

CHEMONICS INTERNATIONAL INC.



ACCESS TO LAND AND FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN COLOMBIA*

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Access to Land and Forced Displacement in Colombia

1. Introduction

Forced displacement in Colombia as a result of the armed conflict and political violence has increased at a dizzying rate in recent years, and encompasses almost the entire national territory. According to calculations of the national government and CODHES, the magnitude of this displacement currently ranges from 1,079,080 to 2,914,854 persons. During the 2000-2001 period, the number of municipalities affected rose by 70 percent. Furthermore, nearly 74 percent of the municipalities in the country experienced problems with displacement in 2001, with people either entering or leaving. (RSS, 2002).

Displacement and the armed conflict appear to be closely related to the land problem in Colombia (Reyes and Bejarano, 1998). Land depopulation is one of the illegal armed groups' strategies to strengthen their control over the territory and appropriate farmland. Thus, displacement is far more intense in departments with a greater concentration of farmland (Fajardo, 1999). Consequently, land owners are frequently expelled by illegal armed groups (Kirchhoff and Ibáñez, 2001), and therefore according to the Episcopal Conference, approximately 60 percent of displaced households report having some type of land tenure. In an effort to protect the property of displaced families, the national government has required local authorities to establish an inventory of land¹ and the "Oficina de Registro de Instrumentos Públicos" (Office for Public Instruments Registry) to prevent deals on pieces of land when there is an imminent risk of displacement. The land inventory is sufficient proof to confirm owner, holder or occupant status.

Land tenure is also a crucial component of the displaced persons return programs. Data from the Episcopal Conference Information System indicates that 11 percent of the displaced households wish to return, and that 80 percent of these households report land tenure of approximately 8 hectares on average. The challenges inherent to a land program for the displaced population are diverse and complex. On one hand, the appropriation of land, whether formal or informal, without the consent of its legal owners appears to be significant. Therefore, any possible return programs would involve beginning a legal process to restore land. On the other hand, the allocation of land to displaced households participating in a return program could place pressure on the land market.

The goals of this research are to study the link between land tenure and forced displacement in Colombia, and to establish the factors that determine the desire to return. First, we will attempt to clarify the question arising in several studies regarding land tenure as a reason to expel the civilian population. Demonstrating this link is crucial to establishing a long-term policy focused on preventing displacement. Second, the article identifies the factors that determine displaced households' desire to return. Knowledge of the factors that determine displacement and the characteristics of the households that plan to return make it possible to create successful and sustainable return programs.

¹ Decree 2007 of 2001.

The results of the research show an apparent link between the expulsion of the civilian population and land tenure. A high percentage of displaced households had access to small pieces of land in their areas of origin. Contrary to the proposed premises on which the current policy is established, legal ownership of land does not appear to discourage illegal armed groups from expelling civilians in order to subsequently appropriate the land.

On the other hand, access to land is a fundamental element to be included in a return policy. The figures analyzed in this study indicate that the welfare of households with land tenure before displacement is greatly impacted, probably due to difficulty connecting with a labor market for which they were not prepared. The school dropout rate among children from these households is also high. Limited access to the labor market along with low school attendance has resulted in a sharp decline in the socioeconomic level of these families. This fact, combined with the desire to recover their property in the place of origin, creates more willingness to participate in return programs.

This report is comprised of two main sections. The first section contains Chapters II, III, and IV and its objective is to describe the context surrounding forced displacement and land access in Colombia. Chapter II describes the basic facts of forced displacement in Colombia with a special emphasis on causes and return and prevention policies. It is imperative to know the causes and consequences of displacement and the government policies for the displaced population in order to understand the relationship between displacement and access to land, and to propose policies designed for the current programs. Chapter III examines the databases on forced displacement available in the country, identifies their advantages and disadvantages and compares the Social Solidarity Network [Red de Solidaridad Social] database with the RUT System database. Understanding the advantages of the RUT System database is fundamental to gauging and understanding the results of the study. Chapter IV analyzes a profile of the displaced households in the RUT System and an analysis of the vulnerable groups with the displaced population, i.e. families with female heads of household and recently displaced persons. Given that the characteristics of the households are a key factor in determining the desire to return, a detailed analysis of the RUT System households is necessary.

The second section, which contains Chapters V, VI, and VII, concentrates on the principal objectives of the study: revealing land tenure as a cause of displacement and understanding the role of access to land in return programs. Documentary evidence on land ownership, territorial conflicts and forced displacement is studied in depth in Section V. This chapter also describes how land tenure works for the displaced households of the RUT System, and estimates some returns in order to identify the municipal causes of displacement. Chapter VI studies the desire to return and its determining factors. Finally, Chapter VII concludes [the report] and presents policy recommendations.

2. Basic Facts on Forced Displacement in Colombia

Characterizing the displacement in Colombia is of utmost importance in understanding all the elements affecting the displaced population, its assets and desire to return. It is particularly important to have a basic understanding of the magnitude and evolution of displacement in recent years, as well as its regional distribution, different causes, triggering factors and the


parties involved. Finally, it is important to analyze government policies to assist the displaced population and assess the impact that these policies have had in order to identify the areas that must be improved.

This chapter is based on the information compiled by the RSS and the CODHES relative to forced displacement and on the findings of various studies in order to provide a first overview of displacement in all its dimensions and describe some of the basic facts that will be very useful in the following chapters.

2.1 Magnitude of Displacement

The ever increasing phenomenon of displacement as a result of the escalation of the armed conflict is an undeniable fact. The two principal statistical sources in this field, the Social Solidarity Network and CODHES, reveal a major increase beginning in the mid nineties. However, and despite some differences, both sources agree that displacement increased over the last two years, reaching the highest level in recent years (Graph 2.1). CODHES calculated that in November 2002, there were 2,135,682 displaced persons and the RSS accounted for 926,201 displaced persons on the same date.²

Graph 2.1. Magnitude of Displacement



Source: RSS and CODHES


2.2 Distribution of displaced persons by department and municipality

The displacement trend is covering increasingly more territory. According to the RSS in the year 2000, a total of 480 municipalities were affected and in 2001 this figure increased to 819, which is a 70 percent increase. According to these figures, 74 percent of the country's municipalities have displacement problems with either entry or exit trends. Of the 819 municipalities, 183 exclusively expelled people, 120 exclusively received displaced persons and 516 expelled and

² The discrepancies between the CODHES and RSS figures will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.

received people³. Nevertheless, 65 percent of the expulsions are concentrated in 52 municipalities while 72 percent of the receptions are concentrated in 44 municipalities. According to RSS data as of November 2002, all departments in the country, with the exception of San Andrés and Providencia, expel and receive displaced populations. However, as can be seen in Graph 2.2, fifty percent of the displaced population originates from five departments (Antioquia, Bolívar, Magdalena, Chocó and Cesar) while approximately 50 percent of the displaced persons are located in Antioquia, Bolívar, Sucre, Valle and Magdalena (Graph 2.3). Antioquia and Bolívar deserve special attention since these departments both expel and receive displaced persons.


Graph 2.2. Expelling Departments – 2002*



Source: RSS

* Cutoff date: November 2002.

³ Again, there are discrepancies in the information because according to CODHES, 29.47% (586) of the country's municipalities received displaced persons in 2001.

Graph 2.3. Receiving Departments – 2002*

Source: RSS

* Cutoff date: November 2002.

While the absolute numbers on the displaced populations make it possible to identify which of the country's municipalities and departments have higher expulsion and receiving rates, these figures do not make it possible to identify the impact displacement has on the expelling municipality or the pressure it places on the receiving municipality. To do so, it is necessary to analyze the intensity and pressure indicators calculated by Ibáñez and Vélez (2003b). The intensity indicator measures the number of displaced persons in a municipality for every one hundred thousand inhabitants. The displacement pressure indicator calculates the number of displaced persons in the receiving municipality as a percentage of the total population in the municipality.

The displacement intensity figures show that Chocó, Putumayo, Caquetá, Sucre and Bolívar are the departments with the highest number of expelled people per every 100,000 inhabitants. This suggests a relationship between the dynamic of the conflict and the intensity of the displacement since some of these departments are major drug and weapons corridors, have illegal crops and are the scene of territorial disputes between guerrilla groups and inhabitants defending themselves.

High intensity departments usually also have high displacement pressure indicators, as is the case in Chocó, Sucre and Putumayo. This fact evidences the magnitude of interdepartmental displacement, which tends to be predominant, due to the attraction of department capitals because they are perceived as being more secure and having economic opportunities.

Contrary to popular thinking, the situation tends to be worse in intermediate cities than in the main cities as evidenced by the displacement pressure figures in Florencia, Santa Marta, Valledupar and Quibdó, which have much higher displacement pressure indicators than the main

cities. The situation in Quibdó is particularly critical since this city received over 20 percent of its population and has a very precarious infrastructure.

2.3 Displacement Causes


The causes of forced displacement in Colombia are complex and closely linked to economic, social and political conflicts in the country, many of which go back one hundred years. While the armed conflict is generally acknowledged as the primary cause of displacement, it is important to analyze the situation in greater detail to understand the various elements of the conflict that generate displacement. To understand displacement, it is particularly important to analyze land tenure, which for many is an extension of the agrarian conflicts of the last century, and drug trafficking, which is closely related to the current armed conflict because of the logic and interests of the parties involved.

Likewise, it is also important to differentiate between the underlying causes of displacement and the specific triggers that cause households to be displaced and the parties that expel the population through different mechanisms. This section will describe the various causes of and triggers for displacement and their relationship to the armed factions.

2.3.1. The Armed Conflict

While it is not easy to identify the underlying causes of displacement due to the differences in the various regions and the many factors operating simultaneously, it is undeniable that the political violence unleashed by the armed conflict is the principal cause of displacement in Colombia. The conflict affects civil society through threats, attacks, military actions, recruitment and the seizure of municipalities, thus generating a displacement of the population that is either reactive (with a concrete event affecting households) or preventive (in order to avoid violent events related to the armed conflict)⁴. Graph 2.4 shows that there is a relationship between violence (measured by the number of political and civilian homicides) and displacement, which once again points to the importance of the conflict as a root cause of displacement.

⁴ Some authors such as Meertens (1999) and Ibáñez and Vélez (2003) note that preventive displacement could prevail over reactive displacement, particularly in violence-stricken zones.

Graph 2.4. Violence and Forced Displacement

Source: RSS, CODHES and the Human Rights Permanent Committee

Although it is true that violence originating from the armed conflict is the principal cause of displacement, it is important to observe what triggers displacement, i.e. what causes the immediate mobilization of the population. A study of the Episcopal Conference (1995) and another joint report of the Archdiocese of Bogotá and CODHES (1997) cite threats followed by homicides as the main triggers for displacement. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to note that according to the RSS, armed attacks have gained importance as a trigger of displacement in recent years, probably due to the fact that the war between the various players has moved to populated areas.

Identifying the parties responsible for displacement is a major and difficult task due, once more, to the regional differences and the presence of more than one stakeholder in many cases. The main groups responsible for displacement are (in alphabetical order not order of importance): emerald miners, self-defense groups, guerrillas, popular militias, drug traffickers, State Organizations (DAS, Police, Military Forces), paramilitary groups and landowners. According to RSS data, in 2001, fifty percent of displacements were caused by self-defense groups, 20 percent by guerrillas, and 22 percent by more than two parties, and in 7 percent of the cases, the party in question is unknown. The RSS, CODHES and the Episcopal Conference identify self-defense groups as the major factor causing displacement, despite their different data collection methods. Displacement caused by these groups is linked to different interests such as land appropriation, and other underlying causes related to the armed conflict and drug trafficking, as we will see below.

2.3.2. Land Ownership

Reports by Reyes and Bejarano (1998) and Erazo et. al. (2000) agree on the importance of land as a cause of displacement. In effect, in many cases, the economic interests of the armed factions led to the violent appropriation of land, divesting displaced persons of one of their principal means of survival. The importance of land for the displaced population is seen in the work of Erazo et. al. (2000) where nearly 50 percent of the households surveyed reported either owning or leasing land in their places of origin, and approximately 80 percent of these households depend on the land for their survival. Nearly 60 percent of households with land reported being the owners, and in the majority of cases, the land was appropriated by force or abandoned, which contradicts some hypotheses according to which displaced persons sold their land at a very low price before leaving it.

A report by the Episcopal Conference (1999) found that a sample of 1,322 displaced families abandoned approximately 32 thousand hectares, with an average of 24 hectares per family. This coincides with the Erazo et. al. report (2000), which stated that the average size of abandoned plots is approximately 20 hectares (with some regional differences)⁵.

2.3.3. Drug Trafficking and Illegal Crops

Drug trafficking and illegal crops are closely related to displacement in some regions of the country. Reyes (1996, 1997) and Pérez (2002) mention two particular cases that are worth noting. On one hand, drug traffickers purchase land as a mechanism to launder illegal proceeds, thus generating a speculative land process that destroys the purchase power of the State and peasants' ability to negotiate with landholders. Moreover, drug traffickers in many cases inherit the social conflicts of the land they buy, which is why they form self-defense groups, intensifying the conflict in the region, and consequently the displacement.⁶

Illegal crops add another pressure on land and displacement, due not only to the purchase of land for cocaine and poppy seed production, but also to the amount of control over the corridors for the transport of drugs. Spraying illegal crops also destroys producers' assets, causing their income to come crashing down and an increase in fighting. Intense spraying of crops in recent years caused a major surge in migration. According to CODHES, the eradication of these crops has contributed to the displacement of 36,000 people since 1998. It has been estimated that in the cocaine and warring regions of Guaviare, Meta, Caquetá and Putumayo, 13,153 people were displaced in 1999. This figure could rise to 20,000 if interdepartmental migration is included, and to over 30 or 40 thousand if the cocaine leaf harvesters and sharecroppers are added (Puyana, 1999). The RSS does not consider people forced to migrate as a result of spraying illegal crops to be displaced persons, therefore they are at a great disadvantage (GTD, 2001).

⁵ WFP figures (2001) are even more dramatic, since they report that more than 4 million hectares have been expropriated from displaced persons, which is equal to one third of the arable land in the country. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the figures on the size of abandoned land and land ownership may be affected by the interest of displaced populations in reporting larger amounts in order to possibly participate in a land return program.

⁶ Pérez (2002) states that pressure on the land and the conflicts this creates occur in areas with strategic resources, not only illegal crops but also coal, oil, and emeralds, thus creating speculation and violence.

2.3.4. Breakup of Social Network

Another hypothesis suggests that displacement is a strategy to dismantle social action, networks of friends and neighbors, and an element to intimidate the population, like a war strategy to attack the enemy by making its base population vulnerable (Henaio et al., 1998). According to Lozano and Osorio (1999), 65 percent of the displaced population belongs to community organizations –community action boards, production coops- and only 11 percent are members of political or trade unions.

2.4. Displacement Prevention and Mitigation Policies⁷

Policies for dealing with displacement can be analyzed according to the specific objective they pursue and the problems and needs they wish to solve. First are the policies targeted at preventing displacement that concentrate on the population at risk of being displaced. Second, are the humanitarian care policies that attempt to care for the population at the time of displacement. Finally, there are socioeconomic stabilization policies that attempt to create appropriate conditions for displaced persons in areas such as health, education, housing and the labor market in order to enable displaced households to reach an acceptable standard of living in either location where they are received, the place of settlement in the event of relocation, or the place of origin in the case of returns. The purpose of this section is to describe and analyze the government policies and programs for the displaced population.

The government responded to the increase in displacement by enacting Law 387 of 1997 and a series of presidential directives and decrees that branch off of it. One of the most important elements of the government policy is the significant increase in investments to assist the displaced population. According to the CONPES document, during the 2000-2002 period, investments grew to 360 million USD, a number six times higher than the investments made during the 1997-1998 period. Approximately 81 percent of the investments are concentrated on socioeconomic stabilization programs, followed by 16.2 percent on humanitarian care programs and 1.2 percent on prevention programs.

State assistance programs face two major challenges. On one hand, under registration leads in many cases to a large number of displaced households having no access to this type of assistance, since only households registered with the SUR have access to government resources⁸. Households that fear being identified prefer not to register with the SUR and consequently cannot access government aid and are very vulnerable.

Another difficulty is the efficiency of governmental aid, including for the households registered with the SUR. The national government and local authorities covered approximately 30 percent

⁷ This section is based on Ibáñez and Vélez (2003b).

⁸ Causes of under registration with the SUR. First, despite the tangible benefits of registering with the SUR, a significant number of households prefer not to register. Second, the creation of the SUR in 1999 and the obligation to register households with only one year of displacement impedes the registration of households displaced prior to that date, which has resulted in state aid covering only 17 percent of the displaced population (Arboleda y Correa, 2002). Third, a large disparity also persists between the inclusion and non-inclusion rates in the various territorial units of the RSS: in Bolívar, the non-inclusion percentage is around 5 percent, in Antioquia six percent and in Bogotá and Huila it is 50 percent (GTD, 2001).

of the actual demand for aid in the best cases, but in the areas of relocation, education, psychosocial care and return services, the coverage was less than ten percent.

Finally, it is important to emphasize that not only the government plays an important role in the care of the displaced population. Several international organizations have also shown interest in contributing to solving this problem. The International Committee of the Red Cross, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Catholic Church have provided basic support for the displaced population, mainly in the form of humanitarian aid. Other international organizations that have programs related to forced displacement are the European Union, UNICEF, USCR, FAO, WFP, AID and the United Nations Office for Emergencies.

The Colombian Agency for International Cooperation (ACCI) centralizes proposals for international cooperation and initiatives by concerned entities. Since 2001, 26 cooperation projects on displacement have been proposed, 12 of which were rejected by the ACCI or the source providing the resources, 5 were completed, and the 9 remaining projects are still in progress, being reformulated or under study by the source. The 14 projects not rejected by the ACCI represent an approximate amount of 85 million dollars distributed as follows: Human Rights (80%), Peace and Regional Development (19%) and Social Development (1%).

2.4.1. Prevention Policies

The purpose of prevention policies is to dismantle all processes that create violence and displacement caused by the armed factions, and to strengthen community initiatives in order to guarantee compliance with the DIH and create a place for dialogue and inclusion.

The Early Alert System [Sistema de Alertas Tempranas] (SAT) is the main tool of prevention policies to stop and prevent forced displacement by improving the government's response to the imminent risk of displacement. The SAT is jointly coordinated by the Ombudsman ("Defensoría del Pueblo"), the Vice Presidency of the Republic, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Defense, the RSS and the Attorney General's Office.

Despite the growing capacity of the SAT to identify displacement risks in a timely manner, government response efforts continued to be untimely and ineffective. Authorities are still largely negligent in protecting the communities and in 2001, eleven of the twenty alerts received resulted in murders and threats to civilians. (Human Rights Watch, 2002).

Although the budget allocated to prevention programs is low compared to that allocated to other types of policies, the Democratic Security Policy enacted by the current administration plays a fundamental role in preventing displacement. According to a document of the Presidency of the Republic (2003), the Democratic Security and Defense Policy considers safety to be the main concern of this government. According to the government, access to security is the area of greatest unbalance in the country, since the poorest people are generally the least protected and victims of forced displacement. Therefore, the prime goal of the government is to restore safety in the areas by using public security forces to prevent new displacements and consequently encourage households to return to their places of origin.

On the other hand, Decree 2007 of 2001, by acknowledging and protecting the ownership rights of the population at risk of displacement,⁹ endeavors to prevent displacement by reducing vulnerability and the possibility of the people's land being expropriated by armed groups, and eliminating the economic incentives for displacement of the population.

2.4.2. Humanitarian Care

Humanitarian care policies are focused on food security, health, transportation, protection and security, lodging, education, and the organization and participation of the community.

According to the UNHCR, humanitarian care is the most developed government policy. Nevertheless, despite the fact that investment between 1998 and 2002 was much higher than previous years, the budget is still not sufficient considering that only 30 percent of the households received humanitarian care.

Some difficulties associated with the provision of humanitarian care are linked to regional disparities and the higher vulnerability of certain groups. On one hand, some departments receive a proportion of humanitarian care that is higher than the percentage of displaced persons that must be served (as in the case of Sucre and Atlántico) while cities like Bogotá receive half of the humanitarian assistance required to cover the flow of displaced persons they receive. On the other hand, it is noted that humanitarian assistance is usually standard, with no distinction according to region, gender, age or culture. Moreover, displaced households living in urban areas are usually more vulnerable since they must earmark more resources for transportation and drinking water, among other items, which in many cases lead to greater food insecurity.

2.4.3. Socioeconomic Stabilization

Law 387 proposes creating possibilities to access land, credit, technical assistance, training, basic infrastructure and trade, food security, health care, employment, housing availability, and urban equipment in order to create stable living conditions for displaced households. Below, we describe the basic measures adopted by the government in each of these areas.

2.4.3.1. Education

The national government, through Decree No. 2231 of 1989 and Decree No. 2562 of 2001, establishes the preferential access of the displaced population to education and determines the exemption from the payment of tuition and school enrollment fees for displaced minors. Nevertheless, and despite government regulations, the education coverage of displaced minors is worrisome. In many cases, the preferential access of displaced minors in education institutions is not ensured by local authorities who prefer to avoid "social conflicts" between displaced groups and the local community, and due to the weak economic support for these government initiatives that result in more pressure on the budget of each municipality.

⁹ Decree 2007 establishes in general terms that INCORA must register property abandoned by the displaced population, establish means of prevention and to freeze property in areas with high risk for displacement and it must regulate the program targeted at receiving land from displaced people in exchange for other land.

The precarious economic status of displaced households forces them to withdraw their children from school in order to save [that money] and pay other expenses or have them enter the labor market under very unstable conditions. Displaced children do not perform well because of many disturbances in learning, loss of memory, malnutrition and other psychosocial factors.

The figures on displaced children's education speak for themselves: a study of the Archdiocese of Bogotá in 1999 indicates that 77 percent of the school aged displaced children residing in Bogotá have no access to education. And a study conducted by the WFP (2001) points out that 23 percent of the families reported withdrawing their children from school. The government aid provided by the RSS is not enough and it is estimated that only three percent of the displaced population received education aid.

2.4.3.2. Health

Agreements 185 of 2000 and 59 of 1997 establish the right of displaced populations to receive the health care “necessary for the timely treatment of diseases arising from exposure to the risks inherent to displacement,” define the procedure for claiming payments for health services provided to the displaced population and open the possibility of care being provided throughout the national territory by any private or public health care provider.¹⁰

Despite the provisions above, health coverage for the displaced population is insufficient. According to a survey by the IOM, the vaccination coverage of displaced children is 20 percent lower than the national rate, and approximately 57 percent of the child mortality reported by this community between August and November 2000 could have been prevented. Approximately 80 percent of the households reported some illness in the last three months and only 53 percent received professional care.

Problems associated with providing health care service are once again a result of weak government financial support since hospitals, in many cases, refrain from providing health care to displaced persons due to the inability of the central and local governments to reimburse the funds necessary to cover health care services for displaced families.

2.4.3.3. Housing

Law 387 and Decree No. 951 of 2001 set forth preferential access for displaced households through the Family Housing Subsidy Program and favors granting subsidies to families who return over those who relocate. The housing supply includes the acquisition of new or used housing, improving housing, and the construction of housing on owned or leased plots.

Sixty-three percent of the resources for housing in 2001 was allocated to the purchase of new housing, eight percent to home improvements, one percent to the acquisition of used houses and leases, nineteen percent to the construction of water and sewage networks, pipes and roads, and nine percent to basic rural sanitation.

¹⁰ The costs of providing health care to displaced households not registered in the social security program must be paid by the municipality where the displaced individual used to live.

The access of displaced households to public services is usually lower than the average urban access rate. However, it is difficult to determine whether access to public services gets worse with displacement since it would be necessary to establish the access rate to public services in the place of origin.

The impact of humanitarian care on covering lodging and housing subsidies and solutions is insufficient. In the majority of cases, displaced families stay in relatives' homes temporarily and then live in marginal neighborhoods with acute sewage and health problems and overcrowding.

2.4.3.4. Land

As previously stated, Decree 2007 of 2001 sets forth the protection of the property of displaced persons as well as the awarding of land in the event of relocation. Displaced households can exchange vacant plots for another plot in their place of relocation and will have priority in land allocation programs coordinated by INCORA.

According to the GTD (2001), there is a significant delay in carrying out return and relocation programs for displaced persons, and according to the RSS, no more than 15 percent of the displaced persons in 2001 were allocated subsidies for land, temporary relocation, relocation and return. Defects in program design, weak institutional capacity, and the lack of coordination between the entities of the National System to Care for the Displaced Population restrict the effectiveness of land access programs. In addition, the displaced populations' loss of assets makes access to credit for purchasing more land impossible, in many cases (Arboleda and Correa, 2002).

At this point, it is worth noting a pilot experiment conducted by the RSS last year¹¹ related to the application of Decree 2007 in the municipality of Landázuri, Santander. After declaring the imminent risk of displacement in March 2002, an inventory of land was prepared and assets were frozen as set forth in the decree in 4 subdivisions (28 districts) of the municipality. The Landázuri experiment yielded some difficulties relative to the application of the decree, which are described below:

i) Comparing the information recorded in the inventory with the information in the land registry files reveals a severe under registration problem. While the official information includes 850 plots registered, the inventory revealed the existence of 1,600 plots. This difference points to the need to institutionally strengthen land registration that facilitates the application of the Decree and guarantees the security of the displaced population's ownership.

ii) After the inventory was prepared, approximately 30 households requested lifting the property freeze in order to sell land voluntarily. However, there appears to be evidence that, in many cases, the request to lift the inventory was in response to pressure from some parties in order to appropriate land from the peasants.

iii) The participation of the population is of fundamental importance to the development and implementation of the decree in its different phases. Disseminating the scope and limitations of

¹¹ The following paragraphs are based on a personal interview with Myriam Hernández.

the decree and increasing the participation of the population in the Displaced Population Assistance Committees is important to guaranteeing the success of the measure.

On the other hand, the Technical Unit of the RSS identified a series of additional problems that must be improved in order to improve the implementation of the decree. First, the decree does not make any distinction between owners and non-owners, which is a major obstacle given the evidence and predominance of unstable forms of land tenure in many municipalities. Moreover, there has been no exchange of land to date, although this alternative is set forth in the decree. Another important element is the debts of the population, which it ceases to administer upon displacement placing at risk assets such as land, which guarantee in large part its financial obligations. Finally, it is important to develop special processes to grant land titles that guarantee the protection of land due to the absence, in many cases, of titles or legal documents that support land ownership.

2.4.3.5 Labor Market

Law 387 and Decree 2569 set forth the need to create policies and programs to include displaced persons in productive activities such as training programs, job creation, as well as productive projects with greater coverage indices compared to humanitarian care, or relocation and return projects. Nevertheless, displaced persons primarily join the labor market in low quality jobs without any benefits, and according to the Episcopal Conference (1995), many displaced persons go from earning salaries or being farmers in their place of origin to working as street vendors or small business people.

2.4.3.6 Relocation and Return

Relocation and return programs involve many of the socioeconomic stabilization elements described in this section. As stated previously, Decrees 951 and 2007 of 2001 provide for the allocation of land and housing subsidies for households that wish to return. Similarly, INCORA will receive abandoned land as part of the payment for the acquisition of new land in the event the family wishes to relocate. Also, displaced families may return to a vacant plot in their places of origin and accrue the time that they were displaced in order to prove holding the land.

However and despite the considerable budget allocated to return and relocation programs, the scope of these programs is very modest: less than ten percent of the households registered in the SUR have participated in relocation programs and approximately one percent is involved in return programs.¹²

One of the main problems is the unwillingness of displaced families to return despite the government programs designed for such purposes. According to a CODHES study in the Urabá and Medellín area, 68 percent of the households surveyed do not wish to return and 45 percent reported insecurity and fear as the main reason for not returning. Relocation programs, in turn, face major obstacles due to the lack of political will of local governments that resist receiving

¹² The RSS report submitted to Congress reports that in 2001, 11% (21,172 people) of the displaced population returned, compared to 37% in the previous year. In the same year, 2,039 people were relocated.

displaced families in their municipalities for fear of the problems that may arise with the local community.

2.4.4. Differences Between Local and National Responsibility

As indicated by Ibáñez and Vélez (2003b), forced displacement should be addressed by both the national and local governments since it is a problem that transcends the local arena. Although the national government assumes a large part of the financial responsibility of caring for the displaced population, the administrative and institutional responsibility falls on the local governments. Table 2.1 taken from Ibáñez and Vélez (2003b) describes the responsibilities of the various governmental levels.

In general, one can see that the institutional and administrative pressure on local governments is considerable due to the assistance that they must provide to the displaced population, and also to the financial commitments to health and education that they must fulfill. As Ibáñez and Vélez note, it is useful to establish whether the municipalities have the financial, administrative and institutional capability to assume this responsibility.

Table 2.1. Assistance to the Displaced Population: National and Local Responsibilities

Type of Support	National Government Responsibilities	Local Government Responsibilities
Humanitarian Care	Provide humanitarian care.	Emergency management of aid with the national government.
Housing Subsidies	Provide housing and land subsidies. INURBE allocates subsidies in urban areas and the Agrarian Bank [does so] in rural areas. Define (RSS) aid ceilings per household for land and housing subsidies.	
Return	Lead return programs.	
Education	Send displaced minors to schools (RSS).	Guarantee access to education on the preschool, elementary and intermediate levels. Release [displaced persons] from the payment of registration and tuition. This will be effective for the entire period of the study.
Health	Allocate a budget to cover the illnesses arising from forced displacement.	Pay health services when the displaced persons are not members of the General Social Security System or any other special plan.
Land	Initiate programs and procedures for the transfer, allocation and titling of land in areas of expulsion. Designate plots for temporary use by groups of displaced households. Receive the abandoned real property of displaced persons who elect to be relocated.	Make a declaration when displacement is imminent. Identify owners, those in possession, holders and occupants located in the respective area of displacement. Inform the Public Instrument Registry of the risk or occurrence of displacement and identify the owners or those in possession of rural land. Request that INCORA not grant titles to

		vacant land in the area at risk for displacement or where it has occurred.
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Source: Ibáñez and Vélez (2003).

2.5. Impact of Displacement

Displacement imposes substantial costs on affected families given the difficulty of recovering lost and intangible materials. On the one hand, physical assets, such as land, are abandoned in the majority of cases since the families do not have sufficient time to sell them prior to migration, and they rarely have titles to the land. On the other hand, the members of the household, who are generally trained for agricultural work, lose the human capital specific to their trade. Third, access to social services such as health and education in the location of origin cannot necessarily be recovered once they adjust to the place that receives them. This can mean the loss of the fixed costs necessary to access social services, and more seriously, the interruption of the displaced children and adolescents' education. Finally, the consequences of post-traumatic stress syndrome from being in violent situations and the loss of their social capital can have grave psychological implications.

Despite the presumed high costs of displacement, few studies have concentrated on the impact of forced displacement in Colombia. The purpose of this section is to briefly describe the results of a study whose objective is to examine the losses in welfare arising from forced displacement in Colombia.

In 2001, the International Organization of Migration (IOM) conducted a study in six departments in Colombia.¹³ In order to study the status of the displaced population, surveys were given to 2,534 households in 14 municipalities in 6 departments in the country. The sample of households was comprised of 1,846 displaced families and 688 neighbors of the displaced families who were used as the control group. The principal results are described below.

In contrast to the Colombian population, the distribution of the displaced population has a higher concentration of ethnic groups and dependent population. Nearly 28 percent of the displaced households are Afro-Colombian and indigenous, while these groups account for 18 percent of the Colombian population. The bulk of the displaced population is between the age ranges 0 to 17 and 65 or older, i.e. the ages of high economic dependence. In contrast, the entire Colombian population is between 18 and 64 years of age.

The survey results suggest wider health coverage for displaced households given the poor residents in the receiving areas studied. Approximately 62 percent of the families surveyed are members of the subsidized or tax-funded health system. The membership rates in the subsidized or tax-funded health system for the residents in the four lowest income deciles residing in the receiving areas are 44, 37, 38, and 45 percent. Despite the higher membership of displaced households, 41 percent of the families with children under the age of 12 reported weight loss during the past six months. School attendance for displaced children is slightly lower than that of the neighboring children. School attendance among children between the ages of 7 and 11 is 72

¹³ Norte de Santander, Santander, Valle del Cauca, Nariño, Caquetá and Putumayo.

percent for displaced minors and 78 percent for the neighboring children. The gap widens between the ages of 12 and 17 probably due to the need for minors to enter the labor market. Families list the high cost of education (54%), the need to work (23%) and child care responsibilities (9%) as the principal causes for not attending school.

The high unemployment rates of the displaced population appear to be the result of little education and inadequate preparation for work in urban areas. The average education level of displaced populations is approximately half of that for the control groups. An immediate consequence of low school attendance is the unemployment rate, which is 31 percent for male heads of households and 48 percent for females. The unemployment rate for neighbors is 25 percent for men and 22 percent for women. The unstable economic situation of the displaced households is reflected in the fact that all the families surveyed are below the poverty line. The average monthly income of the displaced households at the time of the study was \$217,711, or nearly \$110,000 below the poverty line of that time period.¹⁴ Moreover, all the families surveyed reported that at least one basic need was not satisfied, and half indicated that three or four basic needs were not satisfied. This means that 50 percent of the study sample is living in abject poverty.

State assistance appears to mitigate little of the impact of displacement. Despite the fact that over half registered with the Social Solidarity Network, and as a result received government assistance, their situation continues to be urgent. Government support is principally concentrated on humanitarian aid (62%) and health services (20%). However, the displaced groups identify their principal priorities as: health (32%), housing (31%), work (23%), food assistance (5%), child care (4%) and elder care, formal education and basic infrastructure (1%).

The results of the study reflect the extreme situation of displaced households. First, the bulk of the population is comprised of vulnerable groups such as youth, the elderly, and ethnic minorities. Second, displacement causes school dropouts, which entails high costs for displaced families and perpetuates poverty. Third, all the displaced people surveyed are living in poverty and half are living in abject poverty. Finally, the figures suggest that the capacity of government assistance to alleviate displacement is limited.

2.6. Conclusions

In Colombia, displacement is the result of a series of dynamics related to the armed conflict, and to the phenomena of drug trafficking and the dismantling of social networks inherent to the same relationships of the armed groups. Displacement has increased significantly in recent years due to the intensification of the armed conflict, and this trend is expected to continue because there are no effective solutions to this problem.

The government response, while set forth in Law 387 and other decrees, does not yet appear to have achieved the desired coverage and effectiveness, which means there are many institutional, economic and administrative challenges in order to guarantee displaced persons' quality of life, as well as the security of their property, which in the end can facilitate the viability of the current government's return programs.

¹⁴ The poverty line for March 2001 was \$327,500.

3. Data on Forced Displacement

The data on forced displacement in Colombia is from three sources, the Social Solidarity Network and CODHES presented in the previous chapter, and the RUT system data compiled by the Episcopal Conference, which is the data used in this report. These three registries show major differences as a result of the compilation methods, which in many cases generate biases that are important to identify. Specifically and as will be discussed in the following paragraphs, none of the three databases is a representative sample of the displaced population; therefore, any findings based on them must carefully consider the biases and constraints of each of the information systems.

This chapter will discuss the data gathering mechanisms and constraints of each database, and will then attempt to compare the RSS database to the RUT System database in order to identify the existence of biases in variables such as regional distribution of displacement, type of displacement, causes and stakeholders and other characteristics of the displaced population such as gender and age distribution.

3.1. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Current Databases

The main sources of information on the displaced population are the Social Solidarity Network, CODHES and the Episcopal Conference. The figures used in our analysis are from the RUT Information System of the Episcopal Conference – EC – whose purpose is to monitor the phenomenon of forced displacement in the country. The EC surveys displaced households to gather information on the stakeholders and reasons for expulsion, land tenure, membership in organizations, desire to return, demographic characteristics of the household, school attendance before and after displacement and work information before and after displacement.

The RUT Information System began in 1997 and it is comprised of households that request assistance from the 3,764 Catholic Parishes¹⁵ located throughout the national territory. The RUT System currently¹⁶ covers 30,084 displaced households accounting for a total 147,943 people. Data from the RUT System, while covering the broadest sample of the displaced population in the country, is not representative of this population, as explained in the following paragraphs.

The RSS bases its data on the Single Record System (Sistema Único de Registro, SUR) established in 1999 and on the Contrasted Sources Estimation System (Sistema de Estimación de Fuentes Contrastadas, SEFC)). In order to access governmental assistance, displaced families must register at the SUR through a statement of the household to any institution of the Public Ministry. The government has fifteen business days to verify the household statement. The SUR currently has¹⁷ 222,892 households corresponding to 1,016,175 people. Data from the SUR system is not representative of the population since it only includes those households that decide to register for government assistance.

¹⁵ Priests, nuns or seminary students generally give out questionnaires. The goal is to initially approach displaced families and build a bond of trust with the household. Therefore, the duration of the questionnaire ranges from one to four hours.

¹⁶ Cutoff for data: March 31, 2003.

¹⁷ Cutoff date is March 3, 2003.

NGOs dedicated to providing services to the displaced population are assigned the task of classifying the households of the SUR. The forms gather information on the structure of the household, the socioeconomic conditions of the municipality of expulsion, the causes of the displacement and the parties involved in the conflict. The RSS does not control the administration of the surveys, which has resulted in poor coverage and survey responses of displaced people appearing to be biased, reflecting the interests of the NGOs in charge of the surveys.

The purpose of the SEFC is to estimate the magnitude of displacement and its regional distribution based on both the information provided by the various types of sources and the displaced population itself. In order to gather information, the Territorial Units of the RSS¹⁸ must complete some base records where the source of the information, geographical data on the displacement, the number of displaced households and their socio-demographic characteristics are recorded as well as the causes and parties responsible for the displacement. In addition, all data recorded in the SEFC is compared with different sources of information in order to confirm the facts reported and is consolidated at the RSS central office by the Joint Technical Unit (Unidad Técnica Conjunta). Decentralized data sources, the presence of the RSS in all regions, and validating information increases the precision of the SEFC estimates. However, the SEFC does not include detailed data on the displaced families, which prevents analysis transcending the traditional study of the regional distribution of displacement, the basic characteristics of the displaced population or the parties responsible for the expulsion.

CODHES produces a database to calculate the magnitude of displacement (SISDES). It gives surveys to establish the socio-demographic characteristics of the population and

¹⁸ RSS has 35 territorial units located in 32 departments and in Urabá, Magdalena Medio and Bogotá.

performs case studies in some areas of the country. To determine the magnitude of displacement, CODHES uses a methodology called “statistics by consensus,” which gathers the information contained in 34 newspapers of the country that is confirmed with local authorities and individuals and entities related to the SISDES. Based on the SISDES, CODHES identifies a sample of displaced households that will receive the detailed surveys in order to learn about their socio-demographic characteristics, the parties involved and triggers for expulsion as well as land tenure. Case studies are localized in some regions and their data are not in any way representative of the displaced population.

The RUT Information System has several advantages compared to the RSS and CODHES databases despite not being representative of the displaced population. First, the RUT System was implemented in 1997, and therefore covers a longer period of time. In addition, the System contains households displaced since 1980, as considering households with one or less years of expulsion is not restricted by legal provisions. Second, the RUT System questionnaire, unlike the RSS Register, contains detailed information on the structure of the household, parties involved in the expulsion and land tenure. Finally, the RUT System covers a considerable percentage of the national territory through its parishes, while the CODHES database contains case studies from some municipalities in the country.

3.2. Comparison of Data from the SUR and RUT Systems

The RUT Information System database may be biased in selection because its coverage is restricted to those who request assistance from the Catholic Church. It is also possible that the Catholic Church has a greater presence in certain geographic regions, which would result in wider coverage of displaced households in these regions. On the other hand, households with determined characteristics could be more inclined to seek assistance from the Catholic Church than other entities such as the RSS. It is worth noting that the Catholic Church tries to provide psychological support and comfort to households, but does not attempt to replace the government’s obligations to the displaced population. The following paragraphs investigate the bias of the RUT database in terms of its geographical coverage and the characteristics of displacement and displaced households.

As mentioned in the previous paragraphs, RUT registry is carried out in the municipalities with Catholic parishes, while the RSS registry must, in principle, cover the entire national territory. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 compare each department’s share of the total displaced population according to RUT and RSS data. RUT data indicates more expulsion and receiving in the Bolívar, Meta, Valle del Cauca and Guaviare departments, but underestimates the participation of Antioquia, Magdalena and Sucre with regard to RSS data.

Table 3.1. Displacement Distribution by Departments- Expelling Departments

Department	% People Expelled	
	RSS	RUT
Antioquia	17.18	13.59
Atlántico	0.09	0.06
Bogotá	0.03	0.06
Bolívar	12.45	20.35
Boyacá	0.33	0.25
Caldas	1.15	1.68
Caquetá	4.65	5.07
Cauca	2.97	1.45
Cesar	6.47	4.85
Córdoba	4.45	3.22
Cundinamarca	1.69	0.89
Choco	5.46	7.10
Huila	1.01	0.94
Guajira	1.30	0.19
Magdalena	6.57	2.52
Meta	3.11	7.21
Nariño	1.64	1.15
Norte de Santander	3.55	1.95
Quindío	0.12	0.20
Risaralda	0.53	0.69
Santander	3.43	2.03
Sucre	6.24	2.86
Tolima	4.19	5.03
Valle del cauca	3.30	6.15
Arauca	0.94	0.35
Casanare	0.88	0.79
Putumayo	5.04	4.63
Amazonas	0.01	0.00
Guainia	0.04	0.05
Guaviare	0.91	4.04
Vaupés	0.05	0.23
Vichada	0.22	0.44

Source: RSS (2003) and authors' calculations based on RUT

Table3.2 Displacement Distribution by Departments-Receiving Departments

Department	% People Received	
	RSS	RUT
Antioquia	14.00	7.84
Atlántico	5.30	2.40
Bogotá	6.41	4.21
Bolívar	8.24	24.02
Boyacá	0.42	0.41
Caldas	0.64	1.82
Caquetá	2.53	2.21
Cauca	1.99	0.00
Cesar	5.02	4.23
Córdoba	5.22	2.98
Cundinamarca	2.04	2.59
Choco	3.23	6.25
Huila	2.01	2.92
Guajira	1.87	0.00
Magdalena	4.73	0.83
Meta	2.85	9.30
Nariño	2.95	5.01
Norte de Santander	2.92	0.80
Quindío	0.68	0.66
Risaralda	1.25	2.64
Santander	5.06	2.19
Sucre	9.18	2.70
Tolima	1.97	3.54
Valle del cauca	5.62	7.11
Arauca	0.49	0.00
Casanare	0.64	0.41
Putumayo	2.21	0.07
Amazonas	0.01	0.00
Guainía	0.03	0.00
Guaviare	0.37	2.83
Vaupés	0.00	0.01
Vichada	0.11	0.00

Source: RSS (2003) and authors' calculations based on RUT

Table 3.3 shows the percentage of intra-departmental displacement in each department for data from the RUT and the RSS. Although the data shows important differences by department, as is the case in Cundinamarca, Magdalena, Norte de Santander and Sucre among others,¹⁹ the aggregate intra-departmental displacement percentage of the RUT (60.08%) roughly coincides with the RSS data (62.52%).

In departments like Antioquia, Bolívar and Caldas the differences in intra-departmental displacement are also significant according to RUT and the RSS.

Table 3.3 Percentage of Inter-Departmental Displacements

Department	RUT	RSS
Antioquia	51.7	72.3
Atlántico	5.6	16.9
Bogotá	4.6	35.0
Bolívar	87.5	55.2
Boyacá	28.1	29.0
Caldas	81.0	65.1
Caquetá	36.7	47.5
Cauca	0.2	54.6
Cesar	68.4	60.4
Córdoba	66.7	64.0
Cundinamarca	26.0	62.9
Chocó	62.5	59.9
Huila	62.6	44.0
Guajira	0.0	79.8
Magdalena	26.2	68.2
Meta	77.1	59.9
Nariño	78.7	56.9
Norte de Santander	28.9	71.6
Quindío	44.3	53.8
Risaralda	84.0	73.9
Santander	66.6	67.5
Sucre	47.5	79.1
Tolima	59.3	42.1
Valle Cauca	89.4	88.1
Arauca	0.9	49.3
Casanare	43.3	56.3
Putumayo	1.6	40.0
Amazonas	0.0	21.4
Guainía	0.0	30.1
Guaviare	63.4	48.5
Vaupés	1.4	1.4
Vichada	0.0	20.6

Source: RSS (2003) and authors' calculations based on RUT

Tables 3.4 and 3.5 report the age and gender composition according to RUT and the RSS. The tables show no bias of the RUT regarding these variables, and a considerable difference between the two registries can only be seen in children between the ages of zero and four. This may be due to the fact that the most vulnerable households register at the SUR to obtain government assistance.

Table 3.4 Distribution of Displaced Persons by Gender

Gender	RSS %	RUT %
Male	50.02	50.45
Female	49.98	49.55

Source: RSS (2003) and the authors' calculations based on RUT

Table 3.5 Age Composition of Displaced Persons

Age Group		RSS %	RUT %
	Total	53.22	53.46
Minors under 18 years	Male	27.07	27.93
	Female	26.14	25.53
	Total	16.95	11.88
0-4 years	Male	8.72	6.24
	Female	8.23	5.64
	Total	15.48	16.34
5-9 years	Male	7.84	8.50
	Female	7.64	7.84
	Total	13.78	14.58
10-14 years	Male	7.07	7.58
	Female	6.71	7.00
	Total	7.00	7.05
15-17 years	Male	3.44	3.55
	Female	3.56	3.50
	Total	38.60	38.58
18-50 years	Male	17.90	18.35
	Female	20.70	20.24
	Total	8.18	8.19
50-98 years	Male	4.14	4.29
	Female	4.05	3.90

Source: RSS (2003) and the authors' calculations based on RUT

Another important difference between the two databases is the percentage of households headed by females. While RUT reports 37.5 percent of households headed by women and the RSS data shows 44 percent. This may be due to the fact that the most vulnerable households register at the SUR to obtain government assistance. This hypothesis also appears to be confirmed by the number of displaced people who belong to ethnic minorities. According to the RSS, the percentage of households in ethnic minority groups was 38 percent up to 2002, while in data from the RUT this number increases 3.3 percent. These differences may be the result of vulnerable households' need to seek government assistance or to a geographic bias of the RUT data, which appears to be concentrated in the departments with less indigenous or black inhabitants.

Finally, it is worth noting some differences in the databases relative to expulsion factors. According to data from the RSS, around 50 percent of the displacements in 2001 were caused by paramilitary forces and 20 percent by guerilla groups. RUT data agrees attributing 53 percent of displacements to paramilitary forces that year, but 38 percent to guerilla groups. This discrepancy may be attributed to RUT's geographical bias.

In summary, a glimpse of a few facts on displacement reveals that there is a geographical bias in the RUT database compared to that of the RSS, possibly caused by the strong presence of the Catholic Church in some municipalities and a difference in certain characteristics of the displaced households probably due to the tendency of the most vulnerable families to register with the RSS. The subsequent findings presented throughout this study must be analyzed keeping in mind the specified bias.

3.3. Proposals for Strengthening the Information Systems on the Displaced Population

Colombia currently has three systems whose principal objective it is to collect information about the displaced population: the RUT System, the SUR, and the SISDES. The RUT System and the SISDES are maintained by non-governmental organizations, while the SUR is administered by the national government. Therefore, the objectives of the information systems do not necessarily agree and the nature of the institutions makes it possible for each institution to specialize in specific subjects. The objective of this section is to propose some modifications to strengthen the current information systems.

Modifying the form and collection method of the RUT System could be a mistake for two reasons. On the one hand, the RUT System was initiated in 1997 with a form that has not been modified. The continuity of the formula throughout six years is, without a doubt, a strength since it makes time comparisons and trend analysis possible. On the other hand, the RUT System does not claim to be representative of the displaced population. Its objective is to characterize the displaced population that approaches the Dioceses to request assistance. However, the trust generated by the Catholic Church and its wide coverage of the national territory has resulted in a sampling of 32,093 households from 29 departments in the country.

The aforementioned reasons make it possible to confirm that continuing to use the current form and information collection method is essential. However, it is possible to expand the form in order to increase the information on the status of the displaced persons in the place they are received. Although the form compiles information about access to education and inclusion in the labor market, it could also include some questions to learn about access to the social security health system and access to government services.

A possible aspect to be reinforced in the RUT System form is the information concerning government assistance. The RUT System, by covering displaced households with and without access to government assistance and belonging to a neutral institution in the conflict, is an extremely valuable tool for identifying the characteristics of households with access to government assistance and assessing the impact of such assistance. While the form does ask about the institutions which provided assistance to the displaced population, it would be important to inquire:

1. Whether the households have turned to government assistance and if this assistance has been provided to them.
2. As to the timeframe between the displacement and the family's decision to request assistance.
3. The time between the request for government assistance and the provision of the government assistance.

Moreover, the module on access to land could be enhanced in two fundamental ways to incorporate prevention and return policies. On the one hand, the RUT System could inquire whether the land in the region of origin was abandoned, sold to a third party or rented. On the other hand, the form could include a carefully worded question to determine the amount of land necessary to replace the land of families who do not wish to return.

Finally, it is important to review the questions in the RUT form on the labor situation. The current question does not make it possible to establish whether the individuals are effectively unemployed, i.e. whether they are participating in the work force, but have been unable to find a job, or the individuals do not work, but are not unemployed. Additional questions could be included in order to make this differentiation since as it is now written, the unemployment rates may be overestimated. It is also important to include questions to identify the quality of the work in which the displaced people are engaged.

The RSS information has errors in representation and information that are essential to directing its public policy. It is imperative that the RSS use a representative survey for the displaced population in order to characterize that population, estimate the impact of the displacement, evaluate the current policy, and identify the needs of the displaced population. In addition, the current forms collect little information on the displaced families. The RSS could take the RUT System form, add the items proposed in the paragraphs above, and add some questions about the principal priorities of the displaced population. With a representative sample and the information yielded by the specified questions, the RSS could effectively direct its policies and programs.

3.4. Conclusions

Differences in the information systems on the displaced population in Colombia are significant and must be kept in mind in any analysis. Although none of the registries is a true representative sample of the population, the RUT System database compiled by the Episcopal Conference offers a series of advantages over the others due to the period of time it covers and the detailed information it gathers for displaced households. Despite this, it is important to emphasize the RUT System bias resulting from the Catholic Church's stronger presence in some regions of the country and the apparent inclination of vulnerable households to register with the SUR to receive government assistance.

In the future, it will be important to find mechanisms that will make it possible to standardize the data collection process so that more specific comparisons can be made between the databases and there can be more certainty with regard to the figures on forced displacement. While the standardization process has already begun, it is important to continue and intensify these efforts.

4. Displaced Households of the RUT System and the Description of some Vulnerable Groups.

It is crucial to understand the characteristics of the displacement process and the displaced population in order to focus displacement prevention and relief programs. The first objective of this chapter is to describe the sampling of the RUT System with respect to the factors of

expulsion, displacement triggers, process of displacement, structure of households, and establish the impact of displacement on access to the labor market and school attendance.


Displacement has created some particularly vulnerable groups, which include women heads of households and recent displaced households. Government assistance must take into account the particular needs of these population groups in order to create policies specific to their special characteristics. Therefore, the second objective of this chapter is to examine the characteristics of the displaced households headed by women and identify the impact of displacement on groups in various stages of displacement.

4.1. RUT System Households: Characteristics of Displacement, Structure of Households and Impact of the Displacement

The purpose of this section is to examine the characteristics of the displacement process, the structure of displaced households, and the impact of displacement on the wellbeing of the households registered in the RUT System. In order to understand the displacement process, the parties responsible for the expulsions, the triggering factors for the migration and the characteristics of migration are studied. The analysis of the household structure examines the composition of the household and its human capital to understand the level of vulnerability of the displaced families. Finally, this section makes a preliminary estimate of the impact, as a result of displacement, on access to the labor market and school attendance.

Table 4.1. examines the characteristics of expulsion and the migration process of displaced families. Paramilitary and guerilla groups are the principal parties responsible for displacement, expelling a similar percentage of rural families. However, the evolution of their participation has differed over time. Between 1997 and 1998, paramilitary forces caused the largest number of expulsions. In contrast, guerilla groups have continuously grown since 1997 to be the major expulsion factor, and in 2002 they made a major leap, displacing approximately 70 percent of the households (Graph 4.1). It is worth noting, however, that the previous findings may be the result of disproportionate coverage of the RUT System in some departments of the country.


Graph 4.1. Change in the Participation of Guerrilla and Paramilitary Groups as Expulsion Factors



Source: Authors' calculations based on RUT

Threats and murder are direct attacks on homes, and therefore highly effective strategies for displacing the civilian population. Approximately 41 percent of displaced families identify threats as the principal trigger of displacement and eight percent cite murder (Table 4.1). Although armed confrontation and forced recruitment produce less displacement, their impact has increased in recent years, probably due to the intensification of the conflict. For example, the armed conflict caused six percent of the displacements in 2001, while in 2002, it was the cause of 13 percent of the forced migrations. (Graph 4.2).

Graph 4.2. Change in Armed Struggle and Forced Recruitment as Triggers for Expulsion




Source: Authors' calculations based on RUT

Some studies predicted that the geographic spread of violence in recent years would result in an increase in preventive displacement²⁰ (Meertens, 1999). However, the continued growth of threats as a trigger for displacement and the recent increase in the armed conflicts and forced recruitment have resulted in the growth of reactive displacement²¹. Graph 4.3. shows how reactive displacement²² doubled between 1999 and 2002 so that in 2002, approximately 71 percent of all displacements were reactive in nature.

²⁰ Preventive displacement occurs when families abandon their places of origin to avoid becoming victims of violence like forced recruitment or massacres. This type of displacement occurs in violent areas or their neighboring areas.

²¹ Reactive displacement occurs when the household is the direct victim of violence or a member of the family is murdered or when the family is directly threatened by an illegal armed group.

²² Reactive displacement was defined as situations where households identify threats, murder, missing persons, torture, armed confrontation and forced recruitment as triggers for expulsion.

Graph 4.3. Change in Reactive Displacement

Source: Authors' calculations based on RUT

The characteristics of migration show that displaced households prefer to migrate directly and within their department. Intra-departmental displacement and direct migration to the place of receipt has increased throughout time, particularly direct displacement. Proximity to the place of origin, familiarity with the department and the possibility of sporadically traveling to look after property can determine the preference for intra-departmental migration.

Table 4.1. Characteristics of Displacement

Variable	Median	Standard Deviation
Guerrilla – party involved in expulsion	45.8	-
Paramilitaries – party involved in expulsion	45.3	-
Government – party involved in expulsion	1.4	-
Two expulsion factors	9.2	-
Threat – reason for expulsion	41.4	-
Murder – reason for expulsion	8.2	-
Missing or torture – reason for expulsion	1.3	-
Armed confrontation – reason for expulsion	6.3	-
Forced recruitment – reason for expulsion	3.1	-
Spraying – reason for expulsion	58.3	-
Reactive displacement	0.5	-
Intra-departmental displacement	60.1	-
Intra-municipal displacement	25.8	-
Direct displacement	95.5	-
Displacement period	296.82	629.25

Source: Authors' calculations based on RUT

Table 4.2. summarizes the structure and characteristics of displaced households. Displaced households are comprised of an average of 4.9 members, 2.2 of whom are minors under age 14 and 2.5 are between the ages of 14 and 60. Approximately 38 percent of the households are headed by women and 14 percent are single parent households due to the loss of a spouse. The average education level of the head of the household and the other members is 4.6 and 5.1 years respectively. The socio-demographic characteristics of displaced households reflect the specific characteristics of rural families and violence, and are associated with high vulnerability and propensity for poverty in urban areas. Vélez (2002) shows that poverty in the urban areas is linked to the size of the household, the presence of children, human capital and women heads of household. In 1999, poor urban households were comprised of 4.5 [people], 1.4 of whom were children under the age of 12, and the education level was approximately 8.9 years. Displaced people exhibit clear disadvantages even compared to the urban poor, which is proof of their high degree of vulnerability.

Table 4.2. Structure of Displaced Households

Variable	<i>Median</i>	Standard Deviation
Size of household	4.9	2.3
Number of children under 14	2.2	1.7
Number of persons between the ages of 14 and 60	2.5	1.5
Number of persons over the age 60	0.2	0.5
Women Heads of Household	37.5	-
Widower-Widow Heads of Household	13.8	-
Years of education – Heads of Household	4.59	
Years of Education – Other household members	5.10	
Ethnic minority	3.3	-
Participation in organizations	24.5	-
Participation in peasant organizations	55.0	-
Participation in organizations not peasant-related	45.0	-


Source: Authors' calculations based on RUT

Table 4.3 shows labor access before and after displacement. The data reveals an apparent improvement in the labor situation of displaced families. Unemployment decreases for both the heads of household and other family members as a result of displacement.²³ However, unemployment rates are high compared to national averages: 33 percent for heads of household and 51 percent for the other members. Nevertheless, displacement appears to result in more jobs in the informal sector, which can indicate unstable employment conditions. Moreover, the labor status of displaced persons suffered a significant drop beginning in 1999 when the unemployment rate increased from 15 percent to slightly more than 45 percent in 2002 (Graph 4.4). Labor opportunities are different in each department. Unemployment rates range from 1 to 80 percent (Tables A.5 and A.6).

²³ Approximately 15.7 percent of the displaced persons surveyed were unemployed in their municipality of origin and are employed in the receiving municipality. On the other hand, 8.7 percent were employed before displacement but are unemployed in the receiving municipality.

The preceding data must be carefully analyzed for three reasons. First, the definition of unemployment in the RUT survey is confusing. Individual must be classified in one of the labor categories, one of which is unemployed. Subjective classification may result in individuals identified as unemployed, but who are not part of the economically active population. Second, the survey lacks information regarding the quality of the job and does not make it possible to accurately establish whether individuals are linked to the formal or informal sector, or if the job provides benefits. Previous studies have shown that although unemployment rates for the households have dropped as a consequence of displacement, they are generally hired in the informal sector and under unstable conditions. Third, unemployment rates contain high statistical accuracy in some departments due to the reduced number of households registered in the RUT System in those departments.

Graph 4.4. Change in Unemployment in the Receiving Municipality




Source: Authors' calculations based on RUT

Displacement has a clear negative impact on access to education among children between the ages 6 and 14. Forced migration reduced school attendance from 42 to 31 percent (Table 4.3) and caused dropout rates of 9 percent. School attendance by departments suggests that the limited school attendance among displaced households is more a result of the municipalities' unwillingness to absorb these children than a restriction of their education opportunities. For example, Bogotá shows insufficient rates, especially when one considers that the capital city has almost 100 percent education coverage. On the other hand, Santander, Córdoba and Chocó have higher education coverage. The prospects are dim, however, as the department with the best performance has a rate of only 40 percent (Graph 4.5).

Table 4.3. Labor Market and Education Before and After Displacement

Variable	<i>Prior to displacement</i>	<i>After displacement</i>
Unemployed – Head of household	42.8	33.3
Farmer – Head of household	50.0	27.9
Employed – Head of household	10.7	14.7
Independent – Head of household	18.1	27.0
Unemployed – Other household members	66.6	50.6
Farmer– Other household members	28.3	12.6
Employed – Other household members	7.3	9.3
Independent – Other household members	16.3	18.0
School attendance among children between ages 6 and 14	42.0	31.0

Source: Authors' calculations based on RUT

Graph 4.5. School Attendance by Receiving Department

Source: Authors' calculations based on RUT

Three conclusions must be drawn from the previous analysis. First, guerilla groups as a party involved in expulsion, armed confrontations and forced recruitment have increased in recent years. Second, the household structure and its human capital show that displaced families are not well prepared for urban environments. Third, the decrease in school attendance as a result of displacement is a matter of great concern.

4.2. Displaced Households Headed by Women

Women account for a large percentage of the displaced population. Data of the Social Solidarity Network reveals that women made up 49 percent of the displaced population in 2001. Displaced households also report a larger number of households headed by women compared to the average of the population. Around 45 percent of the households registered in SUR in 2001 were headed by women²⁴ (Ibáñez and Vélez, 2003). This section compares the characteristics of the displacement, household structure, and the impact of displacement on households headed by males and females.

Migration and expulsion characteristics are quite similar in households headed by males and females. Notwithstanding the similarities, there are two major differences: murders occur more frequently, almost twice as much, in households headed by women, (Table 4.4). It is probable that these households are displaced after the murder of the father. Second, intra-departmental and inter-municipal displacement is lower among households headed by women. The murder of a member of the household can create a fear of remaining near the municipality of origin and a desire to forget what happened and start over in another location.

Table 4.4. Characteristics of Displacement– Female and Male Heads of Households

Variable	Male heads of household	Female heads of household	Pearson-Chi2 T-stat [sic]
Guerrilla – party involved in expulsion	45.9	45.8	0.00
Paramilitary– party involved in expulsion	45.8	44.5	3.49
Government – party involved in expulsion	1.5	1.1	5.60
Two expulsion factors	9.2	9.3	0.17
Threat – reason for expulsion	42.5	39.6	20.70
Murder – reason for expulsion	6.7	10.6	119.52
Missing or torture – reason for expulsion	0.9	1.9	39.96
Armed conflict – reason for expulsion	6.4	6.3	0.17
Forced recruitment – reason for expulsion	2.9	3.3	3.15
Spraying – reason for expulsion	0.5	0.5	0.00
Reactive displacement	57.4	59.8	13.35
Intra-departmental displacement	61.6	57.6	48.13
Intra-municipal displacement	28.9	20.7	251.81
Direct displacement	95.1	96.4	28.32
Displacement period	293.9	301.6	-1.03

Source: Authors' calculations based on RUT

In addition to the vulnerability inherent to households headed by women, two more factors are added that arise as a result of displacement. First, the death of a spouse is approximately eight times higher in households headed by women (Table 4.5). Widowhood is generally caused by the murder of the male head of household, since as the Table above shows, murder is a common

²⁴This percentage is 24 percent for the average Colombian population.

trigger of displacement among households headed by women²⁵. Second, and as a result of the loss of a family member, the economic dependence rate is higher among households headed by women.

Table 4.5. Structure of Displaced Households – Female and Male Heads of Household

Variable	<i>Male heads of household</i>	Female heads of household	Pearson- Chi2 T-stat
Size of household	5.0	4.8	8.33
Number of children under age 14	2.1	2.2	-2.56
Number of persons between ages 14 and 60	2.7	2.4	15.45
Number of persons over age 60	0.2	0.2	-0.18
Widower–widow heads of households	1.74	13.8	1252.64
Years of education – Head of household	4.5	4.7	-7.06
Years of education – Other household members	4.1	4.1	-0.49
Ethnic Minority	3.4	3.1	1.64
Participation in organizations	24.7	24.3	0.65
Participation in peasant organizations	51.9	60.3	49.24
Participation in organizations not peasant-related	48.1	39.7	49.24
Land tenure	63.9	54.8	242.73

Source: Authors' calculations based on RUT

Despite the fact that women heads of household face a more unstable labor situation and greater vulnerability, the school attendance for children from households headed by women is significantly higher. Although the unemployment rate in the receiving location for heads of household is similar for the two groups of households, the unemployment rate of the other family members is significantly higher. Nevertheless, women appear to attach special importance to their children's education, since regardless of the challenges they face, a higher proportion of their children attend school in both the place of origin and the receiving location. (Table 4.6).

²⁵ The majority of women become heads of household due to widowhood or separation from their spouse. In Bogotá, approximately 40% of the displaced households headed by women in 1997 had experienced the violent death of the husbands. (Bogotá Archdiocese-CODHES, 1997).

Table 4.6. Labor Market and Education Before and After Displacement- Female and Male Heads of Household

Variable	Male heads of household	Female heads of household	Pearson-Chi2 T-stat
Unemployed, Origin- Head	39.5	36.0	36.24
Agriculture, Origin- Head	40.9	14.3	2325.03
Employed, Origin- Head	5.9	7.8	41.62
Independent, Origin – Head	10.3	12.5	32.91
Unemployed, receiving- Head	30.7	29.8	2.52
Agriculture, receiving - Head	28.6	4.7	2388.63
Employed, receiving - Head	11.8	7.7	121.77
Independent , receiving – Head	21.0	15.3	137.81
Unemployed, Origin- Others	55.8	56.8	6.13
Agriculture, Origin- Others	9.6	17.7	818.75
Employed, Origin- Others	2.9	3.6	20.67
Independent, Origin – Others	6.9	7.5	6.31
Unemployed, receiving - Others	41.0	49.1	331.65
Agriculture, receiving - Others	6.1	9.0	157.73
Employed, receiving - Others	4.8	6.0	36.42
Independent, receiving – Others	8.7	12.9	246.92
School attendance before displacement	35.4	45.7	319.03
School attendance after displacement	20.9	27.0	170.47

Source: Authors' calculations based on RUT

The data confirm the previous findings. Displaced households headed by females face a precarious situation. Not only are the families uprooted from their places of origin, but they also must deal with the loss of the head of their family, higher unemployment and the challenge of starting a new life in an unknown city.

4.3. Displacement Period²⁶

The socioeconomic status of displaced families varies throughout the different stages of displacement. State assistance and the process of adapting to the receiving location makes it possible to divide displacement, although arbitrarily, into three stages: (i) three months after displacement, (ii) between four months and one year after displacement; and (iv) [sic] beyond one year. The government of Colombia is obligated to provide humanitarian assistance to every displaced family.²⁷ The instability of displaced families' situations is even more acute three months after displacement when the initial government assistance expires (WFP, 2001). In contrast, one year and longer following displacement families have adapted to the receiving location, and in the vast majority of cases, their situation improves considerably. The purpose of this section is to analyze access to the labor market and school attendance during these three stages.

Connecting with the labor market and school attendance improve significantly among displaced families with a longer period of displacement. Households displaced for three months have the

²⁶The length of the displacement period is defined as the time between the date of expulsion and the date of the survey.

²⁷ At the end of three months, families in unstable situations may request a three-month extension.

worst situation while those with over one year of displacement show significant progress. Unemployment decreases over the duration of the displacement period so that the unemployment rate for households with less than three months of displacement is 38 percent and this rate is 23 percent after one year of displacement (Table 4.7). In contrast, the percentage of salaried and independent workers doubles in these groups. Similarly, school attendance for households with over one year of displacement is two times that of households that have been displaced less than three months.

Table 4.7. Access to the Labor Market and School Attendance During the Different Displacement Stages

Variable	Displacement Period		
	Under 3 months	Under 1 year	Over 1 year
Unemployed – Head	38.6	32.4	23.4
Agriculture – Head	20.8	21.1	13.8
Employed – Head	6.9	9.3	13.4
Independent – Head	13.4	16.0	29.0
Unemployed – Others	49.7	45.2	38.2
Agriculture – Others	7.8	7.6	5.3
Employed – Others	4.1	5.1	5.7
Independent – Others	8.0	8.4	15.9
Employment improved - Head	25.0	29.1	25.3
Employment worsened – Head	29.4	24.0	7.5
Employment improved– Others	19.6	23.8	18.6
Employment worsened – Others	16.2	13.1	4.2
School attendance	24.1	26.3	44.8

Source: Authors' calculations based on RUT

The results suggest that displaced families adapt to their new condition over time, and that receiving locations are able to slowly assimilate these new inhabitants. But the figures also show the government's limited capacity to care for displaced families during the first three months of displacement. Despite the government's obligation to assist displaced households, these families are the most unstable during the first three months. Nevertheless, these conclusions are still preliminary since current data does not make it possible to identify households that receive support from government entities.

4.4. Access to Government Assistance

RUT data suggests that nearly 32 percent of displaced households have received assistance from some type of government entity.²⁸ The objective of this section is to analyze the differences between the characteristics of the displacement and other characteristics of the households for households with access to government assistance and those without access.

²⁸ "With government assistance" refers to the households that received assistance from the Social Solidarity Network, the ICBF, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health. However, the households also reported having received assistance from friends and relatives as well as other NGOs, the ACNUR, the Church and the Red Cross (national and international).

Table 4.8 shows that the households that received government assistance were displaced in larger proportions by guerrilla, and in particular paramilitary groups. Similarly, the proportion of households displaced by more than one party was three times higher among households that received government assistance.

Another interesting result can be seen in the triggers for expulsion. Government assistance was primarily concentrated on households displaced by threats, armed confrontation and forced recruitment while households that reported murder as a trigger for expulsion accessed government assistance to a lesser extent. In general, however, it is noted that households that received government assistance reported reactive displaced in greater proportions. This is probably due to the coincidence between reactive displacements and massive displacements in which the Social Solidarity Network appears as soon as the displacement takes place. In contrast, homes that experienced a family member being murdered probably receive government assistance to a lesser extent in order to maintain their anonymity and avoid being victims of another attack by the different parties involved.

On the other hand, the data suggests that intra-departmental and intra-municipal displacement occurred in greater proportions in households that did not receive government assistance. It is possible that in these cases, the households migrated to the municipal administrative center or to a neighboring municipality where some relative or friend [lives] in hopes of the situation improving in order to return to their land. Therefore, it is feasible that they do not receive government assistance.

Table 4.8. Characteristics of the Displacement – Government Assistance

Variable	Did not receive government assistance	Received government assistance	Pearson-Chi2 T-stat
Guerrilla – party involved in expulsion	44.97	48.36	24.87
Paramilitary – party involved in expulsion	41.19	51.71	240.27
Government – party involved in expulsion	1.41	1.49	0.25
Two parties involved in expulsion	5.35	16.58	785.72
Threat – reason for expulsion	36.17	55.00	807.18
Murder – reason for expulsion	8.36	6.97	15.04
Disappearance or torture – reason for expulsion	1.53	0.93	15.72
Armed confrontation – reason for expulsion	5.29	9.63	164.18
Forced recruitment – reason for expulsion	2.62	4.75	77.61
Spraying - reason for expulsion	0.22	0.39	5.82
Reactive displacement	52.02	75.56	1293.83
Intra-departmental displacement	62.98	60.55	15.72
Intra-municipal displacement	29.91	21.22	237.54
Direct displacement	97.25	90.99	541.71
Displacement period	289.58	358.0381	-7.95

Source: Authors' calculations based on RUT

As shown in Table 4.9, the households that received government assistance were headed in larger proportions by females or widows or widowers. This is consistent with the argument put

forward previously according to which the most vulnerable households tend to receive assistance from the government in greater proportions. Similarly, households with less years of education and that have to work harder to adapt to the receiving location in the absence of government assistance turn more frequently to government assistance [sic]. However, it is interesting to emphasize that the percentage of minorities within the group of households that had access to government assistance is much lower than the percentage of minorities in the group of households that did not receive assistance from any government entity. Despite their high vulnerability, ethnic minorities have not been able (or have not wanted) to turn to assistance from the government, a phenomenon that has been noted in several reports.

Finally, individuals who belonged to some type of organization in their place of origin received government assistance in greater numbers. This may be the result of a better organization ability in these households in seeking government assistance as a group, or the greater propensity of these households to turn to the government to participate in return programs because of the feeling of security that its organization can offer them in the event of a possible return to their municipality of origin.

Something similar occurs with households that reported some type of land tenure in their municipality of origin and that seek government assistance in greater numbers, probably in hopes of participating in a land return program or to request that ownership rights to abandoned land be guaranteed.

Table 4.9. Structure of Displace Households – Government Assistance

Variable	Did not receive government assistance	Received government assistance	Pearson- Chi2 T-stat
Size of household	4.94	4.95	-0.30
Number of minors under age 14	2.19	2.14	2.12
Number of persons between ages 14 and 60	2.53	2.58	-2.68
Number of adults over age 60	0.22	0.23	-0.30
Female head of household	36.21	41.39	70.96
Widow/er head of household	6.14	7.05	6.54
Years of education – Head of household	4.93	3.62	36.24
Years of education – Other members of household	4.59	3.73	27.60
Ethnic minority	4.79	0.42	361.13
Participation in organizations	16.54	41.40	2082.81
Participation in peasant organizations	52.44	52.49	0.00
Participation in organizations not peasant-related	47.56	47.51	0.00
Land tenure	57.87	69.37	347.33

Source: Authors' calculations based on RUT

The labor and education characteristics before and after the displacement of the households are reported in Table 4.10 according to access to government assistance. Evidence suggests that unemployment in the location of origin in households that sought government assistance was significantly lower than the other households, both for the head of household and for the other members over age 18. This suggests that government assistance benefited the households that

were better off before displacement and not those that had more unstable situations.²⁹ However, after displacement, unemployment increases for households that sought government assistance while it decreases for the households that did not do so. This result must be interpreted with care as the idea that government assistance did not have a positive impact, or worse even, that it had a negative impact on the labor situation of the households cannot be inferred from this.³⁰

However in order to determine the impact of government assistance, it would be necessary to establish the same household's performance if it had not sought government assistance although there are other characteristics that have a bearing on the labor and education performance of the households. For example, household with access to government assistance have an average education level that is lower than those that do not seek it. It is possible that the increase in unemployment in households that seek government assistance is caused by the lower education level and not by having turned to government assistance. Even yet, it is probable that the increase in unemployment would have been higher without the access to government assistance. Therefore, households that did not receive government assistance must be compared to households with access to government assistance and with identical characteristics so that it is possible to isolate the impact of the government assistance from other characteristics specific to each household. This is what is known as a propensity score analysis for which interested readers may refer to the report by Ravallion (2001).

Likewise, the data does not make it possible to establish whether homes with access to government assistance requested it as a direct consequence of the marked increase in unemployment, in which case the increase in unemployment is a cause for these households' greater access to government assistance and not necessarily a consequence. Similar reasoning could be cited to explain why those households whose unemployment prior to displacement was very high, but decreased as a result of displacement, accessed government assistance with less frequency.³¹

A similar phenomenon is observed for school attendance before and after displacement for other members of the household under age 18. The data shows that school attendance before displacement was higher in households that sought government assistance (which once again suggests that government assistance is channeled to those households that were in a better position before being displaced), but this decreased significantly after displacement when it increased in households that did not seek government assistance. Again, it is difficult to conclude that government assistance had no positive impact on school attendance or to establish whether the households sought government assistance as a direct result of their drop in school attendance.

²⁹ It is possible that the households that were in better situations before displacement are better informed on the procedures for seeking government assistance.

³⁰ However, various reports have mentioned that the training programs to develop productive activities, which are provided to the displaced population, are usually poor in quality and do not contribute to improving the labor situation of the households.

³¹ With regard to this point, the ACNUR report on the displaced people in Bogotá shows, based on an analysis of 1,101 heads of household, that the time between displacement and the first humanitarian care is usually over three months, and in some cases can be as long as two years. For this reason, it is possible that the households that experience a marked increase in unemployment are the ones that sought government assistance and the labor situation can become more critical to the extent that the time passes without receiving government assistance.

Table 4.10. Labor Market and Education Before and After Displacement

Variable	Did not receive government assistance	Received government assistance	Pearson-Chi2 T-stat
Unemployed, Origin- Head	51.96	9.43	4739.43
Agriculture, Origin - Head	24.62	43.78	1071.24
Employed, Origin - Head	5.07	9.64	213.21
Independent, Origin – Head	8.34	16.26	402.91
Unemployed, Receiving- Head	30.75	33.33	17.99
Agriculture, Receiving - Head	22.56	11.17	495.41
Employed, Receiving - Head	11.75	6.76	159.97
Independent, Receiving – Head	14.70	27.46	625.63
Unemployed, Origin - Others over age 18	60.53	22.62	4634.16
Agriculture, Origin - Others over age 18	12.24	22.87	689.30
Employed, Origin - Others over age 18	3.07	6.54	242.81
Independent, Origin – Others over age 18	6.17	11.43	308.66
Unemployed, Receiving - Others over age 18	37.46	37.73%	0.24
Agriculture, Receiving - Others over age 18	9.31	7.03%	50.55
Employed, Receiving - Others over age 18	6.70	5.35%	23.71
Independent, Receiving – Others over age 18	8.86	17.29%	527.53
School attendance before displacement (other members under age 18)	28.80	55.43	3323.12
School attendance after displacement (other members under age 18)	44.10	47.89	42.93

Source: Authors' calculations based on RUT

4.5. Conclusions

Displaced households face harsh socioeconomic conditions. Households are generally displaced by direct violence with severe psychological repercussions. Also, their ability to adapt to the receiving locations is reduced since their education level is low and they have little knowledge of their new city. Consequently, their inclusion the labor market is limited and school attendance is insufficient. All of this results in an extremely fragile situation for displaced households that can lead to a spiral of poverty, which very possibly may not be overcome in the near future. The situation among households headed by women and recently-displaced households is even more precarious. There is no doubt that the government must intervene to ease the conditions of displaced families, and that government programs must be focused on and differentiate between the various groups of displaced households.

5. The Link Between Access to Land and Forced Displacement in Colombia

Land conflicts and violence have been connected historically in Colombia. The current conflict does not seem to be an exception. Thousands of households have been expelled from their municipalities by illegal armed groups, and in many cases, displacement is linked to land conflicts (Reyes and Bejarano, 1998). RUT System figures reveal that approximately 60 percent of displaced households had access to land and over half are the legal owners of their land. The displaced population reported having lost four million hectares of land, which is equal to one third of the land in Colombia (WFP, 2001).

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the link between access to land and forced displacement in Colombia. The first section reviews the literature on land ownership and land conflicts. The second section is based on descriptive statistics, calculated with data from the RUT System, in order to bring more information into this debate.

5.1. Land Ownership, Land Conflicts and Displacement

Land shortage is, in general, a result of an adequate definition of property rights (Binswanger et al, 1995). However, some developing countries offer evidence to the contrary. The land shortage in these countries has caused conflicts along farm boundaries and the lack of strong institutions has made it possible for groups in power to appropriate large extensions of land through illegal strategies (Deininger and Feder, 1998). When coercion is not sufficient, these groups have turned to the government to obtain a bias in their favor and thus gain a concentration of property. (Binswanger et al, 1995).

Empirical evidence shows an undeniable link between land disputes and violence in countries such as Brazil, Uganda, Rwanda and Colombia. The contradictory land policy in Brazil has created conflicts between landowners and settlers. Alston et al (2000) show that conflicts are more common in municipalities where there are large properties and the government is expected to intervene on behalf of settlers, which encourages the large landowners to expel settlers and settlers to avoid being expelled. Municipal econometric estimates for Brazil show that insecure land ownership rights increase the probability of violent conflicts. On the other hand, civil war in Uganda broke out more frequently in regions lacking in human capital, with capital specific to their location, such as coffee plantations with little access to infrastructure and with broad ethnic diversity (Deininger, 2003). André and Platteau (1998) demonstrated that there is a close relationship between competition for land and the civil war that ignited in Rwanda in 1994.

Colombia is also a clear example of the dynamic of land concentration and violent conflicts. During the first half of the twentieth century, Colombian land policy was aimed at promoting the colonization of wastelands and protecting land distribution within the agricultural boundaries (Molano, 1994). Land titles were granted for wastelands to those who cleared and worked the land, which promoted the accelerated colonization of the border areas. Once the land was in condition to generate economic surpluses, large landowners appropriated the land for themselves and converted the settlers into lessees. (LeGrand 1994).

The last century was plagued with land conflicts between settlers and large landowners. From 1889 until 1925, small owners were in a constant struggle against large landowners and turned to the government to solve their land disputes. However, the depletion of the agricultural frontier in the Andean region between 1925 and 1935 led to the first wave of violent conflicts and the growth of the agricultural export economy exacerbated the conflicts even further. In the late thirties, large landowners expelled the settlers and replaced lessees and tenant farmers with waged workers. (LeGrand, 1994).

Agriculture surpluses and institutional weakness created the potential for influential groups to seize profits (Binswanger et al, 1995). The areas recently colonized lacked sufficient social capital to prevent the moral risks inherent to informal land markets. A formal process for granting land titles was crucial to support emerging markets (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2001).

Nevertheless, the government's inability to create an administrative infrastructure dedicated to protecting property rights soon resulted in violent conflicts between large landowners, small landowners and settlers.

In the late thirties and during the Violence Period, the conflict between small and large landowners was diverted from the institutional track. Due to the lack of government support, settlers began a process of violent responses to [their] eviction from land by large landowners who responded in turn with threats and the destruction of property (Fajardo, 1994). Settlers and small landowners began to be sympathetic to left wing groups in some regions of the country. (LeGrand, 1994, Binswanger et al, 1995).

The titling of wastelands began to increase during the Violence Period. Promoting colonization became the escape valve for the latent land conflicts within the agriculture frontier (Fajardo, 1994). During this period, individuals began to migrate to the city or former colonization areas where peasant organizations were deeply rooted in the thirties (LeGrand, 1994). Moreover, the government designed a program in 1961 to title land and infrastructure to displaced households. This process led again to the dynamic of colonization and expulsion described previously, further intensified violence in some regions and created settlers' profound distrust in the government. (Le Grand, 1994).

Land conflicts took on new hues with the expansion of drug trafficking and intensification of the armed conflict. On the one hand, concentration of property and land conflicts deepened with the expansion of drug trafficking and the growth of the armed conflict. (Suárez and Vinha, 2003). On the other hand, illicit crops and illegal armed groups dominate in agriculture frontier areas where the institutional presence is weak or nonexistent. (LeGrand, 1994). Finally, the regions of the country where the armed conflict has intensified also show a high rate of human rights violations and increased land purchases by drug traffickers (Reyes, 1994). Areas with the highest concentration of land are also those with the lowest economic growth, low wages and the highest levels of violence (Castaño, 1999).

Land reform has been a recurring theme in Colombia given the possible connection between the armed conflict and land ownership. In 1936, the government of Colombia proclaimed the first land reform law with a marked favoritism towards large landowners (Binswanger et al, 1995). The seventies were characterized by numerous certifications of wastelands, but the government never attempted to redistribute property within the agriculture frontier. At present, land reform is governed by Law 160 of 1994. Notwithstanding the will to redistribute approximately one million hectares, the results of land reform have been discouraging to date (Deininger, 1999). From 1993 to 2001, land reform granted 598,332 hectares. Moreover, it has focused on four departments and 50 percent of the land awarded is concentrated in 40 municipalities. (Zapata and Arismendy, 2003).

The emphasis of the agrarian policy on wasteland colonization during the first half of the twentieth century, the conflict between large and small landowners, the Period of Violence, the expansion of drug trafficking and the intensification of the armed conflict have produced a high concentration of land in Colombia. During the period between 1962 and 1982, 5.4 times more titles were granted for settling than for the land allocated in land reform (Fajardo, 1994). Despite

land reform policies, land concentration remained constant between 1960 and 1990; the period in which the Gini land coefficient only decreased by three percentage points (Deininger, 1999). Moreover, the expulsion of settlers has not increased agricultural productivity since approximately 75 percent of the most productive land is dedicated to extensive cattle breeding or is not cultivated due to violence (Heath and Binswanger, 1996).

Land disputes that remain unresolved since the last century have also permeated the current conflict. Land occupation and eviction of the civilian population are war strategies adopted by the armed groups to vacate land, expand their areas of control and violently appropriate agricultural property. Preliminary data from a study by the Episcopal Conference (1999b) shows that 1,322 surveyed displaced families abandoned approximately 32 thousand hectares of land with an average of 24 hectares per family. In a study on the effectiveness of land reform, Suárez and Vinha (2003) found that 31 percent of large property transfers occurred due to violence and 20 percent were due to violent pressure and economic crisis.

Kirchhoff and Ibáñez (2001) show that landowners are more frequently the victims of threats from illegal armed groups, and therefore are more prone to migrate. Moreover, a low cost strategy to occupy land seems to be evicting owners of land that is small in size (USCR, 2001). Small landowners have limited capacity to adopt protection measures, making them the target of threats for illegal armed groups.

However, land occupation could have several explanations for each region of the country. In some regions, displacement of the population could be caused by territorial expansion, while in other regions, the violent appropriation of production assets may cause displacement. For example, the departments with the highest displacement are³² Chocó, Putumayo, Caquetá, Sucre and Bolívar (Ibáñez and Vélez, 2003b). Chocó appears to respond to the territorial expansion theory due to its importance as a corridor for weapons and drugs. On the other hand, Bolívar and Sucre are departments with land that is highly suitable for ranching and agricultural production and displacement could be in response to the violent appropriation of the land.

The link between land tenure and the armed conflict appears to be without doubt. Access to land has been a fundamental component of the various social conflicts that have weighed on Colombia since the end of the nineteenth century. Large and small landowners and settlers have faced for decades, and in the last fifty years, illegal armed groups and drug traffickers have joined this battle. Today, thousands of Colombians have been displaced by violence, and it is assumed that a high percentage of these households are victims of old disputes over land tenure.

5.2. Land Tenure and Ownership Structure of Displaced Households: RUT System Figures


The purpose of this section is to analyze land tenure and the tenure structure of displaced households. We attempt to achieve this objective through an initial approach that studies land tenure, the structure of tenure and the number of hectares abandoned. The change in these variables since 1980 and their distribution by department are examined to establish whether there is a behavioral pattern or the numbers are the result of a random process. The characteristics of

³² Displacement intensity is measured by the number of people displaced per one hundred thousand inhabitants.

households with and without land are compared to determine, for example, whether the expulsion strategy and factors for both groups differ. Finally, the issue of whether Decree 2007 of 2001 has modified the profile of displaced households is studied, in particular whether the expulsion of people with access to the land has been avoided.


Land tenure is a constant³³ for the vast majority of displaced households. Over 60 percent of the displaced households from the RUT System reported some type of land tenure. The figures per departure year reveal that this percentage has remained unchanged throughout time (Graph 5.1). Moreover, land tenure per expelling department is quite even. This figure is over 20 percent for displaced households originating in Vaupés and 80 percent for households originating in Valle del Cauca, departments at the two extremes of the distribution. (Graph 5.2).

Graph 5.1. Land Tenure by Departure Year



Source: Authors' calculations based on RUT

³³ For the purposes of this study, land tenure is considered as any link to land, such as ownership, collective ownership, leasing, colonization and possession.

Graph 5.2. Land Tenure by Expelling Department

Source: Authors' calculations based on RUT

Legal ownership of land does not appear to prevent displacement. On the contrary, land tenure structure is concentrated on owners; approximately 53 percent of the displaced households are owners (Table 5.1), and data shows a sustained increase in the expulsion of agricultural landowners since 1997 (Graph 5.3). The ownership percentage per department shows vast differences that could also reflect the limited ability of land tenure to reduce the incentives for expelling owners. (Table A.1).

Likewise, lessees and owners of collective land also comprise a high percentage of the displaced households. In particular, households that own collective land have sharply increased, probably due to the higher expulsion of ethnic minorities in recent years.


Table 5.1. Land Tenure Structure

Tenure Type	Percentage
Ownership	53.5
Collective ownership	8.8
Settler	4.1
Possession	7.8
Lessee	13.7
Other	12.0

Source: Authors' calculations based on RUT

The figures suggest that the small landowners, as mentioned in the literature, comprise the bulk of the displaced households with some type of land tenure. Ten hectares is the median for the entire sample and this median has not changed significantly over time. (Graph 5.4). However, it is possible that medium and large landowners have also been displaced but do not report this to

the government authorities. The first evidence of this potential bias is in the Suárez and Vinha (2003) report, which shows that approximately 51 percent of transfers of large land are carried out through violent events.

Graph 5.4. Median Change in Abandoned Hectares

Source: Authors' calculations based on RUT

Tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 show the difference between displaced households with and without land tenure. The results point to a higher tendency of paramilitary groups to expel households with land tenure, which guerilla groups evict households with and without land tenure equally. The repeated strategic for evicting households with land tenure is through threats. Selective murders occur more frequently among households without access to land (Table 5.2.). This may reflect the armed groups' decision to threaten families, with no need to kill them, in order to take their assets. Selective murders could be reserved for households with possible links to opposing parties, or to leaders inside the community and who are therefore a risk to the groups that want to exert control over the civilian population. Consequently, reactive displacement is quite similar between households with and without land tenure.

Households with land tenure usually choose receiving areas near their receiving municipality, probably to visit and exploit their property whenever possible (Table 5.2). Displaced populations ultimately migrate to areas near their municipalities of origin in hopes that the intensity of the conflict will subside. This defensive strategy may indicate that the rural population has a profound knowledge of the dynamics of the conflict and the behavior of the illegal armed groups.

Table 5.2. Characteristics of Displacement–Land Tenure

Variable	No Land	Land Tenure	Pearson-Chi2 T-stat
Guerrilla – Party involved in expulsion	47.5	44.9	14.60
Paramilitary – Party involved in expulsion	40.2	48.2	142.92
Government – Party involved in expulsion	1.3	1.4	0.95
Two parties involved in expulsion	6.8	10.6	94.62
Threat – Reason for expulsion	38.8	42.9	42.95
Murder – Reason for expulsion	9.4	7.5	28.09
Disappearance or torture – Reason for expulsion	1.6	1.1	10.23
Armed conflict – Reason for expulsion	5.0	7.2	49.62
Forced recruitment – Reason for expulsion	3.3	3.0	1.96
Spraying of illegal crops – Reason for expulsion	0.7	0.3	15.02
Reactive displacement	56.5	59.4	19.77
Intra-departmental displacement	54.5	63.7	256.26
Intra-municipal displacement	20.0	29.6	343.67
Direct displacement	96.8	94.7	77.57
Displacement period	263.1	318.8	-7.52

Source: Authors' calculations based on RUT

Land tenure appears to be associated with less economic and social vulnerability in the place of origin. The size of households with access to land is slightly larger, but the higher number of working-age adults in these households means less economic dependence. Female heads of household are also less frequent in these homes. Households with access to land show more propensity for participating in community organizations, especially peasant organizations, as opposed to households without land. However, the lack of land appears to lead households to invest in human capital, which results in higher education levels than households with access to land, and more appropriate preparation for urban labor markets. (Table 5.3).

Table 5.3. Structure of Households –Land Tenure

Variable	No Land	Land Tenure	Pearson-Chi2 T-stat
Size of household	4.5	5.2	-23.23
Number of children under age 14	2.0	2.2	-10.04
Number of people between ages 14 and 60	2.3	2.7	-21.31
Number of people over age 60	0.2	0.2	-7.31
Female heads of household	42.9	33.4	242.73
Widow(er) heads of household	7.2	7.3	0.14
Years of education – Heads of household	5.3	4.2	32.81
Years of education – Others	4.5	3.9	24.14
Ethnic Minority	2.9	3.5	8.08
Participation in organizations	12.9	32.1	1425.57
Participation in peasant organizations	44.5	57.8	86.95
Participation in organizations not peasant-related	55.5	42.2	86.95

Source: Authors' calculations based on RUT

Notwithstanding the lower vulnerability of households with land tenure in the municipality of origin, the impact of displacement appears to be more resounding. Households with land tenure show high unemployment rates compared to the other households. Moreover, the drop in unemployment as a result of displacement is notably higher for households without land tenure who, in addition appear to have greater access to the formal sector of the economy (Table 5.4). This is not surprising since the members of households with land concentrate their preparation on farming activities and lack the skills necessary to compete in the urban labor market. On the other hand, households without access to land could be dedicated to work compatible with urban jobs, and therefore their preparation is more consistent with urban needs.

School attendance decreases considerably for children from households with land tenure. School attendance before displacement for households with and without land tenure was 42 and 32 percent respectively, and displacement balances the school attendance of the two groups at around 20 percent. Families with land tenure, with better school attendance before, suffered a hard blow from displacement and faced conditions similar to displaced people without access to land. (Table 5.4).

Table 5.4. Labor Market and Education - Land Tenure

Variable	No land	Land Tenure	Pearson-Chi2 T-stat
Unemployed, Origin- Head	46.5	32.7	574.51
Agriculture, Origin- Head	21.6	37.0	792.97
Employed, Origin- Head	6.4	6.7	0.99
Independent, Origin – Head	12.0	10.6	14.83
Unemployed, Receiving - Head	29.5	31.0	7.42
Agriculture, Receiving - Head	15.1	22.3	217.23
Employed, Receiving - Head	11.0	9.7	11.69
Independent, Receiving – Head	17.6	19.6	17.27
Unemployed, Origin- Others	64.5	51.7	894.57
Agriculture, Origin- Others	7.9	14.8	586.79
Employed, Origin- Others	2.3	3.7	86.28
Independent, Origin – Others	6.2	7.7	44.42
Unemployed, Receiving - Others	43.0	43.9	3.34
Agriculture, Receiving - Others	5.6	7.8	85.66
Employed, Receiving - Others	5.3	5.2	0.01
Independent, Receiving – Others	8.2	11.0	107.33
School attendance before displacement	32.0	41.8	252.23
School attendance after displacement	22.0	23.1	4.74

Source: Authors' calculations based on RUT

In summary, a significant percentage of the displaced population has access to land and is small landowners. However, the legal ownership of land does not appear to protect rural households, and thus prevent displacement, as assumed by Decree 2007 of 2001. Households with land are displaced with greater frequency by paramilitary groups and the most common triggering factor of expulsion is direct threats. Moreover, these households prefer to migrate to areas near their places of origin. In contrast, households without access to land flee because of selective murders and their displacement does not always occur within their department of origin. Finally, the higher economic status associated with land tenure at the origin disappears upon displacement.

Households with land tenure, and therefore with agricultural vocations, are less prepared for urban labor markets.

A first approach to analyzing the impact of Decree 2007 of 2001 is to compare the profile of displaced households with regard to land tenure and tenure structure before and after the decree. In general, the difference is not so striking. Approximately 60 percent of both groups of households have land tenure, and over half are owners. However, the displacement of owners of collective land increased considerably after the decree, while the percentage of lessees and holders dropped by approximately half (Table 5.5) Although this change cannot be attributed to Decree 2007 of 2001 without first performing a thorough analysis, it is possible that the decree changed the incentives of armed groups, and the expulsion of lessees and holders is not effective. It is also possible that this change simply follows the dynamics of the conflict and that the deterioration of the conflicts in departments where collective ownership is more frequent is just a coincidence.

Table 5.5. Land Tenure and Tenure Structure

	Prior to Decree 2007	After Decree 2007
Land tenure	60.3	61.2
Ownership	52.7	55.9
Collective ownership	6.2	17.5
Settlers	4.7	2.3
Possession	9.0	4.1
Leaseholder	15.3	8.7
Other	12.1	11.5

Source: Authors' calculations based on RUT

5.3.2. Municipal Causes of Displacement

While it identifies the link between forced displacement and land tenure, the analysis in the previous section does not make it possible to determine causal relationships. The objective of this section is to consider the municipal causes of forced displacement in an attempt to identify causal relationships between displacement and variables such as the concentration of land ownership, available social services, infrastructure and violent actions, among others.

The data used to estimate returns is based on the RUT System and a database of municipal characteristics compiled by various institutions and researchers over the past six years. The database of the Center for Economic Development Studies [Centro de Estudios de Desarrollo Económico – CEDE] of the Universidad de los Andes contains information on municipal homicides, geographic characteristics of municipalities, presence of institutions, index of unmet basic needs and guerrilla actions for the 1990 – 2002 period. Ana María Ibáñez and Mariana Martínez gathered information on violent events in the municipalities during the 1993 – 2000 period based on data from the Ministry of Defense. Klaus Deininger and Juanita Riaño compiled information on municipal investment based on data from the National Department of Planning. Hillón and Offstein (2003) created Gini land concentration indices based on data from the Land Registry of the Instituto Augustín Codazzi and municipal data from the CEDE.

The number of persons displaced annually per municipality was calculated with data from the RUT System and with data from the RSS. The econometric returns were estimated with both databases in order to identify any possible biases. The results, however, are similar so only the estimates made with data from the RUT System were reported.

Some municipal characteristics for the municipalities with and without displacement during the years 2000, 2001 and 2002 are shown in Table 5.6. The figures indicate that the municipalities with displacement events were subject to violent events more frequently than municipalities without displacement flows. However, the gap between the two groups of municipalities appears to decrease for massacres, the number of victims of massacres and the homicide rate and kidnapping over the past three years. It is worth noting that in the last year, paramilitary groups have replaced massacres with selective murders to prevent being identified by the government and human rights organization as international human rights violators.

On the other hand, guerrilla attacks became more common as a cause of displacement in 2002. These results provide additional evidence of two phenomena observed in recent years. First, the spread of the conflict throughout the national territory has caused more indiscriminate population expulsions. Second, the guerrillas' responsibility for displacement has increased in recent years.

The concentration of land appears to be a determining factor of displacement as put forward in Section 5.1. Municipalities with a higher concentration of land, measured by the land ownership Gini, are consistent with those that were subject to displacement events. This phenomenon has repeated over the last three years analyzed in Table 5.6.

The provision of social services, the physical infrastructure and institutional presence appear to mitigate displacement. Municipalities with displacement have higher indices of Unmet Basic Needs³⁴ compared to municipalities without displacement and the difference is statistically significant. On the other hand, the density of roads and the number of institutions per capita are higher in municipalities where there is no forced displacement.

Table 5.6. Municipal Characteristics – Municipalities With and Without Displacement

Variables	2000			2001			2002		
	Displ.	No Displ.	t est.	Displ.	No Displ.	t est.	Displ.	No Displ.	t est.
Massacres	0.41	0.10	-7.16	0.28	0.07	-5.92	0.22	0.03	-5.14
Victim Rate – Massacres	0.77	0.26	-4.98	0.49	0.27	-2.10	0.44	0.06	-1.96
Homicide Rate	73.19	48.37	-4.66	79.16	47.65	-6.91	80.29	56.87	-4.51
Kidnapping Rate	63.04	34.38	-6.31	59.37	31.11	-6.51	53.88	37.34	-3.75
Terrorist Attacks	2.75	0.62	-5.56	1.83	0.34	-4.67	2.94	0.49	-6.16
Guerrilla Actions	0.62	0.18	-6.42	0.41	0.12	-6.30	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.
Land Ownership Gini	0.72	0.68	-5.73	0.71	0.68	-5.56	0.72	0.68	-6.03
Rural Index	57.10	65.36	5.66	57.37	66.18	6.28	55.77	65.91	7.2
Index of Unmet Basic Needs	51.69	41.81	-7.04	50.28	41.08	-6.76	51.31	41.28	-7.31
Road Density (km/km ²)	162.44	224.22	4.67	172.04	228.04	4.38	164.33	227.87	4.91
Density (1000s/km ²)	120.45	146.77	0.68	149.21	130.53	-0.48	193.87	104.54	-2.23
Per Capita Institutions	0.12	0.20	7.17	0.12	0.21	8.42	0.00	0.00	8.13

³⁴ The CEDE calculated municipal indices of unmet basic needs for the years 1993, 1995 and 2000. It was assumed that the unmet basic needs for 1994 were identical to those of 1993, the unmet basic needs for the 1996 – 1999 period were identical to those of 1995 and the unmet basic needs for 2001 and 2002 were identical to those of 2000.

Source: Authors' calculations based on municipal data

The figures in Table 5.6. indicate a difference between the municipalities that experienced displacement events and those without them. Nevertheless, these descriptive statistics are not controlled by other municipal characteristics. In order to monitor observable and non-observable municipal characteristics, returns were estimated from panel data with fixed and random effects. The estimates use the annual municipal displacement data for the 1993-2002 period. Given that a large percentage of the municipalities had no displacement and this very frequently results in a dependent variable of zero, the natural logarithm of the number of displaced persons was used as a dependent variable. The Hausmann test reveals that the random effects panel data is better adjusted to the data in contrast to the fixed effects estimate, therefore only these results are presented. The results of the estimates are presented in Table 5.7.

The econometric estimates confirm the Table 5.6 conclusions. Violent events, with the exception of bank robbery, increase the number of displaced persons in the municipalities³⁵. Massacres are, however, more effective than indiscriminate murder or kidnapping. On the other hand, the concentration of land raises the number of displaced persons, which corroborates the hypotheses put forward in literature on forced displacement and presented in Section 5.1.

Providing government services mitigates displacement. Although investment as such does not influence displacement, offering services does reduce displacement. Higher UBN indices, which indicate that the provision of social services is lacking, increase the number of displaced people. Similarly, a greater density of roads and more institutional presence decrease displacement. In contrast, investment in infrastructure and social services and spending on security and law enforcement do not have a significant effect on displacement.

Table 5.7. Municipal Causes of Displacement – Random Effects Panel Data

Variable	Causes of Displacement					
	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	Coefficient	P> z	Coefficient	P> z	Coefficient	P> z
Bank Robberies Per Capita	115.9654	0.69	90.9945	0.76	-127.5518	0.72
Victim Rate – Massacres	0.0444	0.00	0.0437	0.00	0.0389	0.00
Kidnapping Rate	0.0012	0.00	0.0010	0.00	0.0018	0.00
Homicide Rate	0.0006	0.00	0.0008	0.00	0.0009	0.00
Terrorist Attacks	0.0220	0.00	0.0304	0.00	0.0231	0.00
Land Ownership Gini			1.0791	0.00	1.1448	0.00
Density (1000s/km ²)			0.0000	0.44	0.0001	0.46
Road Density (km/km ²)					-0.0007	0.00
Index of Unmet Basic Needs					0.0039	0.00
Per Capita Investment in Infrastructure					-0.0001	0.83
Per Capita Spending on Security and Law Enforcement					0.0086	0.44
Per Capita Investment in Health and Education					0.0223	0.20
Per Capita Institutions					-93.1796	0.00
Number of Comments		8.376		7.238		4.445

³⁵ Homicide, kidnapping and massacre rates are calculated as the number of victims per 100,000 inhabitants.

Wald Test	327.62	340.11	375.36
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Source: Authors' calculations based on RUT and municipal database

The preceding statistical analysis, both the descriptive statistics and econometric estimates, confirm various hypotheses made relative to forced displacement. On one hand, there is a close connection between forced displacement and land concentration. On the other, the actions of armed groups encourage forced displacement. Finally, a strong institutional presence and a broad supply of government services mitigate displacement.

5.4. Conclusions

Land disputes and armed conflict have been a constant in the history of Colombia. The expulsion of colonists, the concentration of land and the conflict are some of their most obvious consequences. The forced displacement facing the Colombian population today appears to not be an exception.

While the RUT System data does not make it possible to determine a causal link between land tenure and forced displacement, the results show a high percentage of displaced households with access to land over the last twenty years. Ownership structure, after the armed conflict erupted, appears furthermore to not offer any type of protection to prevent expulsion by the armed groups. Econometric estimates on the municipal level also reveal a strong link between the concentration of property and forced displacement.

On the other hand, households with land in their places of origin suffer a greater impact with displacement in comparison to landless displaced households. Two reasons might explain this fact: First, households with land are less prepared to confront the urban labor market since they are largely dedicated to farming activities in their municipality of origin. Second, land tenure apparently grants a higher economic status within the municipality of origin that disappears upon displacement.

6. Desire to Return

The period after the geographical displacement of the population and humanitarian care is called the socioeconomic stabilization stage of the households and it is when the families must decide whether to remain in the receiving area, relocate to another municipality or return to their place of origin. Each decision involves special programs by government entities and it is possible that the characteristics of the household and the displacement process influence the household's decision. Therefore, it is crucial to know what type of households wish to return and what ones wish to stay in the receiving location in order to design public policies that are suitable to the special characteristics of each household.

The purpose of the following chapter is to identify what determines the desire to return in displaced households. The first section presents an econometric model and the second section presents the results of the model estimated with data from the RUT System.

6.1. Model for Willingness to Return³⁶

The decision to return, unlike the decision to move, is similar to the decision to migrate, since households can slowly analyze their choice. Families must weigh the alternatives - remaining in the receiving location or returning – and select the one with the greatest net benefit. The desire to return, while itself not a decision, involves determining factors similar to the decision to return, and therefore, the decision to migrate voluntarily. However, the desire to return will also be influenced by characteristics inherent to the issue of displacement such as violence in the place of origin and at the receiving location and the parties involved in the expulsion. The following paragraphs explain a random use model that considers both traditional variables from migration literature and variables specific to the armed conflict that the country is up against.

Household i wishes to return if the expected benefits of returning ($U_{i,ret}$) are greater than the benefits of remaining in the receiving location ($U_{i,per}$).

$$U_{ret} \geq U_{per}.$$

The expected benefits of household i for settling in location j are comprised of a deterministic component (v_{ij}) and a random period (ε_{ij}), which includes all factors that are unknown or impossible to quantify.

$$U_{ij} = v_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

³⁶ The model presented in this section is based on Kirchoff and Ibáñez (2001).

Where $j=ret$ denotes the decision to return and $j=per$ represents the decision to remain in the receiving location.

The deterministic component for household i to settle in location j is determined by the perception of safety of household i in location j (S_{ij}), the economic opportunities for household j (O_{ij}), in location i (C_{ij}), the migration costs for the household, i (Z_i) and the characteristics of the household i (Z_i). The expected benefits of household i settling in location j are equal to

$$U_{ij} = \alpha_j + \beta_j S_{ij} + \delta_j O_{ij} + \gamma_j C_{ij} + \delta Z_i + \varepsilon_j.$$

The variables used to approximate the perception of safety in the expelling municipality are the parties involved in the expulsion, the reason for expulsion, grouped in the reactive displacement variable, and the homicide rate in the place of origin at the time of the survey. Perceptions of safety in the receiving location are approximated with its homicide rate.

Connection to the labor market in the place of origin and receiving location indicates the economic opportunities at each location. The variables to characterize this connection are dichotomous variables for salaried work, independent work and farm work.³⁷ Economic opportunities in the place of origin depend on land tenure, tenure structure and the number of hectares to which the household has access. On the other hand, the education level of the head of household reflects its ability to compete in the labor market of the receiving location, and therefore, makes it possible to estimate the economic opportunities in the receiving location. Finally, municipal per capita spending or investment may evidence the economic advantages of the expelling and receiving municipality.

Migration costs are included in three variables: intra-departmental displacement, membership in peasant organizations, and the length of the displacement. Migration within the department entails lower travel costs for possible returns, and more importantly, the possibility of maintaining a connection with the place of origin, which makes it possible to reinforce social ties and look after their property. This is translated into lower migration costs. Membership in peasant organizations also reduces return costs since their members receive support when settling. In contrast, the duration of the displacement increases migration costs. Households with long settlement periods could be more adapted to the receiving location and returning could mean the loss of labor and education benefits, among others.

Household characteristics include the size of the household, female heads of household, number of children under age 14, number of members over age 60, education of the head of household and belonging to ethnic minorities. The structure of the household can determine the desire to return. For example, women heads of household, particularly those who lost their spouse and located in urban areas could prefer to stay in the receiving municipality with the hope of access to government programs.

³⁷ Independent work and farm work were separated since the latter is large due to the clearly rural nature of the displaced population.

The previous model makes it possible to establish the weights of the various factors determining the desire to return. Several equations were used to determine the impact of the structure of land tenure, the effectiveness of Decree 2007 of 2001, the effect of the characteristics of the municipality as well as the influence of some determining factors differentiated by preventive and reactive displacement and by duration of the displacement. The following section presents descriptive statistics and the results of the econometric estimates.

6.2. Results

Before examining the results of the estimates it is convenient to analyze the difference between the groups of households that do and do not intend to return in terms of the characteristics of the displacement, land tenure, household structure, and changes in the access to the labor market and education. Approximately 11 percent of the households expressed a desire to return to the municipality of origin. Tables 6.1 - 6.4 compare households that do and do not wish to return and calculate a Pearson statistic or a t-statistic to determine whether the difference between the two samples is statistically significant.

A first glance at the data shows a clear divergence between the two household samples. Of the 52 variables considered, 45 present a statistically significant difference between the two groups of households. This suggests, initially, the existence of characteristics specific to the household and displacement that influence the household's desire to return and that must be considered in any return program.

The results of Table 6.1 show that intra-departmental or intra-municipal displacement is more frequent among households that wish to return. Proximity to the municipality of origin means lower return costs, and therefore more inclination to return. Moreover, rural inhabitants have understood the behavior of the armed groups and adopted strategies to protect themselves without a need to abandon their place of origin, which has led to temporary migration while secure conditions are established.³⁸

Reactive displacement is more frequent among households that do not wish to return. Combined with this fact, households that do not wish to return are usually found to flee their places of origin due primarily to threats, murder, disappearance or torture. These triggers are aimed at specific individuals and a possible return could result in becoming victim to violence again. On the other hand, displacement due to armed confrontation in which violence is between two or more fighting groups and not directed toward specific households occurs more frequently among households that wish to return.

The relationship between the desire to return and parties involved in the expulsion reveals that a larger proportion of households that wish to return were displaced by paramilitary groups while the largest percentage of households that do not wish to return were displaced by guerilla groups. There is no clear explanation for this result and it merits careful analysis.

Finally, Table 6.1 indicates that the duration of the displacement influences the desire to return: households that do not wish to return report an average displacement duration of 315 days, while

³⁸ Personal interview with Jairo Arboleda.

households who wish to return have stayed in the receiving location 149 days. This result, which is consistent with literature on migration, indicates that after a period of time, individuals adjust and gain strength in the receiving location, which decreases the desire to return.

Table 6.1. Characteristics of Displacement – Desire to Return

Variable	Do not wish to return	Wish to return	Pearson Chi2 T-statistic
Guerrilla – Party involved in expulsion	46.6	40.5	39.7
Paramilitary – Party involved in expulsion	43.4	58.3	234.5
Government – Party involved in expulsion	1.4	1.0	2.5
Two parties involved in expulsion	8.2	16.4	210.2
Threat – Reason for expulsion	42.2	35.4	53.8
Murder – Reason for expulsion	9.0	2.5	154.7
Disappearance or torture – Reason for expulsion	1.4	0.4	20.9
Armed conflict – Reason for expulsion	5.4	12.5	235.4
Forced recruitment – Reason for expulsion	3.2	2.4	6.4
Spraying – Reason for expulsion	0.5	0.0	15.5
Intra-departmental displacement	57.1	84.1	909.0
Intra-municipal displacement	22.9	49.2	1079.9
Reactive displacement	59.2	52.5	50.8
Direct displacement	95.3	97.3	28.0
Displacement period	315.4	149.0	14.5

Source: Authors' calculations based on RUT

Table 6.2 compares households' desire to return based on land tenure structure. Land tenure has a positive effect on the desire to return. Abandoning land is an economic cost, and it is generally the only asset of the households; therefore, the desire to recover abandoned land is an incentive to return. Moreover, households with access to land are generally dedicated to agricultural work and are at a clear disadvantage compared to individuals prepared for the urban labor market, which means an additional cost if they do not return.

Upon examining the differences in the structure of land tenure, the results reveal that larger proportions of households that wish to return are owners, collective owners, and lessees of abandoned land. The first two modes are some type of legal ownership, and therefore offer greater certainty of recovering the land upon return.³⁹ Households that are lessees are not legal owners, and therefore the land cannot be appropriated illegal armed groups. Therefore, there is less possibility upon return of being victims of threats or violence directed toward transferring their land.

The land ownership modality of the majority of the households who do not wish to return is the possession modality that offers the least certainty of recovery upon return. Therefore, land tenure and specifically land ownership seem to be associated to a greater desire to return. Leasing also appears to be an alternative to stimulate the return of displaced households.

³⁹ This is particularly important when one considers that Decree 2007 of 2001 requires authorities to prepare a report that records owners of land in the municipality when there is an imminent risk of displacement.

Table 6.2. Land Tenure and Structure of Tenure – Desire to Return

Variable	Do not wish to return	Wish to return	Pearson Chi2 T-statistical
Land tenure in place of origin	58.0	80.0	259.8
Ownership –tenure structure	53.8	51.2	10.3
Collective ownership – tenure structure	6.9	19.9	599.4
Possession – tenure structure	8.2	5.8	7.5
Settler – tenure structure	4.3	3.4	0.7
Lessee – tenure structure	13.6	14.3	10.7
Median number of hectares abandoned	10.0	8.0	

Source: Authors' calculations based on RUT

Table 6.3 reports on the differences in the structure of the households that do and do not wish to return. Data suggests that greater economic vulnerability is associated with less desire to return. In effect, households who do not wish to return have a higher proportion of children between ages zero and four, female heads of household and are ethnic minorities. In addition, households who do not wish to return have, on average, a higher number of years of education. More education results in more opportunities to adapt and progress in the receiving location, which reduces the incentive to return.

Two reasons may determine vulnerable households' little desire to return. First by being more vulnerable, they are more likely to receive government assistance in the receiving location, which in turn decreases the incentive for returning. Second, as mentioned by Meertens (1999), displaced women rely on their social networks for support, and obtain work in homes or selling food in the streets for which they were prepared. Participation in community groups makes it possible for women to rebuild their identity, form social ties, and create new vital horizons that did not exist in the field and that can facilitate adaptation to the receiving location and decrease the desire to return.

The importance of social networks becomes clearer when it is noted that a higher proportion of households who wish to return participated in organizations, in particular peasant organizations. The existence of social networks in the place of origin that can provide support and security are a very big incentive for returning.

Table 6.3. Household Structure – Wish to Return

Variable	Do not wish to return	Wish to return	Pearson Chi2 T-statistical
Size of household	4.9	5.0	-1.8
Number of minors under age 14	2.2	2.1	3.4
Number of persons between ages 14 and 60	2.5	2.6	-3.7
Number of adults over age 60	0.2	0.3	-7.5
Female head of household	38.6	29.0	117.2
Widow/er head of household	7.6	5.0	21.3
School attendance before displacement	39.0	40.1	1.9
School attendance after displacement	23.6	17.6	88.1
Ethnic minority	3.4	2.3	11.0
Participation in organizations	22.7	38.8	415.5
Participation in peasant organizations	51.7	70.6	155.2
Participation in organizations not peasant-related	48.3	29.4	155.2

Source: Authors' calculations based on RUT

Table 6.4 analyzes the impact of displacement on access to the labor market and school attendance. There are also significant differences in the labor and education characteristics of the two types of households. First and as expected, households who do not wish to return have higher unemployment rates in their places of origin, while households who wish to return have higher unemployment rates at the receiving location. Therefore, better prospects for employment, whether at the place of origin or receiving location, are associated with the desire to return.

Moreover, households who do not wish to return have a higher proportion of wage-earning jobs in the receiving location, which is associated with connections to the formal sector, more work stability, and access to social security. In contrast, households who wish to return are linked in greater proportions to agricultural employment in the place of origin and receiving location. Thus, the desire to return is associated with the opportunity to perform agricultural activities in the municipality where many households had access to land and where the displaced households had a better understanding of the products, climate, and different types of crops.

Education opportunities in the receiving location decrease incentives to return. School attendance in the receiving location is also higher among households who do not wish to return and who prefer to remain given the security of having children in school and the uncertainty of obtaining a slot [in a school] in their place of origin should they return.

Table 6.4. Labor Market and Education Before and After Displacement. Wish to Return

Variable	Do not wish to return	Wish to return	Pearson Chi2 T-statistical
Unemployed, Origin- Head	38.7	33.6	32.4
Agriculture, Origin- Head	29.9	39.1	116.4
Employed, Origin- Head	6.7	6.4	0.4
Independent, Origin – Head	41.3	49.1	74.2
Unemployed, Receiving - Head	29.6	36.6	61.5
Agriculture, Receiving - Head	18.1	30.8	278.4
Employed, Receiving - Head	10.8	5.2	93.3
Independent, Receiving – Head	37.6	43.8	43.5
Unemployed, Origin- Others	55.9	57.4	6.2
Agriculture, Origin- Others	12.1	14.7	39.7
Employed, Origin- Others	3.2	3.1	0.2
Independent, Origin – Others	19.2	22.2	34.9
Unemployed, Receiving - Others	42.5	51.5	197.0
Agriculture, Receiving - Others	6.7	10.2	115.2
Employed, Receiving - Others	5.5	3.1	74.4
Independent, Receiving – Others	17.2	17.6	0.8
School attendance before displacement	39.0	40.1	1.9
School attendance after displacement	23.6	17.6	88.1

Source: Authors' calculations based on RUT

All the differences specified in the preceding paragraphs are not controlled by the various factors that appear to explain the desire to return. For this reason, it is of fundamental importance to confirm some of the differences discussed previously in the framework of a return that produces evidence of causal relationships between the variables presented in Tables 6.1 - 6.4.

The results of the estimates confirm some of the hypothesis put forward and the conclusions made previously. Table 6.5 shows estimates for the aggregate and separate structure of tenure as well as the impact of Decree 2007 of 2001. A greater desire to return is associated with ownership of assets in the municipality of origin and limited opportunities in the receiving location. Access to land increases the probability of the desire to return, but households with access to large pieces of land are less willing to return. Abandoning land at the place of origin entails high economic costs. However, it is difficult to interpret the effect of the size of land since the economic costs of abandoning land are higher as the size of the land increases. On the other hand, it is probable that the owners of large pieces of land are able to manage their plots remotely, thus avoiding the hardships of the armed conflict.

The most vulnerable households are less willing to return. The desire to return significantly decreases in households with children under age 14, with female heads of the household and in households belonging to ethnic minorities. As stated in previous paragraphs, vulnerable households may prefer to remain in the receiving location where it is probably easier to access government assistance.

Labor opportunities in the receiving location and higher measure of human capital are associated with a lower probability of returning. Labor opportunities in the receiving location reduce the desire to return since migration costs are higher. Likewise, households headed by more educated

individuals are less inclined to return. This means favorable conditions at the receiving location reduce the probability of returning.

The duration of the displacement has a negative effect on the probability of returning. Although displaced households face unstable conditions at the receiving location, as time goes by, they appear to adapt to the extent that they do not wish to return. Return programs must, then, try to include recently displaced households.

Social networks in the municipality of origin appear to play a basic role in the desire to return. Membership in peasant organizations increases the desire to return by three percent, a percentage similar to land tenure. Peasant organizations can be a crucial element of support for the return of displaced households by providing their members with protection and economic assistance.

The parties involved in expulsion and the causes for expulsion are factors that determine the desire to return. Surprisingly, expulsion by paramilitary or guerilla groups in comparison to other factors encourages the desire to return. This result must be explored in greater depth before making a final conclusion. In contrast, reactive displacement results in less willingness to return. This displacement was caused by a specific attack against a household and the prospect of suffering similar attacks can decrease the incentives for returning.

Finally, households that migrated within the department show a higher probability of a desire to return. Proximity to the place of origin and possible remaining connections with the place of expulsion translate into lower return costs. However, it is necessary to carefully consider the result since it is difficult to determine the causal link. Households may wish to return since their displacement was intra-departmental. Alternatively, households may choose a location near their places of origin with the idea of returning in the near future.

Estimates (2) in Table 6.5 show the results when a dichotomous variable is included that identifies displaced households that own land after the enactment of Decree 2007. The results described previously do not vary, and show the positive and statistically significant impact of Decree 2007 of 2001. Notwithstanding the soundness of this result, it is important to analyze it in greater depth since the variable may be gathering some other temporary effects rather than the impact of Decree 2007. First, and as explained in the second chapter, the decree has only been enforced in one municipality in the country. Second, commencing in August 2002, the government of Colombia granted special emphasis to return policies, which may make households more willing to return after this date.⁴⁰ The decree variable could take in this effect. On the other hand, it is possible that the decree decreased incentives to appropriate peasant land even without having been strictly enforced.

The effect of each tenure structure is analyzed separately in the Table 6.5 estimate (3). Again, the results described previously remain stable. All land tenure structures, in contrast to possession, increase the desire to return. Private ownership and collective ownership have the highest coefficients, in particular collective ownership, which has a coefficient two times higher than that of private ownership.

⁴⁰ Myriam Hernández identified this possible interpretation.

Social unity and collective action appear to offer protection against the actions of armed groups. Membership in peasant organizations and collective ownership both increase willingness to return. Two projects developed in Oriente Antioqueño and in Magdalena Medio also point to the importance of collective actions in resisting the activities of illegal armed groups, providing rural inhabitants with the perception of safety, and therefore preventing displacement or promoting return.⁴¹

The Magdalena Medio Development and Peace program is a successful project where communities' unity impeded the action of armed groups, and consequently, displacement was reduced. This project is financed and implemented by ECOPEPETROL, the World Bank, CINEP, the Dioceses of Magdalena Medio, UNDP, The National Planning Department and the European Union. The purpose of the project, in which 29 municipalities of the departments of Antioquia, Bolívar, Cesar and Santander participate, is to strengthen the management of the communities and promote productive projects. Communities submit development initiatives to the Development and Peace program in order to be financed and exercise social control over the authorities. The project has also financed productive projects on cocoa plantations for 2,300 families and on palm plantations for 1,200 families where production and credit are handled individually, but technical assistance, marketing and transportation are developed collectively. Project activities have resulted in increased social capital, and the greater capacity of communities to resist the armed conflict. For example, 500-inhabitant community of Mico Ahumado, expelled the paramilitary groups from its territory and later the guerrilla groups who attempted to replace the former. Finally, they requested the presence of the National Police and the withdrawal of the Army from the community.

The second project was designed by the government of Colombia in cooperation with PRODEPAZ⁴² and its primary objectives are to foster return and reduce displacement in 14 municipalities in Oriente Antioqueño. The project unites displaced families, families that returned following displacement and families who do not wish to return, but want to continue to receive economic benefits from their piece of land. A production project with sugar cane molasses, which is resistant to the vicissitudes of the conflict since it can go for three or four months without any care, was developed with these families. Families adopted a production and marketing structure that makes it possible for them to generate economic earnings from sugar cane molasses. Families who are reluctant to return live in housing rented by the Social Solidarity Network in neighboring municipalities and can exploit their land without the need to live on it. The project's social structure and institutional support also create a feeling of solidarity and protection, which combined with economic incentives, have reduced displacement throughout the region and promoted return despite the fact that violent conditions remain the same.

The results of the estimates and the impact of the projects described make it possible to infer the importance to households of having collective activities that diffuse risks, protect the community and decrease the opportunities for armed actions due to their high political cost. The incentive of

⁴¹ This information was obtained in a personal interview with Jairo Arboleda.

⁴² PRODEPAZ is a foundation comprised of ISA, the Federation of Municipalities of Oriente Antioqueño, the Diocese of Antioquia and the Universidad del Oriente.

collective ownership would then be more closely linked to this feeling than to collective possession per se of an agricultural piece of land.

Table 6.5. Probability of Return – Aggregated and Separate Tenure Structure and the Impact of Decree 2007 of 2001

Variable	Probability of return					
	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	Marginal Effect	p> z	Marginal Effect	p> z	Marginal Effect	p> z
Intra-departmental Displacement	0.0680	0.00	0.0681	0.00	0.0681	0.00
Displacement period	-0.0001	0.00	-0.0001	0.00	-0.0001	0.00
Reactive displacement	-0.0144	0.00	-0.0138	0.00	-0.0119	0.00
Size of household	0.0002	0.87	0.0002	0.81	0.0001	0.93
Members under age 14	-0.0028	0.04	-0.0029	0.04	-0.0027	0.05
Members over age 60	-0.0035	0.28	-0.0035	0.27	-0.0042	0.19
Female head of household	-0.0187	0.00	-0.0190	0.00	-0.0184	0.00
Education of head of household	-0.0030	0.00	-0.0030	0.00	-0.0029	0.00
Age of head of household	0.0007	0.00	0.0007	0.00	0.0007	0.00
Ethnic minority	-0.0305	0.00	-0.0291	0.00	-0.0265	0.00
Employed-Receiving	-0.0372	0.00	-0.0363	0.00	-0.0339	0.00
Independent work- Receiving	-0.0282	0.00	-0.0269	0.00	-0.0251	0.00
Agricultural work- Receiving	0.0222	0.00	0.0247	0.00	0.0263	0.00
Land tenure	0.0439	0.00	0.0395	0.00		
Private ownership					0.0551	0.00
Collective ownership					0.1241	0.00
Lessee					0.0549	0.00
Settler					0.0297	0.00
Ownership*hectares	-0.0001	0.01	-0.0001	0.01	-0.0002	0.00
Tenure*Decree 2007			0.0183	0.00		
Peasant organization	0.0377	0.00	0.0393	0.00	0.0290	0.00
Guerrilla – Party involved in expulsion	0.0199	0.00	0.0160	0.00	0.0142	0.00
Paramilitary- Party involved in expulsion	0.0335	0.00	0.0316	0.00	0.0277	0.00
Government – Party involved in expulsion	0.0190	0.24	0.0183	0.26	0.0120	0.44
Employed-Origin	0.0077	0.29	0.0071	0.33	0.0057	0.43
Independent work-Origin	0.0112	0.06	0.0099	0.10	0.0087	0.15
Agricultural work- Origin	0.0056	0.17	0.0044	0.28	0.0032	0.43
Number of observations	27,767		27,767		27,767	
Pseudo-R2	0.1809		0.1815		0.1874	

* Department controls included

Source: Authors' calculations based on RUT

The different circumstances at the time of expulsion for reactive and preventive displacement shape the two groups' desire to return differently. In order to establish these differences, rates for the labor market, the education of the head of household, and land tenure are estimated separately for preventive and reactive displacements. The results of the estimates are presented in Table 6.6. Estimates show that economic variables have a more marked influence on the decision to return of households displaced due to prevention. First, the connection to a wage-earning or independent job in the place of origin leads to a greater desire to return in families displaced for prevention purposes and has no influence on those whose displacement is reactive. Moreover,

the effect of land tenure is stronger in the case of preventive displacements compared to reactive displacements. However, dedication to agricultural work in the place of origin is an important factor for both groups upon return, in particular for those that underwent reactive displacement. This could mean that displaced families with limited opportunities in the receiving location would be willing to return despite the probability of being victimized once more by selective violence.

Second, access to the labor market and education, a reflection of advantages in the receiving location, are also more prominent for preventive displacement compared to reactive displacement. It is possible that reactive displacement, as a reaction to save one's life, makes households face an unwanted, but unavoidable situation. Consequently, the implementation of return programs for households displaced reactively may have limited success.

In summary, economic or labor variables, with the exception of agriculture, are not significant in the desire of households displaced reactively to return. It is possible that the circumstances that generated the reactive displacement prevail over any economic incentives to return.

Table 6.6. Probability of Return – Reactive and Preventive Displacement

<i>Variable</i>	Reactive		Preventive	
	Marginal Effect	p> z	Marginal Effect	p> z
Intra-departmental Displacement	0.0701	0.00		
Displacement period	-0.0001	0.00		
Size of household	0.0004	0.65		
Members under age 14	-0.0029	0.03		
Members over age 60	-0.0013	0.68		
Female head of household	-0.0184	0.00		
Age of head of household	0.0006	0.00		
Ethnic minority	-0.0298	0.00		
Education of head of household	-0.0024	0.00	-0.0032	0.00
Employed-Receiving	-0.0227	0.01	-0.0397	0.00
Independent work- Receiving	-0.0298	0.00	-0.0245	0.00
Agricultural work- Receiving	-0.0067	0.28	0.0407	0.00
Land tenure	0.0343	0.00	0.0429	0.00
Ownership*hectares	0.0000	0.33	-0.0001	0.10
Employed-Origin	-0.0061	0.46	0.0239	0.04
Independent work-Origin	0.0011	0.88	0.0278	0.00
Agricultural work- Origin	0.0117	0.03	0.0092	0.10
Tenure*Decree 2007	0.0174	0.00		
Peasant organization	0.0383	0.00		
Guerrilla – Party involved in expulsion	0.0132	0.00		
Paramilitary- Party involved in expulsion	0.0337	0.00		
Government – Party involved in expulsion	0.0183	0.24		
Number of observations	30,025			
Pseudo-R2	0.1872			

* Department controls included

Source: Authors' calculations based on RUT

For the purpose of establishing the differences in the desire to return according to the length of displacement, a return was estimated, considering separately the rates for education and labor variables for households with less and more than three months of displacement. Displaced households that register in the SUR can only receive government assistance during the first three months after displacement, therefore it is interesting to analyze the desire to return according to the length of the displacement. Moreover, as time passes, it is possible that displaced households will succeed in assimilating the conditions of the receiving location and be included in the labor market, which could possibly have a negative effect on their desire to return.

The results of Table 6.7 suggest that the marginal effect of labor variables on the desire to return is increased for households with more than three months of displacement. In effect, we see that variables such as school attendance, a wage-earning job and independent jobs at the location are associated with less desire to return and they have a much bigger effect on households with over three months of displacement. This suggests that economic conditions in the receiving location reduce the desire to return even further once the households have managed to adapt to the conditions of their new municipality and achieve greater stability, as well as a better standard of living compared to the conditions they endured during the first three months of displacement.

On the other hand, the effect of labor conditions in the place of origin, which positively affect the wish to return in households with less than three months of displacement, disappear and in fact change for households whose displacement exceeds three months. This is consistent with the argument made previously that as time passes, the economic conditions of the receiving location and their negative effect on the desire to return outweigh the economic and labor conditions in the place of origin, since families get accustomed and adapt to the new conditions they must face.

Finally, an interesting result is the differential effect of agricultural work in the receiving location according to the length of displacement. While agricultural work has not significant effect on the desire to return of households with less than three months of displacement, as time passes and the displacement exceeds three months, agricultural work in the receiving location strongly increases the desire to return. This could be associated with the fact that during the first three months of displacement, households dependent on agricultural work for their survival have the possibility of exploiting pieces of land along their way. However, this is a temporary solution and as time passes households accustomed to agricultural work wish to return to their places of origin.

Table 6.7. Probability of return – before and after three months of displacement

<i>Variable</i>	< 3 months		> 3 months	
	Marginal Effect	p> z 	Marginal Effect	p> z
Intra-departmental Displacement	0.0638	0.00		
Size of household	0.0002	0.85		
Members under age 14	-0.0027	0.05		
Members over age 60	-0.0027	0.39		
Female head of household	-0.0188	0.00		
Age of head of household	0.0007	0.00		

Ethnic minority	-0.0297	0.00		
Education of head of household	-0.0025	0.00	-0.0035	0.00
Employed-Receiving	-0.0165	0.05	-0.0456	0.00
Independent work- Receiving	-0.0179	0.00	-0.0221	0.00
Agricultural work- Receiving	0.0029	0.58	0.0662	0.00
Employed-Origin	0.0379	0.00	-0.0459	0.00
Independent work-Origin	0.0383	0.00	-0.0376	0.00
Agricultural work- Origin	0.0336	0.00	-0.0384	0.00
Land Tenure	0.0385	0.00		
Ownership*Hectares	-0.0001	0.01		
Tenure*Decree 2007	0.0175	0.00		
Peasant organization	0.0370	0.00		
Guerrilla – Party involved in expulsion	0.0185	0.00		
Paramilitary- Party involved in expulsion	0.0272	0.00		
Government – Party involved in expulsion	0.0094	0.54		
Number of observations	27,767			
Pseudo-R2	0.1874			

* Department controls included

Source: Authors' calculations based on RUT

The inclusion of homicide rates and per capita expenses in the places of origin and receiving locations changes some results as shown in Table 6.7. However, it is important to clarify that these outcomes are preliminary, and therefore, must be carefully analyzed given the fact that we do not have municipal data as of 2001, over half of the observations are lost. First the statistical significance of the duration of displacement disappears. This is not surprising since by eliminating the observations for years 2001, 2002 and 2003, recently displaced households are lost, and the variation in the length of displacement is small. Second, the importance of labor conditions in the place of origin clearly declines. Before including the homicide rate, labor opportunities in the place of origin increased the desired to return, and after the homicide rates are included, labor opportunities in the place of origin lose statistical significance. It is possible that violence in the region eliminates any economic attraction, with the exception of land tenure, of the municipality of origin.

The characteristics of the municipality of origin influence the desire to return, while those of the receiving location do not appear to affect it. A high homicide rate in the place of origin, signaling that violence persists after displacement, reduces the desire to return. On the other hand, a high per capita expense, indicates the commitment of the local authorities to improving the socioeconomic situation of its inhabitants and to establishing protection mechanisms, and consequently increasing the desire to return.

Table 6.8. Probability of Return – Municipal Characteristics

Variable	Marginal Effect	p> z
Intra-departmental displacement	0.0722	0.00
Displacement period	0.0000	0.84
Reactive Displacement	-0.0169	0.04

Size of household	0.0031	0.07
Members under age 14	-0.0033	0.15
Members over age 60	-0.0009	0.87
Female head of household	-0.0166	0.02
Education of head of household	-0.0035	0.00
Age of head of household	0.0006	0.01
Ethnic Minority	-0.0240	0.06
Employed-Receiving	-0.0560	0.00
Independent work- Receiving	-0.0283	0.02
Agricultural work- Receiving	0.0350	0.00
Land tenure	0.0570	0.00
Ownership*Hectares	-0.0002	0.20
Peasant organization	0.0301	0.08
Guerrilla – Party involved in expulsion	0.0358	0.00
Paramilitary- Party involved in expulsion	0.0086	0.24
Government – Party involved in expulsion	-0.0011	0.96
Employed-Origin	0.0455	0.19
Independent work-Origin	0.0203	0.42
Agricultural work- Origin	0.0199	0.06
Homicide rate-Receiving	-0.0004	0.66
Homicide rate-Origin	-0.0045	0.00
Total Per Capita Spending-Receiving	0.0000	0.72
Total Per Capita Spending-Origin	0.0003	0.00
Number of observations	8,058	
Pseudo-R2	0.1857	

* Department controls included

Source: Authors' calculations based on RUT

6.3. Conclusions

The results of the returns make it possible to draw five main conclusions. First, land tenure is an incentive for return, but owners of large land properties prefer to remain in the receiving location. Second, vulnerable households seek to establish themselves in the receiving location. Third, economic opportunities in the municipality of origin stimulate return while greater economic opportunities in the receiving location reduce the desire to return. Fourth, it appears that persistent violence in the municipality of origin eliminates the effect of economic opportunities in the place of origin, with the exception of land tenure and the per capita spending of the municipality. Finally, the feeling of belonging to a united community and having the opportunity to develop collective actions can strengthen the feeling of security in the municipality of origin and increase the desire to return as indicated by the variables for membership in peasant organizations and collective ownership of land.

7. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

The results of this report suggest a close link between land tenure and forced displacement in Colombia. On the one hand, territorial expansion and the appropriation of farm land by illegal armed groups lead to the expulsion of rural households with access to land. Programs to mitigate and prevent forced displacement must provide as part of their foundation land ownership and the protection of property rights. On the other hand, land tenure is a determining factor in the desire to return, and therefore must be the central focus of a national government return program.

Data from the RUT System shows that a high percentage of displaced households have access to land, under several modes of tenure, and in general, the land is small in size. These results, combined with the results of previous studies, make it possible to confirm with increasing certainty the relationship between land tenure and the expulsion of the civilian population. However, the policies to weaken this link are confused since data demonstrates the low capacity of legal land ownership to reduce the risk of displacement. On the contrary, the vast majority of displaced households legally own their land.

Access to land is a crucial factor in any return policy. Land tenure appears to be the only economic incentive in the municipality of origin for returning once violence is included in the estimates. Furthermore, the impact of displacement appears to be worse for households with land tenure who suffer higher unemployment rates and a significant drop in school attendance compared to their situation before displacement. Displacement eliminates the best economic privileges present in the municipality of origin and arising from land tenure.

Return programs must consider the characteristics of displaced households. Vulnerable families, in particular those with female heads of household with small children, appear to prefer remaining in the receiving location. Land tenure, for its part, stimulates the desire to return due to the economic cost of abandoning land and the sharp economic decline as a result of displacement. Finally, long displacement periods undermine the possibility of return since as time passes households adapt more easily to the receiving location.

Collective programs and group action appear to be an important component in promoting return and preventing displacement. Households with collective ownership and members of peasant organizations are more willing to return probably due to the fact that membership in a group provides them with a stronger feeling of security and protection when facing possible attacks by armed groups.

Finally, and it is important to stress that this results is still preliminary, violence in the municipality of origin reduces the probable success of a return program, while the per capita spending of the municipality increases its appeal, and therefore, the willingness to return. The return of displaced families must be accompanied by a comprehensive policy to protect the civilian population. Economic incentives in the municipality of origin are not sufficient to encourage the displaced population to return.

The conclusions of the analysis and some qualitative evidence collected to date make it possible to establish policies for the different phases of forced displacement. The policy recommendations identify actions to prevent displacement, promote return, reinforce socioeconomic stability for those who do not wish to return and create the conditions necessary to the return and titling of land in the post-conflict phase. Each phase is presented in detail below. Although the objective of the report is to analyze the connection between land tenure and forced displaced, policies are identified for all the phases of displacement for the purpose of understanding the tradeoffs decision makers face. Appendix I presents an outline of the policy recommendations and establishes the primary population groups to benefit.

Prevention of Forced Displacement

Displacement prevention policies must provide greater protection for the civilian population, despite the persistence of the armed conflict, and dismantle the underlying causes of displacement. Agrarian conflict is, without doubt, an underlying cause of displacement, and therefore, preventing displacement and protecting agricultural property are intertwined on all levels. In order to bring greater protection to the civilian population, and thus prevent displacement, it is necessary to:

1. Increase the presence of the National Police in every municipality of the country. Evidence provided by Ibáñez and Vélez (2003a) and the Mico Ahumando experiment show the important protection duty of the National Police. Although the current national government is following this path, it is important to accelerate the process of sending the National Police to municipalities with a high risk of displacement. In addition, the Early Alert System [Sistema de Alertas Tempranas – SAT] could be used so that every time it is identified, an alert is sent to the police, Army and National Police in order to restore the control of the territory. After control of the territory is achieved, a permanent National Police presence must be established in the municipality and the Army must be begin to withdraw.
2. It is necessary to strengthen the Early Alert System (SAT) by means of the following actions: (i) Systematize the identification of potential risk zones; (ii) Design strategies for timely action; and (iii) establish permanent communication with local authorities and inhabitants in areas at risk.
3. Restoration of security in the regions must be accompanied a community participation policy in which social processes are reinforced. Programs such as those carried out in Magdalena Medio and Oriente Antioqueño have strengthened citizen participation processes and rebuilt social networks in municipalities with violence. This has all resulted in an increase in the social capital and the greater capacity to resist armed groups. Thus, it is important to replicate these programs in other regions of the country, while taking into account the special characteristics of each region.

In order to dismantle the underlying causes of the armed conflict and [those] linked to displacement, it is necessary to:

1. Create mechanisms to prevent the appropriation of farm property. Decree 2007 of 2001 is a first step towards this goal, but it is necessary to carry out the following:
 - a. Update the land registry.
 - b. Speed up imminent risk [notifications] and establish permanent communication channels with the Early Alert System.
 - c. Involve the community in the decision to declare imminent risk [of danger] since this has major repercussions upon freezing the land market. The settlers must then be

convinced of the imminent nature of the risk, since they could otherwise perceive the declaration as a liability.

- d. Establish mobile registries in expulsion areas to record and authenticate ownership of farm land. The high cost for rural settlers to register and authenticate land may favor population groups with more resources, and thus create a greater concentration of land. Moreover, titling processes have led groups with power to use information to their advantage to acquire land that does not belong to them (Binswanger et al, 1995). Mobile registries in expulsion areas should facilitate the registry process for households with limited resources and could be free of charge for owners of small pieces of land (for example, ten hectares).
- e. Verify the registration or transfer of land based on the Municipal, District or Department Committees for the Comprehensive Care of Households Displaced by Violence. (Atención Integral a la Población Desplazada por la Violencia) and inhabitants of the municipalities in order to prevent granting titles to members or front men of the illegal armed groups.
- f. Decree 2007 of 2001 currently provides the temporary freezing of land while declarations of imminent risk are in effect. Once the declaration period is over, the freezing of the land market ends, and rural households are once again in a weak position. To avoid the temporary nature of the risk declaration, households could be granted the option to transfer land to the government, which must in turn guarantee displaced households a piece of land that is the same size and with similar characteristics at the return or relocation site. The pieces of land would be part of the government's equity and would constitute a land swap fund. These types of experiments have been put into practice in Colombia. Therefore, the administrative and bureaucratic infrastructure necessary to adopt a land swap fund for the displaced population is available in the country. It is necessary, however, to explore different types of mechanisms to implement this fund.
- g. The declaration of imminent risk attempts to shelter mass displacements, therefore it does not protect the property of the households that are displaced individually or in a preventive manner. This can lead to increased individual displacements and consequently to inadequate protection of the capital assets of these households. Although titling land in mobile registries is an alternative, it is necessary to make it possible for households to also have access to the Land Fund proposed in the previous item prior to registering in the SUR and with a legal title of the land.
- h. Decree 2007 of 2001 only protects legal ownership of the land and does not consider any other land tenure structures such as leasing or settling. However, both settlers and lessees have invested in assets and improvements on the land and must be compensated in some manner. In order to compensate lessees, the government could assign them an equal-sized plot of land and permit leasing with the option to buy. The amount of the assets and improvements to the former piece of land can be assimilated into the lease payment and the first years of the payment waived. In the case of

settlers, the occupation period must be verified based on the same procedures used by the INCORA, and this time will be taken into consideration when participating in a land allocation process.

Return of Displaced Population

Prior to implementing any return policy, it is advisable to analyze whether a mass return program is a real and sustainable solution to the problem of displacement. Return and relocation must be a free and well-informed act. So, it is worth asking whether the current government's excessive emphasis on return programs limits the alternatives of the displaced population and thus undermines their freedom to choose the best alternative for each specific case. With this in mind, it is necessary to:

1. Carry out return programs through negotiation and consensus.
2. Disseminate information on the right to return or the right to receive compensation for the violation of land property rights. (Rose et al, 2000).
3. Focus on long-term successful and sustainable return programs for households. It is essential to characterize what type of households wish to return and what type of households prefer to stay in the receiving location:
 - a. Households with access to land and dedicated to agricultural work in the place of origin and receiving location are less prepared to deal with displacement in urban areas. Return or relocation programs should target these households since they appear to be in the worst economic condition and have more incentive to return.
 - b. Return programs must be carried out with recently displaced households. A prolonged period of displacement makes it possible for households to adapt to the receiving location, and therefore they prefer to remain rather than face an uncertain future in their municipalities of origin. This is why the government must respond to return requests as quickly as possible.
4. Before starting a return program, the government must ensure that security is restored in the municipalities, and build sufficient trust in the households participating in the program. However, programs with a strong community component can also contribute to a greater perception of security. Collective return processes can be successful even if security has not been fully restored in the regions. Moreover, it is important to include components to reinforce social ties and promote community participation to increase the its members' ability to undertake collective actions, which enable them to defend themselves against armed groups at any time. The success of collective return programs lies in the knowledge and prior experience of participants acting as an organized collective group, which can be a reflection of the trust between the participants and strong social bonds. Otherwise, the failure of a collective project is quite probable.⁴³

⁴³ Zapata and Arismendy (2003) found that the agrarian reform community project targeted at displaced families failed because families from different regions of the country were assembled with different productive vocations and

5. Include in return programs a comprehensive land access policy that takes into account the following considerations:
 - a. Award land in the municipalities of origin to prevent land awarded in the receiving or relocation municipalities from being abandoned when security is improved in the place of origin.
 - b. Differentiate return programs according to the needs and vocations of the displaced households. The selection of beneficiaries must be rigorous to guarantee the success of the productive processes. Avoid awarding land to households without agricultural vocations or entrepreneurial skills.
 - c. Provide agricultural training and technical assistance programs with the support of the UMATAS.
 - d. Permit leasing with the option to buy. Land ownership may be acquired once the users are able to profitably exploit the land. However, it is necessary to take into account that weak property rights reduce the land leasing market. (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2001).
 - e. Establish credit programs with special conditions for displaced households. Displacement caused a substantial reduction in the assets of these households who cannot begin a productive project, thus receive farm land. Therefore, credit for the displaced population must be under special conditions that make it possible for it to begin a sustainable productive process and that reduces the probability of becoming delinquent. All of this would increase mistrust of the government even further.
6. Tie return programs to school attendance programs since the latter is very low. Likewise, return can be an opportunity to increase access to other social services such as health.
7. Return programs must be accompanied by programs of: (i) psychological and labor support for inclusion in society; (ii) support to establish social networks and contact with the local community; and (iii) support for the initial basic survival of the family (Suárez and Vinha, 2003).

Socioeconomic Stabilization

All studies have found that displaced households have little willingness to return. The government must then assume that a high percentage of displaced households prefer to remain in the receiving location, and consequently, it must create programs and policies to support these households during the adjustment and incorporation process. Economic stabilization programs for displaced households must:

occupations and little ability to interact as a group. This resulted in a high degree of distrust, and therefore, there is little willingness to share the expenses and responsibilities arising from the projects.

1. Identify households who do not wish to return and start programs for their prompt stabilization in the receiving municipality as soon as possible.
2. Focus their efforts on the socioeconomic stabilization of vulnerable households- such as households headed by females, with high degrees of economic dependence, or that belong to ethnic minorities- in the receiving municipalities to ensure access to labor markets and education as well as health coverage.
3. Create incentives for the receiving municipalities to avoid the perception that displaced persons are an additional burden, and therefore, not attend to their needs. Some municipalities are receiving considerable flows of displaced people and lack the financial resources to care for this new population group. For this purpose, the following projects could be implemented:
 - a. Implement the National Census to determine the new demographic composition resulting from displacement and thus assign transfers adequately.
 - b. Establish a Compensation Fund for Municipalities with High Displacement Pressure to support these municipalities with financial resources that make it possible for them to care for the displaced population. The fund would have the following characteristics:⁴⁴
 - i. The financial resources could come from multilateral and international cooperation organizations given the temporary nature of the displacement problem.
 - ii. Resources would only be transferred to municipalities whose population growth as a consequence of displacement exceeded the natural growth rate of the population.
 - iii. Displaced persons cared for by a municipality be registered in the Single Registry System (Sistema Único de Registro), and thus would comply with the definition of displacement set forth in Law 387 of 1997. This means that special transfers for the displaced population would be suspended once the displaced status ceases in accordance with the provisions set forth in Colombian law.
 - iv. Resource management and compliance monitoring would be the responsibility of the Social Solidarity Network.
 - v. Fund resources would only be allocated to investment in education and health since humanitarian assistance programs would continue to be the responsibility of the national government.
 - vi. The national government would cover 90 percent of the investments in health and education for displaced households and the municipalities would cover the

⁴⁴ Juan Gonzalo Zapata contributed with very valuable inputs to perfect the Fund features.

remaining ten percent. Transfers could be made per displaced person and would be equal the amounts currently defined for government transfers, i.e. approximately \$815,000 per child for education and \$300,000 per person for health care.

4. Define programs to facilitate the access of displaced households to labor markets. Programs could include the following actions:
 - a. Link the SENA to urban labor training programs for displaced households that decide to remain in the receiving municipality.
 - b. Involve the private sector in providing labor solutions for displaced households. The government could create tax incentives for companies that hire displaced persons registered in the SUR System. Tax incentives would be valid for one year and would be lost when a displaced individual is fired.
 - c. Establish a labor clearing house administered by the Social Solidarity Network that matches companies whose worker profiles are similar to those of the displaced with displaced households. For example, companies dedicated flower crops in Bogotá, coffee shops, construction firms or public works programs.

Post Conflict

The end of the conflict poses a great challenge for society as policies will be required to return land and capital assets to the displaced population. It is essential to pave the way for a possible post-conflict phase, and therefore we must:

1. Include provisions and mechanisms for returning the land of the displaced population in the current negotiation process with self-defense groups and in a possible peace process with guerrilla groups.
2. Create a property return law with the following considerations:
 - a. The government must be responsible for land return in order to prevent displaced households from being involved in negotiations that are unfair due to the political power and weapons of those who appropriated the land.
 - b. Form a Land Return Committee.
 - c. Provide legal advising for the land return process. The Ombudsman (Defensoría del Pueblo) can assume this legal advisory role since it is essential to move forward with government evaluation and monitoring of its effectiveness.⁴⁵
 - d. Establish a mechanism for compensating landowners who do not wish to return to their municipality of origin.

⁴⁵ In Bosnia, free legal centers created for this purpose and financed by multilateral organizations failed due to the inability to move forward with the evaluation and monitoring processes. (Rose et al, 2000).

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APPENDIX I

Outline of Policy Recommendations

Table A.1. Displacement Prevention Policies

Policy Recommendation	Entire population in areas with high risk of displacement	Households with private ownership of land	Households without private ownership of land, but with tenure	Households without land tenure	Vulnerable groups ^a	Agriculture Workers
Increase the presence of the National Police in all municipalities of the country	X					
Strengthen the Early Alert System (SAT)	X					
Community participation policy where social processes are reinforced.	X					
Update the land registry.		X	X			
Streamline imminent risk and establish permanent communication channels with the Early Alert System.		X	X			
Involve the community in the decision to declare an imminent risk.		X	X			
Set up mobile registries in expulsion areas to register and authenticate ownership of farmland.			X			
Confirm the registration or transfer of land based on the Municipal, District or Department Committees for Comprehensive Care for the Population Displaced by Violence.		X	X			
Establish a land swap fund.		X	X			
Allocate land of equal size to lessees and settlers and permit leasing with the option to buy.		X	X			
Extend Decree 2007 of 2001 to include real property in urban areas.	X					

a. Households headed by females and with a high degree of economic dependence

Table A.2. Return Policies for Displaced Population

Policy Recommendation	Entire population displaced	Households with private ownership of land	Households without private ownership of land, but with tenure	Households without land tenure	Vulnerable groups^a	Agriculture Workers
Conduct return programs through negotiation and consensus.	X					
Disseminate information on the right to return or the right to receive compensation for the violation of land ownership rights.	X					
Return programs centered on households with access to land and dedicated in the original and receiving municipalities to agricultural work.		X	X			X
Return programs must be carried out with recently-displaced households.	X					
Restore security in municipalities and create sufficient trust in the households participating in the program.	X					
Allocate land in the municipalities of origin.		X	X			
Make distinctions in return programs according to the needs and vocations of the households.	X					
Provide agriculture training programs and technical assistance with the support of the UMATAS.		X	X			X
Establish credit programs with special conditions for displaced households.		X	X			X
Psychological and labor support for inclusion in society.	X					
Support to establish social networks and contact with the local community.	X					
Support for the initial basic survival of the family.	X					

b. Households headed by females and with a high degree of economic dependence

Table A.3. Socioeconomic Stabilization Policies

Policy Recommendation	Entire population displaced	Households with private ownership of land	Households without private ownership of land, but with tenure	Households without land tenure	Vulnerable groups^a	Agriculture Workers
Identify households with no intention of returning and begin programs as quickly as possible.				X	X	
Focus their efforts on achieving the socioeconomic stabilization of vulnerable households.				X	X	
Require joint registration in the SUR of both heads of households and their spouses.					X	
Implement the National Census in order to determine the recomposition of the population as a result of displacement, and thus adequately assign transfers.	X					
Establish a Compensation Fund for Municipalities with High Displacement Pressures.	X					
Define programs to support displaced households in accessing the labor market.	X					

c. Households headed by females and with a high degree of economic dependence

Table A.4. Policies for a Post-conflict Phase

Policy Recommendation	Entire population displaced	Households with private ownership of land	Households without private ownership of land, but with tenure	Households without land tenure	Vulnerable groups^a	Agriculture Workers
Include provisions and mechanisms for returning the land of the displaced population in the current negotiation process with self-defense groups and in a possible peace process with guerrilla groups.		X	X			
Create a property return law with the following considerations [sic]		X	X			

d. Households headed by females and with a high degree of economic dependence

APPENDIX II

Some Descriptive Statistics by Department of Origin

Table A.1. Land Tenure and Ownership Structure by Department of Origin

Department	Tenure	Ownership	Collective Ownership	Settler	Possession	Lessee
Antioquia	77.5	39.0	10.3	4.3	8.5	10.7
Atlántico	58.3	33.3	0.0	0.0	16.7	0.0
Bolívar	74.3	33.8	1.9	3.9	6.1	21.1
Boyacá	75.0	35.9	1.6	1.6	1.6	25.0
Caldas	70.8	52.3	0.7	0.0	2.8	6.3
Caquetá	79.5	56.6	2.0	2.9	6.8	7.2
Cauca	90.2	58.0	2.6	5.2	21.2	1.9
Cesar	67.9	39.0	1.4	3.8	4.9	10.4
Córdoba	74.1	46.7	2.4	2.2	2.1	6.9
Cundinamarca	70.1	47.1	3.8	1.3	2.5	13.4
Choco	89.1	44.5	31.4	1.6	5.4	4.4
Huila	89.3	51.9	8.6	3.7	6.9	12.3
Guajira	41.2	17.6	5.9	8.8	2.9	2.9
Magdalena	55.2	24.2	8.3	6.5	6.8	6.3
Meta	72.2	47.8	2.5	4.2	5.2	9.0
Nariño	81.6	58.9	8.6	2.7	2.2	5.9
Norte de San	74.9	48.3	0.9	2.8	2.8	17.1
Quindío	76.7	37.2	2.3	4.6	2.3	18.6
Risaralda	80.0	61.1	6.3	2.3	2.3	6.3
Santander	82.6	38.0	2.7	7.7	6.6	20.7
Sucre	72.6	41.7	6.5	2.1	7.7	8.3
Tolima	78.2	48.6	4.7	1.3	4.6	10.8
Valle Cauca	89.9	64.5	5.6	2.2	10.6	4.6
Arauca	79.8	46.4	2.4	3.6	7.1	10.7
Casanare	85.3	57.1	1.7	1.7	6.8	11.3
Putumayo	86.4	57.8	8.5	1.6	3.8	11.1
Guainía	55.6	33.3	0.0	22.2	0.0	0.0
Guaviare	70.1	40.2	7.3	7.3	7.3	5.5
Vaupés	88.2	47.1	0.0	11.8	11.8	11.8
Vichada	73.9	37.0	6.5	10.9	4.3	10.9

Source: Authors' calculations based on RUT

Table A.2. Characteristics of Displacement by Department of Origin

Department	Intra-departmental	Intra-municipal	Reactive	Direct
Antioquia	51.7	17.9	56.6	93.7
Atlántico	5.6	0.0	68.8	94.4
Bogotá	4.5	4.5	62.5	100.0
Bolívar	87.5	56.2	34.3	97.7
Boyacá	28.0	2.4	76.4	92.7
Caldas	81.0	4.5	74.6	87.1
Caquetá	36.7	6.7	88.0	93.8
Cauca	0.3	0.3	72.4	97.7
Cesar	68.4	40.1	65.0	98.4
Córdoba	66.7	19.4	56.3	82.0
Cundinamarca	26.0	2.3	77.0	95.8
Chocó	62.5	5.4	66.0	96.1
Huila	62.6	9.3	90.7	91.1
Guajira	0.0	0.0	68.1	94.5
Magdalena	26.2	2.3	54.7	97.5
Meta	77.1	0.8	47.5	96.6
Nariño	78.7	14.0	70.7	98.5
Norte de Santander	28.9	9.9	42.1	97.0
Quindío	44.3	15.7	82.4	100.0
Risaralda	84.0	2.1	76.9	71.6
Santander	66.6	10.3	75.0	95.3
Sucre	47.5	16.7	60.6	96.6
Tolima	59.3	19.9	82.3	93.5
Valle Cauca	89.4	85.5	43.3	98.5
Arauca	0.9	0.9	77.4	97.3
Casanare	43.3	29.1	71.1	95.1
Putumayo	1.6	1.5	55.2	97.7
Amazonas	0.0	0.0	50.0	100.0
Guainia	0.0	0.0	60.0	93.3
Guaviare	63.4	48.6	73.0	98.9
Vaupés	1.4	1.4	30.8	97.1
Vichada	0.0	0.0	45.9	98.5

Source: Authors' calculations based on RUT

Table A.3. Expulsion Triggers by Department of Origin

Department	Threat	Murder	Disappearance Torture	Armed Confrontation	Forced Recruitment
Antioquia	40.3	7.1	0.8	9.2	1.5
Atlántico	43.8	18.8	0.0	0.0	6.3
Bogotá	25.0	25.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Bolívar	18.5	8.6	1.4	7.3	0.3
Boyacá	63.9	6.9	2.8	1.4	6.9
Caldas	58.0	6.8	0.5	7.2	4.5
Caquetá	68.6	7.3	1.4	2.9	10.2
Cauca	66.7	2.1	0.0	2.1	2.6
Cesar	52.2	10.3	1.4	1.5	1.1
Córdoba	36.4	17.8	3.6	12.6	0.6
Cundinamarca	52.7	13.4	0.8	4.2	7.5
Chocó	48.6	5.0	0.4	12.9	0.6
Huila	61.2	10.9	0.4	11.2	7.8
Guajira	57.4	10.6	0.0	2.1	2.1
Magdalena	42.9	10.1	1.3	0.7	0.7
Meta	23.3	12.3	2.9	2.4	7.8
Nariño	44.9	9.0	1.4	12.6	3.8
Norte de Santander	26.4	11.7	3.4	0.9	0.6
Quindío	68.6	7.8	0.0	2.0	2.0
Risaralda	56.0	12.1	0.0	7.7	4.4
Santander	56.6	8.2	1.5	8.5	2.1
Sucre	36.6	24.0	0.9	2.4	0.5
Tolima	65.5	5.8	0.8	4.7	7.5
Valle Cauca	39.0	2.8	0.3	0.8	0.3
Arauca	58.1	8.6	2.2	2.2	7.5
Casanare	44.7	17.4	4.2	1.6	4.2
Putumayo	38.8	4.1	1.1	7.6	4.1
Amazonas	0.0	0.0	0.0	50.0	0.0
Guainia	20.0	6.7	0.0	26.7	6.7
Guaviare	51.7	4.7	1.8	8.8	6.8
Vaupés	6.2	12.3	1.5	7.7	3.1
Vichada	24.8	8.3	7.3	0.9	5.5

Source: Authors' calculations based on RUT

Table A.4. Party Involved in Expulsion by Department of Origin

Department	Guerrilla	Paramilitary	Government	Two Parties Involved
Antioquia	44.6	59.7	1.3	16.7
Atlántico	66.7	33.3	0.0	13.3
Bogotá	66.7	16.7	0.0	16.7
Bolívar	29.5	49.9	2.3	4.8
Boyacá	48.5	33.8	0.0	1.5
Caldas	61.2	45.6	0.6	16.2
Caquetá	74.2	14.2	1.2	13.2
Cauca	37.1	58.2	1.0	3.4
Cesar	22.1	38.3	1.5	1.9
Córdoba	49.1	33.6	1.0	4.6
Cundinamarca	57.7	29.9	3.8	6.4
Chocó	43.9	77.8	0.3	25.7
Huila	79.1	8.3	0.8	4.3
Guajira	45.8	25.0	6.3	2.1
Magdalena	16.9	54.9	0.7	3.1
Meta	61.9	29.4	2.1	2.3
Nariño	52.1	30.2	2.1	7.0
Norte de Santander	38.9	45.8	1.1	2.4
Quindío	64.0	10.0	2.0	0.0
Risaralda	83.1	23.0	1.1	12.0
Santander	30.2	39.7	1.2	1.8
Sucre	34.8	55.0	0.4	5.6
Tolima	62.8	26.7	0.8	13.2
Valle Cauca	25.7	67.8	0.2	4.6
Arauca	67.0	18.2	0.0	3.4
Casanare	30.4	60.9	1.7	3.5
Putumayo	48.0	45.4	2.6	14.0
Amazonas	100.0	50.0	0.0	50.0
Guainia	80.0	10.0	30.0	10.0
Guaviare	85.1	14.1	0.8	3.4
Vaupés	91.2	7.0	1.8	0.0
Vichada	53.1	39.8	2.0	1.0

Source: Authors' calculations based on RUT

Table A.5. Head of Household Unemployment Rate by Receiving Department

Department	Unemployed	Agriculture	Employed	Independent
Antioquia	44.06%	23.46%	8.98%	9.80%
Atlántico	1.32%	3.95%	7.89%	54.17%
Bogotá	10.51%	29.99%	13.47%	27.19%
Bolívar	24.07%	34.73%	15.52%	10.62%
Boyacá	40.00%	6.15%	9.23%	28.46%
Caldas	45.63%	5.47%	2.81%	9.84%
Caquetá	51.38%	2.94%	5.36%	20.76%
Cauca	100.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Cesar	25.92%	17.62%	11.25%	25.65%
Córdoba	10.95%	23.36%	15.24%	38.83%
Cundinamarca	26.47%	7.58%	4.72%	35.19%
Chocó	49.17%	8.00%	6.17%	20.39%
Huila	35.27%	6.66%	4.81%	36.00%
Magdalena	2.80%	9.35%	7.48%	40.65%
Meta	13.75%	14.08%	11.95%	8.47%
Nariño	75.74%	6.79%	2.38%	6.28%
Norte de San	50.00%	22.77%	6.70%	16.07%
Quindío	63.64%	1.91%	1.91%	5.26%
Risaralda	22.12%	10.85%	8.01%	15.47%
Santander	37.36%	5.31%	6.60%	28.18%
Sucre	43.54%	11.52%	7.72%	18.54%
Tolima	25.44%	8.66%	10.78%	30.32%
Valle Cauca	17.56%	26.40%	9.79%	31.88%
Arauca	100.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Casanare	0.81%	2.42%	34.68%	11.29%
Putumayo	73.08%	7.69%	0.00%	3.85%
Guaviare	21.68%	28.77%	9.02%	23.51%
Vaupés	0.00%	0.00%	50.00%	0.00%
Vichada	0.00%	0.00%	100.00%	0.00%

Source: Authors' calculations based on RUT

Table A.6. Unemployment Rate of Other Household Members by Receiving Department

Department	Unemployed	Agriculture	Employed	Independent
Antioquia	54.85%	7.43%	4.51%	5.56%
Atlántico	4.33%	0.34%	3.76%	22.89%
Bogotá	19.40%	18.00%	6.47%	17.72%
Bolívar	41.44%	8.62%	4.98%	4.70%
Boyacá	43.75%	0.89%	12.95%	10.27%
Caldas	41.47%	5.66%	1.80%	5.31%
Caquetá	40.19%	2.90%	3.67%	9.64%
Cauca	100.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Cesar	61.11%	4.44%	3.95%	6.36%
Córdoba	36.12%	4.82%	14.33%	10.61%
Cundinamarca	52.83%	3.34%	1.89%	14.55%
Chocó	54.44%	3.95%	3.37%	20.35%
Huila	53.64%	3.74%	3.43%	14.57%
Magdalena	21.62%	9.15%	7.90%	16.84%
Meta	26.73%	6.68%	8.99%	3.49%
Nariño	81.04%	2.18%	0.76%	2.60%
Norte de San	68.62%	5.85%	1.06%	5.59%
Quindío	72.02%	2.68%	1.22%	2.68%
Risaralda	35.11%	5.62%	4.25%	6.16%
Santander	52.19%	3.62%	2.49%	14.03%
Sucre	54.18%	5.31%	10.07%	7.57%
Tolima	38.98%	7.76%	7.67%	14.78%
Valle Cauca	29.80%	11.76%	7.76%	24.48%
Arauca	100.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Casanare	0.00%	0.00%	5.65%	2.17%
Putumayo	75.76%	3.03%	3.03%	6.06%
Guaviare	32.08%	10.43%	2.53%	19.12%
Vaupés	66.67%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Vichada	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%

Source: Authors' calculations based on RUT