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THE POLITICAL CLIMATE AND WILL IN SENEGAL  
FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM

FINAL REPORT

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Although I am delighted to be part of the collective effort to elaborate the mission's new development strategy, this report represents the views of the author and not that of USAID/Senegal.

THE POLITICAL CLIMATE AND WILL IN SENEGAL  
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I INTRODUCTION

This report is one of several studies commissioned by USAID/Senegal in preparation for the elaboration of the mission's development strategy for the period 1998-2006. It focuses on four key objectives:

1 provide an accurate reading of the political climate in Senegal today

2 ascertain Senegal's political will for political and economic reform at all levels of society

3 identify the main actors and forces promoting and blocking the reforms needed to accelerate the development of the country

4 point to potential areas for USAID/Senegal activities to implement the mission's strategic objectives

The study addresses a broad range of themes and issues crucial to understanding the current political situation and Senegal's will for change. These include decentralization, good governance, state-civil society relationships, the role of Islam, the impact of grassroots organizations and social networks on political and economic development, and the credibility of the regime and its political institutions. For a complete list of the topics and themes covered in this report, see Annex IV which contains the terms of reference.

The consultant began work on the study in late July 1996. During the course of the study, the consultant made four field trips to Senegal (July 25-August 30, 1996, October 29-November 27, 1996, February 23-March 22, 1997, and May 25-June 26, 1997). These field trips involved a variety of activities:

1 interviews with all the members of the core USAID/Senegal mission team charged with elaborating the mission's new development strategy

2 discussions with Senegalese scholars and practitioners working on the issues covered in the study and organizing the commissioning of six papers and presentations by Senegalese scholars

3 interviews with political party leaders, deputies, mayors, municipal, regional and rural councillor, ministers and other central government officials, governors, prefects, and sub-prefects, government technicians in the field, representatives of civil society and the media, religious leaders, businessmen, youth, NGO leaders, members and officials of diverse women's youth, and other grassroots associations, and donor officials. For a list of the persons

contacted, see Annex III

4 field trips to the interior which included the following regions outside of Dakar Thiès, Diourbel, Kaolack, Louga, Fatick, Saint Louis, and Ziguinchor

5 in-depth coverage of the November 24, 1996 election campaign

6 an extensive review of the Senegalese press and audio-visual media

7 the collection of books, documents, newspapers, campaign platforms, and other materials in Senegal related to the topics in the terms of reference and a review of these materials by the contractor at his home base at the Harry S Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace in Jerusalem

8 the examination of other USAID/Senegal studies, documents, and think piece papers related to the preparation of the new development strategy

9 an extensive review of articles and books in the literature on Senegal related to the topics in the terms of reference

## II Current Political and Social Context Crisis and Crisis Management

Senegal is currently undergoing another of its recurrent cycles of political and social crises characterized by confrontations between the governing party and the opposition concerning the elections and the electoral system, turmoil and strikes in the educational system, and growing labor and social unrest

Over the past ten years, Senegal has experienced three major political crises All began or were intensified after hotly contested and disputed elections Abdou Diouf has been able to skillfully manage the quasi permanent state of political crisis over the past decade and to reinforce his own authority as president of all the people by gradually opening up the government to other political parties, distancing himself from the PS, and promoting regionalization and further decentralization In July 1997, the country was still waiting for President Abdou Diouf to intervene to find a solution to the political impasse caused by the PS' refusal to accept an independent national electoral commission

For its part, Senegal's established political opposition parties have been less willing to take to the streets to confront the regime The entry of the PDS, PIT, and the LD-MPT into the government has reduced the volume and stridency of political protest

At the same time, the negative effects of structural adjustment and the 1994 devaluation on the average Senegalese's living standards, the unresolved and deepening crisis in the educational system, and widespread social unrest and disillusionment with the political system are making it more difficult for the regime to manage social crises in the face of growing demands by different sectors of Senegalese society for change

The credibility of Senegal's political class is increasingly in question. Many Senegalese citizens have little confidence in the ability of the politicians and the government to deal with their everyday problems. In providing different segments of society greater freedom to express their views, the liberalization of Senegal's political system has made it more difficult for the regime to manipulate Senegalese society and generated more demands and pressures on the regime and Senegal's political class to deliver on their promises

The November 24, 1996 local government elections were significant for several reasons

1 For the first time since independence, local elections became a major battleground for Senegal's opposition political parties

2 The elections reflected a genuine movement towards greater decentralization and accountability of political parties and local government to local constituencies

3 The appeal to local, regional, and ethnic identities in mobilizing electoral support marked a clear-cut trend towards greater public recognition and acceptance of Senegalese pluralism by Senegal's political class

4 The elections confirmed the PS as the country's dominant and best organized party

5 The high rate of abstentionism indicated a certain disaffection of the electorate with the political system

6 Irregularities in electoral procedures, especially in the Dakar region, cast doubts about the credibility of the electoral system and generated demands for an independent national electoral commission (CENI)

Despite the recurrent cycles of political and social crises and the declining credibility of the political class that characterize the current political and social context in Senegal, the fact remains that Senegal has made considerable progress in liberalizing the political and economic system since the beginning of the 1990s. The loosening of state control over the media, the emergence of a more autonomous and diversified private sector, the growth of dynamic grassroots associations, and decentralization laws designed to transfer more decision making powers from the central government to

local government jurisdictions are important indicators of change

The formulation of USAID/Senegal's future development strategy and its first steps towards implementation will be taking place during a period of intense political competition in which the PS will attempt to position itself to remain Senegal's governing party into the 21st century while the opposition parties will continue their uphill struggle to gain power. The political landscape is not likely to change radically in the next few years, President Diouf and the PS will probably retain their dominant position in the political system as long as the opposition remains fragmented and divided.

The next few years will be characterized by major institutional readjustments and experimentation as the 1996 decentralization and regionalization reforms are put in place. The current political and social context is also one in which Senegal is going through significant changes in the way in which politics works. With decentralization, politics will be more increasingly locally based. The diffusion of greater and more accessible information to Senegalese citizens through the media, the greater participation in national institutions of previously excluded groups, and the emergence of younger political leaders coming of age in the post-Senghor era and not wedded to old-style politics will lead to changes in the top-down, clientelist politics of the past. These developments and their impact on Senegal's political climate are discussed in detail in the body of the study.

### III The Political System

#### A Basic Features of Senegalese Political Culture

##### 1 Perspectives on Democracy

Unlike many other African countries, Senegal has a long democratic tradition. The Senegalese elite is highly committed to principles of free elections, majority rule, freedom of association, and the defense of basic human rights. Mass perceptions of the notion of democracy place more emphasis on consensus, maintaining social peace, providing everybody with a place in the sun, and equitable redistribution and sharing of resources.

Senegalese opposition parties often stress the right of opposition political parties to oust the governing party through open and fair elections as the essence of democracy. This explains the great importance they give to the notion of alternance and why they have concentrated so much time and energy to lobbying for electoral reform and a CENI which they claim will make it possible to change governments and regimes.

##### 2 Traditional Senegalese Political Leadership Styles

Senegalese political leadership is characterized by several general features

(1) Leadership is individual and not collective. While leaders may consult with others, there is only room for one leader. A Senegalese proverb states that two crocodiles can not coexist in the same swamp.

(2) Leadership is hierarchical and centralized. This kind of leadership results in top-down decision making and a sharp dichotomy between the chef who "donne les instructions" and others in the hierarchy who are expected to execute the orders. This style of leadership has been influenced by the French colonial administrative model.

(3) Senegalese leadership styles discourage open and public criticism of the leader and stifle the initiative of those under the leader. Within Senegalese political parties, criticism of the leader often results in sanctions and expulsion from the party.

(4) Competition for national political leadership is highly personalized and tends to be bipolarized around the leader of the party in power and the leader of the major opposition party. Senegal's two major political parties consequently are identified primarily with their national leader rather than with a party ideology or program. To vote PS is to vote for Diouf, to vote PDS is to vote for Wade.

(5) National political party leaders often intervene to impose their own candidates as local party leaders.

(6) National leadership and power is concentrated in the hands of the president. Thus, Abdou Diouf, like his predecessor, controls both the government and ruling party and has the final word in determining Senegal's foreign and domestic policies, naming cabinet ministers, magistrates, and high-ranking state officials, and choosing his successor as party leader.

The political and constitutional crisis which led to the demise of Prime Minister Mamadou Dia in December 1962 marked the end of the two-headed political regime in which power was shared between the President and Prime Minister. In 1963, President Léopold Sédar Senghor changed the constitution to establish a strong presidential regime and used his control over the ruling party and the state apparatus to eliminate potential rivals and establish his hegemony over the Senegalese political system. This model of presidential leadership has prevailed ever since and explains the relative weakness of the office of prime minister in the Senegalese system.

### 3 Factionalism

Competition for leadership at the local level is

also often highly personalized, bipolarized and fosters factionalism. Clan politics at the local level revolves around efforts by local leaders to gather supporters/clients loyal to them in a bid to become the local party leader. The winner in Senegalese parlance is called the leader of tendance A while the loser is called the leader of tendance B. The failure of the losers to accept the winners as party leaders fosters constant intraparty strife and sometimes leads to the losing tendance or clan to stay home or vote against its own party on election day.

Factionalism also takes place at all levels of Senegalese society--e.g. trade unions, student movements, business organizations, cooperatives, religious brotherhoods, rural villages, etc.--as rivals vie for power within their own organizations or grassroots communities.

#### 4 Clientelism

Clientelism is based on asymmetrical and hierarchical relationships between leaders and followers in which leaders redistribute resources to their followers in exchange for votes, support, and deference. Leaders are expected to be generous towards their followers and clients loyal to their patrons.

Clientelism does not entail notions of accountability. However, dissatisfied clients can vote with their feet and transfer their allegiances to other patrons when patrons don't provide what clients want. Clientelism discourages the forging of horizontal linkages and local initiative.

Two other features of Senegal's political culture raise serious obstacles to improving the political climate.

1. The losers in both interparty and intraparty elections have a tendency to attribute their loss to fraud, manipulation, and other unfair tactics by their opponents. Within the broader political system, this leads to constant delegitimization of the winners, and within individual political parties, this leads to perpetual factional conflicts. The absence of a "good loser" culture makes collaboration among contending factions and parties more difficult and undermines the efficient functioning of the political system.

2. Contending political leaders rarely engage in serious debate and face to face exchange of views. Political leaders tend to engage in monologues. This makes negotiations between contending parties based on discussion of substantive issues and principles more difficult and leads to appeals to higher authorities and/or confrontations based on a show of force as the principal means for resolving conflicts.

### B The Political Party System

## 1 One-party Dominance of the PS

The PS and its predecessors (BDS, BPS, and UPS) has been the majority party in Senegal since the BDS won the 1951 national elections with 66 7% of the votes. Founded by Senghor and Mamadou Dia in 1948, the party came to power by winning the overwhelming support of Senegal's rural populations which then constituted more than 80% of the country's population. In the 1957 territorial elections, the BPS, the successor of the old BDS, won 78 25% of the vote and took control of the executive branch of government, a position it did not relinquish over the next forty years. In the 1959 national elections, the last ones before independence, the UPS, the product of the fusion between the BPS and Lamine Guèye's Socialist Party, gained 81% of the vote and all of the seats in the National Assembly. The continued dominance of the UPS which changed its name to PS in 1976 can be attributed to several factors rooted in its pre-independence victories

(1) It was by far the single most popular political party in Senegal during the drive to independence and thus enjoyed the prestige of being the party of independence

(2) It was the only political party to have a solid party organization in the countryside

(3) It was the first political party to control the state apparatus which enabled it to use state power and resources to reinforce its position as the dominant party during President Senghor's twenty year reign (1960-1980)

The present party leadership under the direction of Ousemane Tanor Dieng (OTD) has expressed its intention to win a smashing victory in the 1998 legislative elections to reinforce its claims to govern Senegal alone without sharing power with other opposition parties

## 2 The PS and Party-State Political Culture

Senegal has much in common with Mexico where one party dominated the country since the Mexican Revolution and used its control of the state to retain power despite the existence of periodic elections, a free press, vibrant civil society, and growing public criticism of the regime until its recent defeat in the July 1997 local elections. Shortly after independence, the Senegalese government moved to squash or coopt opposition political parties. With the rallying of PRA-Sénégal to the UPS in 1966, Senegal became a de facto one-party state (1966-1974). In the last few years of his tenure as President, Senghor permitted the establishment of three and then four legal political parties which had to register as representatives of distinct ideological currents. Senghor refused to recognize the legality of other political movements seeking approval to become legal political parties. Despite the opening up of Senegal's political system to unlimited

multiparty competition in national elections under Abdou Diouf, Senegal remained a predominantly one-party system led by the PS

The absence of serious political competition, the concentration of power in the hands of the presidency, and state tutelage over local government fostered the perpetuation of a parti-état system characterized by the following

(1) a decline in party dynamism and mobilizing capacity at the local level

Not having to compete in elections, the PS had few incentives to mobilize its troops at the local level. The assured outcome of the elections meant that political competition was essentially intra-party and involved primarily local party leaders vying for office.

(2) the blurring of boundaries between party and state structures

This generally meant that (a) one had to be a member of the ruling party to become a minister or to hold high positions in the state bureaucracy, (b) state resources were used for political purposes--e.g. rewarding party followers and supporters--and appropriated by the party during election campaigns, and (c) the regime could use its hold over the state apparatus to control the media, restrict opposition party activities, and manipulate electoral rules and processes in order to preserve the PS' hegemony in the country.

(3) an unwillingness to share power or to accept the possibility of losing an election

This implied the willingness to use all means, fair or foul to insure that the PS would stay in power and the sentiment that the governing party was the only truly legitimate party in the country.

Those wedded to a party-state mentality in the PS have resisted and/or criticized President Diouf's efforts to liberalize the political system and end the party's monopoly over political power and public office. In 1981 Diouf changed the constitution to permit unlimited multiparty competition. After the 1983 elections he chose ministers among those who supported him for president as heads of citizens for Diouf groups who were clearly not party members. The 1991 electoral code made it possible for opposition parties to make gains in the 1993 national elections while Diouf's naming of ministers from the PDS, PIT, and LD-MPT in 1992 and 1995 meant that the PS had to share some control over government ministries with opposition parties.

Despite Diouf's liberalizing measures, the PS continued to maintain its political prerogatives and hegemony. Thus, the number of ministers in the government was expanded to insure

that the number of PS ministers would not be reduced. For the 1996 elections, the election rules continued to be shaped and bent to insure the victory of the PS while the Interior Minister, himself a high-ranking PS official, did not seem to have the will to maintain the administration's neutrality in organizing and supervising the elections. Party officials running for office continued to use state resources and vehicles during the campaign. And opposition party leaders cried fraud, accused the PS of spending huge sums of money to buy electoral support and denounced the alleged parti-état culture that made the PS incapable of accepting to hold fair elections.

### 3 Transformations Within the PS

While the political reforms of the early 1990s enabled opposition parties to win more seats in the National Assembly and the possibility of holding ministerial posts, the narrowing of the gap between the PS and the opposition also moved Diouf and the PS to attempt to reorganize and revitalize the party. Following its loss of the capital and Thiès to the PDS in 1993, the PS vowed to "reconquer" the capital in the 1996 elections and reorganized party structures to take into consideration changes in Senegalese society, the party's unpopularity with youth, the growing demand for a greater role for voice for women, and the need to capture the support of civil society personalities and leaders of NGOs and other associations. Thus, the youth and women's wings of the party were given more autonomy and greater representation within the Political Bureau, national and regional secretariats were created to deal with NGOs, émigré groups, and civil society, and a major effort was made to woo young people by providing jobs, sponsoring sports and cultural events, and trying to win the endorsement of prominent cultural and sports figures popular among the youth. The March 22, 1996 decentralization laws, the availability of nearly 24,000 public offices, and the fact that the main opposition parties were making an unprecedented attempt to seriously contest local elections throughout the entire country provided strong incentives for the PS to mobilize and intensify its efforts all over the country.

With Diouf's support, Ousemane Tanor Dieng (OTD) emerged as the nominal party leader in the March 1996 PS Party Congress. As First Secretary, Dieng placed many of his allies in high party positions and took responsibility for leading the PS in the November 24, 1996 rural, municipal and regional elections. The PS election campaign and its aftermath indicates that the party is moving in several directions at the same time.

(1) It has acknowledged its need to work hard to maintain its traditional electoral support and to win over and capture new constituencies created by Senegal's rapid urbanization and explosion of associational life. The PS knows that it can no longer rest on its laurels and take victory for granted.

(2) The PS is modernizing and opening up party structure to provide more representation to women, youth and civil society associations and revitalizing party life at the local level. It also is making greater use of sophisticated electoral and advertising techniques to target key constituencies.

(3) At the same time, the new party leadership has retained elements of the single party culture by not consulting with other political parties in determining the number and boundaries of the new communes d'arrondissement, adamantly rejecting the establishment of a CENI and the right of independent candidates to run for office, using state resources and state officials in the territorial administration to support the party, and telling the other parties in the government coalition to quit if they don't like the way the PS is running things. OTD and other party officials have also declared their intention to win a smashing victory in the 1988 legislative elections to reinforce the PS' claims to govern Senegal alone.

(4) The PS continues to maintain a strong rural base in the countryside where state services are often equated with PS patronage.

(5) The party still suffers from internal conflicts and factionalism which threaten its cohesion and unity. Tension within the party is likely to increase as local party leaders of different factions fight to control rural, municipal, and regional government councils which will be receiving more power over resources and jobs as a result of the 1996 decentralization laws. The jockeying to get on the PS party list for the 1998 legislative elections also threatens to heighten tensions between winners and losers.

The battle for the succession to Diouf, control of the party apparatus, and access to government posts is also likely to intensify as Tanor Dieng seeks to eliminate potential rivals for party leadership and put his own clique into key positions. The efforts to replace Mamadou Diop as mayor of Dakar, the desertion of popular local leaders like Balla Daffé in Sédhiou and Tété Diédhiou in Dakar to the PDS, and the refusal of local PS party clan leaders to accept the party leadership's choice for mayor in cities like Saint Louis all constituted signs of heightened conflict within the PS which, if not resolved, could seriously weaken the party in the future.

(6) Many political observers believe the creation of new local government institutions like the communes c'arrondissement in the region of Dakar and the proposed Senate were designed to provide consolation prizes and offices for the losers. Thus, in Dakar, candidates who did not make it as mayor of Dakar, Pikine, and Rufisque could at least have the consolation of becoming a mayor of a commune d'arrondissement.

(7) Tanor's lack of a strong grassroots political base within the party, an aggressive but inept campaign style, and resistance to his efforts to impose his allies as party leaders at the local level by older party officials have hamstrung OTD's efforts to assert his personal authority within the party

(8) Although not actively involved in the party's election campaign, Diouf still had the last word. Thus, Diouf intervened to make sure that Mamadou Diop would be the party's candidate to head the list for mayor and to overrule the clumsy attempts by Tanor's allies to replace Diop with one of their own. To avoid becoming a lame duck president, Diouf announced that he will again be a candidate for president in the year 2000. This has made it easier for PS leaders to accept Tanor Dieng as the new party boss since they don't want to openly challenge the president's choice. If Tanor falters and makes too many mistakes, Diouf still has the power to dump Tanor and his friends because he retains all the prerogatives of a presidential monarch and remains more popular than his party. During the early months of 1997, Tanor adopted a lower profile as Diouf made it clear that he was still in charge.

To conclude, the PS is definitely modernizing its party structures and adapting to changing social and economic conditions. But the modernizers rising in the party hierarchy are not necessarily reformers of Senegal's political system. On the contrary, they don't seem to be very committed to continuing and intensifying the ongoing process of democratization in the country or in fighting corruption. Despite Tanor Dieng's rapid ascent in the party, the struggle for the succession is far from over. Though now outside the government and the party hierarchy, Djibo Ka has recently positioned himself as a PS leader more open to democratic processes and committed to good governance. Foreign Minister Moustapha Niassa is another major PS figure who could emerge to challenge Dieng for the succession.

#### 4 The Parti Démocratique Sénégalaise (PDS)

Founded in 1974 by Abdoulaye Wade, the PDS soon became Senegal's major opposition party while Wade emerged as the main challenger to Abdou Diouf for the country's national leadership.

During the 1970s, the PDS started as a moderate parti de contribution rather than an opposition party seeking to bring down the governing party. During this period, the PDS was the only Senegalese party to make a serious effort to organize party structures throughout the country. It benefitted primarily from the support of UPS dissidents and defectors as well as backing from influential Mouride and Tijani marabouts in the peanut basin. Its main zones of influence were in Diourbel, the Casamance, and Dakar. In the February 26, 1978 elections, Wade and the PDS won close to 18% of the vote. More significantly Wade did best in Dakar getting more than 32% of

the vote

The radicalization process within the PDS began in 1981 when Abdou Diouf became president. Wade contested the legality of Diouf's replacing Senghor as president without being elected. Wade saw himself as the legitimate leader of the opposition. In the hotly contested 1988 national elections, Wade and the PDS cried foul when the official results gave Wade 25.8% of the votes, 40.67% of the vote in Dakar, and his party 24.74% of the votes in the legislative elections. Rioting followed the election results. Wade proclaimed himself as the duly elected president, releasing his own figures which showed him winning 58.2% of the vote. The radicalization phase ended following the 1991 electoral code and Wade's entry into the Diouf government. Wade and the PDS left the government in late 1992 to contest the 1993 national elections in which the PDS attained its best official score ever winning more than 32% and defeating the PS in Dakar, Pikine, and Thiès. Once again, Wade and the PDS cried fraud and declared that the elections had been stolen. Following the assassination of Maître Sèye, vice president of the Constitutional Council, shortly after the May 1993 legislative elections, Wade was arrested and then released in August. In January 1994, he again joined the government as Minister of State. Although highly critical of the PS in contesting the November 24, 1996 local elections, this time Wade and the PDS have remained in the government. Pressures are mounting within the party for the PDS to quit the government.

Several important features characterize the PDS as Senegal's major opposition party.

(1) The party revolves primarily around its unpredictable and charismatic leader. Wade himself has done little to promote strong party leaders at the grassroots level or to groom his lieutenants to take over when he leaves the political scene.

(2) The PDS became the major opposition party by positioning itself as the party of change (Sop1). For the PDS, change refers primarily to bringing down the PS government and replacing it with a PDS-led government. Over time, it has capitalized on growing popular dissatisfaction with the PS to enlarge its electoral base and has its greatest electoral strength in the Dakar region, Thiès, and the Casamance.

(3) Wade and the PDS have lobbied for democratic reforms and deserve much of the credit for having pressured the regime to accept important political reforms--e.g. the 1991 electoral code, greater opposition party access to state media, etc.--that have moved Senegal forward towards greater democracy. Wade has also called for other reforms--e.g. strengthening of an independent judiciary, more power for the National Assembly, and an Independent National Electoral Commission that have not yet been implemented.

(4) The PDS offers no coherent alternative projet de société to that of the PS. Wade and the PDS have criticized the PS as corrupt and incompetent and argue that they can govern more effectively. In his campaign speeches, Wade confidently asserts that he can solve most of Senegal's problems if given the chance to govern. As a liberal, he is committed to more or less the same policies as the government. As Minister of State, he has not attacked the contents of the government's economic program.

(5) The PDS has served as the main alternative for PS politicians and voters to turn to when dissatisfied with their own party. For example, during the late 1970s and 1980s, the PDS owed its strength in Oussouye department in the Lower Casamance to the defection of former PS leader Laye Diop Diatta. More recently, the PDS carried Sédhiou, thanks to the defection of former PS minister Moussa Balla Daffé,

(6) At the same time, the PDS suffers from frequent crossovers of its own party leaders to the PS. For example, between 1978 and 1983, half of the PDS deputies in the National Assembly eventually joined the ruling party. The main causes of PDS defections are the greater access to power and resources available for officials and politicians associated with the party in power.

(7) The credibility of Wade and the PDS with the public has eroded in recent years. The public realizes that Wade's claims that he and his party have won every election over the past decade are somewhat exaggerated. Perhaps more significantly, the entry of Wade and other PDS leaders into the government has undermined the credibility of the PDS as an authentic opposition party.

(8) Wade and the PDS have not been able to lead and unify the political opposition in its campaign to oust the PS. Opposition coalitions created immediately after elections to protest against electoral fraud or repression have tended to disintegrate before and during national election campaigns or when opposition parties like the PDS have decided to join the government.

(9) An interesting new development has been the suggestion put forward by Abdou Fall of the CDS (Convention Démocratique Sociale) that the collectif des 19 organized to lobby for a CENI unite behind Wade to form a single opposition party list for the May 1998 legislative elections.

## 5 The Smaller Political Parties

The number of Senegal's legal political parties has increased tremendously since Abdou Diouf eliminated restrictions on party formation in 1981. By the 1983 elections, the number of political parties had jumped from four to fourteen. In mid 1996 Senegal had twenty-five legally recognized political parties.

Since the establishment of an open multiparty system in 1981, the role of the smaller political parties have been characterized by the following

(1) Collectively, the smaller parties have steadily increased their share of the total vote, mostly at the expense of the PS and to a lesser extent that of the PDS. During the 1970s, non-PDS opposition parties took barely 1 percent of the total votes. In the 1988 legislative elections, non-PDS parties won nearly 4% of the votes. This figure jumped to close to 10% of the votes in the 1993 elections.

(2) The more prominent of the smaller political parties intensified their efforts to organize outside of Dakar and expanded their electorate in the countryside.

In the 1993 elections, the non-PDS left-wing political parties won approximately the same percentage of votes in the interior as they did in the capital. In the 1996 local elections, And Jef captured a majority of the Rural Councils in Bignona and did well in the Fouta while the LD-MPT won control of Rural Councils in the departments of Bambey and Foundiougne. The smaller political parties will also have some seats on nearly all of the municipal and regional councils and representation on many rural councils.

(4) Since the collapse of the communist system in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the formerly radical Marxist opposition has become more moderate and less ideological. In the 1990s, the major Marxist parties (e.g. PIT, LD-MPT, and And Jef) toned down their ideological pronouncements while two of them (PIT and LD-MPT) actually joined the government.

(5) Many of the smaller political parties are spin-offs from older parent parties and founded by those who left the older party. For example, the PIT, And-Jef, and LD-MPT were founded by leaders who had been formerly associated with the PAI or who were part of the radical student movement in the 1960s and early 1970s. The PDS/R was founded by Serigne Diop after he quit the PDS. The PLP was founded by Babacar Niang who broke away from Cheikh Anta Diop's RDN.

(6) In the November 24, 1996 elections AND JEF, led by Landing Savané, emerged as Senegal's third largest party. And Jef made dramatic gains by making an intensive organizational effort in the countryside, especially in Bignona where Savané campaigned as a native son, and remaining principled in its refusal to join a PS dominated government. Some of the gains of And-Jef were made at the expense of the PDS and the LD-MPT, parties that were seen by some die-hard opponents of the regime and former supporters of the two parties as having sold out by entering the government.

(7) Decentralization has increased incentives for the more prominent of the smaller parties to make greater efforts

to organize at the local level

(8) Many of the smaller political parties have lacked the following and resources to engage in electoral activity and exist largely on paper. In 1996, only 14 of the 25 parties presented candidates in the November 24 elections. Given the existing electoral rules, the smallest of the smaller political parties are likely to remain marginal and fade into obscurity, especially those with a following only in the capital.

## 5 The Independent Candidates

Mamadou Lo, who ran as a spokesperson for civil society in the 1993 presidential elections, has been Senegal's only independent candidate because of rules forbidding independent candidates running for deputy or local government positions.

In the 1996 local government elections, Jean-Paul Dias in Dakar and Cheikh Abdoulaye Dièye in Saint Louis quickly set up political parties to stay within the law but essentially ran campaigns as independent candidates who were not beholden to the political party system. Dias, a former PDS leader, claims that his party is now the fifth largest. Cheikh Abdoulaye Dièye ran an impressive campaign as a reform candidate in Saint Louis. As municipal councilor he has initiated investigations looking into misuse of municipal funds.

## 6 Political Party Finances

### Where Will Political Party Finance Come From?

The issue of political party finances in Senegal, as elsewhere, becomes most acute during election campaigns when the need for money to finance public meetings, travel expenses, publicity, etc. reaches its peak.

The PS is in the best position to finance its political activities. It has a large membership and collects money through several traditional means: (a) sale of membership cards, (b) annual dues, (c) contributions of party candidates, (d) contributions of elected and appointed officials such as deputies and ministers, (e) contributions of wealthy party supporters. Other political parties also use similar methods to finance their activities.

The PDS is the only other political party with a large enough base to raise significant sums of money. But, the PDS is far from being competitive with the PS in its capacity to raise funds. In the past, Wade himself financed much of the party's activities with his own money or funds solicited from backers abroad--e.g. the French Right or the International Liberal Movement. The drying up of external financial support coupled with an apparent decline in Wade's own financial situation hampered the PDS' campaign efforts in the 1996 elections and contributed to a decline in its electoral

support especially in Dakar

The key difference between the PS and other political parties is that the PS also has broad access to state resources which can be diverted for party use. The PS also receives money from private firms aligned with the regime and benefitting from special privileges. The governing party thus has many advantages over the other parties in financing campaigns and party activities.

The PS recently has advocated raising money by setting up NGOs, party youth associations, and other income-generating organizations which would devote part of its revenues to the party. This would make it possible for the party to keep the costs of membership cards low in order not to discourage potential members from joining. The official stance of the PS is that it has relatively little financial resources available. Most of the party financing seems to be centrally controlled. Tanor seemed to have little difficulty in finding party funds for his own personal campaigns. On the other hand, local party officials often maintained that they received little money from central party institutions to conduct local election campaigns.

During the November 24, 1996 election campaign, the independent media produced stories suggesting that directors of important state services diverted funds to the party, and that foreign governments-- mainly Senegal's friends in the Arab world-- also contributed large sums of money to support the Diouf regime. The media have also reported that political parties, especially the PS, dispensed large sums of money to important "grands électeurs," paid off prominent politicians to defect from other parties, and used money to finance the distribution of rice, sugar, and other basic commodities to family heads as a means of securing their votes and those of their families.

There is growing support in Senegal for the state to intervene to regulate the financing of political campaigns and to provide funding for political parties participating in elections. Even the PS has expressed the need for some kind of financial electoral assistance for political parties and regulation of party financing. While the PS is likely to support, if not initiate, legislation in this area, it is less likely to promote legislation that would permit stricter enforcement of rules against diverting state resources for campaign purposes.

## C The Electoral System

### 1 Evolution

During the Senghor era (1960-1980), the electoral system was tightly controlled by the government. From 1966-1974, Senegal was a de facto one party state. Diouf liberalized the political system by permitting an unlimited number of

political parties to contest elections. But election rules-- e.g. the absence of the secret ballot, no requirements for voters to prove their identity, and limited representation of opposition parties in supervising election results in polling stations--provided the ruling party with many opportunities to inflate their score.

The passage of the 1991 electoral code reform created the potential for open and transparent elections and was supported by nearly all of Senegal's political parties. However, flaws in the system manifested themselves in the 1993 national elections and in the 1996 elections. The most pertinent criticism of the electoral system concerns the lack of neutrality of the Ministry of the Interior in organizing and supervising the elections.

## 2 The CENI Debate

The recent debate concerning the CENI reflects the lack of serious discussion and dialogue between the PS and the 19 political parties in the collectif des 19. Until now, both sides have budged little from their initial positions and are counting on President Diouf to intervene to support their point of view. The PS wants to maintain the existing system more or less intact with the Ministry of the Interior continuing to organize and supervise the elections, and has denounced the CENI as dangerous, anti-Republican, and even unconstitutional. On the other hand, the opposition has called for a totally independent national electoral commission that would be responsible for organizing and supervising all phases of the electoral process. A compromise solution that would provide Senegal with more safeguards and supervision against manipulation and fraud than found in the current system, if fully implemented in good faith, would probably be sufficient to insure the kind of transparent elections needed to instill confidence in the electoral system.

## 3 Independent Candidates

One of the major obstacles to further democratization of Senegal's political system are the electoral rules barring independent candidates from running for office who are not running on a political party list officially recognized by the government. The only exception to this rule took place in the 1993 presidential elections when independent candidates were permitted to run against Abdou Diouf. Mamadou Lo, the only independent candidate in the race, ran as the candidate of civil society. While most vocal about the need for an independent national election commission, most of Senegal's established political parties have been relatively silent on the need for independent candidates. Iba Der Thiam's CDP/Garab G1 has been one of the few political parties to insist that the right for independent lists of candidates to contest elections is a fundamental democratic principle.

The PS and the PDS have the most to lose from changing

the current system for several reasons

(1) It would provide more incentives for party leaders with a popular following to quit the party and to run as independent candidates without going through the trouble of forming a new political party. Someone like Balla Daffé, for example, would probably have preferred to run as an independent candidate in Sédhiou rather than rallying to the PDS

(2) Decentralization provides more incentives for candidates to contest elections at the local level without having to be a member of a party or having the support of the national and local party hierarchy. In some areas, a leader of a non-partisan group of citizens might be preferred by the electorate to discredited local party leaders or candidates imposed by the national hierarchy of political parties

(3) It would make local leaders less dependent on the party and more dependent on support by and accountability to local community groups

(4) At the local level, independent candidates would more likely fight for local interests rather than submit to decisions made by the national party leadership

In fact, it is possible for politicians seeking to run as independents to do so by conforming with the law and forming their own parties. For the November 24, 1996 elections, Jean-Paul Dias in Dakar and Cheikh Abdoulaye Dièye in Saint Louis established their own party lists while running as independent reformers

#### 4 Representation Issues

Representation rules have gradually improved since independence. For example, the 1959 election rules called for legal political parties to establish a national party list. The party winning the majority of the votes in the country then took all of the seats in the National Assembly. During the Senghor era, the government restricted the number of political parties, prevented popular leaders like Cheikh Anta Diop and Mamadou Da from creating their own political parties, and forced many left-wing groups underground.

The system became more representative when Abdou Diouf changed the constitution in 1981 to permit an unlimited number of political parties to register and contest elections. The 1991 and 1996 electoral codes opened up the system even further. Rules governing the 1993 national legislative elections called for 70 of the 120 seats in the National Assembly to be determined by proportional representation. Because of opposition boycotts of local elections and a winner take all electoral system, the PS continued to monopolize local government offices until the November 24, 1996 elections. The 1996 local government election rules called for half the seats

to be determined by proportional representation and the other half by a winner take all system in which the majority party would take all of the remaining seats in its district. Since 1993, the smaller political parties have won seats in the National Assembly and more recently in local government institutions. Despite improvements in representation rules, the rules still favor the majority party by giving them a larger percentage of seats than would be justified by the percentage it received in the elections.

The PS is currently proposing rules which will make the system less representative by

- 1 eliminating the requirement that a presidential candidate needs to win at least 25% of the number of registered voters to win on the first round

- 2 reducing the number of seats in the National Assembly allocated by proportional representation from 70 to 60

- 3 imposing requirements that will make it difficult for smaller regionally and locally-based political parties to run

---A major electoral reform which would make elected officials more representative of their constituencies would be the creation of single district constituencies. Such a reform would be particularly useful for Rural Council elections where officials residing in the chef lieu of the Rural Community often have a disproportionate number of seats while other villages are not represented at all.

#### 5 Abstentionism and the Senegalese Electorate

The rapidly growing numbers of Senegalese citizens eligible to vote have not been accompanied by a parallel increase in the number of registered voters. Voter turnout has declined steadily in relative terms during the 1990s despite the lowering of the voting age to 18 in 1991. In 1983 over 56 percent of those registered voted. In the 1993 presidential elections, less than 52 percent of those registered voted. In 1996 only 2.9 million eligible voters out of a potential of 3.8 million registered. Of the 2.9 million voters registered, less than 1.3 million (44 percent) actually voted. The relatively low turnout took some of the shine off of the PS' victory in the 1996 local government elections. It remains to be seen to what extent the low voter turnout was due to efforts by the regime to discourage opposition supporters from voting, the decision of large numbers of potential voters not to vote because they had little confidence in the political parties and political leaders contesting the elections, or the incompetence and confused lines of authority among government officials responsible for organizing the elections.

#### D National Political Institutions

## 1 The Executive Branch

### a The President

The single most important political institution is the presidency. National leadership and power are concentrated in the hands of the president. Abdou Diouf, like his predecessor, controls both the ruling party and the government. The president determines Senegal's foreign and domestic policies, names all cabinet magistrates, army officers, and high-ranking state officials. The president also has the power to initiate changes in the constitution more or less as he wishes and to prepare his succession by establishing rules and precedents that will make it possible for the person he is grooming as his successor to become president without being elected. Thus, Senghor changed the constitution to make sure that the prime minister (Abdou Diouf) would succeed him if Senghor would die or resign before his term of office ended. The succession rules also kept the new president in office until the next scheduled presidential elections (1983) term (1983).

While liberalizing the political system, Diouf, like his mentor Senghor, has worked hard to (1) maintain and reinforce the powers of the presidency, (2) promote a coterie of devoted followers both within the party and the government to loyally follow his bidding, (3) trim the wings of popular political figures in his party who conceivably could become strong enough to challenge his leadership, and (4) project a positive international image of himself and of the country.

Several features concerning the structure and organization of the presidency merit attention.

(1) Little has been done to delegate real authority outside the presidency. Nearly all major reforms and legislation originate within the office of the presidency. A large number of political, legal, military, economic, religious, and cultural advisors and specialists directly work for the president and provide counsel and information concerning the functioning of government and civil society.

(2) The overconcentration of power in the hands of the president slows down government decision making processes and is detrimental to effective implementation of policies.

(3) Over the years, Diouf has made an effort to clearly distinguish between the office of the presidency and that of leader of the dominant national political party. The designation of Ousemane Tanor Dieng as PS First Secretary in March 1996 represented an important step towards breaking down the fusion of party and state institutions.

(4) Diouf has also sought to elevate the office of the presidency by seeking to endow it with a quasi-religious quality.

(5) Direct criticism of the president has declined in recent years as the president has attempted to position himself above party politics. More people are looking to Diouf to intervene as the last resort in arbitrating political, economic, and social conflicts.

#### b The Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers

Under Senegal's strong presidential regime, the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers have relatively little initiative. They are largely instruments for implementing the program defined by the president. The Prime Minister has little leverage over the other ministers in the cabinet since it is the president who actually chooses the ministers. Habib Thiam, a close friend and associate of the president, has held the post since 1991.

One of the most important developments since 1992 has been the naming of political party leaders outside the PS as ministers. The establishment of a broad-based government (the so-called enlarged presidential majority) including opposition parties has led to some of the following benefits:

(1) contributed to greater transparency and openness in formulating and discussing government policy

(2) provided opposition leaders with experience in governing and managing a ministry

(3) made opposition ministers more aware of financial and institutional constraints affecting the choice and implementation of government policies

(4) weakened the foundations of the party-state culture by legitimizing the presence of opposition and non-PS political party leaders in government

On the other hand, partisan politics has created tensions within the government and undermined effective collaboration between PS ministers and ministers from political parties hostile to the governing party. For example, Wade has complained that PS ministers have deliberately torpedoed his projects while other opposition ministers have maintained that the PS has blocked the appointment of non-PS officials to head key services within their ministries. For its part, the PS has bitterly protested against opposition claims that their ministers do a better job and allegations implying that PS ministers and the party have a monopoly over corruption and bad governance practices. PS party leaders also covet ministries held by opposition leaders and argue that opposition leaders should quit the government if they are not happy with their colleagues in the PS. Some observers also argue that the cooptation of the PDS and LD-MPT has reduced pressures on the regime to undergo major political reforms.

#### c The State Bureaucracy

Although donor pressures through structural adjustment programs have led to reductions in the size of the state bureaucracy and the scope of government economic intervention, there is still considerable resistance on the part of civil servants to giving up their regulatory powers and prerogatives and changing top-down management styles and Jacobin models of governance. Ministers and directors of central services often find it difficult to delegate authority. Their administrative style discourages initiative by lower level civil servants, collaboration among different levels of the bureaucracy, and effective implementation and monitoring of state programs.

Since independence, the top echelons of the state bureaucracy have been dominated by a corps of male administrateurs civils trained in the French bureaucratic tradition. During the early years of independence, ambitious young men sought careers in the civil service. However, declines in real wages and cutbacks in personnel have made government employment much less attractive than in the past. With the modernization of the state bureaucracy, economic, technical and managerial rather than administrative skills have become relatively more important in recruiting heads of national services.

The persistence of recruitment and promotion criteria unrelated to merit and competence hamper the efficiency of the state bureaucracy. Civil servants active in opposition party politics still find it difficult to obtain important government posts. But with other parties in the government, PS party affiliation is not as important as in the past. The new Civil Service law passed in June 1997 should also provide more clear-cut criteria for promoting and sanctioning civil servants.

#### d The Territorial Administration

The authority of the territorial administration has been steadily declining since the beginning of the 1990s. The 1996 decentralization laws should accelerate this process as local government assumes more responsibility and initiative. While the new decentralization texts proclaim the end of the tutelage of the territorial administration, the sub-prefects, prefects, and governors still have to approve local government budgets before they can be executed. Moreover, many state officials continue to exert considerable authority in areas where local voluntary associations and political leaders are weak.

During the colonial period, the territorial administration dealt primarily with Senegal's predominantly rural populations. With Senegal's rapid urbanization, more and more prefects and sub-prefects deal with urbanized populations and urban government officials. For example, the creation of 43 communes d'arrondissement within the Dakar region has led to the reassignment of sub-prefects previously accustomed to administer rural councils and rural populations to

metropolitan areas where they will have to deal with a very different kind of population and local government official

Decentralization and urbanization are thus creating conditions requiring a new kind of territorial administration official

## 2 The National Assembly

Although no longer a rubber stamp institution, the National Assembly still remains a weak institution in relationship to the executive branch of government. It rarely initiates legislation and has little means at its disposal to provide National Assembly commissions and individual deputies with the information needed to effectively challenge government proposals or to present alternative ones

The National Assembly has become an increasingly more pluralist and representative body since 1993, thanks to the presence of deputies from parties other than the PS and PDS and a larger number of young and female deputies. Debate is more vigorous than in the past

The composition of the National Assembly reflects two different kinds of perspectives. The first is a Jacobin perspective which sees the deputy as above all concerned with promoting the national interest. Deputies elected on the national party list tend to be more Dakar-oriented, better educated, and more closely tied to national party leadership. The second perspective perceives the deputy primarily as the representative of local constituencies. Deputies elected on departmental party lists tend to be relatively less educated and have a stronger local grassroots electoral base than their counterparts on the national party lists. Some are not literate in French and often have trouble following the debates in French

Before independence, territorial councilors in the Territorial Assembly from the same region often constituted pressure groups to lobby for services and investments in their region. This practice died out under the one-party and Jacobin state regime instituted by Senghor. The reemergence of pluralist politics in Senegal coupled with decentralization and regionalization reforms are creating the climate for new forms of coalitions within the National Assembly based on local and regional concerns and interests. Thus, PDS and PS deputies from the Casamance joined together to create a parliamentary group dedicated to finding a peaceful solution to the Casamance conflict. Regional Council presidents who are also deputies are likely to promote their region's interests in the National Assembly

## 3 The Judiciary

Like the National Assembly, the judiciary remains a weak branch of government, lacking autonomy and subordinated to the

executive branch of government. In principle, the independence of the judiciary is guaranteed by the constitution, Magistrates cannot be removed from office without their consent, and in carrying out their duties, they are not to be pressured by the executive or legislative branches. In practice, however, the courts have rarely ruled against the government in important constitutional cases or political trials.

The courts have often been a major political battleground. Opposition political leaders in the past have attempted to delegitimize the legal system by accusing it of lacking neutrality and being too closely tied to the Diouf regime. For his part, President Diouf has made a great effort to present Senegal as a country guided by the rule of law.

The recent defamation trial pitting Mimran versus Sud-Communication provides an interesting case study of the politicization of court cases. Sud-Communication was accused of defaming the character of Jean-Claude Mimran, a close friend and ally of the President, by writing articles accusing him and his company of cheating the government of millions of dollars in customs revenues. The court found Sud-Communication guilty and ordered Sud-Communication to pay a fine of over 500 million CFA in damages. The size of the fine was unprecedented and considered by many as a thinly disguised effort to stifle freedom of the press as well as a warning not to attack the president's friends.

The trial soon became a cause célèbre. The legal aspects of the case quickly became subordinated to political factors. Sud-Communication decided to appeal the case. Just a few days before the appeal, President Diouf decorated Mimran for services rendered to the country in a highly publicized ceremony, which observers considered to be at best inappropriate and at worst a blatant attempt to influence the judge. For its part, Sud-Communication made no effort to present the kind of legal defense needed to overturn the original verdict.

— The Mimran versus Sud-Communication case indicates a certain lack of confidence in the autonomy and neutrality of the courts when dealing with controversial political issues. While there is much speculation about the lack of autonomy and politicization of the judiciary, no major studies exist which have systematically looked at this issue. A systematic study of Senegal's legal system would do much to clear the air and provide a more solid basis for proposing concrete measures to improve the current legal system and to provide safeguards for maintaining its autonomy.

#### 4. The Economic and Social Council

One of the most positive recent developments has been the revitalization of the previously moribund Economic and Social Council. The 1963 constitution set up the Economic and

Social Council as an advisory body to the government on national economic and social policy. Under Senghor, it served primarily as an organ of the presidency. During the 1980s, the Council declined in importance. Since 1993, its membership has been expanded to make it more representative of Senegalese society and of interests that had been previously excluded-- e g , youth, womens' groups, the informal sector, NGOs, and voluntary associations. The Economic and Social Council has emerged as an important forum for the public discussion of important social and economic issues. Under the leadership of its current president, Famara Sagna, it is currently contemplating creating a Senegalese think tank to initiate serious research and public debate on vital issues.

#### IV Islam and the Muslim Brotherhoods

Since independence, Senegal has become a clearly more Islamic society both in numbers and in the depth of the practice of the faithful. Nearly 95 percent of the population are Muslims. The overwhelming majority of Senegal's Muslim population are affiliated with Sufi Brotherhoods. At the present time, Senegal seems to be in little danger of a fundamentalist takeover and is continuing a long tradition of religious tolerance and coexistence.

In his excellent study, Islamic Society and State Power in Senegalese Society (1995), Leonardo Villalón argues that the Muslim Brotherhoods in Senegal have provided the basis for a religiously based "civil society" by

- 1 serving as a balance to state power and a major barrier to unchecked authoritarian excesses on the part of the state

- 2 encouraging their followers (talibés) to be both good citizens and good Muslims

- 3 defending peasant interests and representing societal concerns in the face of state actions

- 4 contributing to the maintenance of a stable and quasi-democratic order in Senegal

While Villalón may be somewhat overstating their importance in equating the Brotherhoods with civil society, it is clear that the Brotherhoods are a crucial component of Senegal's political system and must be taken into account when considering strategies for promoting good governance and social and economic development.

##### A The Political Role of Religious Leaders

Historically, Senegal's Muslim leaders have played a prominent role in Senegalese political life. During the colonial conquest and early years of French rule, Muslim

religious leaders staunchly opposed the authority of the French. However, by WWI, the leaders of the most prominent Muslim Brotherhood had made their peace with the French and called upon their followers to accept the authority of the French colonial state.

The involvement of religious leaders in Senegalese politics serves three important functions:

(1) To legitimize the authority of the state and its leaders. While in power, Senghor insisted upon asserting the supreme authority of the Senegalese state. As a Catholic, he also worked hard to retain the political support of the marabouts for his own leadership through frequent personal visits, bestowing state honors on the heads of the brotherhoods, providing resources to construct mosques and finance pilgrimages to Mecca, and offering other services and material benefits to the Brotherhood leaders.

As President, Abdou Diouf has continued Senghor's policy of retaining the Muslim leaders' allegiance to the Senegalese state. However, as a Muslim, he has also used Islamic symbols to reinforce his own personal authority among Senegal's Muslim populations in a way that the Catholic Senghor could not do. Thus, one of Diouf's first acts as president was to go on pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia where he asserted Senegal's role as the preeminent spokesperson for Francophone Africa's predominantly Muslim countries.

(2) to provide electoral support for political parties by endorsing and instructing their followers to vote for the candidates and parties favored by the marabouts. Blaise Diagne, who became Senegal's first Black African deputy in 1914, owed much of his victory to the backing he received from the Mourides thanks to his lobbying to bring Amadou Bamba back from exile to Senegal. During the post-war decolonization era, Senghor and his party owed much of their success to endorsements received from prominent Brotherhood leaders who were able to deliver the votes of their followers. Since independence, the Muslim brotherhoods' leaders have constituted one of the main pillars of the regime and contributed to Senegal's political stability.

The ndigel, the instructions given by the marabout to his talibés (followers) to vote for the candidate or party designated by the marabout, has been one of the most prominent features of the involvement of religious leaders in Senegalese politics. When given, the ndigel imposes an obligation on the follower under the authority of the marabout to vote for his choice. In the 1988 presidential elections, Abdou Diouf benefitted tremendously from the ndigel handed down by Abdoul Lahat Mbacké, the head of the Mouride Brotherhood.

The use and impact of the ndigel as an instrument for mobilizing electoral support seems to be waning for several reasons:

(1) The leader of the Mourides, the most centralized and disciplined of Senegal's Brotherhoods, declined giving an ndigel to his followers in the 1993 presidential and legislative elections and in the 1996 local elections

(2) Urbanization has weakened the hold of the rural-based brotherhood leaders over the faithful

(3) The institution of the secret ballot in 1991 made it easier for followers not to follow their marabout's orders without being detected, thus reducing the risk of sanctions being taken against them

(4) There has been a growing trend for the faithful to make distinctions between the authority of the marabouts in religious matters and their authority in political matters

(5) Many marabouts have responded to the unpopularity of the PS among their constituents by not binding their followers to vote for a given candidate or party even though they themselves might endorse the governing party and publicly declare their loyalty to President Diouf. Conversely, many marabouts sympathetic to opposition party leaders don't see the advantage of issuing an ndigel in their favor when the chances of opposition candidates winning are highly unlikely

(6) The decline of the parti-état which blurred the identity of state and party officials coupled with Diouf's efforts to present the office of president as separate from and above that of PS party leader has made it more possible for Muslim leaders to affirm their allegiance to the state and support of Diouf without having to necessarily back the PS

Despite the decline of the ndigel in election campaigns, popular Muslim leaders and movements still exercise considerable political clout. In the 1993 presidential and legislative elections Abdoulaye Wade and the PDS benefitted tremendously from the support of the Moustarchidine movement headed by Moustapha Sy, the son of Cheikh Tijiane Sy. The Moustarchidines helped Wade and the PDS to carry Dakar, Pikine, and Thiès. The government outlawed the movement after rioting in February 1994 led to the lynching of several policemen. A reconciliation between President Diouf and Cheikh Tidiane Sy, the honorary president of the Moustarchidines, engineered just before the November 24, 1996 elections, led to the lifting of the ban on their movement and not surprisingly, a shift in allegiance from the PDS to Tanor and the PS.

One of the most recent developments in Senegalese politics has been the emergence of marabouts and religious reformers as candidates for political office. The National Assembly has a PS marabout from the Kolda region and a PDS marabout from the Mbacké family. In Saint-Louis, Cheikh Abdoulaye Dièye, a Mouride marabout and city planner, campaigned as an independent reform candidate after organizing his own party and won close to 15% of the vote in the November

24, 1996 elections Sadio Cissé, the mayor of Waoundé, is a religious reformer closely connected with Zakat-House, a Wahabite NGO financed by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait

Another development in recent years has been a shift in attitude and tactics of leaders of radical and formerly Marxist parties towards the brotherhoods. After years of denouncing the maraboutic system, opposition leaders like Landing Savané, for example, are now courting the marabouts by paying their respects during important religious holidays and pilgrimages. In 1997, the opposition parties also sent delegations to lobby the leaders of the major brotherhoods for support of an independent national electoral commission.

(3) to obtain material benefits and honors in exchange for their collaboration and support for the regime. During the colonial period, French officials allocated large tracts of lands to prominent maraboutic leaders in the peanut basin in exchange for their accepting French authority and promoting peanut production. They also gave lots of medals and honors to marabouts like Seydou Nourou Tall who recruited Senegalese troops to fight for France in WWI and who remained faithful subjects of France.

While not controlling the state apparatus and its resources, Senegal's two major parties in the post WWII era before independence used their influence to reward Muslim leaders in their political camp. For example, many of the peanut cooperatives established during this period were run by prominent marabouts and their followers.

After independence, the state extended preferential treatment to its maraboutic supporters. Certain religious authorities received enormous loans from state-run banks which they felt they did not have to repay. The leading peanut producers among the marabouts also received higher prices for their peanuts, special attention from the extension services, greater access to rural inputs, and large tracts of land which often intruded on herder grazing grounds. During the era of the one-party state, the electoral support of the religious leaders was relatively less important in the absence of party competition.

Since the 1980s, competition for the support of Muslim religious leaders has increased considerably among Senegal's political parties. The PS has a marked advantage over all the other political parties because it has the resources of the state at its disposition which can be used to reward religious leaders supporting the regime. Abdoulaye Wade, himself a Mouride, has done his best to wean the support of the Mouride brotherhood leaders away from Diouf. But it is difficult to compete with a PS-dominated government which can allocate 40,000 hectares in one day to the Grand Khalife of the Mourides as it did in the early 1990s.

Resources received by the marabouts in exchange for their

support of state authority, Diouf, and the governing party often get redistributed to their followers because inherent within the maraboutic system is an important redistribution and social welfare component in which the religious leader is obliged to share his wealth, provide opportunities for employment, and take care of the basic needs of his talibés. Thus, the more prominent leaders use their influence to get their followers jobs in the state bureaucracy, offer land and seeds to peasants having worked for the marabout, provide funds to help petty traders, merchants, and entrepreneurs to get started, and distribute food to the needy. These kinds of arrangements reinforce clientelism with resources flowing down from the state to the marabouts and then from the marabouts to the talibés.

The evolution of political, economic and social conditions has led to changes in the nature and intensity of relationships between the state, Senegal's religious leaders, and politics.

(1) The state has fewer resources and more claimants on its resources.

(2) The decline of the peanut basin coupled with the deregulation and privatization of agriculture give the state fewer opportunities to offer advantages to rural-based religious leaders.

(3) The collapse of the state-controlled banking and credit system, reform and privatization of state banks, and more rigorous control of the banking system in general also makes it more difficult for the state to channel resources towards their maraboutic supporters.

(4) However, despite the decline in discretionary resources available to the state, the regime still has considerable resources to dispense, especially at election time, to win the support of prominent Muslim leaders.

(5) The growing size of the most prominent maraboutic families is creating more competition for power and status within the Brotherhoods and providing incentives for the younger marabouts to become more directly active in politics to gain access to state resources.

#### B The Brotherhoods, Reformist Movements, and Radical Islamic Movements in Senegal

Westerners often regard fundamentalist movements as anti-western, and revolutionary. However, conservative fundamentalist regimes like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are not revolutionary and have forged close alliances with the United States. To date, radical anti-western Islamic fundamentalists have not had much of an impact on the Senegalese political system or society. Ahmed Niasse's efforts during the late 1970s and early 1980s to establish a radical Islamic party

committed to transforming Senegal into an Islamic Republic soon fizzled out. His younger brother, Sidy Lamine Niasse, who started Wal Fadjri as a radical Islamic newspaper has also toned down his rhetoric while his newspaper has become a respectable daily addressing a more secular readership. The Moustarchidine movement which adopted a radical reformist rhetoric while mobilizing thousands of discontented urban Muslim youths under its banners in 1993 rallied to the regime just before the November 1996 elections. The fact that both Ahmed Niasse and Moustapha Sy are themselves members of the ruling families of Tijani Brotherhoods and part of Senegal's maraboutic establishment serves as a check on their radicalism. The small and predominantly Lebanese Shiite movement in Senegal maintains close ties with Iran and has begun to recruit among urban Senegalese youth.

In recent years, Iran, Iraq, and Libya which had stormy relations with Senegal during the 1980s, have been less interested in financing radical Islamic movements in Senegal. The drying up of external financial resources has hindered the expansion of radical Islamic groups.

Both the state and the maraboutic establishment have been wary of fundamentalist and reformist movements and have done their best to keep these movements under control. Since the Senghor era, the state has supported moderate Islamic reformist groups like the Fédération des Associations Islamiques au Sénégal (F A I S) founded by Abdou Aziz Sy Junior in 1962 and the Union Pour le Progrès Islamique au Sénégal (U P I S) founded in 1973. Both associations led by men affiliated with the Sy Tijani dynasty in Tivaouane had close ties with the administration and were encouraged to counterbalance the growing influence of the Mourides as well as to provide an alternative to radical Islamic reformist groups critical of the regime.

Early reformist movements like Cheikh Toure's Union Culturelle Musulmane (UCM) founded in 1953 were highly critical of the maraboutic system in Senegal. Others like Al-Fallah and Jamaatou Ibadou Rahmane (JIR), influenced by the Wahabite movement in Saudi Arabia, have preached a more orthodox form of Islam. One of the most striking developments in recent years has been the toning down of criticism of Senegal's maraboutic system on the part of Islamic reformist movements and radical secular political leaders. Reformist leaders now preach unity, solicit the heads of the Senegalese Brotherhoods to attend their major cultural and religious events, and acknowledge the Brotherhoods' religious practices and events as legitimate. Rather than directly confronting the maraboutic system, Islamic reformers now seek to promote reform within the Brotherhoods.

Reformist Islamic associations stressing Islamic educational and charitable activities not controlled by the Brotherhoods in recent years have been used by the state as a counterweight to the power of the brotherhoods. These reform

movements have also received considerable material benefits from the state in exchange for supporting state programs in such areas as family planning, Arabic language education, and anti-AIDS campaigns

The waning influence of Marxist ideologies and the conversion of many former Marxists to Islam and the maraboutic system have also reinforced Islam as the dominant ideological and social force in the country and contributed to a decline in attacks on the Brotherhoods. Religion is no longer regarded as the "opium of the masses." The rallying of many students and intellectuals to the maraboutic system has sparked reformist currents within the brotherhoods and increased their appeal to Senegalese youth. For their part, the Brotherhoods seem perfectly capable of assimilating and coopting reformist currents while many Islamic reformers seek to promote reform from within the maraboutic framework.

Today, the Brotherhoods constitute a major barrier to radical religious fundamentalism and political upheaval for several reasons

1 Although demanding that the state not violate traditional Muslim law in matters affecting family life and introduce more Islamic content in the public school system, the Brotherhoods have not challenged the legitimacy of the secular state or called for the installation of an Islamic state governed by the Sharia.

2 The leadership of the major Brotherhoods all preach the importance of maintaining national unity and social peace. During periods of major political and social tension, the marabouts have often been solicited to intervene to calm the situation.

3 The Brotherhoods have been reaching out to Senegal's urban youth and seeking to incorporate them into the maraboutic system which is generally committed to non-violence and the maintenance of social peace.

4 The major religious leaders have generally preached and practiced peaceful coexistence within and between the different Senegalese Brotherhoods, thus reducing the potential for violence to erupt between members of different brotherhoods. The top religious leaders are regularly invited to attend each other's religious celebrations.

#### C Urban-Based Islamic NGOs and Associations

Senegal has a large number of urban based Islamic associations and NGOs to meet the spiritual and social needs of Senegal's Muslim populations. Unlike the predominantly secular NGOs and associations described later in the study, the Islamic NGOs and associations discussed in this section have as one of their major objectives the propagation and reinforcement of the faith and include

1 da'hiras The urban extensions of the Senegalese brotherhoods, the da'hiras bring together members living in the same neighborhood or workplace who meet on a regular basis. Their meetings often consist of religious singing (the Muslim equivalent of gospel music). Members pay dues and make contributions to their marabouts. Some of the money collected may be sent to the rural-based maraboutic leadership. But much of the money is used for mosque construction, maintenance, and repair and providing assistance to the needy.

2 cultural and educational associations affiliated with one of the major brotherhoods These groups seek to promote Islamic culture and religious practices. Mouride versions tend to promote the ideas of Ahmadou Bamba. The Al Azhar Institute, founded by Mortada Mbacké seeks to reinforce Islam by establishing Islamic educational institutions. The Tijani associations generally represent modernist currents in Islam and are often supported by funding from Arab countries.

3 anti-Brotherhood reformist Islamic associations These groups have a smaller following and generally present ideas which are highly critical of the maraboutic system. Some of these groups call for the establishment of an Islamic state and receive significant financial support from Iran and Arab countries.

4 charitable and educational institutions not directly affiliated with the Brotherhoods The Fonds Sénégalais de Solidarité Islamique (FSSI) founded by Khadim Mbacké, the head of the Islamic research department of IFAN, for example, seeks to "fight to improve the lot of the poor". One has also seen a sizeable expansion in the number of Franco-Arabic and Arabic educational institutions to, a large extent, financed by Arab countries. Organized by university scholars and intellectuals, CERID (Cercle d'Etudes et de Recherches Islam et Développement) reflects a modernist Islamic perspective on development.

5 Association Nationale des Imams de Senegal This group is presided over by the Imam of the Grande Mosquée of Dakar and tends to support the regime on most issues. Recently, the Association took a stand in favor of family planning after many of its members attended an international Islamic family planning conference.

6 Islamic NGOs financed largely by international Islamic NGOs and Institutions These include institutions like the Agence Musulmane d'Afrique (Kuwait) which has dug wells, constructed mosques, and cared for orphans in Dakar, Bignona, and Kolda, WAMY (World Assembly of Muslim Youth), a branch of the Fayçal Foundation in Saudi Arabia with 16 offices in Africa that has built Islamic youth centers, funded mosque construction, and provided subsidies to celebrate Muslim holidays, Human Appeal International (Arab Emirates) which has provided funds to build mosques, care for orphans, and dig wells in Pikine, and the Islamic African Relief Agency.

(Sudan) which finances various social, educational, health and agricultural activities

#### D Islam and the Christian Minority

Senegal has a long tradition of religious tolerance and peaceful coexistence between Muslims and Catholics. It should be noted that most Senegalese Muslims do not regard the rebellion in the Casamance to be a Catholic rebellion even though the ostensible head of the MFDC is a Catholic clergyman.

In the 1988 census, Christians comprised only 4.3 per cent of the total population. Nearly all of Senegal's Christians are Catholic. Two-thirds live in towns.

With the resurgence of Islam, Senegal's small Christian community remains somewhat apprehensive about the possibility of Senegal's becoming an Islamic Republic. However, most of Senegal's political and intellectual elite remain strongly committed to a secular state. In the past, relationships between Muslim and Christian communities have been very good and generally characterized by mutual respect and tolerance.

Catholic religious leaders have not been as involved in national Senegalese politics as their Muslim colleagues. They can't deliver the vote of rank and file Catholics. However, Catholic leaders have been prominent in dealing with events in the Casamance. Abbé Augustin Diamacoune Senghor has been the main spokesman for the Movement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance (MFDC) since the outbreak of rebellion in the early 1980s. More recently, a committee of Catholic clergy in the Casamance has played an important role in seeking a peaceful settlement to the conflict. Cardinal Thiandoum is also a highly respected national figure in Senegal.

Senegalese Catholics have their own networks of religious, educational, and charitable organizations which support a well-developed private educational system which is also frequented by Muslim students, especially at the secondary school level. Since two-thirds of Senegalese Catholics live in the towns, they have a relatively larger role to play in urban associational life than in the countryside.

Under the leadership of Senghor and Diouf, the PS has regularly won most of the Catholic vote in Senegal. Elizabeth Diouf, the president's wife, is Catholic and Diouf has given Catholics a disproportionate share of government ministries in relation to their numbers in the population.

#### E Senegalese Brotherhoods, Good Governance, and Development

Several indicators point to a potentially positive role that can be played by the Brotherhoods in promoting good governance norms and practices

1 the emergence of reform-oriented marabout-politicians like Cheikh Abdoulaye Dièye who ran for mayor in Saint Louis in 1996. During the campaign, Dièye preached the importance of religious tolerance and the need for religious figures to get involved in politics to fight corruption and injustice and promote the well-being of their community. As municipal councillor, Dièye has launched an investigation concerning the use of the possible misuse of revenues generated by renting municipal property bequeathed to Saint Louis by a former French resident.

2 the solicitation of maraboutic support for the creation of a national independent electoral commission (CENI). If the marabouts openly support the CENI or a similar organization, it will be difficult for the government not to accept.

3 the recent ndigël given by the Grand Khalife of the Mourides asking his followers in Touba to pay their taxes to support local government services in Touba. While his choice of the president of the Rural Community of Touba has been contested, the principle that taxes need to be paid to insure government services is an important one to implement.

4 the possibility that religious leaders could be mobilized to support civic education and anti-corruption campaigns designed to "moraliser" public life.

On the other hand, many prominent marabouts still take advantage of their great influence in accepting favors and special privileges from the government which are not available to ordinary citizens. Recently the government intervened to save a prominent PS marabout-politician from imprisonment and worse for allegedly dealing in counterfeit money in Saudi Arabia.

The capacity of the Brotherhoods to mobilize financial resources and human energy for religious programs and events is also evident in other areas important to the well-being and development of their followers.

1 The Brotherhoods have provided extensive resources to the needy, thus creating a social safety net for their members and large segments of Senegalese society.

2 The Brotherhoods have been accelerating their establishment of primary and secondary religious schools based on the Franco-Arab model and encouraging their followers to acquire a university education. This trend implies their greater recognition of the need to acquire modern secular knowledge in addition to traditional religious values.

3 The Brotherhoods are establishing religious schools for girls and young women in unprecedented numbers, generally encouraging girls to go to school, and promoting adult literacy programs for women. In Kaolack, for example, the Niassene Brotherhood recently set up a literacy program for 1200 women.

4 The marabouts have also been supporting the establishment of private pharmacies, clinics, and other health services.

5 Senegal's leading marabouts have shown a concern to generate employment for their followers and have been investing in various economic activities. For example, Mortada Mbacké has financed many economic activities to provide employment for his followers -- e.g. bakeries, truck farms, agricultural enterprises in the Delta, and bus lines. It should be noted that Mortada Mbacké's business ventures are designed more to provide employment than to generate profits.

The maraboutic system in Senegal defies simple generalizations. On the one hand, the system is based on the talibé's submission to the marabout, unequal hierarchical clientelist relationships, and authority structures based on innerited charisma which don't seem to offer a good foundation for western-style democracy. On the other hand, submission is voluntary, talibés have the right to vote with their feet in choosing their personal marabout and Brotherhood affiliations and to decide whether or not their marabout's ncigel binds them in political matters.

#### E Prospects for the Future

Major conflicts are more likely to take place, as in the past, over battles for succession when the older generation of the sons of the founders of the Mbacké and Sy dynasties passes on. It will be difficult to choose an appropriate successor to the office of Grand Khalife from the numerous grandsons of the founders, many of whom lack the depth of religious training and moral authority of their elders.

The Brotherhoods have seemed to adjust very well to the changing times and are becoming more autonomous vis-a-vis the state. They are reaching out to the young, educating their women, and providing public goods and services to their followers not provided by the state. The Mourides, in particular, have modernized their traditional social structures and have high hopes of putting one of their own in the presidency when Diouf steps down. Mouride political ambitions could lead to greater tensions and rivalries with the Tijani Brotherhoods. Unless the social situation deteriorates drastically, Senegal's Muslim religious leaders are likely to strive to preserve political stability and social peace in the country.

Given the great influence of Islam in Senegalese society

and the Brotherhoods' growing interest in developmental activities and providing educational and social services for their people, it would be wise for donors like USAID/Senegal to discuss programs and objectives with the religious leaders or their representatives and to seriously take into consideration their views in planning and implementing aid interventions

## V The State and Civil Society

### A Definitions and Usages

There is a vast and growing literature on civil society in Africa and its role and potential as a bulwark of democracy and promoter of democratic governance. The term civil society has often been defined formally as encompassing all voluntary associations operating between the family/household and the state. This broad definition includes trade unions, political parties, religious groups, burial societies, sports clubs, PTAs, NGOs, hometown associations, etc. Because this definition is so inclusive, it may be more helpful to disaggregate the term and to refer to specific groups and their role in politics and in promoting the democratic process. In practice and common usage, civil society usually refers to the leaders of associations rather than to all its members. In the Senegalese context, three common usages of civil society stand out.

(1) The most narrow usage is that of civil society as the intellectual and professional class. This class supposedly should promote democratic norms and values and fight to limit the state's abuse of power.

(2) A somewhat broader usage sees civil society as encompassing the leaders of organized urban society. Donors often focus on the people in this group when devising strategies fostering democracy and democratic governance. Hence, they support leaders of human, civil, and women's rights groups, trade unions, political parties, civic associations, the media, and professional, business, and legal professions.

(3) In the context of competitive party politics, Senegalese politicians often refer to civil society as encompassing civic leaders and professionals who are not members or militants of a political party. In an interview held just before the November 24, 1996 elections, a prominent PS official when describing his party's efforts to win the endorsement of civil society, talked about recruiting prominent civic leaders who were not members of a political party. For example, in Saint-Louis where the PS was sharply divided, the PS coopted Almamy Fall, leader of the Convention des Saint Louisiens, a civic organization dedicated to promoting Saint Louis to head the party list in the municipal elections. A close friend of Abdou Diouf, Almamy Fall insisted that he was not a PS member and was representing civil society.

in an alliance with the PS to work for a more prosperous Saint Louis. A coalition of opposition parties chose a non-party member to head their list in Gorée as a representative of civil society.

Regardless of the definition that one uses, it is clear that the base for Senegalese civil society has increased tremendously since independence and that the myriad components of civil society have become increasingly important actors in the democratization process. In 1960, Senegal had only a few hundred university graduates and professionals. Today, there are more than 25,000 Senegalese in state universities and thousands more studying abroad. Since independence, Senegal has experienced both a growth in the size and the Africanization of its state bureaucracy, university and secondary school systems, professional and business associations, and liberal professions. The number of grassroots rural and urban voluntary associations and leaders has also grown enormously since the late 1970s and early 1980s. Today there are thousands of voluntary associations operating throughout the country.

#### B State Tutelage, Liberalization, and Associational Life

The loosening of the state's tutelage over associational life has been one of the major factors underlying the proliferation and dynamism of Senegalese associational life over the past two decades.

During the autocratic phases of colonial rule in Senegal, the French destroyed the autonomy of many local institutions and created state structures to supervise and tightly regulate associational life. As colonial subjects, the great majority of the Senegalese did not have the right to associate. Only a small minority of Senegalese citizens in the "Four Communes" enjoyed these rights. Senegalese subjects could not organize trade unions, cooperatives, or political parties. While the French permitted the Senegalese Brotherhoods to expand, they carefully monitored them closely to make sure that they did not engage in anti-French activities.

The post-WWII decolonization era (1945-1960) saw the rapid growth of voluntary associations following the granting of citizenship and the right to associate to all Senegalese. In the open competitive party system, political parties strived to win the support of various ethnic, regional, hometown, religious and professional associations.

The emergence of a de facto one-party state in Senegal during the first decade of independence slowed down the expansion of autonomous associational life and was accompanied by the following:

- (1) the elimination of competitive party politics and the decline of ethnic and regionally based party-affiliated organizations

(2) the development of a single party culture which sought to bring associational life under the banner and control of the governing party in the name of national unity

(3) the centralization of state structures and the reinforcement of state tutelage over associational life

(4) the creation of rural cooperatives and producer groups at the initiative of the state and subordinated to state agencies

State control over voluntary associations and civil society was maintained through a combination of state regulations and a patronage system designed to provide benefits to loyal clients of the party-state system

Throughout most of the Senghor era, especially during the period of the de facto one party state, Senghor discouraged the development of an autonomous civil society and used the state apparatus to closely supervise associational life which remained under the tutelle of various state ministries. Peasant producer groups were "encadré" by ONCAD and Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) like SODEVA, SAED, SODEFITEX, and SOMIVAC. The government dissolved trade unions and student organizations hostile to the Senghor regime and pressured business organizations critical of government economic policies to stay affiliated with the pro-government GES to maintain the unity of the Senegalese business community behind the regime. During the 1960s it was easier to repress, control, or coopt potential civil society leaders because civil society was small and the state had relatively large resources at its disposal.

Senghor's decision to liberalize the political system in 1974 by allowing other political parties to compete was also accompanied by liberalization in other areas which opened up more space for civil society. Non-party affiliated trade unions, autonomous peasant associations not dependent upon the RDAs, and independent newspapers sprung up in the late 1970s. The priority that Senghor gave to higher education also created a large number of university graduates and professionals who could not all be absorbed into the state and party apparatus.

The 1980s saw a further expansion of civil society and the loosening of state control over associational life. Economic crisis and structural adjustment programs prodded the regime to liberalize the economy and to slow down the rate of government spending. Donor preference for channeling more funds through NGOs and grassroots associations also reduced these groups' dependency on the state for resources. The decline of the RDAs opened up more space for rural associations to operate.

During the late 1980s and the early 1990s, donor interest

in promoting good governance and reinforcing democratic institutions supported the creation and development of civil, human, and womens' rights associations and legal associations promoting the rule of law. New economic interest groups like UNACOIS emerged with the liberalization of the economy, the decline of parastatal corporations, and the elimination or reduction of monopolies and preferential treatment for large-scale firms or entrepreneurs favored by the regime.

The liberalization of the regime that began in the mid-1970s created an environment conducive to the proliferation of locally-based grassroots movements not under the control of the party or the state. Political liberalization helped loosen the tutelage of the state. The inefficiencies of the state-initiated cooperative system and peasant producer groups under the supervision of the RDAs, the growing interest of donors to work through NGOs rather than through state development agencies, and the state's declining resources and inability to finance and staff the provision of basic grassroots public goods and services also sparked the expansion of rural grassroots associations involved in various developmental activities.

Between 1990 and 1996, the state undertook various decentralization and political liberalization measures that further reduced its tutelage over associational life and afforded more incentives for political parties to contest national and local elections. These included the 1990 second administrative reform, the 1991 reform of the electoral code, and the March 1996 regionalization and decentralization laws. These measures reduced the authority of the territorial administration and the state over local government and grassroots associations and created the conditions for more interaction between political parties, local government, and grassroots associations.

Although the state no longer has the capacity to exert the same kind of control over civil society as in the past, it still strives to maintain a minimum of control over all sectors. While the tutelle has been lightened, many state officials still feel the need to regulate the activities of the various manifestations of civil society and associational life.

With the decline of the party-state, the PS must now relate to voluntary associations and civil society differently. The PS has responded by attempting to coopt leaders of associations, groups, and movements in civil society not affiliated with the party, supporting associations dominated by party stalwarts, and creating new civil society organizations led by party activists. For example, Babacar Sine, a member of the PS Political Bureau also heads the African Institute for Democracy, while a group of prominent PS lawyers provides legal advice to the party. President Diouf and party leaders like Ousemane Tanor Dieng often sponsor or cosponsor conferences and meetings discussing issues important

to civic society groups and donors--e g human rights, rule of law, good governance, and promotion of women--or honoring civic leaders for their contributions to Senegalese society

Since the mid-1990s, civil society has become more assertive in its relationships with the state and increasingly critical of flaws in the political system. In the 1993 presidential elections, Mamadou Lo, the first independent non-affiliated candidate to run against Diouf, attacked the PS-dominated political system and claimed to speak for civil society while leaders of peasant associations met to discuss the creation of a new peasants' party to represent rural interests. The emergence of two independent daily newspapers and several radio stations has also provided critics of the regime with greater access to the media and the public. Controlled by a new brand of businessmen representing the so-called informal sector, UNACOIS has opposed state taxing and import policies and has developed the clout to close down markets in urban Senegal. Independent trade unions have launched strikes to protest privatization measures threatening the job security of their membership. These developments all point to the dwindling power of the state and the governing party to domesticate and dominate civil society organizations.

Civil society played a modest role before and during the November 24 election campaign which remained dominated primarily by political party activities. Two prominent civil society organizations, the Forum Civil and Ligue pour les Droits de l'Homme sponsored a conference calling on the government to permit independent candidates and to create an independent election commission. While the political parties recruited some non-partisan civil society leaders, most party candidates were party regulars. Immediately after the elections, the main outcry of protest concerning election day irregularities came from the opposition parties rather than from representatives of civil society. However, in March 1997, urban civil society groups and intellectuals created an ad hoc group, the comité d'initiative to launch a campaign for electoral reform. Recent trends affecting the evolution of civil society include the following:

(1) Decentralization and liberalization of the political system and economy have opened up more space for civil society to develop.

(2) Civic leaders are becoming more autonomous in their relationships with the state.

(3) Associations are less dependent upon the state for resources.

(4) The expansion and consolidation of civil society associations are likely to strengthen the foundations of Senegalese democracy.

(5) Winning the support of key civil society leaders and

organizations is becoming an increasingly important part of the electoral strategies of Senegal's political parties

(6) Leadership roles in civil society as opposed to working one's way up through the party ranks may be becoming a significant training ground and stepping stone for political leadership roles

(7) Civil society leaders are less critical of President Diouf than they are of the governing party

(8) Since taking office, Diouf has been less partisan in his efforts to court and coopt prominent civil society leaders than his own party

(9) The lack of credibility of Senegalese political parties and electoral processes may encourage the public and donors to look to civil society organizations to provide new leadership

(10) Civil society organizations espousing democratic ideals, human, civil, and womens' rights, and grassroots development are not all necessarily paradigms of virtue. Some of their leaders may be seeking to capitalize on current donor support of these objectives to further their own personal, organizational, and political interests. One skeptical observer of Senegalese civil society referred to civil society leaders as "essentially politicians who didn't have the courage to form their own political parties "

## VI The Voluntary Association Movement (VAM)

One of the most promising developments has been the proliferation of voluntary associations at all levels of society, especially at the grassroots. The dynamism of grassroots associations, to a large degree, depends upon the extent to which people are free to organize and manage their own affairs with a minimum of control and regulation by the state and other external forces. The right to associate freely constitutes one of the basic foundations of democracy. What distinguishes Senegal from many other multiparty regimes in Francophone Africa has been the density and dynamism of associational life.

### A Anatomy of the Voluntary Association Movement

This section will briefly deal with the different kinds of associations found in Senegal and their relationships to the political process and economic development. The development literature often blurs differences between NGOs and other grassroots organizations involved in development activities. The term civil society usually includes a wide range of urban-based associations involved in relationships to the state.

43  
42 - (42 missing)

The voluntary association movement (VAM) in Senegal consists of a vast and diverse universe of organizations with different functions, social bases, modes of organization, scales of activities, links within and outside local communities, and degrees of involvement with the state and political party structures

Senegal's voluntary association movement can be divided into three basic categories

1 Supra-local associations which transcend local grassroots communities (e g villages, urban neighborhoods) These include:

a NGOs which are non-profit foreign or Senegalese associations endowed with a specific legal status professional staffs, and modern bureaucratic structures

b Federations and Unions bringing together representatives of local communities and grassroots associations and seeking to represent and negotiate on behalf of their members with the state, donors, NGOs, and other supra-local actors

c Émigré and Hometown(ressortissant) Associations which are based outside the local community but which work with their home communities to mobilize resources and provide benefits for the home community which can be a town, village, or region

d State-Initiated Movements and Supra-local Associations

2 Grassroots associations based in local community structures--e g village, neighborhood, youth groups, women's groups, Groupements d'Intérêt Économiques(GIEs), and sports and cultural associations These can be rural or urban

3 Predominantly-urban based associations organized around modern professional, functional, and civic concerns-- e g , trade unions, employer organizations, lawyers' associations, student movements, civil and human rights organizations, and civic and charitable organizations In common Senegalese usage, the leaders of these groups constitute "civil society "

B Dynamics of the Voluntary Association Movement

1 Extra-Local Associations

a The NGO Movement in Senegal

The NGO movement is essentially a post-independence phenomenon The first NGOs were established in the early 1960s and associated with religious-based organizations like Catholic Relief, CARITAS, and Protestant Evangelical Groups

The NGO movement took off in the 1970s following the severe droughts which hit Senegal and other Sahelian countries. International NGOs soon sought national partners in Senegal while donors channeled more funds through NGOs. By 1988, 126 NGOs had registered-- 69 international and 57 national. Today, Senegal has well over 200 NGOs. National NGOs have become major sub-contractors in managing and implementing donor projects.

NGOs are private non-profit apolitical organizations engaged in a broad range of social and economic development activities which include agriculture, natural resource management, education, health, marketing, and credit and savings. Many NGOs work closely with women's and youth groups. Although they are not dependent upon the state for financing, they receive important benefits such as exoneration from customs duties on imported inputs and other taxes. NGOs must register and operate under the surveillance of the Ministère de la Femme. Relations between the state and the NGO sector have sometimes been tense due to conflict caused by the state's attempt to retain its tutelage powers over the NGOs and the NGOs' desire to maximize their autonomy vis-a-vis the state.

The creation of the Conseil des Organisations Non-Gouvernementales d'Appui au Développement (CONGAD) in February 1982 marked the emergence of a coherent NGO movement regrouping most of Senegal's major international and national level NGOs. Based in Dakar, CONGAD has a permanent secretariat which offers a wide range of services and information to its members. CONGAD purports to be the main voice of the NGO movement in Senegal.

The NGO movement presents itself as an alternative to the state in fostering Senegalese development and is characterized by the following:

1 participatory development ideology. While the NGO movement is apolitical in the sense that it is not formally affiliated with or directly involved in partisan party politics, it claims to have a political vision of society which sees the initiative for development coming essentially from local populations and grassroots communities. The NGO movement thus opposes the statist perspectives implied in centralized Jacobin models of the state.

2 a claim to be more responsive to local community needs and conditions than state agencies. NGOs claim to consult more closely with local communities in formulating projects than most state agencies which have a tradition of imposing projects and activities from above.

3 an attempt to position itself as the main intermediary between the local communities and grassroots associations which it serves and the state and external donors. As a

movement, NGOs seek to reinforce their ties with international NGOs, external donors, and international training and research institutions on behalf of local communities and claim to represent grassroots interests in their lobbying activities aimed at the state and external donors

4 financial independence from the state but financial dependency upon external donors and sources Less than 1 percent of NGO funding comes from the state while more than 80 percent of funding comes from external donors

5 the need to conform to regulations, modes of operations, and priorities imposed by donors in order to get external funding which they need to operate In the end, NGOs are more accountable to the donors who finance their activities than to the local populations they serve. The choice and concentration of their activities are also heavily influenced by donor interests in certain areas--e.g. women in development, and natural resource management

6 a relatively top-heavy and costly bureaucratic structure compared with grassroots associations and organizations The complexity of paperwork required by donors coupled with the fact that NGOs are professional, specialized organizations staffed largely by salaried personnel rather than volunteers contribute to this phenomenon. Top management personnel are relatively well-paid compared to their counterparts in the public sector. Some donors feel that a too high percentage of NGO budgets go into salaries

7 a special status which exonerates NGOs from paying taxes and customs duties on imported inputs needed to carry out its development activities Some NGOs have abused these privileges by importing tax-free vehicles and other commodities for personal use or for resale

Relations between the NGO movement and the state have improved considerably in the past few years. One of the major reasons for this change has been the growing disengagement of the state from direct economic intervention in the rural areas and greater acceptance of a smaller role for the state in financing and managing local and regional development activities. Changing state paradigms and attitudes towards the NGO movement can be seen in these areas

1 The Senegalese government now looks to NGOs to attract more donor funding for local development activities

2 The government points to its greater acceptance of the NGO movement to support its contention that the state is indeed complying with donor requests to downsize its activities and increase the role of the private sector in promoting economic and social development. And compliance justifies continuing donor support and aid

3. NGOs are represented in government decision making and

consultative institutions such as CONSERE, the Economic and Social Council, and the newly created regional economic and social advisory bodies. NGOs are gaining more recognition as partners rather than as rivals of government. NGOs now work closely with the government in certifying new NGOs.

Though working more closely with the government, the NGO movement still reserves the right to take public stands and political positions in opposition to government policies. CONGAD thus opposed the 1994 devaluation and has recently supported demands for an independent national electoral commission.

Liberalization of the political system and decentralization have led to changes in the politics of the NGO movement and its stance towards the state and local government institutions. During the 1970s and 1980s, several Senegalese NGOs were founded and run by people with close ties to the opposition. Leaders associated with the political opposition used the NGOs that they controlled as a means of obtaining resources and influence in rural areas which were previously closed to them as political activists because of the hostility of local PS party leaders and the territorial administration. For their part, NGO leaders sought to bypass local government structures and to work directly with the local populations because they perceived rural councils and urban municipal government as essentially political institutions monopolized by the PS and designed to further that party's clientelist interests rather than to serve the population. The transfer of more powers to local government units, the ending of the PS monopoly over local government, and the rapid expansion of donor aid directed to local and now regional governments and communities (coopération décentralisée) have provided incentives for NGOs to collaborate more closely with local government organs. The entry of opposition parties into the government since 1992 also contributed to breaking down walls between the state and the NGO movement.

At the same time, the intensification of competitive party politics and decentralization measures in the 1990s have provided incentives for political leaders and parties to create new NGOs and to politicize existing NGOs to serve partisan political purposes. With the disengagement of the state, the end of the PS' monopoly over the control of state and local government, and more donor resources being shifted away from the state, PS politicians are becoming more actively involved in setting up their own and fighting for control over NGOs. In some instances, party leaders controlling particular ministries are lobbying donors to give contracts to NGOs controlled by members of their own party. The politicization of NGOs and their use for partisan political purposes poses a potential threat to the coherence and unity of the NGO movement. CONGAD is aware of this issue and is seeking to elaborate new rules to restrain the politicization of the NGO movement.

Organizational obstacles to the efficient functioning of the NGO movement as a key actor in promoting economic and social development include

1 the proliferation of many NGOs without sufficient technical expertise primarily as a response to perceived economic opportunities opened up by growing donor support for NGOs and non state institutions

2 the lack of coordinating mechanisms and exchange of information among NGOs CONGAD has been working to improve communications and networking among its membership

3 poor collaboration between NGOs and state agents working at the local level NGO personnel and state technical agents often see themselves as rivals rather than as partners in local development activities

4 insufficient collaboration among NGOs working in the same geographical zones In this instance, the lack of donor collaboration may be also be a contributing factor

5 lack of accountability and transparency

Despite their participatory development rhetoric, many NGOs operate much like state agencies in practicing top-down management styles and in their attitudes towards working with the local populations

Decentralization has affected the NGO movement in several ways

1 Dakar-based NGOs are establishing branches and offices in the regional capitals, thus bringing them closer to the local populations Regionally based NGOs which generally have a higher percentage of personnel who are natives of the region in which they are working are also increasing This trend is likely to be accentuated when the Regional Councils become fully operational

2 Political parties have responded to decentralization measures transferring more power to local government by calling for more direct cooperation between local government, NGOs, and other associations in providing public goods and services In the past, many NGOs were reluctant to work with the Rural Councils (RCs) because these were perceived as being instruments of the state and ruling party Now that members of opposition parties are controlling some RCs and represented on most others, NGOs may be more willing to collaborate with the RCs

3 More and more external aid is coming from local communities and community-based institutions in Europe and North America (coopération décentralisée) and being channeled locally This trend has sparked the creation and expansion of the development activities of sub-national

Senegalese NGOs operating at the municipal, regional and sub-regional levels NGOs are intensifying their direct contacts with local communities and local government institutions abroad, thus decreasing their dependency on international donors and NGOs The loosening of the state tutelle over the NGOs and local government have made these kinds of contacts more feasible

The proliferation of NGOs has intensified competition among them in bidding for external resources and influence with their local constituencies At the same time, the NGO movement as a whole is finding it more difficult to act as the primary intermediary and representative of local communities because grassroots unions and federations are increasingly bypassing the national NGOs and making direct contacts with the Senegalese government and foreign donors

NGOs are likely to remain a potent force in Senegalese society However, with the concept of decentralized cooperation based on people to people contact becoming more widespread, the international and Dakar-based NGOs will probably see a decline in their relative influence as local grassroots associations gain greater direct access to external sources without having to pass through the national and international NGO movements Decentralization and regionalization will encourage NGOs to decentralize their own activities and move their offices to regional capitals rather than remaining in Dakar Political parties will start more of their own NGOs and NGO leaders may use their leadership roles to launch political careers or to enhance their social status

#### b Unions and Federations of Grassroots Associations

One of the most significant developments over the past two decades has been the tendency of Senegalese grassroots associations to establish horizontal linkages with similar organizations through the establishment of Unions and Federations This trend has been accelerating in the 1990s Extra-local and federal structures serve several purposes

1 As organizations, they represent local, regional, and sectoral interests in dealing with the state and external donors

2 They provide the potential for increasing the bargaining power of grassroots associations vis-a-vis the state and external donors

3 They constitute an alternative force to political parties, the Brotherhoods, and the professional NGO movement in articulating local community and sectoral needs, mobilizing local resources, and serving as an intermediary between local communities and associations and the state

4 They provide an institutional framework for

formulating and coordinating the development strategies of their constituent organizations

5 They provide a forum for the exchange of information and sharing of experiences

The numerous unions and federations reflect a wide diversity of community and functional interests and differ in their degree of autonomy vis-a-vis the state and political parties. Some federal structures like the Regional and National Cooperative Unions began as state-initiated movements dominated primarily by rural notables affiliated with the governing party. Other unions like UJAC (Union des Jeunes Agriculteurs de la Casamance) and the Amicale du Walo were organized as independent peasant organizations for rural youth in the 1970s. Still others like the Soninké Federation in Bakel reflected the desire of the local populations to establish their own independent development institutions and to escape the heavy-handed tutelage of state agencies like SAED.

FONGS (Fédération des Organisations Non-Gouvernementales au Sénégal) has been one of the major forces promoting federations of grassroots associations. Founded in 1976, FONGS regroups 24 peasant-based extra-local unions representing more than 2000 village associations and a membership of over 100,000. While FONGS enjoys the legal status of an NGO, its constituent members do not. FONGS' main objectives are to reinforce solidarity and collaboration among Senegal's grassroots associations and to develop their institutional capacity for autonomous development.

FONGS was the driving force behind the establishment of the Comité National de Concertation des Ruraux (CNCR) in March 1993 to defend rural interests. The CNCR seeks to become the voice of Senegal's federated peasant associations and to serve as the principal intermediary representing the rural populations in discussing national development issues with the state, local government, and external donors. The CNCR consists of 7 major national federations representing farmers, herders, fishermen, women, and FONGS.

Since its inception, the CNCR has gained in stature and won recognition from the government. The CNCR is represented in the Economic and Social Council and on the Board of Directors of the CNCAS (Conseil National de Crédit Agricole Sénégalais). This year, both Prime Minister Habib Thiam and President Diouf made a point of meeting with CNCR leaders to discuss the government's agricultural program and to solicit their advice. The CNCR has recently advocated the establishment of a national calamity insurance fund. Despite its aspirations to speak for all of Senegal's rural populations, the CNCR remains much better known at the national level and in NGO circles than at the grassroots level.

Mamadou Cissokho, the president of the CNCR, has been active in grassroots development movements for more than two decades and has cultivated strong ties with European NGOs. A former schoolteacher, Cissokho founded the Entente de Koumpentoum, a multi-functional peasant-based development association in the southeast of the peanut basin affiliated with FONGS. In the early 1990s he served as head of FONGS before being elected as president of the CNCR in 1993. Cissokho represents a new breed of rural leader who is not politician, traditional rural notable, or marabout. His leadership position derives from his role as development broker (courtier de développement) between local communities and the state and external donors.

The emergence and proliferation of unions and federations of grassroots community development associations have secreted a new class of development brokers, who in many instances, have replaced local PS leaders as the main intermediaries between local communities and the state. Most development brokers are "political outsiders" to the extent that they are not active in party politics and "cultural insiders" in the sense that they usually have their roots in the local community associations they serve. The development brokers have transformed traditional clientelist relationships because of their ability to communicate and negotiate with international NGOs and other external donors in bringing resources to local communities. Some observers suggest that the development brokers are using their access to aid to create a new patronage system.

The development brokers also constitute a new pool of potential candidates for local government office. Some, like Abdoulaye Diop, the founder of the Amicale du Walo, have joined the PS and become presidents of Rural Councils. Others have run on other party lists. The rules excluding independent candidates mean that the development brokers need to join a political party and run on party lists if they are to be elected.

Some observers are concerned that the development brokers may use their leadership positions to further their own personal interests and ambitions at the expense of the local communities they serve by embezzling funds earmarked for local projects and other rent-seeking behavior or by using their influence and popularity to direct votes to a political party or to launch their own political careers. It would be naive to expect the development brokers to remain totally altruistic and to renounce material and social benefits deriving from their leadership roles. In fact, the development brokers deserve to receive some remuneration for the important services which they render. Otherwise, there would be little incentive for them to promote local development activities. In evaluating the development brokers, it seems more relevant to examine the extent to which they are truly representative of and accountable to the grassroots development associations they serve and their effectiveness in meeting their

constituents' needs

The Senegalese NGO movement, as personified by CONGAD, and the supra-local unions and federations representing grassroots associations, whether independent or affiliated with FONGS, have become competitors in going after external donor resources. Both are needed. The better Senegalese NGOs have the technical expertise and personnel to implement donor-financed programs. The unions and federations are generally more representative of the local populations and better placed to express their needs and aspirations but often lack the technical and managerial skills required to implement their programs.

Greater collaboration, cooperation, and coordination between the professional NGO movement and the unions and federations of grassroots associations are essential to making the best use of their complementary roles and contributing to a more efficient delivery of public goods and services to local communities. Professional NGOs and the federated grassroots associations need to maintain their autonomy and guard against their politicization and takeover by political parties using their movements for partisan political ends.

c Hometown (ressortissants) and Émigré Associations

The hometown associations have become increasingly important political and economic forces in Senegal. During the colonial period, the hometown associations were primarily urban-based and provided ressortissants from the home village with assistance in finding jobs and housing, loans to take care of social obligations, and recreation in the form of dances and other social events. During the post-WWII period before independence, Senegal's two major political parties also worked hard to win the support of these groups. Senghor and Mamadou Dia were far more successful in bringing these groups under the banner of their party.

During the 1960s, the political importance of hometown associations declined as the regime discouraged the involvement of regional, ethnic, and hometown associations in politics. During the 1980s and 1990s, the hometown associations became increasingly involved in development activities in their villages. Unlike the NGO movement which received extensive funding from international NGOs and donors, the hometown associations financed most of their activities from voluntary contributions from native sons.

The hometown associations have several features in common:

(1) They are based on tight social solidarity networks linking the home village to native sons working in Dakar, other African countries, Europe and more recently North America.

(2) The basic units are the village or group of villages with traditional historical ties

(3) In the towns and abroad, the hometown associations provide social services, information, and recreational activities for their members

(4) Hometown associations have organized projects and mobilized funding for projects in the home village such as mosques, wells, schools, health facilities, and truck farming

(5) Members of hometown associations living in the towns or abroad meet regularly to discuss their problems

(6) The leaders of hometown associations living in Dakar and abroad return to the home village every year or two to hold Congresses in which they discuss the needs of the village and their members and plan future projects

(7) Nearly all of the funding and labor for hometown association projects is provided by the ressortissants with those residing in Dakar and abroad contributing more money while those remaining in the village provide local materials and labor

(8) While hometown associations are a general phenomenon in the country, the strongest hometown associations tend to be those organized by people in regions where the rural exodus has been greater such as the Fleuve and Lower Casamance. In the northern peanut basin, the bastion of the Mourides, hometown associations are less important than the Mouride networks of solidarity with the towns-and-native sons abroad

When planning projects in rural areas, donors have tended to pay little attention to the social solidarity networks developed through the hometown associations and their potential for mobilizing resources. Instead, they have tended to regard villages as self-contained entities attached to the exterior primarily through market relationships. In working in rural areas, donors would do well to make a detailed analysis of the role of hometown associations in village life and involve leaders residing outside the village to participate in planning development activities

Political and economic changes accompanying the disengagement of the state from many rural development activities, the explosion of associational life, the growing numbers of Senegalese working abroad, and the increased intensity of competitive party politics over the past decade have led to some important changes in how the hometown associations operate

(1) Leaders of hometown associations which previously had no legal recognition have been taking the initiative in creating state recognized NGOs to carry out development activities in the village or group of villages

(2) With the growing number of Senegalese working and residing abroad, émigrés are supplying more and more of the financing and leadership of many hometown associations and using their connections abroad to bring money and projects to their villages without going through donors and international NGOs operating in Senegal

(3) Competition for the leadership of hometown associations is becoming more intense and politicized. For example, two different hometown groups fought for the leadership in sponsoring a cultural week in Ndioum last year. The dispute had much to do with clan politics within the PS.

(4) Local politicians are bidding for the support of or trying to take control over the developmental associations emanating from hometown associations. In the November 24, 1996 elections, several local NGOs publicly declared their support for a particular candidate or list. Tanor Dieng and the PS seemed to be the major beneficiaries.

(5) Political parties are actively seeking the support of ressortissant associations. For example, the PS worked through Halpulaar ressortissant associations operating in Dakar to mobilize support behind the PS in the recent elections. They achieved this by asking Halpulaar leaders from the Fouta and Kolda (Fouladou) to attend mass rallies to support Tanor and the PS. A rival Halpulaar group from the Fouta decided to support the PDS and disputed the right of the pro-PS association to claim that they represented all the populations in the Fouta.

The main difference between the hometown associations and the national NGOs based in Dakar is that many of the latter are run by elites who don't necessarily have close links with the populations in the areas in which they are working. Decentralization will probably increase the influence of the hometown association as economic development institutions and their leaders as active participants in the political process.

In a 1996 report to the Economic and Social Council, Moustapha Niassé announced that there were approximately 402,000 Senegalese officially registered in Senegalese embassies abroad. Many observers feel that there are at least double that number of Senegalese studying, working, and residing abroad. One of the most striking features of their life is that they have reproduced the same kinds of associations found in Senegal. This is especially true in France which harbors the largest number of overseas Senegalese. One thus sees hometown, student, women's, sports, cultural, and religious associations, sections of political parties, workers' organizations, informal and formal economic networks, and human rights groups. These associations help overseas Senegalese to find jobs, get used to a strange environment, and defend their interests vis-a-vis the host society. They also preserve Senegalese culture and maintain close and well-developed networks with the mother country.

The Senegalese émigrés have been an important and vital part of Senegalese society for several reasons

(1) The large number of overseas Senegalese provide a safety valve for Senegalese society. Their departure places less strains on local resources and provides an outlet for Senegalese adults seeking work and opportunities for higher education not found in Senegal.

(2) The money that they send back from their earnings helps support their families back home and injects investment capital for social infrastructure and economic development. For example, Soninké auto workers in France played a major role in building mosques, wells, and other social infrastructure in Bakel and in introducing irrigated agricultural projects not connected with and dependent upon SAED. Soninké émigrés also played a vital role in establishing the Soninké Federation which regrouped tens of villages in the Bakel area as an autonomous development unit. The amount of money sent back to Senegal is difficult to estimate because funds are generally brought back through informal circuits when the émigrés return to Senegal. These sums are doubtlessly several times higher than the money sent through the post office system in the form of money orders.

(3) Their connections with host country individuals and institutions--e.g. NGOs, church groups, philanthropic groups, foundations, civic associations, etc. interested in third world development--have been translated into funding and technical assistance for small-scale projects in their home areas in Senegal.

(4) The émigrés are a source of new ideas and technology for Senegal. For example, one group of émigrés belonging to a hometown association bought some simple Belgian machinery and started a small factory in a Fouta Toro village that produced barbed wire for fencing in local vegetable gardens, woodlots, and other small-scale farming units. A Mouride student group in Paris founded by Cheikh Abdoulaye Dièye in 1977 broadened the horizons of Mourides by exposing them to other religious currents and placing a greater emphasis on the philosophy of Ahmadou Bamba. The new interest in intellectual concerns which university-trained Mouride students like Dièye brought back to Senegal helped break the stereotype of the Mourides as blind, parochial followers of ignorant marabouts.

(5) The Senegalese overseas diaspora has established far-reaching economic networks in many countries. Perhaps the best known are the Mouride networks which have branches in Europe, Asia, North America, and Africa. As a result, the Mourides have taken over many areas of the import sector in Senegal that were previously controlled by French and Lebanese businessmen. Other Senegalese have done well trading in diamonds in other African countries and reinvesting some of their gains in Senegal.

(6) Overseas Senegalese are also involved in various international organizations and have organized NGOs based in the host country. For example, a recent Ohio State University PH D set up a Washington-based NGO designed to promote democratic leadership and human rights in Africa.

In 1983, the regime responded to the growing importance of the émigrés by creating a special ministry designed to deal specifically with the émigrés' problems. In 1993, this ministry was abolished and its functions taken over by the Foreign Affairs Ministry. Although the PS and other political parties had overseas branches in the past, the quest for the support of the émigrés has increased tremendously in the 1990s because of changes in the electoral system which gave overseas Senegalese the right to vote. In the 1993 national elections, the official results gave the PS over 72 percent of the émigré vote, a much higher score than they obtained at home. In response, the opposition has complained about electoral fraud and deny that the results are accurate.

Since the 1994 devaluation, émigrés have sent large sums of money to Senegal. Much of the current boom in construction in Dakar derives from émigré investments on housing. The government has attempted to win émigré support by setting up banking branches abroad to facilitate the transfer of funds to Senegal, granting exonerations from customs duties for émigré associations engaged in development projects, and providing financial assistance and training to émigrés seeking to reestablish themselves in Senegal. Émigré groups have opposed efforts by the government to impose a tax on money orders.

Émigrés also constitute some of the most dynamic members of hometown associations. One interesting development is that the leadership of émigré associations no longer necessarily reflects traditional leadership structures back home. For example, people of caste who would normally be excluded from leadership positions at home in the Senegalese Valley often hold important positions in émigré associations abroad.

Several changes are affecting hometown and émigré associations

- 1 In recent years, they have shifted from providing social services and starting to get more involved in promoting economic development activities.

- 2 As they are engaging in more developmental activities, they are becoming relatively more dependent on external financing.

- 3 With the expansion of decentralized aid, émigré leaders and associations are multiplying their contacts in the countries where they work with local government institutions, NGOs, and civic organizations interested in helping Third

## World development

4 Hometown and émigré associations are forging new forms of modern contractual relationships and social patterns in addition to the traditional solidarity ties and social structures linking them to their home villages. They are not just replicating traditional rural structures in the towns and abroad but also bringing innovations back to their villages of origin.

### d State-initiated movements and associations

One of the least successful elements in Senegal's associational life have been organizations and movements initiated by the state such as rural cooperatives, producers groups, and women's groups under the tutelage of the Ministère de la Femme. These movements have had the following characteristics:

(1) The rules and organizational structure were determined by the state rather than by the membership and imposed from above. For example, Senegalese cooperatives followed an imported European model based on Rochdale principles which had little to do with local realities in Senegal. Moreover, the state imposed a uniform and rigid organizational structure which created the exact same cooperative structures throughout the country. When the government decided to decentralize the rural cooperative movement in 1983, the state cooperative service responded by setting up over 4000 cooperative sections in the middle of the agricultural season when farmers clearly had no time to discuss the pros and cons.

(2) These movements were usually subject to the heavy-handed tutelage of state agencies in their operations. The rural peanut cooperatives which constituted the heart of the cooperative movement were dominated by ONCAD until 1980 while producer groups affiliated with RDAs like SAED, SOMIVAC, SODEVA, and SODEFITEX and integrated into donor-financed development projects had little autonomy and freedom of action. Relations between the state and these movements were asymmetrical. Thus, the RDAs could violate its contractual obligations without suffering sanctions while producer groups could be punished for not meeting its obligations.

(3) The state derived most of the benefits from its close relationships with cooperatives and producer groups. The state through ONCAD, for example, was able to skim off billions of CFA francs from peanut marketing operations by keeping peanut producer prices much lower than world market prices. Other RDAs also derived the lion's share of benefits from their activities as encadreurs of producer groups in the peanut basin, Eastern Senegal, the Senegal River and the Casamance.

(4) These movements were also used to reward rural allies of the regime and to win the political support of rural

notables The rural cooperative movement was especially subject to domination by rural notables aligned with the ruling party. Moreover, the state consistently provided preferential treatment in the form of higher producer prices for peanuts, rural credit, and extension surfaces to influential marabouts, thus contributing to the discrediting of the coop movement in the peanut basin. The Fédération Nationale des Groupements Féminins (FNGF) sponsored by and under the tutelage of the state ministry dealing with womens' affairs has often been used by national and local female politicians as a vehicle for patronage and winning popular support through the distribution of rice and millet milling machinery. Many local women's groups affiliated with the National Federation have complained that they see very little benefits from the dues that they pay coming back to them.

The state-initiated movements have been losing influence and are in decline in the rural areas because of the disengagement of the state in the distribution of inputs, the decline of the peanut economy, and the opening up of more alternatives to the rural populations. For example, a 1984 law made it relatively easy for small groups of producers to get legal recognition and access to credit by forming Groupements d'intérêt Economiques (GIEs). NGOs and legally recognized village development associations also provide access to external resources while giving local people more autonomy in organizing and managing their own affairs.

## 2 Small-Scale Locally-Based Grassroots Associations

At the grassroots community level, one can identify at least six forms of grassroots organizations which have a strong potential to contribute to Senegal's social and economic development. These include

a Village Development Associations (AVDs) which often have a tripartite structure incorporating male adult, women's and youth sections. The AVDs often federate with other village associations in their area to participate in broader development projects. Many also have close connections with hometown associations in the towns and native sons working abroad. The rise of the AVDs in the 1980s corresponded with the decline of the state-initiated cooperative system and producer groups affiliated with the RDAs.

### b Women's Groups

The huge number of women's groups and associations that have sprung up in rural Senegal in recent years are a very promising development. There are over 4,000 women's groups affiliated with the Federation Nationale des Groupements Féminins du Sénégal (FNGF). The FNGF is under the tutelage of the Ministère de la Femme and highly politicized at the extra-local level. Village-based womens' groups are less politicized while other womens' groups such as mbootays, tontines, and popular savings societies are not affiliated with the FNGF and

often lack official state recognition

Many Senegalese insist that women are the hardest-working, best-organized, and most dynamic element in Senegalese society. Women in Development (WID) components of donor and NGO projects have facilitated greater participation of women in development activities. The predominantly male rural exodus has also left women with greater responsibilities in managing household production units and providing for their families. The women's sections of rural-based development associations are often larger than their male counterparts. This is particularly true in the Casamance but becoming a general phenomenon throughout rural Senegal. FONGS reports that 65 percent of its members are women. Their dynamism and the fact that a larger percentage of rural girls are attending both Koranic and regular schools are setting the stage for Senegalese women to play a greater leadership role in the rural areas. Functional literacy programs for women leaders are also speeding up this process.

c Youth groups which engage in social, economic, and cultural activities. Village-based rural youth groups like the Amicale du Walo and young farmer associations in the Casamance and other regions constitute some of the most dynamic forces for change in the countryside. Nearly every village in Senegal has its own youth group which tries to find solutions to everyday problems--e.g., obtaining potable water supplies, improving health and educational facilities, increasing rural income, improving agricultural productivity, protecting the environment, etc. Youth groups often provide unpaid labor in constructing village schools and health posts. To earn money, they often cultivate collective fields and organize labor groups to harvest crops. Their dynamism has led traditional village gerontocracies to transfer more prerogatives to youth groups.

In Dakar, youth groups have taken a great deal of initiative in organizing activities to improve their neighborhoods by policing the streets, collecting garbage, improving sanitation facilities, and engaging in periodic clean-up campaigns.

One of the most popular and successful form of youth groups have been the Sports and Cultural Associations (ASCs)

The growth and popularity of the Associations Sportives et Culturelles (ASCs) in the past two decades has been one of the most fascinating developments in Senegalese society. The ASC movement has sprung deep roots in rural Senegal. The ASCs provide rural youth with a recreational outlet primarily through participation on soccer teams competing in league competitions. Nearly every village has its own team, playing field, and equipment. The league matches promote village civic pride, especially when a local team wins a championship. Some village elders see the ASCs as a means of keeping rural youth down on the farm. However, for some local residents, the ASCs

are a mixed blessing. Some of the older rural residents complain that young people are getting so involved in practicing for matches, that they are neglecting their work in the fields during the summer when the navétane leagues are most active. In the rural areas, the summer vacation corresponds with the height of the agricultural season when demand for labor is at its peak. In the urban areas, this poses much less of a problem. On the contrary, the leagues occupy otherwise idle and keep them out of trouble.

Some of the more successful urban ASCs provide an excellent model for institutional reform. The ASCs are pluralistic and inclusive institutions which bring together young men and women living in the same town and neighborhood. Leaders are generally democratically elected and chosen on the basis of competence. Members make sacrifices and fulfill their obligations by paying their dues and respecting the rules. The ASCs generate civic pride at the neighborhood level and can mobilize their members to provide public goods and services at relatively low costs. The SET SETAL cleanup campaign in Dakar in the early 1990s demonstrated the strong mobilizational capacity of youth groups like the ASCs.

Local and regional PS politicians have attempted to enhance their popularity by providing assistance to the ASCs in the form of equipment and uniforms and contributing prizes and trophies. During the recent election campaign, opposition political leaders also made frequent appearances at local soccer matches and vied to preside over and/or sponsor championship matches.

d Groupements d'Intérêt Économique (GIEs) which are organized primarily and almost exclusively around economic activities and objectives. The GIEs were originally created to provide access to credit to small groups of economic actors who were not members of government sponsored cooperatives and producer groups as part of the government's New Agricultural Policy (NPA). Two-thirds of GIEs have less than 50 members. Since 1984, their numbers have increased tremendously. By 1990 close to 5,000 GIEs were registered. GIEs are attractive because they can be formed easily and provide access to credit. In the Saint Louis region, people organized GIEs to gain access to land previously controlled by SAED and producer groups affiliated with SAED. Women's and youth groups have also transformed themselves into GIEs, especially in Dakar and the larger cities. Like many AVDs, community-based GIEs are affiliated with extralocal GIE federal structures. Debt repayment has become a major problem for many GIEs. Some GIEs were set up primarily to get access to credit which was then used for personal consumption rather than to invest in inputs to improve production. In the Saint Louis region, which has the largest number of GIEs, low producer prices combined with high production costs have made repayment of debts difficult.

e popular savings and credit associations which have sprung up in rural and urban areas as a response to the

failure of formal large-scale banking and state credit institutions to accommodate the needs of people of modest means to accumulate and mobilize capital. For example, women's groups in Dakar over the past ten years have created their own savings and credit organizations to finance a variety of small-scale business activities, access to housing, and the pilgrimage to Mecca. These new institutions have been set up in addition to the less formal tontine rotating credit structures. In the countryside, village-based associations are also setting up mutual savings and credit institutions to finance both individual and collective projects. These institutions are particularly well developed in Thiès which has a long tradition of peasant-based institutions. Many village associations have also set up cereal banks in which grains like millet and maize are deposited shortly after the harvest and then made available to members at low prices during the hungry season. In most instances, external NGOs have provided the initial impetus and funding in setting up these new institutions.

f Urban Neighborhood Associations and Committees

In Dakar and in other large Senegalese cities, neighborhood associations and committees have sprung up to provide or to co-produce a wide variety of public goods and services not supplied in sufficient quantity by the state. Historically, neighborhood groups banded together to extract favors and services from politicians seeking their votes. While urban politicians still dispense patronage to neighborhoods to win electoral support from their constituents, major changes have taken place in how the state, municipal governments, and external donors and NGOs relate to urban neighborhoods.

(1) There is greater recognition and acceptance of neighborhood associations and groups built on traditional hierarchies, networks, and modes of social organization. ENDA, for example, has stopped attempting to impose its own community development organizational model based on egalitarian principles and adapted a model of cooperating with neighborhood groups primarily on the basis of mutual interests. ENDA's research has shown that most of the neighborhood associations and groups organized by donor and NGO projects no longer exist, having disappeared shortly after the end of the project. The more successful and permanent neighborhood associations have been those built around traditional social values and modes of organization. Many of these neighborhood-based associations operate outside of the usual state, donor, and NGO circuits and provide a host of low-cost services--e.g. credit, security, garbage collection, and sanitation facilities.

(2) State bureaucrats and politicians are at last beginning to regard urban neighborhoods more as local governance units in their own right and less as potential recipients of the largesse of central government and political

patronage While the fragmentation of Dakar into 19 communes d'arrondissement might have been a ploy of the PS to weaken the opposition, it also legitimized the concept of urban neighborhoods as local governance units

(3) There is a distinct trend towards municipal government and neighborhood committees and associations working together to co-produce key public goods and services such as education, health, security, sanitation, and credit

(4) Neighborhood committees and associations are becoming more and more partners of rather than the dependent clients of central and municipal government institutions

(5) Decentralization and opposition control over or representation in urban local governance units may break the monopoly of the state and the PS over local decision making and strengthen the influence of neighborhood committees and associations in decision making related to their interests

A not exhaustive sampling of the kinds of associations and organizations operating at the neighborhood level would include

(1) women's tontines and small-scale credit and savings institutions

(2) health committees, PTA associations, and neighborhood clean-up committees

(3) neighborhood patrols to combat crime

(4) ad hoc neighborhood committees organized to mobilize resources and influence to obtain a specific facility or service or to deal with pressing issues

(5) market women's groups and associations

(6) local youth associations

(7) groups and associations involved in GIEs and other micro-enterprises

(8) ASCs

(9) religious associations

(10) branches of hometown associations

(11) Local Management Committees (CLG)

g. grassroots organizations linked with state services

Several important organizations work closely with government services in managing the delivery of public goods

and services at the local level. The three most important are

a parent-teacher associations (APE) which are organized in the urban areas and in nearly every village. Rural APEs are becoming more involved in contributing to local school construction and in providing materials and school supplies.

b local health committees which can be found where there are dispensaries, maternities, and local health posts. The health committees work closely with local health agents.

c local water management committees which are responsible for choosing someone to manage and maintain boreholes and work closely with the Water ministry.

The more successful grassroots associations usually have traits that are often lacking in many national level political and modern urban-based functional institutions.

1 Internal democracy. Leaders are designated by members of the group and chosen on the basis of competence and good character.

2 Unity. Members generally agree on goals and work together to implement them.

3 Financial autonomy based largely on dues paid by members, contributions by wealthier members, and mobilization of human investments and materials in kind. This is true as long as the associations operate on a modest scale.

4 Transparency due to the fact that members know each other and will levy and enforce sanctions on those violating the rules.

The grassroots associations described above are not without their flaws and should not be idealized. These groups often lack managerial and technical skills and capacity and financial resources to manage more than small-scale activities. Some suffer from mismanagement of funds and corruption. Politicians often coopt their leaders and transform these organizations into clients of the ruling party in exchange for their electoral support.

At the present time, grassroots associations exert very little influence over national political and economic institutions. Over time, they may generate the kind of leadership needed for reforming the political system and making it more responsive to local needs and more accountable. An important issue arising from the emergence of supra-local unions and federations purporting to represent their grassroots membership groups concerns the extent to which they truly articulate and defend the needs and interests of their constituents.

To sum up, the expansion and growing density of associational life are building a more solid foundation for further democratization of Senegalese society. The associations have also made important contributions to Senegalese economic development even though most of their activities have been on a small scale. They have mobilized scarce resources and provided basic low cost public goods and services for their communities. Many have also provided a social safety net and generated resources that have prevented the kind of deterioration in living standards that one might have expected from the country's poor performance at the macro-economic level. Donors and external NGOs will need to have a better understanding of how indigenous associations built on traditional modes of social organization and solidarity networks function if they are to work more closely and effectively with these forces in the future.

Finally, one should not forget the so-called voiceless urban populations who are not

- a integrated into state and party patronage networks
- b clients of the professional NGO movement
- c organized in formal associations

The voiceless (sans voix) includes the urban homeless, children forced to fend on their own, idle and alienated adolescents, beggars, hustlers, drug addicts, street peddlers, the landless rural poor, and other marginalized groups in society. They are usually the poorest of the poor with little prospects for the future unless they develop their own dynamic networks and associations to meet their needs. ENDA is one of the few groups working with these people to mobilize their energies. Islamic associations also reach out to these people.

### 3 Urban-Based Associations Organized Around Modern Economic, Professional, Cultural, and Civic Concerns

The narrow definition of civil society usually refers to the kinds of modern economic, professional, cultural, and civic associations found in large urban areas. One has difficulty in finding militant trade unions, lawyers' associations, feminist groups, Rotary Clubs, and karate federations in Senegal's rural villages. Rural social structures are much less differentiated than those in a modern metropolis like Dakar. In Senegal most of the major organizations and associations usually identified with civil society are concentrated in Greater Dakar which contains more than 20% of the country's total population and an even larger percentage of its modern infrastructure.

#### a Economic Organizations

During the colonial period, the modern formal sectors of

the economy were almost exclusively controlled by the French French businessmen controlled the Chambers of Commerce which represented their interests Until 1937, trade unions in Senegal were dominated by Europeans since Africans were not permitted to organize their own trade unions Post-World War II political reforms permitted the flourishing of a militant trade union movement in Senegal which extracted concessions from the French colonial state and private sector--e g equal pay for equal work for French and African civil servants, the establishment of a minimum wage, and rules making it difficult for employers to fire their workers

Independence was accompanied by the following changes in the state's relationships with organizations and associations representing labor and management

1 Radical independent trade unions were crushed and replaced by a single domesticated trade union federation incorporated into the party-state system

2 A new organization closely aligned with the regime, the Groupements Économiques du Sénégal (GES) to represent Senegalese private sector businessmen was established

3 The state set up a tripartite structure to settle disputes between labor and management with the state as the final arbiter

4 The Chambers of Commerce were gradually Africanized and transformed into docile symbolic institutions subordinate to the state

5 The French private sector increasingly looked to France to defend their interests and developed close but discreet ties with the Senegalese president

Political and economic liberalization beginning in the mid-1970s created the opportunities for greater pluralism and autonomy in labor and employer labor organizations Nevertheless, the government remained reluctant to give up its hegemony over private and public sector organizations Since the mid-1990s, the political will of the government to consult more actively with independent labor and employer groups and to take their views into consideration before making major economic decisions has increased markedly For their part, labor and employer associations have evolved and become more willing to openly criticize the state's economic and labor policies

#### 1/ Trade Unions

In the past decade, one can discern the following trends in the trade union movement

(1) The PS-affiliated CNTS is still the largest trade union in the country and is likely to remain so

(2) The CNTS which has representatives in the cabinet and in the PS Political Bureau is no longer automatically rubber stamping government economic policy It now occasionally opposes or attempts to slow down the implementation of state economic policies deemed detrimental to the working class. The CNTS has thus opposed legislation to make firing of workers easier and has resisted efforts to accelerate the pace of privatization. In 1993 the CNTS joined forces with other trade unions in a coalition to negotiate revision of the Sakho-Loum austerity program. The CNTS needs to retain a minimum of militancy in order not to lose ground to rival trade union movements. At the same time, it cannot become too militant because of its integration into PS party structures.

(3) Over the past decade, autonomous trade unions not affiliated with the PS or the PDS have become more important and increasingly militant in their stands. The most prominent has been UNSAS (Union Nationale des Syndicats Autonomes de Sénégal) headed by Mademba Sock. Their militancy has been fueled by the loss of jobs in the private and public sectors, the hardships imposed by structural adjustment policies and devaluation, and the prospect of losing more jobs as privatization proceeds.

(4) The trade union movement has adopted a more moderate ideological stance and has largely given up Marxist vocabulary and modes of analysis. Even UNSAS, perhaps the most militant of the major trade unions, accepts some form of liberal capitalism and large parts of the country's structural adjustment program.

(5) Trade Union activities have become relatively less politicized than in the past and more focused on economic bread and butter issues.

(6) Privatization seems to be the main issue currently concerning public sector trade unions. The proposed privatization of state railroads, SONATEL, and SENELEC have met resistance from the trade unions. UNSAS wants the workers to be informed of the government's current negotiations with the French and to be given shares in SONATEL as part of the privatization package and has extracted a promise from the government that the state would retain a 51 percent controlling interest in SENELEC. The trade unions prefer to deal with the state than with private management because they have more political leverage in pressing to preserve jobs.

(7) Private sector trade unions continue to remain weaker than public sector trade unions.

## 2/ Employer and Business Associations

Senegalese employer and business associations can be divided into three main categories

a organizations like the Conseil National du Patronat du Sénégal (CNP), UNISYNDI, and SCIMPEX which represent the older large-scale formal sector French and Senegalese business establishment with close links to the regime

b organizations like the Conseil National des Employeurs Sénégalais (CNES) which represent newer formal sector organizations that oppose the preferential treatment granted to state enterprises and older private sector firms

c organizations like the Union National des Commerçants et Importateurs du Sénégal (UNACOIS) and the Organisation des Commerçants, Agriculteurs, Artisans et Industriels du Sénégal (OCAAIS) which represent commercial and informal sector interests

In the 1990s, the growth of more autonomous enterprises less dependent upon the state for credit, state contracts, and preferential treatment has led to some of the following changes

(1) Employer Organizations, like the trade unions, no longer rubber stamp or remain passive when adversely affected by state policies or not consulted by the state

(2) The Economic and Social Council now includes a broader spectrum of private sector interests than in the past and has taken a strong stand against monopolies

(3) Relatively new organizations like UNACOIS and the CNES have become highly critical of state monopolies and the preferential treatment given to certain enterprises and individuals profiting from their political and social ties to the regime These organizations have lobbied for the end to monopolies and further liberalization of the economy. The groups connected with the predominantly Mouride UNACOIS have profited from the liberalization of foreign trade which enabled their members to increase imports and to replace the Lebanese as the main importers of textiles and electrical appliances. Organizations like UNACOIS also staunchly supported Sud Quotidien after it lost its recent court battle with Jean-Claude Mimran

(4) For their part, private formal sector associations complain that they have to bear the brunt of the tax burden and unfair competition from the informal sector and call upon the government to enforce rules requiring informal sector firms to pay taxes and licensing fees

(5) The government still seems to favor and give preferential treatment to older, large-scale formal

private sector enterprises like the CSS and SOCOCIM

(6) New leaders in the Senegalese business community are taking more important leadership roles in institutions like the Dakar Chamber of Commerce which were once safely in the hands of businessmen closely aligned with the regime

(7) Organizations representing the so-called informal sector have been more willing to openly confront the state and to take action to shut down certain economic sectors as a means of exerting pressure on the government to change its policies For example, UNACOIS has opposed the levying of a value added tax and raising tariffs on imported rice to protect local producers. On several occasions it has launched successful strikes which has shut down business.

(8) Despite its militant stance towards the government, UNACOIS has maintained its political neutrality

(9) Senegalese business groups aligned with the regime are seeking to develop alliances and partnerships with French investors

#### b Teacher and Student Associations

Historically, teachers and students have been among the most highly politicized groups in Senegalese society. During the 1960s and 1970s, teachers and students spearheaded the radical opposition to the Senghor regime. Since the 1980s, their movements have become less radical. The failure to reform Senegal's educational system has once again sparked a resurgence of organizational activity among teachers and students. One can make the following observations about their associations:

(1) The diverse teachers' unions still play an important role in Senegalese society and political life. Teachers' unions thus continue to pressure the government to make educational reforms, spend more to improve primary, secondary, and higher education, and to increase the number of teachers and professors. Many of Senegal's leading political figures in the opposition like Iba Der Thiam, Madia Diouf, Abdoulaye Bathily, Abdoulaye Faye, and Mamadou Ndoeye were active in the teachers' trade union movement.

(2) Fragmentation and overpoliticization have made it more difficult for teachers' unions to become a major force for reform. Elementary, secondary, and university teachers have different interests and concerns. The teachers' unions have not forged a coalition to fight for educational reform. Elementary teachers' unions tend to be more closely

aligned with the PS and government than secondary school and university unions. The intensification of party competition has exacerbated rivalries and divisions within the trade union movement. The leadership of SUDES affiliated with PIT and the leadership of UDEN aligned with the LD-MPT are currently competing to win more support within the teachers' trade union movement.

(3) Student radicalism and opposition to the regime has declined sharply since 1968. Ideological radicalism has waned primarily because of the collapse of radical student movements based on Marxist ideologies and the return of many Senegalese students to Islamic values and affiliation with student organizations tied to the Brotherhoods. Hardcore opposition to the regime and activism have also declined because of the growing competition for scholarships and jobs which make student agitation a luxury which most can't afford and the co-opting of student leaders into mainstream politics.

(4) The student movement is currently fragmented and divided. Political parties and different Islamic currents are competing for influence among the students and have organized their own student affiliates. There are now Mouride and Tijani student associations as well as student associations connected to the major parties. Since 1993, the PS student movement has had the largest membership.

(5) Student organizations and agitation are no longer concentrated primarily in the capital but have spread throughout the country as a consequence of the decentralization and expansion of secondary and higher education in the 1990s.

(6) Secondary school students seem to be less disciplined and more alienated and willing to use violence to obtain their ends than university students.

#### c Professional, Intellectual, and Reform-Minded Associations

Senegal has a growing number of associations and organizations which have been prominent in advancing civil, human, and women's rights and the further democratization of Senegalese society. This represents a marked change from the early years of independence when the degree of democratization was generally determined from above and public debate largely confined to discussions within the Club Nation et Développement organized by Senegal's political elite with the blessings of President Senghor. In the 1990s, Dakar has been the site of scores of national and international conferences focused on human rights, good governance, promotion of women, electoral reform, the rule of law, consumer rights, the role of the media, and other topics connected with democratization processes. Many of these conferences have been directly sponsored by the Senegalese government or by associations.

whose leaders are closely connected to the government. Others have been organized by more neutral associations and groups that are part of Senegal's rapidly expanding professional and intellectual community.

A survey of civil society groups involved with the topics described above would include

(1) human and civil rights groups such as the Senegalese branch of Amnesty International which has documented human rights violations on both sides in the Casamance, the Civil Forum which has lobbied for electoral reform, and other Senegalese human rights organizations like the ONDH and the Institut des Droits de l'Homme et de la Paix

Senegalese human rights groups seem to be more Pan African and internationally oriented. Nevertheless, Senegalese human and civil rights groups played an important role in appealing to international public opinion to release political prisoners like Abdoulaye Wade, Abdoulaye Bathily, and Landing Savané and in stopping human rights violations of the Senegalese government in dealing with the rebels in the Casamance. Groups promoting women's rights have also been fairly effective in championing a greater role for women in leadership positions and in fighting violations of women's rights.

(2) groups emanating from the legal professions which promote the rule of law and strive to maintain high standards in the legal profession such as the Senegalese Bar Association, the Magistrates' Association, and the Senegalese branch of The African Jurist Association

(3) Foundations and independent research Institutes like Paix et Développement, CODESRIA, the Gorée Institute, the Société d'Éducation et de Formation pour le Développement, and the African Institute for Democracy which focus on democracy, governance, and development issues

(4) Feminist organizations fighting to promote women's rights and leadership roles in Senegalese society such as the Conseil Sénégalais des Femmes (COSEF) which sought to increase the number of women candidates in the last elections

(5) Consumer Rights organizations like the recently created Conseil National des Associations de Consommateurs (CONAC) which regroups 6 consumers rights groups and organizations lobbying for environmental protection like Ecoprotect

(6) Various media associations like the Syndicat des Professionnels de l'Information et de la Communication du Sénégal (SYNPICS), the trade union of media professionals which has actively defended freedom of the press and greater access of political parties to the media. Media leaders like Babacar Touré in publishing independent newspapers and

broadcasting on radio are providing the public with more information about politics and public affairs. Radio is reaching a very broad audience, thanks to programming in the national languages.

These groups have been highly visible in promoting reforms and the further democratization of Senegalese society. However, some suffer from the following problems:

1. Factionalism For example, consumer groups seem to be divided because of personal rivalries within the movement.

2. Isolation from the masses Many are elite organizations with little contact with the everyday problems of ordinary Senegalese.

3. Excessive financial dependency upon external resources

4. Use of their organizations by the leaders to further personal interests

5. Lack of sufficient autonomy vis-a-vis the state and political parties

#### d. Secular Civic and Charitable Organizations

Various civic and charitable organizations have recently sprung up in Dakar and other large cities. Some like the Convention des Saint Louisiens and the Convention des Thièsois seek to promote their city and region. Others, like the Rotary Club and the Soroptimists, are Senegalese branches of international organizations that provide a social meeting ground for the Senegalese elite and sponsor various cultural and charitable events. A relatively new phenomenon has been the creation of private foundations to support charitable and cultural activities and to finance various social services. One of the best known is the Partage-Solidarité Foundation organized by Elizabeth Diouf, the wife of the president.

#### e. Sports and Cultural Associations

The relationship between sports and politics in Senegal merits further study. Some leading PS politicians like Prime Minister Habib Thiam and former sports minister Lamine Diack owe no small measure of their popularity or notoriety to their having been sports heroes in their youth or heads of sports associations. Sports achievements have become an increasingly important part of many politicians' credentials.

Sports associations have helped build civic pride, kept urban and rural youth out of trouble, and taught young people the value of hard work and developing specialized skills, discipline, and team spirit. The American political scientist Robert Putnam in a now classic study examining the relationship between the existence of voluntary associations

and democratic culture in Italy noted that Northern Italy which emerged as the more democratic and dynamic part of the country not only had a denser network of voluntary associations but also that an astonishing 73% of the voluntary associations were sports associations

In contrast with rural Senegal where team sports are generally limited to soccer, and the ASCs the main and often only organization involved in sports activities, Dakar has a wide variety of teams, leagues, and associations connected with organizing and promoting sports. Dakar now has tennis and swimming clubs, basketball and soccer leagues, martial arts teams and federations, boxing matches, and horse races. The best individuals and teams often participate in Pan African and international competition.

Several features characterize organized sports associations in Dakar and other large urban areas

(1) The state continues to play an important tutelage role in overseeing sports associations. The various laws concerning sports associations promulgated since independence all insist that sports activities fall under state authority. The 1984 Sports Charter reiterated this principle.

(2) the number and diversity of sports teams, clubs, and federations have increased tremendously since independence. For example, Tai Kwondo as a martial art sport first appeared in Senegal in 1984. The first Tai Kwondo Federation was created in 1990. By 1996, there were over 3000 students attending Tai Kwondo classes on a regular basis, mostly in Dakar.

(3) Female participation in organized sports is much greater in Dakar, especially in basketball, track, swimming, and the martial arts. Female participation in sports breaks down sexual stereotypes and provides another channel for social promotion.

(4) Organized sports are becoming more international and participation more expensive as money needs to be raised to send Senegalese teams to compete in international competitions. This has led to heavy financial dependency of sports federations on the state and pressure on state resources to provide the funding.

(5) Senegalese success in international competition helps the popularity of the state and builds national pride. The state takes a particularly strong interest in seeing to it that Senegal has a strong soccer team which can compete successfully in African and World Cup competitions.

(6) Given the popularity of sports figures and associations in Senegal, politicians are increasingly trying to win popularity and votes by providing financial support to sports activities in their community and recruiting sports heroes to endorse them at election time. For example, Mamadou

Diop put a great deal of effort into expanding and improving Dakar's sports facilities as part of his campaign to win back Dakar for the PS

Cultural associations have also grown in size and number since independence. The music industry, in particular, has become one of Senegal's major growth industries. Senegalese singers like Youssou N'dour and Baaba Maal have won international fame. In 1990, Senegalese musicians organized the Association Nationale des Métiers de la Musique (ANAMM) to protect and promote their interests. In December 1996, Mortala Diop, a successful Senegalese businessman who made his fortune in the United States selling African art established a foundation to promote African artists, art museums, and cultural exchanges. NGOs like ENDA have also encouraged the development of popular culture in the capital.

As political parties make greater efforts to win the support of Senegalese youth, they are turning more and more to sports and cultural heroes. Sports and culture are the only two areas where young people dominate. In a poll taken in Dakar in 1996, the results showed that singer Youssou N'dour was by far the most admired Senegalese, finishing well ahead of Abdoulaye Wade and President Diouf. Senegalese artists have become more active in campaigns fighting against drugs and promoting civic pride. For example, Youssou N'dour's song preaching the importance of cleanliness was one of the driving forces behind the 1990 Set-Setal neighborhood clean-up campaign in Dakar.

## VII The State and the Media

The emergence of an independent daily press and private radio stations has been one of the most positive developments in recent years for strengthening Senegalese democracy and providing new and alternative sources of information.

Under the party-state regime, the government and dominant party completely controlled the media. In 1970 the government took over Dakar-Matin, the country's only daily newspaper which became Le Soleil. The liberalization begun by Senghor in the mid-1970s was accompanied by the appearance of independent newspapers appearing sporadically and reflecting the views of opposition political parties and leaders. The independent print media expanded rapidly in the 1980s but was often subjected to harassment and libel suits by the government.

Several important changes took place in the 1990s which reflected the liberalization of the government's position vis-a-vis the media.

1 the establishment of the Haut-Conseil de la Radio-Télévision (HCRT) in 1992. The law creating the HCRT set up guidelines for providing all of Senegal's political parties with regular access to state controlled media--the radio and

television

2 the authorization of private radio stations in 1993

3 the emergence of three independent daily newspapers, thus ending the government-controlled monopoly over the daily press

The rapidly expanding independent media now offer opposition party leaders and civil society personalities new outlets to present their message. The independent media are also forcing the state-controlled media to expand their reporting of political events and discussion of public issues in order not to lose their audience.

One of the most significant developments was the emergence of independent radio stations like Sud-FM which provided news and information in the local languages and extensive coverage of the November 1996 local government campaign and elections. Sud-FM also provided its listeners with a comprehensive description of election day proceedings throughout the country and documented flaws in the organization of the elections which sparked demands for electoral reforms.

Since 1993, Sud-FM has opened up local radio stations outside of Dakar which can reach more than two-thirds of Senegal's population. Decentralized radio broadcasts in the local languages can serve a crucial role in raising important public issues, diffusing reliable information, and providing a forum for citizens to discuss their problems.

By reporting and documenting government and private sector corruption and abuse of state power, the independent media also serve an important watchdog function. However, the credibility of the media in this area will depend upon accurate, professional, and well-researched reporting. Rumor-mongering and inaccurate reporting attacking public figures and state policies and practices could undermine the credibility of the press with both the government and the public and lead to greater restrictions and control over the media.

While the government has clearly demonstrated the political will to promote a vibrant and independent media and to end the state's monopoly over the media, it, nevertheless, retains its monopoly over television broadcasting which it uses to promote the prestige of the president and to support the regime's political agenda. It has dragged its feet in granting Sud-Communication authorization to start a private station on the grounds that the Senegalese market is not big enough to permit Sud-Communication to go it alone.

The Mimran Affair and government prosecution of Sud-Quotidien journalists for publishing an article sharply attacking President Diouf for decorating Mimran a few days

before the trial indicate that the regime has its limits as to the degree of criticism it can tolerate by the media

Donors should support programs to upgrade the professionalism and objectivity of the Senegalese media and vigorously back efforts to defend and expand freedom of the press

## VIII Pressures Leading to Changes in the Political and Economic Context for Reform

### A Population Pressures

Annual population growth rates of 2.7-2.9% are putting tremendous pressure on Senegal's resources. Population pressures on land have reduced soil fertility and stimulated rural exodus. The rapid rate of urbanization is also putting great pressure on society to provide more expensive modern housing and services and jobs to employ the urban population. Dakar's high growth rates means that a larger and larger percentage of Senegal's population will be concentrated in the capital. By the year 2015, Senegal will have to accommodate a predominantly urban population of approximately 16 million people.

Population pressures thus force Senegal to seek economic growth rates to maintain and increase living standards and effective environmental policies to protect its deteriorating natural resource base.

On the other hand, population pressure has its positive side. While demanding more jobs and services, a young population may also be more dynamic and flexible in adopting to change. Larger populations also mean larger potential internal markets in Senegal and larger potential sub-regional and regional markets in West Africa. Success in providing education and training for larger numbers of people may also create the critical mass of skilled people for Senegal to take off. Thus, while overcrowded universities may be the negative side of population pressures, a larger pool of university graduates may prove to be a more positive asset.

### B Economic Forces

Economic forces exerting pressure on the government to accelerate the pace of reform and restructuring of the economy include

(1) the globalization of the international economy which provides new opportunities for Senegal to diversify its trade and investment partners and new challenges in that it also exposes Senegal to increasingly fierce competition for world markets

(2) the implementation of structural adjustment programs which have forced the government to liberalize the economy,

reduce the size of government, and move to end preferential treatment for non-competitive private sector enterprises

(3) the devaluation of the CFA which has opened up possibilities for Senegalese industry to become more competitive while forcing many Senegalese to tighten their belts

(4) the decline in foreign aid which provides more incentives for the government to use aid more effectively and to seek more development-capital from private sector sources

(5) a more competitive and autonomous Senegalese private sector which is putting more pressure on the government for liberalizing the economy

(6) the influx of modern computer and telecommunications technology which is transforming old ways of doing research, managing state bureaucracies, and doing business, and bringing the rest of the world closer to Senegal

#### C Donor Pressures and Support

The donors have used conditionality and aid to prod and help the government to make reforms in the following areas

1 reduction in the size of the state bureaucracy and the allocation of a smaller percentage of departmental budgets to salaries

deficits 2 reduction in the size of state budgetary

3 reduction in the size of Senegal's foreign debt

4 deregulation of key sectors of the economy

5 liberalization of foreign trade

6 the liquidation of bankrupt state agencies

7 privatization of state enterprises

8 decentralization of public medical services

9 improvements in the electoral system

10 upgrading of local government institutions

#### D Youth and Women As Change Agents

##### 1. Senegalese Youth

Senegal is a young society The 1988 census reported

that 58% of the population was under 20. The need to address and satisfy the exploding needs of Senegalese youth constitutes one of the main pressures for change and reform in Senegalese society. There is almost unanimous agreement that Senegal's future lies with its young people and the ability of the system to provide the public services--education, health, recreation, etc --needed to nurture Senegal's youth and provide employment opportunities and a place in the sun.

Senegal's young people do not constitute a monolithic body with the same traits, therefore, it is essential to distinguish among the various groups who make up Senegalese youth. One can classify youth according to the following criteria:

1 age and age sets Senegalese usually classify anyone under 35 as part of youth. For example, political parties generally set 35 as the age limit for membership in party youth groups. Different age sets have different kinds of problems. Children up to the age of five have high mortality rates. Children between the age of 6-14 rarely participate in formal associations. Young people between the ages of 15-25 are just entering the work market or going to secondary and post-secondary institutions. Young people from 25-35 are concerned with employment and career issues, getting married, and starting a family.

2 gender In common usage, youth in Senegal generally refers to males. In the rural areas, villages have separate male groups, while young girls and women tend to be grouped together in female groups headed by adult women. Most youth groups and associations--party youth groups, student organizations, ASCs, etc --tend to be dominated by males. Young women get married much earlier than their male counterparts, especially in the rural areas.

3 class Differences in access to schooling, employment opportunities, and degree of participation in youth groups are closely related to social and economic status. For example, the wealthy can afford to send their children to private schools and the middle classes to public schools, the poor often do not send their children to school or cannot support their children beyond primary school. Children of the poor usually enter the labor market at an earlier age. Children of the wealthy go to university and become professionals while poor children constitute family labor or work as apprentices. Party youth groups tend to be dominated by relatively well-educated middle class youth. The Conseil National de la Jeunesse (CNJ) is comprised primarily of representatives of middle-class youth associations. The ASCs are one of the few youth associations whose members cross class lines.

4 urban-rural cleavages The problems and concerns of young rural peasants and herders are quite different from young urban residents. The former seek access to land and agricultural inputs while the latter are more concerned with

getting jobs and furthering their education. Urban children are far more likely to go to school and to continue their education than rural youth. Urban youth is also more likely to be involved in crime, drugs, and promiscuous behavior than rural youth.

5 cultural influences and lifestyles The range of cultural influences and lifestyles is greatest in Dakar and are expressed through differences in dress, musical tastes, religious affiliations, and choice of role models and heroes. Traditional Senegalese wrestlers have taken the name of American boxers, Senegalese youth enjoy Michael Jackson, Bob Marley, Aretha Franklin, Youssou Ndour, Baaba Maal, traditional griots, and Islamic religious singers. Some wear boubous and sandals, while others sport T-shirts, trousers, and sneakers.

Pressures for change are coming from the young, influenced by both western and Islamic currents. Caste barriers are breaking down, young girls are going to school in larger numbers, Senegalese youth are exposed to international cultural currents and issues, they are aware of new social diseases like AIDs and tempted by drugs, the world in which they are growing up in is markedly different from the one in which their country's leaders grew up. No one under 35 has experienced one minute of colonial rule. Urban youth, in particular, is less likely to listen to their elders. It is no mere accident that Abdoulaye Wade's slogan sopi (change) struck such a chord among Dakar's young people, particularly those whose futures looked bleak.

#### a Youth and Politics

The younger generation is becoming a potentially powerful force in Senegalese electoral politics. The lowering of the voting age to 18 and the growing numbers of young people between the age of 18 and 25 make that age group an important stake in national and local elections. Political self-interest drives Senegal's political parties to make a greater effort to woo youth to gain their votes. Politicians have tried to win the support of Senegalese youth by

(1) upgrading the status and autonomy of their parties' youth wings

(2) nominating more young people to run for public office on their party lists

(3) placing greater emphasis on issues important to youth -- e.g. employment, access to education, etc -- in their campaigning

(4) establishing party-affiliated movements at the university and secondary school level

(5) seeking popularity with broad-based youth groups

like the ASCs by providing them with prizes and financial support

One of the most interesting developments has been the growing independence of youth wings and organizations affiliated with the political parties and their refusal to automatically follow the lead of their elders in taking public stands. Thus, the youth wings of the PDS and LD-MPT have asked their party leaders to leave the government while PS affiliated student organizations have criticized PS leaders like OTD for not listening to their concerns. Party youth leaders have also demanded that the collectif des 19 take a more militant stand in pushing for a CENI.

Inter-generational tensions are growing within Senegal's major political parties because senior party leaders continue to place their protegés as heads of party youth wings even when their choices don't correspond with those of the rank and file.

In contrast with the intense politicization of student organizations and party-affiliated youth groups, young people in general seem to be increasingly alienated from the political system. In Senegal, as elsewhere, young people tend to register and vote in smaller numbers than the rest of the electorate.

One of the most potentially dangerous trends in Senegal and one that could conceivably undermine Senegal's political and social stability has been the growing propensity of young people towards violence as a means of venting their frustrations. Many young people are disillusioned with politics and see little value in getting involved in democratic politics. Their non-involvement could eventually set the stage in worst scenario settings for a dictatorial regime with a mandate to reestablish order following uncontrollable outbreaks of urban violence or a more radical form of Islamic fundamentalist regime committed to purging Senegal of its corrupt western influences.

In 1988, young people took to the streets to protest the election results. Young people were also the main force in the 1989 massacres of Senegal's Moorish population in the capital. In February 1994, youth associated with the Moustarchidines rioted after the police broke up an opposition demonstration and killed six policemen. Attacks on the houses of PS party officials by striking students, the unchecked destruction of public property, and the beating up of car rapide drivers involved in local accidents are more recent manifestations of growing violence and lawlessness.

#### b State Responses to Youth Pressures

During the Senghor era, youth protests were confined largely inside the walls of Dakar University. The state dealt with these pressures through a combination of repression and

cooptation Repression consisted of dissolving hostile student organizations, jailing or expelling student leaders, and closing down the university Cooptation involved setting up pro-regime student organizations, offering scholarships, and eventually providing employment and political office

Diouf enjoyed considerable popularity with Senegalese youth during his early years in office But his popularity declined during the latter half of the decade In the late 1980s, Diouf referred to urban youth as the jeunesse malsaine (unhealthy youth) The political reforms of the early 1990s revising the electoral code and lowering the voting age to 18 were in part a response to the 1988 rioting By 1993 Diouf was making young people one of the main focal points of his electoral platform, promising to create 20,000 new jobs a year

The Diouf regime has attempted to reach out to Senegalese youth by taking the following measures

1 establishing the Conseil National de la Jeunesse (CNJ) in November 1994 under the tutelage of the Senegalese Sports Ministry as a national coordinating body of Senegalese youth associations throughout the country

2 naming the president of the CNJ to the Economic and Social Council

3 sponsoring a annual national youth week dedicated to celebrating youth's accomplishments and promoting civic values

4 developing labor intensive programs geared towards providing employment for youth through AGETIP

5 expanding sports facilities in Dakar and other urban areas

6 paying more attention to issues of importance to youth such as AIDs, family planning, unemployment, and access to sports and cultural facilities, etc

### c Youth and its Problems

The current social and economic crisis in Senegal has contributed to some of the following problems among youth

1 high rates of unemployment Each year approximately 200,000 enter the labor market Two-thirds of Senegal's unemployed are between the ages of 15 and 35 Young people with degrees are finding it increasingly difficult to find employment related to their skills Many young Senegalese are leaving the country to seek work Uneducated youth are also finding it difficult to find employment even though the informal sector has managed to absorb thousands of young people High unemployment rates have put severe strains on

family life since young people without jobs continue to stay at home without contributing to family budgets already under strain as the result of devaluation and higher prices for many basic commodities

2 growing crime rates, drug use, prostitution, AIDS, and other social ills The breakdown of family life in Dakar accentuated by the current economic crisis is putting more and more young people at risk. State institutions are not geared to deal with these ills or to provide social workers. Few institutions work with juvenile delinquents. However, some religious leaders like Kara Mbacké, the "marabout des jeunes," and various Islamic associations have been working to rehabilitate former delinquents and drug addicts.

3 the crisis in the educational system The declining material conditions and overcrowding of schools and universities, a school curriculum unadapted to societal needs, the poor perspectives of employment for graduates, and the absence of a real dialogue between the government, teachers, students, and parents have contributed to the deterioration of confidence in Senegal's educational system. The state seems to lack a clear-cut vision as to how to go about reforming the educational system. The recent series of strikes and negotiations between the state, teachers, and students have not advanced the cause of educational reform.

#### d Youth as a Dynamic Force for Change

Notwithstanding the problems cited above, the fact remains that youth associations constitute some of the most positive, dynamic, and innovative forces in Senegalese society. Youth organizations concerned with economic survival, meeting young people's needs for cultural and sports outlets, and improving the quality of life in their communities are proliferating and gaining widespread support.

In the Dakar metropolitan area, for example, the ASCs have become more than just sports and cultural associations; they have also become competent organizations capable of mobilizing neighborhood resources for community purposes. Other youth associations and GIEs have also helped their neighborhoods through clean-up campaigns, collecting garbage, and other human investments. Urban youth groups are also becoming increasingly active in dealing with such problems as AIDS, unwanted teenage pregnancies, drug abuse, and juvenile crime.

In the rural areas, youth-based groups contribute to the well-being of their communities through human investments and have organized dynamic producer groups.

Senegalese youth is open to change and eager to learn how to improve their skills. The inclusion of civic values and good governance concerns to the agendas of youth groups could

lead to their exerting greater pressure on their elders to reform the political system and to make a more serious effort to address Senegal's social and economic problems more seriously

## 2 Women As Change Agents

Observers of Senegalese society often point to women as the most dynamic and hard-working elements in Senegalese society. As with youth, one can not deal with Senegalese women as a monolithic group with common attributes and objectives. The perspectives and problems of women differ according to age, class, urban-rural cleavages, cultural influences, ethnicity, and religious affiliations.

Gender is a major factor in understanding Senegalese society. The professional, economic, educational, religious and political functions of Senegalese men and women differ drastically.

One of the most striking features of Senegalese society is the almost total absence of women in general, and young women, in particular, in leadership roles outside of specifically women's groups. Young women are marginalized in party youth wings, non-political youth organizations, and peasant associations. Women's organizations themselves tend to consist primarily of adult married women.

Senegalese women have made significant gains since independence. To understand the climate for improving the position of women in Senegal, it is useful to make a distinction between the political will to raise the political and social status of women along western egalitarian principles and the political will to improve the condition and quality of life of women. Although there is still considerable resistance in Senegalese society to the former, there is a very strong consensus on the part of virtually all segments of Senegalese society to improve the condition of women. While resisting legislation to upgrade the status of women in ways which they feel contradict Islamic law, the Brotherhoods are making an important effort to provide education for girls and in some instances, providing literacy programs for adult women. In the countryside, males back the efforts of women to organize autonomous associations and measures to lighten the domestic work load of women.

### a The State's Role in Upgrading the Status and Condition of Women

Since independence, the government has taken the following measures to improve the status and condition of women:

- 1 the establishment of the Rural Animation movement in the early 1960s which included a strong women's component

- 2 the passage of the 1973 family code
- 3 the creation of a ministry concerned with women's issues, the Ministère de la Femme de l'Enfant et de la Famille
- 4 the incorporation of WID projects in National Development Plans
5. the establishment in 1980 of an annual two week event (Quinzaine Nationale de la Femme Sénégalaise) to discuss themes concerning the role of women
- 6 the elaboration of National Action Plans for Women starting in 1982
- 7 the signing of international conventions concerning the upgrading of women's rights and condition
- 8 the sponsoring of international conference in Dakar concerned with women's rights and other issues affecting women
- 9 increased representation of women in the Economic and Social Council

While the government has vigorously given verbal support to raising the status of women, it has been less active in taking steps to implement its policies. For example, the government often has avoided applying family code provisions concerning divorce and inheritance because of opposition from Islamic religious authorities. Within the state bureaucracy itself, women comprise only 15 percent of the personnel with most concentrated in the health and education sectors. The corps of civil administrators controlling the top echelons of the Senegalese bureaucracy remains an almost exclusively male domain.

#### b Women and Politics

The number and percentage of Senegalese women holding elected public office and important party posts has sharply increased over the past decade. Historically, women have served as women's auxiliaries in Senegal's male-dominated political parties. Women have been and remain very active in organizing campaign rallies and in turning out to vote. Today, they are no longer satisfied with supporting the men, they want to hold public office and leadership positions in their parties. Women now head three government ministries and hold 14 seats in the National Assembly. Women are also beginning to assert their leadership in local government. Louga and Linguère now have women as mayors and four of the urban communes d'arrondissement are headed by women. Larger percentages of women are appearing on political party lists. This is true even in traditionally conservative rural areas.

Despite their gains, women still play secondary roles in leadership positions. No woman heads a political party, women hold relatively minor ministerial posts in the government, none are represented in the collectif des 19, all ten presidents of regional councils are men.

### c Women and the Economy

The marginal position of women is most evident in the economy. Women constitute less than 10 percent of the salaried work force. Women are largely absent from certain sectors of the economy--e.g. telecommunications, transportation, construction and public works, and textiles. In the urban areas, they are concentrated in the informal sector. Thousands of women, mostly of Serer and Diola ethnic origin, work as poorly paid domestics in the urban areas. Women don't own, control, or manage large-scale formal sector enterprises. They have little voice in the trade union movement. In the rural areas, they have little access to land and credit.

Despite their marginality, women are playing an increasingly important economic role within the family economy. Women involved in the urban informal economy and in rural women's associations constitute some of the most energetic and dynamic forces in the Senegalese economy. Their dynamism has not yet been translated into political influence or in major gains in getting greater access to land and formal credit institutions. These women are more likely to have a greater positive impact at the micro-economic level since they lack the education, technical and managerial skills, and capital needed to operate large-scale enterprises. Nevertheless, they are capable of making significant improvements in living standards and quality of life for their families and local communities.

Rural women, for example, have become increasingly involved in managing village forestry resources and operating mechanical rice and millet mills. They play a prominent role on village health committees and in prenatal and postnatal baby care programs. Women's groups have also organized various small-scale economic projects--e.g. vegetable gardens, small livestock raising, etc --to supplement individual and family income.

### c Women and Civil Society

Greater access to higher education is providing Senegalese women with greater opportunities to enter the professions, organize modern urban associations, NGOs, and feminist groups, and to assert leadership positions in promoting political, social, and economic reform. For the most part, these women are the wives and daughters of Senegal's male elites.

Senegal's university-educated women are playing an important role in promoting women's rights and have organized

several associations to further these goals. Women like Marie-Angelique Savané, the former editor of Famille et Développement and Fatou Sow, a sociologist at IFAN, one of Senegal's leading university research institute, have been active in Senegal's feminist movement. Fatoumata Sow, the head of APAC (Association des Professionnelles Africaines de la Communications), for several years headed CONGAD. Women academics like Penda Mbow have been active in organizing civil society intellectuals and associations to take a more active role in promoting electoral reform.

One of the major challenges facing the well-educated Senegalese female civil society leaders is overcoming the social gap that prevents their developing closer ties and dialogue with their less educated female colleagues active in grassroots associations.

## IX Forces Resisting Political and Economic Reform

Some of the major forces resisting political, administrative, and economic reforms and further liberalization and indicators of this resistance include

1 groups within the PS holding on to old party-state habits and unwilling to share power with other political parties. The wing of the party allied with OTD is seeking to change some of the rules to reinforce their control over national political institutions and refusing to accept a CENI

2 the heads of political parties opposing independent candidates

3 government employees and officials who owe their jobs and positions to the ruling party who are afraid of losing their jobs should the PS lose the elections. This is particularly true of municipal employees who are often unskilled workers hired primarily for patronage purposes who would have a hard time finding equally remunerative employment in the private sector should they lose their jobs.

4 elements within the state bureaucracy seeking to perpetuate top-down ways of managing the government and the predominant role of the administrateurs civils in the higher echelons of the state bureaucracy and territorial administration

5 sectors of the business community closely aligned with the ruling party that have benefited from monopoly privileges and past preferential treatment. These sectors are opposing or attempting to delay the implementation of reforms designed to end private sector monopolies, tax exonerations, and other forms of preferential treatment as part of an overall strategy to make the Senegalese economy more competitive.

6 PS party leaders and high-ranking state officials

managing state services and enterprises resisting the implementation of privatization measures and further deregulation and liberalization of the economy The Diouf regime has been more reluctant to move more rapidly in these areas because reduced regulation and control over and privatization of key sectors of the economy means less power, patronage, and resources available to the regime and those heading the state bureaucracy

The reluctance of the state to give up its regulatory powers and its control over the filières of key agricultural commodities should come of no surprise. The revenues generated by skimming off receipts from the peanut trade permitted the state to rapidly expand its bureaucracy and to have access to resources which could be used for patronage and personal gain. Even though it had been losing money and operating inefficiently many years, the state found it difficult to privatize SONOCOS because of its importance as a source of patronage for the party faithful, means of enriching its managers, and providing special benefits to influential religious leaders

#### 7 Trade union leaders opposing privatization and reduction of jobs in the public and parapublic sectors of the economy

One should not exaggerate the capacity of the forces listed above, powerful as they are, to stop reform

1 The PS is not a monolithic structure, Tanor's two main rivals, Djibo Ka and Moustapha Niasse, have both taken more liberal stances towards the CENI

2 Younger cadres within the state bureaucracy with different educational and professional profiles than their elders are supporting new managerial styles and lighter government structures

3 Despite their efforts to hold on to privileges as long as possible, even the entrenched business interests benefitting from their special relationships with the regime are being forced to adjust and to become more competitive in order to meet the challenges of globalization

4 Trade unions are reluctantly accepting the inevitability and value of privatization in certain sectors

5 Forces within civil society are also stepping up their pressures on the government for political and economic reform

#### X The Changing Political Climate and its Impact on the Economic Development Climate

The political climate in the mid-1990s has become

increasingly more compatible with the promotion of private sector activities and economic development, especially when compared with other periods in the post-independence era

The most pertinent components comprising Senegal's political climate that have an important impact on the climate for economic development include

(1) the degree of political stability in the country

Since the February 1994 riots in Dakar sparked by the Moustarchidines, the country has been relatively quiet. The level of political violence connected with the rebellion in the Lower Casamance has subsided and the government is involved with serious negotiations with the MFDC which did not attempt to disrupt the 1996 local elections as it had done in 1993. Peace and the devaluation of the CFA have brought tourists back to the country and led to a sharp increase in revenues from tourism.

The prospects for continued political stability remain good. In his 1996 campaign speeches, Abdoulaye Wade insisted that he would not appeal to the street and risk bloodshed in the event the PS would "steal" victory from his party through massive fraud. The other opposition parties also seem committed to resolving their conflicts with the regime through non-violent protest and negotiations and have toned down their rhetoric. The country's major religious leaders have all preached the need to maintain peace and national unity. And urban youth seem to be less inclined to take to the streets and trash the capital.

Political stability is a necessary but not sufficient condition for economic development. You can't develop a country when civil wars are raging. The MFDC insurrection retarded Ziguinchor's economic development in the 1980s and early 1990s. Compared to most African countries, Senegal has been a pillar of stability, yet its economic development has been disappointing.

2) the ideological stances of the president, governing party, and other key political actors-- e.g. opposition political parties, trade union leaders, the intelligentsia, etc

While the same party has been in power since independence, it has undergone several changes in its ideological stance. During the early 1960s, African Socialism became the official ideology of the regime. Mamadou Dia's brand of communitarian African Socialism called for a national cooperative movement to replace the French and Lebanese-dominated colonial trading economy and state control over the commanding heights of the economy. After the fall of Mamadou Dia, Senghor adopted a more moderate, technocratic, and statist version of African Socialism which left the modern sectors of the economy more or less under the control of

French and Lebanese business interests while asserting state control over the peanut trade and rural cooperative movement. The technocratic elite groomed by Senghor to run the country favored a more statist and nationalist version of African Socialism. In the mid-1970s, the regime dropped African Socialism as its official ideology and adopted democratic socialism to demonstrate its affinity with the Socialist International movement. The new state ideology justified both continued state control over the leading sectors of the economy and democratic processes.

During the 1980s, the regime's ideology clashed with that of the liberal, market-oriented ideology of the World Bank and IMF. President Diouf began to incorporate the slogan "less government is better government" into the regime ideology in trimming the size of the state bureaucracy but still maintained that the state should continue to control the country's leading economic sectors. Since the 1993 national elections, the regime has moved to a more capitalist and free market-oriented version of democratic socialism. Diouf's speeches have become increasingly full of references to free market economic principles.

In the 1970s, the PDS was obliged to become a liberal capitalist party under the constitution although its proclivity was towards a British Labor Party form of socialism. In the late 1980s, it moved more to the right and became part of the international liberal capitalist movement. Today, the PDS remains a strong supporter of market capitalism while at the same time distancing itself from all-out dog-eat-dog forms of capitalism (le capitalisme sauvage).

One of the major developments in the 1990s has been the desertion of Marxist ideological principles and language on the part of most of Senegal's radical political parties which transformed themselves into parties espousing some form of democratic socialism. Among the once heavily Marxist intelligentsia, Marxism has declined drastically in influence. When defended, state control over important economic sectors is justified in the name of nationalist rather than socialist principles while criticism of IMF-World Bank policies is justified primarily on the grounds of their negative social consequences rather than as an attempt to impose a capitalist economic model on the country.

The decline of socialist ideologies makes for a more propitious economic environment for the development of a more capitalist market-oriented economy. Moreover, the younger generation of Senegalese economists being trained in the 1990s will have more of the technical skills needed to manage enterprises by capitalist criteria and less of the ideological baggage of the past.

However, shifts to a more capitalist official ideology will not have much impact on the economic development environment unless there are shifts in state policy reflecting

this new ideological orientation

(3) current state economic and planning policies

Some of the most significant shifts in state economic policies favorable to improving the climate for economic development in the past decade have been

- \* the liberalization of foreign trade
- \* the privatization of many activities previously carried out by the RDAs
- \* the reduction and elimination of preferential tax treatment and monopoly privileges for inefficient private sector firms
- \* the passage of legislation making it easier to fire private sector employees
- \* the non-enforcement of regulations adversely affecting the so-called informal sector
- \* the adoption of a more liberal foreign investment code and simplification of registration procedures
- \* the reduction of the state's debt to private sector suppliers and Senegalese banks
- \* the reduction of Senegal's foreign debt
- \* the establishment of commissions to study how to make Senegalese enterprises more competitive, privatize state enterprises, and simplify bureaucratic procedures

While the Senegalese government has often dragged its feet in adapting these policies and even more importantly in fully implementing these policies, its resistance to change seems to be declining if not crumbling in certain areas

The political climate for privatization has improved in the past few years for several reasons

(1) When Diouf won the 1993 presidential elections, the regime was assured of holding power until the year 2000. Since 1993 Diouf has had a freer hand to proceed with privatization despite its unpopularity with those fearful of losing their jobs

(2) Trade unions have begun to accept the inevitability of privatization and are now maneuvering to give workers better severance pay or a chance to become shareholders. If the unions are successful in this area, one is less likely to see social unrest resulting from privatization measures

(3) The independent media and public opinion are becoming less critical of privatization of state enterprises like

SENELEC, SONOCOS, SONATEL, SONES, and SOTRAC which are regarded by many as riddled with corruption and inefficient management

(4) Powerful private sector interests and political influentials allied with the regime see privatization as an opportunity to take over potentially lucrative activities or to acquire assets at bargain basement prices

To sum up, the changing political climate is moving towards creating a more favorable economic development environment. At the same time, one can expect the regime to attempt to hold on to certain areas which it considers crucial to its interests despite the negative effects which such a policy might have on the economic development environment. Until recently, little has been done to improve the legal system or to streamline and modernize existing commercial codes and regulations which are for the most part modeled after antiquated French legislation.

(4) the nature of the state's relationships with diverse national and foreign private sector actors

The major economic policies in Senegal have generally been elaborated by the president and a small circle of decision makers with relatively little consultation with the private sector. During the Senghor era, tripartite meetings involving the state, employers associations, and the trade unions were clearly dominated by the state. In the 1980s, employers associations complained that they had not been sufficiently consulted when the state introduced various policies connected with structural adjustment reforms. During the mid 1990s, one began to see a major shift in the state's relationships with the private sector and a greater willingness to consult with various representatives from the private sector on economic issues. Several indicators seem to confirm movement in this direction.

(a) the general satisfaction of most of the participants in the July 1994 consultation of state officials, employers associations, and trade unions to discuss how to respond to the January 1994 devaluation of the CFA franc. Similar groups have been formed to discuss ways of making Senegalese enterprises more competitive.

(b) the upgrading of the Economic and Social Council as an active partner of the state in discussing and evaluating economic policies and strategies associated with Famara Sagna's assumption of the presidency of that institution. The Economic and Social Council has representatives from all segments of the private sector and civil society. In the past two years, the ESC has conducted major studies concerning the impact of devaluation on the economy and society and has taken the lead in identifying key economic and social issues.

(c) the taking of a more conciliatory stance by the

government in dealing with the trade union movement and its various components when discussing important policy decisions concerning Senegalese workers

(d) the acceptance by the state of greater pluralism within the trade union and employer associations even though this means that it is likely to get more public criticism than would be the case if there were only pro-government trade unions and associations

One of the major obstacles to further improvements in the economic development environment has been the reluctance of the government to take measures to break the near monopolistic hold and to reduce the privileges of a small number of French and Senegalese private sector enterprises maintaining control over key sectors of the economy. Claude Mimran, for example, who heads the Mimran group which controls the CSS and the Grands Moulins de Dakar has close ties with President Diouf and Prime Minister Habib Thiam. The results of the regime's cozy relations with Senegal's largest firms are higher production costs which make these firms less competitive, the discouraging of other firms seeking to enter the same sectors, and higher consumer prices for Senegalese. The regime has also helped finance and provided favorable terms for influential marabouts seeking to become important shareholders in major enterprises. For example, thanks to the support of the government, Cheikh Tijiane Sy became an important shareholder of SOCOCIM, Senegal's leading cement producer. Mouride marabouts hold important shares in textile and peanut oil companies.

(5) the nature of Senegal's political and diplomatic ties and relationships with foreign countries, bilateral and multilateral donor institutions, and international NGOs

Diplomacy has been one of the major instruments of Senegal's economic policies. The regime has sought to compensate for the low level of domestic investment in Senegal by appealing to foreign aid. It has been remarkably successful in achieving large amounts of aid which have kept the government afloat and the economy going despite negative per capita growth rates.

Under Diouf, Senegal has tried to project a positive image of Senegal as both (a) a model African democracy and (b) a moderate Islamic country. The West and wealthy Islamic countries like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have extended large amounts of aid to Senegal thus reducing its previous dependency on France. Senegal's attentiveness to political, economic, and cultural trends outside Senegal, its mastery of communications skills, and political stability have all facilitated Senegal's extraordinary success in attracting aid from bilateral donors, multilateral institutions like the World Bank and European Union, and international NGOs.

Domestic political considerations affect the nature of

Senegal's external relationships and these often have an impact on Senegal's economic environment. For example, Senegal's relationships with the IMF and World Bank are conditioned by several factors

(1) tremendous financial pressure to accept economic policies that will keep the credits coming and permit the government to meet its payroll

(2) electoral pressures close to and before major elections that move the government to reject or slow the implementation of unpopular economic measures that might increase unemployment, close down firms, and lead to higher prices for basic consumer goods

(3) pressures from within the governing party and state bureaucracy to resist changes that would undermine their interests

(4) the availability of other options that can provide the resources needed to keep the regime going-- e.g. going to the French and finding new donor sources like Taiwan

(5) the degree of general support from the public for standing up to the World Bank or conversely, the extent to which resistance to structural adjustment policies is declining

(6) the relative success or failure of structural adjustment policies to generate new jobs and higher growth rates

In general, the economic development climate in Senegal has improved considerably in the past few years, thanks to changes in government policies that reflect a gradual movement towards a more competitive and market-oriented economy and the regime's ability to maintain political stability and social peace

#### Who will be Looking to Invest in Senegal?

For many years, Senegal was not a very attractive place for foreign investors. The French invested heavily in Senegal during the post-WWII era when Senegal was still the capital of the French West African Federation and the main industrial pole in the region, thanks to French protectionist measures. After independence, French private sector firms preferred to invest more heavily in the Ivory Coast, Cameroon, and Gabon. As the economy declined, Senegal actually began to lose foreign investment capital as French firms took more money out of the country than they put in.

With the economy beginning to grow again and the business climate improving, foreign investors may once again be drawn to Senegal. The most likely candidates are the French because they know the country well. A recent delegation of French

business led by the former French Cooperation Minister indicated their interest in investing in diverse sectors of the economy, --e g telecommunications, transportation, textiles, food processing, and mining Existing French interests also have taken advantage of the liquidation of state-controlled banks to fortify their control over large segments of the banking sector Devaluation has also provided incentives for greater investments in modernizing Senegal's textile, cement, and oil refinery industries

Other foreign investors have expressed an interest in investing in promising high tech sectors --e g , telecommunications and computer and data processing-- and in urban housing After the November 24, 1996 elections, the government announced that it had sold off one-third of Sonatel to a predominantly Swedish and American consortium When the deal fell through, the government began negotiations with French investors who had been previously outbid by their rivals The new American policy to encourage expanding trade with Africa may stimulate more American investments in the commercial and service sectors of the Senegalese economy

The new investors may also include Senegalese Many Senegalese living abroad have invested heavily in housing since the devaluation The Mourides are planning to set up their own bank The latest Berg report on the private sector points to Senegalese entrepreneurs and former managers of state enterprises setting up very competitive medium-sized businesses

#### XI The Governance Climate in Senegal and Its Impact on Development

Good governance has been a major theme of donors since the late 1980s Advocates argue that good governance promotes a more favorable environment for economic development Good governance is not identical with democracy One can move towards democracy without necessarily having major improvements in governance And one can achieve better governance without necessarily moving towards greater democracy

Governance refers to how societies organize themselves to manage their public and collective resources Good governance implies effective, efficient, and responsive management Transparency and accountability are tools for achieving it Good governance also includes notions of fairness, due process, and legal limitations on abuses of office and authority Analyses of good governance often include discussions of corruption which many regard as the nemesis of good governance

Several positive developments indicate that the governance climate may be improving

- (1) Good governance has become a major topic of

discussion within government, political, and civil society circles. This development must, however, be taken with a grain of salt, since Senegalese are notorious for adopting the latest ideas and concepts in fashion without necessarily being interested in actually implementing them.

(2) The emergence of independent newspapers and radio stations has brought the topic to the attention of a broader public. Investigative reporting has exposed and documented many examples of corruption.

(3) The government has established a Ministry for the Modernization of the State to reform and streamline the Civil Service.

(4) The state has liquidated or privatized poorly managed state agencies and state-controlled banks known for corrupt practices. The process began with the elimination of ONCAD in 1980 and has continued with the liquidation of state banks like the BNDS in the late 1980s and the dismantling of the Caisse de Péréquation in the 1990s.

#### A Good Governance and the Electoral System

Even though the 1991 electoral code marked a vast improvement in insuring transparency in voting procedures, its implementation has not proven to be very effective.

The organization of the November 24, 1996 elections provides an interesting case study of shortcomings in good governance practices--e.g., fairness, transparency, accountability, and efficiency--by the Ministry of the Interior.

(1) The MINT did not consult with other political parties in determining boundaries for the new communes d'arrondissement and provided inside information to the PS that gave them an advantage over other political parties in preparing for the elections.

(2) A blurring of lines between party and state hierarchies led to confusion about the respective responsibilities of the Minister of the Interior and the Governor of the Dakar region. Neither took responsibility for the election day bungling and blamed the other.

(3) The performance of the Ministry of Interior in organizing the elections left much to be desired, especially in Dakar. In some areas, indelible ink was not available, not enough ballots were printed for some of the smaller parties, party ballots of some parties were printed in different colors from that originally designated, voting cards were often not distributed to registered voters, and polling stations were not opened on time in many areas of the country while in Dakar the situation was so bad in many areas that voters had to go

the polls again in 100 voting stations a few days later. It is not clear to what extent these measured reflected inefficiency or fraud.

One of the main reasons for this performance was the conflict of interest between the partisan interests of PS state officials and the need of the state to be neutral in administering the elections. The poor governance performance of the MINT damaged the credibility of the election system and stirred angry demands for the creation of an independent election commission. It also demonstrated that good governance rules by themselves are not sufficient to ensure good results unless they are actually implemented and enforced.

## B "Bad Governance" and the State Bureaucracy

Four major factors contribute to bad governance practices within the Senegalese state bureaucracy.

### 1 Centralized and Hierarchical Bureaucratic Structures

Decision-making power is highly centralized in Dakar. Until recently, there has been relatively little delegation of authority to the lower echelons of either the central or the field extensions of state services. For example, while CER agents, in theory have enjoyed a great deal of autonomy, in practice, individual agents remained subordinated to their hierarchical superiors in Dakar and locally to the sous-préfet. Moreover, ministers and national directors of services remain reluctant to delegate authority. The kind of administrative system in place discourages local initiative, the upward flow of information to the top, effective collaboration among different levels of the bureaucracy and monitoring of state activities. It also slows down the implementation of policy decisions and makes the bureaucracy less sensitive and responsive to public concerns.

Changes in the design of donor projects aimed at giving greater decision making roles to locally based officials may be making a modest contribution to administrative decentralization. It remains to be seen whether the implementation of regionalization and other recent decentralization reforms will lead to major shifts away from top down modes and styles of bureaucratic decision making. The entrenched position of the "civil administrators" with their proclivity for centralized decision making styles suggests that this process will take some time.

### 2 Poor Management Practices

Here we are speaking about primarily technical matters which theoretically could be improved by better training of officials, the adoption of more efficient management practices and performance incentive structures, and institutional restructuring to reduce waste.

Unfortunately, the knowledge of better management techniques will not necessarily lead to good governance. The main problem is not that not enough Senegalese officials have mastered good management techniques but that they have little chance to apply them because of political and cultural constraints inherent in the political system and Senegalese society. Senegalese managers have often performed extraordinarily well when working in other more neutral bureaucratic structures abroad.

### 3 Political constraints

In the Weberian bureaucratic model, the state bureaucracy is supposed to operate rationally and effectively to implement policy decisions taken by political leaders. Its function is primarily administrative. Positions are acquired primarily on the basis of objective qualifications and competence and promotion based on good performance. Of course this model is an ideal type. In reality, many appointments are political, promotion is based on social connections and political services, and legality is often ignored when conflicting with personal or party interests.

Without going into great detail, one can say that the Senegalese bureaucracy's failure to meet high good governance standards derives in part from its political system and elite structure.

In theory, Senegal's national leaders adhere to a belief in a neutral civil service working for the benefit of all its citizens and a political system based on the rule of law. While these rules are prescribed and invoked, they are often not applied and enforced because Senegal still remains dominated by a party-state system and culture whereby the state is used to serve party interests and those of the political class in power.

This phenomenon can be seen in several areas:

(1) the politicization of personnel decisions. Thus, appointments and promotions are based primarily on political connections. Despite obviously superior qualifications, experience, and competence, certain state officials sympathetic to the opposition or not a member of the PS may be denied access to key government posts. In other instances, incompetent or corrupt officials won't be sanctioned because of their political connections with the president, minister, party, or influential marabouts. Still another example, is overstaffing to provide jobs for the party faithful.

(2) the non-enforcement or bending of rules and regulations to serve political purposes. For example, high-ranking politicians and their family members and important clients of the state-- the so-called "untouchables" won't be prosecuted for breaking the law. When the "untouchables" didn't repay massive loans from state-controlled banks, their

actions undermined the entire banking system and contributed to a major crisis in public finances. Conversely, the state may decide to invoke and scrupulously apply the law when it concerns important opposition figures. For example, Ameth Dansonko, former housing minister and opposition party leader was accused of illegal construction of houses on property not belonging to him in the midst of the recent election campaign. The well-connected often don't get punished for speeding, not paying their taxes or electric bills, and taking from public coffers for private gain.

(3) the diversion of state funds and resources to serve political purposes. Here we can briefly identify several kinds of activities along these lines:

a. the illegal use of state funds and resources to support the PS during election campaigns. For example, it is widely acknowledged that the PS uses government vehicles and unofficially lets PS state officials stop working to campaign full time just before elections. Just before the November 24 elections an article appeared in Wal Fadjri alleging that the director of the State Lottery was diverting large amounts of money from the lottery fund to finance the PS campaign. The article noted that lottery fund contributions to the state had declined sharply despite the fact that more people were buying lottery tickets.

(b) Preferential treatment in the allocation of state-controlled resources to win the support of powerful influential party stalwarts, and potential clients. One of the most blatant examples of this practice was the allocation of 40,000 hectares of classified forest lands to the Grand Khalife of the Mourides as a time when the government was ostensibly committed to protecting the environment. The land was cleared within a few days. Party stalwarts also get preferential treatment in access to low and middle income housing in the Dakar region while the state thanks local party leaders and rural notables for supporting the PS by allocating wells, dispensaries, and schools to their neighborhoods and villages.

Many of the practices described here can, of course, also be found in western democracies. Such concepts as a politically neutral civil service, equality before the law, and hiring and promotion on the basis of merit, however, seem to be more widely accepted and internalized while violations of these norms when discovered tend to be more widely sanctioned than in Senegal.

Opposition parties have a strong incentive to invoke these principles since they are the ones with the most to lose when the Senegalese state uses and diverts its resources to keep the PS in power and discriminates against individuals and localities associated with the opposition.

#### 4 Cultural Factors

Cultural factors also serve as obstacles in reducing corruption and implementing good governance practices in the state bureaucracy. These include

(1) Values which call for individuals in power to reward and give preferential treatment to members of their social solidarity networks on the basis of kinship, friendship, ethnicity, religious affiliations, etc. This is reflected in hiring practices, non-enforcement of certain rules, and the preferential allocation and use of state resources ,

(2) Pressures on civil servants and political leaders to use or divert state resources to meet social obligations and maintain social status. Pressures are becoming even more acute during a period when civil salaries are declining in real value. Civil servants and political leaders thus have an obligation to maintain their living standards, contribute to the well-being of their family and members of their social network and generously spend on baptisms, funerals, marriages, pilgrimages, gifts to marabouts, charity, and other practices designed to maintain and reinforce their social networks.

(3) Societal attitudes towards the state and the state bureaucracy.

Many Senegalese see the state as an alien and impersonal institution imported from the West and do not see the state and its resources as the common property of the community at large. Traditional African societies were not organized around abstract Weberian notions of rational-legal norms and a neutral bureaucracy. Political power was highly personalized. Moreover, it was assumed that those in power had certain prerogatives--to tap state resources for their own purposes--and certain obligations--to take care of their clients and be generous in redistributing their wealth.

Malick Ndiaye, a Senegalese sociologist, argues that much of what passes for corruption in Senegalese society has its roots in pre-colonial Senegalese culture and political organization. He offers the Ceddo--the precolonial warrior caste--as a model to explain contemporary Senegalese attitudes towards using the resources of the state. On the one hand, the ceddo felt no qualms about using their power and military might to pillage the public's resources, especially resources belonging to the common people--the badolos--to amass a personal fortune. On the other hand, they were also inclined to be extremely generous in redistributing their resources to their clients. Ndiaye maintains that this style has become the normative one among a large segment of Senegal's elite at a time when the society is undergoing rapid modernization.

In contemporary terms, this means that both the elites directly controlling the levers of state power and their allies among the traditional elites---marabouts, rural notables, etc --see themselves like the ceddo as having the

prerogatives to pillage and use state resources to amass personal fortunes. The notion that people in power with access to and control over state resources have a public trust to safeguard these resources and to use them for the public good is not very developed. Because Senegalese society also sees the state as not their common property, they are more likely to condone "corruption" as long as those doing the stealing are generous in sharing what they have taken with the rest of society and with their own personal clientele.

The following anecdote provides an interesting example of this kind of thinking. A prominent and well-connected regional notable was highly critical of the 1981 loi sur l'enrichissement illégal. He didn't complain about the fact that it was never really enforced. Instead, he argued that the law was a bad one because it encouraged the people stealing from the state from keeping their money in Senegal. Instead of investing in Senegal the pillagers of the state sent their money abroad and invested their gains in real estate in France and Switzerland. Thus, stealing from the state was tolerable. What was not acceptable was that the money would not be redistributed and spread around.

If the ceddo model accurately depicts an important segment of Senegalese society, then Senegal is beset by conflicting trends and paradigms which may make the implementation of good governance norms and anti-corruption measures problematic.

On the one hand, the pool of western-educated Senegalese schooled in western democratic norms and state-of-the-art managerial techniques is increasing, an independent media is providing more information and negative publicity concerning corruption and other bad governance practices, and with urbanization traditional social hierarchies don't have the same power and influence as in the past. These trends, ostensibly provide a basis for greater societal commitment to good governance and the introduction of more efficient managerial styles in government.

On the other hand, a good part of the elite, even those who may be organizing conferences on good governance, rule of law, etc., in their own lifestyles are behaving more like ceddo than like sober civic-minded reformers.

One of the fascinating paradoxes in contemporary Senegalese society is that horizontally-organized associations built around traditional modes of social organization and values whose membership and leadership are less schooled than the urban Senegalese elite, are likely to be run along the lines of good governance principles. Thus, one sees far less corruption in tontines, village development associations, and hometown associations than one finds within the state bureaucracy. Unlike stealing from an impersonal state, stealing from a village or tontine fund usually entails social sanctions and disgrace.

If the ceddo mentality is indeed a prominent feature of the current governance climate, than what can be done to change it or to put into place safeguards and rules to discourage ceddo style behavior? From a donor perspective, one can ask what kinds of donor activities and objectives are most adversely affected by ceddo-type behavior. Choices have to be made as to whether donors should continue activities and objectives undermined by ceddo behavior or move into areas less subject to ceddo influence.

### C Presidential Leadership in Implementing Governance Reforms

Since independence, Senegal's national leaders have consistently spoken out against bureaucratic corruption. During his tenure in office President Senghor frequently denounced the "ten percenters" and the pots de vin of civil servants and other government employees. One of Abdou Diouf's first acts as president in 1981 was to push through legislation against l'enrichissement illicite of public officials using state resources for private gain. In the 1990s Diouf has once again been in the forefront of those speaking out against corruption. In 1994, he ordered an extensive and systematic audit of the entire state bureaucracy.

The office of the Presidency has many powerful tools to identify corruption and malpractice within the bureaucracy. The president has a large corps of controleurs financiers and inspecteurs d'état to inspect accounts at all levels of the state bureaucracy, he also has a myriad of technical advisers who monitor the activities of all the state ministries and keep the president informed. The presidency thus has enough resources at its disposal and reporting networks to know what is going on. However, there seems to be a widespread belief that little is done to punish wrongdoers, especially at the highest levels.

In some Senegalese intellectual circles, the belief is that corruption in government is actually increasing and that the president and his government are doing little to stop it. These allegations are difficult to confirm. The appearance of higher levels of corruption may, in part, be due to the increased coverage and public exposure of corruption by the media.

One could objectively measure the seriousness of the government's anti-corruption stance by systematically tracing the number and level of state officials actually fired or brought to trial for malfeasance and stealing of state funds. Another area to examine would be the extent to which the state is seeking to recover unpaid loans from the so-called "untouchables." Going after the "untouchables" may exact a high political price. For example, Cheikh Tijiane Sy's opposition to the government increased dramatically after the Société de Récouvrement National took away his shares in

SOCOCIM to compensate for his non-repayment of debts to state-controlled banks

The initiative for governance reforms and restructuring of the bureaucracy also comes from the president Senghor, for example, created the Bureau d'Organisation et Méthode (BOM) to study and recommend improvements in government operations. Most of the legislation related to governance reforms is drafted in the Sécrétariat Général of the Presidency or handed down by presidential decrees. The National Assembly has not been very involved in initiating reform legislation.

In the early 1990s, Diouf ordered that the name of the Civil Service Ministry be changed to that of Modernization of the State to reflect his intention to modernize and streamline the state bureaucracy and gave instructions to create several state commissions like the commission to streamline government procedures and regulations to study how to cut down on red tape and improve efficiency of the state bureaucracy.

#### D The Legal System and Good Governance

Reforms in the legal system seem to be lagging behind political reforms despite the increased numbers of Senegalese in the legal professions. The justice system remains highly politicized and lacks autonomy. The current Minister of Justice is a trusted associate of the president and regional party boss of the PS in Diourbel. Judges rarely rule against the government, especially in suits concerning electoral procedures. Moreover, the public has little confidence in the independence and neutrality of the legal system and courts in dealing with political matters-- e.g. elections, charges against political opposition leaders, etc. The president looms as the guardian of the legal system, naming judges and presiding over the Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature.

Under a political system operating under the rule of law (état de droit), rules are applied fairly and those violating the rules are sanctioned. The courts also intervene to resolve conflicts among different parties, provide recourse to parties adversely affected by violations of rules, contracts, and abuse of power, and protect basic constitutional rights guaranteed by the constitution. An independent and vigilant legal system promotes good governance by levying sanctions on state officials guilty of abusing their authority and diverting public resources for personal profit, thereby reducing their incentives to engage in corrupt practices.

Since the mid-1990s, the government has begun a serious effort to modernize and improve the country's legal infrastructure. Donors and foreign businessmen have complained that Senegal's legal codes are antiquated, not adapted to contemporary business conditions and needs, and discourage foreign investors from coming to Senegal. The government has started to correct this deficiency by curriculum reforms in the École Nationale d'Administration et de la

Magistrature (ENAM) and setting up a Legal Training Center (Centre de Formation Juridique- CFJ) to provide sitting and future judges with more training in commercial law, and providing greater access of judges and the public to Senegal's principal legal codes--e g penal, civil, family, customs, etc The French are playing a major role in financing and providing technical assistance to help the Senegalese modernize the legal system

Much of what the government refers to as legal reforms consists primarily of training and better information for judges and court officials, modernization of existing legal codes and signing of agreements committing Senegal to follow international legal norms, and investments in rehabilitating and building court houses and other legal facilities Some examples of recent reforms include

- \* the signing of the New York convention on Arbitration, revisions in the code de procédure civil, and plans to set up an arbitration section in the Dakar Chamber of Commerce

- \* the signing of a legal convention committing Senegal and thirteen other African countries to harmonize their business law codes

- \* plans to make physical improvements in Senegal's regional courthouses and to construct a new Palais de Justice and other legal facilities in Dakar

The kinds of legal reforms and measures listed above, while necessary, are not sufficient to improve the legal system Many national governments in Africa as in Senegal have adopted the most modern codes based on imported western models, received new equipment, provided more training for judges and other court officials, and invested in building new and rehabilitating old court houses However, the public and potential users of the new codes often have no knowledge of their existence and little confidence in the probity and fairness of the courts Moreover, few Africans bother to use the courts because of the relatively high transaction costs Most of the new legal codes in Africa reflect donor conditions and donor objectives rather than from the felt and expressed needs of African society

For Senegalese legal reform to work, the new rules must not merely be prescribed, they must also be known and invoked by the public and applied and enforced by the courts and executive branch of government They must also have some relevance to the way things actually work

One of the most promising innovations connected to the promotion of good governance was the establishment of a National Ombudsman (Médiateur de la République) in 1991 Article 2 of the February 11, 1991 law creating this function states that the Ombudsman, through his recommendations, encourages public officials to seek the spirit of the law in

applying legal texts, especially in dealing with ordinary citizens and to take into account the need for fairness in their relations with the public in a manner compatible with the respect of existing law and regulations

The Ombudsman has a mandate to examine different dossiers and cases involving the state, local government, and other state enterprises in conflict with the public and state officials. The institution provides another avenue other than the courts for citizens to redress abuses of state authority and violations of contractual obligations. The annual report of the Ombudsman publicizes important governance issues and often provides suggestions as to how governance practices can be improved.

### E Good Governance, Top-Down Decision Making and Clientelist Modes of Behavior in the Senegalese Government and State Bureaucracy

Current efforts to rationalize and modernize the state bureaucracy may not necessarily be accompanied by a marked decline in top-down decision making styles and clientelist practices in personnel decisions and resource allocation.

#### 1 The Presidency and the Government

The extreme centralization of decision making power in the hands of the president encourages the perpetuation of top-down decision making styles in the government. Party and state bureaucrats still seem to need the support of the president to rise to the highest positions in the state and party bureaucracy. The office of prime minister remains weaker than ever with little decision making autonomy. Ousemane Tanor Dieng derives his power from his relations with the president and his title as Minister of Presidential Affairs. He has little power in his own right.

Ministers still tend to hang on to their own prerogatives and to staff the higher echelons of their ministry with their own personal clientele.

#### 2 The Territorial Administration and Deconcentrated Technical Services

Under the Senghor regime, the regional Governors operated as super-prefects who clearly asserted their supremacy over the rest of the territorial administration and technical services in their region. Moreover, préfets and sous-préfets also exercised considerable authority in the areas under their jurisdiction as representatives of the state. The 1990 second administrative reform was accompanied by a general erosion in the authority of the territorial administration. The 1996 decentralization reforms and regionalization are likely to continue the decline of administrative authority as state officials withdraw from direct intervention in managing the affairs of local government and restrict their activities to

controlling the legality of local government decisions

It remains to be seen if top-down decision making patterns will change with the deconcentration of various technical services. Will technical services become more accountable to regional and local units or will they remain tightly under the control of the central ministry?

### 3 Clientelism and Local Government

As decentralization proceeds, the nature of clientelist relations may be changing. The intensification of competitive party politics is forcing politicians to work harder to get the support of voters outside of their own clientelist networks. At the same time, local government officials also have incentives to be more responsive to the needs and demands of local grassroots associations, not necessarily part of their own and party's traditional clientelist networks in allocating public resources.

At the Rural Council level, rural notables generally win most of the offices although women and younger men in the November 24, 1996 elections won more seats than ever before. The paucity of Rural Council resources, and up to now, the absence of jobs available to offer to one's followers usually mean that clientelist relationships are based on traditional criteria related to one's social status. The traditional social elites in many rural areas seek office because they feel that their victory confirms and reinforces their roles as traditional leaders. Their preeminence in rural society may become increasingly challenged by leaders of local associations who don't necessarily have the same high social status of the traditional elite. This kind of competition may contribute to the breaking down of traditional clientelist relationships.

### 4 Lobbyists and Clientelism

Lobbyists for different interests are becoming more vociferous in defending their cause. In the old days, lobbyists were often part of clientelist networks. Today we are getting new kinds of lobbying groups in areas which are totally new for Senegal--e.g. consumer rights advocates, environmental protection groups and even a "Green" political party. Unions and business associations are becoming less inclined to seek the patronage of the state and more inclined to lobby vigorously to protect the interests of their constituents. Because power is so centralized in the executive, most lobbying is directed towards the president and ministers. Little lobbying takes place at the National Assembly.

## XII Major Topics Decentralization

Initial efforts to promote decentralization shortly after independence with the creation of municipalities in all of the

departmental capitals and regional assemblies in Senegal's seven regions were set back in the mid-1960s when Senghor reestablished and tightened central government controls over local government and allowed the regional assemblies to fade into oblivion. The 1972 Administrative Reform led to the creation of 317 Rural Councils but kept these embryonic institutions under the tutelage of the territorial administration. In 1990, the "Second Administrative Reform" marked an important breakthrough in transferring control over the preparation and execution of municipal and rural council budgets from state officials to the mayors and presidents of Rural Councils. In April 1992, President Diouf announced that the next phase in Senegal's decentralization reforms would be the creation of elected regional councils that would have extensive powers in the realm of education, health, and natural resource management. In March 1996 a comprehensive series of laws revised the existing decentralization code and transferred wide ranging powers to local government in addition to creating regional councils in each of Senegal's ten regions. Application decrees followed in December 1996. The latest decentralization reforms are affecting the political climate and accelerating the pace of change in Senegal by

(1) systematically giving more power to local government institutions

(2) changing the way in which political parties conduct campaigns and local government institutions deal with their constituents

(3) weakening the tutelle of the central government and the authority of the territorial administration

(4) creating more opportunities for grassroots associations to have greater influence on local government decision making

(5) stimulating a demand for decentralized media-- local and regional radio stations and newspapers

(6) providing a framework for coopération décentralisée in which foreign local government entities establish direct ties with and give aid directly to Senegalese local government units

The major question mark remaining is whether the regime is willing to decentralize its control of Senegal's public finances and give local government authorities more freedom to levy taxes and a larger share of central government revenues. Without proper financing, the local government institutions will remain a shell without substance and power to accomplish much. However, the fact that the decentralization rules are there will provide more incentives for local politicians, officials, and civil society to fight for a greater share of and control over public revenues

The 1996 Decentralization laws and the participation of opposition party officials in local government bodies following the November 24, 1996 elections present an excellent opportunity to reinforce Senegalese democracy and good governance at the local level

The 1996 decentralization reforms provided the legal framework for the following changes

1 the creation of new local government bodies which included 10 regional councils, 43 communes d'arrondissement, and 12 new urban communes

2 the transfer of major powers from central government to local government bodies in several areas--e.g. education and literacy programs, health, urbanism and housing, economic development planning, management and protection of the environment, land use management and planning, and sports, cultural, and youth activities

3 the reduction of the tutelle of the central state and territorial administration over local government operations. In those areas where the transfer of powers had taken place, the central state no longer had to approve local government actions before they could be executed. The central government and its representatives in the territorial administration now exercised a posteriori control only over the legality of local government measures

4 the transfer of deconcentrated government services and officials from central government ministries to local government. In principle, school teachers, health officials, technical agents, etc. working at the local level will be supervised by the heads of the local government units where they are serving

5 the commitment of the state to transfer the appropriate financial resources commensurate with the new responsibilities of local government. Article 6 of Law 96-07 transferring powers from the central government to the urban communes, rural councils, and regional councils explicitly states that the government must also transfer the necessary means and resources necessary for local government to carry out its new mandate

#### A Government Perspectives on Decentralization and Regionalization

A mix of motives underlie recent decentralization and regionalization reforms

1 a desire to move Senegal further along the road to democracy by giving local populations a greater voice in running their own affairs

2 the need to transfer greater responsibility from

the central government to local governments and populations because of the disengagement of the state

3 a response to the Casamance insurrection by establishing a legal framework to provide the transfer of greater power to the region in the hope of satisfying aspirations for more autonomy and reducing the demand for Casamance's independence as a solution to the conflict

4 a desire to maintain Senegal's reputation as one of the leading models for decentralization in Francophone Africa

The government sees the donors shifting more of their aid from the state to local government units. With traditional donor bilateral aid drying up, the government regards coopération décentralisée as a new and increasingly important source of external aid which must be expanded to compensate for the fact that the state is no longer willing or able to transfer large financial resources directly to local government

Notwithstanding the major changes effected by the new decentralization laws, the government still seeks to hang on to its control over the decentralization process in several ways

1 The government and its representatives have retained extensive tutelle powers in financial matters. Thus, the state still must approve the following before they can be executed

- a local budgets
- b aid agreements drawn up between Senegalese local government units and external donors
- c contracts signed between local government and private sector suppliers
- d changes in local tax rates and categories

2 State officials dominate the various national advisory bodies recently created to support decentralization-- e g Conseil National de Développement des Collectivités Locales, the Comité Interministériel de l'Administration Territoriale, and the Commission Nationale d'Assistance aux Centres d'Expansion Rurale Polyvalent (CERP)

3 The National Decentralization Endowment Fund has less than 5 billion CFA francs to allocate to 10 regional councils, 60 urban municipalities, and 320 Rural Councils. In real purchasing power, this represents approximately 15 percent of the funds allocated by the state to only 30 Senegalese urban communes in 1960

B Flaws in the Elaboration Process, Decentralization Codes, and Application Decrees Which Make Implementation More

## Difficult

The February 1996 decentralization laws and December 1996 application decrees were elaborated primarily by a relatively small group of officials in Dakar with minimal consultation with the people. The public had little information concerning the details of the reforms and how the new institutions would function. Political considerations also affected the application of the decentralizations. Some of the flaws in design and obstacles to effective implementation include the following:

1. The boundaries of the communes d'arrondissement (CAs) were drawn up primarily on the basis of political criteria which did not take into consideration the viability of specific CAs and the relative division of resources and powers between the CAs and the city in which they were located. Most CAs had no offices to house their officials and conflicts quickly emerged pitting city mayors and mayors of CAs as to which local government unit had control over markets, public buildings, and tax revenues.

2. The preservation of existing administrative boundaries and regions in some instances--Fatick Kolda, --went against the logic of creating regions as development poles. Many newly created urban communes like Goleré lacked the financial base to become viable and were elevated to commune status primarily on the basis of political criteria.

3. In some instances, distinctions in powers and powers between the central government and its representatives, the regional councils, and the rural councils within the region are not clear.

4. The codes seem to concentrate power in the hands of the executive--e.g. mayors, rural council and regional council presidents--to the detriment of the deliberative councils.

5. Adequate plans were not made to insure that the local government unit would have the technical and financial capacity and personnel to carry out many of its new mandates. Outside of Dakar, municipalities have few trained managers and skilled workers. Rural councils have no personnel budget and must rely upon technical assistance from the CERS.

6. Relatively little attention was given to the steps needed to be taken in order to transfer deconcentrated government services and personnel to local government authorities before the passage of the decentralization laws. Since then, an effort has been made in this area through the initiative of the Ministry of the Interior's Local Government Service.

7. The financial resources transferred by the state were not sufficient to permit the local government units to

carry out its new responsibilities

8 Decentralization of local government was not accompanied by decentralization of the legal system, thus making the speedy resolution of conflicts between different government jurisdictions more difficult

The problems listed above indicate that it will take some time to make the local government institutions fully operational. One has to look at the next five years (1997-2004) primarily as an experimental period.

### C Decentralization and the Political Process

The increased powers and resources of local government bodies provide more incentives for politicians to become more involved in local politics and issues. It also places more pressure on central party bodies to nominate people who are known and popular in their local constituencies.

The ending of the PS' monopoly and the presence of opposition officials in nearly every local government body have increased the potential for greater transparency in local government operations. It is in the interests of opposition politicians to look for and to uncover irregularities in local government institutions controlled by the PS. The same is true for the PS when they are the minority party.

The creation of 43 communes d'arrondissement and the Dakar regional council has changed the dynamics of local politics in the Dakar region. While providing more political offices for the losers in internal factional disputes, it has at the same time increased the potential for conflict among rival PS clans. Thus, the president of the Dakar Regional Council may come into conflict with the mayor of Dakar concerning control over markets and other sources of revenues. Similar battles may arise between PS and opposition officials in the 43 CAs and officials in Dakar, Pikine, Rufisque, and Guédiawaye.

The intensification of political competition combined with the shortage of salaried jobs in the private sector have raised the stakes of local government elections. PS local government officials, especially in Dakar and Pikine, who owe their jobs to their clientelist relationships with local PS party bosses have a lot to lose if the opposition wins the elections. It is also becoming increasingly important not only to work for the victory of the party but also to make sure that one is allied with the dominant tendance within the party to be assured of a job or part of the spoils. It will be interesting to see how the struggle for power between Mamadou Diop and his rivals for party leadership in the Dakar region will affect clientelist relationships and the allocation of jobs and other spoils within the PS. Will patronage be shared with the clients of rival clan leaders or will one move

towards a winner take all stance?

The presence of opposition local government officials has affected the dynamics of coalition politics in some local government units and prevented the leaders of PS majority factions or those favored by OTD from becoming rural council president or mayor in several instances. At first the PS threatened to take sanctions against PS local government officials who accepted opposition support in order to become mayors or heads of rural councils. But with the 1998 national legislative elections coming up, the party has decided to drop efforts at sanctions in an effort to unify the party.

Although the regional councils are potentially powerful institutions and the cornerstone of the heralded regionalization program, they were not considered important enough by the major contenders for power within the PS to give up ministerial posts. Not one PS minister gave up his post to become president of a regional council, the two main rivals for power within the Dakar region chose to be mayors rather than the president of the regional council. Daby Diagne (Louga) and Abdoulaye Diack (Kaolack) were the only mayors of regional urban capitals to move up to head regional councils.

One striking feature of local urban politics is that the majority of urban mayors and regional council presidents are based in Dakar and spend far more time in Dakar than in their home towns or regions. Urban mayors who spend most of their time in Dakar behave much like government ministers and heads of government services in being reluctant to delegate decision making authority. This often delays decision making and hinders the smooth functioning of local government. In some instances, not only the mayor but also the deputy mayor reside in Dakar. On the other hand, Dakar-based local government officials justify their absence from on the grounds that they need to be in Dakar to effectively lobby for their constituents and to make contact with potential donors who are concentrated in Dakar.

The creation of so many new local government bodies has radically increased the number of local government officials (nearly 24,000) and the number of Senegalese directly participating in local government. It has also significantly increased the opportunity for women and young men to serve as local government officials. Political office is still dominated primarily by professional party politicians. Electoral rules prevent independents from running. And even though civil society figures like Almamy Fall in Saint Louis were chosen to head the PS party list, in the end, it was usually a professional party politician who became the mayor or regional council president.

#### D Local Government and Decentralization

Most of the discussion concerning ways of implementing decentralization are limited to measures directly involving

local government These include some of the following

- a training of local government officials
- b creating a competent local civil service recruited by and under the authority of local government jurisdictions
- c improving existing tax collection techniques and generating new fiscal resources
- d establishing rules and sanctions to insure greater transparency
- e channeling more donor aid to local government units in general and urban communes in particular
- f developing new sources of aid and resources through coopération décentralisée--that is direct links with local government units, universities, chambers of commerce, etc --in other countries
- g setting up more local courts and training judges and lawyers to deal with local government issues

However, the implementation of decentralization and good governance at the local level involves more than just improving local government units and administrative deconcentration It requires working at many levels

#### E Decentralization as a Broader Process

Decentralization is not limited to devolution of power from central government to local government jurisdictions and administrative deconcentration It also includes the following

- a generating more public and private investment outside the Dakar region Historically the great majority of industrial investment and public services have been concentrated in the Dakar region
- b initiating and reinforcing local and regionally based media Decentralized private radio stations and the 1994 local government elections have increased the demand for regional media Kaolack, Diourbel, Thiès, Ziguinchor, and Saint-Louis now have regional newspapers It remains to be seen whether these will be viable Decentralized radio is rapidly expanding and has a great potential to inform and educate residents of the interior
- c establishing and reinforcing regional and locally-based NGOs instead of Dakar-based NGOs This process has already begun
- d fostering the development of a vibrant civil

society in towns and rural areas outside of Dakar. The explosion of associational life has created the basis for greater participation of local leaders in politics and greater potential for exerting a positive influence over local government.

e. strengthening good governance practices at the local and regional levels and the capacity of local citizens to hold their elected officials accountable.

#### F. Opportunities and Areas for Exploiting the Potential Opened Up by Recent Decentralization Reforms

Opportunities exist to exploit the potential for political and economic reform made possible by recent decentralization reforms. The following measures would help the process:

1. Reinforce regional institutions and regional planning by looking into ways of strengthening the regional economic and social councils (comités économiques et sociaux), the regional equivalent of the national Economic and Social Council.

2. Reorient investments and trading circuits to stimulate the emergence of regional development poles and to establish sub-regional development poles linking one or more regions with neighboring countries--e.g. Ziguinchor, Kolda, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, and Guinea Conakry.

3. Promote the development of regional media, the diffusion of information concerning local issues and problems in the national languages, and the establishment of better communications networks within the region and between the region, other regions, the capital, and the outside world.

4. Formulate mechanisms for fostering horizontal linkages between various grassroots organizations, hometown and émigré associations, NGOs, government officials, and regionally based technical services in order to better identify, analyze, and find solutions to problems and concerns raised by the local populations.

5. Optimize the use of complementary skills, knowledge, financial resources, and organizational capacity among the diverse actors operating at the local level to provide and co-produce essential public goods and services needed by the local populations.

6. Provide training and credit to small and medium scale-enterprises based in the region, especially those likely to have multiplier effects within the region.

7. Promote a local civic culture that will help reinforce and insure democratic and good governance practices.

## G Possibilities for Failure

Decentralization is by no means a panacea. It is possible that many of the same kinds of problems plaguing the central government will be transferred to the local level--e.g. corruption, clientelism, and non-democratic decision making.

Decentralization can fail if

a local government heads simply replicate the same top down management styles still prevalent at the national level

b procedures to insure transparency and the sanctioning of corruption and abuse of power are not established and enforced

c local government officials don't have the skills and training needed to manage local affairs

d local government doesn't generate the minimal fiscal resources needed to maintain services without perpetually being dependent upon external aid. This will depend to a large extent on the local populations' willingness to pay taxes because they benefit from the public services financed by their taxes

e local government priorities don't correspond with those of the local populations

f donors perpetuate a mentalité d'assisté by spending too much money to support local government and other local and regionally based activities which require little counterpart spending or effort by the local populations

Decentralization thus provides the potential but does not guarantee the implementation of major political and economic reforms. It is likely to experience considerable ups and downs rather than proceed in an upward linear path.

## XIII Major Topics Prospects for Resolving Tensions and Conflicts in the Casamance and the Senegal River Valley

The Senegalese government and donor community have considered the Casamance and the Senegal River Valley to have significant economic potential, since the late 1960s they have invested heavily in these two regions with very disappointing results. The Casamance's economic potential was predicated largely on its relatively abundant rainfall and open spaces when compared with northern Senegal. The Fleuve's future looked bright because of the immense potential for irrigated agriculture and the willingness of donors to invest in this area.

The analysis in this section argues that the unfulfilled potential of these two regions is largely due to unresolved

political and social tensions and conflicts and looks at the prospects for resolving these conflicts given the present political climate

## A The Political Climate in the Casamance

### 1 Regional Identity and The Independence Movement in Lower Casamance

Historically, the Casamance was not integrated very well with northern Senegal--i.e. that part of Senegal north of the Gambia River. Until late in the nineteenth century much of the Casamance was under Portuguese control. During the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the Diola who were concentrated in the Lower Casamance resisted both Islamization and the French colonial occupation. The Casamance was not completely pacified until 1920 and had its own special administrative structure up to 1939. The Gambia River also separated the region from the rest of Senegal and made travel and economic integration difficult. People from the Casamance used to and many still do refer to "going to Senegal" when heading north. The Casamance's historical and geographical isolation from the rest of Senegal contributed to the creation of a specific regional identity.

Since the outbreak of the rebellion against the Senegalese government in 1982, many commentators tend to describe the rebellion as part of a generalized Casamance independence movement. This description is inaccurate for several reasons:

(1) The irredentist independence movement in the Casamance does not concern the entire region, the Halpulaar in Upper Casamance and the Mandinka in Middle Casamance are not actively involved in the armed struggle.

(2) The rebellion is concentrated primarily in the rural areas of the Ziguinchor region among the Diola and forest peoples closely related to the Diola. It has little support among the multiethnic populations living in the regional capital.

(3) Most Casamançais do not want independence but seek more autonomy in running their own affairs.

The Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance (MFDC) that claims the leadership of the rebellion is very different from the original MFDC in its social base and objectives.

(1) The original MFDC, founded in 1947, had a diverse multiethnic social base that included Diola, Mandinka, and Halpulaar and purported to speak for the entire Casamance region.

(2) The original MFDC was created to oppose the

domination of Senegal's political life by the "citizens" of the "Four communes "

(3) The original MFDC never sought independence as an objective, it merely wanted a greater role for Casamance leaders and more attention paid to Casamancais concerns in Senegalese politics. It sought to achieve these objectives through the democratic process.

(4) The original MFDC allied itself with Senghor's BDS and eventually became an integral part of the BDS in 1955. Assane Seck, the leader of the Mouvement Autonome de Casamance (MAC), founded in 1955, rallied to Senghor's party in 1957.

(5) The new MFDC founded in 1980 is dominated almost exclusively by Diola leaders and seeks independence through armed struggle.

Some of the Casamance's failure to capitalize on its economic potential in the Ziguinchor region can be attributed to the rebellion which has

- \* disrupted agricultural activities
- \* stifled the growth of tourism
- \* discouraged foreign investment and trade
- \* made the implementation of development projects in the region more difficult
- \* forced more than 30,000 residents to flee their villages and seek refuge in the Gambia and Guinea Bissau

At the present time, the political climate has improved considerably and prospects for ending the war seem good. The government is currently negotiating with the rebels to find a solution. The MFDC did not seek to disrupt the November 24, 1996 local elections. The southern wing of the MFDC led by Abbé Diacomoune Senghor seems to be committed to making peace. Senegal's improved cooperation with Guinea Bissau and the Gambia have deprived the rebels of important sanctuaries and training bases. The government seems to have succeeded in isolating the Diola rebels who have lost support with the local populations through their intimidation and taxing of villagers in the zones still under their control or subject to their exactions. These are all positive signs in the right direction.

However, many of the conflicts and tensions leading to the rebellion have not yet been fully resolved in Diola country.

(1) tensions caused by the sentiment that their region was governed largely by administrators from the north.

(2) tensions caused by the feeling that northerners were taking over the local economy and pushing out the natives in such areas as trade and fishing

(3) tensions caused by the feeling that the Senegalese administration was violating traditional Diola land tenure systems and taking land from its original owners without permission and compensation--e g the expropriation of village land for the use of Club Med

(4) tensions caused by the feeling that northerners were getting a disproportionate share of the benefits of development projects in the region

(5) tensions caused by the sentiment that the government was favoring Islam at the expense of Catholic and traditional animist beliefs

(6) tensions caused by the destruction of Diola sacred forests to make room for development projects

(7) tensions caused by differences in culture and modes of social organization

(8) persistence of bitterness and defiance towards the government on the part of many Diola due to the harsh government reprisals against villages harboring or sympathetic to rebel fighters

(9) the non-acceptance of government authority by many Diola youth who had previously fought in the maquis and been trained in Guinea Bissau

Some in the Senegalese government see regionalization as an important step towards satisfying some of the Casamançais demands for more autonomy and changing perceptions that northerners govern their region. The downgrading of the powers of the governor, usually a northerner, and the creation of regional councils presided by elected representatives of the local population are important steps in the right direction.

Moreover, it appears that Senegal's major parties are making more of an effort to win the support of Casamançais in general and the Diola in particular. Robert Sagna, a Diola, has been the PS mayor of Ziguinchor since 1984. The government has several ministers from the Casamance, including Robert Sagna, Landing Savané, and Daour Cissé. In the local election campaign, the PDS tried to gain votes by positioning itself as the peace party and calling for the 30,000 Casamançais who had fled the region to return. Finally, Landing Savané, the leader of And Jef and a native of Bignona campaigned extensively in the region and promised to work hard to promote local development efforts initiated and controlled by the local populations.

Although the majority ethnic group in the Ziguinchor

region, the Diola represent only 60 percent of the total population and less than 35% of the population in the regional capital. This means that there are many non-Diola who have little stake in the predominantly-Diola based rebellion. Despite the lull in the rebellion, ethnic tensions persist between the Diola and other ethnic groups. In campaigning in Ziguinchor, General Taveres Da Souza, the candidate of the PDS/Renovation complained that the mayor was discriminating against non-Diola ethnic groups, the rebels have attacked predominantly Wolof villages and massacred the populations, a Manjacque PDS leader in Ziguinchor threatened to withdraw his support from the regional PDS list headed by Marcel Bassene.

A lasting peace agreement with all factions of the MFDC and the full implementation of regionalization are necessary but not sufficient political conditions to insure that the Casamance's economic potential will be fully realized. However, they are important steps in the right direction. More needs to be done to improve inter-ethnic relations and to create a atmosphere of trust in resolving land tenure issues and other areas of conflict. The government also needs to make a greater effort to end the region's economic isolation, develop Ziguinchor's port facilities, and encourage more trade between the Casamance, Guinea Bissau, and Guinea region.

#### B The Political Climate in the Senegal River Region

Since independence, three important issues have affected the political climate in the Senegal River region and created tensions and conflicts which have retarded the region's growth and optimal use of its new irrigation facilities.

(1) the state's hegemonic relationships with the local populations in planning, constructing, and managing the region's economic infrastructure

(2) refugee and land tenure issues resulting from the 1989 conflict between Senegal and Mauritania

(3) the non resolution of land use and labor issues, especially in the Middle Senegal Valley region

The Senegal River region is divided into three distinct entities whose histories and ethnic compositions vary. Thus, the Delta has a predominantly Wolof populations, the Middle Senegal River has a predominantly Halpulaar population, and the Upper Senegal River a large Soninké population. Upper Senegal is part of the Tambacounda Region while the rest of the region is part of the region of Saint Louis.

The Senegal River region was the most prosperous part of Senegal until the locus of economic activity shifted south with the rapid expansion of the peanut economy towards the end of the nineteenth century and the emergence of Dakar as the capital of French West Africa in the first decade of this

century Since the droughts of the late 1960s and early 1970s, rainfed agriculture in the region has faded. Once a major exporter of millet, the region is now turning to rice cultivation made possible through the development of irrigated agriculture financed primarily by massive donor investments in dams and physical infrastructure.

(1) the state's hegemonic relationships with the local populations

The post-colonial state's hegemony over the region has its roots in three main developments:

(a) the 1964 land tenure law which gave the state ownership of the land, the power to determine usufruct rights and allocate land, and the authority to declare certain zones pioneer zones directly under the management of state authorities.

b) the creation of SAED, a highly centralized RDA with a broad mandate to control the development of the region from the Delta to the Upper Senegal River Valley.

(c) a commitment to large-scale irrigation projects and dam construction financed primarily by external investments.

The state's plans to develop large-scale irrigated agriculture began in the Delta region during the late 1960s and early 1970s. These projects failed miserably and regularly had to be rehabilitated. The local populations were not consulted in the design of the projects. SAED prepared the physical infrastructure, determined the crops to be grown, established rules and regulations for allocating land to producer groups, provided the inputs, set the prices, and collected the crop. At the same time, household heads relied on young people to provide the labor. Since the main benefits of rice production in the Delta went to the male heads of household units, young people had few incentives to work hard while the local populations had few incentives to maintain the physical infrastructure which was largely the creature of SAED. This situation created generational conflicts as the younger people balked at working in the irrigated perimeters and insisted upon having greater access to their own irrigated perimeters. With the expansion of irrigated agriculture throughout the valley, resistance to SAED's hegemony grew. The Soninké Federation in the Upper Senegal Valley and the Amicale des Jeunes Agriculteurs du Oualo in the Delta challenged SAED's power to determine all aspects of production and marketing and set up alternative and less costly ways of doing irrigated agriculture than the top-heavy and heavy-handed SAED approach. Thus, in the 1970s, one saw the emergence of grassroots peasant associations not totally dominated by and under the thumb of the state.

The gradual disengagement of SAED from controlling development activities in the Senegal River region opened up

more space for grassroots associations to function and provided greater choice in crop selection and organization of land use. However, the state and private firms closely allied with the state like the CSS in Richard Toll and SOCAS, the tomato paste factory, still operate in a heavy-handed manner in such areas as setting producer prices for rice and tomatoes and the allocation of village land by state and local government authorities to enable the CSS to expand sugar production. The opposition usually sides with the producers and the local populations in their conflicts with the state. But perhaps because many leading political leaders have close links with the CSS and SOCAS, the state does little to reduce their monopoly privileges or to improve the bargaining position of the producers.

## 2 Refugee and land tenure problems resulting from the 1989 conflict between Senegal and Mauritania

In April 1989 an incident involving Senegalese farmers and Mauritanian herders along the Mauritanian border with Senegal in which 4 Senegalese were killed touched off massacres of black Mauritians in Nouachchott and massacres of Moors living in Dakar and other parts of Senegal. The incidents also led to a massive air lift to repatriate Moors to Mauritania and the expulsion of approximately 60,000 black Mauritians and Senegalese from Mauritania. The conflict created a negative environment for exploiting the economic potential of the Senegal River region.

(a) The conflict led to major problems on the Mauritanian side of the border when the Moors sent their former slaves (haratins) south to farm land formerly under the control of the black Mauritians who were related to and part of the same ethnic groups living on the other side of the border.

(b) Senegalese with traditional land and fishing rights on the Mauritanian side of the border were no longer allowed to farm there, thus reducing potential sources of income.

(c) The closing of the borders and greater surveillance of the border by both sides reduced trade between the two countries.

(d) The conflict between Senegal and Mauritania also prevented the taking of important decisions by the OMVS concerning the future development of the Senegal River Valley.

(e) Most of the refugees from the Mauritanian side of the border received lodging and other help from their Senegalese relatives along the Fleuve, not without causing strains on the local rural economy.

(f) The political opposition in Senegal criticized the government for not taking a harder stand and for not doing enough to protect its nationals.

Over the past few years, Senegal and Mauritania have reconciled Diplomatic relations which had been broken in 1990 have been restored The borders are again open And in 1996 many of the refugees in Senegal began returning to Mauritania after the Mauritanian government promised to restore their land rights While the refugee problem has not been resolved since there are still thousands of refugees in Senegal, the danger of an escalation of conflict with Mauritania has been avoided as the Halpulaar elite in the region has come to accept the rapprochement with Mauritania

### 3 Unresolved Land Tenure and Labor Use Issues

The question of unresolved land tenure and labor issues are most acute in the Middle Senegalese River Valley region Despite the fact that the land tenure law giving the government authority to allocate land for national development purposes has been on the books for more than three decades, the Senegalese government has made no frontal effort to change the traditional land tenure regime dominated by the Halpulaar nobility Nor has the legislation giving Rural Councils the power to allocate land made much of a difference because the traditional power structure continues to control them

Until the introduction of irrigated agricultural perimeters, the most valuable land in the Senegal River was the fertile band of land adjacent to the Senegal River (oualo) which benefitted from the annual flooding of the river Much of the land now receiving water for irrigated agriculture lies outside the Oualo and has become more valuable Several factors are putting pressure on the government to change the existing land tenure arrangements

a the need to develop the land as rapidly as possible in order to reduce Senegal's dependency on food imports, especially rice

b the need to generate revenues to amortize the massive investments in physical infrastructure and to repay donor loans

c demands from Senegalese outside the Senegal River region to have access to land there The Mourides, in particular, are interested in cultivating land along the Senegal River as an alternative to staying in the peanut basin where soil fertility and rainfall is declining Political leaders and civil servants from Dakar are also interested in acquiring land on irrigated perimeters

d the temptation of increasing production rapidly by turning over large tracts of land to foreign agribusinesses

e the desire of casted elements within Halpulaar society to have access to land without having to go through

the traditional hierarchy. This group profited from the allocation of small plots of land to them on the medium and large-scale irrigated perimeters financed by the donors

f the massive rural exodus which has created labor shortages because there are not enough people around to engage in labor-intensive agricultural techniques and to work the land all year round. The optimal exploitation of the region's economic potential requires importing large amounts of labor coming from outside the Senegal River Valley

While the various Halpulaar hometown and émigré associations have provided resources to improve their villages' social infrastructure and to support small-scale projects, they lack the financial and labor resources to fully develop the economic potential of the region. Traditional allocation patterns give priority to nobles, elders, and males to the detriment of low caste, younger people, and women. On the other hand, some traditional landowners have been prepared to "rent" their land in exchange for largely symbolic payments because they don't have the financial resources or labor to farm all of their land. Hometown associations and émigré groups tend to have a greater mix of traditional nobles and lower caste leaders. Many Halpulaar nobles are willing to work with lower caste people as long as the latter recognize and treat with respect the nobles' higher social status

The government has gone slowly in changing land tenure regimes in the Middle Senegal River Valley which has the largest amount of cultivable land available because of the fierce opposition of the traditional elite to such changes. The traditional Halpulaar elite have also been strong allies of the PS. The regime may not want to risk losing their support. Changes in the status quo are likely to increase the level of political conflict because the traditional elites are likely to resist

\* attempts to allocate large tracts of land in the Valley to Senegalese coming from other regions, especially Mourides and Wolof civil servants and politicians

\* attempts to allocate large tracts of land to foreign agri-businesses and to bring in wage labor from outside the region

\* attempts to bypass the prerogatives of traditional landowners and favor access of lower castes to good farm land

To resolve the current impasse, it might be helpful to launch a dialogue between the government and the Halpulaar elite to discuss the conditions under which the region's economic potential might be fully exploited, the kinds of compensation the traditional landowners might receive for giving up some of their prerogatives, and safeguards to insure that newcomers like the Mourides, Dakar civil servants, or

foreign agribusinesses will not push out or dominate the local populations. If the regime attempts to ram through its own agenda without sufficient consultation with the Halpulaar elite, it risks losing their political support and perhaps worse. The attempts by the Moors to alter traditional land tenure systems on their side of the Senegal River have been a major cause of conflict between them and the Black majority.

#### XIV Major Topics The Impact of Senegal's Political Climate on Senegal's Role in the Region

The political climate in Senegal affects its relationships with its neighbors and in West Africa. During the late 1980s and early 1990s Senegal's domestic politics and relationships with its neighbors were closely interrelated. The rioting after the 1988 elections, the rebellion in the Casamance, and the 1989 rioting against the Moors reflected a very stormy period in Senegalese politics when the stability of the country and its credibility as a model African country came into question. Some of Senegal's immediate neighbors took advantage of Senegal's difficulties in the Casamance to press their own agendas in disputes with Senegal.

(1) Guinea Bissau provided sanctuary for the Casamançais rebels and clashed with Senegalese troops when the latter crossed the border in hot pursuit of the rebels. At the time, Senegal was embroiled in a territorial dispute with Guinea-Bissau over rich fishing areas and oil deposits in the maritime areas along the borders. By 1993, Senegal had signed a cease-fire with the rebels and agreed to share some of the rights to the disputed areas despite the fact that an International Court had ruled in Senegal's favor.

(2) Gambia took advantage of Senegal's problems in the Casamance in 1989 by goading Senegal into breaking up the Senegambian Confederation. Tensions with Gambia were also exacerbated by the huge smuggling trade which cost the Senegalese state millions of dollars annually in lost customs revenues. Smuggling has plummeted since the 1994 devaluation of the CFA franc which has all but eliminated the differential in prices which provided the initial incentives for smuggling.

(3) After the 1989 outbreak of violence between Mauritania and Senegal, Mauritania clandestinely provided arms and logistical support for the rebels in the Casamance in order to keep more Senegalese troops pinned down along the Guinea Bissau border. Senegal's alliance with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait during the Gulf War while Mauritania was aligned with Iraq also contributed to tensions between the two countries. The end of the Gulf War, Mauritania's break with Iraq, and ending of logistical support to the rebels has led to improved relations between the two countries.

(4) In late 1993, the Senegalese government withdrew its troops from the ECOMOG operation in Liberia in order to bring

them back to Senegal to have more troops available to put down the on and off again rebellion in the Casamance

Since the early 1990s, Senegal has worked to reestablish good relations with Guinea-Bissau, Gambia, and Mauritania. The good neighbor policy makes it easier to contain and isolate the rebellion in the Lower Casamance and to move ahead in the joint development of the Senegal River and Gambia River Basins. It also contributes to setting the stage for increasing Senegal's trade with her neighbors and the region. Decentralization coupled with Guinea-Bissau's recent entry into the CFA franc zone could spark more interregional trade between Guinea-Bissau and the Casamance and between the Casamance and Guinea. Decentralization may eventually pit Dakar's interests against those of regional capitals like Ziguinchor and Saint Louis whose development may take business away from Dakar in such areas as port activities and import-export trading which has products and goods passing through Dakar before leaving or entering the country.

A healthy domestic political climate characterized by political stability, social peace, and collaboration between the state, private sector, and trade unions provides the kind of economic environment that will contribute to making various sectors of the economy more competitive, attracting foreign capital, maintaining donor aid levels, and fostering sub-regional and regional trade.

Senegal's image and prestige as a model of democracy for Africa in general and Francophone Africa in particular depends to a large extent on the political climate at home. Senegal has long had a reputation as being one of the freest countries in Africa. But since the 1990s, other African countries have been catching up in developing democratic institutions. To preserve its reputation in the region, Senegal will need to resolve the current debate over the electoral system and demonstrate that democracy is working well in the country. Successful implementation of the 1996 decentralization degrees would once again put Senegal in the vanguard of African democracies.

#### XV Major Topics The French Connection

The recent coming to power of a Socialist government in France is likely to improve France's image in Senegal and the condition of Senegalese workers in France. It will probably not lead to any major changes in Franco-Senegalese relationships. The French will continue to remain Senegal's single most important bilateral aid partner, promote the francophone community, and support French business interests in Senegal. At the same time, its relative political, economic, and cultural influence will continue to decline with the globalization of Senegal's economy.

France has maintained a special relationship with Senegal since independence. Despite the fact that France's relative

share of trade, aid, and foreign investment has gone down, France remains Senegal's most important partner and accounts for 38 percent of Senegal's total imports. On the other hand, France's relationships with Senegal are not as strong as in the past for several reasons:

(1) French aid has begun to decline in absolute terms in the past few years. French public opinion is less supportive of aid to France's former African policies.

(2) Many Senegalese and Francophone Africans blame France for the January 1994 devaluation of the CFA franc and charge that France broke its promise to maintain the parity of the CFA franc.

(3) Senegalese public opinion turned against France because of the present government's anti-immigrant policies, harsh treatment of Senegalese and other African workers, and the recent violent expulsion of Senegalese and other African workers. Anti-French feeling may soften because of the new Socialist government's efforts to treat foreign workers less harshly.

(4) France no longer monopolizes the higher education of Senegalese as many younger Senegalese are going to the United States for higher education studies.

(5) French cultural influence is declining especially among the younger generation of Senegalese. The Senegalese elite are sending more of their children to American universities. American popular culture has also made important inroads, especially among Dakar's urban youth.

(6) The most recent wave of Senegalese going abroad to seek work are turning more and more to Spain, Italy, Germany, and North America rather than to France.

(7) French private investors no longer monopolize foreign private investment.

(8) American foreign policy makers have challenged France's claims to keep its former colonies as a chasse réservée and is launching a program to expand trade with Africa.

On the other hand, several factors point to France's maintaining its special relationship with Senegal:

(1) President Jacques Chirac, an old African hand, is attempting to mend France's fences with the former colonies to enhance French prestige on the African continent and to divert attention away from France's domestic problems.

(2) While French bilateral aid is declining, there seems to be increased cooperative relationships between Senegal and French NGOs and French local and regional government.

institutions through coopération décentralisée Nearly every large Senegalese urban commune has a French local government partner

(3) France still hosts the largest concentration of Senegalese working and studying abroad

(4) France and Senegal see the importance of maintaining a strong Francophone commonwealth Senegal vigorously supports the Francophone community and aspires to the leadership of its Black African members

(5) France and Senegal have similar interests in collaborating and maintaining good relations with the Arab world

(6) France still provides certain forms of bilateral aid with fewer strings than other donors and remains the largest bilateral donor

(7) French businessmen have demonstrated a renewed interest in Senegal In June 1997, the Conseil National du Patronat Français sent a delegation to Senegal led by the former Minister of Cooperation to explore investment opportunities in Senegal

(8) The regime and major PS political figures have close ties with French-owned firms operating in Senegal and continue to maintain many of their privileges

(9) Senegal still remains in the franc zone and French banks control an important share of Senegal's banking sector

(10) Senegal has preferred to follow the French model in its decentralization and legal system reforms

(11) The older generation of PS leaders such as Abdou Diouf and Habib Thiam were trained in France and still have strong attachments to France and French ways of governing The French cultural and administrative model is thus still strong among older members of the Senegalese elite

## XVI Conclusions

### A Senegal's Political Will for Change and Reform

The Senegalese government, state bureaucracy, political class, and entrenched economic interests are not enthusiastic advocates of rapid political and economic reforms Donors have complained about foot-dragging and resistance to implementing reforms, opposition politicians speak of the persistence of the party-state culture, businessmen grumble about the difficulties of doing business and preferential treatment given to their competitors This could lead to some pessimism concerning Senegal's political will for reform

Nevertheless, a close look at the changes taking place over the past few years indicate a political will, reluctant and limited as it is, on the part of Senegal's leaders to reform the political and economic system. The principles of reform have been accepted and steps have been taken to provide a legal framework for implementing the reforms. The lack of enthusiasm in political will is seen more in the domain of applying and enforcing the rule changes associated with reform.

Thus, a model electoral system is created but the rules not completely enforced. The principles and programs incorporated in the PS' Manifesto on Local Governance presented during the 1996 local government election campaign merit praise, but they are not being implemented. Privatization is accepted, but the government and trade unions still want to hold a majority interest in state enterprises like SENELEC.

The reality is that the regime is moving slowly but surely in the direction of reform. Donor pressures, globalization, demographic pressures, and social unrest are all factors pushing Senegal to move forward on this path. The establishment has understood this and will attempt to preserve its interests as best it can under the changing context. The issue now is not how to initiate reform but how to accelerate it.

Senegal's political will for change can be felt more at the grassroots level where people are fighting for survival and taking advantage of social solidarity networking to mobilize resources to meet their social, economic, and cultural needs. While clientelist and mentalité d'assisté behaviors still persist, more and more Senegalese no longer look to the state to solve their problems. Different groups in civil society--e.g. UNACOIS, the private media, human rights groups, etc.--are no longer acting as clients or wards of the state but asserting their independence and demanding more freedom.

The major problem facing Senegal on the road to political and economic reform is not the degree of political will for change but the growing gap between the political elite in power and the rest of the population, particularly the young. The gap is reflected in alienation from the political system, social unrest, and outbreaks of violence.

#### B Who Will Be The New Leaders?

Discussion is already taking place concerning the succession in Senegal's two leading parties. Diouf has turned over the reins of the PS to Ousemane Tanor Dieng. Dieng and his allies are all men in their forties and fifties and have replaced a slightly older generation of PS party leaders. Their style is more aggressive, their organizational methods are more modern. The choice of the next generation of PS

leaders is crucial to Senegal's future. The battle for the succession is likely to be very intense. Tanor and his allies may not have the political skills and stature to assert their authority. The struggle for power within the PS could split the party. To avoid a disastrous split in the party, party leaders may put pressure on Diouf to make sure that he will run as announced in the next presidential elections scheduled for the year 2000. If Diouf runs and wins, the succession struggle will be put off for a few years.

It is not clear that the other political parties have up and coming leaders to take over when the present leaders go. Abdoulaye Wade does not seem to have groomed or to be grooming anyone to succeed him. PDS party leader Abdoulaye Wade is in his 70s and pressure is mounting on him to start preparing for his succession. At the same time, some opposition parties see Wade as the best short-run hope for defeating the PS and are contemplating the idea of presenting a unified opposition list led by Wade in the 1998 legislative elections.

Senegal's new political leaders in the PS and PDS over the next few years, though younger, will still be attached to traditional political party practices. The leaders of the other main opposition parties like Abdoulaye Bathily and Landing Savané are of the same generation as the new PS leaders.

There is little likelihood to be major changes in the profile of the major party leaders in the next few years. However, the youth wings of all the major parties are increasingly challenging and contesting the authority of their elders. It remains to be seen how long it will take them to emerge as new party leaders and whether they will be more responsive to popular problems and constituencies than their elders. Party youth leaders like Pape Babacar Mbaye of the PS and Modou Diagne of the PDS are more overtly articulating the concerns of youth. But they still remain more dependent on the support of senior party patrons than on the rank and file of the party for their position.

Younger religious leaders are now taking a more prominent public role. These include men like Cheikh Abdoulaye Dièye, the Mouride maraboutic reformer, Moustapha Sy, the head of the Moustarchidine movement, and Hassane Cissé, the Niassene marabout with hundreds of American talibés, who has also been active in promoting social projects in Kaolack. They represent different Brotherhood interests and attitudes towards politics. All three are gearing their message to the young.

The new religious leadership and their approach to politics will have a major impact on the political process. Some marabouts may get more directly involved in politics as candidates and run against the establishment either as moderate clean government reformers like Cheikh Abdoulaye Dièye or ambitious marabouts like Moustapha Sy who will be more rabble-rousing in appealing to discontented youth. There

is likely to be a wrenching struggle for succession after the death of Abdou Aziz Sy and probably less of a struggle following the death of Saliou Mbacké—The new Khalifes of the Sy and Mbacké brotherhoods and their relationships with the PS, the government, and other political parties will have an important impact on the political scene

Civil society is also producing a new generation of leaders--e g human rights leaders like Sidicki Kaba, the head of the Organisation Nationale des Droits de l'Homme (ONDH) who has worked with grassroots associations to promote democratic principles and championed political reform, businessmen like Mansour Cama of the CNES and Serigne Ndia Ndongo of UNACOIS who are challenging the old business establishment, independent trade union leaders like Mademba Sock, media magnates like Babacar Touré of Sud-Communication, university professors like Babacar Kanté who are demanding and getting rigorous scholarship from their students, representatives of peasant-based movements like Mamadou Cissokho, urban community organizers like Emmanuel Ndione of ENDA, and dynamic women leaders like Fatoumata Sow, former head of CONGAD. Their numbers will increase, and they will likely play a greater role in influencing the political system in the future

Some self-made business men with little formal education are challenging the regime's economic policies and alliances with the old private sector economic establishment. They will affect the political process by giving a greater voice to those in the so-called "informal" sectors of the economy

Before independence, the social base of Senegalese society was quite different because of the smaller percentage of western educated Senegalese with higher education degrees. During the early years of independence, politics and the state bureaucracy constituted the main vehicles of upward mobility for well-trained Senegalese. With the decline of the state and the growth of a much larger pool of university educated Senegalese, members of civil society are no longer seeing politics and state jobs as the main avenue for social advancement. Civil society can play an important role in promoting clean government and fairness in electoral politics. The new civil society leaders may push for greater democratization and/or seek to play a larger role in the political process. It is already clear that the PS and other parties are bidding for their support.

Senegal's new brand of leader may come from outside the political arena, business, and the liberal professions. For example, singer Youssou Ndour is one of the most admired men in Senegalese urban society. He is in tune with Dakar's urban youth. He defends modern life styles but insists on the virtues of hard work, social solidarity, and the pursuit of excellence. He inspired the Set-Setal youth cleanup campaign in Dakar in 1990.

Relatively little is known about the young men and women

who are emerging as the heads of grassroots associations in the towns and in the countryside. But the dynamism and mobilizing capacity of their organizations seem to offer much hope for the future. It is possible that various grassroots associations will generate new types of leaders less subject to clientelist politics. More will become presidents of Rural Councils and regional, municipal, and rural councilors.

Decentralization will stimulate greater contact between leaders of grassroots associations and local government officials. Involvement in local government may serve as a good training ground for future national leaders. At any rate the involvement of the leaders of local grassroots associations may have a positive influence on the functioning of local government and eventually on the entire political system.

### C Will Decentralization Succeed?

Although the recent decentralization and regionalization reforms were elaborated in Dakar with little consultation with the populations concerned, it is clear that the reforms or at least the main principles underlying the reforms--i.e. giving people more leeway to manage their own affairs at the local level--are popular.

Because of the confusion in divisions of powers and functions between different levels of government, differential access to public financial resources, the inexperience and lack of training of most newly elected officials, the ignorance of the general population concerning the functions of local government, and the Dakar-centered focus of Senegal's political elite, the process of decentralization will be a messy one over the next few years. It is too early to predict how it will turn out. But with 320 rural councils, 43 communes d'arrondissement, 60 urban municipalities, and 10 regional councils, there are bound to be some striking success stories as well as examples of horrible failures. One can build on the success stories and learn what needs to be learned from the failures.

Decentralization definitely represents a deepening of the democratic process at the local level. Decentralization also seems to be weakening the hold of national political party hierarchies over local politics and giving more autonomy to local politicians with a strong local base.

Will decentralization open up opportunities for corruption? Possibly. A case can be made for the argument that decentralization and the end of monopoly control over local government will make it more difficult for local officials to cheat since the minority parties will be watching very carefully for signs of corruption in order to discredit the party in power. Decentralization will likely increase demands for transparency and encourage local officials to be more accountable to their constituents.

The decentralization and regionalization reforms provide a framework for mobilizing the energies of local populations. In the past, overcentralization has stifled the energies and creativity of local populations and the effective functioning of local government. The new decentralization structures have the potential to reduce the gap between grassroots communities and associations, local government, and the broader national political system. The process deserves to be supported.

#### D Ou Va Le Sénégal?

Variants of three scenarios are possible for the future.

1 Senegal continues on the path of muddling through and managing recurrent political and social crises to prevent catastrophe. A too moderate pace of political and economic reform, however, will make it increasingly difficult for the regime to manage crises in the future. This scenario more or less reflects the current situation in Senegal.

2 Senegal's leaders become increasingly insensitive to popular dissatisfaction with the performance of the system and demands for reform, and take measures which aggravate tensions--e.g. accept no reform of the electoral system, clamp down on media freedom, and ignore student concerns. This could lead to greater social unrest, a popular explosion, and waves of violence which could undermine political stability and social peace. It could possibly lead to a military coup to reestablish order or a repressive autocratic civilian regime. This is the worst, and, hopefully, the least likely scenario.

3 The pace of political and economic reform in Senegal accelerates. The political elite shares in the sacrifices it is asking the population to accept and puts more transparency into the political system. Electoral reform and a serious effort to fight corruption and poverty restore the credibility of Senegal's political system. Civil society exercises more checks on the abuse of state authority and provides a broader pool of leadership. Peace is completely restored to the Casamance. Grassroots associations working closely with local government find less costly ways of producing public goods needed by the populations and upgrade their technical and managerial skills. Economic liberalization and Senegal's advantages in location and communication skills provide opportunities to create a new, more dynamic private sector which rapidly expands employment opportunities. This scenario is of course the best, and most optimistic one.

Senegal is currently at the crossroads. Though the worst scenario is possible, Senegal, during the next few years, is likely to waver between muddling through (scenario 1) and accelerating the rate of reform (scenario 3). A good working partnership between donors, the Senegalese government, and Senegalese society based on a development strategy reflecting the real needs and aspirations of the Senegalese people will

make it possible for Senegal to move beyond the present muddling through stage and towards a more hopeful future

## E Changes in the Political Climate and Impact on Development Strategies

Earlier sections of this study dealt with the political climate and its impact on Senegalese economic policies and strategies. It is now time to look at the implications of Senegal's political climate for those formulating USAID/Senegal's new "graduated" development strategy (1998-2006) and to identify potential areas for USAID/Senegal interventions to implement the mission's strategic objectives which focus on support for the decentralization process and private sector development.

The analysis in the study points to a healthier and more dynamic political climate and will for reform at the grassroots level than at the national level. It also identifies the new decentralization laws, the end of the PS' monopoly over local government, the emergence of more autonomous urban civil society organizations, and the flowering of grassroots associations throughout the country as creating a new institutional setting which has great potential for promoting Senegalese development and good governance practices.

### 1 Support for the Decentralization Process

As stated earlier, decentralization entails more than just measures to strengthen local government institutions and train local government officials. Other donors are already quite active in that area, providing financial support and training, especially in Senegal's urban municipalities. USAID/Senegal's comparative advantage lies in supporting decentralization as a broader process involving a multitude of actors and institutions--e.g. decentralized media, local and regional entrepreneurs, grassroots voluntary associations, etc.

USAID/Senegal could support decentralization by designing programs and activities to do the following:

(1) strengthen regional government and regional planning mechanisms. Training of regional government officers and councilors and members of regional advisory bodies like the comités économiques et sociaux. Workshops to promote global regional development strategies and to discuss regional problems in areas in which the state has transferred power to the regional councils--e.g. education, health, environment, and natural resources.

(2) foster horizontal and vertical linkages and collaboration among NGOs, regional unions and federations, local grassroots associations, hometown and émigré groups, and

regional and local entrepreneurs

(3) promote greater collaboration between the private sector actors listed above and the territorial administration, deconcentrated state services and regional, municipal, and rural government units to plan joint and complementary development programs, provide and co-produce public goods and services, and stimulate the development of private sector activities

(4) support the development of regional and local level media--e g radio, television, newspapers, newsletters, etc

(5) work with local government officials, the media, and grassroots associations to promote civic values, good governance practices, and a better understanding of democratic processes

(6) help insure greater accountability and transparency in regional, municipal and rural government operations

2 Development of the Private Sector and Entrepreneurial Activities

USAID/Senegal interventions in this area could be focused on addressing three major structural problems facing the Senegalese economy (a) the overconcentration of formal sector economic activities and investments in Dakar, (b) high rates of unemployment, especially among the young, and (c) the limited ability of formal sector credit institutions to provide credit to small and medium scale enterprises (SMEs)

USAID/Senegal could work in the following areas to attack these problems and implement its strategic objectives

(1) stimulate the emergence of regional development poles by encouraging the reorientation of investments and trade from Dakar to the regions

(2) promote greater trade and economic collaboration between Senegalese border regions and their neighbors

(3) Provide support for medium scale enterprises to engage in regional level activities and incentives for Dakar-based enterprises to decentralize and establish branches outside of Dakar

(3) provide training in managerial and technical skills to grassroots associations, artisans and local entrepreneurs

(4) explore new forms of credit mechanisms that might be established by mobilizing and pooling financial resources of hometown, émigré, grassroots community associations, the Brotherhoods, and local government

(5) identify areas in which local artisans, businessmen, and grassroots associations can provide public goods and services more effectively and at lower cost than NGOs, state services, and external consulting firms

(6) Provide training and advice to youth and women's groups that will help them to identify potential markets for their goods and services and to develop the skills needed for them to become efficient micro-enterprises.

### 3 Priority Groups to be Targeted by the New USAID/Senegal Development Strategy

Effective implementation of USAID/Senegal's development strategy will entail giving priority to focusing on the following groups

(1) Youth associations Senegal's future lies with its youth. Right now Senegalese youth is suffering from alienation from the political system and high unemployment rates. USAID/Senegal activities should give special attention to Dakar's youth. The ASCs have proved to be excellent institutions for mobilizing youth. Many have become GIEs performing social and economic services for their local communities. The mission could work with ASCs in several areas: (a) civic education to get young people more knowledgeable about the political process, (b) leadership training, (c) educational campaigns and delivery of services related to the health sector to fight high infant mortality rates, malnutrition, AIDs, sexually transmitted diseases, unwanted teenage pregnancies, drug addiction, poor sanitary conditions, etc., (d) training in managerial, technical, and entrepreneurial skills to make young people more employable, and (e) identification of areas in which young people might find remunerative employment either individually or through GIE micro-enterprises. The mission could also work with the C.S., student organizations, and the youth wings of Senegalese political parties to promote support for democratic and good governance practices. The mission should develop programs with similar goals for rural youth.

(2) Women's groups Women are often considered to be the most dynamic force in Senegalese society. Young women

generally are the most marginalized elements in Senegalese society USAID/Senegal could address their problems at the grassroots level by providing leadership training to encourage greater participation of young women in youth wings of political parties, student groups, ASCs, neighborhood associations, and rural women's associations Special attention could also be paid to provide training to female local government officials at the regional, municipal, commune d'arrondissement, and rural council levels In the rural areas, USAID should concentrate on strengthening women's groups involved in health, natural resource management, agricultural, and commercial activities Rural women would also benefit by the kind of literacy training and education in democratic values provided by TOSTAN

(3) hometown and émigré associations These groups are well organized and capable of mobilizing considerable financial and human resources and introducing new ideas USAID/Senegal should incorporate these groups as an integral part of its development strategy for rural Senegal and use their networks to disseminate new ideas and optimize the mobilization of local resources

(4) regionally-based NGOs With regionalization, regionally-based NGOs or regional branches of national NGOs are going to play a more important role than in the past in formulating regional development strategies and providing support to local grassroots associations and federations operating within a given region USAID/Senegal should strengthen their capacity to provide support services through training programs and workshops and develop mechanisms for making them more accountable to the local populations they may be serving

(5) journalists and the media The emergence of independent media has been one of the most promising developments in Senegal's march towards greater democratization USAID/Senegal could contribute by (a) providing training in objective investigative reporting and ethics to Senegalese journalists, (b) encouraging greater coverage of local and regional news on the part of Dakar-based media, (c) supporting the development of decentralized regional media, and (d) subsidizing programming in the national languages which would address local governance issues, provide a forum for discussion of local and regional economic, social, and cultural issues, and disseminate useful information in the areas of health, natural resource management, agricultural technologies, etc

(6) local, regional, and national unions and federations USAID/Senegal should support the development of horizontal linkages between local and regional unions and federations, local and regionally based entrepreneurs, and local government units in the rural areas USAID/Senegal could provide assistance for starting up newsletters in French and the

national languages to increase the flow of information from the unions and federations down to the member organizations at the grassroots level

(7) local and regional small and medium-sized enterprises USAID/Senegal could support the efforts of local and regional enterprises by (a) providing training in management skills and specialized technical training to permit the local firm to meet local and regional demand for goods and services, (b) developing mechanisms to give local entrepreneurs greater access to credit, (c) identifying potential Dakar-based and/or foreign firms that could supply inputs at the lowest costs, and (d) financing market research and feasibility studies

(8) Groupements d'Intérêt Économique (GIEs) Many GIEs are experiencing difficulty in repaying their debts USAID/Senegal could look into this issue and help GIEs with economic potential to develop mechanisms to insure both access to credit and repayment of loans

The areas of intervention suggested above are by no means exhaustive They flow logically from the political analysis contained in this study Perhaps more significantly, most of the suggestions for USAID/Senegal coincide with the aspirations expressed by the Senegalese interviewed in the mission's 1997 customer survey and, therefore, provide the basis for a truly Senegalese-driven development strategy

## ANNEX I

### ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

|         |  |
|---------|--|
| AGETIP  | Agence d'Exécution de Travaux d'Intéret Public Contre l Sous-Emplois |
| ANAM    | Association Nationale des Métiers de la Musique                      |
| AND JEF | Parti Africain Pour la Démocratie et le Socialisme                   |
| APAC    | Association des Professionnelles Africaines de la Communication      |
| APE     | Association des Parents d'Élèves                                     |
| ASC     | Association Sportive et Culturelle                                   |
| AVD     | Association Villageoise de Développement                             |
| BCG     | Bloc des Centristes Gaiiné   |
| BDS     | Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais   |
| BNDS    | Banque Nationale du Développement Sénégalais                         |
| BOM     | Bureau d'Organisation et Méthode                                     |
| BPS     | Bloc Populaire Sénégalais  |
| CA      | Commune d'Arrondissement   |
| CDP     | Convention des Démocrates et des Patriotes                           |
| CDS     | Convention Démocratique Sociale                                      |
| CENI    | Commission Électorale Nationale Indépendant                          |
| CERID   | Cercle d'Études et de Recherches Islam et Développement              |
| CERP    | Centre d'Expansion Rurale Polyvalent                                 |
| CES     | Conseil Économique et Social   |
| CFJ     | Centre de Formation Juridique  |
| CLG     | Comité Local de Gestion  |
| CNCAS   | Caisse Nationale de Crédit Agricole Sénégalais                       |
| CNCR    | Conseil National de Concertation des Ruraux                          |
| CNES    | Conseil National des Employeurs Sénégalais                           |

|          |   |
|----------|---|
| CNJ      | Conseil National de la Jeunesse   |
| CNP      | Conseil National du Patronat  |
| CNTS     | Conseil National des Travailleurs du Sénégal                            |
| CODESRIA | Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa        |
| CONAC    | Conseil National des Associations des Consommateurs                     |
| CONGAD   | Conseil des Organisations Non-Gouvernementales d'Appui au Développement |
| COSEF    | Conseil Sénégalais des Femmes   |
| CONSERE  | Conseil Supérieur des Ressources Naturelles et de l'Environnement       |
| CR       | Conseil Rural   |
| CSS      | Compagnie Sucrière Sénégalaise  |
| DCL      | Direction des Collectivités Locales                                     |
| ECOWAS   | Economic Community of West African States                               |
| ENAM     | École Nationale d'Administration et de la Magistrature                  |
| ENDA     | Environnement et Développement du Tiers-Monde                           |
| FAIS     | Fédération des Associations Islamiques au Sénégal                       |
| FNGF     | Fédération Nationale des Groupements Féminins                           |
| FC GS    | Fédération des Organisations Non-Gouvernementales du Sénégal            |
| FSD      | Front pour le Socialisme et la Démocratie                               |
| FSSI     | Fonds Sénégalais de Solidarité Islamique                                |
| GES      | Groupement Economiques du Sénégal                                       |
| GIE      | Groupement d'Intérêt Économique   |
| HCRT     | Haut Conseil de la Radio-Télévision                                     |
| IFAN     | Institut Fondamental d'Afrique Noire                                    |
| IFES     | International Foundation for Elections Systems                          |
| IMF      | International Monetary Fund   |
| ISRA     | Institut Sénégalais de Recherches Agricoles                             |

JIR Jamaatou Ibadou Rahmane

LD-MPT Ligue Démocratique-Mouvement pour le Parti du Travail

MAC Mouvement Autonome de la Casamance

MFDC Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance

MINT Ministère de l'Intérieur

NPA Nouvelle Politique Agricole

OMVS Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Sénégal

ONCAD Office National de Coopération et D'Assistance pour le Développement

OND- Organisation Nationale des Droits de l'Homme

NGC Non-Governmental Organization

NR' Natural Resource Management

OTD Ousemane Tanor Dieng

PAI Parti Africain de l'Indépendance

PDS Parti Démocratique Sénégalais

PDS P Parti Démocratique Sénégalais/Rénovation

PIT Parti de l'Indépendance et du Travail

PLP Parti pour la Libération du Peuple

PR- Parti du Rassemblement Africain-Sénégal  
Sénégal

PS Parti Socialiste

PSS Parti de la Solidarité Sénégalais

RDA Regional Development Agency

RND Rassemblement National Démocratique

SAED Société d'Aménagement et d'Exploitation des Terres du Delta

SAES Syndicat Autonome de l'Enseignement Supérieur

SENELEC Société Nationale de Distribution de l'Énergie Électrique

|           |  |
|-----------|--|
| SICAP     | Société Immobilière du Cap-Vert  |
| SOCOCIM   | Société Commerciale de Ciment  |
| SODEFITEX | Société de Développement des Fibres Textiles                                   |
| SODEVA    | Société de Développement et de Vulgarisation Agricole                          |
| SOMIVAC   | Société pour la Mise en Valeur de la Casamance                                 |
| SONATEL   | Société Nationale des Télécommunications                                       |
| SONOCOS   | Société Nationale des Commercialisation des Oléagineux du Sénégal              |
| SUDES     | Syndicat Unique et Démocratique des Enseignants du Sénégal                     |
| SUTELEC   | Syndicat Unique des Travailleurs de l'Électricité                              |
| SYNPICS   | Syndicat des Professionnels de l'Information et de la Communication au Sénégal |
| UCAD      | Université Cheikh Anta Diop  |
| UCM       | Union Culturelle Musulmane   |
| UDEN      | Union Démocratique des Enseignants du Sénégal                                  |
| UJAC      | Union des Jeunes Agriculteurs de la Casamance                                  |
| UNACOIS   | Union Nationale des Commerçants et Industriels du Sénégal                      |
| UNSAAS    | Union Nationale des Syndicats Autonomes du Sénégal                             |
| UPIS      | Union Pour le Progrès Islamique au Sénégal                                     |
| UPS       | Union Progressiste Sénégalais  |
| USAID     | United States Agency for International Development                             |
| VAM       | Voluntary Association Movement   |
| WAMY      | World Assembly of Muslim Youth   |

ANNEX II

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C Senegalese Newspapers, Magazines, Periodicals, and Party Documents

1 Dakar Newspapers and Periodicals

Le Soleil (government-controlled daily)

SUD Quotidien (independent daily)

Wa Fadjri (independent daily)

Le matin (independent daily)

La Nouvelle Horizon (weekly news magazine)

SOPH (PDS weekly but irregular)

Le Politicien (satirical weekly)

Le Cafard Libéré (satirical weekly)

La semaine (satirical weekly, irregular)

Le Témoign (weekly)

La République (weekly)

Le Debat (weekly)

Le Croix (irregular)

Nuit et Jour (monthly)

En ecette (monthly)

2 Regional Press

Thiès Tribune (Irregular, Thiès)

Louga Infos (weekly but irregular, Louga)

Voix du Sahel (monthly for southeast Senegal (Tamba, Kolda))

Waar-Wi (bi-monthly, Kaolack)

Saint-Louis J (irregular, Saint Louis region)

Le Courrier du Sud (irregular, Ziguinchor, Kolda and Tambacounda)

### 3 Specialized Press

Luttes Ouvrières (organ of CNTS, irregular)

Performances (irregular newspaper dealing with economy, tourism, and culture)

Le Contact (bi-monthly newspaper dealing with development and private sector)

CONGAD INFOS (monthly bulletin of CONGAD NGO movement)

Ecri du Consommateur (consumer advocate weekly)

Gouvernance Locale Plus (bi-weekly, irregular devoted to decentralization issues)

La Revue du Conseil Économique et Social (quarterly of Economic and Social Council)

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Parti Démocratique Sénégalais, La Révolution Bleue ou Révolution libérale dans la gestion municipale Dakar, n d

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1 Loi Portant Code des Collectivités Locales

2 Loi Portant Transfer de Compétences aux Régions, aux Communes, et aux Communautés Rurales

3 Loi Modifiant le Code Électoral

4 Loi Fixant l'Organisation Administrative et Financière de la Commune d'Arrondissement et Ses Rapports Avec la Ville

5 Loi Modifiant la Loi No 72-02 du 1er Février 1972 Relative à L'Organisation de l'Administration Territoriale

6 Loi Organique Relative à la Limitation du Cumul des Mandats Electifs et de Certaines Fonctions

RÉPUBLIQUE DU SÉNÉGAL, Journal Officiel, No 5722, December 27, 1996 (Special Issue contains 22 application decrees related to March 22 decentralization code laws)

RÉPUBLIQUE DU SÉNÉGAL, Journal des Actes du Conseil Économique et Social, No 1, March 1997 Contains Avis and Recommendations of CES

RÉPUBLIQUE DU SÉNÉGAL, MINISTÈRE DE LA FEMME, DE L'ENFANT ET DE LA FAMILLE, Décret No 96-103 du 8 Février 1996 Modifiant le Décret 89 775 du 30 Juin 1989 Fixant les Modalités d'Intervention des Organisations Non-Gouvernementales (ONG)

RÉPUBLIQUE DU SÉNÉGAL, MÉDIATEUR DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE, Rapport Annuel 1995 Dakar, n d

## ANNEX III

### PERSONS CONTACTED

#### I DONORS AND EXTERNAL CONSULTANTS AND NGOS

##### A USAID/Senegal

|                     |   |
|---------------------|---|
| Anne Williams       | Director                                  |
| Douglas Sheldon     | Deputy Director                           |
| Alan Reid           | Deputy Director                           |
| Robert Navis        | Program Core Coach                        |
| Gary Merritt        | Health, Population and Nutrition Coach    |
| Belinda Barrington  | Legal Officer                             |
| Massar Bèye         | Program Core Officer                      |
| Sounka Ndiaye       | Program Core Unit Economist               |
| Maradou Kane        | Program Core Unit Specialist              |
| Ernest Gibson       | Agriculture and Natural Resource Coach    |
| Larine Thiam        | Economist, Strategic Objective #2 Team    |
| François Faye       | Agronomist, ANR Core Unit                 |
| Moribajan Keita     | Economist, ANR Core Unit                  |
| Souleymane Diakhité | Translator, Information Core Team         |
| Effie Negash        | Economist, Program Core Unit              |
| Cusemane Sané       | Economist, Program Core Unit              |
| Saidou Cissé        | CAT Team, Democratic Governance           |
| Cusemane Ndao       | CAT team                                  |
| Carou Ba            | CAT Team                                  |
| Maradou Diarra      | CAT Team                                  |
| Accoulaye Barro     | Strategic Objective # 2 Team              |
| Tatou Kader         | Documentalist, Information Core Unit      |
| Fatou Sarr          | Documentalist, Information Core Unit      |
| Fatmata Sy          | Strategic Objective # 1 Team              |
| Maradou Ndaw        | Strategic Objective # 2 Team              |
| Maradou Niassé      | Financial Specialist, Financial Core Unit |
| Te Gadio            | USAID/Senegal sociologist and WID         |
| Samba Khary Fall    | Strategic Objective #2 Team               |

##### B American Embassy

|                |                         |
|----------------|-------------------------|
| Dave Smith     | Ambassador              |
| Jares Ledesma  | Deputy Chief of Mission |
| Brett Mattei   | Political Officer       |
| Bacacar Ndiaye | Political Section       |
| David Wagner   | First Secretary         |

##### C USIS

|               |                     |
|---------------|---------------------|
| Steven Pike   | Cultural Officer    |
| Wren Sullivan | Chief Press officer |

##### D Consultants

|                   |  |
|-------------------|--|
| Adeyinka Oyindola | IFES (International Foundation for Elections System) |
| Denise Dauphiné   | IFES   |

|                  |   |
|------------------|---|
| Guilain Denoeux  | Consultant, Democratic Governance Study                               |
| Elliot Berg      | Consultant, Private Sector Study                                      |
| Vivien A Schmidt | Director, Center for Democracy and Development                        |
| David Wilcock    | Director, Agriculture and Agribusiness, Development Alternatives, Inc |
| N Van der Walle  | Democratic Governance Consultant Michigan State University            |
| Pape Sene        | CLUSA   |

E France

|                   |   |
|-------------------|---|
| CAFFERINI, Lionel | Decentralization specialist, French AID Mission |
|-------------------|---|

--II NATIONAL AND LOCAL SENEGALESE POLITICIANS AND OFFICE-HOLDERS

A Dakar Region

|                    |   |
|--------------------|---|
| BATHILY, Abdoulaye | Head of LD-MPT, Environment Minister  |
| DANSONKO, Ameth    | Head of PIT, deputy, former minister  |
| DIAGNE, Modou Fada | Head of PDS youth wing  |
| DIÉD-IOU, Tété     | PDS mayor of Parcelles Assainies,   |
| DIOP, Serigne      | Head of PDS/R, Communications Minister  |
| DIOUF, Madior      | Head of RND, deputy   |
| FAYE, Abdoulaye    | President of PDS parliamentary group  |
| LECROIX, Mamadou   | And JEF   |
| BAYE, Pape Babacar | Head of PS youth wing,  |
| NGOM, Ousemane     | PDS Health Minister,  |
| SALL, Analfifa     | Head of PS election campaigns, minister   |
| SAVANÉ, Landing    | Head of And Jef   |
| SYLLA, Talla       | Founder of Alliance pour le Progrés et la Justice, Senegal's newest political party |
| THIA, Iba Der      | Head of CDP/Garab-g1, deputy and former Education Minister                          |

B Interior

|                         |  |
|-------------------------|--|
| BA, Amadou              | V P of Gamadji Saré Rural Council (Podor)                |
| PAFFÉ, Moussa Balla     | PDS Deputy and mayor of Sédhiou                          |
| DIAGNE, Daby            | PS Deputy and president of Louga Regional Council        |
| DIALLO, Demba Abou      | PS party leader, Goleré commune                          |
| DIALLO, Oumar           | Rural Councilor, Guédé, (Podor)                          |
| DIÈYE, Cheikh Abdoulaye | Head of FSD, marabout candidate for Mayor of Saint Louis |
| DIOP, Abdoulaye         | President, Roncq Rural Council (Dagana)                  |
| GADIO, Ousemane         | President of Gadiobé Rural                               |

|                      |                                       |
|----------------------|---------------------------------------|
| GAYE, Fara           | Council (Podor)                       |
| KANE, Marième Lamine | Militant, FSD in Saint Louis          |
| KING, Thérèse        | PS Municipal Councilor, Richard-Toll  |
| MANÉ, Yaya           | PS former minister, Ziguinchor deputy |
|                      | PS advisor to Robert Sagna, mayor of  |
|                      | Ziguinchor and Agriculture Minister   |
| NDIAYE, Godé         | President, Kaymor Rural Council       |
|                      | (Nioro)                               |
| NDIAYE, Mamadou      | President, Merina Dakhar Rural        |
|                      | Council (Tivaouane)                   |
| SALL, Boubacar       | LD-MPT militant, Thiès                |
| SALL, Ousemane Djiby | PS mayor of Richard-Toll              |
| NDIAYE, Modou        | PS Rural Councilor, Fandène (Thiès)   |
| SANÉ, Moustapha      | PS V P Diango Rural Council (Bignona) |
| SECK, El Hadj Oumar  | PS Municipal Councilor, Saint Louis   |
| TENDENG, Pierre      | PS Municipal Councilor, Ziguinchor    |
| TOURÉ, Babaly        | President, Medina Sabakh Rural        |
|                      | Council (Nioro)                       |
| WANE Taifor          | PS mayor of Podor                     |

### III SENEGALESE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

#### A Dakar

|                        |                                       |
|------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| CAMPO, Alexis,         | Advisor, Urbanization Ministry        |
| CAPALHO, Jean-Paul     | (MEAVF) Mission d'Études et           |
|                        | d'Aménagement de des Vallées Fossiles |
| DICUF, Mamadou         | Head, Direction des Collectivités     |
|                        | Locales, Interior Ministry            |
| DRAÏE, Alioune         | Advisor, Communications Ministry      |
| FALÉ, Jacques          | Former Director of ISRA               |
| GUEË, Idrissa          | National Assembly Official            |
| KALÉ, Lamine           | Advisor, Ministère de la Ville        |
| MBALÉ Diop Mbaye       | Advisor, Communications Ministry      |
| NDOË, Mamadou          | Directeur de Cabinet, Modernization   |
|                        | of the State Ministry                 |
| SAGAL, Famara Ibrahima | President of Economic and Social      |
|                        | Council                               |
| SEË Abdoulaye          | Head of MEAVF                         |

#### B Interior

|                 |                                       |
|-----------------|---------------------------------------|
| DIATTA, Emile   | Forestry Agent, Medina Sabakh,        |
|                 | (Nioro)                               |
| DICUF, Léopold  | Sous-Préfet of Medina Sabakh, (Nioro) |
| Lv, Mamadou     | Sous-Préfet, Merina Dakhar            |
|                 | (Tivaouane)                           |
| NIANG, Ibrahima | Head of CER Medina Sabakh, (Nioro)    |
| SAPP, Biram     | Governor of Ziguinchor                |
| SECK Oumar      | Regional Urbanism Service, Diourbel   |

### IV CIVIL SOCIETY, NGOs, AND VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS

## A Dakar

|                       |   |
|-----------------------|---|
| BAER, Lillian         | Co-Director, Africa Consultants, Inc  |
| BUGNICOURT, Jacques   | Head of ENDA  |
| DIAGNE, Pathé         | Director, Centre d'Étude de<br>Prospective Alternative et de<br>Politologie                             |
| DIA, Ismaila          | Pharmacist, V P of PADEC  |
| DIALLO, Sonia         | Literacy training specialist in<br>pulaar   |
| DIENG, Mbaye          | Lawyer, Avocat à la Cour  |
| DIOP, Momar-Coumba    | IFAN researcher   |
| DIOUF, Mamadou        | Research Director, CODESRIA   |
| ENGELBERGER, Gary     | Co-Director, Africa Consultants, Inc  |
| FAYE, Modou           | Mouride marabout who works with<br>university youth   |
| KABA, Sadicki         | Head of ONDH, civil rights advocate   |
| MBACKÉ, Khadim        | Islamic scholar, IFAN, Founder of FSSI  |
| MBODJ, El Hadj        | Political Scientist, Director of<br>the Institut des Droits de l'Homme et<br>de la Paix, Membre of HCRT |
| MBOW, Penda           | Historian, UCAD and feminist  |
| NDIAYE, Raphael       | ENDA, communications specialist   |
| NDIAYE, Mademba,      | Journalist, <u>Wal Fadjri</u>   |
| NDIAYE, Tafsir Malick | Jurist, international law professor,<br>UCAD  |
| NDIONE, Emmanuel      | ENDA sociologist and community<br>organizer   |
| NDONGO, Serigne Ndia  | Businessman and UNACOIS official  |
| NIANG, Madické        | Lawyer, defended PDS  |
| NIANG, Mamadou        | IFAN researcher   |
| SALL, Tamsir          | Sud-Communications Executive,   |
| SAVANÉ, Malamine      | Secretary-General of CONGAD   |
| SOW, Fatow            | IFAN researcher, sociologist, women's<br>issues   |
| SY, Racine            | Communications consultant, former<br>head of Senegal Radio  |
| THIOUPE, Ibrahim      | Islamic scholar, UCAD university  |
| TOURÉ, Babacar        | Head of SUD-Communication   |
| WILSON, Wendy         | NCNW, American-based NGO  |
| ZEIMAN, André         | Director, Gorée Institute   |

## B Interior

|                    |  |
|--------------------|--|
| CISSÉ, Imam Hassan | Imam of Niassene Tijani Branch in<br>Kaolack                                   |
| COLY, Ibou         | ACADA, Ziguinchor Based NGO  |
| COLY, Souleymane   | CORD, Ziguinchor-based NGO   |
| DIAGNE, Cherif     | Sud-FM reporter Saint Louis  |
| DIOP, Serigne      | AFRICARE (Kaolack)   |
| GOSSAMA, Ibrahim   | Sud-FM manager, Ziguinchor   |
| KANTÉ, Babacar     | University of Saint Louis Professor,<br>member of <u>Commission Cellulaire</u> |
| BACKÉ, Mortada     | Head of Al Azhar Institute and<br>brother of Mouride Khalife, Saliou           |

|                 |  |
|-----------------|--|
| MELCHING, Molly | Mbacké<br>Head of TOSTAN, literacy training<br>NGO (Thiès) |
| SADJIO, Idrissa | CADEF, Casamance-based Peasant<br>Federation (Bignona)     |
| SAGNA, Almamy   | Ziguinchor businessman and notable                         |
| TANO, Felix     | University of Saint Louis, Local<br>Finance Specialist -   |
| TOURÉ, Ali      | President, Medina-Sabakh APE (Nioro)                       |
| TOURÉ, Bamba    | CNTS official, Saint Louis                                 |
| TRAORÉ, Harouna | Secretary-General of Kaolack Chamber<br>of Commerce        |

The consultant also met with male and female officers and members of village organizations ( e g , women's groups, APES, youth groups, water management committees, etc ) in collective meetings in the following villages

- 1 Saam Ndiaye (Thiès)
- 2 Ouro-Ciré (Matam)
- 3 Merina Dakhar (Tivaouane)
- 4 Colomba (Bignona)
- 5 Diango (Bignona)
- 6 Diatang (Bignona)
- 7 Medina Sabakh (Nioro)
- 8 Ndiour (Podor)

Sheldon Gellar

ANNEX IV

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR SENEGAL POLITICAL CLIMATE STUDY  
(Contract No 685-0294-C-00-6293-00)

The contractor shall prepare a study which sets out the political context in which USAID/Senegal's next strategy will be situated

This study must include, but not be limited to, the following topics

- 1 A description of the current political context, including leadership, political parties, role of civil society, the role of religious leaders, etc
- 2 An analysis of the impact of the rise of grassroots associational life and social networks on the political process and prospects for economic development, particularly in the rural areas
- 3 A discussion of the pressures leading to changes of this context including the younger generation, decentralization, population pressures, and economic forces
- 4 An analysis of how these changes will affect the economic development climate including the continuing political will to engage in development activities, and encourage private sector growth
- 5 An analysis of the governance climate in Senegal and its role in the continuing development of Senegal
- 6 An analysis of how these changes in political climate should be reflected in a development strategy- especially a "graduation" strategy
- 7 The prospects for resolving tensions and conflicts in the Casamance and the Senegal River Valley which are regions of significant economic potential whose resources to date have not been mobilized effectively
- 8 The potential for changing top down and clientelistic modes of behavior styles in the Senegalese government and bureaucracy
- 9 A review of the political climate as it affects the region and Senegal's role in the region

The contractor shall also answer a series of questions which flow from these topics Examples are

Who will be the "new" leaders of Senegal?

How will this translate into the political process?

What will be the new role of civil society? the media? Human rights groups? Lobbyists? How will NGOs fare?

Who will be looking to invest in Senegal? Where will openings be? Where will blockages be because of vested interests?

Will decentralization succeed? Will it deepen the democratic start in Senegal? Will it open up opportunities for corruption? Will it bring more control to the population?

What role will the current demographic trends play? Urbanization? Youth? Unemployment?

What are the likely impacts of Islam and increasing fundamentalism on the political scene?

Will economic reforms continue? In what context? What reactions can be expected as privatization hits vested interests?

Where will political party financing come from?

What will be the "French connection" continue to be?

The contractor shall prepare this study in several stages over the next 12 month period