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*Comparative Urban Studies Project*

# YOUTH, POVERTY, AND CONFLICT IN SOUTHEAST ASIAN CITIES

Edited by
Lisa M. Hanley
Blair A. Ruble
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# INTRODUCTION

LISA M. HANLEY AND JOSEPH S. TULCHIN

The growth of youth populations in cities around the developing world poses a particular obstacle to urban development and serious challenges to local government. Urbanization continues to be a primary trend in developing countries and as already constricted labor markets are inundated with even more and younger job seekers, cities must take a closer look at the way they provide employment opportunities for youth populations. In cities throughout the world youth are dropping out of school and being excluded from the economy. They take to the streets, form gangs, and become an alienated violent social group that presents a unique set of problems to society. In some cases, this violence and systematic exclusion of poor youth threatens the stability of cities and regions. In such situations, the sustainability of urban areas, and subsequently of developing nations as a whole, depends upon the ability of cities to foster inclusive local development and improve their ability to deal with the growing portion of youth among their population.

Asia's level of urbanization is relatively low, approximately 34 percent, compared to both developed and other developing countries. However, of the world's 6.2 billion people, about 60 percent live in Asia and 1.3 billion are urban dwellers. By 2015, 2.6 billion people will reside in Asia's cities, twice as many as the urban population of the world's more developed regions. There are just over one billion youth in the world today, about 25 percent of the working age population. However, according to the International Labour Organization, youth accounted for 47 percent of the 186 million unemployed workers in 2003. Youth also represent 130 million of the world's 550 million working poor, earning less than $1 per day. It is estimated that the world's youth population in this decade will increase from 116 million to 1.2 billion. Rapid growth coupled with further predictions that the global economy will need to accommodate half a billion more people in the labor force of developing countries over the coming decade is a significant concern for policy makers today. With 87 million unemployed youth in the world today, and projections of signifi-

cant increases in the youth population in the next decade, youth employment statistics indicate a major policy concern for the region.

Low urban fertility rates combined with rural-urban migration, create urban age profiles which reveal a relative deficit in children and a relative surplus of working age youth and adults. A further analysis of age structure demonstrates a notable increase with city size in the working age proportion, with the occasional exception of the largest city size category. Given population trends, such large increases in the number of young people, have serious implications for the future. The Asian youth bulge has become a focus of significant interest to policymakers, in part because youth are considered to be a source of problems, although they are also a major resource for national development.

Youth, most frequently defined as those between the ages of 15 and 24, can indeed contribute to urban development. However, harnessing the energy of youth in a productive manner and facilitating positive development is a difficult task made more difficult by the fact that vulnerable groups of adolescents have not been given the research attention necessary to understand the complexities of their peculiar situation.

This book is concerned with the issues of poverty, unemployment, and youth and how governments and civil society can more successfully incorporate youth into the labor market in Asian cities. It focuses on both the unemployed and underemployed youth and by examining specific case studies of social programs focused on youth throughout Asia, reflects on how policies and programs can be planned and managed so that jobs and social services become more accessible to urban youth.

The papers included in this volume were presented at a workshop convened in Bangkok, Thailand, by the Comparative Urban Studies Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the Asian Institute of Technology. It was the first pan-regional encounter to consider these vital and complex issues. Panelists and participants reflected on the role of youth in a rapidly urbanizing society and examined the linkages between poverty, conflict, and youth populations in Southeast Asian cities. We hope these papers will be of use to students of cities, development practitioners, and local government officials throughout the world.

The chapters and view points presented in this book examine strategies for linking youth to employment possibilities and the particular challenge of integrating the needs of marginalized youth into local

economies. The authors aim to address regional differences and highlight successful programs for improving the lives of youth in cities around the world, in order to foster a better understanding of the size and demographic of the youth cohort in cities in Southeast Asia. They call for a better understanding of the particular predicaments of youth in cities of Southeast Asia today and draw attention to successful and replicable strategies and programs for including youth in local economic development efforts by both government and civil society groups.

The first part of the book examines demographic and urbanization trends in Southeast Asia. Peter Xenos, of the East-West Center, examines the size and nature of these trends in Southeast Asia, in order to gain a better understanding of youth populations in the region. Xenos disaggregates the youth population and examines the particular needs of the urban youth population, with a special emphasis on impoverished youth. He notes the rising number of youth and their ever-increasing share of the national population. He analyzes the expansion of youth numbers, the comprehensive social transformations and the focus of both in urban areas of the Philippines, Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand. The Asian youth explosion or youth wave is a phenomenon of the last three decades of the 20th century and the first quarter of the 21st. Urban areas expect the highest net in-migration rates, particularly in the youth range. In this chapter, Dr. Xenos explores questions such as the systematic national consequences of this demographic transition and the implications for levels of youth conflict in urban areas.

Yap Kio Sheng, of the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, argues that the concept of conflict is too vague and promotes misconceptions about the inevitable casual linkages between large youth populations and violence. In the second chapter, he explores "incomplete urbanization," which means the population is in place, but lacks infrastructure, services and policies. He emphasizes the urbanization of poverty and the need to unite the urban with traditional rural values. This compromise is essential, as it can give a society in transition direction. Dr. Sheng calls for policies to cope with the new urban demand and urges experiment with innovative urban management styles.

Quality of life for youth in cities depends upon their ability to earn sufficient incomes. Cultivating a skilled youth cohort through general education programs and vocational training is indeed a start, but in order to encourage economic growth and alleviate poverty, cities must ensure

that job opportunities match the skills of local populations. How, then, can cities best encourage the inclusion of youth in local economic development? A focus on school and work may miss urban girls. Girls are much less likely than boys to take part in school-based or community-based activities. Reaching girls in such environments requires targeted efforts.

In chapter three, Felicitas Rixhon, of the Consuelo Foundation discusses some of the key issues facing youth and how the Consuelo Foundation addresses these concerns, including lessons learned and recommendations. Ms. Rixhon focuses on youth employment, particularly on out of school youth and unemployed youth. This chapter provides concrete examples of programs, which have been effective and successful in dealing with youth in the Philippines. Ms. Rixhon emphasizes the mismatch between skill training programs and the labor market. Many young Filipinos see a college education as a passage to better paying white-collar employment, however in the Philippines, the supply of educated youth is much higher than actual labor demand. Unfortunately, technical training is viewed as a poor persons college, and few of these programs match up with industry needs when designing their curricula. Therefore, upon graduation, students' skills and qualifications are ill matched with potential employers. The Consuelo Foundation attempts to offset this disparity, in order to close the youth employment gap. This chapter explores the programs and cases of the foundation and concludes that integrated basic and technical education can be a means of improving the life chances of urban youth.

The fourth chapter analyzes the way government programs address the needs and concerns of poor urban youth in the Philippines. Angela Desiree Aquirre, of the Institute of Philippine Culture, describes case studies of informal settlements and constructs a profile of poor urban youth in Manila, Quezon, and Davao. The author emphasizes the importance of establishing links with civil society groups and local government in order to foster a more coordinated effort. In this chapter, Ms. Aguirre suggests ways of including this vulnerable cohort in both government and non-government programming as well as recommends approaches to making employment development initiatives more effective.

In the face of this rapid urbanization and burgeoning problems, it is strategically critical to identify effective ways in which mayors and their local governments, along with other agencies, NGOs, the private sector, and other partners can collaborate to improve employment opportunities

for youth. Integrating youth into local economies is vital to the sustainability of urban areas. Yet, understanding the potential of youth will require that society set aside the apparent link between violence and youth. It is not enough that we make youth a priority on the policy agenda; we must seek to understand them and include them in the development process. Creating programs to improve the employment opportunities of urban youth, particularly girls, presents an enormous challenge to the development community. The question then remains: how can cities best foster a sense of community and citizenship among urban youth in order to encourage positive urban development? All of these challenges suggest that it is imperative to make municipal government and civil society organizations more sensitive to the peculiar problems of youth populations and to increase their capacity so to undertake the policy challenges youth represent.

Preventing the isolation of youth is vital to efforts to foster local economic and democratic development. Impoverished youth can be especially vulnerable to joining street gangs and institutions of organized crime. Ethnic or communal conflict can also be exacerbated by the presence of poverty. Creating socially inclusive cities is vital to a stable and economically successful city. This volume creates a more informed knowledge base for youth programming in cities of Southeast Asia, as we move towards a framework and improved understanding of the successes and urgency of these issues. It is the sixth volume in the series of studies of urban governance the Wilson Center has conducted with the generous support of the Urban Programs Team of the United States Agency of International Development.

CHAPTER 1

# Demographic Forces Shaping Youth Populations in Asian Cities

PETER XENOS
*East-West Center*

There is a crucial back story for any account of modern Asian youth in cities—the story of the underlying demography at work.[i] This chapter seeks to describe and explain this demography and some of its implications for contemporary urban youth populations across Asia. The discussion covers the entire Asian region, but my focus is on four countries—Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand—where detailed data are available to illustrate important elements of the story.

The overarching theme for the region as a whole is one of rising numbers of youth making up an ongoing, much-touted "youth bulge" or "youth explosion." These terms refer, respectively, to an expanding youth population's share of the total population and to youth population growth rates well in excess of growth rates for the population as a whole. Across Asia, youth growth rates have sometimes reached 6 percent a year sustained as an average for a decade, and youth shares of the total population have sometimes reached nearly 25 percent. The analysis here places such evidence of an Asian youth explosion into a broader demographic context.

Although there certainly has been a rapid expansion of youth populations across Asia, analysis shows that the overall youth bulge is a temporary phenomenon and, moreover, one that takes its importance mainly from the way that it combines with two additional elements of the demographic picture. These are, first, the systematic rural-to-urban movements of youth and the associated large rural–urban differentials in youth growth rates and youth shares; and second, the momentous shifts in social composition among youth that are also occurring. Often, indeed typically in the data I have examined, the social transformations of youth are occurring concurrent with both the youth explosion and the urbanward movements.

The analysis presented here emphasizes the cumulative force of these three elements—expansion of youth numbers, comprehensive social transformations, and the focus of both of these in urban areas. Much of each national youth explosion is an urban phenomenon, reflecting youth's ubiquitous press toward the cities, especially those that are large. Moreover, urban youth are at the vanguard of a set of major social transformations that are producing, among other outcomes, ever greater proportions of youth who are single, rising proportions enrolled in school, and declining proportions of youth in the workforce. I examine available measures of these transformations and demonstrate the extent to which there is an urban and even a metropolitan locus for them.

Globally, evidence for a youth explosion has drawn considerable attention, with a youth bulge measure often serving as a predictor of trouble. Huntington's (1996) widely debated "clash of civilizations" idea assigns a significant role to an explosion in youth numbers, particularly in the Middle East (Huntington 1996, chap. 5, especially figure 2).[ii] As others have done, Huntington employs a youth share of 20 percent or greater as predictive of crime, civil disturbance, and even deeper political strains. He refers to a "combination of [youth population] size and social mobilization" and views youth as "the protagonists of protest, instability, reform, and revolution" (p. 117).

Other recent assessments have echoed Huntington's general concerns, if not his apocalyptic tone. As early as 1989, the Population Crisis Committee was making a connection between a youth bulge and social instability.[iii] More recently, Teitelbaum (2000) has described single men 15 to 25 years of age as potentially "dangerous to the social order," asking whether a youth bulge can "overwhelm weak states." This can occur, he says, when the population of male youth is "not employed, disciplined by schools or military, or under parental/community control." Recently we have had the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (2001) offer an assessment of long-term global demographic trends that draws the same kind of conclusion. Even more recently the U.S. National Academy of Sciences offered an analysis in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks (Smelser and Mitchell 2002), which has a section titled "Demographic and Economic Considerations" and a lengthy demographic appendix (Hammel and Smith 2002). The main report discusses the "youth dependency ratio" as a factor that puts "great pressure on the education systems of these societies and also results in high propor-

tions of young people in the economy who cannot find their way into paying and productive economic roles" (p. 29).

Most of these researchers are thoughtful enough to consider a broad range of factors that might encourage instability and to examine critically the specific conditions under which a youth bulge might be important. Kahl (2000) sees demographic pressure as neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for civil strife, just as much earlier Wriggins (1988, 1989) had related youth numbers to the "distribution of scarcities," a problem that may be handled either well or poorly whether there is a youth bulge or not. Analysis by Keyfitz (1971, 1973, 1986) are along the same lines. The State Failure Task Force (Esty et al. 1995), supported by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), concluded—on the basis of an extensive set of global data and multivariate modeling of relationships—that the youth bulge is only a weak predictor of state failure.

Interestingly, the CIA has also expressed concern over "youth deficits," the opposite sort of problem, which it suggests become a factor when the youth share drops below 15 percent in a sustained way (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 1990), and produce, for example, insufficient labor force entrants. In the presentation below, we are able to compare the Asian youth bulge indicators with these 15 and 20 percent benchmarks for the youth deficit and youth bulge.

Beyond total numbers, there is considerable policy and program interest in particular categories of youth—those thought most likely to experience problems and even engage in violent or otherwise disruptive behavior. For example, the ethnic group demography of Singalese and Tamil youth in Sri Lanka has been examined by Fuller (1995); Brennan-Galvin (2002) has considered the greater violence rates among youth and especially young single men; and Goldstone, in both his historical (1991) and contemporary research (2002), sees problems in "a surge in the production of youth with advanced education in the context of a relatively limited, semi-closed structure of elite positions" (2002, 10).

The analysis offered here highlights some of the population segments that might be of interest, including unmarried male youth, youth enrolled in higher levels of schooling, and youth of each sex who are still single but out of school. For example, we will see that among males in Indonesia the 1970s saw growth rates of 25 percent for the total population, 36 percent for young men 15 to 19 years of age, 54 percent for

such young men living in metropolitan Jakarta, 56 percent for young single males in Jakarta, and 121 percent for young single Jakarta men who were enrolled in school.

The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. First I look at systematic national sequences of demographic transition, certainly the overarching demographic conjuncture across Asia in the latter part of the twentieth century (East–West Center 2002, 15ff.). Important cross-national patterns of similarity and difference stem from the divergent timing of demographic transition across Asia, and this has implications for the timing of ensuing age waves, including the age wave we call the youth explosion (Tuljapulkar, forthcoming).[iv]

Next we turn to disaggregations of urban and rural youth populations and of the metropolitan component of urban youth populations. This brings out distinct national patterns of youth bulge and growth rates, as well as some evident regional themes. It is then possible to consider the demographic force of national demographic transitions versus rural-to-urban migration processes within countries and to compare the relative magnitudes and importance of the two in determining both youth shares and youth growth rates, our two primary indicators of youth explosion.

Having examined the essential demography underlying urban youth explosions, we then review the shifting social demography of Asian youth and in particular two dramatic trends from which much else derives: (1) the shift from relatively early to quite late ages at marriage, and the concomitant progressively higher percentages of single youth; and (2) the shift to higher levels of school enrollment among youth. Elsewhere, these trends are documented for all countries of the region and for both sexes in each (Xenos and Kabamalan 1998a, 1998b). Their combined force in reshaping the social composition of youth is illustrated here for the four focal countries. When they occur simultaneously, the combination of youth explosion and these social transformations can be extraordinary, with a cumulative effect on numbers and growth in numbers suggested by an alternate metaphor, of ocean waves piled upon one another as they approach a shoreline. Once again, we see that each trend is most dramatic and combines most forcefully in urban and especially metropolitan areas. But first we must establish some background by reviewing two aspects of recent Asian demographic change—rapid urbanization, and the urbanward mobility of youth.

**Table 1. Indicators of Urban Transformation, Selected Countries of Asia, 1950–2000 (percent)**

| COUNTRY | 1950 | 1960 | 1970 | 1980 | 1990 | 2000 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **THAILAND** | | | | | | |
| **Urban** | 10.5 | 12.5 | 13.3 | 17.0 | 18.7 | 21.6 |
| **Sectoral growth rates** | | | | | | |
| Urban | 4.4 | 3.5 | 5.5 | 2.8 | 2.3 | 2.7 |
| Rural | 2.4 | 2.9 | 2.5 | 1.6 | 0.8 | 0.3 |
| **Proportion of national urban population in agglomerations of 750,000 or more** | 64.9 | 65.1 | 65.5 | 59.3 | 56.7 | 54.9 |
| **INDONESIA** | | | | | | |
| **Urban** | 12.4 | 14.6 | 17.1 | 22.2 | 30.6 | 40.9 |
| **Sectoral growth rates** | | | | | | |
| Urban | 3.3 | 3.7 | 4.9 | 5.3 | 4.6 | 3.6 |
| Rural | 1.4 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.0 | 0.04 | -0.6 |
| **Proportion of national urban population in agglomerations of 750,000 or more** | 14.7 | 19.1 | 19.1 | 17.9 | 13.7 | 12.7 |
| **PHILIPPINES** | | | | | | |
| **Urban** | 27.1 | 30.3 | 33.0 | 37.5 | 48.8 | 58.6 |
| **Sectoral growth rates** | | | | | | |
| Urban | 3.7 | 3.8 | 4.2 | 5.2 | 4.4 | 3.1 |
| Rural | 2.2 | 2.6 | 1.9 | .6 | 0.2 | -0.06 |
| **Proportion of national urban population in agglomerations of 750,000 or more** | 27.1 | 27.2 | 28.6 | 33.0 | 26.9 | 24.4 |
| **SOUTH KOREA** | | | | | | |
| **Urban** | 21.4 | 27.2 | 40.7 | 56.9 | 73.8 | 81.9 |
| **Sectoral growth rates** | | | | | | |
| Urban | 3.7 | 5.7 | 5.3 | 4.0 | 2.1 | 1.4 |
| Rural | 0.2 | 1.3 | -0.6 | -2.8 | -2.7 | -2.6 |
| **Proportion of national urban population in agglomerations of 750,000 or more** | 23.5 | 34.1 | 40.9 | 38.2 | 33.3 | 25.8 |

Note: (b) and (c) are annual rates during the first five years of the interval shown; in (d), the size classification of places is defined as of 1995.
Sources: (a) United Nations (2001), table A.2; (b) United Nations (2001), table A.6; (c) United Nations (2001):table A.15; (d) United Nations (2001), table A.15.

## Asia's Urban Transformation and Youth

Across most of Asia, there has been rapid growth of urban populations generally and especially of major city populations (United Nations 2001; United Nations Center for Human Settlements 1996). Nothing short of an urban revolution occurred in the second half of the twentieth century, as is suggested by the indicators in table 1 for the four countries we are examining here.[v] In Thailand and the Philippines, urbanization levels doubled

**Table 2. Indicators of City Growth and the Role of Migration, Selected Cities of Asia, 1950–2000**

| CITY AND INDICATOR | | 1950 | 1960 | 1970 | 1980 | 1990 | 2000 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Bangkok** | | | | | | | |
| **Number** | | | | | | | |
| Total | (a) | 1,360 | 2,151 | 3,110 | 4,723 | 5,901 | 7,281 |
| Youth | (b) | | | 516 | 1,293 | 1,452 | |
| **Growth Rate** (annual percentage) | | | | | | | |
| Total | (c) | | | | | | |
| Youth | (d) | | | | | | |
| **Migration as percentage of growth** | | | | | | | |
| All Urban | (e) | | 50.1 | 59.2 | | | |
| Bangkok | (f) | | 42.9 | 50.8 | | | |
| Other Urban | (g) | | 50.1 | 45.8 | | | |
| **Percentage of population who are migrants** | (h) | | 20.3 | 20.7 | | | |
| **Jakarta** | | | | | | | |
| **Number** | | | | | | | |
| Total | (a) | 1,452 | 2,679 | 3,916 | 5,985 | 7,650 | 11,018 |
| Youth | (b) | | | 949 | 1,560 | 2,035 | |
| **Growth Rate** (annual percentage) | | | | | | | |
| Total | (c) | | | | | | |
| Youth | (d) | | | | | | |
| **Migration as percentage of growth** | | | | | | | |
| All Urban | (e) | | | | | | |
| Bangkok | (f) | | 35.4 | | | | |
| Other Urban | (g) | | 31.2 | | | | |
| **Percentage of population who are migrants** | (h) | | | | | | |

| CITY AND INDICATOR | | 1950 | 1960 | 1970 | 1980 | 1990 | 2000 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **MANILA** | | | | | | | |
| **Number** | | | | | | | |
| Total | (a) | 1,544 | 2,274 | 3,535 | 5,955 | 7,968 | 10,870 |
| Youth | (b) | 254 | 293 | 1,028 | 1,466 | 1,769 | 2,098 |
| **Growth Rate** | | | | | | | |
| (annual percentage) | | | | | | | |
| Total | (c) | | | | | | |
| Youth | (d) | | | | | | |
| **Migration as percentage of growth** | | | | | | | |
| All Urban | (e) | | | 36.9 | | | |
| Bangkok | (f) | | | n.a. | | | |
| Other Urban | (g) | | | n.a. | | | |
| **Percentage of population who are migrants** | (h) | | | | | | |
| **SEOL** | | | | | | | |
| **Number** | | | | | | | |
| Total | (a) | 1,021 | 2,361 | 5,525 | 8,351 | 10,603 | 9,888 |
| Youth | (b) | | | 1,282 | 1,997 | 2,240 | |
| **Growth Rate** | | | | | | | |
| (annual percentage) | | | | | | | |
| Total | (c) | | | | | | |
| Youth | (d) | | | | | | |
| **Migration as percentage of growth** | | | | | | | |
| All Urban | (e) | | | 60.5 | 57.9 | | |
| Bangkok | (f) | | | 73.1 | 62.7 | | |
| Other Urban | (g) | | | | | | |
| **Percentage of population who are migrants** | (h) | | | 16.2 | 23.2 | | |

Sources: (a) 1950–1980 from United Nations (1985), Table 1 or from published census reports; (b) extracted from published census reports; (c) and (d) Calculated from (a) and (b); (e) 1960–1970 and 1970–1980 from ESCAP (1988); (f) and (g) 1960–1970 from ESCAP (1988), Table 17; (h) from ESCAP (1988), Table 2
Notes: (e), (f) and (g) include change due to reclassification

during the 50 years shown, starting from a low level in Thailand and a much higher level in the Philippines, and reaching 22 and 59 percent urban in 2000, respectively. Indonesia's urbanization level was also low in 1950 but had more than tripled by 2000. Extraordinary urbanization in South Korea had quadrupled its urbanization level to 82 percent by 2000.

Rising percentages of urbanization of course reflect higher urban than rural rates of population growth. It is worth noting the pattern of these magnitudes, against which we can later compare growth rates for categories of urban youth. In the places and periods I am describing, rural rates are always lower than urban, and they rise and fall in line with national demographic transitions. For example, Thailand's rural growth rates peaked in the 1960s at 2.9 percent a year and then fell as national fertility levels fell (Knodel, Chamrathrithirong, and Debavalya 1987; Jones et al. 1997). Interestingly, rural growth rates peaked in that same decade in all four countries, but at much lower levels in Indonesia and South Korea than in Thailand and the Philippines.

For our purpose, we are especially interested that urban growth rates peaked in the 1960s (South Korea), 1970s (Thailand), and 1980s (Indonesia and the Philippines). This may reflect some falling back of urban net migration rates, as is suggested later in this chapter, but it certainly reflects mainly the overall national fertility declines. Describing the 1970s and earlier, Preston (1979) identified overall population growth as the major factor associated with urban growth, and the subsequent trends described here certainly support that. Finally, we note that at their peak, annual urban growth rates exceeded 5.0 percent, and in Thailand and South Korea reached or exceeded 5.5 percent.

The character of these urban sectors varies markedly. About one-eighth to one-third of urban dwellers live in large cities of 750,000 people or more; see table 1, row (d). The exceptions are the very high big-city composition of Thailand's urbanization, reflecting the historical and continuing dominance of Bangkok (Sternstein 1984; Askew 2002), and the 40 percent or so big-city composition of South Korea's urbanization that had been reached by 1970. For all these countries, and indeed most Asian countries, the common pattern of note is the surge and then falling back of big-city shares of urbanization as the twentieth century progressed.[vi]

Actual rates of urban population change during the period shown fell well short of the urban population growth that had been projected (United Nations 1980; discussed in Brockerhoff 2000, table 1).[vii] The reasons offered for this include macroeconomic setbacks to urban-industrial growth, a shift in the terms of trade favoring agriculture, and of course the curtailment of national population growth rates, which before 1980 had been a most important contributor to urban growth. But another

**Table 3. Age-Specific Net Rural-to-Urban Migration Rate for Selected Asian Countries and Time Periods, and Sex**

| COUNTRY, TIME PERIOD, AND SEX | 5–9 | 10–14 | 15–19 | 20–24 | 25–29 | 30–34 | 35–39 | 40–44 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **INDONESIA** | | | | | | | | |
| **1961–1971** | | | | | | | | |
| Male | 2.9 | 9.5 | 7.5 | 0.5 | -2.3 | | 1.1 | 0.5 |
| Female | 4.2 | 10.8 | 3.4 | -1.3 | | 1.4 | | |
| **1970–1980** | | | | | | | | |
| Male | | 13.6 | 15.2 | 7.3 | | | | |
| Female | 7.0 | 16.2 | 10.8 | 4.1 | | 6.1 | 5.0 | 4.7 |
| **KOREA, SOUTH** | | | | | | | | |
| **1960–1970** | | 30.3 | 33.1 | 29.9 | 39.9 | | | |
| **1970–1980** | | 34.3 | 43.5 | 31.8 | 31.8 | | | |
| **PHILIPPINES** | | | | | | | | |
| **1970–1980** | | | | | | | | |
| Male | | | 16.4 | 13.5 | | | | |
| Female | | 20.4 | 23.1 | 9.4 | | | | |
| **THAILAND** | | | | | | | | |
| **1970–1980** | | | | | | | | |
| Male | | | 7.8 | 10.6 | 7.4 | | | |
| Female | | | 9.9 | 11 | 8.2 | | | |

Source: Singelman (1993), table 10.
Note: Table shows only rates for ages 15–19 and 20–24, and any other age-specific rates for a row which are equal or greater than those for 15–19 or 20–24. These are estimates made by the census survival ratio method.

simple demographic explanation may suffice. When rural populations are large relative to urban, even small rural-to-urban out-migration rates can produce proportionally large additions to urban populations, but as the urban share grows the same out-migration rates yield diminishing impacts on urban numbers.

The final stage in this process is the leveling off of rural populations and even the beginnings of rural decline. Among our focal countries, this historic turning point—the absolute decline of rural populations—began during the period 1965–1970 in South Korea and 1995–2000 in Indonesia, and is projected to begin in 2000–2005 in the Philippines and 2010–2015 in Thailand.[viii]

## Youth in National Migration Systems

We turn now to four major metropolitan areas of interest: Bangkok, Jakarta, Manila, and Seoul. Each stands at the apex of a national system of cities, and each has shared disproportionately, at least until quite recently, in the urban growth just described. It is important to recognize two elements of these city histories: the very considerable contribution of migration to their growth; and the important contribution of youth age groups to that migration. The relevant data are assembled in tables 2 and 3.

The trajectory of city populations is shown in table 2, row (a), and the related intercensal growth rates are shown in row (c). These are rapid rates of city growth, often (though not always) above the levels for urban sectors of their countries generally. Rows (b) and (d) provide the trend in youth numbers in these cities, and the related growth rates of the youth population, obtained from census reports for some of the dates. In each instance, metropolitan youth populations had an episode of extraordinarily rapid growth relative to total metropolitan populations, which has since tapered off. In Bangkok and Jakarta, this occurred during the 1970s, when total metropolitan population growth was also at its peak. In Manila, this occurred during the 1960s, somewhat before metropolitan total population growth peaked. The pattern for Seoul cannot be seen clearly in the available data because much of it may have occurred before the data series begins.

The contribution of migration to such population changes can be described only in broad terms, and then only by pulling together a disparate set of estimates. Measurement of migration and the indexing of migration as a systemic feature of national demography is not nearly so standardized as the fertility and mortality components of demographic change. This is in large part because migration is an inherently more complex phenomenon that can only be defined on the basis of essentially arbitrary time-and-space cutoffs.[ix] One result of these complications is that migration has come to be measured by a variety of direct and indirect means. We lack a consistent body of measurement across countries. Table 2 compiles much of the available evidence for the four cities of interest.

More comprehensive coverage is only available for urban sectors rather than specific cities, using an indirect method such as the census survival ratio method, which requires good population data and correct modeling of mortality ratios, but no direct information on migration. One of the most complete and recent compilations of such estimates is provided by

Singelman (1993). His estimates for the urban sectors of our four focal countries are shown in table 3. Although these estimates are for whole urban sectors rather than the cities of interest, I am presenting them here because they indicate very effectively the age and sex selectivities underlying the urbanward movements. Estimates for all the age groups and by sex are available, but for the present purpose I am showing only the rates for the groups 15–19 and 20–24 years of age for each sex, as well as any additional age-sex specific rates that for any row (country/city, time period, and sex) exceed the 15–19 or 20–24 level.

It is readily apparent in table 3 that in South Korea, the Philippines, and Indonesia there has been a heavy concentration of urbanward migrants, or at least the net effect of urbanward migration, in the groups 15–19 and 20–24 years of age. Many other migration rates are positive, but none reaches the levels for those age groups, except for the age 10–14 rates in Thailand and South Korea and the 25–29 rates in South Korea. The Indonesian pattern also features a concentration of urbanward migration among youth, but with greater participation of the other age groups. The urbanward movement occurs at younger ages in Indonesia than elsewhere. We note also that the South Korean rates are comparatively very high throughout the age range 10 through 29. It is noteworthy that estimation of this kind is relatively scarce for the intercensal periods after 1980.[x] We will return to our four cities and consider some further evidence of the net migration of youth, but first the next section considers more fully the demographic context of the rapid growth of Asian youth populations.

## Demographic Transition and Youth Explosion

Countries follow a very similar pattern of demographic shifts in the course of demographic transition. But whereas the Asian countries have experienced demographic transition in similar ways, they have done so at somewhat different times. Consequently, demographic transition experiences of countries represents a major dimension of differentiation in youth demography. Demographic transition occurs when birth and death rates both plummet from high levels at varying speeds and sometimes rather quickly toward low levels. The consequences of demographic transition are many, the most obvious being the sequence of temporary age shifts that is set in train, transitional to a more nearly constant and probably permanent much older age structure at the end of the transition. The latter is recognized as the graying

**Table 4. Indicators of Youth Demography during Demographic Transition, Selected Asian Societies**

| SOCIETY | Year of Onset of Fertility Decline (date) | Duration of Demographic Transition (years) | Peak Youth Growth Rate (year) | Peak Youth Share of Total Population (year) | Peak Youth Population Number (year) | Percentage of Growth of the Youth Population during the Demographic Transition |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Singapore** | 1959 | 16 | 1969 | 1978 | 1980 | 112 |
| **Hong Kong** | 1960 | 20 | 1970 | 1950 | 1980 | 220 |
| **South Korea** | 1962 | 23 | 1974 | 1980 | 1981 | 83 |
| **Sri Lanka** | 1962 | 43 | 1975 | 1980 | 2002 | 90 |
| **Philippines** | 1963 | 66 | 1974 | 1977 | 2021 | 259 |
| **Brunei** | 1965 | 55 | 1970 | 1980 | 2012 | 443 |
| **Taiwan** | 1965 | 18 | 1960 | 1980 | 1980 | 54 |
| **Malaysia** | 1966 | 49 | 1970 | 1980 | 2015 | 194 |
| **Thailand** | 1968 | 32 | 1973 | 1986 | 1992 | 109 |
| **China** | 1969 | 21 | 1984 | 1987 | 1989 | 97 |
| **Indonesia** | 1970 | 40 | 1974 | 1992 | 2005 | 104 |
| **India** | 1973 | 47 | 1977 | 1984 | 2014 | 106 |
| **Myanmar (Burma)** | 1976 | 49 | 1985 | 1994 | 2001 | 117 |
| **Bangladesh** | 1981 | 34 | 1995 | 2002 | 2004 | 78 |
| **Nepal** | 1988 | 42 | 2001 | 2007 | 2032 | 127 |
| **Pakistan** | 1990 | 40 | 2005 | 2010 | 2033 | 100 |

Source: Singelman (1993), table 10.
Note: Table shows only rates for ages 15–19 and 20–24, and any other age-specific rates for a row which are equal or greater than those for 15–19 or 20–24. These are estimates made by the census survival ratio method.

or aging of populations. The former, transitional age waves are equally well predicted in demographic models but have received much less attention (but see Tuljapulkar, forthcoming).

The Asian youth wave or youth explosion is a phenomenon of the last three decades of the twentieth century and the first quarter or so of the twenty-first. Asian youth numbered 239 million in 1950 but had expanded by 2.4 times to 572 million by 1990. That underlying annual rate of growth (2.18 percent) was in line with the annual growth of total population growth (2.03 percent) during the same period. But between 1990 and 2025, according to UN projections, the total Asian population will

**Figure 1. The Youth Explosion Phase of Demographic Transition: Four Countries of Asia**



grow by 3,897 million or 39 percent, while Asian youth numbers will expand by only 25 percent. The youth share of the total population was 18.9 percent in 1950 and 20.5 percent in 1990 but will decline to 14.9 percent by 2025. The peak Asian youth population in absolute terms will be reached between 2010 and 2020 and decline thereafter.

The sequence of experiences for particular societies is obscured in this regional summary. The age waves are set in motion by abrupt fertility and mortality transitions, and the experience of these has varied among Asian countries. Among the 16 societies for which the onset of fertility decline has been dated,[xi] 11 dates are spread quite evenly over the period from 1959 (Singapore) through 1970 (Indonesia). Then we have two onset dates in the 1970s (India, and Myanmar or Burma), two in the 1980s (Bangladesh and Nepal), and one in the 1990s (Pakistan). The impact of demographic transition in generating age waves is a function of how far fertility falls (essentially, a function of its initial level) and how quickly. Throughout Asia, fertility is falling from rather high initial levels. Asian societies vary in the pace of their transitions, from the region's exemplars of rapid change (first South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan; then, more recently, Thailand and China) to instances of very deliberate change such as India, Malaysia, and the Philippines. In these estimates, the duration of the fertility component of the demographic transition ranges from 16 to 66 years (Singapore vs. the Philippines).

The youth explosion yields the largest magnitudes when the changes just described are substantial and rapid. And the effects are most evident when, in addition, countervailing or obscuring forces are not at work. A summary of national experiences is given in table 4 and depicted four our four focal countries in figure 1. Among the four countries, South Korea best illustrates rapid demographic transition from high fertility levels, resulting in a notable youth explosion marked by two indicators—rising youth growth rates and youth shares of total population—and three benchmark events. In sequence, these are the peaking of the youth growth rate (1974), the peaking of the youth share of the total population (1980), and the peaking of the absolute number of youth (1981). From a policy standpoint, there is a rough trade-off in these numbers, because the very rapid shifts have social and infrastructure costs (e.g., rising and then falling school building requirements) but do keep the surge in the number of youth within limits. Thus South Korea's youth population grew by only 83 percent during its demographic transition.

The contrasting experience of slow transitions is illustrated by countries such as Malaysia and Nepal, and among our focal countries by the Philippines. The Philippines began its fertility transition fairly early according to the widely accepted estimates I am using, but then progressed very slowly. Its demographic transition is projected to occur over a period of 66 years. The Philippines has already seen the peaking of its youth growth rate, and of the share of youth in its national population, but the peak number of youth will not be reached for some time. During the whole transition episode, the number of youth in the Philippines will grow by 259 percent.

Such is the youth explosion at the national scale across Asia. Growth rates of youth sometimes reach quite high levels, considerably higher than rates for the population as a whole. Moreover, the youth shares shown in figure 1 are generally well above the levels for youth shares across the Middle East that have captured so much attention. Huntington's charts of youth shares for Middle Eastern countries show levels that peak barely above the 20 percent line (cf. Huntington 1996, figures 5.1–5.3), but these episodes of the youth bulge are over, or nearly over, throughout most of Asia today. The historical importance of these episodes is bound up with other demographic changes. With these national patterns as background, we can now turn to the youth demography of metropolitan, urban, and rural areas as these are affected by both national demographic trends and the historical urbanward press of youth.

## The Urbanward Press of Youth

Earlier in the chapter, we looked at Asia's national urban transformations, which for most countries have been simultaneous with the national demographic transitions and were no doubt fed by the rapid growth phase of those transitions. We have also seen that urban areas generally experience the highest net in-migration rates, particularly in the youth age range. As an element of the demography of urban youth, we wish to draw out some of the demographic implications of this urbanward press of youth. The first step is to look briefly at rural, urban, and metropolitan disaggregations for indicators of the youth explosion. The available data allow a disaggregation of these measures for our four focal countries during the period from 1970 through 1990 or 1995, and for South Korea and the Philippines for well before 1970. The indicators are presented in table 5.

**Table 5. Indicators of the Youth Explosion in Metropolitan, Other Urban, and Rural Sectors in Four Countries of Asia, Available Years, 1925–95**

| COUNTRY AND YEAR | YOUTH SHARE OF POPULATION | | | | GROWTH RATE OF YOUTH POPULATION | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Whole Country | Metropolitan | Other Urban | Rural | Whole Country | Metropolitan | Other Urban | Rural |
| **KOREA** | | | | | | | | |
| **1925** | 0.176 | 0.213 | n.a. | n.a. | 2.07 | 4.49 | n.a. | n.a. |
| **1930** | 0.183 | 0.235 | n.a. | n.a. | 1.00 | 2.36 | n.a. | n.a. |
| **1935** | 0.178 | 0.237 | n.a. | n.a. | -0.23 | 17.73 | n.a. | n.a. |
| **1940** | 0.159 | 0.232 | n.a. | n.a. | 1.43 | 1.13 | n.a. | n.a. |
| **1945** | 0.169 | 0.227 | n.a. | n.a. | 6.31 | 10.85 | n.a. | n.a. |
| **1950** | 0.186 | 0.228 | n.a. | n.a. | 2.04 | 1.78 | n.a. | n.a. |
| **1955** | 0.193 | 0.225 | 0.209 | 0.186 | 1.88 | 7.98 | 1.68 | 2.33 |
| **1960** | 0.182 | 0.218 | 0.195 | 0.174 | 1.88 | 8.43 | 5.72 | n.a. |
| **1965** | 0.172 | 0.214 | n.a. | n.a. | 2.28 | 9.12. | 5.99 | n.a. |
| **1970** | 0.178 | 0.232 | 0.215 | 0.148 | 5.18 | 5.33 | 7.95 | -0.66 |
| **1975** | 0.210 | 0.243 | 0.240 | 0.180 | 2.64 | 3.53 | 5.92 | -2.25 |
| **1980** | 0.222 | 0.239 | 0.244 | 0.194 | 0.64 | 1.34 | 3.21 | -2.66 |
| **1985** | 0.212 | 0.222 | 0.223 | 0.191 | 0.65 | 0.95 | 3.36 | -4.64 |
| **1990** | 0.204 | 0.211 | 0.204 | 0.196 | -1.59 | -1.98 | 0.60 | -2.98 |
| **1995** | 0.183 | 0.199 | 0.184 | 0.165 | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a |

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **PHILIPPINES** | | | | | | | | |
| **1903** | 0.180 | 0.249 | n.a. | n.a. | 2.47 | 1.80 | n.a. | n.a. |
| **1918** | 0.192 | 0.252 | n.a. | n.a. | 2.66 | 3.48 | n.a. | n.a. |
| **1939** | 0.199 | 0.239 | n.a. | n.a. | 2.07 | 5.92 | n.a. | n.a. |
| **1948** | 0.199 | 0.258 | n.a. | n.a. | 2.66 | 1.18 | n.a. | n.a. |
| **1960** | 0.195 | 0.257 | n.a. | n.a. | 3.16 | 12.56 | n.a. | n.a. |
| **1970** | 0.197 | 0.260 | 0.206 | 0.184 | 3.90 | 4.12 | 2.92 | 2.80 |
| **1975** | 0.209 | 0.254 | 0.221 | 0.198 | 2.27 | 2.98 | 6.55 | 0.94 |
| **1980** | 0.205 | 0.247 | 0.213 | 0.193 | 2.32 | 1.88 | 5.68 | 0.31 |
| **1990** | 0.205 | 0.224 | 0.210 | 0.197 | 2.03 | 3.41 | n.a. | n.a. |
| **1995** | .200 | 0.222 | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |
| **INDONESIA** | | | | | | | | |
| **1971** | 0.164 | 0.209 | 0.202 | 0.155 | 4.23 | 5.52 | 7.04 | 1.68 |
| **1980** | 0.193 | 0.241 | 0.230 | 0.182 | 2.13 | 2.66 | 5.76 | 0.83 |
| **1990** | 0.196 | 0.247 | 0.229 | 0.180 | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |
| **THAILAND** | | | | | | | | |
| **1970** | 0.186 | 0.239 | 0.212 | 0.180 | 4.39 | 9.19 | 3.58 | 2.20 |
| **1980** | 0.222 | 0.275 | 0.248 | 0.213 | 1.23 | 1.15 | 2.28 | 1.76 |
| **1990** | 0.206 | 0.247 | 0.211 | 0.200 | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |

Note: Information for 1925-1945 refers to the area under Japanese control, thus the entire Korean peninsula;
N.A. = Not Available
Source: Calculations based on published censuses.

There are some general patterns in table 5 as well as some distinct results. In general, the two key indicators of youth explosion reach much higher levels for the urban areas of countries, and higher levels still in the metropolitan sector. Generally, both metropolitan and other urban sectors show evidence of the youth explosion, while in rural sectors the explosion is muted if it is in evidence at all. It is notable that at only one point (Thailand in 1980) does the rural youth share exceed 20 percent, while it is always above 20 percent in metropolitan and other urban sectors (with one exception, South Korea in 1995, by which date youth had become relatively scarce everywhere), and in metropolitan sectors is usually above 23 percent. Nowhere in table 5 does a youth share fall below the 15 percent "deficit" level. We should note that levels just below 15 percent are predicted from

**Figure 2. Indicators of the Youth Explosion for Residential Sectors with detail for South Korea 1970–90**



demographic models as the normal state of an age structure both long before and well after demographic transition. From a long-term perspective, all the youth shares shown in table 5 are somewhat elevated.

Youth shares are on average 28 percent higher in metropolitan than in rural areas across the four countries, which is clear evidence of the urban-ward net shift of youth. The highest youth share anywhere is that for Bangkok in 1980 (0.272)—fully 6.2 percentage points higher than the rural level at that time.

The youth growth rates follow similar patterns, though as change measures they are less regular in their movements. Following the youth transition sequence described above, peak youth growth rates occur somewhat before we see peak youth shares. For example, metropolitan South Korea's peak youth share of 0.222 is reached in 1980. Ten to fifteen years earlier, it had witnessed annual growth rates of its youth population in roughly the 8–9 percent range, remarkable levels indeed. A similar youth growth rate is seen in Bangkok during the 1970s before its peak youth share was achieved in 1980.

There are some interesting differences among the four countries. For example, in South Korea, where the youth explosion occurs in the 1970s and 1980s, the indicators are somewhat higher for the combined youth population of urban areas outside of Seoul. In Korea, both youth shares and youth growth rates are higher in the nonmetropolitan urban sector.[xii]

Figure 2 offers a perspective on the demographic force of the national demographic transitions versus the rural-to-urban transfer processes within countries. The upper part of figure 2 gives us a visualization of a two-dimensional space defined by the two youth explosion indexes, with information shown for each of the sectors of each of the countries, across the 1970–71 through 1990 range of dates. It is evident from this that metropolitan levels on both indexes are considerably higher than rural levels, with other urban levels in between and not much different from the metropolitan. Each sector for each of the countries follows a path through this space, but South Korea's (shown in the lower part of figure 2) is the most instructive of the four cases because the whole of its demographic transition is reflected along with the whole pattern of ensuing youth demography, including the sectoral patterns of youth population growth. Arrows show the paths of each of the three sectors. The rural youth shares are consistently low, and rural youth growth rates decline over the 1955–90 period (cf. table 5 for the earliest dates) and are neg-

ative from 1970 onward. Both the other urban and metropolitan sectors have rising and then falling youth growth rates, peaking about the same very high level though at different dates, and falling to very low or even negative growth rates recently. Urban-sector youth shares also rise and then fall (both peaking around 1980). The process is incomplete in the data for the other three countries, but we can speculate that a similar pattern will be followed.

## The Singular Social Profile of Urban Youth

Earlier in the chapter, we noted two social trends that are very important in the demography of Asian youth: the shift to late marriage, bringing progressively higher percentages of single youth; and the shift to higher levels of school enrollment among youth. Previous research has documented these trends from 1950 through 1990 for all countries of the region, and for both sexes in each (Xenos and Kabamalan 1998, forthcoming; Xenos and Gultiano 2002). In this section, we consider these two national social transformations along with levels of labor force participation, each disaggregated for metropolitan, other urban, and rural residences. The data permit this examination for the four focal countries; see appendix A to this chapter.

This is not the place for a detailed discussion of the considerable body of information shown in appendix A. The following few points are pertinent for our purpose here. There are the expected differentials among the age groups and between males and females: school enrollment rates and per-

**Table 6. Decennial Percentage Population Change during the period 1970–80 in Selected Population Segments, Males by Country and Age Group**

| POPULATION SEGMENT | Indonesia | Thailand | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | 15–19 years | 15–19 years | 20–24 years |
| **Total population** | 25.0 | 30.4 | 30.4 |
| **Youth Population** | 36.0 | 47.2 | 69.5 |
| **Metropolitan** | 54.0 | 118.6 | 179.9 |
| **Single** | 55.7 | 114.3 | 173.6 |
| **Out of School** | 9.4 | 60.5 | 135.8 |
| **Enrolled** | 121.3 | 171.0 | 327.3 |

Source: Calculations based on published censuses

centages single are higher for males and decline with age; labor force participation rates are generally higher for males than females and higher at the older ages. Percentages single and school enrollment rates both rise with time, while labor force participation rates follow diverse paths by country, by age, and by sex within a country and age group.

Patterns in these measures associated with level of development will be most likely found in differentials by sector and across time. Of the three social profile measures, school enrollment seems to have the pattern most suggesting universal developmental change, with all categories rising with urbanization level and over time, albeit with various time lags. Percentages single show some of the same pattern but also reflect the overall lateness of marriage in these countries. There are, most noticeably, remnant low percentages single in some rural sectors and especially among rural females. Due to a combination of conceptual and measurement problems, labor force participation rates are notoriously difficult to interpret, particularly for international comparisons or comparisons between males and females. Within countries and sexes, comparisons are more reliable. Nevertheless, the labor force participation rates given in appendix A present very different trends for each of the countries. For example, the rates rise over time for metropolitan females 15 to 19 years of age in Indonesia while declining for males (the generally expected pattern; Durand 1975) but move in opposite directions in the Philippines. In any case, the discussion here focuses on the marriage and schooling indicators.

The combination of youth explosion, metropolitan movement, and social change can be shown with a few illustrations. Table 6 describes males and the 1970–80 intercensal period only. The information for young Indonesian males indicates 25 percent decadal growth for all males, but 36 percent growth among males ages 15 to 19 years of age. This rises to 54 percent among metropolitan males 15 to 19. Among single males 15 to 19 in the metropolitan sector, the registered growth is about the same, reflecting the fact that as early as 1970 virtually all these young men were single. There could be little further change. The number of such young men who were out of school grew by only 9.4 percent, reflecting the fact that the proportion enrolled rose from 40 to 57 percent and absorbed much of the growth in the number of single males 15 to 19. The number of enrolled young single men 15 to 19 grew by 121 percent, this considerable growth within a single decade being the combined result of all the forces we are examining.

The data for the same population group in Thailand has a different pattern. Here total male population growth is greater and the youth bulge and urbanward shift are more important. The number of young metropolitan males expanded by 119 percent. The number who were single within this group expanded slightly less as the percentage single declined slightly. With substantial increases in the percentage enrolled, the number enrolled in this group grew by a considerable 171 percent. The last column of table 6 describes Thailand males at 20 to 24 years of age. Here there is an even greater impact of urbanward movement, with the expansion of metropolitan males 20 to 24 at 180 percent. That demographic base is combined with virtually no change in the percentage single, but a considerable rise in the proportion enrolled (from 16 to 25 percent). The result is a smaller expansion of the number out of school in the group (136 percent) but a huge expansion of the number in the group who were enrolled (327 percent). At 20 to 24, this very great expansion reflects tertiary education, which was being opened to a broader range of young Thais at the time. It is a coincidence, perhaps, but this rapidly growing population segment was at the center of the political actions in Thailand from October 1971 onward.

## Conclusion

We have looked at the youth explosion across Asia, in terms of its magnitudes, its origins in the age dynamics of national demographic transitions, and its important connections with two other elements of the demographic picture. These are the urbanward press of youth, and certain transformational changes among youth leading to a wholly new social profile. I suggested at the outset of this chapter that the Asian youth explosion takes its significance largely from its connection with these other elements of social change. The national Asian youth explosions can be seen as all the more important because they are happening concurrent with the urbanward movement of youth, along with some important social transformations of youth. Youth growth rates that seem elevated, perhaps, but not overly so, look rather more impressive when we consider urban youth populations. And when we look at specific categories of urban youth, we often find extraordinary rates of growth indeed. Youth shares that never (among the four countries we have examined) exceed 20 percent at the national level virtually always exceed that level in the four metropolitan areas. And within these metropolitan youth explosions, particular groups, sometimes important ones, experience exceptional growth rates.

## Appendix A. Indicators of Changing Composition of Youth Population, by Country, Age Group, Sector and Sex: Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand, 1970–90

| COUNTRY, AGE GROUP, AND SECTOR | Male | | | Female | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1970[a] | 1980 | 1990 | 1971 | 1980 | 1990 |
| | PERCENTAGE ENROLLED | | | | | |
| **INDONESIA** | | | | | | |
| **15–19 years of age** | | | | | | |
| Metropolitan | 39.7 | 57.1 | 62.0 | 25.3 | 36.0 | 48.5 |
| Other urban | 53.1 | 62.7 | 63.0 | 36.9 | 45.9 | 54.0 |
| Rural | 24.1 | 33.6 | 34.5 | 12.4 | 20.4 | 28.1 |
| **20–24 years of age** | | | | | | |
| Metropolitan | 17.9 | 14.6 | 17.0 | 7.2 | 7.0 | 11.0 |
| Other urban | 24.2 | 22.0 | 23.2 | 10.8 | 9.6 | 15.5 |
| Rural | 5.7 | 5.5 | 5.7 | 1.2 | 2.3 | 2.8 |
| **PHILIPPINES** | | | | | | |
| **15–19 years of age** | | | | | | |
| Metropolitan | 67.8 | n.a. | n.a. | 57.4 | n.a. | n.a. |
| Other urban | 54.9 | n.a. | n.a. | 48.6 | n.a. | n.a. |
| Rural | 32.4 | n.a. | n.a. | 32.6 | n.a. | n.a. |
| **20–24 years of age** | | | | | | |
| Metropolitan | 33.5 | n.a. | n.a. | 27.2 | n.a. | n.a. |
| Other urban | 22.9 | n.a. | n.a. | 19.2 | n.a. | n.a. |
| Rural | 9.8 | n.a. | n.a. | 9.2 | n.a. | n.a. |
| **SOUTH KOREA** | | | | | | |
| **15–19 years of age** | | | | | | |
| Metropolitan | 46.1 | n.a. | 76.0 | 34.0 | n.a. | 84.6 |
| Other urban | 49.5 | 10.2 | 77.0 | 35.6 | 86.2 | 71.6 |
| Rural | 31.3 | 61.4 | 71.4 | 17.5 | 55.2 | 73.9 |
| **20–24 years of age** | | | | | | |
| Metropolitan | 18.0 | n.a. | 26.8 | 7.0 | n.a. | 67.0 |
| Other urban | 11.8 | 2.9 | 25.1 | 3.4 | 12.6 | 9.2 |
| Rural | 3.1 | 4.7 | 9.2 | 0.4 | 1.8 | 6.4 |
| **THAILAND** | | | | | | |
| **15–19 years of age** | | | | | | |
| Metropolitan | 47.3 | 58.7 | 55.2 | 36.8 | 51.1 | 49.0 |
| Other urban | n.a. | 54.1 | 56.0 | n.a. | 49.8 | 52.7 |
| Rural | n.a. | 3.6 | 21.6 | n.a. | 18.6 | 20.2 |
| **20–24 years of age** | | | | | | |
| Metropolitan | 16.2 | 24.7 | 22.0 | 12.7 | 20.7 | 20.6 |
| Other urban | n.a. | 16.1 | 19.7 | n.a. | 14.0 | 18.8 |
| Rural | n.a. | 0.9 | 4.0 | n.a. | 3.9 | 4.0 |

**Appendix A.** *Continued*

| COUNTRY, AGE GROUP, AND SECTOR | Male | | | Female | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1970[a] | 1980 | 1990 | 1971 | 1980 | 1990 |
| | PERCENTAGE SINGLE | | | | | |
| **INDONESIA** | | | | | | |
| **15–19 years of age** | | | | | | |
| Metropolitan | 96.1 | 97.1 | 98.7 | 68.5 | 78.9 | 91.6 |
| Other urban | 97.5 | 97.8 | 98.5 | 79.0 | 82.8 | 90.8 |
| Rural | 94.3 | 95.8 | 97.0 | 58.9 | 65.6 | 76.5 |
| **20–24 years of age** | | | | | | |
| Metropolitan | 70.7 | 91.5 | 83.8 | 26.1 | 35.7 | 55.7 |
| Other urban | 75.7 | 75.0 | 82.3 | 36.3 | 37.0 | 52.9 |
| Rural | 53.5 | 53.5 | 64.7 | 14.5 | 17.2 | 25.3 |
| **PHILIPPINES** | | | | | | |
| **15–19 years of age** | | | | | | |
| Metropolitan | 97.6 | 96.5 | 96.6 | 93.3 | 90.0 | 91.8 |
| Other urban | 97.9 | 97.2 | | 92.5 | 90.0 | |
| Rural | 97.3 | 95.8 | | 87.0 | 82.8 | |
| **20–24 years of age** | | | | | | |
| Metropolitan | 77.6 | 68.5 | 76.5 | 68.1 | 58.1 | 65.9 |
| Other urban | 74.1 | 68.4 | | 60.7 | 53.1 | |
| Rural | 66.1 | 59.8 | | 42.8 | 37.9 | |
| **SOUTH KOREA** | | | | | | |
| **15–19 years of age** | | | | | | |
| Metropolitan | 100.0 | 99.8 | 99.9 | 98.0 | 98.9 | 99.6 |
| Other urban | 94.0 | 99.8 | 99.9 | 98.0 | 98.4 | 99.4 |
| Rural | 99.6 | 99.7 | 99.9 | 96.1 | 97.6 | 99.4 |
| **20–24 years of age** | | | | | | |
| Metropolitan | 93.7 | 94.3 | 97.0 | 65.3 | 73.3 | 84.8 |
| Other urban | 93.4 | 92.5 | 95.7 | 60.1 | 65.3 | 78.8 |
| Rural | 91.7 | 92.8 | 97.2 | 50.8 | 60.4 | 78.7 |
| **THAILAND** | | | | | | |
| **15–19 years of age** | | | | | | |
| Metropolitan | 97.1 | 95.2 | 95.8 | 90.3 | 89.8 | 92.5 |
| Other urban | 93.7 | 92.9 | 93.3 | 87.7 | 87.5 | 90.8 |
| Rural | 92.7 | 92.6 | 93.8 | 79.3 | 81.0 | 82.9 |
| **20–24 years of age** | | | | | | |
| Metropolitan | 81.9 | 80.0 | 82.5 | 63.3 | 65.8 | 72.2 |
| Other urban | 75.0 | 73.2 | 76.6 | 54.8 | 55.7 | 62.9 |
| Rural | 57.9 | 59.7 | 65.3 | 33.6 | 37.7 | 41.6 |

**Appendix A.** *Continued*

| COUNTRY, AGE GROUP, AND SECTOR | Male | | | Female | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1970[a] | 1980 | 1990 | 1971 | 1980 | 1990 |
| | PERCENTAGE IN THE LABOR FORCE | | | | | |
| **INDONESIA** | | | | | | |
| **15–19 years of age** | | | | | | |
| Metropolitan | 40.0 | 54.5 | 28.8 | 20.9 | 26.9 | 35.1 |
| Other urban | 31.2 | 20.9 | 28.6 | 18.8 | 21.1 | 26.0 |
| Rural | 58.2 | 54.8 | 57.5 | 33.8 | 34.4 | 37.2 |
| **20–24 years of age** | | | | | | |
| Metropolitan | 73.4 | 70.8 | 73.5 | 21.9 | 28.4 | 46.6 |
| Other urban | 65.0 | 66.6 | 67.7 | 25.0 | 26.6 | 39.9 |
| Rural | 83.0 | 84.2 | 87.3 | 35.8 | 35.4 | 44.9 |
| **PHILIPPINES** | | | | | | |
| **15–19 years of age** | | | | | | |
| Metropolitan | 24.3 | n.a. | 41.9 | 93.3 | n.a. | 46.0 |
| Other urban | 31.3 | n.a. | 32.4 | 30.9 | n.a. | 26.5 |
| Rural | 53.2 | n.a. | 48.9 | 28.3 | n.a. | 31.0 |
| **20–24 years of age** | | | | | | |
| Metropolitan | 63.7 | n.a. | 71.4 | 68.1 | n.a. | 61.4 |
| Other urban | 68.0 | n.a. | 64.4 | 41.3 | n.a. | 41.1 |
| Rural | 84.5 | n.a. | 74.1 | 45.5 | n.a. | 36.5 |
| **SOUTH KOREA** | | | | | | |
| **15–19 years of age** | | | | | | |
| Metropolitan | 32.0 | 24.4 | 6.7 | 39.5 | 34.8 | 14.4 |
| Other urban | 31.8 | 23.6 | 7.5 | 34.6 | 37.5 | 16.9 |
| Rural | 54.2 | 28.9 | 6.6 | 41.1 | 29.8 | 10.8 |
| **20–24 years of age** | | | | | | |
| Metropolitan | 41.2 | 47.1 | 29.1 | 38.0 | 53.6 | 50.7 |
| Other urban | 43.1 | 50.8 | 29.9 | 36.4 | 49.6 | 49.6 |
| Rural | 51.5 | 53.0 | 22.4 | 49.2 | 56.7 | 40.5 |
| **THAILAND** | | | | | | |
| **15–19 years of age** | | | | | | |
| Metropolitan | 43.2 | 36.9 | 38.9 | 40.1 | 38.0 | 43.4 |
| Other urban | 42.4 | 36.2 | 34.9 | 36.3 | 34.7 | 38.7 |
| Rural | 83.7 | 70.6 | 72.4 | 84.5 | 68.4 | 67.6 |
| **20–24 years of age** | | | | | | |
| Metropolitan | 75.2 | 69.9 | 71.9 | 52.2 | 57.7 | 64.6 |
| Other urban | 75.9 | 72.5 | 76.4 | 50.3 | 58.2 | 64.5 |
| Rural | 95.7 | 87.5 | 90.1 | 84.6 | 74.3 | 77.8 |

Note: n.a. = not available

a. Indonesia date is 1971.

Source: Extracted from national census reports, sometimes with calculations as required.

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i. In this paper the term "youth" refers to the age range 15 through 24. This is one of many widely accepted, general purpose definitions of youth and is convenient in terms of data sources, particularly census materials. For specific programmatic purposes various other age ranges are employed (ESCAP 1997:7ff; Xenos and Kabamalan 1998b, footnote 7).

ii. On the Middle East, also see Cordesman (1998) and Maynes (1998).

iii. See the committee's "Population Pressures: Threat to Democracy (Map and National Statistics)," 1989.

iv. Others have covered this ground for Asia but in somewhat different ways. See Jones (1997), Fussell and Greene (2002), and Santa Maria (2002).

v. The urban definition, classifications into urban and rural, can change over time for each country, and also differs, sometimes markedly, among the countries. The use of these "national definitions" in international comparisons is thought to be the best available approach (United Nations 1969, chaps. 1–3, vs. United Nations 1980, chap. 2) because national nomenclatures and settlement patterns differ so much. At the same time, national definitions are meant to conform over time to the evolving pattern of urbanization.

vi. In many instances (e.g., the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand), this is occurring even as the big cities' share of total population continues to grow (United Nations 2001), comparison of tables A.15 and A.16. A good case study on this for the Philippines is Gonzalez et al. (2001), chap. 1, which describes "urbanization slowdown" and "primacy reversal."

vii. This is true of the four countries examined in detail here. Comparing urban population projections made in the late 1970s (United Nations 1980, table 48) and the late 1990s (United Nations 2001), the downward revisions are as follows: Bangkok, 11.9 million vs. 7.3 million more recently; Jakarta, 16.6 million vs. 11.0 million more recently; Manila, 12.3 million vs. 10.9 million more recently; and Seoul, 14.2 million vs. 9.9 million more recently.

viii. The source of these projections is United Nations (2001). The onset of rural population decline is predicted by application of a simple algebraic model of agricultural transformation (Mellor 1966, 25) to the rural–urban transformation. The fact that there has been a definite curtailment of urbanization as conven tionally defined does not belie the rise of urban experience in other forms, as urban places coalesce into whole extended regions (McGee 1995) and new forms of rural-urban linkage arise from modern transport and communications. I cannot explore here, e.g., the reach of modern-city-based communications on youth all over Asia, both rural and urban.

ix. In addition, migration events have no direct biological constraints shaping the patterns, can be repeated within any period of time, and can be undone by reverse movements.

x. I could not locate a study that calculates such rates for the 1980s on the basis of 1990 censuses. Across Asia, far less information on migration was collected in the 1990 censuses than had been before that date (Skeldon 1986).

xi. For the present purpose, Japan is excluded because its recent demographic history has been so complex and its age waves have multiple sources. The other major excluded country is Vietnam, because the necessary data are not available. See Bongaarts and Watkins (1996) for discussion of the evidence for these onset dates.

xii. United Nations (1985, table 6) indicates considerable contributions of net migration to the growth of many cities besides Seoul (data are provided for Busan, Daegu, and Incheon).

CHAPTER 2

# Youth and Urban Conflict in Southeast Asian Cities

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As the organizers of this conference know, I was somewhat puzzled by the title of the conference on which this volume is based when I received the invitation to be a speaker. In my case, I was asked to write and speak about the dynamics of growing youth populations in cities, increasing urban poverty, and the potential for conflict that the mixing of these two phenomena creates. I have to admit that before the announcement of the conference, I had not thought about the relationship among youth, poverty, conflict, and cities in Southeast Asia. One of my fears was, and still is, that conceptually linking such broad, ill-defined concepts increased the risk of undue generalizations. Are settlements of poor people in Southeast Asia characterized by violence and crime? Would such concepts lead to the perception of squatting as a crime rather than an articulation of the right to housing? Would poor people be described as generally violent and criminal, while we all know that rich people can get away with murder? Behind all this also loomed a larger question: Does poverty breed armed struggle and terrorism? Simply asking these questions generates a feeling that there are other factors involved.

It is also difficult to speak about Southeast Asia (Brunei; Cambodia; Indonesia; the Lao People's Democratic Republic, or Laos; Malaysia; Myanmar, or Burma; the Philippines; Singapore; Thailand; and Vietnam) as if it is one homogeneous region. There are important differences among the countries of Southeast Asia in their culture, political systems, and level of economic development: Cambodia and Laos are among the least developed countries of the world, while Singapore is among the most developed. There are also important social, reli-

gious, political, and demographic differences. It is even dangerous to generalize about the urban areas within a single country. Conditions in the capital city and other very large cities may differ fundamentally from those in medium-sized and small cities and towns where the largest portion of the urban population lives. There may even be differences between parts of the same city. Conversely, there are undoubtedly also similarities in culture and economy, economic policies, and social problems.

As a consequence of these considerations, this chapter is more of an exploratory exercise than a statement of empirical findings and conclusions. I start with my views on the four concepts (urbanization, poverty, youth, and conflict) separately, before discussing the relationships among them.

## Urbanization

Table 1 shows the urbanization trend in Southeast Asia from 1975 to 2030 based on projections by the United Nations. According to these projections, half the population of the region will be living in urban areas by around 2020. At the same time, however, the urban growth rate has been and will continue to decline. Urban growth is the result of natural population growth, rural–urban migration, and reclassification of rural into urban areas. Over the years to come, rural–urban migration is expected to be considerable. If the projections are correct, the rural population will soon stop growing and then start to decline. Any natural growth of the rural population will be added to the urban population through rural–urban migration and reclassification.

One can and must raise some serious questions about the reliability of the data in table 1, because they are likely to underestimate the actual urban population. In the first place, a portion of the urban population of many cities and towns lives outside the municipal boundaries, in suburbs and outskirts that are administratively considered to be rural areas, although they are urban in all or many respects. Second, rural–urban migrants are often included in the rural population, because they claim the village as their home, although they may have lived for many years in urban areas or are alternately living in urban and rural areas. Third, many rural villages are rapidly urbanizing in sociocultural and economic senses. Rural society everywhere is acquiring "urban" characteristics. People have urban-based or urban-type occu-

**Table 1. Urbanization in Southeast Asia, 1975–2030**

| YEAR | Urban Population (thousands) | Rural Population (thousands) | Urban Population as a Percentage of Total | Urban Population Average Annual Growth Rate during the Preceding 5 Years |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1975** | 87,087 | 249,749 | 22.3 | 4.10 |
| **2000** | 196,029 | 326,092 | 37.5 | 3.67 |
| **2015** | 302.006 | 326,207 | 48.1 | 2.52 |
| **2030** | 407,174 | 313,269 | 56.5 | 1.78 |

Source: United Nations Population Division (2002).

**Table 2. Youth (15-24 years of age) in Southeast Asia, 1975–2030**

| YEAR | Number of Youth (thousands) | Number of Youth as a Percentage of Total Population |
|---|---|---|
| **1975** | 62,947 | 19.6 |
| **2000** | 103,132 | 19.8 |
| **2015** | 110,821 | 17.6 |
| **2030** | 106,811 | 14.3 |

Source: United Nations Population Division (2001).

pations. Life styles become more urban than rural. Conversely, some governments already declare a settlement "urban" when it has 2,000, 5,000, or 10,000 inhabitants.

## Youth

The population in the age bracket of 15 to 24 years represents about 20 percent of the total population of Southeast Asia (table 2). This percentage has remained stable during the past 25 years, implying that the youth group has increased proportional to the total population. However, in Southeast Asia, the growth of the youth group will be slowing down during the next 15 years, and as a proportion of the total population, the youth population will decline to less than 15 percent in 2030. In other words, the population of Southeast Asia is aging.

If we look at the individual countries in the region, we can see two different patterns. On the one hand, there are the countries whose youth population will continue to form about 20 percent of the total population. These countries are Cambodia and Laos, two of the countries that are economically least developed and that have among the lowest levels of urbanization (16.9 and 19.3 percent in 2000, respectively) and highest urban growth rates (6.35 and 4.64 percent in 1995–2000, respectively).

On the other hand, seven countries of Southeast Asia will see their population aging and their youth population shrinking to 12–15 percent (table 3). Among these seven, the Philippines is the slowest decliner. The tenth country, Singapore, is the most advanced in this process of aging. At this moment, youth form 12.4 percent of the total population; this share will reach 8.6 percent in 2030. As Southeast Asian countries demographically follow the path of Singapore, it is not surprising that most countries are more concerned about their elderly population than about their youth.

**Table 3. Number of Youth (15–24 years of age) and Youth as a Percentage of the Population of Southeast Asian Countries, 2000 and 2030**

| | 2000 | | 2000 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **COUNTRY** | **Number (thousands)** | **Percent** | **Number (thousands)** | **Percent** |
| **Brunei** | 56 | 17.1 | 64 | 12.9 |
| **Cambodia** | 2,445 | 18.7 | 4,908 | 20.6 |
| **Indonesia** | 42,268 | 19.9 | 40,532 | 14.3 |
| **Laos** | 1,024 | 19.4 | 1,819 | 19.6 |
| **Malaysia** | 4,198 | 18.9 | 4,894 | 14.9 |
| **Myanmar** | 9,530 | 20.0 | 8,862 | 14.2 |
| **Philippines** | 15,377 | 20.3 | 18,095 | 16.1 |
| **Singapore** | 500 | 12.4 | 435 | 8.6 |
| **Thailand** | 11,756 | 18.7 | 10,285 | 12.9 |
| **Vietnam** | 15,843 | 20.3 | 15,899 | 14.4 |

Source: United Nations Population Division (2002).

The United Nations does not make projections for the age distribution of urban populations. Data on the current age distribution in cities of Southeast Asia are scarce. The available data show broadly the same pattern as the total country population: The youth population forms about 12 to 20 percent of the urban population, with a higher percentage for the least developed countries than for the developing or developed countries (table 4). However, what was said about urbanization applies also or perhaps even more to this specific age bracket in the urban population: Many rural–urban migrants in urban areas may not show up in the statistics.

It has been observed that rural–urban (and international) migrants tend to be young. Migrants move to urban areas to study; they move to find work after they have completed their primary or secondary education; they move while they are still unmarried or still do not have children. If the population of a city or town grows due to rural–urban migration, the youth population is likely to be growing disproportionally in urban areas and the percentage of youth among the urban population may well be higher than among the population as a whole.

## Poverty

Reliable data about poverty in the world and in the region are also scarce and are almost nonexistent for urban and rural areas separately. Development agencies tend to use the World Bank's data based on the international poverty line of $1 per person per day. On this basis, it has

**Table 4. Youth (15–24 years of age) in Selected Cities of Southeast Asia, 1998 or 1999**

| City | Country | Year | Youth as a Percentage of Total Population |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Phnom Penh** | Cambodia | 1998 | 22.9 |
| **Siem Reap** | Cambodia | 1998 | 18.5 |
| **Kuala Lumpur** | Malaysia | 1999 | 20.3 |
| **Singapore** | Singapore | 1999 | 13.2 |
| **Bangkok** | Thailand | 1998 | 15.9 |

Source: United Nations (2001).

been calculated that there are about 1.2 billion poor people in the world and 800 million of them live in the Asia-Pacific region. Using a rule of thumb (and nothing more than that), it has been said that currently two-thirds of the region's poor people live in rural areas and one-third lives in urban areas. That would mean that there are 250 million poor people in the urban areas of the Asia-Pacific region.

The World Bank uses different subregions in the Asia-Pacific region than the United Nations; it includes Southeast Asia as well as China in its region of East Asia. Table 5 shows a substantial decline in poverty in East Asia as a result of the "Asian Miracle," as well as an increase in poverty as a result of the Asian financial crisis of 1997. However, the above figures certainly also have serious limitations.These figures only look at income poverty, whereas we have learned that poverty is a much more complex phenomenon than a simple lack of income. The Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific tends to distinguish three dimensions of poverty: income poverty, access poverty, and power poverty. Income poor could be defined as "being deprived of income, a stable livelihood, assets, social capital in the form of support networks, etc." Access poverty refers to "being deprived of access to essential services such as water supply, sanitation, housing, health care, education, credit, information, etc." Power poverty can be defined as "a lack of power, participation, respect, influence, organization, etc." There are obviously no quantitative data on the second and third dimensions of poverty, but they may be important for the topic at hand.

Is poverty growing in the urban areas? There are again no reliable data. The Asian Miracle and the Asian financial crisis were largely urban-industrial based, and the conclusion could be that the trend of the figures in table 5 also represents the trend in urban poverty.

Research shows that migrants move to urban areas because these areas offer more opportunities for socioeconomic mobility for the migrants

**Table 5. Number of People Living in Poverty in East Asia and the Pacific (excluding China), 1987-98 (millions)**

| 1987 | 1990 | 1993 | 1996 | 1998 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 114.1 | 92.0 | 83.5 | 55.1 | 65.1 |

Note: "Poverty" is defined as a person living on less than $1 per day.
Source: World Bank (2000).

themselves or, in the longer term, for their children. In other words, migrants see rural–urban migration as a form of poverty alleviation. Research also seems to indicate that rural–urban migrants tend to do better than the native urban population. Although many rural–urban migrants have to resort to the urban informal sector for their housing and work, it is now clear that the informal sector is not a residual economic sector full of underemployment but rather an important part of the urban economy with many links to the formal sector and even the global economy.

Cities and towns have to be able to cope with the inflow of rural–urban migrants and the growth of the informal sector. A particular problem in this respect is the second dimension of poverty, that is, poverty of access. Access to services forms the basis for any income-poverty reduction, as it creates the conditions and provides the tools for poor people to improve themselves. Urban resources have to be managed efficiently and urban policies need to be inclusive to make sure that the city can meet the needs of its growing population.

Otherwise, urbanization will become an urbanization of poverty. Cities have to work hard to ensure that basic infrastructure and services are available for the growing urban population. Given that urbanization is largely inevitable and perhaps even desirable process for development, one should not speak of *over urbanization* but rather of *incomplete urbanization*—that is, the population is in place but infrastructure and services, policies and capacities are lagging behind. The growth of unserviced or underserviced slum and squatter areas is an indicator of whether poverty is urbanizing.

## Urban Crime and Violence

The term "conflict" gives the most problems. What do the conference organizers mean by "conflict"? Is it violence? Is it crime? Is it dissent?

According to the United Nations Center for Human Settlements (2001, 56), developing countries have shown an increase in rates of urban crime and an exponential increase in youth crime. Crime and violence in urban areas have increased significantly as cities have grown. Most of the crime involves property rather than people; that is, there is much more theft and burglary than there is assault and murder. However, violent crime is increasing and now makes up more than one-quarter of urban offences in many countries. Youth crime is becoming increasingly violent and has entrenched itself in learning institutions. It is difficult to find sta-

tistics about crime and juvenile crime. Table 6 presents some recent data on juvenile crime in Southeast Asia. However, with strengths and weaknesses of law enforcement and the judicial system in Southeast Asia, the figures raise more questions than they answer.

Vanderschueren (1996, 99–102) suggests a number of possible reasons for the increase in urban violence and crime:

1. The utter poverty of badly served neighborhoods: Very poor and overcrowded housing and living conditions and the lack of security in illegal settlements creates fertile soil for the development of violence and generates a subculture of violence.
2. A provocative and poorly protected urban environment: The ostentatious display of luxury and prosperity provokes those who have not accepted their unfavorable social situation, and this engenders an attitude that legitimizes the "redistribution of wealth through criminal activity."
3. The limitations of current protection measures: The policy is ineffective either because of lack of resources or because of corruption, while the large majority of the population cannot afford private security services.
4. The absence of social controls: The loosening of community ties affects community protection; the anonymity and fragmentation of cities has eliminated all community intervention (except perhaps in poor urban settlements).
5. Frustrated youth, prone to violence: The people who are most prone to violence are those whose personalities have been condi-

**Table 6. Number of Juveniles Convicted per 100,000 Inhabitants in Selected Countries of Southeast Asia, 1998–2000**

| Country | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Indonesia | 12.89 | 13.29 | 13.86 |
| Thailand | 61.32 | 48.74 | n.a. |
| Malaysia | 17.36 | 14.45 | 12.96 |

Note: n.a. = not available.
Source: Data from United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2003.

> tioned by negative social experiences in their formative years. Families that perceive themselves as losers in society create disorganization and cultural underdevelopment. Moreover, the failure of poorly qualified young men to enter and remain in the labour market has a negative impact not only on their desire to conform to social norms but also on their participation in a stable life style.

Later in the article, Vanderschueren adds another factor that may have some importance in Southeast Asia—what he calls "the crisis of criminal justice" (1996, 102). According to international studies, there is a systematic loss of reputation of criminal justice systems, but it raises the question whether that loss of reputation is caused by the overload of cases, in particular of everyday petty crime, or perhaps by the ineffectiveness of criminal justice in dealing with the illegal activities of the rich and powerful. Elsewhere, I have called this the trend "social deregulation" (to contrast it with economic deregulation)—the emerging attitude of not to take rules and regulations seriously when they stand in the way of personal gain.

Vanderschueren's article does not specifically deal with youth, and he mentions youth explicitly only as part of the fifth factor (frustrated youth). However, one could argue that the absence of social controls and the crisis in criminal justice are affecting youth in particular because they lack benchmarks for social behavior.

## Urban Conflict

To some extent, conflict is almost inherent or endemic to urban society. Conflict characterizes urban society by its competition for work, income, and profit, its struggle for land, its contrasting ideas and its clashes of cultures, its heterogeneous population, and its sociocultural minority groups. This is not to say that rural areas are always harmonious and peaceful, but diversity and competition characterize cities.

In 1938, Louis Wirth wrote an article in the *American Journal of Sociology* titled "Urbanism as a Way of Life." Wirth defined a city as "a relatively large, dense and permanent settlement of socially heterogeneous individuals" (quoted in a recent collection; Wirth 2000, 98). In the article, he argues that the bonds of kinship, neighborliness, and sentiment arising out of living together for generations under a common folk tradition are likely to be absent or at best weak in a city. He points at "the glaring contrasts between

splendor and squalor, between riches and poverty, intelligence and ignorance, order and chaos" and at "the competition for space" (p. 100). In a city, competition and formal control mechanisms must furnish substitutes for the bonds of solidarity that are relied upon to hold a folk society together. Because he writes about American cities, he does not raise the question of what happens if formal control mechanisms are not yet in place or are ineffective, as they often are in rapidly changing Southeast Asia.

Wirth writes, "the necessary frequent movement of great numbers of individuals in a congested habitat gives occasion to frictions and irritation. Nervous tensions which derive from such personal frustrations are accentuated by the rapid tempo and the complicated technology under which life in dense areas must be lived" (2000, 101). He talks about instability and insecurity, and about the premium on eccentricity, novelty, efficient performance, and inventiveness as urban traits. He suggests that personal disorganization, mental breakdown, suicide, delinquency, crime, corruption, and disorder might be expected to be more prevalent in urban than in rural areas.

Wirth warns that cities already existed in precapitalist times, but one could argue that the modern city is also very much a capitalist city. Cities are the engines of economic growth, but economic growth is not a smooth process. Schumpeter (1962, 83) writes about creative destruction when he refers to the process of economic development: "The…process of industrial mutation…that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one. This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism." Creative destruction sounds very much like the essence of urban society.

Urbanization and industrialization are recent trends in Southeast Asia. Many consider the region still predominantly rural and agrarian. As table 1 above shows, only 22 percent of the population in Southeast Asia lived in urban areas in 1975. Urbanization and economic growth have advanced rapidly during the past quarter of a century. Culture, norms and values, and social organization and institutions tend to change more slowly than the economy, as for instance shown by the Asian financial crisis of 1997, when the corporate culture of banks and governments could not deal with global capital flows. One could argue that norms, values, and the ability to cope with the emerging urban society and to give it direction are now seriously lagging behind. This may well be another aspect of "incomplete urbanization."

## Global Trends Affecting the Region

It is obvious that "glaring contrasts" can give rise to dissatisfaction and disillusionment and can ultimately lead to conflict. People have become more aware of these "glaring contrasts" as a result of a number of important trends that are fundamentally affecting and changing the region. Urbanization is only one of these trends. Another important trend is the spread of education; most people in Southeast Asia, especially youth and especially people in urban areas, have had some education. Now, the information revolution makes it possible for almost everyone, again in particular in urban areas, to know what happens anywhere else in the world and to compare one's own situation with that of others. For instance, one should not underestimate the impact that recent political upheavals in the Philippines and Indonesia had on each other and on other countries. At the other extreme, the televised soap operas that pretend to depict the lives of rich people reinforce ideas about enormous disparities between rich and poor people, as well as about solutions to problems that are not always lawful.

Although access to education is improving, the quality of the education poses a serious problem. The gradually emerging knowledge society stresses the importance not just of knowledge but also of creativity to find new answers to new challenges, and of the ability to deal with constant change. Education in many parts of Southeast Asia does not prepare youth for this situation, because the culture, values, and norms are not always geared toward the development of such knowledge and attitudes. It could be very difficult for Southeast Asia in the coming years to be economically successful without a good knowledge base and technological skills. Educated youth with the knowledge, skills, and attitudes that do not fit these requirements may be left behind. Society will be divided into the "knows" and "know-nots" rather than the "haves" and "have-nots."

Yet parents are well aware of the importance of education. Not only do middle-class and well-to-do parents urge their children to excel in school; many rural–urban migrants come to the city so that their children can enroll in better schools than are available in rural areas and/or so that they can pay for their children's education. Because of the scarcity of schools that provide a good education, there is fierce competition to enter, to stay in, and to graduate from such schools. The pressure the parents exert on their children is sometimes too hard to

bear, and conflicts, mental breakdowns, and even suicides are not uncommon. Such a situation was known to exist in Japan, but it has now spread to Southeast Asia.

The spread of education, the information revolution, and the emergence of the knowledge society are also closely linked to the process of democratization that can be seen in the region. This process is raising expectations, particularly among youth, that they will be allowed to have a say in the direction their society is developing socially, economically, and politically. At the same time, however, globalization is affecting the region. Even in its most positive form, globalization means that governments and consequently citizens are losing decision-making power to the marketplace of labor, goods, services, and ideas. In other words, the above trends, which have the potential to be beneficial—if people and countries are prepared for them—can lead to serious frustration among those expecting the most.

Wirth mentioned anonymity as another of the city's characteristics; because of this anonymity, people are supposed to be judged on their actions and merit rather than on their status and family background. As capitalist societies par excellence, competition should characterize cities, but competition on a level playing field. Unfortunately, most societies in Southeast Asia do not provide a level playing field. Everywhere in Southeast Asia, who one knows or who one is counts more than what one knows. This is, of course, extremely frustrating for youth that have worked hard at school to gain knowledge but who find that what gives access to jobs is not just knowledge but also connections.

There is one more trend, which was already referred to, perhaps the result of the above trends or perhaps a condition that has always existed in the region, but is becoming more visible. I called it social deregulation. In an ever more complex urban society, regulations are necessary to ensure that the negative externalities of the multitude of decisions and actions are minimized. Everyone knows that regulations are necessary, but everyone also sees regulations as a frustrating, profit-reducing burden. As cities become more and more heterogeneous, it becomes difficult to introduce regulations that can apply to all.

Regulations often inhibit poor people in getting what they are entitled to, and as a result there is the informal sector, which provides housing, employment, infrastructure, and services to poor residents in an unregulated form. Rich and powerful urban residents see regulations as an obsta-

cle to doing what they would like to do, and as a result they use their money and influence to bypass regulations. This situation leaves the middle class with the uneasy question of whether the law applies only to them. And it sets a bad example for youth. The situation is not new; in fact, Southeast Asia has a tradition of seeing rich and powerful groups as above the law. However, education, information, and democratization make the situation much more transparent for all income groups.

## Disorientation

The very rapid economic growth and urbanization in Southeast Asia appears to have created a large gap between professed norms and values that are based on the traditional cultures of the region (family values, leadership, hierarchy), on the one hand, and the actual behavior and the day-to-day priorities, on the other hand. This gap is not necessarily an intentional gap between what is said and what is done. It is often a gap between what is actually valued and what modern urban society requires. Whereas traditional norms and values, for instance, promote the extended family, modern urban society makes this increasingly difficult to realize. Traditional norms and values stress the lasting value of wisdom and knowledge held by the elderly, but society requires quick new answers to newly emerging problems.

A discussion rages across Southeast Asia about the meaning of and the need for development (in the sense of economic growth), in particular after the Asian financial crisis, which was mainly a Southeast Asian crisis. Is there anything worth preserving, or will all have to be "creatively" destroyed? There is also the "conflict" between environment and development, mainly placed on the agenda by youth asking the question of what development really means and if development can only be achieved at the expense of the environment, in particular the rural environment, with its consequences for the livelihood of the rural population.

These are conflicts not only between the rural population and the policymakers in the Southeast Asian capitals but also between urban youth and those policymakers. What seems to be lacking is any kind of national debate about development (What are the costs? What are the benefits? What is the bottom line?). Such a debate may not be in the interest of the ruling profit-making classes.

If opinion leaders cannot answer the questions of what is right and wrong, how can parents know? If parents do not know anymore, how can

children and youth learn right and wrong? Moreover, education is not only a matter of not knowing what norms and values to transfer but also a matter of opportunity to teach right and wrong. A considerable number of children do not seem to have much support from their parents, because their parents have to spend the largest part of the day working. The reasons for the long time spent away from home are the long traveling times, the long working hours, and the need to hold two jobs due to the low wages. It is also more difficult for many parents to provide children with the social support they need both at school and at home. As Vanderschueren (1996, 100–1) points out, an unsupportive home can lead to nonadaptation at school and to a lack of personal discipline and self-esteem, which increases the risk of antisocial or criminal activity.

One group of youth who face the dilemma of opposing cultures almost daily are the rural–urban migrants who come to urban areas to work and earn money to support their parents in rural areas. The entire purpose of the rural–urban migration may well be founded in the traditional, rural culture, but the plan is realized in urban areas where consumerism rather than saving and peers rather than parents are dominant.

A student at the Asian Institute of Technology is writing a Ph.D. thesis (Arifin, forthcoming) on the housing preferences of women factory workers in Surabaya, Indonesia. Women factory workers in Surabaya, as in Bangkok and elsewhere, are youth who live their lives partly in urban and partly in rural areas. These preferences are determined by a host of factors, some of which are simply economic: the housing supply around the industrial estate, the income of the women factory workers, and the rent they are able and willing to pay. However, there is also a whole set of sociocultural factors:

- their position as daughters with the obligations to their parents and other family members in the village;
- their position as future wives of (often still unknown) husbands who will probably be from the same village; and
- their peers, the other women factory workers, with whom they have to compete in the use of modern products such as cosmetics and clothes.

On the one hand, it is surprising how easily migrants can adjust, back and forth, to urban and rural circumstances. On the other hand, new

ideas inevitably creep into the worldview of migrants, and somehow these new urban ideas need to be reconciled with traditional rural ideas. Some modern urban ideas conflict with the traditional, rural ideas of the village, parents, and husbands. How will these youth deal with the situation when it comes to the relationship between husband and wife and the future of their children, particularly their daughters?

## Exclusion

There has been a lot of talk about the relationship between poverty and terrorism, the assumption being that poverty breeds terrorism. I must admit that I do not see that relationship. Where I see a relationship is between disillusionment or frustration as a result of unmet expectations and terrorism. The frustration grows out of unmet expectations for the "terrorist" or for a specific group in society with which he or she identifies. This disillusionment or frustration is a typical urban, modern phenomenon, because urban areas offer so much hope and expectation for improvements. The city is the land of opportunities; urban areas are the places where merit rather than kinship should count and where there is a level playing field, because everyone is somewhat anonymous.

The urban reality is, of course, very different. Although the playing field may be more level and the opportunities may be more numerous, some people have advantages and some are disadvantaged. The disparities between the haves and have-nots (whatever it is they have or do not have) are far more visible in urban areas than in rural areas, because densities are higher and wealth is (supposed to be) more conspicuous. As was pointed out above, urban society and economy are highly competitive, and though there are win–win situations, the pie is never large enough to give everyone an equal-sized piece. If the lack of success is the result of individual shortcomings, it may still be acceptable. However, if particular population groups are being disadvantaged for other reasons, frustration and disillusionment may breed conflict with the dominant society.

## Conclusion

Development agencies give considerable attention to the problems faced by, what they call, countries with economies in transition. These countries are in transition from a centrally planned economy to a free-market one. Examples in Southeast Asia are Vietnam and Laos. However, it may

be time to give more attention to the societies in transition, which in fact include almost all the countries of Southeast Asia.

The transition most countries in Southeast Asia are experiencing is the transition from an agrarian society to an urban-industrial one, from a local to a global economy, from slow to accelerated economic growth, from stability to rapid change. This is a transition that many countries in the world are experiencing. However, in Southeast (and East) Asia, economic growth has been more rapid and has largely been the result of the opening of the countries to the global economy.

The challenge is how to deal with the rapid changes. When the 1997 Asian financial crisis erupted, commentators blamed it on the unpreparedness of the financial institutions in the affected countries: the inadequate banking regulations, poor corporate governance, and so on. One could say the same about the society in transition.

Central and local governments are largely unprepared for the rapid growth of urban population and the urban economy. This is part of what I called *incomplete urbanization*. They do not have the policies and the capacity to cope with the growing demand for housing, infrastructure, and services. That explains the current search for and experimentation with innovative urban management strategies. Similarly, many people living in rapidly growing and changing cities and urban economies feel at a loss. This is another part of incomplete urbanization. There is also a search on, by some but not by all, for new (or old) norms and values that can give direction to society in transition, and the challenge is particularly acute for youth.

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The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the ideas of the United Nations.

CHAPTER 3

# Addressing Youth Unemployment in the Philippines: The Consuelo Foundation's Experience

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The Consuelo Foundation, Incorporated, is the Philippine subsidiary of the Consuelo Zobel Alger Foundation of Honolulu. Upon its creation in 1993, it inherited from Mrs. Consuelo Zobel Alger the mission "to assure a decent quality of life for the most needy families and children throughout the Philippines." Now, ten years later, the Consuelo Foundation has managed more than 100 programs focusing on children and youth, family, and community.

The Consuelo Foundation's support for children and youth revolves around two program thrusts: prevention of sexual and physical abuse and rehabilitation of the survivors of abuse; and enhancement of the social and economic potential of disadvantaged youth, particularly those out of school. Its projects are distributed throughout the country, and most of them are managed by its partners, which form part of the Consuelo Foundation network. By taking a developmental approach, it strengthens the organizations it works with by building their capacities for effectiveness and sustainability. It creates opportunities for them to continue, replicate, or scale up projects through the provision of strategic funding.

Along with a consortium of government, civil society, and business institutions, the Consuelo Foundation has been implementing a pilot project benefiting out-of-school youth since 2000, the Philippine Out-of-School Children and Youth Development Project (hereafter, "the project"). The World Bank made available two grants for the project from the Asia Europe Meeting Fund and the Japan Social Development Fund. The contents of this chapter are drawn mainly from the data, studies, focus group discussions, and ongoing experience of the foundation as it

implements the project. The young people referred to are out-of-school youth, 15 to 24 years of age, who are neither studying nor working.

This chapter is divided into four sections and two case studies. The first section describes the employment or unemployment situation of the young people. This discussion leads to the key issues facing urban youth seeking work placement, which are discussed in the second section. The third section focuses on how the Philippine Out-of-School Children and Youth Development Project has addressed the problems identified. It highlights four subprojects that cater to urban youth. The lessons learned from the project are discussed in the fourth section, which also provides recommendations for various stakeholders intending to serve disadvantaged young people. Illustrating the points raised in these four sections are two case studies on youth employment, which round out the chapter.

## The Employment Situation of Young People

As of mid-2000, the population of the Philippines was 76.5 million (according to the Philippine 2000 Census), with the sector 15 to 24 years of age forming a hefty 20 percent of the total population. Because more than 40 percent of the population lives below the poverty threshold (according to Asian Development Bank's *Country Strategy and Program Update 2002–2004*, the Philippine Gini Coefficient reached 48.7 percent in 1997; Asian Development Bank 2002), youth and children are the sectors most at risk. This affects all life circumstances and categories: health, education, employment, and so on. To better explain the situation, this section briefly describes the labor participation rate, the availability of jobs in Philippine cities, age and gender factors, private- and public-sector programs, and the psychosocial profile of unemployed youth.

### Labor Force Participation Rate

To touch only on the labor force, in 2002, the national unemployment rate was 13.3 percent and the underemployment rate was 17.5 percent (according to Department of Labor and Employment figures). However, the unemployment rate for the youth (15–24 years of age) sector is higher than any of the older sectors, as is shown in table 1.

Furthermore, a serious disparity appears between the urban and rural sectors in terms of labor force participation by close to 7 percentage points, as is shown in the 1996 figures (see table 2). It also shows that

**Table 1. Percentage Distribution of the Philippine Labor Force by Age Group, 1995**

| Age Group (years) | Employed | Unemployed |
|---|---|---|
| 15–19 | 10.3 | 24.3 |
| 20–24 | 11.7 | 27.3 |
| 25–34 | 22.8 | 22.4 |
| 35–44 | 23.3 | 10.4 |
| 45–54 | 17 | 7.3 |
| 55–64 | 10 | 4.8 |
| 65 and above | 4.8 | 3.7 |

Source: National Youth Commission (1998).

**Table 2. Labor Force Participation Rate of Young Urban and Rural Filipino Workers, 1996 (percent)**

| Sex and Age Group (years) | Urban | Rural |
|---|---|---|
| **Both sexes** | 55.09 | 61.96 |
| 15–20 | 35.34 | 49.68 |
| 21–25 | 71.23 | 73.13 |
| **Male** | 67.19 | 79.74 |
| 15–20 | 38.56 | 62.73 |
| 21–25 | 85.69 | 91.64 |
| **Female** | 45.18 | 40.95 |
| 15–20 | 32.14 | 33.43 |
| 21–25 | 56.84 | 54.41 |

Source: National Youth Commission (1998).

young males in urban areas have a higher labor force participation rate than young females in rural areas; that of the females is two-thirds that of the males. This may be due to females being hired in low-paying jobs. The higher figures for male workers could be explained by the fact that agricultural jobs are open mostly to males.

As for unemployed youth, 30 percent reached or finished only grade school, and 40 percent had only some high school education, an education level that blocks their access to skilled and more highly paid jobs and thus puts them in a disadvantaged situation. About 70 percent of

employed youth work under exploitative terms, characterized by low pay, long hours of work, and a lack of tenure and employment benefits.

## Availability of Jobs in Cities

A study on labor demand conducted by the Consuelo Foundation in 2001 indicated that in cities, firms that hire large numbers of young workers are those providing services, as well as hotels, fast food courts, retail shops, and to a certain extent construction (Consuelo Foundation 2001). The workers become production helpers, drivers, service crew members, food attendants, salespersons, kitchen helpers, room attendants, and the like. These types of jobs do not require a college degree or even a high school diploma.

However, with the growing unemployment situation in the country, medium-sized and large companies have the luxury of hiring young employees whose educational attainment is way above the actual need of the jobs offered. In many cases, a college education is required of waiters, encoders, drivers, department store salespersons, and even dishwashers. Owing to their high educational qualifications, they are assumed to acquire the necessary skills on the job more quickly, to be more responsible, and to have more conceptual ability.

Youth without a high school diploma are usually relegated to unskilled types of jobs, such as bottle cleaners, utility workers, warehouse loaders, helpers, and similar types of work in small businesses, many of them sweatshop factories. Other options open to them are to become tricycle drivers, street vendors of cigarettes and candies, newspapers, fruit, flowers, and other light and low-price consumer goods. Their chance of being employed in medium-sized or large companies and of becoming regular or permanent workers is almost zero. To make up for the usual lack of academic or vocational training preparation, most medium-sized and large companies expect new employees to have at least one year experience on the job, an unlikely prospect for most of them.

## Age

Philippine laws allow for employment of youth 15 to 17 years of age, but only in jobs that are not hazardous to their health. It is, however, not unusual to find 15-year-old males who are engaged in jobs that call for carrying very heavy loads or that expose them to harsh or unsanitary working conditions in sweatshops.

Medium-sized and large companies, which are more prone to visits of representatives of the Department of Labor and Employment, usually do not hire those below 18 years of age. Only companies engaged in retail trade, such as department stores and fast food outlets, hire 17-year-olds, but only as apprentices.

## Gender

Gender discrimination in the employment of young people in the Philippines is usually based on the physical demands of available jobs. Jobs that require carrying heavy loads, fast movements, the use of motor vehicles, and night shifts are usually reserved for males. Employers prefer to hire young females for jobs such as sewing, embroidery, food service, and retail store sales. Factories where patience and manual dexterity are necessary, as in the production of microchips and audiovisual equipment, generally also favor young women.

## Private-Sector Programs and Projects

In 1998, the Children and Youth Foundation of the Philippines (now the Consuelo Foundation) profiled 74 organizations that operated programs for out-of-school youth (Consuelo Foundation 1998). It included 27 nongovernmental organizations, 18 foundations, and 11 academic-based organizations. The rest were local government units and people's organizations. More than half of the respondents focused on education, and about 40 percent on skills training to equip young people for employment. Two-thirds expressed their intention to reach out more to out-of-school youth and expand their geographical coverage. However, they cited the following handicaps: lack of funding, nonparticipation and dropout of participants, and unavailability of facilities, equipment, materials, supplies, technical support, and personnel. Many expressed interest in being part of a network of institutions that serve out-of-school youth.

## Laws and Government Programs

The country is not wanting in laws addressing the needs of young workers. A number of government agencies run programs for youth, including those out of school: the Departments of Education, Local Government, Labor, and Social Welfare and Technical Education and Skills Development Authority. A World Bank report, Out-of-School

Children and Youth in the Philippines: Issues and Opportunities (World Bank 2002, page 18), concluded that "taken together, the existing government effort can be characterized as comprising a large number of programs with poor coordination among and within the implementing agencies." With a consolidated budget of $20 million, they reach less than half a million out-of-school children and youth.

### Psychosocial Profile

A series of focus group discussions that the Consuelo Foundation conducted in 1998 revealed that out-of-school youth have low self-esteem and self-confidence, lack communication and problem-solving skills, and generally do not know what path to take into adulthood. However, they have a strong desire to be needed and to feel useful, and many aspire to a better life. They come from large and poor families, and their parents had some elementary education. Only one family member is a wage earner but has a source of income that is most often seasonal.

## Key Issues for Youth Employment

The magnitude to the youth employment situation that springs from the country's own economic straits and complex political and societal problems, one of which is the almost unbridgeable gap between rich and poor people. As Philippine population growth remains unabated, the number of those entering the labor force will increase but the size of the unemployed youth subsector will also rise. Economic growth has to accelerate to increase employment opportunities. As it is, the current rate cannot accommodate the 800,000 young Filipinos entering the labor force every year. Among the critical issues to consider one by one are youth migration, skill mismatching, the financial constraints of technical institutions, limited access to technical education, unfair terms of employment, youth's attitudinal shortcomings that are unmet by government training institutions, and the spotty complementarity of efforts by government, private nonprofit, and business entities to attack the complexity of youth unemployment.

### Youth Migration

In general, youth in the cities are perceived to have better chances of employment compared with those from rural areas. Economic investments that could absorb job seekers tend to crowd in cities and adjacent areas,

where infrastructure and utilities are relatively well developed and the population density is higher. Thus cities act as magnets, attracting rural youth migrants hopeful of finding employment. However, the continuing economic slump makes youth employment a serious problem, especially among poor people, in these areas—exacerbating the conditions that make unemployed youth easy prey to revolutionary and other dissidents.

## Mismatch between Skills and Job Competencies

Not much has been done to alleviate the youth employment situation because skills development programs reach only a few. Moreover, there is no demand–supply matching in most labor training programs. According to a Consuelo Foundation labor study, many medium-sized and large industries have difficulty finding and recruiting qualified young people. Yet it is not unusual to see college graduates working as food attendants or messengers and high school graduates working as dishwashers or janitors.

Secondary or high school education in the Philippines is four years of mostly academic subjects, preparatory to college education. Very little time is given to the acquisition of vocational skills that would have provided graduates with entry qualifications for higher-level jobs.

Most young Filipinos, including those who are poor, think of a college education as the passport to white-collar jobs, which are seen as better paying compared with manual jobs. Unfortunately, they take up courses like commerce, banking, and finance, where supply is much higher than demand. The country has not rationalized the course offerings to match the labor power demand for development. And very few institutions directly tie up with industries in the design of their curricula to ensure that the skills and qualifications developed are compatible with the needs of potential employers.

## Financial Constraints on Technical Education

Although technical education is seen as the poor person's substitute for a college education, it is not cheap. Government-managed technical education institutions usually make substantial initial investments in buildings and equipment. The huge capital costs deplete their resources, such that it becomes almost impossible to upgrade their training tools and equipment. This also reduces their flexibility in revising their curricula to adapt to the latest technological innovations.

The high cost of setting up institutions and the need for continuous retooling also limit nonprofit private-sector participation in technical education to mostly religious organizations. They get funding support from their mother organizations, which are based in Western countries. Not only do they have access to resources for upgrading facilities and course offering; they also receive scholarships, which they make available to poor students, but in limited number.

## Limited Access to Technical Education

Most technical institutions only accept high school graduates. In jobs that require technical competence, such as air conditioner and refrigerator repair persons and electrical or mechanical technicians, accreditation by the government's Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) is required from applicants. Only those who have taken vocational education in TESDA-accredited or -managed learning institutions, which accept only high school graduates as students, are allowed to undergo the testing it administers. Only recently have high school dropouts begun to be accepted, but only by a few technical and vocational institutions, after which they are allowed to take TESDA accreditation tests.

The quality of education of high school dropouts also affects their ability to profit from participation in technical training programs. A study showed that grade levels deteriorate by two years after one year of being out of school. To add to this woe is the poor state of education they have received, due to overcrowding in classrooms, a lack of books, and the uneven quality of teaching. Many are deficient in English, science, and mathematics—important requisites for entering technical schools.

## Exploitative Terms of Employment

With the scarcity of available jobs, unskilled and inexperienced youth are forced to accept jobs under very exploitative terms. Some 70 percent of young workers work in an environment characterized by a below minimum wage set by law, unreasonable working hours, and short contracts that block any permanent tenure. This is especially true among those working in small companies.

Among medium-sized and large companies, those engaged in retail trade and fast food chains get around the labor laws by taking advantage

of loopholes. Young people are usually taken in as apprentices that legally permit companies to pay workers only 75 percent of the minimum wage and not give employment benefits. Their work and responsibilities are, however, similar to full-time work done by regular employees. Before the young workers are able to complete the six-month apprenticeship period that will entitle them to benefits, their services are terminated. A new set of young workers is then hired as apprentices. In this way, employers need not regularize the employment of young workers.

Every six months, young people with expired contracts look for other jobs. Most likely, if they ever find another job in a large company, they will be employed under the same terms and conditions. It is not unusual for poor working young people of age 21 years to have worked in five different companies during a period of 3 years.

## Youth Inadequacies Unmet by Government Training Programs

The work attitudes of youth also are found to be inappropriate. Many young Filipino workers lack self-control and discipline, teamwork, creativity, loyalty to the employing organization, and a capacity to generalize instructions (applying the same processes to tasks with similar steps). This points to the need for a complementary curriculum that will strengthen young people's psychosocial skills to develop self-confidence and improve interpersonal and communication proficiency while undergoing skills development. Unfortunately, a lack of funds hampers government institutions from offering such a course and training or hiring value-formation teachers. A few private nonprofit institutions fare better, especially religious ones, which have always had work ethics and value formation in their curriculum to help students cope better with their work environment.

## Spotty Complementarity of Efforts

No single sector has the resources, expertise, and commitment to solve the problems of poor and unemployed youth. Until recently, there was no concerted effort among the three sectors—government, private nonprofit, and business—to address youth unemployment. This led to unnecessary duplication and overlapping of activities but also to a lack of pooling of knowledge of the best practices needed to make programs and projects more effective. It is only by working together that government, non-

governmental organizations, foundations, and corporations can make a significant dent in poverty and unemployment conditions as well as extend their reach. An effective—but perforce limited—stab at the issue was made by the Philippine Out-of-School Children and Youth Development Project of the Consuelo Foundation and its collaborators, the Department of Social Welfare and Development and Ayala Corporation, together with the World Bank. It is considered to be at the cutting edge of programs designed to alleviate poverty collaboratively and to advance the cause of out-of-school youth in a more effective manner, and one that should give an impetus to similar and larger efforts.

## The Philippine Out-of-School Children and Youth Development Project: A Response to the Needs of Disadvantaged Youth

The development of the Philippine Out-of-School Children and Youth Development Project took three years of negotiation with the World Bank. It started in July 2000, and its pilot phase will end in July 2003. Having been implemented under its Business Partners for Development, it seeks to test the feasibility and viability of a trisector partnership among government, civil society, and business to provide opportunities for out-of-school youth through subprojects, which directly benefit the target group. The subprojects are designed to upgrade academic competencies and to develop the work skills of high school and elementary school dropouts. Two aspects of the project are examined here: its unfolding since its inception, and its accomplishments.

### The Project's Inception and Growth

In June 2000, a national consortium was established to implement the project. Aimed at harnessing the potentials and building the competencies of vulnerable young Filipinos, it attempts to show that the linked problems of disenfranchised youth and exacerbated poverty can be addressed in an effective manner.

The national consortium provides the structure for the convergence of the efforts and resources of civil society, government, and the business sector. The three key players for each sector are the Consuelo Foundation, representing civil society; the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), leading a group of government agencies;

and the Ayala Corporation, mobilizing business. They have given substance and purpose to the project. The Consuelo Foundation acts as secretariat and takes care of the project's day-to-day operations, and the DSWD serves as overall project manager.

The project's target participants are disadvantaged children and youth, age 6 to 24 years. They are basic education dropouts, come from poor families that live below the Philippine poverty threshold income line of $278 a year, and have scant opportunities to acquire the competencies necessary to become productive members of society. The project covers the priority regions of Central Luzon (Region III), Southern Tagalog (Region IV), Eastern Visayas (Region VIII), the National Capital Region, and the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. These regions have a high incidence of out-of-school children and youth and poor families and lay close to industrial zones and areas of employment.

The subprojects offer courses that fall under three major categories: formal basic education, nonformal education billed as alternative learning systems, and integrated technical education. The first category is geared for those 6 to 12 years of age and so is beyond the purview of this chapter. In some cases, nonformal education is incorporated into technical education to upgrade the academic level of youth at the same time their productive skills are developed.

In addition to testing the viability of the trisector partnership and effectiveness of subprojects, the project develops support mechanisms to improve youth's coping skills. These include "Skills for Life," an instructional package developed for the Consuelo Foundation by the International Youth Foundation, and the "Peer-to-Peer Counseling Manual" produced in partnership with the DSWD. Many include program components for parent and youth participation, mentoring, and counseling. More significantly, the project requires that implementing organizations ensure that technical education graduates are gainfully employed.

The World Bank has invested $1,980,000, representing 40 percent of the total cost of the project. The remaining 60 percent was supposed to be generated from other donors, not exclusively from consortium members. Subproject implementers were obliged to tap funds from the community and to provide counterparts to complete project funding. In 2002, the project received $415,000 from the Lucent Foundation, managed by the International Youth Foundation, which is used to scale up proven projects.

## Project Accomplishments

As of March 2003, 54 subprojects have been approved for implementation. Of this number, 35 focus on integrated technical education, 11 concentrate on formal basic education, 7 implement alternative learning systems, and 1 offers both technical and basic education.

By January 2003, the actual number of participants in the pilot phase totaled 10,044, which exceeded the original pilot phase target of 9,840 (this was broken down thus: Asia Europe Meeting Fund, 3,000; Japan Social Development Fund, 5,840; and Lucent, 1,000). The number excludes beneficiaries of 8 subprojects, which started implementation in January. Four projects under the Lucent grant still have to be identified. Table 3 shows the distribution of the targeted population by types of courses. Of the 54 subprojects, 23 target youth from urban areas. More than half implement integrated technical education, 7 focus on formal basic education, and 3 address alternative learning systems. The total net beneficiaries from urban areas is 5,938.

Most of the urban-based subprojects offer many courses that are typically and extensively demanded by urban industries. These include automotive mechanics, general or basic electricity, electronics, information technology, refrigeration and air conditioning mechanics, fitter-machinist skills, and the garment trade. Still, several courses were also applicable to both the urban and rural settings, such as food processing, construction work and masonry, metal arc welding, leather craft work, and jewelry making.

## Urban Youth: Outcome

The results of the project have been encouraging. A few of the subprojects were evaluated in 2000 (Philippine Business for Social Progress 2001a, 2001b, 2001c). The four that catered to urban youth—Don Bosco Technical Institute, Makati; Meralco Foundation, Incorporated; Taguig Jewelry Producers' Cooperative; and Mary Help of Christian School—showed remarkable accomplishments in the areas of youth outcomes and job placement. All four had a positive impact on the trainees. Not only did they gain improved technical skills, their outlook on life also changed. They evolved into better people—more self-assured, patient, and understanding. Their interaction with other people became easier. And most important, they found hope and purpose. The case studies below offer detailed descriptions of the Don Bosco Technical Institute and Mary Help of Christian School projects.

Except for the trainees of the Meralco Foundation, all those who graduated are now working. Some opted to become self-employed; for example, novice jewelry makers accept subcontracting jobs from the cooperative and enterprise shelters.

On the basis of reports on the subprojects with industry tie-ups and employment and self-employment data, the extra attention paid to committing institutions to have their trainees placed through either linkage with potential industries or the creation of small enterprise shelters led to about 80 percent of technical education graduates becoming gainfully employed. This rate exceeds the national average of 40 percent by 100 percent, as is shown in table 4.

[a]Of the graduates, 302 come from one subproject without industry ties and employment and self-employment tracer, and 141 are from the shelter for convicted youth offenders who are still serving their sentences.

## Trisectoral Partnerships

The trisectoral approach to the resolution of issues concerning out-of-school children and youth, which the Philippine Out-of-School Children and Youth Development Project pioneered, worked beyond expectation. Partnership among disparate groups can and does work in dealing with issues affecting disadvantaged and marginalized sectors of society. Through the efforts of local implementers, the project engaged diverse groups that hitherto had never worked to alleviate the conditions of out-of-school children and youth, much less had teamed up with others. A number of local consortia were set up. In dollar terms, they contributed in cash and in kind $2.4 million, which bodes well for the sustainability of the project.

With continuing input and support from the project staff, the subproject implementers became determined to organize the various sectors in their community to rally around the cause of the out-of-school youth. The initial challenge was to make them do it, to change their paradigm from working alone with a reliable donor to cultivating relationships within their community. A series of training programs on trisectoral partnership plus technical assistance in organizing and running meetings with potential stakeholders enabled them to take the first step. Later, the confluence of support from local government, business and civic groups, the families of participants themselves, and the community further motivated

**Table 3. Distribution of Beneficiaries of the Philippine Out-of-School Children and Youth Development Project by Type of Education Scheme, 2003**

| Education Scheme | Total Number of Beneficiaries as of |
|---|---|
| **Integrated Technical Education** | 2,968 |
| Attending in-center training | 1,120 |
| Attending practicum training | 378 |
| Graduated | 1,469 |
| Others | 1 |
| **Formal Basic Education** | 2,435 |
| **Alternative Learning System** | 4,641 |
| Current learners | 1,777 |
| Finishers | 2,864 |

Source: Project data.

them to sustain their effort. The outcome: the counterpart funding topped by 4 percent the expected 60 percent.

## High School Dropouts Included

The project has also been successful, through unwavering advocacy efforts, in convincing a number of technical institutions to admit high school dropouts. They, in turn, changed the business sector's attitude toward accepting for apprenticeship and employment high school undergraduates who have completed relevant training. It has taken a more receptive stance due to the improved work traits demonstrated by graduates of technical education subprojects. This crucial makeover of the graduates has been spawned by immersion in the Skills for Life and other value-focused curricula, aimed at strengthening their self-esteem and self-trust and developing their abilities to handle emotions constructively and to set positive goals. Their academic competencies were also raised through the integration of accreditation and equivalency and home study. These key add-ons ensure the formation of not only well-trained technicians but also individuals on the cutting edge with positive attitudes and excellent work habits.

## Lessons and Recommendations

From the Consuelo Foundation's experience as the pilot project unfolds, several distinct lessons have become apparent. As expected, they relate to the issues raised above regarding technical education, placement of graduates, the matching of skills, and effective partnerships.

### Lesson: Enhance Technical Education with Other Relevant Programs

Opening skills training opportunities to high school dropouts is a profitable investment. Several institutions that began to admit those without a high school diploma discovered that non-high school graduates perform as well as those with accreditation. More important, employers found them acceptable and agreed to their apprenticeship and eventual employment.

However, the change in the perception of out-of-school youth has not come about without additional interventions. It should be underscored that the project has made a policy decision to upgrade the academic competencies of technical and vocational students and to strengthen their character at the same time through Skills for Life training. Enrollment in an alternative learning system—designed and implemented by the Bureau of Non-Formal Education of the Department of Education—has enabled them to accomplish the first. This has the added advantage of making available a tutor to guide them in their studies.

The project developed a curriculum on Skills for Life geared to equip poor young people with core social and emotional values and employability skills. It addresses the problems of low self-esteem and the consequent lack of skills to relate meaningfully with others, to cope with stress and emotions, and to think critically and creatively. This integration of both academic and character formation into the technical education program augurs well for the project.

### Lesson: Commit Technical Training Institutions to Provide Placement to Graduates

When technical graduates complete their training, they have high hopes of finding employment. Not finding any right away becomes a disincentive. However, without support, new graduates have difficulty landing a job. Thus the pilot project has made it a requirement for implementers to design a system for placing their students. Many have adopted one of two major strate-

**Table 4. Status of Graduates of Subprojects with Industry Tie-Ups, Philippine Out-of-School Children and Youth Development Project, 2003**

| Status of Graduates as of January 2003 | Number of Graduates January 2003 |
|---|---|
| **Total graduates** | 1,469 |
| **Less:**[a] | |
| **Net graduates of subproject without industry ties and employment/self-employment tracers** | 443 |
| | 1,026 |
| **Number employed or self-employed** | 844 |
| **Employed** | 718 |
| **Self-employed** | 126 |
| **Percentage of graduates employed or self-employed** | 82 |

[a]Of the graduates, 302 come from one subproject without industry ties and employment and self-employment tracer, and 141 are from the shelter for convicted youth offenders who are still serving their sentences.
Source: Project data.

gies. One calls for starting an enterprise shelter that subcontracts jobs to their former students and teach them to become small entrepreneurs. It is still a risky proposition because of the unreliable number of contracts coming in which affects the income stream, but the shelter does provide work and provides firsthand experience for many of the out-of-school youth on the pitfalls of being a freelance worker. Greater effort needs to be devoted to improving the profitability of enterprise shelters by promoting their services to generate more jobs.

The other strategy asks training institutions to establish a linkage with industries which can host on-the-job training and offer employment. This is discussed at greater length in the next lesson.

## Lesson: Encourage the Matching of Technical Skills with Industry Needs

When technical training institutions tie up with industries, they must do so after mapping carefully the industry's needs with their offerings toward the

acquisition of relevant skills. This means training programs imparting skills that have carefully been crafted to suit job requirements and that are jointly designed by representatives of target industries and the implementing training institution. This also includes well-tailored on-the-job training. Close coordination and joint planning between potential employers and trainers in providing skills that are in demand facilitates such a planning. Expert production or other technical specialists from the target industries are happy to be invited to give lectures and demonstrations for the trainees. It is recommended that well-planned guided visits to plant or factory sites be conducted early enough in the training so as to bridge theory and practice.

### Lesson: Develop Effective and Lasting Tripartite Collaboration

Bringing and keeping together representatives from government, business, and private nonprofit sectors require time, patience, communication skills, and much diplomacy. Each sector is a composite of institutions and individuals that bring to the partnership diverse and complementary expertise and contributions. The project has proven that there is a willingness among them to work together on a common cause. What it needs is sharing of information, discussion of issues, and agreement on what each one should bring to the table. From experience, the signing of a formal memorandum of agreement has not been necessary to keep them together. All it requires is persistent and consistent effort on the part of an individual or organization that takes on the coordinating role to keep everyone informed and broker an agreement on the role each individual organization plays. Each one has to strengthen its niche. And this is much better done locally than nationally.

In the end, solutions to youth unemployment should be planned within the context of a country's comprehensive policies to promote economic growth. It is the framework for the changes that need to be instituted in training programs for skills development.

## Case Study on Youth Employment: Don Bosco Technical Institute, Makati

The Don Bosco Technical Institute (DBTI) in Makati City has always been known as a prestigious institution for elementary and high school boys. However, many do not know of the existence of DBTI's Manpower Training Department, which was established in 1972 by the Salesians of

Don Bosco to cater, specifically, to disadvantaged youth 17 to 22 years of age. The department is the anchor of DBTI's effort to fulfill its social responsibility to train poor young men and enable them to improve their lives by gaining stable employment. Each year, the department accepts about 1,200 young people in the various skills training programs offered.

The department is manned by three Salesian leaders and supported by 42 lay staff, who are mostly products of the Don Bosco educational system. The department—accredited by the Department of Education, TESDA, and the Philippine Accrediting Association of Schools, Colleges and Universities—develops its own technical training curriculum in collaboration with industry. It provides consultancy assistance to and trains trainers of other technical and vocational institutions. Moreover, it serves as a showcase for vocational and training courses not only in the Philippines but also in other countries, such as Australia and Papua New Guinea.

DBTI has linkages with close to 350 partner companies. As a result of these linkages, it boasts of a 90 percent employment rate for its graduates. To date, it has produced 8,646 graduates and topnotchers in the field of automotive, electrical, and machine shop technology. Many of these graduates are now holding upper- and middle-level positions in various companies.

## The Handyman Skills Training Project

The DBTI Handyman Skills Training Project is premised on two factors. First, there is a need for more trained workers who have mastered new skills and developed attitudes suitable to the dynamic and changing workplace. This situation has been spawned by the rapid development and changes in industry, as well as the shift to new social and development programs. Second, many marginalized youth cannot afford to attend formal school. These youth should be given an option to undergo technical skills training incorporated with nonformal education to afford them an opportunity for employment and high school equivalency.

The project, to be completed in six months, aims to equip 50 disadvantaged youth with technical skills and competencies in such fields as computer technology, basic electronics, automotive maintenance, and basic carpentry. The project also seeks to provide such interventions as job placement, entrepreneurship, and life skills and values enhancement that will mainstream the youth into society. It also endeavors to forge and institutionalize partnerships with different sectors to enable it to become sustainable.

The training system adopts an alternative delivery system that combines both the peer learning and actual exposure, and utilizes the electronic skills (e-skills) modular learning approach. The technical education focuses on the trainees, learning processes, learning outcomes, and the achievement of proficiency in the fields that trainees are pursuing. This is the first undertaking of DBTI that has accepted young women, 10 of whom are enrolled.

## Approaches to Youth Employment

DBTI's approaches to youth employment include e-skills training, technical-vocational education and training, supervised in-plant training, Non-Formal Education-Accreditation and Equivalency System and Skills for Life services, linkage with the business sector, and temporary housing for selected trainees. This section looks briefly at each in turn.

## E-kills Training

DBTI makes use of interactive modules, developed by the Center for Industrial Technology and Enterprise under the sponsorship of the Consuelo Foundation, to facilitate the theoretical learning by out-of-school youth. These interactive or e-skills modules improve the quality and delivery of the technical courses to technical students. Trainees undergo Web-based ready modular curriculum for skill and technical competencies in basic computer technology, practical electronics and electrical installations, refrigeration and air conditioning, basic automotive maintenance, basic office procedures, basic carpentry, plumbing, and masonry.

## Technical-Vocational Education and Training

DBTI offers four-month formal training courses supported by two-month supervised in-plant training courses for trainees in the general fields of automobile maintenance, basic electronics, general electrician, refrigeration and air conditioning mechanics, and the like. Under these general fields, specialized skills training is emphasized depending on the demands of the course. For instance, a specialization training is conducted on automotive electronics under the automotive maintenance course, or industrial automation under the course in industrial electronics.

A skills training modification is also undertaken to meet the needs of companies or industries while the trainees are in the program. Such mod-

ification is done using print-based materials provided by companies and objective testing.

## Supervised In-Plant Training

An essential component of the project is the 2-month supervised in-plant training (SIPT), a prerequisite to the completion of the program. The trainees are dispersed to companies to enable them to acquire the necessary knowledge and skills and to develop the appropriate attitude required by industry. Close coordination between industry and the training center is established through bimonthly visits of DBTI staff to the trainees attending the SIPT. Such partnerships facilitate assessment based on industry needs.

The project adopted several principles—"plan, develop, check, act"—to maintain quality standards based on data on the industry's needs assessment. During the SIPT, industry needs are revealed and a training program is developed. The weaknesses of trainees are assessed and improved based on the feedback provided by their supervisors during the SIPT.

## The NFE-A&E System and Skills for Life

DBTI is now an accredited Non-Formal Education-Accreditation and Equivalency (NFE-A&E) System service provider. The NFE-A&E System is implemented in partnership with Assumption College–Makati and is given for free. The NFE-A&E System enables a learners to attain knowledge, values, and skills equivalent to a higher curricular level than what a trainee has previously achieved. By passing the national A&E test, and with adequate preparation, a high school undergraduate can obtain a certificate equivalent to a high school diploma.

Trainees are given the option to undertake NFE-A&E activities. The A&E sessions are held every Saturday. The Skills for Life modules are integrated into the training curriculum and are conducted twice a month for six months, in addition to DBTI's existing Personality Training. DBTI utilizes the Skills for Life Modules introduced by the Consuelo Foundation.

## Linkage with the Business Sector

Through its Industrial Placement Office, DBTI has established partnerships and linkages with close to 350 companies, where graduates undergo in-plant training and are eventually placed for employment. These companies

have consistently provided employment and training opportunities, as well as technical inputs to DBTI's Technical and Vocational Education Training programs. The office also monitors the industry's labor power demands for appropriate matching with the trainees' qualifications.

## Temporary Housing for Selected Trainees

Through its technical director, DBTI maintains three apartments near the school to accommodate and feed selected and needy students whose parents could not afford to provide them transportation and meal allowance. This is an extra effort made by the school to ensure that its students continue attending school activities.

## Project Outcomes

DBTI is now an accredited Department of Education Non-Formal Education Training Center. This was achieved through a meaningful partnership with Assumption College and Pio del Pilar, a local public school.

Applicants who have not completed high school are now accepted on a regular basis. From at first catering exclusively to high school graduates, the center has now maneuvered toward addressing the technical education needs of disadvantaged high school dropouts. The institution now provides support for the ancillary school and training needs of marginalized youth.

The center is slowly opening its doors to young women for mainstreaming into its formerly all-male program. The center now considers trisectoral partnerships as an approach to addressing the sustainability issue.

The center is pushing for recognition as a Center of Excellence for Marginalized Youth. The center is now in the process of establishing a foundation to facilitate the project for marginalized youth.

The project has had a significant impact on the lives of its beneficiaries. Virtually all cited an improvement in their lives as a result of participation. They expressed a deep gratitude for the opportunity given them to study, and possibly gain employment after graduation. Improved technical skills in computer technology, electronics, electrical installations, automotive maintenance, carpentry and masonry, plumbing, and office procedures, improved skills in literacy and numeracy, increased knowledge and broadened perspectives were some of the changes mentioned by the trainees as a result of the project.

Also important were the attitudinal transformations that materialized in the trainees. There was a boost in their confidence and self-esteem, as shown by their ability to face people from different strata. They have learned more about themselves, they now have better interpersonal relationships, and they have learned to value and respect their work, others, and themselves.

Employment was not cited as a benefit because the trainees are still completing either their in-center or in-plant training. All of them, however, expressed full optimism that the project will eventually enable them to secure employment after graduation. The majority of them said that their expectations have been well achieved.

## Significant Lessons

The program has resulted in seven lessons being learned.

*First, on youth employment, a program for marginalized youth needs to be focused on skills and competencies development as the industry requirement may demand*. The usual training program is based on the capacity of trainees to cope with technology related to a job requirement, but skills and competencies are more attractive not only to the trainees but to the industry as well.

*Second, a training program needs to keep abreast of the changing needs and demands of employment*. Economic trends usually dictate labor power demands. If training is not able to address these demands, the beneficiaries will not be employed or productive.

*Third, industry usually does not consider "just accepting" marginalized youth for the sake of "social responsibility."* Social responsibility goes hand in hand with the skills and competencies needed by the industry. As a corollary, industry needs to be convinced of the capacity and skills of marginalized youth in order to accept them. Validating DBTI-Makati's training program by the industry made the beneficiaries acceptable for employment.

*Fourth, marginalized youth need thorough preparation in job orientation*. Usually they have a tendency to experience difficulty in a structured workplace. While in the company, the youth need follow-up to make sure that the "preventive system" is practiced.

*Fifth, marginalized youth need to be guided and nurtured in their career path*. When given proper guidance and supervision, youth excel in industry and are very productive. Company loyalty is one of their strengths.

*Sixth, in training youth, support for ancillary needs (transportation, meals, boarding house) is essential to sustain the interest and participation of beneficiaries in the training program*. Many indigent youth are forced to drop out from the training due to economic constraints, such as the lack or absence of allowances.

*Seventh, partnerships are crucial in ensuring project continuity and sustainability*. Many organizations are willing to extend support to address the needs of and provide interventions for the marginalized, but these need to be opened up in segments as a window of opportunity for partnering.

## Case Study on Youth Employment: Mary Help of Christians School–Technology Center for Women

The Mary Help of Christians School–Technology Center for Women was established on August 15, 1995, to provide free skills training to poor, vulnerable young women, both high school graduates and dropouts, who aspire of having a better future through the acquisition of technical-vocational education (figure 2). The center trains young women to become highly skilled workers, and at the same time it imbues proper work values and attitudes.

The center started with an offering of three courses, namely the garment trade, food trade, and computer secretarial. It eventually phased out the food trade course due to low enrollment, which was attributed to the Kapampangans' apparently innate culinary skills. In 1997, it launched electronics and computer technology courses, considered the emerging technologies for women in nontraditional occupations. The new courses spawned a dramatic increase in enrollment.

In 1998, a Dutch organization generously provided the center with a grant to construct a new technology center building to accommodate the increasing number of trainees and house the state-of-the-art facilities donated by equally munificent European benefactors such as Stichtung Porticus, Mondial Social Services, and the German Development Service. In the same year, the center was granted dual training accreditation by TESDA.

The center has a professional and dedicated staff, and it boasts of having a virtually 100 percent employment rate for its graduates. It is highly reputed for the quality of its graduates, and business firms in Pampanga and neighboring areas regularly approach it for their skilled labor power requirements.

## The Empowering Disadvantaged Young Women Project

The Empowering Disadvantaged Young Women Project is a one-year technical skills training course for 80 vulnerable young women in Pampanga province. The project's primary aim is to provide a learning system, wherein a dual-technology curriculum would produce responsible, productive, skilled, and employable young women.

The project caters mostly to sex workers, exploited and abused young women, helpers, and street children. These women undertake technical training in industrial electronics, focusing on servicing and maintenance, installation and repair of electronic systems, components and parts. The training also provides a sound, thorough knowledge in digital, practical, and analog electronics.

The project adopts the dual-technology system approach in training, focusing on the total development of the trainees—human, social, moral values, and attitudes geared toward building employable skills. Extracurricular activities—such as those culled from the Salesian Youth Movement and other activities done during special occasions—are also included to create a healthy atmosphere that would ensure a development of values and interpersonal and social skills.

## Approaches to Youth Employment

The center's approaches to youth employment include technical education and training, supervised in-plant training, functional and remedial instruction, individual or group counseling, the organization of graduates, and linkages with industry for job placement. This section looks at each in turn.

## Technical Education and Training

The technical training provides trainees with basic knowledge in industrial electronics. The training employs the dual-technology system, wherein the curriculum is divided into in-center and in-plant training. The dual-tech system is an effective approach in meeting the demands of the industrial sector and addressing the training needs of young women. The system not only prepares the women to be employable but also allows them to undergo auxiliary training in advanced technologies that further hones their skills and capabilities for more challenging job positions in the future.

The in-center training covers five months of technical education classes with close mentoring from professionally trained instructors. To ensure the training quality, the center offers an additional training subject on quality control, which is supervised by a German technical consultant of the center. The subject is integrated into the five-month in-center training. In this subject, the trainees will learn how to be especially cautious of the quality of their output, which will further help the center ease up, recommending them to different garment manufacturers in the areas of coverage.

### Supervised In-Plant Training: On-the-Job Training

Under SIPT, the trainees are exposed for five months to the actual work environment in cooperating companies. This training phase enables trainees to acquire the requisite knowledge and skills and instills in them the proper work attitude required by industry. In addition, the flaws and limitations of trainees are appraised and improved on, based on the feedback provided by their supervisors during SIPT. The center also negotiates with cooperating companies on the enforcement of the SIPT law, which requires companies to provide at least 75 percent of the minimum wage to trainees undertaking SIPT.

### Functional and Remedial Instruction

The first two months of the in-center training focuses on the conduct of basic education classes, which include mathematics, English, and science subjects to refresh the trainees' minds and to provide them with values and skills to enable them to cope with the demands and challenges of everyday life. Remedial instruction is given to slow learners to help them catch up with the lessons. Remedial instruction applies to both the review of basic education subjects and the technical course itself.

### Individual or Group Counseling

Individual counseling is marked by a series of interviews conducted by a counselor to a trainee needing counseling assistance. The counselor examines conflicting values that may be the roots of a personal problem or weighs information to help the trainee come up with decisions related to her schooling or work. This is done in an appropriate environment, normally in an interview room, to provide an atmosphere of

assurance and confidentiality. The termination of the meeting would depend on the counsel's needs.

Group counseling, however, reinforces the learning process through interaction among peers. The counselor meets with a group of trainees, usually in a section or a class per week, to discuss growth and development peculiar to adolescents' psychological and social concerns. These group guidance meetings provide a supportive atmosphere, which helps trainees develop strategies for the attainment of personal and career goals.

## Organization of Graduates

Graduates are followed up on by "past pupils," who conduct regular meetings every four months to provide more value formation inputs relevant to their roles in their respective workplaces and in society and to prepare them for future vocations in life such as marriage and parenthood. These meetings allow the staff to monitor their progress or provide consultations and advice as the need arises.

## Linkages with Industry for Job Placement

The center has established tie-ups and linkages with business firms to ensure that trainees are absorbed for in-plant or on-the-job training and eventually get employed. Such tie-ups include the review of curriculum to be taught to the trainees, supervision of trainees during the in-plant training, and coordination with the center staff on the performance of trainees. To formalize such arrangements, a memorandum of agreement is usually signed between the center and the company concerned. Some of the industries the center has established partnership with are American Power Corporation; SANYO Semi-Conductors; NEC Storage, Incorporated; Amertron; SMK Electronics Incorporated; Fujitsu Corporation; National Electronics Corporation; and Computer Data.

## Project Outcomes

The project has had four notable outcomes. *First, the project has achieved a remarkable employment rate of 100 percent for its 36 industrial electronics graduates*. Their employment was made possible by the center's establishment of formal linkages with semiconductor companies in the Clark Economic Processing Zone.

*Second, significant positive changes have been noted in the lives of the trainees, which are proof that the technical-vocational training they have undergone at the center is of value and is appreciated*. Trainees developed positive values, such as good study habits and a favorable self-image. These are illustrated by the fact that 100 percent of the trainees passing classroom examinations and actively participate in school activities.

*Third, the trainees regarded the resumption of their studies as very important because it facilitated their defining their life and work goals*. All the trainees professed to have learned to take care of themselves, to set goals, and to work toward the attainment of these goals, and they have learned new skills and technical concepts that have contributed to increasing their self-confidence. They said that with their renewed confidence, they gained more friends and they learned to interact with different people. They have also become more patient and understanding. And because they are now employed, they are more certain of their future and able help to their families.

*Fourth, with regard to the effectiveness of the project, all the trainees agreed the project's training endeavors and accomplishments went beyond their expectations*. The trainees commended the competence and effectiveness of the nuns and teachers, along with the good policies and high-quality amenities and facilities of the school. They were well aware that through the project, they had the opportunity to go back to school and find employment.

## Significant Lessons

The project has enabled those involved to learn six significant lessons.

*First, given the opportunity, disadvantaged youth are interested and willing to undertake integrated technical education*.

*Second, out-of-school youth have special learning needs brought about by their lack of psychosocial skills that must be understood by individuals and organizations involved in their education*. Support services, such as mentoring, remedial instruction, counseling, and life skills training, are extremely crucial in reducing the prospect of dropping out by the out-of-school youth.

*Third, among the beneficiaries who had to discontinue their education and training, poverty-related causes were the main reasons*. The dropout rate becomes even higher for trainees in especially difficult circumstances. such as those experiencing extreme poverty, those who have been victims of sexual or physical abuse, and those beset by family problems.

*Fourth, the longer the technical education course, the higher the dropout rate.* The situation is correlated with poverty, because the longer the training, the more expenses students have to incur and the longer they have to wait to become employable. It must be noted, however, that a longer technical education course means a higher level of skills and therefore better opportunities for employment.

*Fifth, direct linkages with industry for curriculum development and modification, apprenticeship of students, and employment of graduates contribute to higher employment rates of graduates.*

*Sixth, one-to-one partnerships with various organizations or agencies from government, civil society, and business firms can be successful. However, partnerships with government institutions are affected by politics, and tie-ups with the business sector are affected by the overall status of the economy.*

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CHAPTER 4

# Government Response to Youth, Poverty, and Conflict: Voices of Young Filipinos in Child Friendly Cities

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This chapter assesses how government programs have addressed the needs and concerns of poor urban youth, and it suggests ways to make these effective. It is based mainly on case studies of three informal settlements that formed part of the Institute of Philippine Culture (IPC) research study, "Child-Friendly Cities and Urban Poor Settlements: Views from the Community" (hereafter, the CFC study).[i] This participatory research—aimed at generating a sensitive profile of poor urban children and youth from the perspectives of children and youth themselves, as well as other residents of the communities—also sought the views of implementers of development programs and services targeting the poorest, out-of-school and out-of-work youth. They included government, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other assisting organizations with initiatives related to development, employment, protection, and participation in communities.

What follows is a brief description of the three case study sites: Barangay Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Company (BASECO) in the City of Manila, Barangay Payatas in Quezon City, and Barangay Sasa in Davao City. The first two are located in Metro Manila, and the third is in the Southern Philippines. Payatas is the only Country Program for Children (CPC) pilot site.[ii]

BASECO, a major government relocation site for evicted slum dwellers, is the popular name of Barangay 649, which is strategically located in a major harbor in the City of Manila.[iii] The informal settlers, totaling 45,017

in 5,515 families as of 2001, obtain their livelihood from rendering various services or operating small-scale businesses. About 17 percent of the population consists of young people 15 to 17 years of age.[iv]

Like BASECO, Barangay Payatas in Quezon City is a major government resettlement area. It is densely populated, with 112,690 residents in 24,161 households as of 2000. Estimates show that a third of the community is composed of school-age children (7 to 12 years). Payatas is known for its 13-hectare garbage dumpsite that is a daily source of income of thousands of people, both residents and nonresidents. The mountain of garbage, however, collapsed under heavy rains in 2000, leading to more than 200 confirmed deaths, many of them children caught in or near the site.

Barangay Sasa, which lies to the east of Davao Gulf, is one of the largest *barangays* in Davao City, covering 639 hectares. Largely a commercial and industrial area, Sasa is the site of Davao's main seaport and airport. Because of this, as well as the *barangay*'s proximity to the city, several business firms have set up offices in the area, providing a source of livelihood for many residents, including young people.

The recent population count (as of 2002) shows 42,000 people distributed in 7,200 families. Youth (15–24 years of age) account for 30 percent of the total *barangay* population, with girls outnumbering boys. Only 40 percent of them are reported to be in school.

## Children and Youth in the Communities

> *Politics is all they [the national government] know…that is why the youth are neglected…they report only simple things even if there are bigger problems confronting the youth.*
> *—Jason, 17-year-old male gang member, BASECO, City of Manila*

Jason is one of the 57 male and female informants 13 to 17 years of age (one of several age groups in the CFC study) living in an informal settlement in highly dense Metropolitan Manila. These youngsters form a small portion of the 10 million young Filipinos living below the poverty line.[v]

In 2000, the government placed the youth population (15–29 years of age) at 21.158 million, nearly a third (28 percent) of the total Philippine population. Almost half of this age group (47 percent) is found in the National Capital Region.

During a national forum, a youth leader[vi] reported that the Philippines was experiencing a "youth bulge," a transitory demographic expansion of the youth population (15–24 years of age), from 12.3 million in 1990 to 15.1 million in 2000. He noted a great concentration of young people in urban centers, with 7.5 percent of households having four or more youth, compared with 3.5 percent in rural households. Youth, especially females, are generally more mobile than the rest of the population, and they are constantly in search of jobs and better economic opportunities. The youth leader added that this youth bulge is expected to increase to 18.9 million by 2025.

This is perhaps a valid expectation if we consider the large number of women of childbearing age (see table 1). According to the official statistics web site, half of the total female population in the country belongs to the childbearing age group (15–49 years), with the highest percentage falling into the age bracket of 15 to 19 years (11 percent). In all five cities covered by the CFC study, a majority of the females belong to this age group: 58 percent in the City of Manila, with women 20 to 24 accounting for 21 percent; 59 percent in Quezon City in 2000, up from 31 percent in 1995; 57 percent in Cebu City; and 55 percent in Davao City, with young people 15 to 19 making up nearly a fourth of the childbearing population.

Following the national trend, the youth population (15–29 years of age) in all five cities represents a third or more of the total city population. At the Metro Manila sites (Quezon, Pasay, and Manila), there are more youth age 20 and above, which is consistent with official survey results showing a median age of 24. The Cities of Cebu and Davao have relatively younger populations.

*Barangay* records of the youth population, when available, indicate only estimates, from a low of 17 percent to a high of 60 percent of the total *barangay* population, so the reliability of these figures is obviously highly questionable. Estimates show more female than male youth in the case study sites, similar to the national gender proportion. Those 18 years of age and above make up a significant majority of the youth in the communities, following the Metro Manila trend.

Community-level population data classified by age group (e.g., 15–19 years of age) and by gender are lacking, as are data on the number of youth in subgroups targeted by the study, particularly the poor-

est, out of school, working, users of drugs and prohibitive substances, members of gangs and fraternities, and those in conflict with the law. Fewer than half (7 of 17) of the communities in the three Metro Manila cities have disaggregated population figures. The age groupings, however, differ from one community to the other, depending on the agency or group that conducted the social investigation. In a sense, younger children have an advantage, being the targets of health monitoring by community health and nutrition workers.

Let us now listen to the voices of these young people and take a look at their lives,[vii] in the context of their social units (environment, families, and peer groups), and see how the government has addressed their basic rights to development, protection, and participation.

## Daily Lives of Young People

This section describes several aspects of children's lives: their environment, households and families, peer groups, and access to education. It looks at each briefly in turn, with quotations from youth themselves.

**Table 1. Childbearing Age Groups of Population, Selected Philippine Cities, 2000**

| CITY | Ratio of Childbearing Age Group (15–49 years) to Total Female Population (percent) | Largest Childbearing Age Group (years) | Ratio to Total Childbearing Age Group of Population (percent) |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Cebu** | 57 | 15–19 | 20 |
| **Davao** | 55 | 15–19 | 21 |
| **Manila** | 58 | 20–24 | 21 |
| **Pasay** | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |
| **Quezon** | 59 | n.a. | n.a. |
| **All Philippines** | 50 | 15–19 | 11 |

Note: n.a. means no data available.

Source: National Statistics Office website (www.census.gov.ph/data/pressrelease/2002)

## Environment

Young people live with their parents, siblings, or relatives in temporary, cramped houses located beside a creek or near their primary source of livelihood, such as the dumpsite, port or wharf, and the market. They are thus vulnerable to floods, diseases, fire, and other forms of catastrophe. The collapse of the dumpsite in Payatas (Quezon City), for instance, killed hundreds of people, mostly scavengers. In BASECO (Manila), a tragic fire in 2002 also displaced hundreds of families. In Sasa (Davao City), flooding is a common reason why children do not attend school regularly and eventually drop out. According to a male out-of-school youth, sometimes, when seawaters rise, many cannot go to school, or drop out of school. Poor sanitation is another problem in the community. A health sanitation inspector notes:

There are areas along the river in Barangay Sasa where some households have no excavated pits so human waste is excreted directly into the river. Others have waste disposal pits, but when there is a flood, the pits overflow, contaminating the river and causing waterborne diseases among adults and children.

In Payatas, the young people seem to have grown accustomed to the smell of the dumpsite within their community, and in fact see it as a valuable source of livelihood. They remark:

> *Awful smell. …I do not smell anything bad, as I am already used to it.*
>
> *It is fine because [at least] we have a roof over our heads…it is more important to have a dwelling place than to have none at all. …Dirty, but even if it is dirty, we are happy here…for example, we play by hitting each other with pillows ransacked from the garbage. …Sometimes we get sick…sometimes we cannot breathe…sometimes we quarrel over small things like when someone in our group received more than his or her share of the money. …The dumpsite for me, for the people, is a challenge. It enables us to provide for our families…instead of doing senseless things. It is not embarrassing.*

Children are also exposed to violence within and outside their homes. Young people in BASECO, including male gang members, describe their *barangay* as follows:

> *So noisy…many quarrels. …In one day, sometimes, there are 10 quarrels.*
>
> *He stole things, then the police ran after him. There was chaos in the com-*

*munity [along the coast], with the police chasing him. He hid himself and was never caught. We see people who have been salvaged [summarily executed]. People run after each other with big knives, or shoot each other. Each alley here makes sumpak [home-made guns] because they are afraid of shootouts invading their homes, hitting sleeping members of the family. …Our neighbor, whenever he was drunk, challenged everyone to a fight…he died in one of his fights…because he was shot.*

In-school boys fear for their safety because of the proliferation of gangs and fraternities. They reveal:

*It is horrible…because they (gang members) might just stab us…they are not caught…they are able to hide immediately. …There in the dumpsite, I was mauled. …I was riding my bicycle when suddenly somebody blocked me and then punched me. …Sometimes, they extort money from younger children…*

*There are so many fraternities here [referring to Isla Liit, a subcluster of households along the coast]…and so is drug abuse.*

However, there are youth who, because of family problems, peer pressure, and boredom, are lured into gangs. Eventually, their schooling is disrupted and they get involved in drugs and delinquent activities. In BASECO, a culture of violence (riots), drinking, gambling, and drug abuse has become a part of youths' lives.

## Households and Families

Most youth belong to large families (ranging from 5 to 12 members; with an average of 6 siblings); some of them live independently or stay with relatives outside the parental household. Their parents have no permanent jobs, so there are days on which they barely eat. Some have siblings who have not finished their elementary or high school education. The situation of out-of-school teenagers is worse; they fend for themselves because their parents are out of work. Commenting on their out-of-school youth counterparts, several in-school youth in BASECO say:

*Parents have no sufficient funds to send their children to school because they just cannot get a job owing to their lack of education. …It is so dif-*

*ficult for us, some people cannot find jobs; we just take chances at the sea, only then can we eat.*

Some children work to augment the family income. As one female adult expresses:

*I pity my nephews and nieces whom I have been taking care of after their mother died. Their father left to work abroad, and we just depend on the meager allowance he sends us. Sometimes, there are delays in his remittances so we have to find ways to support ourselves. I do laundry. One of my male nephews has to work, especially since his father has not been giving us regular financial support.*

Others experience not only financial difficulties but also domestic problems. Gang members and out-of-school females, in particular, come from dysfunctional families.[viii] A few have parents who engage in gambling and illegal activities, such as selling prohibited drugs, in order to feed their families. A female out-of-school youth from BASECO shares:

*My mother sells shabu [a poor man's cocaine]. …I ignore her. …I leave the house.*

Accounts of adult residents illustrate further the family situation of some children their communities:

*Couples quarrel, especially if the husband has no job. This affects the children so much that they do not find peace and security at home, which their friends can readily provide. …Their [the children's] meager earnings are not enough to buy food. So they just sniff rugby [a strong compound with an addictive smell] to stave off hunger. Their parents, who are also working, often neglect them. They are out of the house most of the day and have little time left for their children when they come home at night. Thus, their children are lured toward gangs and dangerous activities.*

Still, the family is the major source of happiness for most children and youth, especially those whose families are able to eat daily, intact, happy, and peaceful, because the members get along well. An in-school female youth in Payatas explains:

*Oh well, as long as I have my family with me…and my friends are with me…I am happy!*

## Peer Groups

Several youth turn to their peers (*barkada*) for a sense of belonging, support, and protection, considering them as a central part of their daily lives. They help one another in collecting garbage and carrying heavy loads in the dumpsite, for instance, and share cold drinks like brothers and sisters. In some cases, however, the peer group brings more trouble than good to the youth. Although many youngsters see the gang as a protector and a source of refuge, more often than not, they are influenced by their gangmates to cut classes, try drugs, or engage in sex. These delinquent activities affect greatly the school attendance of the youth and primarily account for the incidence of teenage pregnancies and early marriages in the communities. A mother in Sasa shares:

*Children nowadays are stubborn and hardheaded. After school, they hang out with their peers and go home late at night. They engage in petty gambling, get into romantic relationships at an early age, join gangs, and drink alcohol. If you warn them against doing these things, they answer back at you.*

## Access to Education

Youth have access to free education in public schools located within or outside their communities. Some attend nonformal education sessions organized by government and NGOs. Although tuition is free in government schools, there are miscellaneous expenses that parents have to shoulder, such as identification cards, daily allowance and food, transportation fare, and school projects. Most parents who do not earn regular income see these as an added financial burden. This is one reason why some children fail to attend school regularly and eventually drop out. Others even quit their studies to work and help augment the family income, and they take great pride in this. Boys are usually porters at the pier, assistants to truck drivers, and scavengers, while girls are vendors, workers in home industries, and waitresses. Girls are also assigned responsibilities at home, such as cleaning the house and taking care of their younger siblings. A number of youth in Sasa and Payatas recall:

*I was still young when my mother asked me to become an ambulant vendor because we were very poor. I sold whatever I could. After some time, I began to take on heavy work.…[Sasa]*

Many children support their own schooling through scavenging. Others are able to support their families. Should the dumpsite be removed, people here would resort to stealing. Many of them hope to finish school, but there are some, especially among out-of-school youth, who perceive this as an unattainable dream. Parents themselves are a major influence in their children's attitude toward their education. They pass on to their children the obligation to provide for the family and saddle them with household responsibilities. In-school females in BASECO and Sasa complain:

*When you have younger siblings, you take care of them. Of course, this makes you very tired and [it is unfair] because they (parents) just take it easy. And if they lose in gambling ["tong-its"], they get mad at you! Then there is no money to buy rice because they have already used it for gambling.*

*I cannot study seriously because I spend most of my time caring for my younger siblings. I am expected to do this, being the eldest child, since my mother is often away for work…*

*Parents always fight due to poverty… instead of focusing on their studies, the youth think about their future. This makes them lose their concentration…then what they see from their parents are all negative . . . these have a bad effect on them.*

Out-of-school youth are reluctant to resume their studies because of several factors, including laziness, lack of motivation, financial limitations, family problems (e.g., father is a drug addict or *shabu* user), and frequent riots in school. A few of them have never even stepped into a classroom. Others did not make it to the enrollment period because their parents failed to complete the school requirements, particularly submitting their birth certificates. Many have received only a partial elementary or high school education. The following accounts illustrate their difficulties:

*I cannot rely on anyone to help me finish my education. Even the government cannot help me…I know that. My parents are poor so they will also have difficulty in assisting me in this regard. Only I can help myself. I will*

*work hard to finish my education so that, in return, I can help my family.…*

*Wherever I go, there is always somebody (a gang member) who attacks me. Even if you bribe them, they still hit you. Sometimes, they will forcibly take your P 20 [$0.35], which is intended for your fare and snacks, and divide it among them. If you do not give them the money, all of them will hit you. That is why I have stopped attending school…all children even at the elementary level are already members of fraternities.*

## The Government Response to the Rights and Needs of Young People

Most poor youth are cynical about the government. As a 15-year-old youth from Sasa put it:

*We cannot rely on government to help our families. It is difficult to look to them [for assistance], especially now that the [present] government is not sensitive to our needs…unlike the previous administration. Before, we could avail ourselves of very cheap rice from the barangay; now, the same kind of rice is sold at a higher price.*

And as a male out-of-school youth from BASECO said:

*There is no one here who helps…even if there is assistance, no one is extending it because they [the government] are busy stealing money.*

## Basic Services

Generally, poor urban youth identify education, protection, and livelihood for their parents as among their primary needs. They clamor for activities that will keep them occupied, productive, and safe from drugs, such as sports and livelihood activities, especially for those out of school. The residents, including the youngsters, strongly urge the local government to increase and expand the scope of its programs and services, lessen corruption and politicking, and give children and youth its full attention and commitment.[ix] When asked what they wanted from the government, the in-school youth in Payatas said:

*I am calling on the barangay [council], I hope its projects will reach us. …The Harap ko, Linis ko [a cleanliness project] is okay.*

*I would like more schools for the poorest…even if they are just small …build health centers, hospitals, playgrounds, library…give people here jobs or livelihood opportunities so that even if the dumpsite is removed, no one will get angry, and everything will be okay… allocate more funds for the youth…education!…*

*Organize groups for the youth, like for sports activities, free education, livelihood generation, computer training…eliminate drug abuse among the youth because this destroys many lives.*

They recognize a number of government services and programs intended for them, such as annual sports events (basketball leagues), community dances, construction or upgrading of recreational facilities, and occasional donations, both material and financial. For their part, city and *barangay* councils claim to have allocated funds for the construction of recreational facilities and shelters for delinquent youth, provided resources for dances and sports activities (e.g., venue, materials), and awarded scholarships to deserving indigent youth. They deliver numerous services to their constituents, like medical assistance, donations for burials, and transportation fare for those returning to the province. City councilors vie in providing scholarships to youth seeking their help. In-school youth in BASECO also mention various other benefits:

*President Gloria, Mayor Atienza, or sometimes [barangay] chairman gives rice.*
*President Gloria initiated a housing project for fire victims.*
*Gloria feeds people only when there is a typhoon….*

*DILG [Department of Interior and Local Government] provides school supplies to the most indigent youth enrolled in formal schools. Families with many children are prioritized. The program is effective. However, parents are required to attend meetings, or their child will be removed from the program….*

*Youth aged 16 to 30 years used to participate in DILG's Linis Barangay [Clean the barangay], which was a weekly project, and were paid P 250 [$4.63] per day. The activity, however, became irregular and was eventually stopped. The activity was effective as the barangay became cleaner and the out-of-school youth were able to contribute to community service while earning their keep.*

*DSWD [Department of Social Welfare and Development] distributes relief goods to victims of typhoon and fire.*

*Medicines are available at the barangay health center and some stores in BASECO.*

*Mayor provides educational assistance in the form of bags, notebooks, shoes.*

Across all study sites, government interventions in the communities, especially those for youth, seem limited in scope, reach, and impact, considering the increasing number of various subgroups of marginalized youth, and the vastness and density of poor urban areas. Moreover, the residents, including the children, appear to have a low awareness of development programs, partly owing to a lack of information dissemination. Social services are also said to target specific groups of residents. For instance, health services are focused on children and women; and educational scholarships and sponsorships are granted to students whose families have connections with officials of the *barangay* and the city council, or who have above-average grades in school.

For youth outside the information loop, with no influential connections, these windfalls are not within their reach. Skills training for out-of-school youth and interested parents has benefited only a few. Participation in community development is limited to occasional activities initiated by the Sangguniang Kabataan (or SK, the Youth Council), such as cleanliness drives and sportsfests.

In BASECO, out-of-school youth do not know of any group in their community that provides educational assistance. They are cynical about government's capacity to offer meaningful support:

*I do not think that the barangay can help the youth (refusing to comment any further).*

*I do not know the SK since no efforts have been made to introduce the group or its projects to the youth.*

*There is a political unrest in BASECO such that even venues for youth participation are affected, like the community dances....*

Among the national government agencies, youth show high appreciation for the Department of Education (DepEd), with its "free tuition policy" in public elementary and high schools and its programs for out-of-school youth (Philippine Educational Placement Test, Accreditation and Equivalency Test, alternative and nonformal education). Many out-of-school youth have been able to reenter the formal school or have developed productive skills thanks to DepEd's livelihood training.

Parents further mention that scholarships and other forms of educational assistance have eased their difficulties in supporting their children's school expenses. They likewise acknowledge that sports activities have kept their children from drugs and destructive activities and have been a source of entertainment for the entire community. Another government initiative that is popular among the residents is the Kalinga sa Kabataan (Care for Young People) Program of DILG. This has encouraged youth to participate in community-wide cleanup activities.

Youth recognize the free medical and dental services, including medicinal supplies, provided by the Department of Health through its network of city and *barangay* health centers. They seem to have no knowledge of adolescent health programs.

## Protection

The Local (or Barangay) Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC or BCPC)[x] is the body tasked to develop and implement programs to safeguard the rights of young people in the community. In Cebu and Davao cities, almost all *barangays* have formed their own LCPCs. In one *barangay* in Davao, formerly delinquent youth were recruited as undercover police to identify and monitor members of street gangs. The LCPC also received a citation from the city government for its quick action program. In another *barangay*, Sasa, the collaborative efforts of organized community volunteers, police officers, and LCPC members to carry out night patrol and regular area visits and to strictly implement the curfew have lessened the number of *rugby* boys, gangs and fraternities, and *bontog*[xi] in the community.

The LCPCs in Metro Manila are less active, if not nonfunctional, except one in Pasay City, whose dynamism largely reflects an energetic youth committee. Residents of Cebu, Davao, and Pasay who have experienced functional LCPCs say that energetic nongovernmental, religious,

youth, and other civil society groups have helped strengthen the capacity of LCPCs to carry out their mandates and have made the LCPCs more vigilant about the rights of young people.

In the absence of fully functioning LCPCs—particularly in Metro Manila communities not covered by the Country Program for Children—*barangay* officials, such as the chair, councillor for peace and order, and community police and security officers, cooperate to achieve a trouble- and violence-free community. They handle cases of abuse and violence among women and children, in collaboration with DSWD, the national police, and other concerned government agencies; mediate gang wars and monitor drug-related activities; apprehend drug users and pushers; and send youth offenders to rehabilitation centers. At some sites, special bodies were formed to address the protection needs of vulnerable groups, such as the *barangay* family council and *barangay* family welfare committee in two Quezon City barangays. Other local governments seek to clear the communities of drug users and gangs by organizing or sponsoring seminars on drug abuse.

Youth seem unfamiliar with the LCPC but are aware of activities to ensure peace and order in their communities. However, they find these initiatives ineffective, claiming that *barangay* officials themselves are abusive and corrupt and are bent on apprehending child workers instead of drug users or pushers, thieves, and troublemakers. Some even accuse *barangay* officials of selling the drugs they have confiscated, beating young offenders, and soliciting bribes. The very few honest officials, says a female out-of-school youth, seem resigned about the problems with youth in the community, because youth continue to engage in drug abuse, theft, and gang wars despite repeated apprehensions. Young people from Sasa (Davao City) and Payatas (Quezon City) share:

The *barangay tanod* [community police] arrest youth who are found roaming the streets late at night. Young people are prohibited from going out of their homes beyond curfew hours to avoid fistfights.One time, our gang approached them [a rival gang], but it turned out later that we were the ones at fault. They [the rival gang] returned with their parents who were *barangay* officials. Outright, we were at the losing end. What we did, having no choice, was fight back.

They [referring to *barangay* security development officers, or BSDOs] are troublemakers. They apprehend child scavengers at the dumpsite

instead of those using or pushing drugs. If you have a decent work, like scavenging, they arrest you; if you have an illegal job, that is the time they do not apprehend. The BSDOs warn youth scavengers who jump on passing garbage trucks to collect garbage, but ignore those who steal. Scavengers are all they see; they do not look for the thieves because they are too lazy to run after them. Really, they do their work, but out of 100 percent, perhaps only 10 percent.

## Work and Livelihood

Because of extreme poverty, some youth are forced to quit school and work.[xii] The younger ones take on lighter jobs, such as washing meat trays or selling vegetables and bananas in the market, washing cars in the airport, or collecting used plastic, bottles, and other recyclable items from the dumpsite and selling them to scrap dealers. When they get older,[xiii] they assume heavier jobs, like delivering goods to the market, watching over food stalls at the dumpsite, waiting on tables in small eateries or restaurants, and scavenging. They seem to have accepted their fate; as one female in-school youth in BASECO (Manila) notes:

Because they were unable to finish school, they are limited to these types of work.

A quick appraisal done by the Child-Friendly Cities (CFC) project team in selected communities in Manila[xiv] found that the skills of a majority of informal settlers are limited to carpentry, sewing, cooking, and driving. A larger number have no particular skills, physical labor thus being their only option. To address this, government offers occasional livelihood and skills training to out-of-school youth and unskilled residents in BASECO, such as strawflower and hollow block making. Some youth who have undergone the training are reported to earn P 150 ($2.78) daily. In another government project, DILG's Linis Barangay (cleanliness project), a number of youth 16 to 30 years of age received P 250 ($4.63) a day for participating in the project. In Barangay Sasa (Davao City), the City Social Services and Development Office (CSSDO) organized skills training for out-of-school youth so they could engage in livelihood-producing activities. The CSSDO likewise provided job placement support. An out-of-school youth notes, however:

Before, the Pag Asa Youth Association [working youth group] conducted a series of training in basic carpentry, electronics, and drainage

maintenance for boys, and dressmaking, culinary arts, and handicraft [making simple Christmas decorations] for girls. We were happy and grateful, for these opportunities have helped us apply our learning at home. Unfortunately, the CSSDO cannot help us find jobs easily because those who have acquired formal education are favored [by employers].

City employment managers[xv] in Pasay and Manila raise the same problem facing many out-of-work and out-of-school youth. Employers, they say, prefer at least high school graduates,[xvi] younger applicants (18 to 25 years of age for a popular department store; 30 for factories), and people with pleasing personalities.[xvii] Although some employers hire applicants who did not finish high school, they give them shorter work contracts of six months to avoid paying social security benefits.

Government-sponsored job fairs have generated employment for only a few residents in urban poor settlements because most applicants did not meet the requirements of prospective employers, usually in food and sales establishments.

To prepare out-of-school and out-of-work youth for the job market, the government needs to allocate more funds for their skills training, give them access to seed capital to start their own businesses, and provide incentives for greater private-sector participation. The Pasay City Government, in collaboration with the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA),[xviii] is proposing a training, placement, and livelihood consortium program for unemployed residents, including out-of-school youth, women, and persons with disabilities. A similar initiative is the "Kasama Ka, Kabataan!" ("We are with You, Young People!"), an employment program of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). This is intended to provide out-of-work and out-of-school youth with "productive and sustainable jobs and livelihood alternatives through training, entrepreneurship and wage employment."[xix] Pilot sites of the program include Metro Manila. Another DOLE project involves the formation of working youth organizations to undergo skills and livelihood training.

Kabataan 2000 (Youth 2000), another government initiative, is a year-round multisectoral youth work program that encourages youth (in school, out of school, working, and special youth) to engage in constructive and productive activities. Some of its programs that target out-of-school youth and indigent students are listed in table 2.

**Table 2. Selected Kabataan 2000 Programs**

| Name of Program, Lead Agency | Objective and Nature of Program |
|---|---|
| Special Program for Employment of Students, Department of Labor and Employment | Aims to help poor but deserving students and out-of-school youth pursue their education by encouraging their employment during summer or Christmas vacation. |
| Government Internship Program, National Youth Commission | Out-of-school youth and vocational, secondary, and college students are employed in government agencies for two to three months. |
| Youth in Infrastructure Development, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) | Out-of-school youth and technical and vocational students are given priority in hiring labor for infrastructure projects. |
| Immersion and Outreach Program, Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) | Volunteer out-of-school youth are assigned to depressed areas or institutions to assist in organizing youth groups and conducting capability building and other sociocultural activities. |
| Youth Action for Sustainable Development/Department of Education | Students and out-of-school youth are exposed to entrepreneurship, cooperativism, science, culture, and arts in their own communities. |
| Weekend Youth Brigade, DPWH and DSWD | Youth groups undertake community projects, such as cleanliness and street maintenance. |

## Participation

Some of the projects mentioned above provide venues for youth participation, such as Youth Action for Sustainable Development, the Immersion and Outreach Program, and the Weekend Youth Brigade. Of these, the Weekend Youth Brigade is the most popular in the communities, followed by sportsfests, dances, and fiesta activities (celebration of the feast day of the community's patron saint). For young people, the basketball court, billiard hall, and video arcade are the most significant features of their communities. The local youth council, SK, does not seem popular among out-of-school youth, who claim to be unaware of its projects or who perceive SK leaders as weak. Compared with out-of-school youth, in-school youth register higher participation in community activities, such as family planning and drug prevention seminars, and church-based and SK projects.

With the assistance of NGOs and church-based organizations, youth groups have become more creative and active in planning and implementing projects to address the concerns of their constituents. Energetic and confident youth groups that plan, direct, and evaluate their own projects form partnerships with the *barangay* to carry out community development activities. In one *barangay* in Pasay City, LCPC youth have managed to mobilize the participation of young people in the *barangay*, including members of gangs and fraternities.

This situation largely accounts for the dissolution of gangs and fraternities in the area, and it has promoted a spirit of cooperation and a sense of community among youth. *Barangay* and youth officials do not take sole credit for this, because they recognize the major contribution of NGOs to developing the skills of the youth through training and seminars. Some youngsters have become street educators, roaming the city streets at night to give information and educational materials on sexually transmitted diseases to commercial sex workers, especially those 16 years of age and younger. Others serve as junior health workers providing first aid to street children.

It is also important to note here the experience of the city government of Naga, which tapped youth volunteers to help institutionalize the productivity of city personnel, resulting in a remarkable increase in revenue collection—almost 200 percent within a seven-year period.[xx] These young volunteers, who were handpicked by the mayor from the city's Summer Youth Program, headed most of the programs.

## Conclusions

Government efforts to improve the conditions of marginalized young people are wanting. Structures of government (city, *barangay*, including the local council for the protection of children and the local youth council) are not able to respond or address fully the concerns of youth, especially marginalized groups. The absence of a reliable and disaggregated youth database, inadequate social services, and unsafe environments, among others, are indicative.

Scholarships and other forms of educational assistance are not enough, because youth have problems other than financial ones, such as broken homes and chaotic neighborhoods, that hinder them from completing their education. Government officials are perceived as insensitive and generally unsupportive or as preoccupied with politicking. It is not surprising,

then, to hear young people, looking ahead, say that they do not pin their hopes on government, for not even their present concerns are adequately addressed—how much more their future! They would rather rely on their own capabilities, with the assistance of their families and relatives, to fulfill their dreams, whether big or small. Feelings of disappointment and mistrust in *barangay* or city government officials prevail among youth, who seeing see the officials as uncaring and having no initiative to improve their conditions. Youth council members contend that their projects are dependent on allocations from local governments, which in turn seem to prefer infrastructure projects to strengthening basic social services for youth.[xxi] They have kinder words for civil society groups that impart to them values of discipline, hard work, and community partnerships.

Youth believe that government should strengthen its initiatives on health and education while they are young. Safe motherhood programs, for instance, will ensure the sound health of children at the moment of their conception. The establishment of health posts in remote areas will enable the most depressed communities to obtain basic health services. The provision of good-quality education in public schools will develop in the children the necessary life skills and increase their chances of finding employment later on. Increasing the number of public schools will also allow more children access to education.

The youth also call on the *barangay* to unite the community, and on the youth council to unite all gangs and involve them in project planning and decision making. They seek constructive activities to steer them away from drug abuse and other types of destructive behavior. Communities with active youth groups that work in partnership with other stakeholders (government organizations, NGOs, private, church, business, and academe) are more able to sustain activities and projects.

Listening to the voices of young people and understanding the lives they live, the researcher makes the following recommendations to government:

- Establish a community-based database system that distinguishes and includes various youth subgroups, because this will aid program planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. Gender disaggregation by age is also imperative.
- Improve the quality of education and skills training, especially for young people, to match community skills to the labor market, and

develop a culture of youth entrepreneurship. This pertains specifically to the significant youth subgroup of 1.7 million that is neither working nor studying.
- Increase the awareness and commitment of local officials to youth concerns through advocacy and training.
- Strengthen youth councils through leadership training, and design new ways of engaging young people in community development (see the Naga City experience).
- Establish linkages with civil society groups for a more efficient and coordinated planning and implementation of youth programs.
- Tap the knowledge of young people and listen to their voices, especially the vulnerable subgroups of out-of-school and non-working youth.

## Postscript

- Youth leaders express the same concerns as the above, as follows:[xxii]
- Map out what needs to be done, such as formulating a clear framework for youth development.
- Define "youth."
- Generate comprehensive data on the situation of the youth.
- Develop programs to address the needs of specific youth subgroups.
- Improve program coordination and complementation.
- Enhance capacities of local governments.
- Implement youth protection laws.
- Strengthen mechanisms for youth representation and participation.

For its part, the National Youth Commission hopes to address some of these concerns through the activities planned for 2003,[xxiii] namely: rationalize youth-related programs and projects implemented by various government agencies; synchronize the same with the Philippine Medium-Term Youth Development Plan (MTYDP); carry out preparatory activities for the updating of the Philippine Youth Situationer; draft the next MTYDP framework (2005–9); lobby for the passage of youth-related bills in Congress; operationalize policy recommendations of the Fourth National Youth Parliament; and improve the Commission's organizational capability.

Given these plans and directions of the government, one wonders how the young people in BASECO, Payatas, and Sasa would react. To find out, ask them!

## References

i. Research talks with the Institute of Philippine Culture were initiated by UNICEF/Innocenti Research Centre (IRC)–Florence and supported by UNICEF–New York and UNICEF–Manila Country Office, which together with the Philippine government is implementing the Fifth Country Program for Children (CPC V). UNICEF–IRC contracted IPC to conduct the CFC study covering 4 communities for the case study phase and 27 for the quick appraisal phase in five major cities of the Philippines (Cebu, Davao, Manila, Pasay, and Quezon Cities). Dr. Mary Racelis and Angela Desiree Aguirre co-directed the CFC research. Their research partners in IPC consisted of Eunice Anne M. Enriquez, Careza P. Reyes, and Liane Peña-Alampay, Ph.D. (Psychologist-Consultant), who comprised the Metro Manila research team, and Teresa B. Fernandez of Lihok Pilipina Foundation, Inc.. and Dr. Felisa U. Etemadi in Cebu City, and in Davao City, the Social Research, Training and Development Office of the Ateneo de Davao University (represented by Rosemarie Fernandez and Jerome Serrano). Interviews, focus group discussions, and secondary data review were the major data-gathering tools used for this study. To generate information on government's employment strategies and programs, additional interviews and secondary data review were carried out.

ii. The local government of Manila declared BASECO a CPC expansion site only in April 2002.

iii. The company provides employment to many BASECO residents.

iv. Republic Act 8044 of 1994 (or the Youth in Nation Building Act) defines the youth as those 15 to 30 years of age. However, government agencies have their own age group targets, depending on the needs of their youth clientele, for example, 7–18 years for DepEd and DSWD; 10–24 for the Department of Health; and 15–24 for DOLE. Refer to the Pambansang Ugong ng Kabataan (National Voices of the Youth), Department of Social Welfare and Development.

v. *Child Awake* 9, no. 9 (April–June 2002).

vi. A Central Luzon youth leader and elected Sectoral Council member of the Youth and Students Basic Sector of the National Anti-Poverty Commission presented a national youth situationer during a National Workshop for Presidents and Officers of Youth Associations organized by the Philippine Office of the Christian Children's Fund in May 2002.

vii. This research project is partly informed by the method known as "Participatory Poverty Assessment," which seeks to understand poverty from the perspectives of

a wide range of stakeholders—most important, the poor people themselves (see Deepa Narayan, with Raj Patel, Kai Schafft, Anne Rademacher and Sarah Koch-Schulte, eds., *Voices of the Poor: Can Anyone Hear Us?* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

viii. Based on the two CFC case studies, "Expanding the Child Friendly Movement in Barangay BASECO, City of Manila," and "Listening to the Voices of Young People: A Case of the Child Friendly Movement in Barangay Sasa, Davao City."

ix. The passage of the Local Government Code (LGC) in 1991 allowed for the devolution of functions, personnel, financial resources, and control over these to local government authorities.

x. Article 87 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code provides for the creation of the Local Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC). The LCPC is a multisectoral group led by the *barangay* chair or an NGO representative. Its members include the head of the youth council (vice chair); representatives from the municipal or city government, NGOs working to promote the welfare of children and youth in the *barangay*, people's organizations, Department of Education, Department of Health, and Human Rights Group; and a child advocate (9 to 14 years of age) elected by the community and designated by *barangay* officials. Other members may be appointed to the council if necessary.

xi. *Bontog* are girl prostitutes between the ages of 8 and 18 years who render sexual services for a fee, or for free. They are mostly users of prohibited drugs and substances like *rugby* (a strong compound with an addictive scent).

xii. This subsection is partly based on a review of secondary materials and interviews with city officials.

xiii. In 2002, youth age 15 to 24 years made up one-fourth of the total labor force, and almost half of the unemployed. More than half of them were males (58 percent) and were found in urban centers (62 percent). Out-of-school youth age 15 to 24 years totaled 1.4 million, mostly females (85 percent; see *LabStat Updates*, Bureau of Labor and Employment Statistics, January 2003; and also the "*Kasama Ka, Kabataan!*" brochure).

xiv. The first phase of the Institute of Philippine Culture's CFC project was a quick appraisal of the situation of children and youth in selected urban poor communities in the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Cebu, and Davao.

xv. The city employment manager heads the city's Public Employment Service Office (PESO), which provides job referrals to residents, including the youth. In 2002, fewer than half of the persons referred by PESOs in Manila, Pasay, and Quezon cities were offered work or placed in business firms.

xvi. The employment manager in Pasay City notes the case of some working students who, by the time they graduate from college, are already past the age requirement (usually 25 years) of private employers.

xvii. According to city employment managers, employers react differently to people residing in urban poor settlements, like Smokey Mountain, Payatas, and BASECO.

xviii. TESDA is the government's lead agency that promotes and strengthens the quality of technical education and skill development programs aimed at attaining international competitiveness.

xix. This is taken from the DOLE brochure on Emergency Employment Program for Out-of-Work/Out-of-School Youths.

xx. This was obtained from "Energizing the Bureaucracy: Naga City's Productivity Improvement Program" in *Kaban Galing: The Philippine Case Bank on Innovation and Exemplary Practices in Local Governance, Volume 5. Promoting Excellence in Urban* [Quezon City]: Galing Pook Foundation, 2001.

xxi. A city youth adviser notes how some private contractors "initiate" youth officials to corruption by way of infrastructure projects.

xxii. A Central Luzon youth leader and elected Sectoral Council members of the Youth and Students Basic Sector of the National Anti Poverty Commission presented a national youth situationer during the National Workshop for Presidents and Officers of Youth Associations in May 2002, which was organized by the Philippine Office of the Christian Children's Fund.

xxiii. The National Youth Commission, established through Republic Act 8044 of 1994 (or the Youth in Nation Building Act), is the government's policymaking and coordinating body for youth development. It is an autonomous agency under the Office of the President. It has formulated a national comprehensive and coordinated program for youth development, the Philippine Medium-Term Youth Development Plan (1999–2004), which serves as the government's blue print for addressing youth concerns. This five-year plan espouses the same goals as the Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan: poverty alleviation, employment generation, promotion of social justice and equality, and sustainable economic growth.

APPENDIX A

# Government Programs to Improve the Life Prospects of Youth

PRATEEP UNGSONGTHAM HATA
*Senate of Thailand*

It is good to have this opportunity to comment on government programs to improve the life prospects of youth. My background is in the nongovernmental sector. I started with a school underneath my parents' house when I was still a teenager. Since then, I have been working with urban poor on poverty alleviation, community development, and helping children. More recently, three years ago, I became a member of Thailand's first ever elected Senate. In my new role as a senator, I am closer to the workings of government, but I am not involved in party politics on either the government or opposition side. In fact, under the Thai constitution, senators are not allowed to be members of political parties. I hope that my position as a senator, with no party affiliation but with plenty of years of experience of working to help youth, gives me a perspective from which I can give a fair opinion about government programs to improve the life prospects of youth.

Every government has a responsibility to help youth. The teenage years are a vulnerable yet important period in anyone's life. So much of what we achieve as adults depends on how we shape up as teenagers. There are many factors influencing youth. Obviously, families, friends, and places of education play important roles in how youth develop. Governments have a vital role to play in supporting this process, so that young people can move forward into adulthood with positive prospects.

It is worth reminding ourselves that in talking about youth, we are talking about a large number of people. According to Thai government statistics, more than 52 percent of the population are under the age of 25 years.

In Thailand, since 1997, we have had a new Constitution. This was the first Thai Constitution to be drafted by the people, after the election of a constitutional drafting assembly and a wide consultation process with the general public. Several articles of the Constitution are concerned with youth development. Because the Constitution is the basis for the government, it is important to consider what it says about young people.

Chapter 3 of the Constitution is about the rights and liberties of the Thai people. Section 43 states that "A person shall enjoy an equal right to receive the fundamental education for the duration of not less than twelve years." Section 51 bans forced labor. Section 53 states that "children, youth and family members shall have the right to be protected by the State against violence and unfair treatment."

Chapter 5 of the Constitution is titled "Directive Principles of Fundamental State Policies." In this chapter, section 80 states: "The State shall protect and develop children and the youth, promote the equality between women and men, and create, reinforce and develop family integrity and the strength of communities." Article 28 of the Constitution provides that a person can invoke the provisions of the Constitution to bring a lawsuit or to defend oneself in court.

Three ministries of the Thai government have a major role in the welfare of youth: the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Public Health, and the new Ministry of Social Development and Human Security. According to the United Nations Development Program, the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security, which came into being in October 2002, is the first such initiative in the world. The ministry serves to coordinate social development and to ensure the social security of the people.

Under this newly established ministry, the Office of Welfare Promotion and Protection of Children, Youth, the Vulnerable, the Disabled, and the Elderly was set up to promote and protect the rights and welfare of vulnerable people, including youth. The office was transformed from the National Youth Bureau, formerly under the Office of the Prime Minister. The office promotes and protects children's welfare and rights.

The former National Youth Bureau, now the new Office of Welfare Promotion, cooperates closely with the National Council for Child and Youth Development. This organization was established in 1985 as a link between the government and nongovernmental sector. The council coordinates efforts between the Thai government and nongovernmental

organizations (NGOs) in support of the nation's children and youth. The council is composed of 65 children's and youth organizations from throughout the country and is recognized by both the government and the private sector as the official national coordinating body for child and youth development efforts.

The main functions of the National Youth Council are to be a center for coordination, of private organizations in policies, plans, and projects on child and youth development; to be the center for the collection of data on child and youth development; and to be the center for the promotion and support of child and youth development operations.

Under the law and the Constitution of Thailand, and also as a party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Thai government is committed to maintaining high standards in child and youth development. However, the reality is that there are many problems in the implementation of policies. Also, as in other countries, young people are faced with new threats in their rights to welfare and development.

Under the new Constitution, all Thai children should be guaranteed 12 years of free education. The reality is, however, that about 4 million out of 18 million children who should be in school or in higher education institutions are not studying at all. Where the youngsters are in school, the resources and the teaching offered are often woefully inadequate, especially in rural areas. Fifty children in one class is common, and many schools lack sufficient desks, books, or writing materials. In isolated areas, there are often chronic teacher shortages, with possibly one teacher looking after a whole school with 100 children. Even in Bangkok, there is a shortage of places in schools for children, who according to the law should be learning rather than working or hanging around on the streets.

There are also many problems faced by children and youths from minority groups. Hill-tribe youngsters are often denied access to education, as are the sons and daughters of migrants. Thailand is also a center for trafficking in young people. Thailand is a country from which young people are trafficked and to which they are trafficked, and it is also a transit country. Recently, there have been accusations from foreign agencies that the Thai government is not doing enough to cut down on human trafficking.

There are many other children in difficult circumstances. There include the disabled, street children, child laborers (including sex workers), orphans, victims of abuse, slum children, children with AIDS, chil-

dren growing up on construction sites, children who are addicted to narcotic substances, children in detention centers, and other young people growing up in a society that does not give them a fair chance.

The number of children in disadvantaged circumstances is significant. For example, government figures state that there are 70,000 child sex workers in Thailand. More than 250,000 children have AIDS, and 50,000 have already died prematurely because of it. In total, the Thai government estimates that about 4 million children and youth are underprivileged.

How has it come about that so many young people are in disadvantaged circumstances? For me, a number of factors have led to this situation. Most crucial is the role of the family. Parents and the extended family should be the main positive influence on our youngsters. However, these days many parents do not devote sufficient time to their children. The emphasis on material goods means that parents are often working long hours, The rising divorce rate, something which has changed considerably in Thailand in recent times, means that children are increasingly growing up with one parent who is struggling to cope, or with a stepparent who does not care for the partner's offspring. In Thailand, we have a situation where children are often living with grandparents in the countryside while the parents are working in the cities. Parents might only see their children once or twice a year. The elderly grandparents who look after the children are not able to provide active care, so children suffer from neglect. There is a vicious circle, whereby children who grow up without good parental control are more likely to become parents at a young age, while they are still youth themselves. The young parents are not mature enough emotionally to look after children and lack the financial resources, so the problems are carried forward to the next generation.

There are also problems with the type of education we give our young people. Our educational system, with its traditional emphasis on rote learning, does not encourage the development of leadership skills, does not motivate youngsters to analyze and solve problems, and does not encourage young people to become risk takers. There are intentions to change the system of education in this country, but the top-down approach and the resistance to change of many teachers are hindering progress.

The government channels insufficient resources to help children in disadvantaged circumstances. Much of the Education Ministry budget is spent on bureaucracy and material items, rather than where it is really

needed in supporting the teachers who are working in the classrooms. Of the annual total education budget of 141 billion baht, just under 3 percent goes specifically to problem children and just over 1 percent goes to exceptionally talented children.

There is an active network of NGOs working to help children, yet the government provides only small funds to help NGOs with their work; in total, the amount is less than 100 million baht. I would welcome greater flexibility in the system of care for disadvantaged young people. In particular, I would welcome the involvement of temples, mosques, and other religious centers. There are about 30,000 temples with about 300,000 monks in the country. This is a resource that could help children with difficulties much more than is now the case. For example, children from the street could be encouraged to live at temples, and the temples could receive money from the government for their child care role.

Not everything is bleak when we look at the government's record in programs to improve the life prospects of youths. In recent times, there has been a greater understanding that detention centers are the wrong places to put youngsters who have got in trouble with the law. The emphasis until recently has been on punishment rather than rehabilitation. There is a change of thinking now, and it is a change that cannot have come too soon.

In Thailand, we see a Constitution that promises much. Now is the time to get all the sectors of society, and especially the government and NGOs, cooperating to ensure that the Constitution is not merely fine words on paper but truly results in all young people having equal opportunity.

# APPENDIX B

## The Children of Klong Toey

**A Story from Father Joseph Maier**[1]
***Human Development Foundation***

At the conference, Father Maier related The Human Development Foundation,[1] main difficulties in Thailand by describing the experiences of a six young boys who were exploited by their families, neighbors, and ultimately two European men. These boys, between the ages of 8 and 14, were living on the streets of Klong Toey, Bangkok, when they were introduced to two European men by a local man, for whom they did odd jobs. The men gave the boys money, pizza, hamburgers and clothing, and told them that they loved them.

Not long after the boys' first encounter, police in the Europeans' home country discovered a website created by the men, which contained explicit photos of the boys. In order to effectively prosecute the men, the police contacted the Thai Police, who asked Father Maier's group to assist them in their investigation. One of the boys was recognized and the two men were arrested. The Human Development Foundation took custody of the boys, as their parents had likely taken money from the men as well, and shuttled them to court the next two days to testify. The first two boys were questioned multiple times by the judge and a social worker from noon until midnight. The other boys were questioned in a similar fashion a week later.

This undertaking itself was full of difficult questions and, occasionally, difficult answers. One of the boys said he still loved the men, because they bought him clothes and food, and never were verbally abusive, unlike his parents.

As for the men, they were unrepentant, citing various laws and loopholes which they intended to exploit. According to Father Maier, pedophiles of this type are usually released after paying a large "bail."

[1] Prepared by Lisa M. Hanley

They then disappear, leaving the social workers, judges, and others to represent and interview nearly 200 children in similar situations every month in Bangkok.

The major concern is few sexually exploited children are able to move on with their lives, as most slip back into old patterns of abuse. This is, in many ways, due to a lack of monetary penalty against pedophiles which benefits their victims. The main problem for The Human Development Foundation encounters is the children's overall lack civil registry documents, which prevents children from enrolling them in schools, receiving hospital care, or any access to public services. This effectively keeps them out of the government's sight or care, rendering many statistics less meaningful. In order to help exploited and poor children, governments need to make identity documents more accessible and listen to the stories that organizations like the Human Development Foundation tell of the poor. Father Maeir concludes, "…for every good slum story, maybe for every five good stories about a kid getting out of the muck, about a family pulling together and surviving through hardships, about a community banding together and standing up for what is rightly theirs, we have a story like this one,…a story that makes you wonder how these kids are going to get over this."

# APPENDIX C

## Youth, Poverty, and Conflict in Southeaster Asian Cities

*Organized by*
The Comparative Urban Studies Project (CUSP) of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (WWICS), Washington, D.C., USA, and the Urban Management Centre/UEM Field of Study, Asian Institute of Technology (AIT), Thailand, at Bangkok, Thailand.

**8–9 APRIL 2003**

**TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 2003**

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| **8:30–9:00** | **Registration** |
| **9:00–9:30** | **Inauguration and Welcome**<br>Prof. Mario Tabucanon, Provost, Asian Institute of Technology |
| **9:40** | **Panel I: Urban Conditions and Conflict in Southeast Asian Cities**<br>Peter Xenos, East-West Center<br>Yap Kioe Sheng, UNESCAP |
| **10:25–10:45** | Open Forum-questions and/or reactions by conference participants to preceding speakers<br><br>Chair: Diana Varat, Woodrow Wilson Center |
| **10:45–11:00** | **Coffee** |

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| | **Panel II: The Current State of Youth, Poverty, and Conflict in Southeast Asia**<br>Indonesia: Budhy Soegijoko Tjahjati, URDI<br>Thailand: Vitit Muntarborn, Chulalongkorn University<br>Philippines: Amina Rasul, Magbassa Kita Foundation |
| **12:10–12:30** | Open Forum<br>Chair: Dr. Ranjith Perera, UMC/UEM Field of Study |
| **12:30** | **Luncheon** |
| **1:30** | **Panel III: Civil Society Responses to Youth, Poverty, and Conflict**<br>Indonesia: Teti Argo, Bandung Institute of Technology<br>Thailand: Fr. Joseph Maier, Human Development Foundation<br>Philippines: Felicitas Rixhon, Consuelo Foundation |
| **2:40–3:00** | Open Forum |
| **3:00–3:15** | Setting up of groups for afternoon session<br>Chair: Dr. Edsel Sajor, UEM Field of Study |
| **3:15–3:30** | **Coffee Break** |
| **3:30–4.30** | Discussion Groups |
| **4:30–5:00** | **Plenary**<br>Chair: Diana Varat, Woodrow Wilson Center |
| **7.00 p.m.** | Reception and Dinner |

**WEDNESDAY APRIL 9, 2003**

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| **9:30–9:45** | **Welcome:** Prof. Gothom Arya , Registrar, AIT<br>**Special Speaker session: Dr. Bhichit Rattakul (Former Governor of Bangkok)** |

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| **10:15–10.30** | Open Forum<br>Chair: Aprodicio Laquian, Woodrow Wilson Center |
| **10:30–11:00** | **Coffee** |
| **11:00–12.10** | **Panel IV: Government Responses to Youth, Poverty, and Conflict**<br>Indonesia: Bakti Setiawan, Gadjah Mada University<br>Thailand: Prateep Ungsongtham Hata, Duang Prateep Foundation<br>Philippines: Angela Desiree M. Aguirre, Ateneo de Manila University |
| **12:10–12:30** | Open Forum<br>Chair: Amy McCreedy, Woodrow Wilson Center |
| **12:30** | **Luncheon** |
| **1:00–1:45** | **Panel V: Strategies and Opportunities for partnerships with International Donors to address Youth, Poverty and Conflict**<br>ESCAP:Asa Jonnson<br>UNFPA: Pornchai Suchitta<br>UNICEF:Gamini Abeysekera |
| **1:45–2:00** | Questions<br>Chair: Radhika Savant Mohit, UMC |
| **2:00–2:15** | **Coffee** |
| **2:15–3:00** | UMP-Asia: Nathaniel von Einsiedel<br>UN-HABITAT: Sabine Ravestijn (Safer Cities Program)<br>ILO: Sarah Spant |
| **3:00–3:15** | Questions |

**3:15–3:30** **Plenary & Final Remarks**
Chair: Diana Varat, Woodrow Wilson Center

**3:30** **Adjournment**

# CONTRIBUTORS

**Angela Desiree Aguirre** is a research associate of the Institute of Philippine Culture, a social science research and training organization of the Ateneo de Manila University, which is where she obtained her masters degree in Social Development. In addition to children and youth studies, she has been involved in the research of people-centered health, agrarian reform, and natural resource management.

**Prateep Ungsongtham Hata** has spent 35 years fighting for the rights of poor children in Thailand. She is not only a senator, but also serves as Secretary General of the Duang Prateep Foundation, a nonprofit that she founded in 1978, which provides assistance to schools and children throughout Thailand and addresses the problems of poverty and deprivation in slum communities. Prateep Ungsongtham Hata is an internationally recognized child advocate.

**Lisa M. Hanley** is project associate at the Comparative Urban Studies Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. She holds a M.A. from the University of Texas at Austin and a B.A. from George Washington University. Her research interests include the Andes, urbanization, migration, identity, and Quichua language and culture. She has conducted fieldwork in Ecuador and was a recipient of a Ford Foundation Area Studies grant and a Tinker Foundation grant. Prior to joining the Wilson Center she was a Peace Corps volunteer in Guatemala, working on municipal development, and Assistant Director of the Bretton Woods Committee in Washington DC.

**Father Joseph Maier,** C. Ss.R., has lived among the poor in Thailand and Laos since 1967. He settled in Bangkok in the early '70s, where he served as the priest to a small Catholic parish in the slaughterhouse neighborhood of Klong Toey. He started the Human Development Foundation for his poor neighbors of all religions. He holds advanced degrees in Theological Studies and Urban Planning as well as an honorary doctorate in Social Administration from Thammasart University. He is also the

recipient of the Most Noble Order of the Crown of Thailand, the Koman Kim Tong Foundation Award, and the Bangkok Community Service Award for outstanding citizenship. Father Joe still lives in Klong Toey where his work first began.

**Felicitas C. Rixhon** has been the Executive Director of the Consuelo Foundation (formerly *Children and Youth Foundation of the Philippines*) since July 1995. She established the sustainability program for CFI partners and guided the development and implementation of a project that addresses problems of out of school children and youth, among others. Her international involvement includes being a Senior Fellow of the Synergos Institute and member of the Advisory Committee of International Youth Foundation Partners' Network. She is also a member of the Executive Committee of the International Forum for Child Welfare, which exists to improve the welfare of children, and to advocate for the full implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. Locally, she serves in the board of the Association of Foundations, the Philippine Council for NGO Certification, Tuloy Foundation Inc., and Child and Family Service Philippines, Inc. Ms. Rixhon holds a Bachelor of Literature in Journalism from the University of Santo Tomas and a Master of Arts in Communication from the Ateneo de Manila University. Her areas of expertise include development planning, children and youth programs, and capacity building of not-for profit organizations.

**Blair A. Ruble** is currently Director of the Kennan Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, in Washington, D.C., where is also serves as a Co-Director of the Comparative Urban Studies Project. He received his M.A. and Ph.D degrees in Political Science from the University of Toronto (1973, 1977), and an A.B. degree with Highest Honors in Political Science from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (1971). He has edited a dozen volumes, and is the author of four monographic studies. His book-length works include a trilogy examining the fate of Russian provincial cities during the twentieth century: *Leningrad. Shaping a Soviet City* (1990); *Money Sings! The Changing Politics of Urban Space in the Post-Soviet Yaroslavl* (1995); and *Second Metropolis: Pragmatic Pluralism in Gilded Age Chicago, Silver Age Moscow, and Meiji Osaka* (2001). A native of New York, Dr. Ruble

worked previously at the Social Science Research Council in New York City (1985–1989) and the National Council for Soviet and East European Research (1982–1985).

**Yap Kioe Sheng** is the Chief of the Poverty Reduction Section, Poverty and Development Division, of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP). Before joining ESCAP, he was Professor of Housing and Urban Development at the Asian Institute of Technology and a staff member of the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat) in Nairobi.

**Joseph S. Tulchin** is the Director of the Latin American Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, in Washington, D.C., where he also serves as a Co-Director of the Comparative Urban Studies Project. The Wilson Center is the preeminent nonpartisan forum in Washington, D.C. bringing together the realms of scholarship and public affairs. As Director, he coordinates research on and public discussion of issues of concern to Latin America and promotes the exchange of ideas among persons from governments, international organizations, the media, business, labor, foundations, churches, and the academic world. Dr. Tulchin is an active and prominent Latin Americanist. He was Associate Editor and then Editor of the *Latin American Research Review*. He served on the Program Committee of the Latin American Studies Association, and on several national committees of that association and the Conference on Latin American History. Before moving to Washington, Tulchin was Professor of History and Director of International Programs at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He taught at UNC for twenty years and at Yale University before that for seven years. His areas of expertise are U.S. foreign policy, inter-American relations, contemporary Latin America, strategic planning and social science research methodology. Tulchin holds the B.A. degree, magna cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa from Amherst College. He read History at Peterhouse, Cambridge before attending Harvard University where he completed his Ph. D in History in 1965.

**Peter Xenos** is a Senior Fellow at the East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii, in Population and Health Studies and a member of the Affiliate

Graduate Faculty at the University of Hawaii. Dr. Xenos has focused in recent years on a program of research into the living conditions, problems, behaviors and contribution to development of youth in Asian societies. Against the background of a rapidly changing social demography of youth, he has focused on issues relating to the emergence of adolescence as a social condition and stage of life, on the policy-recognition of this emergence, and particularly on topics relating to the rise of pre-marital sexuality and other forms of youth risk-taking behavior. This interest has been pursued through a series of survey research activities in Asia, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam and Nepal. These research activities have involved a network of Asian and U.S. investigators into youth reproductive health issues and has generated many lessons, both positive and negative, that are being codified and disseminated to other researchers through workshops. Prominent among these are workshops in the Summer Seminar on Population, which is sponsored annually by Population and Health Studies at the East-West Center. Since 1995, Dr. Xenos has been the overall Coordinator of the Summer Seminar on Population.

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