



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Markets, Livelihoods and Food Aid in Darfur: A Rapid Assessment and Programming Recommendations

**Abdel Rahman Hamid, USAID
Ali Abdel Aziz Salih, FAO
Susan Bradley, USAID
Thomas Couteaudier, EC
Mahgoub Jaafar El Haj, FAO
Mohamed Osman Hussein, FAO
Philip Steffen, USAID**

**Assessment: January-February 2005
Full Report: May 2005**

*The opinions expressed in this Rapid Assessment are those of the authors alone,
not necessarily their respective organizations.*

ITINERARY MAP



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A rapid assessment of this kind depends critically on the willingness of many people to respond to our many questions. We thank many ordinary Darfuris for their information and observations – the displaced and non-displaced, the worse-off and the better-off, agro-pastoralists and pastoralists, rural and urban, men and women, wholesalers and retailers, millers and transporters, and others whose help cannot be reciprocated.

We wish to acknowledge information from state and local government officials who, with extremely limited resources, are trying to hold their communities together and maintain some sense of order, fairness and normalcy during chaos and upheaval. These include state ministers, district commissioners, mayors and other officers of the Government of Sudan (GoS). We also wish to acknowledge information from traditional leaders, particularly the *sheikhs*, who are trying to inspire their people to carry on with hope and dignity.

A number of international and Sudanese organizations who shared their perspectives and experiences deserve special mention: *Action Contre la Faim* (ACF), Action by Churches Together (ACT), CARE, CHF International, Concern, Intermediate Technology Development Group (ITDG), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Rescue Committee (IRC), the GoS Jebel Mara Rural Development Project, *Médecins sans frontières* (MSF)/Holland, MSF/Spain, MSF/Switzerland, Mercy Corps, Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), OXFAM/US, Pastoralists' Union (Al Geneina), Save the Children/US, Sudan Social Development Organization (SUDO), the Sudanese Red Crescent (SRC), TearFund, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the Office of the UN Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD), the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Union of Truck Owners (Al Geneina), and World Relief.

We want to express our appreciation to the WFP officers who accompanied and briefed us in various locations, becoming virtual team members during our stay in each location: Jane Juan Nakoboji (Kass); Izzedin Yousif (Zalingei); Sami Yacoub (South Darfur locations); Bakri Osman Abdel Majeed (Al Geneina); and Mohammed Salih Ishag (North Darfur locations). We also thank Carlos Veloso, WFP Director of Emergencies in Darfur and Arif Husain, WFP Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping (VAM) officer for their support on our behalf in Khartoum. From FAO we thank Bir Mendal and Dr. Mohamed Salah Eldin in Nyala; Jonathan Omukuba and Dr. Abdel Rahman in Al Geneina; Sarah McHattie and Abdul Rahim Hussein Norein, and Abdalla Abdelateif in El Fasher. Part of the team benefited from the insights into Darfur grain markets of Dr. Ibrahim el Dhukeri, University of Kordofan.

Lastly, we are particularly indebted to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in Sudan for organizing our trip itinerary in Darfur and to the UN World Food Program (WFP) for arranging our flight schedule and providing other dependable logistical support.

These people and groups have helped us to better understand the impact of conflict and displacement on livelihoods and markets as well as the vital role and multiple purposes of food aid during a period of otherwise low supplies and high prices. These people and groups have helped us develop realistic recommendations concerning food aid, civil security, livelihood support and market-oriented programs to improve food security. Taken collectively, their information and insights have greatly improved this *Assessment Report*.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Itinerary Map	i
Acknowledgements	ii
Table of Contents	iii
Preface	v
Executive Summary	vii
PART ONE. A CONTINUING COMPLEX EMERGENCY	1
1.1. Review of the Current Conflict	1
1.1.1. Underlying Causes of the Current Conflict	1
1.1.2. Proximate Causes of the Conflict	3
1.1.3. The Human Cost of Conflict	3
1.2. Recent Cropping Seasons	4
1.2.1. 2003/04 Agricultural Season	5
1.2.2. 2004/05 Agricultural Season	5
1.3. Consequences of Conflict and Drought	7
PART TWO. LIVELIHOODS AND COPING MECHANISMS	8
2.1. Getting By: Livelihood Options in Pre-Conflict Times	9
2.1.1. Sedentary Agro-Pastoralists	9
2.1.2. Semi-Nomadic Pastoralists and Nomadic Pastoralists	9
2.1.3. Living Together	10
2.2. Far Fewer Livelihood Options during Conflict	11
2.2.1. Sedentary Agro-pastoralists	12
2.2.2. Internally Displaced Persons	14
2.2.3. Urban Host Communities	15
2.2.4. Semi-nomadic and Nomadic Pastoralists	15
2.2.4.1. Loss of Mobility	15
2.2.4.2. Loss of Markets	16
2.3. Immediate Cross-cutting Livelihood Support Programs	18
2.3.1. Expand Livelihood Monitoring	18
2.3.2. Livelihood Asset Protection: Provide Feed, Fodder and Water	18
2.3.3. Veterinary Services: Carry Out Horse and Donkey Deworming Campaign	19
2.3.4. Veterinary Services: Carry Out Emergency Vaccination Campaign	19
PART THREE. MARKETS, FOOD AID and FOOD SECURITY	20
3.1. Rural Cereal Markets in Darfur	20
3.2. Urban Markets in Darfur	21
3.3. Impact of Conflict and Insecurity on Transportation	22
3.4. How Conflict Weakens Market Performance	23
3.4.1. Many Rural Markets are Missing	24
3.4.2. Supply Lines have become Shorter, with New Supplier Relationships	24
3.4.3. Market Demand is Down and Unpredictable	25
3.4.4. Market Turnover has Slowed Down	25
3.4.5. Cash Crops have Lost their Marketing Channels	26
3.5. A New Development in Cereals Marketing: Sales of Food Aid	28
3.6. The Role of Mills	29
3.7. New Price Relationships	30
3.8. New Terms of Trade	32

3.9.	Net Impact of Food Aid Sales	34
3.10.	Programming Recommendations to Support Markets and Food Aid	36
3.10.1.	Continue to Stabilize Availability of and Access to Cereals	37
3.10.2.	Meet Expanding Food Aid Requirements	37
3.10.3.	Expedite the Re-registration of WFP Food Aid Beneficiaries	38
3.10.4.	Coordinate Food Aid Planning and Distributions	38
3.10.5.	Resolve the Cereals Milling Issue	39
3.10.6.	Increase the Cereals Ration Size	39
3.10.7.	Monitor the Impact of Food Aid More Closely	40
3.10.8.	Revive Markets for Cash Crops	40
3.10.9.	Improve Market Performance	40
3.10.10.	Prepare Transport and other Logistical Infrastructure for the Rainy Season	41
PART FOUR. SECURITY and HUMANITARIAN ACCESS		42
4.1.	Insecurity in Camps, Markets and Host Communities	42
4.2.	Slow Security Clearance Procedures	43
4.3.	Increasingly Effective Presence of the African Union	44
4.4.	Programming Recommendations to Support Markets and Food Aid	45
4.4.1.	Identify Options to Speed Security Assessments	45
4.4.2.	Identify Options to Speed Food Distributions	46
4.4.3.	Strengthen WFP-ICRC Security Coordination and Collaboration	46
4.4.4.	Liaise Closely with the African Union to Improve General Security	46
4.4.5.	Organize Routine “Market Days of Tranquility” in Transition Zones	46
PART FIVE. PROGRAM COORDINATION and PLANNING		48
5.1.	Program Coordination	48
5.2.	Meeting the Longer-term Needs of IDPs	49
5.3.	Continue Support to Resident Livelihood Groups	50
5.4.	Programming Recommendations	50
5.4.1.	Meet the Needs of All Livelihood Groups	50
5.4.2.	Follow “Do No Harm” Principles	51
5.4.3.	Develop Contingency Plans for Longer-Term Development	52
PART SIX. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS		54
Annex 1. Itinerary		54
Annex 2. References and Readings		55
Annex 3. Programming Recommendations to Support Livelihoods		61
A3.1.	Immediate-term (1-year) Livelihood Group-Specific Support Activities	61
A3.1.1.	Agro-pastoralists	61
A3.1.2.	Internally Displaced Persons	63
A3.1.3.	Host Communities	64
A3.1.4.	Semi-nomadic and Nomadic Pastoralists	64
A3.2.	Short-term (1-3 year) Activities	64
A3.2.1.	Implement Water Harvesting Program	65
A3.2.2.	Demarcate Livestock Migration Routes	65
A3.2.3.	Establish Fire Lines to Protect Pastures and Forests	65
A3.2.4.	Design Pastoralist Livelihood Support Program	66
A3.2.5.	Making Cheese in West Darfur: A Pilot Activity	67
A3.2.6.	Plan and Implement a Donkey Transfer Program	67

PREFACE

Analysis of projected food aid inputs and UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and UN World Food Program (WFP) production and consumption statistics for Darfur points towards a 2005 cereal shortfall between approximately 130,000 and 230,000 metric tons (MT) in the three Darfur states, depending on assumptions. In normal years, people in Darfur would adopt a sequence of traditional coping mechanisms to offset a reduction in the availability of and/or access to cereals. However, prolonged insecurity and large-scale population displacement over the past two years have disrupted normal livelihood patterns, severely undermining these coping mechanisms.

Against this backdrop, representatives from the European Commission (EC), the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) participated in a joint food security assessment and program design mission January 26 - February 5, 2005, to determine whether some form of market support program would be necessary to help meet cereal shortages in Darfur during this year's "hungry season," the period from approximately June to September when food stocks from the previous harvest are exhausted. This year, the hungry season will arrive several months earlier.

Goal and Objectives of the Rapid Assessment

Such a market support program falls under the longer term goal of keeping Darfur grain markets functioning under conditions of unpredictable insecurity, limited supplies and low purchasing power. The immediate goal is to:

- avert further dislocation by the movement of people into camps, towns, and urban centers in search of food, and
- prevent destitution of groups that depend on the market due to rising commodity prices.

The joint assessment/design mission traveled to towns, villages, and primary and secondary markets in South Darfur (Ed Daien, Nyala, Edd el Fursan, and Kass), West Darfur (Zalingei, Habilah, Al Geneina) and North Darfur (El Fasher, Kutum, and Mellit) with the following objectives:

- determine how well food and livestock markets are functioning in the widespread absence of security, predictability, and mobility of people and goods;
- assess the extent to which Darfurians currently participate in food and livestock markets, as well as their expected market participation during the next 1-2 years in view of deteriorating livelihoods and narrowing options due to conflict, insecurity, and fear;
- investigate the extent to which current and projected food aid distributions are acting as a buffer to food insecurity beyond the intended beneficiary groups; and,
- determine what mechanism(s) could best increase cereal availability to meet consumer demand and decrease price inflation.

Rather than designing various for separate funding donor by donor, the Assessment Team agreed to write a joint assessment report, including recommendations, to which each donor could refer and from which more detailed proposals could be designed.

Our rapid *Assessment Report* is neither exhaustive nor comprehensive. It is confined to one aspect – markets, livelihoods and food aid – of a larger picture. The *Report* makes only occasional reference to the critical issues of health and nutrition, water and sanitation, or IDP protection. Moreover, we decided not to address resettlement and reconciliation, as these issues go beyond our goal and objectives. Despite these self-imposed limitations, we hope to add new value to the growing list of thoughtful assessments of conditions in Darfur and prospects for the next several years.

Rapid Assessment as a Method of Inquiry

Rapid assessment (or rapid appraisal) is an acknowledged method of inquiry for quickly diagnosing problems and constraints or quickly improving knowledge and understanding. Although rapid assessments are often carried out by interdisciplinary teams, they apply a common theoretical framework – such as assessment of household vulnerability to food insecurity due to the shocks of conflict and displacement. Rapid assessments use both informal interviews and secondary data, but they may lead to formal research surveys. Rapid assessments are most effective when focused on a limited topic or geographical area. Decision makers usually appreciate the practical, problem-solving orientation of rapid appraisals.

For all their positive features, rapid appraisals might lead to wrong conclusions if biased by factors such as seasonality, faulty data, prevailing economic trends, choice of itinerary, or sources of information. For example, interviewing elders and local officials is obligatory in rural areas of Darfur. To broaden our perspectives and mitigate any potential bias of views, we sought a wide diversity of opinions by splitting up into sub-teams to interview internally displaced people (IDPs), agro-pastoralists, pastoralists, traders at all levels, UN and NGO staff and other key informants in towns or in markets. We enjoyed free-ranging conversations in nearly every instance.

Means of travel is another potential source of bias of rapid assessment findings. Time and insecurity restricted our travel to visits by air. However, our low-flying aircraft offered many views of the rugged terrain bisected by seasonal *wadis*, populated and abandoned villages, and farm fields and occasional glimpses at herds. Once at destination, we traveled by vehicle, including several trips to nearby villages within the UNSECOORD security perimeter.

Lastly, to round out our field observations, we extensively reviewed other secondary sources – reports, evaluations, agreements, planning documents and price data. This *Assessment Report* has been supplemented by information available through mid-May.

This represents the full report of our Assessment, following numerous briefings to our respective headquarters in Khartoum, Brussels and Washington. This full report was preceded by an EU reporting cable (February 1) and Briefing Note (February 7), a USAID reporting cable (February 15) and an FAO Interim Report (March 10).

The Assessment Team has continued to read, discuss and think about Darfur crisis in the past several months, adding insights and value to earlier information. However, the authors alone are responsible for any errors of fact or interpretation. They welcome all comments.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This *Report* stems from a rapid assessment of markets, livelihoods and food aid in Darfur, January 26 – February 5, 2005, supplemented by post-travel discussions and review of secondary sources.

PART ONE. A Continuing Complex Emergency

According to the United Nations, Darfur is in the throes of the “world’s worst humanitarian disaster.” The systematic assault on civilian livelihoods and means of survival is unprecedented in Sudan’s history.

Many underlying and proximate causes of conflict have converged to make this a complex emergency. The underlying causes include increasing competition for limited natural resources, exacerbated by unreliable rainfall; a disempowered Native Administration linked with a land tenure system in disarray; impoverishment from past droughts; general lawlessness and armed violence; and the short reach of government services and security. The proximate causes, increasing militarization of the region and manipulation of ethnicity, are tightly intertwined.

The conflict, now into its third year, has wrought massive demographic upheavals. At the time of the Assessment, based on UN figures, one of every two pre-conflict *resident* Darfuris was considered conflict-affected. Two of every five Darfuris had been routed from their homes. Two of every three Darfuris will require food aid during peak months in 2005, as estimated by the World Food Program (WFP). Deaths from malnutrition and communicable diseases reach about 10,000 per month, according to the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator. The number of deaths from violent conflict is the most controversial, with estimates ranging between 60,000 and 400,000 since the conflict began in February 2003.

Darfur is in crisis. Many signs point in the wrong direction. Crop production has plummeted the past two years. Livestock are lost, stolen, trapped or dead. Conflict is escalating, civilians are fleeing and humanitarian conditions are deteriorating. Aside from scattered pockets of peace, rural areas are in social turmoil and economic paralysis. Darfuris from all walks of life unanimously identify conflict and insecurity as the most significant factors that seriously disrupt their livelihoods.

Looking ahead, perspectives for 2005/06 are bleak. Very few internally displaced persons (IDPs), if any, will return home for the agricultural season that starts in June-July. At best, crop production in 2005/06 might equal the deficit production in 2004/05, even if the rains are good. There is still hope of avoiding a further decrease in security, cut-off of humanitarian access and departure of implementing partners, but the future for Greater Darfur is grim.

PART TWO. Livelihoods and Coping Mechanisms

Darfur occupies a vast, sparsely populated territory in western Sudan. **Seasonal weather patterns govern livelihood options and rhythms. Agriculture and livestock, the main productive sectors, are often hit by drought,** particularly during the single rainy season between late June and late September. Sedentary agro-pastoralists grow rainfed millet, sorghum, groundnuts and sesame. Yields are relatively low, reflecting unreliable rainfall, poor soils and low-input agriculture. For agro-pastoralists, the hungry season occurs during the rainy season when labor requirements (calorie expenditures) are highest but consumption availability (calorie intake) the lowest. The main season harvest occurs during October-December.

Much of the southern two-thirds of Darfur is suitable for pastoralism. Semi-nomadic pastoralists grow crops and raise livestock. Semi-nomadic pastoralist households have regular access to rural and village markets where they can sell milk during a good rainy season.

Most of the nomadic pastoralists depend on their camel herds, and keep fewer cattle, sheep and goats. Nomadic pastoralists take their livestock on seasonal migrations, following the northward advance of the rains and returning when the rains retreat southward 2-3 months later. Permanent water sources for pastoralists and their livestock are limited to hand-dug wells, traditional water catchments (*hafirs*) and boreholes (many fallen into disrepair). Trouble arises whenever the distance between available water and available vegetation exceeds the distance animals can walk. In addition, pastoralist livestock are often vulnerable to disease, drought, and common banditry.

For both pastoralist groups, the hungry season comes in the last months of the dry season between March and June when few animals provide milk and food consumption is limited to market purchases and wild foods.

Livelihoods in Darfur are difficult and at times harsh, but not impossible. Many households are able to cope, for the most part, with *expected* seasonal stresses. Nearly all households attempt to diversify their incomes by engaging in some sort of trading and marketing; long distance labor migration and remittance of income; and gathering and consumption of wild foods and hunting.

Over time, shared vulnerabilities led to a system of mutual dependence and intricate rules between the main traditional livelihood groups. Nevertheless, this mutual dependence did not prevent frequent friction over access to seasonally scarce water and pasture in drought years.

The past complementary relationship between distinct livelihoods and seasonal demands on water, pasture, and cropland has become blurred. **From a livelihoods perspective, the conflict in Darfur hinges on converging livelihoods between sedentary agro-pastoralists and semi-nomadic pastoralists, in particular.** After the shocks of drought and increasing poverty of recent decades, only a more diversified income base offers a higher probability of meeting all needs: Agro-pastoralists are keeping more animals and pastoralists are growing more crops.

While there is increasing competition for seasonally scarce resources, there are few viable institutions and procedures to resolve disputes over access, management and control. Following deliberate provocations from all sides, the current conflict goes far beyond previous levels.

Intimidation, insecurity and conflict threaten the viability of livelihoods and ability to earn income by restricting mobility and access to markets. Conflict severely hinders the usual means for coping with adversity.

All livelihood groups have suffered economic dislocation. The sharp drop in cereal production in 2004/05 occurred as result of poor rainfall, less area planted after hundreds of thousands of agro-pastoralists had fled their homes, abandoned fields, destruction of standing crops, and plunder of newly harvested crops. Destruction of wells and theft of irrigation pumps reduced vegetable production and erased income-earning opportunities for seasonal laborers. Some agro-pastoralists pay “protection” fees in effort to keep their crops and income, but this practice is expensive and does not always work.

Many agro-pastoralists also lost their animals due to a combination of looting, poor rains, and limited mobility and distress sales. Households that lost their donkeys, a high-value asset, are at a distinct economic disadvantage.

Internally displaced households are making determined efforts to cope with their loss of livelihoods and, in some cases, loss of primary income earners, but jobs are rare. Insecurity and fear severely

limit options to relatively safe areas close to IDP camps. Women and girls risk violence and sexual assault if they venture too far from the relative safety of camps or villages.

Residents in urban areas are negatively affected by conflict in terms of disruption of markets, influx of displaced persons, and competition for jobs. Residents in urban areas are positively affected in terms of cheaper goods and services sold by displaced persons. Attracted by the promise of food aid and other support, many poor townspeople have shifted to displaced persons camps.

Lack of mobility and access to markets has greatly jeopardized pastoralist livelihoods. In some cases, pastoralists and their livestock are forced to change migratory patterns to less desirable destinations, exposing animals to insufficient water and pasture. The opposite phenomenon, little movement and concentration of animals, leads to over-use of water and pasture resources, environmental degradation and possibly contagious diseases, prompting distress sales. New trade routes have not compensated for the loss of usual income from livestock exports to Libya and Egypt. Terms of trade have generally turned against pastoralists wherever markets are disrupted or access blocked.

Access to cereals and other food staples is becoming increasingly difficult for pastoralists due to greater distances to the fewer markets that are still open, higher prices, and, in some cases, hostility from IDPs in camp markets and reluctance of resident traders to deal openly with nomads.

In this context of continuing violence, population displacement and growing food needs in the past six months, the Assessment Team recommends development-relief activities that place greater emphasis on meeting emergency humanitarian needs, and take quick, flexible advantage of opportunities in pockets of peace and stability where they appear. These recommendations thus aim to:

- Meet the emergency food and livelihood needs of vulnerable groups,
- Mitigate the secondary effects of livelihood disruption; and, whenever possible, and
- Take steps now that will lay the basis for future reconciliation.

Monitoring the status of all livelihood groups is becoming increasingly critical as the conflict and crisis continues to unfold. The Assessment Team proposes four cross-cutting programs to restore and reinforce economic livelihoods and coping capacities. The first program calls for an expanded surveillance of livelihood welfare in Darfur. The Team recommends that WFP's Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping (VAM) expand its Darfur monitoring in terms of technical topics and professional personnel.

The other three cross-cutting programs aim to protect and preserve livestock assets – keeping animals alive – through provision of emergency fodder, deworming drugs and emergency vaccinations before livestock leave on their rainy season migration.

The Assessment Team recommends a set of livelihood group-specific support activities for immediate implementation over the next twelve months, assuming adequate security and access to each target group. The Assessment Team also recommends activities that can be carried out in the next 1-3 years in zones less affected by conflict (Annex 3).

PART THREE. Markets, Food Aid and Food Security

Before the conflict, weekly rural cereal markets were considered traditional, basic and not particularly efficient. Long distances, high costs and poor road infrastructure leave Darfur's millet and sorghum markets poorly integrated with those of Central Sudan. This exposes the region to periodic cereal shortages, as Darfur is rarely self-sufficient in cereals production.

Conflict amplifies all the old marketing constraints and adds new ones – crop production shortfalls and inaccessible supply sources; cut off markets and abandoned markets; shifting

population centers, collapsing livelihoods and declining demand; capital flight; increasing petrol prices; and threats to people and property.

Since the fighting started, *commercial* traffic has plummeted while conflict and insecurity have made transport all the more expensive by raising the costs of truck rentals, fuel and “protection.” Clearly-marked *humanitarian* aid vehicles no longer enjoy immunity from attack, resulting in injured staff, looted supplies and seized vehicles.

The essential prerequisites that markets require to function properly – security of people and property, predictability of supply and demand patterns and mobility to take advantage of unexpected opportunities – **have vanished across many parts of Darfur.**

- Many rural markets no longer exist. They were either destroyed or abandoned.
- Supply chains have become shorter as a result of missing markets and the sharp decrease in cereal production in 2004/05, similar to a major drought year.
- Market demand is unpredictable but generally lower this year due to insecurity and decreased crop production that reduced rural incomes.
- Market turnover has slowed down dramatically.

Continuing insecurity and displacement have reshaped Darfur's marketing networks. New markets have sprung up in displacement camps and nearby towns to cater for the needs of IDPs and resident populations.

For internally displaced people in camps as well as households hosting IDPs outside camps, food aid serves two vital functions: nourishment, and income transfer. Many IDPs sell their food aid commodities, especially food aid sorghum, to get cash to meet other pressing needs. For many IDPs, uprooted and functionally destitute, food aid is their ticket into the money economy. **Food aid is helping to lubricate a depressed economy and keep prices lower than they would be in the absence of market sales.**

Food aid sorghum enters the market in two ways: sales by recipients and payments to millers. The limited number of mills lets millers charge exorbitant payments in kind. The Assessment Team recommends that donors, NGOs and responsible local authorities urgently resolve the cereals milling issue in an equitable and economically rational way that balances the needs of recipients and millers alike.

Meanwhile, the Assessment Team recommends that WFP increase the cereal ration from 13.5 kg to 15 kg for IDPs to partly offset the high payment in kind for milling; continue to enable IDPs and poor residents to participate in the market; and increase the availability of cereals on the market as the hungry season approaches. The Assessment Team also recommends that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) increase its rations in response to analysis carried out in its areas of operations.

Consistent, in-depth monitoring of the impact of food aid is critical to determine whether the cereals ration increase is ensuring sufficient access for the broad spectrum of conflict-affected people; to discern local price and terms of trade trends in *each* major market and IDP camp market; and check whether food aid is flowing out of Darfur because of higher prices elsewhere in Sudan.

The Assessment Team therefore recommends that WFP expand its market monitoring and analysis capability to be able to more quickly adjust its program levels and coverage. Based on expanded capacity for monitoring and analysis, WFP should be able, for example, to increase or decrease ration levels, change programming and beneficiary targets, and quickly call for supporting interventions from FAO, UNICEF, ICRC and/or non-governmental organizations.

Marketing channels for two important cash crops, groundnuts and gum arabic, have broken down as industrial buyers largely stopped buying in 2004/05. Loss of markets left many producers with unsold

supplies, low or collapsed prices and greatly reduced terms of trade. The Assessment Team recommends that state and local authorities, along with FAO, WFP and agricultural-oriented NGOs, use their good offices to put industrial buyers in contact with producer groups to develop groundnuts and gum arabic production and marketing plans for the 2005/06 season. The same organizations should consider alternative groundnut marketing schemes, such as buying groundnuts as part of a food aid ration and/or exchange of groundnuts for other basic food commodities.

Steady and increasing delivery and distribution of food aid cereals has altered the usual price relationships between locations and commodities. The most far-reaching changes are that:

- Sorghum prices are lower in Darfur than elsewhere. Since September 2004, Darfur prices have fallen even below prices in the heart of the sorghum-growing area in Central Sudan and as of April, sorghum prices in the main markets in Darfur remained the lowest in the country.
- Sorghum prices are relatively low, and lower than what they would have been under the circumstances. Millet is always more expensive than sorghum, reflecting distinct consumer tastes and preferences. Pre-conflict sorghum prices that reached 80-85 percent of millet prices, have dropped to 50 percent or less of millet prices due to substantial food aid shipments and the drop in millet production.
- Sorghum is more economical than millet in terms of cost per unit of nutrition. This makes sorghum an ideal *self-targeting* food, one that the better-off will not consume but one that the poor will consume because they cannot afford millet.

There is no short-term alternative to food aid, whose benefits outweigh the costs. On the positive side, food aid has increased cereals availability to help offset the sharp drop in Darfur's crop production in 2004/05. Food aid sorghum is less susceptible to wide variations in supply. Food aid sorghum has become a marketable commodity and income transfer, thereby giving people access to other commodities. Participation in the market gives displaced people something to do. Sorghum has also entered normal (non-IDP) marketing channels. Primary and secondary markets are acting as redistribution points for relief commodities.

On the negative side, the availability of free or low-cost sorghum – like all food aid and relief assistance generally – has fueled a sense of exclusion and resentment by those who have not received.

Accordingly, the Assessment Team recommends that WFP and local market authorities continue to facilitate the sale of donor food aid to stabilize market supplies and prices of cereals staples; protect household purchasing power; help meet consumer effective demand; and maintain market-related employment opportunities.

The estimated number of people needing food and other assistance in 2005 has risen sharply in the past four months. WFP estimates that food aid needs will peak during August-October at 3.5 million people (including 250,000 whose needs will be met by ICRC). The Assessment Team recommends that food aid and other donors pledge and deliver additional emergency food aid to both WFP and ICRC, in response to these additional urgent needs and that donors contribute financially to the non-food support operations of WFP and ICRC to meet these emergency needs.

To deal with possible redundant registrations, WFP and its cooperating partners are conducting a Darfur-wide re-registration of food aid recipients. The re-registration has run into various obstacles. The Assessment Team recommends that WFP and its cooperating partners quickly resolve these obstacles and finalize the re-registration of eligible food aid recipients as a means to confirm and/or adjust the revised estimate of greater needs; gain a clearer breakdown of those needing full rations (IDPs) and those needing half rations (non-IDPs affected by conflict); and facilitate planning and resource allocations.

In view of rising food needs, the Assessment Team recommends that WFP improve coordination and collaboration between its partners to focus on the programming horizon through the end of the year.

More specifically, the Team recommends that WFP and ICRC strengthen their coordination and collaboration to ensure broad and accurate coverage, including cross-line delivery and distribution.

Within security constraints, the Assessment Team recommends that state and local authorities, working with UN agencies and NGOs and traders, improve market performance by providing minimum essential sites and services, such as constructing simple shelters and secure warehouses for hire to protect food commodities from physical and financial loss.

WFP needs to prepare transport and other logistical infrastructure for the rainy season when roads become impassable. The Assessment Team recommends that WFP carry out the following steps before the start of the rainy season: Complete the re-registration of food aid beneficiaries; continue to expand warehouse capacity; preposition sufficient food aid stocks in West Darfur as a high priority; take maximum advantage of the Benghazi (Libya)-Al Khofra-Abéché (Chad) corridor for reaching locations in West Darfur; and bring the operating transport fleet up to full capacity.

PART FOUR. Security and Humanitarian Access

Insecurity continues to terrify civilians and hamper humanitarian access. Inter-tribal tensions exist in varying degrees in all markets visited, but all groups are able to access these markets when necessary.

Vulnerability, lack of adequate protection and persistent insecurity for IDPs in and around camps in Darfur remains a problem. Displacement camps are reasonably safe, but not completely safe because IDPs are unarmed, unlike their attackers.

The ability of WFP and other UN agencies to access, assess, and assist needy people has been constrained by understaffed UNSECOORD offices. The Assessment Team recommends that WFP identify options to address delayed security assessments and food distributions that would enable WFP to act more quickly to respond to reports of need. The Assessment Team recommends that WFP energetically implement its Plan of Action for Darfur that calls for a sizeable increase in security assessment capacity.

Meeting increased food needs will require innovative efforts and extra collaboration among all partners. The Assessment Team recommends that WFP introduce and try additional food distribution methods to manage the increasing estimated needs, including those identified in the *Plan of Action*, such as community-based targeting methods and use of WFP mobile teams to reach distant beneficiaries.

The Assessment Team recommends that as the number of people requiring food aid climbs to 3.5 million by August (served by WFP and ICRC), it is all the more critical that WFP and ICRC strengthen their security coordination and collaboration through regular consultations at the headquarters and sub-office levels to mitigate security constraints to rapid assessment, delivery of assistance and post-distribution monitoring.

The increased visible presence of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) – foot patrols, accompanied convoys and pre-emptive protection operations – has led to a markedly increased sense of security in the state capitals, other large towns and surrounding areas. The Assessment Team recommends that UNSECOORD and the humanitarian community liaise closely with AMIS and develop a constructive relationship with AMIS at a local level and at a broader policy level to establish and maintain regular working contacts; protect civilians and humanitarian staff and operations under immediate threat; and expand areas where IDP camp-based cultivation and other activities may be safely undertaken.

Peaceful resumption of market trade would help renew economic activity in transition zones.

The Team recommends that suitable NGOs, UN agencies and local AMIS contingents evaluate the opportunities for organizing periodic “Market Days of Tranquility” in designated transition zone markets where pastoralists and agro-pastoralists could buy and sell livestock, grain, seeds and consumer goods in an atmosphere without fear.

PART FIVE. Program Coordination and Planning

Coordination between humanitarian agencies requires good communications and agreement on essential tasks, programming priorities, and contingency planning. The Assessment Team encourages strategic planning and management by sector and geographic area, as well as the practical expansion of all regional coordinating groups. The Assessment Team therefore recommends that WFP be proactive in advocating joint planning with FAO, UNICEF, and ICRC to develop a strategic approach to needs assessment and the delivery of assistance to all livelihood groups.

All aid providers, not just WFP, need to ensure that the impact of their aid and their implicit messages do not feed tensions and prolong the conflict. The Assessment Team recommends that aid agencies and state and locality governments use “Do no harm” principles so that the impact of aid and its implicit ethical messages reduce tensions; discourage Darfuris from engaging in conflict; expand the scope for social and economic interdependence among Darfuris; and find peaceful means for resolving disputes. Aid agencies also need to be alert to changes in the context of conflict that would require flexibility and changes in aid programming.

WFP and other organizations must carefully weigh the practice of "needs-based assessments" against the principle of "do no harm." WFP should hold itself accountable for the repercussions of distributions that are considered inequitable. The Team recommends that WFP's monitoring, assessment, analysis, and planning consider the causes and driving factors of the current conflict.

Without an effective cease fire and minimum security in the countryside to encourage displaced people to return home voluntarily, **aid agencies, NGOs and local governments will need to adjust their programs and policies from short-term emergency relief to longer-term development.** As a first step, the Assessment Team recommends that aid agencies and local governments develop contingency plans for the provision of multi-year development-relief services in Darfur, security permitting, for displaced people as well as residents.

Given the sensitivity of planning for a longer timeframe, the Assessment Team recommends that aid agencies develop and coordinate contingency plans discreetly, to avoid causing distress to those weary of conflict and comfort to those who profit from conflict.

PART SIX. Concluding Observations

All groups in Darfur need to look forward to the day when they can start the long process of social healing as well as a broad consultative process to determine the future direction of the region – moving from poverty, exclusion and conflict to equitable growth, inclusion and hope.

Until then, widespread insecurity continues to be the overriding obstacle to better food security, livelihood options, and market linkages. Only restoration of peace and security in conflict-affected areas will allow people to engage in their normal seasonal activities.

Fortunately for Darfur, all livelihood groups have capacities for peace. All recognize the need to negotiate. Any willingness to reconcile, however, will likely wane the longer current conditions and underlying issues persist without resolution.

PART ONE. A CONTINUING COMPLEX EMERGENCY

The Darfur conflict is inordinately complex. Its causes are numerous, not always linked. Its consequences are multiple and profound. In contrast with the scope of the crisis, only a few researchers and institutions have tried to analyze its genesis. Based on field interviews and available literature, Part One sketches the fundamental features of the region that shed light on some of the conflict's roots and consequences.

1.1. Review of the Current Conflict

According to the United Nations, Darfur is in the throes of the "world's worst humanitarian disaster." The systematic assault on civilian livelihoods and means of survival is unprecedented in Sudan's history. Many underlying and proximate causes of the conflict have converged to make this a complex emergency.

1.1.1. Underlying Causes of the Current Conflict

The current conflict in Darfur does not result from sudden shocks. Instead, it stems from the accumulation of long-held grievances about the lack of development and participation in resource management and governance decisions, aggravated by the erosion of powers of traditional rulers, outside interference in regional affairs and increasing tensions between livelihood groups over competing demands for natural resources due to periodic droughts.

Unreliable rainfall, limited natural resources. Darfur stretches from savannah grasslands in the south to desert in the arid north. Its natural resource base is characterized by generally poor soils and low and erratic rainfall. Precipitation may reach several hundred millimeters per year in the very south, but tapers off moving north where ecological conditions are increasingly harsh. Four of the last 10 years were considered drought years, lowering the water table. According to long-term trends, rainfall has decreased over the past 80 years.¹ Except for land near the *wadis* that permits intensive cultivation, the environment is best suited for extensive farming and herding. Agro-pastoralists and pastoralists, the main livelihood groups, have had to face the cumulative consequences of desertification, lower crop productivity and modified livestock migration movements to access diminishing water and pasture sources.

Increasing population and livestock pressures and competition for limited natural resources. Population data for Darfur are not always reliable, but figures show an unmistakable upward trend, from 1.3 million around Independence in 1956 to 3.1 million in 1983, 4.62 million in 1993 and to 6.556 million in mid-2004, or 5.506 million when adjusted for absent economic migrants² – a fourfold increase in 50 years. The number of livestock also increased with the population to about 26 million head before the conflict. People and livestock are unevenly distributed, most living in the more productive, higher rainfall southern areas (South Darfur having about 22 persons/km² in contrast to North Darfur with only 5 persons/km²). The increase in demand for finite land and water resources, in conjunction with volatile rainfall patterns, puts increasing pressures on land carrying capacities and a fragile ecology. Sporadic friction leads to violence over competing demands for scarce resources, especially during years of low rainfall and scarce pastureland.

¹ Source: Save the Children/UK rainfall data for Nyala and El Fasher, 1921-2004.

² UNFPA/CBS figures, as cited in WFP (1994), pp. 23-24. This figure is before adjusting for conflict-related deaths and refugees in Chad.

Land tenure system in disarray.³ Historically, the dominant tribe held the power to allocate land as well as collect land taxes in its homeland. The traditional land tenure system, *hakura*, recognizes user rights to the specific land for crops and livestock. These rights can extend indefinitely, provided the user demonstrates active use of the land or makes improvements on it, such as planting fruit trees or building water catchments. Newcomers were always granted use rights according to the customs and traditions of the dominant tribe.

Ambiguity over land use rights became another source of conflict. First, some larger tribes had the authority to allocate land, but other smaller ones did not, including northern camel-herding tribes, leading to long-held grievances. Second, immigrants had no land-allocating rights, even where they were locally dominant. Third, the Government created a new rank for immigrant tribes giving them the right to participate in the selection of the next traditional potentate of the homeland, a direct threat to the dominant tribe.

Native Administration dismantled and disenfranchised.⁴ Use of the Native Administration (NA), indirect rule through tribal authorities, ensured that the *hakura* system worked effectively because land disputes could be adjudicated and enforced according to local customs and traditions. However, the Native Administration was deprived of its judicial and political prerogatives in the past half century. Post-independence governments weakened the *hakura* system by asserting state ownership

Box 1.1. Complex Emergency defined

A humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing UN country programme.

UN Interagency Standing Committee, 1994/95

over all land and by abolishing the rank in the NA that held tribal jurisdiction over the *hakura*. This rank was restored in 1986, but its land-allocation authority was left unclear. Over time, the Native Administration has lost respect as an effective local institution for land disputes and inter-tribe reconciliation. Meanwhile, the system it has replaced does not reflect Darfur's distinctive history and customs.

Impoverishment from past droughts.

Environmental warnings have been visible for the past two decades. Among them, the drought and famine in 1983-85 that killed and displaced

thousands of Darfurians can be seen as a turning point. Although agro-pastoralists were the most affected, previously prosperous pastoralists and nomads lost many animals. Without viable livelihoods, many households did not recover. A sizable number of pastoralists had to settle down as agro-pastoralists, cultivating crops while keeping animals, and a good number of agro-pastoralists had to move into the towns, looking for paid work. According to many observers, it wasn't until the mid-1980s that Darfurians really became conscious of the fragility of their socio-economic system in relation to their limited resource base.

General lawlessness, armed violence and insecurity. Violence is not new to Darfur. The region has been home to periodic fierce conflicts between rival tribes throughout the centuries. Effective law and order has eluded rural Darfur in recent decades. The police are under-funded and under-equipped to deal effectively with pervasive banditry and frequent clashes between tribes. This authority vacuum has allowed all tribal groups to arm themselves. Escalating militarization of tribal groups has left Darfur awash in light arms. Such conditions are conducive for unchecked land grabs and livestock thefts.

Short Reach of Government, Few Services. Darfur suffers from a history of underdevelopment and administrative neglect stemming from a chronic budget deficit. New oil revenues from the central government have not reached the regional governments. Civil servants suffer from low pay and tough

³ This section is based on de Waal (2005b).

⁴ This section is based on de Waal (2005b).

working conditions. A veneer of government offices and services is available in the state capitals and main towns. Elsewhere, government services and infrastructure – schools, clinics and water points – are notably lacking or of poor quality. Government has been eclipsed by aid agencies and NGOs as a provider of services. For many in the countryside, neither the Government nor Government services feature in their daily lives. Yet, people there clamor for the likes of wells, roads and veterinary services – and protection from insecurity. Significantly, this absence of government services and development has affected all Darfuri communities without discrimination.

1.1.2. Proximate Causes of the Conflict

At the risk of simplification, the proximate causes of the current conflict were increasing militarization of the region and manipulation of ethnicity. These causes are tightly intertwined.

Increasing militarization of the region started from the 1980s when the GoS allowed use of Darfur as a base by Chadian rebels, followed by a steady inflow of Chadian Arabs thought to now number 400,000⁵ and a period of militant Arab nationalism that started the polarization of Darfur into ‘Arab’ and ‘African’ tribes. In return for political allegiance, some tribal leaders were given increased military power and support. Violent tribal clashes were momentarily halted by the 1991 tribal conference on Darfur organized by the Government. A decade later, the Darfur rebel movements, the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) launched the current phase of the conflict.

Many nomadic groups also consider themselves political outsiders and victims of a system in which they had no voice. While not all of these nomadic groups joined in the conflict, others were the most susceptible to joining the counter-insurgency (*janjaweit*). Confronted by increasingly bold attacks from the SLA/M and JEM, the Government mobilized and armed its nomadic allies to fight back, alongside the paramilitary GoS Popular Defense Force (PDF).

1.1.3. The Human Cost of Conflict

The conflict, now into its third year, has wrought massive demographic upheavals. Based on UN figures at the time of the Assessment and taking the adjusted *resident* population of Darfur of 5.51 million (mid-2004) as a reference, 2.61 million were considered conflict-affected (nearly one of every two pre-conflict resident Darfuris).⁶ About 1.85 million Darfuris had been displaced from their homes and 213,000 were refugees in eastern Chad (nearly two of five Darfuris). More recently in April, the World Food Program (WFP) estimated that 3.5 million Darfuris (about two of every three) would require food aid during the peak months of August-October 2005.⁷

Children are especially vulnerable. The harmful effects of displacement, breakdown of families and increasing poverty, have left many orphans without protection from families or their communities and dependent entirely on strangers for their survival.

Physical injury and psychological trauma take a serious toll, especially women and girls who face extreme sexual violence – beatings, rapes and other sexual assaults. In some cases unmarried victims of rape, visibly pregnant, have been imprisoned for adultery while their known perpetrators go unpunished.⁸ Many cases go unreported because of the social stigma that even unwilling victims feel.

⁵ Cited in de Waal (2005b), p. 3.

⁶ These and other UN figures are cited in USAID. *DARFUR – Humanitarian Emergency. Fact Sheet #21, FY 2005*, February 18, 2005.

⁷ World Food Program. *WFP Sudan. Plan of Action: Darfur*. April 10, 2005.

⁸ Médecins sans frontières. *The Crushing Burden of Rape: Sexual Violence in Darfur*. MSF. March 8, 2005. <http://www.artsenzongergrenzen.nl/usermedia/files/Report%20Sexual%20Violence%20march%202005.pdf>


Deaths in Darfur from communicable diseases and malnutrition have stabilized, thanks to an increasingly effective donor response providing food, clean water and medical-nutritional attention. Even at reduced mortality rates, deaths reach about 10,000 per month, according to the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, or 180,000 in the 18 months ending in February 2005.⁹

The number of deaths from violent conflict is the most controversial. At the upper end of the range, the Coalition for International Justice estimates that 396,600 people died between February 2003 and April 2005, of which 142,900 were from violent deaths.¹⁰ At the lower end, the U.S. State Department estimates that between 63,000 and 146,000 deaths can be attributed to a combination of violence, disease and malnutrition during the same period.¹¹

With a continuing military stalemate on the ground, most observers believe that only a negotiated settlement can put a halt to the violence in this war-torn region.

1.2. Recent Cropping Seasons

Against this backdrop of violent conflict and displacement, this next section looks at the last two main season cereals harvests. Even under good climatic conditions, cereal production is limited in Darfur. Only South Darfur might be a cereal surplus producer. Millet is the most widely produced and the



most preferred cereal in Darfur (Figure 1.1). Sorghum, almost non-existent in North Darfur because of its higher rainfall requirements, represents significant areas in South Darfur (normally about half of the millet area) and West Darfur (almost equal to millet in cultivated area).

Due to poor soils, unreliable rainfall and low yields, farmers have to cultivate larger fields than those in other parts of Sudan. Fields are also scattered and far apart, taking advantage of better soil and moisture conditions where they can be found. This explains why conflict and insecurity that prevented farmers from reaching distant fields reduced crop production so drastically.

⁹ Reuters. *10,000 dying each month in Darfur, U.N. says.* March 15, 2005.

¹⁰ http://www.cij.org/pdf/CIJ_Mortality_table_21_April_05.pdf

¹¹ www.state.gov/inr/rls/fs/2005/45105.htm

Darfur makes a minor contribution to national cereal production. The land tenure system (section 1.1) does not provide incentives of investments for better utilization of land resources. Long distances and poor road infrastructure leave Darfur's millet and sorghum markets poorly integrated with Central Sudan. This exposes the region to periodic cereal shortages, as Greater Darfur is rarely self-sufficient in cereals production. Of the three states, North Darfur is least sufficient in cereals.

1.2.1. 2003/04 Agricultural Season¹²

At the national level, Sudan harvested a bumper crop of 6.3 million MT of sorghum, millet and wheat in 2003/04 (63.2 percent greater than the 2002/03 harvest and 47 percent more than the previous 5-year average). Darfur produced about 11 percent of the harvest. Given its poor road and rail links with the rest of the country (section 3.2), Darfur did not benefit that greatly from the national crop except, as it turned out, as a source of food aid for purchase by WFP and other agencies.

Even though planted areas in June-July 2003 were not very affected by the spreading conflict already underway, harvested areas were greatly reduced compared to the 5-year average. The 5-year ratio of harvested area/planted area varies between 50 percent and 80 percent in Greater Darfur whereas the 2003 ratio amounted to only 40 percent. With yields marginally lower than those of previous years, sorghum production was estimated at 260,000 MT, about 60-70 percent of the previous five-year average. In addition, large scale looting of harvested cereals occurred all over Darfur, particularly West and North Darfur, and agro-pastoralist populations fled to cities, towns and IDP camps with very little food reserves.

Perhaps the only bright spot was that Darfur produced its highest millet crop in recent years, about 423,000 MT, or 54 percent of the national millet harvest of 784,000 MT. The remainder of this big crop was still found in Darfur markets more than 15 months after the harvest.

1.2.2. 2004/05 Agricultural Season¹³

The 2004/05 season was much more affected by the shortage of household labor for planting and cultivating than the 2003/04 season. Since many agro-pastoralist communities had already evacuated their homes for IDP camps, planted areas amounted to only 30-40 percent of the previous 5-year average. In turn, harvested areas were less than half of the planted areas. Due to patchy and below-normal rainfall as well as insecurity that prevented farming operations, sorghum yields were estimated to be 36 percent lower than the 5-year average.¹⁴ According to the 2004/05 Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission (CFSAM), sorghum production dropped to 102,000 MT, only 35 percent of the 5-year average.

Millet yields actually improved some 7 percent in 2004/05 above the 5-year average, although due to the drop in area planted, millet production fell to 194,000 MT, only 54 percent of average. Given the prominence of Darfur in millet production, national millet production fell about 65 percent to 271,000 MT. Once again, these figures do not take into account looting that occurred after the harvest, though looting was not as widespread in 2004/05 as in 2003/04 because so many agro-pastoralists had already abandoned the countryside and there was less to loot.

Overall cereal production of 297,000 MT in Darfur in 2004/05 corresponds to only three months of the Region's usual consumption requirements, leaving a major gap in all states (shown in Figure 1.2).

A few cautions are in order. The area, yield and production estimates cited above are taken from the 2004/05 CFSAM, of which the duration and scope were limited. The visit to Darfur was restricted to

¹² Data from FAO/WFP *Crop and Food Supply Assessment [Mission]* for 2003/04, Table 2. February 13, 2004.


¹³ Data from FAO/WFP *Crop and Food Supply Assessment [Mission]* for 2004/05, Table 2. January 2005.

¹⁴ Another factor, of less importance given widespread insecurity, has been the effective withdrawal of agricultural extension and rural financial services from Darfur in the past two years.

UN Office of Security Coordination (UNSECOORD) “go” areas and, disregarding the prescribed practice, no field visits were made. Data collection consisted mainly of interviews with key informants in towns and IDP camps.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the main organization working with remote rural resident populations, carried out its own assessment of the 2004/05 harvest.¹⁵ The ICRC evaluation presents estimates even lower than those of the CFSAM. Indeed, ICRC believes that 2004/05 cereal production did not exceed 25 percent of the Darfur 5-year year average of 655,200 MT, or about 164,000 MT.

Figure 1.2. Gap between Gross Cereal Production and Consumption Requirements in Darfur: 2000/01 – 2004/05 (Thousands of Metric Tons)



Sources: FAO/WFP CFSAM Reports for gross production estimates; Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) Year Book 2002 for 2002 and UNFPA and CBS Population Data Sheet for Sudan for 2000 and 2001 (http://www.unsudanig.org/STARBASE/statistics/Statistical-reports/North/Population/Population_2000-02.pdf). Note: Consumption requirements for 2002 are straight-lined for the remaining years for illustrative purposes.

Taking North Darfur as indicative of other areas, the “agriculture gap,” defined as the deviation of cereal production in 2004/05 from ‘normal’ production, was 75 percent in Sereif Umra, 77 percent in Kutum, 85 percent in El Fasher, 92 percent in Kebkabiya; and 89 percent in Korma (FAO/North Darfur). These district averages mask local variations: some locations experienced total crop failure, while others did tolerably well as lower production was offset by lower demand due to displacement.

Agricultural perspectives for 2005/06 are bleak. With three, perhaps four, months of cereal reserves and overly stretched coping mechanisms, more agro-pastoralist populations are starting to move to towns and urban centers. Seeds are very

expensive, given production shortfalls of the past two seasons. Cultivation opportunities around IDP camps are limited for lack of land, water and know-how; (these garden plots have already created tensions between IDPs and residents). Unless the security situation gets better by May, which is unlikely, very few IDPs will return home to get ready for the new agricultural season. This leaves only a fraction of the pre-conflict resident agro-pastoralists in the villages to cultivate. Even if weather conditions are acceptable, production in 2005/06 will at best equal the deficit production in 2004/05.

¹⁵ International Committee of the Red Cross. “Economic security assessment in Darfur. Recommendations for 2005.” (Khartoum: ECOSEC-ICRC), 15 January 2005.

1.3. Consequences of Conflict and Insecurity

A few words in closing Part One can help convey how profoundly this conflict has torn the fabric of Darfur.

It is striking, as the Team encountered Darfuris from all walks of life, that each one identified conflict and subsequent insecurity as the most significant and often only factor that had seriously disrupted or threatened to disrupt their livelihoods. The impact of drought, an inherent feature in Darfur, was rarely mentioned, much less long-term desertification.

Many displaced Darfuris say that in the current crisis, “the dignity of the Government is lost” because it is failing in its fundamental obligation to ensure peace and security. Agro-pastoralist groups, the primary victims of the conflict, no longer trust the Government as a good faith mediator.

The Government is in a quandary – it needs to meet its sovereign responsibility to protect the lives and livelihoods of its citizens, on one hand, from the very forces that it has armed and militarily supported, on the other hand.

Box 1.2. Conclusion of the Independent Commission of Inquiry on Darfur

Earlier this year the UN Independent Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (ICID) noted that the range of *widespread and systematic* atrocities committed in Darfur includes *indiscriminate attacks, including killing of civilians, torture, enforced disappearances, destruction of villages, rape and other forms of sexual violence, pillaging and forced displacement*. Moreover, *[t]he extensive destruction and displacement have resulted in a loss of livelihood and means of survival for countless women, men and children*.¹

The ICID concluded that the Government of Sudan and Government-sponsored militias known as the *janjaweit* did not pursue a policy of genocide in the Darfur region. However, the ICID determined these atrocities were *serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law* that very likely amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur, given the widespread and systematic pattern of violations.

The ICID has forwarded a list of suspected criminals for prosecution by the International Criminal Court. The Government of Sudan, vowing not to hand over its nationals to a foreign court, has arrested suspects from the military, police and security forces for trial in Sudan.

¹ http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf


Darfur is in crisis. A crisis is a grave situation or a turning point when the situation must either end soon or rapidly worsen. Many signs point in the wrong direction. Crop production has plummeted. Livestock are lost, stolen, trapped or dead. Conflict is escalating, civilians are fleeing and the humanitarian situation is deteriorating. Aside from scattered pockets of peace, rural areas are in social turmoil and economic paralysis. Although there is still hope to avoid a further decrease in security, cut-off of humanitarian access and departure of implementing partners, the future for Darfur is grim.

This Assessment is not the place to chronicle the sequence of events in this complex emergency or apportion blame for the atrocities committed against civilians in Darfur. This has been done amply by the ICID (Box 1.2) and others. This Assessment, rather, will analyze the consequences of the Darfur complex emergency, as well as recommend programming options to support livelihoods, market performance and food aid and food security during conflict.

PART TWO. LIVELIHOODS and COPING MECHANISMS

Darfur occupies a vast, sparsely populated territory in western Sudan. Agriculture and livestock, the main productive sectors, are vulnerable to volatile and extreme weather patterns, especially drought. The ecosystem, stretching from savannah grassland in the south to barren desert in the north, is fragile. Poverty and chronic food insecurity are endemic.¹ Darfur has a below-average life expectancy and the lowest literacy rate in Northern Sudan.² Government services are thinly stretched due to a scarcity of trained personnel, a persistently deficit tax base and a history of administrative neglect. Insufficient government investments and market-facilitating services hold back sustainable growth. Physical infrastructure is often deteriorating or unreliable due to inadequate maintenance. In contrast to hopeful new prospects for stability and reconstruction in Southern Sudan, the conflict in Darfur has struck a severe blow to broad-based economic growth and development from which the region will take a long time to recover.

Figure 2.1. Generalized Seasonal Calendar



Source: Assessment Team, after De Waal (2005a) and ICRC (2005)

Seasonal weather patterns govern livelihood options and rhythms in Darfur, particularly the single rainy season between late June and late September (Figure 2.1). Rainfall levels decrease going from the semi-arid south (around 500 mm) to the arid north (where viable crop cultivation ceases below 150-200 mm). Rainfall distribution – frequency, intensity, duration, timing and location – can fluctuate wildly. Seasonal rains cause flash floods that surge through *wadis* before percolating into the ground or evaporating into the atmosphere. Mango, citrus and guava trees and date palms mainly grow along side *wadi* beds. These *wadis*, some reaching several hundred meters across, are at once an obstacle to markets and migrations as well as a source of relatively more productive soil and pasture – and hence an object of competition. There are no permanent streams or rivers. The Jebel Mara Mountains straddling all three Darfur states are the most prominent physical feature.

¹ http://www.almishkat.org/engdoc98/poverty_eradication_in_the_sudan/poverty_in_sudan04.htm. According to analysis using 1993 census data, Darfur had “universal rural poverty” and the highest incidence of income-poverty in Northern Sudan.

² Darfur’s life expectancy is 42 years, compared with 57 for Sudan. <http://www.kidsforkids.org.uk/sudan.html> and http://niaid.rti.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.country_view&country_id=35. Darfur’s adult literacy rate was 37.5 percent, the lowest in 1999 (20.1 percent for female adults, also the lowest), compared with a national average of 57.2 percent. http://www2.unesco.org/wef/countryreports/sudan/rapport_2_1.html

2.1. Getting By: Livelihood Options in Pre-Conflict Times

2.1.1. Sedentary Agro-Pastoralists

Sedentary agro-pastoralists practice rainfed agriculture, the dominant agricultural system, as do more and more semi-nomadic pastoralists (rare nomadic pastoralists may try *opportunistic* agriculture). Sorghum and sesame are planted on the heavier soils near the *wadi* courses and other bottomlands. Pearl millet and groundnuts, which cannot tolerate excess moisture, are cultivated on the higher, sandy (*goz*) soils. Sesame and groundnuts double as cash crops, although agro-pastoralists also sell their surplus sorghum to buy millet.

The harvest of the main staples occurs during October-December. Yields are relatively low, reflecting unreliable rainfall and poor soils as well as traditional labor-intensive, low-input, low-output technology using few purchased inputs. Even though yields reach about 650 kg/ha for sorghum, but only 300 kg/ha or less for millet (CFSAM, 2004/05), agro-pastoralists plant several times more land in millet than sorghum. As a result, Darfur normally produces considerably more millet than sorghum (Figure 1.1).

Winter season vegetables are continuously planted and harvested between November and March, occasionally using small-scale pump irrigation. These horticultural crops represent a significant source of seasonal income for those who can deliver their produce to the bigger market towns. Winter season crops also offer employment opportunities for women and those without land.

Agro-pastoralists keep goats and sheep to meet household milk needs. These small ruminants also function as financial assets to be sold to meet household money needs. For agro-pastoralists, the hungry season occurs during the rainy season when labor requirements (calorie expenditures) are highest but consumption availability (calorie intake) the lowest.

2.1.2. Semi-Nomadic Pastoralists and Nomadic Pastoralists

Much of the southern two-thirds of Darfur is especially suitable for extensive pastoralism. Pastoralist livelihoods are complex, but the common and major core of pastoralist livelihoods revolves around dependence on livestock. Semi-nomadic pastoralists and nomadic pastoralists migrate with their livestock, following the northward advance of the rains and returning when the rains retreat southward 2-3 months later. Cattle and sheep circulate shorter distances within the southern higher rainfall zones. Nomadic pastoralists take their hardier camels on longer-term migrations into lower rainfall zones.

Semi-nomadic pastoralists own more small ruminants than agro-pastoralists, as well as occasional cattle or camels. Their animals constitute a measure of wealth and an asset for trade. Semi-nomadic pastoralist households have regular access to nearby rural and village markets where they can sell milk and ghee during a good rainy season.

Most of the nomadic pastoralists depend on their camel herds, and keep fewer cattle, sheep and goats. They live farther from the villages but often come on market days to sell charcoal and firewood. For both pastoralist groups, the hungry season occurs in the last months of the dry season when few animals provide milk and consumption is limited to market purchases of grain and gathering of wild foods, particularly *mukheit*, a wild, toxic berry that must be soaked several days before it can be safely eaten.

Permanent water sources for pastoralists and their livestock are limited to hand-dug wells, traditional water catchments (*hafirs*) and boreholes (although many boreholes had fallen into disuse and disrepair before the current conflict). In the dry season sheep and goats, which require watering every three to four days, stay close to watering points and while camels, which can go as long as two weeks without

water, migrate to more remote grazing areas. In contrast, cattle cannot last more than two days without water.

Trouble arises whenever there is a mismatch between the availability of water and vegetation. Livestock are effectively trapped when the distance from water to vegetation exceeds the distance that livestock can walk between waterings. The animals weaken and become more susceptible to parasites and disease. Veterinary services are basic but reach only a fraction of the animals.

2.1.3. Living Together

Livelihoods in Darfur are difficult and at times harsh, but not impossible. Many households are able to cope with *expected* seasonal stresses, with varying success. Depending on their resilience, many households usually recover from a year or two of drought or other *natural* calamity (Box 2.1).

Box 2.1. Understanding How Households Cope with Livelihood Crises and Shocks

Within each livelihood group, households follow a range *and sequence* of practical strategies to cope with adversity. A common feature of these coping strategies is a willingness to endure hardship in one period in attempt to protect vital livelihood assets for a later period.

Anticipatory coping measures are actions households take when they anticipate that conditions will worsen. These coping strategies, anticipated and planned well in advance, usually cause little damage to people and their livelihoods because they are less costly and can be easily reversed – such as switching to cheaper foods, selling low-value, non-productive assets, or looking for temporary work.

Crisis coping strategies are used if more drastic measures are required – or when an unanticipated shock has occurred, such as conflict. Crisis coping strategies are costlier and less easily reversed, if at all, and hence more dangerous to the future viability of household livelihoods. The most dangerous strategies include selling productive assets or migrating as a household out of the area. As seen in Darfur, migration to displacement camps for food, shelter and protection is an extreme *crisis* coping strategy because it signals near-complete dependence on others for survival.

Whether a household is able to cope with anticipated or unanticipated adversity depends on its resilience. A household's resilience is greatly influenced by the depth of its remaining resources, the reversibility of previously taken actions, the lapse of time since the beginning of the crisis, and the stage in the sequence of coping strategies that households find themselves at the moment that the crisis eases or conflict ends.

A single shock, such as a moderate drought, does not necessarily lead to poverty or other calamity for a household. Instead, it's usually the *cumulative impact* of a series of shocks that erodes a household's resilience and that may push the household to the brink of ruin.

All households attempt to diversify their incomes to reduce the risk of income failure from any one source and to offset seasonal fluctuations in the dominant source of income. In addition to farming and herding, nearly all Darfur households engage in some sort of trading and marketing; long distance labor migration and remittance of income; and gathering and consumption of wild foods, such as *mukheit*, and hunting.³

Over time, the shared vulnerabilities of living on the edge led to a system of mutual dependence between the main traditional livelihood groups. In its most basic form, sedentary agro-pastoralists

³ Tufts University Feinstein International Famine Center and Ahfad University for Women. *Darfur: Livelihoods under Siege. Executive Summary and Recommendations. Final Report.* February 17, 2005.

households would entrust their few animals to the semi-nomadic and nomadic pastoralists for their rainy season migrations during which pastoralist households would leave their youngest children to agro-pastoralist households. In the meantime, agro-pastoralists cultivated and harvested crops before *taleq*, the return of the pastoralists whose animals would graze on the crop residues and stubble, leaving valuable manure as fertilizer.

This system of mutual dependence led to intricate codes managing relations between livelihood groups and governing infractions. When animals strayed into fields of unharvested crops, for example, the local authority, *umda*, could fine the responsible herders up to 5-6 sacks of millet – or more if the incursion was considered intentional. On the other hand, there was no protection from animals for crops planted too close to known livestock migration routes, *mass'arat*.

With low and erratic rainfall determining the welfare of nearly all livelihood groups, Darfur is no stranger to competition over access to seasonally scarce natural resources, especially water and pasture in drought years, and the frequent friction arising between agro-pastoralists and pastoralists. In recent decades, increased vulnerabilities have eroded, and from time to time broken, the system of mutual dependence between agro-pastoralists and pastoralists. In Darfur, as elsewhere, when groups do not have control over or access to the natural resources on which their very lives depend, they can migrate, attempt to reconcile or resort to conflict.

Yet, the current conflict goes far beyond previously seen levels. There have been deliberate acts of provocation on all sides – filling wells, burning pastures and destroying crops. The breakdown of the symbiotic relationship between the main traditional livelihood groups will take a long time to rebuild and heal.

2.2. Far Fewer Livelihood Options during Conflict

Viewed through a livelihood lens, the conflict in Darfur hinges on converging livelihoods between sedentary agro-pastoralists and semi-nomadic and nomadic pastoralists and increasing competition for seasonal scarce natural resources. After the drought shocks and increasing poverty of recent decades, only a more diversified income base offered a higher probability of meeting all household needs: Agro-pastoralists are keeping more animals and pastoralists are growing more crops.⁴ The distinctly different livelihoods of the past with their complementary seasonal demands on water, pasture, and cropland have blurred.

Making matters worse, few viable institutions and procedures were available to resolve disputes over access, management and control of these natural resources. This institutional void has exacerbated political grievances and socio-economic marginalization, leading to armed insurgency and counter-insurgency.

Intimidation, insecurity and conflict set into motion crisis coping strategies. Intimidation, insecurity and conflict threaten the viability of livelihoods and ability to earn income in two fundamental ways:

- by restricting mobility; and
- by restricting access to markets (Box 2.2).

These two restrictions go hand in hand. Conflict means that the usual means for coping with adversity are no longer available, severely eroding household resilience, at least for now. In short, livelihoods are at stake in conflict, as well as lives.

One of the most critical resources to ensure household resilience is the availability of able-bodied labor. The loss of labor through absence, injury or death poses a grave threat to livelihood viability and quickly reduces household choices. The inability of internally displaced men, women and

⁴ Tufts University and Ahfad University, page 3.

Text Box 2.2. The Link between Livelihoods and Markets

Rural households choose livelihoods – the mix of seasonal income-earning activities – that best meet their food security and other needs during the year. These livelihood choices depend on the natural environment, available assets, household composition and, above all, on access to markets. Most households are willing to specialize in a few activities, provided that they have dependable opportunities to buy, sell and exchange.

Markets support livelihoods in several critical ways. Markets provide a setting for the transfer of ownership, an outlet for own-produced goods and services, and a source of supply for other goods and services. Markets determine prices for exchange purposes. Households use market price signals to make adjustments in their livelihood strategies to smooth their seasonal availability and access to food.

When households suddenly lose their usual sources of income and livelihood due to shock – such as the current conflict and displacement – they may have to drop out of the market. When there are no buyers, market prices will fall and then collapse altogether. When traders cannot recover their costs, they will cease deliveries altogether.

children to carry out their normal activities due to insecurity is tantamount to loss of household labor. The inability of migrant workers to send funds home due to insecurity and the breakdown of the informal money transfer system represents another loss of household labor. Both losses drain household resilience and ability to cope.

2.2.1. Sedentary Agro-pastoralists

The conflict has had a profound impact on sedentary agro-pastoralists in terms of demographic displacement and livelihood disruption, particularly farming.

Agro-pastoralist households in Darfur may farm several scattered fields, each selected for its better soil productivity. To avoid crossfire or exposure to attack, households were often forced to cultivate only their fields closer to home or skip critical weeding and other operations. These actions resulted in lower area planted, yields and harvests. In addition, many agro-pastoralists had to abandon their fields during the season and attackers destroyed standing crops or plundered newly harvested crops.

Landless laborers relying on intermittent main season and winter season employment are often on the edge of poverty, with little margin for something to go wrong. Destruction of wells and theft of irrigation pumps in areas such as Kutum, Kebkabiya, Jebel Sy, Sereif Umra and Al Tuwaisha (North Darfur) not only reduced vegetable production but wiped out critical income-earning opportunities for these laborers.

Many agro-pastoralists lost their animals due to a combination of looting, poor rains, and limited mobility and distress sales. For example, in the area between El Fasher and Kebkabiya (North Darfur), agro-pastoralists lost about 90 percent of their animals, mostly sheep and goats, in the past year (FAO/North Darfur). Similarly, agro-pastoralists in the area between Nyala and Kass (South Darfur) lost virtually all their livestock to looting; only donkeys were less heavily looted.

Looted livestock represent a loss of income, milk and other animal products, and animal traction (plowing). Looted animals appear in the larger regional markets, identifiable by their brands in the case of camels and cattle. However, it is nearly impossible to prove theft and have the police action take action before the animals are sold, in border areas, to Chad and the Central African Republic.

All in all, household food reserves were likely to run out by March-April. An increasing portion of agro-pastoralist households is already turning to the markets – where they exist – for their supplies. Although wild cereals and fruit are gathered in the relatively secure corridor between Kulbus and Al Geneina, resident households claim to depend on the market for at least two-thirds of their food basket, a rate usually not seen until later during the rainy season.

Box 2.3. What Value a Livelihood? To Protect or Not

Some livelihoods are more profitable than others and hence thought worth protecting. In Karande (Kass District, South Darfur), an irrigated vegetable producing area, agro-pastoralists grow winter season tomatoes for the Nyala market, about 30 kms away. Karande is an area subject to attack and destruction of crops by the *jangaweit*. The police, who claimed they had no resources to investigate an earlier incident, suggested that the villagers protect themselves by hiring, through a nearby Arab *sheikh*, 30 Arab horsemen armed with Government-issued weapons.

The tomato growers calculated that protecting their lucrative returns to tomatoes was worth the investment in protection. Each 6-gallon box of tomatoes had a market value of SDD 1,000 per box. They could sell 400 boxes per week for weekly revenues of SDD 400,000. Each horseman would be paid SDD 1,000 per day, or SDD 7,000 per week. The cost of 30 horsemen was therefore SDD 210,000 per week, leaving a gross weekly profit of SDD 190,000. It is not known, at the time of this writing, whether this protection contract succeeded – or, if so, whether it was amicably terminated at the end of the tomato season in March.

Other examples abound in all three states. Some people are reluctantly prepared to pay for protection as a necessary business expense – or they have no choice to refuse protection. Others shun private protection services as a source of extortion and intimidation, insisting that peace and security is the rightful responsibility of the state. Still others have no means to pay for protection, even if they had wanted to pay.

Source: Team Assessment

Even in currently secure areas, there is a constant fear of insecurity. Villagers intending to cultivate millet and sorghum this year know that they have no guarantee of a harvest. A single incursion of livestock into fields of standing crops can destroy a season's worth of effort and food. On other occasions, the *jangaweit* militias or common bandits simply wait until crops are harvested before robbing them. In Al Geneina and Kass, village leaders reported arranging to pay Arab semi-nomadic pastoralist tribes for protection against *jangaweit* attacks (Box 2.3). However, paying “protection” money may backfire if payments are not kept up.

2.2.2. Internally Displaced Persons

Forced displacement to new surroundings prevents households from employing their coping strategies to the fullest extent or in the optimal sequence. Their normal systems of social support and leadership may have been weakened, and new power structures developed in their place. Depending on the distance and duration of displacement, as well as the warning that preceded it, agro-pastoralist IDPs in camps and towns may have arrived with nothing. They have little resilience except their own skills, although there are few opportunities to use them.

Despite these obstacles, internally displaced households are making determined efforts to cope with their loss of livelihoods and, in some cases, loss of primary income earners. Insecurity and fear severely limit options to relatively safe areas close to IDP camps when collecting grass, firewood, construction materials, and wild foods. A few others have found employment with the UN or NGOs in charge of the camps, such as digging latrines and constructing latrine slabs. Some IDPs have been able to find work as domestic servants or occasional laborers in town. However, when large numbers of IDPs simultaneously pursue the same options, supply exceeds demand, depressing prices and wages that IDPs receive. The only "certain" income is food aid (Part Three), an income transfer in kind, allowing many IDPs to sell part of their food aid rations in order to buy other necessities (Box 3.6).

Women are usually more vulnerable as displaced persons than in their home areas. Worse, women and girls live in fear of violence and sexual assault if they venture too far from the relative safety of camps or villages – usually only a kilometer or two (although towns are usually safer). Incidents of assault and rape are well documented (MSF-Holland, Human Rights Watch). Most assaults occur when women are out searching for firewood, fodder or water for sale or household use.

NGOs are trying to expand the economic options for IDPs. Taking one NGO, CHF International, rented land near Zam Zam camp (El Fasher) and provided seeds and tools for winter cropping by IDPs. This experiment was not successful as IDPs didn't complete the season, believing that the land owners would claim the crops. CHF is distributing bovani chickens, of no interest to the *janjaweit*,

Box 2.4. Protection of Donkey Assets

Nearly every household in Darfur has a donkey, considered a high-value asset. Those who lost their donkeys are at a distinct economic disadvantage.

Donkeys greatly expand a household's mobility and transport capacity and hence livelihood options. For example, by buying grain by the sack, households save by paying a lower price per unit – and with a donkey, households have a way of carrying their purchase home. If necessary, a donkey can be lent out to a trusted neighbor on a short-term basis, earning good will and prospects of a return favor.

Donkeys can be used even for plowing. The Sudanese NGO, Intermediate Technology Development Group (ITDG), has developed a locally-made, low-till (10 cm) donkey plow that plows, plants and weeds in a single operation. It can plow one-half *fed* per day (1 *fed* = 0.42 hectare), with yield increases of 35-50 percent. ITDG links its sales of donkey plows (SDD 6,000, in three installments) to its support of community seed banks to ensure higher returns.

Some IDPs were able to flee with their donkeys to IDP camps and towns. IDPs could not gather firewood or fodder without their donkeys. One donkey can carry 2 fagots of firewood (total market value of about SDD 100 at Kalma camp) or 6 bundles of grass (SDD 300), providing one of the few sources of independent income available to those in camps.

A donkey is a valuable asset because it extends a household's economic options in every sense. Maintaining the health and welfare of donkeys is paramount to the displaced and non-displaced alike. During the 1983-85 famine, Darfuris chose to go hungry, eat wild foods and cut back on market purchases of cereals in order to spend most of their scarce money on their animals (De Waal, 2005a).

Thus, to protect a donkey is to protect a livelihood. People with means feed their donkey a *coro* of sorghum per day, in addition to grass and fodder. Donkey deworming programs, carried out by a number of NGOs and other agencies in the camps and surrounding towns, are very popular with owners. Where possible, these deworming services should be made available to non-displaced pastoralists.

Source: Assessment Team

for IDPs to raise. The NGO is collecting and distributing fodder for donkeys in camp during the dry season (Box 3.4). Other NGOs offer donkey deworming services (section 2.3.3.).

2.2.3. Urban Host Communities

Residents in urban areas are negatively affected by conflict in terms of disruption of markets, influx of displaced persons, and competition for jobs. Landless underemployed people in towns, already on the margins of survival, are generally harmed by the economic downturn and lower wages due to competition from job-seeking IDPs. In addition, the influx of IDPs severely strains the weak social infrastructure and services in many communities, by increasing demand for health services, schools and drinking water.

Residents in urban areas are positively affected in terms of cheaper goods and services sold by displaced persons (food aid, poultry and eggs, firewood and grass, as well as labor) and, to a lesser extent, demand for goods and services (labor, rent, and supplies) by humanitarian response agencies. In general, resident urban populations continue to accept the presence of displaced people, but as competition for jobs and resources increases there is a growing risk that IDPs in urban areas will be seen less as unfortunate victims and more as economic burdens.

WFP, other UN agencies, and NGOs appropriately recognize that host communities need assistance to help support IDPs. About one-third of WFP's initial emergency operations (EMOP) appeal for 2005 for Darfur was targeted to non-displaced, host communities.

2.2.4. Semi-nomadic and Nomadic Pastoralists

Pastoralism is not free of risks – disease, drought, and common banditry – but the Darfur crisis has added new threats of blocked migrations and closed markets. Lack of mobility and access to markets in contested areas has significantly jeopardized pastoralist livelihoods.

2.2.4.1. Loss of Mobility

Even in the absence of conflict, herd management is a constant effort to balance the availability of edible vegetation, consumption requirements and habits of the different species, on the one hand, with the availability of water and water requirements of the different species, on the other hand. For example, cattle and sheep *graze* on grasses and other edible vegetation. Goats are more versatile, and can *graze* as well as *browse* on the leaves and tender branches of low shrubs. Camels prefer to browse but will *graze* if suitable trees are not available. Splitting the herd into complementary species, such as hardier low-grazing/browsing goats and high-browsing camels, is one such balancing technique, particularly during the dry season.

However, the ultimate key to the viability of extensive pastoralism is mobility. Whenever hostility and conflict block mobility, pastoralists and their livestock are forced to change their seasonal migratory patterns to less desirable destinations, exposing animals to insufficient water and pasture and possibly to parasites and insect-borne diseases. Animals risk getting trapped in the wrong place in the wrong season. As camel herds can go longer without food and water, camels are more mobile. This expanded mobility gives camel herders many more options for avoiding hostile areas when seeking resources for their animals. Cattle, on the other hand, cannot stray too far from water sources.

As animals are used to moving only 8-10 kilometers a day, about half of that for cattle, longer daily distances are stressful on animal health. The opposite phenomenon, little movement and concentration of animals, leads to over-use of water and pasture resources and environmental degradation (Box 2.5).

Box 2.5. Examples and Consequences of Blocked Migrations

Some current examples of blocked migrations and their consequences show that:

- Desirable pastures in the higher rainfall, cooler temperature Jebel Mara Mountains are not accessible to outsiders due to insecurity.
- The concentration of livestock near major towns has prompted increasing distress sales (such as in Sereif Umra) and increasing distances to find pasture and fodder (up to 25 kilometers from Kebkabiya).
- Camels and sheep that used to pass from Mellit to Malha (North Darfur) on their way to Libya are now blocked by rebel (SLA/M) control of Sayah, affecting the trade and livelihoods of people in both locations, raising cereal prices depressing livestock and meat prices in Malha. Market activity in Mellit, one of the main livestock assembly centers, has dropped precipitously.
- Livestock are effectively trapped in Um Kedada Locality (Um Kedada, Al Tuwaisha and Al Lait Councils) in southeastern North Darfur because other areas are insecure. The increased demand for meat generated by thousands of IDPs reaching El Fasher and other towns across southern North Darfur is being met from Nyala in South Darfur, rather than from the large herds trapped in Um Kedada.
- The usual migration north and south of the railroad at Ed Daein (South Darfur) is confined to the area to the south, partly because of large livestock concentrations in Um Kedada. Depletion of pasture south of Ed Daein is exacerbated by low rainfall and carelessly-set brush fires.

Source: Assessment Team

The immobility of nomadic pastoralists and their livestock due to insecurity often has dire consequences for agro-pastoralists who are unaccustomed to their presence in the wrong season. When the concentration of livestock around Serif Umra, Kebkabiya, Kutum and Fato Borno (North Darfur) ran out of pasture, herders were compelled to let their livestock graze in farm fields – possibly acts of desperation to save livestock assets rather than acts of provocation.

2.2.4.2. Loss of Markets

Before the conflict, semi-nomadic pastoralists and nomadic pastoralists were marketing more and more of their livestock within Darfur, within Sudan and to foreign markets, such as Libya and Egypt. Closure of the Sudan border has prevented the annual export of 30,000 camels to Libya and 50,000 camels to Egypt.⁵ So far, new trade routes have not compensated for the loss of usual income (Box 2.6).

Conflict has also severely disrupted livestock marketing within Darfur.⁶ Important secondary livestock markets, such as Mellit, Sereif Umra and Kebkabiya in North Darfur, operate at much lower levels of activity. The market in Mellit, usually bustling with sheep and camels, was near empty during the Assessment's visit in February.

Terms of trade (what the money from the sale of a given animal can buy of another good) have generally turned against pastoralists wherever markets are disrupted or access blocked. Larger animal prices have fallen by 20 to 30 percent since the conflict began (variable by species), while millet and sorghum prices continue to climb (section 3.7).

⁵ Tufts University and Ahfad University, p. 6.

⁶ According to Tufts University and Ahfad University, livestock markets have *collapsed*, p. 7.

Market access to cereals and other food staples is becoming increasingly difficult for pastoralists due to greater distances to fewer markets that are still open, higher prices, and, in some cases, hostility

Box 2.6. Closed Borders, Lost Profits in West Darfur

Two related economic shocks have jolted nomadic pastoralist livelihoods and incomes in West Darfur over the past two years. First, a lucrative export market was lost when the Government of Sudan closed its border with Libya in May 2003 in its fight against northern rebels. During pre-conflict times, some 20-25,000 camels reached al Khofra in Libya, where they made a net profit of SDD 150-200,000 per head (about \$600-800).

Camel herders have been able to find an alternative market in Argeen, in southern Egypt. By taking a long and circuitous route from West Darfur through South Darfur to Kordofan to Dongola on the Nile River and then northward, herders can deliver camels in 65 days to Argeen Egypt – compared with only 37 days to Omdurman. The longer journey is not only costlier (watering camels three times along the way in Kordofan costs about SDD 1,000 per head) but longer, riskier and hence less profitable as animals that walk a greater distance lose more weight and value.

Some camels reach Libya through Chad, but herders fear insecurity and consider this long route riskier. Nonetheless, the Chad consul in al Geneina has consulted with the Pastoralist Union about taking steps to formalize what is now an informal trade.

Second, three cattle drives used to leave West Darfur for Omdurman in a normal year, in April, September and December, when water was available along the way. Whereas herders used to deliver 5-7,000 cattle every year, now only 1-2,000 cattle belonging to “the right groups” make this trek, via Al Humra (Kordofan). Internal trade in Darfur has remained the same at about 30,000 cattle, decreasing in the north but increasing in the south.

Worse, declining demand has dropped camel and cattle prices, as shown below comparing present prices in Al Geneina (West Darfur) with prices before the conflict began in February 2003. In contrast, small ruminant prices have increased.

	Prices in early 2003	Prices in early 2005
Camels	SDD 50-60,000	SDD 40,000
Cattle	40-50,000	30,000
Sheep	3,500-8,000	8,500-15,000
Goats	3-4,000	4-6,000

Transporting goats by air to Khartoum may become a potential market, but this is expensive and cannot fully compensate for the loss of other markets.

Source: Pastoralist Union, Al Geneina, West Darfur

from IDPs in camp markets and reluctance of resident traders to deal openly with nomads. Moreover, the economic decline due to conflict means that nomadic pastoralists sell fewer animals because fewer customers can buy. Consequently, nomadic pastoralists have less income for buying the commodities they need.

2.3. Immediate Cross-cutting Livelihood Support Programs

This section recommends four livelihood support programs for immediate implementation. These livelihood support programs cut across livelihoods. The first program, directed to WFP, calls for an expanded surveillance of livelihoods in Darfur. The last three programs are directed to aid agencies, local authorities and NGOs working in the livestock sector. These programs aim to protect and preserve livestock assets – keeping animals alive – through provision of emergency fodder, deworming and emergency vaccinations. All programs are predicated on security and access to the intended target groups.

2.3.1. Expand Livelihood Monitoring

As the Darfur conflict and crisis continues to unfold, monitoring the status of all livelihood groups becomes increasingly urgent. The first step is to carry out, or update, food security/livelihood baseline assessments in the most severely affected areas. Monitor key indicators as a way to gauge the welfare of each livelihood group – for example, changes in household income, expenditures, consumption and health. The Assessment Team recommends that WFP's Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping (VAM) expand its Darfur and Sudan monitoring in terms of technical topics and professional personnel. The VAM can draw on the experience of other UN agencies and NGOs previously and presently based in Darfur. The VAM can collaborate with the USAID Famine Early Warning System, based on its extensive coverage elsewhere in Africa and integration with US remote sensing (sensing by satellite) agencies.

Elements of expanded Darfur monitoring include on-the-ground market price and market performance analysis, food security analysis, nutritional assessments, and seasonal crop and livestock production assessments. These can be complemented by increasingly sophisticated analysis based on remote sensing of rainfall, vegetation and crop conditions. Together, these elements can build a critical data base to help sharpen pre-famine or "human security" indicators and ensure that all indicators are tracked and analyzed quickly to guide targeting decisions.

2.3.2. Livelihood Asset Protection: Provide Feed, Fodder and Water

Provide supplementary feed and fodder for animals on an urgent, immediate basis to prevent further deaths and maintain sufficient reproductive stock. Following the late and below-average rainfall in 2004, fodder is already scarce and shortages will continue until the first rains in June-July. Introduce hay balers and pellet makers from grasses and crop residues. In addition to millet stover and groundnut hay, processed groundnut residue cakes would be a convenient option, even if delivered from outside Darfur. To the extent that feed and fodder can be provided through a market-oriented sales program (perhaps through payment vouchers or other type of demand subsidy), it is essential to price these below the cost of food aid sorghum to avoid diversion from people to animals. Delivery of feed and fodder may be easier to IDPs and agro-pastoralists, but pastoralist animals should not be excluded.

As the dry season progresses, it may be necessary to truck water on an emergency basis to livestock and people isolated from water sources, primarily agro-pastoralists and pastoralists. One 200-liter barrel can water 25 sheep and goats; these animals require water every three-four days. One barrel is required for one adult/one young pair of camels every two weeks. Three adult cattle require one barrel every one-two days. Given the reluctance of truckers to transport water to insecure areas, *this would be an expensive operation and purely a stop-gap measure*. However, the cost of sustaining animals and the livelihood of pastoralists for a short period needs to be weighed against the cost of supporting destitute pastoralists for several years while they try to reconstitute lost herds.

Except in rare instances where local conditions permit, a large-scale livestock destocking operation should not be attempted in present circumstances due to a host of logistical, financial, marketing and public health constraints.

2.3.3. Veterinary Services: Carry Out Horse and Donkey Deworming Campaign

Provide animal surveillance and health care services, particularly deworming for work horses and donkeys. Any worm or other internal parasite robs animals of precious blood, nutrients, and energy. Unless internal parasites are removed by regular deworming (3-6 times per year), donkeys will suffer internal tissue damage from migrating parasites, which may considerably shorten their life span. Likewise, a parasite-ridden horse can suffer intestinal damage causing chronic digestive problems, fatigue and lethargy. Deworming is necessary more often (up to 6 times per year) the more crowded the environment and more frequent the contact with new animals, such as those in IDP camps and host towns.

Deworming is one critical preventive action that can be carried out by trained para-veterinarians, or Community Animal Health Workers. One para-vet can monitor and handle about 100 animals in a populated area. This service can be extended to semi-nomadic and nomadic pastoralists. FAO has considerable experience working with implementing partners providing animal health surveillance and curative interventions and could work with state governments in expanding their operations.

2.3.4. Veterinary Services: Carry Out Emergency Vaccination Campaign

Insecurity and immobility have disrupted access to veterinary services previously handled by the state governments. While it's fortunate, at the time of the Assessment, that animal health was not a pressing problem, vaccination coverage has fallen off and many pastoralists fear that the seasonal (or eventual) return of unvaccinated livestock from Chad will expose their own animals to disease.

To avoid epidemics of the most prevalent diseases, it is necessary to carry out an emergency vaccination program before the *shoggar*, the first light rains in June-July that signal the start of annual migrations, while more animals are within reach of veterinary services. This emergency program should be comprehensive in scope, covering both Government and rebel controlled areas as diseases know no boundaries. The program should target livestock concentrated in the dry season grazing areas, wet season grazing areas as well as the transition zones between these two areas.

Cattle, sheep and goats need protection against bacterial diseases such as hemorrhagic septicemia, black quarter, and anthrax. Camels need protection against *peste des petits ruminants* (PPR), a rinderpest-like disease usually prevalent in sheep and goats that has been discovered in camels.

Reaching all these animals will not be easy. First, many small ruminants are in the opposition held areas. Second, it will be necessary to overcome the suspicions of camel herders, whose camels have been neglected by past vaccination programs.⁷

⁷ Abdal Monium Khidir Osman, Tufts University (personal communication with the Assessment Team, March 2005).

PART THREE. MARKETS, FOOD AID and FOOD SECURITY

3.1. Rural Cereal Markets in Darfur

Cereal marketing in Darfur is based on a hierarchy of village and rural assembly markets, intermediate town markets that function at the retail and wholesale level and main town markets. The Assessment Team was not able to observe village or rural assembly markets due to their widespread absence and destruction (section 3.1). Thus, the following sketch of rural village markets *prior to the current conflict* is compiled from interviews with key informants, including displaced villagers and village traders, as well as secondary sources.¹

Weekly rural cereal markets are traditional, basic and not particularly efficient. The marketing chain is generally short, with two or three links between producer and consumer. Cereals are often sold in small lots using local weights and measures (Box 3.1.). There is little processing of cereals. Due to storage risks, small traders try not keep cereals for long periods.

The number of market participants and degree of market competition vary by season. Traders converge on the market when agro-pastoralists sell their crops during the harvest/post harvest season but come less often later in the year as supplies dwindle. Rural marketsheds expand or contract to meet seasonal shifts in supply and demand patterns.

Prices reflect the quality of the previous harvest, current seasonal rainfall and expectations of the harvest, seasonal variability in supply and demand as well as marketing costs, especially transportation that accounts for 20-25 percent of the delivered cost (el Dukheri), and even more during the rainy season.

Box 3.1. Dealing with Local Weights and Measures

Local measures are based on volume, not weight, which varies by commodity and moisture content. Measures and weights also vary by locality. Hence, the commonly accepted weights of local measures, shown below, are only approximations. Weights are as likely to be cited in pounds as kilograms.

<i>Coro</i>		3.3 lb	1.5 kg
<i>Melwa</i>	= 2 <i>Coro</i>	6.6 lb	3.0 kg
<i>Moud</i> or <i>Midd</i>	= 2 <i>Melwa</i>	13.2 lb	6.0 kg
<i>Rubo</i>	= 2 <i>Moud</i> or <i>Midd</i>	26.4 lb	12.0 kg
<i>Kaila</i>	= 2 <i>Rubo</i>	52.8 lb	24.0 kg
Sack of Millet	= <i>Shawal</i>	220.3 lb	100.0 kg
Sack of Sorghum	<i>Shawal</i> = 30 <i>Melwa</i>	198.2 lb	90.0 kg
<i>Kintar</i>		100.0 lb	
Quintal			100.0 kg

The *kintar* is a measure for groundnuts, sesame and *karkadeh* (hibiscus flowers).

Note: These measures are common in South Darfur.

Source: Assessment Team

Some village markets are seasonally thin, with little turnover and little liquidity. Thin markets lead to volatile price behavior when individual transactions exert “undue” or “disproportional” influence on prices or terms of trade. Furthermore, thin markets increase perceptions of risk and uncertainty, thereby raising transaction costs, the costs of doing business.

Personal trust between traders is crucial, especially where credit is involved or the business environment uncertain. Traveling traders (*um dawarwar*) often establish exclusive relations with village traders (*sababa*) to minimize transaction costs that are high due to long distances, difficult access and the risk of making a costly trip for nothing. Repeated transactions between the same

¹ Ibrahim El-Dhukeri *et al.*; Yagoub Osman *et al.*; and Alex de Waal (2005a).

trading partners lowers transaction costs, but is likely to inhibit more fluid and transparent market flows. On the other hand, without this relationship, some village markets might be bypassed altogether.

Despite certain shortcomings, rural cereal markets provide an essential outlet for cereal surpluses as well as cash crops. More and more agro-pastoralists produce for the market and depend on market transactions to smooth food consumption and manage other essential needs. Pastoralists, who do not store cereals but carry supplies with them, also depend on rural and town markets for replenishing their provisions.

3.2. Urban Markets in Darfur

Many characteristics of village and rural markets *prior to the conflict* exist in the bigger town and urban markets. Market facilitating services to foster competition, innovation and investment are unavailable. The process of price discovery depends on other traders and suppliers, and other traders and clients, rather than public market information services. Almost no public sector credit facilities exist and commercial banks are largely absent.

Markets in Darfur are not integrated with the markets outside the region due to long distances, rough roads and high transport costs. Darfur markets, however, are integrated with other markets within Darfur (el Dukheri). Spatial price integration is handicapped by low production volumes and thin markets in many rural locations, particularly in years of poor production, as well as the poor and inadequate transportation network.

As a consequence, long-distance coordination is achieved haphazardly. Poor or non-existent telecommunications severely hamper planning. Many traders in rural areas are independent transporters, bringing supplies to the wholesaler in an informal business arrangement, not necessarily according to a fixed schedule or regular delivery contract. Smaller traders also get their supplies in this loose manner.

Urban cereal wholesalers typically add a constant margin to their delivered prices. Wholesalers make their gross income on turnover volume, rather than a variable mark-up to achieve a constant level of income. When volumes decrease, incomes decrease.

Several structural constraints hinder specialization, investment and innovation in urban cereals markets. Foremost is the uncertainty of year to year fluctuations in regional and local cereal production (Figure 1.1) and their uncertain effect on market conditions. High transaction costs between markets present another constraint. Third, seasonally low purchasing power of consumers dampens demand for value-added services (such as grading or retail packaging in smaller volumes).

When rural traders practice rapid turnover of cereal stocks, thereby accelerating cereal flows within the marketing system, they deflect the storage function to urban wholesalers. A few big wholesalers in the regional capitals can store up to 100 MT of cereals (el Dhukeri). No wholesaler was observed to use modern storage techniques – storage of sacks on pallets, with fumigation in a temperature- and moisture-controlled warehouse.

Turning to the present, distribution of food aid cereals by the World Food Program (WFP) can cause sharp day to day fluctuations in prices when many food recipients sell part of their rations at the same time. More importantly, sustained delivery of food aid sorghum has held cereal prices low – or lower than they would have been – for many months (section 3.7).

Urban cereal traders did not appear to be overly irritated with competition from food aid nor economically hurt by it, given the larger economic slowdown in Darfur beyond their control. They generally take an accepting attitude towards these food aid distributions – they are, after all, a

convenient source of cheap supplies (section 3.5). Moreover, urban traders still have a market for locally produced cereals with their special characteristics for which discerning customers are willing to pay more.

3.3. Impact of Conflict and Insecurity on Transportation

Trade patterns to and from West Darfur are typical of those between Darfur and the rest of Sudan. *Prior to the conflict*, transporters mainly exported groundnuts, sesame and *aradeib* from West Darfur to Omdurman. Darfur mainly imported sugar, soap, tea, candies, soft drinks, and construction supplies such as cement, zinc plates and iron bars. Transporters delivered goods on contract as well as engaged in their own buying and selling based on their knowledge of weekly markets in Darfur. They say that they always find something to bring back and never return empty.

Delivery of goods and people between markets is hampered by an inadequate road network, random banditry and long distances. Only about 20 percent of Darfur's roads are paved (7 percent) or graveled (12 percent), and the rest are unimproved roads or tracks. Poor roads raise transport costs per kilometer ton in Darfur several times more than those in eastern Sudan.² Poor roads slow medium and large-volume trucks to 10-20 kilometers per hour. Driving across *wadis* is difficult in the dry season and impossible during rainy season flash floods.

Consumers near the main paved roads benefit from increased competition between transporters that lowers prices. In contrast, consumers in rural markets pay higher transport costs resulting from less competition, rougher roads and smaller economies of scale due to lower demand and lower volumes. In short, *in pre-conflict times*, difficult transportation conditions – roads, distances and banditry – reduced market access by raising transport costs.

Since the fighting started, conflict and insecurity has made these transport costs all the more expensive for *commercial* trade by raising the costs of truck rentals, fuel and “protection.”

- Renting a 20-MT truck roundtrip from Omdurman to Al Geneina increased from SDD 80,000 in early 2004 to SDD 200,000 in early 2005 to account for additional risk.
- Fuel prices have also increased from SDD 2,800 per 20-liter jerrican in January 2004 to about SDD 4,000 in January 2005 while a 44-gallon drum increased from SDD 26,500 to SDD 35,000 over the same period. Diesel, petrol and kerosene prices in Al Geneina are notably more expensive than those in Nyala and El Fasher due to the greater distance from the main fuel depot in Khartoum. In turn, prices in the three Darfur capitals are 2-3 times more expensive than those in El Obeid, (North Kordofan).³
- Protection payments to bandits for the part of the road under their control cost SDD 50,000 per roadblock. These roadblocks can occur in quick succession (for example, every 10 kms) or over longer stretches (every 100 kms), requiring drivers to keep extra cash on hand.

Insecure areas shift over time, forcing transporters to deal with continual uncertainty. For this reason, truckers wait several days or weeks until a sufficient number of trucks are available to travel by convoy, sometimes with GoS army or police escorts. Commercial transporters are not bound by UNSECOORD restrictions on road movements.

Commercial traffic has dropped in half, reflecting the slowdown in economic activity – for example, from about 15 trucks arriving every day in Al Geneina from El Obeid to about 7 trucks. To some extent, increases in the transport of *humanitarian aid* have offset the decrease in the transport of

² For example, poor roads raise transport costs per kilometer-ton between El Obeid (North Kordofan) and Nyala (South Darfur), a distance of 642 km, about three times more than costs per kilometer-ton between Port Sudan and El Obeid, a distance of 1,532 km – or SDD 41.4/km/MT vs. 11.4 km/MT (el Dukheri, Table 9.).

³ (<http://www.unjlc.org/content/index.phtml/itemId/16419>).

commercial goods, as WFP has expanded its fleet of local contractor transporters to meet ever increasing food needs.

For a time, trucks and drivers hauling emergency humanitarian aid were immune from deliberate attack by warring sides. Unlike WFP's own drivers who are required to follow UNSECOORD ("no-go") road restrictions, WFP local contractor transporters are unaffected by UNSECOORD road closures and have been crucial to WFP operations by delivering food aid across insecure areas. However, volatile insecurity affects contractor transporters as well. Some transporters have reduced deliveries or refused to go to certain areas following incidents where armed gunmen recently seized vehicles, the GoS conducted military sweeps, or rebel forces could not be notified of transporter plans. By disrupting food aid deliveries, insecurity prevents emergency food aid from reaching intended beneficiaries.⁴

The implicit immunity from danger enjoyed by humanitarian vehicles, drivers and cargo has ended. Since the Assessment, clearly marked aid vehicles have come under increasing attack, resulting in injured staff, looted supplies and detained or seized vehicles. Aid agencies and NGOs have temporarily suspended travel outside state capitals. The UN now requires its staff to travel in convoys of at least three vehicles, rather than two. When it can, the AU provides armed escorts of relief vehicles. These insecurity incidents increase costs for humanitarian agencies as they have for commercial transporters.

3.4. How Conflict Weakens Market Performance

Conflict amplifies all the old marketing constraints and adds new ones – crop production shortfalls and inaccessible supply sources; cut-off markets and abandoned markets; shifting population centers, collapsing livelihoods and declining demand; capital flight; increasing petrol prices; and threats to people and property.

To function properly, markets require a basic level of:

- security of people and property,
- predictability of supply and demand patterns and price relationships, and
- mobility to take advantage of unexpected opportunities.

All three are largely missing across many parts of Darfur. Of these, insecurity is the immediate cause. Even though everyone needs to buy and sell, the greatest number of security incidents occurs on market days when adversaries come into contact.

⁴ As of December 19, for example, insecurity had prevented the arrival into Darfur of more than 50 percent of WFP food aid for December distributions, and total WFP stocks in Darfur were currently less than 11,000 metric tons (MT), or under ten days' requirements (USAID *Darfur Update*, December 19, 2004).

3.4.1. Many Rural Markets are Missing

Many rural markets collapsed when markets themselves came under attack (insecurity of people and property), agro-pastoralist households fled from their villages (absence of buyers and sellers), and crop production plunged (absence of marketable supplies to meet demand). Under conditions of unpredictable conflict (no clear front lines), many markets simply no longer exist (Box 3.2).

Box 3.2. Missing Markets

After becoming easy, undefended targets for armed groups, many rural markets no longer exist.

For example, in Habilah Sub-administrative Unit (West Darfur), 85 rural villages were totally destroyed and 17 villages were partially destroyed after the first attacks in August 2003. Where there used to be 7 markets, only 2 exist, in Habilah town and in Gobie (40 km to the southwest near the Chad border). Some market traders shifted operations to the bigger towns and IDP camps in Habilah Locality (Habilah, Foro Burunga and Beida) while others shifted to Chad.

- Elsewhere in West Darfur, no village exists for 100 km to west of Zalingei, effectively shutting down markets in Sulu, Kuja and Sarafunga.
- In South Darfur, of 10 rural markets within a 40 km radius of Kass, only 2 still function.
- In North Darfur, of 40 rural markets in Kutum Administrative Unit, only one still operates. Of 10 rural markets in Malha Administrative Unit, only a few remain open. In Kebkabiya Administrative Unit, only 3 of 20 rural markets still function.

This is not a complete inventory. Market closure is extensive and complete in many areas. By removing opportunities for trade, missing markets have had a devastating impact on livelihoods for those remaining in rural areas. For those in camps, the decision to return home depends on an environment of security that will allow markets to resume.

Sources: Habilah Administrative Unit Commissioner; NGO meeting in Zalingei; WFP Field Office, Kass; Ministry of Agriculture, El Fasher; FAO/El Fasher; and Assessment Team.

Transporters weigh the tradeoff between risk and profit, when deciding whether to drive through insecure areas. Sometimes this is not possible where the front lines are sharply defined. Commercial transport of commodities, particularly cereals, between GoS and SLM/A-controlled areas and towns is tightly regulated. Some grain moves in and out of the respective areas in small quantities (by donkeys, horses, and camels), and a small quantity of grain produced in Jebel Mara was found in markets in all three Darfur states. However, restrictions on commercial transport combined with the drop in cereals production in 2004/05 pose a serious threat to food security in Government and rebel-held areas that are effectively isolated.

Effectively isolated areas are equivalent to missing markets. A current example is Malha, a government-controlled town in North Darfur normally supplied from El Fasher but currently cut off because the transport route from Mellit passes through rebel-held Sayah. Malha experienced a total failure of its cereals crop in 2004/05, according to FAO/North Darfur, making the town

completely dependent on food aid cereals. Semi-nomadic pastoralists in Malha have income from their harvest of winter tomatoes and watermelons, but few cereals to buy because of the road closure.

3.4.2. Supply Lines have become Shorter, with New Supplier Relationships

Supply lines have become shorter as a result of missing markets and the decrease in cereal production in 2004/05, similar to a major drought year. In Ed Daein, market women claim that the weekly inflow of cereals this year was equivalent to the daily inflow of cereals last year and that supply volumes in early 2005 reflected “the second worst year since the major drought in 1984.” Because of insecurity, grain was arriving only from producing areas to the south, not to the north.

In previous years, trader agents bought and assembled small quantities in rural markets to bring to major town markets (Section 3.1). Now, fewer agents go to the countryside to buy. Rather, producers and some small traders bring their small quantities to sell in the town markets, a frequent phenomenon.

- A cereals wholesaler in Zalingei used to get his sorghum and millet from Wadi Azoum, but now gets supplies from agro-pastoralists coming from Wadi Salih and other nearby areas.
- In Habilah, local authorities said that no supplies are coming from the countryside, only millet produced in Chad and brought in via Foro Burunga since road security improved.
- In many markets, the only millet available is more than one year old, from the 2003/04 harvest, sold from dwindling trader stocks.
- Near Al Geneina and other locations near Chad, agro-pastoralists hide their harvested crops or take them across the border to sell.

3.4.3 Market Demand is Down and Unpredictable

Consumer purchasing power is lower this year, according to market traders, due to the combination of insecurity and lower production that reduced rural incomes.

- A trader in Zalingei believes that consumer purchasing power in the towns has been cut in half since last year.
- Many households can only afford to buy retail-size quantities (such as a *miid*), paying higher retail prices per unit, rather than wholesale-size quantities (such as a sack) and lower wholesale prices per unit.
- Nearly all retailers insist on payment in cash. Few retailers extend credit. A millet retailer in Kass sells on credit only to people she knows and trusts, repayable in 2-3 days. Wood vendors in Kass may sell on credit on non-market days but require cash for large-volume market days.

Attracted by the promise of food aid and other support, many poor townspeople have shifted to displaced persons camps.

3.4.4. Market Turnover has Slowed Down

As most cereals wholesalers and retailers add a constant mark-up to their procurement costs, they make money on their rate of sales, or turnover (Section 3.2). Wholesalers and retailers are hurting financially because sales volumes are dramatically down.

- A major grain wholesaler in Nyala used to sell 1,000 sacks of millet and sorghum every day throughout the year. Now he sells about 500-600 per day. His mark-up (SDD 200 per sack) is not affected, but his gross income has dropped.
- Occasionally, turnover is so slow that traders find it profitable to sell grain back to the point of origin, especially food aid sorghum that travels between towns and markets where IDPs are congregated.
- Another wholesaler of millet in Zalingei gets her millet through a buyer who goes to Um Dhuken (South Darfur) from time to time. Her weekly sales volume is down by nearly 90 percent: Last year she bought and sold 300 sacks per week whereas this year she buys and sells only 30-40 sacks per week.

Box 3.3. Carving out New Markets: Three Tales of Meat Supply and Demand

The livestock and meat markets are in economic disarray as conflict disrupts usual supply and demand channels and seasonal price relationships. In particular, the market for meat, highly valued but highly perishable, is fraught with risk and unpredictability.

Al Jelaya Ahmed, owner of a butcher shop in Kass (South Darfur), claims that animal supplies are lower this year than last year. As a result, a bull that cost him SDD 15-20,000 last year costs SDD 35,000 this year. While the butcher's purchase price has increased approximately 100 percent, his meat prices have increased only about 33 percent, from SDD 450/kg last year to SDD 600/kg this year. He complains of "losing money every day." Unexpectedly, the butcher claims to sell much more meat this year than last, in part due to the influx of IDPs and others that have more than doubled the Kass population. He slaughters 20-30 cattle every market day (Mondays and Thursday), compared with 10 cattle per market day last year.

A butcher in pre-conflict times, Hassan Khakis Mohamed has reestablished himself as a small butcher in Hasa Hissa camp, the largest in Zalengei (West Darfur). He and a fellow butcher in the next stall split the costs of a bull. Together, they pay SDD 40,000 to buy a bull, SDD 500 to the man who slaughters it, SDD 300 to the man who carts the carcass to the Hasa Hissa camp market and SDD 2,500 in fees to the market. Hassan says he can sell a whole table top of meat in one day, but at 16:45, his table is full of unsold meat, despite the late afternoon reduction in price from SDD 500/kg to SDD 400. He complains that IDPs are not buying, because most are away at a food distribution today that he didn't know about. Then his eyes brighten. Perhaps some IDPs will buy meat with the cash earned from selling food aid rations. After all, in winter time his unrefrigerated meat can last another day. Despite uncertainty, Hassan finds butchering more rewarding than making mud bricks in town for SDD 200-300 per day.

El Fasher (North Darfur) used to be one of the largest livestock exporting markets but now, cut off from normal supply lines in North Darfur, meat prices in El Fasher are expensive. A kilo of beef sells for SDD 800 (normally SDD 300) and a kilo of mutton sells for SDD 1,000 (normally SDD 500). Ever since rebels prevented an attempt by several traders to truck animals from Nyala to El Fasher, traders in Nyala slaughter animals in Nyala and ship meat by bus and truck to El Fasher, a 3-hour trip that now takes 6 hours due to frequent roadblocks. Few IDPs buy meat regularly but aggregate purchases of small quantities add up. Thus, meat demand by IDPs, numbering 200,000 in the El Fasher area, also accounts for increased meat prices.

Source: Assessment Team

3.4.5. Cash Crops have Lost their Marketing Channels

Marketing channels for two important cash crops, groundnuts and gum arabic (Box 3.4),⁵ have broken down as industrial buyers largely abandoned producers in 2004/05. This loss of markets left many producers with unsold supplies, low (or collapsed) prices and greatly reduced terms of trade.

With few exceptions, demand for industrially processed groundnuts is also down due to the absence of buyers on behalf of oil processors from central Sudan, in addition to slack demand due to distribution of food aid vegetable oil and competition from olestra (no-fat cooking oil).

Whether prices are higher or lower depends on the quantity of local production in 2004/05, outside demand and local insecurity. Three oilseed manufacturing companies used to compete for supplies from Nyala, but none showed up after the last harvest.

⁵ Sudan is the largest exporter of gum arabic, gums produced from *Acacia senegal* and *Acacia seyal* and related species of the mimosa family. Gum arabic has a variety of uses, including sweets, fruit juices and other drinks; gum paste; animal feed; coating for pharmaceuticals; ink and ink-based products; and dietary and health foods.

- Nyala prices are down this year to SDD 3,200 per *kintar* from SDD 6,000 last year. A sack of groundnut cake for livestock feed costs SDD 1,300 this year, up from SDD 800 last year due to the higher cost of fuel.
- In Ed Daein and Edd el Fursan markets, one 100-lb *kintar* of groundnuts sold this year for SDD 1,700 compared with prices ranging between SDD 3-4,000 last year. In Ed Daein groundnut supplies increased due to a sell-off by migrants heading home to Southern Sudan and prices decreased from SDD 3,300 per 100 lb *kintar* last year to SDD 2,500 this year.
- Even so, economics do not support supplying cheaper groundnuts from Edd el Fursan to Nyala because various delivery costs, taxes and fees eliminate nearly all of the price difference between the markets. When transfer costs per unit exceed the difference in price per unit, the two markets will not trade.

Box 3.4. Institutional Marketing Problems for Gum Arabic

Producers of gum arabic don't know where to sell their output. The Agricultural Development Bank closed operations in North Darfur in December, most weekly rural markets no longer exist and the main buyer, the gum arabic company headquartered in Nyala, didn't buy anything this year.

During December-February, producers usually sell gum arabic in rural markets to independent middlemen or agents of the gum arabic company. This year, the gum company as well as traditional buyers from Kordofan and Khartoum stayed away. Insecurity and general restrictions on the transport of all commodities prevented producers from traveling directly to sell their goods in Nyala where prices were better.

Production dropped by half, affected by insecurity rather than poor rainfall. Normally, such a decline in marketed quantity would prompt a price hike. However, the gum arabic company is an effective monopoly, offering a fixed price that is unaffected by changes in supply. Smuggling supplies to Chad or the Central African Republic used to bring better prices, but this year, smuggling was too dangerous.

Source: Assessment Team

Conversely, groundnut prices improved where supplies fell and buyers bought.

- In Kass groundnut prices increased from SDD 2,200 last year to SDD 3,000 this year due to decreased area planted and harvested as well as poor rainfall. Moreover, the Agricultural Bank of Sudan bought small quantities to constitute a seed bank for the coming crop season.
- In Zalingei groundnut prices increased from SDD 1,500 last year to SDD 3,000 this year.


Two more examples show other conflict-related changes in groundnut marketing:

- A groundnuts retailer in Al Geneina used to sell 12-15 *kintar* per day last year, compared with at most 1-2 *kintar* per day this year at SDD 3,700 per *kintar*, largely due to supply shortfalls as many producers were in the camps and didn't cultivate. To recoup her lost turnover of about SDD 100-200 per *kintar*, she processes the groundnuts by shelling, boiling and roasting them. She has also expanded into sorghum and millet sales on account of her low groundnuts turnover.
- In Kutum and Mellit (North Darfur), groundnuts are in high demand as food (not oil) and sales volumes this year exceed those of last year. Groundnuts arrive from Nyala. Consequently, a *kintar* of groundnuts in Kutum costs SDD 5,800 this year compared with SDD 4,000-4,500 last year and in Mellit SDD 6,500 this year compared with SDD 4,500-5,000 last year. People eat roasted groundnuts during the day (or as their midday meal) because roasted groundnuts cost less than sorghum and millet and require no fuel for cooking.

3.5. A New Development in Cereals Marketing: Sales of Food Aid

Displacement and continuing insecurity have reshaped Darfur's marketing networks. Village and rural assembly markets have generally disappeared in conflict areas in all three Darfur states. In contrast, primary and secondary markets have expanded.

Moreover, new markets have sprung up in displacement camps and nearby towns to cater for the needs of IDPs and resident populations. Market days in the bigger camps bustle with activity as buses, lorries and donkey carts packed with people and goods weave their way past crowds of buyers and sellers. The presence of new IDP markets, already taking on an air of permanence, has altered a number of economic relationships.



Almost any food aid recipient can participate in the market as there are few barriers to entry (or exit), perhaps a nominal vendor fee payable to the municipality. Petty trade in the markets represents employment for those with low opportunity costs, as well as a source of social diversion.

Food aid commodities are among the main items exchanged in IDP camp markets. Food aid recipients sell some of their sorghum. A few stall keepers, operating on credit advanced from relatives in town, also sell

consumer goods. Spices and food complements (ginger, chilies, cinnamon, dried tomatoes, dried okra, and others) are often available, but few IDPs can afford to buy. IDP markets, where prices are often cheaper, also attract non-IDP customers from nearby towns and villages. These customers often have greater purchasing power and represent a steady source of demand.

Figure 3.2 shows the structure of this new cereals market from the vantage of food aid sorghum sales. Food aid recipients consume most of their sorghum within the household, possibly feeding small quantities to their donkeys.

In the IDP camp market most recipients sell some sorghum to camp or town millers (section 3.6) or town market retailers. Some recipients collect and retail food aid sorghum themselves.

The camp miller may sell to camp wholesalers (whose volumes are measured in sacks not tons) or to town market retailers and wholesalers.

In the end, food aid sorghum reaches consumers in town through as few as one or two transactions or as many as three or four transactions. Many townspeople come directly to IDP camp markets to bypass other middle men or women.

3.6. The Role of Mills

As shown in Figure 3.2, food aid sorghum enters the market in two ways: sales by recipients and payments to millers. Sorghum must be milled before consumed. Few IDPs were able to flee with their mortars and pestles and most women are willing to avoid the daily drudgery of hand pounding by taking their sorghum to mechanical mills. Most cash-strapped customers find it easier to pay for milling services in kind.⁶ Millers keep and put aside part of the sorghum brought for milling. After accumulating unmilled sorghum in bigger volumes, millers sell it to wholesalers and occasionally retailers.

The number of mills is limited, giving millers the latitude to set their payments. The volume of sorghum that millers take as payment varies considerably, but is often high. In most cases, millers keep and put aside about 20-30 percent, but reportedly as much as 50 percent in Al Geneina where

Box 3.5. The High Cost of Milling

- In Hasa Hissa camp, the largest in Zalingei, an IDP miller who was able to bring his mill with him, charges SDD 50 to mill a *moud* of sorghum for those who can afford to pay. For every 5 “bowls” of sorghum (where 4 bowls = 1 *moud*), the Hasa Hissa miller takes one bowl as payment for oil and fuel – a payment of 20 percent. For those who cannot afford to pay, he takes just a handful. He is milling more now because greater numbers of IDPs in the camp are registered for food distributions. He sells his accumulated sorghum to local traders.
- A miller in Zalingei town charges SDD 80 per *moud* of white millet – about 16 percent by value. According to the miller, resident households are milling about 20 percent less than they did one year previously due to higher fuel prices (4 gallons of fuel cost SDD 3,300 in late January 2005, compared with SDD 2,000 in January 2004). This miller also mills for free for those who cannot pay as part of his alms-giving (*sadaka*).
- A miller in Kass town charges SDD 70 per *moud* of millet or sorghum, about 16 percent by value. He mills in the IDP camp for a reduced fee of SDD 30 per *moud*, but insists on cash payment.
- IDPs in Keringding camp near Al Geneina now pay SDD 20 per *coro* of sorghum for milling. As they sell their sorghum to traders at SDD 50 per *coro*, milling charges reach 40 percent.

Source: Assessment Team

fuel costs were highest due to the long distance from supply centers. As a consequence of high milling costs, recipients lose part of their ration and the value of their income transfer decreases, as shown by the examples in Box 3.5.

Part of the high cost of milling reflects monopoly rents, particularly in IDP camps located away from town where there are fewer millers. At the time of the Assessment, as an interim arrangement to help improve competition and reduce consumer costs, the NGO CHF International was installing

⁶ Sorghum and millet are milled without decorticating, yielding a more nutritious wholegrain meal.

additional mills in several IDP camps for operation by private millers who bid on competitively awarded 3-6 month contracts. In Zam Zam camp near El Fasher, CHF provides certain costs, including a fuel subsidy of SDD 20 per *coro*. In exchange, these contracts stipulate that payment in kind for milling will not exceed 10 percent by volume, turned over to supplementary feeding centers in the camp.

3.7. New Price Relationships

Delivery and distribution of food aid cereals has altered the usual price relationships between locations and commodities. The most far-reaching changes are that:

- sorghum prices are lower in Darfur than elsewhere in Sudan;
- sorghum prices are relatively low, and lower than what they would have been under the circumstances; and
- sorghum is a relatively affordable alternative to millet.

Amazingly – yet not surprisingly – the increasing injection of food aid sorghum has lowered prices in Darfur, despite the 61 percent drop in production in 2004/05 (Section 1.2). Since September 2004, Darfur prices have fallen even below Gedarif prices in the heart of the sorghum-growing area. As of April, sorghum prices across the main markets in Darfur remained the lowest in the country. April prices in Darfur were about 30 percent lower than the price in El Obeid.⁷

Figure 3.3 shows millet and sorghum price trends in each of the state capitals since January 2004. These graphs are drawn to the same scale for direct comparison. These trends do not reflect the normal seasonal pattern of rising prices in the dry season (January-May) and hungry period (June-September) and decreasing prices in the post-harvest period (October-December). Conflict has muddled these normal price patterns.


Millet is always more expensive than sorghum, reflecting deep-seated consumer tastes and preferences. Pre-conflict sorghum prices usually reached 80 to 85 percent of millet prices. The combination of conflict, displacement, reductions in net millet production ranging from 50 to 100 percent and massive food aid shipments has greatly widened the gap between millet and sorghum prices to where sorghum prices have dropped to 50 percent or less of millet prices. As of February, millet prices were very high in all three Darfur states, ranging between SDD 8,000 and SDD 10,000 (approximately \$31-39) per 100 kg sack – and twice as expensive as prices over the previous two years.

Of all three markets, millet prices reached their peak in Al Geneina in March 2004 at SDD 13,400 per 90-kg sack – about 4.5 times more expensive than sorghum prices – one month before WFP started its emergency operations. Curiously, market retailers (all women) consistently report that millet sells faster than other cereals. This suggests that despite the higher price, demand remains high for the relatively few who can afford to buy, even for smaller quantities.

At prevailing prices, many IDP households in Darfur cannot afford to purchase millet. In interviews with resident households and IDPs in the market, most people indicated that millet had become out of reach for them, and referred to millet as food for rich people. Even relatively "wealthy" families with stable incomes reported reducing the amount of millet consumed as well as reducing the number of meals consumed per day.

⁷ WFP/VAM *Food Security Update – Sudan*. Vol. 1, Issue 2, May 2005, p. 2.

Figure 3.3. Wholesale Sorghum and Millet Prices: January 2004 – February 2005



Source of Data: WFP/Sudan
 Graphs: Assessment Team

In contrast, poorer urban households and residents from outlying villages are buying and consuming sorghum twice a day. According to WFP distribution monitoring and post-distribution monitoring reports in Al Geneina, for example, recipient households sold, on average, about 20 percent of all sorghum food aid.

As of February 2005, prices of sorghum were considerably lower than millet, ranging between SDD 3,000 and 5,000 (\$12-20) per 90 kg sack. These average prices were about SDD 500 to SDD 1,500 (\$2-6) more per sack than prices recorded at the same time two years ago in Darfur when the conflict was just starting, and more than prices last year at the same time.

Thanks to the sales of food aid sorghum, therefore, market prices of all cereals are still rising, but at a slower rate. Sorghum prices in Al Geneina have been the most stable of the three markets, hovering around SDD 3,500-4,000 per sack. This stability reflects steady delivery and distribution of food aid sorghum and the steady infusion of food aid sorghum onto the market.⁸

⁸ Although the Assessment Team could not quantify food aid sold in each market, the relative volume of food aid appeared to be very high in Abu Shouk (El Fasher), moderate in Kutum and low in other markets. This relative volume depends in part on the date of the previous food aid distribution.

3.8. New Terms of Trade

Displaced people struggle to use their fixed income – food aid – to sell or exchange for other goods. One kilogram of sorghum, for example, will fetch about 500 grams of dried tomatoes, about 200 grams of dried okra and 3 cakes of generic soap (Box 3.6).

Box 3.6. Terms of Trade: The Value of Food Aid Sorghum

Selling one kilogram of sorghum (SDD 75 per *coro*, or SDD 50 per kg) in al Geneina in early February fetched the equivalent of:

	Sale of Sorghum (1 kg)	Unskilled labor wages (1 day)
Millet (grain)	429 g	2.1429 kg
Wheat (grain)	500 g	2.500 kg
Rice	187.5 g	937.5 g
Groundnuts	250 g	833 g
Groundnut Oil	250 ml	1.250 l
Sugar	168 g	840 g
Meat (Beef)	125 g	625 g
Soap	1.67 bars	8.33 bars
Grass (large bundle)	0.10 bundle	0.50 bundle
Grass (small bundle)	0.29 bundle	1.43 bundle
Fodder (groundnut vines)	0.33 bundle	1.67 bundle
Firewood (fagot)	1.0 fagot	5.0 fagots

Note: US\$1 = SDD 255 and €1 = SDD 325.

Note: Wages = SDD 250 per day.

Source: Assessment Team.

Terms of trade express how much of one good (or service) can be obtained in exchange for another good (or service), calculated by dividing the market value of one by the other. This useful measure reduces the influence of general inflation and captures seasonal price fluctuations.

Box 3.6 shows the value of food aid sorghum in terms of other goods. Using the WFP ration of 450 g of cereals per person per day (or 13.5 kg per person per month), 1 kg of sorghum will meet the daily requirements of 2.22 people. In contrast, 1 kg of the more expensive millet will only feed 0.95 person per day and rice 1.11 persons per day.

Terms of trade for one day of unskilled agricultural wages (SDD 250 per day) are shown for comparison. Wages for one day's work can buy 5 kg of sorghum, enough to feed a household of 5 for 2.22 days. At this rate, working 13.6 days per month would meet the household's gross sorghum needs,

before milling. Assuming further a payment for milling of about 25 percent (loss of 16.875 kg per month), a household member would need to work about 17 days per month to meet the household's total *net* consumption needs of 67.5 kg per month.

However, agricultural work is seasonal. With so many IDPs and others competing for employment, there is no certainty of finding work for 17 days every month. Moreover, these days of work do not cover other (non-cereal) household requirements.


Figure 3.4 shows the terms of trade between daily agricultural wages and kilograms of sorghum in each of the state capitals. These graphs are drawn to the same scale for direct comparison.

Starting with the terms of trade between the daily wages of an agricultural worker (represented by columns, using the left-hand scale), the graph shows that in February 2005, an agricultural laborer in Nyala could earn the equivalent of 3.38 kg of sorghum for each day of work, compared with 9.23 kg in Al Geneina and 5.38 kg in El Fasher.

These terms of trade imply that to meet *monthly* cereal consumption needs for household of 5, about 67.5 kg when adding losses due to milling, a worker would need to work 20 days a month in February in Nyala, 7.3 days in Al Geneina and 12.5 days in El Fasher.

Each graph also shows the trend of daily wage-sorghum terms of trade for the 14 months ending February 2005. Terms of trade reached the highest in Nyala during March and April 2004, about 14.40 kg. Comparing the three capitals, daily wage-sorghum terms of trade have generally declined between March 2004 and February 2005 in Nyala while terms of trade in Al Geneina have been generally stable between 6 and 8 kg. For most of the period, terms of trade were lowest in El Fasher, as low as 3.35 kg in January 2005.

Turning to goat-sorghum terms of trade (represented by the line, using the right-hand scale), a goat seller in Nyala could obtain the equivalent of 198.5 kg of sorghum for each goat in February, compared with 215.3 kg in Al Geneina and 124.2 kg in El Fasher. This implies that to meet *annual* cereal consumption needs (67.5 kg/month * 12 months = 810 kg/year), a household would need to sell 4.1 goats over the course of the year in Nyala, 3.8 goats in Al Geneina and 6.5 goats in El Fasher. As it's unlikely that many households near town would have that many goats to sell, it is presumed that they would seek to diversify their sources of income, as noted in Part Two.



To the extent that food aid sorghum has helped to keep cereals prices lower than what they would have been (and lower than elsewhere around Sudan), goat sellers benefit from more favorable terms of trade in the three markets and, presumably, better household sorghum consumption.

3.9. Net Impact of Food Aid Sales

While conflict has created new marketing constraints, food aid sorghum and other commodities have helped moderate some of the old ones. In this regard, food aid benefits clearly outweigh the costs.

On the positive side, food aid sorghum has increased cereals availability to help offset the sharp drop in Darfur's production in 2004/05. Food aid sorghum has become a marketable commodity and income transfer (Box 3.7), thereby giving people access to other commodities. Sorghum has also entered normal (non-IDP) marketing channels, where these channels still exist. Participation in the market gives displaced people something to do. Primary and secondary markets are acting as redistribution points for relief commodities.

In addition, food aid sorghum is delivered fairly regularly and less susceptible to wide variations in supply. Food aid sorghum is helping to stabilize sorghum prices specifically and food prices generally. As a non-preferred staple, abundant sorghum has kept millet prices in check and provided a low-cost, self-targeting alternative for the poor (Box 3.8, next page). In fact, millet and sorghum may be considered distinct markets.

On the negative side, that usual criticism of food aid is that it distorts food production incentives and disrupts prices and markets. Food aid

sorghum interjects new uncertainty into the market. The unpredictability of food aid – timing, volume and frequency – prevents producers, traders and transporters from adjusting their production and marketing strategies in time. Moreover, food aid often displaces other purchased food, releasing new purchasing power that changes market supply and demand patterns in unforeseen ways. For this reason, European Community and US food aid legislation requires their respective aid agencies to certify that their food aid does not cause a significant disincentive to food production and marketing in the recipient country.

These conventional criticisms don't hold in Darfur where violent conflict has already displaced more than one million agro-pastoralists from their farms and severely disrupted normal production and marketing patterns. As long as the conflict continues, local cereal production cannot begin to make up the current deficits and all local production will go to meet part of the aggregate consumption requirements.

Box 3.7.

Why Tolerate Leakages of Food Aid onto the Market?

For internally displaced people in camps as well as households hosting IDPs outside camps, food aid serves two vital functions:

- nourishment, and
- income transfer.

Whereas critics used to blame food aid “leakages” onto the market on poor targeting, food aid programmers deliver food aid to Darfur in the expectation that some of it will be sold. For many conflict-affected people, food aid is their only regular source of income. Selling part of their food aid allows these people to meet other pressing needs. In the case of many IDPs, wrenched from their homes and livelihoods and functionally destitute, food aid is their ticket into the money economy.

In short, food aid is helping to lubricate a depressed economy and keep prices lower than they would be in the absence of market sales.

Box 3.8. Self-Targeting Sorghum, a Nutritional Bargain

Food consumption choices reflect both economic factors (relative prices as well as water, fuel and time costs of preparation) and non-economic factors (tastes, preferences and prestige). Of the two main cereals grown and consumed in Darfur, millet is the cereal of first choice. However, low incomes and high prices put millet out of reach for many households. These households have to turn to sorghum as a substitute cereal. This makes sorghum a *self-targeting* good, one that the better-off will not consume but one that the poor will consume because they cannot afford millet.

Fortunately, sorghum is nearly as nutritious as millet in terms of weight (Table 3.1.). However, in terms of cost per unit of nutrition, sorghum is more economical (Table 3.2.).

Table 3.1. Comparison of Nutritional Values between Sorghum and Millet by Weight: per 100 grams edible portion

	Energy (kcal)	Protein (g)	Fat (g)	Carbohydrate (g)	Calcium (mg)	Iron (mg)
Sorghum	329	10.4	3.1	70.7	25	5.4
Millet	363	11.8	4.8	67.0	42	11.0

Source: FAO. *Sorghum and Millet in Human Nutrition*. Rome, 1995. Chapter 4. Chemical Composition and Nutritive Value, Table 17. Values are shown for pearl millet, the most common variety in Darfur.

Table 3.2. Comparison of Nutritional Values between Sorghum and Millet by Cost: Sudanese Dinars (SDD) per Unit

	Energy (kcal)	Protein (g)	Fat (g)	Carbohydrate (g)	Calcium (mg)	Iron (mg)
Sorghum	0.0152	0.4808	1.6129	0.0707	0.2000	0.9259
Millet	0.0321	1.1221	2.4313	0.1742	0.2765	1.0609

Source of price data: Assessment team, Al Geneina market, January 31, 2005. Sorghum refers to food aid sorghum (*feterita*).

Based on retail market costs in Al Geneina of SDD 75 per *coro* of sorghum and SDD 175 per *coro* of millet (a *coro* of grain weighs approximately 1.5 kg), 100 grams of sorghum cost about SDD 5.00 and 100 grams of millet cost about SDD 11.67. For energy, each sorghum kilocalorie costs SD 0.0152 (SDD 5.00/100 g ÷ 329 kcal/100 g) and each millet kilocalorie costs SDD 0.0321 (SDD 11.67/100 g ÷ 363 kcal/100 g), and so on for other nutrient costs. As shown in Table 3.2., each millet kilocalorie, gram of protein and gram of carbohydrate is more than twice as expensive as the comparable sorghum unit. Unit for unit, sorghum costs less than millet in all categories. In this regard, sorghum is the better bargain and an ideal self-targeting food.

Source: Assessment Team

More troubling, distribution of limited food aid on the basis of emergency needs of IDPs and hosts, rather than needs of all livelihood groups, has not gone completely as planned. The availability of free or low-cost sorghum – like all food aid and relief assistance generally – has fueled a sense of exclusion and resentment by those who have not received.

Looking ahead, food aid sorghum from the United States, the main cereal donor, is about to be replaced by 200,000 MT food aid wheat for the next several months. Wheat is an imperfect substitute for sorghum: it is the second-choice commodity after millet and costs considerably more than sorghum at present. Thus, its likely market impact is not clear. Food recipients may decide to sell less wheat than they sell sorghum now (Box 3.9). Higher wheat prices, all factors equal, may exclude poorer consumers. The market impact of wheat will need to be monitored closely for any unexpected negative effects.

Box 3.9. What Food Aid to Sell?

The value of food aid as an income transfer is measured by its potential savings to the recipient household that frees its budget for other food and non-food purchases. However, the value of this income transfer varies widely among food aid commodities.

The decision of what food aid to sell depends on market demand and the amount of cash required. According to the WFP distribution monitoring and post-distribution monitoring reports in Al Geneina, food aid recipients first sell part of their sorghum, rather than other items, as a way to get cash income. Recipients generally sell pulses next and within pulses, less preferred peas before lentils, because lentils “taste better and cook faster,” according to a market interview in Mellit (the food aid peas and lentils are brought in traders from El Fasher). Fortified vegetable oil has an “unpleasant smell,” according to consumers in Al Geneina, and is sold before other vegetable oil – but it commands a lower price.

Corn-soya-blend (CSB), a nutritionally fortified food supplement for children, is the most expensive “cereal” for donors to deliver, but the least expensive “cereal” on the market, selling as low as SDD 50 per *coro*, about two-third the price of sorghum. Unfamiliarity of recipient households with CSB – its purpose and preparation – accounts in part for its low market value. It is recommended that WFP and its implementing partners instruct recipient households on preparing CSB with the suggested measures of vegetable oil and sugar.

Source: Assessment Team

3.10. Programming Recommendations to Support Markets and Food Aid

This final section recommends actions to support markets and food aid distributions in Darfur. While adequate security is a prerequisite for markets to function, security issues will be discussed separately in Part Four. Suffice it to say here that markets would benefit from a) an expanded presence of AU forces in the markets themselves and along key highways and marketing routes and b) a culture of peace that recognizes each market as a neutral venue where everyone can do business without fear.

These programming recommendations are based on a *status quo* scenario in terms of the overall situation – continuing conflict and insecurity, large numbers of displaced persons and lack of progress on a negotiated settlement.

These recommendations also reflect a *deteriorating* scenario in terms of the larger number of conflict-affected people needing food assistance due to the dismal harvest in 2004/05, depletion of resources and collapsing livelihoods.

3.10.1. Continue to Stabilize Availability of and Access to Cereals

Part Three has demonstrated the enormous contribution of food aid in Darfur to food availability and access in the current environment, not only for internally displaced persons and host households, but for poor consumers who are able to reach food markets. The distribution and sale of food aid sorghum is stabilizing sorghum prices without political manipulation, hoarding, or diversion. Thus far, Darfur has been spared efforts by spoilers or others who may have lost financially as a result of the food aid influx to halt or interfere with food aid sales.

In light of the vital importance of food aid sales, the Assessment Team recommends that WFP and local market authorities continue to facilitate the sale of donor food aid to:


- stabilize market supplies and prices of cereals staples;
- dampen price inflation and protect household purchasing power;
- help meet consumer effective demand; and
- maintain market-related employment opportunities.

3.10.2. Meet Expanding Food Aid Requirements

For many reasons, food security prospects in Darfur look bleak for the next year or two. Two million displaced Darfuris are unwilling to return home and resume their former livelihoods because they do not feel safe. Since all livelihoods are closely intertwined, the welfare of non-displaced groups has also suffered during this humanitarian crisis.

In light of these deteriorating conditions, the number of people needing food and other assistance has risen dramatically in the past four months. In April 2005 WFP revised its December 2004 estimates of people requiring food aid from a peak of 2.7 million per month in July-August to 3.25 million per month in August-October.⁹

Figure 3.5. Original and Revised Estimates of Food Aid Recipients in Darfur in 2005



Source: WFP, through USAID/Food for Peace

Concurrently, ICRC, which had planned to support up to 200,000 non-displaced Darfuris with food aid, will now support 250,000. This combined total reaches 3.5 million – about two of three people of the pre-conflict resident population.

Figure 3.5 shows the steep increase in WFP's revised estimate of food aid recipients starting in April, along with actual distributions in January-April.

Meeting this major increase in food aid recipients for WFP alone will require an additional 110,055 MT of food commodities, from 484,274 MT

to 594,329 MT, not to mention a major expansion of management and acceleration of operations. Supplies are urgently needed, especially non-cereals, to avoid a break in the delivery and distribution pipeline.

⁹ World Food Program Emergency Operation EMOP 10339.1 of December 17, 2004; WFP Sudan *Plan of Action: Darfur* of April 10, 2005.

Accordingly, the Assessment Team recommends that food aid and other donors pledge and deliver additional emergency food aid to both WFP and ICRC, in response to these additional urgent needs.

The Team also recommends that donors contribute financially to the non-food support operations of WFP and ICRC to meet these emergency needs.

3.10.3. Expedite the Re-registration of WFP Food Aid Beneficiaries

Once needy people are identified, registered and given ration cards, they are eligible to receive food aid. With the fluid movement of people to and from camps and host communities, some beneficiaries have registered in more than one location to receive more than one food ration. Although there are no estimates of the number of these duplicate registrations, there is concern that they represent a sizeable percentage and a drain on limited food resources at a time of rising needs.

To deal with duplicate registrations and up date its lists, WFP and its cooperating partners are conducting a Darfur-wide re-registration of food aid recipients. The registration methodology, developed with help from the International Office of Migration (IOM), is intended to capture all eligible beneficiaries regardless of ethnic background or geographic location. Each WFP partner is responsible for re-registering its caseload, in accordance with procedures developed in consultation with WFP. The IOM has assisted WFP in training partner field staff.

The re-registration is well underway but it has run into various obstacles, including the refusal of some camp and community leaders to endorse the re-registration, misunderstanding and mistrust of its purpose, the mistaken belief that re-registration was optional, underestimates of the effort required to reregister hundreds of thousands of people, overly stretched cooperating partners and ever-present insecurity that prevented simultaneous (same week) re-registration of recipients designed to minimize movement from distribution center to distribution center.

The Assessment Team recommends that WFP and its cooperating partners resolve these obstacles and quickly finalize the re-registration of eligible food aid recipients as a means to:

- Confirm and/or adjust the revised estimate of greater needs;
- Appeal for additional food and funds with greater precision and confidence;
- Gain a clearer breakdown of those getting full rations and those getting half rations;¹⁰
- Gain a better understanding of overall non-food needs; and
- Facilitate planning and resource allocations.

3.10.4. Coordinate Food Aid Planning and Distributions

The Assessment Team recommends that WFP improve coordination and collaboration between its partners to focus its efforts on the programming horizon through the end of the year. For example:

- Several assessments and studies over the past months have highlighted the deteriorating agricultural conditions in Darfur. FAO and NGOs have prepared work plans to provide seeds and tools to villages, IDPs, and host communities. WFP can provide food aid to these households with the purpose of shoring up their precarious livelihoods while they await the harvest in 4-5 months.
- Likewise, the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) and partners can inform WFP nutrition programming decisions, such as where to focus supplementary feeding activities in response to communities who missed recent food aid distributions. The numbers and locations of beneficiaries, the timing of food distributions or health interventions, and a concerted strategy to meet the needs of people so they don't have to leave their homes should be coordinated among major programming and implementing organizations.

¹⁰ IDPs are to receive full rations and all other (non-displaced) conflict-affected beneficiaries half rations.

More specifically, the Assessment Team recommends that WFP and ICRC strengthen their coordination and collaboration to ensure the steady delivery of cross-line assistance.

3.10.5. Resolve the Cereals Milling Issue

Given our deep concern about the high proportion of sorghum that food aid recipients pay in kind to the millers, the Assessment Team recommends that donors, NGOs and responsible local authorities urgently resolve the cereals milling issue in an equitable and economically rational way that balances the needs of recipients and millers alike.

Resolution of this issue should consider:

- The functional destitution of *many* IDPs who remain dependent on others for their basic survival;
- The ability of *some* IDPs to pay for milling services, thanks to income-earning activities that helps put their skills and capacities to good use;
- The principle that milling adds value for which a cost must be paid;
- The need for millers to recover rising operating and maintenance costs, particularly fuel costs;
- Options to increase competition among millers as a way to reduce in-kind payments;
- Options to subsidize milling operations to reduce in-kind payments; and
- Payment and cost-recovery solutions that are simple to implement and fair to all.

It is our objective to keep Darfur grain markets functioning – including grain milling services. Creating more forward and backwards linkages by paying for services will help revive the informal economy and ultimately reduce IDP dependence on others. Equally important, the decision to pay for services (or not to pay) gives IDPs a sense of control over their economic destiny that is otherwise missing.

3.10.6. Increase the Cereals Ration Size

WFP's planned increase in food distributions and beneficiaries will help ensure that emergency food aid remains accessible as the hungry season progresses, but in order to mitigate the currently projected cereal shortfall, it will be necessary to increase the cereal ration.

The Assessment Team recommends that WFP increase the cereal ration from 13.5 kg to 15 kg for IDPs to:

- partly offset the payment in kind for milling;
- continue to enable IDPs and affected residents to participate in the market; and
- increase the availability of cereals on the market to meet remaining effective demand as the hungry season approaches.

The proposed increase of 1.5 kg per person per month represents an additional cereal requirement of approximately 25,000 MT of cereals over the remainder of the year, based on expanded needs.¹¹

With regard to ICRC, the other major source of food aid in Darfur, the Team recommends that ICRC use its flexibility to increase its rations in response to analysis carried out in its areas of operations. Where necessary, ICRC should take steps now to address possible resource constraints and/or organizational constraints to borrowing commodities from WFP pending repayment.

The Assessment Team also recommends that WFP fully explain its decision to provide full rations to displaced persons and half rations to non-displaced persons. This can be done through a mass communication campaign and consultations with camp, community and tribal leaders.

¹¹ WFP increased its sorghum ration to 15 kg, after discussions on this recommendation, starting with the March distributions.

3.10.7. Monitor the Impact of Food Aid More Closely

As Darfur moves into the hungry season with its seasonal stresses – declining own grain stocks, normally increasing food prices and decreasing livestock prices – consistent, in-depth monitoring of the impact of food aid will be essential for several reasons.

- First, determine whether the cereals ration increase is ensuring sufficient access to cereals to the broad spectrum of conflict affected people.
- Second, closely monitor prices, volumes and terms of trade in *each* major market and IDP camp market to discern local trends, given that the *localized* impact of insecurity can disrupt market supply and demand patterns in unknown ways.
- Third, check whether food aid is flowing out of Darfur. There is a risk that if the sorghum price difference per ton, say, between El Obeid and Nyala becomes greater than the transport cost per ton between El Obeid and Nyala (section 3.7), food aid sorghum could find its way to El Obeid and possibly elsewhere in Kordofan.

The Assessment Team recommends that WFP expand its market monitoring and analysis capability to be able to more quickly adjust its program levels and coverage, a recommendation closely related to the previous recommendation (section 2.3.1.4) that WFP expand its livelihood monitoring for more flexible and responsive programming. Based on expanded capacity for monitoring and analysis, WFP should be able, for example, to increase or decrease ration levels, change programming and beneficiary targets, and quickly call for related interventions from FAO, UNICEF, ICRC and/or non-governmental organizations.

As NGO implementing partners are setting up their own weekly surveys in IDP camps and towns, the Team recommends that WFP coordinate with its partners to ensure proper training and uniformity of survey instruments for comparable results.

3.10.8. Revive Markets for Cash Crops

Marketing channels for two important cash crops, groundnuts and gum arabic, have fallen into disarray as industrial buyers largely abandoned producers in 2004/05 (section 3.4.5). This loss of markets left many producers with unsold supplies, low (or collapsed) prices and greatly reduced terms of trade. As with other economic problems in Darfur, insecurity is the major cause of the problem.

This is both a livelihood failure and market failure. The Assessment Team recommends that state and local authorities, along with FAO, WFP and agricultural-oriented NGOs, use their good offices to put industrial buyers in contact with producer groups to develop groundnuts and gum arabic production and marketing plans for the 2005/06 season. These plans could include:

- provision of production credits (both crops) and seeds (groundnuts);
- agreement on credit repayment terms (such as repayment in kind, based on a floor price and indicative price ranges);
- provisional procurement schedules and locations; and
- identification of contacts of producer-buyer representatives for quick exchange of news and information and/or adjustments to procurement plans.

In the meantime, the same authorities and organizations can consider alternative groundnut marketing schemes, such as buying groundnuts as part of a food aid ration and/or exchange of groundnuts for other basic food commodities (sorghum, oil, sugar and salt).

3.10.9. Improve Market Performance

Within security constraints, the Assessment Team recommends that state and local authorities, working with UN agencies and NGOs and traders, improve market performance by providing minimum essential sites and services. These include:

- Establishing a simple radio-based market information network, starting with market prices, to inform traders, transporters, agro-pastoralists and consumers of potential market opportunities. Prices and other relevant information, such as road security status, could be announced by radio and/or posted publicly in market places by designated personnel.
- Constructing of simple structures, including *rakubas* (awnings that provide shade) and rainy season shelters for IDP camp and other markets and secure warehouses for hire, and related services, to protect food commodities from physical and financial loss.
- Rehabilitating (or developing) rural feeder roads in secure areas to facilitate access to market and reduce transport costs.
- Rehabilitating (or developing) key livestock water points on market routes.

These last three activities could be implemented as food for work (or cash for work) activities under the proper supervision and management of technically qualified NGOs.

3.10.10. Prepare Transport and other Logistical Infrastructure for the Rainy Season

By necessity, WFP continues to focus on the short-term horizon — the need to complete the food aid registration process, pre-position food before the rainy season, and augment logistics capacity in preparation for newly expanded food aid needs. *The Plan of Action: Darfur* aims for “dispatches” of 60,000 MT to the state capitals every month starting in April.

Accordingly, the Assessment Team recommends that WFP take the following measures to prepare for the rainy season.

- Complete the re-registration of food aid beneficiaries. Registration may remove ineligible or duplicate recipients (such as the 16 percent reduction in head count in Kutum in March), significantly easing planning and preparations for the rainy season and rest of the year.
- Continue to expand warehouse capacity in the three state capitals and elsewhere as dispatching hubs to reach the planned capacity of 23,900 MT in North Darfur, 33,000 MT in South Darfur and 26,000 MT in West Darfur.
- Preposition sufficient food aid stocks in West Darfur as a matter of priority before the onset of the rainy season. Reaching West Darfur is more difficult than reaching South Darfur or North Darfur where roads to the state capitals are more passable during the rainy season. Preposition food aid quantities in North and South Darfur, as required.
- Take maximum advantage of the Benghazi (Libya)-Al Khufra-Abéché (Chad) corridor for reaching locations in West Darfur, where prepositioning needs reach an estimated 10,000 MT per month. This overland route will remain drier longer than other approaches.
- Bring the operating transport fleet up to full capacity. As of early March, only two-third of the 150 long-haul trucks (operating from Port Sudan to El Obeid) and only one-half of the 600 long-haul trucks (operating from logistics hubs to the Darfur state capitals) were available. Expand transport capacity by leasing or buying and/or repair long-haul trucks, as required. Ensure that the availability of short-haul trucks (from the state capitals to extended distribution points) is adequate.

Lastly, the Team recommends that UN agencies, NGOs and engineering firms expedite and complete on-going road repairs, upgrades and passages over key wadis (fords, causeways or submersible bridges) to minimize delivery delays and facilitate transport of food and other supplies during the rainy season.

PART FOUR. SECURITY and HUMANITARIAN ACCESS

The Abuja Protocols, signed on November 9 by the GOS and the main rebel groups, cover the security and humanitarian situation in Darfur. The Security Protocol requires all signatories to *recommit themselves ... to an effective ceasefire on land and air...* (Article 1).¹ The Humanitarian Situation Protocol requires all signatories to *take all steps required to prevent all attacks, threats, intimidation and any other form of violence against civilians by any Party or group, including the Janjaweed and other militias* (Article 2).²

Further reading of these Protocols shows that:

- all civilian groups should be able to carry out their normal livelihoods and commercial activities, with protection of property, and
- aid workers should be able to travel without hindrance throughout Darfur to serve conflict-affected populations.

As well known, these provisions have been violated by all sides. Serious gaps and deviations from these provisions persist. Insecurity continues to terrify civilians and hamper humanitarian access. In the words of the State Minister of Agriculture for West Darfur, all livelihoods are “terribly paralyzed” because “little is moving in the countryside.”

4.1. Insecurity in Camps, Markets and Host Communities

Our travel as Assessment Team was limited to air travel between cities and towns, with local vehicle transport after reaching our destination. We did not attempt to travel outside the security radius (20 km or less) set by the UN Office of Security Coordination (UNSECOORD). Except for a few visits to nearby villages, our first-hand observations are limited to bigger cities and towns.³

Inter-tribal tensions exist in varying degrees in all markets visited during the Assessment. All groups currently appear to be able to access these markets when necessary.

Vulnerability, lack of adequate protection and persistent insecurity for IDPs in and around camps remains a problem. Displacement camps are reasonably safe, but not completely safe. Although there is relative safety in large numbers, IDPs are unarmed, unlike their attackers.

Insecurity at Kalma camp exemplifies the problem. On December 13, *janjaweit* militias entered areas of the Kalma camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs), randomly shooting into the air and looting personal items and livestock belonging to new arrivals, according to humanitarian agencies.⁴ On April 27, as many as 200 *janjaweit* fired on Kalma camp.⁵ In addition to the fear, intimidation and confusion that such attacks create, UN agencies and NGOs usually suspend services to IDPs and movements in the areas where insecurity and fighting occur. In effect, the IDPs lose twice.

¹ <http://www.unsudanig.org/emergencies/darfur/reports/data/misc/security-protocol-abuja.doc>

² <http://www.unsudanig.org/emergencies/darfur/reports/data/misc/humanitarian-protocol-abuja.doc>

³ At the time of this Assessment, relatively secure areas broadly included eastern and southern South Darfur, eastern North Darfur, the area north-north-east of Jebel Mara (West Darfur), the corridor between Al Geneina and Kulbus (West Darfur). Some of these lie within rebel-controlled territory, posing additional difficulties of crossing front lines to assess needs and provide services.

⁴ USAID/OFDA *Darfur Update* #173, December 16, 2004.

⁵ USAID/OFDA *Darfur Update* #218, April 28, 2005.

Interviews with agro-pastoralist IDPs in various camps elicit common concerns about camp security. Nomadic pastoralist women occasionally come into the camp to shop at camp markets, though IDPs suspect they are there to size up recent distributions of non-food items (such as blankets, buckets or mosquito nets). In Hassa Hisa camp, IDPs complained about periodic after-midnight incursions of *janjaweit* who steal non-food supplies from IDPs. Frequently suggested solutions include installation of camp lighting⁶ and perimeter fencing, relaxation of the 19:00 camp curfew to ensure the longer presence of humanitarian workers in the camp, and camp patrols by personnel of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), the only security force that IDPs trust.

4.2. Slow Security Clearance Procedures

One of the most critical functions of UNSECOORD is ascertaining that a given zone is “secure” before aid agencies enter. If a security incident occurs in a previously secured zone, UNSECOORD sends a rapid assessment mission to investigate. In most cases, UNSECOORD declares the road to and from an incident area a “no go” area. Travel and operations by UN agencies is suspended for several days or longer until the investigation is completed. Travel and operational restrictions are lifted when conditions are safe to return, based on the professional judgment of UNSECOORD personnel. Many donors, such as USAID, voluntarily comply with UNSECOORD security restrictions as do NGOs that are fund by the UN and complying donors. Other NGOs are not bound by UNSECOORD restrictions.

The UNSECOORD office in Al Geneina typifies the problems of security investigations in Darfur: a large caseload but a small staff. The Al Geneina UNSECOORD office counts three UNSECOORD staff plus the security officers of three other UN agencies. This small office is responsible for the three Localities (Kulbus, Al Geneina and Habilah) west of Wadi Azoum that effectively splits West Darfur in two during the rainy season.

The ability of WFP and other UN agencies to access, assess, and assist communities has been constrained to a large extent by UNSECOORD staffing levels. As shown in Box 4.1, UNSECOORD operating constraints and delays can immobilize humanitarian activities for months. Lack of UNSECOORD capacity has resulted in delayed assessments, delayed distributions, and population displacements that could have been preventable.

Shifting the responsibility of initial assessment and food needs determination to WFP implementing partners who are not bound by UNSECOORD restrictions is not a solution to UNSECOORD’s lack of capacity. Implementing partners are often smaller and less equipped to operate in insecure environments than the organizations for which they implement. Partners should not be expected to take risks not taken by the UN. These findings are mirrored in a “real-time assessment” of the UN’s Darfur Response recently completed by OCHA.

⁶ According to the Women’s Development Network of El Fasher, IDP women raised concerns of attacks in and outside of the main IDP camps, Abou Shouk and Zam Zam. Lighting on the main roads, at water points and around latrines would provide the best protection as most attacks occur in these locations. Distribution of flashlights to women would be helpful as would-be attackers flee if they risk identification. USAID/OFDA *Darfur Update* #220, May 5, 2005.

Box 4.1. Kass Villages and Insecurity

Three examples from Kass Locality (Kass, Shettaya and South Jebel Mara Localities in South Darfur) show what happens when pervasive insecurity and inadequate police presence prevent delivery of food and humanitarian services.

- As of late January, the WFP Field Office in Kass was supposed to be operating in 29 towns and villages within a 30-km radius of Kass Town. WFP depends on UNSECOORD to carry out a periodic security assessment in these villages before mounting a general food distribution, but UNSECOORD had not been able to check security in all of these villages since the previous October. As a result, people in 19 villages classified as “no go” areas had not received food aid in more than four months.
- After renewed attacks in late 2004, the Locality established 8 police centers staffed by reserve police in attempt to reassure 47 predominantly agro-pastoralist villages that conditions were safe again. The adequacy of these police centers, however, could be seen as people voted with their feet and drifted into Kass Town. The entire village of Dugu decamped to Kass in mid-January, starting its own new camp. IDP leaders submitted to Locality Commissioner a list of claimants for relief aid totaling 18,000 people.
- According to representatives of four villages west of *Wadi Gundi* (Delo, El Guba, Awein Rado and Saranbana), the situation in their villages was “miserable.” They had lost all their livestock, including the donkeys. Their meager harvest in 2004 would last about four months (December 2004-March 2005), with no carry-over stocks from the previous year’s harvest. Wild foods were available but too dangerous to collect. People were eating one meal a day. They had gone without tea for 10 days. Moreover, no one had come to their aid. While their dignity told them not to leave home, their desperation told them to go for help. In fact, about one-quarter of the people in the four villages had already migrated to Kass Town. Three days before our interview, village leaders delivered a letter to the Locality Commissioner threatening to bring the entire villages to Kass if they didn’t receive adequate security quickly that would enable WFP and other agencies to deliver food and other relief.

Plainly, if services cannot go to the people, people will go to the services – with all the consequent complications. Unless quick action were taken, more villagers would arrive in Kass, changing market dynamics and increasing demand on relief services, such as health, water and sanitation. The pre-conflict population of Kass Town had already swollen from 37,000 to 78,000 with the influx of IDPs. This expansion, raising tensions between newcomers and townspeople, showed no signs of abating.

Source: Assessment Team

Insecurity takes a big toll, regardless of UNSECOORD capacity. According to WFP figures, the agency was only able to distribute food aid to a portion of the needy in the first quarter of 2005 – 1.243 million of 1.775 million planned in January (70 percent), 1.350 million of 2.0 million in February (68 percent), 1.303 million of 1.925 million in March (68 percent) and 1.57 million of 2.1 million in April (74.8 percent) – mainly due to the compounding impact of insecurity.⁷

4.3. Increasingly Effective Presence of the African Union

The gradual build-up of the African Union Mission in Sudan – observers, protection forces and civilian police – provides a glimmer of hope that incidents of violent conflict can be contained, if not

⁷ WFP figures for January-March, from USAID/FFP. WFP figure for April from WFP *Operational Update*, May 12, 2005.

prevented. For example, the AMIS civilian police is taking steps to establish a 24-hour presence in Kalma camp, after recent insecurity incidents, at the request of humanitarian aid agencies.

Thus, the Assessment Team is pleased that the AU's Peace and Security Council has agreed to increase the size of AMIS to more than 7,700, including nearly 5,500 troops, 1,600 civilian police and some 700 military observers, with full deployment expected by the end of September. Personnel, financial and logistics support from UNMIS and other sources is also welcome. Meanwhile, it is urgent that AMIS reach its full complement of 3,320 personnel authorized in October 2004.⁸

4.4. Programming Recommendations to Support Markets and Food Aid

This final section recommends actions to improve security in camps, markets and transport routes in Darfur as a prerequisite for delivering emergency humanitarian services, including food aid. These programming recommendations are based on a *status quo* scenario in terms of the overall situation – continuing conflict and insecurity, large numbers of displaced persons and lack of progress on a negotiated settlement. These recommendations can be carried out now.

4.4.1. Identify Options to Speed Security Assessments

The Assessment Team recommends that WFP identify options to address delayed security assessments and food distributions.

Options to consider include:

- Increasing UNSECOORD's capacity by seconding WFP security staff;
- Reaching a new agreement with AMIS observers; or
- Exploring some other mechanism acceptable to UNSECOORD that would enable WFP to act more quickly to respond to reports of need.

The issue of delayed security assessments and distributions will continue to affect WFP's response capabilities not only in Darfur, but in all other complex emergencies. If no UN solution is forthcoming, WFP should consider developing a global implementing partner relationship with an organization specializing in assessment and response in insecure environments that could extend WFP's reach into insecure or unassessed environments.

Enhancing UN security capacity through UNSECOORD or WFP itself is all the more urgent in light of the sharp increase in people needing food aid (section 3.10.2.). WFP's *Plan of Action* acknowledges this point.

The Assessment Team commends WFP for having already hired six new security officers of which four have arrived. The Team recommends that WFP energetically implement its *Plan of Action for Darfur* that calls for a sizeable increase in security assessment capacity before the end of May, including the deployment of:

- UN Department of Safety And Security (UNDSS) security officers (at least 4 per state);
- additional AMIS troops and civilian police; and
- 18 additional WFP security professionals throughout Darfur.

⁸ African Union Peace and Security Council, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. PSC/PR/Comm. (XVII). *Communiqué*. October 20, 2004.

4.4.2. Identify Options to Speed Food Distributions

According to the *Plan of Action*, WFP and its implementing partners have the current capacity to reach 2.3 million people – out of a caseload that is expected to rise to 3.25 million for WFP. Expanding this capacity in time is imperative.

In the immediate term, this capacity constraint may need to be addressed by providing WFP sub-offices the flexibility to decide whether extraordinary measures must be taken, such as distributing through tribal/community/religious leaders, or other informal networks, to prevent suffering and displacement.

The Assessment Team recommends that WFP introduce and try additional food distribution methods to manage the increasing estimated needs, including those identified in the *Plan of Action*:

- Community-led distributions using community-based targeting methods and information campaigns, followed by post-distribution monitoring by WFP or its partners; and
- Use of WFP mobile teams within designated clusters to reach distant beneficiaries where there are no partners or where partners cannot expand their capacity quickly. This option will require significant additional financial resources, including international and national staff, security officers, logistics support, management, and communications support.

4.4.3. Strengthen WFP-ICRC Security Coordination and Collaboration

The Assessment Team recommends that as the combined (WFP and ICRC) numbers of people requiring food aid climb to 3.5 million by August, it is all the more critical that WFP and ICRC strengthen their security coordination and collaboration through regular consultations at the headquarters and sub-office levels to mitigate security constraint to rapid assessment, delivery of assistance and post-distribution monitoring. Within the institutional mandates of both organizations, it will be necessary to share security intelligence regularly and routinely.

4.4.4. Liaise Closely with the African Union to Improve General Security

The increased visible presence of the African Union Mission in Sudan – foot patrols, accompanied convoys and pre-emptive protection operations – has led to a markedly increased sense of security in the state capitals, other large towns and surrounding areas. AMIS personnel have deterred violence to villagers and displaced persons by uncontrolled armed groups.

The Assessment Team recommends that UNSECOORD and the humanitarian community be proactive in developing a constructive relationship with the AU both at a local level and at a policy level to:

- Establish and maintain regular working contacts with AMIS personnel, including exchange of communications coordinates;
- Protect civilians and humanitarian staff and operations under immediate threat and in the immediate vicinity, within capabilities; and
- Expand areas where IDP camp-based cultivation and other economic activities, educational and recreational activities may be undertaken.

4.4.5. Organize Routine “Market Days of Tranquility” in Transition Zones

Without a fundamental improvement in market security in transition zones – mostly between rebel-held and GOS-controlled territories – many Darfuris remain cut off from markets and access to humanitarian deliveries as well as economic opportunities.

There are several areas where the AMIS mandate could be usefully refocused – at little cost and no formal amendment – to support of the peaceful resumption of market-based trade in transition zones:

- Protection and patrol of designated marketplaces and approaches;
- Protection and patrol of designated seasonal trade and migration routes; and
- Armed escort of livestock caravans and/or food convoys.

Such protections would go far in restoring security, predictability and mobility. By protecting and securing markets, these safeguards would greatly improve prospects for renewed economic activity.

The Assessment Team recommends that suitable NGOs, UN agencies and local AMIS contingents evaluate the opportunities for organizing periodic “Market Days of Tranquility” in designated transition zone markets where herders and agro-pastoralists could buy and sell livestock, grain, seeds and consumer goods in an atmosphere without fear.

These Market Days of Tranquility could be modeled on the successful National Immunization Days in January. Such Market Days of Tranquility will require an energetic information campaign, through radio and other media, spelling out the locations of markets, rules of participation, measures to enforce the peace (including the robust presence of AMIS personnel), facilitating NGOs, and future

Box 4.2. Trading for Peace in Southern Sudan

In northern Bahr el-Ghazal, an outgrowth of locally initiated “Peace Committees,” to negotiate annual migration routes and resolve disputes between northern herders and southern agro-pastoralists, led to the formation of some eight “Peace Markets.” These Markets lie in transition zones between North and South Sudan where northerners and southerners can exchange consumer goods and livestock in relative security. The Peace Committees negotiated rules for the Peace Markets, such as no weapons permitted within the designated market area. These Peace Markets have enjoyed 4-5 years of relative success because each side perceives benefits.

It is long recognized that resumption of normal economic activity reduces tensions and conflict between adversary groups. Unlike a one-time transaction, where each party has an incentive to cheat, repeated transactions build confidence and reinforce trust. Both sides come to depend on routine transactions to maintain their own economic welfare. Over time, peaceful trading becomes the norm, an investment in economic security as well as an agent of social change and harmony.

In Bahr el-Ghazal deep-rooted tribal conflicts have abated in recent years in part due to the establishment and growth of Peace Markets. The benefits from this trade include standardized exchange rates between market currencies, more value-added processing of goods and commodities, new opportunities for women, and better community cohesion. The Peace Markets also exposed the need for job skills development, micro-enterprise training and formal credit and savings institutions and better transportation services.

SUPRAID, BYDA and Concern Worldwide. Trading for Peace. September 2004.

schedule of Market Days. To reinforce the notion of peaceful and confidence-building exchange, it is critical that Market Days of Tranquility be held and seen as a recurring event, for which people can make economic plans, rather than a one-off affair.

It may be possible – under the right local conditions – to induce and replicate variations of the “peace markets” that have succeeded in parts of Bahr el-Ghazal in Southern Sudan (Box 4.2.). The Team recommends that suitable aid organizations in transition zones look into whether local conditions are favorable for working with community leaders to set up “peace markets” in their operating areas.

PART FIVE. PROGRAM COORDINATION and PLANNING


By every indication, a large scale return of displaced persons to their home areas is not imminent. Barring the unforeseen, IDPs in Darfur (and Darfur refugees in Chad) will need continued support for another 1-2 years. In contrast, more than half of all pre-conflict *resident* Darfuris remain in their home areas. These groups will also require support to remain economically active and viable. Our collective task over the coming months will be to plan and deliver support to both IDPs and residents effectively and impartially.¹

5.1. Program Coordination

Coordination between humanitarian agencies continues to be a serious challenge to the Darfur response, aside from the physical and security constraints. Overcoming this challenge requires good communications and agreement on assessment missions and field operations, allocation of staff and resources, programming priorities, and contingency and seasonal planning.

An indicative timeline for seasonal planning is shown in Figure 5.1. Most critical events require planning months in advance. Contingency plans require routine updating – and more frequent updating when triggered by pre-designated thresholds.

Figure 5.1. Darfur Program Coordination and Planning Timeline



Source: Assessment Team

The Assessment Team encourages strategic planning and management by sector and geographic area, under the leadership of the designated sector agency, to develop common benchmarks and timetables for results-oriented activities. We encourage the manageable expansion of all regional groupings that

¹ The conflict in Darfur will come to an end some day. This makes it necessary, even as the conflict continues, to prepare for the resettlement and rehabilitation of entire displaced communities. Moreover, it is not too early to attempt reconciliation among livelihood groups in support of a broader peace settlement. While the Assessment Team has views on resettlement, rehabilitation and reconciliation, these topics go beyond the scope of its mission and are not covered here.

aim for better coordination, such as the Drought Task Force or Food Security Monitoring Group in North Darfur.

5.2. Meeting the Longer-term Needs of IDPs

For many reasons, prospects are dim for a large-scale return of displaced persons to their home areas to resume their former livelihoods. These IDPs will need continued support, at least through the main season harvest in November 2006 and possibly longer.

Some IDP camps are taking on an air of permanence as temporary shelters give way for more durable housing. Camp services, such as reliable water, allow people to start reclaiming their economic independence by planting vegetable gardens and making mud brick ovens.

Box 5.1. Accommodating IDPs Who Want to Stay in Towns

Even if it were safe to go home, there is mounting evidence that urban areas are becoming increasingly attractive to IDPs. The number of IDPs that may want to stay permanently in or migrate to urban areas ranges between 20-25 percent (Catholic Relief Services) and 40 percent (UNHCR).¹

These IDPs value the increased social services and support networks that camps and urban areas offer. For example, IDPs are grateful for boreholes in camps that pump clean water for washing and showering, instead of having to fetch dirty water from a distant *wadi*, and for water and sanitation services that reduce intestinal illnesses and other diseases.

On balance, there may be an ecological benefit with net decrease in rural population as people and their animals leave the countryside – although this needs to occur in a voluntary manner and peaceful and secure environment.

Yet, any benefits need to be balanced against new demands on the fragile ecology in urban areas. From a hydrological viewpoint alone, there is concern among water engineers and others that meeting emergency water needs has led to poorly sited boreholes, slowing the natural annual recharge of water tables and possibly leading to a net drawdown of the aquifers.

If IDPs are to leave the confines of the camps, they will require practical skills and new occupations by which they can support their households. What is more, towns and cities will require some level of planning to prepare for the permanent needs of new residents. Aid agencies and NGOs can provide necessary job training. State and local governments should plan for expanded sites and services.

¹ According to the USAID *Darfur Update* #203 of March 8, 2005.
Source: *Assessment Team*

The Assessment Team concedes – reluctantly – that with no end of conflict in sight, aid agencies, NGOs and local authorities will need to adjust their activities from emergency relief to increasingly open-ended, development-oriented support services, particularly in the area of education and vocational training, micro-enterprise development and marketing. In the interest of fairness, these services should be made available to anyone who can claim to be affected economically or financially by the current conflict.

5.3. Continue Support to Resident Livelihood Groups

Without a political settlement and the development of a process for inter-tribal reconciliation, future security cannot be guaranteed, even in areas now considered to be relatively peaceful. However, where agro-pastoralist communities are currently willing to stay and cultivate, and where nomadic tribes are accessible, seeds and tools distributions and para-veterinarian services are urgently required.

Agricultural support by FAO and ICRC appears to offer the best hope for a strategic approach to seeds and tools distribution in North, South, and West Darfur this coming crop season. FAO even expects a slightly higher planted area this year than last. Established seed distribution programs exist in North and South Darfur, and a seed distribution and livestock support program was recently initiated in West Darfur. FAO currently expects to be able to provide 51,500 households with "quality declared" millet seeds prior to the June planting season, but is appealing for additional resources to expand both seed and livestock support activities.

ICRC's Darfur program aims to support resident agro-pastoralist populations in rural villages, as well as pastoralists where found. In Zalingei, one locality where ICRC works, less than 15 percent of the agro-pastoralists remain on the farm. ICRC distributes food and non-food items to motivate villagers to stay in place for the main season cultivation for which the Committee will supply seeds and tools. ICRC has a special role in Zalingei and elsewhere as it operates in rebel-held territory, providing essential livelihood support service to people otherwise cut off from other sources.

The ability of FAO and ICRC to address some of the more pressing concerns of nomadic pastoralists makes these organizations critical to sustaining the rural economy and markets in Darfur. In turn, economic activity and incomes are conducive to conflict mitigation.

5.4. Programming Recommendations

This section recommends actions to support coordination and planning in Darfur. Aid agencies – as well as state and locality governments – need to meet the legitimate needs of all groups while realigning their motivations in favor of peace. This requires interacting with warring sides and motivating them to take responsibility for the welfare of civilians under their control. This also requires establishing a system to ensure equal and unimpeded access by aid agencies to all civilian populations.

5.4.1. Meet the Needs of All Livelihood Groups

Neutrality is a matter of perception. WFP and many other aid organizations are going by the technical manual of emergency "needs-based" assessment and delivery of assistance as a way of providing assistance "neutrally." As a result, assistance has gone overwhelmingly to agro-pastoralist tribes.

Unfortunately, in the Darfur context, this leaves nomadic tribes (many members of which have not participated directly in the current conflict) with the perception that aid organizations are discriminating against them. Arab pastoralists feel unfairly blamed for the Darfur crisis and unfairly forgotten by the emergency response.

Increasing tensions between nomadic and agro-pastoralists place both groups at considerable risk. WFP and other organizations must carefully weigh the practice of "needs-based assessments" against the principle of "do no harm" (section 5.4.2.). Through its control of access to food, WFP should hold itself accountable for the repercussions of distributions that are considered to be inequitable.

It is likely that the *visibility* of food aid, not necessarily the food itself, is exacerbating tensions between nomadic pastoralists and agro-pastoralists. Nomadic groups face many threats to their

livelihoods and have many needs. Even evidence that these needs have been recognized and will be addressed may address current tensions better than the provision of food aid.

The Assessment Team therefore recommends that

- WFP be proactive in advocating joint planning with FAO, UNICEF, and ICRC to develop a strategic approach to needs assessment and the delivery of assistance to all livelihood groups.

Furthermore, the Team recommends that WFP's monitoring, assessment, analysis, and planning consider the causes and driving factors of the current conflict.

- Specific responsibility for conflict analysis should be delegated to appropriate program and monitoring and evaluation personnel both in WFP/Khartoum and Field Offices.
- These personnel should also have the flexibility to rapidly adjust program interventions to prevent and/or mitigate inter-tribal conflict while respecting the priority of need.

The Assessment Team appreciates that the WFP *Plan of Action: Darfur* takes an expansive view of food needs. The *Plan* explicitly takes into account the rising food needs among non-displaced populations, whose numbers rise from 800,000 to 2 million per month, including a large number of pastoralists. Nonetheless, provision of food should always be predicated on needs, whatever the group, not on efforts to minimize disruptions or threats to relief operations.

5.4.2. Follow “Do No Harm” Principles

All aid providers, not just WFP, need to ensure that the impact of their aid and their implicit messages do not – advertently or inadvertently – feed tensions and prolong the conflict.² As seen, the impact of outside aid is not neutral. Jealousies arise among host communities who perceive that displaced people have better access to food, water, shelter and other assistance. Similar jealousies arise among nomadic pastoralist groups who perceive that sedentary agro-pastoralists and semi-nomadic pastoralists benefit disproportionately from aid transfers.

Aid providers – aid agencies, NGOs and local governments – in Darfur have an opportunity and a responsibility therefore to shape their relief and development impact and implicit ethical messages so they will do no harm. Box 5.2 outlines four steps aid agencies, NGOs and governments can take to ensure their aid does not worsen conflict. This will enable their aid programs to achieve their intended goals and, at the same time, build local capacities for a lasting and just peace.

The Assessment Team recommends that aid agencies and state and locality governments use “Do no harm” principles so that the impact of aid and its implicit ethical messages:

- reduce tensions,
- discourage Darfuris from engaging in conflict,
- expand the scope for social and economic interdependence among Darfuris, and
- find peaceful means for resolving disputes.

Conflict is dynamic, in constant change. New tensions may appear. Because of their work connecting people and building capacities for peace, aid agencies, aid workers and those they are trying to help may be purposely targeted by fighters whose interests lie in perpetuating conflict. Thus, the Assessment Team recommends that aid agencies and governments be alert to changes in the context of conflict that would require flexibility and changes in aid programming.

² Parts of these concepts are paraphrased from Mary B. Anderson. *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – or War*. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers), 1999.

Box 5.2. Steps to Do No Harm

Aid influences the course of conflict in two ways. First, the impact of aid is not neutral. Aid affects inter-group relationships, either feeding tensions or capacities for peace. Aid becomes part of the context of war. Second, aid can do harm if aid programs, policies and practices send messages that implicitly stoke tensions and support conflict.

What can aid providers do? Why does aid, intended to do good, end up doing harm? To do no harm, aid programs must be designed so that *for anyone to gain, everyone must gain*. This requires aid providers to:

- Systematically analyze the context of conflict. Consider the root and proximate causes, historical and new factors, broad and narrow issues, internal and external influences, and the motivations of the antagonists. Identify the “dividers” of people, sources of tensions and war capacities, and assess their importance;
- Use aid to strengthen local capacities for peace and “connectors” of people. Identify and assess the importance of the what connects people in conflict – systems and institutions that bring people into contact (such as the marketplace), attitudes and actions, shared values and interests, common experiences, and symbols and occasions. Consider historical and new factors; broad and narrow issues; internal and external influences; and actual and potential opportunities.
- Look carefully at the pertinent characteristics of the aid agency and its program, policies and practices and assess their impacts on dividers and connectors. Anticipate how details of each program, policy and practice choice can affect the conflict through resource transfers or implicit ethical messages. Understand and assess aid’s unintended side effects as a way to find solutions.
- Assess and reassess, design and redesign aid programs, policies and practices to do no harm.

Most tribal and livelihood groups have capacities for both peace and conflict. This makes it all the more important for aid agencies to avoid the situation where aid can *reinforce dividers and undermine connectors*, if not handled right.

Quoted and paraphrased from Mary B. Anderson. Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – or War. (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers), 1999.

5.4.3. Develop Contingency Plans for Longer-Term Development

Barring an effective cease fire and modicum of security in the countryside, displaced people have no incentive to return their home areas. Aid providers and development planners thus face a scenario of the prolonged displacement of nearly 2 million people *inside* Darfur.

This increasingly probable scenario requires aid agencies, NGOs and local governments to adjust their programs and policies for an extended timeframe. In many instances, this will mean shifting agency perspectives from short-term emergency relief to longer-term development, a shift some agencies have already – quietly – made. In addition, some three million Darfuris who remain in their home areas require support.

As a first step, the Assessment Team recommends that aid agencies and local governments develop contingency plans for the provision of multi-year development services in Darfur, security permitting, for displaced people as well as residents. These contingency plans will need to consider changes in:

- development focus and priorities, goals and objectives and progress indicators,
- staffing requirements and funding needs,
- security implications, and
- exit strategies for the day when local people and institutions can manage operations completely on their own.

While such contingency planning is necessary, it is also extremely sensitive. Planning for a longer timeframe carries an implicit message that aid agencies don't expect a quick end to the Darfur conflict, now into its third year. This message could cause distress to those weary of conflict and comfort to those who profit from conflict. Thus, the Assessment Team recommends that aid agencies develop and coordinate contingency plans discreetly, with little fanfare that might encourage further conflict and violence.

So that this aid connects people rather than divides them, aid providers should offer these and similar development programs and support services to anyone who has been affected by the Darfur conflict. Ironically, this would help bring the development that Darfuris have been calling for, but missing these many years.

PART SIX. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

All groups in Darfur need to look forward to the day, after peace and security have been restored, when they can start the long process of social healing as well as a broad consultative process to determine the future direction of the region, moving from poverty, exclusion and conflict to equitable growth, inclusion and hope.

Ending the Darfur conflict itself will require political will and the effective and constructive engagement of all armed groups, livelihood groups, government and traditional leaders, mediated by outsiders acceptable to all. Few of these elements are apparent now.

Widespread insecurity continues to be the overriding obstacle to better food security, livelihood options, and market linkages. All livelihood groups, humanitarian agencies, and government officials agree that only restoration of peace and security in conflict-affected areas will allow people to engage in their normal seasonal activities. Restoration of peace and security will also help economic recovery in indirectly-affected areas. Achieving lasting peace and reconciliation will require a comprehensive settlement of current and long-held grievances as well as new approaches that strengthen existing livelihoods, create new livelihood opportunities, and expand the participation of neglected groups, particularly the pastoralists, in decisions affecting their economic future.

In the medium to long term, peace and security will not be sustainable without broad-based economic development and equitable poverty reduction. Without this, the Darfur tragedy is bound to repeat itself. Fortunately for Darfur, its tribal and livelihood groups are not completely polarized. By circumstance or choice, some groups have been able to avoid the worst of the conflict. All livelihood groups recognize the need to negotiate, but any willingness to reconcile will likely decrease the longer current conditions and underlying issues persist.

ANNEX 1. ASSESSMENT TEAM ITINERARY

Team Composition

Abdel Rahman Hamid	USAID
Dr. Ali Abdel Aziz Salih	FAO
Susan Dehoney Bradley	USAID
Prof. Mahjoub Jaafar El Haj	FAO
Thomas Couteaudier	EC
Mohamed Osman Hussein	FAO
Philip Steffen	USAID

Wednesday, 26 January 2005

08:00 - 11:00	Fly Khartoum - Ed Daien
11:30 - 13:30	Meeting with Key Stakeholders in Ed Daien Field Observations
15:00- 15:30	Fly Ed Daien - Nyala (<i>Overnight in Nyala</i>)

Thursday, 27 January 2005

08:00	Meeting with Key Stakeholders in Nyala
10:00	Fly from Nyala to Edd El Fursan
17:00	Fly back to Nyala (<i>Overnight in Nyala</i>)

Friday, 28 January 2005

Visit to Kalma IDP Camp, Nyala
Further meetings with different stakeholders in Nyala
(*Overnight in Nyala*)

Saturday, 29 January 2005

08:00	Fly from Nyala to Kass
09:00	Meeting with MoAF, HAC, Merchants, NGOs
11:00	Field Observation in surrounding areas (<i>Overnight in Kass</i>)

Sunday, 30 January 2005

08:00	Fly from Kass to Zalingei (helicopter) Visit Market Meeting with NGOs, NGOs, HAC, traders, and field observations Field Observation in surrounding areas, Zam Zam IDP Camp (<i>Overnight in Zalingei</i>)
-------	---

Monday, 31 January 2005

08:00 Fly from Zalingei to Habilah (helicopter)
Meeting with MoAF, HAC, traders, NGOs, field observation and market visit

13:00 Fly from Habilah to Al Geneina (helicopter)

15:00 Meeting with NGOs, MoAF, HAC, traders
(Overnight in Al Geneina)

Tuesday, 1st February 2005

08:00 Further meetings with key stakeholders (MoAF, HAC, traders, NGOs) and market visit

10:00 Field observation in surrounding areas
(Overnight in Al Geneina)

Wednesday, 2 February 2005

08:00 Visit Keringding IDP Camp

09:30 Fly from Al Geneina to El Fasher

12:00 Meeting with MoAF, HAC, merchants, NGOs, field observation and market visit
(Overnight in El Fasher)

Thursday, 3 February 2005

08:30 Fly from El Fasher to Kutum (helicopter)
Meeting with MoAF, HAC, Merchants, NGOs, field observations and market visit

12:30 Fly from Kutum to Mellit (helicopter)
Meeting with MoAF, HAC, Merchants, NGOs, field observation and cereals and livestock market visit

15:00 Fly back to El Fasher
(Overnight in El Fasher)

Friday, 4 February 2005

North Darfur debriefing, FAO
Livestock market visit, report writing and further Team discussions
(Overnight in El Fasher)

Saturday, 5 February 2005

Further Team discussions
Return to Khartoum

ANNEX 2. REFERENCES and READINGS

African Union. *Agreement with the Sudanese Parties on the Modalities for the Establishment of the Ceasefire Commission and the Deployment of Observers in the Darfur.* (Addis Ababa: AU), 28 May 2004.

African Union. Peace and Security Council, 17th Meeting. *Communiqué.* PSC/PR/Comm. (XVII). (Addis Ababa: AU), 20 October 2004.

African Union. *Protocol between the Government of Sudan (GoS), the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) on the Enhancement of the Security Situation in Darfur in Accordance with the N'Djamena Agreement.* (Abuja, Nigeria: AU), November 9, 2004. <http://www.unsudanig.org/emergencies/darfur/reports/data/misc/security-protocol-abuja.doc>

African Union. Protocol between the Government of Sudan (GoS), the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) on the Improvement of the Humanitarian Situation in Darfur. (Abuja, Nigeria: AU), November 9, 2004. <http://www.unsudanig.org/emergencies/darfur/reports/data/misc/humanitarian-protocol-abuja.doc>

Anderson, Mary B. *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – or War.* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers), 1999.

CESVI. “South Darfur State Agriculture and Livestock Survey in Nyala and Kass surroundings [host communities].” (_____: *Cooperazione e sviluppo onlus*), March 2005.

Coalition for International Justice. “New Analysis Claims Darfur Deaths Near 400,000.” Press Release. (Washington: CIJ), April 21, 2005. http://www.cij.org/pdf/CIJ_Mortality_table_21_April_05.pdf

CRS. “Seed System & Security Pre-Assessment: Implications for West Darfur.” (Nairobi: Catholic Relief Services), March 2005.

Cuny, Frederick C. with Richard B. Hill. *Famine, Conflict and Response. A Basic Guide.* (West Hartford, Connecticut: Kumarian Press), 1999.

De Waal, Alex. *Famine that Kills. Darfur, Sudan.* (New York: Oxford University Press), revised edition, 2005.

De Waal, Alex. “Steps Towards the Stabilization of Governance and Livelihoods in Darfur, Sudan. A Paper for USAID.” (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Global Equity Initiative), February 16, 2005.

De Waal, Alex. “Steps Towards the Stabilization of Governance and Livelihoods in Northern Sudan. A Paper for USAID.” (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Global Equity Initiative), February 22, 2005.

Diskin, Patrick. “Market Assistance Programs: Using Food Aid to Address Food Insecurity Caused by Market Failures. Guiding Principles and the Case of Zimbabwe.” (Johannesburg: USAID/RCSA), February 2004.

El Dukheri, Ibrahim, Hassan Damous and Abdul Majid Khojali. "Rationale for a Possible Market Support Program in Darfur, Sudan: A Brief Look at Markets and Food Security." Commissioned by USAID and implemented by CARE. (El Obeid, Sudan: CARE), August-September 2004.

FAO/North Darfur. "Interim Summary of the North Darfur Food Security and Livelihood Situation Analysis (November to February). Partners: FAO, SC-UK, MoA, WFP. (El Fasher: FAO/North Darfur), February 3, 2005.

Food and Agriculture Organization. "Cooperative Agreement between OFDA and FAO. Fourth Quarterly Report. Reporting Period: 1 October – 31 December 2004." (Rome: FAO/Emergency Operations and Rehabilitation Division), No date [January 2005.]

Food and Agriculture Organization. *Crop and Food Supply Assessment for 2004/05. Local Mission in Northern Sudan.* (Rome: FAO and WFP), January 2005.

Food and Agriculture Organization. "FAO ramps up relief efforts in Sudan." (Rome: FAO), 2 December 2004.

Food and Agriculture Organization. *Special Report. FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Sudan.* (Rome: FAO Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture and World Food Program), 11 February 2004. [Previous year CFSAM Reports also consulted.]

GOAL. "Pre-Harvest Food Security Assessment for the GOAL Area of Operation in Jebel Mara, West Darfur Region." (Khartoum: GAOL), 25 October 2004.

Government of Sudan, Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs. "Policies and Procedures for facilitating humanitarian work in the peace stage." (Khartoum: Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs), April 25, 2005.

Human Rights Watch. *Memorandum from Human Rights Watch to Oslo Donors' Conference on Sudan.* Memo. April 8, 2005.

ICRC. *Food Mobilisation: Darfur Sudan, 2005.* (Khartoum: ICRC), No date [November 2004].

ICRC. *Food Needs Assessment DARFUR.* Economic Security Department, International Committee of the Red Cross. (Khartoum: ICRC), October 2004.

International Committee of the Red Cross. "Economic security assessment in Darfur. Recommendations for 2005." (Khartoum: ECOSEC-ICRC), 15 January 2005.

International Committee of the Red Cross. *Sudan: Bulletin* (various issues) (Khartoum: ICRC), 2004 and 2005.

The Jebel Marra Rural Development Project (JMRDP). "Fact Sheet." (_____: JMRDP), No date [January 2005].

Médecins sans frontières. *The Crushing Burden of Rape: Sexual Violence in Darfur.* MSF. March 8, 2005.
<http://www.artsenzongergrenzen.nl/usermedia/files/Report%20Sexual%20Violence%20march%202005.pdf>

Médecins sans frontières. *Persecution, Intimidation and Failure of Assistance in Darfur.* (Khartoum: MSF-Holland), October 2004.

Office of UN Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Sudan, Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for the Sudan. *Darfur Humanitarian Profiles No. 11 & 12*. Situation as of 01 March 2005. Khartoum, No date [April 2005].

Office of UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for the Sudan. *Darfur 120-Day Plan Report September to December 2004*. (Khartoum: UNHCR), January 2005.

Osman, Yagoub (APU), A/Rahim Hussein (SCF) and Ibrahim Sulieman (MoANR). "Cereal Marketing Enquiry: Fasher Province." (El Fasher: Save the Children Fund (UK) West-Sudan Programme), December 1995.

Physicians for Human Rights. *Destroyed Livelihoods: A Case Study of a Furawiya Village, Darfur. Preliminary Briefing*. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Physicians for Human Rights), February 2005.

Save the Children Fund UK. "Household Food Economy Analysis: Kutum & Malha, Northern Darfur, 1997-98." (_____: SCF/UK), No date [December 1997].

Special Representative of the Secretary-General. *Monthly Report of the Secretary General on Darfur*. S/2005/240. (New York: UN Security Council), 14 April 2005.

SUPRAID, BYDA and Concern Worldwide. *Trading for Peace*. (Washington, D.C.: USAID/OFDA), September 2004.

United Nations. "Inter-Agency Evaluation of the Humanitarian Response to the Darfur Crisis. Observations and Recommendations following second visit." (Khartoum: ____), 9 February 2005.

United Nations Independent Commission of Inquiry on Darfur. *Report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General. Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004*. (Geneva: Independent Commission), 25 January 2005. http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf

_____. "The Plan of the Rehabilitation of War-Affected Areas in the State of West Darfur." (_____: ____), No date [late 2004].

UNHCR El-Geneina. "Government Plan for Rehabilitation of War Affected Areas in West Darfur. Observations and Findings (in the 76 villages/towns included in the government plan)." (El-Geneina, Sudan: UNHCR), 1 March 2005.

UNHCR El-Geneina. "Participation of the International Community in the Rehabilitation of War Affected Areas in West Darfur: Planned and Ongoing Activities." Drafted by UNHCR with inputs from various agencies and organizations based in West Darfur. (El-Geneina, Sudan: UNHCR), 2 March 2005.

"Rehabilitation of War-Affected Areas in West Darfur: Principles Derived from the Workshop between the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the Agencies of the United Nations Based in West Darfur." (El-Geneina, Sudan: ____), 2-3 March 2005.

USAID. *DARFUR – Humanitarian Emergency. Fact Sheets*. (Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development), various dates 2004, 2005. .

USAID/OFDA. *Darfur Update*. (Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development), various dates 2004, 2005.

USAID. "The Role of Reconstruction in the Implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan." Remarks by Andrew S. Natsios, Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. (Washington: USAID), April 6, 2005.

U.S. Department of State. "Remarks by Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick at the Oslo Donors' Conference on Sudan." Oslo, Norway. (Washington: US State Department), April 12, 2005.

WFP. *Weekly Situation Report on Darfur (No. 55)*. (Khartoum: WFP), 2-8 March 2005.

World Food Programme. *WFP Sudan. Plan of Action: Darfur*. (Khartoum: WFP), April 10, 2005.

World Food Programme. "A Proposed Modality for Handling Food Assistance in the Sudan." (Khartoum: WFP/VAM), no date [January 2005].

World Food Programme. "Briefing Note." (Kass, South Darfur: WFP Sub-Field Office), 29 January 2005.

World Food Programme. *Emergency Food Security and Nutrition Assessment in Darfur, Sudan. (Provisional Report)*. (Rome, Italy: World Food Program), October 2004.

World Food Programme Emergency Operation Sudan EMOP 10339.1. "Food Assistance to Population Affected by War in Greater Darfur, West Sudan." December 17, 2004.

World Food Programme. "Estimated Cereal Production Gap in Greater Darfur." (Khartoum: WFP/VAM), no date [January 2005].

World Food Programme. "Information Note: Food Security Situation in Sudan." (Khartoum: WFP, 16 February 2005.

World Food Programme. *WFP/VAM Food Security Up-Date – Sudan. Volume 1, Issue 1, February 2005, Sudan*. (Khartoum: World Food Program), February 2005.

World Food Programme. *WFP/VAM Food Security Up-Date – Sudan. Volume 1, Issue 2, May 2005, Sudan*. (Khartoum: World Food Program), February 2005.

Young, Helen, Abdul Monim Osman, Yacoub Aklilu, Rebecca Dale, Feinstein International Famine Center, Tufts University, and Babiker Badir, Ahfad University for Women, Omdurman, Sudan. *Darfur: Livelihoods under Siege. Executive Summary & Recommendations. Final Report*. Thursday, 17th February 2005. [Cited as Tufts University and Ahfad University.]

ANNEX THREE. PROGRAMMING RECOMMENDATIONS to SUPPORT LIVELIHOODS

Annex 3 makes recommendations to restore and reinforce economic livelihoods and coping capacities in a context of continuing violence, population displacement and growing food needs.

The numbers point to a downward slide in conditions in recent months.

- As estimated by UN OCHA, the number of people affected by the conflict in Darfur and eastern Chad rose from 2.2 million in October 2004 to 2.61 million in April 2005¹ – approaching half of the *resident* Darfuri population of 5.51 million in mid-2004.
- Similarly, the estimate of internally displaced persons inside Darfur climbed from 1.45 million in October to 1.85 million six months later.
- To accommodate rising food needs due to insecurity, displacement and the sharp drop in agricultural production in 2004/05, WFP plans to distribute food to as many as 3.25 million Darfuris per month, up from its original estimate for 2005 of as many as 2.7 million per month (in addition to ICRC's planned support of 250,000 Darfuris).²

It's not known whether these numbers will stabilize. This requires planning for two contingencies – on the basis of current indicators above (*status quo* scenario) and on the basis of a continuing downward trends (*deteriorating* scenario). The challenges posed by either scenario are daunting.

Confronted with these scenarios, the Assessment Team recommends that aid agencies, local authorities and NGOs plan and carry out development-relief activities that place greater emphasis on meeting emergency humanitarian needs and take quick advantage of opportunities in pockets of peace and stability where they appear. Flexibility on the part of local authorities, donors and aid agencies will be imperative.

Within the 12-month timeframe of this Assessment, these recommendations thus aim to:

- Meet the emergency food and livelihood needs of vulnerable groups,
- Mitigate the secondary effects of livelihood disruption; and, whenever possible, and
- Take steps now that will lay the basis for future reconciliation.

Further development and implementation of these recommendations will require a degree of peace and stability to allow unhindered mobility to reach target groups and protection of people and property.

A3.1. Immediate-term (1-year) Livelihood Group-Specific Support Activities

The following programs are based on a 12-month time frame. Unless noted, they are addressed to all state governments, UN agencies, ICRC and NGOs working with each group.

A3.1.1. Agro-pastoralists

Agro-pastoralists who still eke out living in relatively secure areas have experienced a dangerous erosion of their welfare and livelihoods due to loss of small livestock and access to milk, dwindling food stocks and reduced mobility and access to markets. Under these circumstances, immediate-term activities should focus on planning and implementing agricultural production activities that do not require extensive field preparation and maintenance and for which water is not a limiting factor.

¹ Cited in USAID/OFDA *Darfur Fact Sheets* #3 (October 15, 2004) and #29 (April 15, 2005).

² World Food Program Emergency Operation EMOP 10339.1 of December 17, 2004; WFP Sudan *Plan of Action: Darfur* of April 10, 2005.

Looking ahead to the main rainy season that starts in June-July, the dramatic reduction in area planted and harvested and looting or destruction of stored seeds will have a direct impact on the availability of seeds for the 2005/06 season.³

Box A3.1. Addressing Longer Term Recovery

Implementation of the short-term recommendations in Annex 3 can also start now to address the following requirements for Darfur's longer-term recovery:

- *Capacity building* to increase the response and administrative capacities of Darfuri and other Sudanese non-governmental organizations and the capacities of local staff whenever possible.
- *Institutional support* to new, progressive institutions and policies that open the door to greater economic growth and the inclusive management of natural resources.
- *Environmental impact* by implementing environment-friendly relief strategies that restore natural resources and plan their equitable and sustainable use.
- *Conflict sensitivity* to the potential impact of the allocation and management of humanitarian aid on exacerbating local tensions between ethnic and livelihood groups.
- *Inter-livelihood dialogue* to restore communications and find common ground between livelihood groups to mend the region's torn fabric as part of a broader reconciliation leading to new political arrangements.
- *Social context, including gender*, by considering the effects of conflict on adults, adolescents, and children as well as equipping individuals, households, and communities with the skills to deal with and recover from the crisis.
- *Protection* of the physical and legal security of vulnerable groups and individuals through appropriate design and implementation of all activities, whenever possible.
- *Market support* by using market facilitating institutions and infrastructure to revive and promote a vibrant economy on which reconciliation and recovery in Darfur will depend.

Most agro-pastoralist households save their seed for planting the following season but many will find it increasingly difficult to meet their needs. According to the *WFP Emergency Food Security and Nutrition Assessment* (October 2004), the portion of resident (non-displaced) households who relied on their own sorghum seeds dropped from 55 percent in 2003/04 to 30 percent in 2004/05. Conversely, the portion of resident households relying on purchased seeds climbed from 42 percent to 61 percent over the same period. The Assessment Team prefers a market-oriented approach to seed sales and distribution, recognizing that seed markets are affected by insecurity just as other markets. High transport costs severely reduce the movement of low-value goods, such as seeds, suggesting that a market support mechanism would be necessary, such as a demand subsidy.

To protect seed stock and availability of seeds, it is necessary to:

- Collect, multiply and safeguard indigenous staple crop seed stocks (landraces), carefully catalogued by location and/or agro-ecological zone, for future distribution and/or sales.⁴ These staple crops include sorghum, millet, groundnuts and sesame.
- Continue to preposition locally procured sorghum, millet, sesame and groundnut seeds for retail sales and, if necessary, free distribution before the start of the rainy season.
- Continue to distribute and sell certified (or quality declared) sorghum and millet seed, including seed for quick-maturing varieties.

³ Seed demand is a function of area cultivated. As more Darfuris are displaced from their land, demand for seeds will decline. A Catholic Relief Services pre-assessment of the seeds sector in West Darfur does not find evidence of a looming seed famine, with the possible exception of groundnuts, but urges that FAO and other suitable partners take steps now to help meet demand. CRS. "Seed System and Security Pre-Assessment: Implications for West Darfur." CRS/Khartoum and Nairobi, March 2005.

⁴ Ongoing FAO activities in seed protection and multiplication, as well as related support activities, predate this recommendation. FAO has been working through its implementing partners to prepare for the 2005/06 season.

- Sponsor and hold seed fairs in secure locations, where farmers can buy or exchange seeds of their choice.

Other activities to prepare for the 2005/06 main season (June-September):

- Provide hand tools, as required, to replace lost, looted or destroyed tools.
- Sell improved donkey plows through NGOs, Area Development Schemes and Village Councils.
- Support NGO-based agricultural extension programs, including use of informative radio broadcasts to maintain interest and skills in agriculture and animal husbandry.
- Produce and distribute seedlings for reforestation in environmentally degraded areas, in conjunction with food for work or cash for work.
- Implement needs-based small livestock (sheep, goats and perhaps rabbit and poultry) transfer and restocking programs. Monitor livestock health. Follow up with vaccines and anti-parasitic drugs.

To prepare for the 2005/06 winter season (November-March):

- Multiply and market vegetable seeds and garden tools as a means to improve overall nutrition and help to prevent further displacement of agro-pastoralist households. Depending on location, this activity may require development of necessary water sources to replace destroyed or looted irrigation equipment.

Other livelihood activities to support to groundnut producers experiencing sluggish demand and location-specific depressed prices:

- Facilitate the exchange in kind of groundnuts for other basic commodities.
- Encourage groundnut exports to processors in Khartoum through trader credits.
- Rehabilitate local groundnut processing of oil for human consumption and groundnut cake processing for livestock.

A3.1.2. Internally Displaced Persons

By definition, IDPs do not have a sustainable livelihood. Yet, IDPs bring with them their inherent capabilities and aptitudes that they do not lose.

IDPs are vulnerable. Vulnerability is often caused by lack of power and status in society, so that IDPs – men and women – who lack contacts and protection will find themselves more at risk. The following activities can help empower IDPs by giving them greater economic freedom, and hence power and status.

To provide economic empowerment to IDPs:

- Carry out vegetable production near IDP camps as a means to improve overall nutrition and open marketing opportunities. Distribute vegetable seeds and garden tools. This activity requires access to sufficient water and/or development of necessary water sources.
- Develop educational, informative and entertaining radio programming by local language radio stations for use by listener clubs in IDP camps (and elsewhere) to maintain interest and skills in agriculture and animal husbandry. This is particularly important the longer the Darfur conflict continues. Sell or distribute wind-up radios to IDPs and others.
- Implement household-level poultry production and marketing activities as a source of income and nutritional diversity.
- Help IDPs find lower-cost cereals milling options that take a significant part of their food aid ration as payment in kind (section 3.6).
- Implement suitable food for work activities for IDPs, of both genders, to build camp community assets and/or outside camp assets that facilitate livelihoods and marketing. This will require appropriate technical management, labor supervision and supporting no-food inputs.

To enhance the physical security of IDPs:

- Train female-head IDP and host community households in the manufacture and use of fuel-efficient stoves to reduce firewood expenses and exposure to assault when gathering firewood outside the camp perimeter.
- Provide night lighting for IDP camps to ensure greater physical security for IDPs to go about their business. Provide a visible presence of AMIS observers in the camps to ward off intimidation and assaults by *janjaweit* and others.

A3.1.3. Host Communities

As noted in section 2.2.2., people in host communities gain and lose from the presence of IDPs and the relief agencies that IDPs attract, although the incidence of gainers and losers varies by household. Among those placed at disadvantage are host households that cannot afford to support IDPs physically and financially indefinitely.

There is no fixed formula for addressing host community needs other than to expand social services to reduce pressures on existing social services. That is, host communities need support most in the very areas where IDP impact has been the greatest. This impact often includes lost access to resources, higher prices, lower wages and worsening sanitation conditions. To offset the impact of IDPs, local authorities and humanitarian agencies should offer host communities access to the same public goods and services offered to IDPs, particularly where there are no restrictions on use. Additional income transfers to hosts, such as food aid, should be based on need or self-targeting mechanisms.

A3.1.4. Semi-nomadic and Nomadic Pastoralists

While many of the same activities supporting agro-pastoralists are appropriate for semi-nomadic pastoralists, the desires of nomadic pastoralists are more complex. After years of perceived neglect and underdevelopment, pastoralist groups claim needs of their own. These needs include clearly demarcated migration routes with water points, health services for households and their animals, and access to other government services such as education. They also want access to food aid and other relief. Most of all, they would like a louder voice in their social, political, and economic future.

Some activities can be done now. To link livestock markets to the emergency response and long-term opportunities,

- Remove impediments for participation of pastoralists in livestock markets, both internally and externally, possibly by a greater security (AMIS) presence in Darfur on market days.
- Reopen Sudan's borders with Libya to resume previous exports of camels and other livestock (as well as allow the repatriation of thousands of Darfuris stranded in Libya).
- Plan now to demarcate former livestock trekking routes and market channels. Determine necessary sites and services. Design technical specifications. Estimate costs. Actively seek the views of pastoralist groups most likely to use these trekking routes (as well as any sedentary or semi-sedentary groups living near demarcated routes). Seek funding.

A3.2. Short-term (1-3 year) Activities⁵

Peace is a basic condition to reactivate development cooperation in Darfur. Preliminary activities could be undertaken in zones less affected by conflict (such as Edd al Fursan). Accessibility and insecurity will remain major obstacles. Inter-community dialogue is a necessary and preliminary action in each case. Modification of old institutions and establishment of new ones are essential for both short-term reconciliation, adjudication of disputes and compensation and longer-term regulation of land use rights, livestock migration routes and use of tax revenues for development purposes.

⁵ The first five activities in Section A3.2. have been developed by FAO/Sudan.

The following activities, briefly summarized, should be considered as feasible options that can be carried out in the next 1-3 years, providing a modicum of peace and security prevails.

A3.2.1. Implement Water Harvesting Program

Recurrent droughts and long dry spells during the rainy season put crops and animals of settled agro-pastoralists at risk of stress or loss. Yet, Darfur has an abundance of seasonal *wadis* and potential water resources that can be tapped productively to support agriculture using supplementary irrigation.

The objectives of the water harvesting program are to a) reclaim sizable portions of secured lands for production of crops and animals; b) introduce appropriate intermediate water-harvesting technologies to increase crop and animal productivity; c) increase income for beneficiaries and to make available off-season employment opportunities; and d) improve the food security of area households by diversifying their diet with fruits and vegetables.

The combination of dams and *hafirs* will make available 20,000 feddan of surface water area in Edd el Fursan locality. Beneficiaries: Local farming households in various locations for dams and *hafirs*.

A3.2.2. Demarcate Livestock Migration Routes

Demarcate traditional (and possibly new) livestock migration and transport routes to seasonal grazing grounds and/or commercial markets as a way to establish rights of way and reduce tension between pastoralists and others.

The seasonal scarcity of natural resources and competition for crop land, pastures and water resources fuels conflict between crop producers and livestock owners, especially during drought when traditional norms governing grazing and farming break down – crop producers grow crops on traditional livestock migration routes and livestock owners graze on crop lands. Hence, there is a need to rehabilitate livestock migration routes and demarcate them clearly.

This activity will erect concrete poles every two kilometers apart to mark the routes. Migration routes require periodic stations with provision of water and feeding, as well as health and possibly phyto-sanitary components. These stations can be designed with holding pens/feed lots to deliver animals on the hoof to collection points on transport corridors for movement by trucks.

Migration routes must be established with community support and state government approval, clear rules for avoiding conflict, reliable mechanisms for providing water, health, and feed provision, and access to markets at either end.

According to the Nazir of Beni Helba in Edd El Fursan locality of South Darfur, many potential grazing points are not accessible because of lack of water, while many areas with potential water points are not accessible for grazing because of lack of pastures. The demarcation of routes, together with supplementary support services, is expected to improve the rational use of natural resources use in many parts of Darfur. Beneficiaries: Primarily nomadic pastoralists, followed by semi-nomadic agro-pastoralists and then all consumers.

A3.2.3. Establish Fire Lines to Protect Pastures and Forests

Large areas of West Darfur are damaged by fire every year. This activity proposes to establish 4,600 kms of fire lines (or breaks) in different parts of the state to control the spread of fire, reduce the risk of damage to the ecosystem and protect nearby villages. By limiting the extent of fire damage and loss of natural resources, it is expected that the activity will facilitate conflict resolution between agro-pastoralists and pastoralists.

The project proposes to a) conduct surveys to identify potential fire lines; b) create a network of fire lines across the state; c) provide additional services along the fire lines such as water and vaccination-programs, d) supply additional supplementary animal feeds in form of dry hay, vitamins, molasses and salt licks; e) distribute seeds (and/or reseed the fire lines) to improve the quality of pastures and range; and f) develop community forestry associations to conserve the ecology of the area and provide the associations with nurseries and forest plant seedlings. **Beneficiaries:** Numerous pastoralists and agro-pastoralists near the fire lines.

A3.2.4. Design Pastoralist Livelihood Support Program

As summarized in Part Two, pastoralists face numerous longer-term threats. The following components of a pastoralist livelihood support program can help bring about positive change towards

Box A.2. New Institutions to Clarify, Resolve and Compensate

The study by Tufts University and Ahfad University for Women, *Darfur: Livelihoods under Siege*, identifies *immediate priority* actions dealing with land and livestock, among other areas, to strengthen the viability of rural livelihoods in Darfur as part of the process of peace and reconciliation.

Creation of a Livestock Reconciliation and Compensation Commission to provide certificates of ownership for livestock; encourage the voluntary return of looted livestock through an amnesty; and oversee use of livestock sales taxes and revenue transfers from the GoS for a compensation fund to pay owners of looted livestock. Work of this Commission would be locally implemented through the Native Administration Council system. The opening of livestock migration routes would also be handled between local authorities and the communities through which the migration routes pass.

Appointment of a Land Commission to map the existing *hakuras* (land use rights) and *mass'arat* (livestock migration routes) through local consultations and agreement with the Native Administration; administer land tenure based on traditional systems; ensure fair representation of all groups (including minority pastoralist groups); rehabilitation of water points on a case by case basis; and overseeing restitution and compensation over land disputes.

Source: Tufts University and Ahfad University, Executive Summary, pp. 10-12.

achieving food security and sustainable livelihoods for pastoralists in Darfur, in conjunction with institutional recommendations by Tufts and Ahfad Universities (Box A3.2).

- Natural resources conflict mitigation programs, such as use of remote sensing forecasts of resource availabilities and community/elder based structures for mediation and peaceful resolution of competing needs.
- Applied research in improved forage and the viability of introducing Rhodes grass and similar grasses in conjunction with universities in Darfur and Khartoum.
- Improvement of fodder crops and fuel-wood access through research and promotion of fast-growing trees, as appropriate.
- Introduction of tools and techniques to identify locations for water source development and sustainable use of available groundwater.
- Restocking herds with improved varieties of small ruminants (such as *saameen* goats) and female cattle to process milk and ghee. Maintain existing stock.
- Establishment of a timely, reliable and practical livestock market information system and other livestock extension in conjunction with local language radio programming.

Beneficiaries: Pastoralist groups, particularly *nomadic* pastoralist groups, throughout Darfur, as well as other livelihood groups indirectly.

A3.2.5. Making Cheese in West Darfur: A Pilot Activity

Seasonal production of milk is often greatest during the rainy season when migrating livestock are far from market. Even when livestock stay at home, milk supply often exceeds demand and, without refrigeration, results in considerable loss of this highly perishable product. This livelihood support activity aims to process surplus milk production into cheese by women in many parts of West Darfur (and elsewhere) to make use of the milk surplus and to generate extra income and improve the food security of households in the state.

This activity will be designed to a) supply cheese fermenting pills; b) train women how to make cheese; c) provide equipment for cheese preparation and training in equipment use; d) supply packaging materials; and e) set up marketing cooperatives for buying inputs and selling cheese. The State Ministry of Agriculture estimates that 340 women can produce 178,700 MT of cheese per year. A critical assumption is that the product will be less perishable, affordable and acceptable to consumers. Beneficiaries: Cheese producers, milk sellers and consumers.

A3.2.6. Plan and Implement a Donkey Transfer Program

Donkeys are indispensable in Darfur. All households need at least one donkey to transport goods, carry people and plow fields. Many displaced persons and refugees lost their donkeys to conflict, drought or disease following the flight from danger. Replacing these donkeys would give newly resettling former IDP/refugee households a better chance to successfully resume their former livelihoods.

Plan and prepare a donkey transfer program for returning refugees, IDPs and resident Darfuris. Anticipate required veterinary and other supporting services. Estimate source of supply and level of demand, taking care not to overly distort local and regional markets. Develop conditions of the transfer. Phase activities. Monitor and evaluate the program. Beneficiaries: All qualifying households in any livelihood group.