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A SURVEY of the *Release State opinion* MAJOR POLICE FORCES of ARGENTINA

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

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Auth.: E.O. 12958, Sec. 1.2, Sec. 3.1-8.

USAID/MIA/ISS by: *FWS* Date: *5/1/98*

SECTION IV Program Recommendations to the United States Government

February 1966

OFFICE OF PUBLIC SAFETY
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D.C.

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SECTION IV

SURVEY

OF

MAJOR POLICE FORCES

OF

ARGENTINA

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SECTION IV

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FOREWORD

This survey of the major police forces of Argentina was conducted by the Office of Public Safety of the Agency for International Development of the United States Government, at the request of the Ministers of Defense and Interior of the Argentine Government. Local arrangements for the survey were completed through the U.S. Embassy and USAID Mission in Argentina.

Field work on the survey was started in Argentina by the Survey team on October 10, 1965 and completed December 22, 1965.

The information contained herein was obtained as a result of extensive studies and field observations of the respective police forces, plus discussions with their officers and men and with various governmental officials, military personnel, representatives of the U.S. Embassy and USAID Mission in Argentina. This information is for the official use of the governments concerned in determining the feasibility of developing a joint police assistance program.

The survey is not intended to be critical of any person or group, but, rather, to be a factual statement of existing police problems and recommendations for their solution. The Survey Team regrets that the time available for this survey was not sufficient to deal in depth with the many problems and needs of the various police forces. It was only possible to cover the high points of each force and to limit recommendations to the most urgent problems.

All of the information in this report has been thoroughly checked. However, with the many complexities of police operations, the broad scope of the survey, language and translation difficulties, it is possible that certain mistakes may exist. For these, the Survey Team accepts full responsibility and hopes that they cause no serious difficulties or misunderstandings.

Sincere appreciation is expressed to the many persons who assisted in the conduct of the survey and who helped to make the Survey Team's stay in Argentina more enjoyable. These include the officers and men of the respective police forces, officials of the Argentine Government, the Ambassador and staff of the U.S. Embassy, the Director and staff of the USAID Mission in Buenos Aires, the U.S. Consul in Cordoba and many others.

Appreciation is expressed to Mr. Paul Katz of the Office of Public Safety, AID, Washington, Mr. Herbert Hardin, Chief U.S. Public Safety Advisor in Colombia, Mr. Robert L. Barnes, U.S. Area Public Safety Advisor in Brazil and Mr. Adolph Saenz, Chief U.S. Public Safety Advisor in Uruguay, who came to Argentina and assisted in certain aspects of the survey. Special thanks are expressed to Comandante Hector D. Yemmi of the Gendarmeria, Inspector Hector V. Morel of the Federal Police, Prefecto Nestor Mario Alonzo of the National Maritime Prefecture and Inspector Guillermo Remos Mejia of the Buenos Aires Provincial Police. These officers rendered invaluable service as the liaison representatives of their respective police forces and in many other important respects.

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The members of the Survey Team appreciated the opportunity to participate in this important project and they hope that the survey will be useful in helping to solve the problems toward which it was directed.

JOSEPH L. LINGO, Chief of Survey Team

MARION N. HARDESTY, Associate

January 25, 1966

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INTRODUCTION

Acting on the request of the Government of Argentina, as transmitted to the United States Embassy and AID Mission in Buenos Aires, the Office of Public Safety of AID/Washington recently completed a factual study and report on the major police forces of Argentina. This survey included the Federal Police, The Provincial Police of Buenos Aires, the National Gendarmeria, the National Maritime Prefecture, with incidental comments on other provincial police forces.

The objective of the study was to provide complete and factual information on the organization, training, operations, problems and needs of the Argentine security forces to be used as a basis for recommendations which would help to:

1. Improve police public safety activities and capacities to handle problems of subversion, civil disorder, insurgency and other threats to internal security;
2. Point out any need for additional financial backing of the police by the Argentine Government and to indicate priority problems and needs demanding such support; and
3. Serve as a basis for any potential police assistance program developed in cooperation with the Government of the United States.

The basic survey recommends that a program of police technical assistance and training be agreed upon between the two governments and that limited amounts of modern police equipment be provided to the Argentine police forces. The Survey Team feels that much could be accomplished through such a joint program that would serve, not only to improve safety and security operations in Argentina, but would be extremely important to the security objectives of both governments and to the inter-American collective security system.

Much of the information which follows is supplemental to that contained in the survey previously mentioned. Certain classified information, personal observations and opinions of the Survey Team, and specific suggestions regarding the nature and extent of the joint assistance programs, are included. Also included are the specific conclusions and recommendations regarding each of the Argentine police forces, which the Survey Team feels should be given major consideration in the development and implementation of such a joint police assistance program between the two governments.

It should be pointed out that the basic survey will be made available to the police forces and government officials of Argentina. This report is classified and is only for the use of the United States Government.

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SITUATION SUMMARY IN ARGENTINA

The major police forces of Argentina, while potentially capable of handling problems of public safety and internal security in an effective manner, must be greatly improved if this potential is to be fully realized. This capacity has been allowed to deteriorate in recent years in each of the major forces due to lack of budgetary support by the government, with the resultant low salaries and serious shortages of capable manpower and modern equipment. In the Federal Police, for example, police patrols have been reduced fifty per cent since 1930, while the city's population has more than doubled during the same period.

Other threats to police effectiveness include a cumbersome and bureaucratic legal system and judicial process which tends to favor the criminal rather than the police; a lack of strong and clear legislation, especially with regard to certain federal crimes such as contraband, immigration and internal security matters; governmental influence on police operational and enforcement policies, depending on the current political climate; poor public relations and a lack of information about modern public safety and internal security operations. In other cases, when such information is known, police interest has been lacking because of the unavailability of the facilities and equipment required to implement such projects. Police training has been highly pedantic and academic and not designed to meet the practical needs of the service. Modern visual aids and other teaching equipment are practically non-existent, except a limited amount of such equipment in the National Maritime Prefecture.

While the police forces have, through dedication and improvisation, been able to keep going, they have not been able to even begin to meet their potential capabilities for dealing with current problems of crime and subversion.

As police capacities have deteriorated during recent years, crime rates and internal security problems have been increasing rapidly in all parts of the country. Details on the nature and extent of these problems are contained in the basic study and report.

While no known active insurgency exists in Argentina at present, the experience in the northern province of Salta in 1964 is indicative of what may happen in the future. This incident involved a group of Castro Communists who attempted to establish operations in Salta. The guerrillas were well armed and offered strong resistance when encountered by the Gendarmeria who completely neutralized the subversive group, although one gendarme was killed in the action.

Potential insurgents in the country include such groups as the Castro Communists, the Communist Party, the Revolutionary Peronists and extremists like the Tacuara as well as various rightist groups. Other potential troublemakers include the many Bolivian and Paraguayan exiles and workers in the southeast and the large numbers of illegal aliens from neighboring countries who have settled in the slum areas surrounding Buenos Aires and other large cities.

The Communist Party in Argentina is one of the largest in Latin America with an estimated 60,000 to 70,000 members. Communist activities are well defined and follow the general pattern of infiltration, propaganda, promoting labor and student

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unrest, and provoking violence when and where suitable to its interests. The presence of other strong extremist groups in Argentina add to the problem of public safety and internal security. Terrorist action in the provinces is a frequent occurrence. Mob violence and illegal strikes in the Federal Capital and Greater Buenos Aires area are ever-increasing problems which are of concern to police officials. Federal Police officials have stated that rioters appear to be getting more aggressive and offer more resistance than in the past. This situation will require effective application of force so as to prevent serious injuries to persons involved and prohibit the creation of martyrs for propaganda purposes. It appears that the Communists and Castroites have no great political strength at present except insofar as they might be able to act in conjunction with Peronist elements. During 1964-1965, Peronist labor leaders sought to foment public repudiation of and discontent with the Illia administration through a concerted program of strikes and mass demonstrations. They hoped to make capital of their sponsorship of the working-class interests. The government, through a combination of conciliatory measures, maintenance of law and order and avoidance of violent repression was able to hold on. Non-Peronist labor elements declined to support the campaign and Peronist support weakened.

Communist infiltration into labor, universities, student groups, intellectual and cultural groups, and poor segments of the populace is generally well traced by police and military agencies. However, this is a difficult task which requires a constant application of effort and evaluation of results. Police forces involved in these operations require training, modern equipment and a knowledge of up-to-date techniques and methods.

The vast territorial extent of Argentina, the rugged terrain in rural areas, which varies from hot to cold, from jungle to rough mountain country, and its relative position to five neighboring countries, makes it not only vulnerable to smuggling operations and clandestine movement of persons but also to guerrilla-type activity.

Internal security is the primary responsibility of the Federal Police, the Gendarmeria, the Maritime Prefecture and the 22 provincial police forces of the country. These forces are supported by the armed services in the event of a large-scale uprising or insurrection. Within the limitations which have been pointed out, the police forces of Argentina are relatively effective and represent well-organized forces capable of coping with most threats against the internal security of the country. Additional comments on the capacity of each of the respective forces are included on other sections of this report.

The Survey Team believes that:

1. While there may now be no clear and present danger of a subversive takeover in Argentina, the volatile nature of the present situation demands a stepped-up capacity on the part of all police forces to deal with such problems.
2. There is a drastic need for improvement in police training, operations and equipment to deal with the rapidly-rising crime rate and potential threats to internal security in the country.
3. A relatively small joint program of technical assistance and training with the U.S. Government, plus the provision of limited amounts of equipment, would greatly serve to supplement present police efforts and improve police capabilities to deal with present and future problems of crime and subversion.

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Each official of the Argentine police forces expressed a sincere interest in receiving technical assistance and training from the United States and their desire to participate and cooperate in any joint police assistance program which might be developed. Similar expressions of cooperation and participation were expressed by the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Interior of the Argentine Government in meetings with the Survey Team and U.S. Embassy officials in Buenos Aires.

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POLICE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

It is recommended that the Government of the United States and the Government of Argentina agree on a joint program of police aid and assistance along lines suggested in this report. Such a program should be implemented through the Office of Public Safety of the Agency for International Development with the assistance of other U.S. Government agencies. Details of the program should be agreed upon and actual operations started in Argentina on or near the beginning of U.S. fiscal year 1967. The program should include technical assistance, training and the provision of limited amounts of modern police equipment. It is believed that the program should be planned to extend over a four-year period and be designed to achieve the following basic objectives:

1. To insure that the police forces of Argentina continue to be favorably disposed toward the United States, its policies and security objectives;
2. To insure that the organization, training and operations of the police forces of Argentina are adequate to provide an effective capacity for the handling of basic public safety and internal security responsibilities; and
3. To encourage further development of responsible and effective police administration in Argentina that will serve to provide the type of law and order needed as a basis for the stable economic, social and political development of the country.

It is suggested that major attention in any joint assistance program be given to the following activities as they relate to each of the respective police forces:

The Federal Police

1. The modernization and improvement of police communications, particularly those needed for country-wide administrative and security purposes, for expanded motor patrols in Buenos Aires, and for tactical communications used in the control of civil disturbances in the Federal Capital.
2. The modernization of intelligence files and records used by the Federal Coordination Directorate; to provide certain basic information-gathering equipment and technical assistance in its effective use; and to assist in the training of police intelligence personnel.
3. The development and use of more effective motor and foot patrol activities in Buenos Aires and in the preparation of factual information (data-processing) for various types of police operational planning, including patrols.
4. The establishment of a central criminal record and identification service for the entire country and to develop a system of uniform crime reports for the use of all police forces in Argentina.

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5. Improve the quality of police training and to develop the effective use of audio-visual aids, modern teaching materials, case studies and practical field practice, including the handling and use of police weapons. Also, to assist in the development of a central police training facility for the use of all police forces of Argentina.

6. The improvement of police capacity to deal with civil disorders and other problems of internal security through training and technical assistance and the provision of limited chemical munitions and other special equipment.

7. Assist in the expansion of the country-wide criminal and security activities of the Federal Police to assure the more effective handling of such additional crimes as contraband, auto theft, narcotics, white slavery and others of a federal nature.

The Provincial Police of Buenos Aires

1. The modernization of police communications for highway patrol use and for tactical use of riot control and mounted police units.

2. Improved police training including the addition of more police-type subjects in the instructional programs and the development of an effective audio-visual program, field practice, case studies and weapons handling instruction.

3. Assistance in the modernization of information files and records and in the development of more effective intelligence training activities.

4. The improvement and expansion of foot and motor patrol activities and the development of information for police planning activities in this area.

5. Assistance in improving the capacity of the police to deal with mobs and riots, terrorism and other internal security problems, including the development of special training programs for the police units responsible for such activities.

National Gendarmeria

1. The improvement of communications for tactical border patrol operations and for the effective coordination of administrative communications with the country-wide network of the Federal Police.

2. Assistance in the expansion of present intelligence activities, particularly in the border areas of the country, to deal with problems of smuggling and illegal entry of persons and in the modernization of files and records used for intelligence operations.

3. The improvement of police training activities and the addition of more police-type subjects in the various school courses. Also, the development of an audio-visual and expanded police library program.

4. Assistance in the planning and operation of border control and checking activities and in the development of more effective methods of coordination and control of smugglers and illegal entry of persons with both the customs and immigration services of Argentina.

5. The improvement of the Gendarmeria's capacity to handle counterinsurgency, civil disorders, terrorism and other internal security problems through tactical instruction in the use of modern techniques and weapons.

National Maritime Prefecture

1. The improvement of tactical communications for the more effective control of smuggling and illegal entry of persons in border areas under the jurisdiction of the agency.

2. Assistance in border patrol planning and operational activities with special emphasis on the expansion of land, air and water patrols and modernization of present patrol equipment.

3. The expansion of intelligence activities, particularly in river border areas, and improvement of files, records and equipment used for information gathering activities.

4. Assistance in the development of a capacity to deal with mobs, riots and other subversive activities in the port areas under its jurisdiction and an added capacity to handle counterinsurgency operations in the frontier areas.

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BASIC ELEMENTS AND COST OF PROGRAM

A. Technicians

Five U.S. technical advisors, one administrative assistant and one U.S. secretary are needed to provide the basic staff for the joint program. This staff should be supplemented, as needed, to deal with specialized or highly technical problems, by TDY personnel. At the outset, full-time technical advisors are needed in the following areas of specialization:

Chief Advisor, who is a police generalist with wide background in police organization and management and with experience as a police administrator and a broad understanding of internal security problems.

Communications Advisor, who understands police security problems in relation to communications and who is thoroughly familiar with both municipal and country-wide communications systems.

Training Advisor, who has a good knowledge of police training, including methods of instruction and use of audio-visual aids. He should also have a familiarity with modern police procedures and methods, including internal defense training activities.

Investigations Advisor, who is thoroughly familiar with modern investigative techniques and information gathering and evaluating activities. He should also be able to assist the various intelligence agencies in the development of effective filing and record procedures.

Patrol Advisor, who is thoroughly familiar with modern patrol planning and operations and is capable of assisting in the development of patrol information through the use of modern data processing machines.

The estimated cost of the six advisors plus one U.S. secretary and TDY assistance is indicated below by year:

| <u>Technical Advisors</u> | | | |
|---------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| <u>FY 67</u> | <u>FY 68</u> | <u>FY 69</u> | <u>FY 70</u> |
| \$157,040 | \$155,000 | \$157,000 | \$155,000 |
| <u>TDY Assistance</u> | | | |
| 15,960 | 15,000 | 15,000 | 15,000 |
| <u>TOTALS</u> | | | |
| \$173,000 | \$170,000 | \$172,000 | \$170,000 |

B. Training

The estimated cost of training participants in the U.S. and third countries is as follows:

| <u>Participants</u> | | | |
|---------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| <u>FY 67</u> | <u>FY 68</u> | <u>FY 69</u> | <u>FY 70</u> |
| \$72,000 | \$49,500 | \$43,000 | \$41,000 |

It is suggested that during FY 67, a total of 28 participants be selected and sent to the U.S. for study and observation of modern police methods and operations as follows:

Federal Police

- 1 Officer to study modern instructional methods and visual aids at IPA.
- 1 Officer to senior course at IPA.
- 1 Officer to FBI National Academy
- 2 Police Executives for observation of police identification and record procedures, police communications and patrol operations.
- 2 Junior Officers to study telecommunications management (10 months)
- 1 Officer to study police motor patrol operations with special attention to communications and dispatching methods.

Buenos Aires Provincial Police

- 1 Officer to Senior Course at IPA.
- 2 Officers to General Course at IPA.
- 1 Officer to study highway patrol operations with special attention to communications.

Other Provincial Police

- 2 Officers to General Course at IPA.

National Gendarmeria

- 4 Officers to General Course at IPA with specializations in border control and internal security operations.

- 1 Officer to Senior Course at IPA.

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2 Ranking Officers for observation and study visits to the U.S. with special emphasis on emergency riot control and counterinsurgency operations.

2 Officers to study communications management.

National Maritime Prefecture

1 Officer to study border patrol operations (3 months).

2 Officers to General Course at IPA with specialization in border patrol.

It is estimated that the cost of this participant training would be approximately \$72,000 for FY 67. Participants in future years should be selected as needed to assist in the solution of certain basic police and security problems in the joint program.

Note: Plans should also be developed, in close coordination with U.S. military attaches and U.S. Military Assistance Group in Argentina, to send selected participants from the Gendarmeria and Prefecture to study emergency crowd control and counterinsurgency operations at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, or Panama, or other military training centers.

C. Equipment

The major item of equipment for the entire period of this proposed program is police communications. This has been indicated as a top priority item by each of the local security forces and is a vital need if public safety and internal security objectives are to be realized. The estimates for basic communications needs are as follows:

| <u>Federal Police Communications</u> | | | |
|--|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| <u>FY 67</u> | <u>FY 68</u> | <u>FY 69</u> | <u>FY 70</u> |
| \$150,000 | \$100,000 | \$75,000 | \$50,000 |
| <u>Buenos Aires Provincial Police Communications</u> | | | |
| 75,000 | 50,000 | 25,000 | 15,000 |
| <u>National Gendarmeria Communications</u> | | | |
| 200,000 | 150,000 | 100,000 | 75,000 |
| <u>National Maritime Prefecture Communications</u> | | | |
| 150,000 | 100,000 | 55,000 | 25,000 |
| <u>TOTALS</u> | | | |
| \$575,000 | \$400,000 | \$255,000 | \$165,000 |

Note: It is possible that part of this equipment for the Maritime Prefecture could be made available through the U.S. Military Assistance Program.

Other equipment estimates, including basic items for all security forces for the first year of operation, include:

| | |
|---|-----------|
| Audio-visual aids, books and training materials. | \$10,000 |
| Excess property - including civic action needs repair facilities and spare parts | \$22,000 |
| Jeeps (four-wheel and special ambulances - 30 total) - for Gendarmeria | \$90,000 |
| Emergency use equipment for internal defense and crowd control (gas weapons, chemical munitions). | \$80,000 |
| Special information gathering equipment for the respective intelligence services | \$15,000 |
| Other special equipment including sample tropic and arctic gear. | \$25,000 |
| TOTAL | \$242,000 |

D. Total Program Cost

| <u>Technicians</u> | | | |
|---------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| <u>FY 67</u> | <u>FY 68</u> | <u>FY 69</u> | <u>FY 70</u> |
| \$173,000 | \$170,000 | \$172,000 | \$170,000 |
| <u>Participants</u> | | | |
| 72,000 | 49,500 | 43,000 | 41,000 |
| <u>Equipment</u> | | | |
| 817,000 | 623,000 | 510,000 | 347,000 |
| <u>TOTALS</u> | | | |
| \$1,072,000 | \$842,500 | \$725,000 | \$558,000 |

It is strongly recommended that any equipment provided by the U.S. Government, other than communications, be largely for demonstration, operational or training purposes and closely associated with a particular technical project in the

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joint program. No highly technical or special use equipment should be provided unless the police forces are capable of using it effectively or unless technical assistance is made available to train local personnel in its use.

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PROGRAM GUIDELINES

While all of the police forces included in this report have an important role in the country's internal security situation, it is believed that special attention in any joint program should be given to the basic problems and needs of the Federal Police and the National Gendarmeria. These forces have broad country-wide responsibilities for both crime and internal security problems and the best potential for effective development. Secondary attention should be given to the Provincial Police of Buenos Aires, largely because of its specific internal security responsibilities in the highly strategic Greater Buenos Aires area and to the Maritime Prefecture for its important port and border patrol functions. Special consideration should also be given to those projects which will best serve to strengthen overall police activities and provide more effective coordination between the various police forces, including other provincial police units.

It is hoped that many of the problems and needs of the National Maritime Prefecture can be included in the U.S. Military Assistance program with AID assistance limited chiefly to technical help in a few specific police activities and the provision of certain basic training in public safety and internal security subjects.

As a part of the Joint Program, it is believed that the Argentine Government should agree to provide much needed additional financial assistance to the public security forces. Such support should greatly exceed that provided by the U.S. Government. The entire U.S. effort and any U.S. equipment provided should be predicated on the willingness of the GOA to accept its responsibility for additional backing of the police forces and be spelled out in detail in any program agreements developed by the two governments.

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THE POLICE FORCES OF ARGENTINA

A. The Federal Police

The Federal Police of Argentina is composed of 22,560 officers, agents and civilians. It has the basic responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in the Federal Capital (Buenos Aires). In addition, it is responsible for the enforcement of laws dealing with federal crimes and for certain intelligence activities in all parts of the country.

Specific conclusions and recommendations for improving the organization and operations of the Federal Police were submitted in the basic survey and are also included herein, as follows:

Conclusions on Federal Police

1. The Federal Police is a highly professional police agency composed of experienced and dedicated officers and agents, who are attempting to do a capable police job under extremely difficult conditions.

During recent years, the Federal Police have been forced to limit and curtail many basic police operations, due largely to serious shortages of manpower, facilities and modern police equipment. The tremendous growth of population in the Federal Capital, together with social, political and economic developments throughout the country, has created a multitude of new problems for the Federal Police. These problems are further intensified by increased threats to the country's internal security and a rapidly rising crime rate. Although police officials are generally aware of these problems and what needs to be done toward their solutions, they have not been provided with even the minimal facilities and equipment needed for their solution. In trying to keep up, the police have been forced to resort to partial and piecemeal solutions which have proven far from adequate. This failure on the part of the government to provide financial backing and support for police efforts has resulted in a steady lessening of police effectiveness, which has reached alarming proportions and could be a serious factor in the country's internal security situation.

2. The threat of civil disorders, subversion and terrorism in the Federal Capital and Provinces is potentially serious and calls for the best efforts of the police. It is believed that the police will have a good capacity to deal with these problems if additional technical assistance, training and modern equipment is provided.

3. The present system of written court trials is less efficient than the oral trial system and places an undue burden of report preparation and bureaucratic activity on the police.

While this report does not include a study of the judicial processes of Argentina, it is believed that this is a valid conclusion which has a direct relation to police operations. Consideration should be given to changing the court system along lines of oral trial procedures now used in many countries.

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4. The basic organizational structure of the Federal Police is sound and meets the needs of the service in most regards.

Duties are well defined and police functions seem to be allocated along logical lines in the various Directorates. There is, however, some question regarding the wide span of control now exercised by the Chief of Police who has at least 15 persons reporting to him.

5. Due to the difficulties encountered in recruiting new police and civilian personnel, low salaries and other problems, there has been a tendency in recent years to assign trained police officers and agents to various administrative and service activities at the expense of actual police operations like patrol and criminal investigation. The relatively low police salaries have also not been conducive to the recruitment of the best quality of personnel for the police service.

6. Traffic control and supervision in the Federal Capital leaves much to be desired and does not even meet the minimal needs of a large metropolitan city. This situation is rapidly becoming chaotic as more and more vehicles go on the streets.

7. The Riot Squad and Mounted Police units have a long record of effectiveness in the prevention and control of civil disorders, mobs and riots.

Training is good, and personnel are well disciplined and efficient. Additional communications equipment, chemical agents and weapons are needed if these units can be expected to continue to operate effectively.

8. One of the serious defects in police service at present is the lack of effective foot and motor patrol operations in the city.

While this is due in part to shortages of manpower and equipment, it is believed that more effective use could be made of the patrol vehicles presently available and used only for reserve or special purposes.

9. There is a need to strengthen and enlarge the facilities of the police records and identification service into a center for the entire country to expedite the issuance of passports and other identity documents and to coordinate criminal identification and record activities on a country-wide basis.

Such a project would help to coordinate and strengthen federal, provincial and other police identification and record activities and would provide a valuable uniform crime reporting service for the police of the entire country. At present, separate criminal records are maintained by the Federal Police, the National Gendarmeria, the National Maritime Prefecture and the 22 Provincial Police forces. If a person from the interior is arrested in Buenos Aires, for example, it is necessary to communicate with the respective police agencies to get full information on his criminal record or background.

10. Investigative operations have become highly specialized by type of crime and each of the specialized investigative squads has been allowed to build up its own particular activity with little or no coordination with the other squads.

Each squad maintains its own special records, photographs and files. There has also been a lack of coordinated action between the investigative squads, the

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police precincts and the various patrol forces. There is a vital need for additional investigative equipment and for vehicles to allow investigators to operate effectively.

11. The countrywide responsibilities of the Federal Police have not been allowed to reach the potential necessary to deal effectively with federal crimes in the entire country.

While the Directorate of Federal Coordination has operated successfully in regard to its information gathering and intelligence duties, it is believed that additional legislation and expanded police effort to deal with federal crimes is a vital need on a countrywide basis. Such additional effort could be extremely effective in dealing with such crimes as contraband, auto theft, transport of stolen goods across provincial boundaries and others.

12. Basic training for agents and officers is well developed but limited in both quality and quantity of practical police subjects.

There is a definite need to improve training facilities, teaching methods and materials. More audio-visual aids should be provided and more practical police type subjects included in the training programs.

13. The Survey Team believes that the basic responsibility for dealing with the problems mentioned above rests with the people and government of Argentina. The Team also believes that a joint program of police assistance with the Office of Public Safety of the Agency for International Development of the United States Government would prove extremely useful in helping to supplement local efforts toward police improvement and would aid in making both the crime and security aspects of police operations more effective.

14. While the management and technical competence of the Federal Police communications organization is more advanced than most of the Latin American countries, the enormous communications responsibilities placed upon this organization without proper budgetary support have seriously limited their capability of providing rapid and reliable communications.

15. The Federal Police administrative and security country-wide radio network can not provide the reliability or traffic capacity required for the following reasons:

- a) This communications network operates for the most part in the radio-telephone mode and subsequently cannot handle the traffic load required.
- b) An insufficient number of technical supervisory personnel at the field offices, and the use of antiquated equipment, contribute to the general unreliability of this network.

16. The operational capability of the radio patrol car communication system is far less than that required to support Federal Police operations in Buenos Aires. Over 75% of the radio equipment in use, both mobile and base, is obsolete and unreliable. While Control Center facilities are presently inadequate, the police are constructing a new control center which, when completed, will satisfy their current requirements.