

USAID  
Bureau for Humanitarian Response  
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance

## STRATEGIC PLAN

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## **PART I - Summary Analysis of Assistance Environment and Rationale**

### **A. U.S. Foreign Policy**

Historically, emergency, or humanitarian assistance was viewed as a small appendage to USAID's large scale, traditional development assistance. Financially, it was dwarfed by the resources that flowed into development projects. In the late 1960s, soon after USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) was created in the heyday of large infrastructure development projects, USAID development assistance was close to \$4 billion annually, compared to OFDA's limited funding of under \$10 million.

One of the most significant and noteworthy changes occurring over the last decade in the field of foreign aid, has been the gradual, but important shift in a dwindling pot of foreign aid resources; while support for development programs has continued to shrink, formerly small emergency programs have grown markedly. In the late 1970s OFDA's budget averaged about \$25 million annually, while USAID's development budget was around \$3 billion. Twenty five years later, OFDA's budget increased dramatically to \$170 million in FY 1995, including funding for BHR's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), while development assistance (DA) decreased to \$2.9 billion, due to Congressional cuts. However, foreign aid overall has recently come under increasing pressure as part of widespread budget cutting measures, and DA faced further sharp reductions in FY 1996. In contrast, OFDA's budget has fared relatively well; OFDA's budget was \$181 million for FY 1996 and is \$190 million for FY 1997 (including OTI resources).

There are numerous reasons for the increase in the humanitarian assistance budget. One of the most cited and visible reasons has been the dramatic upsurge of civil conflicts around the world. The following two charts show the dramatic "pyramiding" of emergencies and the steady rise in OFDA expenditures for complex emergencies since 1987. Some argue that the increase of these often brutal and increasingly protracted conflicts is a stark indicator of the failure of development. Others posit that they are the part of the inevitable process resulting from the end of the Cold War, as nationalist movements spring forth from the Balkans to Haiti.

Whatever the cause, the net result is indisputable: a record number of "complex," or politically based emergencies with huge humanitarian consequences. Most of these increasingly bloody civil conflicts -- some small and nearly invisible, some large and highly visible such as the former Yugoslavia or the genocide in Rwanda -- share two traits in common; there is no cold-war foreign policy that dictates playing a forceful interventionist role and there are no obvious solutions. Therefore, the burgeoning number of protracted emergencies have laid a heavy burden at the feet of the heralded "new world order." Perhaps most notable has been the inability or lack of political will of the international political leaders to resolve these largely political and socioeconomic problems.

These emergencies have increasingly been left to the domain of humanitarian agencies, such as USAID's OFDA, and the EU's ECHO. While there has been intense political effort

by the U.S. State Department and other governments in situations like the former Yugoslavia, northern Iraq, Angola, Liberia, Sudan and Somalia, among others, it has largely been unsuccessful, with some apparent exceptions, such as Haiti, and the former Yugoslavia. In some cases there has been a significant deployment of DOD resources to support humanitarian operations also. In many instances, humanitarian agencies have been left as the most active and visible players in conflict situations, with neither the mandate, the political/diplomatic skills, nor the resources to resolve civil conflicts.

One indication of the changing nature of these involvements, and their increasing politicization, has been the use of U.S., and other military forces to provide security and logistical support to large-scale humanitarian operations such as Somalia and Rwanda. The humanitarian protection operation for the Kurds in northern Iraq was a somewhat unusual example of military involvement, following as a result of the Gulf War. The addition of military resources and personnel not only vastly expanded and complicated the scope of humanitarian operations, but also presented serious new challenges. These included both logistical and operational challenges for coordination, and philosophical challenges for defining the mission and mandate of such expanded joint operations. One of the lessons of Somalia was how difficult it is to limit such operations to a purely humanitarian mission.

As a consequence of the geometrically increasing demands and pressures for humanitarian assistance to serve as a key element of the USG response to conflict situations, there has been concomitant increasing concern about the need for exit strategies. With greater competition for decreasing resources, it has become ever more necessary, both for BHR/OFDA and for the larger humanitarian community, to focus on more clearly articulating and defining strategic frameworks for emergency humanitarian responses.

One result of these efforts within OFDA has been the development of country-specific strategies for the long-term, costly complex emergencies in which it is involved. While strategies alone will not resolve all of the challenges posed by the larger seismic shifts currently altering the humanitarian assistance landscape, the use of such strategies allows a reexamination of the objectives and limits of humanitarian assistance.

## **B. Overview**

Since the late 1980s, as emergency relief resources have been increasingly applied to complex emergencies, the entire nature of emergency relief has undergone a significant transformation. Prior to 1989, approximately 80% of OFDA's budget was spent on natural disasters. More recently, with the increase of highly visible, large-scale, protracted emergencies, such as those in the Horn of Africa and the former Yugoslavia, the field of disaster assistance has been forced to respond to very different types of situations. Characterized by increasing political and military strife, these situations have created the need for a new vocabulary and a markedly different modus operandi in relief work to respond to man-made or politically-based complex emergencies.

These multifaceted crises, largely political in origin, are now consuming emergency assistance and causing much greater and longer-term damage than natural disasters. While natural disasters, such as large earthquakes, can cause catastrophic loss of lives and property,

the scope is usually much more limited than a protracted civil conflict. Although a detailed analysis of these developments is beyond the scope of this document, there are several trends with a direct bearing on the changing nature of emergency response. As suggested above, these trends reflect the change in the nature of conflicts themselves, and consequently in the nature of emergencies. These changes, in turn, shaped the directions in OFDA's strategic plan outlined below. These trends include:

- The nature of conflicts has changed from the Cold War era. During the Cold War ideological liberation movements often permitted safe access of humanitarian workers. In the post-Cold War period, the more common scenario is of conflicts over resources and territorial disputes. Violence is common, exacerbated by a plethora of weapons left over from Cold War build-up and a lack of respect for humanitarian codes of conduct. Humanitarian assistance is rarely seen as neutral and apolitical by combatants or civilians.
- Recent emergencies which have elicited increased USG response have been characterized by a combination of factors: political and military strife, the breakdown of governance structures, sudden and large migrations of displaced persons or refugees, massive deterioration of basic economic and social infrastructure, degenerating health conditions and the emergence of famine.
- One of the predominant characteristics of these complex emergencies is that they are protracted in nature and often require elusive political solutions. Indeed, the scarcity of solutions to resolve these conflicts has meant that humanitarian workers and resources are increasingly being thrust into highly politicized and dangerous environments.
- One of the most measurable products of these emergencies has been the massive increase in the numbers of internally displaced persons and of refugees, placing an immense burden on the international community. In 1994, there were an estimated 25 to 30 million internally displaced people, and 17 million refugees worldwide, compared to 7 million internally displaced and 10 million refugees in 1985.
- There is an increasing reliance on the capacity of NGOs and cooperating international organizations within the UN system, as well as on the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Currently OFDA provides funding to over 50 NGOs (comprising over 50% of its funding), as well as to international organizations (IOs). These partners are also grappling with the changing demands of complex emergencies.
- The growing number of humanitarian actors, from NGOs to international organizations and the military, has led to a much greater need for coordination in all emergency phases.
- The much discussed issue of a relief to development "continuum" is often misunderstood as implying a linear process of development which is disrupted by a crisis. Rather there are ongoing, often overlapping and irregular, phases of relief, rehabilitation, and development.

- Emergencies are increasingly expensive, particularly when there is military involvement. USG expenditures on Somalia, including DOD cost, totaled \$1.8 billion for FY 1991-94; in Rwanda USG expenditures for FY 1994-95 were over \$558 million. The high level of resources channeled to these situations appear to engender greater interest by the combatants in maintaining the conflict. Valuable humanitarian assistance, whether food or non-food, becomes a weapon of war and humanitarian workers, in turn, become targets of such conflicts.
- Finally, economic realities within the donor community, and in the US in particular, pose significant challenges to maintaining the unprecedented resource levels for long-term, large-scale emergency relief efforts.

OFDA has developed new procedures to deal with the challenges outlined above, significantly modifying its traditional response to natural disasters. One of the most visible elements of OFDA's response has been an increase in the use of Disaster Assistance Response Teams, or DARTs. These are teams of experts sent out as a rapid response in the acute phase of an emergency, with a fluid composition based on the type of emergency. While DARTs were originally developed as short-term mechanisms to respond to natural disasters, they have increasingly been used in complex emergencies and, consequently, may remain activated for several months or longer. The purpose of the DART is to provide accurate and timely assessment and reporting on a disaster situation, to assist in coordination, and to accelerate the funding process through delegation of funding authority to the field when necessary.

In addition to the deployment of DART teams, OFDA has continually refined its response techniques and methodologies to respond more effectively to these complex disasters. OFDA targets vulnerable, often mobile, groups and prepares for contingencies should the need arise. Similarly, OFDA's NGO partners have adapted their programming techniques to deal with the volatility of these disaster situations. OFDA also has regional advisors posted in the field who work with host governments and local and regional entities to prepare for and respond to disaster situations. While many of the programming priorities are the same in complex emergencies as in natural disasters; i.e. water, shelter, food, and health services, the planning, implementation, and approach has been significantly altered to address the constantly changing dynamics outlined above.

### **C. Customers and Partners**

From BHR/OFDA's perspective, the customers for humanitarian assistance are disaster victims, especially women and children, who suffer most during natural and complex emergencies. In emergency periods, the relationship between OFDA and its customers is direct and personal. Typically, OFDA conducts an assessment of the situation, often done by its small field staff located in disaster prone areas world-wide, surveys people's capacities and needs, and then arranges for delivery of the needed emergency supplies. In situations where food is required, OFDA works closely with Food for Peace (FFP) to arrange for delivery of the commodities.

In large-scale emergencies where a longer-term OFDA presence is required on the

ground, OFDA fields a DART to serve as a coordinator and liaison with other donors and humanitarian actors, expediting funding of emergency grants as necessary.

OFDA has an extensive list of partners, the most important of which include:

- **Office of Food for Peace and the Office of Transition Initiatives.** Within BHR, OFDA works most closely with the Office of Food for Peace in situations where emergency food is required, which includes most of the major disasters. OFDA and FFP often jointly support projects, with OFDA providing supplemental funding for administration of emergency food projects. OFDA also works closely with the Office of Transition Initiatives, a recently created entity, in countries like Angola, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda.
- **Other bureaus within USAID and USAID Missions.** In responding to disasters and in developing preparedness, mitigation and prevention activities, OFDA works closely with regional bureaus, the Global Bureau and USAID Missions. Because of the preponderance of emergencies in Africa, OFDA has worked very closely with the Africa Bureau (AFR), particularly with AFR's Disaster Response Office, to coordinate assistance. OFDA continues to work on developing joint strategies with regional bureaus, the Global Bureau and USAID Missions in order to maximize the use of scarce resources and better link relief and development.
- **Other U.S. Government Agencies.** In responding to emergencies, OFDA's close working relationship with the State Department has been critical. In most crisis situations, the U.S. Ambassador is the focal point for coordinated U.S. emergency assistance. OFDA works closely with the State Department's regional bureaus and the Population, Refugee and Migration Bureau (PRM) in Washington. In addition to the State Department, the Department of Defense (DOD) has become increasingly important in disaster assistance. Transporting emergency supplies has been a traditional DOD role, but with the growth of political emergencies, DOD's role has expanded significantly.
- **Host Governments.** When disasters strike, and governments are functioning, OFDA often relies on good working relations with host-government officials. These are often developed by OFDA's regional advisors. Effective partnerships help speed and direct the flow of assistance, particularly for countries facing a quick-onset emergency. OFDA has had great success in building such partnerships in Latin America and Africa through its preparedness programs. Because complex emergencies are frequently characterized by political instability and governmental breakdown, OFDA tends to work predominantly through NGOs and international organizations in these situations.
- **Private Voluntary Organizations.** PVOs, both American and non-American, are vitally important in virtually all of OFDA's programs. PVOs are the prime deliverers of OFDA emergency assistance, receiving over 50% of OFDA's funding. OFDA also collaborates with indigenous institutions, where appropriate, to help promote linkages for recovery in the affected country.

- **International Organizations.** United Nations operational agencies and international organizations such as the ICRC are also critical OFDA partners in emergency response. In addition to providing ongoing support to UNICEF and WFP so that they can meet requirements for their emergency programs, OFDA has also endeavored to strengthen the recently created U.N. coordinating body, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA).
  
- **Other Donor Organizations.** BHR/OFDA and FFP continue to enhance ties with other donor agencies, such as the Dutch, Canadian, British and Danish aid offices. In particular, OFDA has increased its contacts with the European Union's recently created emergency office, ECHO. OFDA and ECHO officials meet regularly to discuss issues of mutual concern, including budgetary issues, and have also agreed to implement steps to improve coordination and communication, such as conducting joint assessments of disasters. In addition, the two offices are linked electronically for sharing grant information. The purpose of this collaboration is to coordinate programs and assure "burdensharing" with our partners in the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

## **PART II - Proposed Strategic Plan**

### **A. Strategic Objectives**

The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance has captured all activities it currently carries out, and those planned, under two strategic objectives. However, it should be noted that this plan represents a major step for OFDA in trying to measure more accurately the results and effectiveness of its emergency programs. Given the extreme challenges presented by working in a continuously changing emergency context, there will be considerable reliance on pilot efforts, particularly in measuring achievements under SO No. 2. As is detailed later in the strategy, these efforts are likely to require some experimentation to produce the quality of performance measurement desired. With that caveat noted, the two objectives noted below will serve as the basis for OFDA's strategic plan. While there may be ongoing revisions to intermediate results and indicators, OFDA anticipates that the SOs will remain valid for a strategy timeframe of three to four years:

**SO # 1: Increased adoption of mitigation measures in countries at risk of natural and man-made disasters**

and

**SO # 2: Critical needs met of targeted vulnerable groups in emergency situations**


Strategic Objective No. 1 aims to assist vulnerable populations, their institutions and infrastructure to mitigate man-made or natural disaster. Mitigation is used in a broad sense to include prevention, preparedness and planning. Many of the activities carried out under this strategic objective take place prior to, or immediately following, a disaster. Some, carried out under BHR/OFDA's Prevention, Mitigation, Preparedness and Planning (PMPP) division, have focused on training personnel in disaster prone countries in preparedness and mitigation activities. Others under the PMPP division, however, are aimed at keeping, at the very least, the process of subsistence production -- agriculture, artisan or communal services -- functioning. (These include, for example, famine early warning and provision of seeds and tools to support the pre-conditions for development.) While emergency relief needs will always have first priority, it is BHR/OFDA's intention to carry out more of these mitigation or "transitional" activities under Strategic Objective No.1, and to work towards facilitating the linkages between relief, rehabilitation, and development.

Strategic Objective No. 2 includes the core emergency relief activities OFDA has traditionally carried out, representing the major part of its resources. As outlined above, in recent years OFDA has spent more time and money confronting humanitarian needs generated by complex emergencies than by natural disasters. Complex emergencies require a broader array of responses and longer time commitments than the relatively short-lived responses to natural disasters. Because of their political nature, complex emergencies are proving much more difficult to disengage from than traditional natural disaster responses. For these reasons OFDA foresees the trend of proportionately greater involvement in complex emergencies to continue for the period of this strategic plan.

**B. Linkages to Agency and Bureau Goals and Objectives**

Humanitarian relief, as one of USAID’s five strategic goals, is integral to the Agency’s overall goal of sustainable development. By meeting the critical needs of vulnerable groups when a natural or complex disaster strikes, OFDA can minimize the human and economic loss, accelerate the return to normalcy and increase the chances for sustainable long-term development. Appropriate emergency relief, coupled where possible with development assistance programs, can help not only to save lives and alleviate suffering but also to initiate the process of rehabilitation and accelerate the return to development.

The relationship between OFDA’s strategic objectives and those of the Bureau for Humanitarian Response and the Agency itself can be seen graphically below.



Meeting critical emergency needs, and reducing potential impact of humanitarian

crises, are a precondition to effective progress in the Agency's four other goals which are defined as follows:

- *Environment:* The search for fuelwood and other resources by at-risk and migratory populations can have a devastating environmental impact which can damage the resource base and deplete the carrying capacity of the land. Often the need for relief assistance is in part a by-product of poverty-related degradation of natural resources such as desertification and deforestation.
- *Democracy:* Basic institutions of civil governance function less effectively during disaster and crisis; therefore support for democratic institutions is difficult if not impossible to provide during periods of civil instability and transition.
- *Health and Population:* Natural disasters and complex emergencies have an obvious, direct impact on health conditions and on the health care infrastructure of the society.
- *Economic Growth:* Provision of minimal food, shelter and medical needs is essential if those groups affected by disaster are to begin to reenter the mainstream of economic life. Disasters destroy lives and livelihoods and victims must become productive to make development sustainable.

From the above, the relationship between the goal of saving lives, reducing suffering and reinforcing development potential and USAID's four other goals becomes clear; effective response to emergencies is a necessary foundation to viable sustainable development.

**OFDA Strategic Objective No. 1**

Increased adoption of mitigation measures in countries at risk of natural and man-made disasters

**Intermediate Result No. 1.1**

Enhanced institutional capacity of NGOs and international organizations to reduce the impact of disasters

**Intermediate Result No. 1.2**

Strengthened host country capacities to reduce vulnerability to natural disasters

**Intermediate Result No. 1.3**

Improved strategic use of disaster resources to link relief activities to rehabilitation and development

## **C. Strategic Objective No. 1**

### **Statement of the Strategic Objective**

#### **Increased adoption of mitigation measures in countries at risk of natural and man-made disasters**

#### **Problem Analysis**

Historically, the majority of OFDA's preparedness and mitigation activities have concentrated on natural disasters. However, given the preponderance of resources going to man-made disasters, attention is increasingly being paid to the challenging task of applying these lessons to complex disasters. While many of the lessons learned from responding to natural disasters have informed the responses to complex disasters, there are also many important differences, such as the destabilizing effect of ongoing civil conflict, which limit the application of these lessons. Therefore, considerable research and experimentation will be required to develop fully prevention, preparedness and mitigation strategies relevant to complex emergencies. Nevertheless, complex disasters have been included as part of the strategic objective.

Some countries, particularly advanced, industrialized nations, are better able to prevent and respond to crises in their own country and return to normalcy more quickly. Other countries, particularly those with which USAID typically works, are more susceptible to certain types of disasters and are less able to rebound. Indeed, emergencies can retard economic, democratic, environmental and health advances considerably. The purpose of OFDA's Strategic Objective (SO) No. 1 is to assist countries to prevent disaster where possible, and to reduce the devastating effects of such crises when prevention is not possible. Mitigation is being used in the broadest sense to include prevention, preparedness and planning. Prevention of complex emergencies is not in OFDA's mandate, but, as outlined in this strategy, mitigation and preparation measures are being explored.

Within BHR/OFDA, the PMPP Division spends approximately \$10 million annually to implement disaster preparedness, mitigation and prevention activities to improve countries' ability to face complex or natural disasters. As suggested above, the majority of the resources have been focused on natural disasters. Food production, shelter and the health/industry sectors are high priority areas for PMPP activities and include such interventions as: helping prevent crop destruction from insect infestations, supplying seeds and tools to reduce vulnerability to famine, improving the prospects for construction of low income housing with disaster resistant materials and building methods, and developing hazard mitigation projects in urban areas threatened by industrial accidents and hazardous materials disposal. In-country training for disaster preparedness is also an important part of the PMPP program.

Through its SO No. 1, OFDA seeks to mitigate and prepare for the damaging results of complex emergencies and natural disasters for vulnerable populations. OFDA has initiated a number of programs that focus on hazard and crisis prevention, maintenance and preparedness. All of these programs seek to put countries "ahead of the curve" with respect

to disasters and, as a result, to reduce their impact significantly. Disasters that would have taken a lesser toll if, for example, adequate building codes and standards were enforced in earthquake-prone areas, have raised concerns about prevention and preparedness to the highest levels in many countries, including our own. Importantly, resources spent on prevention, mitigation and preparedness help to lower the amount that must be spent on disaster assistance.

### **Strategic Framework: Intermediate Results**

OFDA's Intermediate Result No. 1.1 - "Enhanced institutional capacity of NGOs and international organizations for PMP in disasters" - focuses on strengthening the ability of such international disaster relief agencies as private voluntary organizations, the World Food Program, and DHA within the United Nations, to reduce the impact of disasters. For example, efforts in this area should result in improved capability of WFP to conduct field vulnerability assessments, using the Famine Early Warning Systems (FEWS) and other field monitoring groups to improve targeting, timeliness and appropriateness of response. This improved capacity to identify and target vulnerable groups should, in turn, help WFP and other organizations to improve the coping capacity of vulnerable groups, assisting them to restore their livelihoods, as well as health and other basic services, to a level comparable with pre-disaster levels. These efforts should also strengthen the capacity of international organizations such as the UN's DHA to coordinate international emergency response. They should facilitate coordination between development entities, such as international agricultural research institutes, and emergency response NGOs, to improve the quality and production potential of seeds used in relief response.

OFDA's Intermediate Result No. 1.2 - "Strengthened host country and local capacity for PMP activities in natural disasters" - focuses on in-country entities with responsibility for natural disaster response, such as municipal and state disaster relief agencies, health facilities, community organizations, and fire and rescue entities. OFDA will achieve these results through numerous approaches: ensuring that lifeline and health facilities are preserved and effectively operational during disasters, increasing the knowledge, awareness and sense of security by public officials, industry officials, and adopting appropriate disaster mitigation and preparedness techniques and disaster and emergency relief plans.

OFDA's Intermediate Result No. 1.3 - "Improved strategic use of disaster resources to link relief activities to rehabilitation and development" - represents a new goal of the office. As mentioned above, PMP activities have traditionally focused on natural disasters. However, with close to 90% of OFDA's budget going to complex emergencies, it has become increasingly important to apply and incorporate PMP approaches into an integrated OFDA response to complex emergencies.

Typically, relief activities are initiated quickly to meet specific needs identified in the assessment. However, once critical needs have been met, there are often further ongoing needs to help the vulnerable population recover. The objective of this intermediate result is to ensure that relief strategies are as effective as possible in supporting local capacities, and, where appropriate, to apply PMP-type approaches to complex emergencies. PMP approaches will facilitate the linkage between OFDA's traditional relief and rehabilitation efforts and the

rehabilitation and development efforts of other parts of USAID and other international actors.

In addition, there is growing awareness of the need and importance of trying to intervene before, rather than after, a full blown disaster erupts, in order to try to mitigate or prevent a disaster from occurring. While prevention has been an important and successful part of OFDA's response to natural disasters for years, it is OFDA's intent to try to bring more of this experience to bear on complex disasters. To this end, an internal strategy has been developed to apply mitigation lessons to complex emergencies.

While PMPP resources are too small to address effectively the issue of conflict prevention, efforts will focus on three areas: (1) expanding assessments of situations to include rehabilitative and longer term needs as opposed to only immediate critical needs; (2) applying mitigation expertise to emergency response country strategies and exit strategies; and, (3) augmenting coordination with other relief agencies and other USAID Bureaus, including regional Bureaus and the Global Bureau, to facilitate rehabilitation activities in emergency grants when appropriate. Nevertheless, given the newness of this field and the difficulty of measuring the impact of these approaches, it is likely that additional indicators will have to be developed. (See "How the Achievement of the Strategic Objective Will Be Judged" below for a discussion of indicators.)

Related to the above, the growth in the number and demands of complex emergencies has made it even more important for OFDA to continue to develop country strategies for all its major programs, and to apply a more systematic approach to its country programming. This is particularly important, given the need to operate more effectively in the "gray" area between emergency and long-term development activities. While OFDA does not manage development resources, the Office is engaged, through the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative and other efforts, in promoting coordination of relief and development efforts by collaborating with regional bureaus on integrated country strategies. Thus far, OFDA is a central player in the integrated strategic planning (ISP) process for Somalia and Sudan.

### **Critical Assumptions**

In developing this strategic objective, OFDA predicated its analysis on several critical assumptions and constraints.

#### Constraints:

- The difficulty in responding to disasters in highly volatile situations involving social, economic, and political turmoil. Resistance and unwillingness of governments to invest in disaster planning, preparedness, and mitigation can exacerbate such situations.
- Resistance to the integration of relief and disaster vulnerability reduction into the formulation of development strategies, internally from USAID, as well as from host countries and partner institutions.
- Difficulty of developing effective preparedness, mitigation and prevention measures for

complex disasters.

- The inability of OFDA to foresee the number of disasters requiring resources and budgetary constraints may restrict funding of activities not directly related to emergency relief.

Assumptions:

- Sustained investment in preparedness, mitigation, and prevention analysis.
- Agency commitment to foster relief to development transitional activities.
- Ability to integrate rehabilitation focus into selected emergency responses.

### **Commitment and Capacity of OFDA Partners in Achieving the Objective**

Because of the nature of prevention, preparedness and mitigation activities, generally carried out and implemented by partners, particularly PVOs and U.N. agencies, OFDA consults with these organizations on an ongoing basis. Consultations cover both program-specific issues, and general policy issues relevant to the relief to development linkage, and prevention and rehabilitation activities. In discussions with partners, the PMPP division has had great success in gaining agreement on using results-based monitoring and reporting frameworks, allowing for improved management and focus on grant objectives. As a result of close consultation, OFDA's partners have been an important influence on this strategic plan. PMPP has also conducted consultations with its partners in developing a strategy for working on complex disasters. Ongoing discussions are expected to elaborate further a PMP approach to complex disasters.

### **Illustrative Approaches**

Preparedness, mitigation, and prevention activities can take a wide variety of forms. One of OFDA's most successful activities for rapid onset disasters has been preparedness training of government and local personnel in Latin America and the Caribbean. This has resulted in the fact that most of the participating countries no longer need to request external assistance for emergencies, except in the case of major catastrophes. This has been a highly successful activity and is scheduled to continue until the end of the decade, when it is estimated that all training activities will be completed. Training in other regions, however, will likely be continued. PMPP activities also involve more technical assistance such as volcanic monitoring.

A major effort in responding to complex emergencies has been the Famine Mitigation program. OFDA has supported both the Famine Early Warning Systems (FEWS) project in famine-prone countries in sub-Saharan Africa, and USAID mission-based famine mitigation programs, also in selected African countries. This effort has allowed OFDA to leverage other donor support for increased preparedness and mitigation of drought-based famine. This too has been successful and is expected to continue into the future.

A related activity supported by PMPP has been assistance to international agriculture research institutes to address mitigation objectives as part of their development objectives. The Rwanda Seeds of Hope project, which reintroduced improved seeds to Rwanda after the genocide, was a particularly successful effort to bring PMPP expertise to bear on complex emergencies. By providing a small amount of funding to a consortium of international agriculture research institutes to save improved germplasm specifically adapted to Rwanda after country sources were destroyed, OFDA was able to catalyze other donor resources and significantly affected the recovery of Rwandan agriculture. This program has succeeded in improving agricultural production and, consequently, has helped to sustain the gains from OFDA's and other donors' emergency assistance.

This approach is illustrative of the manner in which OFDA expects to apply PMP-type concepts to complex emergencies in the future. In a larger context, the focus on famine mitigation, whether under the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI) or in other regions, will be critical to diminishing the potential impact of famine on millions of people and facilitating the links between relief and development emphasized in Intermediate Result 1.3.

### **How Sustainability Will Be Achieved**

One of the main objectives of the prevention, mitigation and preparedness activities has been to institutionalize sound preparedness practices in vulnerable countries, both at the central government and local levels. The result of this emphasis on training in the Latin America and Caribbean region is that many of the countries are able to respond to all but the most serious disasters on their own. In addition, many of OFDA's rehabilitative activities are aimed specifically at sustaining the benefits of the emergency programs. For example, as cited above, OFDA's Seeds of Hope activity in Rwanda has succeeded in improving agriculture production, thereby sustaining the gains from emergency assistance. Programs which promote drought-resistant crops sustain livelihoods and reduce effects of drought in farming communities.

## STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NO. 1

OBJECTIVES AND INTERMEDIATE RESULTS	PROPOSED INDICATORS	SUGGESTED DATA SOURCES	CURRENTLY AVAILABLE	BASELINE DATA (most recent year)
<b>STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE #1:</b> Increased adoption of mitigation measures in countries at risk of natural and man-made disasters	Number and percent of OFDA-targeted at-risk countries with PMP programs	PVO and OFDA reports	Yes	1995
	Number and percentage of early warning systems' recommendations resulting in PMP actions taken	OFDA records	Yes	1995
	Percentage of OFDA-targeted countries previously requiring donor assistance requesting fewer resources for new emergencies	OFDA records	Yes	1995
INTERMEDIATE RESULT 1.1: Enhanced institutional capacity of NGOs and international organizations for PMP in disasters	Percentage of NGO and IO resources spent on PMP activities	PVO reports	No	
	Number of staff trained in PMP activities and percent of organizational resources spent on PMP training activities	PVO reports	Yes	1996
INTERMEDIATE RESULT 1.2: Strengthened host country capacity for PMP in natural disasters	Number of OFDA-targeted vulnerable countries developing, adopting and practicing national and local disaster mitigation and preparedness programs	PVO reports	Yes	1995
	Number of OFDA-trained officials working in disaster response organizations	PVO reports	Yes	1995
	Percentage of OFDA community partner institutions in vulnerable areas undertaking prevention, mitigation, and preparedness activities	PVO reports	Yes	1995
INTERMEDIATE RESULT 1.3: Improved strategic use of disaster resources to link relief activities to rehabilitation and development	Percentage of complex disasters for which strategic plans are developed	OFDA records	Yes	1995
	Percentage of complex disasters for which joint OFDA-FFP strategies are developed	OFDA records	Yes	1995
	Number and percentage of complex-disaster countries with integrated strategic plans, reflecting intra-agency coordination for transition	OFDA records	Yes	1995

## **How the Achievement of the Strategic Objective Will Be Judged**

Although the majority of PMPP's past focus has been on natural disasters, the division is now expanding its focus and has developed an internal strategy on complex disasters. There will be a period of experimentation to determine the best approaches and subsequently, the most appropriate indicators to measure their effectiveness. While the SO is specifically worded to include both complex and natural disasters, currently only two of the Intermediate Results (1.1 and 1.3) measure effectiveness in relation to complex disasters. As experience is gained, it is assumed that more indicators will be developed to address complex disasters. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the numerous and active PMPP programs in place have led to concrete and measurable results, particularly in the area of training in the Latin America region.

OFDA has identified the indicators shown on the previous page as performance measures for SO No. 1 and Intermediate Results 1.1 through 1.3. The overall SO -- increased adoption of mitigation measures in countries at risk of natural and man-made disasters -- attempts to capture the programmatic direction of preparedness, prevention and mitigation that has guided all the PMPP activities. The three IRs under the SO further define PMPP's focus in preparedness through efforts to enhance capacity of NGOs and international organizations, to strengthen host country capacity, and to improve the strategic linkages between relief, rehabilitation, and development efforts.

The indicators have been selected to provide data on PMPP programs in place in OFDA-targeted countries, the number of early warning system recommendations resulting in appropriate actions taken and the number of countries which have reduced their reliance on OFDA assistance. These indicators should allow OFDA to define both the qualitative and quantitative aspects of achieving the strategic objective and are causally related to one another.

**Intermediate Result No. 1.1** focuses on OFDA's implementing partners, including international organizations and NGOs, and PVOs involved in disasters. It measures and tracks the extent to which OFDA helps its partners to better focus their proposals, and design their emergency preparedness interventions according to PMP guidelines. It is also important to monitor effectiveness. Combined, these factors satisfy the objective of "enhancing institutional capacity" contained in IR 1.1. The first indicator measures the percent of resources spent on PMP-type activities by implementing partners, while the second measures the number of staff trained in this area, as well as resources spent on training.

**Intermediate Result No. 1.2** focuses on host country institutions, whether local NGOs, governmental agencies, private sector associations or community groups with which OFDA works, to improve their preparedness for natural disasters. The first indicator was designed to address the broadest level of the number of targeted countries which have developed, adopted, and are practicing national disaster mitigation and preparedness activities. Directly related to that, the second indicator is designed to measure the number of OFDA-trained officials working in disaster response organizations, while the third is designed to determine how well community partner institutions (as opposed to government institutions) have adopted disaster preparedness and mitigation programs. It is worth noting that certain

aspects of IRs 1.1 and 1.2, such as the indicator on governmental capacity, may not be relevant or applicable to complex disasters.

As mentioned above, **Intermediate Result 1.3** is relatively new for OFDA and there are not, therefore, corresponding performance measures now being collected. The main objective behind this IR is for OFDA to improve its overall planning capabilities, with particular focus on better linking its relief activities with rehabilitation and development activities. Over the past several years, OFDA has developed country strategies for most of its major disasters, and the issue of linking disaster assistance and development efforts to bridge the grey area between the two is one in which much work and thinking is currently being done. Traditionally this area has been overlooked by both emergency and development planners, viewed as the responsibility of neither. Under the aegis of the GHAI, however, there has been considerable attention and effort paid to how to better link the two arenas.

The three indicators address three different levels of strategic planning that are currently being undertaken and directly build on one another. The first level focuses on developing an internal OFDA strategy for a country which integrates both PMP and traditional emergency response activities. The second indicator then builds on the first, measuring joint OFDA-FFP plans, and the third indicator measures the most comprehensive of the planning levels -- those strategies which reflect interagency coordination for transition. This has been a focal point under the GHAI, referred to as the Integrated Strategic Planning process (ISP), and has been successfully carried out for Somalia, is underway for Sudan, and is planned for Rwanda. The process entails a fully participatory planning process in both Washington and the field, including USAID regional, technical and BHR Bureaus, State regional and PRM Bureaus, and DOD.

Finally, it should also be noted that IR 2.4, which measures the development of training curricula, standards and protocols to provide better humanitarian assistance, closely relates to and supports SO No.1. This is especially true for IR 1.3, the improved strategic use of disaster resources.

## **Monitoring and Evaluation**

As mentioned above, much of the information required under SO No. 1 is already being collected according to the performance-based reporting system. Over the past two years, the PMPP division has done extensive work with its grantees in performance-based reporting, with the result that many of the PVOs are now using performance based systems for their regular reports to OFDA. Much of the data that has already been collected in the past year in the results framework has been used in programming decisions. It is noted that for the third indicator, as for others, the final number must be examined in context to be meaningful.

Many of the indicators for Intermediate Results 1.1 and 1.2 are drawn from performance indicators now being tracked at the level of PVO grant activity. Consequently, there are existing links between PVO performance in achieving results at the activity level and OFDA performance in achieving results at the office level. Data is being collected by grantee PVOs in accordance with OFDA/PMPP's guidance, allowing PMPP to track PVO

results achievement through comparison of periodic targets to baseline measures. It is anticipated that some PVO-collected performance data can be aggregated and used to measure performance at the Strategic Objective level.

For some indicators, such as the percentage of NGO and IO resources spent on PMPP activities, additional information will be necessary. For others, such as the number and percentage of early warning systems recommendations resulting in PMPP actions taken, data collection methods will also have to be developed. In addition, data aggregation methods and baselines will need to be developed in several cases. However, it is anticipated that this can be accomplished by early 1997 and that the results framework will be fully operational by mid 1997.

As mentioned above, while IR 1.3 is a newer objective for the office, OFDA has been involved in developing integrated strategies with regional bureaus during the past year. These efforts will serve as the baseline for the third indicator of this IR. Due to many of the resource and other constraints outlined previously, OFDA has been actively developing strategic plans for all of its major disasters, mostly in conjunction with FFP. Baselines already exist for the other two indicators and targets will be set accordingly.

In addition to the training on performance reporting, there has been a conscious emphasis placed on evaluation of PMPP efforts. In the past few years over 30 evaluations and special studies were conducted of PMPP and DRD activities under SO No. 1. It is anticipated that frequent evaluations will continue, particularly as the PMPP division actively pursues new ways to apply PMPP approaches to complex disasters.

**OFDA Strategic Objective No. 2**

**Critical needs met of targeted vulnerable groups in emergency situations**

**Intermediate Result No. 2.1**

Target populations and their needs and capacities identified

**Intermediate Result No. 2.2**

Targeted affected populations receiving emergency assistance meeting recognized standards, within acceptable timeframe

**Intermediate Result No. 2.3**

Delivery of short-term rehabilitation activities to help restore life-sustaining productivity of target population

**Intermediate Result No. 2.4**

Development and acceptance of training curricula, standards, protocols and other measures by the international relief community to provide better humanitarian assistance

## **Strategic Objective No. 2**

### **Statement of the Strategic Objective**

#### **Critical needs met of targeted vulnerable groups in emergency situations**

#### **Problem Analysis**

The costs of providing humanitarian assistance are rising. In 1993 the global cost of emergency relief was in excess of \$6 billion, with the United States contributing \$1.5 billion or roughly 4 times the base levels of the 1980s. With costs rising, and the length of many emergencies increasing, it is important for OFDA to target its assistance and to meet the critical needs of the population subgroups who are most “at risk” as efficiently and effectively as possible. It is also increasingly important for OFDA to work more effectively with its partners to address humanitarian assistance needs.

OFDA’s most important objective is to try to ensure that the critical needs of people involved in natural disasters and complex emergencies are met effectively. OFDA defines the term “critical needs” using four categories: (1) shelter, (2) food, including food assistance and agricultural inputs; (3) water and sanitation; and (4) medical (particularly immunizations) and nutritional needs. The specific emergency needs that must be met, however, vary greatly from situation to situation. OFDA initially responds to a crisis based on the declaration of a disaster by the U.S. Ambassador in the given country (or by the appropriate Assistant Secretary of State in the absence of a U.S. Ambassador).

OFDA and FFP provide emergency relief in response to quick onset natural disasters such as earthquakes and floods. (FFP provides the major response for drought relief.) Quick response has been the hallmark of OFDA’s emergency assistance and streamlining provision of services continues to be a priority. Effective assistance is particularly dependent on field reporting which can best identify the needs and orchestrate the response under difficult circumstances.

Meeting the critical needs of population subgroups that are particularly vulnerable, or at risk, is usually far more difficult in complex emergency situations than in natural disasters, since complex emergencies, by definition, are characterized by complicated political and military dimensions. OFDA typically targets specific groups which it deems most vulnerable within the general population in an emergency, usually women and children, for assistance. Insecurity affects safe passage for relief personnel and commodities which, in turn, greatly influences the efficiency and effectiveness of assistance delivery and the ability to fully account for goods and services provided. This is a problem for USAID, DOD, UN, and PVO partners as well. The vulnerable populations, which are always situationally defined, are often displaced and migratory, which hinders the planning and delivery of humanitarian assistance. The composition of vulnerable populations can change on a daily basis. The lack of viable social and economic structures results in a vacuum in which the coordination of humanitarian assistance is very difficult. Complex emergencies can last for years, placing a major burden on OFDA’s humanitarian assistance resources.

Complex emergencies pose special problems in their need, like natural disasters, for a timely, effective and targeted response. Frequently, they require a field presence of experienced personnel with a sophisticated understanding of underlying social, political and economic conditions. While the response to many large scale natural disasters can also be very politically sensitive, they tend to be of much shorter duration. Complex disasters, in contrast, tend to be longer-term in nature, requiring an even closer than normal degree of coordination with ongoing or planned development assistance efforts. They also often require the establishment of donor coordinating mechanisms that function at the senior policy level, as well as at the field level. Support of the international community and a willingness to intervene are also essential in complex emergency situations.

In most emergency response situations, USAID is one of several entities attempting to save lives and return to pre-disaster conditions. While USAID, through OFDA and FFP, has a clear lead role, effectiveness is highly dependent on smooth coordination with the following:

- OFDA and the USAID Missions and regional Bureaus;
- USAID, State, Defense (particularly in the case of complex emergencies where civil strife may require a military intervention), Agriculture (with respect to food provided under Title I) and other USG agencies such as the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), U.S. Public Health Service, U.S. Forest Service, U.S. Geological Survey, NOAA and NASA with regard to technical expertise;
- International organizations including the International Committee of the Red Cross, and U.N. agencies such as UNICEF, UNHCR, and WFP; and
- Private voluntary organizations that manage programs and provide assistance directly to vulnerable groups.

OFDA also seeks to help affected populations return to social and economic stability in the aftermath of disasters through short-term rehabilitation. Rehabilitation is the first post-crisis assistance intended to move toward sustainable development. This is accomplished by delivering relief to the point where populations will not easily slide back into disaster situations and by support for mitigation practices which help families obtain a minimal basis for earning their livelihood. Rehabilitation has secondary priority to relief, but is provided to the extent possible within resource constraints. As the Agency increasingly focuses on the linkages between relief and development, and as OFDA continues efforts to better link relief, mitigation and development (as emphasized under SO No. 1), rehabilitation will play an important role. In this context, OFDA is emphasizing to its partners, NGOs and donors, that coordination during the transition phase of recovery is just as important as it is during the emergency phase.

### **Strategic Framework: Intermediate Results**

As in SO No. 1, there is a direct logical and causal relationship between the intermediate results. The first priority is to obtain a good assessment of the situation,

therefore, Intermediate Result 2.1 - "Target populations and their needs and capacities identified" - is essential to achievement of SO No. 2. Clearly, in order to meet the critical needs of targeted populations, OFDA must first identify those populations and their needs and their capacities accurately. In many complex emergencies, this can often be a major challenge. This will be achieved by activities such as improving OFDA staff capability in the area of capacity and needs assessment methodologies, use of technical experts on assessment teams, and analysis and evaluation of assessment methodologies.

It is worth noting that, while needs assessments have been a routine prerequisite for OFDA actions, assessing the capacities of target populations is an area which has only recently received greater attention by operational agencies and the academic community. Leading practitioners in linking relief and development, however, such as Fred Cuny, have long focused on gaining a better understanding of a given vulnerable target population, taking into account their skills and existing capacities, rather than just treating them as helpless victims. This, in turn, leads to much more effective relief and rehabilitation programming.

Based on the assessment, OFDA is then able to target the affected populations with the adequate emergency assistance. Intermediate Result 2.2, - "Targeted affected populations receiving emergency assistance meeting internationally recognized standards, within acceptable timeframes" - is the heart of the OFDA disaster relief program. This means that in achieving its SO No. 2, OFDA will insure that the right assistance gets to the right people in an appropriate time. As mentioned, OFDA generally focuses its programs on women and children, as the most vulnerable subgroup in an emergency, providing them with the goods identified in a needs assessment, such as health care, food, water, shelter, etc. However, the ability to deliver the necessary assistance is often affected by variables outlined earlier, such as security conditions, access to those in need, and the activities of other donors.

In specifying that OFDA assistance will meet "recognized standards," OFDA notes that while in some areas, such as water, there are internationally accepted and recognized standards, in many other areas, such as health, there are no commonly recognized and accepted standards (which is addressed in IR 2.4). Nevertheless, in cases where clear standards do not exist, OFDA will strive to provide assistance that meets locally acceptable standards. In addition, while "within acceptable timeframes" may sound vague, it reflects the fact that because every situation is different, there can be no set standards on timing; for OFDA it means that relief must be delivered within timeframes determined as critical by assessments and strategies at the earliest stages of an emergency situation.

Subsequent to the initial delivery of emergency assistance, OFDA's Intermediate Result 2.3 - "Delivery of short-term rehabilitation activities to help restore life sustaining productivity of target populations" - pushes OFDA efforts beyond relief to rehabilitation and the restoration of locally sustainable productivity of critical necessities. Outcomes and activities which OFDA carries out in support of this result include famine early warning monitoring of affected areas, famine mitigation and rehabilitation activities, such as providing seeds and tools to affected populations, and efforts to improve the productive capacity of target populations. While this area is a secondary priority to that of IR 2.2, as mentioned above, it is nonetheless an area of increasing emphasis as OFDA strives to promote linkages between relief and development.

Finally, Intermediate Result 2.4 - "Development and acceptance of training curricula, standards, protocols and other guidance by the international relief community to provide better humanitarian assistance" - represents OFDA's recent effort to improve the qualifications and standardize training of its implementing partners, particularly in the health field. This directly supports all the preceding IRs as well as those under SO No. 1. To this end, OFDA has provided a grant to InterAction, an NGO umbrella group, to develop a health training curriculum which will eventually be required for relief professionals. In conjunction with the health training effort, OFDA is also working in concert with other concerned organizations to develop internationally standardized health protocols for emergency situations. In addition, it participates in a working group that includes USAID's Global Bureau and State PRM to consider how to better address reproductive health needs of refugees and internally displaced people.

### **Critical Assumptions**

As under Strategic Objective No. 1, there are several key constraints and assumptions that underlie OFDA's elaboration of Strategic Objective No. 2. as follows:

#### Constraints:

- The limited capacity to predict or anticipate a disaster or civil emergency before it occurs.
- The limited ability of the USG, including USAID, to take preemptive steps to avoid political crises and civil conflicts.
- Insecurity, which limits access to vulnerable populations for relief personnel and commodities in conflict situations, and greatly affects the efficiency and effectiveness of assistance efforts.
- The inability of OFDA to know what its workload will be in advance, and to allocate scarce resources with precision.
- The burden on USAID's contracts office to process OFDA's 400-plus grants and amendments each year.
- The availability of properly trained and equipped personnel with sufficient expertise and experience for deployment to the field.
- The effectiveness of coordinating mechanisms within USAID and the USG, as well as those involving cooperating international organizations and other donors.
- The institutional and logistical capacity of cooperating institutions, particularly international organizations and PVOs.
- The high rate of staff turnover in OFDA and the amount of time needed to recruit and

train new staff.

Assumptions:

- The U.S. Government will continue to give priority to emergency response.
- The "pyramiding" of requirements in known emergencies will demand growing resources at least in the short run.
- There will continue to be burden-sharing with other donors.

### **Commitment and Capacity of OFDA Partners in Achieving the Objective**

Because of the nature of its work which relies so heavily on operational partners, particularly the PVOs and the major international humanitarian organizations such as the ICRC, OFDA regularly and routinely consults with these organizations. Consultations cover both program specific issues as well as more general policy issues confronting the relief community. For example, after every DART operation is completed, OFDA holds an "After Action Conference" to which all partners are invited to review the lessons learned from that emergency response. The issues are analyzed and synthesized and finally documented as part of OFDA's 'Lessons Learned' data base.

Through OFDA's cooperative agreement with InterAction, OFDA maintains regular communication with the PVOs to better coordinate OFDA/PVO projects and priorities. OFDA holds regular conferences and workshops with NGOs to explain and refine OFDA program objectives and programs, to provide country-specific updates, and to review operational issues such as grant procedures and proposal guidelines. OFDA also provides capacity building assistance and staff support, as well as program assistance, to the U.N. Department of Humanitarian Affairs. As a result of continuous close consultation, OFDA's partners have significantly, both directly and indirectly, influenced the development of this strategic objective.

### **Illustrative Approaches**

OFDA's emergency interventions take many different forms. At its simplest, it might just be provision of \$25,000 through an Embassy in response to a disaster declaration, such as a flood. At its most complicated, such as a Somalia or Rwanda situation, it means the deployment of a DART, which might be based in several different locations in a region and has contracting and funding authority for quick processing of grants and disbursement of funds. With military involvement, there is a geometric increase in the work load and complexity of coordinating a humanitarian response. However, the bulk of OFDA's responses fall somewhere between the two extremes, requiring a heavy workload of proposal reviews and grant processing in Washington, as well as reliance on OFDA field staff for assessing and reporting on conditions on the ground.

The Rwanda crisis was the most recent example of a large-scale response. Prior to the genocide and massive outflow of refugees, OFDA personnel were deployed in the field,

where they constantly monitored, assessed and reported back on the situation. As the situation unfolded into a large scale emergency, OFDA deployed a DART, which was based in numerous locations, and US military were deployed for logistical support. Numerous other donors, of both emergency aid and military support, were also involved along with UN operations. The DART provided ongoing immediate reporting, and accelerated funding for emergency proposals. One of the reasons, IR 2.4 became a priority was the experience with Rwandan refugees in Goma, where it became apparent that many NGOs were using very different health protocols and standards, creating additional confusion and impairing program results.

Due to the increased numbers of players on the humanitarian scene and the complexity of the operations (as in Rwanda) with multiple US and other donor actors, coordination has become an increasingly critical and time-consuming part of OFDA's job; this includes internal USG coordination, coordination with other donors on funding and policy, coordination with PVOs and international organizations, both in the field and in capitals, and often extensive coordination with U.N. agencies.

### **How Sustainability Will Be Achieved**

Unlike development assistance, emergency assistance, by its very nature, is meant to be temporary, responding only to life-threatening needs. For natural disasters, it is normally the case that emergency assistance is only required for a limited amount of time. However, for complex emergencies, which now absorb the preponderance of emergency resources, it is much more difficult simply to provide the needed services and commodities, and expect the affected population to be self-sufficient. Given the ongoing needs generated by long-term complex disasters, it is increasingly difficult to limit assistance to a quick response. Nor, as resources become scarcer, is it possible to sustain high levels of emergency assistance to countries year after year.

Therefore, one of the most difficult issues confronting the field of emergency assistance today is the question of determining when the initial "emergency" phase of a disaster is over -- particularly since the phases are rarely clear or distinct -- and consequently when to terminate emergency assistance and shift to rehabilitation and development assistance. One of the most difficult aspects is knowing in advance what the effects will be of ending emergency assistance. This is particularly true in complex emergencies where the operating environment is often characterized by insecurity, uncertainty, and lack of a stable governing authority. Will individuals fall back to the previous emergency status, will they become dependent on emergency aid, or will they be able to survive on their own? Closely related to, and exacerbating this problem, is the question of what resources are available for transition; with USAID development resources facing severe budgetary cuts, and with numerous USAID missions closing in crisis areas, OFDA's progress and effectiveness is threatened.

For these reasons, one of the major themes highlighted in this strategy has been the importance of developing strategic priorities to guide OFDA's interventions in complex emergencies and of strengthening the linkages between relief and rehabilitation and development. OFDA has placed a high priority on formulating country strategies which state

OFDA's objectives as clearly as possible, including the delineation of exit criteria. In formulating internal guidelines, OFDA has attempted to clarify some of the 'gray' areas between relief and rehabilitation. While OFDA's first priority will always be to respond to life saving needs, it attempts to bridge the relief-development gap where possible and appropriate, helping to restore livelihoods as well as lives. This takes many forms in different situations; it may mean restoring public health facilities in Rwanda or providing seeds and tools in southern Sudan.

As a first step to further its understanding of some of these difficult policy issues, OFDA contracted different studies by relief experts to examine specific issues in detail: How can OFDA foster self-sufficiency of disaster victims? How can OFDA engage in civil conflict situations with minimum negative effect? A series of policy reviews is being conducted around these studies, serving to inform policy, management and staff training. Follow up training for staff is anticipated as part of this exercise.

## STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NO. 2

OBJECTIVES AND INTERMEDIATE RESULTS	PROPOSED INDICATORS	SUGGESTED DATA SOURCES	CURRENTLY AVAILABLE	BASELINE DATA (most recent year)
<b>STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE #2:</b> Critical needs met of targeted vulnerable groups in emergency situations	Percent of vulnerable population with critical emergency needs met	PVO reports	No	
	Mortality rates reduced below emergency levels in targeted timeframe	PVO reports	No	
	Morbidity rates reduced below emergency levels in targeted time-frame	PVO reports	No	
<b>INTERMEDIATE RESULT 2.1:</b> Target populations and their needs and capacities identified	Percent of declared disasters receiving over \$25,000 in OFDA assistance for which independent assessments are conducted	OFDA MIS reports	Yes	1995
	Increased technical expertise, in areas of critical needs, on assessment missions	OFDA MIS reports	Yes	1995
	Percent of OFDA, FFP staff trained and utilized in disaster assessment	OFDA training records	Yes	1995
<b>INTERMEDIATE RESULT 2.2:</b> Targeted affected populations receiving emergency assistance meeting recognized standards, within acceptable timeframe	Percent of interventions accomplished in acceptable time-frame, based on timeframe proposed in assessment	PVO reports	No	
	Percent of interventions meeting internationally or locally accepted standards	OFDA assessments	No	
<b>INTERMEDIATE RESULT 2.3:</b> Delivery of short-term rehabilitation activities to help restore life-sustaining productivity of selected target population	Percent of relief activities which include appropriate rehabilitation components	PVO reports	No	
	Percent of targeted population participating in rehabilitation activities	OFDA and PVO reports	No	
<b>INTERMEDIATE RESULT 2.4:</b> Development and acceptance of training curricula, standards, protocols, and other guidance for the international relief community to provide better humanitarian assistance	Number of selected universities where OFDA-approved health training curricula are available	OFDA and PVO reports	No	
	Number and percent of health standards informing health protocols adapted by implementing agencies	OFDA and PVO reports	No	

## **How the Achievement of the Strategic Objective Will Be Judged**

The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance has identified the indicators shown on the preceding page as performance measures for Strategic Objective No. 2 and Intermediate Results 2.1 through 2.4. While the Agency's strategic planning guidance has exempted emergency assistance from the specific planning requirements, appropriate planning is encouraged to the extent that it is feasible and can be achieved. It is recognized that once relief assistance begins, planning can and should be done. OFDA believes that it is important to measure success in relief activities and to learn from experience to build stronger programs and to better explain funding needs. The office recognizes that SO No. 2 does not fully meet the requirements of the Agency for a strategic framework or plan; its main weakness lies in the area of judging achievement. In emergency situations, measurement of results is the main challenge.

Generally, emergency situations lack baselines for assistance areas. Collecting data is often difficult because of lack of security or the immediate need to save lives. The timeframes to achieve a certain level of service delivery or health support are also difficult to predict and vary from emergency to emergency. Quantifiable targets, set out yearly or for specific periods, are impossible. Complicating the matter further, emergency situations change rapidly and drastically. Thus, while IR 2.2 (emergency assistance meeting recognized standards within acceptable timeframes) may seem vague, it reflects the fact that pre-existing standards, where they exist, may not be appropriate in a given emergency. Similarly, setting a timeframe without standards in an evolving situation is impossible. Nonetheless, the Office believes that it is possible to get a quantitative measure and an informed judgement of achieving the result in specific emergency situations.

With all of these constraints at the individual country level, it is an even greater challenge to aggregate the "results" of each of the country-level emergencies to measure the performance of the entire OFDA relief program. While OFDA does not have a method or approach to aggregate data across countries, given the huge variation in country contexts and the nature of the emergencies, it will make its best effort at country-level analysis, and then make a qualitative assessment on its overall performance. Despite these daunting challenges, OFDA is moving forward with the measurement of the emergency relief activities outlined in this strategic plan. However, the Bureau recognizes that the use of this strategic plan is being undertaken on a pilot basis to test the feasibility of strategic planning and managing for results in emergency situations.

Critical relief needs, as identified under the SO, while varying from situation to situation, are usually defined as food, water, shelter and medical assistance. OFDA has not yet identified specific indicators for these areas to measure performance, but is using a general indicator initially. Part of the pilot nature of the work will be to identify strong indicators that can be measured. OFDA is also using two other indicators on mortality and morbidity rates, which are currently only irregularly reported on by grantees, but will be emphasized in the new reporting system being developed.

**Intermediate Result 2.1** explicitly recognizes the importance of targeting and assessment and sets "targeted populations and their needs and capacities identified" as a result

for OFDA to achieve to help set a baseline and priorities for relief assistance. While, as mentioned above, there are serious weaknesses in using an initial assessment as a baseline, OFDA sees improving the quality of assessments as an important accomplishment and a strong basis to help judge OFDA's performance.

The first indicator for IR 2.1 is aimed at the percent of larger OFDA involvements for which independent assessments are conducted. The other two indicators support increased technical expertise on assessments, both in developing and utilizing staff expertise, as well as inclusion of outside technical expertise on assessment missions. It is hoped that OFDA can further refine these indicators as part of the pilot.

**Intermediate Result No. 2.2** focuses on the delivery of appropriate, timely and targeted emergency assistance, the heart of OFDA's work. The indicators measure the assistance delivered, in terms of timeliness and effectiveness for addressing the identified needs and for the ability to meet international standards. Because of the difficulty of measuring these indicators, given the great variability and unpredictability of emergency situations discussed above, it will remain a qualitative assessment. Nevertheless, OFDA will experiment in some of the larger complex disasters to refine and clarify standards to measure against (based on assessments of the particular situation), using its field staff to monitor data. These standards will reflect the critical needs (water, shelter, food, etc.) referred to under the SO, identified in the initial assessment. (In addition, IR 2.4 also directly supports the development of standards for humanitarian assistance.) Ongoing assessments, undertaken in all complex emergencies to determine the status of targeted population and the need for continued assistance, will provide a critical source of data for both of the indicators.

**Intermediate Result No. 2.3** concentrates on the delivery of rehabilitation activities. The thrust of this IR is restoring the coping capacity of vulnerable populations. Coping capacity is understood by OFDA to mean self-sustainable, productive capacity. As a relatively new area of focus for OFDA, the integration of effective rehabilitation activities into relief activities is still in an experimental phase, thus indicators will again result in a qualitative assessment. This IR also links closely to PMP activities outlined in SO No. 1, IR 1.2. As results of the first indicator demonstrate, an important aspect of this IR is the degree to which rehabilitation components are incorporated into relief activities. The second indicator is designed to measure the participation of vulnerable populations in the rehabilitation activities, and the extent to which it enables them to become more self-sufficient. OFDA will continue to experiment on the best means to gain an accurate picture of the impact of its rehabilitation activities.

**Intermediate Result No. 2.4** focuses on OFDA's attempt to develop consensus on standards and protocols for humanitarian assistance, particularly in the health field. As mentioned earlier, this became a particularly critical issue in Goma, Zaire in 1994 when it became apparent that there were no standardized protocols in several critical health areas. With the growth in the number of PVOs and IOs now responding to disasters, it has become increasingly important that field staff are all adequately trained in emergency response. The two indicators are aimed at measuring the success of the OFDA's efforts to promote consensus on basic health protocols and to develop training curricula for relief workers.

## **Monitoring and Evaluation**

In contrast to SO No. 1, much of the data for the indicators for SO No. 2 and its intermediate results is new to the inventory of information now being collected by OFDA and its grantees. Therefore, considerable work will need to be done before the results framework is fully operational. However, as a first important step, OFDA has begun to develop a new Management Information System (MIS), which will serve as the overall centralized mechanism to collect and track data on OFDA programs. OFDA had attempted to install such a system over two years ago, but both technical and personnel problems unfortunately prevented it from being realized. In order to develop fully this system to track and monitor the information required for this strategy, OFDA will be relying heavily on support from BHR's new performance monitoring and evaluation contract which is scheduled to be in place in FY 1997.

Complementary to the new information system, and in order to establish better reporting on the indicators that have been developed under this SO, OFDA is now in the process of revising and updating both its procedures guidelines and its proposal guidelines, which PVOs follow for their grant proposals. These documents will provide clear guidance on the kind and methodology of reporting required under the results-based framework. This, in turn, will be followed by workshops with the PVOs to strengthen their capacity for the data gathering that will be required under this strategy. OFDA recognizes fully the importance of minimizing reporting requirements for PVOs, the key actors in OFDA's delivery of emergency assistance, and will work to reduce the burden of any new requirements to the greatest degree possible.

As part of this overall review of procedures, OFDA has already reached agreement with USAID's Contracts Office to simplify some of its procedures: for no-cost extensions, for instance, PVOs will no longer be required to submit pipeline analysis and other documentation. In return for the simplified procedures, OFDA will make the new reporting requirements clear to grantees. As soon as the system is in place and approved, OFDA will present it to grantees with training on performance based reporting.

Even with an improved information management system, measurement challenges clearly remain. Under SO No. 2, for instance, baselines and targets on the indicators on morbidity and mortality rates will be quite difficult to obtain in some cases. OFDA proposes to use what information is gathered at the outset (and in some cases there is previously existing data available), and compare it with what is collected later on. At that point a judgement on the quality of the achievement would be made.

For the indicators under IR 2.1, good data is available, and establishing baselines and targets will be relatively straightforward. Baselines for all three indicators exist for FY 1995, and targets will be set accordingly.

For IRs 2.2 and 2.3, as much of the data is not currently available, OFDA will rely on what PVOs are able to report under the new system. OFDA would again propose gathering data for baselines as soon as possible, where not already available. As it is not possible to establish generic acceptable timeframes or an accepted standard of service across situations,

targets will again be based on assessments of each individual situation.

For IR 2.4, a new objective for OFDA, the baseline for both indicators is essentially zero; both targets and data should be easy to collect and monitor with the help of InterAction, the major grantee for this activity.

An additional significant challenge to the system will be to disaggregate the results of OFDA's efforts from those of the rest of the donor community. In many cases, numerous donor-sponsored interventions are aimed at different needs of the same targeted population. By relying heavily on its assessments and targeted programming by NGO implementors, OFDA hopes to be able to distinguish the effects of its programs from those of other donors. In some cases, however, given the overlapping nature of many of these activities, it is likely to be impossible. While no perfect information or data collection system is possible in emergency situations, OFDA nevertheless believes that information can be collected which will be useful to its programming decisions.

As stated above, OFDA is in the process of developing a new information system to help in the collection and tracking of the data requirements requested from PVOs. However, given the newness of the system, the additional data requirements, and the challenge of aggregating all the information, OFDA proposes beginning with a pilot project of selecting one or two disasters for which it would collect the data required for the indicators for SO No. 2 and IRs 2.1 through 2.3. This would serve as an experiment to see whether it will in fact be possible to collect the information that has been identified and whether the indicators are valid and useful measures of OFDA's intended results and objectives. If successful in the first year, OFDA would then expand its coverage to all the major disasters as soon as possible. As mentioned earlier, OFDA does not believe that aggregation of data for indicators under SO No. 2 will be possible.

In addition to the development of the information system outlined above, OFDA's participation in BHR's new evaluation contract will facilitate initiation of evaluations of its disaster response programs. OFDA plans to use this mechanism to conduct evaluations of some of large country programs, such as the former Yugoslavia, where it has been involved for several years. In the past, large evaluations, such as that of Somalia, have proven very useful in terms of lessons learned. In the future, OFDA is particularly interested in evaluating programs and specific projects that may be instructive in the area of linking relief and development.

### **Part III - Resource Requirements**

Given the nature of OFDA's work, it is often difficult to know exactly what resource requirements will be from year to year. However, given that the largest share of funds are used to respond to ongoing complex emergencies, and based on past experience in addressing fast onset emergency requirements, OFDA estimates that, on average, approximately \$165 million in IDA funds will be required each year to implement this strategic plan. Given the unpredictability of both natural and manmade disasters, there could be an estimated 25 percent increase in resource requirements in any given year. OFDA has the authority and is sometimes required to borrow from other Agency accounts to meet unforeseen needs. In extraordinary circumstances, such as the 1994 Rwanda crisis, Congress appropriated supplemental funds to meet such needs.

The majority of OFDA funds are channeled to SO No. 2, Critical needs met of targeted vulnerable groups in emergency situations. This continues to be the highest priority of OFDA and resource allocations will be made accordingly. It is also true that the office is charting new territory by looking at how prevention, mitigation and preparedness measures can be applied in the context of manmade emergencies. This is explained in the strategy under SO No. 2, Increased preparedness of at-risk populations in countries prone to natural and manmade disasters. Historically, these SO No. 2 activities (Prevention, Mitigation and Preparedness - PMP) have accounted for some \$8-10 million of OFDA resources. OFDA expects that this funding level will increase as it considers how to address PMP in manmade disasters. In the near term, however, the office will be engaged in considerable analysis and "trial and error" pilot programs in this new area. Therefore, while resource allocation for SO No. 2 will grow, the increase is expected to be quite modest over the next few years.