



**USAID**  
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

# REVIVING AGRICULTURE IN THE AFTERMATH OF VIOLENT CONFLICT

## A REVIEW OF DONOR EXPERIENCE



This paper is available from USAID's Development Experience Clearinghouse (DEC). To order or download, go to [dec.usaid.gov](http://dec.usaid.gov) and enter the document identification number (see front cover) in the search box. The DEC may also be contacted at 8403 Colesville Rd., Ste. 210, Silver Spring, MD 20910; tel 301-562-0641; fax 301-588-7787; email [docorder@dec.usaid.gov](mailto:docorder@dec.usaid.gov).

Editorial, design, and production assistance was provided by IBI-International Business Initiatives, Arlington, VA, under contract no. HFM-C-00-01-00143-00. For more information, contact IBI's Publications and Graphics Support Project at 703-525-2224 or [pgsp@ibi-usa](mailto:pgsp@ibi-usa).

**Photo: Tomato sellers in Mozambique. USAID/Mozambique.**

# REVIVING AGRICULTURE IN THE AFTERMATH OF VIOLENT CONFLICT

## A REVIEW OF DONOR EXPERIENCE

**Grant Morrill and Robert J. Muscat**  
U.S. Agency for International Development

Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination

The findings and conclusions in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of USAID.

# Contents

Executive Summary . . . . .	v
Reviving Agriculture in the Aftermath of Violent Conflict . . . . .	1
Introduction . . . . .	1
The Impact of Violent Conflict . . . . .	2
Postconflict Recovery in the Agriculture Sector . . . . .	3
Strategic Problems and Potential Interventions . . . . .	4
Interventions at Different Levels . . . . .	7
Timing and Sequencing . . . . .	11
Design and Implementation Issues . . . . .	13
Conclusion . . . . .	14
Bibliography . . . . .	15



# Executive Summary

Donors need to learn from experiences in reviving agriculture in the aftermath of violent conflict. The effort is all the more necessary because the agriculture sector is critically important to a country's recovery, and because postconflict agriculture is substantially different than agriculture under normal circumstances. This paper contributes to this learning process by reviewing evaluative literature by the World Bank, USAID, and other donors on postconflict experiences in agriculture.

**Postconflict agriculture is substantially different than agriculture under normal circumstances.**

The strategic management of postconflict situations is a precarious balancing act. Donors thus need to consider and monitor carefully the following urgent critical issues and decision points:

- the resupply of seeds and other agricultural inputs at the farm level

- the demobilization and integration of ex-combatants
- the removal of land mines and other unexploded ordinance
- the eradication of drug-crop cultivation
- the potential for agriculture policy reform
- the depletion of agricultural know-how
- the rehabilitation of agriculture infrastructure
- the survival of rural, female-headed households
- unresolved land rights
- threats to forests and the forestry sector

Effective management of these decision points and issues may prevent future problems and allow historic opportunities for reform to be seized. Their mismanagement may lead to the dissipation of national resources or even contribute to the return of violent conflict. Donors need to examine carefully the effectiveness of their interventions—in different

arenas as well as at different levels and units of development.

The design and implementation of interventions in a postconflict situation are more complex and difficult than in normal circumstances. Moreover, the broad array of urgent needs on the ground, the demand for donors to act quickly, and problems relating to donor coordination accentuate the increased difficulty.

Coping tactics include simple, flexible designs; willingness to redesign midcourse; project monitoring that is integrated with daily operations management; and interventions that offer an overlapping array or menu of goods and services. Differing preconflict conditions and patterns of destruction and displacement will dictate differing rehabilitation requirements and sequencing.

Community organizations and social structures are often necessary precursors to the maintenance of small, local irrigation systems and farmer-to-market roads, which should be restored before investments are made in large new infrastructure. Social healing needs to take place before farmers will participate in labor exchanges and group projects.

There is also a specific window of time for stopping and starting each type of assistance in postconflict situations.

Food aid provided for too long may create dependencies and inhibit farmers from growing food. Seed may be consumed if supplied too early. And the resupply of agricultural inputs may weaken farmer self-reliance and the startup of private sector distribution if continued for too long.

The literature review reveals a broad consensus on donor-funded interventions that yield high and immediate impact when executed effectively. Prime examples are resupply of seed and agricultural implements, rehabilitation of rural infrastructures of low specification, and the reengagement of private sector activity.

The easiest and quickest results occur at the grassroots level. The effort becomes more difficult as rehabilitation is built from the ground up. The task of helping individuals settle in rural areas and return to farming is difficult, but it is more difficult to rebuild infrastructures and heal local communities. It is much more difficult to strengthen institutions

and undertake policy reforms, at least in the short term.

Strong implementing government agencies are key factors in agricultural recovery, as well as in issues such as access to credit and land reform. Though donors can support government institutions such as agriculture extension and technical outreach, positive institutional effects are frequently limited to the period of donor funding. In spite of the agriculture sector's critical importance to a country's recovery, its rehabilitation cannot replace the long-term, onerous effort of rebuilding weak central governments, which constrain full recovery and hamper sustainable development.

The old ways of doing business—those largely founded on foreign assistance during normal circumstances—may constrain donor interventions to the point of inhibiting their effectiveness. Donors more closely engaged with centralized decisionmaking and the highest levels of government need to define their direct, interventionist approaches and rethink the parameters of their efforts and the terms of their engagement during the extraordinarily difficult period of postconflict assistance.

# Reviving Agriculture in the Aftermath of Violent Conflict

## Introduction

This paper draws on a wide range of evaluative literature on donor efforts to help recover productive capacity and establish the basis for resumption of long-term agricultural growth. Its focus is lessons from immediate emergency recovery programs, especially where components of response activities precede and shape the return to productive capacity and long-term growth. However, much of the literature

bearing on the agriculture sector; country-specific evaluations and completion reports on individual agricultural projects and on redevelopment projects with agricultural components; and country studies focused on agriculture. Very few country studies examine efforts to revive the agriculture sector after violent conflict. Evaluations reviewed relied more on knowledgeable observers than on scientific data. In Rwanda, for example, evaluations lacked the kinds of information upon which assessments of impact and effectiveness are usually based (Kumar 1997, 282). The paucity of reliable data and the degradation or absence of government economic and social data make evaluation of results more difficult.

**The paper examines the most strategic issues and decision points for bringing about recovery and reviews the type and timing of interventions that promote recovery.**

focuses on immediate relief experiences, not on longer-term economic recovery problems. Two types of literature are virtually absent: sector-wide reviews of experiences and studies of the effectiveness of donor efforts to aid agricultural recovery.

The review included documents relating to postconflict rehabilitation in 16 countries. The documents were of three types: general reconstruction literature

The paper addresses the typical attributes of a postconflict situation and highlights specific agricultural development challenges. It examines the most strategic issues and decision points for bringing about recovery and reviews the type and timing of interventions that promote recovery. It concludes with lessons learned and recommendations that may help inform USAID's approach to rebuilding agriculture in postconflict situations.

## The Impact of Violent Conflict

### National Levels

Violent conflict is usually traumatic for the entire nation-state. It frequently results in economic collapse, dramatic political transformation, and the flattening of most (if not all) institutions of economic governance. When such institutions are in disarray, the task of reconstruction is akin to rebuilding the nation-state from scratch. The central bank and the banking system may have collapsed, and the currency may be worthless. The ministry of finance, other ministries and agencies, and tax administration may be inoperative and need to be reconceived. Public expenditure may have stopped or be out of control. The budget process may be broken down, and financial intermediation and services may be at a standstill.

Pension funds, social security, and other social safety net institutions, once distorted by the political system, may have been vandalized to the point of being defunct. The constitution may be suspended or have no legitimacy, and laws may not be implemented. The existing body of laws may also be inappropriate for a market-oriented democracy and need redrafting.

Productive, entrepreneurial activity and most of the formal economy may have collapsed due to severe insecurity, and foreign investment may be out of the question. Basic survival needs may be met by means of arm's-length bartering of goods and subsistence gardening.

There may also be a political and human resource vacuum. The head

of state may be gone, and few, if any, suitable candidates may be available to fill that role. The country's citizens, victimized for decades, may possess few skills, or those with skills and education may be accustomed to corrupt systems of political patronage, their livelihoods and mindsets formed by a regime that stripped the country's assets, taxed any type of economic activity, and controlled money and the military. Even opposition forces that assisted a regime's collapse may seek to operate the only system they know to benefit themselves and a small constituency. The few emigrants to Western democracies who return to the country may not be capable of running a government.

### The Agriculture Sector

Years of physical and institutional decay may have weakened the agriculture sector prior to the conflict. The impact of violent conflict on rural life and agricultural activity will vary, depending on its duration and the scale of destruction and looting, especially that affecting irrigation systems, livestock and draft animals, homes, farming tools and household enterprise equipment, production inputs, farm-to-market roads, and storage and processing facilities.

Other important consequences of conflict are institutional: the ruin of state-run, cooperative, or private-sector owned and operated marketing, storage, and processing facilities; government agricultural services, research facilities, and extension offices; and veterinary services.

Violent conflict may also degrade land, forests, and watersheds. It may also

affect cropping patterns. Farmers may resort to the cultivation of crops that yield illegal drugs, and land mines may boobytrap the rural countryside for years to come.

Even more important is the demographic impact of violent conflict and its consequences for rural life and agricultural activity. Among factors to consider are the level of death and disability, the physical and mental health of traumatized survivors, and the extent to which social capital—including traditional labor exchange, community collective action, and trust—has been destroyed. Segments of the population may have been subjected to genocide or ethnic cleansing, perhaps resulting in a disproportionate number of female-headed households. It is also crucial to consider the extent and duration of population displacement and urban migration, along with whether agricultural research has been severely affected and the ranks of educated agricultural professionals depleted, as was the case in Rwanda and Cambodia.

Conflicts affect subsistence and commercial agriculture differently. The collapse of security and the degradation of marketing systems force commercial farmers to regress to subsistence cultivation. Because commercial agriculture is more dependent on transportation infrastructure and marketing systems, it can be quickly incapacitated. After a conflict, the recovery of commercial agriculture must dovetail with the rehabilitation of other sectors. Small farmers dependent on cash income may require different emergency support than subsistence farmers.

In economies facing transition from a centrally planned to a market-oriented economy, the postconflict situation is even more complex (box 1). Thorough reorientation of agriculture and associated ministries and state agencies is required for the longer-term recovery process, and administrators may need extensive retraining. State trading companies usually need to be phased out, and state processing and warehousing may need to be privatized. In addition, state administration of commodity and input markets may need to be liberalized, privatized, or abolished. New legislation and regulatory functions may need to be drafted, legislated, implemented, and enforced, and new private sector institutions (such as trade and business associations) may need to be created.

## Postconflict Recovery and the Agriculture Sector

Most postconflict situations require a multisectoral approach to rehabilitation and recovery, including integration and coordinated decisionmaking. Key ingredients include the maintenance of peace and security throughout the country, the establishment of basic institutions of economic governance, and the emergence of political leaders capable of orienting opposing factions toward a new future.

The revival of the agriculture sector is another key factor. In most developing countries, agriculture is the most important sector of economic activity. It is often the largest, in terms of output, employment, and exports, and it is also politically important because it employs a large number of people.

### Box 1: The Kosovo Emergency Agri-Input Program, October 1999–May 2000

Kosovo's agriculture sector was suffering in October 1999 from the effects of massive population dislocation and destruction of livestock and agricultural capital. When USAID funded a program designed to normalize the second growing season after the conflict, emergency humanitarian and agriculture input assistance was flowing in and refugees were returning.

The Kosovo Emergency Agri-Input Program (KEAP) was a successful intervention. It included a needs assessment, and aimed to initiate a rapid transition from state-enterprise institutions to a market-based input supply system. KEAP undertook to elicit rapid development of private agriculture services, including a private sector-run input distribution network (IFDC 2003, 2).

The program identified over 150 input dealers and 18 importers and helped them form a trade association, elect officers, and contact outside and regional suppliers. KEAP also helped establish trade associations and gave advice to flour and feed millers, vegetable processors, and seed producers. It assessed damage, provided updates on the commercial gap between donor input supplies and demand, and disseminated rapid assessments of input requirements.

KEAP also

- initiated a pilot credit program for dealers, began demonstration plots, and set the stage for private-sector extension services
- made assessments and offered policy recommendations on trade, taxation, and regulations concerning inputs and milling
- offered other options for strengthening private processing and distribution
- initiated systems and media feeds to provide market information for dealers and input recommendations for farmers

A follow-on project extended KEAP initiatives, but further implementation of some of them was complicated by the transition to a private, market-based economy.

Postconflict, most displaced people will likely be resettled in rural areas. Many will have abandoned their land, moving into cities or crossing borders to escape from warfare. Those who find employment and develop a favorable perception of urban life may remain in cities, amplifying the problem of recovery in rural areas.

But whether or not displaced rural populations return, agricultural re-

vival is likely to figure largely in the postconflict reconstruction process and donor funding. Within this context, the agriculture sector usually figures second only to the reconstruction of capital-intensive infrastructure (such as transportation and electric power). Of 157 World Bank projects in 16 postconflict countries and West Bank/Gaza, 35 (or 22 percent) were engaged or partially engaged in agricultural recovery (Kreimer 1998, annex 2).

Postconflict efforts require structured, phased approaches to a return to normal development programming. At least three phases can be identified, though these are distinct only at conceptual levels:

1. *The immediate emergency relief phase* is concerned with basic survival needs. Efforts aim to resupply inputs at the farm level and assist the resumption of agricultural production. In addition to direct provision of food aid and livestock feed, interventions may include resupply of seeds, farm implements, fertilizers, and other essential inputs; veterinary services; and aid for harvesting, transporting, and marketing crops. Inputs are usually distributed on an urgent basis as humanitarian assistance at no cost to recipients. Another related effort addresses physical security and preventing the reoccurrence of conflict. Such interventions may aim at demobilizing ex-combatants and clearing land mines and unexploded ordinance. Eradication of the cultivation of drug crops and the settlement of land tenure disputes may also be undertaken.
2. *The rehabilitation and reconstruction phase* aims to restore preconflict conditions: getting people back to work, restarting systems, and rebuilding physical and institutional infrastructure.<sup>1</sup> Though these objectives correspond to those of normal development programs, the empha-

sis is on restoration. Depending on the level of destruction, donors may fund most of these efforts on a full-cost, direct-finance basis until the private sector and the government can become partners.

3. *The growth and development phase* targets the resumption of economic activity and growth so people can earn a better living than they could before the conflict. Programs during this phase progressively resemble normal development interventions.

Though the initial and most pressing donor concern in postconflict countries may be humanitarian relief, the main objective is to resume normal development processes. Some types of damage to the agricultural sector may persist long after crop export levels return to preconflict levels. Though seed and tool deficits may be corrected in one season, individuals and rural farm households recover at different times. Full restoration of irrigation systems and farm-level water control may take several years, and the labor deficit for female-headed farm families may last a generation. In addition, undiscovered land mines may continue to affect farming for the next 50 years. Some elements of a postconflict strategy thus may have to be continued while other elements are phased out as beneficiaries return to a normal development path.

## Strategic Problems and Potential Interventions

Some donor interventions relating to postconflict agriculture are categorically different than assistance efforts under

normal circumstances (box 2).<sup>2</sup> Other interventions may be similar, but they are handled in different ways. Strategic management of postconflict situations is frequently a dramatic balancing act, and their urgent problems call for agricultural assistance interventions at strategic decision points—points that are strategic in significantly different ways.

- Some problems—such as the demobilization of ex-combatants and land disputes—are like time bombs that threaten to return the country to violent conflict.
- Other decision points represent unprecedented opportunities for change and reform, if decisionmakers act in a timely manner to turn a weakened situation to a reform advantage.
- Some decision points are connected to preventing the dissipation or unjust appropriation of national resources during postconflict chaos and the impoverishment of a country's future.
- Other problems and decision points concern short-term actions—such as agriculture input resupply and landmine removal—that have immediate impact and high return.

The first donors to arrive in a postconflict situation need to consider carefully and monitor these strategic decision points and problems. The following are the most pressing:

<sup>1</sup> Physical infrastructure includes buildings, bridges, feeder roads, market sites, and irrigation systems. Institutional infrastructure includes agricultural extension services, schools, and healthcare.

<sup>2</sup> "Normal" refers to conditions of general peace, where violence is limited to ordinary levels of crime and banditry.

### **Resupply of production inputs and farm-level capital replacement:**

Resettled refugees and internally displaced persons often return on their own accord to their land or they settle on land newly allocated to them. But such people frequently lack production inputs, along with tools, draft animals, irrigation structures, and other capital requirements. Farmers who remained on their land during the conflict may be similarly affected, but perhaps to a lesser degree. Without assistance, returnees are likely to become discouraged and leave their farms.

*Intervention:* Donors fund food aid, agriculture inputs, tools, and draft animals. Such quick-impact projects figure largely in the humanitarian phase, but relief activities may overlap with or prefigure the redevelopment phase.

**Demobilization and integration of ex-combatants:** The demobilization of ex-combatants and their integration back into the civilian economy are an important element of most peace processes. Although rank-and-file combatants typically come from agricultural environments, they may have lost their preconflict skills. Others recruited or dragooned as children into military service may have never acquired agricultural or other peacetime skills.

*Intervention:* Donors fund training related to on- or off-farm employment, along with reinsertion programs to help ex-combatants become productive and prevent them from turning to banditry. The easiest transition may occur when ex-combatants return to farms occupied by their families.

**Removal of land mines and unexploded ordinance:** In Angola, Laos, Bosnia, and elsewhere, land mines and unexploded ordinance have rendered arable areas unusable or dangerous to cultivate. Postconflict, the death and injury toll is often heaviest for farm families. Where millions of mines have been laid and location maps are absent, removal costs are high and the task extends over many years. The task can also be complex: for example, small plastic mines laid in Cambodia floated into previously cleared fields during periods of flooding.

*Intervention:* Donors have taken on the clearing of mines and unexploded ordinance from fields, schoolyards, and roads. The choice to clear for agriculture—rather than for schools—is difficult. Mine clearance and agriculture recovery strategies need to be coordinated so as not to jeopardize resettlement and economic opportunities.

**Eradication of drug-crop cultivation:** In several countries, U.S. programs aimed at eradicating the cultivation of drug crops have met with mixed results. Eradication, not easy during times of relative security, is even more difficult in postconflict situations. Security to enforce eradication may be weak, and drug processor networks and their local political supporters may be powerful. Because farmers who cease to grow such crops experience sharp drops in income, eradication programs need to offer alternatives that yield a competitive return. However, there may be insufficient time to research and establish the credibility of such alternatives, and there may be no available marketing system for these crops.

*Intervention:* Efforts to clamp down on farmers who grow drug crops and their supporting networks may cause misery and work against the peace process. Donors should consider whether quick eradication is possible; if so, they need to consider the timing and sequencing of programs that attack this thorny problem.

**Reform of agriculture policy:** Postconflict changes in policies affecting agriculture are often recommended. Indeed, a “threshold level of proper policies” has been seen as the sine qua non for donor investments in agriculture (McClelland 1996, vii). However, postconflict governments may be technically incapable of the time-consuming tasks of formulating or installing new frameworks, and they usually lack the ability to implement state-planned policies. In addition, long conflicts may mean that preconflict frameworks have been overtaken by changes in factors of production, external markets, and agricultural technology knowledge.

*Intervention:* A devastated agriculture sector and institutional disarray may force—or at least open a window of opportunity for—a thorough reevaluation of preconflict government policies and interventions. Donors should remain alert to such opportunities, as well as constraints relating to policy reform. Though policy frameworks should be attended to early on, making investment contingent on donor-preferred policy reform is not likely to be feasible in postconflict situations with urgent humanitarian needs. But donors should at least seek to prevent the reinstatement of preconflict policies detrimental to the agriculture sector. As in Iraq,

## Box 2: USAID Investments in Agriculture under Normal Circumstances

The following areas have received most of the Agency's agriculture investments:

- *policy reform and planning*, including budget support for agricultural policy reform and analytical capacity building, to support an economic policy framework conducive to profitable farming and agricultural growth
- *agricultural technology development and diffusion*, especially technology applicable to soil, water, and climatic conditions; and support for agricultural research, agricultural education, and agricultural extension
- *rural infrastructure*, including rural electrification and irrigation, as well as rural roads to transport agricultural inputs and market agricultural outputs
- *agricultural services*, including agricultural credit, input and output marketing, and crop storage and processing
- *asset distribution*, including land reform to encourage secure tenure arrangements and investment in land and other agricultural assets, and support for local participatory institutions and decentralization

agricultural authorities may be provided with policy, administrative, and detailed functional technical assistance.

**Depletion of agricultural know-how and knowledge:** Agricultural knowledge may be lost during a conflict.

Young refugees and orphans may have little agricultural knowledge or experience in cultivation. If internally displaced persons are resettled in new areas (rather than in their original home areas), their production knowledge may be poorly suited to their new agronomic conditions.

*Intervention:* Donors fund activities to revive agricultural extension services, research, and education to enable people to make their livelihoods in agriculture.

**Rehabilitation of agriculture infrastructure:** Functioning farm-to-market feeder roads are critical for input supply flows. They accelerate production and allow merchants to restore cash-crop marketing. The restoration of physical infrastructure is the “low-lying fruit” of the recovery process.

*Intervention:* Donor assistance is key to the rebuilding of physical infrastructure, and the return on the investment is high and immediate. In Haiti, rehabilitation of irrigation schemes and rehabilitation of roads and water supply provided far more economic benefits and returns on investment than the construction of new roads (World Bank 1997b, 9). The larger the scheme, the greater the problems encountered (FAO 2002, 6). In Eritrea, the construction of feeder roads stimulated production and enabled farmers to exploit new markets, increase fertilizer usage, and reduce the cost of transporting agricultural commodities and the loss of perishable goods (World Bank 2002a, 6).

The rebuilding of small irrigation systems that can be restored quickly and easily is another priority. In Afghanistan, where half of all irrigation systems were

damaged, traditional irrigation systems with temporary intakes were easy to put into operation.

**Survival of female-headed households:** In many postconflict countries, one-third or more of working-age men have been killed (Kreimer 1998, 33). HIV/AIDS has also taken a heavy toll of males in parts of Africa. These losses pose a major challenge for agricultural recovery. The absence of males may reduce the production of farm households (Fritschel 2003, 11). In subsistence cultures, where women cultivate and men hunt and gather, male absence leads to a reduction in important dietary components.

*Intervention:* Where women lack full property rights and credit is normally extended only to adult males, new institutional and legal arrangements have to be created to make female household heads eligible for full economic rights. With additional support, female-headed farm households can become the productive base for restarting the rural economy.

**Unresolved land rights:** Security of land tenure is the key to farmer productivity. Highly concentrated land ownership, systems of access dependency, and uncertainties over land rights are likely to make small-scale farmers unwilling to invest in land improvements or any fixed structures. The problem is heightened when farmers resettled after a conflict know they may lose land because of disputed claims. The newfound peace can be threatened by unresolved land rights, especially if these were a source of dispute during the preconflict period.

*Intervention:* Donor-supported property or claims commissions (as in Cyprus and Bosnia) can be effective tools for facilitating orderly restitution. Land tenure experts should help plan agriculture recovery, and one donor should serve as the single contact for land-related projects. Absent good coordination, such projects produce suboptimal results, as in El Salvador. In Cambodia, good coordination supported a successful program for orderly management of land disputes.

**Threats to forests or the forestry sector:** Postconflict situations may threaten forests and related livelihoods. Conflict has affected the forestry sector in various ways in different countries. Sometimes, it has increased unsustainable logging and deforestation. Elsewhere, conflict has slowed logging operations because increased insecurity means that logging company concessions cannot move timber to market. On occasion, conflict opens the way to a regime that fosters sustainable forestry resource use.

*Intervention:* Donors and financial agencies need to increase monitoring and vigilance. At the very least, they should discourage countries from making commitments to authorize plywood and pulp and paper mills whose demand for feeder stocks can decimate national forestry resources. International sanction regimes could discourage unsustainable forestry. Donors can also encourage popular participation of rural communities dependent on forests, since they can play a key role in sustainable forestry and the reduction of conflict-timber incidents.

## Interventions at Different Levels

In postconflict situations, the capacity of private and public sectors to service agriculture is degraded or rendered virtually inoperable, and donors assume much a greater role than is normally feasible or desirable. Recovery requires donor interventions at many levels and arenas that function individually and as a whole: the individual, the farm, the community, and national policies and institutions. Each type of intervention affects a web of relations, and effective assistance must occur at appropriate times and in appropriate sequences.

Donor interventions are often designed to focus on one level, and may ignore problems at other levels. Conversely, interventions may try to take on all problems affecting a sector and ignore complexities. To help rural populations recover, a hierarchy of systems needs to be reinvigorated, each with its own borders, interrelated parts, and decision-making rights. Donors' interventions thus affect the following:

- individual farmers who decide to stay on the land, engage in agriculture, practice a specific cropping pattern, or cultivate a cash crop
- groups such as refugees, ex-combatants, and female-headed households, and communities who decide to work together to maintain small-scale rural infrastructure
- rural entrepreneurs who decide whether to go into businesses upstream or downstream to farm production

- government officials who set policy and operate institutions.

Donors tend to be most effective in intervening with individuals and assisting with the restoration of local agriculture infrastructure built to low specification. Working with communities to operate and maintain the infrastructure and build agricultural, business, and trade associations is more difficult. It is still more difficult for donors to know when the private sector can resume tasks and when their emergency relief assistance is beginning to displace the sector.

Donors have had the least success in building the capacity of central governments.<sup>3</sup> Strong implementing government agencies are key factors in agricultural recovery, and in issues such as access to credit and land reform. Though donors can support government institutions such as agriculture extension and technical outreach, positive donor-driven institutional effects are frequently limited to the period of donor funding.

Donors should give greater consideration to the relationship between the countryside and urban areas and focus on how the agriculture sector and the central government can work together. The countryside can provide a basic livelihood for a large number of indi-

---

<sup>3</sup> The World Bank noted: "Operations intended to strengthen public sector entities in agriculture in El Salvador and Rwanda encountered protracted problems in attempting to work with weak, inefficient, or rigid bureaucracies. This has led to the canceling or restructuring of operations, and to a search for alternative approaches to such functions as research, extension, and service and input delivery, relying more on the private sector and non-governmental organizations" (World Bank 1998, 30).

viduals, and can be used to reintegrate ex-combatants and stabilize female-headed households. At the same time, recovery and sustainable development in rural areas is frequently constrained by the absence of a strong central government.

### Individuals

The main instruments for influencing choices of rural individuals—to stay on or return to the land and engage in productive agriculture—include food aid and agriculture inputs resupply. Most of the literature consulted is devoted to these assistance interventions and associated problems.

*Food aid:* Short-term food aid, provided on an emergency basis, can facilitate the transition to rehabilitation and reconstruction. Food aid management can also make a significant contribution to postconflict agricultural recovery. Funds generated through short-term food aid sales and food-for-work programs can, in many cases, generate jobs and income and help settle people in rural areas. Food-for-work programs can also help reconstruct roads and irrigation facilities.

But food aid can have negative effects if local populations grow dependent on it. It can also discourage domestic food production by depressing local food prices and market demand. In Kosovo, the private sector was hampered by donor-sponsored distribution of free inputs and wheat flour, which undermined efforts to activate private sector distribution and milling networks and contributed to uncertainty for markets

and scarce credit for dealers (Waterman 2000, 2).

During peacetime, food aid is targeted to disadvantaged consumers, including destitute returning refugees unable to buy food in local markets (McClelland 1998). In war-affected areas, donors have learned that targeting certifiably affected families can cause social discord and be counterproductive; they thus extend input distribution to all vulnerable farmers (Kumar 1995, 27–28). Individually targeted assistance may create local conflict and contains the potential for corruption. It is also difficult to administer because of poor information about intended beneficiaries. Input supply and delivery by government entities and NGOs will not be needed after the first few years if the private sector can recover.

*Resupply of seed, tools, and other inputs:* To tide farmers over the first production cycle, emergency supply programs usually include input and tools packages. Donors consider seed resupply one of the most urgent and critical needs after a conflict, but they are frequently hard pressed to get appropriate supplies to farmers in time for the first planting season. Donors sometimes provide seed that is agronomically undifferentiated for the soil types and climatic niches within a country, and they have even provided seed that is diseased.

By the second planting season, donors usually have had enough time to tailor seed packages: they can ensure the distribution of seed appropriate for local agronomic conditions and implement or help revive local seed multiplication programs. But if food aid is not part of

the supply program or food is insufficient, farmers may consume seeds instead of planting them. Farmers may also consume seed if they are uninterested in a particular crop (Kumar 1997, 276).

Resupply programs that seek to address short-term food shortages are likely to be rushed, leading to inconsistencies and medium-term costs that erode their impact (Kumar 1997, 283). One of the lessons from Rwanda was that the primary objective of agricultural rehabilitation programs should be to ensure food security for the medium term and, ultimately, to establish the base for longer-term food security. Food aid is a better tool for short-term food security.

Supplying free inputs also risks weakening incentive and fostering recipient dependency. The risk of dependency is a function of local circumstances, the duration of the distribution program, and the size and content of the package. Still, third-year distribution of inputs is probably ill-advised. In practice, it is difficult to limit this assistance to those still vulnerable (Kumar 1996, 46–47).

Individuals who decide to stay in rural areas participate in decisions that shape their farming systems and affect their livelihoods. Though assistance relating to choice of crops is appropriate in postconflict situations, crops that are agronomically unsuitable should not be introduced. Interventions need to make sense for individual farmers as well as the farming system, whether it is subsistence farming, cash crop production, or commercial production for export or local processing. Even a heavily funded project can fail if it promotes products

and enterprises that are poorly chosen for local conditions, as a project in postconflict El Salvador demonstrated (Bobel 1995, 18). Though it is unwise to introduce even locally suitable production choices to farmers unfamiliar with them in a short-term postconflict intervention (World Bank 1998a), new cash crops were successfully introduced in Uganda and the Philippines. The substitution of higher-value for lower-value crops in these agronomic environments was a warranted development initiative, even under normal conditions.

*Seed banks:* Seed banks established preconflict have been a great benefit during postconflict situations. Reconstitution of appropriate genetic resources is much more difficult where local seed banks do not exist or have been destroyed, and no international banks contain a country's genetic resources. For example, with very few exceptions, Angola's agricultural germplasm was not conserved in international gene banks, and donors distributed "one-size-fits-all" imported seed packages (Matos 1998, 2). The initial distribution of largely inappropriate seeds varieties retarded the pace of agricultural recovery, though problems were recognized and corrected in the subsequent program (Nankam 1998, 2). Returning farmers found seed, but the systematic collection of genetic material from the country's heterogeneous agronomic areas and the creation of gene banks had to start from scratch, using NGOs, extension workers, and others as paracollectors. Plant genetic authorities recommend that duplicate gene banks be established in different

locations, including outside the country (Matos 1998, 4).

Some of the lessons learned may be useful in advance of violent conflict. When a country is at risk, measures that could be taken to make postconflict agricultural recovery easier include the estab-

**When a country is at risk, measures that could be taken to make postconflict agricultural recovery easier include the establishment of seed banks held by international agencies.**

ishment of seed banks held by international agencies. International data banks could also amass in-country records, baseline data, and information on traction animals and machinery, farm tools, processing facilities, landholding and use issues, agronomic practices, and soil classification. Such information, not available in postconflict Rwanda and Cambodia, could have provided a knowledge base for more fine-tuned needs assessments and response designs.

### **Groups and Communities**

Donors can influence decisions made by groups: refugees can decide to resettle in rural areas or remain unemployed and dependent; female-headed households can decide to stay in agriculture or abandon it; and ex-combatants and internally displaced persons can decide whether they will engage in on- or off-farm employment or resort to extralegal activities.

*Programs for ex-combatants:* Donor programs that narrowly target ex-combat-

ants can create resentment among local populations (Kreimer 1998). Though, as in Uganda, availability of land can be an important determinant of successful reinsertion and reintegration of ex-combatants, it is not a guarantee of success. In El Salvador, a substantial number of ex-combatants abandoned land pro-

vided to them under an accord-mandated program. Among reasons cited were poor land quality, insufficient supporting services and credit, and lack of aptitude and interest. Demobilized soldiers may need to be settled in structured, family-based programs. In many countries, families have moved around with their combatant members.

Donor training schemes for ex-combatants have had a mixed record.<sup>4</sup> The special needs of demobilized soldiers need to be carefully considered, along with whether they are children, come from rural areas, and have little or no education (Kreimer 1998). The sustainability of farm-based reinsertion may be enhanced if ex-combatants also receive training in skills used in off-farm employment during agriculturally slack

<sup>4</sup> In Sierra Leone, for example, the demobilized "have sunk into the rural underclass," and those in power have no interest in "reorganizing and modernizing the countryside" (Pons-Vignon and Solignac-Lecomte 2004, 27).

periods.<sup>5</sup> The Agricultural Reinsertion Program in Mindanao, Philippines, may be a useful model for settling ex-combatants on agricultural land (box 3).

*Programs for female-headed households:* Though assistance targeted to women is an important issue for many donors, little attention has been paid to female-headed households—agricultural or nonagricultural—as a separately defined group. The potential problem of supporting female-headed households may be less severe if general programs designed to assist women are large enough in scale to comprise a meaningful response to the production problems of rural female-headed households in postconflict situations.

*Programs for farming communities:* Recovery from violent conflict needs to occur at the community level. In the USAID-CAP Peace Program in Guatemala, agriculture was one component of a community reestablishment effort. Civil society degradation and distrust may inhibit farmers from returning to preconflict norms relating to labor exchanges and group projects and may impede farm output recovery (Fritschel 2003, 12). Donors should not underestimate the important role of social infrastructure in sustaining physical infrastructure improvements (ARD 1998, 8). Social infrastructure also helps to maintain local physical infrastructure, such as tertiary irrigation channels and unpaved farm-to-market roads.

### **Policies and Institutions**

The postconflict rebuilding of agriculture and food systems is political as well as technical (Fritschel 2003, 12). It often depends heavily on institutional and political rehabilitation or reform, and it includes reestablishing trust in markets and sound governance. But donors need to tailor their policy reform agendas to the administrative capabilities of weakened governments and the urgent needs of a postconflict environment.

Partial policy improvements may be easier—technically and politically—to design and install, but the challenge is to identify the most strategic reforms for enhancing the effectiveness of initial interventions. For example, Rwanda seems to have experienced commodity-specific reform success alongside structural reform failure. The postwar Rwandan government started a policy reform program that included liberalizing trade and key product markets such as coffee, but it also reestablished preconflict land policies that were in obvious need of reform. Donors had paid no attention to that fact three years after the war and genocide ((World Bank 1999a, i; Kumar 1997, 280).

*Land tenure and land reform:* The literature review does not support the presumption that power shocks incurred during violent conflict result in opportunities for land reform. Donor efforts to promote land reform as a basis for agricultural modernization have yielded a very mixed record (McClelland 1996, 35), but have been more successful in assisting property or claims commissions that facilitate restitution and the resolution of land disputes (box 4).

The review suggests that donor strategies to enhance land-use efficiency should pay attention to local land politics and approach interventions with a high degree of political understand-

### **Box 3: Agricultural Reinsertion Program, Mindanao, Philippines**

USAID and other donors supported the Agricultural Reinsertion Program in Mindanao, Philippines. Most of the ex-combatants who were to be settled on agricultural land had little or no agricultural experience. The program offered technical assistance and training in credit and marketing arrangements and many production options. It encouraged the formation of social capital in local producer and business associations and promoted investment in infrastructure and private enterprises.

An evaluation attributed the program's success to

- its responsiveness to the capital, training, and technology needs of beneficiaries
- its focus on quick-maturing crops that require simple technology and have ready markets
- its publicized insistence that beneficiaries graduate from dependency on free inputs after one or two cropping cycles

Beneficiaries made a quick transition to readiness for long-term growth: 89 percent continued the prescribed technology, and a large number ventured into other businesses and the production of more lucrative crops (Lumawag 2001, 29)

<sup>5</sup> Most of the lessons on demobilization and reinsertion have been drawn from nonagricultural programs (Kumar 1997).

ing. Though interventions should not focus only on technical aspects of land policy, such as plot registration, efforts to establish sustainable land reform programs will be constrained by the weakening or destruction of the social fabric, including the emergence or reemergence of exploitative power structures and criminal networks that force farmers to cultivate drug crops.<sup>6</sup> Land reform will also be constrained when returning refugees or internally displaced persons find that their lands have been settled by others, and when, as in Bosnia, these new settlers had been forced out by ethnic cleansing and could not return to their original homes.

*Credit programs:* The implementation of credit programs is particularly problematic in postconflict situations, and credit cooperatives also performed poorly (Kumar 1997, 28). Many types of credit programs have been tried, none very successfully (box 5 next page).

The preconditions for successful credit-granting are favorable economic conditions, and these are usually absent or weakened in the aftermath of conflict (McClelland 1996, 28). More success may accrue to credit programs that channel funds to farmers or rural enterprises later in the development phase, when economic activity has resumed and loans can be repaid.

<sup>6</sup> In postconflict Afghanistan, uncertainties over land use rights have increased because traditional access systems have broken down. As a condition for being allocated a subsistence plot, peasants are being forced by opportunistic village chiefs to cultivate poppies (Pons-Vignon and Solignac-Lecomte 2004, 29).

## Timing and Sequencing

A basic assumption of many recovery efforts is that countries can return to normal levels of agricultural production because they once operated at those levels, and that various interventions will stimulate the population to return to previous production levels and levels of efficiency in social structures. Donors thus provide the stimulus of food aid to encourage farm production. They introduce new cash crops to permit farms to survive and recover, and they restore the farmer-to-market feeder roads that are critical for input supply flows and cash-

crop marketing. Once farmers have an initial supply of agriculture inputs and return to production, the private sector responds.

But the effectiveness of the assistance and the level of responsiveness may vary. Getting infrastructure repaired and back into service is easier and less time-consuming than building community user organizations to maintain it. Rural credit programs, land reform, and a host of commodity-specific policy reforms may not get underway if an effective central government and basic

### Box 4: Donor Response to Land Disputes in Postconflict Cambodia

In postconflict Cambodia, tens of thousands of families were involved in land disputes with the military and the government, who had claimed seized land or wanted to turn it into concessions for forestry or agriculture. Frustrations reached a climax in the late 1990s, when demonstrations signaled a real threat to postwar peace.

A working group of ministerial representatives and local and international NGOs drafted a new land law. They did so in a transparent manner, with technical assistance from donors. All donors worked under a single umbrella, and key components were shared between different agencies. The Asian Development Bank took the lead on legal reform, the World Bank led institutional development and land titling, and the German development agency took the lead on land and information management (Pons-Vignon and Solignac-Lecomte 2004, 45).

The new law clarified jurisprudence on land rights and included a cadastral commission and programs to put unoccupied state land to use. Two years later, dispute commissions were just beginning in the provinces. So was the land distribution program, which is accountable to local populations and piloted by local governments. The process was deemed a success. Among other positive outcomes, disputes are less violent, tensions have lessened, and public scrutiny has reduced the ability to resort to violence. Key factors include

- framing responses in the governance realm, with a monitoring and dissemination system that ensures a system of checks and balances
- incorporating a participatory process among the working groups
- establishing an unusual degree of coordination among donors

institutions of economic governance are absent.<sup>7</sup> Field-level donor supervision is needed to compensate for limited institutional capacity (World Bank 1997c, 46), and project monitoring needs to be integrated with daily operations management. In addition, early training or retraining programs for staff in units concerned with agriculture policy, research, and services are essential.<sup>8</sup>

Where the capacities of regular government ministries remain weak, social fund projects have moved resources rapidly to meet economic recovery priorities expressed by farmers and local communities, and they have encouraged the formation of new social capital by requiring recipients to organize processes for project selection and implementation. Through such projects, donor resources can be “retailed” to small local rehabilitation projects.<sup>9</sup> Though such projects can be effective short-term recovery instruments, the risk is that their continued operation may delay the recovery of government ministries that normally run such programs.

For each intervention, donors need to carefully consider two questions:

- 7 Basic institutions of economic governance include currency, foreign exchange markets, an independent central bank, inflation policy, a rudimentary banking regulatory regime, a budget preparation process, tax administration, and basic commercial laws, including private property law.
- 8 In Mozambique, the World Bank financed rehabilitation of cashew production and rural and agricultural services, but the design was too complex, and the Ministry of Agriculture was “unprepared to lead a market-driven agricultural sector” (World Bank 1997c, 46).
- 9 One example is the Eritrea Community Development Fund, whose flexible project design and small subprojects allowed it to make necessary adjustments to respond quickly to the consequences of the war. Key factors included national ownership and the mobilizing of stakeholder participation (World Bank 2002a, 22).

First, does the intervention remedy the postconflict problem? For example, does food relief stimulate farmers to return to work? Second, does the intervention pave the way to ongoing development? If seed resupply creates new dependencies, how can this be avoided? The learning curve is steep, and what donors learn during the first two or three years of postconflict aid needs to be captured for follow-on, longer-range projects.

Differing preconflict conditions and patterns of destruction and displacement mean differing rehabilitation requirements and sequencing. But each type of assistance seems to have a specific window of time for stopping and starting for it to be effective:

- Food aid needs to be provided on an emergency basis to keep people from starving, but it may create dependen-

### Box 5: Credit Programs in Postconflict Situations

The following reasons are cited for the lack of success of credit programs during relief or reconstruction phases:

- There is insufficient time to design an effective program: Though there is always pressure to move money quickly, postconflict situations are usually unforgiving of hastily designed credit programs. For example, USAID/Uganda attempted to support a quick revival of commercial farming enterprises by injecting credit through local banks, but “actions were taken and others omitted which, while understandable for expediency’s sake, were the root cause of a variety of detrimental impacts on the smooth functioning of the project.”<sup>\*</sup> Taking the time to reassess postconflict realities might have prevented the mistakes.
- Credit is not the key constraint for agriculture enterprise: As the evaluation of the Uganda project stated: “Credit-driven solutions that fail to adequately consider related problems in marketing, infrastructure, extension services, research, the macroeconomic environment, and agricultural policy may exacerbate farmers’ problems” (Laport and Walker 1994, vii). Not only was technical assistance provided to banks insufficient, but farmers were unfamiliar with the machinery financed and received no training in its use. Almost half the animals imported under the project died, and the farmers were burdened with debt and nonproductive assets.
- There is no tradition of credit discipline or it has been destroyed. Socialist traditions contributed to Kosovars initially making little distinction between loans and grants. All donors and financial institutions faced problems of default, especially in the agriculture sector (IFDC 2003, 12). Though the tradition had existed preconflict in rural El Salvador, credit discipline disappeared, and many programs ended with “excessive rates of delinquency” (USAID/El Salvador 1998, 8–9). Inappropriate use of a credit may affect the future of the financial system. The El Salvador evaluation concluded that transfers to people made destitute by a conflict should be provided as grants to maintain the integrity of credit systems.

<sup>\*</sup> This project was designed before the civil war broke out in 1985. It was suspended during the conflict and activated postconflict, in 1986.

cies and inhibit farmers from growing food if provided for too long.

- Seed resupply needs to coincide with the planting season. If supplied too early, the seed may be consumed by hungry farmers. If seed resupply continues for too long, farmers may become dependent and their self-reliance weakened.
- Though donor-funded distribution of seed and other agricultural inputs is needed when the private sector is in disarray, incorrect timing in ending it can inhibit the startup of private-sector distribution networks as well as government-provided services. Donors need to respond to the emergency situation, then get out of the way and allow the private sector to distribute and process agriculture inputs and outputs.

Appropriate sequencing is also a critical element in the success of donor interventions. The restoration of small, local infrastructure—such as irrigation systems and farmer-to-market roads—should be effected before investments are made in large new infrastructure. And community organizations and social structures are often necessary precursors to the maintenance of this infrastructure. Social healing needs to take place before farmers will participate in labor exchanges and group projects, and social funds can be used effectively as a flexible short-term intervention.

## Design and Implementation Issues

Given the need to assess postconflict realities and pressures to move money

quickly, donors should develop sector-specific, rapid-appraisal guides that are tailored for urgent, postconflict situations.

Notwithstanding, each donor may interpret the situation on the ground differently. Donors also operate with differing criteria and interests in specific agricultural products. For example, a recovery option with substantial income potential—the coffee and tea sector—went relatively unattended in Rwanda. Well-timed and well-placed assistance toward its rehabilitation could have led to the monetization of the rural economy and had important financial and psychological effects, both at household and national levels (Kumar 1996, 48).

Donors should expect to make mistakes and change designs in such volatile environments. Pressure to move quickly can lead to hasty choices of design options and mistakes. Flexibility—in project design and in relation to beneficiaries—allows for midcourse corrections. Specific windows of time for starting and stopping each type of assistance should be considered, along with the simultaneous provision of overlapping goods and services.

Project designs should be as simple as possible, though their implementation needs to be closely supervised. Projects should take account of host-government weaknesses and inexperience with donor requirements in financial management, procurement, accounting, and auditing. Projects should not depend on numerous cooperating entities and should not be designed to require donor coordination, which is difficult to effect in postconflict situations that attract a large number of aid actors.

Donors should rethink the parameters of their involvement and the terms of their engagement in a postconflict situation. Postconflict assistance is extraordinarily difficult, and a business-as-usual approach will not likely suffice. The old ways of doing business, largely founded on foreign assistance during normal circumstances, may constrain donor interventions to the point of inhibiting their effectiveness. Donors may have to be more closely engaged with centralized decisionmaking at the highest levels of government. If so, more direct, interventionist approaches need to be defined.

Because implementation logistics are very difficult, donors may be tempted to address problems on a case-by-case basis to achieve greater logistical precision of specific inputs. The literature suggests, however, that a more workable approach offers simultaneously a flexible array of overlapping goods and services—for example, providing food aid along with input resupply may be more effective than trying to provide them separately. Conversely, some failed interventions were too tightly focused. Projects that targeted single crops may be prone to failure, and projects targeting one group over another may cause resentment. Flexibility is key: in Bosnia, for example, an emergency farm reconstruction project procured machinery that some farmers would not accept (World Bank 1998a). Conversely, a project in El Salvador that had identified the agricultural priority as basic grains was amended after it was realized that this production would not improve living standards and farmers wanted to move to higher-value crops (World Bank 2003, 29).

Other implementation problems discussed are common to standard development projects. These include poor quality of project leadership, rapid turnover in local and donor staff, host-country and donor red tape, poor road and equipment maintenance, and counterpart funds that are insufficient or slow to arrive.

## Conclusion

Agriculture in many countries can play an important, strategic role in recovery after conflict. It can allow a large number of people to make at least a subsistence living at a time when other forms or livelihoods are unavailable. It is a sector that often can also absorb the largest number of displaced persons in a postconflict situation. However, the initial and most pressing concern for humanitarian relief should not overshadow the fact that the resumption of normal development is the central, long-term objective.

Conflict generates a number of critical issues for agriculture. Some of these include demobilization of ex-combatants, removal of land mines, survival of female-headed rural households, the threat of drug-crop cultivation, and the depletion of forest assets. Many of the agricultural activities appropriate in postconflict settings are entirely

different than agricultural activities during normal times. Even activities that resemble traditional agricultural interventions need to be adapted to the postconflict situation. Furthermore, the right timing of assistance and its sequencing with other efforts can make the difference between a helpful and a harmful intervention.

Recovery requires interventions that address a complex web of problems at different levels: individuals, groups and rural communities, and national policies and institutions. To date, donors seem to be more effective in intervening with individuals and closer to the local level than in rebuilding the capacity of the central governments.

While some see a continuum between humanitarian to development assistance, each level needs to be attended to separately from an operational perspective. Success at one level does not necessarily assure success at any other level. In postconflict situations, experience shows that donors should adopt simple, flexible design formats capable of accommodating volatile environments. Finally, if donors and recovering governments can learn from their experiences, the agriculture sector can be the keystone to recovery in many postconflict situations.

# Bibliography

- ARD. 1998. *Assessment of USAID-CAP Peace Program activities in Ixcán (Quiché) and Barillas (Huehuetenango)*. Associates in Rural Development and USAID/Guatemala. <[http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PDABR135.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDABR135.pdf)>
- Bobel, Ron E. et al. 1995. *Final evaluation of the Salvadoran Foundation for Economic and Social Development (FUSADES)*. Management and Business Associates and USAID/El Salvador. <[http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PD-ABM867.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PD-ABM867.pdf)>
- Cernea, Michael M., and Christopher McDowell, eds. 2000. *Risks and reconstruction: Experiences of resettlers and refugees*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- FAO. 2002. Purpose, conclusions, and recommendations. *Proceedings of the international workshop on developing institutional agreements and capacity to assist farmers in disaster situations to restore agricultural systems and seed security activities*. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. <<http://www.fao.org/ag/agp/agps/norway/Tabcont.htm#Workshop>>
- Fritschel, Heidi. 2003. Food security when the fighting stops. *IFPRI Forum* (June): 1. <[www.ifpri.org/pubs/newsletters/ifpriforum/IF200306.htm](http://www.ifpri.org/pubs/newsletters/ifpriforum/IF200306.htm)>
- IFDC. 2003. *Kosovo Agribusiness Development Program: completion of project report, June 2000–January 2003*. International Center for Soil Fertility and Agricultural Development and USAID/Kosovo. <[http://pdf.dec.org/pdf\\_docs/PDABX950.pdf](http://pdf.dec.org/pdf_docs/PDABX950.pdf)>
- Kreimer, Aleira et al. 1998. *The World Bank's experience with postconflict reconstruction*. Report No. 18465. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. <[http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoelib.nsf/0/753e43e728a27b38525681700503796/\\$FILE/PostCon.pdf](http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoelib.nsf/0/753e43e728a27b38525681700503796/$FILE/PostCon.pdf)>
- Kumar, Krishna. 1995. *Generating broad-based growth through agribusiness promotion: Assessment of USAID experience*. Washington, D.C.: USAID. <[http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PNAAX295.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNAAX295.pdf)>
- Kumar, Krishna et al. 1996. Study 4: Rebuilding post-war Rwanda. In *The international response to conflict and genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda experience*. Copenhagen: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda. <<http://reliefweb.int/library/nordic/book4/pb024.html>>
- Kumar, Krishna, ed. 1997. *Rebuilding societies after civil war: Critical roles for international assistance*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner.
- Laport, Robert, and Patricia Walker. 1994. *Final evaluation: Rehabilitation of productive enterprises project*. Kampala: Management Systems International and USAID/Uganda.

- Longley, Catherine et al. 2001. *Supporting local seed systems in southern Somalia*. AgREN Network Paper 115. London: Overseas Development Institute. <[http://www.odi.org.uk/agren/papers/agrenpaper\\_115.pdf](http://www.odi.org.uk/agren/papers/agrenpaper_115.pdf)>
- Lumawag, Efren, Elipidio Octura, and Larry Digal. 2001. *USAID Emergency Livelihood Assistance Program (ELAP): GEM-ELAP evaluation survey report*. <[http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PNACM837.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACM837.pdf)>
- Matos, Elizabeth M. 1998. Seed and plant genetic resources restoration in disaster and conflict situations in Angola: Some experiences from over 20 years of conflict situations. In *Proceedings of the international workshop on developing institutional agreements and capacity to assist farmers in disaster situations to restore agricultural systems and seed security activities*. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. <[www.fao.org/ag/agp/agps/norway/study1.htm](http://www.fao.org/ag/agp/agps/norway/study1.htm)>
- McClelland, Donald. 1996. *Investments in agriculture: A synthesis of the evaluation literature*. Program and Operations Assessment No. 15. Washington, D.C.: USAID. <[http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PNABY219.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNABY219.pdf)>
- McClelland, Donald. 1998. *U.S. food aid and sustainable development: Forty years of experience*. Program and Operations Assessment No. 22. Washington, D.C.: USAID. <[http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PNACA913.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACA913.pdf)>
- McClelland, Donald et al. 2000. *Complex humanitarian emergencies and USAID's humanitarian response*. Program and Operations Assessment No. 27. Washington, D.C.: USAID. <[http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PNACG605.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACG605.pdf)>
- Nankam, Claude. 1998. Agricultural recovery and emergency seed restoration in the post disaster situation of Angola—A case study: World Vision International. In *Proceedings of the international workshop on developing institutional agreements and capacity to assist farmers in disaster situations to restore agricultural systems and seed security activities*. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. <<http://www.fao.org/ag/agp/agps/norway/Study2.htm#Angola2>>
- Pons-Vignon, Nicolas, and Henri-Bernard Solignac-Lecomte. 2004. *Land, violent conflict, and development*. OECD Development Centre Working Paper No. 233. Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. <<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/29/50/29740608.pdf>>
- Schelhas, B. 1998. *Farming systems approach and postconflict reconstruction*. FAO Farm Systems Management Services No. 14. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
- Thomson, Jamie, and Ramzy Kanaan. 2003. *Conflict timber: Dimensions of the problem in Asia and Africa—Volume I synthesis report*. Burlington, Vt.: Associates in Rural Development. <[http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PNACT462.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACT462.pdf)>
- USAID/El Salvador. 1998. *Project assistance completion report of the Peace and National Recovery Project, 519-0394. Final evaluation report*. San Salvador: USAID/El Salvador. <[http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PDABR021.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDABR021.pdf)>
- USAID/Peru. 2002. *Strategic objective closeout report: USAID/Peru special objective—Reduce illicit coca production in target areas in Peru*. Lima: USAID/Peru. <[http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PD-ABX048.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PD-ABX048.pdf)>
- Waterman, Dan. 2000. *Kosovo Emergency Agri-Input Program (KEAP), October 1999–May 2000: Completion of project report*. Pristina: International Fertilizer Development Center and USAID/Kosovo. PD-ABS-519.
- World Bank. 1996a. Haiti—Emergency Economic Recovery Credit. Project implementation completion report. Report no. 16166. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- World Bank. 1996b. Uganda—Forestry Rehabilitation Project. Project implementation completion report. Report no. 15382. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- World Bank. 1997a. Eritrea—Recovery and Rehabilitation Project. Project implementation completion report. Report no. 17059. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- World Bank. 1997b. Haiti—Employment Generation Project. Project implementation completion report. Report no. 17238. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

- World Bank. 1997c. Mozambique country assistance review. Operations evaluation study. Report No. 17209. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- World Bank. 1997d. Uganda—South West Region Agricultural Rehabilitation Project. Project implementation completion report. Report No. 16358. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- World Bank. 1998a. Bosnia—Emergency Farm Reconstruction Project. Project implementation completion report. Report No. 17666-BA Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- World Bank. 1998b. Ethiopia—Emergency Recovery and Reconstruction Project. Project implementation completion report. Report No. 17750. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- World Bank. 1998c. Tajikistan—Agriculture Recovery and Social Protection Credit. Project implementation completion report. Report No. 18077. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- World Bank. 1999a. Rwanda—Emergency Reintegration and Recovery Credit. Project implementation completion report. Report No. 19391. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- World Bank. 1999b. Uganda—Livestock Services Project. Project implementation completion report. Report No. 19480. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- World Bank. 2000. Uganda—Agriculture Extension Project. Project implementation completion report. Report No. 20591. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- World Bank. 2001a. Mozambique—Rural Rehabilitation Project. Project implementation completion report. Report No. 22446. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- World Bank. 2001b. Rwanda—Food Security and Social Action Project. Project implementation completion report. Report No. 22317. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- World Bank. 2001c. Uganda—Agriculture Research and Training Project. Project implementation completion report. Report No. 22045. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- World Bank. 2002a. Eritrea—Community Development Fund Project. Project implementation completion report. Report No. 22694. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- World Bank. 2002b. Uganda—Cotton Sector Development Project. Project implementation completion report. Report No. 24438. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- World Bank. 2003. El Salvador—Agricultural Sector Reform and Investment Project. Project implementation completion report. Report No. 25503. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- World Vision. 1998. *Rwanda Emergency Agriculture Program, REAP II—final report*. Kigali: World Vision Relief and Development, Inc. PD-ABQ-611.



## **U.S. Agency for International Development**

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is an independent federal agency that receives overall foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State. For more than 40 years, USAID has been the principal U.S. agency to extend assistance to countries recovering from disaster, trying to escape poverty, and engaging in democratic reforms. USAID supports long-term and equitable economic growth and advances U.S. foreign policy objectives by supporting

- economic growth, agriculture, and trade
- global health
- democracy and conflict prevention
- humanitarian assistance

The Agency's strength is its field offices located in four regions of the world:

- Sub-Saharan Africa
- Asia and the Near East
- Latin America and the Caribbean
- Europe and Eurasia

**U.S. Agency for International Development**  
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW  
Washington, D.C. 20523-1000  
Telephone: 202-712-4810  
[www.usaid.gov](http://www.usaid.gov)