

**Achievement of Market-Friendly Initiatives and Results Program
(AMIR 2.0 Program)**

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Analysis of Roadmap Implementation Efforts

Final Report

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Acronyms and Key Terms

ACC	Amman Chamber of Commerce
AMIR	Access to Microfinance and Improved Implementation of Policy Reform
AQA	Analytical Quality Assurance Program
AMC	Ahli Microfinancing Company
ASE	Amman Stock Exchange
ASEZA	Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority
ASYCUDA	Automated System for Customs Data
AWTC	Amman World Trade Center
BA	Business Association
BAI	Business Association Initiative
BPWA	Business & Professional Women - Amman
CCD	Companies Controller Directorate
CFA	Chartered Financial Analyst
CMD	Capital Markets Development Component
DEF	Development & Employment Fund
DevIS	American contractor of IT services, particularly Management Information Systems
DLS	Department of Land and Surveys, Ministry of Finance
EDS	Electronic Data Systems
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FCZ	Free Zone Corporation
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FIAS	Foreign Investment Advisory Service
FORFAS	Ireland's policy advisory board for enterprise promotion & science & technology development
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
GCEP	General Corporation for Environmental Protection
GPA	Government Procurement Agreement
HR	Human Resources
ICT	Information & Communications Technology
IE	Industrial Estate
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMI	Integrated Management & Information Consultants
INTAJ	Information Technology Association of Jordan
IOSCO	International Organization of Securities Commissions
IP	Intellectual Property
IPC	Investment Promotion Corporation of Jordan
IPO	Initial Public Offering
IPR	Intellectual Property Rights
IT	Information Technology
JACP	Jordan Access to Credit Project
JIB	Jordan Investment Board
JIEC	Jordan Industrial Estates Corporation
JITCC	Jordan Information Technology Community Center
JMCC	Jordan Micro Credit Corporation
JSC	Jordan Securities Commission
JTA	Jordan Trade Association
JTC	Jordan Telecommunications Corporation
JVA	Jordan Valley Authority
JV2020	Jordan Vision 2020
MAJ	Microfinance Association of Jordan
MENA	Middle East & North Africa Region
MFW	Microfund for Women
MIP	Microfinance Improvement Program
MIS	Management Information System
MoA	Ministry of Agriculture
MoE	Ministry of Education
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MoI	Ministry of Interior
MoICT	Ministry of Information and Communications Technology
MoIT	Ministry of Industry and Trade

MoH	Ministry of Health
MoL	Ministry of Labor
MMRAE	Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs and the Environment
MoPC	Ministry of Post and Communications
MoTA	Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities
MoWI	Ministry of Water and Irrigation
NIC	National Information Center
NPP	National Production Protection Department
OSS	One-Stop-Shop
PRI	Policy Reform Initiative
PSF	Postal Savings Fund
QIZ	Qualifying Industrial Zones
REACH	Regulatory Framework, Estate, Advancement Programs, Capital, Human Resources
SDC	Securities Depository Center
SEC	Securities Exchange Commission
SM	Sustainable Microfinance
SME	Small & Medium Enterprise
SMI	Sustainable Microfinance Initiative or Institution
TOR	Terms of Reference
TRC	Telecommunications Regulatory Commission
TRIP	Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
TSG	The Services Group, Inc.
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USAID CTO	USAID Chief Technical Officer
US EFA	United States 'Equator' clearing and settlement, registry and depository system
VC	Venture Capital
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization
YEA	Young Entrepreneur's Association

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Executive Summary

In 1998, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) funded a diagnostic of administrative barriers to foreign direct investment (FDI) in Jordan. The diagnostic was implemented by The Services Group, Inc. and the Foreign Investment Advisory Service of the World Bank. The goal of the diagnostic was threefold:

1. To outline the critical procedural path that investors were required to take to start up and operate a business in Jordan;
2. Highlight the major administrative, procedural, and regulatory constraints to business startup and growth, and
3. Suggest “ways and means to make the necessary improvements.”

In assessing the business environment in Jordan, the 32 specific procedures were analyzed for inclusion in the diagnostic. The diagnostic indicated what steps were involved to complete the selected procedures, what submissions were required, what the associated costs are, and how long each procedure took. The outcome was a report entitled *The Investor Roadmap* and subsequent presentations designed to trumpet its findings. According to its authors, the report “reviews critically the current investment process, identifies the areas where efforts are most needed to address the problems, and suggests ways and means to make the necessary improvements.” The resulting analysis and recommendations were written to inform future reform efforts and sketch out a broad vision of change. As the original authors stated, “The findings and recommendations of the report are meant to provide a basis for discussions at a high-level workshop on procedural reforms, to be attended by the line ministries, key authorities, and all other government agencies involved in the investment process.”

Through its Access to Microfinance and Improved Implementation of Policy Reform (AMIR) project, USAID funded various interventions to work with the Jordanian government, business leaders, and other civic partners to implement changes as referenced in the report. For example, short-term expatriate consultants and local experts were convened to work on such issues as improving food inspections, environmental oversight, and company registration. Implementation activities included the production of issue papers, drafting legal recommendations and model regulations, skill development and on-site technical training for agency staff, convening multi-agency Process Improvement Workshops, and arranging for exposure tours and overseas training for selected government staff.

The AMIR program took direct actions to implement change in relation to roughly 43% of the recommendations articulated in the Investor Roadmap. Of these, about 70% of the recommendations were adopted, but in several cases although a specific recommendation may have been rejected a qualitative change was nonetheless effected.

Table I summarizes the number of specific recommendations made per area, the number of issue areas that saw change, and the number of recommendations that AMIR worked to implement.

Table I: Summary of Investor Roadmap Recommendations and Results

	No. Recommendations in Roadmap	No. of Recommendations for which Change was Effected	No. of Recommendations that AMIR Addressed
Company Registration	7	4	7
Incentives Approvals	4	3	4
Expatriate Work Permit Approval	8	2	3
Hotel Licensing Procedures	6	3	0
Industrial Licensing	10	4	5
Land Acquisition	13	9	1
Site Development and Environmental Clearance	9	4	3
Utility Connections	7	4	2
Industrial Estates	2	2	0
Income Tax Registration and Payment	4	4	0
Customs Procedures	9	9	9
Site Inspections	4	4	2
TOTAL	83	52	36

Lessons Learned from AMIR Implementation Initiatives

As elaborated in the main body of the draft report, there are several lessons that can be learned from the successes and setbacks faced in implementing process-oriented administrative reforms. These lessons are reflected in Annex C of this report, which focuses on remaining constraints and a methodology programming an Updated Investor Roadmap project.

The major themes born out by AMIR's Roadmap implementation work are summarized below:

- Sufficient time and effort must be devoted to **leveraging and mobilizing political will** for change at the initial phases of programming a change intervention in Jordan. Political will be most effectively marshaled when process re-engineering is aligned with the agency's overall goals, albeit externally mandated – as when the Customs Department was required to adopt many new laws and procedures as part of its Jordan's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) – or internally motivated – as when the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MoIT) strongly backed ideas to improve and streamline services related to company registration.
- An important part of mobilizing support is ensuring that the particular way in which reforms are implemented designed and **introduced collaboratively with implementing officials**. While external pressure and advice may convince an agency's management of the existence of problems, the implementation of

solutions is best and more thoroughly accomplished with the consensus and guidance of those directly involved. Multi-agency planning meetings and Process Improvement Workshops have proven to be effective mechanisms to build consensus and produce realistic Action Plans for implementing change.

- It is important to **carefully assess the capacity of partners** when launching a change management process. While some government partners may be interested in implementing change, if they lack the internal capacity, technical expertise on staff, or legal authority to fulfill their agreements, process re-engineering efforts can backfire. Agencies that are distracted by internal management instability, shifting mandates, or other institutional concerns that may conflict with process re-engineering initiative may come to resist such attempts to introduce change despite initial enthusiasm.
- Another important consideration in process re-engineering is finding ways to **link proposed changes to overall agency priorities, reforms, or capacity building programs**. AMIR achieved considerable success in implementing Roadmap recommendations in Customs as part of the broader goal of making the country compliant with WTO norms and laws. The initiative to improve the regime for testing for imports achieved considerable gains in improving the technical capacity of Government of Jordan (GoJ) regulators while simultaneously reducing the regulatory burden on the private sector.
- **Effective monitoring and on-going support**, programmed to correspond with a specific timetable for implementing changes called for in an Action Plan agreed to by the implementing parties, is vital to ensuring that change initiatives do not fade away due to lack of direction, attention, and motivation. The mechanism for this monitoring and support can vary, and under AMIR expatriate consultants, local consultants, and business associations have all successfully overseen the implementation of reforms.
- Perhaps not surprisingly, there is a direct relationship between the amount of resources dedicated to implementation and the degree of success. The commitment of resources should not be viewed in strict monetary terms, however, but rather in **flexibility**. An intervention that is well supported and can be highly responsive to its implementing partners **is likely to achieve a greater degree of success**. The more successful implementation efforts under AMIR were able to utilize a variety of tools, including fielding technical experts, programming workshops, providing a wide array of training, purchasing equipment and software, and financing exposure tours.
- While it is tempting to program broad initiatives that may have an impact on many institutions, as the AMIR licensing reform effort suggests **initiatives that are very specific and well targeted are likely to achieve a greater degree of success**. This requires focusing on specific procedures and agencies for reform and advocating for “quick wins” as well as more fundamental changes.

- **Adequate legal support and good coordination** can have a tangible impact on shepherding through reforms. An implementation project that can provide detailed analysis of issues, model legislation that can be submitted for ratification, and support for implementing new legislation makes it easy for agencies to sign onto a change management process.
- In some cases **re-designing procedures may be best accomplished on a demonstration project basis**, especially when facing determined recalcitrance to change. As with the implementation of a risk-based food testing system, when national level authorities were resistant to adopting new procedures AMIR was able to negotiate with the Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority (ASEZA) to serve as a test case. Successful demonstration projects can have a profound impact in overcoming bureaucratic intransigence.

Chapter 1: Introduction

I. Project Context and History

In 1998, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) funded a diagnostic of administrative barriers to foreign direct investment in Jordan. The diagnostic was implemented by the Foreign Investment Advisory Service of the World Bank and The Services Group, Inc. (TSG). The goal of the diagnostic was threefold:

4. To outline the critical procedural path that investors were required to take to start up and operate a business in Jordan;
5. Highlight the major administrative, procedural, and regulatory constraints to business startup and growth, and
6. Suggest “ways and means to make the necessary improvements.”

In assessing the business environment in Jordan, the following specific procedures were analyzed for inclusion in the diagnostic:

1. Approval by the Controller of Companies
2. Commercial Registration
3. Approval by the Investment Promotion Corporation
4. Approvals by Ministry of Labor and Ministry of Interior for Work Permits for Expatriates
5. Hotel Licensing and Approvals for Construction of Hotels
6. Final Licensing and Grading for Hotels
7. Industrial Licensing
8. Acquiring Privately Owned Land
9. Land Title Registration
10. Acquiring State Owned Land from the Jordan Valley Authority
11. Acquiring State Owned Land from the Aqaba Regional Authority
12. Acquiring State Owned Land from the Industrial Estates
13. Acquiring State Owned Land in Municipal Areas
14. Zoning and Rezoning in Municipal Areas
15. Building Permit in Municipal Areas
16. Environment Clearance
17. Building Safety Clearance in Municipal Areas
18. Occupancy Permit in Municipal Areas
19. Obtaining Professional Licenses
20. Obtaining Electricity
21. Obtaining Water Services
22. Obtaining Wastewater Services
23. Obtaining Telephone Services
24. Obtaining Postal Services
25. Building Permit in Industrial Estates

26. Occupancy Permitting Industrial Estates
27. Income Tax Registration and Payment
28. Customs Procedures
29. Customs Procedures at Amman Airport and Aqaba Port
30. Import Licensing
31. Duty Drawback and Temporary Entry Regime
32. Site Inspections

The primary outcome of this diagnostic exercise was a report entitled *The Investor Roadmap*. According to its authors, the report “reviews critically the current investment process, identifies the areas where efforts are most needed to address the problems, and suggests ways and means to make the necessary improvements.” As the original authors stated, “The findings and recommendations of the report are meant to provide a basis for discussions at a high-level workshop on procedural reforms, to be attended by the line ministries, key authorities, and all other government agencies involved in the investment process.”

Through its four year Access to Microfinance and Improved Implementation of Policy Reform (AMIR) project, USAID funded various interventions to work with the Jordanian government, business leaders, and other civic partners to implement changes as referenced in the report. Implementation of the Investor Roadmap’s recommendations directly contributes to USAID’s strategic objective Number 5 – “Increased Economic Opportunities for Jordanians” by increasing the effectiveness of policy reform and creating an improved environment for private sector activity. As part of the Policy Reform Component, the Investor Roadmap takes critical view of government regulation of the private sector to improve policy reform and implementation of policies, regulations and procedures.

In its implementation, Investor Roadmap initiatives tend to encompass broad legislative changes as well as specific institutional, administrative and procedural reform driven by demand from the private sector. For example, short-term expatriate consultants and local experts were fielded to work on such issues as improving food inspections, environmental oversight, and company registration. Implementation activities included the production of issue papers, drafting legal recommendations and model regulations, skill development and on-site technical training for agency staff, convening multi-agency Process Improvement Workshops, and arranging for exposure tours and overseas training for selected government staff.

The effort to effect the changes advocated by the Investor Roadmap aspect of the over AMIR objective to improve the investment climate in order to have a tangible impact on the Jordanian economy. The rationalization of government regulation and improved implementation of laws and procedures can be expected to have several important results, including:

- Improved government service delivery among agencies that attract, facilitate, and regulate the private sector

- Enhanced image of Jordan as an investment destination
- Increased FDI
- Improved local business climate for private firms in an open and competitive marketplace
- Reduced poverty levels as employment increases and wages rise
- Increased choice and lower prices of goods and services for consumers as foreign and local competition increases
- Rising government revenue from an expanded private sector tax base and increased consumer spending
- Reduced government expenditures from the elimination of costs related to inefficient and unnecessary regulation, inspections, and monitoring

II. Objectives of the *Analysis of Roadmap Implementation Efforts*

More than four years later, however, no systematic effort has been made to assess and record the specific changes implemented and revisit the administrative, procedural, and regulatory barriers that continue to constrain investment and business growth in Jordan. Jordan has undertaken a wide range of economic policy and commercial reforms in the past four years, many of which were assisted and expedited by the AMIR Program. Previous analyses have sought to summarize and assess the successes and challenges of the AMIR program as a whole, but prior to this effort a detailed analysis of the status of implementation efforts of the 1998 Investor Roadmap's 83 recommendations¹ has not been completed.² As a result, USAID contracted for an assessment of the degree to which change was achieved in relation to the Investor Roadmap's recommendations that reflects on reasons behind successes and setbacks faced in implementing regulatory, administrative, and procedural changes.

In examining the status of the Investor Roadmap's recommendations, this analysis answers several basic questions:

- What topical areas noted in the initial diagnostic have been targeted for systematic reform efforts since 1998?
- What agencies and organizations were involved in implementing changes based on the diagnostic's recommendations?
- What changes have there been in agency structure, mandate, and regulatory requirements related to the processes relevant to investment?

¹ In most cases the 1998 Investor Roadmap's analysis articulated a specific recommendation, but in a few instances an issue was raised without an explicit recommendation. In these cases, a recommendation was inferred for the sake of this analysis. In the individual process charts found throughout this report, recommendations that are inferred appear in brackets.

² Most notably Wellons, Richard and Wieland, Robert, *Mid-Program Impact Assessment*, October 2000, Chemonics, *AMIR I Final Report*, January 2001.

- What new investment-related licensing, permitting, or approval requirements have been introduced since 1998?
- Based on preliminary intelligence from the business community, government regulators, and other stakeholders, what are the most significant procedural impediments to investment in Jordan today?³

This report will summarize the actions taken on the Roadmap's recommendations, citing specific legal and institutional changes, AMIR program activities to support these changes, and areas where change has not been effected. Interviews with selected private sector representatives, business association representatives, AMIR staff, and government officials have been conducted to identify the reasons why some implementation activities were more successful than others, and lessons learned are included in relation to the specific Investor Roadmap activities undertaken.

III. Report Outline

The main body of this report describes the change effected since 1998 in relation to the Investor Roadmap's recommendations. The report is structured to correspond to the 12 major process areas included in the 1998 report, as follows:

1. Company Registration
2. Investment Incentives
3. Work Permits for Expatriates
4. Hotel Licensing Procedures
5. Industrial Licensing
6. Access to Land
7. Site Development and Environmental Clearance
8. Utility Connections
9. Industrial Estates
10. Income Tax Registration and Payment
11. Customs Procedures
12. Site Inspections

Annex A lists the documents reviewed for this assessment, including AMIR project reports, legislation, and government publications.

Annex B is a list of interviewees.

A separate output of this Analysis is a detailed Terms of Reference (TOR) to create an updated Investor Roadmap diagnostic study and program follow-on implementation efforts. This TOR is included as Annex C, accompanied by a draft table of contents for an updated Roadmap document, *curriculum vitae* of consultants proposed to undertake

³ A more detailed process of soliciting detailed private sector feedback will need to be undertaken in a future initiative to thoroughly assess the current administrative, procedural, and regulatory constraints to business activity in Jordan.

the work, and a survey piloted during this analysis. The TOR reflects the lessons learned in previous Roadmap implementation efforts, notes important procedural areas that were not covered in the 1998 diagnostic report, and highlights new areas of concern to local and foreign investors today.

Chapter Two: Status of Roadmap Implementation Efforts

I. Company Registration

The area of company registration was one of the most significantly changed since the initial Investor Roadmap was completed in 1998. The differences effected since 1998 include legal, institutional, procedural, and informational dissemination change. Amendments to the Companies Law, the promulgation of a new Craftsman Law (No. 28, 1999), and new laws and guiding regulations governing Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks are in effect. While a recommendation to merge two institutions (Company Controller and Registrar of Companies) with similar mandates into one was not heeded, significant physical and organizational changes were implemented in the Company Controller. The most visible manifestation of this change is the creation of single room staffed with the various officials involved with company registration, allowing for investors to complete all company registration activities in one space. The procedures have similarly been changed, with a new automated application processing system installed, the number of forms being cut by 80%, and according to government officials and an independent investigation the total time was reduced from over two weeks to 30 minutes.⁴ The Ministry's communication tools have also been improved and a revamped Ministry website explaining the registration procedure in English and Arabic is expected to be completed by the end of April 2002.

An exception to the general degree of success achieved by the Ministry and AMIR in re-engineering the company registration process is related to the area of sole proprietorships. While the time for approving of sole proprietor registrations is consistently much quicker than in the past, recent assessments suggest that the Registrar is less efficient, not completely computerized, and staffed by personnel with less obvious customer service orientation.⁵

The AMIR program focused on the company registration area as one of its priorities for technical assistance, and several interventions were concluded as part of the reform effort. The major interventions programmed to support the re-engineering of the company registration process are outlined below:

1. The first intervention was the creation of a short issue paper by TSG on company registration that expanded on the observations contained in the Roadmap document and presented additional recommendations and analysis based on private sector feedback and international best practice.
2. The local legal consultancy International Business Legal Associates (IBLA) prepared a parallel legal analysis that focused on the legislative background for company registration in Jordan and identified specific statutes that would need to be changed to streamline the system.

⁴ See AMIR Microenterprise Draft Report on Phase I.

⁵ Op cit.

3. These papers were disseminated to stakeholders in the government in order to present the context for programming additional interventions related to streamlining the company registration process in Jordan.
4. Next, a meeting with officials from the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MoIT) led to an agreement to support convening a multi-agency Process Improvement Workshop. Under the auspices of the then-Investment Promotion Corporation (IPC) of Jordan⁶ some weeks later the workshop was held at the Dead Sea, attracting the participation of 32 government officials from 14 different agencies. Richard Dreiman, an international expert on company registration reform, was brought in to lead part of the workshop.
5. The workshop produced a broad consensus on the need for change, and a series of follow-on meetings with government stakeholders refined an implementation plan to address the conclusions presented in the workshop and previous analytic documents.
6. Implementation was then managed and monitored by the local consulting group Al Jidara Investment Services.

Lessons Learned

The success in reforming company registration can be attributed to several factors, as outlined below:

- Considerable time and effort were devoted to **leveraging and mobilizing political will** within the MoIT and external parties. By making a successful argument about the need to make change within the process at a high profile event and successive efforts, regulators were motivated to work to make improvements. Additionally, several decision-makers in the Ministry were pre-disposed to make efforts to reform what was recognized as an inefficient system, and AMIR implementation efforts supported existing urgency for reform within the MoIT.
- The company registration reform project **successfully worked collaboratively with implementing officials** in the change planning process. Although the AMIR consultants were proactive in moving the various interventions along a timeframe, Ministry officials were involved early and often in the formulation of recommendations for change, planning the process improvement workshop, and creation of a practical action plan.
- **Effective monitoring and on-going support**, programmed to correspond with a specific timetable for implementing changes called for in the Action Plan, was provided for the company registration process re-engineering. Unfortunately, many government change efforts lose momentum without prolonged external

⁶ The Investment Promotion Corporation has been reorganized into the Jordan Investment Board (JIB) since the Roadmap was completed in 1998.

support and guidance to continue implementation. In some countries, the private sector, media, or other external interests can monitor implementation. In the case of company registration in Jordan, however, implementation was left largely to the local consulting sub-contractor Al Jidara with periodic support from core AMIR Policy Component staff.

- As demonstrated by the feedback of the Process Improvement Workshop held at the Dead Sea suggests, specific **international best practice models and examples are persuasive**. Jordanian regulators appreciate some of the theoretical arguments for making administrative reform, but international case examples and models of international best practice are also persuasive.

Table 1 summarizes the issues, recommendations, changes, and AMIR program activities related to company registration noted in the 1998 Investor Roadmap.

Table 1: Company Registration

Issues	Recommendations	Change Effected	AMIR Actions
Company Registrar process redundant with Company Controller and too time-consuming	Abolish Company Controller in favor of Company Registrar Eliminate redundant submissions and reduce the time required for approvals	No change Company registration process re-engineered Registration system automated Office space reorganized to better facilitate serving public Forms reduced from 5 to 1 Required data fields reduced from 35 to 7 Standard operating procedures implemented Department re-structured Job descriptions written Amendments to Companies Law drafted New Craftsman Law created to regulate Sole Proprietorships by Registrar	Company registration issue paper produced Large multi-agency Process Improvement Workshop convened Detailed change action plan created Follow on re-engineering with MoIT, Controller, Registrar staff trained on new systems Drafted amendments to Companies Law
Use of model contracts restrictive	Allow companies to use own contracts so long as minimal data is included	No change	Change advocated as part of action plan
Minimum capital requirement ties up capital needlessly and deters SMEs	Eliminate or reduce minimum capital requirement	No change; requirements stated in Companies Law, No. 22, 1997	Change advocated as part of action plan
Principals can't delegate signing incorporation papers	Cease requiring partners to sign papers in front of the Controller	With power of attorney this can be delegated Documents can be filed over the Internet	Change advocated as part of implementation plan
Registering trademarks, patents, and industrial designs is time-consuming	Accept foreign registrations if criteria are sufficiently robust	Amendments to Law on Trademarks enacted New regulation on trademarks enacted New Law on Patents enacted New regulation on patents enacted	Trademark, Patent, and Copyright laws drafted
Minister of Industry and Trade is required to approve of foreign companies' local agents	Abolish Ministerial approval of foreign agents	Abolished except for public shareholding companies	Change advocated as part of implementation plan

II. Investment Incentives

The AMIR program has provided significant support to the IPC and its successor organization, the Jordan Investment Board in the past few years generally related to developing a rational organizational structure, creating internal policies and procedures, marketing strategies, strengthening internal management protocols, and upgrading staff skills through training and exposure tours.

The 1998 Roadmap had little comment on the procedural efficiency of the Jordan Investment Board (JIB), but certain areas were critiqued. Of these, there was modest change accomplished. For example, sales tax and duty rates have fallen on many items. Although the specific recommendation authored by the 1998 Investor Roadmap regarding duty exemptions has not been fully adopted, there have been improvements related to the process. First, documents are now accepted over the Internet, saving investors the time and money that was previously expended on physically delivering documents back and forth between customs and the JIB. Second, the JIB's efforts to cultivate counterparts in other agencies seems to have significantly reduced the conflicts related to what items can qualify as a duty exempt input. Third, in response to criticism of its limited physical presence throughout the country, the JIB has opened offices at the Princess Alia International Airport and the industrial area of Zarqa.

The JIB has not adopted the recommendation to make duty free classification more automatic, and has retained the case-by-case exemption system. However, JIB officials note that as more and more investors enter a given sector and get certain imports to be classified as duty exempt, the duty exemption process becomes much easier and more automatic for subsequent investors.

Table 2 summarizes the issues, recommendations, changes effected, and related AMIR program actions since 1998 in reference to incentives approvals by the JIB.

Table 2: Incentives Approvals

Issues	Recommendations	Change Effected	AMIR Actions
Duty exemption process is cumbersome	Lower sales tax and duties on imports, thereby making the cumbersome duty exemption process unnecessary	Many tax rates lowered since 1998 by 50% in many cases Duty exemption documents can be processed over the internet Increased cooperation with customs has reduced conflicts	IPC reorganized into JIB Processes redesigned Staff trained in facilitation New Investment Promotion Law proposed, but later withdrawn
Duty free imports are poorly defined, leading to arbitrary decisions	Make duty exemptions more automatic based on a business' sector or operation and a specific list of goods	No change; case by case exemptions are still the norm, but after first few businesses in a sector are approved later ones have an easier time	Change advocated as part of IPC/JIB reforms
Investors must come to the IPC in Amman repeatedly to get documents stamped for duty exemptions	After lists created, monitoring function shifted from IPC to customs Set up IPC representative offices in Aqaba and elsewhere or delegate IPC functions to other agencies	Increased role for customs in monitoring Duty exemption documents can be processed over the internet Satellite office set up at Queen Alia International Airport and Zarqa Chamber of Industry	Support to IPC/JIB in developing website and IT infrastructure Work with JIB and Customs to coordinate operations Funding and assistance for IT infrastructure and facilities for new office at airport and in Zarqa

III. Work Permits for Expatriates

Streamlining the process governing expatriate work permits was not targeted for any particular change intervention beyond the general advising provided to the JIB in addressing the concerns of foreign investors, developing counterparts in other agencies, and creating more efficient information sharing and decision-making structures, including multi-agency committees. Other government bodies involved in granting expatriate work permits include the Ministry of Labor (MoL) and departments of General Intelligence and Public Security of the Ministry of Interior (MoI). JIB officials note that the Ministry of Interior officials have been resistant to changes that would in their view lessen the state's control over security matters.

The changes in the expatriate work permit regime have been fairly modest, and largely relate to the JIB developing relationships with the other agencies involved to streamline and clarify internally what the process is. These negotiated understandings, in turn, have better enabled the JIB to advise investors appropriately. Although several observers have expressed skepticism about JIB's ability to successfully implement a true One-Stop-Shop (OSS) – which is a difficult undertaking in most countries, but especially with those that have not undergone a comprehensive process of civil service reform and improving government procedures – the agency has structured the OSS to address the primary concerns of investors based in part on the Investor Roadmap and subsequent Roadmap-related interventions. Unlike in 1998, at the JIB's OSS there is a promotions officer who is specifically tasked with handling expatriate employment affairs on behalf of investors.

Further, the JIB has reached agreements with the MoL and MoI on committing to a specific timeframe for reaching decisions and coordinating decision-making. Presently, expatriate work permit applications are to be approved or rejected by the Ministry of Labor within three days, while the Ministry of Interior has ten days to render a decision. Some countries may require a longer period of time. Syria, Egypt, Yemen, and the Arab Gulf States are exempt from normal residency law and security screening procedures.

Finally, a clear formula for expatriate hiring has been agreed as follows represented in Table 3 below.

Table 3: Expatriate Approval Formula

Year of Operation	Percentage of Expatriates Allowed	Percentage of Jordanians Required
First Year	50%	50%
Second Year	33%	67%
Third Year	25%	75%

A new labor law came into effect as of January 1, 2002 but MoL officials state that the only procedural differences are related to lowering expatriate work permit fees. The new fees are for an expatriate work permit are:

- JD 150 (US \$210) for the first year
- JD 225 (US \$315) for the second year

- JD 300 (US \$420) for the third year

While no specific short-term work permits are available in Jordan (all work permits are for a fixed one-year period and twice renewable under normal circumstances), one can apply directly to the Ministry of Interior for an extended visit visa of up to six months.

Table 4 summarizes the issues, recommendations, changes effected, and AMIR program actions related to expatriate work permit issuance since 1998.

Table 4: Expatriate Work Permit Approval

Issues	Recommendations	Change Effected	AMIR Actions
Number of approvals is arbitrary and potentially restrictive	Link expatriate approval with number of firm employees or invested capital	New Labor Law and Instructions in force as of 1/1/02; permit fees reduced in new law JIB agreed to a specific ratio of expatriates to locals with MoL based on 3 year period where local employment ration increases	In-house technical assistance provided to JIB help streamline approval process
Approval criteria are unclear	Publish guide to process and make approval criteria explicit	No change; JIB and MoL disagree about which agency is expected to publish a guide	In-house technical assistance provided to JIB help streamline coordination of process
Too many agencies involved with approval (Ministry of Labor, Ministry of Interior, General Intelligence and Public Security) and effectiveness of security check is cumbersome and unsubstantiated	Limit security screening to selective cases Rely on better enforcement and stiffer penalties	No change in the number of agencies involved in security screening or in relying on pre-screening, but JIB committee formed to streamline various approvals No change	In-house technical assistance provided to JIB help streamline approval process No direct action
Process can be time-consuming and variable	Commit to a specific and short timeframe for approval	Agreement between JIB and MoL call for timeframes	No direct action
Permit valid for only one year subject to same process	Extend validity period for permit	No change	No direct action
System does not account for short-term expatriate workers	[Allow for expedited approvals of short-term workers]	No change in validity period of permit but MoL says approval times are speedy (1 week) One can apply directly to the Ministry of Interior for an extended visa for up to 6 months	No direct action
MoL lacks accurate definition of workers in short supply in Jordan	[Create accurate and regularly updated “negative list” of prohibited workers]	No change; Department of Statistics and other agencies have data but it is old and MoL lacks resources to conduct regular studies	No direct action

IV. Hotel Licensing Procedures

The 1998 Investor Roadmap examined the licensing requirements for hotels. AMIR did not program any specific activities related to licensing hotels, but there have been some modest changes in the procedures addressed in 1998. Examples of these changes include publishing application form and rudimentary guide for tourism projects in Arabic and English and increasing private sector participation in the committee that star grades hotels.

Table 5 summarizes the issues and recommendations from the 1998 Investor Roadmap as well as the changes effected and AMIR program actions related to hotel licensing.

Table 5: Hotels Licensing Procedures

Issues	Recommendations	Change Effected	AMIR Actions
No application form produced by Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities to specific application data	[Produce simple application form]	Form complete in Arabic and English (although poor quality translation)	No direct action
MoTA micromanages tourism project development	Limit MoTA approval to projects of a certain size and/or if within areas vital to environmental protection or regional development	No change; star grading system covers all construction designed as temporary accommodations are within MoTA jurisdiction, including hotel apartments	No direct action
MoTA requires a preliminary and final approval that do not seem to offer any value	Eliminate preliminary and final approval by MoTA	No change; preliminary approval is designed to allow for project to proceed and final approval confers operational approval and Star Grading	No direct action
MoTA lacks expertise to assess feasibility studies and has to out-source to professionals	[Increase staff capacity or refer approval of studies to qualified private consultants]	No change; MoTA asserts staff is appropriately trained in engineering and architecture	No direct action
Compulsory star grading system is overseen by government officials not knowledgeable industry association	Improve standards and guidelines issues by government agencies (including the GCEP) and delegate monitoring to private organizations	Modest change; increased cooperation with Jordan Tourism Association Star grading done by a committee with private sector representatives	No direct action
Lack of an overall national tourism strategy that guides a master plan and zoning policy	MoTA needs to develop a national strategic plan	Modest change; strategic plan discussed and partially complete	No direct action

V. Industrial Licensing

In addition to hotel licensing, the 1998 Investor Roadmap examined the process for a generic industrial project. According to government and private sector interviewees, and supported by research by the AMIR's Microenterprise Initiative, obtaining sectoral licenses can still be complicated. The degree of difficulty varies depending on the agency responsible for administering a given licensing system, with health related activities among the most complicated.

The AMIR program attempted to address the over-regulation of licensing agencies by getting the government to agree to restrict licensing by all agencies to commercial activities that would have a clear impact on human health, safety, or environmental quality, or in cases where the individuals themselves were deemed to need a license to practice their professions, such as for doctors and lawyers. Recognizing that the program did not have the resources to work with the dozens of licensing departments and agencies individually, the program sought instead to draft a model licensing law that would eliminate the many supercilious licenses issued by government and create an administrative structure with the JIB to support its implementation. After the law was drafted, the JIB was supported in attempts to get the law passed and to give the JIB the necessary authority to enforce it.

The licensing reform effort was comprised of the following interventions:

1. International legal consultant Leon Bijou, Esq., working with local lawyers, examined the legal regime for business licensing.
2. A multi-agency workshop was designed and led by the international expert, attracting approximately 40 representatives from 17 agencies. The workshop presented the principles behind why reducing the number of licenses would have a beneficial on business activity and eventually government revenue and recommendations regarding specific licenses to abolish.
3. An action plan was created that called for:
 - Creating and disseminating a survey to various licensing authorities aimed at having them document licensing procedures and make recommendations for which of their licenses could be eliminated;
 - Mapping the individual licensing procedures of the agencies surveyed;
 - Identifying a high-level government sponsor for the activity, such as the Economic Consultative Council; and
 - Drafting a model licensing law that would limit the types of licenses permissible in Jordan.
4. A Law on Licensing was drafted with JIB input to limit the types of licenses that agencies could issue and make the JIB the "gate keeper" of all licenses.

5. Follow-on support was provided to the JIB to assist its efforts to get the law passed.

Although some quality diagnostic work was completed and several meetings were convened, the impact on reducing licenses has been negligible, and many of the licenses that were singled out for elimination still exist today.

Lessons Learned

While the AMIR undertaking to streamline licensing articulately made the theoretical arguments for deregulation of the private sector and set forth specific proposals, at the implementation stage this intervention was too diffuse and ambitious. Many agencies in Jordan issue licenses. As such, a comprehensive effort to streamline the licensing regime would either require intense interaction with many individual agencies or the imposition of a new regime supported by the top political and economic powers within government.

Some of the specific conclusions as to why the licensing intervention produced only modest results and did not lead to process re-engineering are outlined below:

- First, agency **resistance was strong**. Agency intransigence to eliminating licenses is rooted in several factors. Government agencies tend to become vested in issuing licenses because so doing represents a means to generate agency revenue and maintaining agency control and relevance vis a vis sister agencies. Further, the elimination of licenses often creates a fear among those civil servants directly involved in licensing that eliminating the licensing function will eventually lead to termination. The fear of job losses reinforces an agency's general bureaucratic resistance to change and can frustrate implementing reform efforts even when senior management are supportive. As such, convincing an agency to limit its regulatory actions is difficult to accomplish in the best of circumstances.
- Second, achieving concrete results was more difficult because **no specific agency received sufficient individual attention or incentives** to make the requested changes. Without strong reformist leadership within an agency and some clear benefits to making change, general and infrequent appeals to reduce bureaucracy rarely succeed. As executed, the AMIR licensing initiative did not sufficiently build support for change within the agencies involved and did not align the proposed reforms with the institutional or personal interests of the top decision-makers. One serious shortcoming of the effort was its inability to ensure that the government's internal funding system would compensate agencies that lost revenue from eliminating licenses.
- Third, external **senior political will was not effectively marshaled** to guarantee success. While the JIB tried to urge the Cabinet to support the law, these efforts failed. A more authoritative body, such as the Economic Consultative Council,

was not successfully cultivated to support the initiative, and as such the law was not implemented.

- Fourth, the **changes advocated were not linked to overall agency reforms or capacity building** and were consequently seen by some participants as an entirely externally initiated activity that had little benefit to their own agencies. Procedural changes are often best implemented as part of a broader agency process re-engineering and capacity effort by providing context, structure, and institutional support for reducing bureaucracy.
- Finally, some observers in government noted that the effort was hampered because there was **a lack of consensus in the initiative's approach**. Although the workshop was a good first step in seeking input and support on how to shape the intervention, additional time and effort were required to convince agencies of the desirability of making changes and the best way to proceed. As it was, some in government felt that the initiative was being imposed externally without sufficient input and regard for the interests of the personnel involved.

As such, unless the overarching licensing law is passed and a senior governmental organ with meaningful control over all of the agencies involved takes a direct interest in overseeing sweeping change, a new approach should be identified to effect improvements. As elaborated in Annex C, future efforts to eliminate licenses may be best accomplished as part of a more concentrated sectoral, agency, or process-specific effort. The role of business associations as partners in crafting recommendations for change and in on-going advocacy should also be emphasized. While this approach reduces the breadth of reforms, it is more likely to produce tangible results. Given the increased efficiency of private sector associations in advocating for business friendly reforms within government, there is reason for optimism in working with the private sector to help communicate the need to change to licensing agencies while giving Jordanian businesspeople the tools to shepherd and monitor change on an on-going basis.

Licensing of Food Establishments

The licensing of food establishments was touched about in the licensing workshop, but no follow-on was programmed related to the overall licensing streamlining initiative. However, the more focused intervention related to improving the regime for screening and testing food imports has recently begun to look at ways to link on-going improvements in the technical and administrative regime for inspections to the licensing regime. While it is too early to assess the impact of this initiative, there are positive indications that improvements in the government's system for assessing food risks, including the implementation of a pilot risk-based system for food import inspections and technical staff training, can eventually translate into a streamlined and less intrusive licensing procedure based on better science and inspection methods. ASEZA has agreed to serve as a demonstration project for streamlined and improved food safety systems, and based on the results achieved in the on-going technical assistance provided by AMIR

in Aqaba, it can be expected that improvements can be replicated nationwide with approval of the Ministry of Health.

Table 6 summarizes the issues, recommendations, changes effected, and related AMIR program actions since 1998 in relation to general industrial licenses.

Table 6: Industrial Licensing

Issues	Recommendations	Change Effectuated	AMIR Actions
Department of Industrial Development's preliminary approval is unnecessary	Eliminate the general industrial license for most projects Screen only projects on a negative list of projects that are of particular strategic importance	Modest change; DID approval is final not preliminary No change	No direct action No direct action
Approvals are not well coordinated, especially for special sectors where health and safety approvals are required	Departments/agencies should create comprehensive rules and standards Streamline procedures through an integrated agency	Modest change; JIB now guides investors through process No change	No direct action No direct action
Quality control and environmental approvals tend to be pre-approvals	[Shift from cumbersome pre-approvals to effective monitoring of compliance]	No change GCEP relies on other agencies to do some monitoring and also on pre-approvals	Analytic study completed related to environmental clearance Draft law prepared on environment Workshop on improving process convened
Many approvals overlap	Departments/agencies should create comprehensive rules and standards	No change	Analytic study completed related to environmental clearance Draft law prepared on environment Workshop on improving process convened
Information on the process is unavailable in English	[Create procedural guides and other information in English and other languages of targeted investors]	Modest change; JIB posts some information on its website	No direct action
There are too many sectoral licenses	Limit sectoral licenses to issues of public quality control or professional certification	No change	Workshop convened Draft law limiting licenses prepared JIB supported in unsuccessful attempt to get law enacted
Environmental approvals overlap	Streamline environmental approvals	No change	Analytic study completed Draft law prepared on environment Workshop on improving process convened
Food safety approvals overlap and lack clear unified standards	Streamline food safety approvals based on new unified standards	ASEZA law adapted to allow for new food safety inspection regime ASEZA adopted risk-based food testing regime new Law on Plant Variety Protection Food safety database created in Aqaba	On-going advising provided to MoH, ISM, and other agencies Trained staff on food sampling, laboratory analysis, and risk assessment Provided MoH and Customs with needed computers, lab equipment, and training to implement and link the system with Customs' ASYCUDA system

VI. Access to Land

The regime for acquiring land in Jordan has changed substantially, most notably in the proliferation of private industrial estates and free zones, the development of the Aqaba Special Economic Zone, the expansion of public free zones and industrial estates, and changes in the laws governing land ownership by foreign investors. All of these developments were advocated in the 1998 Investor Roadmap, and considerable effort in developing the Aqaba Special Economic Zone arose from the efforts of the AMIR program and the follow-on Aqaba Technical Assistance Project (ATASP). However, AMIR did not directly engage the Ministry of Finance, which has jurisdiction over the Department of Land and Surveys (DLS), in seeking to implement the reforms advocated in the Investor Roadmap, but senior officials at DLS attended several events, including the initial presentations on the Investor Roadmap.

The most significant changes related to land are seen in the promulgation of two new laws (the Law on Leasing and Selling Land and the Law for Leasing Which Leads to Ownership) and creating contracts that enable foreign investors to own land.⁷ The new laws are still before the Cabinet, and as such their impact on procedures and the ease of acquiring land cannot be assessed at this time.

Among the changes proposed in the new laws are increased delegation of land allocation decision making from the Cabinet to the Ministry of Finance and the Director General of the DLS and clarification of increased rights to land ownership by foreign investors. The DLS has increased the flexibility of investors in acquiring land by adding terms in the contracts that investors sign related to the land under its control. Similarly, DLS allows for more flexibility in leasing arrangements than in 1998, but specific terms of lease contracts are still subject to negotiation with government officials. The qualitative impact of this flexibility must also be investigated in the subsequent Investor Roadmap Update project.

Several aspects of the regime governing state-controlled land were not changed since 1998. Among these are the roles of the several agencies involved, including the municipalities, the 30-year time limit for leases, and the length of time required to obtain permission for land acquisition.

Table 7 summarizes the issues, recommendations, changes effected, and AMIR program actions since 1998 related to acquiring land in Jordan.

⁷ No official English translation of these laws has been created, and because the laws have not been officially approved by the Cabinet, Arabic versions were not issued publicly.

Table 7: Land Acquisition

Issues	Recommendations	Change Effected	AMIR Actions
The approval of line ministries and municipalities for land overlaps with previous approvals by these same agencies	Eliminate approval of line ministries in land acquisition	No change; DLS says each agency approves of a separate issue related to acquiring land	No direct action; participation in AMIR presentations on the Roadmap and Free Zone development
Cabinet approval for land sale is unnecessary; other agencies should exercise increased autonomy in allocating land	Cabinet approval eliminated or only in few special cases Delegate authority for land allocation to local/regional authorities	Cabinet approval still required for sale, but new Leasing and Selling Land Law before Cabinet expected to be in force by end of June will delegate most approvals to Director General of DLS and MoF Allocation of land delegated to FCZ, JIEC, ASEZA	No direct action; participation in AMIR presentations on the Roadmap and Free Zone development
Many approvals apparently related to fears of land speculation and environmental degradation	Put protective clauses and stiff penalties in relevant laws and model contracts	New Leasing and Selling Land Law includes some protective clauses	No direct action
There is a need to expand the land available for industrial use, particularly in the IEs	[Expand land available in IEs]	Aqaba Special Economic Zone established Additional public and private Industrial Estates established Additional Free Zones established	Feasibility, investment targeting, physical, and institutional studies and on-going technical assistance provided to create ASEZA and make zone operational
Procedures for acquiring land are time-consuming, discretionary, and unpredictable; JVA process is the most restrictive	[Eliminate number of agencies required for approval and streamline procedures]	No change; DLS expects new Leasing and Selling Land Law to reduce approval by as much as 12 days (out of 14 now)	No direct action
Current lease system is unsuitable for wooing significant investment	Allow for increased private ownership of land Allow for leases to be transferred Allow lessors to sublet Ensure lessor right to own and resell structures on the leased land at fair market value	New mechanisms for owning land in place through contracts with DLS New Law for Leasing Which Leads to Ownership expected to be in force by end of June Leases can now be transferred if the contract says so Subletting allowed if the contract says so Structures can be sold at fair market value after 5 years on land	No direct action No direct action No direct action No direct action
30 year lease period is too short	Increase lease terms to up to 90 years and allow for renewals	No change; 30 year period fixed in the civil code, but 2 renewals allowed	No direct action
Leased land generally inhibits investors from using land for mortgage purposes	Allow leases to be used as collateral and lender to be able to foreclose and resell lease rights	No change in DLS policy or procedure, but some banks may collateralize leases	No direct action
Valuing land should use market mechanisms like auctions	Use market-oriented mechanisms to price land	Three formulas used depending on the decision of MoF: cost of existing development; expected revenue; and comparison of value to similar plots nearby	No direct action

VII. Site Development and Environmental Clearance

Little has changed in the regime governing site development in Jordan. There is a new law pending that would change the institutional nature of the GCPE, but according to government officials all of the agencies that had a mandate in inspecting site development in 1998 have the same powers. Individual municipalities have their own procedures, partially dictated by limited resources and capacity.

AMIR didn't address any of the site development issues directly except for the area of environmental clearance. In that regard, AMIR programmed an intervention focusing on the general regime for environmental clearance. Several actions were taken toward improving the conduct of environmental clearance in Jordan, including the following:

1. The creation of a short issue paper by TSG on environmental clearance that further developed the analysis raised in the Roadmap document and presented additional recommendations and observations based on private sector feedback and international best practice.
2. The local legal consultancy Arab Bureau for Legal Services prepared a parallel legal analysis on the legislative background for environmental clearance in Jordan and identified specific statutes that would need to be changed to streamline the system.
3. These papers were disseminated to stakeholders in the government and together these documents presented the context for programming additional interventions related to improving the environmental oversight regime in Jordan.
4. Next, a multi-agency meeting to discuss the findings of the Roadmap, build consensus for change, and propose future actions was convened under the auspices of the IPC. The meeting was attended by 14 representatives from six crucial government agencies and eight other stakeholders, including the Jordan Environmental Society and the World Energy Council.
5. The meeting produced some consensus on the need to improve the regime and improve coordination among the various regulators involved. Follow-on meetings with government stakeholders resulted in support for the fielding of a specialized consultant to evaluate the previous analyses and produce a detailed Action Plan to implement changes.
6. The consultant, Patience Whitten, came to Jordan, reviewed the legal regime and intra-agency coordination mechanisms, convened a workshop with IPC support to and created an Action Plan to implement changes. This second workshop was designed to identify the root causes of the problems.

7. Based on feedback from the workshop and further consultations, the consultant drafted a new Environmental Impact Assessment By-law and presented to GCEP and other agencies for consideration and ratification.

While this initiative produced a detailed report and recommendations for change, new law that would improve the conduct of environmental impact assessments, and a new level of awareness of the detrimental impact on FDI of the current environmental clearance regime in Jordan, little practical change was implemented. GCEP did make improvements in its dissemination of information and in creating an application form, but the fundamental issues of a lack of transparency in the overall regime, agency overlap poor intra-agency coordination, and conflicting legislative mandates remain largely unaffected. GCEP has recently drafted a new law that is before the Cabinet to promote its status to that of a ministry, thereby de-linking it from the direct control of the Municipality of Rural Affairs and Environment (MMRAE), but the qualitative impact of this institutional change on the end users of the process will need to be assessed in the future.

Lessons Learned

The environmental clearance intervention suffered primarily from a lack of capacity and support from GCEP – the chief implementing agency involved. The main reasons why the initiative produced only modest results are further elaborated below:

- AMIR's efforts to streamline the environmental clearance regime achieved limited success in large measure because **internal management instability**, which initially distracted from reform efforts agency, stiffened to outright resistance later in the implementation phase. According to government officials and AMIR staff, GCEP was never particularly enthusiastic about the initiative. Although consultations with GCEP were frequent, little enthusiasm for the change initiative was generated among the top echelons of the agency.
- The effort to streamline environmental approvals was seen as a **conflict with other priorities** that were more pressing to the GCEP leadership. During the time when implementation efforts were on-going GCEP had been responding to criticism that it was an ineffective and irrelevant agency. As a result, AMIR's attempts to streamline GCEP's approval process, which was largely oriented toward pre-approvals rather than on-going inspection and monitoring (functions which even today agency officials admit that they lack the resources and staff to do), were considered counterproductive to its overall goals.
- **Agency rivalry** also seems to have been a factor behind the limited gains produced by the environmental initiative. By request, the IPC served as the sponsor for the change initiative. While IPC support helped facilitate the participation of government officials and also lent credibility to the perspective of foreign investors, it had the unintended consequence of making some in GCEP discount the conclusions of the Roadmap and subsequent documents and meetings

as part of a plan by the IPC to undermine its authority. At the time, both the IPC and GCEP chaired nearly identical multi-agency committees designed to expedite investor project approvals and environmental approvals, respectively. In discussions with the leadership of both agencies, neither was willing to disband its committee and both cited a legal justification for why its committee had superceding authority over the other and therefore had to be maintained.

- As noted previously, some of the conclusions reached in the **Action Plan posed challenges to the capacity of the GCEP** that the agency proved unwilling to shoulder. Particularly in relation to shifting from a process characterized by cumbersome pre-screening and multiple agency inspections toward a regime that emphasized active and effective monitoring based on sound science, in 2000 some in GCEP confided that without considerable donor assistance the agency would not be able to fulfill its commitments.⁸ As such, there was resistance to eliminating the safeguards represented by pre-screening and having several agencies involved in environmental monitoring.
- Finally, the **support of other environmental screening agencies was not sufficiently engendered**. The other agencies involved, including the Ministry of Water and Irrigation, Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Health, and municipalities all cited a legislative basis, existing staff and institutional structures, and the need for their specific expertise to safeguard the environment. Without stronger GCEP leadership and a clear demonstrative of its capacity to fulfill its proposed mandate, the other agencies had little reason to change the way they operated in regard to environmental clearance.

Despite the lack of implementation, this initiative produced a very thorough analysis of the environmental regime, and much of the criticism and corresponding recommendations remain valid today. Future attempts to streamline the environmental clearance regime would benefit significantly from revisiting the analysis and conclusions generated by this activity. More importantly, the draft by-law created a solid legal structure for the conduct of environmental impact assessments where previously there was insufficient and poorly drafted legislation. Four years after the Investor Roadmap was created, the GCEP is still working on completing its by-laws, so the principles included in this draft legislation can still be of use to the agency. Future AMIR initiatives related to the environmental clearance regime would need to cultivate more secure senior public will for change within GCEP and also ensure that internal political issues between GCEP and the MMRAE do not distract from efforts to implement reforms.

Table 8 summarizes the issues, recommendations, changes effected, and related AMIR program actions since 1998 pertaining to site development and environmental clearance.

⁸ In recent years, GCEP has received donor assistance from Germany and the European Unions, among other sources.

Table 8: Site Development and Environmental Clearance

Issues	Recommendations	Change Effected	AMIR Actions
Process is too complicated and agencies cannot provide clear guidance	Set discreet timeframes for approvals Create clear rules and standards	No change Amman Municipality has produced a procedural guide (Arabic only)	No direct action No direct action
Too many agencies involved in approving of a site and many redundant checks; professional license duplicates all previous checks	Decrease the number of agencies involved Reduce the number of inspections required by either combining them under one existing agency or a new Government Inspection Center	No change No change	No direct action No direct action
Same environmental impacts cleared by GCPE, municipalities, and others (depending on type of industry)	Eliminate redundancy	No change; different agencies, including MoWI, MoH, MoA, have a role in examining different aspects of environmental impact	Analytic study completed related to environmental clearance Draft law prepared on environment Workshop on improving process convened
Building safety approval handled by too many agencies, including Civil Defense Department, Jordan Engineering Association, and cities	Eliminate redundancy	No change	No direct action
Lack of clear procedural rules and published guidelines, particularly for building codes, safety requirements, and environmental regulations	Create clear rules and standards	Modest change; regulations, guide, and form not approved but interim materials prepared by GCEP	Analytic study completed related to environmental clearance Draft law prepared on environment Workshop on improving process convened
Not many agencies have standard application forms	Create standard application forms	GCEP and Amman municipality have application forms, although GCEP's is not final pending new by-laws being enacted	No direct action
Little information or forms in English	Translate forms and guidelines in English	GCEP has an interim application form in Arabic and English Amman municipality has a procedural guide in Arabic	Analytic study completed related to environmental clearance Draft law prepared on environment Workshop on improving process convened

VIII. Utility Connections

The AMIR program did not act directly to implement any of the recommendations from the 1998 Investor Roadmap related to the quality of utility services. Indirectly, however, AMIR's new Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Component and support for Int@j, the country's most active ICT business association, are expected to have a significant impact on improving the quality of service provision and attractiveness of the sector for local and foreign investment.

In the areas of water and telecommunications, there has been increased private sector participation through joint ventures with foreign companies.⁹ In the case of water, a joint venture management partnership has been signed between the Water Authority of Jordan and a consortium comprised of Lyonnaise Des Eaux (France), Montgomery Watson (U.S.A.), and Arabtech Jardaneh (Jordan). Also, the Ministry of Water and Irrigation (MoWI) has created a special project management unit equipped with modern systems within the Water Authority of Jordan to monitor the progress of on-going improvements in capacity and service. In regard to telecommunications, France Telecom signed a US \$508 million agreement to purchase 40% of the Jordan Telecommunications Corporation (JTC) in 2000. JTC asserts that getting a basic telephone connection is no longer time-consuming, averaging between four and seven days.

Investors suggest that there have been some noticeable improvements in recent years, but particularly in regard to the cost of obtaining a new power connection and general customer service private sector feedback suggests that several of the problems identified in 1998 remain. As part of a subsequent analysis, a more detailed accounting of the extent to which accessing utilities still poses constraints to investment and represent undue cost for startup companies will need to be conducted.

Table 9 summarizes the issues, recommendations, changes effected, and related AMIR program actions in relation to utility provision since 1998.

⁹ It should be noted that the French government remains some ownership of France Telecom and Lyonnaise Des Eaux.

Table 9: Utility Connections

Issues	Recommendations	Change Effectuated	AMIR Actions
Utility connections involve lengthy waiting periods and investors don't know when/how to plan to get services	Establish a Utilities Facilitation Desk at the IPC to assist investors in accessing utilities	JIB has an officer familiar with utilities in OSS	In-house technical assistance provided to JIB help implement recommendations
New investors in undeveloped areas must pay significant infrastructure costs	Encourage increased development of public and private industrial estates to lower infrastructure costs	Additional public and 20 private industrial estates started or planned	No direct action
Electricity installation is too slow and expensive	[Improve service]	No change	No direct action
Investors must pay 100% of installation costs up front, creating cash flow problems for SMEs	Eliminate installation charges or allow investors to defer some portion of these charges	No change	No direct action
Many companies need to build costly back-up generators	[Improve service]	No change	No direct action
Water supply is unreliable and limited	Ensure that pricing reflects the real cost of production	Private sector management contract signed in 1999; impact on reliability of supply is unclear	No direct action
Getting telecommunications services can take a very long time	Speed up the process of privatization to improve service	40% of JTC sold to France Telecom in 2000 Ministry of Information and Communications Technology created Telecommunications regulatory board Amendment to Post and Communication Law 13, 1995, approved by Cabinet Private sector management contract signed for water services	Comprehensive e-government and information and communications technology strategies devised Support of creation of MoICT IT association formed Regulatory board formation supported Amendment to Post and Communication Law 13, 1995, prepared and submitted to Cabinet

IX. Industrial Estates

While the 1998 Investor Roadmap did not explore the policies and procedures related to industrial estates (IEs) in depth, two broad recommendations were offered in the report. These recommendations advocated increasing the amount of serviced land for investors and encouraging the development and management of private industrial estates. Both of these goals have been achieved, and today there are four public and seven private industrial estates in operation and 13 more private IEs in development. Additionally, serviced land is available in four public free zones and 13 private free zones, and the Aqaba Special Economic Zone has been opened for investment with both serviced and virgin land available for investors.

Table 10 summarizes the issues, recommendations, changes effected, and AMIR program actions in relation to industrial estates.

Table 10: Industrial Estates

Issues	Recommendations	Change Effected	AMIR Actions
Industrial zones have been successful but are presently at capacity	Promote more industrial estates	New public industrial estate in early phases of operation Seven new private industrial estates operational, 13 in development	No direct action; research on competitiveness of Jordan's Free Zones and IEs completed Top officials attended various AMIR presentations and involved in planning for investment promotion efforts
Encourage private participation in the development and management of industrial estates	Establish pilot projects with private participation	Seven new private industrial estates operational, 13 in development	No direct action; research on benefits of private Free Zones and IEs completed Top officials attended various AMIR presentations and involved in planning for investment promotion efforts

X. Income Tax Registration and Payment

The 1998 Roadmap report made a few observations about the Jordanian system for tax payment. The AMIR Program took some action in drafting amendments to the Tax Law related to sales tax and as part of WTO accession. In addition, customs duties and sales tax rates have fallen in some categories, but AMIR did not directly address any of the issues raised in the 1998 Investor Roadmap.

Jordan's tax regime has changed substantially nonetheless in large measure due to a new Tax Law in effect for the 2002 tax year. The new law was crafted based on advice from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which fielded an international tax expert prior to 1998. The new law addresses most of the issues raised by the 1998 Investor Roadmap but until taxpayers file 2002 returns the qualitative impact of the new legislation cannot be fully assessed. Through April of this 2002, investors expressed complaints similar to those noted in 1998 about the arbitrary nature of tax assessments and the lack of clarity about rules related to declaring and documenting deductions.

Tax registration was not considered burdensome in 1998, but some aspects of the payment system were judged onerous by the Roadmap authors. Additionally, the tax authority's ability to effectively communicate to the public was largely ignored in the initial Investor Roadmap. This is particularly germane given the GoJ's emphasis on implementing an e-government strategy that increases the transparency and accessibility of government through IT tools such as websites and the Internet. Particularly for new Jordanian entrepreneurs and small and medium enterprises (SMEs), the communication interface would bear particular scrutiny by the Investor Roadmap Update. Indeed, while the tax authority may have improved its procedures and become easier to deal with than in 1998, many firms remain wary of reporting income accurately to the tax authorities and many small entrepreneurs highlight fear of mistreatment by tax assessors as a reason to remain in the informal sector.

Table 11 summarizes the issues, recommendations, changes effected, and related AMIR program actions since 1998 in relation to income tax registration and payment.

Table 11: Income Tax Registration and Payment

Issues	Recommendations	Change Effected	AMIR Actions
Tax payment procedures are cumbersome	[Improve customer service capabilities among tax officers]	New Tax Law includes provisions to guide audit procedure based on clearer rules, so authorities predict less conflict	No direct action; IMF advisor offered advice consistent with Roadmap recommendations
Assessments are too aggressive and unpleasant	Modify Article 34 of the Income Tax Law to shift the burden or proof away from the investor Establish accounting standards and require accounting firm audits Increase fines for falsifying tax claims	New Tax Law passed in 2001, in effect for the 2002 tax year, including provisions to clarify rules for self-reporting and external audits by private accounting firms New rules related to accounting mostly conform to international accounting rules Fines and other penalties increased for tax fraud, and additional actors like accountants are now also subject to penalties	No direct action No direct action
Companies are inspected too often instead of randomly	Introduce a random auditing system	System is designed and will be implemented in 2002 tax year	No direct action

XI. Customs Procedures

Customs procedures have seen dramatic changes since they were first investigated in 1998. By focusing on expediting Jordan's accession to the WTO, many of the changes were implemented as part of a broader effort to make Jordan's customs regime compliant with the dictates of the WTO. Of those that were not specifically addressed in the context of WTO accession, a specific Roadmap implementation initiative was undertaken to address the issues of reducing the punitive way in which fines were levied and modernizing the bank guarantee system. Additionally, a specific Roadmap initiative was programmed related to improving the way in which food imports and exports were tested and conducted through Jordan's borders.

WTO Related Improvements

The scope of AMIR actions related to customs clearance under the auspices of its WTO-related reforms is quite broad. For the purposes of this analysis, the major activities that relate to Roadmap recommendations include the following:

1. Short-term technical experts were fielded over an extended period of time to analyze the existing legal regime and make recommendations for change based on WTO rules. The WTO work largely accounted for the need to improve transparency, efficiency in customs clearance, and the customer interface as called for by the Roadmap.
2. New WTO-compliant regulations were drafted in several areas.
3. Computers and other resources were purchased and installed for customs as part of an overall technical assistance strategy designed to increase automation of customs operations and improve clearance times. Two new computer systems were installed linking most of the regional customs posts to headquarters in Amman and operating the internationally recognized ASYCUDA system.
4. Significant training was provided to customs officials related to several aspects of customs administration in accordance with the changes required by WTO membership.
5. Specific implementation timetables were established and monitoring and technical assistance was provided to ensure compliance with establishing new systems.

Lessons Learned

The transformation of customs and the legislative regime regarding importing and exporting to comply with WTO provisions was among the most successful initiatives undertaken by AMIR, and well documented elsewhere in many AMIR reports. As such, this analysis will make only a few observations related to its successes:

- Given GoJ's commitment to accede to the WTO at the highest levels, many of the AMIR efforts to overhaul customs operations received **clear and effective political support** to make needed administrative and procedural changes based on the new legal regime. Customs officials were held accountable for implementing the reforms programmed within a specific timeframe, and as such motivation to succeed was high.
- **Changes in legislation were demand driven and well coordinated** with implementation efforts. Because the priority to join the WTO required legal changes, Customs was appreciative of the external legal and technical support required to help the Department fulfill its commitments. An overall schedule of needed legal changes and training on implementing the changes was agreed and well coordinated with customs officials. As legal changes were to be enforced within Customs, support was made available to help change internal systems to support effective implementation.
- **Significant resources were expended** to achieve results. These resources were manifested by the commitment of numerous specialized technical experts, programming workshops, provision of a wide array of training, and financing exposure tours. The impact of this support meant that the customs initiative did not suffer from want of personnel, funding, or sustained technical assistance to implement needed changes.
- **Collaboration with local officials was significant**, meaning that the interventions programmed were well aligned with overall agency goals. Customs officials were regularly and deeply involved in coordinating how technical assistance was programmed and agreed with the general thrust of the reforms being championed, making implementation widely supported and understood.

Customs Based Guarantees and Penalty-based Customs Incentives

To address some of the Roadmap recommendations not specifically addressed by the WTO compliance initiative, an international customs consultant was fielded to prepare a detailed analysis of the issues and their root causes and implement changes. Specifically, the consultant, John Holl, examined the reasons for customs limitations on accepting blanket guarantees and the internal incentives of the Customs Department that related to aggressive and unwarranted levying of fines on traders. The consultant was successful in winning agreement from Customs to accept expanded blanked guarantees and reduce the punitive nature fines assessed by customs officers.

Specific actions taken under this initiative include the following:

1. The consultant prepared a detailed study related to both issues outlining the internal rationale for the current system and making specific recommendations for change.

2. The consultant worked with customs managers to re-design and implement new systems and procedures.
3. The changes to the guarantee system were re-enforced by becoming computerized within customs.
4. Working with local legal consultants IBLA, Customs Law 20, 1999 was drafted and enacted to link the assessment of heavy fines to criminal intent (versus clerical errors), reduce some fines, and end the practice of customs taking as payment of duties.
5. Follow-on advising and monitoring was provided by the AMIR program directly as part of on-going support for customs.

Lessons Learned

The major reasons for the success of the intervention related to bank guarantees and penalty-based incentives are outlined below:

- The **initiative was very specific and well targeted**, making change implementation relatively easy to understand and put into force. The recommendations arising from the Roadmap report were also more specific than many others, helping to eliminate the need for much additional analysis and recommendations crafting. As such, the proposal for change were specific, well-articulated, and easy to implement once the case for their beneficial impact was made successfully.
- As with the other customs reforms, the consultant was supported by **clear and effective political support**. The consultancy encountered some resistance in changing certain aspects of the Customs Department's internal incentives system, but the negative impacts on traders of the system were largely mitigated as a result of the intervention.
- **Adequate legal support and good coordination** on customs-based reform enabled the consultant to produce draft amendments to effect the changes advocated, thereby reducing the workload required of Customs and easing adoption.
- **Collaboration with local officials was sufficient** to develop new systems and procedures that would both achieve the goals of reducing the burdens on traders and help Customs achieve its goals to improve performance and internal management systems.

Food Safety

The Investor Roadmap's recommendations regarding cumbersome food safety procedures for imports and exports spawned another significant implementation initiative championed initially by Anthony Whitehead, a short-term consultant specialized in food safety, and later including food testing laboratory specialist John Weatherwax and food inspection expert John Parker. The activities and outcomes of this initiative have been well documented on at least 14 reports submitted by the consultants, and the highly technical nature of the steps that need to be taken to improve the regime frustrate attempts to easily summarize results in terms of responding to Investor Roadmap issues. Nonetheless, specific undertakings of the initiative paint the broad picture of the work undertaken to improve the food safety regime in Jordan, as outlined below:

1. Based on post-Roadmap consultations with investors and the IPC, a brief issue paper was produced by TSG elaborating on the constraints faced by the private sector related to food safety, testing, and licensing.
2. A parallel legal analysis of the various agency laws that govern food safety issues was produced by the local legal consultancy Middle Eastern Global Advocates & Legal Consultants.
3. A multi-agency meeting was convened at the IPC to reach consensus on the need for changes and create an Action Plan for change. The meeting was attended by 19 government officials from five key agencies and four AMIR program staff. The meeting also produced an agreement to support the further scientific and technical analysis of the regime for food safety and the implementation work of a short-term technical expert.
4. Dedicated food safety experts were fielded to review the technical and legal aspects of the food safety regime and Jordan and beginning in 1999 producing a series of 14 technical papers related to several issues and the status implementation efforts. The consultants' work included the design and implementation of WTO-compliant improvements.
5. Several training workshops were programmed over more than three years related to various aspects of food sampling, laboratory analysis, and risk assessment, including at a Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) workshop held in Amman.
6. Agreements were reached with ASEZA to implement and adapt the required laws to allow for the implementation of a model risk-based food testing system in Aqaba.
7. The AMIR program provided the MoH and Customs with needed computers, lab equipment, and training to implement and link the system with Customs' ASYCUDA system.

8. A food safety database was created in Aqaba to allow for greater sensitivity in testing of food imports.

Lessons Learned

Food safety regime has made considerable progress in the last four years with support from the AMIR program. The previously low level of technology for testing, poor coordination mechanisms, insufficient training, over-reliance on psychically testing 100% of all imports, and high and arbitrary rejection rates of food shipments imposed a significant burden on investors in 1998. While not all of the changes are fully implemented and work continues today, much progress has been achieved culminating in the implementation of a risk-based food inspection regime particularly in Aqaba, where 80% of the country's food imports are cleared.

Some of the reasons for the success of this initiative are discussed below:

- In this case while there was general political will for some aspects of the changes proposed, initial resistance to change encountered by the Ministry of Health was counteracted by finding a more willing institutional sponsor. With the development of ASEZA, AMIR **recognized an opportunity to create a pilot project** that would demonstrate cost savings to government and traders alike while simultaneously improving the technical quality of the food safety regime. Based on agreements with the MoH, it is anticipated that the ASEZA system will be replicated nationwide.
- The initiative **appropriately coordinated technical assistance inputs** thereby keeping implementation efforts on a steady schedule. The food safety initiative was given significant flexibility in programming legal change, training, and purchasing and installing new equipment. This enabled the consultants to offer a variety of resources to implement changes and maintain a high degree of flexibility in responding to the needs of counterpart agencies over time.
- The **implementing agencies were motivated by** being offered a comprehensive **capacity building** program that included procedural reform. The consultants were able to develop an overall strategy of institutional capacity building and administrative reform that contributed not only to streamlining the procedures related to food testing but also to working with the relevant agencies in upgrading skills, providing needed training, providing lab and computer equipment, and regular oversight in implementing new procedures.
- **Significant resources were expended** to achieve results. These resources were represented by deploying numerous specialized technical experts, programming workshops, providing a wide array of training, and financing the purchase of equipment. The impact of this support meant that the food safety initiative has

been able to provide a consistent level of technical assistance and material resources to implement needed changes in a realistic timeframe.

Table 12 summarizes the customs-related issues, recommendations, changes effected, and related AMIR program actions since 1998.

Table 12: Customs Procedures

Issues	Recommendations	Change Effected	AMIR Actions
Customs procedures are inefficient, time-consuming, and require multiple double checks	Install modern infrastructure and facilities, including smart card identification and merchandise control system, EDI links, and civil works Improve the skills of customs officials Streamline and clarify the number and types of exemptions using a pre-tabulated list system	Average clearance times cut in half from two to one days in Aqaba 70% of customs declarations completed with two or three hours ASYCUDA system installed in all checkpoints Customs transit system automated Exemption classification streamlined	Implemented two major automation programs Purchased computers and software to upgrade systems Conducted trainings on many subjects Implemented two major automation programs Training of customs officials
Customs officials are difficult to deal with and do not trust private sector	Instill intuitional culture of service and stress need to keep goods flowing	Modest change	Training of customs officials
Customs regulations are inconsistently implemented	Improve the skills of customs officials	Modest change	Training of customs officials
Testing imports such as foodstuffs is technically inadequate	Improve food testing based on international best practice	ASEZA law adapted to allow for new food safety inspection regime ASEZA adopted risk-based food testing regime which is a pilot for nationwide testing New Law on Plant Variety Protection New Ministry of Health Law Ministry of Health commits to monitor the implementation of ASEZA system for potential replication nationwide	Issue paper and technical papers produced Planning meetings convened Dedicated food safety experts fielded to design and implement WTO-compliant improvements Trained staff on food sampling, laboratory analysis, and risk assessment (including at FAO workshop) Provided MoH and Customs with needed computers, lab equipment, and training to implement and link the system with Customs' ASYCUDA system Food safety database created in Aqaba
Customs officials levy unnecessary fines	Decrease reliance on import duties as a source of revenue	Customs demonstrates and increased tendency toward complying with FTAs and GST rules	Workshops on implications of FTA programmed for customs officials

Issues	Recommendations	Change Effected	AMIR Actions
Officials' remuneration tied to the fines they levy, encouraging them to assess fines excessively	Replace the bounty incentive system	Customs Law 20, 1999, established intent to violate the law as evidence of criminal liability Penalties reduced for inconsistencies in declarations from 2-3 times duty amount to between JD 25-100 "Normal" value replaced with "transaction" value, reducing disputes Only modest change in internal incentive scheme	Study and dedicated consultant tasked with follow-on advising related to the bounty system Detailed recommendations crafted for implementing changes
Bank guarantee system is inefficient and expensive for investors	Modernize bank guarantee system; improvement is the collective responsibility of customs, the central bank (which sets fees), and private banks	Bank guarantee costs lowered Customs Law 20, 1999 eliminated taking goods as payment of customs fees Customs agrees to accept general guarantees more widely accepted, lowering costs Customs allows duty and tax liability in excess of guarantee amount	Study and dedicated consultant tasked with follow-on advising related to the guarantee system Guarantee system computerized within customs
Consular certification of the value of goods is unnecessary	Amend Article 40(a) of the Customs Law (16) of 1983 to eliminate consular certification of value	WTO-compliant Customs Law drafted and expected to be in force by 2003	AMIR drafted model law

XII. Site Inspections

Like licensing, reforming the conduct of site inspection agencies is a diffuse task if not done as part of a reform process linked to an individual agency or a process in which several agencies have a regulatory role. Little has changed in the regime governing site inspections in Jordan and according to government officials all of the agencies that had a mandate in inspecting in 1998 have the same powers today. Individual municipalities have their own procedures, partially dictated by limited resources and capacity.

Inspections are presently being addressed as part of the Roadmap initiative to improve food safety inspections and customs clearance, but other agencies did not receive specific technical assistance related to inspections. As such, little has changed in most agencies.

Table 13 summarizes the issues, recommendations, changes effected, and AMIR program actions since 1998 related to site inspections.

Table 13: Site Inspections

Issues	Recommendations	Change Effected	AMIR Actions
Too many authorities involved with overlapping agencies and mandates, especially for monitoring environment, food safety, and product standards	Centralize environment and labor safety inspections in one agency like the GCEP MoH and ISM should combine inspections	No change; inspections not combined because they focus on different issues	No direct action
Clear rules and regulations are lacking	Establish clear rules and regulations and make information readily available	WTO-compliant Standards Law enacted in 2000 Hundreds of WTO-compliant standards revised and published in English and Arabic	Provided assistance in revising some standards and standards laws
Some inspectors lack sufficient competence and professionalism	[Improve training and outlook of inspectors]	Modest improvement among MoH, Customs, and ISM inspectors related to food and other imports	Risk-based inspection system introduced in Aqaba as a pilot program for all of Jordan Training of inspectors in food safety
Good companies are inspected as often as bad ones	Reorient inspections to award good firms and punish bad ones	No change	No direct action

Annex A: List of Resources Reviewed for Analysis Mission

2002

Baird, Andrew and Khatib, Suhair. *Draft Jordan Microentrepreneur “Roadmap” - Report on Phase I, April 2002*

Dreiman, Richard N. *Ministry of Industry and Trade Strategy Assessment, January 2002*

Chemonics. *Final Proposal for AMIR II, 2002*

Shafiq, Majd. *The US–Jordan Free Trade Agreement: Opportunities, Challenges and Strategies, January 2002*

D’Allones, Tania. *Tijara: A Strategy for Implementing the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement. January 2002*

2001

Perrett, Graham [*Implementation of the Law of Agriculture \(SPS\) Phase II*](#), December 2001

[Int@j](#). “Investments in Jordan’s ICT Sector: Survey Results,” October 2001

O’Shea, Brian and Rosenow, Sherri [*Implementation of a Risk-based Import Inspection System Phase III, Aqaba Special Economic Zone*](#) October 2001

Hjort, Kim C. [*Implementation of a Risk-Based Import Inspection System*](#) May 2001

Kingston, Richard [*Implementation of the Law on Agriculture \(SPS\)*](#) May, 2001

Weatherwax, John. [*Laboratory Analytical Quality Assurance-Phase I*](#), March 2001

Whitehead, Anthony. [*Implementation of the Law on Food Control \(SPS Compliance\) and Food Standards- Trip 3*](#), March 2001

Roth, Allan. [*Recommendations for Amendment to the Companies Law, and Suggestions for Regulations Under the Draft Law*](#), February 2001

Chemonics. *AMIR I Final Report, January 2001.*

2000

Wellons, Richard and Wieland, Robert. [*Mid-Program Impact Assessment*](#), October 2000

- MIDGLOBE. [*Enforcement/Administration of the Law on Copyright*](#), October 2000
- Weatherwax, John. [*Import Food Sampling and Re-testing Procedures*](#), October 2000
- EnviroConsult Office. [*Environmental review for FTA*](#), September 2000
- Whitehead, Anthony. [*Implementation of the Law on Food Control \(SPS Compliance\) and Food Standards- Trip 2*](#). September 2000
- IBLAW. "Reach 2.0 Checkpoint Meeting Notes," August 2000
- IBLAW. [*Amendments to the customs law & implementing legislation*](#), August 2000
- IBLAW. [*Trade Mark Law*](#), August 2000
- IBLAW. [*Amendments to Copyrights laws*](#), August 2000
- IBLAW. *Legal Regime and WTO Transparency Requirements*, August 2000
- IBLAW. [*Patent Laws*](#), August 2000
- IBLAW. [*Amendments to the Customs Law*](#), August 2000
- IBLAW. [*Law on Food Control, TO # 23*](#), August 2000
- IBLAW. [*Amendment to the General Sales Tax Law, TO# 20*](#), August 2000
- IBLAW. [*Standards & Metrology Law, TO # 33*](#), August 2000
- IBLAW. [*Income Tax Assessment and Audit Schemes in Jordan 99, TO# 18*](#), August 2000
- Erstling, Jay. [*Enforcement and Administration of the Laws on Patents and Industrial Design*](#), July 2000
- Maier, Polly. [*Enforcement/Administration of the Copyright Law*](#), July 2000
- Whitehead, Anthony. [*Status Report on the Implementation of the Law on Food Control-Trip 1*](#), July 2000
- Erdman, Andrea. [*Investment Realization Analysis for the Jordan Investment Board*](#), May 2000
- Lovegrove, David and Pitigala, Sherri. [*JIB LAW Final Report*](#), April 2000

Akinci, Gokhan 2000. [*WTO Enforcement-Administration, Roadmap, and Component Leader Support*](#), April 2000

Whitehead, Anthony. [*Draft Law on Food*](#), April 2000

Whitten, Patience. [*Investor Road Map - Environmental Clearance*](#), April 2000

Whitehead, Anthony. [*Investor Road Map - Food Safety Inspection \(Workshop, Dec 12, 1999\)*](#), April 2000

BAI. [*The REACH Initiative*](#), March 2000

Bijou, Leon. [*Investor Road Map - Licensing*](#), March 2000

Erdmann, Andrea. [*Investor Targeting Strategy for the IP: Middle East Update*](#), February 2000

1999

Whitehead, Anthony. *Impediments Facing the Foodstuff Importer in Jordan*, December 1999

Sonbol, Amira El-Ashary. *Women in Business Constraints: Report on Women, Work and Legal Constraints*, November 1999

Miller, Sutherland. *Study Tour to Ireland for the Investment Promotion Corporation of Jordan August 9-13, 1999*, November 1999

Lovegrove, David and Pitigala, Sherri. *Analysis and Recommendations for Improvement of the Investment Promotion Law, By-laws and Regulations for the Investment Promotion Corporation*, August 1999

IBLAW. *Business Licensing Research*, August 1999

Al Bashir, Salah, Hjort, Kim C., and Stephenson, Sherry. *Conformity to the WTO Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement and Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement*, August 1999

Holl, John. *Report on Customs Bank Guarantees and Penalty-based Customs Incentives*, July 1999

Miller, Sutherland and Price, Gregg. *Investor Road Map - Company Registration Issue Paper*, May 1999

Miller, Sutherland and Price, Gregg. *Investor Roadmap Implementation: Company Registration Process Improvement Workshop Materials*, April 1999

MidGlobe. *Legal Analysis of Food Industry Inspection in Jordan*, April 1999

Basheer, Salah. *Company Registration under Jordanian Legislation*, April 1999

Desai, Mihir. [Investor Promotion Strategic Plan and Investor Service Guidelines](#), January 1999

IBLAW. [Legal Barriers to Service Trade in Jordan Modified](#), August 1998

Hjort, Kim C. *An Introduction to Jordan's Agriculture Sector and Agricultural Policies*
Dr. Consultant, May 1998

Price, Gregg and Tuntuncu, Can. *The Investor Roadmap of Jordan*, June 1998

Government Publications

Free Zones Corporation:

- Adopted Procedures for Completing Transactions in Jordan Free Zones
- Annual Report 2000
- The Free Zones Corporation
- The Free Zones in Jordan
- Law of the Free Zones Corporation

General Corporation for Environmental Protection:

- Environmental Impact Assessment Form

Jordan Industrial Estates Corporation:

- Abdullah II Ibn Al-Hussein Industrial Estate
- Al-Hassan Industrial Estate
- Clarifying Qualifying Industrial Zone Questions and Answers
- Investor's Directory to the Industrial Estates
- Jordan Industrial Estate Corporation
- The Management of Investment in the Free Zones

Jordan Investment Board:

- Benefits of Investing in Jordan
- Investment Promotion Law and Regulations
- Investor Reception Center
- IT Was a Dream... Today IT is a Reality
- Jordan Development Areas
- Jordan's Exclusive Qualifying Industrial Zone
- Jordan Investment Opportunities – FTA Inside
- Jordan... Time to Invest
- QIZ – A Golden Opportunity
- Sectoral Marketing Brochure – Apparel and Textiles

Sectoral Marketing Brochure – Dead Sea Cosmetics
Sectoral Marketing Brochure – Information Technology
Sectoral Marketing Brochure – Medical Care
Sectoral Marketing Brochure – Mining
Sectoral Marketing Brochure – Pharmaceuticals
Sectoral Marketing Brochure – Tourism

Ministry of Finance:

Instructions for the Registration of Companies and Individuals in the Free Zones

Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities:

Hotel Specifications and Application Form
Licensing Procedures of Hotel and Touristic Establishments

Institute of Standards and Metrology:

Jordanian Standards Catalogue 2001

Annex B: List of Analysis Mission Interviewees¹⁰

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