



**Greater Horn of Africa
Peacebuilding Project**
Mradi wa Kujenga Amani

**Start-up Workshop Report
1-3 December 1999**

Management Systems International
600 Water Street, SW, Washington, DC 20024 USA

**Contract No. GS-23F-8012H, Task Order No. 623-N-00-99-00294-00 for
DG/Conflict Evaluation and Analysis Services**

Table of Contents

Introduction.....	1
Highlights from the Workshop Sessions	1
Results from the Workshop	20

Appendices

- Appendix 1: Scope of Work for the Project
- Appendix 2: Startup Workshop Agenda
- Appendix 3: List of Participants
- Appendix 4: USAID Requirements and the Relationship to Concepts and Tools from the Workshop
- Appendix 5: Workshop Evaluation Summary
- Appendix 6: List of Materials provided at the Workshop
- Appendix 7: Workshop Presentations in PowerPoint

Introduction

From 1-3 December 1999, 24 participants from the United States Agency for International Development, Management Systems International, and Tulane University engaged in a workshop to start up the GHA Peacebuilding Project under the MOBIS contract for Democracy and Governance/Conflict Evaluation and Analysis Services. A list of participants is found in Appendix 3.

The objective of the GHA Peacebuilding Project is to support the implementation of REDSO/ESA's Conflict Prevention, Mitigation and Response (CPMR) Program by identifying and disseminating CPMR best practices. To accomplish this goal, Management Systems International (MSI) will:

- Evaluate the impacts of new and existing CPMR activities in the region (supported by USAID and others) to identify best practices and lessons learned to date.
- Develop suitable activity-based and program level indicators of success for CPMR activities.
- Disseminate these practices and lessons learned to support replication.
- Identify and characterize potential conflict flashpoints within a country or sub-region.
- Analyze new opportunities and entry points for future effective CPMR activities.

The Startup Workshop was intended to launch the evaluation and analysis activities of the project and clarify the Phase 1 work plan with the USAID staff in the Greater Horn region. The workshop had several objectives:

- Provide a comprehensive framework for the overall CPMR strategy process – from conflict diagnosis, to strategy development, to consensus buy-in by local stakeholders, to local stakeholder buy-in to the implementation process, to pre- and post-implementation evaluation of the strategy. This framework included a working set of concepts to serve as a common CPMR vocabulary for the project, explained the levels and stages of conflict, and identified a toolbox of CPMR interventions.
- Elicit the interest and support of USAID officers in the region for the project.
- Obtain information from USAID staff to begin the design of Phase 1 activities.

As a result, the scope of the Startup Workshop was larger than the GHA project itself. The workshop was meant to provide a common language to deal with CPMR issues among the project team, USAID staff, and local partners. It also sought to begin the transfer of analytical tools for conflict vulnerability analyses and other planning and reporting procedures by eliciting the detailed requirements for such assessments from Mission staff and introducing existing methods. Finally, it was hoped that participant feedback would help focus and guide the project to practical techniques and issue areas at an early stage.

The following report describes the project in more detail and provides highlights of the workshop presentations as well as the group discussions.

Highlights from the Workshop Sessions

Session One: Welcome, Introductions, and USAID Expectations

During the opening session, the participants introduced themselves and general comments were offered on what REDSO and the Africa Bureau hoped to achieve through the Greater Horn of Africa Peacebuilding Project (hereafter, GHA project).

In his opening remarks, REDSO Director Steve Wisecarver mentioned the irony that violence had just broken out in Seattle, arising from the protests directed at the meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Although violent conflict is not occurring just in Africa, its effects are often more destructive there. The REDSO project can help to understand how to get a better handle on destructive Africa conflicts, and has the potential for changing the way that REDSO, the Africa Bureau, and the Agency think about conflict prevention. The focus in the workshop is mainly on the first phase of a three phase program. Wisecarver expressed his enthusiasm for the larger networking process that will begin during the three days of the workshop.

Ned Greeley of the REDSO staff pointed to the opportunity for advancing the knowledge of conflict prevention and resolution that is uniquely held by staff working in the field. But to succeed, the project must be a collective and collaborative effort. In this vein, Greeley introduced Colleen McGinn of Tulane University's Tulane Institute for International Development, which is also doing relevant analysis on conflict prevention that will be coordinated with the GHA project.

Ajit Joshi of the Africa Bureau in Washington commended the support from REDSO/ESA for the project and echoed Ned Greeley's theme of partnership. He also described the work by Tulane University that the Africa Bureau has sponsored for the last year and a half, which has produced four relevant documents (see Appendix 6). There are other documents available in Washington that he will share with the participants.

Session Two: Objectives and Work Plan of the Project

(In reviewing this and the following sessions, the reader may want to first consult the corresponding PowerPoint presentations that are attached as Appendix 7.)

The broad purpose of the project is to support and enhance peacebuilding initiatives in the Greater Horn of Africa and strengthen local capacity to conduct conflict prevention and mitigation activities. The project's roots are found in the GHA's Strategic Objective 2 which involves strengthening African capacity to prevent, mitigate and respond to conflict in the GHA region – and, in particular, Intermediate Result 2.3 – testing pilot activities to identify and disseminate best practices and incorporate them into future initiatives.

It was emphasized that the field of conflict prevention, mitigation and response (CPMR) is relatively new and there have been comparatively few systematic and reliable analyses of the effectiveness of CPMR initiatives. Thus, the GHA project can be viewed as exploring new territory and at the vanguard of the evaluation field for conflict interventions. In particular, four project objectives were identified:

1. Evaluate the impacts of new and existing CPMR activities in the region (sponsored by USAID and others) to identify best practices and lessons learned
2. Develop activity-based and program level indicators of success for CPMR activities.
3. Disseminate these practices
4. Identify new opportunities and points of entry for future CPMR activities
5. Analyze new opportunities and entry points for future effective CPMR activities

The project is organized into three phases. In Phase 1, MSI will conduct the Startup Workshop, analyze and evaluate the impact of CPMR activities in four focal areas, and conduct a Dissemination Workshop to present best practices and lessons learned to USAID officers, donors, and local partners. The evaluation task will focus around four types of activities that USAID or others have supported as means to prevent, manage, or resolve conflicts. These types of information are::

1. Broadcast media used as a peacebuilding tool
2. Internet use as a peacebuilding tool
3. Community level projects as a peacebuilding tool
4. Middle-level leaders dialogues as peacebuilding tools.

In Phase 2, MSI will conduct two analyses of potential conflict flashpoints, as well as an analysis and evaluation of initiatives to prevent and/or mitigate conflicts over resources. In Phase 3, there will be additional analyses of interventions in cross-sectoral programs, development of indicators of success, and a final dissemination workshop.

The period of performance of MSI's project is September 30, 1999 to February 18, 2001. MSI's possible partners were identified – in the US, Search for Common Ground, the Center for Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa, and Computer Frontiers, and in the region – the Nairobi Peace Initiative, Africa Peace Forum, and the Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development.

Much of the discussion revolved around the idea that conflicts exist at many different levels. There are also a broad array of interventions that can be applied at different levels as well, for example, at the regional (e.g. IGAD), inter-governmental, or grassroots level. The cross-sectoral nature of many CPMR programs was also discussed. The problem facing USAID is to assess where it has a comparative advantage in this field. The GHA is intended to help in this regard by evaluating the effectiveness of past initiatives. The utility of having a common language with which to talk about CPMR programs inside USAID and with local partners was another theme of the discussion.

The workshop was conceived to have a broader scope than the project. Its purpose was to offer USAID Program Officers a comprehensive perspective on developing and implementing CPMR interventions. It was hoped that the material presented in the workshop would introduce for participants what steps are required not only to identify sources of potential violent conflicts, but formulate CPMR programs, and implement and evaluate responses in a way that would maximize their probable success. While it was understood that some of the workshop participants are highly experienced program officers, the organizers of the session felt that it was important to consider all of the major programmatic steps – from diagnosis of conflict vulnerabilities and opportunities, to strategy development, to partner buy-ins, to partner implementation buy-ins, to pre- and post-implementation evaluation – because of the relative newness of the CPMR field.

A particular interest of the workshop was to begin the process of incorporating CPMR analytical concepts, methods and tools into USAID reporting and strategy development requirements. Specifically, finding appropriate tools to accomplish vulnerability analyses emerged as a clear concern of the participants. As there is no prescribed or tested technique to conduct such analyses, and they are but one step in the CPMR framework, this Startup Workshop could only begin to describe possible approaches. It is hoped that during the course of the GHA project a set of practical analytical tools can be developed to support vulnerability analyses.

Session Three: The Project in the Context of USAID GHAI Activities and Needs

This session first took up how USAID officers can use the project's results and how USAID can help the project. Essentially, Phase One of the project will produce evaluative studies that indicate what identifiable impacts on conflict prevention and peacebuilding have been obtained from USAID or other donor investments in the four types of conflict prevention or resolution interventions listed earlier. These studies will yield conclusions regarding what features of these interventions have worked especially well and under what conditions, thus pinpointing best, or at least good, practices that USAID might replicate in the future.

In the process of conducting the studies, a second result for USAID will be the development of a generic framework of evaluative questions that can be applied to a wider range of different types of interventions under differing country contexts. This framework can be used both for evaluations of projects that have been operating and for screening proposals that come to USAID for funding, as a way to judge the extent to which such proposals have an explicit strategy of intervention that takes into account critical factors that will affect the project's results. Although MSI will implement the project through its funded resources, mission staff can help the project's success by providing local advice, expediting country clearances, endorsing the project, publicizing meetings, helping to publicize the dissemination workshop, and the like.

The workshop then turned to the wider overview of basic analytical and operational steps involved in a thorough conflict prevention, mitigation and response process. The five basic steps in CPMR are:

1. Conducting Conflict Diagnostic Assessments
2. Formulating Conflict Prevention and Management Strategy
3. Seeking Consensus Buy-in by Local Stakeholders
4. Seeking Local Stakeholder Buy-in to the Implementation Process
5. Evaluation of Conflict Prevention/Management Interventions and Strategy

A chart was presented that indicated where the topics and skills that are to be introduced by the workshop under these five steps are relevant to R-4s and the several other planning and reporting procedures that USAID mission and REDSO staff are required periodically to carry out (see Appendix 4).

Finally, the point was made that the European Union, the United Nations, and other donor governments and organizations are engaging in a number of activities to apply key concepts and skills involved in a complete CPMR process. A few examples of this scattered work were made available at the workshop. However, no one government or organization has fully operationalized all the major aspects of such a process. Thus, USAID has an opportunity in the coming years both to benefit from the efforts of others in developing the several aspects of a complete CPMR process, and to contribute leading edge work to the worldwide state of the art of such a process, such as through the work done under various phases of the GHA project.

The discussion clarified that though the generic framework was comprehensive in its scope, neither the workshop nor the GHA project would deal with every detailed aspect of the CPMR process. Among the specific outcomes of the project would be the identification of best, or good, practices. Frequently, little time is reserved for assessing the results of projects that are funded and implemented, under the assumption that only “practical” work has value - even though analysis and reflection may reveal that existing practices are ineffective. So-called “theory” and “practice” must be treated as interdependent.

Yet, good practices resulting from evaluation studies obviously must be fed into actual practice to have value, such as actually helping to inform action that may prevent further civil conflict in the Congo, for instance. When dealing with conflicts, someone observed that third parties such as USAID typically just deal with putting out fires, rather than stopping the fire before it begins.

Programming for conflict prevention cannot be viewed as an activity carried out in isolation from programming in areas such as anti-poverty policy, curbing the abuse of power, and effective governance. Although it has distinct elements not necessarily found in existing policy sectors, and some specific activities do set explicit conflict prevention/resolution objectives, conflict prevention and resolution is not simply a distinct and separate program sector itself. Our approach to peace issues must be

multi-sectoral. Conflict prevention/resolution are also activities that must happen at a very local level, as well as at other levels.

Session Four: Essential Orientations – Key Concepts and Terms

Because there is a continuing confusion on how people use words in this field, it is essential to have a grounding in certain basic concepts and how to use certain terms consistently to make sense of conflict phenomena and develop coherent responses.

First, to place the recent conflicts in a wider global-historical context that highlights the underlying trends that are generating them, it is useful to describe the post-Cold War era as witnessing a “liberal revolution.” The ideological struggle for influence between the blocs during the Cold War has given way to the ascendancy of a liberal paradigm for organizing national politics and economies, as well as international relations. In Africa as well as in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, these liberal changes at the national level have transformed one-party states, authoritarian political systems, and autocratic leaders into uncertain forms of governance and public policy characterized by multi-party elections, a marketplace that decides the allocation of goods and services, and societies that are shaped by broad popular participation in politics. All major donors, including the UN, have adopted this paradigm in their policies.

These rapid changes from old ways to a new liberal order present a shock to many societies that are experiencing them. While the changes going on in most of the transitioning nations have been basically peaceful, in others they have been very disruptive and have led to great violence. The lack of economic development is not by itself a cause of violent conflict; in fact, increased development may occasion it. (The first republic to initiate hostilities in the former Yugoslavia was the richest, Slovenia; one of the poorest, Macedonia, remained peaceful.)

An example of the effects of rapid transitions is Burundi, where in 1993, the elections that brought in the first Hutu President were celebrated as a turn in the road, but then were followed by a coup that led to the president’s assassination and mass violence in the countryside. The winner-take-all election had brought about a shift in power that was so drastic that it prompted violent backlash by those who had lost out. A similar pattern is evident in Rwanda, Kosovo and East Timor.

Thus, while functioning democracies may ultimately be the most stable forms of government, the transition period toward such systems may be extremely unstable, and simply adding elements of democracy willy-nilly may help to generate destructive conflicts unless the societal context in which it is introduced can handle the changes involved. In some contexts, increased civic participation in politics per se does not automatically lead to more legitimate governments. Instead, it can be divisive and destabilizing where it is not accompanied by controls over populist demagogues and effective guarantees and protection for political minorities of minority rights (e.g., in the rump Yugoslavia, which has been controlled largely by popular but ethno-nationalist Serbian leaders).

Liberal change is neither inevitable nor complete everywhere. In the GHA, recent changes have not necessarily replaced one-party systems with multi-party systems, but replaced particular one-party governments with other one-party governments. In other nations, stability has been preserved at the cost of producing a new kind of order that thrives on corruption and criminal syndicate activity.

The possibly adverse consequences of the liberal revolution present a challenge for USAID and other donors in balancing various policy goals. Promoting change toward certain kinds of democracy and market economies can cause instability, which if it leads to civil war, can wipe out years of development progress. The dilemma is how to bring about the desired changes through a peaceful form of conflict that proceeds in a non-violent way, rather than through violence or new forms of coercion.

An overarching goal that conceptually reconciles the competing goals within the liberal paradigm is the notion of *peaceful transition*. In this way, the goal of conflict prevention and preventive peacebuilding can be incorporated into the set of more conventionally articulated policy goals. This serves to acknowledge the prospect of increased instability and even violent conflict, and downplays the prevailing assumption that the task is simply one of promoting democratization, marketization and development, with little explicit consideration to their destabilizing impacts in vulnerable settings. Thus, the European Union has adopted a similar concept using the term “structural stability.” Fortunately, there is a widening awareness that development and democratization policies can bring about counterproductive change.

Another useful set of working concepts concerns the difference between the various stages or phases of conflict that can occur in those societies that lack the capacity to handle change peacefully. These stages start with the idea of the stable peace that has been afforded by some previous order (e.g., communism or clientelism) and in which some forms of peaceful conflict can occur because there are conflict regulation mechanisms in operation. The stages proceed through unstable peace, crisis, violent conflict, post-violent conflict, and finally a new stable peace that is based on the consolidation of democracy.

These stages are not linear – situations can go forward and backward or stall. They are not black and white categories that apply to a whole nation. But these distinctions are essential in guiding policy decisions because different kinds of policies are appropriate depending on the stage of peaceful or violent conflict a society is experiencing. The various societies in the GHA differ significantly in terms of such stages of conflict. While some societies are making modest progress toward more legitimate government, others are engaged in all-out military combat.

While most of the violent conflicts that are active in the GHA concern national issues revolving around the control of political power, the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea involves the mobilization of the armed forces of one state against another, and the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo combines internal issues and states’

armies. Thus, differing combinations of programs and corresponding objectives are appropriate, rather than a “one size fits all” approach.

The discussion brought out that so-called “state failures” and “complex humanitarian emergencies” are terms that can be subsumed by this perspective because they refer to various *symptoms* when the changes that have been described lead to violence and destruction. A failed state, for example, is one that has been unable to function effectively during a transition period, and thus the order it had preserved (even if an unjust one) may give way to civil chaos.

An example that is generally considered to represent successful conflict prevention intervention in recent years is that of Macedonia. Other Eastern Europe countries might be listed such as the Baltics. Another that is mentioned is Congo-Brazzaville in 1993, although that was short-lived (the political leaders’ militias were not demobilized). Although South Africa experienced much violence, it is also an outstanding example, since the situation may have been much worse.

In Burundi, there was some provision for Tutsi power-sharing under the new largely Hutu government; it had ample resources and the transition of power was initially uncontested and peaceful. But there was little provision for alleviation of the fears of the Tutsi, who were the ‘top dog,’ and in particular, no effective control over small groups of individuals who could relatively easily employ physical violence outside the control of the new political authorities (e.g., the junior officers in the largely Tutsi army who carried out the coup).

Following the 1993 coup and massacres, the many subsequent efforts to manage the crisis also failed because of the lack of control over the political power of competing ethnic leaders, each of which had access to armed force of one type or another. Thus, these leaders have been able to continue to play their populist manipulative games because no effective new order has been created that can control the use of armed force in politics and guarantee physical security.

In such instances where a nation’s own institutions cannot handle the tasks of making a peaceful transition, the international community can come in to offer substitutes for what states themselves ordinarily do to manage their disputes (e.g. an international preventive peacekeeping force, where national security forces are either politically partisan and repressive or legitimate but ineffective). That such intervention is not always necessary is seen in the many recent instances where peaceful transition occurred without violence, due to the deliberate efforts of domestic actors (e.g., the peaceful break-up of Czechoslovakia, and Russia, so far).

Any one donor, such as USAID, can sometimes make an important difference, especially where a country has other factors working in its favor (such as was true in Macedonia). For example, it is at least plausible that timely provision of a small protective armed forces for the remaining elected Burundi government – as was requested by its leaders in late 1993 – might have given that government sufficient

security and political space in which they could carry out the public's business in a way that discouraged further armed challenges and tipped the Tutsi army definitively in its favor. However, this request to the UN for a small force was denied. Individual donors can also pay attention to avoiding doing harm inadvertently.

But generally, it is unlikely that any one donor can alone reverse a forceful challenge to stability in a vulnerable country. Multi-donor collaborative strategies applying a variety of carrots and sticks are essential.

To say the problem stems from a lack of international "political will" is simply to point out that there is insufficient belief at critical decision-making levels in donor governments that acting in modest preventive ways is in their interest, and that inaction or ineffective action damages their interests. Just as influential leaders can choose to cause conflicts in situations that lack countervailing conditions, influential domestic and international leaders can choose to prevent them.

There will not be any one type of intervention that works in all cases. But a common analysis of the various factors that have been present in successful and unsuccessful instances of prevention can highlight what is needed. This includes a kind of political analysis that involves figuring out where the power is. Such political analysis is not something that the development world normally does, but it is starting to.

Session Five: Conflict Diagnosis – What Should We Look For?

This session introduced certain generic causes of potential conflicts, which were termed vulnerabilities. The differences between immediate, proximate and underlying causes were mentioned. These have very different policy implications. In Burundi, critical immediate causes were overlooked, though more basic causes were being addressed (see discussion above). Whether peaceful conflict takes the course of escalating violence is not a matter of inevitability but a contingent thing – it depends on what is done during a conflict's gestation. A chart was presented listing more specific examples of the three levels of conflict causation. In anticipating possible violent conflicts, up to now, we have had only intuition to rely on. To survey many conflicts and note repeated sources attemptsto be more methodological, although you still do not throw out intuition. There are many studies available that capture the various causes of ethnic and other conflicts, but each study tends to use different terms, sometimes for essentially the same phenomena. The challenge is to distill these analyses into a relatively short list of usable causal terms.

A similar list of forces in a society that are managing change is also needed in order to get a balanced view of whether the society that could be headed for violence nevertheless can regulate the new sources of conflict peacefully. These sources of controlled change were termed "opportunities."

Stakeholder analysis forms a second set of conflict diagnostic techniques that focuses more specifically on actor interests, motives, positions, power and resources. These tools scan the landscape of actors to identify which stakeholders may contain the seeds to trigger, feed or quell conflict. A stakeholder analysis matrix was presented which provides a snapshot of the array of groups potentially involved in a conflict situation. Political mapping techniques were also presented that extend stakeholder analysis to include opportunities for conflict and coalition building among actors and complexities across issues. The mapping matrix locates stakeholders in the context of issues they are concerned about. It can help analysts understand where the contentious issues are on which actors have divergent priorities. It can also help identify those issues on which stakeholders must cooperate to find mutually acceptable solutions.

Session Six: Break-out Group Reports

Participants worked in breakout groups to apply the vulnerability/opportunity analysis and stakeholder analysis to a particular case. The groups were given material on Ethiopia to use on for the exercise. As an illustration of these discussions, the following lists some of the first group's findings as to vulnerabilities and opportunities in Ethiopia:

VULNERABILITIES

Systemic Conditions:

- Ethnic regionalism/rivalries
- Poverty
- Illiteracy/lack of civic education
- Political extremism

Aggravators:

- Ethnic federalism (generated by policies and institutions)
- Strong security mechanisms
- Perpetuation of inequality of resources
- Ethiopian/Eritrean war
- Potentially violent armed groups (i.e.Oromo Liberation Front)
- Cross-border issues (i.e. Kenya and Somalia)

Triggers:

- Due to lack of transparency, the upcoming election may cause:
- domestic problems
 - civil strife
 - questions about fairness of election results
 - supposed free election only to appease donors

OPPORTUNITIES

Systemic Conditions:

- Recently implemented country-wide primary education program

Alleviators:

- Recognition of indigenous NGOs as a mechanism to foster civil society
- Open print media to private organizations
- Strong security apparatus (from the perspective of the EPRDF)
- Policies of ethnic federalism (from the perspective of the EPRDF)

Decelerators:

- No short-term actions were identified

The workshop participants concluded that, but for lack of time, it would be important to return to the above outlined chart to prioritize the various factors listed. Some confusion arose regarding the distinction between systemic versus aggravators or alleviators. Finally, it was noted that the factors listed as vulnerabilities or opportunities can often be interchanged depending on the extent they represented positive or negative trends.

On the morning of the second day of the workshop, the group continued to discuss some of the concepts introduced on the previous day. The vulnerabilities and opportunities in the case would have been more fully elaborated, more economical, and prioritized if more time had been devoted to the exercise.

The discussion pointed out that while some systemic problems are easy to see, such diagnostic assessments may sometimes uncover factors that are unexpected. In Tanzania, the extent of Muslim discontent would not have been identified from the normal sources, but the academics uncovered it. When an effort was made to go out to verify this factor, there was indeed such a source of potential serious conflict. In a crisis situation, things are hitting you over the head all the time, and may be quite obvious, but in a more stable situation, a diagnostic assessment such as the one used in the breakout sessions may yield a surprise.

This highlights the issue of whether USAID should gather its information by sitting around the table or use techniques that tap several sources of information, including going out into the communities to ask about various trends. The latter provides an academic rigor that can bring us to an appropriate level of analysis and come up with a much richer array of factors, whereas sitting around the table can lead to “group think.”

Session Seven: From Diagnosis to Prescription – Formulating a Conflict Prevention Strategy

Diagnosis must be completed before a solution can be created. The solution cannot be prescribed prior to the diagnosis (solutions chasing problems). Assuming the diagnosis

is reliable, possible interventions can then be explored and developed. The basic task involved in strategy development is to address as many key vulnerabilities or opportunities as possible with appropriate interventions that are likely to be effective and implementable. The specific steps include:

1. What are the possible leverage points into given vulnerabilities and opportunities, in view of stakeholders interests and capabilities?
2. What would be appropriate interventions? Reviewing the toolbox.
3. But will they work? Prospective evaluation of “candidate” interventions.
4. Do several interventions add up to a country conflict strategy?

Identifying leverage points refers to the various points of attack or angles from which a given vulnerability/opportunity can be approached. These then become one’s specific objectives.

For example, regarding the Ethiopian EPRDF-led government, the upcoming elections are a potential vulnerability point, and intervention of some kind may be appropriate. But the intervention may take the form of encouraging government tolerance directly, promoting civic education among the electorate, or boosting the advocacy power of non-EPRDF groups. The first is an “insider” approach, while the last two work on the government from the outside. Similarly, a country’s professional elite may be loyal to one faction or another, so they do not provide a counterweight to government or other factions’ policy perspectives. This problem of an overly partisan and politicized civil society could be approached by trying to change the attitude of the existing professional elite, weaning the elite from politics by creating alternative non-political ways for personal advancement so that they see that the political route is not the only way, or engendering a new non-political elite.

In connection with this example, the question was raised of whether this is interfering in a sovereign state’s policies. In reply, the illustration was offered of Macedonia and Croatia, where USAID offered assistance to strengthen all the parties in the democratic process. By thus including the leading party, there were no grounds to say that the aid was favoring one party or just the opposition, since all could have technical assistance. The idea is to support the democratic process rather than support specific political parties.

There are other situations, however, where this evenhanded approach is not possible for foreign policy or other reasons. In the Sudan, U.S. legislation prohibits providing assistance to the government. Instead, aid is given to an umbrella group of opposition groups from the south and the north that are united to get rid of the current government. The aim is capacity building. The problem with many states in Africa is the thin line between the government and political parties, which makes it very difficult for opposition parties to get resources. Because they have no access to tax dollars, for example, and lack funds to create a revenue base from their potential constituency, it may be appropriate to mainly help smaller, opposition parties.

In the southern Sudan, aid is being given to strengthen civil society organizations and advocacy groups by giving them more of an opportunity to carry out a people-to-people process between the Dinka and the Nuer. Thus, another leverage point may be to work outside of the normal civil structure and directly at the grassroots level. A possible problem of using this leverage point, however, is that SPLA may not stay on this bandwagon if they see their power being eroded.

In other words, differing leverage points may be necessary in view of the local political situation. The range of possible choices between insider and outsider leverage points needs to be considered. These choices bring back into focus the dilemma mentioned earlier: in order to prevent conflicts while promoting change, is it better to work from the inside or from the outside? Can one do both?

Once leverage points have been identified, the next step is to identify interventions. What would be appropriate interventions to address the leverage points? Interventions (programs, projects, initiatives, etc.) are specific techniques or tools for addressing one or more leverage points. Here it is important to think outside the box. A handout indicated a great variety of possible interventions for conflict prevention and mitigation found in many policy sectors. Possible tools for intervention can range from diplomacy through preventive deployment to development assistance and education.

It was noted in the intervention list that there is an important distinction between interactive interventions or tools (e.g., negotiations, dialogue) and non-interactive tools (e.g., reforming institutions). Most attention in the field of “conflict resolution” has focused on interactive processes, but not on non-interactive processes, such as the reform of police.

It should also be noted that the diverse tools in the toolbox operate at different levels in the system and have different scopes or arenas within which they are likely to have effects. They operate at the global, regional, national, and local levels. An example of an intervention at the global level would be the internet and strengthening codes of conduct to influence arms flows. In making its CPMR choices for a CSP, USAID needs to consider whether it should start at the “top,” at the “bottom” (grassroots level) – or at several levels.

The overall point is to broaden the range of contemplated solutions in the same way that we broadened our look at the dimensions of problems. You tend to get significant results when you have several actors using a variety of tools with various carrots and sticks applied at various levels. Ideally, this should lead to multilateral analyses, policy planning and implementation. Thus, the question arose of what interventions and at what levels USAID can develop influence, since it alone cannot undertake all the tools. In view of its limits, any single donor such as USAID needs to relate this survey of possible tools operationally to its particular capabilities and focus on what it can do that is value-added. What are the range of tools at USAID’s disposal? Then it needs to prioritize these types of interventions, in terms of what goes the furthest in what

situations. One of the key goals of the project is to identify tools that USAID can use most effectively.

Also, there is the issue of short-term action for immediate effectiveness versus the longer-term objectives and programs that have to be taken into consideration.

We also have to consider the impacts of *already operating* programs as tools of conflict prevention or mitigation. To illustrate this, a Kenyan USAID funded project was mentioned. Upon review of a recent Kenyan mission review strategy, it was decided to focus initially on dairy and horticulture projects, as they proved to be the most successful operations from a business perspective. Subsequently, USAID examined these specific areas for any potential conflict and realized that the lack of water resources was a definite problem especially impacting the pastoralists who are marginalized (in particular for the horticulture projects, as they required vast water resources). As a result of the conflict analysis, therefore, the project decided to continue to promote the horticulture business, but also pursue management of water equitability projects to diffuse potential tensions. They realized that from the economic opportunity side, they wanted to encourage economic development, but the conflict perspective led them to conclude they did not want to do this program if it was going to cause a conflict.

An exercise carried out in plenary session sought to illustrate how to develop a conflict prevention strategy, using the concepts of leverage points and interventions. The group looked again at Ethiopia and discussed what are the leverage points and corresponding interventions that would be most promising for USAID.

When it was suggested USAID could start with interventions regarding the upcoming elections as a possible flashpoint, a discussion ensued as to the feasibility of addressing that vulnerability/opportunity or other entry points. It was questioned whether one could get a project going in time – the elections are in May. Why has it taken USAID this long to consider a program around elections, since it has known about the elections for years? But it was pointed out that the National Election Board is already conducting a program in civic education, and NGOs are interested in conducting civic education. One consortium of NGOs that is organizing itself to talk to the public at large has asked for funding. There are also opposition groups who need funding but USAID cannot fund them because of national law.

Someone suggested that USAID should look at what other donors are doing. Civic education in Kenya was tried and it did not appear to work. There are many options around that can be looked at – such as working with opinion leaders. Because of timing and other problems with pre-election interventions, it was asked whether other possible flashpoints dealing with post-election conflict hot points might be looked at now.

The media, for example, might deal with possible aggravators and triggers by bringing civic education to a large number of people. It was pointed out, however, that Ethiopia has 60 million people but only 8 million radios and only 50% of those radios are actually

working. It also has one of the highest illiteracy rates in the world. Yet, reaching 4 million may not be that bad. In Somalia, throngs of people sit around the radio listening, so perhaps it would actually reach a lot more than 4 million people. To help set the tone, we could moderate the attitude of people toward the election outcome, as well as do a post-election media program. The idea is to create enough stakeholders who want the election results to be peace and stability, whoever wins. Having information provided to the public may also push the leaders to be more accountable. And could donors say ahead of time, “We’re not going to fund anyone who promotes violence in the post-election.”

At the same time, we cannot avoid focusing on the election itself. There are many procedural factors which will determine whether it is free and fair, and thus whether there is likely to be post-election violence or not at all. But is USAID involved in these matters?

In conclusion, it was noted that the group started out largely doubting whether anything could be done, but then got to a point where it was talking about what could in fact be done. And although it was not always clear whether an option was in USAID’s toolbox, the process of generating possible options from particular vulnerabilities or opportunities was creative and fruitful.

Finally, it was mentioned that before a particular intervention is actually launched, some consideration needs to be given to whether it will actually work and be implementable in the context in which it will be applied. While such questions naturally were raised in the preceding discussion, a more explicit ex ante, or prospective, evaluation can be done in which various criteria are applied to decide whether an option is likely to be effective or instead will worsen conflict. This topic is examined in more detail in Session Nine, which is devoted to ex post facto, or retrospective, evaluation.

Session Eight: Building Local Partner Consensus around Strategies

In the previous session, CPMR strategy development was presented as a matter of analysis, by referring to diagnostic assessments of the situation, past cases and experience, and logical evaluation. In this session, the emphasis was on the practical activity of developing local partner buy-in to CPMR approaches early in the strategy formulation period. The task is to reconcile all major local stakeholder groups to an agreed CPMR strategy that they can feel ownership over. One way that USAID program officers can promote local participation, ownership and consensus over a CPMR strategy is to support a negotiation process that involves all stakeholders early in the strategy development stage.

Effective local buy-in to CPMR strategies at the formulation stage can facilitate effective implementation at later stages. Negotiation and consensus building among local stakeholders can build the necessary motivation and political will to make difficult decisions and overcome obstacles to complex conflict prevention/mitigation

interventions. But to be effective, negotiations must be planned and prepared for. The session's discussion was oriented to help USAID managers be sensitive to these planning and preparation needs, not to instruct them on becoming negotiators themselves.

When planning for negotiations among local stakeholders, USAID managers need to consider the following types of questions:

- Who are the local conflicting stakeholders?
- What are their interests in conflict prevention/mitigation?
- What is their capacity to serve as CPMR implementers?
- How can these stakeholders be motivated to come to the negotiating table to buy-in and resolve their differences that can serve as potential obstacles to implementation?
- What can USAID do to promote such negotiations among local stakeholders?
- Should USAID be a party to the negotiations and, if so, what role should it play – host, mediator, facilitator, or interested stakeholder?

A planning and negotiation exercise was conducted to illustrate the issues involved in promoting the buy-in among local stakeholders of a common CPMR strategy in a hypothetical Ethiopian scenario. The participants were divided into three groups, which they would role-play: the government, USAID, and local partners. The participants were able to draw upon case study materials and exercises from earlier sessions. In the exercise, participants were first asked to conduct a planning session to clarify the CPMR initiatives preferred by their group, to identify the likely interests of the other stakeholders, and to identify their group's initial offers and demands. In the second half of the exercise, the three groups met together in a negotiation dialogue, seeking to reach consensus on a mutually agreeable CPMR strategy.

In the discussion after the exercise, participants indicated that they derived several important lessons:

- The sensitivity of such communication sessions to cross-cultural interpretation – both the meaning of words and nonverbal signals.
- The problem of confusing a statement of position with a stakeholder's true interests.
- Techniques that USAID can use as a host, mediator or facilitator in such negotiations among local stakeholders to promote the search for common ground.
- The difficulties of persuading a government that did not necessarily depend on US aid to act in ways consistent with a preferred USAID conflict strategy

Session Nine: Building Local Partner Consensus around Implementation

This session emphasized the importance of local partner buy-in, not only in the strategy development phase, but in the implementation period as well. This can help to avert potential deadlock in CPMR initiatives if the local partners' constituents or new local stakeholders have not fully agreed to cooperate and comply with the activities.

Especially when dealing with CPMR interventions, the implementation stage introduces new challenges to program officers that, if not dealt with adequately, can downgrade the effectiveness of the strategy. Details that remained unresolved during the strategy formulation period may need to get ironed out. Unanticipated conflicts may arise. While the leaders of various stakeholder groups may have agreed to participate in a CPMR initiative, their constituents may still have to be persuaded that the activity is in their best interests. And the conflict situation may change over time, requiring an adjustment to the CPMR strategy.

The session focused on several practical “contingency planning” questions for program officers. While these are all questions regarding program implementation, they were presented as issues which program officers should consider and plan for during the strategy development stage, rather than waiting for potential crises during the implementation period itself. They include:

- What issues were left unresolved in the CPMR strategy formulation period?
- What provisions of the strategy might become undone? How might this uncertainty effect success or failure?
- What new actors might become involved during implementation?
- How might the conflict situation change?

The concept of developing indicators of potential CPMR implementation problems was introduced. Such indicators might include changes in the leadership of stakeholder groups, economic measures, and external events such as civil wars in neighboring countries.

An important element that USAID D/G and other program officers need to attend to in building local consensus and buy-in at the CPMR implementation stage is keeping the channels of negotiation open among the various stakeholders. This can include negotiation over implementation details, adjustments to the implementation plan, and improvements or extensions to the CPMR initiative over time. Through such negotiation channels, USAID program officers can support the building of sustainable conflict prevention/mitigation regimes. By helping to develop an acceptable (or possibly, institutionalized) forum for negotiation among the conflicting stakeholders, norms and procedures that produce peaceful resolution of conflict can be given higher priority than resort to violence.

In the discussion, participants related the consensus building techniques in Sessions 8 and 9 to the concept of “channeling.” Negotiation among stakeholders can be conceived of as a channeling mechanism to help regulate the amount of conflict among local interest groups within acceptable levels. Participants also stated their concerns that CPMR strategies can be impacted by further conflict, either making them obsolete or in need of adjustment. CPMR strategies can also produce conflict – they can be conflict aggravators by altering power bases and vested interests. One of the goals of any CPMR strategy should be “do no harm.”

Session Ten: Evaluation of Conflict Prevention/Management Interventions and Strategies

Once implemented, monitoring and evaluation need to track and identify the actual results of interventions (ex post facto, or retrospective, evaluation). This effort can build a knowledge base of what works under what conditions, i.e., lessons learned. The findings about best practices can be fed back into the decision process to foster more informed judgments about appropriate interventions. The main focus here will be prevention, but a similar evaluation can be done regarding conflict management and resolution.

The essential tasks involved in such an evaluation are to:

1. Develop a common framework of questions that can be addressed to varied interventions. These questions should investigate an intervention's:
 - impacts on conflict and peace (ie., peace and conflict impact assessment – PCIA)
 - implementability
 - the political and other conditions that were associated with these results.
2. Gather information from various sources to answer these questions (e.g., documents, interviews, observation).
3. Assess the evidence to identify specific impacts of particular interventions and the associated conditions.
4. Evaluate the whole mix of interventions to see if their impacts affect important facets of the overall conflict so as to add up to a plausible prevention strategy.
5. Construct a cumulative database of lessons learned.
6. Disseminate findings.

In addressing the first task, what should we be looking at? How do we measure prevention impacts? One example of a criterion might be based on the idea that we want to channel tensions and disputes into peaceful forms of conflict (in terms of the previous discussion, this is a leverage point and objective). Thus, we can measure what channeling may have occurred as the result of an intervention. Here are some other illustrative criteria for evaluating the peace/conflict impacts of interventions. The question is whether the interventions have had a positive effect on:

- standards of living and less desperate competition over economic livelihoods
- inter-communal communications and relationships
- the development of non-political professional and business activities (civil society) that reduce competition over state resources
- inter-group shared governing processes and public decision making/ institutions and mechanisms
- effective and legitimate control over the use of lethal force (i.e., the security apparatus).

The above criteria must show positive indicators in order to determine success, and the absence of results indicates a problem or failure.

In defining evaluation criteria that are suitable for particular interventions, one needs to consider the scale of activity entailed in the intervention within the level at which it operates, and thus a feasible scope of its impact. For example, it would not make sense to judge the success or failure of a local community project in terms of whether it ended a national-level civil war.

A question was raised as to whether within the Greater Horn of Africa, Ethiopia's policy of ethnic federalism is a positive or negative policy and to what degree. Thus, a comparative analysis (What are Tanzania's or Uganda's policies, successes or failures with this issue?) might further assist in formulating answers to these questions. A set of evaluations of various interventions can provide comparative results. These would allow USAID to ask: If we do this, how much conflict prevention and peacebuilding will we get for our money versus if we do that?

Such evaluations need to be conducted both with respect to single interventions, as well as with respect to the whole combination of interventions that may be applied. The research literature in conflict prevention is identifying the elements that consistently appear to be present at the level of whole conflict when possible violent conflicts are headed off and peaceful conflict prevails. Thus, those consistent elements can be used as a checklist, against which one could match the discovered effects of a set of interventions. It is not only important to know whether particular interventions achieved their objectives, but also whether the end result of the several interventions in a strategy were sufficient to influence the cause of an overall conflict.

Another consideration is that of the stakeholders in such evaluations. Who defines the criteria of success? If we are going to be evaluating USAID projects, the stakeholders should be brought into the evaluation design of the programs. This has some drawbacks. The stakeholder's criteria may not relate to significant factors driving the conflict and thus individual projects may be found to work well, but in reality, they may be "fiddling while Rome burns."

Session Eleven: Developing an Inventory of CPMR Activities and Final Workshop Discussion

In the final session, the participants engaged in a review of the various existing CPMR programs that are ongoing and proposed in the GHA region from the point of view of which would be suitable to evaluate by the project.

Results from the Workshop

Key Findings

- ❑ USAID and the donor community and their partners need to consider preserving a stable situation while promoting change, in order to prevent violent conflict.
- ❑ In order to assess vulnerabilities and/or opportunities in a specific location, it is imperative that the assessor have a good knowledge of the country – political, civil defense, environmental, social and international community involvement – and how these factors compare to the checklist found in an assessment framework.
- ❑ Vulnerability assessments and early warning systems, in and of themselves, are not sufficient but must be followed by responses.
- ❑ “Channeling” the disputants in a vulnerable society may be one effective way for USAID to approach conflict once the signs of the conflict are recognized. USAID has a specific desire to avoid or mitigate violent manifestations of a conflict and so would seek to channel the parties in conflict into peaceful ways to achieve their interests.
- ❑ Significant results can usually be brought about only when there are several actors intervening at several points. If USAID investments are to be sustained, complementary and supportive multilateral processes also need to be pursued.

Further steps

- ❑ The analytical techniques and methods that were presented at the startup workshop were a useful first step toward understanding the policy questions these assessments concern and how they can be approached in a practical and meaningful way. But missions are looking for specific support especially in developing conflict vulnerability assessments. USAID program officers and SO teams need technical assistance using such tools in a timely fashion in light of the R4s and CSPs (or ISPs) which are under way.
- ❑ Continuing issues that USAID needs to consider are:
 - what it can do most cost-effectively with limited resources in the area of conflict prevention,
 - what it should not do in order to avoid doing harm,
 - how other stakeholders such as African institutions and other donors can be included in CPMR strategizing and at what points does this happen.

The GHA project should help to inform decisions on these issues.

- ❑ An electronic discussion group will be developed so that the workshop participants can continue to discuss issues and methods concerning CPMR strategies.

- A web site will be developed that contains all of the documents related to the project so they can be easily accessible to participants in the field.

APPENDIX 1

SCOPE OF WORK FOR THE PROJECT

DG/CONFLICT EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS SERVICES:

Best Practices Identification and Dissemination for Conflict Pilot Activities

The objective of this contract is to procure evaluation, analysis, dissemination and facilitation services that support implementation of REDSO/ESA's Conflict Prevention, Mitigation and Response (CPMR) Program, particularly the goal of identifying and disseminating CPMR "best practices". Establishing this framework entails:

- evaluating impacts of new and existing CPMR activities in the region (USAID supported and others) to identify best practices and lessons learned to date;
- dissemination of these practices and lessons learned to support replication;
- analysis of new opportunities and entry points for future effective CPMR activities;
- identification and characteristics of potential conflict flashpoints within a country or sub-region; and
- development of suitable activity-based and program level indicators of success for CPMR activities.

The REDSO/ESA/DG/Conflict team identified focal points representing promising areas for the MSI team to initially seek to link with partners, conduct analysis, foster innovation and identify best practices. While MSI's efforts will not be limited to these areas, they include:

- broadcast media as a peacebuilding tool;
- internet access and use as a peacebuilding tool;
- community-based peacebuilding, especially through peacebuilding meetings and prevention/response mechanisms;
- the role of "middle-level" individuals and institutions, especially religiously-based, in peacebuilding and the linkage between these "middle-level" efforts and "high-level" peace processes; and
- prevention and mitigation of conflict over land, water and forest resources.

MSI shall provide services in three phases. The work order for each successive phase may be canceled or modified by REDSO/ESA/DG/Conflict to take into account the performance and findings of the previous phase.

In **Phase I**, MSI shall organize a "start-up" workshop (scheduled for December, 1999) to launch the evaluation and analysis activities and to work with staff from USAID Missions in the region to clarify the Phase I work plan. Under Phase I, MSI will work with the USAID Mission staff and partners to undertake evaluations of existing of CPMR activities relating to the first four focal areas listed above. The aim will be to identify best practices and lessons learned while analyzing additional opportunities and entry points for USAID, other donors, and organizations at the country and regional level. Phase I

shall conclude with a dissemination workshop for USAID missions, implementing partners and other interested donors to share lessons learned and best practices to promote their replication. Phase I is expected to take 9 to 12 months to complete.

Phase II shall consist of three in-depth analyses. Two will deal with conflict situations or conflict flashpoints in individual countries of the GHA region while the third will relate to the fifth focal area above, conflict over resources. The specific topics, locations and details of these analyses will be defined in collaboration with USAID bilateral Missions and Partners. Phase II is expected to take 6 to 9 months to complete and, depending on performance implementing Phase I, may be approved for commencement prior to completion of Phase I.

Phase III shall focus on:

- continued activity evaluation;
- indicator development;
- identification of best practices for new and ongoing pilot CPMR activities;
- study of any additional focal areas identified;
- analysis of cross-sectoral programming opportunities for CPMR that can be developed by working with other Strategic Objective teams within USAID (e.g., health, environment, agriculture, etc.); and
- continued dissemination activities

Phase III is expected to take 6 to 9 months, starting no later than 18 months after the start of the contract and preferably prior to the completion of Phase II.

The **final product** will be:

- a much improved inventory of best practices to address CPMR issues in the region;
- increased understanding of potential conflict flashpoints; and
- availability of indicators to measure performance in CPMR in the region.

APPENDIX 2



DG/Conflict Evaluation and Analysis Services: Best Practices Identification and Dissemination for Conflict Pilot Activities

Startup Workshop Agenda, 1-3 December 1999
Safari Park Hotel, Nairobi, Kenya
Management Systems International

Wednesday, December 1

8:30 – 9:00	Registration <ul style="list-style-type: none">□ Sign in at the registration desk in the main conference room□ Pick up workshop materials at the registration desk□ Coffee, tea and pastries
9:00 – 9:45	Welcome, Introductions, Workshop Goals and Expectations
9:45 – 10:30	Objectives and Work Plan of the Project <ul style="list-style-type: none">– Project phases and elements– Tasks– Outputs and dissemination plan– Timeline– Envisioned results and policy relevance
10:30 – 10:45	Morning break
10:45 – 12:00	The Project and Workshop in the Context of USAID GHA Activities and Needs: Discussion and Workshop Overview <ul style="list-style-type: none">- How USAID officers can use project results- How USAID can help project- Role of the workshop topics: basic steps for CPMR- The current state of the art
12:00 – 13:00	Lunch
13:00 – 14:00	Part 1: Essential Orientations <ul style="list-style-type: none">– Current context of conflicts– Balancing overall goals– Levels and stages of conflicts in the GHA– Working definitions

14:00 – 15:00	Part 2: Diagnosing Conflicts <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Vulnerabilities - Opportunities - Stakeholders
15:00 – 15:15	Afternoon break
15:15 – 17:00	Breakout Group Exercise: Conducting Conflict Diagnoses – An Illustrative Case Study <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Identifying factors
17:00 – 18:00	Plenary: Group Reports and Discussion

Thursday, December 2

9:00 – 10:30	Part 3: Formulating a Conflict Prevention Strategy <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Leverage points (objectives) - Identifying appropriate interventions (the toolbox) - But will they work? Prospective evaluations of likely impacts and implementability - Building country conflict strategies from individual interventions
10:30 – 10:45	Morning break
10:45 – 12:00	Breakout Group Exercise: Formulating a Conflict Prevention Strategy <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Matching USAID programs and resources to a case study - Group reports and discussion
12:00 – 13:00	Lunch
13:00 – 14:00	Part 4: Negotiation of Conflict Prevention Strategies Among Stakeholders <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Engaging local stakeholders and donors in strategy formulation - Skills in negotiation and consensus building
14:00 – 16:15	Breakout Group Exercise: Negotiating Conflict Prevention Strategies Among Stakeholders <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Possible applications to the case-study
16:15 – 16:30	Afternoon break
16:30 – 17:30	Plenary: Group Reports and Discussion

Friday, December 3

9:00 – 10:00	Part 5: Implementation <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Challenges in implementation- Skills in negotiating implementation
10:00 – 10:15	Morning break
10:15 – 11:30	Breakout Group Exercise: Negotiating Implementation <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Applications to the case study
11:30 – 12:00	Plenary: Group Reports and Discussion
12:00 – 13:00	Lunch
13:00 – 14:00	Part 6: Evaluation of Conflict Prevention Interventions and Strategy <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Retrospective evaluation using peace and conflict impact assessment- Implementability- Identifying and disseminating best practices in interventions and strategies
14:00 – 15:00	Breakout Group Exercise: Evaluating Interventions and Strategies <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Applying criteria
15:00 – 15:15	Afternoon break
15:15 – 16:00	Plenary: Group Reports and Discussion
16:00 – 17:00	Workshop Wrap-up: Incorporating CPMR Methods and Tools into Planning and Reporting <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Insights gained- Recommendations and next steps

APPENDIX 3

STARTUP WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS

Greater Horn of Africa Initiative & Great Lakes Justice Initiative (GHAI & GLJI)	Location	Invitee/Title	Email Note: for all who follow the standard: first initial last name@usaid.gov , it is marked simply as REG. All non-standard addresses are included here.	Phone/Fax
				Nairobi numbers 254-2-862-400
Lynne Cripe	REDSO/ESA	A/GHAI Coordinator	REG	Ext 2501
Gerald Cashion	Somalia	Director	REG	Ext. 221
Thomas Nganga	Kenya	Prog. Mngmt Specialist	REG	
Ned Greeley	REDSO/ESA DG/Conflict	Team Leader	REG	Ext. 2333
Eric Richardson	REDSO/ESA DG/Conflict	D/G Advisor	REG	Ext. 2332
Rosalind Wanyagi	REDSO/ESA DG/Conflict		REG	
Mary Muiruri	REDSO/ESA DG/Conflict		REG	
Betty Muragori	REDSO/ESA DG/Conflict	D/G Advisor	REG	Ext. 2353
John Munuve	REDSO/ESA DG/Conflict	D/G Advisor	REG	Ext. 2332
Carolyn Logan	REDSO/ESA DG/Conflict	Democracy Fellow	REG	Ext. 2326
Randy Harris	Uganda	GHAI Coordinator	REG	256-41-235879; fax 2589821;
Kaya Adams	Rwanda	D/G Officer	REG	250-73251/2
Mervyn Farroe	Rwanda	D/G Officer	REG	250-73251/2
Janet Paz-Castillo	Ethiopia	GHAI Coordinator	REG	251-1-51-00-88
Lissane Yohannes	Ethiopia	GHAI	REG	251-1-51-00-88
Janet Schulman	DROC, Kinshasa	Program Officer	janet@usaid.gov	Tel.243-12-21533 Fax.243-88-03274
Joel Strauss	Tanzania	GHAI Coordinator	REG	255-51-117540 fax: 255-51-116559
Ajit Joshi	AFR/SD	Conflict	REG	712-5374
Dr. Bert Spector	MSI/ Washington	Project Director	bspector@msi-inc.com	Tel 202-484-7170 ext 168 Fax 202-488-0754
Dr. Michael Lund	MSI/ Washington	Study Team Coordinator	mlund@msi-inc.com	ext 166
Stacy Stacks	MSI/ Washington	Workshop Coordinator	sstacks@msi-inc.com	ext 117
Sarah Wikenczy	MSI/Nairobi	Researcher GHA	swikenczy@yahoo.com	254-2-58-20-84
Colleen McGinn	Tulane University	Observer	cmcginn@payson.tulane.edu	

APPENDIX 4

USAID REQUIREMENTS AND THE RELATIONSHIP TO CONCEPTS AND TOOLS FROM THE WORKSHOP

I. Strategic Plans Country Strategic Plans; Integrated Strategic Plans; OU Strategic Plans	Timing Strategic Plans are normally for 5-8 years , exceptions may be in complex emergency situations, which have shorter planning and implementation periods.	How might this project and workshop help? Relevant topics, concepts, analytical methods, skills, resources
A. New Strategic Plans and Amended Strategic Plans, including Vulnerability Assessments Components: Mission Statement; Major Goals; Schedule and Resource Implications of Goal Achievement; Key External Factors. Strategic plans are prepared by the operating unit and are reviewed by USAID/W.		From the UNCLAS STATE 115913 cable ADM AID FROM ADMINISTRATOR FOR MISSION DIRECTORS: <p>“As part of preparing a new USAID country strategy, operating units are asked to: 1) prepare an appropriate vulnerability analysis that address the potential for conflict; 2) summarize the findings of such analyses in the strategy document; and 3) specifically indicate when and how these findings affect the proposed strategy...you should seek to make maximum use of existing country team assessments of perceived economic, political, civil-military, or social tensions that could lead to violent conflict, including regional implications if they exist. Identified potential conflicts should be placed in one of four categories: deadly conflict, economic crisis, political crisis, and complex emergencies. Areas of concern can be disaggregated for purposes of analyses according to the specific or unique conditions in any particular region or country. The objective ... is to: (1) help safeguard the achievement of USAID strategic objectives and development investments; (2) make the need for costly post-conflict humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping and reconstruction less likely.”</p> <p>During the life of a strategic plan, it may be necessary to modify specifics within the plan, such as a change in SOs (Strategic Objectives). <u>Amended SPs</u> are prepared by the operating unit and are reviewed by USAID/W. “In preparation of amended USAID strategies, missions are asked to consider conducting an appropriate conflict vulnerability analysis and determine whether or not the scope of the amendment in question warrants such an analysis. If one is conducted, the results should be identified as part of strategy amendment approval requests.”</p>
B Strategic Plan Reviews USAID/W reviews the operating unit’s strategic plan, which usually includes representation by the regional bureau, BHR (if appropriate), PPC, and Global Bureau.		CPMR Basic Steps: Part 1, Essential Orientations <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Balancing policy goals ■ Stages of conflict Part 2, Conflict diagnosis <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Vulnerabilities assessment; ■ Opportunities assessment; ■ Stakeholder assessment. ■ Case-study exercise Part 3, Strategy formulation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Specific objectives ■ Interventions toolbox ■ Prospective evaluation ■ Matching sets of interventions to the whole situation ■ Case-study exercise
“During Washington reviews of country strategies, bureaus will examine the extent to which missions have been able to assess the root causes of conflict, and how directly and effectively strategies are able to address them. As a result of this approach, the agency anticipates more explicit and		See above

complete analysis of potential conflicts as a source of vulnerability for USAID programs, and better knowledge of how and when existing USAID resources can be used to help prevent conflicts.”	
A. MPP (Mission Performance Plan) Mission Performance Plans contribute to the U.S. Strategic Plan for International Affairs and generally include all Agencies within the USG operating within the Mission.	
“For the annual MPP process, USAID staff is asked to contribute to appropriate analytical efforts, particularly when these relate to USAID programs.”	See above and below

II. R4s: Reporting Results and Resource Request – The process and the product Components: Overview and Factors Affecting Program Performance; Progress toward Strategic Objectives (Summary narrative and/or table; individual Sos); Status of the Management Contract between the OU and USAID/W; Resource Request (financial plan narrative, prioritization of objectives, linkage with centrally-funded mechanisms, workforce and operating expenses narratives). Each year, the Agency as a whole, and AFR specifically, issue guidance documents on preparing the R4s. The guidance for the FY2002 R4 is currently in draft for the AFR Bureau.	Timing The R4 document is submitted to USAID/W in the spring of each year. Fiscal year: Oct 1-Sept 30											
	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S
	Collecting data and reports											
				Preparation of R4 report								
								Submission of R4 to USAID/W				
									Inclusion of R4s in Agency Performance Report and Performance Plan			

A. Reporting Results		
The FY1999 reporting results portion of the R4 is underway in some operating units and are due in the spring of 2000 to USAID/W.		Part 4, Negotiating Consensus around Strategies and Strategy Implementation Part 5, Negotiating Implementation of Strategies Part 6, Evaluation of Interventions and Strategies: criteria, methods, indicators Best practices studies
B. Resource Request		
The FY2002 resource requests are being started at this point and are due to USAID/W in the spring as a part of the R4 document. Conflict prevention programs may fall under any of the six Agency strategic goals: Economic Growth and Agriculture Development, Human Capacity Development, Democracy and Governance, Population/Health & Nutrition, Environment, and Humanitarian Assistance. Conflict prevention was removed from the HA goal in 1998 and is now a cross-cutting goal of the Agency.		Part 6, Intervention evaluation criteria, methods, indicators; Best practices studies
C. Evaluations, Impact Assessments and other Evaluative documents		
Evaluations of programs should be referenced in the R4s, and the results should be included in the report. Case studies, pilot study reports, impact evaluations, and other field assessments may be used in reporting in the R4.		Part 6, Intervention evaluation criteria, methods, indicators Best practices studies
III. Performance Monitoring Plans	Timing After development of the Strategic Objective	
For those Strategic Objectives (SOs) or Special Strategic Objectives (SPOs) which include conflict prevention/mitigation or response, each operating unit is expected to have a Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP). This provides managers with the information they need to track data on the performance of objectives and results over time		Intervention evaluation criteria and indicators

APPENDIX 5

WORKSHOP EVALUATION SUMMARY

We are constantly striving to make our presentations, facilitation, and workshops better. You can help us by completing the following anonymous evaluation. We ask that you let us know both what we've done well, what we haven't, and your suggestions for improvement.

EVENT: **Greater Horn of Africa Initiative** **DATES: 1-3 December 1999**
Peacebuilding Project
Evaluation and Analysis
Phase I Start-up workshop

Contract : GS-23-F-8000H, Task Order No. 623-N-00-99-0024-00
for DG/Conflict Evaluation and Analysis Services

On a scale of 1-5, please tell us how useful each part of the workshop was to you:

	Somewhat Useful		Useful		Not Useful	
	1	2	3	4	5	
Day 1						
1. Morning session						
▪ Objectives and workplan for this project	1	3	5	1	1	
▪ The project and workshop in the context of USAID		1	8	1	1	
▪ GHAI Activities and Needs		2	6	1	2	
2. Afternoon session						
▪ Part 1: Essential Orientations	1	5	3	1		
▪ Part 2: Diagnosing Conflicts	3	5	2			
▪ Breakout group exercise: Conducting Conflict Diagnoses using the Vulnerability and Opportunity Assessments and	3	4	2	1		
▪ The Stakeholder Analysis	2	4	2	1	1	

	Somewhat Useful		Useful		Not Useful	
	1	2	3	4	5	
Day 2						
3. Morning session						
▪ Part 3: Formulating a Conflict Prevention Strategy	2	6	2	1		
▪ Group Exercise: Formulating a Conflict Prevention Strategy	3	5	1	1		
4. Afternoon session						
▪ Part 4: Negotiation of Conflict Prevention Strategies Among Stakeholders	3	6	1	1		
▪ Breakout group exercise	5	4		1		

	Somewhat Useful Not Useful				
	1	2	3	4	5
Day 3					
5. Morning session					
▪ Part 5: Implementation Negotiating Implementation		3	4	4	
▪ Part 6: Evaluation of Conflict Prevention Interventions & Strategy	1	3	4	2	1
6. Afternoon session					
▪ Incorporating CPMR Methods and Tools into Planning & Reporting	1	3	2	3	2

	Yes	Partial	No
7. Did the presentation of the CPMR framework give you new insight into conflicts and their prevention and resolution?	9	2	
8. Did you understand the MSI project and see ways it might be incorporated into your work and that of USAID?	10	1	
9. Will you be able to apply the concepts from this workshop in your position?	9	1	
10. Did this workshop meet your expectations?	4	7	

Workshop could have been more tightly structured, more focused discussion/exercises. There were good discussions, but sometimes too much just tossing ideas around (though it's good to do some of this) and not enough time on concrete tools, structured analysis and discussion.

I would have liked to explore more about vulnerability, opportunity and stakeholder analyses.

Improved my understanding of CPMR, and access to colleagues working in other countries and in the region; some examples of good practice.

Did not really learn new concepts but what happened is helping me reorganize my thoughts on conflict.

Not sure that I can immediately apply anything from the workshop, although I will attempt by careful review of material and consultation with MSI and other colleagues.

Comment: *This evaluation needs more details and questions*

We should have taken a session to go over the four Tulane products and provide them feedback. The frameworks look like a good starting point for analysis.

I found the workshop to be a bit academic – it needed more grounding. It was very useful to meet my colleagues from around the Horn and learn what they're doing and hear Bert and Michael's input.

Launched project; built partner team; clarified MSI level of planning and resources for the implementation

11. What was the most useful part of the workshop for you and why?

Session 2: useful tools – we could have spent a lot more time working through this. Case study was too complex for the available time, though. It was interesting, but required so much background there was little time to apply the tool, and this affected later sessions (building on analytical foundation that was only partially understood.

The process of developing a framework for CPMR helped me organize information.

Vulnerability, opportunity and stakeholder analysis and leverage points.

Conflict analysis and response frameworks – vulnerability, opportunity and stakeholder analysis as a way of stepping back and looking at conflict. Experiential case studies useful to check out understanding of the framework and differently using it. Getting to know the other GHAI coordinators and practices in other countries.

Diagnostic; strategic development

*Breakout sessions – direct application of concepts.
Learning about projects in the field and contents of implementation in various represented countries and talking with colleagues from various missions.*

Conflict prevention strategy formulation. I think this may be most immediately useful.

Ethiopian-hands on case study, negotiation exercise, meeting other people working on CPMR issues.

Building partner team, and hearing the views of partners, including MSI and REDSO, on CPMR as a new area.

The breakout groups. I learn through application and the discussion were very valuable. In the larger groups there was too much of a talking head syndrome

12. What was the least useful part of the workshop for you and why?

Friday afternoon. I felt like MSI was gathering information for their own research project. Too many of us had specific issues we wanted to discuss, and we were not given the time. Plus, MSI, in making this change to the schedule, took away one of the most valuable (enjoyable!) learning tools – the breakout groups and exercises to apply new knowledge gained.

Sessions 4 and 5. It seemed that we shifted from a focus to “programming in conflict management” to “conflict management in the programming process,” and the former is what I felt we needed.

The first day had too much lecturing as the only mode of communication – mixing different communication methods would be useful.

Nothing was not useful. Sound job.

Too much time spent on detailed descriptions of the situation in Ethiopia.

Tabulating a list of projects in each country.

Negotiating implementation. Didn't seem immediately relevant.

Morning day one – nothing gained. Provide Friday afternoon experiences as a handout ahead of time for reviews. Powerpoint presentations should be full page handouts, double-sided.

The development skills 101 training components where CPMR was used as a topic, but topic could have been DG or Education or Health or any other sector.

13. What improvements would you suggest to us for future workshops?

Sometimes the discussions were a bit too unstructured/unfocused. Dr. Spector knows his material, but his presentation/facilitation skills are not as strong and this weakened parts of the workshop.

Incorporate African experts in presentations to vary the pace and add flavor.

Set all handouts out.

Better time management – country coordinator involvement in formulation of this activity would have been useful.

Focus on some indicators. Focus on transgender and regional conflict. Define conflict.

More discussion = open topics up sooner for participant input sessions just for USAID implementation in a very basic, nuts and bolts pragmatic way. Information gathering

techniques. Would like a bibliography of related literature, liked the handouts in general.

Greater focus on operational elements.

Send hardcopy questionnaires if no response to your email request. The contract has plenty of money in it – provide Carnegie books and others for reference materials.

Increase the project implementation aspects of workshop and increase vulnerability skills and CPMR indicators portions.

More exercises to apply the framework – it hasn't jelled yet and we need to use it.

14. Lastly, please rate the facilities for us:

	Excellent		Acceptable		Poor
	1	2	3	4	5
<u>Conference Facilities</u>	3	7	1		
Comments: <p style="text-align: center;"><u>Poor acoustics</u></p> <i>Acoustics not good</i> <i>Pretty good acoustics</i> <i>Lighting could be better, especially breakout rooms</i> <i>Microphones</i> <i>Cavernous hall, pleasant surroundings. Table arrangement and high motivation of attendees to talk helped.</i>					
Hotel Facilities	3	7			
Comments: <i>Lovely, but there were no mosquito “blue mat” machines or heating/fans.</i> <i>A bit tacky, but hey, it's Eastern Africa</i> <i>Seemed excellent</i>					

APPENDIX 6

LIST OF MATERIALS PROVIDED IN THE WORKSHOP

Materials provided on the opening day:

- Presentation slide handout pages (need to get files from ML/BS)
- USAID requirements and how this workshop substance will apply
- Vulnerabilities Assessment Worksheet
- Opportunities Assessment Worksheet
- Stakeholder Analysis
- Political Mapping of Stakeholders
- Illustrative Diagnostic Questions: Assessing potential conflict and opportunities for preventing conflict
- Some lessons learned from the literature on conflict prevention/mitigation
- Key variables that determine the trajectory of potentially violent national conflicts
- Toolbox page: Interventions for conflict prevention and mitigation
- Illustrative criteria for evaluating the peace and conflict impacts of interventions (based on major domains in which conflicts are waged).
- Ethiopia case study
- Materials from Tulane University:
 - Literature Review
 - Display copies of Carnegie Commission Books
 - Preventing Deadly Conflict
 - Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized

Materials provided to the participants in the notebook:

- Startup Workshop Participants List
- DG/Conflict evaluation and analysis services (REDSO initial brief on the project)
- USAID/General Notice from the Administrator on Vulnerability Assessments and Conflict Prevention
- Technical Notes
 - Conflict in Africa: A Review of Literature on Selected Topics (working draft, 2nd edition)
 - Conflict Early Warning Models: Frameworks and Reviews
 - A Glossary of Terms and Concepts used in Conflict Prevention, Mitigation, and Resolution in the context of Disaster Relief and Sustainable Development (2nd edition)
 - Synthesis and Summaries: USAID-Commissioned Conflict Risk Assessments of Guinea, Kenya, Northern Uganda, Tanzania, and Zanzibar.
- USIP Prendergrast "From the Horn to the Heart of Africa"
- Improving Conflict Prevention by Learning from Experience, Lund
- Covers of the two Carnegie books:
 - Preventing Deadly Conflict
 - Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized
- Disk with the above + four matrices from the workshop (VA, OA, Stakeholder Analysis, and Political Mapping of Stakeholders)

APPENDIX 7
WORKSHOP PRESENTATIONS IN POWERPOINT