



OVERVIEW OF IBRA FOREST SECTOR DEBT With Perspectives on Forest Area & Processing Capacity

*Policy & Planning Group
USAID/NRM Program*

April 24, 2001

GOI Commitment on Restructuring:

- “Restructure wood-based industries to enhance competitiveness & to balance timber needs and supply” -- (Kepres 80, June 2000)
- “Close down heavily-indebted wood industry under monitoring of BPPN” -- (GOI Action Plan on Forestry: Issue 5, Dec. 2000)

Purposes of Presentation:

- Highlight key facts & anecdotes about debt & industry structure
- Review new results based on combination of data sources
- Illustrate some potentially useful approaches to assess firm viability based on physical features
- Outline important issues, questions & challenges that need to be addressed

Summary of Presentation

Background:

- Overview of the Debt
- Overview of the Data

Basic Description:

- Overall "Match" Among Firms Between Data Sets
- Area, Capacity, & Debt Of Concessions & Mills
- Summary and Questions

Preliminary Analysis:

- Locations of Indebted Mills and Concessions
- Physical Condition vs. IBRA "Recovery" Rankings
 - Years Remaining in Concessions
 - Ratio of Debt to Forest Area
 - Ratio of Debt to Productive Capacity
- Summary and Questions

Progress Toward Restructuring:

- Review of Actions Toward Commitment
- Review of Tasks Remaining
- Important, Complex Issues to be Addressed

3

Background: Overview of the Debt *High Concentration in Key Corporate Groups*

- IBRA holds 129 forest sector firms: 21.9 T Rp in debt
 - Principal is two thirds, interest a third, penalty is 2 %
- Highly concentrated: few large, connected firms & groups
 - Two groups caused 47% of the debt
 - 3 firms caused a third of the debt: 8 T Rp
- Most indebted HPHs are judged good recovery prospects
 - Can value of remaining timber clear debt, cover operations?
- Over half the debt, 12 T Rp., is in mills with no HPH
 - Judged as medium to low recovery prospects
 - Without a stable source of timber, can these firms be viable?
- Pulp & paper firms (4% of debt): judged good recovery prospects
 - Does this account for large pulp & paper firms in press reports?

4

Background: Overview of the Data ***Old Data Set Allows New Links & Analyses***

“IBRA Forest Sector Debt Data”

- Includes firm, group, debt, type, recovery category
- Excludes location & physical features of firms

“DFID Data Set”

- Provides snapshot of HPHs & linked saw & plymills, mid-1990s
- Includes capacity, region, forest area, age of license
- Developed for “*Addicted to Rent.*” D.W. Brown. DFID/ITFMP. Sep. 99
- Based on: *Profil Industri Pengolahan Kayu*, DepHut; “*Integrated Woodbased Industry*,” CIC 94; “*Forestry Indonesia*,” PDBI 94

Linking These Data Sources Illustrates:

- *Why* restructuring should consider location, forest area, capacity
- *How* debt load compares to physical features of indebted firms
- *Where* forest debt is located across Indonesia
- *What* analyses can help to match timber demand with supply
- *Who* (agencies) could produce, verify, analyze forest sector data

5

Basic Description: ***Overall “Match” Among Firms Between Data Sets***

Many Matched:

Of the 129 firms controlled by IBRA, 57 (44%) match to DFID data

- These account for 12.2 T Rp of debt, 55% of IBRA forest sector debt
- 11 IBRA firms (3.4 T Rp.) matched a HPH in DFID data
- 25 IBRA firms (6.8 T Rp.) matched a DFID mill
- 21 IBRA firms (2.0 T Rp.) matched both a DFID HPH & a mill

Still, Many Not Identified:

For other IBRA categories, need more info. Could not identify:

- 30 of the 52 (60%) mills with no links to HPH
 - Any of the 4 Pulp & Paper firms
 - 30 of the 38 firms classified as “Other” by IBRA
-
- Where can we (efficiently) get complete data on unmatched firms?

6

Basic Description: *Area, Capacity, & Debt Of Concessions & Mills*

Area of Concessions

- As of mid-1990s, DFID data account for 51.4 M ha of HPH
 - Most private, but 4.0 M ha (7.8%) in Inhutanis
- IBRA-indebted HPHs matched to DFID data account for:
 - 5.25 M ha, or 11.1% of privately held forest concession area
 - 5.43 T Rp, nearly a quarter of IBRA's total forest sector debt

Capacity of Mills

- DFID data account for 24.5 M m³/yr of saw & ply mill capacity
- IBRA-indebted mills matched to DFID data account for:
 - 5.3 M m³/year, or 21.7% of capacity of this sub-sector
 - 3.3 T Rp, about 15% of IBRA's total forest sector debt

7

Basic Description *Summary and Questions*

- Quick data linking provides clearer picture of half the IBRA firms and half the debt
- IBRA controls a quarter of Indonesia's forest concessions & wood processing capacity (partial match only).
 - Determining the status of these firms will have an important impact on future structure & organization of forest sector.
- Some estimates indicate that Indonesia's wood processing capacity is 2 to 3 times greater than sustainable & legal timber supply
 - Even closing indebted firms (or just matched ones) would not fix the large imbalance between timber demand & supply
- **What policies and incentives can allow this industry to evolve and adjust to a more efficient situation?**

8

Preliminary Analysis

- Illustrates types of analysis that could contribute to transparent, empirically-based restructuring plans & criteria
 - Data are secondary and incomplete
 - Intended as illustrations of questions and approaches
 - Could be used as a guide for data improvement
 - Could be used in targeting later investigations or audits

- This quick data linkage allows examination of:
 - Locations of firms and debts by province
 - Debt relative to “years of life” left in forest concessions
 - Ratio of debt to forest area of concessions
 - Ratio of debt to productive capacity of saw & ply mills

- How can these data & approaches be refined to contribute to inter-departmental restructuring plans?

9

Preliminary Analysis: *Locations of Indebted Mills and Concessions*

| Province | No. | Debt | Province | No. | Debt |
|-----------------------|-----------|-----------------|---------------------------|-----------|-----------------|
| NOT IDENTIFIED | 72 | 9,660.09 | JAVA | 2 | 2,758.16 |
| SUMATRA | 10 | 1,477.82 | West Java | 1 | 29.02 |
| Aceh | 1 | 296.51 | Central Java | 1 | 2,729.14 |
| N. Sumatra | 2 | 112.21 | SULAWESI | 3 | 213.44 |
| Riau | 3 | 406.76 | North Sulawesi | 1 | 64.25 |
| S. Sumatra | 3 | 165.29 | South Sulawesi | 1 | 16.79 |
| Lampung | 1 | 497.04 | SE Sulawesi | 1 | 132.40 |
| KALIMANTAN | 29 | 6,669.72 | MALUKU & IRIAN | 13 | 1,103.00 |
| W. Kalimantan | 6 | 2,628.36 | Maluku | 4 | 79.35 |
| C. Kalimantan | 7 | 892.56 | Irian Jaya | 9 | 1,023.65 |
| S. Kalimantan | 5 | 218.31 | | | |
| E. Kalimantan | 11 | 2,930.50 | | | |

- Can we identify locations of indebted firms relative to forest resources?
- Should debt burden factor into regional government development plans?

10

Preliminary Analysis: ***Physical Condition vs. IBRA “Recovery” Rankings***

- IBRA has ranked firms based on recovery potential: ‘high’ to ‘none’
 - Criteria used to establish categories not available for this analysis
- Assume: recovery classifications should be related to firm viability...
... which should be related to physical condition of resource base
- The following simple measures are offered as examples
 - More sophisticated measures could be developed
 - Should be based on more complete data

11

Preliminary Analysis: ***Years Remaining in Concessions***

Assumes:

- Concession period 25 yrs; Cut plan uses available land in available time
- After 25 years, first cut would be well in progress or completed
- Productivity of forest will be lower, affecting viability & resale potential

Calculating remaining license period, we find:

- Of 31 IBRA HPHs matched with information on license date:
 - 11 have > 10 years of license period remaining: 3.1 T Rp. debt
 - 7 of the 11 are classified as “high” or “medium” recovery potential
 - 15 have < 10 years remaining and hold 1.4 T Rp. of debt
 - 11 of the 15 are classified as “high” or “medium” recovery potential
 - 5 have no years left (but may have been extended): 0.85 T Rp. debt
 - 4 of these are classified as “high” or “medium” recovery potential
- Should concessions with short license periods be targeted for review of the extent & quality of remaining forest?

12

Preliminary Analysis: ***Ratio of Debt to Forest Area***

Assumes:

- Recovery potential should be related to the operational capacity (area)
- Only 75% of concession area is harvestable

Looking at debt burden per hectare of concession area, we find:

- IBRA's recovery ranking is not closely related to state of physical assets
- The range of debt to concession area is very wide
- This could be because debt is related to equipment & capital, not concession land area ...
- Of 5 firms with highest debts per hectare:
 - Debt per hectare ranges from 3 to 17 million Rupiah per hectare.
 - The highest and lowest are ranked as 'high' recovery potential
- Is this a useful measure, or misleading? (capital vs. land area)
- What is status of GOI property (concessions) in IBRA sales of private assets?

13

Preliminary Analysis: ***Ratio of Debt to Productive Capacity***

Assumes:

- Recovery potential should be related to operational capacity (m3/yr)
- Wood processing firms operate at about 85% capacity

Looking at debt per cubic meter/year of mill capacity, we find:

- Of 6 firms with highest debts per m3/yr of capacity:
 - Debt per m3/yr ranges from 7 to 32 million R/m3/yr.
 - 3 highest debt/m3/yr firms ranked as only 'low' or 'med' recovery
 - 3 other firms with lower debts/m3/yr are ranked 'high' or 'medium'
- 36 other firms' debts range from 100,000 to 3,000,000 Rp/m3/yr, with various recovery rankings
- How can we judge when debt-to-capacity ratio is "too high"?
- Should recovery rankings be related to measures of debt-to-capacity?

14

Preliminary Analysis: *Summary and Questions*

- Examination of *(some)* IBRA firms' debt burden relative to physical factors shows little relationship to IBRA's recovery potential classes
... Recovery potential may be based on financial factors, instead
- Some physical measures & field verification would be useful in later investigations and classification of indebted forest sector firms
... Though, simple measures here may be conceptually flawed or distorted by poor data
- This linked data set indicates some kinds of analyses that could contribute to forest sector restructuring discussions
... Inter-departmental working groups on industry restructuring should have access to better, more comprehensive data

15

Progress Toward Restructuring: *Review of Actions Toward Commitment*

- Inter-departmental working groups & collaboration procedures established
- Inventory of indebted forest sector firms established
- Basic data sharing initiated among primary government agencies
- Plan proposed for audit of firms to establish viability for resale, though not publicly reviewed
- Approach drafted for "technical covenants" (including environmental rules) for restructured companies, though not publicly reviewed
- Some info & procedures shared with limited publics

16

Progress Toward Restructuring: *Review of Tasks Remaining*

Public Involvement

- IDCF Technical Team has held some meetings.
- Loose alliance of NGOs formed to offer sound policy options
- Need wider review, agreement on basic principles & criteria

Data Conformance & Verification

- IBRA, Deperindag & DepHut consolidated info on indebted firms
- Still need info on forest status, compliance status, legal timber supplies

Process & Transparency

- TT plans to establish a web site for data, actions & progress
- Technical covenants need to be publicly reviewed & improved
- Field level audits & third party verification should support decisions

Responsibility

- Need plans for issues outside IBRA scope, between agencies
- Need to monitor compliance after firms leave the nest of IBRA.

Integrated Approach

- Needed for debt/closure, restructuring, illegal logging, & conversion

17

Progress Toward Restructuring: *Important, Complex Issues to be Addressed*

Political Pressure vs. “Due Process”

- SR political pressure to close some firms for violations
- Resistance to quick action because legal process takes time
- Need process that balances these concerns

“Restructuring” vs. “Closure”

- Debt “haircuts” & “fire sales” could subsidize poor & uneconomic FM
- Society ultimately bears full, true cost of poor FM practices

Political Pressure vs. Organized Planning

- Political & financial pressure on IBRA to raise money by selling assets
- Political & environmental pressure to “close heavily indebted firm”
- Early, inconsistent, damaging decisions could impede later progress
- Need to recognize & balance these conflicting forces

18

Progress Toward Restructuring: *Important, Complex Issues to be Addressed*

Industry Restructuring vs. Debt Restructuring

- Need clarification of terms used too loosely. Important distinction:
- “Debt Restructuring” – IBRA/Bank language – means:
 - Rearrange debt payment to reduce cash flow burden
 - Discount (“haircut”) principal & interest owed
 - Goal: make *individual firms* more financially viable
- “Industry Restructuring” – language of IDCF & Kepres 80 – means:
 - Plan strategically to balance timber demand with supply
 - Promote growth in appropriate, legal, sustainable sectors
 - Transition out of uncompetitive or unsustainable sectors
 - Goal: make *entire forest industry* more viable & sustainable
- Please, use these terms precisely, clearly, and responsibly