences between programs, however. The PC program registered a small and statistically insignificant impact. PC was formed specifically to generate participation around one particular event — the 1996 elections, and almost 98% of registered voters in the Dominican Republic participated in those elections. After the elections, PC began to look for new roles and activities between elections, but it had not re-mobilized its base when the poll was conducted. As the results indicate, participation in the elections did not spill over to other arenas; and with the relative inactivity of PC between elections, the group appears to have been unable to provide a structure to channel participation in other directions. Participation in the civic education program and in election observation did not translate into general participation, at least in the short term.

The GAD program, on the other hand, demonstrates the greatest overall impact on participation in the Dominican Republic ($d = .47$). Like PC it involved the creation of an NGO, but unlike PC its emphasized a range of goals for participation. Its program sought to embolden people to participate around a variety of different themes (for example, judicial reform or educational reform) and in a variety of different arenas (local government and, perhaps most importantly, through the local branches of the organization). As the graphic shows, the impact on political participation was much greater than PC's. In the control group, respondents claimed to have participated on average in 2.99 political acts. In comparison, those who had taken part in the GAD series of civic education activities participated in, on average, 3.99 political acts.⁸ In other words, GAD stimulated on the whole one additional behavior. Given the existing low levels of political participation in the Dominican Republic in general, it is a significant and meaningful change.

The effects of Radio Santa Maria projects were also substantial. For the leaders (the direct participants in the program), the impact on participation was on average 1.29, over one behavior — or about 68% change ($d = .47$). For indirect participants, the effect was .68 — about 39% over the control group ($d = .35$). We offer two explanations. First, we found that civic education programs had a higher impact in the Dominican Republic on those with lower levels of education. In general, people with relatively low levels of education and socioeconomic development tend to participate less. Thus, civic education may have a relatively greater impact in the RSM program because that was the primary target audience. Second, as mentioned in the project description, the RSM program relied on existing networks of community and neighborhood groups. As we discuss below, the likelihood of civic education affecting political participation increased when the participants were members of civil society organizations. The RSM projects tapped an important network that may have served to mobilize broader participation.

Last, the ADOPEM project produced little measurable change in political participation. The difference between the control and treatment group means was .27, and was not statistically significant. Why? There are two possible explanations. First, the emphasis of the program was on classroom learning. It included no component to mobilize women directly in the community. Instead, it relied on knowledge transmission and classroom empowerment. Second, as we discuss more fully below, in general the effects of civic education on political participation by women are weaker than for men. This should be no surprise given the cultural, institutional and resource constraints on women's participation in many developing countries. While ADOPEM did demonstrate effects on values (particularly tolerance), it seems that, at least in this case, such gains are insufficient to overcome traditional barriers to women's participation.

In Poland the effects of civic education on participation were even greater. This impact is all the more striking given the low overall levels of participation in Poland (1.98). In general, the programs demonstrated a 1.15 behavior change ($d = .81$). In other words, on average those who took part in civic education participated in one more political act than their control counterparts.

The impact may be traced in part to the nature of the programs — their emphasis on community organizing, specific local issues and community action. In all of the community problem-solving activities (FSLD, Dialog and Lublin) the effect was stronger for the leaders, but

⁸ As can be seen, the numbers for control differ among the programs and in comparison to the overall control. This is because, as mentioned earlier, each treatment group had a corresponding control group that differed from the others in location and demographic characteristics. The bars displayed in the graphs are the adjusted means that controlled for these factors.

was still significant for the other participants. Moving from left to right across the graph, FSLD, the most effective program in this respect, demonstrates an increase of 1.62 average behaviors in its leaders ($d = 1.0$) While showing less change, other participants registered a 1.47 difference ($d = .91$). The results for the remaining programs exhibit the same pattern: a 1.19 difference for Dialog leaders ($d = .63$) and a .93 difference for other participants ($d = .48$); and a 1.38 behavior difference for Lublin leaders ($d = 1.1$) and .91 difference for participants ($d = .73$). The impact of the Lublin program is particularly marked given the low existing levels of participation in the area (1.33). The Helsinki program also registers a significant impact of .72, or about a 25% difference ($d = .40$). Thus *all* of the Polish programs registered significantly higher levels of political participation among participants, and these effects were among the strongest we observed in the entire study.

2. Participation and Civil Society Membership

What we have hypothesized about the importance of channels for participation for civic education's impact is supported by analysis of the characteristics of those in the sample who participated more. **In both of the case study countries, the more civil society groups a person belongs to the greater the likelihood that civic education would increase political participation.**

To analyze the relationship between group membership and civic competence and participation, we divided control and treatment respondents into three different categories: those who reported participating in 0-1 civil society groups (what we term low group membership); those who reported participating in 2-5 civil society groups (what we term medium group membership); and those who reported participating in more than six civil society groups (what we term high group membership). Then, dividing respondents into control and treatment, we compared their mean scores in the variables of civic competence (knowledge, skills and efficacy) and participation. The intent was to see which groups civic education had the greatest impact on.⁹

Graph 7 shows the results of our analysis for the Dominican Republic. The left, vertical scale shows the numbers of political acts respondents reported they had engaged in the last year. The bars divide respondents into our categories of low, medium and high group membership. As the reader will see, levels of political participation increase with the number of civil society groups a person belongs to. This is true as much for control group respondents as treatment group respondents. However, it is in the high category where civic education has the most impact — a difference of 1.33 behaviors in the “high” category compared to .19 in the “low” category.

The results in Poland also show that the effect of civic education on participation is greater among individuals who belong to more voluntary associations, but the pattern is less pronounced than in the Dominican Republic, as demonstrated in Graph 8. As discussed above, in general the activities in Poland were more successful in terms of promoting participation, but that success was still influenced by associational membership. For those in the “low” category, the average impact of civic education was 1.1 behavior change; for those in the high category, however, the average impact of civic education was 1.46 of a behavior change.

⁹ In general, there was also a greater effect of civic education on the knowledge and efficacy of those in the medium and high categories of group membership, but these differences were not as great as those for political participation.

These findings are consistent with a number of studies on civil society membership and political participation: membership in civil society groups tend to involve citizens organizationally “at rates far greater than uninvolved citizens.” (See Box 4.)

Our findings in the Dominican Republic and Poland have an important implication for civic education: **the likelihood that civic education will increase participation is much higher when there exist, or its participants already belong to, social institutions to foster and channel their participation.**

3. The Effects by Gender

In asking whether some groups are more receptive to civic education than others we also looked at gender and education levels. Except where noted in this report, our analysis revealed very little difference in impact on different educational groups. This was not the case for gender. **In the Dominican Republic, civic education had significantly less impact on women than it did on men.**

Graph 9 depicts the interaction of civic education with gender participation in the Dominican Republic. In the Dominican Republic the mean differences between the levels of participation for women and men that can be attributed to civic education were .13 and .83 respectively, approximately a six-fold difference. Men were more likely to participate as a result of civic education than were women.

Comparison of these results to those in efficacy, discussed in detail below, is interesting. While there were no comparable differences between men and women in effects on efficacy and on knowledge, there were for participation. What these results indicate is that increasing women’s participation is more difficult than simply changing attitudes or sense of empowerment. Women face considerably greater obstacles to participation than men, in terms of resources and culture. Programs that address the specific, more intransigent issues may be required, over and above attitude change.

In Poland the mean differences were again greater for men than for women, but this difference was not statistically significant. As in the Dominican Republic, however, men participate at higher levels than do women in both the control and treatment groups.

4. Discussion

Several general observations can be made regarding the effects of civic education on participation:

- Those programs that seek either to mobilize citizens to participate in a particular civil society organization or to organize citizens to participate towards a particular end tended to demonstrate the greatest impact on political participation. In the taxonomy of civic education programs on page 6, these correspond to the types we called civil society mobilization projects and community/group problem solving projects. GAD sought to create a national NGO and use civic education to mobilize citizens; Radio Santa Maria tapped into existing networks of community groups to increase participation; and the FSLD and Dialog projects attempted to create local groups to address specific problems. **What all of these share is the creation or use of local associational networks to build participation, indicating the importance of channels for participation. This conclusion is supported by the data on group membership.**

- Promoting participation through civic education may not, at least in the short term, require building a series of democratic characteristics in citizens. In spite of the effects on participation, there were smaller effects on efficacy and skills. The most significant effects on behavior change appear to be direct, not indirect through civic competence. (This is discussed in more detail below.)

5. Effects of Time After Civic Education

But do the effects of civic education on participation last? To test whether the effects of civic education last — in several areas — we divided the respondents into three categories, the overall control group, those who had undergone civic education within the last six months, and those who had undergone civic education six or more months ago. We then compared the scores of these groups in knowledge, efficacy and participation.

It was in political participation that we found the greatest effects of time.¹⁰ In this case, the time since treatment tended to reduce the probability that the participants in civic education were continuing to participate. The drop off was less for the more participation-based programs of Poland, however.

Graph 11 shows the interaction for the Dominican Republic between time and participation levels. In comparing the control to those who had taken part in a civic education program within the last six months, we note a difference of .51 behaviors, 2.76 and 3.27 respectively. For those who were trained more than six months before the survey, the number of participatory acts reported drops off substantially. In this case the difference between control and those treated more than six months before is only .37 — a drop off of .14, or about 27% of the initial gain. This sobering result indicates that the effects of civic education may taper off significantly after six months, and we can speculate that the trend may continue the greater the time after civic education.

¹⁰The effects of time after treatment on knowledge and efficacy were slight or statistically insignificant.

The projects in Poland demonstrate a similar drop off rate. Graph 12 displays the interactions of time on participation in Poland. In comparing the control group with those that had taken part in a civic education program within the last six months, we note a difference of 1.51 (2.25 and 3.76). However, once we move beyond six months we see a drop off in participation. In this case the difference between the control group and those trained more than six months before is .9, indicating a drop off of .6, about 40% of the initial gain.

In both cases there are still greater rates of participation among trainees than in the control. But in the Dominican Republic the effects on participation were already relatively small. And in both case study countries, we see a significant tapering off of participation after six months. This raises the question of the sustainability of the impact of civic education on participation. We offer two possible explanations for the drop-off.

First, the trend may relate again to the capacity of civic education, without accompanying institution-building or other reinforcing opportunities to participate, to generate sustained mobilization. In particular, the drop-off phenomenon raises the question of the durability and effectiveness of workshop-based civic education without accompanying channels or structures to encourage and sustain participation. This also points to the potential weakness of one-shot civic education activities that are based on the hope that participating in a single event may be sufficient to effect sustained behavior change.

Second, the initial surge in participation may also be related to the immediate effects of mobilization; but without corresponding effects on skills and efficacy (the other areas of civic competence) these behavioral changes may not be sustainable. As we discuss in the following section, the impact of the programs in these areas were significantly weaker--characteristics typically associated with sustained participation. What this may indicate is the need to work to bolster other areas of civic competence, particularly skills, alongside of or as a follow-up to more direct participation-focused programs.

Focus group discussions in Poland lend support to these possible explanations. Participants in the focus groups said that psychological, social and practical support were critical to their continued participation in community problem-solving activities after the completion of the training (OBOP). Some groups have attempted to provide such post-training follow up. For example, the Helsinki Foundation tries to maintain contact with trainees, sending them relevant information, materials and invitations to events. Focus group participants trained by Helsinki highlighted this support: "All the time we're in contact and that's terrific because it is support of what we are interested in. What is great is that we've got that countrywide contact-box. If I need something in

Krakow, I know whom I can inquire.” (OBOP) These remarks and other remarks from the Poland focus groups indicate the need for vehicles and resources for participation.

We will return to these points in the recommendations section below.

D. Civic Competence

If effects on participation tend to fade out over time, are there at least lasting changes in civic competence — knowledge, skills and efficacy — and democratic values?

1. Political Knowledge

The civic education programs studied did contribute to the political knowledge of the participants. Those who have participated in civic education tend to know more about the basic features of their political system: the functions of government, who their leaders are, and when the next elections will be held. This increase in knowledge is important on a practical level; without basic knowledge of the system and its leaders, citizens are at a loss in terms of taking part in the political process. Higher levels of political knowledge correlate with higher levels of political engagement, and they indicate that citizens will know where and how to participate politically over the long term.

The results from the Dominican Republic are summarized in Graph 13. Every program except the workshop-based women’s program, ADOPEM, demonstrated significant impact in terms of how much a citizen knows about the system. Overall, on a scale of 0 to 4, citizens in the Dominican Republic that had not participated in civic education averaged a score of 2.14; those who had participated averaged 2.35--a difference of .21 ($d=.21$).

This overall average masks differences among the programs, however. The GAD project demonstrates the largest impact — a difference between control and treatment of .51 which represents an increase of $\frac{1}{2}$ of a correct response out of four knowledge questions. This is a substantial effect ($d=.53$). Two features of the program are noteworthy in this regard: a) the intensity of the civic education program that, in addition to teaching general democratic values and information, also focused on current events and political issues, and b) GAD's emphasis on direct participation. The other programs showed less of an effect. The impact of RSM is noteworthy because of its impact relative to its control group, which starts from a significantly lower level than the national average.

In Poland, where most of the programs were more focused on direct participation through community problem-solving projects, the impact on knowledge is also significant. The results are depicted in Graph 14. Overall, participants in civic education programs registered a .17 difference compared to the control group ($d=.16$). Again, this general score masks differences between programs. FSLD demonstrated a .54 difference for the leaders and .31 for other participants ($d = .53$ and $.31$). Like the GAD program, FSLD focused on bringing people together to discuss specific issues and promote direct participation. The other program that demonstrated an impact was the Helsinki program ($d = .46$), but it should be kept in mind that the Helsinki project involved six months of intensive training in political and human rights.

2. Rights Knowledge

The programs also showed results in rights knowledge. Participants in civic education tended in general to be more knowledgeable of their political and civil rights. Again, those who participated in “direct participation” programs demonstrated greater impact. In the Dominican Republic, the difference between control and treatment groups overall on a 0 to 4 scale was .06, not statistically significant. Only GAD demonstrated a significant but still relatively small difference. In Poland, the programs had a larger overall effect on the rights knowledge of participants; the overall difference between control and treatment was .11.¹¹

3. Interaction of Knowledge with Gender and Time

Knowledge increases did *not* fade out over time. But, as with participation, gender differences existed. Men generally showed greater increases in knowledge than women. Graphs 15 and 16 demonstrate the effects of civic education on knowledge by gender for the Dominican Republic and Poland. The bars to the left represent the mean scores on knowledge for the control group; the bars to the right represent the mean scores for the treatment group.

The difference in impact can be seen. In the Dominican Republic the difference between women in the control and treatment was .15 compared to .33 for men. Poland follows a similar pattern. There the differences for women totaled .09, compared to .26 for men. Thus, civic education in both case study countries was more likely to increase the knowledge of men of the political system than that of women.

4. Civic Skills

In the Dominican Republic the effect of civic education on civic skills (such as speaking in public and leading a group) was negligible. As Graph 17 indicates, there were no significant positive differences between treatment and control in any of the programs, and in the cases of RSM and ADOPEM participants were actually lower on civic skills than the control group.

In Poland there were consistent effects of moderate magnitude. As demonstrated by Graph 18, participants in almost all programs considered themselves more capable of doing such things as solving problems and organizing a group than their control group counterparts. The community problem-solving programs, FSLD, Dialog and the Lublin project, exhibited a significant difference. The efforts to bring people together collectively and work with local government may well have endowed these individuals with the feeling that, in comparison to their fellow community members, they were better equipped to handle the duties and problems of political participation. Again we note the impact of direct mobilization on skills.

¹¹ This is one area of the questionnaire that will have to be refined in future studies. Many of the questions were likely too straightforward to elicit significant differences between the control and treatment samples. See Section VI, How to Evaluate Civic Education Programs, below.

5. Efficacy

The effects on efficacy are generally small. Overall in the Dominican Republic, the programs studied demonstrate a small though statistically significant impact on political efficacy ($d = .18$). Program participants tended to feel marginally more efficacious, i.e. politically empowered. In Graph 19, it can be seen that this effect was strongest for the participants in GAD ($d = .51$). We discussed above how this corresponds to the effect on participation of GAD. The effect on participants in Participación Ciudadana, RSM and ADOPEM were considerably weaker. However these were also populations, as the control numbers indicate, that tended in general not to feel particularly empowered — the rural poor and women. The results indicate that the programs could not significantly overcome these obstacles. Again, a program that emphasized NGO creation and popular mobilization through institutional channels, and included discussion of current events and political issues — GAD — demonstrated the greatest effect on political efficacy of all of the Dominican programs.

Effects on efficacy were similarly small in Poland. As shown in Graph 20, there was an overall effect, but most of that reflects the substantial impact of the Helsinki program ($d=.69$). The difference attributable to the programs overall was small ($d -.24$), and we conclude that political efficacy in Poland has not generally been enhanced through civic participation programs.

Men and women experienced similar increases in efficacy. Graphs 21 and 22 depict the results for the two countries. In the Dominican Republic the results were the same for men and women: there is a difference for both of .12. The result is important given the initial low levels of efficacy. For the men the mean score was 2.82; for women it was 2.52. Moreover, in the Dominican Republic, these comparable changes in efficacy did not translate into comparable levels of participation by men and women. Earlier we demonstrated that the effects of civic education on women's participation were slight--this in spite of a significant increase in efficacy.

The average score for efficacy for women in the Dominican Republic was higher even than in Poland, where the mean score for women was 2.18. In Poland it was men for whom civic education had the greatest impact on efficacy, although the effects were small for both sexes. The difference between control and treatment for women was .13, compared to a difference for men of .23.

E. Democratic Values

The effect of civic education on democratic values in our two case study countries was inconsistent, with its impact on institutional trust and systems support often negative. Effects on values were also not directly associated with the effects described earlier on participation.

1. Tolerance

The effect of civic education on political tolerance was mixed in both countries.

Graph 23 depicts the differences among the programs in the Dominican Republic. Notable are the greater impacts of civic education on tolerance in PC and GAD ($d = .27$ and $.30$). The low levels of tolerance in the case of RSM may be related to the characteristics of the target population, the poorer and more rural segments of the society. It is in the area of tolerance that ADOPEM, the women's program, had a significant impact — one of the few dimensions in which this program affected political attitudes. All of the effects, however, are still relatively small in magnitude.

Graph 24 displays the results for Poland. Overall the effects are less consistent than in the Dominican Republic. Of those depicted only the difference for FSLD leaders and Helsinki are statistically significant, although these are of moderate magnitude ($d = .33$ and $.77$). For FSLD the difference for the leaders between control and treatment was $.36$ or 13%; for the Helsinki program the difference between control and treatment was $.41$, or a 14% difference, the greatest among the four groups. In short with the exception of a six month human rights educating program (Helsinki) civic education failed to show a consistently significant impact on the tolerance of ordinary program participants.

2. Support for Democratic Liberties

The effect of civic education on support for liberty versus social order was also inconsistent. The greatest impact in the Dominican Republic was by PC and the direct RSM participants ($d = .20$ and $.37$). We speculate that the participation of PC trainees in a dramatic democratic process, the 1996 elections, affected their support for democratic liberty and elections. RSM's results are also notable: support for democratic liberties is lower in their comparable control group than in other program's control groups and the overall control. Yet, despite such pre-existing attitudes, RSM seems to have succeeded in instilling a greater respect for democratic liberty. Again, the classroom-based, knowledge- and rights-focused ADOPEM program registers little or no impact although it attempts directly to influence values.

In Poland, the effects on support for liberty are similar to those on tolerance. The impact was statistically significant only for FSLD and Helsinki. Again, however, general levels of support for democracy in Poland tend to be higher than in the Dominican Republic (1.92 compared to 1.6 in the respective control groups).

3. Social Capital

In terms of building social trust, there was little effect from any of the civic education programs in either country. The only exception is the GAD project in the Dominican Republic; here the difference between control and treatment groups was $.29$, or about a 10% difference between the two scores. Curiously, given its objective of building citizen-local government trust, the Lublin neighborhood revitalization project appears to have had a negative effect on social trust; participants were less trusting of their fellow Poles than the relevant control group. Thus, in general, civic education had no appreciable effect on social trust, at least in the short term. The efforts of participating and cooperating with fellow citizens in civic education programs and, in some cases, solving community problems did not significantly extend the participants' circles of trust.

4. Institutional Trust

On confidence in particular social and state institutions, the impact of the programs in the Dominican Republic was negative. In other words, participants in civic education were less trusting of the legal system, the media, the church, the armed forces, the legislature, local politicians, the police, the political system, the educational system, and business. The results by program for the Dominican Republic are in Graph 25. For every program, the effect was negative. Civic education appears to have made participants less confident in the social and political institutions in their country. In contrast, the programs in Poland demonstrated little impact on institutional trust either way. There was no significant difference between treatment and control groups in any of the programs.

There are two possible explanations for these findings. First, comparing the Dominican Republic and Poland, the impact may reflect in part the state of democracy and the efficiency of social and political institutions in both countries. Put quite simply, many of the institutions in the Dominican Republic may be in greater need of reform and thus less worthy of trust. In this case, perhaps, civic education served in the Dominican Republic to build awareness of problems and debilities of these institutions and of the need for reform.¹² If this is so, civic education in the Dominican Republic may have helped to build pressure for political reform of these institutions. A second possible explanation is that the results reflect the different nature of the programs in Poland. With the exception of the Helsinki program, the Polish programs focused simply on participation. There was little emphasis on general knowledge of the political situation or normative qualities of democracy. Such alternative possibilities need to be explored in future studies.

5. System Support

The measure of system support -- trust in the responsiveness of the overall regime -- follow the same pattern: generally negative effects in the Dominican Republic and few or negative effects in Poland. Graph 27 depicts the results for the Dominican Republic. The largest impact was for PC and GAD. The results for RSM again reflect the attitudes of the target population; in general, the population RSM targeted tended to be more conservative and thus more supportive of the system. In Poland (Graph 28), the only statistically significant difference between the control and treatment groups was a negative effect for FSLD and a positive effect for ordinary Dialog participants. As in the Dominican Republic, participation in the FSLD program tended to make participants less supportive of the system. In general, levels of system support tended to be slightly lower in the Dominican Republic than in Poland, with a mean score for the general control group of 1.78 in the Dominican Republic compared to 1.87 in Poland. In the Dominican Republic, civic education appears to have had a more significant negative impact.

¹²Although trust did not decrease among treatment program participants in Poland as it did in the Dominican Republic, discussions in the Poland focus groups indicate that increased encounters with government officials as a result of the increased participation did sometimes provoke feelings of “distrust”, “dissatisfaction” or “disappointment”. If the participants “had not undertaken initiatives, they would not have had an opportunity to face the resistance and lack of support from authorities, to look close at their work, and find something of what they do not approve.” Conversely, successful encounters were highly encouraging. (OBOP)

The results for social capital, institutional trust and system support in the Dominican Republic do not necessarily have to be interpreted negatively. They could signal an important step in building awareness of the areas where the democratic system could be improved or reformed. We could easily speculate that these results indicate a positive impact for civic education in the Dominican Republic. For USAID purposes, however, what these results may indicate is the difficulty in using measures of institutional trust (at least as a positive trend) as indicators of the impact of civic education. **From this case, it would appear likely that under certain conditions confidence in social institutions may in fact decline as a result of civic education.** The question is how and at what point that trust begins to increase.

6. Discussion

In sum, some of the civic education programs studied did succeed some of the time in affecting democratic values. In the Dominican Republic, PC, GAD and ADOPEM did affect tolerance, PC also affected rights consciousness and support for liberty, and PC and ADOPEM showed negative effect on institutional trust and system support. In most of these cases, however, the effects were relatively small in magnitude. Moreover, the Dominican Republic had a baseline that was significantly lower than that in Poland, which may explain in part the differences between the two countries. However, the differences between the programs are also important. Programs in the Dominican Republic tended to emphasize workshop/classroom learning; in Poland the emphasis was on action/participation. Generally, the FSLD and Helsinki programs exhibited the strongest effects on democratic values in Poland.

We can draw four general conclusions from these results:

- Affecting democratic values and attitudes through civic education is highly difficult. This seems logical since values and attitudes are often deeply embedded in culture and historical experience — things not easily overcome through civic education.
- The programs that succeeded in generating higher rates of participation were not necessarily those that had the greatest impact on democratic values; participation could increase without value changes, at least in the short term. Generally, in comparing the results of civic education in promoting civic competence, democratic values, and participation, we found that effects in one domain were not necessarily correlated with effects in the others. Changes in participation do not always translate into changes in democratic values, nor do value changes automatically translate into higher levels of participation.
- Two strands of impact have emerged from the results: slight value changes from the workshop-based programs, and increased participation from the mobilization/community problem-solving programs. Only one program in the Dominican Republic demonstrated consistent impact in the areas of civic competence, democratic values and participation — GAD, while FSLD and Helsinki showed effects in these areas of varying magnitude in Poland.
- Civic education may in fact have a negative impact on participants' trust of social institutions and support of the political system. This points to the ability of civic education programs to raise awareness of problems and build pressures for reform. But it also raises the problem of how and where these participants will influence reform. Awareness without the possibility of reform may lead to cynicism. It is in these cases that promoting participation and providing the means to channel it can be important to making the leap from discontent to positive

change.

F. The Impact of Participatory Methods

The effect of using participatory methods in civic education on efficacy and participation was clear: **the more participatory methods used, the greater the impact**. This was true in both countries.

To measure the impact of methods, the questionnaire asked respondents to say whether or not an array of different methods had been used in the civic education program they participated in. The list included such things as small group discussion, dramatizations, problem-solving and role playing. The scale ranged from 0 to 6. Respondents were also asked about the extent to which they felt free to participate in the classroom and to voice their opinions.

The effects of participatory methods on participation are depicted in Graphs 29 and 30. The horizontal axis groups the results according to the number of participatory methods used, 0, 1 to 3, or 4 or more. The trend is clear — greater effects correspond to greater numbers of methods used. In the Dominican Republic the difference was between 2.58 behaviors with no participatory methods to 3.06 with four or more. [Note: the slight drop in 1-3 methods is not statistically significant.] In Poland the effect was the same. Here the difference was between 2.99 behaviors for no participatory methods and 3.43 for four or more. The difference that can be attributed to the number of participatory teaching methods used in the training program is thus almost one half of a behavior — a substantial effect.

The comments of Poland focus groups participants illustrate this effect: “I think that Dialog taught us how to speak, because it simply listened to us...Because I’m usually shy, and here it was that everybody would say something...And courage is the most important.” (OBOP)

V. Recommendations For Adult Civic Education Program Design

Generally, these results indicate that civic education, at least as shown in the analysis of these eight programs, may not have as broad an impact on the democratic characteristics of individuals as is often expected. In brief, the effects of civic education on knowledge and participation are significant, and those on participation are substantial, particularly in programs that provide channels for participation. But the effects did not necessarily go together. Programs could increase participation without significantly effecting other changes. One possible conclusion is that it is not necessary to change knowledge, skills, efficacy and/or values to promote participation. But here the evidence of drop off in effects on participation becomes important. It may be that, without changes in the other aspects of democratic citizenship, participation cannot be sustained. This is a sobering conclusion given the evident difficulties of the civic education programs studied in changing skills and efficacy and, especially, values.

What then do these results mean in terms of the design and implementation of civic education programs?

1. Participation. **If the goal of civic education is to increase political participation, the program should build in political participation.** Civic education programs should bring participants into active social networks and bring them together with local governments to foster greater collaboration and understanding of the roles and functions of these institutions. Education alone, without corresponding opportunities, may not in and of itself mobilize behavior change. This means that programs seeking to increase participation should focus on initiating participation immediately and directly.

1.a. This in turn means ensuring that opportunities for participation exist. Civic education programs need to tap into and build channels for participation. Our results indicate that the existence of social networks — shown through membership in voluntary associations — was the best predictor of participation and of the impact of the programs that worked with them. This recommendation follows thinking on social marketing that has been applied in other areas (such as population programs): people need reinforcement from and opportunities within their social networks to change their behavior. People may not otherwise seek out the opportunity to participate. **In implementing civic education, designers and programmers need to emphasize the creation or provision of channels of participation or working through existing networks to promote participation.** Transmission of knowledge or other characteristics conducive to participation may not be sufficient

1.b. **Civic education programs should focus on themes that are immediately relevant to people's daily lives.** In three of the programs that demonstrated the greatest effects (GAD, FSLD and Dialog), the emphasis was on specific, tangible issues. GAD rallied people around specific issues in areas such as local government, judicial reform, and education reform. FSLD and Dialog sought to rally people and form community groups around specific community or neighborhood problems. This recommendation is consistent with much of the literature on political participation: people act on specific problems or events that are immediately important to them. Broad notions of political rights or civic responsibility are not sufficient to mobilize people. People tend to weigh their political participation rationally. Therefore, in designing civic education projects, program managers should begin with the assumption that the target audience will act in its own self interest, and then design the program to channel that self interest into democratic participation. Why will people participate? What problems are likely to spark their participation?

If there is no direct answer to these questions, then it may be necessary to reconsider the basic assumptions and objectives of the program.

1.c. **Donors and civic education implementors need to be aware of the effects of time on participation and to consider how to address it.** One-shot programs are not likely to create sustained participation. There are several possibilities for counteracting this drop-off in effect:

- **focus in a sustained way on a specific target group** rather than try to reach a broad group of people. This option presents a trade-off between long-term impact and numbers reached. Nevertheless, it promises a more sustained change;
- **follow-up with participants.** Civic education programs should attempt consistently to renew or reinvigorate the knowledge, etc. of target populations. Programs should maintain contact with participants and continue the programs over time.
- again, **create or maintain opportunities to participate.** Plan how and where these groups are going to continue to participate. Programs need to assist in providing the channels to sustain participation.

Programmers should ask three questions: 1) What reasons will trainees have to participate after taking part in a civic education program? 2) Where can trainees participate after taking part in civic education? and 3) How can implementors maintain contacts with these groups?

2. Target groups. Support for and design of civic education must take the circumstances of its target groups into account when considering impact.

2.a. **If a program seeks specifically to mobilize women, it may have to address more than attitudes and knowledge.** As we noted, particularly in the Dominican Republic, changes in efficacy and attitudes did not translate into comparable changes in behavior. Given resource, cultural and, in some cases institutional, obstacles to participation by women, the focus cannot be solely on changing the attitudes of women. The problems are often deeper and broader than that. Civic education that seeks to increase women's participation needs to look at these problems. Civic educators should consider working directly on building networks through which women can participate. Recommendation 1 above regarding mobilizing directly and immediately applies particularly strongly to women. The greater impact of programs in Poland that directly mobilized women support this recommendation.

2.b. Generally, programmers should have modest expectations for civic education "compensating" for disadvantages among target groups, at least if all other environmental factors remain unchanged. The fact that education did not affect the impact of civic participation indicates that those with lower educational levels, who tend to have lower pre-existing participation rates, will benefit *relative to their starting points*.

2.c. One last word should be said about the Helsinki program, which was unique among all the programs in that it registered significant impact across knowledge, skills, efficacy, tolerance, and participation. Its target population and intensity were also anomalous, however. The results indicate that this sort of long-term, elite-focused program can have an important effect. For reasons of resources, a program of this intensity may not be an option for every mission nor can it

be replicated easily. And, of course, it does little to affect the grassroots immediately. Nevertheless, it demonstrated significant effects on these orientations compared to its control cohorts (those with university degrees). In this sense, then, the Helsinki project was successful in training a new cadre of elite, who may go on to shape public opinion and may over time have a significant multiplier effect.

3. **Methods. Civic education programs should include a heavy dose of participatory methods in their implementation.** Pedagogy in civic education matters. The greatest emphasis should be on helping the participants develop their own skills and tactics for enhancing their roles as citizens. Participatory methods include group problem-solving, role-playing, debates, small group discussions, games and the like. This list can be expanded upon, and the techniques used can still benefit from refinement. The emphasis should be on providing immediate and relevant practice in the traits of citizenship: mobilizing citizens, knowing where to participate, solving problems, and speaking in public, to name a few.

4. **Values and long-term impact. Donors and civic education implementors need to be cautious about the extent to which they can affect democratic values in the short term.** The immediate effects of civic education on democratic values are by and large slight. We should not expect mass value change as a result of civic education: attitudes and values are deeply embedded in culture, socialization, and environment. Nor do attitudinal changes that do occur appear to be sufficient to overcome institutional and personal barriers to participation. At the same time, it is unclear if increases in political participation can be sustained without changes in the attitudes and values that encourage participation. But such broad change is a very long-term undertaking.

5. **Monitoring and indicators.**

5.a. **Civic education programs should include an impact monitoring plan.** Donors should, in fact, require such plans. Lists of participants should be considered critical supporting documentation. Until recently most assessments of civic education programs relied on anecdotal evidence or reports of numbers trained. This told us little about either individual or gross level impact. This information can be critical in designing new programs and assessing impact. It provides a compass to know in what areas, and on which groups, programs are having the greatest impact, and it begins to uncover why. It can reveal flaws in the design of programs and strengths. Without information on impact, it is difficult also to link civic education programs to larger democratization strategies. As our research indicates, civic education programs should be seen as a component of a larger democracy strategy. Alone it may not be sufficient without some corresponding institutional changes--either in civil society or in the state--that promote and provide the means for participation. Evaluation and monitoring plans can help reveal how the impact of civic education relates to other components of that strategy. In short, it is necessary to know how and if programs are having an impact in order to adjust them and fit them in to a larger effort.

5.b. **The negative impact of civic education on institutional trust and systems support should caution against the use of positive “systems support indicators” for measuring the impact of civic education.** As we saw in the case of the Dominican Republic, those who took part in civic education programs were actually lower in their trust in institutions and support for the system than those who did not. This in itself is not a bad thing; it can indicate a certain degree of efficacy and recognition of the need for reform. But it does raise problems for indicators of impact that depend on system support increasing as a result of civic education. Our results indicate that at least in the short term there is a decrease in trust. What we do not know is at

what point, or even whether, those levels begin to increase. (And the increase may be due to factors not directly related to civic education or even other donor programs.)

VI. Study of School-Based Programs

A. Programs Studied

1. General Content and Methods

As indicated above (Section II.B.), "formal civics education" refers to the teaching of civics in the formal school system. Like informal programs for adults, formal programs vary in content -- whether values, particular sorts of knowledge, skills or behavior, etc. are emphasized -- and in teaching methods. They also differ in terms of whether civics is taught in its own course, or as part of social studies, history, etc. Nevertheless, student and adult civic education programs share the goal of trying to inculcate the knowledge, skills, and dispositions necessary to democratic citizenship. Similarly, methods, such as lectures, role-playing and work in the community, can be categorized as more or less participatory.

Efforts to measure school-based student programs are in effect studying young adults who are still in their formative years. The age of the subjects makes it more difficult to discern the impact of a specific, limited intervention on the long-term process of their cognitive, attitudinal development. In this light, results need to be interpreted as the short-term effect on the longer term process of political socialization. Nevertheless, numerous studies have researched the effects of civic education on children and the processes of political socialization. This project draws on, and in many cases supports, this large base of research.

2. Programs Studied

The study focuses on programs for eighth grade students for a number of reasons. First, in both the Dominican Republic and Poland, programs in civic education seem to be more numerous at this grade level than at lower and higher levels. Furthermore, attendance tends to drop off significantly after the eighth grade, especially in developing countries; the pool of respondents is thus more likely to be representative in the eighth grade than in higher grades. Equally important is the fact that eighth graders *can* be surveyed on their political orientations. The biggest growth toward an adult understanding of politics occurs between the ages of 11 and 13 (Morduchowicz, et al., p. 467). Previous studies with comparable aims, methods and questions have produced reliable findings on eighth graders' political orientations and the effects of civic education (see esp. Torney-Purta and colleagues, and Morduchowicz, et al.).

a. Dominican Republic

Status Quo (Control): By the eighth grade in the Dominican Republic, students in the Dominican Republic will have undergone some social studies/civics classes, but exposure will have been sporadic and the content and timing of these classes is not nationally uniform. The government of the Dominican Republic is in the process of developing a new civics curriculum, but this has not yet been implemented. According to the national curriculum, all schools in the Dominican Republic are supposed to have student governments, but few schools have in fact established the governments.

Against this status quo, the project studied 2 formal civic education programs:

Centros de Servicios Pedagogicos, Haina: The purpose of this project was to encourage democratic participation in school decision-making by concerned actors -- administrators, parents, teachers and students. The establishment of student governments in the target schools was the project's chief objective. Intensive training workshops were offered for parents associations, students (to learn about student government), and teachers (in "democratic" teaching methods, and in helping students to establish and run student governments). The project was implemented in 26 schools in Haina. The emphasis was given to private schools serving low income students; 100 teachers, 26 school directors, and 200 student representatives were trained.

Fundación Falconbridge, Educacion para la Democracia Project, Bona0: The purpose of this project was to develop students' skills in self-government and establish student governments. It involved training workshops for students, school directors, teachers, and parents associations in the formation of student self-government. It was implemented in 15 schools. The first phase of the project, from which the treatment sample was drawn, ran from January 1995 to November 1996. A second phase began in early 1997. The Bona0 schools in the project are public, but very well funded, and are attended primarily by students from middle income families.

b. Poland

Status Quo (Control): The typical civics course in Polish public schools before and since the transition to democracy is titled "Knowledge about Society." It is taught one hour per week for one year, and essentially involves lectures about the basic facts about government institutions. There is little to no attention to skills for and attitudes to democracy or democratic practice. The focus is mostly on knowledge -- as one teacher said, to provide "students with elementary and systematic knowledge about the rules and organization of social life."

Against this official national program for civic education, the project studied two civic education reform programs:

Center for Citizenship Education (CCE) -- KOSS Program: Launched in 1994/95 the KOSS program provides a complete package of civics reform to local schools that may be interested in the program. The package includes: teacher training, curriculum/lessons plans, and materials addressing both content and methodology. In addition, in primary schools, the KOSS program requires that civics education be expanded from one hour per week to two hours per week, and from one year (eighth grade) to two years (seventh and eighth grades). Basic lesson plans cover things such as civic skills, local government, basic rules/principles of democracy, human rights, civic activity, institutions of a democratic state, market economy, and Poland and the world. In the classroom the emphasis is on interactive methods: group work, projects, problem-solving, simulations, games, visits to government offices, research in the community -- all with the intent of building cooperation, independence, initiative, and responsibility.

Foundation for Education for Democracy (FED): This activity was more limited than the KOSS program in that it only provided training for teachers in civic education. At the primary school level, the focus is on seminars for teachers titled, "Methods of Teaching Civics at School." It did not involve curriculum reform nor did it increase the time spent on civics in schools. The goal is to "prepare teachers to teach and educate youths within such school courses as social studies, history, Polish, English, to live in a democratic society." Towards this goal the emphasis is on classroom methodology in teaching civics.

B. Study Methodology

1. Overview

The model presented in Section III.A. applies to students as well as to adults, with some modifications. While we cannot ask students about their participation in conventional adult political activities, like voting, it is important to ask about participation at this age. School activity has been found to be correlated with involvement in political and social activity in young adulthood in a number of studies (see Shaver, p. 389 for references). We ask, therefore, about participation by students in school government, school activities and clubs, and non-school activities and clubs.

The additional variables the analysis controlled for are also somewhat different for young people. Research on political socialization has identified several key factors in socialization -- family (parent socioeconomic status (SES), the political participation of the student's parents, and the parents' civic orientations), school (including both the implicit and the intended curriculum, organization, and style and quality of pedagogy), peer group, and broader influences of society (mediated primarily through media). Thus we also examine the impact of parent's education, the openness of family environment, participation of family members, teaching methods, and the openness of the school and civics class environments.

As with adults we controlled for age, sex, and location (whether the school was in a rural or urban area). We treated group membership as a dependent variable rather than controlling for it because such memberships are not intrinsically related to a student's being in the treatment or control group as was the case for adults.

2. Survey Instruments

The student questionnaire is largely a simpler, shorter version of the adult questionnaire, with sections on school, classroom and family environment added. Unlike the adult questionnaires, the student questionnaire were administered in written form to all students from a given school in one sitting.

The questions have several sources. Some are adaptations for age level of questions from the adult questionnaire. A number of questions on values were based on questions used successfully by Torney-Purta in her 1971 multi-country study of the impact of civics education. Questions that addressed what students might be expected to know/believe were modified or created to ensure that the questionnaires reflected the curricula used. For example, the series of knowledge questions includes a multiple choice question and an open-ended question on the duties of local government to capture a key theme of one of the treatment programs. Other knowledge questions were, of course, adapted to the differing political institutions and incumbents in each country.

In Poland, MSI contracted two social scientists with particular expertise in surveying young people. The questionnaires were pre-tested in both countries. Once the data was collected, scales related to the following factors were created.

- a) Civic Competence:
 - knowledge of political figures, institutions and processes;

- knowledge of rights enshrined in laws or the Constitution;
 - self-assessment of democratic skills;
 - political efficacy; and
 - school efficacy.
- b) Democratic Values:
- tolerance;
 - trust; and
 - belief in democratic duties and citizen responsibilities.
- c) Participation:
- school government;
 - school activities and clubs;
 - non-school activities and clubs; and
 - discussions of politics at home.
- d) School Context:
- openness of classes other than civics; and
 - importance placed on civics by school officials and teachers outside of civics classes.
- e) Classroom Context:
- openness of civics classes; and
 - teaching methodology used in civics classes.
- f) Family Context:
- parents' professions;
 - parents' educational level;
 - family members' political participation; and
 - openness of family discussions of politics.

Finally, like the adult questionnaire, the student questionnaire includes questions on political interest and media exposure. It includes demographic questions on sex and place of residence.

Questionnaires were also developed for the teacher and headmaster of each sampled class. The purpose was to obtain more information than that reported by students on school and classroom environment. Teachers were asked about how important they felt civic education to be relative to other courses, how much importance the headmaster placed on civics, the content and teaching methods they use in civics classes, the nature of school government, and the extent of their own training in teaching civics. Headmasters/school directors were given a shortened version of the teacher questionnaire. All these questionnaires are in Annex B.

3. Sampling

Sampling in Poland involved three steps. First, 30 schools were sampled from each of the three lists of schools to be surveyed. The treatment samples were derived from the lists kept by CCE and FED of eighth grade civics teachers trained (teachers of other grades and subjects who were trained were excluded). The 30 CCE/KOSS schools were drawn randomly from CCE's list of

teachers trained in the second of three phases of training they have conducted. The first phase was not sampled because it covered only a small number of schools, while the third phase is too recent for the students of the trainees to have received two years of civics. The second phase of training thus provided the best treatment group: hundreds of teachers/schools were involved, and the students of these teachers had been exposed to the full two-year curriculum by the time of the survey. The FED list was too small to sample from, so almost all the schools on the list were included in the survey. For the control sample, 30 schools were drawn randomly from the Central Statistical Office register of primary schools in Poland. In the second step, one eighth grade class was sampled from each school; in the case of the treatment schools, it was a class taught by a trained teacher. In the final step, ten students were sampled from that class.

Sampling in the Dominican Republic was more straightforward. In both the *Centro de Servicios Pedagógicos* and *Fundación Falconbridge* projects, only a small number of schools had taken part in the project. The Falconbridge project was carried out in two waves of 16 public schools, some of which were rural and some of which were urban. IEPD only sampled from the first wave. In order to ensure that the sample included rural and urban schools, IEPD selected two rural and two urban schools from the list of 16 of the first wave. For the control group schools, IEPD selected two rural and two urban schools in the same area (two urban schools in Bonao and two rural schools in nearby La Vega province) that had not participated in the project. In contrast, the Haina project worked only with private urban schools. IEPD sampled two schools randomly from the CSP list of participant schools and then selected two other urban private schools in the same region that had not participated.

In both the Dominican Republic and Poland, MSI contracted the same polling firms for the student surveys as for the adult, and exercised same level of oversight as described for above.

4. Analysis

As in the analysis of the adult data, we created scales relating to each variable (knowledge, skills, tolerance, participation, etc.). (These scales are described below.) We averaged the scores of respondents within each treatment group and within the control groups for each scale.

To test the impact of civic education, we first compared the differences between the means of the treatment groups and the means of the control group for each of the measures. The means were adjusted for the various control factors listed above, such as location and sex. As with the adult data, differences were tested for significance using analysis of covariance. A statistically significant difference between means of treatment and control groups is interpreted as the impact of civic education.

Second, to explore whether civic education has impact only in conjunction with certain factors, such as sex, teaching methods and family environment, we tested the interactions between these factors and the mean scores.

The scales were constructed as follows (see student questionnaires in Annex B for specific questions):

- *Political Participation*: The questionnaire asks if respondents participated in a number of activities, including voting in student council elections, attending school government meetings, and standing as a candidate in self-government election. The total number of

acts each respondent participated in was added up, and mean scores calculated for treatment and control groups. The scale goes from 0 to 3.

- *School clubs*: The questionnaire asks if respondents belong to a series of school/social/hobby clubs, including sports, study groups, arts/culture, newspaper/radio, and charitable organizations. The scale of average number of clubs runs from 0 to 6.
- *Home participation*: This scale is based on one question, "How often do you speak up in your family when talking about politics?" One means "never", four "often".
- *General Knowledge*: The questionnaire asks five questions about who is Prime Minister, the branches of government, the main duties of the President, parliament and courts, etc. To create the scale we added the number of correct answers. The scale goes from 0 to 5.
- *Constitution Knowledge*: The scale is created from the number of correct answers to six questions about whether the state can by law act in certain ways, for example, enter anyone's home without a special permit, require public officials to be catholic, force people to pay taxes. The scale goes from 0 to 6.
- *Civic Skills*: The questionnaire contains four questions asking the respondent to compare him- or herself to others he or she knows in solving problems, expressing thoughts and ideas, cooperating with others, and speaking in public. We counted an answer of "better than others" as two, "same" as one, and "worse" as zero. We add up these scores and divide by four to create a scale of the average score ranging from 0 to 2.
- *Efficacy*: This scale is derived from the first three questions on efficacy in the questionnaire (questions 205, 206, 207 in the Dominican Republic questionnaire; 105, 106, 107 in Poland). All ask the respondent to agree or disagree on a four-point scale. The scale is the average score, one meaning low sense of efficacy, four meaning high sense of efficacy.
- *School efficacy*: This dependent variable corresponds to one question asking the respondent if he/she thought school officials would pay attention to his/her complaint. A score of one means low efficacy, four high.
- *Rights of Dissent*: This scale represents the average of two questions about whether citizens should always have the right to criticize the government and whether people who disagree with the government should be able to organize and carry out protests. One indicates a more restrictive response, four a less restrictive one.
- *Trust in Others*: This scale is the average of answers to two questions about whether people can be trusted and whether people will exploit you if you don't look after your interests. One means less trustful of others, four more so.
- *Racial Tolerance*: This scale is of the average of scores on two questions; one asks whether employers should refuse to hire people of certain nationalities, the other whether members of ethnic minorities should have same rights as others. Answers are on a four-point agree/disagree scale; one means more racially intolerant, four more racially tolerant.
- *Necessity of elections*: This is another one item scale; on a scale of one to four, one means the

respondent thought that elections are not always necessary, four means the respondent thought they were.

- *Women's Role*: This scale is of the average scores on two questions about whether women should have the same rights, opportunities or roles as men. A score of one indicates more traditional values about women, four more "feminist".
- *Paternalism*: This scale represents the average of two questions about whether the president should be like a father and whether the president should keep order even if it means breaking some laws. One indicates a more paternalistic response, four less so.
- *Tolerance*. The questionnaire asks two of the three sets of questions in the adult questionnaire regarding the respondent's willingness to extend freedoms of association, participation, and speech to different political groups. Answers are on a two-point agree/disagree scale. The scale is created from the number of "democratic responses" to whether atheists and militarists should be allowed these freedoms. Zero means least tolerant, six most tolerant.
- *Civic Duties*: This scale is created from the number of qualities that respondent thinks characterize a good citizen, like voting in local elections, paying taxes, knowing what the government is doing, etc. The scale goes from 0 to 6.
- *Importance of Good Citizen*: Another one-item scale, this scale corresponds to a question asking how important the respondent thinks it is to be a good citizen? One means "not important", three is "very important."

We constructed a series of other variables to take into account as follows:

- *Father's education level*;
- *Number of family members who speak out about politics*;
- *Number of family members who participate in politics*;
- *Number of relevant content areas treated in civics classes* (such as discussions of the meaning of democracy, of local events, and of the news);
- *Number of active methodologies used in civics classes* (such as simulations, research in the community, and mock elections);
- *How free students felt to express themselves in civics classes*;
- *How free students felt to express themselves elsewhere in school*; and
- *How much treatment of citizenship students were exposed to outside of civic classes*.

5. Focus Groups

Focus groups were conducted in Poland after preliminary analysis of the Polish data was conducted. (Delays in polling in the Dominican Republic left no time for focus groups there.) As with the adult focus groups, the intent was to explore selected questions raised by the data analysis, in particular:

- The nature of student participation, and the reasons behind students' participation or lack thereof.
- Whom students trust or do not trust and why.

- Why students do/do not feel efficacious.
- Young people's understanding of key concepts of, and attitudes to, democratic citizenship, including rights, tolerance, responsibility to participate, and trust.

The protocol for the Poland focus groups is in Annex C. The findings are woven into the conclusions below.

Two student focus groups were held in Poland. Participants in both were drawn from the KOSS treatment group. Given the limited number of focus groups, the team decided to concentrate on the more intense of the treatment programs. Participants were drawn, randomly, from schools sampled for the survey, but who were not administered the survey. One was held in a provincial capital, the other in a small town.

C. Results

1. Overview

We were less successful in measuring the key concepts of interest in the student surveys compared with adults. As discussed in more detail in the methodological appendix, many of the scales that were analyzed did not exhibit strong intercorrelations, either due to problems in the questions themselves or due to the relatively ill-formed democratic attitudes among students of this age group. Regardless of the source, however, the measurement problems we encountered suggest that the results in this portion of the study should be viewed as less definitive than the findings for the adult programs.

Overall, the results show that the formal civic education programs studied had limited impact. Results in Poland and the Dominican Republic were quite different, however.

In Poland, modest but positive effects were found in a number of areas, including: participation in school clubs and in the home; general knowledge; skills; and belief in rights of dissent. The effect on participation may be particularly important. There is evidence that participation during school years is correlated with political participation in young adulthood. The Center for Citizenship Education's KOSS program and the Foundation for Education in Democracy (FED) program had impact on different areas. Generally KOSS, the more elaborate program, had positive effects in more areas than did FED. In a few areas, FED had a small negative effect. Interestingly, the area in which both had a negative effect was trust in others -- a finding which echoes the adult results.

In the Dominican Republic no significant differences between treatment and control students attributable to treatment were found in any area. However, the data do shed some light on participation in treatment schools. The intent of the two treatment programs was to establish student governments and thereby to increase student participation. We found that, according to the teachers surveyed in the schools, 5 of the six treatment schools had established student governments and the remaining school was planning to establish a student government. According to the student surveys, students in these schools were participating in student government processes. While we could not compare treatment and control schools in this area (because all but one of the control schools for which we have data lacked student governments), **the raw data indicates that the programs were reasonably successful in getting students to**

take part in the governments.

The data also show that differences between control schools and treatment schools in both countries in civics course content and teaching methods were not uniformly great. **The extent of implementation varied in both countries and that incomplete implementation may also explain the limited results.**

The key finding of the study is that factors other than civic education were consistently better predictors of differences between students in civic knowledge, values and behavior. In particular, family environment and the school environment were more important. As discussed below, this finding is consistent with the literature on political socialization.

The implications of these findings for formal civics education are sobering. **They point, above all, to the need for (a) closer monitoring of implementation, and (b) greater consideration of the family and educational contexts in which civics programs are implemented.**

2. Participation

Participation is the one area in which the civic education programs studied had relatively consistent, positive effects. In Poland, effects were found on participation in school clubs and in discussions of politics at home, although not on participation in school government. In the Dominican Republic, the treatment programs seem to have been effective in meeting their aims of establishing school governments and encouraging students to participate in those governments.

In the Dominican Republic, the majority of students in the treatment schools (86%) claimed that they have a student government, and five of the six teachers in the treatment schools confirmed that their schools had established them. As described earlier, the Dominican Republic programs were directed at instituting school government, so the data indicate that they were successful in this aim. The low numbers of control schools with student government (one) prevented us from comparing treatment and control for participation in school government, but the raw data for treatment schools does indicate that -- when school governments are in place -- students take advantage of this opportunity to participate. In treatment schools, 76% of the students voted in council elections; 42% say they regularly assist in council or other student group meetings; and 38% say they have been a candidate for the council.

In Poland no effects on participation in school government were found when we compared rates of participation in control and treatment schools; but the Center for Citizenship Education's KOSS program increased participation in school clubs. KOSS students reported participating in, on average, 1.27 school clubs, while the students from control schools participated in an average of .95 clubs, and FED students in .96. The KOSS score thus represents an increase of more than one third over the control score. By contrast, the difference between the treatment and the control schools in the Dominican Republic were not statistically significant. Graphs 31 and 32 illustrate these findings.

The use of participatory teaching methods in civics classes appears to increase the likelihood that students will participate outside of these classes. Disaggregated by teaching method, the data showed that high use of participatory teaching methods was associated with

KOSS's effect on school club membership, as Graphs 33 and 34 illustrate.

However, when we disaggregated the data by sex, we found positive impact of KOSS only among boys, as Graphs 35 and 36 show. In fact, the "starting point" for boys is lower than for girls (a control score of .85 school groups compared to 1.2 for control girls); the improvement due to treatment brings them almost up to the girls' level. **In terms of participation, as well as on some of the other aspects discussed below, boys appear to benefit from civic education more than girls.**

In Poland, students from the KOSS program who participated in focus groups characterized their level of participation in school activities as low and attributed this to a lack of opportunities, which in turn they believed is due to a lack of school funds for such activities. National education policy requires that school and class governments be formed. The KOSS students in the focus groups felt that student governments were not accorded much importance by school authorities, however, and this discouraged their participation.

Both KOSS and FED led to modest increases in student's participation in political discussions at home. The control score, on a scale of 1-4, was 2.14; KOSS students averaged 2.22 and FED students 2.32. As we discuss further below, home environment is a critical factor in extent of young people's democratic dispositions. The possibility that civic education may affect this environment through the student is encouraging. What this may indicate, at least at a modest level, is the spillover effect of civic education in the family--that civic education may also have effects on family dynamics, and particularly openness within the family, that may reinforce what has been learned, or conveyed, in the classroom. Again, the effect on these factors in the Dominican Republic were insignificant.

Whether the effect on school participation in Poland was the result of the civic education training *per se* or simply more opportunities to participate in the schools (or a combination) is unclear. The Polish focus group results, however, suggest that it may be linked to greater

opportunities. Students reported that they would be willing to participate in school activities if had the opportunities to do so. It does remain a significant fact--especially given the research on school participation and its correlation with adult political participation--that there were significantly higher rates of participation in the schools that adopted the KOSS and in the case of family participation the FED programs.

Participation at this age matters on two counts. As mentioned above, studies have found that participation at an early age is correlated with, and may actually lead to, participation in adulthood. It has also been found that student participation in extracurricular activities can, like other factors discussed below, be more important than civics classes *per se* to civic outcomes (Shaver, p. 433). On the other hand, as with the adult results, it appears that improved participation need not be associated with changes in other dimensions of democratic citizenship.

2. Civic competence

The effects of civic education on knowledge, skills and efficacy were sporadic in Poland and indiscernible in the Dominican Republic (see Graphs 37 and 38). In Poland, the adjusted mean score of KOSS students on *general knowledge* was 3.89 on the 0-5 scale, indicating a treatment effect of .12 over the control mean of 3.77 on the students' knowledge of political leaders, functions of government and the like. If this knowledge is not lost over time, it will have provided young adults who have been through KOSS with slightly more information than students in the control schools with basic facts about Polish political life. The FED program, however, appeared to have a slightly negative effect, with a mean score of 3.64. The difference between the two treatment programs is not surprising: the Center for Citizenship Education's KOSS program provides a comprehensive new substantive curriculum for KOSS teachers; FED's teacher training stressed methods and left lesson-planning up to the individual trainees.

But, as with participation in school clubs, when disaggregated by sex the positive effect of KOSS was seen only among boys and the negative effect of FED only in girls (see Graphs 39 and 40). Also as with participation in school clubs, the control score for boys is lower than for girls, but the increase for boys attributable to treatment is significantly larger.

When disaggregated by levels of political participation in the family, the positive effect of KOSS on general knowledge was found to be concentrated among students from families with high levels of political participation, and the negative effect of FED concentrated among students from families with low levels of political participation. Graphs 41 and 42 illustrates this interaction.

Disaggregation by teaching method, shown in Graphs 43 and 44, revealed that the negative effect of FED is concentrated in schools that use fewer participatory methods in civics classes. As we discuss further below, these two findings are supported by the literature on political socialization which stresses the importance of environmental factors, including family and teaching methods, in the development of civic dispositions.

KOSS had no effect on *efficacy*. The FED program appeared to have a negative effect, with an adjusted mean score of 2.31 on the 1-4 scale, compared to 2.45 for the control group.

On *skills*, KOSS had no effect, but FED had a positive effect: students of FED-trained teachers scored on average 1.15 on the 0-2 scale, compared to 1.07 for the control group.

Disaggregation of the data by sex showed that the positive effect of FED on skills applied only to boys, however. Again, where effects of civic education were found, boys seemed to benefit more than girls.

Disaggregation of the data by teaching method showed that the extent to which teachers used participatory teaching methods in civics classes is important for the impact of civic education on both efficacy and skills. The positive effect of FED is concentrated in schools that use more participatory methods, while the negative effect of FED on efficacy is concentrated in schools that use fewer participatory methods.

The two Dominican Republic programs showed no effects on general knowledge, efficacy or skills. There were no effects on *constitution knowledge* and *school efficacy* in either country.

The effects of civic education on civic competence are thus quite mixed and rather difficult to interpret. In Poland, there were modest positive effects on general knowledge (the KOSS program) and skills (FED). But the FED program seems to have both negative and positive impacts. **The data does indicate, at least in some areas, that boys benefited more from civic education than girls. The results for civic competence also show the importance of contextual factors:** the use of participatory teaching methods and the extent to which family members participate in politics appear particularly influential.

4. Values

The programs studied had very slight effects on values. As with civic competence, effects are sporadic in Poland and absent in the Dominican Republic. In Poland, the largest impact was on *rights of dissent*. The mean score of KOSS students was 2.95 on a scale of 1-4, and the mean for FED 3.01, increases of .07 and .13 respectively over the control score of 2.88. Graphs 45 and 46 depict these differences. But on *racial tolerance* and the *necessity of elections*, KOSS had no effect and FED had only a marginal positive effect. On the *importance of being a good citizen*, KOSS had no effect, while FED had a marginal negative effect.

Interestingly, both programs had a negative effect on *trust in others*; compared to a mean control score of 1.95 on a scale of 1-4, KOSS students averaged 1.81 and FED students 1.75. Graphs 47 and 48 illustrate this effect. One possible explanation is that the Polish civic education programs have encouraged critical thinking in students, and this effect is a short to medium term result of that.

When disaggregated by sex, however, the data showed this negative effect only among boys (see Graphs 49 and 50). Boys started out more trusting than girls (with a control score of 2.07 against the girls' control score of 1.85), but ended up less trusting, scoring 1.76 for KOSS boys and 1.72 for FED boys. This difference is not readily explained and warrants further examination.

The two Dominican Republic programs showed no effects on any measure of values. **In neither country did we find effects on women's role or civic duties. There were also no effects on tolerance in either country.**

In sum, as for adults, the impact of civic education on values appears to be highly limited, at least in the short term. These findings are in accordance with earlier research suggesting that democratic values are difficult to instill in young people as well as adults. Moreover, as we discuss below, democratic values, like other values, are strongly influenced by a host of factors other than civic education or any other given course. The literature on socialization agrees: family, peer group and school environment are more important to value formation than civics *per se*.

5. Implementation issues

How students are taught civics matters. The study examined three measures of the civics classroom environment: the number of relevant content areas used in civics classes, the number of active methodologies used in civics classes, and how free students felt to express themselves in civics classes.

We have already noted a number of interactions between the use of participatory methods in civics classes and the impact of civic education programs in Poland. When we disaggregated treatment students by numbers of participatory methods used in civics classes, we found, for example, that the use of more participatory teaching methods was associated with the positive effect of the FED program on skills. Conversely, the use of fewer participatory methods was associated with the negative effects of FED on students' general knowledge (see Graph 43) and on their sense of efficacy.

This finding agrees with earlier studies. Judith Torney-Purta et al. found in their 1971 multi-country study of civic education that "The encouragement by teachers of expressions of opinion in the classroom (a measure of classroom climate) was positively related to high knowledge scores and less authoritarian attitudes..." while teaching approaches stressing rote learning and patriotic ritual tended to be negatively related to civic education outcomes (Torney-Purta and Schwille, pp. 34-35).

Even more interesting was our finding in Poland that the use of relevant content, the use of participatory methods, and the openness of discussion in civics classes were as important to civic outcomes as being in the treatment group was. This finding has two possible explanations: the "old" curriculum can be well taught; and there may not be great differences between treatment and control conditions.

We explored the second possibility by comparing the treatment and control groups in terms of numbers of relevant content areas, numbers of participatory methods used and openness of civics class environment. The data showed that, indeed, the differences between treatment and control on these measures is not as significant as one might have expected. **Differences in Poland between schools in course content was slight:** the number of relevant content areas covered by civics courses in KOSS, FED and control schools was relatively similar across the programs. The average number of relevant content areas reported by control students was 4.5 (out of a possible score of 7), the average for KOSS students was 4.7, and the average for FED 4.6. **Differences between programs in the use of participatory methods was more discernable.** We asked students how many of 14 participatory methods were used in their civics course. KOSS students reported an average of 7.6 methods, far above the averages for FED of 5 and the control average of 4.5. But even the KOSS program included schools with weaker implementation: 13.4% of KOSS students reported the use of only four or fewer methods, and only 4.8% reported the use of 10 or more.

We also performed this comparison for the Dominican Republic. Differences between treatment and control schools were even smaller: the difference between control and treatment schools in numbers of relevant content areas and class openness were statistically insignificant; the difference in numbers of active methodologies used, an average 6.19 for control schools and 7.1 for treatment schools was slight.

These findings point to significant gaps in the implementation of these programs. These gaps may at least partly explain the modest impact. The findings for the Dominican Republic are not unexpected: initial research on the programs there indicated that these were small projects focussed on a narrow set of schools, with only limited goals -- namely to create and support parent/school associations, create school governments, and provide discrete training to teachers and headmasters in democracy and civic education.

The two Polish projects are clearly different. The Foundation for Education in Democracy (FED) has pursued a limited agenda of training primarily in methods of teaching civics. The KOSS of the Center for Citizenship Education is much more elaborate. KOSS students receive four times more "treatment" in elementary school than students in other schools (i.e. two hours per week for two years vs. one hour a week for one year), teacher training is well organized, and a wide range of supporting materials, such as curricula, lessons plans, readings and activity suggestions are available.

Yet, when we surveyed teachers in both countries we found possible gaps in implementation. According to the teachers surveyed in each sample, there was little difference between the emphasis teachers in the treatment schools placed on civics in the classroom compared to those in the control schools--and in the case of Poland it was in fact less. In the Polish control schools, 46% of the teachers said that civics was either "one of the most important subjects" or "as important as the others." In comparison, only 43% in the KOSS schools and 25% in the FED schools placed as much emphasis on civics relative to the rest of the curriculum. Similarly, in the Dominican Republic, 66% of the teachers in the treatment schools had the same response compared to 100% in the control schools for which we had data. Even more perplexing is that in the Dominican Republic, only two out of the six teachers in the treatment schools reported that they had received some sort of civics training. The results in Poland were a little more uniform; 97% in the KOSS schools and 85% in the FED schools reported or remembered attending a civics training course. **Thus, one possible conclusion for the modest results is that implementation**

was, in all likelihood, uneven in these projects. In the Dominican Republic, only a small number apparently received training, and in both countries the training programs did little to increase the emphasis teachers placed on civics in the curriculum. We return to this point below in recommendations.

Nevertheless, notwithstanding this possible explanation of the results, the findings should not be surprising. Past studies of civics education have found limited impact (Morduchowicz et al., p. 465 and 467, see notes 1 and 14 for references; Torney-Purta and Schwille) especially in contrast to other factors related to the student's home and school environment. We discuss these factors in the next section. Moreover, numerous studies have found factors other than civics classes to be more important, as the next section discusses.

6. Role of other factors

Individually, environmental factors vary in their importance to the levels of the various dependent variables. **But together, in both the Dominican Republic and Poland, family and school environment are more consistently related to whether a student demonstrates democratic knowledge, values and behavior than civic education is.** In other words, the extent to which students are more competent civically, hold democratic values and participate in extracurricular activities depends more on environmental factors than on receiving civic education.

In this study, family environment is operationalized by father's education level, number of family members who speak out about politics, and number of family members who participate in politics. The larger school environment, beyond civics classes, is measured by how free students felt to express themselves elsewhere in school, and how much treatment of citizenship students were exposed to in school outside of civic classes.

We have already noted where the interaction between family political participation and civic education treatment is important in preceding sections. In particular, high levels of family political participation are associated with the positive effect of the KOSS program on general knowledge. High family political participation also affects participation in school clubs. As noted, the more a family participates, the greater the likelihood that their children will participate too. These findings illustrate the reinforcing effects of factors of a supportive family environment on civic education.

But family and school environment factors were also important to civic outcomes regardless of whether students were in the treatment or control groups. **The five measures of family and school environment were not equally significant for every dependent variable, but as a group they were almost always more important than treatment to the results.**

These findings are consistent with the literature on political socialization. In general, the direct teaching of civic attitudes and values has been found not to have effects independent of supportive experiences in the family, peer groups, school and mass media (see Hahn's review of the literature; and Shaver, p. 389, 395, and 433). The most important multi-country study of civic education to date (Torney-Purta et al.) found that "the predictors of group differences across countries were surprisingly similar. After the effects of home background, age, sex, type of school, and type of program had been controlled, a group of predictors that could be called learning conditions" was found to be critical (Torney-Purta and Schwille, p. 35). Students learn values from "the ways that schools embody...values in organization, teaching practices, and social climate" (p.

46). Furthermore, the "learning of values is strongly influenced by many factors that are outside the control of educators..." (p. 47) These include family socioeconomic status (SES). Research in political socialization in various countries has found that "there are important differences in how students approach citizenship, with those from more highly educated and higher status families more likely to see themselves as active, effective and participant." (IEA proposal, p. 8)

What this study found is that civic education served primarily in our cases to reinforce tendencies based in the family environment. This finding presents a policy question. Civic education, when it has any effect, tends to "make the rich richer". Children from high SES, high participation families will probably go on to be more democratically disposed than children from lower SES, low participation families anyway. Civic education, according to our results, seems to reinforce that trend. Similarly, civic education in several areas tended to have a strong effect on boys than on girls. Civic educators and donors might, therefore, consider how to deal with groups who are more difficult to affect.

In sum, the programs studied in Poland did register effects on participation and knowledge and minimal, and in some cases negative (trust), effects on values. The use of participatory methods demonstrated a significant effect irrespective of treatment and control. Based on student reports on the use of participatory methods in the classroom and teachers reports on the emphasis placed on learning civics, one of the conclusions we can draw is that the implementation of the programs was uneven. When participatory methods were used, however, in either control or treatment schools, they did contribute to measurable effects on participation, and in the case of Poland, skills and efficacy. In addition, other factors, namely the family environment and the overall school environment, revealed a greater impact on civic values than civic education. These effects reinforce what previous research has demonstrated to be the most important factors affecting civic/democratic dispositions.

D. Recommendations

The results present something of a catch-22 for civic educators. They agree with other studies' conclusions that civics education is less important than school and family environment in the development of young people's political values and behaviors. And why would we expect one hour a week or even less to significantly change student values given the multitude and cacophony of other influences that young people experience? We need to be realistic about how much civic education itself can affect youth.

At the same time, however, adults in countries that have only recently made the transitions from authoritarianism or communism are unpracticed in democracy. In cases such as in Eastern Europe and the ex-Soviet Union, the youth would seem like the most productive place to begin to create a new civic culture. But according to this research strictly school-based civic education courses may have only a limited impact.

Drawing from the conclusions of this study, this report suggests recommendations both to guide civic education strategy and to assist in its implementation.

- **Just reforming civics classes or curricula in a school may not be enough.** Donors need to look at working at the broader level of school environment beyond just civics reform. In isolation, sporadic civic education classes may not be that important if these practices and norms are not reinforced in other areas of the school. At a more basic level, this can

include, but is not limited to student governments, school clubs, and the methods and pedagogy used in other classes.

- **Bring parents into civics activities or school activities, and stress the importance of the family environment in reinforcing or canceling out civic attitudes.** As our research and a long line of previous research has demonstrated, family environment and family participation is one of the most important factors in a child's political socialization. Thus, civic educators need to consider how to involve parents and family in the civics education. This can include, but again is not limited to, reinforcing school civic education reform with adult civic education for the parents in the community and creating and working with parent/school associations. **In sum, the civic education of children should not be considered separate from the family.**
- **School activities, such as student government and more extra-curricular activities, can be effective means to increase student participation--even beyond civics courses.** This may be an effective way to get students involved, if the first step is just participation. Nevertheless, the spillover effect on values, at least in the short term, appears weak.
- **Affecting changes in girls and in students from lower income families may require a special effort.** Based on this study and others, civic educators need to be aware that civic education tends to have a larger effect on boys and on those who will already be more receptive to civic values, particularly those who come from higher socioeconomic backgrounds. Compensating for this may require a special effort, particularly in lower income neighborhoods. It is in these cases in particular that practitioners may want to redouble the efforts under the second recommendation above.
- **Follow implementation, and ensure that the methods, curricula, and design proposed are fully carried out in the classroom.** Implementing curricular and pedagogical reform is a decentralized and long-term process. Our research indicates, the use of participatory methods and content in the classroom was spotty. Donors should monitor the implementation to ensure that these practices are fully adopted, deepened and improved.
- **Related to the point above, be aware of the difficulty of effectively implementing a broad-based curriculum reform program.** Consider carefully the possible trade-off between breadth of impact/numbers of teachers trained, and depth of impact. **It may be better to get more thorough implementation by concentrating in fewer schools.**

Last, as part of the monitoring of the implementation of programs, civic educators may want to build impact assessment into the program. This can include students and their parents, as a way to trace not only the implementation of the program but also the extent to which the activities have been able to bring in--and affect--the family. Designing a monitoring plan in this way will begin to address some of the questions of socialization.

This study has attempted to measure a complex phenomenon and in a broadly comparative way. It has looked at the impact of specific civics programs implemented through decentralized bureaucracies in two differing countries, one an industrialized ex-Communist country and the other in a developing Latin American country. These bureaucratic, developmental and cultural differences should be kept in mind. Nevertheless, even taken individually, by each country, the

study points to some general conclusions that should guide the design and implementation of civic education programs in schools.

Practitioners will also want to watch the IEA's current multi-country study of civic education. The study covers over 20 countries and addresses relevant issues of impact and curricula. In addition to measuring student attitudes, it also examines and compares curricula, surveys teacher attitudes, methods and training, and examines the influence of school organization. As of this writing, descriptive research is being done; survey research begins in 1998.

VII. How to Evaluate Civic Education Programs

In the field of democracy assistance, USAID and other donors are coming under increasing pressure to provide evidence of results. This project was intended to develop a methodology for measuring direct impacts of civic education. The questionnaire developed and survey methods employed have shown several advantages for both evaluation and program design.

First, survey methods provide quantitative data on how many people were affected, and to what extent, as a result of civic education. In-depth case studies and anecdotes can only provide a measure of a limited number of particular individuals' knowledge, attitudes or behavior. One success story may be interesting, and even relevant, but for evaluation purposes they do not tell us much about whether the intervention was worthwhile. How many people were effectively trained? How has training affected the target population as a whole? If a program has trained 100 people at a cost of \$500,000, one case study or a handful of anecdotes will not provide a convincing argument for the success of the program. Nor will they enable rigorous comparison of programs. In order to understand the scope of the results, it will be better to measure a representative sample of the treatment group that can provide some insight into gross changes. Doing this requires, at a minimum, survey work and quantitative analysis.

In short, in terms of evaluation, quantitative measures can answer the if: if the program had any impact. They can ascertain if the program had a measurable impact on individuals and if it had an impact on a large sample of individuals within the treatment group. And for project design or mid-term evaluation, quantitative methods can offer strong directions in terms of what themes and methods are showing the greatest impact and which groups are best targeted for maximum impact. This sort of information can be invaluable for making adjustments in a program to enhance impact.

These research methods are not the only ones available by far, and it can always be said that there are other questions that have been left unanswered. Qualitative methods can help fill in details and answer why. But every approach has limitations, and good research picks a limited number of questions and seeks to answer them well.

The question then arises of what sort of survey methods can be used. The methods, in terms of sampling, questionnaires and analysis of results, can be tailored to different conditions and cost options. Below we discuss different tactics for conducting a quantitatively oriented impact evaluation. We then address issues in questionnaire construction and adaptation to different environments and requirements in measuring impact.

A. Measuring Impact: Pre/Post Test or Treatment/Control?

There are several ways to conduct a survey, depending on resources, the size of the group or program to be studied, time, and the degree of validity desired. Scaling the survey back has a cost: namely, the loss of statistical validity and much of the richness of the analysis. Nevertheless, even a rudimentary attempt at measuring impact systematically can provide useful and interesting information — particularly for mid-term evaluations.

There are two basic techniques that can be used, and within these there are varying levels of complexity.

1. *Pre/Post-Test*: This is the easiest in terms of logistics and cost. It is also easily built into any civic education activity. A survey questionnaire can be applied to respondents before they take part in the program, and then a comparable questionnaire can be applied several months afterward. The post-test, however, should not be conducted immediately afterwards for two reasons. First, when the time between the “treatment” and the test is so short, it is difficult to know if the test is measuring only learned responses rather than enduring changes in knowledge, values, attitudes, etc. Second, if the intent is to change behavior there must be time and opportunity for behavior change to take place. In these cases, a longer time period between the training and post-test is preferable. The intent of impact assessment should be to determine the extent to which the changes in knowledge, values and behavior last. In order to conduct the post-test, however, it is necessary to keep records of the participants and their addresses so that they can be located later.

The problem with simple pre-post tests of this kind is the absence of a control sample, i.e. a group of individuals who did not receive the treatment. Ideally, a pre-post test design will include comparisons between a treatment group over time and a control group over the same time period to determine whether differences truly exist between the two groups.

2. *Post-Test Only Control/Treatment*: A second option for sampling is a post-test only control/treatment design. In this kind of design (similar to that carried out in our project), surveys are conducted on a treatment sample and a control sample *after* the treatment program has been carried out.

This method, too, has its limitations, both in terms of results and logistics. Control and treatment samples need to be sufficiently large that valid comparisons can be made between the two. Control groups also need to encompass a set of individuals with comparable characteristics to those in the treatment. The more diverse and/or dispersed the treatment group the more difficult this becomes.

In this study we sought a control group with which we could make valid comparisons with participants both locally and nationally (i.e. to the overall population). As can be seen from the description on pages 19 and 20, this led to a very complicated design. We had to get a valid sample in the region where the project was conducted and nationally. To do this, we instructed the survey firm to first randomly select a national control group and then, randomly over-sample in the specific areas we were studying.

National random sampling and over-sampling may not be worthwhile or cost-effective for smaller evaluations. Such a design can be done on a smaller scale when the participants are in geographically limited areas and it is relatively easy to locate a comparable control group of individuals in the same region. In these cases, if the evaluator wants only to compare results within a specific region it may be necessary only to test participants and then either: (a) randomly select a sufficiently large control group in the same area, or (b) target a comparable sub-population in the area and interview them (for example, if the program focused on women, finding women in the town who did not participate).

One of the strongest advantages of doing a post-test only control/treatment design is that you can compare the average participant to the average non-participant. The comparisons between those who have participated and those who have not can yield useful data on whom the project is reaching in terms of income, sex, etc., compared to the national averages in these areas. For this reason, a more elaborate pre-post test design should include a control sample as well to assess the

project's outreach.

The disadvantage of this kind of design is that it may be difficult to find individuals after they have been trained, and it is not certain that all pre-existing differences between the treatment and control groups have been included in the analysis. For this reason this kind of design may overestimate the effect of civic education treatments on democratic outcomes. With the pre-post test design, this difficulty is overcome to a large extent, *provided* a control group is included in the design.

In sum, both designs have advantages: the pre-post test can be cheaper and measure causality more directly, and the control/treatment, if the former is large enough, can illuminate issues of population impact. For both of these, it is necessary to maintain lists of those trained. Doing this will significantly ease the logistical burden of surveying participants after the programs.

B. Adapting the Questionnaires

As the results and analysis demonstrate, it is worthwhile casting a wide net to capture as many results — expected and unexpected — as possible. The reasons for the specific categories that this project measured (knowledge, efficacy, tolerance) were explained in a previous section [III A] and do not bear repeating here. Their relevance to democratic participation and civic values is well accepted in political science research and literature. Any serious and complete attempt to measure the impact of civic education should include these characteristics. How can this be done?

In any of these categories, a questionnaire can include as many questions as the evaluators think necessary, although for some categories there are limits to the minimum number. We recognize that resources for data analysis and questionnaire design may be limited; it is simply beyond the scope of some missions or NGOs to develop scales, and do complex analyses such as factor analysis, and the like. For this reason, for smaller or more informal evaluations, it may be necessary to select only one or two questions in each category and then calculate percentages for each one. When the samples are small, it could be possible to calculate the percentages by hand.

Below are some guidelines for designing questionnaires. (The following refers primarily to adult questionnaire design, but most of these comments are applicable or adaptable to the student questionnaire. Section VI of this report explains the modifications necessary to take age and school setting into account; and the student questionnaires in Annex B illustrate these modifications.)

Knowledge: Again, project evaluators can include as many knowledge questions as they think necessary. Generally, however, it is desirable to cover several different dimensions of knowledge: knowledge of the political system in general (e.g., what is the role of the parliament?), and knowledge of rights (e.g., is the right to association protected in the constitution?). In addition, evaluators may want to add project-specific knowledge questions. For example, if the project focused on women's rights, a question on the rights of women protected in the constitution could be included. As a rule of thumb, knowledge questions should not be placed at the beginning of a survey questionnaire. When they are, refusal rates of respondents go up, because respondents feel they are being tested rather than surveyed.

Tolerance: There is a standard set of tolerance questions that has been tested and generally accepted in the social sciences. Referred to as the Stouffer Index, these can be easily adapted for a

simpler questionnaire. (See Finkel et al., forthcoming, pp. 6ff.) The intent of the series of questions is to test the extent to which the individual will accord political rights such as freedom of speech, the right to vote and the right to hold office to an individual who holds opposing points of view. In the attached questionnaire, we asked such questions of three different types of groups. It is necessary, even in a simplified questionnaire, if you are going to pre-determine the groups, to include at least two groups that represent opposite ends of the ideological spectrum in a given society. Since an individual may not feel so strongly about a communist, for example, as about a military officer, it is necessary to include groups from at least two different extremes of the political spectrum. If time or cost prevent asking the question in this more detailed fashion, there is another option, the "Least Liked Group" approach: Rather than present two groups, leave the question open. Ask the individual to name the group that s/he disagrees with the most. Then ask them, do you believe that this group should have the right to: 1) Express its views in public? 2) Vote in elections? 3) Hold public office? (See Gibson, 1992 for a comparison of the Stouffer and "least liked" methods.)

For all of these tolerance questions we used a four-point agree/disagree scale (strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree, don't know). This provides a much more precise way of measuring differences. For the purpose of simplicity, however, the evaluator can also consider a simple agree/disagree option. This will produce less variation in the responses, however.

Trust and Social Capital: With the increased attention that social capital has received in recent years, several different researchers have developed means to measure trust. The most straightforward are questions 607, 608 and 701 (a-f) in the questionnaire which we asked as a four-point agree/disagree questions. (All question numbers refer to the Poland adult questionnaire.)

System Support: There are two ways to ask system support questions. One way is represented by questions 601, 602 and 603. Another is represented by questions 703 (a-j). In the first set, we were testing how much people trusted the government. In the second set we tested how much they trust specific institutions. The former is an interesting test of public cynicism toward government in general; the latter a test of their perceptions of institutions.

Women's Participation: For this we used two questions, both with four-point agree-disagree response scales. One question addresses women's participation in politics, the other rights in the home. These questions are 413 and 414 in the attached questionnaire. To these we could have added another, "Women should have the same rights as men in every way."

Skills: For this we asked a series of questions on respondents' self-evaluation of specific skills. In our results we collapsed the answers and scaled them. This provided a scale from 0-12 with which we could compare the treatment and control. Just as easily, though, we could have kept them separate and calculated them individually. For a pre- and post-test this would be the most interesting. (For example, "we noted a 29% increase in how respondents evaluated their speaking skills compared to others before and after the training.") In calculating the answers to these questions we counted "better than" as the correct response, and "more or less the same" as a neutral response. These questions are 305 to 310.

Efficacy: We used a set of four standard political efficacy questions that we scaled. Typically the set of questions we used is kept together. Nevertheless, for a simpler, more back-of-

the-envelope test, one or two could be pulled out and used. Here the goal is to measure respondents' own sense of efficacy and the responsiveness of the system. These are questions 301 to 304.

Civil Society Participation [Group Membership]: This is an important set of questions, both to measure impact, but also — as we discovered — to measure whom civic education is reaching, i.e. is it reaching those who are already in networks of civil society organizations. Here the intent is to measure two things: if respondents participate in groups and how much. It is important to ask about as many groups as possible (community, sports, unions, etc.). At the end it is necessary to ask two other questions to catch anything that may have been missed: do you belong to a group that was not mentioned? did you participate in any of the activities of the groups we mentioned but are not a member? In calculating the results, the total number of groups can be added up for each person. These are questions 901 to 911.

Political Participation: What sorts of political participation to measure will depend on the specific country context, and should be adjusted to reflect conditions in country. Generally speaking, survey questionnaires ask if the person participated in any of the following acts, for example: attend a town meeting, vote, work to solve a community problem, contact a local official, take part in a protest, etc. The idea is to capture as many different ways as possible that an individual could participate politically in a system. In addition, it is useful to ask to what extent they have discussed politics with friends and with family members, as a way to measure their level of passive engagement. In the analysis, the number of participatory acts the respondent has engaged in are totaled. In a pre/post-test the analyst can count the acts up and compare them individual by individual. With a larger control/treatment group, the analyst can calculate the mean of participatory acts for each group and compare them. These questions are 1001 to 1015 in the questionnaire.

Demographics: In order to compare impact to demographic factors and/or to control for specific factors, questionnaires should include questions that get at: level of education of respondent; income; location (rural/urban); and gender. Results from these questions can also be useful for project design and mid-term evaluation: on what strata of the society is the program having the most impact? What does that mean for how you should concentrate — or not concentrate — your efforts? The demographic questions we used were by and large the standard demographic questions used by the polling firms contracted. This enabled comparison to national-level demographic data. These are in the last section of the questionnaire.

Program Specific Questions: If the survey is being used for project design or a mid-term evaluation, it is essential to include questions on program implementation and the exposure of the participant to the program. These questions include: the extent to which the participant was able to participate in the class; the types of methods used; the number of times the participant took part; and the time since the participant last attended. These questions can elicit information on what activities are having a larger impact and why. As discussed earlier, the program specific questions were developed by the team. These questions are in Section XI of the questionnaire.

Finally, we want to stress that all the questions should be pre-tested on a small but representative sample of treatment individuals.

VIII. Conclusion

Social science research on participation and democratic values has shown that there are powerful influences on civic culture and practice that are not related to civic education. The institutional environment in which people participate shapes their behavior and attitudes; the availability of social networks for participation is important for channeling participation; and a number of factors of political socialization (family socioeconomic level, and culture) shape attitudes and values. This study indicates that well-designed civic education programs can address some of these factors, but they cannot overcome them alone. On the basis of this study, we believe that civic education is best considered as one possible tactic within a larger democracy programming strategy.

This research project has not attempted to answer every question regarding the impact of civic education. However, we believe that it has presented some initial findings on what donors can reasonably expect the impact of civic education to be, how to increase impact, and how to measure impact for on-going programs. We also hope that this study and/or studies like it can be a useful tool for sparking and structuring discussion with partners. For example, the model can help clarify aims. Survey results can help tighten implementation. And discussion of results can lead to further insights into the questions of why and how civic education may have impact.

We hope that by beginning this research we have started a longer term interest in rigorously measuring the extent to which civic education affects people's democratic orientations. A more sustained and broader research effort in this area would surely provide more background and sharper conclusions. Future research should broaden this study by examining a wide range of types of civic education programs and country settings. It should also attempt to deepen our understanding of the impact of particular program objectives, content and methodologies. For example: Which channels for participation are particularly successful in reinforcing civic education aims? And if participation increases, does the nature of participation -- its modes and aims -- also change? This study focused on the question of whether civic education programs have impact. We cannot answer the "why" of impact without knowing more about the characteristics of successful programs, in terms of content, duration, methods, etc. Finally, as research in this area proceeds, we should also seek to refine the research methodology. We can sharpen the research instruments, and expand the pool of questions, for example to examine people's attitudes to economic change. And most importantly, where feasible, future studies should employ pre- and post-test designs with control groups to measure impact.

Efforts to develop a "civic culture" are too important not to examine as carefully as we can.