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A Desk Study of U.S. Assistance To Rwanda's Complex Humanitarian Emergency 1995-1998

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Rwanda and Burundi



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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AFR	Africa Bureau
AICF	Action Internationale contre la Faim
AICF/F	Action Internationale contre la Faim/France
AICF/US	Action Internationale contre la Faim/United States
AMREF	African Medical and Research Foundation
APR	Rwandan Patriotic Army (in French)
ARC	American Refugee Committee
BHR	Bureau of Humanitarian Response
CEPGL	Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (in French)
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CRWRC	Christian Reformed World Relief Committee
DART	Disaster Assistance Response Team
DOJ	Department of Justice
DW	Doctors of the World
ESF	Economic Support Funds
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FFP	Food for Peace
FHI	Food for the Hungry International
FPR	Rwandan Patriotic Front (in French)
FTC	Feed the Children
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GOR	Government of Rwanda
GOZ	Government of Zaire
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
IDP	Internally displaced persons
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRC	International Rescue Committee
ISP	Integrated Strategic Plan
MDM	Médecins du Monde
MIGEFASO	Ministry of Gender, Family, and Social Affairs
MSF/B	Médecins sans Frontieres/Belgium
NGO	Nongovernmental organization
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives
REAPII	Rwanda Emergency Agriculture Program
SCF	Save the Children Federation
SCF/UK	Save the Children Federation/United Kingdom
SCF/US	Save the Children Federation/United States
UN	United Nations
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda

UNDHA	United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNREO	United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
WFP	World Food Program
WHO	World Health Organization
WIT	Women in Transition
WVRD	World Vision Relief & Development

I. INTRODUCTION

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Strategic Plan, completed in 1997, outlines six Agency goals, the sixth of which concerns humanitarian assistance and is defined as "Lives Saved, Suffering Reduced associated with natural or man-made disasters reduced, and conditions necessary for political and/or economic development re-established." Within this goal area, four specific performance goals with corresponding indicators were set:

1. Crude mortality rate for refugee populations returned to normal range within six months of onset of emergency situation. Indicator: crude mortality rate in emergency situation.

2. Nutritional status of children under five years of age and other populations made vulnerable by emergencies maintained or improved. Indicator: Proportion of children under 59 months who are wasted (weight-for-height).

3. Conditions for social and economic development in post-conflict situation improved. Indicator: Number of people displaced by open conflict.

4. Freedom of movement, expression and assembly, and economic freedom in post-conflict situations increased. Indicator: changes in the number and classification of designated post-conflict countries classified by Freedom House as free/partly free/not free. Economic Freedom Composite Index. (USAID 1997 Strategic Plan)

While this framework was not in place during the initial USAID response to the complex emergency in Rwanda, it does offer benchmarks that assist in assessing the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance interventions.

This paper will review the causes of the Rwandan complex emergency and USAID's response, and offer an analysis of evaluations and studies to date on the effectiveness of this aid package. In consideration of the above criteria, this analysis will provide insight regarding three basic questions:

- Did emergency assistance save lives and alleviate suffering? If so, to what extent?

- Did emergency assistance reduce or prolong hostilities and political instability associated with the complex emergency? If so, to what extent?

- Did emergency assistance contribute to long-term development? If so, to what extent?

The analysis will conclude with a discussion of results and lessons learned taken from both governmental and non-governmental sources.

II. BRIEF HISTORICAL NOTE

Prior to colonization in the late-nineteenth century, historical accounts of Rwanda and Burundi are controversial. Some scholars believe that in the sixteenth century, the Tutsis invaded from the north, forcing the Hutu population into serfdom under feudal systems based on land and cattle (Minear and Guillot, 53). Others indicate that, after the migration of the Tutsi, the region was divided into smaller kingdoms, with the Hutu controlling several small kingdoms in the northwest and south and the Tutsi controlling the central region. The discrepancy may be attributed to the political motivations of the colonial establishment that recorded the regions oral history. Germany consolidated this multi-ethnic region into one colony, Ruanda-Urundi, and retained power until Belgium captured the territory during World War I.

The Germans instituted a policy of ethnic classification, distinguishing between Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa, showing preference for the Tutsi, whom they described as the "Lord's race." This distinction was based upon colonial perceptions of the social and economic status of the indigenous population. Initially, the Belgians also favored the Tutsi population, offering them more opportunities for education and career advancement. This led to resentment by the majority Hutu population, and the establishment of the *Parmehutu* political party, whose mandate called for the independence of the Hutu people both from European and Tutsi colonizers.

In the 1950s, Belgian colonial administrators began to reverse their policies in Ruanda-Urundi in favor of the Hutu population. In 1959, Hutu leaders took advantage of this policy reversal, and staged "the Social Revolution," overthrowing the Tutsi king of Rwanda and instigating the exodus of a large number of Tutsi to neighboring countries—creating a population that is now referred to as "old case-load refugees." In 1962, the Republic of Rwanda obtained its independence and Gregoire Kayibanda, a member of the *Parmehutu* party, was named its first president.

After independence, Tutsi rebels within and outside Rwanda tried a number of times to overthrow the *Parmehutu* government. In 1963, rebel skirmishes resulted in retaliatory massacres of Tutsi civilians by the Hutu government and the flight of more Rwandan Tutsis. After this incident, the country remained relatively stable until a non-violent coup led by the minister of defense and head of the national guard, Juvenal Habyarimana, overthrew Kayibanda's government in 1973. Habyarimana established the second republic under military rule, with promises to end military rule within five years.

Throughout his twenty-year presidency, Habyarimana's popularity steadily declined as his program to reduce ethnic tensions and create more equal opportunities showed no discernable results. Many observed that the program merely reinforced Hutu domination. In October 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR), a Tutsi-dominated militia formerly known as the Rwandan Alliance for National Unity, attacked from Uganda, demanding political reforms and the resettlement of Rwandan refugees. In response, the government imprisoned 8,000-10,000 Tutsi and suspected anti-Habyarimana Hutu. In 1992, the *Interahamwe*, "those who attack together,"

and the *Impuzamugambi,* "those who have the same goal," militias were founded with training and supplies from the Rwandan army.

In August 1993, after months of negotiations, the Government of Rwanda (GOR) and the FPR signed an accord in Arusha, Tanzania, which guaranteed demobilization, the creation of an ethnically integrated army, a transitional government led by a mutually agreed upon prime minister, and multiparty elections. The peace lasted until 6 April 1994, when a plane carrying Habyarimana and Burundian president Ntarymira was shot down near Kigali airport. Hutu extremists accused the FPR of causing the crash, and Hutu soldiers, the presidential guard, the *Interahamwe*, and the *Impuzamugambi* began killing Tutsi civilians and anti-extremist Hutus. The day after the plane crash, fighting between the GOR and the FPR began again, lasting until the Habyarimana-loyal government fled to Zaire in July. The FPR declared victory and established the government of national unity, led by Hutu Faustin Twagiramunga.

From April to July, 500,000 to 1 million people, predominantly Tutsi, were massacred, many women and girls were raped repeatedly, 2 million were displaced within Rwanda, and 2 million primarily Hutu refugees fled into Zaire and Tanzania. There is evidence to suggest that the massacres were planned in advance of Habyarimana's death by the *akazu*, a clique that formed around Habyarimana's family. It is important to note that there are numerous accounts of attrocities committed by both sides of the conflict.

After the FPR took power, a large influx of old case-load Tutsi refugees returned to Rwanda from Burundi and Uganda. Security in internally displaced persons (IDP) camps in Rwanda and refugee camps housing Rwandans in neighboring countries began to deteriorate in mid-to-late-1994. The Rwandan Patriotic Army (APR) began to close displaced persons camps because the GOR—and the international community—believed that they were hiding *Interahamwe* members. In April 1995, violence broke out in the Kibeho camp, a particularly popular destination for *Interahamwe* displaced, between the APR and IDPs.

Prisons in Rwanda became increasingly over-crowded as the APR arrested anyone suspected of involvement in the genocide. Rumors of retaliatory violence by the APR against the Hutu population, fear of imprisonment for participation in the massacres, and intimidation within refugee camps by *Interahamwe* members, discouraged many from returning to Rwanda.

Development Assistance in Rwanda

Prior to the genocide, Rwanda's development indicators were improving—prompting many in the development community to point to Rwanda as model of development. The international community provided the small nation with more funding than almost any other developing country in the world. Before 1993, there were approximately 200 donor organizations working in Rwanda, and in 1989-90, "official development aid accounted for 11.4 percent of Rwanda's gross domestic product (GDP)" (Uvin 1998, 40-1).

However, the indicators, while improving, remained incredibly low, even for Africa. Despite the large amount of aid pouring into the country, the quality of life for the majority of the popluation was not improving. Aid was channeled by the GOR to political allies in the president's homeland—intentionaly excluding the Tutsi popluation.

In the early 1990s, the international community began to implement conflict-resolution and democracy programs in an effort to end the civil war. Efforts to facilitate a peace agreement ignored government-sanctioned violations of human rights. Several agencies even increased military funding, despite clauses in the foreign aid policies of most nations to act to stop flagrant human rights abuses (Uvin 1998, 82-3; 96; 229).

Peter Uvin suggests that this passive attitude reflects the traditional view that foreign aid should focus on economic growth and should not intervene in domestic political issues (Uvin 1998, 225, 231). Uvin suggests that international community should have reevaluated its policies in light of the increasing violence, racism, and inequality apparent in spite of steady and significant economic growth before and during the civil war (Uvin 1998, 229).

III. ANTECEDENTS TO THE CRISIS AND THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

Although the crisis in Rwanda is often considered to be the result of historical ethnic tensions in the small nation, the antecedents to the crisis in Rwanda are extremely diverse. This section will briefly review the conditions that led to the genocide in 1994 and provide an overview of the initial response of the international community.

Antecedents to the crisis

The complexity of the crisis has roots in the colonial legacy of Rwanda, regional issues, economic factors, environmental scarcity, food security, social factors and refugee issues. The following discussion provides a brief explanation of each of these issues.

The colonial legacy and ethnic tensions

There is little doubt that ethnic tensions played a crucial role in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the humanitarian crisis that followed. However, the source of these tensions is seldom examined by the media, who often portray the violence as the result of an age old ethnic divide that the Tutsi and Hutu were unable to reconcile. In fact, there is little agreement among Rwandans or outside analysts as to the ethnic distinction between the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa. Some point to these groups as specific ethnic groups or races. (Uvin 1998, 13). Others insist that differences arose is a result of numerous factors including socioeconomic status, marriage, kinship lines, and social position, which according to some, could and did change over time.

Most scholars, however, point to Rwanda's colonial legacy as the root of current ethnic tensions in the country. The period of indirect rule by the Germans distributed power primarily to the Tutsi and fostered ethnic tensions. Colonial policies that required ethnic classification on identity cards facilitated efforts to provide health and education services only to the emerging Tutsi elite minority—excluding the Hutu population. Some analysts describe this process as the policy of enthnogenesis—"a politically-motivated creation of ethnic categories" (Eriksson 1996, 13).

Michel Chossudovsky notes that "[a] climate of fear and distrust was installed, communal solidarity broke down, ... [T]he objective was to fuel inter-ethnic rivalries as a means of achieving political control as well as preventing the development of solidarity between the two

ethnic groups."(Choussudovsky 1996, 938) The Belgians attempted to reverse this unequal distribution of power by transferring power to the Hutu majority just before independence. This atmosphere shaped the environment in which Rwanda gained independence and the struggle for political and economic power that developed along ethnic lines.

Regional issues

To complicate matters further, the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa are all part of a single heritage. The Banyarwanda is a historical region that comprises Rwanda, eastern Zaire, Uganda, north-western Tanzania, and Burundi. The people of this region have shared a common heritage throughout modern history and only became distinct populations when the colonial powers drew artificial borders in the region. As a result, the political, social, and economic conditions of each nation in the region are deeply intertwined. People, weapons, consumer goods, ideas, and fears flow freely across the borders. Thus, many refugee problems in the region, such as Rwanda in the 1960s and Burundi in the 1970s, have been partially resolved through host country and third country resettlement.

The importance of examining the regional context of the situation in Rwanda is exemplified by recent examples of international interventions. For example, some recent aid and relief efforts USAID/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and the United Nations (UN) have adopted a regional perspective.

Economic factors

In addition to ethnic and regional issues, Rwanda suffered from an economic collapse, which reached its climax in 1992. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Rwanda made significant economic progress. The economy was largely dependent on coffee exports that accounted for 80 percent of its foreign exchange earnings. The real growth rate of GDP was 4.6 percent per annum from 1965-1989, and Rwanda enjoyed the lowest inflation rate in sub-Saharan Africa at 4 percent per annum throughout the 1980s.

Choussudovsky, among others, points to the conditionality placed on multi-lateral and bi-lateral loans and aid—specifically by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and USAID—as a primary cause of the crises. The role of the push for democratization was discussed above in Section I. The adoption of the structural adjustment program in 1990 called for a 50 percent devaluation of the Rwandan franc that was intended to increase coffee exports and begin to rebuild the devastation brought on by the incursion of the FRP. Instead, the devaluation sparked inflation and a decrease in real earnings. Balance of payments problems emerged, sending many state owned enterprises into bankruptcy and halting most government services—including those for health and education. Under Bretton Woods direction, the government froze coffee prices at the 1989 level, well below market value, causing a crisis in the coffee industry.

A second devaluation was ordered by the IMF in June 1992, further increasing the process for fuel and consumer goods and cutting coffee production by 25 percent. The crisis in the coffee industry had devastating effects throughout the agricultural sector. Choussudovsky notes that cheap food imports and foreign food aid further destabilized local markets during this period.

Environmental scarcity

As noted above, the Rwandan economy was based in the agricultural sector. As the sector collapsed, the civil war was aggravated. Valerie Percival and Thomas Homer-Dixon reviewed the effects of environmental scarcity in Rwanda and found that important factors in its development in Rwanda were the size and activities of the population.. From 1985 to 1990, the population growth rate was 3.3 percent per year. A rising population and continued violence placed increasing demands on the environment, as 95 percent of the population lived in rural areas and 90 percent relied on agriculture for their livelihood (Percival 1995, 5).

By the late 1980s, environmental scarcity resulted in the inability of the agricultural system to produce enough food for the population. All arable land was being farmed, and these was no land available for expansion in the face of a growing population. Rwanda began to experience food shortages. At the same time, it became increasingly difficult to maintain a livelihood in the rural areas—forcing people to move to ecologically fragile areas, i.e., on hillsides and arid lands. Finally, the legitimacy of the government was undermined as it became increasingly difficult to provide for the needs of the population. Much of the development aid acquired by the Habyarimana government was channeled to the north west—Habyarimana's home region—and not to the areas most affected by environmental scarcity and agricultural decline, which increased resentments and hostilities and contributed to the violence. Annex 9 outlines Percival and Homer-Dixon's arguments regarding the relationship between environmental scarcity and conflict in Rwanda.

Food security

Prior to the late 1980s, Rwanda enjoyed high levels of local-level food security and imported only minimal food commodities—despite relative food insecurity throughout the Great Lakes Region. For example, in 1986, 90 percent of the Rwanda's food energy needs were met by domestic production (FAO 1997). Traditional food staples, such as cassava and banana beer, had been established in urban, as well as rural, markets. However, as the pressure of environmental scarcity and economic decline affected the production of the agricultural sector, sharp declines in per capita food availability were experienced. By 1995, only 50 percent of Rwanda's food energy requirements could be met by domestic production (FAO 1997). The structural adjustment program lifted import quotas that protected local producers and opened markets to inexpensive food imports. The declining coffee prices and the devaluation created a need to push increasing acreage into coffee cultivation, resulting in a decline of traditional crop production. Famines and food insecurity quickly became characteristic of the once food secure nation—further complicating the crisis.

Social factors

As in the economic sector, Rwanda was beginning to make progress in the social sector between 1970 and 1980. Primary school enrollment was rising and health services were reaching more Hutu citizens. However, poverty levels remained high and access to services was still far from equitable. As the economic situation worsened, the government's abilities to maintain the same level of service provision deteriorated, thus contributing to the tension and resentment in the country toward the government.

Refugees

The Rwandan crisis was further complicated by the presence of a pre-existing refugee problem from the 'social revolution' in 1959. As a result of increasing violence throughout the country toward the Tutsi minority, many Tutsis began fleeing to neighboring countries. From 1963-1964, between 40 to 70 percent of the surviving Tutsi found themselves as refugees (Uvin 1998, 20). These Rwandans received little support from the newly elected presidential government for return to Rwanda. The descendants of these refugees, a generation raised in refugee camps, were easily recruited into the FPR that invaded Rwanda in October 1990.

IV. THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS 1994-1995

Creation of the UN Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) was approved on 5 October 1993 with an initial mandate of six months and 2,500 person force. On 5 April 1994, UNAMIR was extended for four months on the condition that implementation of the Arusha Accord continue on schedule. Later that month, after ten Belgian UNAMIR soldiers and several indigenous UN personnel were killed, the UN Security Council decided to withdraw all but 270 troops (Kinloch, 141). Also in April, the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) developed the United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office (UNREO) to coordinate UN and nongovernmental organization (NGO) activities in Rwanda (OFDA Situation Report, 11/29/94, 3).

During the worst of the violence, the UN Advance Humanitarian Team maintained staff in Kigali as did the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), but their activities were severely limited. The reduced UNAMIR force was able to protect 25,000 civilians from massacre, and a few organizations were able to deliver supplies to FPR-controlled areas (Eriksson, 25-6).

In May, the UN Security Council approved UNAMIR II with a mandate of 5,500 troops, requesting military support from member states. By the end of May, only Ghana, Senegal, and Ethiopia had promised participation—committing a total of 2,200 troops—so deployment of UNAMIR II was postponed.

In July, the UN agreed to allow the French, with military support from seven countries, to deploy 2,500 troops under Operation Turquoise. Operation Turquoise created a safe humanitarian zone in southwest Rwanda, providing protection for IDPs so that no more would flee into Burundi and Zaire. Before the deployment of UNAMIR II, beginning in late August, Operation Turquoise facilitated the delivery of 10,000 tons of relief supplies through Goma, buried thousands killed in the massacre, and made medical assistance possible in Goma and Cyangugu (Kinloch, 141).

Between April and December 1994, the international community pledged $1.4 million to respond to the crisis in Rwanda. The US Government and the European Union (EU) were the largest official contributors, pledging fifty percent of total funding. Fifty percent of total funding was distributed through UN organizations, predominantly the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Program (WFP). Approximately 200 NGOs were also involved in relief efforts (Eriksson, 25).

In November 1994, after the GOR had already closed a number of IDP camps, the GOR, the UN, and other international organizations developed Operation Retour to coordinate registration and transportation of IDPs. By April 1995, 40,000 IDPs returned to their homes. After October 1994, international assistance began to focus on relief-to-development with programs like food for work, the seeds and tools agricultural production program, and training programs in basic health care. In addition, the international community focused on refugee and IDP resettlement activities, food aid and nutrition programs, emergency health care activities, water and sanitation programs, infrastructure rebuilding, and reunification programs (OFDA Annual Report, FY 1995, 30).

By late 1994, the security and living situations in refugee camps in Zaire had drastically deteriorated. Most refugees were Hutu and had fled with the former government in July. The *Interahamwe* had taken control of many camps and violently convinced refugees to refuse participation in a UNHCR repatriation program. In response, the UN Secretary General requested military support from member nations to create a force of 12,000 troops to provide security for the camps. By January 1995, this idea was abandoned due to lack of international support. In June, the UN and the Zairian military reached an agreement for supervision of the camps by Zairian troops. By mid-1995, the situation in the camps was so unsafe that the Government of Zaire (GOZ) decided that it could no longer supervise the camps. The GOZ began deporting refugees until reaching a compromise with UNHCR for a less forceful repatriation plan (Europa, 851).

Initial Lessons Learned

The international community has been harshly criticized for failure to uphold the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The misunderstanding of and disregard for genocide warning signs factored significantly in the international community's lack of an adequate response. In addition, the political insignificance of Rwanda to many nations coupled with an unwillingness to risk the lives of peacekeeping soldiers resulted in an almost ineffectual peacekeeping force that could not stop the massacres in April 1994. To rectify these issues, the international community should implement and utilize early warning systems and should be held accountable for their failures to uphold the convention on genocide (Eriksson, p. 46-49).

The international community did not make sufficient use of resources available through regional organizations like the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL). In the future, the international community should make full use of regional organizations in peacekeeping and relief assistance efforts (Eriksson, p. 49-50).

Finally, a lack of policy consistency, including a lack of adherence to conditions placed on aid, also contributed to the ultimate failure of the international community in Rwanda. The UN system and the international community as a whole must coordinate their policies to prevent duplication of efforts and gaps in assistance. In addition, international organizations must maintain policy consistency and must uphold conditions placed on aid (Eriksson, p. 53).

V. USAID RESPONSE TO THE EMERGENCY 1995-1998

As USAID assistance to Rwanda continued in 1995, the focus gradually began to shift from relief to rehabilitation in order to meet local needs. BHR/OFDA closed its Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) office in 1995, and the Agency reopened the Mission in Kigali. In 1996, an Integrated Strategic Plan (ISP) was developed as a mechanism to coordinate all U.S. government assistance to Rwanda, with USAID at the helm. This section outlines USAID assistance from 1995 to the present and summarizes the ISP.

The ISP

USAID has provided humanitarian assistance to Rwanda since the onset of the crisis in 1994. From 1994 to 1997, assistance within Rwanda consisted mainly of emergency aid in the areas of health and nutrition, water and sanitation, seeds and tools, and food and non-food distribution to vulnerable populations. After the massive return of refugees from Zaire and Tanzania toward the end of 1996, USAID assistance also addressed the immediate, unmet needs for reintegration of the refugee population. In addition to this humanitarian assistance, USAID/Rwanda also implemented activities with development assistance funds from the Africa Bureau (AFR), the Office of Transition Initiatives in the Bureau for Humanitarian Response (BHR/OTI) as well as Economic Support Funds (ESF) from the U.S. State Department. Key activities of USAID/Rwanda's two strategic objectives included the award of grants to international NGOs to help communities deal with orphans and separated children, the training of social service professionals, support of a post-genocide policy conference, support for the rehabilitation of judicial infrastructure, and the training of lawyers and public safety forces. Throughout this initial period of involvement, coordination among USAID funding sources and with other US Government (USG) agencies was minimal.

The ISP for Rwanda was developed in 1997 to address problems of coordination of resources and consistency of policy among the major USG donors (USAID, State Department, and Department of Defense), and the instability of the transition period under which U.S. assistance programs were being implemented. The ISP represents a progressive and unique effort to bring together the human, technical, and financial resources of the USG to achieve common objectives of relief, stability, and economic and social growth to Rwanda. The plan attempts the coordinated use of the funds pledged by the USG, FY 1997 through FY 1999, including all USAID funding sources (Africa Bureau, Food For Peace, Office of Transition Initiatives, and Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance) as well as the resources programmed for Rwanda by the U.S. State Department, U.S. Information Agency, and the Department of Defense. The plan also reflects an intense process of consultation with other international donor organizations so that US Government resources are programmed to complement, rather than duplicate, those of other donors.

In addition to coordination of resources for maximum effectiveness and impact, the ISP takes into account the fluidity and instability of the situation on the ground in Rwanda by incorporating appropriate conceptual and programmatic linkages between Emergency, Transition, and Development activities. Like the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI), on whose overarching principles the plan is based, the ISP for Rwanda does not accept a linear approach to the transition from crisis to recovery. The strategic objectives and intermediate

results packages agreed upon in this transition assistance plan rather attempt to integrate humanitarian, rehabilitation, and long-term recovery resources to promote stability and create a future environment conducive to economic and social development and investment in Rwanda. Taking into consideration the precarious domestic and regional situation, the ISP also develops crisis modifiers designed to ensure sufficient flexibility within the plan to allow a quick and appropriate program adaptation to either prevent or mitigate a recurrent crisis. Other program themes include capacity-building and building a solid foundation for development.

The transition program goals are stability and strengthened development capacity. To achieve these goals, the plan includes two strategic objectives. Strategic objective #1 focuses on increasing the rule of law and accountability in governance. The three intermediate results under this strategic objective promote increased security during the transition period by promoting a viable institutional justice system and improving the administration of justice, police training, and promoting a dialogue on appropriate civil/military relations. See Annex K for intermediate results and related activities for each strategic objective.

Strategic objective #2 involves activities aimed at reintegrating communities with access to social services and productive opportunities. The intermediate results are intended to promote increased access to social services, specifically for health and unaccompanied children, increase food security, and increase access to productive opportunities during the transition period. Activities contribute to the capacity of Rwandan local and national institutions to plan, manage, and implement health care programs in targeted areas, focusing on HIV/AIDS prevention and primary health care, and reducing dependence on external food aid, by enhancing local production capabilities.

On saving lives and alleviating human suffering

USAID health sector and food assistance activities contribute directly to the objective of saving lives and alleviating human suffering. In Rwanda, the offices of USAID/BHR contributed to numerous activities in the health and food sectors from 1995 to 1998 (specific USAID funding data can be found in Annex D). These activities are outlined below. The results of USAID work in the food and health sectors is reviewed in Section VI. Results and Lessons Learned.

From 1995 to 1996, BHR/Food for Peace (FFP) provided over 418,000 MT of P.L. 480 Title II food commodities. The majority of this assistance was channeled through the WFP, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), ICRC, and World Vision Relief and Development (WVRD). In 1997, BHR/FFP adopted the Great Lakes Regional Strategy and released over $65 million in Title II food assistance. During this year, the United States was the largest food donor in Rwanda, providing 49 percent of the commodities distributed by the WFP. The primary commodities shipped during this period were beans, cornmeal, and VO. These P.L. 480 Title II food commodities targeted 2,596,000 unaccompanied minors, survivors of the 1993-1994 genocide, widows, orphans, and returnees from Tanzania and Zaire. The most vulnerable—pregnant women and children—were reached through wet feeding programs in nutrition centers, inpatient feeding in hospitals, and feeding programs in unaccompanied children centers and orphanages.

USAID/OFDA funded additional food-related assistance during the period from 1995-1997 totaling $12.1 million. Grants to WFP and Feed the Children (FTC) were among these activities.

In addition, CARE conducted feeding programs in the Byumbai, Ruhrnrgeri, Gitarama, and Kibungo provinces. The ICRC received funding for feeding programs in central and southwest Rwanda. WVRD implemented the Rwanda Emergency Agriculture Program (REAPII). CONCERN and Save the Children Federation (SCF)/United Kingdom (UK) conducted smaller programs in the food sector.

In addition to the numerous food related activities undertaken by USAID, several programs in the health sector were also implemented in order to save lives and alleviate human suffering. In 1995, BHR/OFDA funded five separate health care initiatives throughout the country. Africare received funding for a health care program at Nasho Health Center. The African Medical and Research Foundation (AMREF) was granted $700,000 for a series of primary health care programs. The American Refugee Committee (ARC) implemented a $1.2 million program to rehabilitate water and health systems in Mutara. IMC received a $1 million grant to pursue a medical intervention project in Kibungo. Finally, Action Internationale contre la Faim/France (AICF/F) worked on a nutrition program in Kigali. USAID's health programs were complemented by over $4.5 million in activities designed to rehabilitate water systems—implemented by the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), AICF/United States (US), International Rescue Committee (IRC), UNREO, and ARC.

USAID funding for health sector initiatives in Rwanda was cut in 1996, although the IRC and AICF received additional funding for water, sanitation, and health programs of $1.1 million and $96,000 respectively. BHR/OFDA supported over $8.3 million in water, sanitation, and health activities in 1997. Activities were implemented by numerous partners including UNIPAC, Doctors of the World (DW), MSF/B, Food for the Hungry International (FHI), Christian Reformed World Relief Committee (CRWRC), CRS, IRC, Medecins du Monde (MDM), and AMREF.

On reducing or prolonging hostilities or political instability

Unlike in other complex emergencies, USAID did not get involved in demobilization efforts, which tend to have the greatest immediate implications on the continuation of hostilities. This is not to say that USAID humanitarian assistance did not impact hostilities, only that there was not a large pool of specific programming designed to do so.

In terms of political stability, BHR/ OTI provided a substantial amount of support to a variety of activities within the government, specifically the Department of Justice (DOJ), in an attempt to stabilize the political environment. In 1997 alone, BHR/OTI contributed $3.5 million to activities that supported the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), capacity development in the justice department, local governance, and the UNHRFOR. USAID/AFR also provided support to the ICTR and human rights activities. These activities were designed to encourage political stability through an improved, accountable justice system in the medium term.

On promoting long-term development

One of the primary linkages between relief and development is the transition period in which refugees, IDPs, and ex-combatants must be reintegrated into local communities. BHR/OTI and AFR took the lead on facilitating this transition. AFR began funding programs for the IDPs and

unaccompanied children as early as 1994. The initial grant was to UNICEF for $1 million to assist unaccompanied children. In 1995 and 1996, SCF/United States (US) and the GOR received over $3 million to continue working in these areas.

BHR/OTI began the Women in Transition (WIT) initiative in 1995. From 1995 to 1998, WIT received $4.7 million to support both rural women's groups and national women's organizations. The WIT program works closely with the Ministry of Gender, Family, and Social Affairs (MIGEFASO) and numerous local and international NGOs. By the close of 1997, WIT had disbursed 298 grants for various projects in shelter, income generation, and livestock. Funding is granted to women's associations with seven or more members who have something to contribute to their project such as livestock. Some groups receive grants for materials, while others receive predominantly interest-free loans for capital development for which the principle is paid back to an orphanage or other non-profit group (WCRWC 1997, 11).

Another possible linkage between relief and development is the method in which relief is distributed. The agricultural projects that contribute to food security efforts not only save lives and alleviate human suffering by providing food commodities, but begin taking the first steps toward rehabilitating the devastated agricultural sector and rural economy. Programs such as REAPII and the seed and tools project take this initial step. The stated objectives of the Seeds and Tools program illustrate the relief to development linkage. The program was designed "to enable resumption of productive agricultural activity...through the provision of material and technical support with the intermediate goal of" (CARE n.d.) distributing maize, beans and oil to families in order to help families meet energy requirements and dissuade them from consuming seeds (CARE n.d.2).

VI. RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

This section reviews the results of U.S. humanitarian assistance to Rwanda from 1995-1998 and points to initial lessons learned. The results are examined both quantitatively, in terms of Agency indicators outlined in the 1997 USAID Strategic Plan, and qualitatively. The section attempts to answer the three primary questions of the analysis and to point to areas that require further investigation.

In addition to the results and lessons outlined below, it is important to note that security concerns played a crucial role in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian workers were faced with violence directed toward them on many occasions. As is the case in many complex emergencies, the lack of physical security complicated and, in many cases, limited the range of delivery options available to relief workers.

Did U.S. humanitarian assistance save lives and alleviate human suffering? If so, to what extent?

The indicators set forth by the Agency for lives saved and suffering reduced include the crude mortality rate in emergency situations and the proportion of children who are wasted. It is often the case, however, that this data is sporadic and inconsistent when available. No efforts have been made to track this data over time, making the figures that are available difficult to analyze. The World Health Organization (WHO) collects data on the health and nutrition situation within

refugee camps. In 1996, WHO reported that the refugee mortality rate was between 0.7 and 2.8 percent in six surveyed camps. Yet, baseline data are not available to determine if this situation has improved as a result of humanitarian intervention. Similarly, WHO reports on malnutrition in 23 camps in 1996 as 4.93 percent lack the necessary baseline for comparison. Data available on the nutritional status of refugees can be found in Annex H.

Despite the scarcity of data, it can be concluded that USAID humanitarian assistance did, in fact, save lives and alleviate suffering. Food and health assistance was provided to over 2.5 million beneficiaries in Rwanda and neighboring refugee camps. The significant drop in production and the collapse of the agricultural sector left a majority of the population vulnerable to food insecurity and famine. International food assistance was crucial in bridging the gap between food requirements and production, especially in areas to which IDPs and refugees fled that were not prepared to provide for the increased population.

Finally, limited documentation on the range of health-related activities has made it difficult to draw any conclusions regarding the effectiveness of these programs. This is an area that warrants further, field-based investigations.

Did U.S. humanitarian assistance reduce or prolong hostilities or political instability? If so, to what extent?

The effectiveness of USAID humanitarian assistance is also measured by the number of people openly displaced by conflict. In terms of this analysis, the number of displaced persons is considered an indicator of hostilities or political stability as large numbers of transient or displaced populations may create volatile situations. UNHCR reported that the number of refugees from the Rwanda crisis increased from 1993 to 1994 and began to decrease slowly in 1995. The table below illustrates the changes in the refugee population by year and indicates the proportion of refugees benefiting from assistance as cited by UNHCR. This does not include, however, the number of internally displaced persons within Rwanda. Data on the IDP population tends to be extremely scarce and varies dramtically depending onf the source. Most of the available data discussed IDPs in terms of the numbers returned to their homes or reintegrated into society.

UNCHR Refugee Statistics

	Assisted	Total
1993	95,800	450,400
1994	2,075,600	2,257,000
1995	1,706,500	2,256,100
1996	18,011	467,105

Source: ESDS Web Site
http://www.cdie.usaid.org/esds

In addition to the number of openly displaced persons, several other factors affect the level of political stability in the country. For example, many analysts argue that the proximity to the border of the refugee camps outside Rwanda, which violated international standards, contributed to the hostilities. Within Rwanda, BHR/OTI's efforts in the justice sector were the first steps in changing the culture of impunity (i.e., lack of justice and responsibility for the crimes associated with the genocide) that is prominent in Rwanda. Most analysts of the humanitarian efforts in Rwanda point to the culture of impunity as the primary obstacle to political and social reconciliation and reconstruction. A fair justice system without ethnic bias is crucial to the achievement of public legitimacy by the current government. The relationship between the level of hostility, political instability, and humanitarian aid must be further investigated through field-based research.

Did U.S. humanitarian assistance contribute to long-term development? If so, to what extent?

Prior to 1978, Freedom House classified Rwanda as a seven on its political freedom scale—with one being high and ten being low. In the early 1980s, Rwanda improved its performance and registered a six on the political freedom scale. Rwanda's ranking dropped to a seven during 1994 and has remained at this level. According to this indicator, humanitarian assistance has not contributed to long-term development in terms of an improved political and economic environment. The Economic Freedom index score for Rwanda, compiled by Heritage Foundation, has fallen from 4.2 to 4.3 (on a scale of one to five with five being the lowest) since 1994. However, it must be noted that long-term successful political and economic transitions take considerable time. As this emergency has not yet drawn to a distinct close, it may be some time before progress in this area can be measured quantitatively.

Agricultural programs such as REAPII and the Seeds and Tools program provide examples of programs that make a contribution to the relief to development transition. CARE conducted local evaluations of its Seeds and Tools program and found encouraging results. In the Byumba, Kigali, and Kibungo prefectures, for example, CARE found that 85 percent of the population interviewed received maize or bean seeds from CARE by the end of 1995. The average germination rate of donated been seeds was 90 percent, while the average germination rate for donated maize seeds was 67 percent. (CARE n.d.) This indicates that a majority of the seeds that were provided through the program were put into agricultural production. Information on the progress of the Seeds and Tools program from 1996 to the present is unavailable.

BHR/OTI's WIT initiative has been crucial in the reintegration and reconciliation efforts undertaken by the Agency to date. WIT funded activities contribute to the transition from relief to development. Reinvestment in the agricultural sector through livestock and microfinance initiatives enables women to begin to reestablish livelihoods and facilitates the rehabilitation of the rural economy. WIT works closely with MIGEFASO staff, who are the direct implementers of the WIT program, under direct supervision of the USAID coordinator. This relationship has increased the capacity of the MIGEFASO and its staff. MIGEFASO has increased its administrative and management skills as they work with the USAID coordinator to implement the program.

It is important to note that this relationship, while contributing to long-term development in terms of capacity building and reconstruction, does not come without complications. Reconciliation efforts, as well as the benefits of the WIT program, may be jeopardized in the long term due to the practices of the GOR. In an effort to increase capacity and restore legitimacy of the GOR, USAID has worked closely with the new government in determining and implementing the relief and development agendas. Aid disbursements, however, have not been distributed equally to all Rwandan citizens.

In fact, a pattern of ethnically-biased development familiar to Rwanda is emerging. The beneficiaries of development and relief aid have been primarily genocide survivors and "old case load refugees" (from the 1959 revolution) and their descendents—a majority of whom are Tutsi. Hutu citizens have not been equal beneficiaries of this aid, leaving entire populations of IDPs and returning refugees without support and causing resentment to continue within the Hutu population. Local organizations are reluctant to address the needs of this segment of the population—primarily women—that is receiving little or no support from the national government or the international community. The WIT initiative, like many others, has been unsuccessful in reaching this population and may suffer from its close association with the MIGEFASO. This situation presents an opportunity for the Agency to look at the relationship between development and conflict prevention.

The transition from relief to development remains controversial in the development community. The issue of capacity building reemerges in almost every case. The nature of a complex emergency implies structural and political weaknesses in the state. Therefore, it is likely that the state will not have the capacity to deliver assistance effectively and efficiently. In this environment, development practitioners and relief workers are often forced to choose between long-term and short-term goals. In this case, a decision must be made on the most effective use of USAID's limited resources. Should USAID continue to work with the GOR throughout this transition in order to build local capacity in the long term? Or, should some effort be made to engage in conflict prevention in order to protect the Rwandan people and USAID's development and humanitarian investments to date? It would seem that continuing to allow the GOR to channel aid along ethnic lines, recreates a familiar and destructive pattern and puts long term development investments at risk. Uvin suggests that conflict prevention must be a primary goal of long-term sustainable development strategies in the Great Lakes region.

VII. CONCLUSION

In addition to the continuation of violence in some areas of Rwanda, the transition from relief to development faces many challenges. For example, transition based democracy initiatives must take into account a change in demographics that will undoubtedly have dramatic consequences for social, cultural, and political relations. Women now comprise 60-70 percent of the total population, but have little political voice. Women are also excluded from inheritance and land tenure rights, making long-term capital development unlikely. In the social sector, the transition to development activities from relief provision may be difficult due to the low level of urbanization,a factor that makes the delivery of health and education services difficult.

Many questions remain concerning USAID's response to the complex emergency in Rwanda. Since the situation continues to be unstable, it is difficult to determine the final impact of USAID humanitarian assistance.

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Annex A: Total DAC Assistance to Rwanda 1989-1996

Rwanda, as Recipient
Total ODA Net Flows
in US$ millions, current
Source: Geographic Distribution of Financial Flows, OECD DAC-CAD
Prepared by the Economic and Social Data Service (ESDS), PPC/CDIE/DI

DONOR	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	Total
AUSTRALIA	0	0	0	0	0	7.67	0.48	5.44	13.59
AUSTRIA	2.35	7.19	11.28	8.54	4.35	2.29	3.49	2.84	42.33
BELGIUM	26.71	43.39	55.8	45.49	36.66	28.95	13.87	31.29	282.16
CANADA	12.66	13.77	21.15	13.61	11.2	18.2	16.76	20.37	127.72
DENMARK	0.95	1.8	1.71	1.53	0.76	0.34	0.89	0.42	8.4
FINLAND	1.73	0.21	0.17	0.46	0.29	2.31	2.77	1.02	8.96
FRANCE	17.79	33.92	39.92	26.7	30.32	24.26	5.1	10.33	188.34
GERMANY	27.15	31.82	40.05	43.59	38.56	46.57	52.06	45.64	325.44
IRELAND	0.13	0.08	0.05	0.07	0.01	4.04	6.31	5.46	16.15
ITALY	1.45	1.32	1.93	1.87	2.97	12.44	3.85	4.18	30.01
JAPAN	16.52	13.83	8.84	16.38	14.94	16.47	1.5	0.55	89.03
LUXEMBOURG	0	0.83	1.29	0.59	1.27	1.63	0	1.83	7.44
NETHERLANDS	5.57	10.71	3.86	6.88	7.18	32.22	46.67	41.11	154.2
NEW ZEALAND	0	0	0	0	0	1.3	0.8	0.17	2.27
NORWAY	0	0.02	0.39	0.34	1.26	8.78	16.33	24.49	51.61
PORTUGAL	0	0	0	0	0	0.11	0	0.14	0.25
SPAIN	0.09	0.12	0.02	0	0.82	6.53	8.11	4.49	20.18
SWEDEN	0	0.13	1.79	0.3	3.35	12.11	5.81	5.43	28.92
SWITZERLAND	9.07	10.16	17.05	13.79	20.21	22.57	17.78	17.54	128.17
UNITED KINGDOM	0.52	0.85	0.58	0.34	1.2	44.59	34.5	19.28	101.86
UNITED STATES	9	13	27	7	26	194	101	10	387
TOTAL DAC DONORS	**131.69**	**183.15**	**232.88**	**187.48**	**201.35**	**487.38**	**338.08**	**252.02**	**2014.03**
AF. D B	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AFRICAN DEV. FUND	16.44	18.54	10.9	22.25	7.18	3.52	16.58	8.29	103.7
AS. D B	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AS. D B SPECIAL FUNDS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CARDB	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CEC	32.53	36	21.36	82.49	36.01	45.6	17.92	55.42	327.33
EBRD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
EIB	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
IBRD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
IDA	26	21	47	29.89	36.58	11.08	29	38.1	238.65
IDB	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
IDB SPECIAL OPER. FUND	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
IFAD	0.97	3.39	2.28	2.58	2.91	0.19	-0.21	1.46	13.57
IFC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
IMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
IMF TRUST FUND	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER UN	4.33	3.24	2.43	2.51	2.13	4.77	7.38	1.34	28.13
SAF & ESAF	-2.7	-0.82	11.9	0	0	0	0	-1.3	7.08
UN AGENCIES	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNDP	8.97	12.3	12.77	10.15	6.66	3.63	15.15	22.82	92.45
UNFPA	0.78	0.72	1.64	0.6	0.71	0.56	0.65	0.73	6.39
UNHCR	1.5	1.48	1.2	1.61	6.05	75.13	100.24	87.07	274.28
UNICEF	2.33	2.81	3.81	4.5	0	32.28	32.69	22.37	100.79
UNRWA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNTA	1.4	0.94	1.22	1.24	2.24	1.66	3.07	1.11	12.88
WFP	1	1.95	3.17	7.3	53.93	47.73	150.71	183.82	449.61
COUNCIL OF EUROPE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NORDIC DEVELOPMENT FUND	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Arab Agencies	-1.27	-1.73	7.65	1.06	0	0	0	0	5.71
TOTAL MULTILATERAL	**92.28**	**99.82**	**127.33**	**166.18**	**154.4**	**226.15**	**373.18**	**421.23**	**1660.57**
Arab Countries	**5.99**	**10.26**	**3.4**	**0.02**	**2.41**	**0.99**	**-0.36**	**1.18**	23.89
CEC + EU Members	116.97	168.37	179.81	218.85	163.75	263.99	201.35	228.88	1541.97
TOTAL DONORS	**229.96**	**293.23**	**363.61**	**353.68**	**358.16**	**714.52**	**710.9**	**674.43**	**3698.49**

Annex B: DAC Assistance to Rwanda 1989-1996 from the Top Ten Donors

Rank	Country	Millions US$
1	United States	387
2	Germany	325.44
3	Belgium	282.16
4	France	188.34
5	Netherlands	154.2
6	Switzerland	128.17
7	Canada	127.72
8	United Kingdom	101.86
9	Japan	89.03
10	Norway	51.61

Total Dac Assistance	**2014.03**	
Total from Top Ten Donor	**1835.53**	**(91%)**



Annex C: Total USG Humanitarian Assistance to Rwanda for Complex Emergency

Year	1994				1995			
Office	USAID	State	DOD	USDA	USAID	State	DOD	USDA
Water & Sanitation	$3,473,978				$4,557,883			
Health	$0				$2,501,472			
Food	$53,210,882				$134,036,499			
Housing & Resettlement	$138,998				$2,890,143			
Misc*	$28,400,831		$190,921,258		$13,719,800	$93,390,699		
Total	$85,224,689	$0	$190,921,258	$0	$157,705,797	$93,390,699	$0	$0
Total USG Assistance				$276,145,947				$251,096,496

Year	1996				1997**			
Office	USAID	State	DOD	USDA	USAID	State	DOD	USDA
Water & Sanitation	$1,220,127				$1,182,725			
Health					$7,157,634			
Food	$114,085,400				$6,262,869			
Housing & Resettlement	$1,527,570				$8,811,301			
Misc*	$1,557,240	$64,495,901	$8,368,551		$1,779,790			
Total	$118,390,337	$64,495,901	$8,368,551	$0	$25,194,319	$0	$0	$0
Total USG Assistance				$191,254,789				$25,194,319

Source:Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance Commodity/Service Report.

** Misc. category includes data all expenses that are not clearly delineated in other categories. Details available through OFDA.*

***Totals for USG assistance and USAID assistance for 1997 do not match as BHR/OTI figures were not reported in the Commodity/Serivc Report for this period. Total USG funds should be increased by $3.5 million.*

Annex D: Total USAID Humanitarian Assistance to Rwanda for Complex Emergency

Year	1994			1995			
Office	BHR/OFDA	BHR/FFP	BHR/OTI	BHR/OFDA	BHR/FFP	BHR/OTI	AFR
Water&Sanitation	$3,473,978			$4,557,883			
Health				$2,501,472			
Food	$8,974,982	$44,235,900		$5,933,299	$128,103,200		
Housing and Resettlement	$138,998			$1,442,532			$1,447,611
Misc	$28,400,831			$11,159,878		$2,559,922	
Total	$40,988,789	$44,235,900	$0	$25,595,064	$128,103,200	$2,559,922	$1,447,611
Total USAID			$85,224,689				$157,705,797

Year	1996				
Office	BHR/OFDA	BHR/FFP	BHR/OTI	AFR	Mission
Water&Sanitation	$1,220,127				
Health					
Food		$114,085,400			
Housing and Resettlement				$1,527,570	
Misc	$37,624		$519,616	$1,000,000	
Total	$1,257,751	$114,085,400	$519,616	$2,527,570	$0
Total USAID					$118,390,337

Year	1997**				1997 Regional Crisis Funding***	
Office	BHR/OFDA	BHR/FFP	BHR/OTI	Mission	FFP	STATE/PRM
Water&Sanitation	$1,182,725					
Health	$7,157,634					
Food	$6,262,869				$ 65,015,600.00	
Housing and Resettlement	$8,811,301					$62,887,700
Misc	$1,779,790		$3,500,000			
Total	$25,194,319		$3,500,000	$0	$ 65,015,600.00	$62,887,700
Total USAID				$94,650,280		

Source: USAID/BHR/OFDA annual reports from 1994-1997.

**Mission funds are reported as OFDA funds in OFDA report and as Mission allotments in OFDA Commodity/Service reports.*

***Totals for USG assistance and USAID assistance for 1997 do not match as BHR/OTI figures were not reported in the Commodity/Service Report for this period. Total USG funds should be increased by $3.5 million.*

**** In 1997 USAID/BHR/FFP and State/PRM began providing assistance to the Great Lakes on a regional basis.*

Annex F: Rwanda Development Indicators 1985-1996

Prepared by the Economic and Social Data Service (ESDS), PPC/CDIE/DI
All data are from World Bank and reported in WDI 98 unless noted.

Series Name	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Population (thousands)	6056	6250.4	6438.33	6618.86	6791.05	6954	7150	7350	7540	6230	6400	6727		
Population density (people per sq km)	245	253	261	268	275	282	290	298	306	253	259	273		
Population growth (annual %)	3.4	3.2	3.0	2.8	2.6	2.4	2.8	2.8	2.6	-19.1	2.7	5.0		
Urban population (% of total)	5.0	5.1	5.1	5.2	5.2	5.3	5.4	5.5	5.5	5.6	5.7	5.8		
Urban population growth (annual %)	4.6	4.4	4.1	3.9	3.7	3.5	4.3	4.2	4.0	-17.7	4.1	6.7		
GNP at market prices (constant 1987 LCU, millions)	161,782	170,635	170,594	178,269	178,204	173,928	168,639	181,195	164,025	83,653	104,231	118,094		
GNP growth (annual %)	4.4	5.5	0.0	4.5	0.0	-2.4	-3.0	7.4	-9.5	-49.0	24.6	13.3	**13.0***	
GNP per capita (constant 1987 LCU)	26,714	27,300	26,497	26,934	26,241	25,011	23,586	24,652	21,754	13,427	16,286	17,555		
GNP per capita growth (annual %)	1.0	2.2	-2.9	1.6	-2.6	-4.7	-5.7	4.5	-11.8	-38.3	21.3	7.8		
GNP per capita, Atlas method (current US$)	270	300	330	380	370	370	310	300	250	140	180	190		
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)	45.7	41.8	41.3	42.8	43.3	33.0	35.3	36.2	37.6	43.5	37.8	40.3		
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	24.8	25.7	19.5	18.7	18.7	23.0	15.9	14.7	13.8	15.8	15.9	14.4		
Services, etc., value added (% of GDP)	29.5	32.5	39.2	38.5	38.0	43.9	48.8	49.1	48.6	40.6	46.3	45.3		
Agriculture, value added (annual % growth)	2.3	2.9	-2.0	5.6	-4.3	-2.6	5.8	5.2	-15.0	-41.0	20.9	11.1		
Industry, value added (annual % growth)	4.8	4.5	-3.2	-4.1	2.8	2.2	-22.9	14.2	-12.1	-50.0	2.0	15.3		
Services, etc., value added (annual % growth)	5.8	9.6	6.4	6.6	3.7	-3.6	2.0	5.7	-1.4	-56.2	37.5	17.0		
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)	10.8	12.6	7.5	6.6	6.1	5.6	7.6	5.9	5.5	6.0	5.7	6.1		
Exports of goods and services (annual % growth)	26.3	1.6	11.0	-20.6	5.1	-3.5	-7.6	-8.5	-13.6	-54.0	-4.5	40.5		
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)	19.9	20.2	19.1	17.6	17.3	14.0	18.7	19.4	21.9	66.2	30.0	22.3		
Imports of goods and services (annual % growth)	3.7	15.1	-10.5	-0.4	-6.2	-15.5	84.3	2.7	15.0	29.1	-54.0	1.3		
Commercial energy production (kt of oil equivalent)	43	43	42	42	43	46	46	46	46	46	46	..		
Commercial energy use (kt of oil equivalent)	268	260	268	277	278	291	205	205	207	209	211	..		

* (1997 rate is IMF estimate for GDP)

Annex G: Rwanda Social Indicators 1985-1996

Prepared by the Economic and Social Data Service (ESDS), PPC/CDIE/DI
All data are from World Bank and reported in WDI 98

Series Name	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births) various sources reported in WDI 98	120.4	..	118	..	..	133.6	..	144	..	..	132.6	128.8		
Nutrition data from DHS surveys (reported by WHO)														
Children under 5 , underweight (weight for age)								29.4						
Children under 5 , stunted (height for age)								48.7						
Safe Water/Sanitation (WHO in WDI 978)														
Safe water (% of population with access)	..	..	..	77	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..		
Safe water, rural (% of rural population with access)	60	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..		
Safe water, urban (% of urban population with access)	55	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..		
Sanitation (% of population with access)	..	..	..	55	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..		
Sanitation, urban (% of urban population with access)	60	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..		
UNESCO data														
School enrollment, primary (% gross)	63	65	66	67	67	70	82	80	87	94	97	94		

School enrollment, primary (% net)	60	61	62	63	64	66	76	..	..	..	..	..	
School enrollment, secondary (% gross)	5	..	..	..	..	8	11	..	..	..	..	..	
School enrollment, secondary (% net)	..	..	..	..	..	7	8	..	..	..	..	..	
Freedom House Scores (Rwanda has been classified as "not free" since 1985)													
Political rights	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	7
Civil Liberties	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	7	6	6	6
Economic Freedom Index (Heritage/WSJ)													
Trade												5	5
Taxation												5	5
Government Intervention												4	4
Monetary Policy												1	2
Foreign Investment												4	4
Banking												5	5
Wage/Prices												3	3
Property Rights												5	5
Regulation												5	5
Black Market												5	5
Overall Score												**4.2**	**4.3**

UN Population Projections (1998 revision)

Year	**2000**	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**
Population, total	7733.127	8063.066	8263.35	8375.29	8467.936	8591.874	8754.166	8936.19	9133.301	9335.245	9534.549
Population density (persons per sq.km)	294					326					362

Years	**2000-05**	**2005-10**
Infant Mortality Rate	115.7	105.8

Annex H: Refugee Nutritional Information

Results of Health Surveys RNIS

Source: UN/ACC/SCN-Refugee Nutrition Information System (RNIS)

NO.	Situation	Survey Areas	Conducted by	Date	(%)	notes	(%)	notes	Oedema	Mortality	Mortality	Immune
16	Burundi/Rwanda	Birba, Uvira	UNHCR	Apr-96	4.8		0.7		0.0			
14	Burundi/Rwanda	Buraniro Camp	MSF	Nov-95	17.2	**	4.1	**				
16	Burundi/Rwanda	Chablisa ITanzania	UNHCR	May-96	2.0							
17	Burundi/Rwanda	Chimanga, Bukavu, Zaire	UNHCR	May-96	2.2		0.2		0.4			
14	Burundi/Rwanda	Gasenyi Camp	MSF	Nov-95	15.0	**	3.9	**				
14	Burundi/Rwanda	Gohombo Camp	MSF	Nov-95	18.2	**	3.0	**				
17	Burundi/Rwanda	Inera, Bukavu, Zaire	UNHCR	May-96	7.0		0.5		0.2			
17	Burundi/Rwanda	Kabira, Bukavu, Zaire	UNHCR	May-96	1.5		0.5		0.5			
16	Burundi/Rwanda	Kagunga, Uvira	UNHCR	Apr-96	11.0		2.3		0.9		0.70	
17	Burundi/Rwanda	Kahindo, Goma, Zaire	UNHCR	Jul-96	2.5		0.4		(1 case)	0.08-0.28	0.39-1.1	
16	Burundi/Rwanda	Kajembo, Uvira	UNHCR	Apr-96	5.9		0.8		0.0		1.40	
16	Burundi/Rwanda	Kanganiro, Uvira	UNHCR	Apr-96	2.6		0.0		0.4			
17	Burundi/Rwanda	Kashusha, Bukavu, Zaire	UNHCR	May-96	1.4		0.2		0.2			
17	Burundi/Rwanda	Katale, Goma, Zaire	UNHCR	May-96	3.5		0.2		0.0	0.08-0.28	0.39-1.1	
15	Burundi/Rwanda	Kegenyi, Karagwe, Tanzania	MSF	Feb-96						0.81	1.40	
16	Burundi/Rwanda	Kibogoye, Uvira	UNHCR	Apr-96	9.7		0.9		0.9			
17	Burundi/Rwanda	Kibumba, Goma, Zaire	UNHCR	Jul-96	3.5		0.8		0.0	0.08-0.28	0.39-1.1	
17	Burundi/Rwanda	Lac Vert, Goma Zaire	UNHCR	Jun-96	3.2		0.7		0.0	0.08-0.28	0.39-1.1	
16	Burundi/Rwanda	Luberizi, Uvira	UNHCR	Apr-96	2.3		0.5		0.5			
16	Burundi/Rwanda	Luvungi, Uvira	UNHCR	Apr-96	5.6		0.4		0.9			

17	Burundi/Rwanda	Mugunga, Goma, Zaire	UNHCR	Jun-96	1.6		0.0		0.0	0.08-0.28	0.39-1.1	
14	Burundi/Rwanda	Muhanga Camp	MSF	Nov-95	16.1	**	5.0	**				
15	Burundi/Rwanda	Ngozi Province, Burundi	ACF	Dec-95	9.3		1.2		1.8			
17	Burundi/Rwanda	Nyamirangwe, Bukavu, Zaire	UNHCR	May-96	2.5		0.0		0.7			
17	Burundi/Rwanda	Nyangezi, Bukavu, Zaire	UNHCR	May-96	0.9		0.0		0.0			
16	Burundi/Rwanda	Petite Bariere Camp, Rwanda	MERLIN	Apr-96	17.0	**	7.4	**				
15	Burundi/Rwanda	Rubwera, Karagwe, Tanzania	MSF	Feb-96						0.28	0.70	
15	Burundi/Rwanda	Rukuramigabo Camp, Kirundo	IHA	Feb-96	1.7	**	0.2	**				
16	Burundi/Rwanda	Runingo, Uvira	UNHCR	Apr-96	8.3		0.5		0.5			
16	Burundi/Rwanda	Rwenena, Uvira	UNHCR	Apr-96	4.2		0.5		0.9			
17	Burundi/Rwanda	Umbano Camp, Rwanda	MSF	Aug-96	10.2		1.6		1.3			
20	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Between Kisangani & Umbundo, E Zaire		Apr-97						11.4-20		
24	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Brazzaville, Congo	MERLIN/MSF	Feb-98	9.3	**						
22	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Bubanza Province, Burundi	CAD	Aug-97	13.2		2.9		6.3			
23	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Bubanza Province, Burundi	CAD	Feb-98	16.0		3.2		1.3		4.30	
18	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Chabalisa II, Karagwe, Tanzania		Sep-96	1.8		0.0					
18	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Chabalisa I, Karagwe, Tanzania		Sep-96	0.3		0.3					
24	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Cibitoke Province, Burundi	CONCERN	May-98	14.0		3.3		7.2	3.3	5.00	9.9
18	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Gatumba Transit Centre, Burundi	UNHCR	Nov-96			17.6	(MUAC <110)				

18	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Gatumba Transit Centre, Burundi	UNHCR	Nov-96	18.2	(MUAC, all ages)	4.2					
23	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Gitega (North), Burundi	OXFAM(UK)/SCF	Jan-98	19.7		2.4		4.1	0.30		33.7
23	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Gitega (South), Burundi	OXFAM(UK/SCF	Jan-98	8.5		0.9		4.8	0.79		24.3
24	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Kanembwa	UNHCR	May-98	2.2	**	0.1	**				
22	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Kanembwa Camp, Kibondo, Tanzania	IRC	Sep-97	2.2		0.3		0.0	0.2	0.86	0.7
18	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Kanembwa, Kigoma, Tanzania		Sep-96	3.8		0.6		0.0	0.17	0.30	
20	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Kanembwa, Tanzania	UNHCR	May-97	3.0	**	0.0		0.9			
18	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Karuzi Province, Burundi	MSF	Aug 96	13.0		2.7		1.1			0.9
20	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Karuzi, Burundi	MSF	Feb-97	16.9		3.1		1.8			
18	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Kegenyi, Karagwe, Tanzania		Sep-96	0.8		0.1					
18	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Keza, Ngara, Tanzania		Sep-96	3.6		0.1		0.8	0.14-0.59	0.39-1.96	
18	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Kibangira Camp, Rwanda	MSF	Oct-96	6.1		2.8		0.0	0.40	1.90	1.0
20	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Kibiza, Rwanda	MSF	Jan-97	9.4	(MUAC<125)	1.0	(MUAC <112)	0.3			
23	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Kigoma Region Camps	UNHCR	Feb 98						0.37	1.32	
23	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Kinshasa, DRC		Jun-05	5.9-10.7	**						
22	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Kitchanga, Eastern DRC	MSF	Apr-97	3.8		0.5		8.1	0.94	1.37	0.5
24	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Lugufu	UNHCR	May-98	1.0	**	0.0	**				
22	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Lugufu, Kasulu District, Tanzania	UNHCR	Sep-97	2.7		0.4					0.6

24	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Lukole Camp, Tanzania	UNHCR	May-98	5.6	**	0.2	**				
20	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Lukole, Tanzania	UNHCR	May-97	3.9	**	0.8					
18	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Lukoli, Ngara, Tanzania		Sep-96	2.4		0.2		0.3	0.14-0.59	0.39-1.96	
18	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Lumasi, Ngara,Tanzania		Sep-96	1.9		0.3		0.0	0.14-0.59	0.39-1.96	
19	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Maramvya, Burundi	ACF	Jan-97	18.9		7.1		14.3			
19	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Maramvya, Burundi (adults)	ACF	Jan-97	23.6							
20	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Metandle, Tanzania	UNHCR	May-97	3.3	**	0.1	**	1.3			
22	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Mkugwa Camp, Kibondo, Tanzania	IRC	Sep-97	5.5		1.0		0.0			0.8
18	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Mkugwa, Kigoma, tanzania		Sep-96	5.3		0.0		0.6			
22	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Moyovosi, Kasulu District, Tanzania	UNHCR	Sep-97	3.9		0.5					0.7
22	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Mtabila, Kasulu District, Tanzania	UNHCR	Sep-97	5.4		0.7					0.8
18	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Mtabila, Kigoma, Tanzania		Sep-96	3.0		0.2		0.0	0.33	1.14	
22	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Mtendeli Camp, Kibondo, Tanzania	IRC	Sep-97	3.2		1.0		0.0	0.41	0.92	0.7
20	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Mtendeli Camp, Tanzania	UNHCR	Mar-97						0.70	1.50	
24	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Mtendeli Camp, Tanzania	UNHCR	May 98	3.8	**	1.4	**				
18	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Mtendeli, Kigoma, Tanzania		Sep-96	12.5		1.1		0.0	0.26	0.60	
20	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Mukgwa, Tanzania	UNHCR	May-97	1.8	**	0.0		2.2			
24	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Mukuwa Camp, Tanzania	UNHCR	May-98	7.1	**	1.0	**				
22	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Nduta Camp, Kibondo, Tanzania	IRC	Sep-97	1.3		0.4		0.0	0.63		0.8

24	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Nduta Camp, Tanzania	UNHCR	May-98	2.1	**	0.2	**				
22	Burundi/Rwanda Region	North Kayanza Province, Burundi	ACF	Aug-97	13.4		1.9		0.7		4.30	0.4
20	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Nuduta, Tanzania	UNHCR	May-97	7.2	**	0.0		0.7			
22	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Nyarugugu Camp, Kasulu District, Tanzania	AEF	Aug-97	2.3		0.3		0.0		1.06	0.8
19	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Nyarugusu Camp, Tanzania	MSF	Dec-96	5.0		0.2		0.3	1.90	4.40	0.9
20	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Nyarugusu, Tanzania	UNHCR	Mar-97	5.3	**	0.6	**		0.50	1.80	
24	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Nyragusu Camp, Tanzania	UNHCR	May-98	1.5	**	0.2	**				
18	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Omukariro, Karagwe, Tanzania		Sep-96	1.5		0.4					
18	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Rubwera, Karagwe, Tanzania		Sep-96	0.4		0.1					
20	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Rwanguba Health Zone	MSF	Mar-97	3.4		0.2		9.2	1.2	2.70	0.3
20	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Sake	MSF	Feb-97	8.4		1.3		2.3			0.5
22	Burundi/Rwanda Region	South Kayanza Province, Burundi	ACF	Aug-97	12.8		0.9		1.1		4.70	23.5%
19	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Tingi-Tingi, Eastern Zaire	EPICENTRE	Jan-97						2.00	6.40	
19	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Tingi-Tingi, Eastern Zaire	EPICENTRE	6-13Jan 97						4.00	10.00	
21	Burundi/Rwanda Region	Uvira, DRC	UNICEF	Jun 97	13.0							

Annex I: Environmental Scarcity[1]



Figure 3: The Manipulation of Ethnic Identity



Elite Insecurity in the Context of the Arusha Accords



[1] Taken from Valerie Percival and Thomas Homer-Dixon. *Environmental Scarcity and Violent conflict: the Case of Rwanda.*

ANNEX J: EXTENDED TIMELINE

Chronology[1]

Based mainly on Dorsey 1994, Reyntjens 1994:1 and McHugh 1995.

1860 The new *mwami*, Kigeri Rwabugiri (1860-1895), expands his power in the central kingdom and in the western region. He also expands the system of clientship.

1880s The first European explorers arrive in Rwanda.

1895 New *mwami*: Mibambwe Rutarindwa.

1896 *Mwami* Rutarindwa is assassinated and succeeded by Yuhi Musinga.

1899 Germany establishes colonial rule in Ruanda-Urundi and the territory becomes part of German East Africa. The first missionaries arrive.

1910 The frontiers of the Belgian Congo, British Uganda and German East Africa - including the territory of Ruanda-Urundi - are fixed at a conference in Brussels.

1911 A popular uprising in northern Rwanda is crushed by the German *Schutztruppe* and Tutsi chiefs, leaving continuing bitterness among northern Hutu.

1916 Belgium takes over the territory, which after the First World War is administered under a League of Nations mandate.

1931 *Mwami* Musinga is deposed by the Belgians in favor of his son, Charles Rudahigwa Mutara.

1930s A process of "Tutsification" results in a monopoly of political and administrative power in the hands of Tutsi. Ethnic classification through the introduction of identity cards.

1957 The *Bahutu Manifesto*, a document criticizing the Tutsi monopoly, is issued by nine Hutu intellectuals.

1959 The *jacquerie* takes place - a social revolution by the Hutu population supported by Belgium. Tens of thousands of Tutsi flee into exile. The same year, *mwami* Mutara Rudahigwa dies mysteriously in Bujumbura. He is succeeded by his brother, Kigeri Ndahindurwa.

1960 Rwanda's first local elections result in an overwhelming victory for the party Parmehutu. *Mwami* Kigeri Ndahindurwa chooses not to return from the independence celebrations in the Congo.

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[1] Reproduced from Study 1, Historical Perspective: Some Explanatory Factors

1961 The monarchy is formally abolished by a referendum. On 25 September, the first parliamentary elections in Rwanda are held. Parmehutu receives 78% of the vote.

1962 On 1 July, Rwanda and Burundi gain independence from Belgium. The first President of independent Rwanda is Grégoire Kayibanda from the Parmehutu party.

1963 Armed attacks by Tutsi exiles from Burundi, the so-called *inyenzi*, deepen ethnic tension in Rwanda. In the violence, which escalates in November-December, some 1,000 Tutsi are killed and there is a new wave of Tutsi refugees to Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and Zaire.

1973 Coup d'état; Major-General Juvénal Habyarimana assumes power. He founds a new party, the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (*Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement*, MRND). Beginning of the Second Republic.

1978 MRND becomes Rwanda's only party under a new constitution. Habyarimana is confirmed as President in 1978, 1983 and 1988, with more than 99% of the vote.

1987 A military coup takes place in Burundi. President Bagaza is overthrown and Major Pierre Buyoya takes power.

1988 In April, ethnic tensions in Burundi cause a wave of refugees into Rwanda. In connection with a conference on Rwandese refugees, held in Washington D.C., the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) is founded.

1990

July A first breakthrough in negotiations between Rwanda, Uganda and UNHCR on the repatriation of Rwandese refugees in Uganda is achieved.

5 July President Habyarimana recognizes the necessity of a separation between the MRND party and the state.

1 September A protest letter denouncing the one-party system is published by 33 intellectuals.

24 September A National Commission is set up to prepare for the introduction of a multi-party system.

1 October Uganda-based RPF invades the northern parts of Rwanda, demanding the right to settle thousands of (mainly Tutsi) refugees and political reforms, such as introduction of a multi-party system. In the war that follows, several RPF leaders are killed and the attack is repulsed.

Mid-October Local Hutu take revenge on Tutsi in the *commune* of Kibilira (in Gisenyi). More than 300 people are killed.

24 October A cease-fire concluded in Mwanza, Tanzania, a week earlier is violated.

27 October The heads of state of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire agree to form a military peace-monitoring force as a first step to end the civil war in Rwanda.

End of October
There is a stalemate in the war. RPF abandons conventional fighting and reverts to guerrilla warfare.

October-November
Thousands of RPF "collaborators" are arrested. Most of them are released in March/April 1991.

13 November President Habyarimana announces the introduction of multi-partyism and the abolition of ethnic identity cards. The ID cards were, however, never abolished.

20 November A cease-fire is concluded in Goma, Zaire. An agreement on an OAU observer force is signed.

1991

January-February
Trials of arrested RPF "collaborators" start. Several prisoners are sentenced to death, but no executions are carried out.

23 January RPF raid in Ruhengeri. Prisoners are liberated, some of whom join the RPF.

29 March A cease-fire between RPF and the Rwandese government is reached. An agreement on the integration of RPF in a transitional government is signed.

28 April MRND holds an extraordinary congress, where multi-partyism is accepted and the name and status of the party are changed. New name: *Mouvement Républicain pour le Développement et la Démocratie* (still abbreviated MRND).

10 June A new constitution is introduced.

18 June A law on multi-partyism is promulgated.

31 July The domestic opposition denounces plans to hold elections, insisting that ample time must be allowed for preparations.

16 September OAU summit in Gbadolite, Zaire. The earlier cease-fire agreement is amended.

Early November
Widespread ethnic violence.

17 November A Committee of Consultation organizes political demonstrations in Kigali against the government and the one-party system. Some 10,000 people participate.

Early December
The Rwandan Catholic church takes a political stance, calling for serious talks with RPF and formation of an independent transitional government.

30 December Formation of the Nsanzimana government with one minister from *Partie Démocrate Chrétien* (PDC) and the rest from MRND.

1992

8 January Demonstrations in Kigali against the government and the one-party system with some 30,000 participants.

Beginning of March
Ethnic violence in Bugesera. At least 300 killed.

13 March New negotiations between the government and main opposition parties.

March CDR (*Coalition pour la Défence de la République*) and MRND militias are built up by extremist Hutu supporters.

16 April Inclusion of all major opposition parties in the government (MDR, PSD, PL, PDC). Prime Minister: Nsengiyaremye.

May A major RPF attack on Byumba results in a wave of Hutu peasants from the north moving southward (some 350,000 people).

2 June Government army forces begin looting in several towns in anticipation of losing their jobs if the government signs a peace pact with RPF.

9 June After talks in Brussels and Paris between RPF and all government parties except MRND, an agreement to hold a peace conference to end the two years of civil war is reached.

10 August Formal opening of the peace conference in Arusha, Tanzania.

10-18 August Negotiations on the Arusha protocol on the rule of law.

7-18 September and 5-30 October
The second Arusha protocol on transitional institutions is discussed.

November Political violence by extremist Hutu *interahamwe* militia escalates.

End of November
A demonstration, in favour of the peace-talks and against Habyarimana's veto to the protocol on transitional institutions, takes place despite the government's attempts to stop it.

24 November-9 January 1993

A protocol on power-sharing and a transitional parliament is discussed in Arusha, but President Habyarimana refuses to sign it.

1993

21-26 January
Ethnic violence in the north-west. Some 300 people are killed.

8 February RPF occupation of an important zone in the *préfectures* of Ruhengeri and Byumba. As a consequence, almost one million people are displaced. The French reinforce their troops in Rwanda by 300 men.

25 February-2 March
Peace negotiations between RPF and the opposition parties within the government on the withdrawal of all French troops and their replacement by UN or OAU troops.

7 March A new cease-fire agreement is signed in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania.

Mid-March The 300 extra French troops are withdrawn.

15 March Peace talks are taken up again in Arusha (and continue until 24 June).

April The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) warns that the 900,000 displaced people in Rwanda face a major humanitarian catastrophe. ICRC says that famine is imminent.

1 June Presidential elections in Burundi. New President: Melchior Ndadye (Hutu).

9 June Agreement concerning refugees and internally displaced people. An estimated 500,000 displaced people are reported to return home.

24 June Arusha protocol on inclusion of RPF in the army and the *gendarmerie*, and specifications on the transitional institutions.

8 July The Hutu extremist *Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines* (RTLM) starts broadcasting.

16 July The Prime Minister's transitional mandate expires.

17 July A new government is formed with Agathe Uwilingiyimana as Prime Minister. This results in a division within MDR.

23-24 July Extraordinary congress of MDR. Its president, Faustin Twagiramungu, is excluded from the party.

25 July A more detailed agreement (on military matters) is signed in Kinihira. It is also agreed that Twagiramungu will be Prime Minister when the new transitional government is established.

4 August Rwanda's government and RPF sign an accord in Arusha to end the civil war, allowing for power-sharing and the return of refugees.

5 October The UN Security Council approves a 2,500-strong peacekeeping force to Rwanda, the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR).

17-18 October 37 MRND supporters are killed in the Ruhengeri area.

21 October A military coup takes place in Burundi, in which Hutu President Ndadaye is killed. The ethnic violence that follows results in tens of thousands of dead and some 600,000 Burundis fleeing into neighbouring countries. Escalated political and ethnic violence in Rwanda.

1 November The UN starts placing UNAMIR forces in Rwanda.

30 November At least 20 people are killed when RPF forces break the cease-fire and attack government troops in north-western Rwanda.

28 December 600 RPF soldiers arrive in Kigali in accordance with the Arusha agreement.

1994[2]

30 December 1993-5 April 1994
Transitional government fails to take off, with each side blaming the other for blocking its formation.

6 April President Habyarimana of Rwanda, President Ntaryamira of Burundi and a number of government officials are killed in a plane crash in Kigali. President Habyarimana's death sparks violence and widespread massacres in Kigali, which spread throughout the country. The violence soon escalates, mainly targeting Hutu moderates and the Tutsi population.

7 April Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana is killed by government forces. Ten Belgian UN peacekeeping soldiers, who were guarding her, are killed. As a result, Belgium withdraws its forces. The 600 RPF soldiers in Kigali leave their headquarters.

8 April RPF forces in northern Rwanda launch an offensive. Former Speaker of parliament Theodore Sindikubwabo announces the formation of an interim government and declares himself interim President. Prime Minister: Jean Kambanda (MDR).

11 April Relief officials estimate that as many as 20,000 people have been killed in Kigali alone in five days of violence. With foreign journalists out of Rwanda, news from the country is restricted.

12 April The interim government moves from Kigali to Gitarama as RPF threatens the capital.

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[2] The remainder of the timeline is based on Study 1, Historical Perspective: Some Explanatory Factors, and FY 1994-1998 USAID/OFDA situation reports.

14 April	The UN Rwanda Emergency Office (UNREO) is established to coordinate the activities of the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), the UNDP, and other UN agencies.
21 April	The UN Security Council resolution No. 912 reduces the UNAMIR peacekeeping force in Rwanda from 2,500 to 270 men with an unchanged mandate.
28 April	US Ambassador to Rwanda David Rawson declares a disaster in Rwanda.
End of April	An estimated 250,000 people stream across the Rwandese border to seek refuge in Tanzania, reportedly the largest mass exodus of people ever witnessed by UNHCR.
30 April	UN Security Council affirms the need to protect refugees and help restore order, but does not mention peacekeepers. At least 100,000 people have been killed and more than 1.3 million have fled their homes.
May	The UN Security Council (UNSC) imposes an arms embargo on Rwanda.
Early May	OFDA sends a team to Tanzania to assess the situation and needs of Rwandan refugees.
17 May	The UN Security Council passes a new resolution (No. 918), approving the deployment of 5,500 UNAMIR troops to Rwanda.
22 May	RPF forces gain control of the airport in Kigali and the Kanombe barracks, and extend their control over the northern and eastern parts of Rwanda.
25 May	A USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team (USAID/DART) is sent to the Great Lakes region to manage the US government's response to the crisis.
17 June	France announces its plan to the UN Security Council to deploy 2,500 troops to Rwanda as an interim peacekeeping force until the UNAMIR troops arrive.
22 June	The UN Security Council narrowly approves a resolution (No.929) to dispatch 2,500 French troops to Rwanda (*Opération Turquoise*) for a two-month operation under a UN peacekeeping mandate.
28 June	The UN Human Rights Commission's special envoy releases a report stating that the massacres were pre-planned and formed part of a systematic campaign of genocide.
4 July	RPF wins control of Kigali and the southern town of Butare. Its leadership states that it intends to establish a government based on the framework of the Arusha Accords. French troops in south-western Rwanda receive orders to halt the RPF advance.
5 July	The French-led operation has established a "safe zone" defined roughly by the *préfectures* of Gikongoro, Cyangugu, and Kibuye. As RPF advances towards the west, the influx of displaced persons into the zone increases from an initial 500,000 to an estimated one million within a few days.

13-14 July As a result of RPF's advance in the north-west, an estimated one million people begin to flee towards Zaire. Approximately 10,000-12,000 refugees per hour cross the border and enter the town of Goma. The massive influx creates a severe humanitarian crisis, as there is an acute lack of shelter, food, water, and non-food relief items.

15 July Members of the Hutu government escape to the French "safe zone". UN Security Council orders cease-fire.

18 July RPF announces that the war is over, declares a cease-fire and names Pastor Bizimungu as President with Faustin Twagiramungu as Prime Minister.

19 July The new President and Prime Minister are sworn in, and RPF commander Major-General Paul Kagame is appointed Defence Minister and Vice-President.

Late July US Operation Support Hope begins.

End of July The UN Security Council reaches a final agreement on sending an international force to Rwanda.

24 August End of *Opération Turquoise*. UNAMIR forces take over from the French.

30 September US Operation Support Hope ends.

October The UN estimates that there are now about five million people in Rwanda, compared to 7.9 million before the war.

7 October US Ambassador to Rwanda David Rawson declares a disaster in Rwanda due to the continuation of violence.

Early November
The RPA implements its plan to close the IDP camps throughout the country because of their fear that the camps are bases of Interahamwe activity.

8 November UN Security Council adopts a resolution (No. 955) on the establishment of an international court for war criminals of Rwanda.

December The UN expands UNAMIR's mandate to include security for the International Tribunal and human rights observers, and to help to establish and train a new national police force.

24 December An exile government is announced among Hutu refugees in Zaire.

29 December The international community, in support of GOR's decision to close all IDP camps, coordinates with UNAMIR and GOR to implement Operation Retour, a program designed to support the voluntary return of IDPs to their home regions.

1995

18-19 January
UNDP-sponsored Roundtable Conference for Rwanda. International donors promise a total of $588 million in relief and development assistance.

15 February USAID/DART ends its operations in Rwanda because of the shift from emergency to rehabilitation assistance.

27 March Reports of violence against Rwandan refugees in Burundi cause 50,000 refugees to run to the Tanzanian border.

31 March The government of Tanzania (GOT) closes its borders to Rwandan refugees.

April Refugees are forced to return to their home districts from the camps for internally displaced persons.

17 April The RPA begins to close the eight remaining IDP camps in Rwanda. Soldiers surround the largest camp, Kibeho.

18 April Gunfire breaks out in the Kibeho camp. 8 to 11 children are killed.

19 April The Chief of Staff of the RPA and the Deputy Force Commander of UNAMIR visit the Kibeho camp to announce that the camp will be officially closed. Most IDPs are willing to return home. Registration begins, but there is no transportation. The RPA limits food and water deliveries as further encouragement for IDPs to leave.

22 April Fighting breaks out between IDPs and the RPA in the Kibeho camp. Both sides suffer casualties. An inquiry concludes that the incident was not a premeditated slaughter on the part of the RPA, although some soldiers probably acted on their own to kill unarmed IDPs. The inquiry also acknowledges the importance of militias within the camp, whose primarily traditional weapons, such as machetes, are involved in a number of RPA and IDP deaths.

Late April US Assistance Secretary of State for Africa George Moose visits Rwanda.

9 May All IDP camps in Rwanda are officially closed by the GOR.

19 May Representatives from 20 donor organizations meet in Kigali and add $6 million in assistance for the International Criminal Tribunal (ITCR).

Late July The Chief Prosecutor of the ITCR meets with UN officials in New York.

17-21 July USAID staff visit refugee camps in the Ngara and Kibondo districts of Tanzania.

7 August The Chief Prosecutor of the ICTR arrives in Rwanda.

16 August The UNSC suspends its arms embargo against Rwanda for one year with the intention of altogether ending the embargo after that year so that Rwanda can purchase arms for its national protection.

19-23 August The GOZ forcibly expels 15,081 Rwandan and Burundian refugees.

23-26 August Zaire expels refugees from the Goma camps and threatens to expel all refugees. UNCHR takes up a discussion with Zaire.

28 August Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu resigns.

31 August UNREO in Kigali closes.

New Prime Minister, Pierre-Céléstin Rwigyema, and ministers approved in a cabinet reshuffle.

7 September The UN Security Council adopts a resolution on the establishment of an International Commission of Inquiry on the sale and supply of arms and related *matériel* to the former Rwanda government forces in violation of the UN embargo implemented on 17 May 1994 (Resolution 1013 1995).

13 September Zaire closes its borders with Rwanda following bomb explosions in Goma.

7 October US Ambassador to Rwanda David Rawson declares a disaster in Rwanda due to the continuation of violence.

17 October A Supreme Court is established by an act of the Parliament.

November The GOR holds a conference with the international community to discuss genocide issues.

2-6 November
An international conference on "Genocide, Impunity and Accountability" is held in Kigali.

7 November Clash between the army and Hutu rebels on Lake Kivu Island. Many people are reported killed.

8 November RPA soldiers attack an ex-FAR military base on Iwawa Island and capture weapons and prisoners.

23 November The prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Judge Goldstone, signs his first indictment.

28-29 November
The Great Lakes Initiative Conference is held in Cairo to discuss the issue of Rwandan refugees.

December Eight Rwandan refugee leaders are arrested in the Goma refugee camps in Zaire.

The UNSC extends the UNAMIR mission until 8 March 1998. The new mandate calls for a one-third reduction in peacekeeping forces, leaving 1,200 soldiers and 200 military observers to assist in refugee repatriation efforts.

12 December The ICTR issues its first eight indictments for genocide and crimes against humanity.

14 December The UN Security Council extends UNAMIR's mandate in Rwanda for an additional three months to 8 March 1996 (Resolution 1019). The Force will be reduced from 2,100 men to 1,400 and concentrate its activities on the return of refugees.

20 December The Rwanda/Zaire/UNHCR Tripartite Commission for the Repatriation of Rwandan Refugees holds its second meeting in Geneva. The meeting results in the Targeted Voluntary Repatriation Plan to begin on 1 February at the Kibumba camp in North Kivu and the Kashusha camp in South Kivu, Zaire.

1996

9 January The new US ambassador to Rwanda Robert Gribbin III assumes his post.

17 January English is adopted as the third official language of Rwanda.

17 January Violence in the Mugano refugee camp in Muyinga province, Burundi, causes 15,000 primarily Rwandan refugees to flee to the Tanzanian border. GOT allows the refugees into the country and places them in a new refugee camp, Keza.

20-21 January
US Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright visits Rwanda and Burundi and announces a USG pledge of $1 million toward the UN Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda (HRFOR). In addition, Albright announces that two prosecutors from the US Department of Justice would work with the ICTR.

21 January 17,000 Rwandan refugees flee the Ntamba refugee camp in Muyinga province, Burundi, for Tanzania. The GOT refuses to allow the refugees into the country until 24 January.

5 February An attack near Gisenyi kills 11 Rwandans.

14 February Zairian soldiers surround the Kibumba refugee camp.

16 February Zairian soldiers surround the Nyangazi refugee camp, restricting NGO activities and preventing the entry or departure of refugees from the camp.

21 February Five Rwandan refugee leaders are arrested in the Kibumba refugee camp for discouraging repatriation through threats to Rwandan refugees.

26 February Four attacks by unidentified gunman result in the deaths of civilians, municipal officials, and international workers.

Late February
An International Rescue Committee (IRC) vehicle is destroyed by land mines in the Cyangugu region.

16-18 March The Carter Center sponsors a summit on refugees in the Great Lakes Region in Tunis.

Early March Four US investigators arrive in Kigali to work with the ICTR.

1 April USAID Administrator Brian Atwood pledges $1 million to support HRFOR activities.

2 April Brian Atwood and the EU Commissioner for Humanitarian Affairs Emma Bonino visit Kigali to meet with GOR officials and representatives from NGOs and other international organizations.

19 April The last members of the UNAMIR peacekeeping forces leave Rwanda.

8-11 May Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor John Shattuck and USG Special Coordinator for Rwanda and Burundi Richard Bogosian visit Rwanda.

14-15 May US National Security Advisor Anthony Lake and US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs George Moose meet with senior GOR officials in Kigali.

Early June The GOR agrees to allow a UN Office for Rwanda (UNOR) to succeed UNAMIR.

20-21 June The donor community holds an international roundtable conference on Rwanda in Geneva where they pledge $617 million in assistance.

26 October OFDA sends DART to Kigali to assess the situation, provide information, and provide funding to NGOs, UN agencies, and other international organizations.

7 November US Ambassador to Rwanda Robert Gribbin declares a disaster in Rwanda due to the refugee crisis in Eastern Zaire.

12 November USAID/DART is denied permission to enter Zaire. US Ambassador to Zaire Daniel Simpson declares a disaster in Zaire due to the violence in the east.

13 November The White House announces its participation "in principle" with the Canadian-led multi-national humanitarian force (MNHF). The US sends a 40-member military team composed of military medical, engineering, civil affairs, and security specialists to Kigali to assess the situation.

15 November UNSC Resolution 1080 is approved. It authorizes the MNHF to deliver relief supplies to the Great Lakes Region and authorizes the deployment of troops. The GOR and GOZ both have reservations about this operation.

15-21 November

500,000-600,000 refugees returned to Rwanda from Zaire.

17 November USAID/DART team visits the now empty Mugunga camp and Goma in Zaire.

17-19 November
The GOR, UN agencies, and international organizations identify and assist 5,000 Rwandan returnees along the Goma/Gisenyi border.

18 November The USG announces that it will provide $140 million for humanitarian and development assistance activities in the Great Lakes Region.

USG and Canadian Government officials meet in Ottawa to discuss the situation in the Great Lakes Region. They conclude that the international community should focus its assistance on repatriating Rwandans.

19 November UNHCR is allowed to enter Bukavu.

20 November The first trucks of 100 leased by UNHCR to carry relief supplies and to transport refugees, begin arriving in Rwanda.

20 November USAID/DART, accompanied by the IRC, enters Bukavu, Zaire, and meets with rebel leader Laurent Kabila. Kabila informs the team that there is only one large group of 4,000-5,000 refugees in the Bukavu area. The team is not allowed to leave the town limits of Bukavu, but does speak with journalists who have been able to travel within a 40-km radius of Bukavu. The journalists report that most displaced persons are Zairians, and Bukavu residents state that they know of no large numbers of Rwandan refugees in the area.

21 November Merlin, a British NGO, reports that the GOR has closed the MSF/I and MDM clinics at the Petite Barriere border crossing. 20 patients are transferred to a Merlin border clinic. 300 patients will be sent to the hospital in Gisenyi.

The first shipment of OFDA-funded plastic sheeting and blankets arrives in Kigali.

USAID/DART visits the Bukavu central hospital and reports that medicines and other medical supplies have run out and the only ambulance was stolen by ex-FAR. The team reports that food and non-potable water is available, but shops are closed.

22 November USAID/DART deployed to Bukavu returns to Kigali.

22-23 November
The international community meets at the US European Command in Stuttgart, Germany, to discuss the possibility of the MNHF.

23 November The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) holds a meeting to discuss refugee reintegration in the Great Lakes Region. GOR officials, international donor organizations, and UN agencies attend. USAID Administrator Brian Atwood, USAID Chief of Staff Richard McCall, and BHR/OFDA Director Nan Borton also attend.

The remainder of the OFDA-funded plastic sheeting and blankets arrives in Kigali.

24 November USAID/DART and mission staff and representatives from the EU Regional Food Security Program visit the Kigali Rurale and Gitarama districts of Rwanda to evaluate resettlement activities.

25 November According to a GOR Ministry of Rehabilitation and Social Integration report, 135,000 families in rural areas and 65,000 families in urban areas have no shelters.

27 November According to a WFP report, 12,000 Rwandan returnees from the Kahindo and Katale refugee camps in Zaire arrive in Gisenyi.

A team of relief workers finds 40,000 Rwandan refugees in Minova, Zaire.

27 November-2 December
According to a WFP report, 28,000 refugees return to Rwanda from Zaire.

28 November According to a UNFOR report, 21 Rwandan returnees have been arrested on charges of genocide.

29-30 November
20,000 Rwandan refugees cross into Rwanda from Goma. Relief agencies provide high protein biscuits, water, and health care in Sake, Mugungam and Kulungu to refugees traveling from Minova to the border at Goma.

1 December The Nyamulagira volcano, which is located near the former refugee camps of Kitale and Kahindo in Zaire, erupts.

UNHFOR reports that 323,000 of the 600,000 Rwandan returnees have registered in their home districts.

3 December UNHCR and the GOT sign an agreement finalizing a repatriation plan for Rwandans.

4 December The international community holds a meeting in Kibungo, Rwanda to discuss the coordination of activities focused on the assistance of refugees returning from Tanzania.

5 December Two DART staff members visited the Rwanda/Uganda border to determine whether it would be possible for refugees to return to Rwanda from Tanzania through Uganda.

13 December The IMNF steering group meets in New York. Canada suggests that the project end on December 31.

Representatives from 12 countries, the EU, the UN, and the GOR meet in Kigali to discuss reintegration of Rwandan refugees.

14-17 December

175,000 of 535,000 Rwandan refugee in Tanzania return to Rwanda.

17 December A USAID/DART staff member reports that refugees are lined up for 12 km on both sides of the Tanzanian border.

18 December Zairian President Mobutu Ses Seko returns from convalescence in France and promises to retake land seized by the rebel movement. This announcement incites fear of reprisal by the FAZ among Zairian citizens in the Goma area, and many leave the region.

GOZ also announces that General Mahele Bokoungo is the army chief and sends eight planes of FAZ soldiers to Bunia, which is located near several towns controlled by the ADFL.

27 December The first two genocide trials begin in Kibungo.

1997

Early January

USAID reports that 20 Rwandan refugees have committed suicide to avoid repatriating from Tanzania.

3 January Two genocide suspects are found guilty and sentenced to death.

10 January In Kobero, Muyinga province, Burundi, soldiers kill 126 Palipehutu refugees forced by the GOT to return from Tanzania. The GOT arrests seven of those suspected of involvement in the attacks.

11 January The MSF reports that 60 suspected-Interahamwe attacked the Kabaya hospital in Rwanda, killing one, injuring three, and stealing medical supplies.

13 January An HRFOR vehicle is destroyed in Gisenyi prefecture, Rwanda, and two HRFOR staff members are threatened but not injured.

Cameroon decides to send four Rwandan genocide suspects to the ICTR in Arusha, Tanzania.

18 January In Ruhengeri town, Rwanda, workers for the OFDA-funded MDM funding are attacked by gunmen in their house. Three Spanish citizens are killed, and one American is seriously injured. In addition, three Rwandan soldiers are killed. Nearby buildings housing international workers of MSF and SCF are also attacked, but no one else is injured.

20 January The GOZ begins a counter-offensive against the rebels in an attempt to retake rebel-controlled territory.

21 January The GOT announces the end of its Rwandan refugee repatriation program.

28 January The GOR announces its new resettlement plan that is designed to accommodate the population increase caused by the return of refugees. In addition, the housing settlements will integrate Tutsi and Hutu families to promote reconciliation.

30 January President Clinton announces a US "drawdown" of up to $38 million for emergency response activities in the Great Lakes Region.

31 January A HRFOR report states that survivors and witnesses of the Rwandan genocide are being targeted and killed by Hutu death squads in Rwanda.

4 February Two UN human rights monitors and three Rwandan HRFOR staff in Karengera, Rwanda, are killed after their clearly marked vehicle is stopped by a large group of unknown gunmen. The UN announces that staff will be evacuated from the four western prefectures of Rwanda. Most other international organizations reduce or withdraw their staff as well.

9 February An attack on a convoy of minibuses in Rwanda leaves eight Tutsis dead.

14 February The vice-president of the Supreme Court of Rwanda is killed in his Kigali home.

17 February An HRFOR report states that Rwandan police have arrested five and killed two of the men suspected of killing HRFOR human rights monitors on 4 February.

18 February A genocide court in Gikongoro, Rwanda, acquits a suspect for the first time in the tribunal process.

19 February The ICRC decides to relocate most of its already reduced staff to Kigali, greatly reducing its activities elsewhere in Rwanda.

20 February Rwandan foreign minister Anastase Gasana announces a GOR program for the reeducation of returning ex-FAR refugees.

22 February 21 Hutu, including 16 children, are murdered in Kibungo prefecture, Rwanda.

25 February USAID/DART ends its program in Kigali, Rwanda. An OFDA officer will remain.

26 February The chief administrator and deputy prosecutor of the ICTR is fired because of reports of waste and mismanagement by the UN Inspector General.

Early March According to an HRFOR report, human rights violations and violent incidents in Rwanda have increased since 1 January.

1-2 March A French news agency reports that, according to UN and local officials, 20 people are killed in two attacks in Rwanda.

13 March A two-person DART team leaves for Nairobi, Kenya. The team will visit Kigali and Kampala and meet with USG, UN, NGO, and Rwandan officials.

17 March	The ICTR trial of the former leader of the Interahamwe Georges Rutaganda.
19 March	Five Hutu and Tutsi children are murdered in a school because they refuse to segregate themselves according to their ethnic heritage.
24 March	According to Radio Rwanda reports, five people are killed in clashes between Rwandan security forces and the Interahamwe.
28 March	The Rwandan Ministry of Rehabilitation and Social Integration is dissolved and its activities and responsibilities are taken over by the Interior Ministry.
3 April	Part one of the UN plan to repatriate refugees from eastern Zaire is completed as the last of the 2,846 refugees from Tingi-Tingi and Amisi are flown to Goma.
5 April	The Alliance approves parts two and three of the UN plan to repatriate refugees from eastern Zaire. Part two will use commercial flights to transport refugees from cities in eastern Zaire to Goma, and part three will bring 96,000 refugees staying near the railroad south of Kisangani to Goma. (The GOR decides that returnees from Kisangani will not fly directly into Kigali and that they must remain at a transit center for screening before they can go to their homes).
9 April	Rwanda's vice-president and defense minister Paul Kagame tells a Belgian newspaper that the countries of the Great Lakes Region support the Alliance.
21 April	The GOR approves the Emergency Reintegration and Reconstruction Program (ERRP), which details the implementation of the economic program.
22 April	The IMF approves a $12 million loan to Rwanda to support the economic program.
28 April	Suspected members of the Interahamwe murder 17 schoolgirls, a Belgian citizen, and four Rwandan citizens in Satinsyi commune, Gisenyi prefecture, Rwanda after the schoolgirls refused to segregate themselves into ethnic groups. One suspect has been arrested and another killed by Rwandan security forces.
29 April	Bernard Acho Muno of Cameroon is appointed deputy prosecutor for the ICTR.
April	USAID begins providing assistance designed to help strengthen the Rwandan legal system, including assistance to the University of Rwanda law school, the Rwandan bar association, and the national judicial council.
11 May	Two priests, a nurse, and three young girls are murdered in Ginkongoro province.
15 May	An OFDA officer visits Runda, a transit station in Kigali, Rwanda, for returning refugees. The camp processes about 1,800 refugees each day.
17 May	A Gisenyi prefecture sub-prefect is murdered in Satinsyi.

Kinshasha, Zaire falls to the Alliance. The Alliance renames Zaire the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DROC).

22 May A USG assessment team travels to Kibungo prefecture and meets with GOR and local officials who state that the continuation of large-scale free food assistance after the summer harvest would be inadvisable.

26 May 30 armed men (suspected ex-FAR and Interahamwe) ambush two vehicles in Kibuye prefecture, murdering the police commander and ten civilians.

29 May Laurent Kabila is inaugurated the president of DROC.

3 June The GOR denies any involvement in reported massacres in refugee camps in the Democratic Republic of Congo and calls for an investigation of events in eastern Zaire since 1994, including the activities of international organizations.

18 June Two WFP staff members and some members of their families are murdered in Ruhengeri prefecture, Rwanda.

20 June A Rwandan UNHCR driver and members of his family are murdered.

June In response to frequent killings in Rwanda, the High Commissioner for Refugees states that the security situation in the western part of Rwanda has made it very difficult to carry out assistance activities.

4-6 July 20 people are murdered by suspected ex-FAR and Interahamwe members in Gitarama prefecture, Rwanda.

8 July Rwanda's vice-president and minister of defense Paul Kagame announces that all refugees are welcome to return to Rwanda.

9 July The *Washington Post* carries a front-page interview with Paul Kagame. Kagame is quoted as saying that the RPA planned and led the rebel offensive in Zaire. Kagame states that Rwanda became involved because of its concern over the organization of ex-FAR/Interahamwe in refugee camps in Eastern Zaire.

16 July Paul Kagame meets with Kenyan president Moi to discuss Rwandan exiles.

18 July Seven people suspected of involvement in the genocide are arrested in Kenya and handed over to the ICTR.

28 July USAID FEWS releases a report that states that per capita crop production was 14 percent lower in 1997 that in 1996, 20 percent lower than in 1990.

Summer?? A BHR/FFP and FEWS food security report states that the post-repatriation food gap will persist and emergency food assistance will make the transition from relief-to-development

assistance occur more quickly. The report is based on a Kigali workshop attended by the UN, SCF/UK, and the Rwandan Ministry of Agriculture.

1 August The GOR conducts a visit to Ruhengeri for diplomats during which RPA officers claim that 90 RPA were killed in action in May and June, while the RPA killed 1,800 rebels and 300-400 civilians. The Rwandan minister of the interior states that reports of thousands of civilian deaths are not true and would be incompatible with the GOR policies.

7 August An AI report states that 2,300 unarmed civilians were killed in May, June, and July in Rwanda. AI attributes the majority of deaths to the RPA.

22 August 148 Congolese refugees were killed and 80 wounded in an attack by suspected ex-FAR/Interahanwe in the Mudende camp, Gisenyi prefecture. Thousands of refugees flee following the attack, but return slowly in the following weeks.

8-10 Sept. DROC president Kabila conducts a state visit to Rwanda during which Kabila and Rwandan president Pasteur Bizimungu agree to increase economic ties, reinforce security on the DROC-Rwanda border. The two presidents also requested reconstruction assistance for DROC.

10 September US Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues speaks to GOR and NGOs in Kigali, stating the continued support of the US for the ICTR.

12 September After ambushing a clearly marked Red Cross vehicle, a group of gunmen murder two Rwandan Red Cross employees and an employee of the Rwandan youth ministry. 28 Red Cross workers have been killed in the Great Lakes Region in the preceding year.

3 October DROC officially closes its border with Rwanda to prevent an influx of refugees.

7 October Three genocide suspects testify in defense of the former mayor of Taba commune at his ICTR trial

8 October Interahamwe and ex-FAR attack Gisenyi town. The RPA is able to repel the attack which causes 280 Rwandans to flee across the border to Goma.

21 October A WFP driver whose truck had broken down, separating him from a military escort, is murdered at a military checkpoint. His truck, carrying 15 MTs of relief food, is burned.

26-27 October

According to a Hutu group in Brussels, the RPA massacres 5,000-8,000 unarmed civilians who have fled to the Nyakimana Cave in Kanama commune, Gisenyi prefecture.

28 October The National Food Committee (NFC), representing the GOR, WFP, UNHCR, EU, and USAID, announces that it will target a one-time distribution of emergency food aid to the most vulnerable groups.

17 November 1,200 Hutu rebels attack a prison in Giciye commune in an attempt to free comrades in jail for involvement in the genocide. According to the army spokesman, 200 rebels, 88 prisoners, and 2 soldiers are killed, and 93 prisoners escaped.

18 November USAID/Rwanda informs WFP that it must provide nutritional surveys to prove that emergency food aid is still necessary before the USG will pledge more monetary assistance.

2 December Hutu rebels attack a prison in Rwerere commune, Gisenyi prefecture and free 103 Hutu prisoners.

3 December Hutu rebels attack a prison in Bulinga commune, Gitarama prefecture and free 580 Hutu prisoners. 470 prisoners surrender themselves because they say they are too weak to travel.

4 December The National Food Committee (NFC), composed of the EU, GOR, WFP, and USAID/Rwanda, agrees to support hunger season distributions for 380,996 vulnerable people.

10 December At 11:30 pm, Hutu rebels attack the Mudende refugee camp, in which 17,000 Congolese Tutsis are living, killing 312 refugees and wounding 267. Some reports claim that 150 mostly female refugees were kidnapped. At the same time, 460 Hutus escape from a nearby prison. In response, the GOR and the international community provide emergency medical support. BHR/OFDA funds the temporary transfer of a Kigali Central Hospital doctor to the Gisenyi hospital and also funds 160 doses of anti-tetanus serum. The camp is evacuated after the attack.

11 December Madeleine Albright visits Rwanda and meets with the president and vice-president. She announces a USG assistance package that includes $1.7 million for demobilization of the military, $1 million for reconciliation and democracy projects, $1.5 million for education programs. Albright states that the international community should accept blame for the 1994 genocide.

11-13 December

Secretary Albright's team does not learn of the Mudende massacre until after leaving Rwanda. Upon her return to the US, she sends US Special Ambassador for Human Rights David Scheffer to return to Rwanda.

13 December Hutu rebels attack the Mudende refugees at the Nkamira transit center. No injuries are reported.

14 December David Scheffer and US ambassador Gribbin visit the massacre site and the Gisenyo hospital.

18 December DROC, GOR, and UNHCR officials meet to discuss the Mudende refugees and agree to pursue a policy of voluntary repatriation.

Mid-December

During his visit, Ambassador Scheffer is allowed to visit the location of the Nyakimana cave, although he not allowed to enter the cave. He reports that the smell indicates the presence of dead bodies, although there was no way to determine how many as there was no visible evidence of mass murder.

1998

19 January A bus with over 100 Braliwra workers is ambushed in Gisenyi town. The armed attackers order the passengers to separate according to ethnic heritage, but they refuse and the attackers set the bus on fire, shooting any trying to escape. Reports indicate that 74 passengers were killed and 29 seriously wounded.

Week of Jan. 2
The president and vice president of Rwanda visit Brussels. They announce their plan to reduce the number of prisoners held under suspicion of genocide.

21 January 10,000 people participate in a street demonstration in Gisenyi town to protest the ongoing violence in the region.

27 February The UN announces a $550 million Consolidate Inter-Agency Appeal for the emergency needs of 5 million people in the Great Lakes Region.

28 February Fighting breaks out between the RPA and rebels in Gitarama prefecture. During the next week of fighting, two prisons are attacked and 680 prisoners are freed.

11 March 30 armed men attack a resettlement village in Bukora commune, Kibungo prefecture. Eight people are killed.

25 March President Clinton visits Kigali as part of his Africa trip.

6 April The fourth anniversary of the 1994 genocide leads to violence in the northwest and central parts of the country.

24 April 22 people convicted of participation in the genocide are executed by firing squad.

28 April Koffi Annan begins an eight country tour of Africa: Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and Eritrea.

1 May The ICRC hands down its first conviction: former Rwandan Prime Minister Jean Kambanda.

7 May Koffi Annan visits Burundi and Rwanda.

8-9 May UNHCR and the OAU host a meeting in Kampala for regional governments to discuss the issue of refugees in the region.

30 June USAID officials visit Mutura, Rwerere, Kanama, and Rubavu communes, Gisenyi prefecture.

Annex K: Integrated Strategic Plan Strategic Objectives, Intermediate Results, and Related Activities

SO 1: *Increased Rule of Law and Accountability in Governance*

SO 2: *Increased Rwandan Capacity to Provide Effective Decentralized, Sustainable Primary Health Care and Basic Social Services.*

SO 3: *Increased Ability of Rural Families in Targeted Communities to Improve Household Food Security.*

SO#1: Rule of law

IR1 Strengthen administration of justice

1.1. Law school
1.2. Bar association
1.3. MOJ technical assistance
1.4. Natl juduciary council

IR2 Increase security

2.1. Police training (1)
2.2. Demining activities
2.3. Civil-Military ...
2.4 Demobilization

IR3 Improved accountability & transparency

3.1. Local Governance
Local gvt. & participative activities
TA/TRG to Min of Interior
3.2. National assembly
3.3. Civil society

Other SO support activities

Local governance TA/TRG
Program management (PSC)
FSNPSC

SO#2: Reintegration of communities

Health activities

IR1 Health (STD/HIV/AIDS)

1.1. Integrated STD activities
Technical assistance
1.2. Integrated STD activities
Direct support
1.3. Peer education pilot in Gitarama
1.4. IEC capacity building

IR2 Finance/admin. capacity building

2.1. Accounting & admin. support to MOH

IR3 National IEC capacity

3.1. Health communication center

IR4 Health training capacity

4.1 Kigali health institute
4.2. Rehabilit. Kicuro center
4.3. Support to Mutara

IR5 Policy & strategy development

5.1. Long and short term TA

SUBTOTAL SO#2 Health

Food Security and Productive Opportunities

1. Capacity building in ag. sector
1.1. TA and Training activities
1.2. Data collection & analysis
2. Support to women in transition
3. Promote economic opportunities and recovery
4. Technical assistance and training other than agriculture (EG)
5. Road rehabilitation (ERMA)
6. Food monetization
7. Support for Separated Children
8. Relief and humanitarian needs

SO 3

IR3.1 Increased household food security in target communities.
IR3.2 Increased GOR capacity to plan and implement sound agricultural practices.
IR3.3 Critical needs activities completed.

Annex L: Current Events

The following articles were compiled from several online news sources including Africa News Online and the BBC.

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All Africa News Agency

Catholic Bishops Promise to Help Displaced in Rwanda

January 11, 1999

KIGALI (AANA) January 11 - In a Christmas and New Year message to Rwandan Christians, Catholic bishops of Rwanda pleaded for assistance to people suffering in camps in the northern part of the country.

The bishops had visited the camp for displaced people of Nyarutovu in the Diocese of Ruhengeri in northwestern Rwanda on 7th December last year. The delegation also planned to visit the camp of Nyamugali situated in the Diocese of Byumba in northern Rwanda, but the visit did not materialise due to the absence of local government authorities.

In Nyarutovu, the delegation was welcomed by three Ruhengeri sub-prefects who briefed them on the government policy in the area which has been extensively destabilised by fighting between government forces and ex-Rwandan Armed Forces supported by Interahamwe militiamen.

According to Ngabo Amiel, one of the sub-prefects, the government's policy is to allow people to return to their places of origin but stay in 'Imidugudu,' houses built through communal effort along roads. He explained that the aim was to allow people to take security in their own hands while creating an environment conducive to community development.

The Catholic newspaper Kinyamateka, reporting the bishops' visit, says the Nyarutovu camp shelters 64,348 people, though some had started to return home at the time of the visit.

Displaced people's camps face many problems including lack of clean water, firewood, food and diseases such as malaria and diarrhoea.

The camp's dispensary receives 300 people daily and an average of five inhabitants die every day.

Following their visit to the camp, the Catholic bishops took measures to improve the situation in the camps, including asking Caritas-Rwanda to supply food and medicines to the camps, availing school materials to children and sending more religious teachers to the camps.

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Rwanda Joins EAC

January 10, 1999

Kampala - Rwanda will become a member of the East African Cooperation this week when heads of states meet in Arusha Tanzania to ratify the treaty. Rwanda has been seeking to join the EAC since 1994. Rwanda's Foreign Affairs Ministry official told Sunday Vision that they applied for membership three years ago.

"We made an application which was accepted by the E.A. foreign ministers but it has to be ratified by the presidents," the said source.

He was happy that Rwanda had been accepted in the Cooperation. "Economically it will be profitable to us, because all our trade passes through Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda" he said. He said since English was now the official language in Rwanda they would benefit from the Cooperation.

"We have been in good terms with the nations and we fit in well," he added.

State minister for Foreign Affairs (Regional Cooperation) Amama Mbabazi confirmed that Rwanda had applied for membership. "It is on agenda," he said. He said all would depend on the decision of the heads of states.

He added, "Uganda looks at it favourably and we hope it will be adopted." On august 24 1997, a Uganda Rwanda Friendship Association was formed in Kampala by a lobby group to incorporate Rwanda into the Cooperation.

An official at the Arusha based EAC secretariat said yesterday, "preparations are going on well for the meeting." He declined to give further details.

President Yoweri Museveni has since been calling for the regional integration for wider economic market. Mbabazi said yesterday that Rwanda's inclusion would broaden the market. "It will be helpful because they are going to create a common market. The bigger the market the better" he said.

The hinterland covering Rwanda,Uganda, Burundi, Western Kenya, Northwestern Tanzania

and Eastern Congo has a potential market of over 100m people. All these countries have an interest in the stability of the region. Rwanda got independence on July 1962 from the Belgians who took over the country from the French after the second world war.

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All Africa News Agency

Rwandan Army Demobilises Soldiers

December 21, 1998

KIGALI (AANA) - The Rwandan army has demobilised 3602 soldiers, including four colonels, one Lt-Col, six Majors, 16 captains, and 97 lieutenants. The demobilised soldiers first underwent a one-week orientation course.

While officiating the demobilisation ceremony, which was also attended by the prime minister, Pierre-Celestin Rwigema, senior government officials and foreign diplomats, Vice-President and Defence Minister Major-General Paul Kagame said that some of the soldiers had retired voluntarily, while others were forced to retire.

Concerning the appropriate size of the army, Major-General Paul Kagame said it depends on the army's role and job assigned to it and resources the country has to fulfil its duties. Kagame added that his country needed a smaller and disciplined force.

Other sources say some of the demobilised soldiers are old or disabled, but many are young people. Paul Kagame said that the government would assist those who became disabled as a result of the war.

Rwanda has been helped by foreign countries in the demobilisation process. Each soldier is due to get about 1,000 dollars upon retirement. Financial institutions and donors have been asking Rwanda to cut down the size of its large army in order to reduce the country's expenses.

However, according to the Rwandan government's radio, Amnesty International recently accused Rwanda of recruiting by force throughout the country, including the capital, Kigali.

The Rwandan government refuted the accusations arguing that forced recruitment would reduce the morale of its army, and that it would not have demobilised its soldiers if it needed them.

The Rwandan government is fighting insurgency mainly in the north-western prefectures of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri. It has also deployed troops to back rebel forces fighting the regime of President Laurent-Desire Kabila.

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Panafrican News Agency

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Rwanda Insists France Is To Blame For Genocide

December 18, 1998
By Ruth Nabakwe

Paris, France (PANA) - The Rwandan government has insisted that France played a key role in the 1994 genocide and dismissed the French parliamentary Committee report, saying it was only a partisan whitewash of the European country.

A statement from the Presidents office reaching PANA in Paris Friday says France was not only guilty of genocide in Rwanda but played a vital role in the misinformation campaign which misled the international community about the nature of atrocities in at the time.

"The French parliamentary report blames the international community especially the (UN) Security Council yet it was France which manipulated international opinion by distorting facts about the genocide," the statement says.

It accuses French troops of distributing weapons to the Interahamwe militia and delivering piles of weapons to the late President Juvenal Habyarimana's guards under the pretext of evacuating French nationals.

It further says that France's hostility to the post-genocide government in Rwanda and the support it has maintained for the perpetrators of the genocide, underlined the long-term French policy in Rwanda.

It blames France of manipulating a Security Council resolution to block the movement of the advancing Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) forces by ensuring that UN forces were stationed both behind the RPF lines and as well as in front, a move the government says was an attempt by France to curtail the RPF efforts to stop the genocide.

Towards the conclusion of the genocide, France worked hard to secure a UN Security Council Resolution authorising it to deploy forces in Rwanda, the statement address.

While the Parliamentary report agreed that the French soldiers had delayed the RPF's seizure of power, it says the troops that France sent to Rwanda under operation Turquoise had saved thousands of lives.

However, the government statement says operation Turquoise was aimed at re-organising the ex-Rwandan Armed Forces and Interahamwe militia.

"When this could not be achieved in Rwanda, France proceeded to re- arm and re-train these forces in Bukavu and Goma in the then Zaire," it notes.

The statement observes that at the height of the collaboration between the Habyarimana regime and the French government, the late President Francois Mitterand sent the Rwandan militia a letter of solidarity.

It also blames Paris of ignoring reports that genocide had been committed as early as 1991. The French parliament launched the inquiry after Rwanda accused Paris of backing the country's Habyarimana's government for the massacre of an estimated 800,000 people, mostly from the Tutsi ethnic group.

The outcome of the Parliamentary committee findings are not surprising given that it is the same key players who investigated themselves, the statement says.

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Rwandan Official Unhappy With French Genocide Report

December 16, 1998
by Ruth Nabakwe, PANA Correspondent

PARIS, France (PANA) - A Rwandan diplomat in Paris has expressed reservations over a French parliamentary commission report which said Paris was not implicated in the genocide of 1994.

Modeste Rutabayiru, the charge d'Affaires at the Rwandan embassy, said he was not happy with the report's findings that put blame on the international community while portraying France as the "saviour."

"The Commission has made its report, but we have our reservations about it," ht old PANA.

The report was presented in the French National Assembly Monday. The inquiry was launched in March 1998 after Rwanda's current Tutsi-led government accused France of giving military backing to the government of the late President Juvenal Habyarimana just as the Rwandan Patriotic Front was about to seize power.

Representatives of NGOs had also criticised Paris for the close ties it maintained with the former regime, which ordered the massacres after France first withdrew its troops.

Humanitarian and human rights groups have also expressed concern that the commission would suppress damaging findings about France's role in Rwanda.

Presenting the 1,800-page report, which cleared Paris of involvement in the genocide in which over 800,000 people were massacred, the commission's chairman, Paul Quiles, said "France is neither responsible nor guilty."

However, opposition party representatives in the commission -- from President Jacques Chirac's Rally for the Republic, the Union for French Democracy and the Liberal Democratic party -- voted against it.

Rene Galy Dejean, a close associate of the former Prime minister at the time of the genocide, Edouard Balladur, was particularly critical of the report's "introductory note" which cleared France of any responsibility in the events leading up to the genocide.

"The opposition is not party to these findings that are purely political," he declared.

The commission chairman insisted in his report that the "genocide was carried out by the Rwandese themselves even though France may have committed strategic errors."

The report admitted, however, that the three diverse military operations carried out by France delayed the RPF's arrival to power and facilitated the escape into the Democratic Republic of Congo of the Hutu extremist forces. It placed part of the blame on the US, saying its reluctance to boost the UN forces in Rwanda allowed the massacres to occur.

It also assailed the international community's incapacity to halt mounting violence but affirmed France was in no way involved when the violence was unleashed.

The report suggested that French laws be amended to give parliament a bigger say in foreign and military affairs, which currently is a preserve of the president. Quiles said the report's findings will be made public and will be available on the internet.

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Another Accused Pleads Guilty At The United Nations Rwanda

December 15, 1998

Arusha - For the second time in the short history of the United Nations Rwanda tribunal, an accused has signed a plea agreement and admitted to committing genocide. Rwandan businessman Omar Serushago pleaded guilty on Monday to four counts of genocide and crimes against humanity, but told judges that he was not guilty of the fifth count of rape.

The middle-aged, balding businessman calmly answered in the affirmative when judges asked whether his guilty plea was "unequivocal, voluntarily and with full understanding of the facts and charges against him."

"He knew what he was doing and he wasn't scared," one lawyer at the court said in a telephone interview. "He had the same look that Kambanda had." Former Rwandan prime minister Jean Kambanda pleaded guilty in May to genocide charges and was sentenced this fall to life in prison by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. The two await their prison sentences in United Nations detention facilities, alongside thirty others accused of orchestrating the 1994 Rwandan massacres.

Serushago turned himself in to authorities in Cote d'Ivoire last June where he fled after participating in the 1994 killings in Rwanda.

The businessman was in charge of the local Interahamwe militia in Gisenyi, where he and his subordinates tortured, beat, and murdered ethnic Tutsis at the infamous "Commune Rouge."

Prosecutors say that men like Serushago were acting on the orders of Hutu extremists in government who grabbed power after the assassination of Rwanda's president Juvenal Habyarimana.

One hundred days after the president's death, over 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutu had been massacred across the country by militiamen and ordinary citizens who saw the Tutsis as a threat.

After the Tutsi-led rebel army took power in a military victory, many of those who led the killings fled the country and are now living in exile all over the world.

Like prime minister Jean Kambanda, who received court protection for his exiled wife in exchange for his guilty plea, Serushago signed an agreement with prosecutors which promises protection for his family.

After pleading guilty in open court to genocide, Serushago denied the rape charge that held him responsible for the sexual violence committed by his militiamen against Tutsi women and girls.

Prosecutors held a brief meeting during which they opted to drop the rape charge.

Pre-sentencing arguments for Serushago will be held on January 29 and court lawyers say they expect him to be sentenced a few days later.

Contact Farah Stockman Internews For the holidays (517) 351-2134

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Monday, December 14, 1998 Published at 14:33 GMT

World: Africa
Hutu leader admits genocide

The Rwandan massacres sparked a refugee crisis

A former leader of Rwanda's extremist Hutu militia has pleaded guilty to four counts of genocide and crimes against humanity.

Omar Serushago, once a leader of the Interahamwe militia, is now awaiting sentence by a United Nations tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania.

It is trying people for the deaths of around 800,000 people during massacres in Rwanda in l994.

Serushago pleaded guilty to four genocide-related charges, but not guilty to a fifth charge involving rape. After a 10-minute adjournment, the prosecution said it would not proceed with the rape indictment.

The prosecution's said Serushago was present when soldiers abducted 20 ethnic Tutsis who had sought shelter in a house, and that he had personally killed four people from the group.

Co-operated with court

Serushago, a one-time businessman who led the Interahamwe in the north-western town of Gisenyi, turned himself in to police in Ivory Coast in June.

During his detention, he was held apart from other suspects.

Tribunal officials have acknowledged his co-operation with the court, and there is speculation he may testify against other defendants.

Serushago is the second Rwandan to admit to charges of genocide. Former Rwandan Prime Minister Jean Kambanda also admitted genocide.



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South African Muslims threaten war on police
Sudanese leader denies power struggle

The tribunal also convicted Jean-Paul Akayesu, formerly mayor of the central commune of Taba, who had pleaded not guilty.

Both Kambanda and Akayesu received life prison sentences.

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power struggle

Africans dominate cross-country

Tuesday, November 24, 1998 Published at 17:47 GMT

World: Africa

Drugs funded Rwanda rebels, says UN

Rwandan soldiers in 1994: Some became rebels

By East Africa Correspondent Martin Dawes

Rwandan rebels have been financing their fighting in the Great Lakes region of Africa through drug dealing, according to a United Nations report.

The UN international commission of inquiry investigating illegal arms trading in Central Africa suggests that former members of the Rwandan military and of the notorious Interahamwe militia - which was heavily involved in the 1994 genocide - are directly involved in narcotics.

The commission report says that information it had received suggested that the drug mandrax was smuggled from India through Kenya and Tanzania and on to South Africa.



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It adds that narcotics are also said to have been supplied from South America.

The commission says there is information that former officials recruited and raised funds in Kenya to buy arms for use against the Rwandan Government.

It states that the rebels, having been scattered throughout Central Africa, are converging in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Since August that country has been battling a rebellion which is being supported by the new Rwandan Government and Uganda.

The report says that the Great Lakes region is heading towards a catastrophe unless urgent and decisive measures are taken by the international community.

The fact that the Rwandan rebels have become a significant component in the forces supporting the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and have achieved a form of legitimacy is, says the commission, a profoundly shocking state of affairs.

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