





FRONT COVER PHOTO: PANOS STOWERS  
BACK COVER PHOTO: PANOS STOWERS  
PHOTO THIS PAGE: PANOS STORFINN

Conflict can be an inherent and legitimate part of social and political life. In many places, however, the costs and consequences of conflict, crisis, and state failure have become unacceptably high. Violent conflict dramatically disrupts traditional development, can spill over borders, and reduce growth and prosperity across entire regions.

Although development and humanitarian assistance

## FROM THE DIRECTOR

---

programs are increasingly implemented in situations of open or latent violence, unfortunately most still do not explicitly incorporate sensitivity to the dynamics of conflict and instability in their design or execution.

The Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation in the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA/CMM) of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was established to provide technical leadership on conflict, instability and extremism for USAID Missions and our Washington-based regional and pillar bureaus. The vast majority of our field missions and staff are currently working in areas that are either in conflict, coming out of conflict, are at high-risk for violence and instability, or are facing growing extremist threats. A central objective of the office is to integrate or "mainstream" best practices in conflict management and mitigation into more traditional development sectors such as agriculture, economic growth, democracy, education, and health. Increasingly, DCHA/CMM is also working with missions to help them understand how to program in countries experiencing growing fragility.

As Director of DCHA/CMM, I am pleased to introduce this document on forests and conflict. I hope that readers will find this information thoughtful, innovative, and useful. We will release additional toolkits in the near future, and I trust that each one will bring unique value to discussions about development and conflict. We consider these toolkits to be "living documents" and welcome your comments and observations to help us improve future iterations.



Elisabeth Kvitashvili

Director

Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation

Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)

## FORESTS AND CONFLICT: A TOOLKIT FOR PROGRAMMING

This toolkit is part of a series that explores how development assistance can address key risk factors associated with conflict. One area that is receiving increasing attention is the relationship between natural resources and violence. In many recent conflicts, valuable or scarce resources - land, water, timber, or minerals - have played a central role in both causing and sustaining violence. For example, illegal logging and "conflict timber" became a prominent feature of Liberia's civil war.

This toolkit offers: 1) a discussion of the relationship between forests and conflict; 2) lessons learned in developing programs to deal with forest and conflict related issues; 3) program options; 4) a survey instrument related to forests and conflict; and 5) relevant USAID mechanisms and donors. The elements of this toolkit are designed to raise awareness about the linkages among timber, forest management, and conflict; and to help officers integrate a conflict perspective into their development programming. By exploring forests in depth, this toolkit and others in the series serve as companion pieces to conflict assessments. Conflict assessments provide a broad overview of destabilizing patterns and trends in a society. While they provide recommendations about how to make development and humanitarian assistance more responsive to conflict dynamics, they do not provide detailed guidance on how to design specific activities. The toolkits in this series fill that gap by moving from a diagnosis of the problem to a detailed discussion of potential interventions. Together, the assessment framework and toolkits are designed to help Missions gain a deeper understanding of the forces driving violence and assist in developing more strategic and focused interventions.

The Forests and Conflict Toolkit emerged from collaboration with Adelphi Research (Berlin, Germany), the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) (Bogor, Indonesia), and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Washington, DC, USA). Project coordinators were Alexander Carius (Adelphi Research), Geoffrey Dabelko (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars), and Doris Capistrano (CIFOR). The lead authors were Esther Schroeder-Wildberg (Adelphi Research), Doris Capistrano (CIFOR), Olivia Voils (Adelphi Research), and Alexander Carius (Adelphi Research).

The toolkit would not have been possible without the valuable contributions of Jaidev Singh (USAID/DCHA/CMM), Mary Melnyk (USAID/ANE) and Scott Bode (USAID/EGAT/ESP). Comments, questions, and requests for additional information should be directed to the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation at [conflict@usaid.gov](mailto:conflict@usaid.gov).

Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM)

Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance

United States Agency for International Development

KEY ISSUES	2
LESSONS LEARNED	10
PROGRAM OPTIONS	14
SURVEY INSTRUMENT	18
RESOURCES	20

# KEY ISSUES



PHOTO: PANOSANTILLI

Loggers transporting timber in Brazil.

**Covering 36 million square kilometers, or roughly 30 percent of the globe, the world's forests are among its most important natural resources. However, forests are disappearing at an alarming rate. The World Resources Institute reports that 46 percent of the world's old-growth forests have been destroyed. Competition for these resources can trigger, exacerbate and finance numerous crises and conflicts in developing countries (Renner 2002).**

In poor countries, forested areas are more likely to become areas of conflict because they tend to be remote and inaccessible, located on disputed land, inhabited by multiple ethnic groups and minority populations, inadequately governed, or claimed simultaneously by several

different groups. In addition, the majority of forest-dwelling and forest-dependent households suffer from poverty, lack public services, are excluded from national democratic institutions, and resent outsiders who often reap most of the benefits from forest resources (Kaimowitz 2003).

Countries experiencing violent conflict in their forests "account for about 40 percent of the world's tropical forests and over half of all tropical forests outside Brazil" (CIFOR 2003).

Forest-related violence, which is rooted in local histories and social relations, is also connected to larger economic and social processes and power relations, usually within a multi-layered, interrelated "conflict system." While conflict can sometimes compel accommodation and positive institutional change, it can also escalate into violence, especially if the parties have a prior history of conflict and mutual mistrust (Buckles 1999; Peluso and Watts 2001; Ostrom et al. 2002).

This toolkit explores links between forests and violent conflict, including:

- The use of timber to finance violent conflict;
- Forests as safe havens for armed groups;
- The contribution of logging to low-scale conflicts;
- Impacts of conflicts on forest ecosystems; and
- The contribution of poor governance to conflict.

It should be noted that the issue of gender is an important part of this discussion, since women in many countries make most of the important decisions regarding the use of forest resources. Every program option must be gender-sensitive to achieve success in mitigating conflicts related to forests.

## TIMBER AND FINANCING CONFLICT

In today's global markets, timber is in great demand. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimates forest-product trade at more than \$150 billion per year. While demand fuels competition for control and exploitation of timber, its accessibility, myriad uses, and other qualities also make it attractive as a conflict commodity.

Broadly defined, "conflict timber" has been traded at some point in the chain of

custody by groups involved in armed conflict, such as rebel factions, regular soldiers, or civilian administrations, either to perpetuate conflict or take advantage of conflict for personal gain (Global Witness 2003a). Conflict timber does not include legally harvested timber traded by legitimate governments to purchase arms for entirely legitimate self-defense against invasion or insurrection.

Specific links between forests and violent conflict include:

1. The conflict timber trade which is closely linked to the broader problem of illegal logging and often involves the same companies, trade networks, and entrepreneurial methods. A large proportion of logging in tropical countries is illegal. For example, about 80 percent of Brazil's timber is logged illegally. Lost revenues associated with illegal logging total approximately US\$10 billion per year worldwide, in addition to US\$5 billion per year in uncollected taxes and fees from legal logging (World Bank 2003).

2. Timber revenues have financed national and regional conflicts in Cambodia, Burma, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ivory Coast, and Liberia. Conflict timber often heightens or prolongs existing crises, because a conflict's duration depends partly on the financial viability of armed groups. Combatants can quickly accumulate a significant amount of capital for war from conflict timber (Price 2003). For example, estimated revenues from the trade of conflict timber in Liberia, Cambodia, and Burma exceed US\$100 million per year (Table 1).

Forests are comparatively attractive as a conflict commodity for a number of reasons:

1. The many buyers and sellers of timber make it difficult to track extraction activities.
2. Timber trade does not require a large amount of capital and, compared to oil, produces high returns on investment.
3. Timber does not require processing.

Among the factors that make conflict timber attractive compared to other forest resources and "conflict commodities," such as valuable minerals or illicit crops, are (Thomson and Kanaan 2003):

- Accessibility: Forests are more accessible than subterranean minerals. Furthermore, harvesting and transport-

"Forest resources directly contribute to the livelihoods of 90 percent of the 1.2 billion people living in extreme poverty and indirectly support the natural environment that nourishes agriculture and the food supplies of nearly half the population of the developing world." (World Bank 2002).

## HIGH-LEVEL IMPLICATIONS IN FOREST-RELATED CONFLICTS

In Liberia, timber companies used private militias to gain control over local populations, discourage protests, and encroach on communal lands. Timber militias, along with the military and the police, intimidate local communities, destroy and steal goods, and seize farms and forest land for companies (Price 2003; Jarvie et al. 2003).

ing timber (on rivers or crude roads) is relatively simple. Armed groups can easily extort money by blocking production and transportation routes of legal timber.

- **Versatility:** Timber can be transformed into an immense variety of end products making timber highly marketable.
- **Livelihood value:** Forests are a source of subsistence and livelihood for many people often creating competition over limited resources that can contribute to conflict among users and stakeholders. During periods of uncertainty and intense competition, people highly dependent on forest resources may be more prone to engage in conflict when they observe other users felling "their" forests (Thomson and Kanaan, 2003).
- **State involvement:** State-backed organizations, like the military or subsidized logging companies, are more likely to exploit and trade timber because they possess the necessary capital, equipment, and market access (Baker et al. 2003; Thomson and Kanaan 2003). For example, the timber industry in Liberia, which was closely linked to the illegal arms trade and funded former Liberian president Charles Taylor's personal security forces.

## FORESTS AND SAFE HAVENS

In fragile, developing countries, forests can serve as battlegrounds and havens for armed groups, providing refuge and food for combatants (Kaimowitz 2003). In Sierra Leone, for example, forests enabled the Revolutionary United Front to regroup, recruit, and indoctrinate child soldiers. Additionally, in many tropical countries, governments do not have a significant presence in forests, so guerrilla groups often move in to fill the power vacuum (Kaimowitz 2002). For example, in forested areas of Colombia, indigenous leaders opposed to land grabs have been murdered by right-wing paramilitaries, while indigenous people have been forced to join the ranks of the leftist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. Both sides have appropriated the indigenous peoples' traditional land and cleared forest for coca cultivation and subsequent sale of cocaine (Kaimowitz 2001; Álvarez 2001).

Conflicts also arise between competing groups over access to and benefits from forest resources. For instance, conflict over forests often arises between indigenous people and outsiders, especially if it is remote and inaccessible. In the Amazon region of Brazil, cattle ranchers moving into the forests have come into conflict with traditional rubber tappers. Forest-dwelling ethnic groups and indigenous peoples in many countries have sometimes resorted to violence to fend off outsiders encroaching on their territories or threatening their way of life. Often, native people are also motivated by the desire to gain greater political autonomy, independence, or a greater share of benefits from the exploitation of local forest resources (Buckles 1999; Peluso and Watts 2001).


## LOGGING AND LOW-SCALE CONFLICT

There are numerous lower-scale violent conflicts related to forest resources. These have negative impacts on living conditions, increase livelihood insecurity, and can lead to greater conflicts if allowed to fester. While conflicts among competing stakeholders over timber rarely develop into full-scale war, they can affect many people over a wide area and "may prove larger, longer, and, in the end, more serious" than incidents where timber finances violent conflict (Jarvie et al. 2003).

## LOGGING, LAND, AND RESOURCE OWNERSHIP

Conflict can spring from unclear or unfair land and resource ownership rights that render local communities' logging activities illegal. In the past, central governments had little interest in forested areas, which were underdeveloped, sparsely populated, and economically unimportant. Forests thus became "no-state spaces" with little government involvement, and with minority ethnic groups maintaining their own systems of governance, such as "legal pluralism", which was common in colonial Africa and Asia (Kaimowitz 2002).

As governments began to recognize the commercial value of forests, they tended to issue logging concessions, typically without consulting indigenous residents. However, traditional forest users generally do not recognize the government's right to exploit the forests, and local communities may confront logging companies, local governments, police, and the military (Kaimowitz



2002). Weak state institutions, poor governance, and corruption often contribute to these conflicts. Competing claims, disputed land titles, and seizures of community land without compensation can all lead to violence. In Indonesia, local communities have defended their traditional rights and livelihoods by seizing equipment, blocking barges loaded with timber, and burning down logging camps. These low-scale conflicts often escalate because private companies can pay security forces to suppress opposition; furthermore, associated human rights violations are often tolerated or supported by local government officials, as well as the military and police (Harwell et al. 2003).

In Brazil, the rampant use of falsified land titles to exploit public land, known as *grilagem*, has become a powerful tactic to enable outsider domination in the Amazon. The proliferation of this illicit practice can be attributed to the lack of a central land registry, complicit land registration offices, and a legal vacuum regarding land tenure. Once illegal landholders obtain possession of property, they often use violence to expel traditional communities with legitimate land rights. The general lack of gover-

nance and law enforcement allows them to intimidate people through murder and other threats in order to exploit the land for financial gain (Greenpeace International 2003).

Ambiguous land titles may force people to abandon traditional resources, which could limit access to food, water, and other forest products, thus increasing poverty. The possibility of seizing contested land also tends to attract strong outsider groups who can force local communities off their property. Moreover, outsiders can come in and take not only land, but also forest resources, subsequently leaving the land degraded and the local communities without benefit. However, such challenges and related threats of violence from outsiders have also spurred the creation of federations and new institutions. Examples include community-initiated joint forest protection and village confederations in India, Nepal, and elsewhere in South Asia.

### **DISTRIBUTION OF BENEFITS FROM LOGGING**

In most developing countries, local communities bear most of the social and environmental costs of timber exploitation.

### **Soldiers in Sierra Leone on the lookout for rebels hiding out in the forest.**

PHOTO: PANOS OETEN





PHOTO: PANOS/TOWERS

**Logging truck on its way to a sawmill in Nha Trang, in central Vietnam.**

*Large-scale commercial logging by outside private companies often has considerable adverse sociopolitical and environmental impacts on local forest users and forest-dwelling communities.*

Conflicts can occur when local people do not receive a fair share of the benefits from their forests or compensation for seized land, environmental damage, or health risks. Companies that conduct legal logging might clash with local communities that conduct illegal logging. Inequitable distribution of benefits often disrupts local communal and social structures, which can contribute to wider political, social, and economic instability and eventually unrest, as in Indonesia and Bolivia (Price 2003).

However, violent conflict over distribution of timber revenues or compensation is not inevitable. Many communities welcome logging operations if they can secure part of the benefits either as cash or as in-kind benefits, such as new schools. For example, plantations in East Kalimantan, Indonesia, use benefit-sharing schemes to distribute compensation to local communities. There are also many examples of community forest management and logging enterprises in Latin America (Lima et al. 2003).

#### **SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF LOGGING**

Large-scale commercial logging by outside private companies often has considerable

adverse sociopolitical and environmental impacts on local forest users and forest-dwelling communities. The government may encourage colonization of frontier forest lands and their conversion to agriculture through subsidized or state-sponsored relocation programs, such as the promotion of cattle ranching and forest land conversion in the Amazon. In Vietnam, government incentives, such as land rights, agricultural assistance, and logging concessions for inhabited areas, encouraged ethnic Vietnamese to resettle in mountainous areas to control indigenous groups living there who were suspected of seeking independence. These land use patterns of low-land Vietnamese dwellers who moved into upland areas resulted in severe habitat degradation. Consequently, the altered demographics and land-use patterns impoverished the forest-dependent groups and led to conflict (Thomson and Kanaan 2003).

In Indonesia, the government's transmigration program sought to reduce overpopulation of the main islands (Java, Madura, and Bali); between 1969 and 1993, some eight million people were relocated to other islands (Forest Watch Indonesia/Global Forest Watch 2002). The government

allotted land to the newcomers, which created competition with locals, as well as conflicts over economic disparities and ethnic and religious differences.

In the southern Philippines, state-sponsored logging and agricultural development of forests and tribal lands in the 1960s and 1970s has led to ongoing conflict in Mindanao (Capistrano 2003).

Conflicts also occur when governments decide unilaterally to protect forests from logging or other uses by relocating forest dwellers outside park boundaries or restricting the access rights of traditional users. While some international conservation organizations from developed countries have sought "win-win" solutions between "protected areas" and local communities, others have advocated exclusion of people from such "protected areas." The loss of traditional forest access and

rights has led to conflict in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Even when localized, these conflicts can be manipulated to feed into wider disturbances, as in Zimbabwe and Indonesia.

Protests about environmental and health concerns have also arisen over forests. On Sumatra, in Indonesia, air and water pollution from a pulp and paper mill affected residents' health, killed livestock, reduced agricultural output, and caused chlorine gas explosions. Protests led to the mill closing in 1999, but it resumed the same practices upon reopening in 2003 with local government backing. The mill's owners continue to operate, using the military and the police to suppress protests (Happe 2001; Jarvie et al. 2003).

## THE EFFECTS OF CAPTURING TIMBER REVENUES THROUGH VIOLENCE OR CORRUPTION

- Financial independence for rebel groups that reduces "their dependence on and accountability to the rural communities from which they traditionally have drawn recruits, material support, and other collaboration" (Price 2003).
- Prolonged conflict, as in Cambodia, where both the government and the Khmer Rouge financed their military campaigns with timber resources (Renner 2002). Timber availability also prolonged civil war in Côte d'Ivoire.
- Fueling of separatist tendencies, especially in forests with large proportions of valuable timber, such as Burma, which holds 60 percent of the world's teak reserves (Global Witness 2003b).
- Elites enriched at the expense of the general public and small timber producers by diverting revenues and reducing prices for timber from sustainably managed forests.
- Undermined rule of law, increased corruption, and weakened civilian control over the military.
- Displaced communities, increased vulnerability of traditional livelihoods and ways of life, and intensified poverty over the long term.
- Reduced post-conflict development opportunities for local communities and national governments by damaging or destroying forests and wildlife (Thomson and Kanaan 2003; Price 2003).

TABLE 1: ESTIMATED REVENUES FROM CONFLICT TIMBER (SOURCE: RENNER 2002)

Country	Beneficiary	Period	Revenues (Mil US\$/year)
Liberia	President C. Taylor	late 1990s	100-187
Cambodia	Khmer Rouge Government	mid-1990s mid-1990s	120-240 100-150
Burma	Government	1990s	112

*The greatest damage to forests often occurs after a conflict.*

## CONFLICT AND FOREST ECOSYSTEMS

Conflicts have mixed impacts on forest ecosystems, depending on the existence of alternative economic options, availability of roads and market infrastructure, and the nature, condition, and value of forest resources. Conflicts can adversely affect forests under the following conditions:

- Forests are subjected to unsustainable logging or mining; armed forces tend to extract as much as they can before they lose control over the resource;
- Forests are used as a safe haven for refugees fleeing areas of acute fighting. For example, hundreds of thousands of refugees fled into Congolese forests to escape fighting in Rwanda, increasing demands for firewood, bush meat, and housing materials, and leading to localized forest degradation (Renner 2002); and
- State or donor-supported forest protection and conservation efforts are suspended or impeded; illegal logging and hunting can proceed unchecked, especially where governmental and regulatory authorities are absent or ineffective. Post-conflict, weakened political institutions may lack the authority, ability, funding, or urgency to restart derailed conservation efforts.

On the other hand, armed conflict has sometimes protected forests from larger-scale exploitation. Armed forces may exploit the forest, but would less than commercial logging companies, and their presence can discourage illegal logging by outsiders. In Colombia, certain guerrilla groups hinder large-scale exploitation to protect the environment, using strictly enforced "gunpoint conservation," that utilizes landmines and the threat of violence (Álvarez 2003). In the DRC, forests have been spared large-scale logging because they are remote and inaccessible and timber is only one of several conflict commodities available (Baker et al. 2003).

The greatest damage to forests often occurs after a conflict. For example, the DRC has allocated logging concessions for 36 percent of its forests; in the Republic of Congo, 79 percent of the forest area will

probably be logged in the post-conflict phase (White and Martin 2002). Peace often enables forest exploitation, since reconstruction and development require timber; and the need to obtain foreign currency reduces political will to protect forests (Oglethorpe 2002; Halle et al. 2002). Sometimes, forests are cleared for settlement and rehabilitation for ex-combatants (Kaimowitz 2003). Clearly, good forest sector governance should be established before opening it to post-conflict exploitation.

## POOR GOVERNANCE, ECONOMIC POLICY, FOREST-RELATED CONFLICT

Violent conflict is arguably the ultimate expression of governance failure. In many developing countries, inequitable tenure rights and access policies, poor governance, and economic policies focused on a single set of natural resource commodities contribute to the onset of forest-related conflicts and hinder their resolution. The most significant aspects include (Thomson and Kanaan 2003):

- Inconsistent laws and ineffective or selective law enforcement;
- Corruption;
- Weak regulatory framework of the financial sector; and
- High economic dependence on forest resources.

During periods of economic decline and dwindling resources, as well as during periods of rapid economic development in countries with poor economic conditions, the pernicious effects of poor governance on forest-dependent economies are especially pronounced. Financial stresses often lead to: borrowing, structural adjustments, and economic policies that exacerbate forest exploitation; increased competition and conflict; and worsening conditions for marginalized communities and indigenous groups (Bush and Opp 1999; Capistrano 2003).

## **INCONSISTENT LAWS AND INEFFECTIVE OR SELECTIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT**

Remote forested areas often exist in a state of lawlessness; weak governments, such as in Sierra Leone, the DRC, and Indonesia, are unable to defend territorial integrity and enforce law in remote areas. In general, the farther a forest is from the center of government, the more difficult it is for the government to control it. Lack of law enforcement, inconsistent application of laws, and legal discrimination often lead to grievances that can emerge when local agents of distant, powerful patrons control and appropriate the majority of benefits from forest exploitation.

Conflicts also result from contradictory and inconsistent legal and regulatory systems, especially those perceived as illegitimate or at odds with customary laws and practices. Unclear divisions of responsibility and overlapping authority among government organizations also increase the likelihood of conflict (Thomson and Kanaan 2003; Upreti 2002).

The military and the police are often implicated in forest-related conflicts. For example, in Cambodia, Liberia, and Indonesia, private logging companies recruited militias from the state military (Global Witness 2002).

## **CORRUPTION**

Corruption thrives in weak states. It erodes confidence and reinforces perceptions of failure. Corruption hampers binding rules and regulations that govern access to and harvesting of forest resources; it also encourages the wealthier and better-connected people involved to act outside the law without fear of prosecution. This generally benefits corrupt companies, civilian government officials, law enforcement personnel, and legislators (Indonesian Ministry of Forestry 2000; Thomson and Kanaan 2003). In Indonesia, a coalition of politicians, security forces, and judges implicitly or actively supports illegal operations of timber companies that pay the highest bribes. The interests of local communities, which lack the financial resources to pay bribes, are ignored in the decision-making process. Companies backed by the police and the military, and implicitly supported by government officials and judges, largely control local politics, resulting in poor or selective law enforcement. Large-scale and endemic corruption also

contributes to local communities' lack of trust in officials (Upreti 2002).

## **WEAK REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR**

Controls on private financial transactions are weak in many poor, forest-dependent countries. Readily obtained loans from financial institutions require minimal, if any, due diligence procedures. Easily concealed profits move both within and outside the country, which encourages unscrupulous operators to seek logging concessions and access to timber resources (Thomson and Kanaan 2003).

In Indonesia, for example, large timber conglomerates have their own unregulated "private" banks that move money out of the country. In the DRC, officers of the invading Rwandan and Ugandan armies used the unregulated banking system to fill their accounts with cash from the exploitation of Congolese forests. In Liberia, Charles Taylor's personal profits from timber exploitation cannot be traced through the banking system.

## **ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE ON FOREST RESOURCES**

For many poor countries, forest resources provide significant export earnings. For example, in Burma, Cambodia, and Cameroon, such trade contributed 15 percent to 1997 exports. Dependence on natural resource commodities, such as timber, increases a country's vulnerability to volatile fluctuations in commodity export prices and to external economic shocks. When countries do not allocate adequate capital and labor to other sectors, neglecting critical social areas such as education and health, resulting slow innovation impedes development of human skills (World Bank 2001). The policy response to external shocks and to these vulnerabilities can potentially create conditions for increased conflict.

## **HIGH ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE ON FORESTS LEADS TO ILLEGAL EXPLOITATION**

In Indonesia, timber and wood products contribute about 10 to 20 percent to the country's GDP (World Bank 2001). Viewing the timber trade as a way to achieve economic growth, the government prohibited export of logs and rough-sawn timber in the 1980s to encourage pulp, paper, and plywood production. Driven by China's and Japan's demand for wood products, Indonesia's domestic processing capacity increased by 700 percent and outstripped plantation wood supplies. This led to increased illegal logging of natural forests, now estimated at 73 percent of all its logging activity (FWI/GFW 2002).

# LESSONS LEARNED



PHOTO: PANOS/JOHNSON

**Women of the Chipko movement in India use non-violent resistance to oppose the logging of trees.**

**In general, conflicts over natural resources, including timber, are difficult to resolve and often resurface in other forms. However, conflicts can be mitigated with approaches and interventions that strengthen institutions and develop capacity to manage conflict (Capistrano 2003).**

In addition to infrastructure development and social services delivery, the following interventions can help sever the link between timber and violent conflict:

- Improving participation and partnerships;
- Promoting sustainable forest management (SFM);
- Reducing poverty and improving livelihoods;
- Strengthening indigenous land rights and enforcement ability;
- Strengthening governance;
- Improving the regulatory framework of the financial sector;

- Strengthening public procurement and corporate social responsibility; and
- Increasing understanding of the role of natural resources in reducing poverty and supporting livelihoods, the long-term benefits of sustainable resource use.

Illegal logging, one of the most important sources of conflict in tropical countries, is currently not addressed in any integrated form through international rules or agreements. However, individual approaches can address aspects of the problem and, collectively, contribute to tackling illegal logging and its associated conflicts.

## IMPROVE PARTICIPATION AND PARTNERSHIPS

Active participation by local communities and loggers is essential for managing competing claims for forest resources. Participatory decision-making among competing claimants and relevant stakeholders reduces conflict by:

- Facilitating discussion of local issues with key stakeholders, helping diffuse tensions and mitigate conflict;
- Promoting solutions that include sustainable forest management and equitable benefit sharing.
- Negotiating and developing forums, institutional mechanisms, and norms for decision-making and monitoring and assessing outcomes. These institutional mechanisms can be employed to avert, manage, or resolve conflicts; and

To avoid conflict, all groups with legitimate interests in contested forest resources must be included in the process. A successful mediation process requires consulting parties, allocating timber revenues equitably, and balancing the interests of locals with those of migrants. Building the capacity (negotiation skills, financial resources, etc.) of the weakest stakeholders can help reduce power imbalances, thus encouraging more equal participation (see the Food and Agriculture Organization's project in Ghana and the Multi-Stakeholder Forestry Program in Indonesia). While power relations between

people from vastly different socio-economic or social-strata backgrounds will never be entirely equal, recognizing these differences helps facilitators to address them appropriately (Bush and Opp 1999; IDRC 2003).

Consensus-based decision-making can reduce the potential for conflict when the stakeholders seek win-win solutions, secure economic benefits for local people, share responsibility for resulting actions, and collectively gather necessary data. In this context, to resolve conflict fairly, the people involved must be incorruptible (Upreti 2002). The process must be sound and include mechanisms to safeguard against corruption as relying on "incorruptibility" alone may lead to failure.

## PROMOTE SUSTAINABLE FOREST MANAGEMENT

Sustainable management of renewable forest resources can prevent conflict. In general, large-scale clear cutting degrades the social and environmental conditions of local communities and can increase competition for remaining resources. To slow the process, economic incentives that promote large-scale clear cutting should be reduced, local communities should be encouraged to promote Sustainable Forest Management (SFM), and regulations and incentives should be employed to persuade large companies holding forest concessions to practice SFM. In turn, as a component of a sustainable system, SFM provides economic diversity and thus helps secure rural livelihoods. Promoting SFM in the context of community-based natural resource management, such as in the Congo Basin Forest Partnership, can also be a conflict management tool. By involving local communities and institutions, such approaches can mitigate conflict and reduce the potential for violence.

The Sustainable Forest Products Global Alliance demonstrates how sustainable forest management through public-private partnerships can have a significant impact on combating illegal logging, and on increasing transparency. This USAID-supported program developed a partnership between forest producers and consumers committed to sustainable forest

*Active participation by local communities and loggers is essential for managing competing claims for forest resources.*



**Rwanda's remaining natural forests are under pressure from an expanding population.**

management on a global scale thereby promoting sustainable and responsible forest practices in countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Partners in this Alliance include World Wildlife Fund, Metafore and retailers such as Home Depot and Anderson Corporation.

International forest certification schemes can also reduce the likelihood of conflict. For example, the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) label, which is a globally-acknowledged timber certification label, requires certified companies to guarantee their products' legality, as well as to establish clear tenure, limit environmental impacts, and provide social and economic support for local communities. If its incentives were strengthened, the label could contribute to reducing conflict. However, participation in the scheme is very costly, especially for small- and medium-sized enterprises; so far, the scheme has failed in Indonesia due to its high cost (Colchester et al. 2003; Schroeder-Wildberg and Carius 2003).

### 3 REDUCE POVERTY AND IMPROVE LIVELIHOODS

Small-scale subsistence logging could be sustainably operated as part of a diverse livelihood system, which could become part of a broader solution to low-level violent conflicts. Development programs can promote interventions and activities that:

- Increase the range of livelihood alternatives for forest-dwelling communities;
- Increase the share of benefits to local communities from timber and other forest products;
- Ensure a fair price for sustainable timber so that fewer trees provide sufficient income;
- Regulate logging more effectively, so that greed does not lead to over-intensive logging; and
- Provide economic incentives for sustainable timber harvesting and logging operations.

Care should be taken in assessing: (1) whether communities actually prefer logging to other forest uses such as conservation, water shed protection, and spirit forests and; (2) the risk that community timber extraction poses since it opens communities up to possible extortion required to apply for resource use, transport and other permits.

### 4 STRENGTHEN LAND RIGHTS

Clearly defined and widely recognized ownership, use, and access rights to land and forest resources are preconditions for peaceful coexistence in a resource-rich area. Addressing the inconsistencies between formal and local customary law is a necessary step in conflict resolution. Development programs should encourage national governments to recognize and secure indigenous people's traditional rights to land and forest resources. While this could be a long process, stakeholders at the local level could agree to recognize local rights and share benefits from logging.

The German Development Service (DED) project in Ecuador's Esmeralda Forest helps resolve conflicts over ambiguous land and forest rights. Strengthening local land rights can combat forest degradation because traditional forest management by local communities often prevents overuse of resources. Institutions that mediate between parties, monitor compliance, and enforce sanctions can help sort out competing land and vegetation rights.

### 5 STRENGTHEN GOVERNANCE

To break the link between conflict timber and corruption, governance failures must be tackled on multiple fronts:

- Minimize and control corruption to re-establish the rule of law (see the Forest Integrity Network);
- Encourage transparent and fair law enforcement in order to prosecute criminals and resolve ambiguous property rights, without degrading rural livelihoods (see the Multi-stakeholder Forestry Program);
- Strengthen conflict resolution institutions and mechanisms at different levels and scales of conflict;

- Promote institutions or mechanisms that foster adaptive learning among stakeholders to build trust and avoid conflict;
- Provide access to information and develop and implement mutually agreed upon monitoring and evaluation tools; and
- Ensure that local communities and key stakeholders are aware of and able to exercise their forest-related rights, entitlements, and responsibilities.

USAID's initiative in Pata, Senegal, included a number of these elements. The Intergovernmental Forest Law Enforcement and Governance (FLEG) and Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) processes also offer a comprehensive approach to ensuring timber extraction is a legal industry and improving governance in producer countries.

## 6 IMPROVE REGULATION IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR

Weak regulations mean that financial flows from conflict timber are particularly likely to evade detection. Tighter oversight, monitoring, and reporting of forest-related financial and commercial transactions could reduce the profitability of conflict timber.

A recent legal innovation in Indonesia appears promising. In 2003, Indonesia modified its money laundering laws to include illegal logging and other environmental crimes. Under the new laws, banks in Indonesia are required to report any transactions suspected of being connected to illegal logging and other forest crimes to the Indonesian Financial Supporting and Analysis Center (CIFOR 2003b). If enforced, this law will make it more difficult to launder money obtained from illegal logging in Indonesia.

The FLEGT process promotes existing money laundering regulations in certain European Union (EU) countries like the United Kingdom, recognizing that these regulations are an important tool in combating illegal logging and thereby reducing related crimes.

In addition, financial flows from consumer countries to producer countries need to be regulated. Most due diligence by public and private financial/investment institutions does not determine whether the money they provide finances illegal activities. However, the Dutch Bank ABN AMRO adopted a "forest policy" aimed at minimizing the environmental and social impacts of their financing activities; they do not finance logging operations in primary forests or companies that conduct illegal logging or buy illegal timber (ABN AMRO 2001).

## 7 STRENGTHEN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

Public procurement guidelines can play a leading role in excluding conflict or illegal timber from international markets; examples include the EU FLEGT Action Plan and an increasing number of government procurement policies in the EU. The FLEGT Action Plan also calls on corporations to exclude illegal and unsustainably harvested timber from a company's supply chain. Companies include the largest American retailers, IKEA, and the British Timber Trade Federation, which represents the majority of major UK importers.

*Tighter oversight, monitoring, and reporting of forest-related financial and commercial transactions could reduce the profitability of conflict timber.*



# PROGRAM OPTIONS



**Workers unload hardwood cut from Indonesian forests at Sunda Kelapa Docks.**

## IMPROVE PARTICIPATION AND PARTNERSHIPS

### **POLICY RESEARCH, FOREST MANAGEMENT, AND STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION TO CONTROL ILLEGAL LOGGING**

In Indonesia, the five-year Multi-stakeholder Forestry Programme (MFP) supports policy research and forest management, and also combines capacity building with conflict mediation, mitigation, and resolution. It promotes consensus-based policy for a national forest program through participatory activities, including multi-stakeholder workshops, seminars, and training

programs. MFP involves community groups in decision-making about controlling illegal logging without damaging local livelihoods to avoid conflicts over access to resources. [www.dfid.gov.uk](http://www.dfid.gov.uk)

### **INTERDEPARTMENTAL TRAINING BUILDS STAKEHOLDER CAPACITY**

In 1992, a program was initiated entitled "Improving Support for Enhancing Livelihoods of Rural Poor." The five-year training program in Ghana and Gambia is building local stakeholder capacity to manage conflicts over forestry, fisheries, and agricultural resources. The program, designed in partnership with local and national agencies in Ghana, developed training

materials for forestry conflict management in collaboration with the Forest, Trees, and People Programme. It is also strengthening partner capacity to integrate conflict management principles based on sustainable livelihood approaches.

[www.fao.org](http://www.fao.org)

## PROMOTE SUSTAINABLE FOREST MANAGEMENT

### COLLABORATION HELPS PRESERVE LIVELIHOODS AND FORESTS

The private-public Congo Basin Forest Partnership (the Congo Basin Initiative) supports a network of national parks, protected areas, and well-managed forestry concessions, and assists communities in six Central African countries that depend upon these rich forestry and wildlife resources. By improving forest governance through community-based management, combating illegal logging, and enforcing anti-poaching laws, CBFP helps address the sources of conflict over forest use.

[www.state.gov](http://www.state.gov)

### PUBLIC-PRIVATE ALLIANCE IDENTIFIES LEGALLY HARVESTED TIMBER

The public-private Indonesia Alliance to Combat Illegal Logging promotes the sustainable harvest of forests and seeks to identify timber that is harvested legally and free of conflict. Timber-tracking systems and chains of custody will help identify legal sources of timber harvested without conflict and databases of legal timber concessions and deforestation for commercial banks to use as an investment screening tool.

[www.usaid.gov](http://www.usaid.gov)

### FORESTRY INFORMATION AND MANAGEMENT TOOLS

In Cameroon, the Sustainable Management of Cameroonian Forests project, completed in 2001, helped the Ministry of the Environment and Forests implement its new sustainable forest resource management policy. Forestry information systems and management tools included management plans, means to determine timber yields, and defining boundaries of valuable forests with the help of rural forestry committees. Sustainable forest management tools are now used at two production forests and neighboring community forests in the southern province of Cameroon.

[www.acdi-cida.gc.ca](http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca)

## REDUCE POVERTY AND IMPROVE LIVELIHOODS

### INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES

To help indigenous people fight poverty and build sustainable livelihoods, the Indigenous Peoples Partnership Programme promotes partnerships between aboriginal groups in Canada, Latin America, and the Caribbean. The program expects to increase local capacity to fight poverty and build sustainable livelihoods as well as to establish sustainable development partnerships.

[www.acdi-cida.gc.ca](http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca)

### COMMUNITY BENEFITS FROM FORESTS AND WILDLIFE

The Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) demonstrated the importance of wildlife resources to Zimbabwe's national economy and provided opportunities for villages to generate earnings through the sustainable use of forests and wildlife. Resulting socio-economic benefits have improved supervision of communally-owned forest resources and fostered equitable distribution of revenues from safari/hunting activities, along with new schools, mills, and one-time cash payments for each household. By fostering local resource management and strengthening the capacity of participating rural communities, CAMPFIRE has improved livelihoods and the underlying socioeconomic conditions that often contribute to resource conflicts.

[www.usaid.gov](http://www.usaid.gov)

## REGIONAL APPROACHES FOR FOREST PROTECTION AND LIVELIHOODS

The 20-year Central African Regional Program for the Environment (CARPE) began in 1995 and addresses deforestation, biodiversity loss, and associated conflicts in the Congo Basin countries. CARPE builds institutional and human resources so that the sustainable management of valuable forests will be undertaken by Central African institutions. By improving environmental governance, CARPE helps improve democratic governance, transparency, accountability, social stability, and peace in the region.

[carpe.umd.edu](http://carpe.umd.edu)

*Multi donor efforts can support comprehensive regional approaches to address forest protection and livelihoods.*

## STRENGTHEN LAND RIGHTS

In Ecuador's Esmeralda Forest, a project addressing land conflicts arising between indigenous groups and timber companies supports forest communities to help ensure sustainable land use. The program also supports conflict transformation activities, such as training village community representatives to mediate between communities engaged in land conflicts.

[www.ded.de](http://www.ded.de)

## STRENGTHEN GOVERNANCE

### PARTNERSHIPS TO TACKLE ILLEGAL LOGGING

The Forest Law Enforcement and Governance (FLEG) processes in East Asia and Africa were the first partnerships among producer and consumer countries, donors, civil society, and the private sector to tackle illegal logging in these regions. NGOs and private industry participate through advisory groups. Regional FLEG Ministerial Conferences took place in East Asia (2001) and in Africa (2003). The African declaration recommended the following actions:

- Reform the forest sector; establish SFM practices, and build capacity for government services, law enforcement personnel, and civil society;
- Establish a publicly accessible, nationally centralized forest database;
- Promote alternative local livelihood initiatives for poverty alleviation;
- Consider the legitimate interests of all stakeholders when developing forest legislation;
- Enforce law and improve forest-related governance, including accountability, transparency, and law enforcement.

With its focus on law enforcement and governance, the FLEG process could help reduce conflicts in the forests of East Asia and Africa. While the development of the FLEG process in Africa is still ongoing, the East Asian process is currently slowing down.

[www.iisd.ca](http://www.iisd.ca), [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org)

### ENSURE LEGAL SOURCES OF IMPORTED TIMBER

The European Union Action Plan on Forest

Law Enforcement, Governance, and Trade (FLEGT) is the first comprehensive attempt to ensure that timber imported into the EU will come from legal sources. Proposed Action Plan activities include:

- Signing voluntary bilateral or regional agreements under which exporting countries agree to establish independently monitored systems to verify that timber is legally produced;
- Building capacity in producer countries with technical and financial assistance to develop licensing systems for tracking compliance and verifying legality;
- Encouraging EU member states to modify their procurement policies to require legal timber;
- Promoting corporate responsibility among EU companies, including encouraging them to require that their suppliers in producer countries adhere to voluntary codes of conduct to guarantee legality, and to supplement this with independent audits of the supply chain; and,
- Using existing legislation (e.g., money laundering laws) to tackle illegal logging, and examining other options to control imports of illegal timber.

Although the Action Plan focuses only on securing the legality of timber, and not its sustainable production, a substantial reduction in illegal logging should contribute to reducing conflict. Furthermore, once the voluntary timber-tracking system has been established, the mechanisms could be adapted to encourage sustainably managed forests.

[www.europa.eu.int](http://www.europa.eu.int)

### ADDRESSING CORRUPTION IN FOREST EXPLOITATION

Launched in 2000, the Forest Integrity Network (FIN) combines donor experience fighting corruption with civil society's interest in promoting sustainable forestry. To improve understanding and develop common analysis methodologies, FIN plans to establish and coordinate a coalition of stakeholders willing to fight forest-related corruption, create a Web-based document center and database of corruption-fighting initiatives, expand awareness of forest-related corruption, and promote appropriate case studies. FIN intends to produce the first "Forest Corruption Fighters' Toolkit." FIN's anti-corruption measures



PHOTO: PANG'S ROBINSON

could help fight forest crimes and thus reduce conflict; however, the "integrity pacts" between governments and private entities will be crucial.

[www.transparency.org](http://www.transparency.org)

## ADDRESSING CONFLICT DIRECTLY

### NATURAL RESOURCES CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN PATA

In Senegal, conflict between indigenous people and migrant farmers arose over use of forest resources. A conflict assessment involving about 5,000 residents, development partners, and area businesses identified pragmatic options for addressing the conflict, and an ensuing meeting opened dialogue for drafting an action plan. Subsequently, the community developed a plan to promote sustainable management of the 73,000-hectare Pata forest, creating committees to monitor the forest. This also strengthened democratic processes while reducing conflicts over these resources.

[www.usaid.gov](http://www.usaid.gov)

### DEVELOPING TOOLS TO REDUCE CONFLICT

In Asia and Africa, recognition of the emerging issue of forests and conflict led USAID's Asia and Near East Bureau and Office of Transition Initiatives to commission a diagnostic study entitled "Conflict Timber: Dimensions of the Problem in Asia and Africa" (Thomson and Kanaan, 2003; Jarvie, et al., 2003). The study was a first step in designing well-targeted and effective programming to reduce conflict. Follow-on actions with Missions have continued; for example, workshops were held at the national level in the Philippines and at the provincial level in Cambodia. As a result of the Philippines workshop, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) ordered all DENR Regional Executive Directors, Bureau Directors and Agency heads to designate units for conflict mitigation. Laws that exacerbate local-level conflict are also being reviewed by a team of stakeholders. In Cambodia, grants to local NGOs will work to resolve forest and land conflicts by disseminating information to communities on their legal rights in accordance with Cambodia's new forest and land laws.

[www.usaid.gov](http://www.usaid.gov)

### Clearing a forest for farming in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

# SURVEY INSTRUMENT



PHOTO: PANOS STOWERS

Loading timber at a railway station in Cambodia.

This section lists key questions that evaluate the risk of conflict linked to the exploitation of timber. They should help development agencies effectively integrate forest management and conflict prevention tools into their programs and projects. Not all questions will be relevant to each case or region due to natural, historical, and cultural differences.

**Several basic questions help assess the likelihood of violent conflict arising in forests or over forest resources:**

- Are valuable forests located in remote, politically and economically marginalized areas?
- Are these forests divided into logging concessions, and are they already operating?
- Are there secessionist tendencies in these areas, and could timber be used to finance a civil war?
- Are there other conflicts in the region that might be fought in the forests?

- Has the entire context of the potential conflict been examined and a holistic response considered?
- Is small-scale logging by local communities legal? Do they have legal rights to their land?

### **Do underlying governance failures or weaknesses contribute to the potential for violence?**

- Is the country's economy diversified or is it highly dependent on timber?
- Do government and security institutions regulate timber harvesting and trading effectively and/or do they participate in it?
- Are there measures to control any significant off-budget income of local and national elites from timber exploitation and is such corruption being addressed?
- To what extent is the security sector involved in the exploitation of forests?
- Are forest laws effectively enforced and does the judicial system prosecute forest criminals?
- Do third parties that use the forest as a refuge and battleground influence livelihood choices (e.g., does fighting impede agricultural activities)?
- Is the country participating in any international initiatives to reduce conflict or illegal logging (e.g., FLEG, bilateral MOUs, etc.)?

### **Are the social and environmental impacts of logging and inequitable distribution of benefits fueling grievances or contributing to violence?**

- Do the logging companies apply sustainable and selective logging practices and make efforts to sustain local livelihood opportunities?
- If land rights are ambiguous, do compensation or mitigation measures, or even shareholder schemes, provide income to the community? Have they been fairly negotiated? Are employment and/or social schemes planned?
- Do timber processing plants meet environmental standards? Is compliance enforced? Are human rights respected when these plants are secured?

### **Do local governance failures contribute to conflict or inhibit resolution?**

- Have all groups with legitimate interests in the contested resources been identified and recognized and has the negotiation capacity of weaker groups been strengthened? Has competition been replaced by cooperative forest management, including benefit sharing?
- Have local governance structures been accommodated? Is the tenure situation easily understood and enforced or is it nebulous and open to abuse?
- Have other forms of competition (economic, ethnic, or political) been addressed so that they do not reinforce competition for timber?

### **What is the status of subsistence logging and how it is influenced from the outside?**

- Have livelihoods been diversified or is the economy dependent on logging?

# RESOURCES



PHOTO: PANGSILUDWIG

**Defaced official government sign warns non-indigenous intruders to keep out of the Waiapi reservation in Brazil.**

## USAID CONTRACTING MECHANISMS FOR FORESTS AND CONFLICT PROGRAMMING

The Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation works closely with USAID's Forestry Team located within the Bureau of Economic Growth, Agriculture and Trade's (EGAT) Office of Natural Resource Management (NRM). The Forestry Team extended team members include staff from other teams within the Office of Natural Resource Management, Office of Environment Science and Policy, and Regional Bureaus, as well as the Department of State and the US Forest Service. A recent example of this collabo-

ration is the Liberia Forest Initiative Mission. In April 2004, an interagency team composed of representatives from US Department of State, USAID, Treasury and US Forest Service, along with Conservation International and the Environmental Law Institute, provided recommendations to the National Transitional Government of Liberia to formulate an action plan to rehabilitate and reform Liberia's forest sector thereby reducing the potential for a return to "conflict timber."

The Forestry Team works closely with partners to implement a long-term strategy for strengthening the sustainable management of forests, agroforestry and other tree systems while combating illegal logging and conflict timber. The Forestry program seeks to provide technical leadership within the Agency through targeted assistance and training. The Forestry program strategy includes providing information, technical assistance and other forms of support to Mission and Regional Bureau forestry and natural resources management activities; supporting and influencing the research agendas of international research institutions; and encouraging demonstration, training and dissemination of sustainable forest management practices and policies to promote their adoption for the conservation of forest ecosystems, rehabilitation of degraded lands, and mitigation of conflict through better forest management practices. The strategy recognizes that local rights to forest benefits and participation in forest management are essential for improving management practice. In addition to the adoption of improved practices and policies, improved and continued monitoring of forest use and health, is necessary for long-term forest conservation.

One of the key partnerships the Forestry Team relies on to accomplish its mission is an Interagency Agreement with the US Forest Service/International programs (see below).

## **USAID/US FOREST SERVICE PARTNERSHIP TO PROMOTE SUSTAINABLE FOREST MANAGEMENT AND CONSERVATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES - INTERAGENCY AGREEMENT (IAA)**

The Forestry Team manages an Interagency Agreement (IAA) with the US Forest Service/International Programs. Through this partnership, the Forestry Team provides technical assistance to missions and bureaus. Missions can also tap into this interagency agreement to access Forest Service experts in a wide range of

issues related to forests and conflict. The range of resource personnel includes resource management professionals from silviculturists to economists, wildlife biologists, and wildland recreation specialists. Examples of the types of assistance available through the IAA include analyzing policy, implementing technical programs, and conducting training in the field, and research. In addition, technical assistance can be provided in: sustainable forest management, integrated forest monitoring, watershed management, habitat and protected area management. The EGAT/NRM Forestry Team serves as a technical liaison to the Missions and US Forest Service. To access this IAA, Missions can contact technical staff of the Forest Service/International Programs and /or the EGAT Bureau Forestry Team, to develop scopes of work and identify options for transferring funds. Visit [www.btsbti.net/ifsusaidmenu](http://www.btsbti.net/ifsusaidmenu) to access an online guide to the IAA buy-in procedures.

**Contact: Erik Streed**  
[estreed@usaid.gov](mailto:estreed@usaid.gov)

## **GLOBAL CONSERVATION PROGRAM**

The Leader with Associates (LWA) cooperative agreements under the Global Conservation Program provide the flexibility necessary to facilitate USAID Mission program implementation related to forests and conflicts. Missions and Bureaus can develop their own stand-alone cooperative agreement or grant (called an associate award) with any of the organizations awarded a leader agreement without repeating the competition process - as long as the associate cooperative agreement is consistent with the general program description of the leader award. The program's objective is to conserve globally significant areas of biodiversity through programs that are sustainable, focused and adaptive. Many of the programs deal with forest conflict issues, using conflict based natural resource management and a range of conflict resolution and policy tools. Programs use a threats-based approach to biodiversity conservation. Programs build on and strengthen local capacity; use local personnel, organizations and facilities to the maximum exten-

***USAID is funding activities to reduce conflict that is fed by forest resources while also creating opportunities for sustainable livelihoods.***



possible; and facilitate collaboration with USAID and other organizations engaged in related activities.

**Contact: Doreen Robinson**  
[drobinson@usaid.gov](mailto:drobinson@usaid.gov)

## **RAISE (RURAL AND AGRICULTURAL INCOMES WITH A SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT) (EGAT/NRM AND EGAT/AG)**

RAISE offers a full range of policy, economic development, and community action needs of USAID's various strategies related to forestry and conflict issues such as those identified in this toolkit. This includes developing programs related to alleviating inequities in forest tenure, improving land tenure security and institutional capacity development for forest management as well as identifying and resolving forest resource related disputes, responding to population displacement and return as well as post-conflict issues. Examples of programs may include developing or supporting community decision-making and community-based dispute resolution processes related to forest use. In addition, this mechanism can assist in developing alternative job and livelihood opportunities. The RAISE consortia can take on task orders up to four years in duration and can undertake an intermediate results effort, a results package or activity, or simply develop a country or regional strategy, or design a new activity. Furthermore, RAISE can design as well implement activities without disqualifying firms involved in the design, as long as both stages are done under RAISE. Also, RAISE consortia may pool expertise to collaborate and co-finance state-of-the-art approaches to address various program options illustrated in this toolkit. RAISE Plus, the follow-on mechanism to RAISE will also be available in 2005. Please visit the following websites for more information:

<http://www.raise.org/>



**Women working for the Tanzanian Forest Ministry cultivating pine plants in a tree nursery.**

**Prime recipients: Associates in Rural Development, Inc. (ARD); Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI); and, Chemonics International, Inc.**

**Contact: CTO: David Soroko**  
[dsoroko@usaid.gov](mailto:dsoroko@usaid.gov)  
**or Co-Manager: Chris Kosnik,**  
[ckosnik@usaid.gov](mailto:ckosnik@usaid.gov).

## **GREENCOM: COMMUNICATION AND EDUCATION FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (EGAT/NRM)**

Missions may access this mechanism to undertake rapid initial assessments to develop context-specific, programmatic interventions related to forest management as well as forests and conflict such as those outlined in the Survey Instrument. For example, Missions may access this mechanism to assist in developing activities to target effective communication strategies to combat corruption and illegal resource capture related to forests as well as disseminate information to communities on their legal rights in accordance with existing land and natural resource laws. In addition, GreenCOM may be used to develop participatory processes and local capacity for communities dependent on forests and other natural resources to be more involved in addressing issues related to forests management and conflict resolution. [www.greencom.org](http://www.greencom.org)

**Prime recipient: AED**

**Subcontractor: Chemonics International Inc**

**Contact: Roberta Hilbruner**  
[rhilbruner@usaid.gov](mailto:rhilbruner@usaid.gov)

## US GOVERNMENT AND DONOR CONTACTS

The following section provides a partial list of U.S. Government agencies and donor contacts with expertise relevant to livelihoods and violent conflict. For information on NGOs which implement these types of activities, please contact [conflict@usaid.gov](mailto:conflict@usaid.gov)

### **U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)**

1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW  
Washington, DC 20523

Sharon Morris  
Office of Conflict  
Management and Mitigation  
Tel: 202-712-4206  
Fax: 202-216-3231  
Email: [smorris@usaid.gov](mailto:smorris@usaid.gov)

Jaidev Singh  
USAID/REDSO  
Email: [jasingh@usaid.gov](mailto:jasingh@usaid.gov)

Mary Melnyk  
Asia and the Near East Bureau  
Email: [mmelnyk@usaid.gov](mailto:mmelnyk@usaid.gov)

Scott Bode  
Office of Environment and Science Policy,  
Email: [sbode@usaid.gov](mailto:sbode@usaid.gov)

Alicia Grimes  
Europe and Eurasia Bureau  
Tel: 202-712-1642  
Email: [agrimes@usaid.gov](mailto:agrimes@usaid.gov)

CJ Elron  
Office of Natural Resources Management  
Tel: 202-712-138  
Email: [cjelron@usaid.gov](mailto:cjelron@usaid.gov)

Kim Sais  
Office of Environment and Science Policy  
Email: [ksais@usaid.gov](mailto:ksais@usaid.gov)

Cynthia Gill  
Office of Natural Resources Management  
Tel: 202-712-4177  
Email: [cgill@usaid.gov](mailto:cgill@usaid.gov)

Julie Kunen  
Latin America and the Caribbean Bureau  
Email: [jkunen@usaid.gov](mailto:jkunen@usaid.gov)

John Flynn  
CARPE/Kinshasa  
Email: [jflynn@usaid.gov](mailto:jflynn@usaid.gov)

Jon Anderson  
Office of Natural Resources Management  
Email: [janderson@af-sd.org](mailto:janderson@af-sd.org)

### **U.S. Forest Service**

Dr. Alex Moad,  
Assistant Director for Technical  
Cooperation  
USDA/FS/OIP Franklin Court Bldg.,  
1099 14th Street, NW Suite 5500W  
Washington, DC 20005-3402  
Tel: 202-273-0163  
Fax: 202-273-4750  
Email: [amoad@fs.fed.us](mailto:amoad@fs.fed.us)

International Programs Office  
Mike Bengge  
Email: [mbgenge@fs.fed.us](mailto:mbgenge@fs.fed.us)  
Oliver Pierson  
Africa Program Coordinator  
Email: [opierson@fs.fed.us](mailto:opierson@fs.fed.us)

### **U.S. Department of State**

Jan McAlpine,  
Bureau of Oceans and International  
Environmental and Scientific Affairs  
Office of Ecology and Terrestrial  
Conservation  
2201 C Street, NW  
Washington, DC 20520  
Tel: 202-647-4799  
Email: [mcalpinejl@state.gov](mailto:mcalpinejl@state.gov)

### **United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID)**

Sharon Harvey  
Policy Division  
UK Department for International  
Development  
1 Palace Street  
London SW1E 5HE, UK  
Tel: +44 (0) 20 7023 0956  
Email: [s-harvey@dfid.gov.uk](mailto:s-harvey@dfid.gov.uk)

### **German Development Service (DED)**

Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst gGmbH  
Tulpenfeld 7,  
53113 Bonn, Germany  
Contact: Lothar Rast, Head of Unit  
Tel: +49-228-2434 210  
Fax: +49-228-2434 209  
[www.ded.de](http://www.ded.de)  
Email: [lothar.rast@ded.de](mailto:lothar.rast@ded.de)

## REFERENCES

- ABN AMRO, 2001: *ABN AMRO Risk Policies: Forestry and tree plantations* (approved October 5, 2001). ABN AMRO Bank N.V. Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
- Álvarez, María D., 2001: "Could peace be worse than war for Colombia's forests?" *The Environmentalist*, Vol. 21, pp. 305-315.
- Álvarez, María D., 2003: "Forests in the time of violence: Conservation implications of the Colombian war," *Journal of Sustainable Forestry*, 16(3/4), pp. 49-70.
- Baker, Murl, Robert Clausen, Ramzy Kanaan, Michel N'Goma, Trifin Roule, and Jamie Thomson, 2003: *Conflict timber: Dimensions of the problem in Asia and Africa, Volume III: African cases* Burlington, VT: (Final report submitted to USAID). ARD, Inc.
- Buckles, Daniel, ed., 1999: *Cultivating peace: Conflict and collaboration in natural resource management*. DC: International Development Research Center (IDRC)/ World Bank.
- Capistrano, Doris, 2003: "Keynote address." Presentation at the Expert Workshop on Environmental Conflict and Sustainable Peace on August 25, 2003, Bogor, Indonesia.
- Castro, A. Peter and Erik Nielsen, 2003: "Natural resource conflict management case studies: An analysis of power, participation and protected areas." Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization. Available at <http://www.fao.org>
- Centre for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), 2003a: "Fact sheets: Forest and conflict." Downloaded December 1, 2003, from <http://www.cifor.cgiar.org>
- CIFOR, 2003b: Media release: "Indonesian government's new money laundering laws can help save Indonesia's forests" (September 17, 2003).
- Colchester, Marcus, Martua Sirait, and Boehdi Wijardjo, 2003: "The application of FSC principles 2 and 3 in Indonesia: Obstacles and possibilities." WALHI (Indonesian Forum for Environment) and AMAN (Alliance of Indigenous Peoples of Indonesia) Available at <http://www.walhi.or.id/>
- Collier, Paul, Lani Elliott, Havard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol, and Nicholas Sambanis, 2003: *Breaking the conflict trap: Civil war and development policy*. Washington D.C.: World Bank.
- Forest Watch Indonesia (FWI) and Global Forest Watch (GFW), 2002: *The state of the forest: Indonesia*. Bogor/Washington, DC.
- Greenpeace International, 2003: *State of conflict: An investigation into the landgrabbers, loggers and lawless frontiers in Pará State, Amazon*. Amsterdam: Greenpeace International.
- Griffin et al., 1999: *Study on the development of transboundary natural resource management areas in Southern Africa: Highlights and findings*. Biodiversity Support Program: World Wildlife Federation, The Nature Conservancy, World Resources Institute.
- Global Witness, 2002: *The logs of war: The timber trade and armed conflict* (Fafo Report 379). Oslo: Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science.
- Global Witness, 2003a: "Forests-Introduction and Campaign Aim". Downloaded November 22, 2003, from <http://www.globalwitness.org>
- Global Witness, 2003b: "A conflict of interests: The uncertain future of Burma's forests" (Global Witness briefing). <http://www.globalwitness.org>
- Halle, Mark, 2002: "Protected areas as a platform for communication." Presentation at the Naturschutz - (Aus-)Löser von Konflikten Conference on November 26-27, 2002, in Berlin. <http://www.bfn.de/09/skript898.pdf>.
- Halle, Mark et al., 2002: "Conclusion," in Richard Matthew, Mark Halle, and Jason Switzer: *Conserving the peace: Resources, livelihoods, and security*, pp. 385-408. IISD/IUCN.
- Happe, Barbara, 2001: "Tabula Rasa auf Sumatra: Die ökologischen und sozialen Auswirkungen des Zellstoff- und Papierbooms in Indonesien." Germany: Urgewald e.V.
- Harwell, Emily et al., 2003: *Without remedy: Human rights abuse and Indonesia's pulp and paper industry*. Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch.
- International Development Research Centre (IDRC), 2003: "Lessons from IDRC-supported research". Downloaded November 24, 2003, from <http://web.idrc.ca>

- Indonesian Ministry of Forestry, 2000: Analysis and discussion paper by the Director General for Protection and Conservation of Nature presented at the National Working Meeting of the Ministry of Forestry and Estate Crops, June 26-29, 2000. Quoted in Charles Victor Barber: "Forests, fires and confrontation in Indonesia," in Richard Matthew, Mark Halle, and Jason Switzer 2002: *Conserving the peace: Resources, livelihoods and security*, pp. 99-169. IISD/IUCN.
- Jarvie, James, Ramzy Kanaan, Michael Malley, Trifin Roule, and Jamie Thomson, 2003: "Conflict timber: Dimensions of the problem in Asia and Africa", Volume II: Asian Cases (Final report submitted to USAID). ARD, Inc.
- Kaimowitz, David, 2001: "Get serious about averting trouble in the forest," The International Herald Tribune, November 30, 2001.
- Kaimowitz, David, 2002: "Why are there so many conflicts over forests?" Speech delivered at the 30th International Forestry Students Symposium, "Forest Conservation: Role and Implementation towards Sustainable Forest Management" in Indonesia.
- Kaimowitz, David, 2003: *Forests and war, Forests and peace*. Bogor, Indonesia: CIFOR.
- Lima, Eirivelthon et al., 2003: "Forestas familiares. Belem, Brazil": Instituto de Pesquisa Ambiental de Amazonia.
- Oglethorpe, Judy et al., 2002: "Overview C: Conservation in times of war," in Richard Matthew, Mark Halle, and Jason Switzer: *Conserving the peace: Resources, livelihoods, and security*, pp. 361-383. IISD/IUCN.
- Ostrom, Elinor et al., 2002: "The drama of the commons." Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
- Paffenholz, Thania and Roland Dittli, 2002: "Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) of the Swiss Angola Programme" (Assessment report). SwissPeace.
- Peluso, Nancy and Michael Watts (Eds.), 2001: *Violent environments*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
- Price, Stephen (forthcoming): "Forests and violent conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa" (CIFOR occasional paper). CIFOR/Global Witness.
- Renner, Michael, 2002: *The anatomy of resource wars* (Worldwatch Paper 162). Washington, DC: Worldwatch Institute
- Shine, Clare, 1997: "Legal mechanisms to strengthen and safeguard transboundary protected areas," in Adrian Phillips: *Parks for peace: International Conference on Transboundary Protected Areas as a vehicle for international co-operation*. Somerset West.
- Schroeder-Wildberg, Esther and Alexander Carius (forthcoming): "Illegal logging, conflict and the business sector in Indonesia" (study on behalf of InWEnt). Berlin.
- Thomson, Jamie and Ramzy Kanaan, 2003: *Conflict timber: Dimensions of the problem in Asia and Africa, Volume I: Synthesis report* (Final report submitted to USAID). ARD, Inc. (For the full report please visit: <http://www.ard-biofor.com>)
- Upreti, Bishnu, 2002: "Conflict management in natural resources", Nepal (Case study on conflict and peace in mountain societies). Mountain Forum E-consultation for the Bishkek Global Mountain Summit, UNEP. Available at <http://www.mtnforum.org>
- White, Andy and Alejandra Martin, 2002: *Who owns the world's forests? Forest tenure and public forests in transition*. Washington, DC: Forest Trends.
- World Bank, 2001: *Indonesia: Environment and natural resource management in a time of transition*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- World Bank, 2002: *A revised forest strategy for the World Bank Group*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- World Bank, 2003: Manuscript by Nalin Kishor, presented at the Brown Bag Meeting, December 12, 2003, in Berlin.







**U.S. Agency for International Development**  
Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation  
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW  
Washington, DC 20523  
Tel: (202) 661-5810  
Fax: (202) 216-3454  
[www.usaid.gov](http://www.usaid.gov)