


USAID/DCHA/CMM Assessment: Northern Mali



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TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1

BACKGROUND..... 3

AREAS OF CONCERN..... 3

 Terrorism 3

 Religious Extremism..... 4

 Small Arms and Light Weapons..... 5

RECOMMENDATIONS..... 6

 I. Bolstering Malian Outreach to the North 6

 II. Supporting SALW Reduction Efforts and Creating a Peace Culture 10

 III. Promotion of Indigenous Moderate Interpretation of Islam..... 12

 IV. Targeting for Accuracy and Efficiency 13

 V. Promoting Positive Perceptions of the US Anti-Terror Efforts..... 15

CONCLUSIONS..... 17

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: SCOPE OF WORK 18

APPENDIX II: SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS..... 20

APPENDIX III: JOINT INERAGENCY COORDINATION GROUP..... 25

APPENDIX IV: DIGITAL FREEDOM INITIATIVE SENEGAL PROJECT OUTLINE..... 29

APPENDIX V: USAID/CAR POLLING SAMPLE QUESTIONS..... 34

USAID/DCHA/CMM ASSESSMENT: NORTHERN MALI

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Extreme isolation, widespread youth unemployment, and severely insufficient access to social services are the hallmarks of the absence of the state in northern Mali. The abundance of small arms/light weapons (SALW) in the Sahel and tensions within and between the nomadic and sedentary peoples of northern Mali compound the situation and provide ample opportunity for manipulation, recruitment, and destabilizing activities by terrorists and extremists. With a recent history of violent rebellion between northern tribal groups and the Bamako-based Government of Mali, there is a clear potential for grievances, resources, and opportunities to coalesce into a destabilizing mix.

While Mali has a strong tradition of moderation in its interpretation of Islam, missionaries promoting Dawa al Tabligh and Wahhabi views have begun to make some inroads in the North. Both groups are widely perceived to have an end goal of converting Mali, which has been an anchor of democracy in an unstable region, into a fundamentalist theocracy. With substantial financial resources for mosque construction, new madrassahs, community projects, or sending young students abroad for additional training, the Dawa and Wahhabis have the potential of securing a following among the youth. The ineffective state provides little counterbalance to these efforts.

Radical Islamic groups, such as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Salvation (GSPC), appear to be growing in strength in northern Mali. The GSPC, widely believed to have links with al Qaeda, has established a rear base on Malian territory, relying on the vast space and limited reach of Malian security forces. Given the nexus between Dawa, GSPC and al Qaeda, there is ample cause for concern.

In an effort to address these pressing issues, USAID and US Embassy Bamako are focusing on ways to utilize the resources available across each U.S. Government agency to create a comprehensive approach to the problem. In addition, they hope to impress upon the wider international community, the need for a significant increase in resources to northern Mali.

Recommended Interventions: The overall objective of donor engagement must be to ensure that the fundamental causes of Northern dissatisfaction are addressed. USAID Mali is currently pursuing vital strategic objectives related to health, education, economic growth and governance. Additional resources should be provided to allow the Mission to broaden this approach widely among the northern communes. Decentralization, community participation and decision-making, and the engagement of youth and women in these processes are fundamental to progress within communities and stability of the North.

Bolstering Malian Outreach To The North

In order to mitigate the impression that the Government of Mali has remained inattentive to the needs and desires of the North, there should be a concerted and integrated USG and international donor effort to reinforce the Bamako Government's effectiveness in Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu. The current absence of state has produced a vacuum. Without serious steps to bolster Malian efforts to reach out to the North, this vacuum will continue to be filled by extremists and terrorist groups. This will require encouragement and pressure by the international community, as well as a targeting of resources in a way that convinces the northern population that the Government of Mali is taking the lead in improving the conditions that most directly affect their lives: Economics, social services, and security.

The USG and other donors should utilize a robust and multi-faceted approach to engagement and empowerment of the communities of the North to address their underlying dissatisfaction with the Government of Mali. Northern communes must have access to education, health and economic growth

combined with engagement of local communities in exercising their rights and fulfilling their societal responsibilities. The USAID/Mali strategy has been effective in other parts of the country. The Mission should be provided with the necessary resources to see expansion throughout the North of the current USAID/Mali strategy.

Looming large is the immediate need for widespread employment for vulnerable youth. Large-scale infrastructure projects, such as road construction that connects Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu with each other and the rest of Mali, are consistently cited as crucial undertakings. This type of public works project would certainly serve to lessen isolation of the North, provide massive short-term employment potential, and increase the possibility of trade and commerce. As the scope of this particular assessment did not allow for detailed study of these types of interventions, it is strongly recommended that further study be conducted on this topic.

Supporting SALW Reduction Efforts and Creating a Peace Culture

The population in northern Mali remains well armed, despite efforts by the Government of Mali and the international community to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate (DDR) fighters, following the Tuareg rebellion of the 1990s. USAID/Mali and U.S. Embassy Bamako should concentrate their resources on enhancing the culture of peace between nomadic and sedentary populations, within Arab and Tuareg clans, and among vulnerable youth. Simultaneously, Embassy Bamako should continue to apply pressure on the Prime Minister to utilize greater Malian resources to ease the northern population's security concerns. The Government of Mali has already earmarked significant funds for DDR efforts through CAR/NORD and is continuing to raise funds through the international community. Embassy Bamako should use its good offices to pressure the Prime Minister to ensure that these resources are used more effectively and are not needlessly wasted on infighting and corruption.

Promotion of Indigenous Moderate Interpretation of Islam

While Malians traditionally practice a moderate and tolerant form of Sunni Islam, outside influences, particularly from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, have introduced radically conservative interpretations of the faith. Certainly, bolstering Malian efforts to engage the North, improving social services, enhancing security, and improving the economy are absolute preconditions for keeping the population content and providing them with the wherewithal to defend against extremist influences. In addition, however, the USG should directly focus on promoting indigenous moderate interpretations of Islam by highlighting Malians' age-old tradition of venerating holy figures and tombs – a practice that is antithetical to Dawa and Wahhabis.

Targeting for Accuracy and Efficiency

Given resource constraints and a vast expanse of territory for interventions in northern Mali, the USG should strive to determine where its funds could be used most effectively through a combination of polling instruments and GIS development.

Promoting Positive Perceptions of the US Anti-Terror Efforts

The perception that US military assistance may be counter to the interests of northern Malians could be used as a lightning rod for grievances and a tool for galvanizing wider support for extremist/terrorist intentions. The USG should make every effort to quash perceptions that could be manipulated.

USAID/DCHA/CMM ASSESSMENT: NORTHERN MALI

BACKGROUND

The United States Government (USG) is engaged in efforts to counter the growing threat of terrorist groups and extremist ideologies in the Sahel region of Africa. The abundance of small arms/light weapons (SALW) in the Sahel, high youth unemployment, and tensions within and between the nomadic and sedentary peoples of the North provide ample opportunity for manipulation, recruitment, and destabilizing activities by terrorists and extremists. The clear absence of effective state institutions, minimal access to state resources, and perception that the Government of Mali has marginalized and isolated the inhabitants of the North has created a vacuum. With a recent history of violent rebellion between northern tribal groups and the Bamako-based Government of Mali, it is critical that grievances, resources, and opportunities are not allowed to coalesce into a destabilizing mix.

Mali has historically been an island of stability and promising democracy amidst the turbulence of West Africa.¹ Additionally, the Government of Mali has been one of the most vocal African supporters of the U.S. war on terrorism. USAID and U.S. Embassy Bamako are thus focusing on ways to utilize the resources available to create a comprehensive approach to the problem. In order to effectively redress these issues, the USG will not only need to utilize its own resources, it must impress upon the broader international community to focus greater levels of development assistance in northern Mali.

As part of this effort, USAID/Mali requested the assistance of the USAID Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) in gaining greater understanding of the situation in northern Mali, with the goal of providing recommendations to be undertaken. In response to this request, CMM organized a two-person team to work in conjunction with the USAID Mission in developing a vision for programmatic next steps and for strategizing on approaches to garner appropriate resources to address this pressing nexus of security and development in Mali.

During the first half of April 2004, the CMM team accompanied the U.S. Ambassador, USAID Mission Director, and members of their staff in a wide array of meetings with national and local host government representatives, members of civil society, senior military and police officials, and USAID partners. Discussions were held in the northern cities of Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu, as well as in the capital, Bamako. The participation of the U.S. Ambassador and the USAID Mission Director in this assessment of northern Mali underscores the serious nature of the situation and the U.S. commitment to addressing it.

AREAS OF CONCERN

Terrorism

Groups linked with radical Islamic elements appear to be growing in strength in northern Mali. Of most urgent concern are the activities of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Salvation (GSPC), led by Amari Saifi, more widely known by his *nom de guerre* Abderazzak Al Para². The GSPC has been actively engaged in waging an armed struggle against the recently reelected moderate Government of Algeria and is widely believed to have links with al Qaeda. The GSPC is currently using the *de facto* open borders of

¹ The recent conflict in Cote d'Ivoire is especially worrisome, given Mali's dependence on Ivorian ports and the large number of Malian returnees previously working in Cote d'Ivoire.

² At the time of revision to this paper, Al Para had reportedly been captured. It is unclear what effect this will have on the viability of the GSPC.

the Sahel region and the limited effectiveness of law enforcement to cross between countries. As the GSPC continues its fight against the government of Algeria, Mali serves as an ideal location for a safe haven. There is particular concern that the poor semi-nomadic youth of the north are becoming targets of recruitment by the GSPC or at a minimum providing material resources to support its cause. Given the purported links between the GSPC and al Qaeda, the vast openness of northern Mali could become attractive to al Qaeda cells that have been forced out of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Middle East.³

In February 2003, the GSPC took a group of western tourists hostage in the Algerian Sahara. After the hostages were taken across the border into Mali in summer 2003, negotiators were successful in securing their release. According to numerous sources, the release was facilitated by a multi-million euro ransom payment by the German Government to the GSPC.⁴ With this significant injection of resources, the GSPC has been able to enhance the quality and numbers of weapons and vehicles under its control, thus instantaneously raising its profile and ability to cause instability across the Sahel.

The GSPC has subsequently begun to establish a rear base on Malian territory, relying on the vast space and limited reach of Malian security forces. By generously overpaying for supplies of food and gasoline from local herders and merchants, the GSPC has ensured an important level of cooperation, while discouraging the population from being forthcoming with intelligence to Malian authorities. Likewise, the GSPC has reportedly hired young men in the north for menial tasks or taxi driving, compensating them well. This economic incentive creates an attractive lure for undereducated, unemployed youth, who may not be initially swayed by the GSPC's cause.

Recognizing that the GSPC has become a growing threat to the region and may be seeking to establish itself more soundly outside of Algeria, the USG is providing military training, non-lethal equipment, and assistance to the Sahel nations of Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad under the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI). The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State are spearheading PSI to protect borders, track movement of people and meet the U.S. national security goals of combating terrorism, and enhancing regional cooperation and stability.

Current PSI technical assessments in each country focus on training and capacity building resources. PSI is assisting participant countries to counter known terrorist operations and border incursions, as well as trafficking of people, illicit materials, and other goods. Key aspects of the training include basic marksmanship, planning, communications, land navigation, patrolling and medical care. In addition, PSI supplies non-lethal equipment to the target countries.

Religious Extremism

Mali has a strong tradition of moderation in its interpretation of Islam. As with other African countries, religion in Mali is interwoven with the culture, making it difficult to indicate exactly where the boundaries of religion end and the indigenous traditions begin. Most northern Malians assert that their interpretation of Islam is pure and that they have no interest in adopting alternate views of Islam. That said, missionaries promoting Dawa al Tabligh and Wahhabi views have begun to make some inroads in northern Mali. While Malians interviewed were insistent that neither the Dawa nor the Wahhabis have committed crimes, per se, there is concern that their strategy is more insidious and long-term.

While the Dawa and Wahhabis have differing theological interpretations of Islam, both preach extremist ideologies that are counter to the traditions of Mali and, in the view of some circles in the USG,

³ Malian authorities provided the team with specific contact information for a Pakistani national, based in Bamako, who is leading the smuggling of people from Asia and the Middle East to Europe. Clearly terrorists could use this transit route either on their way to Europe or to an end destination in the Sahel. A foreign diplomat based in the North confirmed reports that Asians and Middle Easterners were frequently sighted in northern Mali.

⁴ The German Government and the Malian authorities deny that a ransom was paid.

dangerous for the stability of the region. The predominant belief is that both groups have an end goal of converting Mali into a fundamentalist theocracy. Both have imported their beliefs from abroad: the Dawa from Pakistan and the Wahhabis from Saudi Arabia. Both appear to have substantial financial resources that they use for mosque construction, new madrassahs, community projects, or sending young students abroad for additional training. The highly visible use of these resources appears in sharp contrast to the limited efforts made by the Government of Mali to improve conditions in the north.

It is this last point, training abroad, that is of particular concern. According to sources, the Dawa and Wahhabis target young and poor northern Malians for recruitment. The Dawa reportedly send these students to Pakistan for religious training. The concern, however, is that they receive additional training in less innocuous disciplines. This becomes even more worrisome considering assertions that there are links between the Dawa and the GSPC.

Small Arms and Light Weapons

The borders between Niger, Mauritania, Algeria and Mali are porous and uncontrollable. Armed gangs roam freely between these countries trading small arms, cigarettes and this past year, people. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons, especially through illegal trafficking, has become a widespread affliction in northern Mali, contributing to rising crime, and internal as well as international conflicts. To counter these threats to national and regional security, the heads of state and government of the 16-member Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) declared in 1998 a three-year renewable moratorium on the importation, exportation, and manufacture of light weapons among its members.

While the Tuareg rebellion of the early 1990s has been credited with attracting large supplies of weapons to northern Mali, the subsequent peace agreement with the Government of Mali has not brought about a significant reduction of these arms. The much-hailed Flame of Peace in Timbuktu celebrated the destruction of a mere 3,000 weapons.⁵ By the end of 2002, the peak of post-conflict weapons collection, the Program of Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED) had only gathered 35,000 weapons.⁶ Firm statistics are difficult to obtain, regarding the number of small arms and light weapons still in the north. Anecdotal information suggests that, on average, each family possesses at least one firearm. This would signify approximately 320,000 weapons in the north.⁷ Given figures of 8 million weapons throughout West Africa, estimates in northern Mali are likely quite conservative.

The peace agreement envisioned that northern fighters would be disarmed, demobilized, and reintegrated into governmental security structures. The government set about bringing some 12,000 former rebels back into civilian life. Approximately 2,400 ex-combatants were absorbed into the army and the civil service. A total of 9,530 others were given demobilization payments of 300,000 CFA francs (about \$500) and for some an additional soft micro-credit for small business start-ups. While only ten percent of the former rebels are estimated to have deserted the army or abandoned their new civilian jobs, a portion of these former rebels retained their weapons and refused to reintegrate or were simply overlooked. Some jobless former rebels tired of waiting for the peace dividend and have chosen to go abroad or make easy money by joining gangs of bandits and smugglers who roam the country. Crime is on the increase and large-scale smuggling of American cigarettes is growing. A packet of Marlboros bought for 250 CFA francs (\$0.40) in Burkina Faso sells for 650 (\$1) in Mali and 850 (\$1.30) in Algeria. The possession of weapons has facilitated these activities.

⁵“West Africa Disarmament on the Move,” Program of Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED) Annual Report 2001-2002.

⁶ *ibid*

⁷ This assumes 1.6 million inhabitants in the north, with an average family size of five.

Vast deserts and open borders create a clear security concern for herding populations, whose livelihood can easily be poached by bandits. Tensions between clans and ethnic groups add to the concern. Law enforcement officers and security personnel in Kidal, Gao, Timbuktu, and Bamako claimed that their forces in the North are typically unable to pursue bandits or terrorists in the desert, since their equipment is in poor condition or lacking sufficient fuel. Further, as a key condition to the peace agreement, the Government of Mali was obliged to remove more than 50 security checkpoints in the North. The inability of security and law enforcement to provide protection to local populations and to pursue criminals has undermined the confidence in the national government to protect the people. People thus view security as their own responsibility.

RECOMMENDATIONS

I. Bolstering Malian Outreach to the North

Issue: In order to mitigate the impression that the Government of Mali has remained inattentive to the needs and desires of the north, there should be a concerted and integrated USG and international donor effort to reinforce the Bamako Government's effectiveness in Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu. The current absence of state has produced a vacuum. Without serious steps to bolster Malian efforts to reach out to the North, this vacuum will continue to be filled by extremists and terrorist groups. This will require encouragement and pressure by the international community, as well as a targeting of resources in a way that convinces the northern population that the Government of Mali is taking the lead in improving the conditions that most directly affect their lives: Economics, Social Services, and Security.

The USG and other donors should utilize a robust and multi-faceted approach to engagement and empowerment of the communities of the North to address their underlying dissatisfaction with the Government of Mali. Decentralization, community participation and decision making, economic activities and the engagement of youth and women are fundamental to enhancing satisfaction among communities. Northern communes must have access to education, health and economic growth combined with engagement of local communities in exercising their rights and fulfilling their societal responsibilities. The USAID Mali strategy has been effective in other parts of the country. The Mission should be provided with the necessary resources to see expansion of the areas targeted by the current USAID/Mali strategy into the North.

Mali's three northern regions (Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal) contain only ten percent of the population, about 1,600,000 people, but two-thirds of the country's land mass. Due to the harsh climate, the lack of natural resources, high transport costs, a high illiteracy rate, and the nomadic lifestyle of many of its inhabitants, the North, and particularly the Tuareg population, has not received an equitable portion of Governmental resources. The North has likewise not had the investment in infrastructure and social services that typically serve as preconditions for development and a foundation for peace. As a result, the northern regions lag desperately behind the South in terms of all development indicators. This perception of inequality and abandonment has nurtured frustration among the people of the north and created a breeding ground for social and political instability.

This is particularly palpable regarding the issue of unemployment. According to interviewees, currently, 80 percent of youth in Gao are unemployed. Similar unemployment levels pervade the North, highlighting the visible disparity between northern and southern Mali. The average rate of poverty in Mali is 64 percent. The Timbuktu region has a poverty- rate of 77 percent. The Gao region has a poverty rate of 78.7 percent. The Kidal region is characterized by the highest rate of poverty in the nation, 92 percent.⁸

⁸ Fifth Forum on Governance in Africa, May 23 - 25, 2002, Maputo, Mozambique. "*The Malian Experience in Combating Poverty and Conflict Management*"

The north historically has had a poor economy, dependent on herding by the Tuaregs, limited farming by the Songhai, and international trading by the Arabs. The economy has suffered two massive shocks in recent years, due to widespread and persistent drought, further limiting income-producing opportunities. Education has not been a priority for families seeking to scratch out an existence. Particularly for nomadic populations (i.e., Tuareg, Arab), their transitory culture has precluded education for many youth. The end result is a large youth cohort with too much unstructured time and little hope for their future. It is precisely these types of individuals - poor, uneducated, unable to survive on traditional livelihoods, and likely bored - who are ready-made targets for terrorists or extremists.

In June 1990 a Tuareg rebellion began, fueled by the tragic drought of the mid-eighties and the desperation and disenfranchisement felt by nomadic Tuareg populations. The disputing parties signed the National Pact in April 1992, establishing the conditions for peace. However, the Government had difficulty meeting the conditions of the Pact, ostensibly due to budgetary restrictions and slow donor reaction. This failure to redress the northerners' concerns in a timely manner gave the impression that the Government was not serious about increasing the flow of resources to the North. Fighting subsequently resumed. Peace was ultimately established in June 1995, though there is a continued perception that the GOM has met neither the letter nor the spirit of the peace agreement.

Further undermining the image of the Malian Government is its present efforts to prevent the GSPC from establishing a rear base on Malian territory. The response has been attempts to cut off support to the GSPC by seizing food and gasoline. Unlike the militaries in Chad and Niger, the Malian military has not forcefully and directly engaged the GSPC. While these activities have resulted in modest success, Arab leaders fear that the military will seize goods that are destined for legitimate markets.

While Malian military efforts focus on cutting off the GSPC supply routes, this may be serving to exacerbate tensions with the Arab population. Arabs in the North derive their livelihood largely from cross-border trade. As Mali and Algeria do not have a formalized customs agreement, effectively all goods coming from Algeria into Mali are smuggled and therefore illegal. As the Malian security forces consider all unregistered trucks that are smuggling goods to be potential suppliers to the GSPC, the current practice is to stop the trucks, arrest the drivers, and confiscate the goods. One of the complicating factors in distinguishing between legitimate goods and contraband or that which is destined for the GSPC is that Algeria considers all petroleum exports to Mali to be illegal.

While this is likely effective in cutting off fuel and other material supplies to the GSPC, it has the unfortunate simultaneous result of exacerbating anti-government sentiment remaining in the North from the rebellion. Whereas Arab leaders say they support eliminating the GSPC because of their charging the Arabs protection money to use traditional trade routes and the GSPC recruitment and conversion of Arab youth, the military focus on cutting off the supply routes, combined with allegations of corruption and self-serving practices among Malian military, has the potential of driving a wedge between the military and the population. Given the populations' continued distrust of the GOM, lingering animosity from the rebellion, and pressures from outside influences (i.e., GSPC and Dawa), any further alienation of portions of the nomadic population could be destabilizing for the North.

Specific Recommended Interventions:

(1) Lessening Isolation and Reinvigorating the North:

- Unquestionably, the greatest steps towards improving the stability of the North would be to improve the economy, lessen unemployment, and initiate trade with the rest of Mali. Credible arguments have been made to support the need for *large-scale public works and infrastructure projects*. Most specifically, construction of a road connecting Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu with each other and the rest of Mali, would greatly serve to lessen isolation, while opening the possibility for increased commerce. In the short-term, vast numbers of young adults could be recruited as laborers in building

the road and the secondary services typically associated with such trade routes. Such an undertaking is admittedly massive, though the potential benefits are undeniable. While the assessment team did not delve deeply into this issue, the team strongly recommends that further study be undertaken, in conjunction with large bilateral, multilateral donors, and the Government of Mali.

- In an effort to show that the Bamako-based government is truly concerned about the plight of northern youth, the Government of Mali will need to be pressured to focus a portion of the recently announced **Presidential Youth Initiative** on highly visible effective activities in the north. While some nominal amount of assistance is likely to be sent northward, the bulk of resources will logically be allocated to the more densely populated regions. USG and other donor assistance could be provided to leverage the Malian Government's resources for the North and ensure that a reasonable number of jobs are created. Given the pastoral tradition of the nomadic peoples of the North, USAID could consider focusing resources from the Milk Initiative in areas such as the establishment of collective goat cheese production activities. Supporting the Presidential Youth Initiative would create a good starting point for further developing USAID Mission-wide awareness that it is critical to integrate youth throughout all sectors of development programming.
- **Vocational education** schemes that encourage apprenticeships for youth will not only keep youth from being drawn into dereliction, but also provide them with a useable/productive skill. Further, programs to **reinforce traditional apprenticeships** through scholarships, food support, and promoting evening literacy programs can directly engage youth in a meaningful pursuit. Apprenticeship programs could provide supplemental income to skilled workers willing to train apprentices, *à la* USAID Sierra Leone's program. As USAID and other donors have supplied solar panels, water pumps, and radios to a number of communities, initial vocational education could focus on developing a cadre of technicians across the North who can repair this equipment. With additional resources, USAID/Mali could leverage the Government of Luxembourg's recently established vocational center in Kidal, helping to ensure that trainees move into real jobs following completion of the center's course of study.
- The current **USAID/Mali decentralization program** "Programme du Gouvernance Partagé" is particularly appropriate for the North as it combines economic growth activities with participatory decision making and training for citizens, local associations and local government in the roles and responsibilities of self-governance and conflict mitigation. It engages the entire community, including women and youth, in development decisions and managing budgets transparently. The focus on mobilization of local resources and income generating activities is critical. With additional funding, this program could target conflict prone communes in the North to develop local constituencies for peace and mechanisms for conflict resolution, as well as economic and governance activities.

(2) Engaging Youth through Education:

- One serious issue in trying to tackle the education problem in the North is that the nature of the nomadic lifestyle makes it particularly difficult to reach youth through traditional educational venues. USAID should obtain and review the basic education program for nomadic populations from **Senegal pilot literacy program** to assess it for possible translation and transfer of lessons learned to USAID/Mali.
- It is critical to keep youth in school to ensure that large portions of their days are occupied. Of particular concern are teenaged youth. USAID/Mali is currently focusing on enhancing curriculum and utilizing teacher training to improve the quality of education. Schemes to provide **incentives for children to stay in school** (e.g., school feeding programs, access to micro-credit for parents of attending students, etc.) may be ways to increase short-term attendance. There tends to be reluctance among development professionals to utilize these approaches, as they are widely considered unsustainable. While school-feeding programs, for example, may not be sustainable in the traditional sense, they do serve to take youth off the street and place them in a structured environment for a

given period of time. Often, this period of time is enough to limit the youth risk of recruitment into destabilizing activities.

- USAID is currently providing secular curriculum support to four madrassahs in Gao and one in Kidal. By *injecting secular material into traditional religious schools*, USAID is helping to provide broader education to these youth and expose them to secular issues. Madrassahs have been the target of both the Dawa and the Wahhabis as places of recruitment. In many cases, these groups have built their own facilities. The USAID Education team should endeavor to expand its outreach to include additional madrassahs in Kidal and Timbuktu. By enhancing the attractiveness of moderate madrassahs, youth may be lured away from the Dawa and Wahhabi supported madrassahs. As USAID has already secured “buy-in” from the religious faculty of madrassahs in Gao, it would be useful to introduce these teachers to the faculty at madrassahs in Kidal in an effort to convince them of the usefulness of cooperation with USAID.
- An effective tool for *educating and conveying positive messaging to large portions of the population is through radio*⁹. Community engagement in local radio programming through training and involvement of youth with implementing organizations would engage many youth and produce appropriate messages to meet community needs. USAID/Mali has done much in this regard and should be applauded and further supported in this effort. Radio can serve to create a sense of interlinked community and cohesiveness. The North, however, presents significant difficulties in providing access to information for its population. Communes are sparsely populated and far apart. The value of being able to reach the population, both sedentary and nomadic, through radio is of primary importance.

Further, radio programming can be used to promote a better relationship between the North and other regions of Mali. In the E&E region, USAID has had notable success in confidence building and the reduction of tension by utilizing media exchanges. USAID/Afghanistan has utilized radio in a highly successful program. Typically, a USAID-funded media implementer or association serves as the focal point for gathering radio clips from stations on targeted themes. These clips are edited together to form a weekly radio magazine that draws from multiple regions of a country and produced by local reporters/announcers. Themes for the clips can cover issues pertaining to local government (e.g., poor trash collection), security concerns (e.g., GSPC overtures or negative ramifications of weapons trafficking) or other topic of interest. While the radio magazines convey useful information, the underlying goal is to expose populations in the North and South to ideas and attitudes from their respective regions. This communication helps to break down barriers, prejudice, and isolation.

- USAID/Mali is currently awaiting the release of a *girls’ scholarship fund* from USAID/AFR/SD. Once received, the Education team should target this girls’ scholarship fund to the north, with a special emphasis on Kidal which has the lowest rate of girls’ enrollment. The effect of this fund would be three-fold: (1) it would decrease the isolation of the population of the north, especially women in Kidal (2) it would serve as a counterbalance to extremist influences that are downplaying the importance of education for all, and (3) it would be a visible demonstration of USG support for the population of the north, which is already being courted and influenced by extremists.

(3) Improve Northern Security:

- The US Embassy should encourage the GOM to increase the number of security resources in the North. However, this should be done sensitively, in light of persistent tensions from the rebellion, and in coordination with an intense civilian-military relations campaign. If the GOM relocates military personnel originating from outside the north, there is the risk that the northern population will view this as a move towards “occupation” and an abrogation of the peace agreement.

⁹ For a detailed look at media options in northern Mali, see: Bilodeau, Dennis, Communications in Northern Mali: Challenges and Opportunities for Enhancing Development and Stability, USAID/Mali, April 2004.

General concerns of insecurity, complaints that too many southern Songhai security personnel are working in areas of Tuareg and Arab populations, and a growing concern of outsiders (i.e., Algerians and Dawa) freely moving throughout northern Mali, speak to the lack of checkpoints across the region. There appears to be a coincidence of interests for the Government of Mali to explore the possibility of working with the northern Malians on reexamining the checkpoint clause in the peace agreement.¹⁰ Given this possible window of opportunity, the Embassy should ***encourage the sides to discuss reinstatement of a limited number of checkpoints***. These would be under GOM auspices, but should envision the predominant use of local personnel. While enhancing security, these checkpoints would provide limited employment and would help move the GOM and the northern populations more closely toward concrete cooperation.

Further, the US Embassy, EUCOM, Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA), and PSI should pressure the GOM to ***increase the pace at which they rotate personnel*** from northern posts. Lengthy deployments encourage self-serving practices and corruption. The USG has had success with a comparable request in Senegal.

- In Senegal and Togo, the U.S Department of State has worked with the African Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), the premier civilian-military relations organization on Africa, to improve the relationship and communication between the military and civilian population. Drawing on this experience, the US embassy, USAID, and the Department of State could partner with the ACSS in Mali to provide ***training for effective communication between security forces and the population***. The Senegal and Togo models have had success in establishment of a civilian liaison with the military and conducting workshops to increase broad understanding of military activities and civilian needs. In the northern Mali context, it is critical that particular attention is focused on the Tuareg and Arab communities and areas where PSI assistance is most visible.

II. Supporting SALW Reduction Efforts and Creating a Peace Culture

Issue: The population in northern Mali remains well armed, despite efforts by the Government of Mali and the international community to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate (DDR) fighters, following the Tuareg rebellion of the 1990s. USAID/Mali and U.S. Embassy Bamako should concentrate their resources on enhancing the culture of peace between nomadic and sedentary populations, within Arab and Tuareg clans, and among vulnerable youth. Simultaneously, Embassy Bamako should continue to apply pressure on the Prime Minister to utilize greater Malian resources to ease the northern population's security concerns. The Government of Mali has already earmarked significant funds for DDR efforts through CAR/NORD and is continuing to raise funds through the international community. Embassy Bamako should use its good offices to pressure the Prime Minister to ensure that these resources are used more effectively and are not needlessly wasted on infighting and corruption.

Part of the difficulty in completing the DDR task has been the limited earning potential that reintegrated fighters face, when they enter the Malian military. Comparatively, smuggling and banditry are greater sources of income and solid reasons to retain weapons. Continued distrust of Malian security forces and concern that the population needs to be responsible for its own well-being have led to the possession of weapons by a wider slice of the population than merely former fighters. The lucrative arms trade within Mali and to neighboring African countries is an ever-attractive employment option for successive generations. The assumption that drug traffic closely follows the cigarette smuggling route through Mali, Mauritania, and Morocco on its way to Europe is another reason for gangs of smugglers to hold arms. Further, the apparent infighting and competition between PCASED, CAR/NORD and the ECOWAS Small Arms Unit, three agencies tasked with portions of DDR, has prevented the emergence of crucial synergies.

¹⁰ Discussions with CAR/Nord, a GOM agency, supported this premise (4/15/04)

The inability of the Government of Mali to coordinate DDR efforts and to make more serious inroads on the issue of SALW, speaks to an apparent lack of will at the upper levels of government. Naturally, the solution to this problem is not only in the hands of Mali, but must largely come at the regional level. Unilateral attempts to disarm one country's population in an environment in which there is vast insecurity and open borders will lead to the creation of a vacuum that ultimately attracts additional weapons. Until countries show genuine will to move this issue forward regionally, bilateral assistance is likely to hit an impasse. Valuable resources can be needlessly expended on less-than-fruitful pursuits.

Specific Recommended Interventions:

- USAID/Mali is funding 13 Community Learning and Information Centers (CLICS) throughout Mali. These CLICS will offer Internet and email access, development-oriented information, and computer training. Each CLIC is specifically designed with the needs of local hosting community. For the Northern CLICS, this will mean the incorporation of special content on issues such as desertification, security, employment opportunities, religious topics and water resources. Distance education and teacher training programming will likewise be offered. The USAID-funded CLICS are one example of USG interventions that have tremendous potential for providing much needed information to isolated northern communities, particularly in the realm of developing a greater peace culture.

In order to ensure the broadest impact possible, the Mission should explore ways to engage youth and attract them to the CLICS. Certainly, the access to Internet and computer-based information is important for broadening the world-view of literate CLIC patrons. But, the possibility of developing linkages with other USAID activities should not be only information technology driven, as a large portion of the northern population remains illiterate. Rather, the *Mission should view the CLICS as one type of community-based center* for roundtable discussions, gathering points for youth and women's groups, repositories of development information, and production facilities for radio plays or sensitization campaigns. The *CLICS need not be the only medium for such activities, but should neither be excluded as a vehicle for this type of youth engagement.*

By using community-based centers, such as the CLICS, to create multiple vehicles for information dissemination, USAID can insert specific messages that promote a broader culture of peace. USAID could partner directly with local NGOs, youth groups, women groups, and drama clubs to facilitate roundtable discussions, develop radio plays¹¹, or organize sensitization campaigns. For consistency, however, USAID/Mali should explore with PCASED the possibility of tapping into their existing network of contacts and facilitators. In northern Mali, PCASED has worked closely with the Civil Society National Coalition for Peace and the Fight against the Proliferation of Light Weapons, the Community Collective of Gao, and the National Network on the Fight against the Proliferation of Light Weapons. As these groups already have experience in developing programming that has contributed to the reduction of weapons-associated violence and criminal activity, USAID could build on the PCASED experience, rather than starting anew.

It is important to remember that sensitization activities and conveying positive messages is an attempt at long-term cultural reprogramming. Of greater importance in the short-term is the actual time involvement of vulnerable youth in creating the messages and engaging in dialogue. The more free time committed to these types of positive pursuits, the less time available for harmful activities.

- Recently, armed conflict occurred among the Ould Bonauda and Ould Omara Arab communities in Nebket outside of Timbuktu and between Arabs and Kountas outside of Gao. Given the presence of arms in these communities, tensions erupted into deadly violence. While isolated arms reduction programs are unlikely to have a deep and permanent effect for the reasons specified above, **targeted**

¹¹ Radio plays could be developed with local youth talent and distributed to area radio stations.

weapons for development programming could have the effect of easing tensions and building community bonds.

As a pilot project, USAID could establish elected community groups in two rival communities. These community groups would be tasked with separately identifying the grievances that have given risen to tension with the neighboring community. As the process moves along, representatives from the groups would be brought together to identify common solutions to these grievances. Interviews have suggested that much of the tension that has been exhibited recently is based on access to water or other resources. To resolve the grievance, USAID would offer a menu of assistance to the paired communities. This assistance could include, for example, scholarships for children to attend school, radios for communities, educational materials for a local school, small grants to be used at the discretion of the community. In exchange for the assistance, the communities will be required to collect a certain amount of weapons. In this way, the communities will buy into the process and will symbolically feel as though their security has been improved. The dialogue between the groups can help solidify trust.¹² USAID will need to secure support and cooperation from the Government of Mali to ensure that this effort succeeds.

III. Promotion of Indigenous Moderate Interpretation of Islam

Issue: While Malians traditionally practice a moderate and tolerant form of Sunni Islam, outside influences, particularly from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, have introduced radically conservative interpretations of the faith. Certainly, bolstering Malian efforts to engage the North, improving social services, enhancing security, and improving the economy are absolute preconditions for keeping the population content and providing them with the wherewithal to defend against extremist influences. In addition, however, the USG should directly focus on promoting indigenous moderate interpretations of Islam by highlighting Malians' age-old tradition of venerating holy figures and tombs – a practice that is antithetical to Dawa and Wahhabis.

With reported links between the Dawa and the GSPC and a further connection between the GSPC and Al Qaeda, the importation of new interpretations of Islam not only threatens to transform northern Mali towards more fundamentalist tendencies, it also serves as a vehicle for indoctrination and recruitment of followers for a terrorist agenda. The Dawa have made notable inroads in Kidal, where the Intalla, head of the leading family, has openly embraced this interpretation. In Timbuktu, the Wahhabi influence is of particular concern to the local Muslim leadership, who see youth being adversely affected. There are differing opinions as to whether the Dawa or the Wahhabis have greater sway in Gao. Regardless, however, external influences are clearly present.

Youth are at greatest risk for recruitment. Poor education, unemployment, and boredom create a ripe environment for charismatic leaders with financial resources to sow the seeds of influence. While the USG and the international donor community should undertake poverty reduction interventions to counter the financial incentives that are being used to attract youth, the USG should also focus efforts on promoting the traditional culture and moderate Islam of Mali to form a bulwark against the theological conversion of the North.

Of particular interest to USG efforts to promote moderate Islam is the reverence for Malian “saints.”¹³ Timbuktu is the self-declared city of 333 saints. Linked closely with the saints is the concept of tomb

¹² USAID cannot deal directly with the collection and destruction of weapons. It will, therefore, need to partner with an organization or agency that can. While PCASED or CAR/Nord could be approached as potential partners in this endeavor, a more reliable partner would be the State Department. WARP and CMM are currently examining possible pilot areas for cooperation between USAID and the State Department on SALW interventions. Mali would serve as an ideal test case.

¹³ “Saint,” as used in this context, is a direct translation from French.

worship. In the city of Gao, for example, the Tomb of Askia Mohammad, a well-respected community leader and religious figure, abuts the mosque. Worshippers come reverently to the tomb to pay their respects. Saint worship and tomb veneration are not typical parts of Muslim tradition and may reveal indigenous overtones of either Sufism¹⁴ or pre-Islamic polytheism in Mali. These practices are strictly counter to the core values and teachings of both the Dawa and the Wahhabis. By underscoring this age-old linkage between Mali's cultural and religious tradition, vis-à-vis saints and tombs, northern Malians may be more likely to reject foreign attempts at changing their belief system.

Specific Recommended Interventions:

- Housed in the Ahmed Baba Center in Timbuktu is a collection of approximately 20,000 manuscripts, starting from the 12th century.¹⁵ The documents detail the history, culture, and religion of the region. The writings on religion are rich and include a commentary on the Koran dated from the early 13th century, a 17th century biography of the Prophet, and numerous pieces on holy figures (i.e., saints) of Timbuktu.

The Ahmed Baba Center has received significant assistance from the Ford Foundation and U.S. Embassy Bamako in obtaining equipment for preserving, restoring, digitizing, and cataloguing the pieces.¹⁶ While the facilities are well maintained and the work appears to be progressing, the director of the Center readily admits that there is only specialized use of the facility by researchers, at present. Thus, this rich heritage of important documents remains largely hidden from the public.

As the Center appears to already have adequate resources to conduct its preservation work, it is recommended that the USG focus on information dissemination to reach as wide an audience as possible. If some of the key documents, particularly on the holy figures, were available on CD-ROM, USAID could distribute these virtual manuscripts through its CLICS. This information would help to underscore the indigenous traditions and history of Mali. Naturally, this would be most effective with literate portions of the population.

To further raise awareness of the documents among the illiterate northern Malians, PAS could organize a series of community center-based public presentations by known scholars and religious leaders on the significance of the manuscripts and their relationship to modern Malian life.

IV. Targeting for Accuracy and Efficiency

Issue: Given resource constraints and a vast expanse of territory for interventions in northern Mali, the USG should strive to determine where its funds could be used most effectively through a combination of polling instruments and GIS development.

The USG is at a distinct disadvantage compared with terrorist and extremist groups in trying to determine where tension may emerge or new recruits may be targeted. To reach their goals, the terrorists/extremists need only recruit a handful of people. The USG, conversely, cannot fully know who is being targeted by the terrorists/extremists and, therefore, expends its resources on a buckshot approach to reach as many

¹⁴ Perhaps Tijaniyya Tariqa Sufi practice

¹⁵ According to the Director of the Center, private families continue to hold significant numbers of manuscripts that are not counted in the 20,000. Without proper preservation, there is great risk that these privately held pieces will continue to deteriorate.

¹⁶ The Center received a grant of \$150,000 in 2000 from the Ford Foundation. US Embassy Bamako has provided assistance from the Ambassador's Self Help Fund for publication of a number of manuscripts.

potentially vulnerable people as possible. Likewise, at present, the USG has limited means for gauging the temperature of communities to understand if they are at risk for communal tension.¹⁷

While this gap cannot be fully eliminated, targeting can be improved. If the USG can help specific at-risk communities to feel the positive effects of development by attaining a critical mass of interventions, then those communities will have added reason to reject the advances of groups like the GSPC, Dawa, or Wahhabis. Likewise, if the USG can focus interventions on areas with identifiable grievances, resources, and opportunities, than it has a greater chance of helping to ease tensions.

Specific Recommended Interventions:

- USAID/Mali is currently in the process of *developing Geographic Information System (GIS) capability*. As the Mission is still in the early phase of development, the timing is appropriate to add additional data to the system. GIS can be a tremendous tool for understanding demographics and designating the most appropriate locations for development assistance. Naturally, the data set should include information such as population density, ethnic composition, USAID activities, and other donor activities. Additionally, however, the Mission should strive to include data on the location of past inter-tribal conflict, clashes with Malian security forces, PSI training locations, new Dawa and Wahhabi mosque construction, new Dawa and Wahhabi madrassah construction, communities that surrendered weapons after the rebellion, Ambassador's Self-Help Fund sites, as well as U.S. Department of Defense school and health facility locations. It would likewise be useful to input the location of the home communities of captured Malians who had been fighting with the GSPC.

It is recommended that the Mission *utilize the services of the Humanitarian Information Unit (HIU)*. "The HIU is an interagency collaborative effort led by the Department of State, Bureau for Intelligence and Research, Office of Geographic and Global Issues (INR/GGI). The purpose of the HIU is to improve U.S. Government planning and response to overseas humanitarian crises and complex emergencies by providing better baseline data, streamlining data requirements, and enhancing information management and dissemination. The HIU will collect, disseminate and promote the use of unclassified data for overseas humanitarian crises in which U.S. Government civilian and/or military agencies are engaged either directly or indirectly. It will serve as the nucleus for value-added information that can be used by national-level and field-level decision-makers to assess conditions and factors affecting humanitarian and peacekeeping operations."¹⁸

While HIU was initially created to work on humanitarian crises, CMM has been forging a relationship with HIU on research pertaining to conflict prevention. HIU has the knowledge to assist USAID/Mali in establishing the parameters for proper data collection. Once data has been gathered, HIU has the ability to manipulate the raw data within GIS. The resulting sorting and layering of data can provide a wealth of insight to the Mission, without creating additional financial burden.¹⁹

- A *specific survey instrument*²⁰ would be useful in allowing the Mission to gain an understanding of the population's attitude towards day-to-day issues. In order to gauge the vulnerability of specific

¹⁷ Anecdotal information, for example, suggests that the nomadic Tuareg and Arab youth are at greatest risk for recruitment into extremist or terrorist groups and have greater access to SALW. While this may be a reasonable supposition, without quantifiable data, targeting would be haphazard.

¹⁸ HIU Solicitation No: M/OP-02-1906

¹⁹ If the Mission is interested in pursuing this, Sharon Morris at CMM smorris@usaid.gov can help make the initial contacts with HIU.

²⁰ Given USAID experience utilizing local polling firms in other countries, such an exercise could be relatively inexpensive with costs typically ranging between \$100,000 - \$250,000 for areas of similar geographic size and complexity.

communities to militant overtures, religious extremism, or inter-communal tension, the poll would need to be conducted at least semi-annually. The Mission would need to be able to disaggregate the raw data for the distinct areas around Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu. The ability to break out the data by sedentary and nomadic populations would provide added value to the polling. Questions should, at a minimum, focus on attitudes towards police, military, gendarmerie, religion, elected officials, distribution of resources, sources of income, social services, and economics. A sample survey has been added to the appendix.

At present, the USAID Mission conducts an annual democracy and governance (DG) poll, throughout Mali. The DG Office uses this poll as a way to compare initial baseline results with subsequent results, in order to assess overall DG program performance. There had been initial thought that this poll may be useful in assisting the Mission in understanding the vulnerability dynamics in the North. Given its very specific nature and current sample that includes limited information from Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu, extrapolating from this poll would not be appropriate.

USAID, in conjunction with the Public Affairs Section (PAS) of the Embassy should, therefore, consider developing a North-specific poll. HIU (see GIS recommendation) could be asked to include results of the attitudinal polling on the GIS maps. The resulting map would provide useful insight into the dynamics in the North.

V. Promoting Positive Perceptions of the US Anti-Terror Efforts

Issue: The perception that US military assistance may be counter to the interests of northern Malians could be used as a lightning rod for grievances and a tool for galvanizing wider support for extremist/terrorist intentions. The USG should make every effort to quash perceptions that could be manipulated.

PSI training, equipment and materials are better enabling Mali's security forces to control their territory and reduce the likelihood of terrorist bands exploiting the country's vulnerable north. The visible presence of U.S. military personnel and vehicles has, however, allowed rumors to flourish among the population. Unchecked, these rumors can be used to play on the populations' sense that the U.S. has an anti-Muslim agenda and greater designs on northern Mali. Further, actions by the Malian military that are perceived by the population as unfair, may be directly associated with the current U.S. support.

Specific Recommended Interventions:

- USAID and the other constituent parts of the Embassy have made an earnest effort to visit the northern areas of Mali, periodically. USAID's appointment of a Foreign Service National (FSN) specifically for northern Mali coordination further shows the commitment to the region. Given the remoteness of Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu, however, frequent visits are not easy or affordable. Access to Kidal, for example, is only possible via an expensive charter flight or by a lengthy and hazardous route through the desert. Travel to Gao and Timbuktu entails similar difficulties. Given limited budgets within each individual USAID Strategic Objective team, it is unrealistic to assume that they will be able to individually increase the number of visits that they make to the North. One suggestion would be for the *SO team leaders to coordinate monthly visits*, thus sharing the cost of a charter flight. This would likewise help the Mission to create a shared vision for the North among team members. This approach should not, however, be USAID-exclusive. The Public Affairs Section (PAS) could use this monthly opportunity to conduct outreach to communities in the North. Likewise, the participation of the Defense Attaché (DATT) would help to ensure that public information about PSI is delivered to USAID partners in the field.

Ideally, the USG would establish a *multi-agency field office* in the North, with a permanent FSN presence. As this would be an official USG facility, however, the security requirements would likely prove to be prohibitively expensive. As USAID has the greatest concentration of USG activities in the North, it would be in the Mission's interest to take the lead and explore this option with the Regional Security Officer (RSO).

If the creation of an official USG field office is not feasible, the Mission could still consider establishing a permanent presence in the North, by partnering with the German Development Service (DED)²¹. In Central Asia, USAID and DED have forged a relationship in which DED staff members are assigned to work with USAID implementing partners at no cost to the USG. Following this initial success in Uzbekistan, the Director of DED traveled to Washington in April 2004 to meet with senior USAID personnel to explore other areas where the two agencies could cooperate. DED currently has one staff member assigned to the Mayor's office in Timbuktu. If the USG could fund office space and living accommodations for a DED staff member in either Gao or Kidal, DED staff could be exclusively tasked with monitoring and evaluation of USG activities, providing logistical support for visiting teams from Bamako, acting as a liaison with local authorities or religious figures, and conducting research for GIS.

Muslim religious leaders are highly respected figures in Malian communities. If the USG hopes to convey the message to the northern population that US interventions are designed to assist the development of Mali, the *USG will need to secure "buy-in" from the religious community*. USAID has had positive experiences in Pakistan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan by taking Muslim leaders to visit USAID activities in the field.²² USAID has found that by introducing the individuals to the good works of the USG, they are more likely to encourage their community members to become involved and support the activities. This goes a long way towards undermining efforts by extremists or terrorists to rally people around anti-US sentiment. It is recommended that the USAID Mission, in conjunction with the Embassy, conduct similar tours in northern Mali. Likewise, USG visits to Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu should continue to include courtesy calls to the religious leadership to provide face time and trust building.

- Through the DATT at U.S. Embassy Bamako, the DOD is providing assistance to schools and health clinics in northern Malian communities proximate to areas of PSI assistance. While funds for construction and renovation of these facilities are not burdened by implementing partner overhead, and reaction time for implementation is significantly faster than typical development projects, the potential for ineffective monitoring and evaluation exists. Without proper oversight, the effectiveness of these DOD interventions may be limited.

It is therefore recommended that the *DATT and USAID Mission endeavor to instill a level of coordination so that the USAID education and health Strategic Objective teams can provide support*. Where acceptable, DOD could consider channeling these funds directly through USAID, so that objectives remain consistent and to improve monitoring, evaluation, and accountability.

On a broader level of cooperation, the Joint Interagency Coordinating Group (JIACG) concept improves operational planning and execution within the U.S. Government interagency community.²³ It stems from the recognized need to improve multi-agency contingency response planning and to

²¹For further information on partnering with DED, it is recommended that the Mission contact Dr. Andreas Schneider at andreas.schneider@ded.de and Timothy Alexander at talexander@usaid.gov

²²This program is known as "Mullahs on the Bus." For further information on USAID experiences in Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan, the Mission can contact David Harden at dharden@usaid.gov

²³U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Experimentation Directorate, *A Concept for Improving U.S. Interagency Operational Planning and Coordination*, White Paper Version 1.0, March 2002.

achieve unity of direction and effort among all participating civilian and military departments and agencies. An interesting examination of this issue is appended to this text.

CONCLUSIONS

The complexity of the emerging difficulties in Mali requires a well-developed strategy of action. No single bilateral donor, however, should be expected to address all issues that are needed to stabilize northern Mali. The burden of that responsibility must be squarely placed on the Government of Mali. That said, the Government of Mali clearly has not been effective in ensuring that northern Malians feel as though their voices and issues are being addressed by the central government. A stateless situation has unfolded in the North, leaving an opening for outside forces to provide assistance and opportunity to the most vulnerable people. As this situation continues, a greater wedge will be driven between the northern and southern populations and fertile ground will be provided for further extremist inroads.

To secure long-term gains in northern Mali, the USG will need to convince the Government of Mali that this broadening wedge of underlying grievances must be removed as quickly as possible. Mali will need assistance in this regard, both strategically and through leveraged program support. This will most certainly require additional resources for the USAID Mission and will undoubtedly require Embassy Bamako to apply pressure on sympathetic diplomatic missions and donor organizations.

Ultimate removal of underlying grievances and enhanced stability, requires that current and additional resources be focused on economic development, with a concentration on job creation and poverty alleviation; expanded access to social services, including health and education; and more effective security for inhabitants of the North. As youth are simultaneously the most vulnerable members of society and the hope for its future, all interventions need to revolve around their inclusion. Finally, northerners must partake of the fruits of decentralization. Strong communities and constituents for peace are built through democratic processes and self-empowerment. These practices should be an integral part of programming across all development sectors.

APPENDIX I: SCOPE OF WORK

Analytical Services Task Order #22
Contract No. AEP-I-22-99-00040-00
Management Systems International

USAID/DCHA/CMM

Consultant: Analytical Services for Conflict Specialist for Northern Mali Assessment

1. BACKGROUND

The Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation is charged with providing technical leadership on conflict management and mitigation programs and activities to USAID Missions, implementing partners, regional and pillar bureaus, and other USG agencies working in areas that are at high-risk for violence. A central objective of the office is to integrate or ‘mainstream’ best practices in conflict management and mitigation into more traditional development sectors such as agriculture, economic growth, democracy, education, and health.

CMM is seeking to hire a senior-level short-term consultant with general experience in the assessment and programming of targeted activities designed to reduce the potential for conflict in Northern Mali. This individual will be one of a two-person CMM conflict team that would work in conjunction with the Embassy and USAID in Mali. The civilian team may undertake analysis in collaboration with elements of the U.S. Department of Defense.

The United States Government has embarked on a path to develop a comprehensive plan to counter the threat of terrorist groups operating in the Sahel region, including Mali. In Mali, USAID is addressing basic conditions in the area and attempting to provide opportunities for poor, uneducated youth who, without more promising options, may be sympathetic to the objectives of outsiders (Salafist) who have been linked to radical Islamic elements. These elements, which are operating primarily out of southern Algeria have apparently brought with them a large amount of small arms/light weapons and are seeking to co-opt the (tribal) semi-nomadic people of the north.

PCASED is charged with the reduction of small arms in West Africa. Its headquarters in Bamako is responsible for the Sahel. PACASED is a brainchild of the previous President of Mali and has received considerable USAID assistance in the past. In addition to the fact that former U.S. Ambassador David Rawson is the President of this organization, the Embassy and USAID feel that USAID must re-engage somehow with PCASED as well as analyze the situation in the North to determine what might be done to contain the situation.

2. Tasks

On behalf of DCHA/CMM, the consultant will assist USAID/Mali with the following tasks:

- In conjunction with Embassy and USAID staff in Mali, analyze the situation in the North and determine what we could do to contain the situation. Specifically, the consultant should provide recommendations on how to stop or slow down the number of youth being recruited into militant organizations, as well as determine whether there are ways of using development assistance funds and programs in a more conflict sensitive manner in order to reduce the possibility of conflict, including tribal conflict.

- In conjunction with Embassy and USAID staff in Mali, develop an understanding as to how USAID might enhance PCASED's disarmament and peace building efforts in Mali and in the Sahel. (N.B.: USAID does not finance disarmament programs but can identify how the Embassy/State could do so; further the focus here is on the peace-building efforts.)
- After discussions with religious leaders, recommend specific activities that would promote Mali's tradition of moderate Islamic teachings versus those of the extremists who are arriving in increasing numbers.

3. Level of Effort

Briefings in Washington, DC: 2 days

Travel to Mali for assessment: up to 13 days

Finalize report and recommendations: 7 days

Debrief in Washington, DC (tentative): 2 days

Start Date: as soon as possible, but no later than April 1, 2004

4. Skills and Expertise

The consultant must have an advanced degree, preferably in an area that is relevant to conflict management and mitigation such as international relations. Senior-level, in-depth field experience and expertise in the assessment of and programming of conflict-related programs is required. The consultant must be very familiar with USAID strategic planning and program design methodology. The consultant should be a French speaker and a US citizen with a security clearance.

APPENDIX II: SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS

SCHEDULE FOR USG MISSION BAMAKO, KIDAL, GAO AND TIMBUKTU REGIONS (April 5 – 15, 2004)

Members of the party:

- Ambassador Huddleston
- Pam White, USAID/Dir
- Hannah Baldwin, USAID/DG
- Dennis Bilodeau, USAID/ComDev
- William Farrell, MSI
- Carla Komich, USAID/W
- Ibrahim Litny, USAID
- Oumar Konipo, EPSU

April 5:

0900 In Brief with Ambassador
1000 Ibrahim Sall, PCASED
1100 In Brief with USAID Mission Director
1500 Diagouraga Mohamadou, National Director of Police
1700 Aghatam AG Alhassane, former VP at Commissariat au Nord
1800 Cocktail Reception

April 6:

0830 President Oumarou Ag Mohamed, Nina Wallet, Haut Conseil des Collectivites
0930 Mohamed Kimbiri, Secretary General of Islamic Association and Director Islamic Radio
1100 Mahmoud Dicko, Imam of Badala and SG of Association for Islam Promotion (AMUPI)
14:30 Colonel Mahamane Toure, SG at Ministry of Armed Forces
16:00 Prime Minister Mohamed Ag Hamani

April 7:

0700: Depart Bamako Senou Airport for Kidal
1000: Arrive Kidal airport. Met by Governor Eglèze Ag Foni and Political and Military Officials in Kidal
1015: Depart airport for Kidal.
1030: Arrive Kidal. Check-in Hotel Dattiers
1045: Depart Hotel for Governor's Office
1100: Arrive Governor's Office.
Meeting with Governor Ag Foni and his staff (Directeur de Cabinet, Econ Advisor and Admin Advisor)
1200: Depart Governor's office for Hotel Dattiers
1215: Arrive Hotel Dattiers. Lunch break at Hotel, with Mohamed Lamine Baby, field Coordinator of World Education (W/E) in Kidal and field Coordinator of Action Contre la Faim (ACA)
1315: Depart Hotel Dattiers for City Hall or Regional Assembly
1330: Arrive City Hall or Regional Assembly.
Meeting with Mayor Bayene Ag Akawali + one or two advisors, Regional

- Assembly President Hama Ag Sidamar + one or two advisors, and Deputy at National Assembly
- 1500: Depart City Hall or Regional Assembly, split in 2 groups:
- **Group 1** meets security forces at Military Base: Military Base Commander Mamadou Niangaly, Gendarmerie Chief major Aly Ag Oumar and Police Chief Brehima Fofana
 - **Group 2** meets Civil Society Group at Hotel Dattiers: Batoma Doumbia, President of Women Organization CAFO + 2, Alhousseini Ag Intfaskiwene, CAR/Nord Rep., Alhamdou Ag Elyene, President NGO Coordination, Dramane Kouyaté, Director of Radio AFES, and Wayerzagane, Director of Radio Tisdaz
- 1645: **Group 1** departs Military Base for Intalla's residence
- 1700: **Group 1** arrives Intalla's residence. Round table @ Intalla's residence with religious leaders, including Intalla Ag Attaher, Amupi President & Ahamadou Ag Hamzata, Moufty and other religious leaders invited by Intalla
- 1830: **Group 1** departs Intalla's residence for Hotel Dattiers
- 1840: Arrive Hotel Dattiers
- 1930: All party depart Hotel for "Cheick Ag Baye residence"
Dinner with Political and Military Officials and Civil Society Representatives in Kidal, including Aicha Belco (Women and Children Promotion), Al Bacher (contractor of Intadeini school), Cheick Ag Aoussa, Mohamed Ag Intalla, and former combatants leaders Iyad Aghaly and Ibrahim Bahanga (Dinner hosted by the Ambassador)

RON

April 8:

- 0700: Breakfast at Hotel Dattiers
- 0745: Check out Hotel Dattiers
- 0800: All party departs Hotel Dattiers to tour former Kidal Prison during socialist and military dictatorship
- 0810: Arrive Prison. Guided tour of Prison with Jean Pierre Tita, AMAP Rep. in Kidal
- 0850: Depart Prison for Kidal Airport
- 0900: Arrive Kidal Airport
- 0915: Depart Kidal for Gao
- 1000: Arrive Gao airport. Met by Governor Amadou Baba Touré
- 1015: Depart Airport for Governor's Office
- 1030: Arrive Governor's Office. Meeting with Governor Amadou Baba Touré and his staff
- 1145: Depart Governor's office for Hotel Tizimizi
- 1200: Arrive Tizimizi. Check-in Hotel Tizimizi.
- 1230: Lunch break with Mayor Yaya Diallo, Regional Assembly President El Moctar Kabangou, and Mayor of Anderaboukane Aroudeyni Ag Hamato
- 1530: Depart Hotel Tizimizi for Peace Corps Stage House
Meet with Gao PCV
- 1615: Depart Peace Corps Stage House for "Tombeaux des Askia" Mosque
- 1620: Arrive Mosque. Call on Imam Moussa Aliou and Amupi President and other religious leaders
- 1830: Depart "Askia" Mosque for Hotel Tizimizi
- 1845: Arrive Hotel Tizimizi
Free time
- 1945: Depart hotel for Governor's Residence
- 2000: Arrive Governor's Residence. Dinner with dignitaries. Entertainment
- 2230: Depart Governor's Residence for Hotel Tizimizi

2245: Arrive Hotel.

RON

April 9:

0700: Breakfast at Hotel Tizimizi

0815: Depart Hotel Tizimizi, party splits in 2 groups:

0830:

- **Group 1:** meets security forces at Military Base, including Military Base Commander Colonel Yamoussa Camara, Gendarmerie Chief Becaye Samaké and Police Chief Sibiri Yéfia Koné
- **Group 2:** meets Women association CAFO and Women for Peace in the North at Women and Children Promotion Office

1000: Group 2 depart Women Promotion Office for Hotel Tizimizi

1015: Group 2 arrives Hotel Tizimizi

- **Group 2** meets Mohamed Akline, Director of CAR/Nord Gao, and Ben Mouloud, former elected Regional Assembly President at Hotel Tizimizi

1200: All party meets at Hotel Tizimizi

Lunch break at Tizimizi with Peace Corps Volunteers

1500: Depart Hotel Tizimizi for World Education Office (W/E)

Presentation by W/E field Coordinator and Regional Education Director, and ACA field Coordinator

1630: Depart W/E to visit one of the DOD sponsored primary education schools

1700: Depart schools for Dune Rose by pinasse

1830: Depart Dune Rose for Hotel Tizimizi

1900: Arrive Hotel Tizimizi

1930: Dinner at Residence of Algerian Consul

RON

April 10:

0700: Breakfast at Hotel Tizimizi

0730: Check-out Hotel Tizimizi

0745: Depart Hotel Tizimizi for Bourem Inaly

1200: Arrive Bourem Inaly

1300: Depart Bourem Innaly for Timbuktu

1700: Arrive Timbuktu. Check-in Heneritta Khan Hotel

1900: Private dinner at Hotel Khan

RON

April 11:

0730: Breakfast at Hotel Khan

0830: Depart Hotel for Bourem Inaly.

0930: Arrive Bourem Inaly. Call on mayor Aghissa Bilal Maiga and Sous Prefet.

Visit DOD / USAID irrigation project

Meeting with Dignitaries in Bourem Inaly

1230: Lunch break at Bourem Inaly

1400: Depart Bourem Inaly for Timbuktu

1500: Arrive Timbuktu. Call on Imam Abdramane Essayouti at his residence.

1615: Depart Essayouti residence for Djingareï Ber Mosque
1630: Arrive Mosque. Tour Mosque. Round Table at Djingareï Ber Mosque with religious leaders, including Imam Essayouti, Imam Hasseye Mahmoud of Sidi Yehia, Imam Allimane Alhakoum of Sankoré and Imam Sidi Alpha Maridje of Sareykaina
1800: Depart Mosque for a tour of city and visit of the Artisan Center
1900: Depart artisan Center for restaurant Anamar near Peace Flame Monument
Private dinner
2130: Depart Restaurant for Hotel Khan

RON

April 12:

0700: Breakfast at Hotel Khan
0800: Depart Hotel Khan for Nebet El Ghalik Village on route to Goundam
0900: Arrive Nebet. Call on Mayor of Gouni commune and Arab dignitaries in Nebet
Round table with Arab dignitaries in Nebet and discuss conflict resolutions that took place there recently between two rival Arab groups
1130: Depart Nebet for Timbuktu
1230: Arrive Hotel Khan in Timbuktu. Lunch break
1430: Party splits in two groups:

- **Group 1** departs Hotel Khan for Hachem's Residence and round table with Dignitaries including Lahmeyme Ould Alhousseyn Chief of Bouj Beha village, Salah Ould Sidi Ahmed, Chief of Araouane village, and Moulaye Dana, spokesperson for the former Combatants
- **Group 2** stays at Hotel Khan for round table with Women and Children Promotion Director and 1 or 2 members of the Women Association CAFO and 1 or 2 members of the Women Movement for Peace in the North

1700: All party meets on the Sand Dune for Camel ride
1800: Dinner on the Sand Dune with USAID partners in Timbuktu
Mrs. Fatima of World Education, Mr. Sidibé of Care Mali, Mr. Sare of Africare,
Mr. Houlou Ag Mohamed and Hachem Ould Sidi Mohamed of CAR/Nord

RON

April 13:

0700: Breakfast at Hotel Khan
0800: Depart Hotel Khan for Governor's Office
0815: Arrive Governor's Office. Meeting with Colonel Mahamadou Maiga, Governor and his staff
0930: Depart Governor's Office, party splits in two groups:

- **Group 1** meets security forces at the Military Base. Meeting with Lt Colonel Yanoussa Maiga, Military Base Commander, Capitaine Bafing Coulibaly, Gendarmerie Chief and Fadiala Sidibé Police Chief. Group 1 to visit also DOD sponsored Health Center in Bela Farandji neighborhood in Timbuktu
- **Group 2** meets with civil society. Round table at City Hall with mayor Aly Ould Sidi + 2 city counselors, Regional Assembly President Mohamed Ag Sindibla, the mayor of Salam/Agouni

1230: All party meets at Hotel Khan. Lunch break
1430: Depart Hotel Khan for Ahmed Baba Center.
1440: Arrive Ahmed Baba Center. Visit Center (ancient manuscripts)
1630: Depart Ahmed Baba Center for a tour of city and Artisan Center
1830: Arrive at Hotel Khan.
Evening opened. Free time

RON

April 14:

0600: Breakfast at Hotel Khan
Check-out Hotel Khan
0645: Depart Hotel Khan for Timbuktu airport
0700: Arrive Timbuktu Airport
0800: Depart Timbuktu Airport for Bamako
1130: Arrive Bamako

April 15:

07:45 USAID Education Office
10:00 Director CAR/Nord
16:30 Debrief with Ambassador

April 16:

11:00 Debrief with USAID Mission Director

APPENDIX III: JOINT INTERAGENCY COORDINATION GROUP



U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND
JOINT CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT

Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) AND EXPERIMENTATION'S CONCEPT PRIMER

Introduction

The joint interagency coordinating group concept improves operational planning and execution

The joint interagency coordination group is a multifunctional advisory element of the combatant commander's staff that facilitates information sharing throughout the interagency community.

within the U.S. government interagency community.²⁴ It stems from the recognized need to improve multi-agency contingency response planning and to achieve unity of direction and effort among all participating civilian and military departments and agencies.

Often, the least-effective planning integration occurs at the operational level, where agencies' "campaign plans" are formulated. The diverse cultures, competing interests, and differing priorities among the agencies are primary obstacles to harmonizing agency campaign plans, leading to policy disputes and resource disconnections at the strategic level, and reducing the effectiveness of a contingency operation at the tactical level.

This weak collaboration may be due to the difference in structure among military and civilian agencies, as well as to the lack of sufficient planning to accomplish coordination under strict timelines. Finally, civilian and military planners must overcome a tendency to stay within their own organizational boundaries, thus failing to share insights with their planning partners.


Concept Description

The JIACG is a full-time, multifunctional advisory element of the combatant commander's staff that facilitates information sharing throughout the interagency community. Through habitual collaboration, it provides a means to integrate campaign planning efforts at the strategic and operational levels and throughout all U.S. government agencies.

The JIACG bridges the gap between civilian and military campaign planning efforts for potential crises. Accordingly, the JIACG:

- ❑ Participates in theater strategic engagement, deliberate, crisis action, transition, and reconstruction planning and operations
- ❑ Informs the combatant commander and the joint task force of civilian agency campaign planning, sensitivities, and support requirements, capabilities, and limitations
- ❑ Informs civilian agencies of the combatant commander's and the joint task force's operational requirements, concerns, capabilities, and limitations.

²⁴ U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Experimentation Directorate, *A Concept for Improving U.S. Interagency Operational Planning and Coordination*, White Paper Version 1.0, March 2002.




The JIACG provides a new capability to improve planning integration at the operational level where agency campaign plans are formulated.

Conversely, this new staff capability does not infringe on current military staff responsibilities and does not abrogate any current civilian agency authorities. Accordingly, the JIACG does *not*:

- ❑ Replace any civilian agency staff officer currently assigned to the combatant commander's staff or bypass any existing civilian agency lines of authority and communications
- ❑ Provide civilian agency concurrence to internal Department of Defense staffing actions
- ❑ Interfere with existing memorandums of understanding and agreed-practices for requests for assistance and other formalized interagency request processes
- ❑ Challenge or replace the statutory and presidential-directed relationships for developing, implementing, or executing U.S. national security and foreign policy.

The JIACG serves as a coordinating body among the civilian agencies in Washington, D.C., the country teams located in U.S. embassies in national capitals throughout the world, the combatant command's staff, and other multinational and multilateral bodies within the region.

This JIACG is broader in scope than those provisionally fielded for the limited purpose of the global war on terrorism and operates across the full spectrum of interagency activities—from routine peacetime engagement, through the precrisis period, and during the actual crisis and the post crisis phase to restore stability. This full-time joint and cross-functionally organized interagency element within the combatant commander's staff focuses daily on civilian agency planning and implementation.



JIACG operations rely on habitual relationships with civilian planners and collaborative communications connectivity.


The combatant commander employs a joint interagency coordination group, along with a host of enabling tools, techniques, and capabilities that transform the level of civilian agency coordination and the precision of joint and coalition operations. Under the direction of a senior executive service or equivalent official, the JIACG is fully integrated within the combatant commander staff's planning and operations. Through daily cross-staff and Washington agency involvement, as well as through its regional focus, the JIACG serves as a focal point for civilian agency situational understanding and for the combatant commander's crisis response.

JIACG organization comprises mostly civilian personnel with strong interagency experience who formulate, articulate, advocate, and implement the combatant commander's policies, priorities, programs, and procedures for interagency engagement. Designed as a 12-person staff directorate, the JIACG enhances the command's understanding of civilian agencies' efforts. To this end, it maintains relationships and uses technologies and techniques that enable coherent assessment of all external civilian planning and implementation. The resulting early situational understanding assists the integrated application of national and multinational power to influence and shape the environment in order to deter or contain a crisis.

Implications for Joint Warfighting

Investment in this new operational capability increases planning and execution effectiveness, benefiting all participating civilian and military departments and agencies. The JIACG:

- ❑ Strengthens multi-agency operational planning of complex mission tasks
- ❑ Establishes a mechanism to integrate military and civilian agency efforts
- ❑ Keeps all agencies informed of each other's efforts and prevents misconceptions
- ❑ Provides real-time feedback between civilian and military agencies' efforts
- ❑ Creates realistic cooperative efforts and harmonizes implementation
- ❑ Saves resources through better-integrated operational planning and tactical execution.



Concept

Application

The JIACG functions as the combatant commander’s lead proponent for the interagency process and provides the civilian perspective on military operational planning and execution. Its director serves as the commander’s principal interagency staff advisor, providing direction, oversight, facilitation, coordination, and synchronization of JIACG activities at all levels in the command.

Throughout planning and execution, the JIACG operates within a collaborative information environment (CIE) that is linked to combatant commanders’ staffs and to the broader interagency community for information, planning, operations, administration, and logistics coordination. The CIE enables planning and reduces the time needed for coordination and information sharing, allowing the joint force to operate with a somewhat smaller forward-deployed headquarters. The CIE also contains a “warehouse” of available information that allows all participants in crisis resolution to share constant access to the same current situation information, orders, briefings, and events.

The JIACG increases the combatant commander’s ability to quickly infuse its civilian perspective and situational understanding into the command-and-control structure of a crisis response force. It also maintains timeliness and accuracy and evaluates U.S. government, intergovernment, nongovernment, and international agency plans, programs, and proposals against the combatant commander’s joint interagency requirements. Further, the JIACG coordinates and trains with potential crisis response organizations during peacetime, reducing the time needed to bring a crisis response force to full operational capability.

The JIACG acquires, evaluates, and manages the flow of knowledge throughout the diplomatic, information, military, and economic elements of national power, enhancing planning, operations, and decision-making. Its functional alignment reduces barriers to cross-agency and cross-staff communications. Through habitual, long-term relationships among participating agencies, this group fosters in-depth understanding and continuous collaboration across a wide variety of issues.

JIACG is about transformation—it’s about thinking and operating differently, using networked knowledge, using a truly collaborative approach to planning and operations, and providing a coherently interagency perspective to respond to the demanding challenges of today’s operational environment.

APPENDIX IV: DIGITAL FREEDOM INITIATIVE SENEGAL PROJECT OUTLINE

AND PRIVATE SECTOR ENGAGEMENT

digitalfreedom.gov

Overview

The goal of the DFI is to promote economic growth by transferring the benefits of information and communication technology (ICT) to entrepreneurs and small businesses in the developing world. The approach is bold and innovative, leveraging the leadership of the US government, the creativity and resources of America's leading companies, and the vision and energy of entrepreneurs throughout the developing world. The DFI will be piloted in Senegal, a democratic secular country in which the majority of the population is Muslim (94%), and, if successful, could be rolled out to 20 countries in the next five years.

Key elements of the DFI include: (1) placing volunteers in small businesses to share business knowledge and technology expertise; (2) promoting pro-growth regulatory and legal structures to enhance business competitiveness; and (3) leveraging existing technology and communications infrastructure in new ways to help entrepreneurs and small businesses better compete in both the regional and global market place.

Achieving the objectives of the DFI will require substantial support from the U.S. private sector. President Bush and Secretary Evans will lead the call for U.S. private sector guidance and resources.

Objectives for the Senegal Project

All around the world technology has proven to be the of the rocket fuel of entrepreneurial performance. It can build and strengthen business networks, leverage synergies and identify areas of comparative advantage, and enable markets to be reached and good ideas to be spread. The DFI will share U.S. best practices, knowledge and technical skills to increase productivity, expand trade and promote innovation.

Senegal is particularly well suited to be the pilot country for the DFI, as it was among the first Sub-Saharan countries to make significant investments in technology, and is currently benefiting from a relatively high rate of penetration and growth of technology-related services. A submarine cable system, for example, was inaugurated by President Wade in May 2002, connecting Senegal to the world network of high-speed fiber optic cable systems. Moreover, Senegal enjoys one of the strongest domestic backbones in the developing world, with a high-speed IP network linking all of Senegal's major population centers.

DFI Senegal has identified three specific types of SMEs. First, there are the classic "End User SMEs" such as farmers, artisans, fishermen, manufacturers, transport drivers, small shopkeepers and the like. Many of these participate in the micro-finance industry, as borrowers, savers or both, and most face significant problems in using modern information technology and business practices to strengthen their bottom line. Second, thanks to Senegal's far-sighted policy to leverage the private sector to bring telecommunication to its people, more than 10,000 telephone centers – neighborhood telephone shops paid on a unit basis – are in operation across the country. Further, almost 200 cyber-cafes have emerged, although cost and training remain a barrier. Both the telephone shop and cyber-cafe operators represent a second group of Information Access SMEs. With the right kind of assistance, these centers have the potential to emerge as sustainable, growth-oriented small businesses. Third, there is a burgeoning community of IT developers and service providers. All of these fit the SME profile – energetic, committed owners struggling to build a place for their products and services.

In keeping with the DFI partnership philosophy, the main implementing mechanism for the DFI Senegal Pilot will be the DFI Solution Team. A DFI Solution Team joins the stakeholders of a specific group of

“End User SMEs”, the telephone shop and/or cybercafe owners and the IT industry along with the U.S. volunteers (from Peace Corps, Geekcorps or elsewhere as appropriate) to identify and prioritize the business process problems and potential for IT-based solutions. Based on this priority list, the DFI Solution Team will then begin to develop the IT solution and set about re-engineering the business processes to accomplish the desired outcomes.

The DFI Senegal will focus on three broad areas of activities:

Promoting Productivity and Business Process Innovation

Small businesses in Senegal run the gamut from raw material assembly to production to transportation to marketing, and all of the associated businesses that touch on these functions. SMEs face considerable difficulty in capturing the information that is critical to their prosperity – availability of materials, demand for products, when the government office is open or the market truck will arrive, where the fish are, etc.. It is estimated that in selected agricultural markets, half of all production is lost to spoilage due to information mismatches. In the advanced economies, innovations in supply chain management are being driven by both technology and business process reform. There is every reason to believe that similar types of innovations can be introduced into the Senegal SME economy, allowing Senegalese entrepreneurs to save more of perhaps their most precious commodity – their time.

Productivity and Business Process Solutions Teams will be aided by specific U.S. and Senegalese volunteers from the DFI partners (eg- Department of Commerce, USAID, Peace Corps, Hewlett-Packard, Cisco, Technology and Consulting Practices Partners)

Supporting Entrepreneurship Through an Efficient Financial Infrastructure

An entrepreneurial environment depends upon the presence of an efficient and sufficient flow of capital. In the developing world a broad range of micro-finance programs exist that have helped create thousands of dynamic new companies. These efforts are having a significant impact on global development strategies.

There are currently a number of micro-finance efforts underway in Senegal. Catholic Relief Services, for example, offered 7,000 small loans averaging \$150 each to female entrepreneurs in 2001. A network fifteen micro-finance institutions serves some 360,000 borrowers, savers or both, working through 225 finance outlets known as “Caisses”.

The DFI Senegal could contribute in many ways to strengthen the access to capital that is essential to stimulate economic growth. For instance, focused ICT applications could result in clearer credit administration and a “Real Time” credit processing system, more efficient loan monitoring, stronger financial management and reduced loan losses. Designed properly, a system could be envisaged whereby a neighborhood shop owner could visit a neighborhood cyber-cafe, file an application for a new micro-credit loan, make a payment on an existing loan or otherwise conduct her business, thereby extending the reach of critical financial infrastructure and creating an additional line of business for the cyber-cafe, itself a small business. This network of cyber-cafes could potentially be linked to national or international financial services networks, to allow remittances to flow with fewer transactions, thus lowering costs, creating a digital “paper trail” and improving the transparency of the financial system.

Productivity and Business Process Solutions Teams will be aided by specific U.S. and Senegalese volunteers from the DFI Technology and Financial Practices partners (eg- Department of Commerce, USAID, Technology and Business Systems partners and NGOs).

Building Foundations of Growth and Ownership

Property is much more than ownership: the legal property system is in fact the hidden architecture that organizes the market of advanced economies. In many places this is the missing link for ensuring the lasting success of a market-based economy and the growth of its lifeblood – SMEs. The ability of entrepreneurs to create, assign and sustain value and wealth relies on property systems that represent assets in standardized and universally accepted records. Such records allow property owners to use their assets, whether they be businesses or real estate, to guarantee credit and contracts, and to be divided and represented in shares that investors can buy.

Technology can play a critical role in bringing efficiency to the property-ownership architecture in developing countries like Senegal. For example, DFI Solution Teams could design a system capable of delivering land registration and sales through cyber-cafes. Other municipal or state land and building - related functions could be similarly computerized, bringing new business opportunities to cyber-cafes and easing critical elements of the collateral system.

The technological and organizational expertise of DFI partners and volunteers, supported by the insights and worldwide experiences of the *Instituto Libertad y Democracia*, provides an opportunity to identify specific aspects of this challenge in Senegal.

A Modern Policy and Regulatory Environment

Experience around the world suggests that a transparent, participatory regulatory process, in the context of a pro-competitive policy environment, is essential for ensuring that small businesses are able to afford access to the ICT infrastructure and service. The Government of Senegal established the *Agence de Regulation de Telecommunication (ART)*, in January 2002, and is undertaking a number of steps to assure its effectiveness.

- Establishment of a Regulatory Council (The counterpart of the Commissioners of the FCC) and naming the members. Only a handful of African countries have taken this step.
- Establishment of a high-level working group to plan the introduction of one or more competitive national operator licenses. To date, few countries in Africa permit this type of competition.
- Establishment of a web-based information portal to increase transparency of decision-making in telecommunication regulation.
- Undertaking a study of the costs and benefits of the existing monopoly telecommunications environment.
- Establishing a regulatory development work plan that will increase staff capability in critical areas such as Spectrum Management, Interconnection, Licensing and Consumer Affairs.

Led by the department of State and USAID, the DFI staff, and volunteers will support these efforts noted above. Specialized technical assistance will be sourced from several U.S. institutions, including the USG, universities, National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners and other entities to support the evolution of an enabling regulatory environment.

Measuring Results

At regular intervals, the USG, host country government, private sector, and NGOs will evaluate the success of projects based on performance benchmarks that measure small business growth, market efficiency gains (e.g. falling commodity prices and decreased price differentials within and across regions), business integration with international partners and markets, and job growth. Similarly, regulatory policy reform will be evaluated based on a blend of quantitative and qualitative factors that measure increased competition in telecommunication services (e.g. cellular, internet, voice over IP, etc.), increased sophistication of either a new or existing telecom regulatory entity, and advancement of important policy areas (e.g. customs, IP, cybercrime, etc.).

Partnership Opportunities

Meeting these objectives will require tangible contributions, creative planning, and focused execution from a wide range of private and public sector entities.

The DFI asks private sector partners to be part of a Leadership Roundtable that will:

- Participate in working group meetings leading to the Senegal launch of the DFI (hosted by the U.S. interagency team) scheduled for June/July 2004 to define projects and deliverables under each of the major DFI objectives. The findings of the round table will be announcement at the Senegal launch event in June, 2003;
- Develop a white paper to align the resources of DFI partners, Senegalese collaborators and U.S. Government entities to effectively accomplish the specific projects articulated through the design conference;
- Provide resources (e.g., volunteers, software, hardware) to support success on the ground;
- Monitor progress throughout the pilot project and contribute to a report on the results of the Senegal project after one year; and
- Assist in planning the next phases of the DFI, including future partner countries.

The Leadership Roundtable will be co-chaired by Secretary Evans and a senior business executive, with AID Administrator Natsios serving as Vice-Chair. They will help lead roundtable efforts to build and focus private sector engagement in the DFI. Each Roundtable member organization will be asked to appoint a senior official to serve as a *DFI liaison*. The Technology Administration (TA) will coordinate and help direct the efforts of the Roundtable on behalf of the Secretary and establish a process for open consultation and communication with Roundtable liaisons.

The Under Secretary for Technology will report regularly to the Secretary on the objectives, efforts, accomplishments and of the DFI. Secretary Evans and his Roundtable co-chair will likewise offer regular reports to President Bush.

Country Selection

The Department of Commerce, USAID and the State Department, working with other US government agencies and the private sector Leadership Roundtable, will identify prospective partner countries to be invited to join the DFI. Criteria for selection will include the commitment of the country to establish a business friendly regulatory framework; a demonstrated interest of the country's private sector in participating in this initiative; and identification of private sector contributions to leverage government funds. The beneficiary countries should also demonstrate their willingness to enable partnerships between U.S. and local business entities.

Post-U.S. Launch: Next Steps in Senegal

A. Guiding the Senegal Pilot

The Leadership Roundtable will need to establish an Implementation Working Group (IWG) (coordinated by USAID/Senegal) to guide the implementation of the Senegal DFI Pilot. Likely members of the IWG include representatives from the US and Senegalese governments, voluntary service organizations (e.g. Geekcorps, USA Freedom Corps, Peace Corps and appropriate Senegalese entities), private industry (e.g. Hewlett Packard, Cisco, Senegalese firms, etc.) and think-tanks (e.g. ILD, Berkman Center). The IWG will guide the preparations leading to a Launch Workshop in Senegal. It is expected that the first DFI Solution Teams would be fielded shortly after the launch Workshop, charged with designing and implementing cutting edge ICT applications of benefit to SMEs throughout Senegal. Beta Testing of the first ICT solutions is targeted for Q1 of 2004.

APPENDIX V: USAID/CAR POLLING SAMPLE QUESTIONS

CENTRAL ASIA POLLING INSTRUMENT SAMPLE QUESTIONS

**QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SURVEYS OF CAIP AND NON-CAIP (CONTROL) COMMUNITIES
IN KAZAKHSTAN, KYRGYZSTAN, TAJIKISTAN AND UZBEKISTAN**

INTERVIEW NUMBER: _____
INTERVIEWER CODE: _____
INTERVIEW START TIME: _____ hr _____ min
INTERVIEW END TIME: _____ hr _____ min

QUESTIONS SHOULD BE READ OUT TO RESPONDENTS; NO CHANGES IN WORDING ARE ALLOWED. PLEASE CIRCLE THE CODE OF THE RIGHT ANSWER. MAKE SURE THAT THE CARDS ARE SHOWN. THE QUESTIONNAIRE CONTAINS INSTRUCTIONS FOR YOU IN CAPITAL LETTERS. PLEASE DO NOT READ THEM OUT TO THE RESPONDENT. PLEASE FOLLOW CLOSELY THE FILTERING QUESTIONS AND TRANSITIONS BETWEEN QUESTIONS.

Q1. How satisfied are you with the economic situation in [country] these days?

READ OUT & SHOW CARD Q1

	<i>Single code</i>
Very satisfied	1
Somewhat satisfied	2
Not very satisfied	3
Not at all satisfied	4
DK/NS	8
NR/Refused	9

Q2. And how satisfied are you with your own standard of living?

READ OUT & SHOW CARD Q2

	<i>Single code</i>
Very satisfied	1
Somewhat satisfied	2
Not very satisfied	3
Not at all satisfied	4
DK/NS	8
NR/Refused	9

Q3. Generally speaking, how much do you feel you can trust others? Do you think that one can always trust people, one can usually trust people, one should be somewhat careful in dealing with people or that one cannot be too careful in dealing with people?

READ OUT & SHOW CARD Q3

	<i>Single code</i>
Can not be too careful in dealing with people	1
Should be somewhat careful in dealing with people	2
Can usually trust people	3
Can always trust people	4
DK/NS	8
NR/Refused	9

Q4. Following are some general statements on range of issues. Using the categories below, please indicate for each statement whether you agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly.

<i>SHOW CARD Q4 & READ OUT Q4.A-Q4.I.</i>	Agree strongly	Agree some- what	Disagree some- what	Disagree strongly	<i>B. D D. N K R/ / E. R C. N efused S</i>
4.A. Most people in this village/neighborhood are basically honest and can be trusted.	1	2	3	4	8 9
4.B. People in your village/neighborhood are always interested only in their own welfare	1	2	3	4	8 9
4.C. People belonging to this village/neighborhood are more worthy than people in other communities	1	2	3	4	8 9
4.D. In this village/neighborhood one has to be alert or someone is likely to take advantage of you	1	2	3	4	8 9
4.E. If I have a problem, there is always someone to help me	1	2	3	4	8 9
4.F. I do not pay attention to the opinion of others in this village/neighborhood	1	2	3	4	8 9
4.G. Most people in this village/neighborhood are willing to help if you need it	1	2	3	4	8 9
4.H. I feel accepted as a member of this village/neighborhood	1	2	3	4	8 9
4.I. If you drop your purse or wallet in this village/neighborhood, someone will make sure that it is returned to you.	1	2	3	4	8 9

Q5. How much confidence do you have in the following institutions to perform their jobs for the benefit of the people in your community? Do you have a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or no confidence at all?

SHOW CARD Q5 & READ OUT Q5.A-Q5.E.	A great deal	Quite a lot	Not very much	None at all	F. D H. N K R/ / I. R G. N efused S
5.A. The legal system (courts, judges, lawyers, prosecutors)	1	2	3	4	8 9
5.B. The police	1	2	3	4	8 9
5.C. The local administration	1	2	3	4	8 9
5.D. The government	1	2	3	4	8 9
5.E. Religious leaders	1	2	3	4	8 9

Q6. How satisfied are you with the quality of services provided by the local government in your city? In your oblast? [Examples of services usually supported by local administration: communal services (such as water supply, heating system, gas, electricity, roads, etc.), city improvement, public safety and others] Would you say you are very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, or not very satisfied or not at all satisfied?

SHOW CARD Q6 & READ OUT Q6.A-Q6.B.	Very satisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Not very satisfied	Not at all satisfied	J. DL. N K R/ / M. R K. N efused S
6.A. In your city	1	2	3	4	8 9
6.B. In your oblast	1	2	3	4	8 9

Q7. Suppose your neighbor suffered an economic loss, say _____ [INTERVIEWER: IN RURAL AREAS USE "CROP FAILURE"; IN URBAN AREAS USE "LOSS OF EMPLOYMENT"]. In that situation, how much could he/she rely on the following people for financial assistance? Could he/she rely on _____ a great deal, somewhat, not very much or not at all?
INTERVIEWER: SHOW CARD Q9 AND MARK RESPONDENT'S CHOICES IN THE LAST COLUMN IN THE TABLE BELOW. PROBE: "ANY OTHERS?" UP TO THREE ANSWERS ACCEPTED.

SHOW CARD Q7 & READ OUT Q7.A-Q7.I.	A great deal	Some-what	Not very much	Not at all	N. D P. N K R/ / Q. R O. N efused S
7.A. Family	1	2	3	4	8 9
7.B. Friends	1	2	3	4	8 9
7.C. Neighbors	1	2	3	4	8 9
7.D. Religious leaders or groups	1	2	3	4	8 9
7.E. Community leaders	1	2	3	4	8 9
7.F. Business leaders	1	2	3	4	8 9

7.G.	Local government leaders (akims, hokims, rais, etc.)	1	2	3	4	8	9
7.H.	Patron/employer/benefactor	1	2	3	4	8	9
7.I.	Mutual support group to which he/she belongs	1	2	3	4	8	9

Q8. There are various sources of tension and conflict in different communities. Thinking of your community specifically, please tell me how strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements. Do you agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat or disagree strongly?

<i>SHOW CARD Q8 & READ OUT Q8.A-Q8.I.</i>	Agree strongly	Agree some- what	Disagree strongly	Disagree somewhat	<i>R. S.</i>	<i>D. N</i>	<i>T. R/ U. efused</i>	<i>N R</i>
8.A. There is tension between my community and neighboring communities	1	2	3	4	8			9
8.B. There is tension among different ethnic groups in my community	1	2	3	4	8			9
8.C. There is tension between citizens and the local government	1	2	3	4	8			9
8.D. There is tension between citizens and the national government	1	2	3	4	8			9
8.E. There is tension between citizens and extremist groups	1	2	3	4	8			9
8.F. There is tension between citizens and police	1	2	3	4	8			9
8.G. There is tension between citizens and community-based religious leaders	1	2	3	4	8			9
8.H. There is tension between the government and community-based religious leaders	1	2	3	4	8			9
8.I. There is tension between the government and extremist groups	1	2	3	4	8			9

IF INTERVIEW IS BEING CONDUCTED IN A CAIP COMMUNITY ASK QUESTIONS Q9 AND Q10. OTHERWISE, SKIP TO Q11.

Q9. Since June 2002, the Community Action Investment Program (CAIP) has been active in your community to help identify and solve local problems. Are you aware of CAIP or any CAIP-sponsored projects?

Single code

Yes/aware	1
No/not aware	2
DK/NS	8
NR/Refused	9

Q10. Have you taken part in any CAIP activities?

Single code

Yes	1
No	2

DK/NS	8
NR/Refused	9

ASK ALL

Q11. Following are some statements about life in your community. Using the categories below, please indicate for each statement whether you agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly.

<i>SHOW CARD Q11 & READ OUT Q11.A-Q11.D.</i>	Agree strongly	Agree some- what	Disagree some- what	Disagree strongly	<i>V. D X. N K R/ / Y. R W. N refused S</i>
11.A. My community has confidence to approach local government for assistance.	1	2	3	4	8 9
11.B Community members are equipped to identify the real priority needs in our community.	1	2	3	4	8 9
11.C. Local government officials are responsive to our needs.	1	2	3	4	8 9
11.D. Tension that existed in the community has been lessened through greater community interaction.	1	2	3	4	8 9