



**USAID** | **GUINEA**  
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

# FRAGILE STATES ASSESSMENT

RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1 FEBRUARY 2006

This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by the IRIS Center, at the University of Maryland.



# FRAGILE STATES ASSESSMENT: GUINEA

## RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

**SUBMITTED BY**

The IRIS Center, University Research Corporation International

**SUBMITTED TO**

USAID

**CONTRACT NUMBER**

EDG-0-00-02-0037-00

**DISCLAIMER**

The author's views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

---

## **CONTACT INFORMATION**

IRIS Center  
University of Maryland  
Department of Economics  
2105 Morrill Hall  
College Park, MD 20742  
USA

E-mail: [info@iris.econ.umd.edu](mailto:info@iris.econ.umd.edu)  
Phone: +1.301.405.3110  
Fax: +1.301.405.3020  
Web: [www.iris.umd.edu](http://www.iris.umd.edu)

# CONTENTS

<b>ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS</b>	<b>I</b>
<b>MAP OF GUINEA</b>	<b>II</b>
<b>1. INTRODUCTION</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>2. THE CONTEXT</b>	<b>6</b>
2.1 STRUCTURAL FACTORS .....	6
Additional Contextual Factors	7
2.2 GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS .....	7
2.2.1 Formal Institutions	8
2.2.2 Informal Arrangements	8
<b>3. PATTERNS OF FRAGILITY</b>	<b>11</b>
3.1 OUTCOMES AND PERCEPTIONS .....	11
3.1.1 Political	11
3.1.2 Economic .....	13
3.1.3 Social	14
3.1.4 Security	17
3.2 STATE-SOCIETY INTERACTIONS AND PATTERNS OF FRAGILITY .....	20
3.2.1 Rent Seeking	20
3.2.2 Protection of Territorial Integrity	21
3.2.3 Intermittent Reform and Counter-Reform	22
3.2.4 Traditional Respect for Authority	22

3.2.5 Popular Disengagement and Risk Aversion	23
3.2.6 Explaining Fragility	24
<b>4. ENTRY POINTS</b>	<b>25</b>
4.1 STAKEHOLDER MAPPING - REFORMERS, SPOILERS AND OPPORTUNITIES.....	25
4.1.1 Rent Seeking	25
4.1.2 Protection of Territorial Integrity	27
4.1.3 Intermittent Reform and Counter-Reform	28
4.1.4 Respect for Traditional Authority	28
4.1.5 Popular Disengagement and Risk Aversion	29
4.1.6 Summary of Risks	29
4.2 NEAR-TERM WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY .....	30
4.2.1 Efforts to Re-Engage Donors, Especially IFIs, and Political Opposition	30
4.3 SUCCESSION POSES RISKS .....	32
4.3.1 Irrespective of Scenario, Reform Will End with Succession	32
<b>5. PROGRAMMING RECOMMENDATIONS</b>	<b>34</b>
5.1 BUILDING A STRATEGY FOR GUINEA .....	34
5.1.1 Respond to Key Sources of Fragility/Resilience	34
5.1.2 Confront Rent Seeking at National and Local Levels	34
5.1.3 Mitigate Popular Disengagement and Risk Aversion	34
5.1.4 Reinforce Informal Patterns that Promote Tolerance and Joint- Benefits	35
5.1.5 Capitalize the Open Window of Reform Opportunity, Promoting Civilian-Led Succession	35
5.1.6 Leverage USAID Resources through Harmonization at Agency, USG, and Inter-Donor Levels	35
Greater Leverage through Donor Harmonization	36

5.1.7 Adjust Optimal Programming Reorientations in Line with USAID Competencies, Mandate and Resources in the Short Run	37
5.2 FOUR PROGRAM COMPONENTS.....	37
5.2.1 Promote National Dialogue	37
5.2.2 Increase Transparency and Accountability	37
5.2.3 Pilot Alternative Service Delivery Methods	38
5.2.4 Increase Opportunities for Political Competition	38

**ANNEXES 43**

Annex A. BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	43
ANNEX B. PERSONS INTERVIEWED .....	45
ANNEX C. STATEMENT OF WORK .....	54

**TABLES AND FIGURES**

Table 1: Government of Guinea Effectiveness and Legitimacy: Summary View .....	5
Table 2: Program Recommendations .....	40
Figure 1: Fragility Diagnostic Concepts and Dynamics.....	5

# ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<b>CIDA</b>	Canadian International Development Agency
<b>CLUSA</b>	Cooperative League of the United States of America
<b>CSO</b>	Civil Society Organizations
<b>DG</b>	Democracy and Governance
<b>DoD</b>	United States Department of Defense
<b>ECOMOG</b>	Monitoring Group, Economic Community of West African States
<b>ECOWAS</b>	Economic Community of West African States
<b>FSA</b>	Fragile States Assessment
<b>FY</b>	Fiscal Year
<b>GOG</b>	Government of Guinea
<b>IMF</b>	International Monetary Fund
<b>IQC</b>	Indefinite Quantity Contract
<b>LGU</b>	Local Government Unit
<b>NGO</b>	Non-governmental Organization
<b>OECD/DAC</b>	Organizational for Economic Cooperation and Development/Development Cooperation Directorate
<b>PESSEL</b>	Political, Economic, Social, Security, Effectiveness, Legitimacy
<b>PUP</b>	Party for Unity and Progress
<b>USAID</b>	United States Agency for International Development
<b>USG</b>	United States Government

# MAP OF GUINEA



# 1. INTRODUCTION

This report documents the first field test of the new USAID Fragile States Assessment Tool (FAST), itself a hybrid combining many elements of USAID’s long-standing “democracy/governance assessment” and the Agency’s newer “conflict vulnerability assessment.” In contrast to these earlier assessment frameworks, the FAST methodology incorporates a sharper focus on security issues – the role of police and military forces in exacerbating state fragility or promoting state stability.

The FAST methodology is organized into three major tasks: diagnosing the current situation, identifying entry points, and defining program priorities. The first task involves two steps: 1) identification of *patterns of fragility*, i.e., recurrent forms of interaction among the state and society that shape outcomes and also perceptions of effectiveness and legitimacy, and 2) analysis of the context, including both structural factor and governance arrangements, that gives rise to these patterns. The second task also includes two steps: 1) a *stakeholder mapping* (analysis of relevant stakeholders and their interests in changing or maintaining current outcomes); and 2) identification of “windows of opportunity” – likely events or circumstances when reform could be successfully introduced in the near future. The final task leads to an overarching strategy and set of recommendations, or at least options, for programs that mitigate crises, support recovery and stabilization, and lay the groundwork for transformational development.

## FAST: A Work in Progress

At the time of this report’s initial publication, the Fragile States Assessment Tool (FAST) was still largely a work in progress. Guinea served as the first field test for the FAST and the lessons learned have helped to refine FAST’s methodology. The Guinea field assessment highlighted the need for an easy to use guide to take field teams step by step through the FAST methodology. An updated version of FAST is expected to be completed by September 2006.

## Lead up to the Guinea Assessment

During the time FAST was being developed, USAID’s focus on Guinea was sharpening. A political leadership change was imminent because of the poor health and age of Guinea’s President. A new Mission Director was taking over USAID operations. The complex political economy situation in the country was fragile and not well understood. USAID decided a team from USAID/Washington and USAID/Guinea would use the emerging FAST to assess conditions in Guinea and make suggestions for USAID programming. To provide additional substantive, drafting, and country experience, USAID added an outside expert to the team. The expert was drawn from ARD, a US based consulting firm then helping USAID develop a data system to provide early warning of state fragility to guide and complement the use of FAST.

The Guinea application of FAST was conducted by a seven-person team, three drawn from USAID/Washington, three from the Mission, and one external consultant. The team reviewed documents, interviewed knowledgeable individuals in Washington and throughout Guinea, and produced a draft Fragile State Assessment (FSA) to which Mission personnel responded. The novel elements in this FAST exercise included (in addition to pilot use of the applied fragility analytic framework) an Agency-wide round table of experts and partners and the development and administration of an expert survey, both to the round table participants and to a broad range of technical staffers in USAID/Guinea. At the end of the in-country mission, the team organized feedback sessions with Mission staff. Comments from the Mission and the Africa Bureau have been incorporated into the current version.

The report’s structure diverges modestly from the way the assessment was conducted. It begins with a review of the context surrounding and contributing to observed patterns of fragility. Structural factors include significant instability in neighboring countries, an aging, ailing president whose succession is uncertain, and a historical legacy of repressive authoritarian governments that shapes currently held expectations of how

government should act. In terms of key elements of democracy, Guinea’s governance structures are weak, lacking both rule of law and effective competition for political office.

Secondly, the report presents findings on the patterns of fragility. The team gathered and synthesized data on outcomes as well as perceptions of the government in Guinea, as offered by officials, citizens, and other interlocutors. Key questions in these interviews highlighted the perceived legitimacy and effectiveness of government performance in four distinct sectors: political, economic, social and security. These perceptions both result from and contribute to five patterns of interaction between the state and society. These five persistent and pervasive patterns of behavior are summarized as: 1) rent seeking (the dominant pattern that links the other four together and reinforces their pragmatic logic); 2) protection of territorial integrity; 3) intermittent reform and counter-reform; 4) respect for traditional authority; and 5) popular disengagement and risk aversion.

The analysis then highlights people who could be expected to support reform as well as those who likely will oppose. It also identifies windows of opportunity to affect Guinea’s patterns of fragility and of resilience. The country is currently at a critical juncture, as once again reform efforts have been launched. Donors seem unanimous in their conclusion that it is important to seize this opportunity to reestablish working relationships with the Government of Guinea (GOG), provided that the GOG meets specific performance criteria. It appears clear as well that the inevitable succession—President Lansana Conté is aged and in ill health—will pose problems. Partly because of the insecurities that succession will generate in a system where the president has played a determining role for decades, the team anticipates that reform efforts will be put on hold until such a time as the succession outcome becomes clear, i.e., who ends up in power and on what terms. If the succession is civilian-led and follows constitutional provisions, current reforms might well be easier to revive. If, on the other hand, the military dominates the succession, it seems likely that reforms will be more difficult to reactivate.

The text box below provides definitions of terms used in FAST. Figure 1 illustrates the dynamics that link the elements of the fragile states assessment. Table 1 captures the results of the Guinea fragility assessment.

#### FRAGILE STATES ASSESSMENT: TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

**Structural Factors:** Key political, economic, social and security-related characteristics of the country in question that are difficult or impossible to change in the short term by policy changes. Of particular interest are those that might incite or inhibit conflict, as well as external influences (e.g., cross-border, regional or global sources of conflict, and influences on commodity and other export prices).


**Governance Arrangements:** Both formal and informal institutions that establish incentives — the “rules of the game” —and influence human behavior by both state and non-state actors. Governance arrangements mediate structural factors and the interactions between state and society and thus play an important role in determining whether a state is stable or fragile. For example, having ethnic diversity does not automatically make a country fragile; governance arrangements shape how well or how poorly different groups co-exist. Together, structural factors and governance arrangements make up the context within which patterns of fragility and resilience operate.

**Outcomes:** Objective indicators in terms of society’s well being across the political, economic, social, and security dimensions.

**Perceptions of Effectiveness and Legitimacy:** Subjective views held within society as to (1) the state’s performance in terms of ability to produce desired outcomes, and (2) the extent to which the state’s authority is exercised in a fair and just way. These perceptions are important because they inform stakeholder thinking and decision-making in future rounds of action, and so influence behavior relevant to state fragility or resilience in positive or negative ways.

**Patterns of fragility and resilience:** Persistent and pervasive interrelationships between outcomes, perceptions of effectiveness and legitimacy, and state-society interactions. When state-society interactions are positive and produce outcomes that enhance state effectiveness and legitimacy, they can create patterns of resilience that bolsters recovery, as people seek out yet more interactions with the state. Alternately, negative state-society interactions produce outcomes that diminish perceptions of effectiveness and legitimacy, which creates patterns that increase the state’s fragility; people seek to avoid or damage the state.

**FIGURE 1: FRAGILITY DIAGNOSTIC CONCEPTS AND DYNAMICS**



**FIGURE 1. A PATTERN OF FRAGILITY OR RESILIENCE (IN RED) AND ITS CONTEXT (IN BLUE, COMPOSED OF STRUCTURAL FACTORS AND GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS)**

When applied in the March 2005 Guinea fragility assessment, and using the concepts and definitions presented above, the fragility diagnostic produced the results that appear below:

**TABLE 1: GOVERNMENT OF GUINEA EFFECTIVENESS AND LEGITIMACY: SUMMARY VIEW**

"PESSEL" Dimensions of State Activity	Indicators of State Fragility	
<b>Political</b>		
<b>Economic</b>		
<b>Social</b>		
<b>Security</b>		

**Key:** Green = High, Yellow = Moderate, Orange = Low, Red = Critical

**Bottom Line:** Guinea is a Fragile State, vulnerable to further decline in outcomes, although violence is not likely in short-term.

## 2. THE CONTEXT

Guinea exists, like most fragile states, in a context that is rich, complex, and problematic. This is detailed below.

### 2.1 STRUCTURAL FACTORS

Structural factors, as noted above, include key structural socio-economic and political characteristics of the state in question, particularly those that might incite or inhibit conflict. They also include external influences, e.g., cross-border, regional, or global sources of conflict and influences on commodity and other export prices. These are important insofar as they affect the patterns of interaction detailed below.

Guinea has a rich endowment of natural resources, including abundant deposits of “wasting” minerals such as bauxite (one-third of global proven reserves), gold and diamonds. It also has substantial renewable resources, including surface waters in rivers that could operate hydropower installations and provide electrical energy to major cities and much of the country’s hinterlands. It has, by West African standards, a reasonable agricultural endowment— a mix of terrains and topographies suited to irrigated and rain fed agriculture plus abundant rainfall. Soils are lateritic and not excessively rich but certainly capable of sustaining the country’s population and quite possibly generating a surplus for interregional or international trade.

Guinea’s mineral wealth endowment has generated fiscal flows that are large enough and have been reliable enough over the years that the GOG officials, particularly the country’s two presidents, have felt they had margins of maneuver not available to some other African countries. If an objective appeared critical to either of these leaders, they often pursued it whether or not donors supported the initiative.

Despite these advantages, Guinea has confronted consistent poverty in its nearly half century of independence (from 1958 to 2005). Many families today live in impoverished circumstances, and public services are not provided at a level commensurate with Guinea’s natural wealth. These circumstances, in turn, will leave the country developmentally further and further behind as the years pass.

Guinea exhibits four factors that in many places would count as prime sources of conflict. Despite these, there is strong, widespread antipathy to violence as a political tactic. The four factors are: 1) ethnic heterogeneity; 2) a long-running economic decline with widespread and growing unemployment; 3) a youth bulge burdening the economy with large numbers of young adults who have few if any employment prospects; and 4) “lootable commodities” in the form of gold and diamonds plus abundant supplies of small arms. Nonetheless the antipathy to violence as a tactic is very broadly articulated across Guinea’s geographic regions and economic classes. People seem to have drawn the conclusion that, bad as the current situation may be, it could be considerably worse.

External structural factors include, in particular, the price of bauxite, which has a profound impact on the state’s finances and therefore the government’s capacity to fund and maintain the institutional arrangements that characterize the current set-up. Another critical external factor is clearly Guinea’s geographic neighborhood, which counts a number of countries much in the news over the past five to ten years as failing, failed, or recovering states. Among these are Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Guinea Bissau, and Senegal. Guinea still hosts a sizeable number of refugees and returnees who have left Sierra

Leone, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Guinea Bissau, and even Senegal’s southern Casamance region for the relative calm and security of Guinea’s border regions. But despite these “imported” pressures, and the havoc they have wrought with the renewable natural resource base in parts of the country, Guinea nonetheless has enjoyed internal stability since the civil wars erupted in Sierra Leone and Liberia.

## **ADDITIONAL CONTEXTUAL FACTORS**

Approximately 85% of the population is Muslim, 8% is Christian, and 7% adhere to indigenous beliefs, although almost all Guineans retain some beliefs and practices normally associated with animism. Despite a constitutional commitment to a secular state, the country has established a Ministry of Islamic Affairs. Islam would appear, however, to serve as a broad unifying force within Guinea rather than as a factor of violence.

Guinea can claim, in the West African regional context, a unique historical experience with authoritarian governance. While many countries in the area had authoritarian systems of governance dating back to the colonial era (English and Portuguese as well as French), few had a regime as committed to maintaining control and forcing “development” through violent, repressive means as was that of Sékou Touré’s first republic, following a Stalinist model in both economic and political control. That experience (pre-dating independence in 1958 through Touré’s death in 1984) has had a significant impact in two areas at least. Much of the country’s contemporary leadership was socialized under Touré’s authoritarian system, which arguably fosters contemporary authoritarian practices. The command economy and brutal repression reduced individual initiative, suppressed any attempt at political opposition, and created a pattern of public adulation of the chief of state. In addition, Touré’s quarter-century rule generated a huge diaspora of Guineans both in neighboring countries and in Europe. At present, those individuals, as well as Guineans who have left their home communities to relocate elsewhere in the country, provide significant support for local-level development activities. See below for more elaborate discussions of these issues.

Given the powerful role in Guinean governance that President Lansana Conté’s has developed for himself since leading a coup in 1984 after Touré’s death, his current ill health generates considerable uncertainty as well as concern. While he still retains control over the levers of power, the obvious question concerns the nature and timing of the succession. Conté’s persistently favorable treatment of the military poses the dilemma of the military’s role in the succession period: will they allow constitutionally prescribed processes to be followed, or will they intervene to impose their own preferences? This issue is likewise explored in greater detail below.

## **2.2 GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS**

Sets of institutions and rules — both formal and informal — guide decision-making by key players over time. In particular, they mediate the relationships between structural factors and society. Governance arrangements include organizations (courts, political parties, patronage networks, criminal organizations, involvement in international organizations) and expected patterns of behavior (loyalty or independence, corruption or virtue, competence or spoils as a basis for office-holding). Furthermore, there is often a significant discrepancy between formal (*de jure*) institutions and processes designed to provide order and allow for reform, and the actual ways (*de facto*) in which things “get done.” This discrepancy itself can point to sources of fragility.

In Guinea formal institutions tell us only a portion of what we need to know about the incentives and constraints that key stakeholders face. The realities of the non-formal rule systems appear to shape to a much greater degree everyday decision-making in the political, economic, social and security realms.

### 2.2.1 FORMAL INSTITUTIONS

**A constitution providing for a strong presidential system and a unitary state:** Guinea’s constitution reflects its heritage of French colonial institutions and Marxist past. Both those institutional traditions stressed consolidating power within the executive branch of government, curtailing opportunities for meaningful opposition to executive decisions, and carefully managing the succession to power and the country’s highest offices. While the country’s regions are perhaps diverse enough to warrant consideration of federalism as a formal framework for power, even decentralization initiatives have been managed to ensure that the center retains clear control over the “autonomy” and action capacities of devolved local government units (LGUs).

**Military dominance:** The role of the armed forces as the backbone of the Conté regime shapes the character of the Guinean state and simultaneously has a decisive impact on budgetary allocations, which in turn affect outcomes and perceptions of government performance in the political, economic, and social and security dimensions.

**Active GOG engagement in sub-regional and regional organizations:** Guinea is a member in good standing of a number of organizations designed to enhance opportunities for dialogue and concerted collective action on economic and political issues. Over the course of the last decade these regional and sub-regional organizations have gained credibility as institutional tools for combating the warfare and economic problems that have beset the region. The Government of Guinea does not always accept or follow the advice and collective decisions of those organizations, but it remains an engaged and active member in many of them, including the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Mano River Union.

### 2.2.2 INFORMAL ARRANGEMENTS

**Working rules:** much of the behavior observed in Guinea on a daily basis seems best understood as a function of *informal arrangements* shaped by *working rules*, i.e., those rules – whether written or not – whose enforcement by powerful individual and group actors is sufficiently certain and reliable that they can effectively require certain forms of behavior. In other words, people shape their coping and survival strategies in light of what they understand about these working rules. We explore them in greater detail under the next several headings.

**Persistence of traditional order:** The term “traditional” in this context refers to the kinds of governance structures and arrangements that existed in Guinea – and in most of the rest of West Africa – before the beginning of the colonial era.

- **Patriarchy:** Key among these governance arrangements was *patriarchy*, a governance arrangement under which male chiefs<sup>1</sup> acted as the key decision makers in their societies.

---

<sup>1</sup> Most West African societies were patrilineal rather than matrilineal in terms of kinship and political organization, although there were exceptions, e.g., the Berber-affiliated pastoral Tuareg societies that dominated the West African Saharan desert and its southern “sahelian” fringe. Latterly, even some of these groups have switched their basis of kinship organization to patrilineal from matrilineal principles, in part, apparently, under the influence of Islam.

- **Respect for authority:** In most West African societies, people demonstrated great respect for those who attained positions of authority. In many societies where social, economic and political change moved at a more moderate pace than in the contemporary world, elders of both sexes merited respect for their wisdom, accumulated over a lifetime of learning and experience. Those in the younger generation were educated to respond in a disciplined manner to their elders and to respect and comply with directives issued by those more senior than they, rather than to challenge and question their superiors' decisions. Particularly in an era of considerable inter-group warfare, disciplined compliance with orders issued by those in authority turned out to be an indispensable survival response. That history continues to shape human interactions in Guinea today. Public education appears to have done little to modify the pattern. Class sizes in most primary schools are such that education often comes down to rote learning because it is difficult if not impossible to organize constructive discussions among 50-70 school children in a single classroom. This approach to learning is replicated in Islamic educational institutions as well, particularly at the primary level where students are taught the fundamental principles of their religion and the basic prayers. As both principles and prayers are based on sacred texts, students are not encouraged to question either their structure or their content.
- **Reliance on personal relationships:** Under these social and institutional arrangements the most promising pathway to success for an individual often involves establishing a clientelistic relationship with a patron and then meeting (or exceeding) the patron's demands. Those who show initiative in this regard and successfully carry out assignments can expect to rise in the society, but within the context of particular patron-client relationships rather than in the context of the imaginary meritocracy depicted by Guinea's constitution and formal laws.

**Managed competition among ethnic groups:** Available evidence suggests that Guinea's various ethnic groups (including particularly the largest and most powerful, i.e., the coastal Sutu [of *Guinea Maritime*], specialists in fishing and rice production, the pastoral Fable [Paul ] particularly in the Foote Toro region of "Middle Guinea" [*la Guinea Doyenne*] and the largely agricultural Manlike who dominate in the Upper Guinea region [*la Haute Guinea*] that borders on Mali) hold each other in considerable respect. In times past they have fought with each other; in the contemporary era they continue to compete politically. But they appear to understand very clearly the advantages of "limiting competition," of avoiding all-out struggles that could plunge the country into civil war. The widely-shared view about the desirability of avoiding that outcome can be counted as valuable point of consensus.

**Merging of economic and political power:** Part of the power of patriarchal patron-client networks stems from the advantages that both patrons and clients perceive in capturing political power. Winning office in terms of the formal rules intended to structure political competition adds authority and cachet to the successful politician, who will almost certain also be an important patron, the leader of a pyramid of patron-client networks who can mobilize large numbers of supporters in his efforts to obtain political office.

**Privatization of public resources:** The logic of patron-client relations, as exhaustively explored by Cabal and Dales<sup>2</sup>, explains how public resources can be looted without significant public outcry. The

---

<sup>2</sup> Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument*. International African Institute in association with James Curry, Oxford, and Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana, 1999.

“successful” patron-politician distributes enough of the wealth he acquires “at the public trough” among his loyal clients, so that a significant number of people are complacent. While this is a form of accountability that binds patrons and clients to each other, it clearly does not comply with the rule of law paradigm. It would appear, for all that, to be nonetheless a real and compelling institutional arrangement for most Guineans. Failure to understand the logic of privatization of public resources, and the underlying moral basis, can lead both to inappropriate policy recommendations and to ineffective interventions.

**No concept of the “public weal”:** If “public” is interpreted to refer to the national polity, then there appears to be no broadly shared sense of public good. Those kinds of sentiments and moral orientations seem instead to be concentrated on individuals’ ethnic groups and on the patron-client networks of which they are members.

# 3. PATTERNS OF FRAGILITY

As pictured in Figure 1 and described in the Introduction, FAST conceptualizes a pattern of fragility as taking place in the context of both structural factors and governance arrangements. Any one pattern of fragility has three inter-related components: objective outcomes in terms of the political, economic, social and security functions of the state; subjective perceptions held by key stakeholders of those outcomes; and state-society interactions that result from peoples' reactions to their perception and in turn shape subsequent outcomes. Outcomes shape perceptions, which influences behavior, which comes back to determine outcomes. Although conceptually we could start with any of the three components, we proceed as just presented by starting with findings on outcomes and perceptions, and then we proceed to identify interactions between state and society which constitute patterns of fragility. We look at political, economic, social and security concerns in terms of both effectiveness and legitimacy, as defined previously.

## 3.1 OUTCOMES AND PERCEPTIONS

For each of four dimensions to the Guinean context – political, economic, social and security – we relate qualitative observations about the outcomes of state-society interactions and about people's perceptions of those outcomes in terms of effectiveness and legitimacy.

### 3.1.1 POLITICAL

**Limited voice:** The “rig of the game” inherent in the organization of politics in Guinea seriously dampens citizens' capacity to express their opinions. Positive expressions of support for the Government would presumably be “warmly tolerated,” but expressing negative opinions is deemed as “resisting legitimate government authority.” In any case, despite some freedom of the press, and short-term prospects for improvements through a new GOG bill to “liberalize the media,” citizens' ability to provide negative feedback and “petition for redress of grievances” is seriously limited in contemporary Guinea.

**Absence of the rule of law:** The rule of law in contemporary Guinea is most notable for its absence. Prospects for improvement seem limited, despite the Prime Minister's call in February 2005 for citizens to combat corruption and denounce corrupt civil servants to a government agency and, ultimately, to the judicial system. High judicial officers say they cannot prosecute or try individuals who have not been properly indicted in accord with rule of law norms. While judges are commonly thought to render decisions on a “fee for service” basis, judges' insistence on compliance with rule of law norms cannot be gainsaid. But if citizens fear reprisals, they are unlikely to risk pressing charges either against security forces who abuse their powers or against judges who render corrupt verdicts. For most citizens, judicial recourse does not exist.

**Dormant civil society:** Given the precarious nature of most Guineans' lives and the on-going struggle for survival, few individuals can focus on anything other than coping with the daily challenges of existence. These same circumstances sap the capacity of civil society organizations (CSOs) to attract volunteers. Add serious concerns about CSOs' capacity to protect their members from repression and the likelihood of civil society organizations engaging in effective advocacy nears zero.

Lack of understanding of political rights and responsibilities at multiple levels: Neither the Government, nor civil society institutions, nor the print and electronic media, nor other institutions appear to have invested much effort in clarifying for Guineans their political rights and responsibilities. A small class of lawyers and other elites may know what they can and cannot do, and the nature and limits of officials' authority and powers. But most Guineans lack "civic education," at least concerning offices in their "modern" political system. Whether civic education fares better within ethnic groups was not an issue the Guinea FSA team explored.

### ***Effectiveness***

**Impunity and lack of accountability** characterize operations of the security forces, particularly police units. Uniformed officers regularly engage in shake-down rackets, targeting particularly the private commercial vehicles that constitute a major element of the country's mixed public transportation system. Stories circulate about retired policemen who retain their uniforms so that they can piece out their limited pension income with the proceeds of ad hoc shakedowns. Another example of pervasive corruption derives from the work of an USAID partner, CLUSA, whose staff have been working with local elected officials and Government administrators at the governorate, prefectural and sub-prefectural levels in an effort to convince all parties that LGUs do not have to pay bribes at all three administrative levels to have their LGU budgets approved (without approvals, they cannot expend funds).

**Lack of voice** describes the general political situation. Where rules are uncertain and recourse even more so, challenging officials who abuse their powers and misuse the authority of their offices to extract rents from individuals, firms, groups and collectivities requires either masochism (with little likelihood of success and high probability that challenged officials will demand additional rents even if they do not apply more rigorous sanctions). As most households now suffer the negative impacts of the deteriorating economy and loss of purchasing power, attempting to get recourse against official violations is a luxury that few seem to feel they can afford, particularly given the associated risks.

### ***Legitimacy***

**Lack of knowledge of rights and responsibilities:** Particularly in rural areas, but also in urban popular milieu, few Guineans have a clear sense of their rights and duties under the law. While Guinea possesses a large number of well-crafted institutional designs and laws, and appropriate implementing rules and regulations, this formal rule of law framework rarely applies in practice. In consequence, it is a poor guide to behavior, and is apparently largely ignored by the population, at least in the first instance because people have little sense that formal rules provide them any real means of protecting themselves from predatory officials.

The fact that large numbers of people reportedly believe that the courts are every bit as corrupt as other official institutions, and that court personnel are just as venial, does not encourage citizens to invest in acquiring knowledge of the formal rules (in the absence of rule of law, why learn the laws? Better to focus on the **working rules**: who to bribe, how much to bribe, how best to bargain for a better deal, etc.). In addition, few adult Guineans in rural areas are literate. While many of USAID's partners offer adult literacy programs, they have not capitalized on beneficiaries' new skills by financing and producing regular newsletters or newspapers that could provide information about formal rules in written form. This would enable readers to study and master the details of formal laws and implementing rules and regulations. If backed by appropriate programming in electronic media, e.g., rural radio, a coordinated effort along such lines could help to overcome this endemic weakness. This would not address problems of judicial corruption, but it could begin to impede corrupt practices at local levels (local government units, health centers, schools), where the risks of exercising voice may be more manageable as the work of CLUSA, USAID's Democracy and Governance (DG) partner, has consistently demonstrated.

**The imbalance of power** which results in the current system, and the economic exposures that the majority of citizens confront, combine to keep most Guineans in a disenfranchised state. As most citizens see little prospect of holding officials accountable, the risks of challenging the rule of the dominant Party for Unity and Progress (PUP) are unattractive. The PUP and its military allies have ruled the country since 1984, when Colonel Lansana Conté seized power following the death of Guinea's first president, Ahmed Sékou Touré. Outside observers have challenged the fairness of presidential elections held in 1993, 1998 and 2003; in all cases, opposition parties accused the PUP government of manipulating electoral processes. The consensus of informed observers holds that these accusations were based on real, not imagined, abuses of the electoral process.

### 3.1.2 ECONOMIC

**Double digit inflation:** This issue requires little further discussion. GOG deficit financing of operations exerts a serious negative impact on many aspects of the economy. Guinea suffers inflation, not hyperinflation; even so, unless the situation improves in the near future, prospects for increased foreign investment are not good, and protests are likely. Some observers project inflation running at 22% in 2005, increasing to 27% in 2006.<sup>3</sup> These projections fall below the government's own figure of 28% for 2004, but the trend must be viewed as ominous absent effective measures to right the economy.

**Dependence on a single export commodity:** Guinea reportedly has the world's largest proven reserves of bauxite (30% of global confirmed reserves), in addition to sizeable deposits of diamonds, gold and iron ore. Minerals produce ninety percent (90%) of export earnings, of which 90% in turn derive from bauxite exports. The flagging price of bauxite in international markets has reduced Guinea's hitherto quite reliable mining sector earnings, with a consequent strong negative impact on GOG finances, particularly in light of donors' and funding agencies' withdrawal of budgetary support. Nevertheless, international mining corporations remain interested in increasing their investments in Guinea, typically in enclaves centered on major ore deposits, and in the rail lines that connect those mining sites to ports in Conakry and Kamsar.<sup>4</sup>

**Low-resource mobilization:** Guinea's Minister of Finance reports that customs duties generate 47% of GOG revenues. GOG resource mobilization is otherwise very limited, although personal income and capital gains are, in theory, taxed at 35%.<sup>5</sup> Inadequate budgeting procedures and corruption-riddled taxation procedures leave the GOG with less than adequate control over public finances.

**Significant off-budget transactions:** While difficult to monitor, knowledgeable observers confirm that the Government allocates substantial amounts of public funds without proper accounting procedures. It seems probable that President Conté is responsible for some of these transactions, as he uses budget allocations to reinforce his control over the political system.

---

<sup>3</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit, "Guinea Country Report," December 2004, p. 10.

<sup>4</sup> N.A., N.d.: Unnamed report on Guinea, p. 258, para. 26.

<sup>5</sup> N.A., N.d.: p. 259, para. 35 and 36.

**Expatriate commercial class:** Lebanese and Syrian entrepreneurs (many descended from families who have lived in West Africa for several generations), form the dominant resident economic elite. They have developed working arrangements with officials in the government at multiple levels and are capable of exerting great influence on the domestic economy.

**Increasing poverty:** Throughout Guinea, families dependent for their existence on market goods, particularly staple commodities, confront a growing challenge in putting food on the table.

### ***Effectiveness***

**An economic crisis** has been building for the past two years, as worsening annual inflation rates (14 percent in 2003, 28 percent in 2004, totaling 42 percent inflation over the two-year period) have nearly halved popular purchasing power. People monitor the escalating price of rice – the dietary staple and key price indicator for most Guineans – with mounting dread, particularly in urban areas where most residents lack access to arable, to say nothing of paddy land.

**Uncertainty about the rules of the game** creates numerous opportunities to collect rents in a thoroughly corrupted economy. Lack of clarity about rules means that nearly everyone, including some of the most powerful economic elites, faces uncertainty in calculating the costs of running a household or staying in business.

These same factors **undermine the general economic outlook**, creating a poor climate for investment at all levels, whether for international investors or for domestic, informal sector entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs thus repeatedly fail to create new jobs that would spell economic opportunities for the large numbers of urban under- and unemployed, as well as for the annual waves of university graduates who swell the ranks of the unemployed when they cannot find meaningful jobs. In some instances, university graduates settle on collecting roadside garbage as their best economic opportunity.

### ***Legitimacy***

Endemic corruption figures as the most salient characteristic of Guinea's contemporary economy. Weak economic growth in recent years has left most of the population progressively worse off, and raises serious questions about the government's role in creating and maintaining a less corrupt and more productive framework for economic relations. The current Prime Minister, Mr. Cellou Dalein Diallo, in his maiden speech to the National Assembly in early 2005, highlighted deterioration in the country's economic situation beginning in 2001, with population growth of three percent outstripping economic growth. He outlined plans to reestablish the government's control of its finances and to combat corruption.<sup>6</sup>

## **3.1.3 SOCIAL**

**Inability to fund, manage or support priority sectors:** Deterioration of key public services has reached alarming proportions in many parts of the country. As noted above, health care, education, water supply, and telephone and electrical services have all eroded substantially over the past decade. State failures to

---

<sup>6</sup> Cellou Dalein Diallo, Premier Ministre, "Allocation Prononcee devant l'Assemblée Nationale," Conakry, 8 February 2005, pp. 3-7, 9-11.

fund, manage and support public service organizations, particularly in terms of staffing public schools with adequately trained and paid teachers, ensuring availability of common medicines (e.g., anti-malarials) and replacing aging infrastructure facilities, for instance, water supply systems, before they fail have already imposed considerable costs on Guinea's citizens. Children who graduate from the country's public school system have not acquired the skills to be competitive in Guinea, much less in a global market. In major urban areas families cannot obtain adequate clean water supplies and in rural areas, access to minimal levels of modern health care is, for many, simply unavailable: basic medicines cannot be had at affordable cost.

**Human development indicators** are pretty consistently low.

**Hidden human capital:** Guinea is not without talented people. But many opt not to seek challenging positions in the public sector, where their skills could collectively contribute to significant improvements in social sector performance because such positions are now economically (or politically) unattractive.

### **Effectiveness**

**Services are generally deteriorating** throughout the country.

**Education:** At the primary school level, enrollments have been improving and more girls have been remaining in school. Against these accomplishments – achieved in part through assistance and support provided by USAID partners – one must balance negative developments. The situation in many classrooms is deteriorating. This trend takes two forms. First, classroom enrollments have ballooned to numbers where effective teaching becomes increasingly problematic.<sup>7</sup> Second, primary school teachers, under pressure from persistent inflation that erodes purchasing power of fixed salaries, struggle to make ends. They have sought compensatory salary increases, but the Government has been reluctant to authorize them. Some teachers have ceded to the temptation to use their classes as “captive markets,” where they sell products such as candy at a markup designed to earn them a profit on these transactions. Students' parents complain about such rackets but, fearful that teachers will “punish” students who don't participate, they try to provide their children with the necessary money. USAID partner activities designed to combat such situations, e.g., through Parent-Teacher Associations, have encouraged PTA parent members to monitor classroom activities unannounced – a subtle form of voice, but a powerful one nonetheless, and one which has reportedly improved *teacher* attendance.<sup>8</sup>

**Health:** Health services available to the public have likewise deteriorated. In rural areas, health centers remain operational in many places but availability of common medicines is severely limited. Informants note inflation's negative impact on replacement purchases of foreign drugs: prices charged in rural health centers have not been modified in recent years and, given Guinea's inflated currency, do not suffice to cover replacement costs. Another aspect of this problem in some locations is anchored in corrupt practices. When medical personnel associated with a health center control the flow of state-financed medicines to that center, and are not subject to oversight by a users' committee, they can divert free, state-supplied drugs into their private “pharmacies.” By selling “privatized” public drugs to patients, health personnel realize substantial increments to their annual salaries. Those nominally entitled to free

---

<sup>7</sup> If not truly impossible, with classrooms enrollments reportedly reaching and even exceeding 70 pupils.

<sup>8</sup> Teachers desperate to earn money to keep their families going have been known to abandon their classrooms.

medicines have two unpalatable choices in such situations: find the required funds or go without. But that amounts to a severe increase in the cost of service for no obvious improvement in quality. As health service consumers, for price reasons, opt to forego using drugs, morbidity rates increase, with the usual impacts on family and community welfare and productivity.

In urban areas the situation in **hospitals** is also of concern.

**Potable Water Supply:** Guinea has not kept pace in recent years with the phenomenon of urban sprawl, particularly in new suburbs growing around the capital, Conakry. While developers have created new housing in these settlements, as have squatters, neither the state, nor the state water utility, nor municipal government units have established the water supply and waste water treatment facilities necessary to provide these populations with required services. On the outskirts of Conakry, residents of some communities purchase their household water supplies from individuals who have established control over connections to the urban water supply network. This appears to be a long-term phenomenon, difficult to support under the best of circumstances and even more onerous in the hot season. Furthermore, as multiple donor and funding agencies have ceased supporting Guinea to protest policies and actions, the Government has lacked funds necessary to replace the aging water supply pipe network, some of which apparently dates back to the colonial era and may be rapidly nearing the end of its useful life.

**Electricity** is likewise in short supply in many parts of the country, including the capital city. Guinea has some hydroelectric installations but some at least are not performing to standard through lack of adequate maintenance. The country possesses still other, as yet undeveloped hydroelectric sites. While this potential remains unexploited, too much of the country depends on diesel-fired generators, putting an additional burden on the Guinea's balance of payments situation.

**Telephone:** The government has recently parted ways with the Malaysian telephone company that had been providing service in country. While efforts are envisaged to attract a new service provider with the required technical capacity to upgrade lines and cellular phone service, the country's current investment climate is such that this may not prove easy.

### ***Legitimacy***

Perceptions of legitimacy in social sector activities are more nuanced, in part perhaps because these are somewhat more under the control of citizens and civil society and marginally less influenced by government actions. Many Government interlocutors refer to the "breakdown in morals" that has accompanied the periodic influx in the country's borders areas of refugees fleeing civil unrest in neighboring states (Sierra Leone, Liberia and Ivory Coast). In addition, children who see their parents struggling to cope with a corrupt environment, and those who see their teachers running classroom shakedown rackets, or selling superior grades on key exams, realize that they are not living in a rule of law society and that survival may require kinds of behavior formerly judged unacceptable. But that is the world as they know it. Copying requires ethical as well as political and economic accommodation.

In many parts of Guinean society, ethnic groups' institutional arrangements and rules provide frameworks for both morality and action, and some of those appear still functional. They have presumably suffered, as have most social institutions, but group leaders seem still capable of managing interactions with other groups effectively and maintaining peaceful relationships. Despite frequent commentary in the international media about the "evils of ethnicity," such social units continue to play important roles and they may well, in contemporary Guinea, be among the most important sources of stability and *moral* interactions, as opposed to the "immoral," coping interactions involved in rent seeking. The traditional values of tolerance and respect for hierarchy persist in Guinea, and partially explain the role of ethnic groups in providing stability.

### 3.1.4 SECURITY

**Persistent human rights violations and extortion:** This represents the continuation of violent approaches to politics that date back to the regime of Ahmed Sékou Touré; his willingness to incarcerate and physically eliminate those he considered opponents is well documented.<sup>9</sup>

**Reasonable ability to protect borders, but little combat effectiveness:** Guinea's army has managed, for the most part, to stave off invasions in the period 1995-2004 but those forces were confronting rebel units, many of whom consisted of ill-trained child soldiers. How well they would fare against, e.g., the Ivorian army, is unclear.

**Weak criminal justice system:** The criminal justice system suffers the same kinds of weaknesses that afflict the rest of the judicial system: judges accustomed to taking orders from the executive, rather than serving as an autonomous third branch of government. It has proven nearly impossible to prosecute security force members accused of human rights violations.

Guinea is not a post-conflict state, and this despite the fact that it undeniably exists in a decidedly "bad neighborhood." Recent events in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ivory Coast and Guinea Bissau, all of which share borders with Guinea, reflect breakdowns in state stability and growing state fragility in all four. Domestic conflicts in these countries have either spilled over into Guinea, or sent waves of refugees pouring over the borders into Guinea. At one point in 2000, refugee numbers were calculated at ten percent (10%) of Guinea's population. Yet the country has managed to avoid wholesale invasion and the outbreak of civil war.

In this assessment, the term "security" covers both national defense and public safety. The armed forces consist of the Army, Navy, Air Force and the 1,500-officer *Gendarmerie*. The Presidential Guard (Red Berets) figures as part of the Army. The total security force numbers about 18,000 (of which 13,000 in army units). The Air Force and the Navy number less than 1,000 each. The joint forces commander reports directly to President Conté, who wears a second hat as the Minister of Defense. A *Chef de Cabinet* manages the Ministry's day-to-day operations. Until recently, there were no generals in the forces. After the 2000-2001 border war, the President promoted several senior officers to that grade.

The Ministry of Security oversees the police. The combined police force comprises traffic, intelligence, and riot police, the anti-gang brigade, and specialized units for diplomatic protection. In response to his role in police rent seeking, a Minister of Security was recently sacked. A concerted expose campaign by one of Guinea's more outspoken weekly newspapers apparently contributed to this outcome.

#### **Effectiveness**

Effective security forces must be able to deliver. They must prevent and solve crimes, protect borders, and provide a basic level of safety and security for the population. They should be well trained and educated, understand their roles, and operate effectively, both as individuals and as members of units. Military and paramilitary forces should be able to deploy efficiently against enemy forces or militia, understand the rules of engagement, and exercise effective command and control in the field. Civilian

---

<sup>9</sup> La Verité du Ministre is but a single example in this regard. Most Guinean families, however, lost members during the Touré regime.

police should be deployed in light of crime rates and population numbers; be responsive to requests for assistance; and protect vulnerable groups within the community (particularly women and minorities).

Informants repeatedly emphasized their concerns that Guinea continue to avoid the fate of its neighbors. To achieve this end, they have been willing to support Guinea's security forces (see *infra*). President Conté has voiced satisfaction with the results of US Department of Defense-provided training for a battalion of Guinean rangers who have subsequently been deployed on the country's borders adjacent to hotspots. The return of a semblance of peace in Sierra Leone, and Charles Taylor's removal from Liberia, have reduced pressures, but the civil war in Ivory Coast has not been resolved and poses a potential threat. In the face of U.S. unwillingness to repeat the ranger training exercise, the Guinean Government has reportedly turned to the Chinese seeking similar military training for additional members of its armed services.

- Following the successful 2000-2001 routing of Liberian-backed incursions, Guineans perceived Guinean military forces (particularly the Rangers) as highly effective (although their "shock and awe" tactics may have contributed to the destruction of the city of Gueckédou in the Forest Region). National pride in the ability of the military to successfully repel incursions remains substantial. The GOG refused to allow the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to intervene because they didn't want the Liberian incursion to end in a settlement that would cost them national territory. Yet using its own forces to repel the invaders meant that Guinea's deficit spending rose significantly, unleashing serious inflation.
- The US-provided Ranger training helped to establish an elite battalion (approximately 800 strong) whose members the NGO community has praised for their respect for human rights. Deployed along the borders, the battalion continues to fulfill its stated mission, although threats from adjacent countries have greatly diminished. Its physical location keeps it far from the center of political gravity.
- Increased military funding (at the expense of other government priorities) has continued unabated since 2000, even as external threats have declined.
- Given events in the general neighborhood and despite recent Ranger achievements, many Guineans probably live with a prevailing sense of insecurity
- The Guinean police do not enjoy the same reputation for effectiveness. For the most part, the population considers police forces (and the entire criminal justice system) useless. Policing appears problematic. Many observers note rising levels of violent crime, and popular frustration with the Government's inability to address this issue effectively finds expression in the media as well as, presumably, in popular conversations.

### ***Legitimacy***

Security forces have "succeeded" in protecting the country from external violence, but domestic crime is rising. The GOG has used armed forces to suppress street demonstrations, and popular perceptions of Guinea's police forces depict them as engaging regularly in corrupt activities with almost total impunity.

In general, legitimate security services respect democratic political processes and civilian authority; remain apolitical even under stress; respect human rights; do not use their positions (or weapons) to influence political or economic decisions or private business; and support recognized regulatory and legal standards. There is a clear divide between military (external) security and police (internal) security. The chain of command for each should be distinct, clearly established and subject to regular oversight.

With respect to legitimacy, there is also a clear divide between military forces and police. The military's success in 2001 and ensuing emphasis on the pattern of interaction associated with territorial integrity boosted the military's prestige. The fact that many people look to the military to maintain stability should President Conté die indicates a general level of acceptance and legitimacy that dates back to the military's role in the 1984 transition. Dissenters by contrast illustrate the military's illegitimacy with references to their suppression of political demonstrations, domineering attitudes and rents they collect from private businesses. The police are largely regarded as completely incapable of providing the public good of public safety and unaccountable to the rule of law. With external threats now moderating, the greatest physical threat to the Guinean people may well be the predatory behavior of its own security forces.<sup>10</sup>

Interviewees cited *gendarmerie* roadblocks throughout the country as a major impediment to freedom of movement and as means of extracting bribes. The PM recently ordered them dismantled; it is unclear how long his decision will be respected.

Traffic police regularly use shake-downs to supplement their low salaries. Citing sometimes spurious violations, police demand instant bribes from drivers. Those who object may be taken into custody. Absent the rule of law, many drivers see no point in obtaining required papers for their vehicles since they expect to be penalized on the road even if their papers (and vehicles) are in order.

- Recently, shakedowns have become more overt: money passes hands openly, whereas formerly it was transferred inside folders or envelopes (a soft indicator of the ubiquity of corruption?).
- As police pension payments are distributed irregularly and do not allow officers to maintain their living standards, retired police may continue to walk "their" beats or patrol "their" corners to extract supplemental income.
- Massive funding shortages have hamstrung basic police training. An interviewee reported new recruits receive a month or two worth of training, rather than the year-long Academy course designed for them. Younger police officers have little training in the law or in their specific duties.
- Military and gendarmes use excessive force to suppress popular expressions of discontent such as student demonstrations, marches, etc.
- The military is not combat effective. It repelled the rebels through shock and awe by obliterating the area with air strikes. Even the Ranger battalion will likely show signs of weakening, as there is no reserve force, no rotation cycle, little on-going training, and significant maintenance and logistical challenges (one source indicated that the Chinese have stepped in to continue training).
- The recent Togo succession crisis has compelled the citizenry to reflect on the prospect of a military takeover after Conté's death.

---

<sup>10</sup> On the eve of the Battle of Waterloo, the Duke of Wellington remarked of the English army—whom he also described as "the scum of the earth"—"I don't know if they will scare the enemy, but they sure as God scare me."

## 3.2 STATE-SOCIETY INTERACTIONS AND PATTERNS OF FRAGILITY

The team identified five distinct *patterns of fragility* that flow from conditions identified through analysis of the PESSSEL spheres, governance arrangements and structural factors. Among these, 1) the **dominant pattern is rent seeking**: it appears to shape much of what Guineans do and how they, particularly officials, think about what they do. It involves the effort to extract “unearned” income, or rents, through the exploitation of positions of public authority. Closely allied, in terms of functional links that justify rent seeking is (2) *a commitment to preserving the territorial integrity of the country*, which justifies a variety of behaviors that help consolidate patterns of rent seeking. (3) *Respect for tradition* supports the core authority of the president, which likewise effectively reinforces patterns of rent seeking behavior. To combat adverse consequences of rent seeking, the president has mandated (4) *intermittent reform efforts*. When these undermine the logic of rent seeking and the patron client relationships that rent seeking supports in Guinea, reforms to date have been “neutralized” and then shelved. The upshot has been pronounced patterns of 5) *popular disengagement and risk aversion*.

### 3.2.1 RENT SEEKING

Rent seeking establishes and reinforces perverse behaviors that lead to even more perverse outcomes. Rent seeking involves using formal rules to create points of discretion. These can be thought of as “veto points,” i.e., decisions that officials can make to either permit, explicitly authorize, refuse or condemn a proposed action or initiative. Those who need an approval and know that the official in charge can say “no” have a strong incentive to motivate him or her to say “yes.” Under the circumstances, the official’s positive response is generally delivered as a quid pro quo for a monetary or other valuable inducement.

Official discretion is thus used to generate personal economic benefits for the official who holds the authority to make the desired decision. Another variant of rent seeking is to use official discretion to “reward clients.” By authorizing a client to engage in a particular action, the official, acting as patron, in effect creates a debt on the part of the client which the latter will be expected to honor in the future by providing some service the patron desires, e.g., mobilizing electoral support. Within this logic of patron-client relationships, public resources then become “fair game” for privatization. A significant proportion of the populace attaches little moral opprobrium to diverting public resources to private ends, as long as the patron who successfully appropriates public money shares a “reasonable amount” with his clients.

This system of allocating public resources creates enormous economic inefficiencies and distortions. The point is clearly *not* to structure the allocation of public resources in ways that engender economic development, but rather to use any captured public resources (as well as any private resources that the patron can acquire through legitimate or illegitimate means) to reinforce the patron’s “clout” or political power so that s/he is better positioned to succeed in the next rounds of competition among patrons for new clients, for public office, and for control of other rent-generating posts. But resource allocation decisions, driven by a concern to create rent seeking opportunities, rarely if ever promote investments that lead to more efficient economic interactions.

While perverse when viewed from the perspective of long-term, sustainable economic development, the logic of politics as a means of gaining access to rent-extraction opportunities is, within the context of patron-client systems, compelling.

One particularly destructive outcome of rent seeking as a dominant pattern of behavior is that it reduces politics to a decidedly “zero sum” game. Since the point of engaging in politics is to establish control over resources that can be used to consolidate client loyalty to the generous patron, there is no room in such systems for a “loyal opposition.” The “loyal opposition” concept implies that both majority and

opposition are better off for tolerating each other. But allocating rent seeking opportunities to opposition patron politicians who will predictably use them to attract the clients they need to establish a winning coalition makes no sense to the current majority. Their best strategy is to “starve out” the opposition.

Those who support this system of patron-client politics are those who can “make it work.” Note that the concept covers a wide range of actors and is not limited only to the elites who can aspire to the status of patrons. In the short-run optic of survival and coping strategies that most Guinean adults find themselves compelled to follow in order to sustain their families, hooking up with a generous, successfully predatory patron is a very desirable outcome. A “good” patron will not only provide his/her clients with intermittent though reasonably regular flows of resources, but will also provide political cover, support and succor (*insurance*) when a client suffers an unpredictable personal set-back or disaster (e.g., death or illness in the family, or necessity of providing a bribe to some other official such as a traffic policeman, a hospital official or a judge, intent on raising rents to satisfy that patron’s clients or keep that official’s family afloat in the face of persistent inflation and inadequate salaries).

### **3.2.2 PROTECTION OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY**

This term refers to the second persistent pattern of interaction identified in Guinea. In order to preserve its borders and territorial integrity from external military challenge and to maintain internal order, Guinea requires strong security forces (armed forces and police). This, in turn, implies that security forces, particularly the army, must be the dominant force in the country. Keeping the security forces happy implies reassuring them that their needs and wants will be reliably covered.

If the President is to meet this policy goal, he needs to maintain the status quo, rent seeking regime, which enables him to control enough resources to reward key clients in the security forces. The need to protect the existing system of resource mobilization (through persistent, consistent presidential rent seeking at all levels), which vests in the President very broad (unfettered?) discretion in the allocation of resources, creates a built-in anti-reform bias. Successfully combating overt corruption and other forms of rent seeking would, in all likelihood, undermine or reduce the president’s access to the resources he requires, as the paramount “patron of patrons,” to co-opt potential opponents and reward loyal supporters. Thus externally initiated reform efforts would presumably be categorized as dangerous and undesirable, simply as a function of their source. By implication, domestic “reform initiatives” can more safely be tolerated, particularly if the President has the capacity to quash them if they become “dangerous,” that is, begin to threaten the continuing flow of rents upon which the President depends as the oil that enables the Guinean political machine to function reliably.

The territorial integrity pattern of behavior has produced a generation gap in the military. Pension funds, as public funds, are subject to looting by the logic of rent seeking. Military officers on active duty, by contrast with retired military officers, know that they will reliably receive their salaries and a string of other benefits that may be as or more valuable, for instance, access to the staple commodity rice at heavily subsidized prices. In short, active duty officers have no incentive to retire. This closes off for younger officers the usual opportunities for advancement. Even the relatively junior grades in the security force command structures are occupied by superannuated officers.

Those who support this particular pattern of interaction include the current military leadership as well as most members of the military.

Those who benefit from the economic aspects of this pattern of behavior, in the form of rents that can be acquired through participation, include the President’s inner circle of economic advisors, and the political

barons who occupy leadership positions within the Party of Unity and Progress (PUP). Those associated at all levels with the PUP also count as supporters of the “territorial integrity” pattern of interaction.

### **3.2.3 INTERMITTENT REFORM AND COUNTER-REFORM**

This pattern of interaction is, at its title suggests, a recurring phenomenon. There are, however, fairly clear conditions or sets of factors that initiate reforms and lead to their termination. Reform coalitions, and the reform efforts they support, typically emerge when two conditions prevail. First, Guinea’s security is unthreatened in the sense that potential external and domestic threats are both minimal and viewed as manageable. Secondly, the country faces an economic crisis or interlinked set of crises.<sup>11</sup>

Reform efforts end, conversely, when threats emerge e.g., the 2000/2001 incursion by Liberian military units. The rent seeking regime is seen, probably accurately, to be at real risk from reform efforts.

The intermittent reform pattern of interaction is supported by two groups of actors, those who might be styled “true reformers,” for example the current Prime Minister, His Excellency Dalein Cellou Diallo who, as an economist, appears to have a thorough grasp of the threat to Guinea’s future posed by the current set of institutional arrangements and the outcomes they produce; and “strategic supporters,” those who, for one reason or another see it in their interest to support a particular reform initiative, perhaps because they see it as enabling them to eliminate political rivals or capture new rent seeking opportunities. Insofar as such individuals are already anchored in and loyal to the logic of the prevailing system, they would presumably be extraordinarily sensitive to threats to perpetuation of the rent seeking system and thus inclined to back away from reform efforts that might modify the status quo. Reform coalitions, insofar as they are composed of these two types of supporters, are inherently unstable because one group seeks real change while the other is typically fully satisfied by “window dressing” reforms and indeed opposes real changes.

### **3.2.4 TRADITIONAL RESPECT FOR AUTHORITY**

This pattern of authority involves unquestioning adherence to and acceptance of traditional roles and relationships within the context of popular religious beliefs and cultural arrangements. In many African societies, Guinea among them, people support the idea and the practice of chieftaincy. Many in popular milieus in Guinea, moreover, appear to accept the idea that individuals become and remain chiefs by God’s will. Men may vote, or carry out military coups, or engage in other forms of leadership recruitment, but those who succeed and hold onto office do so, fundamentally, because God accords them his sanction.

This structure of beliefs provides a stabilizing influence within Guinea through the pattern of hierarchical relations that characterize the society as well as the full range of ethnic communities. Nonetheless, these beliefs comprise a downside. They limit voice, insofar as people believe that challenging the President (and his party) at some level also amounts to challenging God.

---

<sup>11</sup> For example, foreign exchange earnings from mineral exports are seen to be producing resource flows inadequate to sustain the Guinean political machine. If – as is currently the case – assistance partners (bilateral donors and NGOs as well as multilateral development banks) have withdrawn their budgetary support, an economic crisis exists.

This “divine right” assumption about chieftaincy works to exonerate the President, who is excused in the popular mind both for the Government’s ineffectiveness in addressing critical public problems and for the rampant rent seeking (“corruption”) about which most Guineans hold decidedly negative opinions, and this although the President, as paramount patron, is the key actor in the Guinean political machine.

This set of assumptions obviously limits Guinea’s willingness (and capacity) to address core problems linked to the persistent poverty and falling standards of living about which the bulk of the population complains. This pattern of interaction derives its support, in particular, from the President, from his inner circle, from the PUP leaders who benefit from their on-going hold on political posts that allow them to seek rents with great voracity and efficacy. In addition, it would appear that many traditional and religious elites see it in their interest to support this pattern of interaction.

### **3.2.5 POPULAR DISENGAGEMENT AND RISK AVERSION**

A final marked, persistent pattern of interaction within Guinean society is persistent popular disengagement and risk aversion. People have few illusions about the limits within which they must function. People may be described as “fatalistic,” but “realistic” would be a better adjective. Citizens simply do not have effective recourse, other than seeking protection and support from a patron or others in their extended families, but that simply reinforces the power and the logic of Guinea’s political machine. People’s experiences and their analyses of their experiences and those of others, leads them to the conclusion that they lack options. They are decision takers, not makers, and they have very restricted margins of maneuver. They have to cope.

In the popular mind, the cost of civic engagement would appear usually to exceed the benefits that one might reasonably expect to derive from such actions. People know that they are exposed to repression and that those who repress them ordinarily do so with impunity. Officials are not subject to meaningful administrative, political or judicial oversight. For the powerful and wealthy, repression poses less of a threat. But without those advantages, challenging abuses can be quixotic. This is not to say that no Guineans are willing to take risks and to push for reforms. But the rig of the game is against civic mindedness on the part of *individuals acting as individuals*.

*Collective or group actions* offer more promising means of opposing repression and seeking recourse against abuses. A number of USAID/Guinea partners have incorporated this insight into implementation of their activities; they invest substantial time and effort in organizing beneficiaries. The Cooperative League of the United States of America (CLUSA) most aggressively promotes collective action. CLUSA agents work to encourage Guineans, as citizens of local governments, to organize to supervise the actions of LGU officials and demand accountability of them. They appear to have had considerable success in that regard, which creates, within such LGUs, a more positive framework for development activities. World Education and its subcontractors in the education sector have sought, with apparent equal success to promote formation and operation of parent teacher associations, which have the salutary effect of subjecting teachers to a modest degree of oversight. Parent Teacher Association members appear, for instance, unannounced in classrooms. They monitor whether teachers are present and performing their duties. At least in some settings, teachers have come to value parental involvement because it enables them to solve pressing problems – maintenance of classroom facilities, for instance – which would otherwise go unattended. And Management Science for Health has encouraged formation of oversight committees for health centers, for the same reasons: group action enables Guineans to take risks that would otherwise be unthinkable in demanding effective performance of civil servants and officials.

While these collective initiatives count as positive developments, most Guineans, in most circumstances where they are compelled to function as individuals rather than as members of groups, respond to the

risks of a decidedly dangerous and unwelcoming environment by withdrawing from the public sphere to focus on individual and family strategies for survival.

This politically-motivated pattern of popular withdrawal is reinforced by the exorbitant cost of economic activity. Economic uncertainties abound: property rights are insecure in a regime not of laws but of (armed) men who can largely act with impunity. Added to the unpredictable nature of tenure and property rights are the uncertainties associated with on-going inflation.

This combination of political and economic insecurity translates in many situations into an inability to mobilize Guineans, absent consistent and enduring efforts to sponsor frameworks for collective action. This clearly limits the ability of either the Government or its development partners to promote economic and political development.

### **3.2.6 EXPLAINING FRAGILITY**

Taken as a whole – the structural factors, the weak governance arrangements, and the five patterns of fragility (rent seeking, protection of territorial integrity, intermittent reform and counter-reform, traditional respect for authority, and popular disengagement and risk aversion) form a coherent description of a fragile state with no basis for transformational development. The fact that many Guineans are economically too marginalized to accept the risks implied in supporting political reforms enhances the “inertia” of the current system. These patterns of interaction and the institutional arrangements upon which they depend have an internal coherence that leaves them *not impervious to reform, but clearly resistant to it*. The patterns of clienteles found in Guinea and associated directly or indirectly with many of these patterns of interaction, for instance, appear to provide just enough insulation for the marginalized that “coping” remains preferable to confrontation. But this systemic inertia generates significant long-term negative consequences in terms of economic, political and social development. Even the “benefit” of territorial integrity is at risk, if conditions deteriorate any further. If the belief in traditional authorities weakens, and patron-client networks begin to fail, in the sense that patrons lack the resources necessary to help clients cope, the stability that currently characterizes Guinea could conceivably give way to more dynamic forms of protest and/or resistance.

## 4. ENTRY POINTS

The second task in FAST requires mapping key actors in terms of the possibilities that they could help or hinder reform and reduction of fragility as well as identifying sensitive time periods – windows of opportunity and vulnerability – when patterns of fragility may be affected.

### 4.1 STAKEHOLDER MAPPING - REFORMERS, SPOILERS AND OPPORTUNITIES

At this juncture in the assessment, FAST looks at the key actors within each of the patterns of fragility and resilience and determines their motivations and means for affecting the country's fragility. Mapping key actors creates a more personalized view of the structural factors, governance arrangements, state-society interactions, outcomes, and legitimacy and effectiveness documented in previous steps.<sup>12</sup> By delving into the patterns in this way, the team can provide a deeper understanding of the country's situation.

#### 4.1.1 RENT SEEKING

The principal purpose of politics in Guinea is resource appropriation where a group in power controls public funds and uses these funds to reward political, military, and private support. This “patron-client” network creates a self-sustaining pattern of fragility that undermines a true political opposition. Majority and minority groups are better off tolerating each other rather than reforming a corrupt system because despite the inefficiencies and challenges of such a system, rent seeking is too difficult to change, and at present it is the only way to affect change.

President Lansana Conté is the most important player in the pattern of rent seeking, sometimes appearing as a reformer and at other times as a spoiler. For twenty years, he has maintained political control and strong military support through the rent seeking process. In 2003, he appeared as a “reformer” to Guinea's corrupt executive, legislative, and judicial system by appointing an anticorruption committee. However, Conté may be the strongest “spoiler” to any true reform as rent seeking fuels his power. He disbanded the anti-corruption committee following the 2003 presidential election. Also, his fragile health is creating a political vacuum in the country.

The general population can be considered as both potential reformers and spoilers. Many Guineans expect and support their politicians in the embezzlement of state funds as it assures political power and enables the public official to pay back his supporters with attained spoils. On the other hand, many Guineans live under extremely harsh conditions and would welcome reforms that lead to improved living conditions. A national dialogue would not only make public officials aware of the necessity of political reform but would also inform and engage the general public.

---

<sup>12</sup> For more detail, please refer to Annex XX, which provides pattern-actor map charts.

Certain members of the PUP party, the controlling party, are already seeking reform, even though the present system fuels their own political clout. Appointed by Conté himself, Prime Minister Cellou Dalein Diallo called for citizens to combat corruption and denounce corrupt civil servants. Diallo is an economist who falls into the “true reformer” category as he appears to perceive the threat that the current institutional arrangements and outcomes pose to the economy and nation. Although Diallo is major political player, he does not have a large local support base. The military would be unlikely to support him as a successor to Conté, as his reforms run counter to their vested interests in the status quo in Guinea.<sup>13</sup>

A second major PUP reformer is Kiridi Bangoura, the Minister of Territorial Administration and Decentralization, who is in charge of political reforms. He has followed Diallo’s lead and urged the political opposition to re-engage with the Government to clarify the terms and conditions of political competition within the country. At 42, he represents a new generation of leaders, but veteran politicians still see him as too young for leadership, and the military is unlikely to support him if he presses reform.

Even so, as members of the controlling party these PUP reformers represent the most viable window of opportunity for reform. Backed by economic and political power, these actors are willing to use their influence to induce change in Guinea. Their current standing endows these actors with the power to negotiate.

### ***Opposition Parties as Reformers***

Opposition parties in Guinea have a history of being weak and fractured, owing to both political repression and their inability to unite against the dominant ruling party. Only 6 of over 40 registered political parties in Guinea are represented in parliament. There had been an attempt to form an opposition coalition, the Front Républicain pour l'Alternance Démocratique (FRAD), ahead of the 2003 presidential election. However, the FRAD failed to unite behind a single presidential candidate. The opposition boycotted the past elections leading to a landslide victory for Conté obtaining 95% of the popular vote.

One of the most prominent opposition figures is Alpha Condé, leader of the Rassemblement du Peuple de Guinée (RPG), who returned July 3, 2005 from his self-imposed exile in Paris. Condé, a presidential candidate in 1998, was imprisoned on charges of sedition and fled to Paris upon his early release in 2001. He has continued to run the RPG from Paris and returned to Guinea in light of the current political vacuum developing and rising public frustration. Despite his long absence, Condé was greeted by thousands of people who lined the streets on his return.<sup>14</sup>

Additional important opposition figures are Sidya Touré and Jean-Marie Doré. Sidya Touré is a businessman and a former cabinet director for Alassane Ouattara, a former prime minister of Côte d'Ivoire. He was nominated to the newly created position of prime minister in 1996 and, in 1998, returned to private life. Today, he leads the Union des Forces Républicaines (UFR). Jean-Marie Doré is the leader of Union pour le Progrès en Guinée (UPG) and a veteran opposition leader. He is the only politician of

---

<sup>13</sup>[http://www.viewswire.com/index.asp?layout=VWArticleVW3&article\\_id=189511004&region\\_id=&country\\_id=550000055&channel\\_id=210004021&category\\_id=&refm=vwCh&page\\_title=Article](http://www.viewswire.com/index.asp?layout=VWArticleVW3&article_id=189511004&region_id=&country_id=550000055&channel_id=210004021&category_id=&refm=vwCh&page_title=Article)

<sup>14</sup> Ibid

any consequence with roots in the Guinée Forestière region and gained prominence by his strongly worded criticisms of Conté. His criticism has led to periods of detention.<sup>15</sup>

### ***Potential Spoilers***

The military forces are potential spoilers of reform, and may, under certain circumstances, even seek a military successor after Conté. The military significantly influence social and political sectors of the country as the backbone of President Conté's regime. Any major political reform would diminish the power and wealth the military currently possesses and therefore it favors the status quo.

Non-reformist members of Party for Unity and Progress (PUP) are also potential spoilers. Their party not only controls the executive and the Cabinet, but also 85 of 114 seats in the National Assembly (the UPR controls 20 and 5 are split between other political parties). As the largest political shareholders, many PUP officials are likely to defend their power and the rent-seeking cycle. However, the division in their political party has weakened their power. The threat of a military successor to Conté is another window of opportunity as they may be open to a national dialogue as well.

### ***Opportunities***

The police are under-trained and under-paid and seek change. They report to the Minister of Security, not the Minister of Defense (President Conté). They seek support and incentives, including higher wages, but also improved training and working conditions. Engaging this group through a national dialogue is a window of opportunity. However, as the police seek a stronger standing in the country, spoilers may also weaken the reform impetus of this group through rent seeking.

The exclusion of these parties and political figures is worsening. While their boycotting tactics merely resulted in an even more reduced political opposition, political tension is growing and the risk of violent uprisings increases daily. A national dialogue would not only give these actors a voice in the future of Guinea but may also avoid potentially violent demonstrations and uprisings.

## **4.1.2 PROTECTION OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY**

The pattern of protecting territorial integrity "at all costs" implies a symbiotic relationship of tactic support between key actors in Guinean society (broadly speaking, the military elites, politic elites and the general public). In order to stave off external threats, the military must not only be strong, but also have necessary financial resources at hand. In order for the military to not use its power to overthrow the government, the government must give the military what it wants. This relationship is clear in the fact that increased military funding, at the expense of other government priorities, has continued unabated since 2000, even as external threats have declined.

Maintaining this system is to the benefit of political elites and the military. Both sides of the equation would lose if this system were to change dramatically. It is unlikely that political elites or the military would change any aspect of the system that may lessen their advantages. Other beneficiaries of this pattern include entrepreneurs, foreign investors, and citizens in general. Clearly, border integrity is crucial to avoid the disastrous fate of neighbors.

---

<sup>15</sup> Ibid

With such entrenched desires to maintain the status quo, USAID has limited programming options. However, there are still entry points to build mutual confidence between military and civilian leaders to forestall a military intervention during succession through civil-military training to promote national dialogue. In such circumstances, key military and political leaders can come together to understand each others' positions and preferences better, as a way of creating social capital indispensable for meaningful dialogue and action when the time for political change and possible reform arises. This dialogue would in turn support the current Prime Minister's reform agenda.

In addition, USAID could engage Guinean and civil society partners within the region and the GOG to work regionally on conflict management and mitigation.

#### **4.1.3 INTERMITTENT REFORM AND COUNTER-REFORM**

Reform coalitions, and the reform efforts they support, typically emerge when two conditions prevail. First, Guinea's security is unthreatened (potential external and domestic threats are both minimal and viewed as manageable); and second, the country faces an economic crisis or interlinked set of crises.

There are a few "true reformers", most notably the current Prime Minister Mr. Diallo. Various other "strategic supporters" exist, who see it in their interest to support particular reform initiatives perhaps because they see it as enabling them to eliminate political rivals or capture new rent seeking opportunities. It should be noted that any reform coalition is inherently unstable.

With the notable exception of the Prime Minister, there is very limited political will to address core problems through reform; most support comes in the form of "window dressing" to meet donor conditionality. The military also has little will to change or support reform agendas.

With regard to economic actors, there is clear willingness to reform economic structures within Guinea to promote change, stability, fairness and predictability in economic regulation, practices and policies. Although most businesspeople, entrepreneurs and investors seek such change, there are a few clear spoilers in the current economic system, notably Mamadou Sylla, who is Guinea's richest man and close personal friend of President Conte. In this circumstance, USAID can leverage economic actors throughout the marketing chain of commodity without political sensitivities, such as cashews, and also continue ongoing Treasury work on budgets. In addition, USAID can focus on improving livelihoods and developing local market linkages.

#### **4.1.4 RESPECT FOR TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY**

As the most culturally ingrained pattern of behavior, this pattern includes all members of Guinean society. At the top, this pattern works to exonerate the President's behavior. As an extension, this behavior also permits Presidential supporters to partake in rent seeking. Despite this, reformers do exist, as mentioned above in the activities of the current Prime Minister and others. However, as explained prior, political elites not only acquiesce to the President, but also derive considerable benefits as recipients themselves of traditional respect.

As it is unclear who specific reformers or spoilers are in this circumstance, USAID can increase opportunities for political competition, especially in joining forces with other donors and harmonizing programming. This includes promoting fair and competitive local and legislative elections. To do so, USAID can program for competent election administration, development of pragmatic and non-ethnic platforms and insist on a level playing field during electoral contests.

In addition, USAID can target normal citizens who have little voice in Guinean society, and few resources to elicit change. In this regard, key actors would be local governments and civil society organizations working at the grassroots level. Thus, USAID should continue its work at the community and local government levels to increase citizens and officials understanding of their rights and responsibilities in all sectors where the mission has programs.

#### 4.1.5 POPULAR DISENGAGEMENT AND RISK AVERSION

This pattern of behavior can best be understood as a game against civic mindedness on the part of individuals acting as individuals; the cost of civic engagement usually exceeds the benefits that one might expect to receive. Lack of voice describes the general political situation. Where rules are uncertain and possibility of recourse even more so, people are extremely unlikely to challenge officials who abuse their powers and misuse the authority of their offices.

Most citizens wish to reform this system of persistent apathy and powerlessness. However, the fact that many Guineans are economically too marginalized to accept the risks implied in supporting political reforms enhances the “inertia” of the system. They are not impervious to reform, but clearly resistant to it. Thus, incentives for risk taking must be offered for regular citizens to take a stand or become politically involved in their communities; USAID cannot count on the support of civil society organizations already in existence—they are weak and the likelihood of their engagement is minimal. USAID programming must emphasize collective or group actions to provide citizens with a method of recourse and oversight. Also, USAID can support outreach initiatives that highlight and clarify citizens’ roles and responsibilities, as well as low risk ways that they can play those roles and act on their responsibilities. At the broader political level, USAID should continue to support the budgetary review process both within the Ministry of Finance and at the National Assembly.

#### 4.1.6 SUMMARY OF RISKS

**Change will produce competition, winners/losers and instability.** This statement carries a heavy burden of implications for assistance efforts in Guinea. If change can be expected to produce competition, new winners and losers and, ultimately, instability, it implies that those who are already on or close to the edge may find that they have serious reservations about “change.” They may agree intellectually about the desirability of putting a new, more responsive system in place but, psychologically, they may be unable to commit to “getting there,” i.e., accepting the new levels of risk that change implies.

At the same time, if reforms and associated changes are accepted and do take root, then traditional patterns of authority, power and organization may lose their collective capacity to control and manage tensions within the Guinean political, social, economic, and security spheres. Collective action groupings might, over time, supplant patrons as sources of security and support for individuals and families, but that will require very substantial institutional innovations and reshaping of existing moral frameworks. Such adjustments are by no means impossible – the work of CLUSA and other partners reveals that average Guineans are indeed quite open to exploring and adopting new modes of organization if they believe that they can manage the risks involved and that the benefits of change outweigh the costs. They have to work carefully through those calculations, however, or take the chance that in embracing change, they put their families at risk.

## 4.2 NEAR-TERM WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY

A reform period has begun with President Conté's appointment of a reform-minded prime minister on December 9, 2004.

Guinea's new Prime Minister, Cellou Dalein Diallo, in his first (8 February 2005) speech as prime minister to the National Assembly, announced that the President had given him a reform mandate. The Prime Minister's reform program comprises four interlinked themes:

1. Re-establish a macro-economic equilibrium and bring the country's escalating deficit under control.
2. Improve the provision of key public services, notably water supply, electricity and telephone.
3. Improve the quality of governance and take action against corruption.
4. Take action against HIV/AIDS.

### 4.2.1 EFFORTS TO RE-ENGAGE DONORS, ESPECIALLY IFIS, AND POLITICAL OPPOSITION

A key effort implied by the first Reform theme is to reestablish working relationships with a variety of donors and financing organizations that have suspended their programs and withdrawn financing from Guinea over the past several years. Among these are the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the European Union, all three of which had been providing Guinea with substantial budgetary support.

The Prime Minister's program appears coherent. The question is whether he can finesse the kinds of changes he projects as indispensable while simultaneously maintaining a working relationship with and the confidence of the President. A number of observers are following developments with keen interest.

The Bretton Woods institutions and the European Union have established five benchmarks which they insist must be respected if they are to resume their assistance support and financing:

**International Monetary Fund staff monitoring plan:** This involves an International Monetary Fund (IMF) team establishing a series of detailed performance criteria that Guinea must successfully meet for an as yet undetermined period of time (most probably six or nine months) before the IMF will conclude that a resumption of support is justified. An IMF team was scheduled to arrive in Guinean in late March 2005 to initiate talks with the government on the staff monitoring plan.

**Media liberalization:** The European Union has taken the lead in insisting that Guinea liberalize its print and electronic media so that, among other things, opposition political parties can obtain fair access to the air waves, newspaper and magazines. In early March 2005 the government reported it was finalizing the required bills which would shortly be approved. Once they are it will remain to be demonstrated that the country's judicial system (or other decision makers) will apply the new rules in any future instances of dispute involving opposition parties or news organs.

**Anti-corruption measures taken:** The Prime Minister's government will have to follow through on its commitment to combat corruption. As corruption links tightly to a range of rent seeking activities – *the dominant* pattern of interaction in the country – progress on this front will signal not only real political

will on the part of the Prime Minister, but President Conté's commitment to supporting him in this endeavor. In his speech to the National Assembly, the Prime Minister invited Guineans to denounce those who engage in corruption and pleaded with officials *not* to use their personal connections to have cases dropped against officials indicted and brought before the courts. While this program builds on the Prime Minister's anti-corruption message, it remains to be seen, in a country where most citizens feel marginalized, where the police – according to high judicial officials – are poorly trained, where many judges may well be corrupt or corruptible, and where personal relationships are powerful, whether many Guineans (much less a critical mass) will accept the Prime Minister's invitation to denounce corrupt actions. Questions of legal proof may play a major role in influencing people's responses. It seems implausible that those who accuse officials of corruption will be easily able to provide legally valid proof of corrupt activities, unless they bear witness against themselves. For obvious reasons, that seems improbable.

**Political consensus on conduct of local elections:** Bilateral donors, e.g., USAID and Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), as well as the European Union, have all made clear the importance they assign to free and fair elections for LGU offices before the end of calendar 2005 (as well as for subsequent legislative and presidential elections). The EU has conditioned resumption of its assistance on a finding of free and fair elections. The GOG spokesman on this point, the Honorable Kiridi Bangoura, Minister of Territorial Administration and Decentralization, has in his turn emphasized the Government's commitment both to holding LGU elections before year's end and to having opposition parties participate fully in those elections. Minister Bangoura, following Prime Minister Diallo's lead, has pressed opposition party leaders to re-engage with the Government to clarify the terms and conditions of political competition within the country. While opposition party leaders, based on the Government's performance in past elections, remain somewhat skeptical, almost all have now joined the talks, which seem to be making progress.

**Transparent local elections:** Transparent local elections will depend, in part, on updating local electoral rolls. Several donors, notably the EU, USAID and CIDA, have indicated willingness to help finance this effort, assuming they conclude that the GOG is making a good faith effort to implement its reform program. This will likely happen; and the effort to update the electoral rolls will be initiated in a timely manner. Completing revisions in good order will provide evidence in turn that the Government is serious about free and fair elections.

Ensuring that outcome will, however, also involve instructing the Government administrators who manage prefectural and sub-prefectural administrative units throughout the country that they must accord opposition parties the same facilities as they do for members of the President's PUP party, and that they must not harass opposition party candidates or organizational efforts in any way.<sup>16</sup> An initial step has been taken along these lines and, according to the Minister of Territorial Administration and Decentralization, a system has been established through which opposition party leaders can contact officials in his Ministry in cases where they feel local administrators are impeding their rights to campaign openly.

**Need to take advantage of this window of opportunity:** Various individuals in the foreign assistance community have concluded that this reform initiative is one that merits all the support they can provide. They see it as an opportunity which they ought not to miss; one individual said that it would indeed be

---

<sup>16</sup> See Minister Bangoura's circular on these points.

very unfortunate if “donors” failed to seize the opportunity, the Prime Minister’s reform program failed, and the donors then found themselves once again “on the outside” confronting all the problems of re-establishing working relationships with the Government.

**Flexible support:** Donor agencies recognize that they must provide the new Government assistance where and when it is needed. They understand that small amounts of financing delivered in a timely manner may make a considerable difference in the Government’s capacity to pursue reforms, in part because things won’t get done if funding is not available. Just as important, however, is the reformers’ need to demonstrate that willingness to work with donors can produce positive results even if, initially, the amounts involved are small.

### 4.3 SUCCESSION POSES RISKS

Most observers recognize that the succession in Guinea, when President Conté leaves the scene, will involve considerable risks. Among these are the inevitable uncertainties surrounding transfer of power in a country where the military has held sway and dominated budgetary decisions for the past two decades. The foremost concern is that the military will prove unwilling to cede power to civilian politicians. Given this context, it is important to explore possible succession scenarios so that United States Government agencies, as well as other donors, are prepared to respond appropriately. To that end, the Guinea FSA team identified, in discussions with knowledgeable observers, four possible succession scenarios.

1. **Follow the constitution:** This involves the President of the National Assembly taking control of the Government for an interim period of six months and organizing elections to select the new president.

The remaining three options would be extra-constitutional in character despite the fact that they might, on other grounds, offer certain advantages.

2. **Civilian care-taker government for 18 months:** This scenario would respond to opposition party concerns that they would need that amount of time to prepare to conduct a competitive electoral campaign.
3. **Military intervention with return to civilian rule in medium-term (6-18 months):** This would presumably ensure stability over the short term; the larger question is whether the military would in fact support, or even permit free and fair elections if military leaders feared that an “opposition” victory could produce a government that would cut advantages and benefits that the military have enjoyed under President Conté in order to fund other priority programs.
4. **Military intervention and military rule:** This is clearly the least desirable scenario and one that would predictably elicit opposition both from donor organizations and from West African regional organizations such as ECOWAS, as occurred during the recent succession crisis in Togo, when that country’s military seized power on the death of the long-reigning military leader Eyadema and tried to impose his son as the successor president. The Togolese military, confronting broad domestic and foreign opposition to this scheme, eventually backed down.

#### 4.3.1 IRRESPECTIVE OF SCENARIO, REFORM WILL END WITH SUCCESSION

However the Conté succession occurs, it seems quite clear that reform efforts then underway will be shelved while key political actors concentrate their attention on resolving the succession issue and

jockeying for power within whatever governance arrangements result. This prospect clearly places a premium on making progress on the Prime Minister's reform agenda *before* President Conté leaves the scene.

**Reform more likely to resume under scenarios 1 and 2:** It would appear more likely that once the succession issue has been resolved, reforms will have a greater chance of restarting under either of the first two scenarios. If the military take power, whether for the short, medium or long term, reforms will predictably become much more problematic as the military seeks to preserve its privileged position and benefits associated therewith.

**Near term strategy should work to increase chances of the first two scenarios:** The clear implication of this analysis is that USAID (and other donor organizations) should promote the first two succession scenarios with whatever influence they can exert in that regard.

# 5. PROGRAMMING RECOMMENDATIONS

## 5.1 BUILDING A STRATEGY FOR GUINEA

The Guinea Fragile States Assessment provides insights upon which programming adjustments can build. Developing a viable strategy for Guinea implies targeting sources of fragility and supporting resilience within a limited timeframe for reform. The greatest impact will follow if USAID, USG agencies more broadly, and assistance agencies in Guinea in general coordinate their policies and their interventions.

The existence of earmarks for the Guinea Mission and sunk investments both imply a gradual and imperfect embrace of a fragility-focused strategy. At a minimum, all USAID-funded activities should support the fragility minimization strategy through anti-corruption and local management/good governance components. This will require fine-tuning of on-going activities. Finally, agriculture, education and health programming should promote improved livelihoods.

### 5.1.1 RESPOND TO KEY SOURCES OF FRAGILITY/RESILIENCE

The FSA recommended approach to countering fragility in Guinea flows from Assessment findings. These highlight the importance of rent seeking both as a major pattern of interaction and as an enabler of several other fragility-promoting patterns of interaction within the polity. However, we are not recommending a simplistic or narrowly-focused anti-corruption program.

Mission leadership should ensure that all new programs are consistent with the emerging fragile state strategy. This involves three major opportunities: the Global Development Alliance with Global Aluminum, currently under negotiation; Title II Food for Peace programs; and agricultural sector market development.

### 5.1.2 CONFRONT RENT SEEKING AT NATIONAL AND LOCAL LEVELS

This involves supporting patterns of conduct that diverge from the dominant patterns of interaction by rewarding merit rather than connections, and in convincing Guineans that alternatives to complicity in corruption do exist. USAID's current efforts to support oversight groups in local governance, health center and primary school operation, and the involvement of rural users of forest products in governance and management of state forests very clearly and effectively move in this direction. Media liberation and a Transparency International campaign at the national level could both help highlight for Guineans the indirect costs of corruption, e.g., in rendering investments in Guinea less attractive, or in producing poorly trained graduates ill-equipped to compete in the modern world are cases in point.

### 5.1.3 MITIGATE POPULAR DISENGAGEMENT AND RISK AVERSION

Support for collective action along lines just noted can provide individual citizens with both a sense of hope – things can change – and help mitigate the risks they confront in trying to promote change. This will clearly require time and sustained support as such changes are not likely to occur rapidly and may well elicit opposition in certain quarters.

#### **5.1.4 REINFORCE INFORMAL PATTERNS THAT PROMOTE TOLERANCE AND JOINT-BENEFITS**

This will involve, to a considerable extent, building on the social capital that exists among ethnic groups in Guinea. If inter-group collaboration is seen to produce benefits for all parties, those kinds of outcomes will encourage and support such practices, modifying peoples' perceptions of the possible.

#### **5.1.5 CAPITALIZE THE OPEN WINDOW OF REFORM OPPORTUNITY, PROMOTING CIVILIAN-LED SUCCESSION**

USAID, in concert with other USG agencies, donors and lenders, should seek to support the reform agenda, initially along lines suggested above to achieve publicized benchmarks upon which the Bretton Woods institutions and the European Union have conditioned their re-engagement. The greater the role that external organizations play in Guinea over the short to medium term, the greater is the likelihood that they will acquire the leverage to support a civilian-led, constitutionally-appropriate succession.

The Mission should select and fund an indefinite quantity contract (IQC) “grants under contract” mechanism to permit flexible disbursements. It could be funded with residual DG funds and accumulated local currency. This would enable the Mission to respond rapidly to targets of opportunity that support the fragile state strategy.

#### **5.1.6 LEVERAGE USAID RESOURCES THROUGH HARMONIZATION AT AGENCY, USG, AND INTER-DONOR LEVELS**

It appears critical that Guinea's assistance partners achieve a high level of coordination as rapidly as possible, and that the “message” passed to GOG officials be substantially the same whatever its source within the donor community. If USAID, other USG agencies, donor and lending organizations make the efforts to coordinate their efforts as closely as possible within their existing mandates, they can all leverage their resources, contingent upon a willingness to monitor coordination levels and fine tune as necessary when one or another agency comes under external pressure to modify its activities or programs.

##### ***5.1.6.1. Greater Leverage through USAID Program Coherence***

Four initiatives could enhance program coherence. First, the Mission should consider establishing cross-cutting strategic objectives to reduce stove-piping within programmed initiatives. Second, USAID/G management units and geographic focus should be consolidated. Third, the Mission should support local-level governance and accountability activities through a single mechanism that all strategic objective teams would support. Fourth, USAID partners should exchange information about their activities, and the Mission should seek ways to ensure that those exchanges occur, that lessons learned are broadly shared and that details of relevance to the broader population are well publicized through a variety of media (television, radio and rural radio, newsletter and public newspapers in national languages, etc.).

##### ***5.1.6.2 Greater Leverage through USG Activity Coherence***

Two general elements should be pursued here. First, USAID should encourage strong USG diplomatic messages on reform, anti-corruption and civilian-led succession, with as much coordination as possible with and reinforcement by other donor/lender organizations. Second, USAID should collaborate with and seek to leverage DoD and Treasury programs in Guinea.

### ***5.1.6.3 Alignment with GOG***

USAID should support government ownership of reform efforts whenever possible. Several ministers, e.g., of Territorial Administration and Decentralization, of Finance and of Media have already taken steps to move on the Prime Minister's reform program. USAID and other USG agencies should take whatever steps they can, again in coordination with other donors, to support those efforts. The fact that donor coordination underlies support efforts should be communicated to GOG officials at every opportunity.

## **GREATER LEVERAGE THROUGH DONOR HARMONIZATION**

### ***5.1.6.4 Maintain Close G-8 Diplomatic Coordination***

In light of the inevitable succession and in part because of the uncertainty of its timing, G-8 diplomatic coordination, already on-going, should be intensified so that when President Conté leaves Guinea's political scene, leaders and personnel in all G-8 embassies are prepared to send a coordinated, consistent set of messages that leave no doubt in the minds of Guinean decision-makers about diplomatic and assistance agency preferences concerning the character of the succession process. Insofar as they judge it useful, embassy personnel should coordinate with and calibrate a common position with West African regional organizations, e.g., ECOWAS.

### ***5.1.6.5 Establish Similar Coordination for Development Actors***

The complexity of development challenges in fragile states argues for USAID/Guinea developing and promoting with other assistance agencies instances within which representatives of those agencies can learn about each other's preferences, constraints, and technical and funding capacities so that they collectively achieve the greatest overall effect with the resources invested in promoting recovery in Guinea. Regular meetings at a frequency that meets the needs of all participants would create opportunities to compare notes, share experiences and pool knowledge about *which* agency is best capable of providing *what* types of assistance. This would help develop a consistent, inter-donor message for GOG agencies and would reduce incentives on the part of GOG officials to interact with donors on other than a good faith basis.

### ***5.1.6.6 Support the Organizational for Economic Cooperation and Development/Development Cooperation Directorate (OECD/DAC) Proposal to Include Guinea as a Pilot Case for Implementing Emerging Best Practices for Donor Coordination in Fragile States***

If inter-donor agency meetings were organized on agreement among all participants so that they addressed a series of issues critical in promoting stability and recovery in fragile states, and if those discussions and their conclusions were summarized in notes that could be circulated among participants, it should be possible to capture information about each agency's most instructive activities, lessons learned and the like that could subsequently inform programming decisions in those agencies, as well as creating social capital among participants that would facilitate more intense collaboration among them as occasions required.

The Fragile States Strategy asserts (p. 2), "In addition to stronger U.S. Government coordination, close partnerships and coordination with other donors and international organizations are essential for successfully responding to fragile states. The United Nations and its specialized agencies, the World Bank, other international organizations, and donors all bring critical resources and perspectives to bear on the challenges facing fragile states." USAID might consider, in close collaboration with other USG agencies, taking a lead in this effort, particularly given the esteem which GOG officials currently accord USG efforts.

### **5.1.7 ADJUST OPTIMAL PROGRAMMING REORIENTATIONS IN LINE WITH USAID COMPETENCIES, MANDATE AND RESOURCES IN THE SHORT RUN**

This will involve a pragmatic search for best ways to achieve new programming orientations. While it may turn out that none can be achieved fully in the short run, adjustments can be made in current programming that help lay the groundwork for more significant changes in future.

## **5.2 FOUR PROGRAM COMPONENTS**

If pursued consistently, all four components can help promote change. These program recommendations are summarized below in Table 2.

### **5.2.1 PROMOTE NATIONAL DIALOGUE**

USG agencies, USAID certainly among them, currently enjoy a strongly positive reputation among GOG officials. The Agency can help promote dialogue and support GOG efforts, initiated by the current Prime Minister under the dual pressures of economic decline and politically-motivated donor withdrawal, to move on the Prime Minister's reform agenda and meet externally-established benchmarks. The greater the understanding among Guinean decision makers in the political, economic, social, and security spheres of the necessity of reform, the greater the likelihood of progress. Some GOG officials have already taken notable steps, e.g., Mr. Kiridi Bangoura, the Minister of Territorial Administration and Decentralization, to revive fair arrangements for political competition. It behooves the donor community to support those efforts to the hilt, e.g., by supporting the up-dating of electoral lists and the on-going press liberalization.

**What:** Promoting national dialogue can take the form of creating opportunities for key national leaders, including military and civilian, politicians and civil servants, governmental, traditional and civil society leaders, to understand critical issues more fully and to understand each others' positions and preferences better, as a way of creating social capital indispensable for meaningful dialogue.

**Why:** It appears critical at this juncture to build mutual confidence between military and civilian leaders to forestall a military intervention during the succession. This will involve broadening support for reform, particularly attacking the widespread and deeply entrenched patterns of rent seeking. Finally, it will involve encouraging a civilian-led succession.

**How:** USG agencies could support three interlinked activities to this end: (1) joint USAID/DoD workshops on civilian-military relations; (2) dialogues on the magnitude and costs of corruption, as well as on decentralization (which, if properly supported, could heighten accountability within new local government units). All these efforts, as well as those supported by other donors, (3) should be monitored and reported in media/outreach campaigns.

### **5.2.2 INCREASE TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY**

USAID is already making progress on this front. An important theme to explore in donor coordination efforts involves ways to enhance that progress. The European Union, for instance, continues to monitor press freedom and can be relied upon to push for progress on that front, backed by a willingness to withdraw support if egregious backsliding were to occur, e.g., during the coming local government and legislative electoral campaigns. The Bretton Woods institutions are pushing for greater budgetary transparency and accountability, with support from the U.S. Department of Treasury. Ensuring that this

range of efforts are monitored and reported broadly could materially assist reform efforts by modifying decision-makers' understanding of the stakes and their paradigms of acceptable political strategies.

**What:** Strengthen mechanisms of oversight and accountability at the national and local levels, along lines that USG and other donor and lending agencies are already promoting.

**Why:** This will build on the concept of competing interests and checks and balances, as a substitute for uncontested hierarchical decision-making. It will take advantage of and support the reform openings embodied in the current Prime Minister's reform program. Finally, it builds on USAID's experience and comparative advantage in these areas, as exemplified in a number of on-going partner programs.

**How:** USAID, in concert with other USG, donor, and lender agencies, should continue to support the budgetary review process both within the Ministry of Finance and at the National Assembly. USAID can, furthermore, create synergies at the local level through program consolidation and a commitment to defining and promoting best practices among its partners as well as more broadly. This will involve, in part, broadening the current single-issue focus of partners' efforts at the local level, in the health, education, and environment/national resources spheres. All these efforts are currently proceeding in parallel, but could well be incorporated within the Agency's more general effort to support transparent, accountable local governance. Finally, USAID should support outreach initiatives that highlight and clarify citizens' roles and responsibilities, as well as low-risk ways that they can play those roles and act on their responsibilities.

### 5.2.3 PILOT ALTERNATIVE SERVICE DELIVERY METHODS

Insofar as service delivery patterns can be modified, e.g., for health or education services, in ways that improve service quality, these will serve as positive examples that build public support, particularly if successes are broadly publicized. One example here could involve pharmaceuticals, i.e., both acquisition and distribution of common medicines. If both of those processes could be subjected to greater transparency, plus more competition in acquisition of foreign source medicines and greater supervision of health center personnel to reduce the temptations they face to convert distribution of common medicines into rent-producing activities, reforms might be rather quickly consolidated.

**What:** Demonstrate that social services can be provided in ways that meet social objectives but are not so susceptible to rent seeking, i.e., private provision of medicines and other medical products.

**Why:** Demonstrating successes along these lines can fuel hope and provide popular momentum to support further reforms, as well as disseminating among the population new, more accountable models of doing business and supplying public services.

**How:** Support both market analysis (e.g., for medicines) and development of a policy reform agenda at the national and local levels. Provide technical assistance on an as-needed basis to government, banks and private sector firms. Finally, USAID should create a revolving credit fund to support private sector importation and distribution, if that appears required.

### 5.2.4 INCREASE OPPORTUNITIES FOR POLITICAL COMPETITION

This process, under strong pressure from the European Union and with considerable support from the European Union, the Canadians and USG agencies, is moving forward. Changes are undoubtedly fragile, given the country's history as a "one-party polity" and the long-running dominance of the current

majority party, the Party of Union and Progress. Still, the growing, GOG-solicited engagement of opposition parties, the willingness of their leaders to come again to the negotiating table and test GOG willingness to modify the working rules of political competition so that outcomes are not a foregone conclusion is, to say the least, encouraging and merits whatever support donors can provide. Insisting on and supporting media liberalization is clearly a critical element of this strategy.

**What:** In general terms USAID should promote, with other USG and donor agencies, fair and competitive local and legislative elections over the next two years. This involves three elements: (1) competent election administration, e.g., updated voter registration rolls; (2) development of pragmatic, non-ethnic platforms; and (3) insistence on a level playing field during electoral contents, i.e., equal access to media.

**Why:** This will serve to extend the national dialogue to local levels, as well as consolidate it at the national level; it will provide a strong rationale for civic engagement, by demonstrating that voting is not “wasted effort” and pointless risk-taking; and it will lay a foundation for the eventual presidential elections which must be seen to be fair and open if the Prime Minister’s reform themes are to become truly rooted and survive.

**How:** USAID, USG and other assistance agencies must support the electoral body, in particular by updating voter registration lists to remove vote fraud as a potential fatal weakness in the process. Support should also be provided to political parties on development of political platforms. Finally, arrangements for long-term robust and reliable monitoring of the electoral process in Guinea should be established, to eliminate the current temptations to manipulate both process and outcomes in contests for power.

**TABLE 2: PROGRAM RECOMMENDATIONS**

Sources of Fragility	Programming Options	Africa Framework Objective
<p><b>Security</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lack of civilian oversight</li> <li>• Extra budgetary allocations</li> <li>• Impunity and lack of rule of law</li> </ul>	No political will to address the core causes	
Programming Window of Opportunity	Civil military training	Inclusive Governance Reform Enhanced or Individual protection from physical violence improved
<p><b>Political</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Power of the presidency</li> <li>• Lack of checks and balances</li> <li>• Grand and administrative corruption/ rent seeking etc</li> <li>• Articulation of the constitution either inadequate or unknown</li> <li>• Limited political competition</li> </ul>	Very limited political will to address core causes – window dressing to meet donor conditionality	
Programming window of opportunity	<p>Support the PMs agenda for reform where not covered by other donors</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Anti corruption</li> <li>• Radio privatization</li> <li>• Political dialogue/ national dialogue</li> <li>• Work regionally on conflict management and mitigation through civil society and GOG</li> </ul>	Inclusive Governance Reform Enhanced
From S/CRS tool kit – there are several other S/CRS tool kits from which the mission can draw to assess what might work.	<p><b>Short term:</b> Identify incentives to reduce corruption.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assess threat/existence of corruption in political system</li> <li>• Develop laws promoting anti-corruption, accountability and transparency within government and private sector</li> <li>• Create mechanisms to curtail corruption, including special prosecutors, witness and judge protection</li> <li>• Medium term Design and implement anti-corruption campaign, including education and codes of conduct</li> <li>• Enforce anti-corruption laws, including removal of corrupt officials</li> <li>• Combat corruption among police, border, customs, tax collection forces/units</li> <li>• Empower legal and civil society mechanisms to monitor governmental behavior</li> <li>• Foster transparent governing practices in public and</li> </ul>	Inclusive Governance Reform Enhanced

	<p>private sectors</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Revise procurement procedures.</li> </ul> <p><b>Longer term</b> - Prosecute violators and enforce standards</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Seek international cooperation to combat corruption</li> <li>• Dismantle organized crime networks.</li> </ul>	
Laying the basis for future change	<p>Continue work at the community and local government levels to increase citizen and officials understanding of their rights and responsibilities – bottom up accountability and advocacy – in all sectors where the mission has programs</p> <p>Literacy Programming – radio shows, local newspapers, etc.</p> <p>Encourage formation of watchdog organizations in private sectors to monitor national institutions – PTA, HMC, Co-Mgt, market committee, NGOs etc</p>	Inclusive Governance Reform Enhanced
<p><b>Economic</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Macro instability</li> <li>• Poor policy environment</li> <li>• Endemic corruption</li> <li>• Lack of support for diversification</li> <li>• Vulnerability to world market prices</li> <li>• Increasing poverty</li> </ul>	<p>Political will to address macro issues in order to meet donor conditionality</p>	
Programming window of opportunity	<p>Possibly address endemic corruption throughout the marketing chain of one not very political commodity, i.e. cashews</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Continue treasury work on budgets</li> <li>• Develop and implement a budgetary process, including input from line ministries</li> <li>• Create capacities to manage budget and personnel issues</li> <li>• Institutionalize process to develop budget and ensure have trained staff to manage on-going budget processes</li> <li>• Support institutional development of local think tanks to inform public discussion of business and economic issues???</li> </ul>	<p>Basic economic activity and livelihoods maintained /restored</p> <p>or Inclusive Governance Reform Enhanced</p>
Preventing deterioration without letting the Government off the hook	<p>Focus increasing livelihoods and developing local market linkages</p> <p>Local market committees</p> <p><b>Short term:</b> Evaluate existing laws pertaining to land</p>	<p>Basic economic activity and livelihoods maintained/ restored</p>

	rights, registration of the property, and collateralization of movable and immovable property. <b>Medium term:</b> Draft laws and codes to establish or strengthen property rights; Reconcile past claims of expropriations; Adopt appropriate laws, regulations, and codes. <b>Longer term:</b> Ensure equitable implementation of laws, regulations, and codes.	
<b>Social</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Infrastructure and basic service provisions (utilities) woefully inadequate</li> <li>• Poor quality of health and education</li> <li>• Lack of drugs</li> <li>• Lack of opportunities for school leavers</li> </ul>		
Programming window of opportunity	Support PM s reform agenda vis-à-vis Global HIV/AIDS and Malaria Possibly attempt to develop a non-governmental/private system of drug distribution Increase focus on life and job skills development through basic education and literacy programming	Increased provision of essential services by local and national institutions
Prevent deterioration without letting Government off the hook	Basic health, nutrition and education programming in a way that increases local empowerment, does not let the government off the hook and reduces corruption (tall order)	Increased provision of essential services by local and national institutions
<b>OTHER PROGRAMMING ISSUES NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO FRAGILITY</b>		
Environment	Bio diversity earmarks can and should be met in a way that increases local empowerment, does not let the government off the hook and reduces corruption (tall order)	Biodiversity objective and/ or Inclusive Governance Reform Enhanced
Health and HIV/AIDS	Health and HIV/AIDS earmarks can and should be met in a way that increases local empowerment, does not let the government off the hook and reduces corruption (tall order)	Health objectives or Increased provision of essential services by local and national institutions
GDA	Should address sources of fragility while encouraging corporate social responsibility, participating in the extractive industries transparency initiative	Depending on what and how it could relate to any of the objectives
Youth and Urbanization	There is little will or opportunity to address urban issues. There is potential to work with youth as a force for positive change and conflict prevention	African conflict mitigation capacity reinforced
Management Units and Consolidation	Reduce mission management units, increase synergies and consolidate best practices in local governance and literacy.	

# ANNEXES

## ANNEX A. BIBLIOGRAPHY

- American Refugee Committee (ARC) 2004. "Project Title: Preventive Activities and Training That Work for At-Risk Youth (PATHWAY). 9 pp.
- CLUSA/Guinea. N.d. "Brève Présentation de la CLUSA/Guinée." CLUSA, Coyah, Guinea. 16 pp.
- Economist Intelligence Unit. 2004. "Guinea: Country Report." London: The Economist Intelligence Unit. December. 23 pp.
- Ethnologue.com. 2001. "Languages of Guinea." 6 pp.
- Fischer, Julie E. 2000. "Policy Review. Creating Common Spaces: Natural Resources Management in Fuuta Jalon, Guinea." *Society and Natural Resources*, 13, 567-77.
- International Crisis Group. 2003. "Guinée: incertitudes autour d'une fin de règne." ICG Rapport Afrique No. 74, Freetown/Bruxelles. 39 pp.
- Kigotho, Wachira. 2004. "Student Arrests Provoke Strikes in Guinea." *Chronicle of Higher Education*, Vol. 50, Issue 26 (3 March 2004), 1-5.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2005. "CrisisWatch Search Results - Guinea."
- Niane, D.T., Souleymane Kouyaté, Aïssatou Keita, Alpha Cabiné Keita, and Mangoné Niang. N.D. "La Charte de Kurukan-Fuga ou la Constitution de l'Empire du Mali." Publication of the Centre d'Études Linguistiques, Historiques et Traditions Orales (CELHTO), Niamey, Niger.
- Oyler, Dianne White. 2001. "A Cultural Revolution in Africa: Literacy in the Republic of Guinea Since Independence," *The International Journal of Africa History*, 34, NO. 3, 585-600.
- République de Guinée; Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances. 2004. "Mission d'Audit des Structures du Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances; Mise en Œuvre des Plans d'Action; État d'Éxecution au 1 12 2004.
- République de Guinée; Présidence de la République. 2001. Comité National de Lutte contre la Corruption et de la Moralisation des Activités Économiques et Financières (CNCL). "Enquête d'opinion sur la Perception de la Corruption en Guinée. Résultats Définitifs." Prepared by Direction Nationale de la Statistique/Secrétariat d'État au Plan. Assistance technique: M. Carlos Morelli, Consultant Internationale p/c PNUD.
- République de Guinée; Primature. 2005. "Allocution de Son Excellence Monsieur Cellou Dalein Diallo, Premier Ministre Prononcée Devant l'Assemblée Nationale." Conakry, le 8 Février. 16 pp.

Secrétariat Permanent de la Stratégie de Réduction de la

UNICEF. 2005. "UNICEF: The State of the World's Children 2005 – Key Indicators for Children and Women in Guinea. March 16. 3pp.

\_\_\_\_\_. 2004. "UNICEF Humanitarian Action: Guinea; Donor Update." 8 March. 6 pp.

UNITED NATIONS Bureau de la Coordination des Affaires Humanitaires/Guinée. 2005. "Rapport de Situation Humanitaire en Guinée. Février. 9 pp.

USAID/GUINEA. 2005. "Rapport Fonds de Cautionnement; Sector. 102 pp.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Triennial Review Report. Country Strategic Plan FY 1998-2006. Conakry, Guinea. August. 23 pp.

U.S. Geological Survey Minerals Yearbook. 1999. "The Mineral Industry of Guinea." Prepared by Philip M. Mobbs and David E. Morse.

West Africa Network for Peace-Building/Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER). 2003. "Policy Brief – Guinea Conakry; Presidential Elections December 2003: Stakes for Sub-Regional Peace." 8 pp.

WINROCK. 2005. "Présentation du PEGRN." Mars.

World Bank. 2003. "Country Assistance Strategy for The Republic of Guinea." Report No. 25925 GUI. Guinea Country Office, Country Department 11, Africa Region. 34 pp.

## **ANNEX B. PERSONS INTERVIEWED**

### **World Bank, Washington, D.C. (Wednesday, 2 March 2005)**

ENGELKE, Wilfried, Senior Economist, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Division  
4 Africa Region

MELLOUL, Karen, Conflict Specialist, Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, Social  
Development Department

RAHIM, Aly Zulficar, Conflict Specialist, Africa Region, Junior Professional Associate Africa  
Conflict and Development Team

TOVO, Maurizia, Senior Social Protection Specialist/Africa Region

### **USAID/Washington, D.C. (Friday, 4 March 2005)**

GRIGSBY, Carol, USAID/West Africa [?]

WOOD, Dennis, IRIS, University of Maryland

### **US EMBASSY/Conakry, Guinea (Monday, 7 March 2005)**

ADAMS, Annette, Mission Director, Office of Director

ATTEBURY, David, Sierra Leone Coordinator, Office of Director

AYBAR, John A., Special Agent, Regional Security Officer

BAH, Alpha Ibrahima, Transition R. Coordinator, Office of Mission Director

BALDÉ, Maladho Siddy, Senior Education Partnerships Advisor, Office of Education

CHALLENGER, Herschelle, Team Leader, Office of Democracy and Good Governance

CRUBAUGH, Tom, Supervisory Program Officer, Program Office

DAILEY, Carrie, Supervisory Executive Officer, Executive Office

DE MARCKEN, Natasha, Team Leader, Office of Education

DIALLO, Ahmed Tidiane, Senior Education Policy Advisor, Office of Education

DIALLO, Alpha Souleymane, Team Leader, Office of Strategic Planning and Results Center

DIALLO, Hadja A., Training Specialist, Office of Education

DIALLO, Kenda, Decentralization Specialist, Office of Democracy and Good Governance

DIALLO, Modjere, Financial Management Specialist, Office of Financial Management

DOUKOURÉ, Abdoulaye, Project Accountant, Office of Financial Management

HASE, Michael, Controller, Office of Financial Management

KIBOUR, Elizabeth, Health Sector Advisor, Office of Health

MACDONALD, Jackson, American Ambassador to Guinea

MICHENER, Vicky, Strategic Results Coordinator, Program Office

MULLENAX, John, Senior Agriculture and Trade Advisor, Office of Natural Resources Management

NELSON, Francesca, Team Leader, Health SO2, Office of Health

PEREZ, Marisol, Education Program Advisor SO3, Office of Education

RAMTHUN, Major Christian, Defense Attaché

THIOUNE, Babacar, Senior Acquisition Specialist, Office of Acquisition and Assistance

TRAORÉ, Soukeynatou, Public Health Specialist, Office of Health

USAID/Conakry, Guinea SO Presentation Meeting (Monday, 7 March 2005)

YOUSSOUPH, Bourahim, IRM Administrator (Systems Manager), Executive Office

**Ministry of Agriculture, Conakry, Guinea (10 March 2005)**

BANGOURA, Kadiatou, Central Committee/PUP

CAMARA, Abdoul Karim, Central Committee/PUP

CAMARA, Hadjia Mame, PUP National Women's Committee

CAMARA, Sény, BPN/PUP

DIABY, Abdoulaye, Central Committee/PUP

KONATÉ, Dr. Sekou, PUP Secretary General

PUP (Majority Party in Guinea's National Assembly), PUP Headquarters, Conakry, Guinea (10 March 2005)

SARR, Jean Paul, Minister of Agriculture

SYLLA, Abdoulaye Chérif, Chief of Staff

SYLLA, El Hadj Kerfalla, Central Committee/PUP

SYLLA, Yacoub "Guillard," PUP Youth National Committee

SYLLA, Yamoussa Dixinn, Federal Secretary

WILKINSON, Jeanne, Deputy, BPN/PUPBAH, Oury, BPN/PUP

ZOUMANIGUI, René, BPN/PUP

**USAID/Conakry, Guinea, Opposition Political Party Leaders (10 March 2005)**

BAH, Ousmane, President/UPR

DIALLO, Boubacar, UFDG

KEITA, Yaya, BPN/UPR

Representative of UFDG

SOMPARÉ, Honorable El Hadj Aboubacar , President, National Assembly

USAID/Conakry, Guinea, National Assembly, (10 March)

**USAID/Conakry, Guinea, Other Assistance Agencies Active in Guinea (Friday, 11 March 2005)**

AMANING, Kingsley, Resident Representative, UNDP

BAH, Mamadou Oury, Chargé de Programme, UNICEF

BALDÉ, A. Goudoussy, Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, UNICEF

BARRY, Mamadou Diouldé, Economist, International Monetary Fund (?)

BIAU, Jacques, Ambassade de France (?)

CAMARA, Mamadou, FNUAP

CISSÉ, Dr. Mamadou, World Health Organization

DIALLO, Ibrahima, Chargé Sécurité Alimentaire, World Food Program

DIENG, Dr. Aïssatou, Technical Advisor, PSS/GTZ

FRANÇOIS, Séverine, Assistant Politique, Commission Européenne

GUILLAUME, Frédérique, Chargé de Mission, l'Agence Française de Développement

LAURENCE, Charlotte, Governance Program Officer, UNDP

Mr. BAH

Mr. SANOGO, World Bank

PUIG, José, Conseiller Économique, Commission Européenne

**USAID/Guinea Implementing Partners/Partner Organizations (Friday, 11 March 2005)**

AVERSA, Stephen, Country Representative, Land O'Lakes Inc.

BAH, Marlyatou, CLUSA M & E Specialist

BASSE, Mohamed Kabir, Country Representative, TOSTAN

BENSON, Krisila, Director, Population Services International (PSI)

BILLINGSLEY, Dennis, Director, Enterpriseworks Worldwide

COTÉ, Elizabeth, Country Representative, International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)

CUSACK, Tom, CLUSA Resident Representative

DIAKITÉ, Ibrahima, Coodinator, RTI/NFQE

DIALLO, Aliou Samba, Program Director, World Educaton (WEG)

DOUKOURÉ Aly Badara, Country Coordinator, Academy for Educational Development (EDC subcontractor)/PACEEQ Project

EVANS, Norma, Teacher Education Advisor, EDC/NFQE

FARESE, Dr. Pasquale, Chief of Party, PRISM Project: Management Sciences for Health (MSH) and Johns Hopkins University Cener for Communication Program (JHUCCP)

KABA, Mohamed Lamine, Coordinator VLIX/SIM7, AFRICARE

KHELGHATI, Thelma, Chief of Party, Educational Development Center (EDC)

KONYNDYK, Jeremy, Country Director, American Refugee Committee (ARC)

PITTMAN, Sharon, Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA)

RIOUX, Alain, Country Representative and ENRM Project Enterprise Development Director, Volunteers in Technical Assistance Abroad (VITA)

SHASHA, Willy, Family Health International

SIODLIRTZ, John, CLUSA Deputy Resident Representative

TRAORÉ, Bonaventure, Representative, AFRICARE

**Conakry, Guinea: Informal Luncheon Meeting (Sunday, 13 March 2005)**

BARRY, Adama Doukouré, consultant and gender specialist

DOUKOURÉ, Dr. Aly Badura, ex-Rector of University of Conakry and currently Program Advisor Country Coordinator, Academy for Education Development, education project in Guinea

DOUKOURÉ, Honorable El Hadj Abraham, ex-Guinean Ambassador to Germany and to Canada, and Mrs. DOUKOURÉ, hosts

H Aidara, Honorable Ibrahim Chérif, ex-Guinean Ambassador to Liberia and to France, presently advisor to Chamber of Commerce

H Aidara, Mahawa Doukouré, Magistrate and Counselor at Ministry of Justice

**Ministère de l'Administration Territoriale et de la Décentralisation (Monday, 14 March 2005)**

BAH, Abdoul Karim, Directeur Libertés Publiques

BAH, Papa Djibril, Conseiller Juridique

BANGOURA, Honorable Kiridi, Minister

CAMARA, Ismaïl, Conseiller Amélioration Services de Base

DIABATÉ, El Hadj Sory, Conseiller Politique

DIALLO, El Hadj Ahmadou Baïlo, Secrétaire Générale

KABA, Bakary, Conseiller Développement Local

YOULA, El Hadj Lansana, Chef de Cabinet

**USAID/Guinea: Professional Associations (Tuesday, 15 March 2005)**

BAH, Mariama Penda, FESABAG

BALDÉ, Professor Ibrahima, President of the Doctors' Association

BANGOURA. Fodé Abass, Esq., Lawyers' Association

CAMARA, Dr. Laye, Veterinarians' Association

CAMARA, Lucrèce, Civil Engineers' Association

KALLO, Mamadi, Architects' Association

KANTÉ, Dr. Bachir, Doctors' Association

KEÏTA, Aminata, FESABAGO

MNATHOS, Jean Albert, Chamber of Notaries

SOW, Dr. Mamadou, Doctors' Association

TRAORÉ, Dr. Adama, Veterinarians' Association

**USAID/GUINEA: Private Sector Representatives (Tuesday, 15 March 2005)**

(SOSACO)

DIOP, Ousmane, Director of Operations, COSMOS and DAFCO International

KANE, Mamadou Abdoulaye, Director General, SPECIA

LAVANIA, Gaurav, Director General, SOSACOSociété Sasksons de Commerce Foods

PHUKAN, Spondon, Regency Far East Ltd. (cocoa exporter)

**Conakry, GUINEA: Conseil Économique et Social (CES) (Tuesday, 15 March 2005)**

COKER, Gérard, President, Committee on Economy and Economic Conditions, UNDP  
Coordinator for DAP/Governance

DIALLO, Hadja Mariama, 2nd Secretary of Executive Committee

DIALLO, Tiana, CES 1st Vice President

KAMANO, Michel, CES President

KANDÉ, Yomba, Member, Committee on Economy and Economic Conditions

LENAUD, Joséphine, CES 2nd Vice President

**Prefecture of Kindia, Sougueta: Prefectoral Team for Projet Élargi de Gestion des  
Ressources Naturelles (PEGRN), (16 March 2005)**

BAH, Souleymane, Agent Contractuel Direction Nationale des Eaux et Forêts

BALDÉ, Mamadou Adama, Agent Services Financiers Ruraux

BARRY, lhassane, Agent Programme Chimpanzé

CAMARA, Djibril, Gardien de l'Antenne Préfectorale1

CAMARA, Kalil, Agent Commercialisation Agricole

CAMARA, Mamadou Lamine, Agent Services Financiers Ruraux

CAMARA, Mamadouba, Coordinateur Adjoint des Activités de Co-Gestion

CAMARA, Maohamed, Agent Contractuel Direction Nationale des Eaux et Forêts

CAMARA, Soriba, Agent Gestion des Ressources Naturelles

CONDÉ, Mamadou, Agent Programme Chimpanzé

DIABY, Mamadou Woréto, Agent Suivi Opérationnel et Stratégique  
DIALLO, Mamadou Abdoul, Agent Environnement Politique Favorable Établi  
FOFANA, Fodé, Chef d'Équipe Préfectoral  
KEÏTA, Morlaye, Coordinateur des Activités de Co-Gestion  
NIANG, Ciré, Agent Production Agricole  
SOUMAH, Soumah, Agent Technique Appropriée  
SOW, Bokar, Agent Services Financiers Ruraux  
SOW, Idrissa, Agent Production Agricole  
SYLLA, Fodé Salifou, Agent Gestion des Ressources Naturelles  
TOURÉ, Youssouf, Agent Contractuel Direction Nationale des Eaux et Forêts

**Zone Forestière Field Trip 17-19 March 2005**

BAH, Mohamed, Acting Program Manager, Plan Guinea  
CAMARA, Mamadou, Prefect, Kissidigou  
DIALLO, Saliou, Assistant Director, Plan Guinea  
DIALLO, Thierno Samba, Bureau Chief, American Refugee Committee (ARC)  
FAIRHEAD, Dr. James, Anthropologist, University of Sussex  
GUISSE, Oumar, Director of Women's and Children's Rights, Office of the Governor, Nzérékoré  
JACKSON, Yaya Sid, Program Officer, ARC  
KARAMO, Ja Chérif, Health Focal Point, ARC  
KODANO, Sia Aissata, Mayor, Guekédou Commune  
KOMANO, Sidiki, Finance Manager, ARC  
KOROMO, Alpha, TransCons, Plan Guinea  
KOUROUMOU, Laurent, Governance Advisor, Plan Guinea  
LENO, Abraham, Community Health/HIV-AIDS advisor, ARC  
LONSANY, Folfana, Logistics Chief, ARC  
MILLIMOUNO Tamba Banda, Communications Administrator, Plan Guinea

MILLIMOUNO, Daniel, Assistant Education Advisor, Plan Guinea

MILLIMOUNO, Eloi, Human Resources Manager, Plan Guinea

MILLIMOUNO, Saa Antoine, IGP Business Advisor, ARC

SOSOGIN, Dr. Jean, Assistant Health Advisor, Plan Guinea

**Conakry, Guinea: Peace Corps Meeting (Tuesday, 22 March 2005)**

BASTIEN, Yamilee, Assistant Peace Corps Director, Small Enterprise Development

DIALLO, Abdoulaye, Assistant Peace Corps Director, Agro-Forestry

KLING, Catherine, Assistant Peace Corps Director, Public Health

**Conakry, Guinea: Security Sector Officials (Thursday, 24 March 2005)**

AVCB

BAROU, Oumr, ex-Minister

BARRY, Boubacar, Secretary and Administrator, Association des victims du Camp Boiro (AVCB)

BOBO, El Hadj Barry, eEx-Commissioner of Police

CONDÉ, Mamoudou, Pharmacist, Association Guinéenne des Victimes du Camp Boiro (AGVCB)

DIALLO, Alpha Abdoulaye, Avocat, former Minister of Youth and Sports and Head of the Bar Association, Association Guinéenne des Victimes du Camp Boiro (AGVCB)

DIALLO, Commandant Alpha ex-Minister of Fisheries and ex Minister of Security

DIALLO, Dr. Ousmane Wora, Treasurer, Coalition nationale de Guinée- Droit, Citoyenneté des Femmes (CONAG-DCF)

DIANÉ, Abou, Police Inspector and Technical Assistant Responsible for Control of Foreigners Residing in Guinea

DRAMÉ, Mamadou Alioune, Judge, Deputy Inspector General of Magistrature

FOFANA, Hawa, Coordinator Programme d'appui à la population Guinéenne) APG, NARWOPNET

KABA, Dr. Saran Daraba, President, Mano River Women's Peace Network

NABÉ, Binta, Member, CONAG-DCF

OGDH

SOW, Dr. Thierno Maadjou, Organisation Guinéen de droit de l'homme (OGDH)

SYLLA, Ben Sékou, President, Conseil national des organisations de la société civile (CNOSC)

## **ANNEX C. STATEMENT OF WORK**

### **Purpose**

The purpose of this exercise is to assist USAID/Guinea prepare for a future change in Guinea's political leadership by identifying those measures it can take in the near term to promote a transition that is peaceful and that provides an opening to address Guinea's chronic fragility. To provide a strong foundation for those program options, this exercise will also include analysis that includes identification of the sources of Guinea's fragility, current political dynamics, and potential future scenarios. It will also serve to test preliminary aspects of the CMM CFACTS project, specifically in respect to gathering fragility data.

### **Activities**

#### Preparatory Phase - Washington, DC

As part of the assessment team, the consultant will assemble in Washington for three days of team planning and orientation prior to departure for the field. During this period, the team will:

- Organize team planning meetings among themselves and with the sponsoring USAID offices—Africa Bureau's Office of West Africa and DCHA's Office of Democracy and Governance and Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation—to clarify roles, objectives and expectations.
- Participate in a USAID-organized workshop on Guinea. The workshop will provide an opportunity for the team to engage with invited outside experts and US Government staff knowledgeable about Guinea to better understand current dynamics in the country and the wider Mano River region and the prospects for the future.
- Collect and review key documents and relevant data including the last USAID country strategy, the annual reports for the past two years, USAID's Fragile States Strategy, the latest guidance on conducting fragility, conflict and democracy and governance assessments, and any other relevant materials.
- Conduct meetings with US government officials, Washington-based NGOs, and others as the team determines are necessary to ensure successful field work and time permits.

#### Field Phase – Conakry and other locations in Guinea

The full assessment team will assemble in Conakry to begin the field phase of the work. During their time in Guinea, the team will:

- Organize team meetings to review the results and findings of the preparatory phase, confirm roles and responsibilities, develop a common understanding of the assessment framework and data collection methods, review any scheduling developed by the Mission, and finalize a work plan,

- Meet with USAID and Embassy staff to clarify the scope and objectives of the assessment and elicit perspectives on the current political, economic, social and security situation in the country and the likely outcomes of future political transition.
- Hold a brown bag session for USAID and Embassy staff to present USAID's Fragile States Strategy, its current thinking on the dynamics of fragile states, the new Agency Framework for Africa and their implications for programming.
- Conduct individual or group interviews and survey a broad cross-section of knowledgeable people to elicit perceptions of the current situation in Guinea and likely results of future political transition. It is important that informants be selected that can provide the team with an understating of governance effectiveness and legitimacy in the political, economic, social and security domains leading up to a political transition and afterwards. Of particular importance is understanding the role of the private sector, local non-government organizations, business associations and trade unions may play in furthering and or advocating for greater levels of legitimacy and effectiveness. It is also important that the team understand the perspectives, current programming and planning assumptions of other major donor agencies. To obtain this information, the team expects to meet with a broad array of host-country politicians, government officials, activists, reformers, researchers, journalists, women's and youth advocates and traditional and community leaders. The team will also meet with resident staff of other donor agencies and international NGOs.
- Develop an analysis that will:
  - Diagnose the current situation in Guinea and the factors that contribute to its persistent fragility
  - Map the motivations of key stakeholders, the nature and durability of their patterns of interaction, and the opportunities for reform.
  - Define future governance scenarios focusing on those that may emerge after a change in political leadership.
  - Identify programming options that can be undertaken in the near term to best support a peaceful transition in political leadership and begin addressing Guinea's chronic fragility.
- Share the results of the analysis with USAID staff and solicit initial reactions, including understanding the implications of any proposed programming options for the composition and priorities of the existing USAID/Guinea portfolio.
- Define and initiate a process of discussion and consultation within USAID/Guinea, between USAID/Guinea and USAID/Washington, and between USAID and other US Government agencies on introducing programming designed to address Guinea's underlying sources of fragility.
- Submit an interim report that summarizes the four elements of the analysis and outlines the final report.

- Formally debrief USAID/Guinea at the end of the field phase on the results of the work to date. The team will give debriefings for others (embassy, donor consortia, NGO consortia) as requested by the mission.

### **Follow Up – Washington and Contractor’s Headquarters**

During the concluding phase of this exercise, the US-based members of the team will:

- Debrief the sponsoring offices and other USAID staff on the results of the analysis and proposed programming priorities.
- Submit a draft of the final report to the Mission and USAID/Washington sponsoring offices and solicit their comments—either written or oral.
- Submit a final version of the final report that incorporates any submitted comments.

### **Deliverables**

Three products are required in the course of this exercise:

1. An interim report that will be submitted to USAID/Guinea prior to the conclusion of the Field Phase, or within two business days of its completion. The report will summarize the four elements of the analysis—fragility diagnostic, stakeholder mapping, scenario development, and program options—and outline the final report. The contractor, along with guidance from the Team Leader and input from the other team member, is responsible for delivering the interim report
2. A final report that will be submitted to USAID/Guinea and the USAID/Washington sponsoring offices within four weeks from the conclusion of the Field Phase. The final report will be prepared in two phases. A complete draft will be prepared within two weeks of the conclusion of the Field Phase and circulated for comment. Those comments that are submitted within a week will be incorporated into the final version. The report belongs to USAID, not to the consultants or contractors, and any use of the material in the report shall require the prior written approval of USAID.

The contracted member of the team will have principle responsibility for writing the final report, though all the other members are expected to participate actively. While the report can be organized in whatever manner best suits Guinea’s circumstances, the major questions and concerns laid out in the assessment SOW must be addressed. The report should include an executive summary that can be detached and used separately whenever a briefer document is required. The team leader has responsibility for ensuring that the final report is complete and reads in a holistic manner.

3. A memorandum that contains the team’s reflections on entire exercise and identifies those aspects that worked well and those that did not. The aim of the memorandum is to capture any lessons that would help improve future assessments of country fragility. Although the team is free to comment on any aspect of the exercise, comments on the assessment methodology and data gathering techniques are particularly welcome. This memorandum will remain internal to USAID. The contractor will contribute to the memorandum but will not be responsible for its production.

**LOE and Schedule**

The LOE for this assignment is not to exceed 45 days. The work is expected to begin with pre-departure meetings on 2 -4 March, 2005 in WDC with the deployment on 5 March through 25 March to conduct field work in Guinea. Upon return consultant will engage in follow-on briefings and the preparation of the final report and other material with work concluding on or about 22 April, 2005. A six day work week is requested for the duration of the field-based work.

**U.S. Agency for International Development**

1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20523

Tel: (202) 712-0000

Fax: (202) 216-3524

[www.usaid.gov](http://www.usaid.gov)