

Somalia

Strategic Plan

1997

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I. THE SOMALIA STRATEGY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA INITIATIVE

The Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI) was developed in 1994 by the U.S. Government in concert with its partners. It seeks to rally the international community, including the governments and people of the Greater Horn, donors, and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) to a collective effort to "break the cycle of despair" in the Greater Horn region (Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi). A concept paper was drafted, which laid out the large-scale human suffering caused by natural and man-made disasters in the region, as well as the extraordinary level of relief funds expended by the international community in response. The paper argues that the international community has consistently addressed the symptoms of crisis rather than the causes. The United States' massive humanitarian intervention in Somalia in 1992 is cited as a case in point. The GHAI concept paper makes the argument that improving food security is a key ingredient in creating a "wedge" that breaks the cycle of despair in the Greater Horn. In addition, it notes that crisis prevention is linked to food security and is also a key element to achieving progress in the region.

The U.S. Government (USG) has adopted a series of programming principles designed to operationalize GHAI concepts. They are:

1. Program existing resources better
2. Promote African ownership
3. Promote strategic coordination
4. Promote a regional approach to problems
5. Link relief and development in order to speed transitions
6. Assume instability in the region

Somalia is an important country in the GHAI context, showcasing both the failures of traditional development activities in the Cold War era, the terrible costs of a complex humanitarian emergency that emerged from a combination of man-made and natural causes, and the regional implications of instability. It is therefore of keen interest to those engaged there to adopt a strategy that applies the GHAI principles.

The emphasis of the Somalia integrated strategic planning (ISP) process was to operationalize new ways of tackling program principles three and five - that is, promote strategic coordination and better link relief and development. The nature of the crisis in Somalia demands all the USG's efforts be integrated, whether it is humanitarian, developmental, or political. Annex A describes the methodology used to achieve integrated strategic planning.

USAID/Somalia and the other U.S. government partners who have prepared this document (addressed throughout this paper as the ISP Team or simply the Team), including the State Department Africa Bureau, the State Department Population, Refugees and Migration Bureau, the State Department Nairobi-based "Somalia watcher," the USAID Bureau for Humanitarian Response (BHR) Office of Food for Peace (BHR/FFP) and Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (BHR/OFDA), and the Africa Bureau (AFR) have broken new ground in this regard. The strategy addresses the State Department foreign policy interests and refugee issues in a more deliberate fashion than traditional USAID-prepared Country Strategic Plans. It also integrates BHR and AFR resources directly into a strategic framework in a way that will capture results of both Bureaus in a single, integrated plan.

Nonetheless, the interest in creating a document that expressed strategic interests of both USAID and the State Department created a challenge that was only partially met in the Somalia strategy process. It is the opinion of the ISP Team that even more intensive dialogue, as well as more direct input from our colleagues from other Agencies and the NGO community is needed in order to further improve strategic coordination. This process should improve over time as more integrated strategies are prepared and the advantages of an integrated approach are clearly seen by more players, both inside and outside the U.S. government.

The Somalia strategy has linked both relief and development elements to address the primary GHAI goal of improved food security. The Somalia crisis manifested itself in the form of a nationwide famine; so by focusing on food security, the ISP Team aims to tackle two problems:

- The immediate problem of household-level food shortages and attendant social and economic deterioration; and
- The problem posed by the gradual reduction by the former centralized Somali state of the economic and political power of local producers.

At the same time, the Team aims to support an increase in the availability of health services, potable water, and sanitation services, each of which, when linked with agricultural activities and managed at the local level, can both improve local economies and living standards, while at the same time promoting the gradual re-empowerment of civil society. Through such linkages, the food security objective not only addresses the country's long-term problems in the area of food security, but also some of the structural problems giving rise to food insecurity.

The strategy's special objective on strengthened civil society captures elements of the GHAI's goal of helping to prevent

crisis. Given the limited ability of USAID, or any other external actor, to influence the macro-political situation and bearing in mind the lack of a formal national government, the ISP Team focused its attention on the local level. This is also important because the Somali crisis was borne of the overt centralization of the state and, with it, the erosion of power traditionally held and managed at the local (clan) level. If successful, this effort will help the Somali people rebuild their country and society from the bottom up, as opposed to replicating the centralized state which proved so problematic in the past. Second, the degree to which local citizens are able to cooperate in the social and administrative fields will impact the degree to which social and political contracts can be struck. Greater cooperation in the economic field may well lead to less conflict at the political level, with local disputes increasingly being resolved in favor of tangible gains.

However, given the limited resources available to implement the plan and the difficulty in measuring progress on conflict prevention, USAID and its strategic planning partners have opted to make conflict prevention implicit in the way services are delivered across its SOs and not an explicit element of the strategy.

II. ENVIRONMENT FOR ASSISTANCE

A. Country Background

Somalia is located in the Horn of Africa and has a land area of 627,300 square kilometers with the Gulf of Aden to the north, Ethiopia and Kenya to the west and the Indian Ocean to the east, but is sparsely populated. The population of Somalia is not accurately known and estimates range from 4.5 - 9 million. This wide range makes accurate food supply and food security calculations extremely problematic. Somalia's topography includes a hot and arid coastal plain, rugged mountains and plateaus, and lowlands of varying fertility.

Rainfall is limited, erratic and variable, averaging about 40 millimeters per year in the north but with widely recorded variations from 210 to 810 millimeters per year in the rest of the country. There are two main rainy seasons, the "GU" (April-June) and the "DEYR" (October-December), and the two agricultural cropping seasons correspond with these periods. The GU season supplies about three-quarters of annual cereal production. Only about 13 percent of Somalia's land area is suitable for cultivation. However, with water being the main constraint less than 10 percent of potentially arable land is under cultivation. The significant irrigation network along the Shabelle River in the south has largely fallen into disrepair and/or has been destroyed as a result of the civil war, thus further hampering production. At the same time, many of the large banana plantations in the Lower Shabelle region have been restored to operation and are enjoying high levels of production and exports.

Historically, the mainstay of the economy has been nomadic pastoralism. Nearly 50 percent of the population depend on livestock for their livelihood. The pastoral society has always been economically stratified, with the majority of the pastoral wealth concentrated in a few extremely wealthy herders. In the 1970s and 1980s, commercialization and monetization of this sector left many of the small herders unable to sustain themselves on pastoral activities alone, resulting in a trend towards agro-pastoralism.

Somalia has always been one of the poorest countries in the world. Statistics gathered prior to the collapse of the Somali government in early 1991 recorded life expectancy at 47 years, infant mortality at 150 per thousand births, and primary school enrollment at below 20 percent. Daily caloric consumption averaged about 1600, with higher rates for agricultural households than for pastoral households and higher rates for men than for women. Relatively high malnutrition rates among children were the norm.

Since the fall of the Siad Barre regime in Somalia in January 1991, statistics and other vital information have been difficult to collect in any systematic way. Some statistics have been collected at a local level by relief organizations, but varying methodologies have been used and the information has not been synthesized. From what is available, however, it is safe to assume that Somalia's dismal pre-1991 quality of life indicators have been reduced to an even lower level and that the majority of the population is receiving little, if any, social services. Malnutrition rates continue to be high among children, women, displaced persons and other vulnerable groups. Unfortunately, the lack of peace and basic security seriously hamper even the most rudimentary rehabilitation and development efforts.

B. USAID'S Involvement in Somalia

Pre-1978

USAID became involved in Somalia in the early 1960's after the country had gained its independence. Between 1962 and 1970, USAID assisted Somalia with agricultural production and extension activities and with the building of infrastructure, particularly sea ports. U.S.-Somali relations deteriorated in the early 1970's, with Siad Barre coming to power in a military coup and his introduction of scientific socialism. Soviet influence increased and by 1974, the U.S. had broken ties with Somalia.

Post-Ogaden War

USAID returned to Somalia in 1978 after Siad Barre's falling out with the Soviet Union and his defeat by Ethiopia in the Ogaden War. Somalia again became strategically important in Cold War politics, as Ethiopia entered the Soviet sphere of influence, and became a major recipient of foreign development and military aid. Between 1979 and 1989, the United States contributed over \$620 million in various forms of assistance to Somalia, mostly directed toward agriculture, health care and infrastructure projects.

1990-1996

The armed struggle to oust the Siad Barre regime intensified in 1988 and culminated in Barre fleeing the capital in January 1991. While sub-clan militias battled for power and spoils, retreating Barre forces and armed militia terrorized the country side, stripping all assets in their path, destroying physical infrastructure, looting grain and small livestock and burning fields. Famine conditions ensued as Somalia was reduced to a "failed state" characterized by armed conflict, anarchy, widespread banditry and looting. From 1991-92, large-scale deaths were reported, primarily among the sedentary farmers and

other minority groups in the agricultural regions, and hundreds of thousands of Somalis sought refuge in neighboring countries.

U.N. agencies had closed down operations in southern Somalia prior to Barre's overthrow leaving the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and a handful of NGOs to provide food and medical assistance in response to the humanitarian crisis. Following international pressure for U.N. action, the U.N. brokered a cease fire in Mogadishu and dispatched unarmed cease fire observers under UNOSOM I. In mid-1992, following increased information on the extent of the crisis, rising media attention, and growing frustration that UNOSOM plans to deploy 500 armed guards to protect food relief in Mogadishu had not materialized, the U.S. launched a military airlift to deliver food in support of ICRC and NGO programs. Coordinated by a USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team, the airlift and NGO efforts are credited with breaking the back of the famine. Also the airlift, combined with the media publicity, set in motion a much broader change in the entire dynamic of the relief effort as many new NGO players entered the scene. However, continued attacks on relief agency personnel and property and increased looting of relief food led to calls for a robust military intervention to support humanitarian assistance.

In December 1992, the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), led by the U.S. military, arrived in Somalia to secure the delivery of relief assistance to the Somali population. As a result, food began moving by road from the major southern ports to internal areas, further improving humanitarian conditions. As international forces deployed to major towns in each southern region, agricultural production resumed. Yet the political/military conditions that had led to the humanitarian crisis remained, causing concern that the gains made by the international force presence would not be sustainable. In May 1993, UNITAF transferred responsibility to UNOSOM II as the focus of the intervention turned to the more difficult tasks of restoring law and order. UNOSOM II operated under Chapter VII of the UN charter (the first time this chapter was invoked in the history of the UN), with a mandate to "make peace", including promoting political reconciliation, coordinating humanitarian assistance, and paving the way for rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country. Soon after the transition, the Chapter VII mandate was tested when 24 Pakistani peacekeepers were killed following an inspection of a radio station controlled by Somali National Alliance (SNA) leader General Aideed. UNOSOM's counter attack resulted in a four month "war" between UNOSOM and the SNA. The October 3 killing of 18 U.S. Army Rangers as part of this battle precipitated the withdrawal of U.S. troops by March 1994.

With little to show for its reconciliation efforts, the remainder of UNOSOM II forces left one year later. Since then, Somalia has

remained absent a national government and divided into "regional fiefdoms" governed by various clan/faction groups. This sort of "status quo" prevailed until July 1995 when Aideed declared himself President of Somalia and subsequently began to expand his forces and control to areas beyond south Mogadishu. Aideed's death in August 1996 has further altered the political/military landscape. Still, while pockets of suffering continue to emerge as a result of sporadic fighting, insecurity and/or climactic conditions, periodic dire predictions of a return to massive humanitarian crisis have not materialized.

USAID, UN, and most other international aid operations for Somalia are now managed from Nairobi, Kenya. Limited program activities inside Somalia are being largely implemented by local Somali staff with regular oversight/monitoring visits from expatriate personnel. Until security conditions within Somalia are restored to a level conducive to a permanent return of expatriates and resumption of full-scale operations, most agencies are likely to maintain this mode of operation.

C. Development Constraints/Opportunities

Constraints

1. **Insecurity:** The overwhelming constraint to development progress in Somalia is man-made violence. There are three potential sources of instability - criminal/predatory, resource competition, and political/military. The level of insecurity fluctuates widely from one region to another and can flare up unexpectedly, with some areas experiencing more than one of these sources at a time. Criminal, predatory violence is characterized by looting and asset stripping. This random banditry is the greatest threat to security in most areas. Young men with guns are omnipresent; extortion and looting of money and commodities is widespread. Resource competition includes attempts to accumulate resources and access to those resources (land, control of roads, food production, livestock, ports, irrigation channels, trade routes, etc.). As evidenced by the civil war, political/military violence is characterized by the contests for power and territory by clan and faction leaders, who are prepared to use violence to increase their power and extend their areas of control.

2. **Lack of Local Administration:** An obvious and overwhelming constraint is the lack of government-supported and maintained physical infrastructure and social services. Prior to the civil war, much of the infrastructure and services were largely funded by the international community. Between civil war and the loss of international assistance, these national administrative structures have disintegrated. In this environment, a state-supported social security system is not feasible nor sustainable.

However, some local and regional administrative structures do exist in various forms. Where they do exist, they are extremely weak; their legitimacy is sometimes questionable; they may not have been designed for service delivery; and their ability to provide any type of services for their citizenry is severely limited. Obviously, it is difficult to carry out development activities in this kind of environment with a local administrative counterpart who is not in a position to meaningfully collaborate or be a contributing partner.

3. Chronic Food Insecurity: Food production, availability and access are very volatile. Poor rains, which occur on average once every three years, and severe drought once every ten years but now increasing in frequency, seriously hinder production and lead to more or less chronic confrontation with malnutrition. Even when food is available, the population may not have the resources to purchase it due to the lack of employment opportunities.

4. Poor Health Care System: Many of the health indicators for Somalia are among the worst in the world. Pre-1990 statistics recorded life expectancy at 47 years, infant mortality at 150 per 1,000 births, and the under 5 mortality rate at 190 per 1,000. More recent data are unavailable but one can assume these poor statistics have worsened during the intervening years of civil strife. There continues to be a dearth of trained health care workers and limited financing for training and medical supplies. Compounding the lack of such services and supplies, is a Somali preference for curative rather than primary/preventive health care.

5. Deteriorated Educational System: Illiteracy is increasing and this generation of Somalia youngsters has largely been doomed to educational darkness. While several international agencies are supporting a limited number of primary schools and some private Koranic schools continue to operate with parent donations, only a very small percentage of primary school aged children attend. Teachers are under-trained, often unpaid, and lack the necessary books and supplies to carry out their work.

6. Lack of Employment Opportunities: The absence of a government and continued armed conflict, banditry and looting obviously make capital investments in businesses a risky and unattractive prospect in some areas of Somalia. Employment creation, therefore, is extremely difficult. In addition, most Somalis lack many of the off-farm skills needed to run micro, small and medium-sized enterprises. The lack of financial institutions and a banking structure further exacerbates the situation.

Opportunities

1. **Strong Entrepreneurial Spirit:** The Somalis seem to have an innate entrepreneurial spirit that is almost indomitable. This is most evident at the present time in the strong livestock economy, with exports reaching record or near-record levels. Small-scale trading also appears to be robust as evidenced by the wide range of commodities available in most urban markets. In addition, some areas of relative stability, such as the northeast, are seeing an increase in private sector investment.

2. **Potential for Expanded Maritime Industry:** Somalia has a long coastline and the potential for expansion of the fishing and shipping industries is great. There are several good ports, some of which are functional now and further improvements are underway with the European Union (EU) assistance. Rehabilitation of others, however, requires significant capital investments and in some cases, such as Mogadishu and Kismayo, a secure environment.

3. **Potential for Increased Agricultural Production:** Considerable amounts of land are not in production because of insecurity, land tenure problems, or lack of agricultural inputs. Most irrigation infrastructure maintenance was stopped in the late 1980's and many existing systems have fallen into disrepair and/or have been destroyed in the civil conflict. However, some of these systems could be rehabilitated with relatively little investment, which could dramatically increase production, assuming rainfall and other inputs are sufficient.

4. **A Population Fed Up With War:** The average Somali is tired of warfare and the disruption of his/her life. He/she is resilient and has well-honed coping mechanisms that can be utilized.

5. **The Emergence of Local Organizations:** A number of indigenous organizations have re-emerged or established themselves and have begun to take responsibility at a local level. These organizations include local NGOs, women's groups, and local administrative structures (LAS) at the district and regional levels. Building upon these nascent organizations offers one of the greatest opportunities for the donor community.

D. Lessons Learned

Many important lessons have been learned from USAID and other donors' involvement in Somalia over the past two decades. In fact, the volume of information generated through research of lessons learned is so large that USAID commissioned two separate studies in 1994, the first of which covered lessons learned from USAID involvement in pre-war Somalia (1978-90) and the second of which covered lessons learned from USAID humanitarian assistance efforts in Somalia from 1990-94.

USAID involvement in pre-war Somalia (1978-90) was full of frustrations and failures. Between 1979 and 1989, despite significant funding, USAID projects fell dramatically short of achieving originally designed objectives. Despite the widespread corruption, poor human rights record, and lack of dedication to policy reform of Siad Barre's government, USAID and other international donors continued to prop up the regime and subsidize the economy in order to further foreign policy agendas. When Siad Barre's government collapsed in January 1991, what limited progress had been achieved over a decade of heavy international donor inputs, was quickly destroyed, and virtually nothing was left to show for the huge investment of aid.

The primary lesson learned during USAID pre-war involvement in Somalia was that true development cannot occur in a country whose host government has little or no legitimacy among its own constituents, let alone a sincere desire to support development activities. Channeling huge sums of development assistance into such countries is highly imprudent.

In late 1992, at the height of the humanitarian crisis which splashed images of starving children across the world's television screens, Somalia became the "test case" in the "new world order" and the international community again committed itself to contributing massive sums of financial and human resources to Somalia. From 1992-94, the U.S. spent more than \$310 million on humanitarian assistance (excluding military expenditures related to humanitarian efforts). Although U.S. and other donor contributions certainly resulted in large numbers of lives saved and a generally improved humanitarian situation, the massive external inputs ultimately failed to turn the tide of Somalia's demise and pockets of serious humanitarian need still arise across Somalia today.

Perhaps the most significant lesson we have learned is that "bigger is not always better." Huge sums have not helped alleviate the root problems in Somalia and may even have, to some extent, exacerbated tensions among rival groups inside the country. Great concentration of resources has more often than not led to increased competition over control and manipulation of these resources. Carefully designed and targeted, relatively low-cost interventions can, on the other hand, have a positive impact at the grassroots level, which may eventually lead to a generally improved environment for development to take place. It is this strategy, taking to heart previous lessons learned, that USAID/Somalia is adapting. In the meantime, the fundamental responsibility for reconciliation and recovery in Somalia lies with the Somalis themselves. The international community can assist in this process, following meaningful Somali initiatives, but it cannot take the lead and impose solutions.

III. PROGRAM RATIONALE

A. U.S. Foreign Policy Interest in Somalia

Until the Somali people form a legitimate, broad-based national government, our primary foreign policy objectives are twofold - to prevent another humanitarian crisis and to ensure that continuing instability in Somalia does not spread to other countries of the Horn of Africa.

Humanitarian Interests: Preventing Another Crisis

The most important American interest in Somalia is humanitarian. We have an interest in providing humanitarian assistance when and where it is safe and possible to do so. It was our compassionate concern for the Somali people that led to the massive UNITAF relief operation in December, 1992. This intervention succeeded in ending the food emergency and saving tens of thousands of lives - the most positive legacy of the international community's involvement. Nevertheless, Somalia is a chronic food deficit country and remains at risk of another crisis. So, we remain engaged on humanitarian issues not only to address the continued needs of the Somali people but also to guard against another crisis that might again require massive international intervention. In this way, we hope to alleviate the most serious effects of the food deficit and ensure that we are in position to respond quickly to any deterioration in humanitarian conditions.

Realizing that successful reconstruction and development can only take place when there is greater stability in the country, we continue to urge the Somali factions to resolve their differences. We are disappointed at their failure to make any significant progress towards national political reconciliation. The U.S. has no desire to take a lead role in Somali political reconciliation efforts. This is something the Somalis themselves must do - outsiders can not do it for them.

Regional Stability: Preventing the Spread of Instability to Neighboring States

The U.S. has an interest in preventing the instability in Somalia from spreading to neighboring Horn of Africa countries. All of the contiguous countries - Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti - have been and are hosts to large numbers of Somalia refugees. Widespread inter-clan fighting and the ensuing famine in 1991-92 caused approximately one million Somalis to flee to neighboring countries, exacerbating tensions in some border areas. In 1992, fighting briefly spilled over into Kenya, when Siad Barre's forces fled across the border and General Aideed's men followed. Ethnic Somalis in neighboring countries have provided financial support and safehaven to their clansmen.

The continued absence of a national government in Somalia also creates an opportunity for groups hostile to western interests to operate. Already, both the Libyans and the Sudanese have made contacts with various Somali faction leaders and have established a diplomatic presence in Hussein Aideed-controlled South Mogadishu. More and more Somali communities have turned to Islamic Sharia courts and militia to provide law and order, and these courts are gradually expanding their authority into the political/security sphere. While this appears to be principally an indigenous movement to fill the vacuum in secular authority, there are worrisome reports that some Somali political and Sharia leaders are in contact with radical fundamentalist groups from other countries. The U.S. has an interest in monitoring developments in Somalia to ensure that the country does not become a base of operations for such groups.

U.S. Strategic/Economic Interests: Minimal

With the end of the Cold War, our national security interests in Somalia are minimal. We also have few economic interests in Somalia. Only three U.S. companies have ventured into the country since the civil war began - two telecommunications firms and one banana exporter. Their total investment is worth only an estimated \$20 million. Several U.S. oil companies conducted exploratory drilling in Somalia in the 1980s, and at least one still retains property and equipment in the country. None of these firms began production, however, and there is even less prospect they would be willing to do so as a result of continued insecurity in Somalia.

Conclusion

This strategy reaffirms the U.S. Government's commitment to assist Somalis where there is a secure environment for donor investments and a commitment by Somalis to their own development.

B. Customers

USAID/Somalia's customers are the poor and struggling lower and middle classes who are economically and socially disadvantaged and whose lives have been severely disrupted by the ongoing civil strife. These include refugees returning from neighboring countries as well as those who remained in Somalia through the years of conflict. Somalia poses both a unique challenge and opportunity for the consultative process. As there is no government, the U.S. Government must maintain a web of contacts across regions, clans/sub-clans, etc. in order to ascertain Somali needs and concerns while at the same time, provide no appearances of favoritism. This involves extensive travel in Somalia. However, the advantage of this process is a wider array of viewpoints than the U.S. might normally be exposed to.

For Strategic Objective 1, the customers are small-scale Somali farmers, small and micro-agribusinesses, cooperatives, and producer associations. For Strategic Objective 2, the customers are the poorest and most vulnerable in Somali society, particularly children and women of reproductive age, internally displaced persons (IDPs), recently returned refugees, marginalized rainfed farmers, the elderly and the disabled. For the Special Program Objective (SPO), the customers are local governing bodies, indigenous NGOs and their members and beneficiaries, small producers and micro entrepreneurs who can help generate employment.

Somalia is a devastated and desperately poor country and its needs far exceed the USG's capacity to address. In terms of sectoral focus, Somalis have expressed an interest for U.S. involvement across the spectrum. However, if there is one sector that generates more interest than any other, it is income generation. This strategy attempts to balance the overwhelming needs that Somalis have identified to USG staff with the limited resources with which we have to respond.

C. Other Partners

The GHAI refers to the need for "strategic donor coordination," a need which has certainly proven critical in the Somali context. Due to the problems attendant to UNOSOM, USAID/Somalia has played a significant role in forming with other donors the Somalia Aid Coordinating Body (SACB), a mechanism which has improved donor dialogue and given donors a greater ability to address coordination issues in a strategic and long-term manner. Through the SACB and bilaterally, USAID/Somalia plays an important part in defining the role of UN agencies in supporting both international and local NGOs in their efforts to be equal partners with the international community and in fashioning a "division of labor" among the donor community so as to avoid gaps in assistance.

D. Refugees

An estimated 430,300 Somali refugees are assisted by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in the Horn of Africa. Estimates are as follows:

Ethiopia: 280,000
Djibouti: 25,000
Kenya: 125,000

In addition to care, maintenance and protection programs in these countries of asylum, UNHCR provides cross border assistance in

the Juba Valley area to stabilize populations at risk of displacement due to unsettled economic and political conditions. It is also engaged in repatriation and reintegration assistance for refugees who wish to return home, both in Northwest Somalia and in the southern region.

Since the fall of Siad Barre in 1991, some 400,000 Somali refugees have returned to Northwest Somalia. In addition, some 153,000 have returned from Kenya. Some have returned with extensive assistance from UNHCR, while others have moved spontaneously, with partial assistance.

UNHCR expects that it will continue with care and maintenance, cross border aid, repatriation and reintegration activities in 1996/7. U.S. government support for these programs comes from the State Department Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration (State/PRM). The Somalia strategy seeks to better integrate USAID and PRM-supported UNHCR activities primarily by focusing on the potential complementarity between USAID activities and UNHCR's programs inside Somalia - that is, its "quick impact" reintegration and rehabilitation support provided both in returnee areas and in the Juba Valley area where it seeks to prevent further refugee outflows.

Assumptions

Northwest Somalia will remain relatively calm in 1997 and 1998, though still suffering from some armed clan clashes and from wartime devastation. Northwest Somalia authorities will seek to obtain as much reintegration aid as possible under the aegis of UNHCR. The existence of relatively secure areas in central and southern Somalia will allow for some repatriation from Kenya.

Repatriation

The U.S. policy position on encouraging progressive refugee return is contingent upon refugees' ability to go back to areas that are known to be relatively safe.

Pilot projects to repatriate 10,000 Somalis from Ethiopia and 1,000 Somalis from Djibouti to Northwest Somalia should get underway this year. UNHCR also hopes to repatriate 36,000 Somali refugees from Kenya into southern Somalia, as well. Provided that security conditions permit, PRM will continue to strongly encourage UNHCR to launch a more comprehensive repatriation project for the rest of the refugees in Ethiopia and Djibouti, to be completed by 1998. PRM would contribute to this effort, pending review of an acceptable UNHCR appeal.

In the southern region, PRM will continue to advocate for the progressive closure and consolidation of camps in Kenya. By the end of 1998, however, at least 50,000 Somali refugees are likely

to remain in these camps. PRM will continue (through FY98; estimated \$350,000 annually) to support the CARE program in the Dadaab refugee camps. Its program has important "capacity building" elements, including microenterprise activities that might facilitate reintegration back into Somalia and complement ongoing USAID and other activities inside the country.

Some 30-60 percent of refugees in the Ethiopia and Kenya camps are probably ethnic Somalis of Ethiopian and Kenyan origin, respectively. Ascertaining the true Somali nationals among the beneficiaries is difficult if not impossible to do and exacerbates the problems of camp closure, since many current beneficiaries have no interest in moving into Somalia. Most will likely try to obtain an initial repatriation package and then reintegrate back into local communities of Kenya or Ethiopia. State/PRM advocates the use of development resources in these resource-poor regions of Kenya and Ethiopia, to reduce poverty, increase food security and prevent future conflict over resources.

Reintegration

State/PRM also plans to support UNHCR reintegration projects during the initial stages of refugee return to Somalia. UNHCR's returnee/reintegration efforts are minimal, due to lack of funds. This seems to have had relatively little impact on the repatriation effort. PRM support will be directed at the most basic transportation, household-level returnee packages, and small-scale, community-based Quick Impact Projects (QIPs). The objectives of QIPs are to (a) accelerate the process of reintegration of returnees and displaced persons; (b) bring about stability to resident populations; and © to reduce the vulnerability of returnees and local communities. QIPs are implemented in such sectors as water, livestock/agricultural support, health and income-generating activities.

Linking Relief and Development

The complementarity between USAID and State/PRM resources within the context of this strategy is focused on areas of program overlap inside Somalia, rather than in refugee hosting countries. As will be discussed in the strategic objectives section, target populations will include returning refugees - for example those interested in pursuing farming in areas targeted under SO 1; and those requiring assistance with basic services as described under SO 2. In both circumstances, USAID and UNHCR (and other donors) need to carefully coordinate to assure that assistance provided by UNHCR under its rehabilitation programs or quick impact projects (to both returnees and IDPs) is not redundant to or in contradiction with USAID (or other donor) approaches in the same area. With UNHCR information on location of returnees, then parallel guidelines for project selection and implementation in

those areas among donors can be established. Ideally, UNHCR information would also include background on both the capacities and vulnerabilities of the returning groups. Within the context of this strategy, the USAID and UNHCR activities are most likely to overlap in southern Somalia. It must be stated that while USAID and State/PRM have conferred on the appropriate linkages between the USAID and State/PRM roles in Somalia, further consultations with UNHCR are needed will be undertaken during strategy implementation.

Chart

IV. PROPOSED STRATEGIC PLAN

A. Linkage to Agency Goals

This strategy fits directly under the Agency Goal of Humanitarian Assistance: "Lives saved, suffering reduced and development potential reinforced." The needs in Somalia, and thus the direction of our program, span the objectives under this agency goal - relief, prevention, and transition. At the height of the humanitarian crisis, relief was the largest component of our interventions. Now, however, parts of Somalia have moved away from a predominantly relief environment to one where rehabilitation can take place. So this program will seek to reinforce rehabilitation efforts when and where they are feasible. At the same time, pockets of highly vulnerable populations still exist and ongoing civil strife continues to make the relief component an integral part of our strategy. This "two-tiered approach" -- with relief and rehabilitation going on simultaneously -- enables us to meet critical needs of the most vulnerable while strengthening the capacity to engage in productive activities.

Productivity in Somalia requires rehabilitation of critical social and physical infrastructure as well as strengthened community capacity to meet their own needs. Inherent in these types of interventions is sustainability or, as stated in the Agency Goal, "development potential reinforced." This strategy intends to reinforce the development potential of Somalis through an emphasis on self-sufficiency at the community level. Given the fact that there is no national government and a continued vying for power among factions, there is certainly no assurance of long-term sustainability on a national scale. Therefore, the strategy will focus on sustainability at the grassroots level on a targeted basis where strengthened capacity for self-sufficiency can thrive despite temporary set-backs caused by civil strife.

Chart

B. Goal/Sub-goals

Goal: A less vulnerable, more self-sufficient population.

Subgoals: (1) Improved household food security
(2) Strengthened civil society

The ISP Team was tasked with developing a strategy for a two to three year period that strives towards an overarching goal of crisis prevention. With the limited human and financial resources that the USG has to commit to Somalia, the team concluded that it was not within the USG's capacity to prevent crisis and resolve conflict in Somalia. However, USG assistance can help support a modicum of stability so that Somalis can begin to rebuild and mitigate some of the worst effects of crisis.

In this vein, the goal, "A less vulnerable, more self-sufficient population", attempts to capture the co-existence and inter-relatedness of relief and rehabilitation. Thus, the relief component of our strategy ensures that vulnerable families are able to return as quickly as possible to productive lives, while rehabilitation efforts help to maintain and reinforce those productive activities. Of course, the ability to achieve the goal of a "less vulnerable, more self-sufficient population" is heavily dependent upon factors outside the scope of our activities the most important of which is insecurity.

In order to better articulate the relationship between the general security environment and specific program activities, the Team broke down the goal into two subgoals. Subgoal 1, "improved household food security," directly reflects reduced vulnerability and increased self-sufficiency. Subgoal 2, "strengthened civil society," emphasizes the critical role of a secure environment in the movement towards food security. The wording of the second sub-goal was carefully chosen. As outsiders, the USG can only support Somalis in their initiatives to restore civil society; we cannot undertake that task ourselves. Support is limited to "strengthening" in order to avoid repeating the mistakes of UNOSOM - endorsing leaders who later prove to be unrepresentative or financing salaries and benefits that are unsustainable in the long-term. Thus, efforts will be restricted to providing training and technical assistance in order to "strengthen" these indigenous emerging initiatives.

Indicators

1. Maintain pre-war [1982-1988] average crop production levels.
2. Maintain pre-war livestock export levels.
3. Increased immunization coverage.
4. Stable market prices for food.
5. Increased community contributions to services.

6. Increased number of local governing bodies providing services.

Maintain pre-war [1982-1988] average crop production levels. At first glance, it may seem odd that the ISP Team proposes to continue investing in the production side of food security with the intention of merely maintaining average levels of production. However, with the unpredictable and independent impacts of insecurity (e.g. General Aideed's September 1995 invasion of Baidoa and the subsequent decision of farmers not to plant in productive areas surrounding the town) and poor weather, reductions in production levels are a very real possibility. Furthermore, at the height of the development efforts in pre-war Somalia, it is not clear that substantial impacts were made in increasing production. Thus, at this time of reduced resources and given the short time frame of the strategy, the Team believes that maintaining average levels of crop production is the most we can realistically aspire to and stands the best chance of impacting Somalia's overall food security.

Maintain pre-war livestock export levels. The above reasoning also applies to livestock. In addition, some experts argue that the root problem of recent droughts and subsequent overgrazing in northern Somalia is a direct result of overpopulation in the livestock sector. If this is true, further increases in livestock numbers will contribute to an increased rate of desertification in the grazing lands, further reducing the environmental capacity to support livestock. In the absence of scientific environmental impact data (the EU is currently doing research in this area), the Team believes that maintaining livestock exports at average pre-war levels will give us a good indication that the livestock sector is thriving without contributing to its own demise.

Increased Immunization Coverage. This indicator is directly linked to the vulnerability of children under the age of five and women of childbearing age to preventable diseases. Increasing immunization coverage among these two target groups stands the best chance of bringing about an overall decline in morbidity and mortality.

Stable market prices for food. This indicator monitors fluctuations in food prices. Normal fluctuations indicate stable or declining vulnerability to food insecurity. Prices above the normal range indicate reduced access to foodstuffs and thus an increase in vulnerability.

Increased community contributions to services/number of local governing bodies providing services. These indicators show progress toward "strengthening civil society." The Team realizes that a strengthened civil society will have more illustrative impacts at the people-level. However, at this time, there is no transparency in community-level structures that would enable us

to develop indicators that could measure conflict prevention and resolution efforts.

Assumptions

The Team based this strategy on the following assumptions, anticipating no major changes within the next two to three years. Of course, a major change in any one of the following assumptions would have a significant impact and would require a reconsideration of the strategy.

1. Continued political rationale for USG engagement in Somalia.
2. No national government.
3. Sporadic outbreaks of armed conflict and continued vying for power among clans/factions.
4. Security and weather conditions will continue to be major driving forces for food security.
5. Limited or non-existent physical infrastructure.
6. Limited internal and external resources.
7. Continued pockets of vulnerable groups requiring external assistance.
8. Continued influence of Sharia Law, particularly in the security sphere.
9. Small-scale private sector expansion.
10. Sporadic outbreaks of fighting or food insecurity will cause some population displacement but no new large-scale outflow of refugees.
11. Pockets of stability will allow for repatriation on a modest scale of existing refugees.

C. Strategic Objectives

In developing the strategic objectives (SOs), the Team struggled most with balancing focus versus flexibility. During the height of the crisis in Somalia in the early 1990's, program flexibility provided the greatest degree of impact, allowing our partners to respond to needs as they became apparent (e.g. quick impact, employment-generating activities that gave people the economic boost needed to resume productive activities). Now that many parts of Somalia have moved away from the critical emergency stage to a rehabilitation stage and the decreased levels of assistance available, the Team believes the emphasis should shift to a more focused approach, allowing for measurable results within well-defined sectors. However, the volatility of the situation in Somalia continues to mandate flexibility in the approach to the sectors chosen. Our partners must have the flexibility to operate around the constraints that the security environment may create. Therefore, this strategy's objectives specify either "target areas" or "targeted populations."

Vulnerability is a function of political targeting and social organization, so the politics of vulnerability need to be analyzed and the "winners" and "losers" need to be identified. In his review of this integrated strategic plan, John Prendergast recommends that donors do assessments of political vulnerability in order to better identify vulnerable groups as well as more appropriate assistance responses. The Team is intrigued by this concept and suggests that under the rubric of the GHAI, further research in this area be done (see also Programming Options, Implementation Issues) so such an approach can be tested in Somalia.

The Team also believes that the USG must capitalize on the opportunities presented by emerging or re-emerging local organizations in order to increase Somali capacity to bring about their own development, not only as an explicit objective but as an underlying theme throughout this strategic plan (see Development Constraints and Opportunities section).

An important tool recommended by Mr. Prendergast that will be explored by the Mission is the use of a "social contract" to enhance sustainability. A "social contract" involves a consultative process between donors/implementing organizations and the beneficiary community that identifies the roles and responsibilities of each, including the willingness of the community to make the proposed activity a priority that they are willing to contribute to, either in-kind or monetarily.

Two sectors suggested by John Prendergast were demining and demobilization. Demobilization, in particular, struck the team as a critical factor in preventing crisis over the long-term. However, the Team was concerned that it was not within our manageable interest to explicitly address demobilization through a separate SO. USAID has previous experience with demining through a \$3 million demining program in northwest Somalia that barely scratched the surface of the mine problem. While mines are certainly remains a problem in the northwest, the Team did not see them as an overwhelming barrier to food security there or elsewhere. The Team believes the demining arena is best left to a donor with greater resources and more interest in a longer term rehabilitation program in the northwest. That said, the Team agrees with Mr. Prendergast the ex-militia can be assisted as customers through the chosen SOs/SPO.

chart

Strategic Objective 1: Improved foundation for food crop production in target areas

Intermediate Results (IR):

1. Improved agricultural infrastructure
2. Increased availability of agricultural inputs and services for farmers

a. Analysis of Problem/Identification of Customers

SO1 reflects USG commitment to food security and, more specifically, agricultural production. Starting with a broad statement: "improved household food security in target areas", the ISP Team quickly realized that the resources at the USG's disposal placed this objective beyond an achievable scope. Nor did the Team feel that USAID/Somalia could be held accountable for increasing actual food production. Not only are there many variables outside our control, there are many critical interventions we are unable to undertake given current resource levels. However, the Mission feels it can impact and take responsibility for improving the foundation for increased food crop production - namely agricultural infrastructure and availability of inputs and services - which in turn stands a good chance of positively influencing production levels.

While narrowing the focus of this objective to concentrate on improving the foundation for increased production, the Team has also kept the objective somewhat broad in terms of geographical coverage in order to allow our implementing partners room to adapt their programs to changes in the security situation in crop producing areas. For the past six years, the main agricultural zones in the inter-riverine area of southern Somalia have been subjected to intermittent outbreaks of violence, often leading to temporary suspension of program activities. Thus, in the interest of flexibility, this SO retains programming options in the event of insecurity while, in the interest of focus, provides limits by qualifying "in target areas" as well as through our list of specific activities and indicators.

Finally, the target groups are not explicitly identified in this SO. In order to most effectively respond to the changing needs and situations in Somalia, we must rely on timely assessments by our experts in the field, specifically the Food Security Assessment Unit (FSAU)/Famine Early Warning System (FEWS). Target groups are likely to change as a result of unforeseen events and flexibility in identifying these groups and designing appropriate interventions to suit the unique circumstances must be maintained. Furthermore, groups targeted in this SO may or may not be the same groups targeted in SO2. One potential source of customers under this SO are returnees, particularly from Kenya, who wish to return to farming. While the Team felt that assistance for ex-militia could not be addressed explicitly as an

SO, clearly demobilized militia could be targeted under this SO for assistance.

b. Indicators

While the Team understands that indicators need to reflect people-level results, in some cases, we simply cannot get to that level yet. While there is a data available in some sectors and some areas of Somalia, accurate, effective information systems are not in place. Given the limited capacity of our implementing partners, the burden would be too great, if not impossible, to require them to implement detailed monitoring systems immediately. During the time frame of this strategic plan, we will try to establish such systems.

Indicators under SO1:

1. Area planted
2. Area harvested
3. Yield

Indicators under IR1 Improved agricultural infrastructure:

1. Number of farmers benefiting from x kilometers of secondary roads rehabilitated
2. Number of farmers benefitting from x hectares of land cleared
3. Number of farmers benefitting from x kilometers of irrigation canals rehabilitated
4. Number of farmers benefitting from x berkads (water catchments) rehabilitated
5. Number of farmers benefitting from x kilometers of river banks protected

Indicators under IR2 Increased availability of agricultural inputs and services for farmers:

1. Number of farmers using appropriate types and quantities of seeds for their production requirements
2. Number of farmers using appropriate types and quantities of tools for their production requirements
3. Number of farmers implementing improved agricultural techniques

c. Activities/Illustrative Approaches

Activities under this SO will be supported by a combination of food for work, monetization, disaster assistance, and development assistance. Under IR1, activities will include rehabilitation of irrigation canals and other water catchments, rehabilitation of farm-to-market (secondary) roads, and land clearing. Under IR2, activities will include farmer education, extension work, and

provision of inputs (seeds, tools, fuel). Such activities will be used to bring rainfed and irrigated land back under cultivation, to rehabilitate irrigation canals and rural feeder roads, to desilt water catchment areas, and to provide seeds and tools. Various UN agencies and NGOs will continue to undertake extension work, from advising during the clearing and planting stage to training in the use of fertilizers and improved agricultural techniques. In addition, UNHCR's short-term assistance packages offer opportunities for promoting agricultural production amongst returnees.

d. Critical Assumptions/Causal Relationship

The Team considered a higher level SO of increasing crop production or household food security. In order to achieve results under such SOs, the Team would have had to make assumptions that are unrealistic in the Somali environment: (1) insecurity would not prevent our partners from implementing programs in or hindering access to the agricultural regions; (2) rains would be favorable and severe drought would not occur; and (3) pests would not be a problem or be taken care of by another donor. Even at this level, the Team is concerned that the first assumption about security will still impede our ability to achieve results. So the Team narrowed the focus on "target areas" so not to rely on an optimistic assumption about security.

Important to the achievement of this SO is progress made under SO2 and the SPO. As localized emergencies arise, populations must first have their critical needs met (SO2) in order to resume productive activities (SO1). For productive activities to be sustainable, there must exist the community capacity to enter into a social contract with donors, provide services and meet community needs, as well as the ability to generate income (SPO).

There exist other intermediate results necessary for the achievement of this SO but which are not within our manageable interests. We are assuming these other results will continue to be pursued by other donors (for instance, EU in the livestock and fisheries sectors). Through the success of non-USAID programs, progress toward our strategic objective will be furthered.

e. Commitment/Capacity of Other Partners

Other donors and implementing partners are committed to increasing crop production. EU is the largest donor in the agricultural sector, funding production activities as well as research, extension, and seed multiplication. Results which complement our SO but are undertaken by other donors include: livestock/fisheries (EU), pest control (USAID AELGA Project, FAO and UNDP), and research/seed multiplication (EU). UNHCR supports reintegration programs and QIPs. Implementing agencies are willing to expand their activities in the field should the need

arise; most groups are constrained more by funding than by implementing capability.

f. Sustainability

Sustainability of this SO is difficult to articulate. The Team believes that sustainability in standard USAID usage (i.e. ability to maintain these agricultural activities in the long-term), is not possible in a country lacking governmental structures where no taxation system exists through which to finance and maintain integral infrastructure. We are exploring possibilities of introducing cost-recovery schemes in canal rehabilitation, though potential for success is not promising given the historical pattern of not having to pay for water. Instead of tackling the issue of sustainability in the larger sense, the Team has chosen to focus on increasing the individual farmer's knowledge and practices of maintaining certain infrastructure or adopting certain cropping practices. Even though all USAID/Somalia rehabilitation efforts are aimed at reinforcing sustainable development principles, farmer knowledge and practices is as close as we can realistically get to program sustainability.

chart

Strategic Objective 2: Critical needs met for targeted vulnerable groups

Intermediate Results:

1. Improved ability to identify vulnerable groups
2. Timely delivery of appropriate food commodities
3. Increased availability of health services
4. Increased number of potable water sources and sanitation services

In order to achieve this SO, USAID must get the right assistance to the right people at the right time. Intermediate results are difficult to define in cases of relief interventions aimed at meeting critical needs. The Team has, however, attempted to outline as much as possible instances when we may have some influence over intermediate results.

IR1 Improved ability to identify vulnerable groups: The needs of vulnerable groups are fluid and so effective information systems are essential in identifying and targeting such populations. Structured information gathering and assessment units, such as the FSAU/FEWS, must be strengthened and, perhaps more importantly, local staff of implementing partners in the field must be trained in identification skills in order to achieve SO2. Political and social dynamics must be factored in. However, it is here where we run into difficulty vis-a-vis the standard USAID strategic framework. Actually, "identification of vulnerable groups" could be a tool required to achieve SO2, not an intermediate result. Therefore, without belaboring the point of whether this is classified as a result or an activity, the ISP Team recognizes the need to include improved information systems under SO2 in one form or another.

IR2 Timely delivery of appropriate food commodities: Emergency food assistance is critical to achieving SO2. However, the provision of food is not enough - it must be the right kind of food to the right population in a timely manner in order for it to be effective. Clearly, the steps necessary to achieve provision of food assistance are, to a large extent, outside the control of our implementing partners. For example, overall commodity availability is determined by USDA. Proposals are reviewed and approved in USAID or implementing partner headquarters - a system which can slow response time. Security issues mandate where commodities may be stored (i.e. outside Somalia in neighboring country ports). Delivery systems are heavily influenced by security and physical infrastructure (severely limited in Somalia). Commodity ordering constraints and security issues may make it impossible to deliver a complete food basket based on nutritional adequacy. Despite these factors, the Team has chosen to include food assistance as an IR because it is obviously an integral part of SO2. Therefore, IR2 will be based on our food basket composition and our delivery

rate as defined by timely assessed needs, actual commodity availability, and realistic assessments of access.

IR3 Increased availability of health services: It is under the health component of S02 there is the strongest marriage of relief and rehabilitation. Provision of basic health care services is an obvious ingredient in meeting critical needs of vulnerable groups. At the same time, many of the health care activities underway in Somalia today have moved beyond the classic emergency phase of providing emergency surgical services and acute care to war wounded, emergency immunization campaigns, etc. (although some of these activities still do occur in response to localized emergencies). Many current day health activities center around support to primary health care systems: training of community health workers (CHWs) and traditional birth attendants (TBAs); supply and supervision of maternal child health (MCH) centers, out-patient dispensaries (OPDs), and village health posts; and ongoing expanded program in immunization (EPI). Therefore, while provision of health services under S02 will address the critical needs of vulnerable groups as crises emerge (relief), some of these same health services will also address the basic health needs of less vulnerable Somalis and will attempt to strengthen the foundation for an expanded health care delivery system at some point in the future. An expanded health care delivery system will also improve utilization of the food resources we provide. Furthermore, it is important to recognize that the health status of most Somalis, in general, is quite tenuous; many move quickly from a non-vulnerable state to a vulnerable state if an element of crisis is introduced. The needs in the health sector are tremendous. However, USAID/Somalia does not have sufficient resources available to expand the current health network. The Mission will concentrate on expanding the level and quality of service being provided through the current network (limited as it may be) of health facilities. Emphasis will be placed on training and strengthening outreach.

IR4 Increased number of potable water sources and sanitation: Much of the same argument presented above applies to IR4 as well. In other words, increased number of potable water sources and sanitation services, while essential to meeting critical needs of vulnerable groups, will also benefit non-vulnerable people in target areas. Results of these water and sanitation interventions, therefore, will alleviate the immediate plight of vulnerable groups, improve health and hygiene conditions, and improve the utilization of household food resources for the wider population as well.

a. Analysis of Problem/Identification of Customers

Although the severe emergency conditions prevalent in the early '90s have dissipated, Somalia continues to experience episodic humanitarian crises. Significant numbers of vulnerable groups

remain in need of external assistance to meet their basic human needs. Because of the unpredictable nature of Somalia today, the numbers of vulnerable groups can increase exponentially with little or no warning as a result of sudden outbreaks of fighting leading to population displacement. Other forms of crisis among vulnerable groups are less sudden, but just as devastating, such as crop failure among subsistence farmers or the inability to access income/employment among the urban poor. SO2 seeks to provide the necessary urgent responses to these crises, while at the same time laying the groundwork for more lasting rehabilitation efforts. In addition, SO2 aims to improve the ability to quickly and accurately identify specific needs of vulnerable populations in order to design and implement timely and appropriate interventions.

This SO poses a challenge to the development and emergency categorizations traditionally used at both the Mission and Agency levels. Somalia is a "transition country." It is neither in the throes of complete crisis, nor is it prepared for sustainable development. The strategy, therefore, must reflect the reality and need for both relief and rehabilitation activities to proceed in an inter-related, simultaneous fashion. In general terms, while SO1 focuses on the rehabilitation side of our strategy, SO2 focuses on the relief side. The SPO captures the need to begin to build up Somali capacity to take care of themselves. However, it has become apparent that a strategic objective centering around emergency relief interventions does not fit neatly into the standard USAID development strategic planning framework.

On the other hand, we recognize that Somalia is no longer a traditional/pure emergency country. Short-term, rapid response emergency interventions have largely given way to longer term, protracted emergency responses, which may not necessarily be aimed at saving lives threatened with imminent danger of death but instead maintaining a minimal level of critical services in order to avoid a return to crisis. We call this the "maintenance mode" and to a large extent, this is the predominant mode of implementing partners in Somalia today. The Team recognizes that in the protracted emergency situation in Somalia, some degree of strategic planning of largely relief-oriented interventions is actually possible and advisable. Our challenge has been in fitting our relief objectives into standard USAID parlance of intermediate results and indicators. We are attempting to break new ground and bring more rational, strategic thinking into our relief responses while at the same time maintaining the obvious flexibility necessary to respond to unfolding critical needs.

An additional difficulty with this SO is the issue of time frame. We cannot realistically expect to achieve systematic results over a finite period of time. Until such time as Somalis themselves can provide at least a basic level of social services, vulnerable Somalis will continue to be in need of international assistance

to meet their critical needs. We must be prepared to assist in order to avoid a return to the widespread humanitarian crisis of the early '90s. Therefore, under SO2, we will not be able to reflect a systematic progression in one direction over time; there are likely to be setbacks along the way.

The customers under SO2 are not a static population. As localized emergencies arise, different populations will be affected, some more acutely than others. And as noted earlier in this section, factoring in political vulnerability is particularly critical in both identifying vulnerable populations as well as appropriate responses. Although the situation is bound to be fluid, experience in Somalia tells us that among the most particularly vulnerable in any crisis are children, women, displaced persons, and returning refugees. The nutritional status of young children and pregnant women can deteriorate rapidly in times of stress, leaving these groups particularly vulnerable to life-threatening diseases. Displaced persons, who have been forced from their homes and separated from their productive assets, are vulnerable. Recently returned refugees, who have not yet been able to reestablish themselves in productive activities, are vulnerable. Subsistence farmers, who are not able to save enough of the food they grow to last between harvests and lack the purchasing power to buy food on the market, are vulnerable. All of these groups are potential customers. Furthermore, with respect to customers, our two SOs are closely linked. In some instances, customers under SO2 may be the same customers served under SO1. For example, if a farming community supported by SO1 suffers a crop failure, this group could quickly revert to vulnerable status, requiring assistance under SO2 to enable them to resume productive lives. Finally, it must be understood that SO2 will serve first and foremost direct customers - vulnerable groups - but will also serve indirect beneficiaries - not necessarily the most vulnerable groups - namely through increased health, water and sanitation services.

b. Indicators

Defining indicators under SO2 is as difficult as defining intermediate results. Since we do not yet know what emergency needs will require our intervention, we cannot quantify the numbers of people who will be assisted or what the appropriate levels of assistance will be. We have tried, however, to fit as best an indication as possible into the standard USAID strategic framework. The specific numerical figures will have to be filled in as events unfold and specific interventions are designed. Furthermore, the difficulty of defining indicators is exacerbated by a limited supply of data. We simply do not have morbidity and mortality statistics for example. The Team, therefore, attempted to outline indicators which can realistically be measured.

Indicators under SO2:

1. declining acute malnutrition rates during the emergency.
2. X percent of target beneficiaries receiving emergency health services.
3. X number of beneficiaries attending primary health care units.
4. X number of beneficiaries receiving water and sanitation services

Indicators under IR1 Improved ability to identify vulnerable groups:

1. identification of most vulnerable population by cooperating sponsors within 30 days.
2. increased percentage of counterpart proposals based on structured information gathering and assessment.

Indicators under IR2 Timely delivery of appropriate food commodities:

1. 80% of agreed-upon commodity baskets delivered.
2. USAID/W reviews and provides feedback on draft emergency proposals.

Indicators under IR3 Increased availability of health services:

1. x number of people served by trained health workers
2. x number of people assisted by emergency medical interventions.

Indicators under IR4 Increased number of potable water sources and sanitation services:

1. x number of people served by chlorinated wells
2. x number of people served per water source
3. x number of people served per latrine

c. Activities/Illustrative Approaches

Activities under this SO will be supported by a combination of disaster, food and development assistance and will be implemented through UN agencies and NGOs. UNHCR assistance packages for returnees may also help to reduce vulnerability.

Illustrative Activities under IR1:

1. Training in performance of rapid assessments and surveys, reporting, monitoring, and evaluation techniques.
2. Strengthening of management information systems (i.e., health information system).

3. Continued support for the Food Security Assessment Unit (FSAU), of which the Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) is an integral part, collects, compiles and disseminates information on the status of Somalis by region and sector. The FSAU also conducts crop assessments to assist in determining the state of food security in Somalia.
4. Development of political vulnerability assessments.
5. The UNDOS Documentation Unit has developed an extensive data bank of information on Somalia.
6. Continued support for UNICEF, WHO, UNDOS and NGO collaboration in the development of a new Health Information System (HIS) to manage health data.

Illustrative Activities under IR2:

1. Emergency feeding programs for vulnerable groups (supplementary feeding for moderately malnourished and therapeutic for severely malnourished).
2. General dry ration distribution to displaced persons.
3. Resettlement package for returning refugees (general rations for 3 months).

Illustrative Activities under IR3:

1. Collaboration exists in the health sector between UNICEF, WHO, UNDOS, and NGOs. Overall guidelines and standards have been established by UNICEF, in consultation with donors and other implementing partners.
2. Emergency medical (surgery, acute care) for war wounded; in and out-patient treatment (cholera).
3. Rehabilitation, supply (drugs, equipment, staff) and supervision of MCH centers, OPDs, and village health posts.
4. Immunizations (emergency campaigns or ongoing EPI activities).
5. Training of CHWs, TBAs and other primary health care providers.
6. Health education and outreach.

Illustrative Activities under IR4:

1. Rehabilitate shallow wells, boreholes, and water yards.
2. Chlorinate wells (cholera prevention).
3. Construct and/or rehabilitate latrines.
4. Training in sanitation and hygiene.

d. Critical Assumptions/Causal Relationship

Clearly, there are a number of "critical needs." The ISP Team tried to focus on those that were particularly important for improving food security. The first step in meeting critical needs is identifying the vulnerable population. Although the provision of food assistance is often needed to enhance food

security, in itself it is often not enough. Good nutrition, water and sanitation are equally important so that the food provided will be better utilized.

In order to achieve results under SO2, access to emergency areas must remain open. Areas like Baidoa have been virtually off-limits to the international community despite unconfirmed reports of critical humanitarian needs. In order to effectively meet the needs of vulnerable groups, USAID must first be able to access an area in order to assess and identify these groups and move supplies into the affected area, and for security to remain operational throughout the crisis (although staying on the ground is not necessarily a requirement to meeting the needs).

There is not necessarily a relationship between success under this SO and a general decrease in numbers of vulnerable groups. It does not necessarily follow that, having met critical needs of one target group, there will be less need in general. USAID intends to continue meeting critical needs, which most often result from insecurity or unfavorable weather, as these needs arise. At the same time, once critical needs of a target group are met and these people are able to resume productive lives, USAID intends to strengthen the capacity of these Somali communities to cope with future crises and meet their own needs (SO1 and SPO).

e. Commitment/Capacity of Other Partners

The major donor in Somalia, the EU, currently has about the same level of emergency resources earmarked for Somalia as USAID. However, programming of these emergency funds is complicated by EU's classification of Somalia as a "development country." Thus, the EU may lack flexibility in their ability to utilize both emergency and development resources in the same place at the same time. Several other bi-lateral donors (British, Italians, Dutch) are responding to both emergency and rehabilitation needs in Somalia, although overall funding levels are quite low.

There are a number of implementing partners working in Somalia with a commitment to address critical needs. NGOs, such as Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF), Action Internationale contre la Faim (AICF), and International Medical Corps (IMC), have a largely emergency-oriented mandate. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the foremost emergency response agency, remains actively engaged in Somalia. Several United Nations agencies, such as UNICEF, WHO, and WFP, have revised their operational mechanisms to incorporate emergency response capabilities. UNHCR also supports reintegration programs and quick impact projects. These partners have had varying degrees of success in their ability to meet needs of critical groups with insecurity and lack of access as the biggest obstacle. UN agencies are currently restricted from assigning international

staff to areas deemed off-limits by the U.N. Security Office in New York. Unfortunately, these areas are often the sites of greatest need.

In the health, water and sanitation sectors, commitment among donors and implementing partners remains strong. Coordination has been excellent among most active agencies. With the EU's lead, the process is underway to formalize coordination in the health sector. The UN spearheads coordination in the water sector. Coordination of food assistance is taking place through the Food Security Task Force, a group of donors and agencies currently headed by the World Food Programme (WFP) that deals regularly with food aid issues.

f. Sustainability

Most emergency interventions are not intended to be sustainable. However, in the protracted emergency case of Somalia, many interventions have been going on for long enough now to incorporate essential elements of capacity-building and cost-sharing/recovery which ultimately contribute to sustainability. Much of the focus of health activities, for instance, is on training. The health sector has been only marginally successful in introducing very minimal fee-for-service mechanisms to recuperate a tiny fraction of operating expenses. Several water well rehabilitation projects, on the other hand, have been quite successful in introducing a cost-recovery component and these systems are now able to sustain themselves after the completion of international agency inputs. However, given the extremely limited purchasing power of the majority of Somalis (due to lack of employment/income-generation opportunities), and the general dearth of trained professionals, we simply cannot entertain unrealistic notions of the potential for sustainability in social service sectors. The Mission is committed to doing whatever it can, however small it may seem, to increasing community capacity (SPO) in order to better meet their own critical needs. However, the ISP Team recognized that significant external inputs will be required from the international community in order to meet critical needs in Somalia for the foreseeable future. Sustainability in the social service sectors is, in essence, a luxury the USG cannot afford to guarantee and the Somalis are not likely to achieve on their own in the time frame of this strategy.

chart

SPO Increased Community Capacity to Meet Their Own Needs

The ISP Team defined "community" in this SPO as encompassing nascent governing bodies, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector.

Intermediate Results:

1. Increased capacity of local administrative structures to provide services
2. Increased institutional capacity of indigenous NGOs to meet community needs
3. Increased capacity to generate income

The ISP Team has purposely not included conflict resolution as an explicit IR under this SPO. The reality is that Somalia remains a deeply fragmented society and political reconciliation is likely still a long way off. Viable partners with whom to interface on substantive conflict resolution interventions do not currently exist. Positive results, therefore, are unlikely.

That said, the Team has determined that the best way to prevent conflict is to build up Somali capacity to deal with these issues themselves. The Prendergast report identified a number of local level civil society initiatives that may be worth supporting that do not go against our foreign policy objective of letting the Somalis resolve their own political problems.

We remain hopeful that opportunities will arise over the next three years, and if so we will certainly try to take advantage of them, but at this point we do not see that as sufficient to warrant a separate, stand-alone IR. Finally, it is important to note that the Team recognizes the fundamental importance of conflict resolution in the Somalia context and will make concerted efforts to integrate conflict resolution themes and approaches into all aspects of Mission-supported interventions.

a. Analysis of Problem/Identification of Customers

Since the fall of the Siad Barre regime, Somalia has had no central government and has come to be referred to as a "failed state". There is no uniformity to the security situation throughout the country. In some areas, there is a constant ebb and flow of violence, while other areas have experienced relative peace for extended periods of time. The primary security threat in all areas of Somalia comes from indiscriminate banditry and looting, perpetuated by the extremely high prevalence of arms in the country and the lack of legitimate employment/income-generation activities.

As a result of ongoing civil strife and lack of civil structures, basic municipal services in most areas have either declined

sharply or have ceased to exist entirely. In most areas, water and sanitation systems are inoperable; health and education services are minimal or non-existent; roads are in disrepair; and port and airport facilities have deteriorated. Furthermore, no officially recognized judicial/penal system is in place and police protection is limited, although there is a movement towards Sharia law in some parts of the country. However, in some parts of the country rudimentary local administrations have been formed. A few of these administrations have met with some degree of success in restoring and providing basic services to their citizenry. However, most of these local administrative structures (LAS) have little or no experience with the work they are trying to undertake nor do they possess the resources to accomplish their tasks. Many are literally starting from scratch.

In addition to the breakdown of public sector functions and services, non-governmental activities and institutions have also been discontinued or destroyed. Traditional societal coping mechanisms, which undertook functions outside the realm of government, have also eroded. However, the vacuum produced by the war and its aftermath, have provided room for genuine local initiatives to emerge.

In the absence of a public sector, the private sector naturally takes on added importance. The Team has narrowed its focus in the private sector to micro/small scale entrepreneurs. We do not have adequate financial or human resources to support medium or large scale enterprises. Furthermore, larger scale entities that do exist already have access to other sources of support and can more or less fend for themselves. The private sector, in general, is largely constricted by the lack of capital and the absence of an official banking system. But has thrived in the absence of regulation and taxation.

Employment generation opportunities are severely limited. Because income is such an integral part of food security, particularly in urban areas, it is crucial that employment and income generation activities be initiated. As mentioned earlier, the Team believes that such income generation activities play to the strength of the Somalis - their innate entrepreneurial spirit. However, because substantial income generation interventions require more resources than are currently available, the Team concluded that it is not within our manageable ability to undertake as a SO. In addition, private sector initiatives, such as employment/income generation, are a new area for the Mission and we are uncertain what results could be achieved. Finally, the underlying issue here is capacity building; communities must have the wherewithal to meet their own needs. The strengthening of the private sector is important because unless Somalis are pursuing productive activities, there will be no resources with which to meet their own needs.

In summary, the normal components of a viable civil society have been destroyed in Somalia by poor governance under the previous regime, five years of humanitarian crisis, armed conflict, banditry and looting. The public, private and NGO sectors desperately need revitalization. This revitalization is what this SPO seeks to address. The ISP Team has opted to make this an SPO rather than an SO because the institutions/organizations in Somalia are nascent and it is uncertain whether measurable results can be achieved in a three year period. Clearly, the importance of moving Somalis towards self-sufficiency outweigh the risk of limited measurable results.

b. Indicators

Indicators under IR1 Increased capacity of local administrative structures to provide services:

1. Increase revenue collection by X percent
2. X number of local administration staff trained in management

Indicators under IR2 Increased institutional capacity of indigenous NGOs to meet community needs:

1. X Number of NGOs and groups trained in management.
2. X percent increase in the Organization Development Index scores (CARE Index).
3. X number of NGOs receiving technical training.

Indicators under IR3 Increased capacity to generate income:

1. X number of graduates of vocational training
2. X number of loan recipients
3. Value of loans

c. Activities/Illustrative Approaches

1. Continued support of an NGO umbrella activity with a focus on capacity building of indigenous NGOs, such as training in financial management, administration, organizational development, and strategic planning
2. Technical assistance and training in financial management, design and evaluation of the provision of basic services, and revenue generation schemes for LAS.
3. Second trained personnel from the Somali diaspora to work within the LAS.
4. Develop an umbrella matching grant that could provide very small inputs and technical assistance to civic organizations and the LAS.
5. Pilot vocational training and micro-enterprise activities through NGOs. Carefully targeted, small-scale income generating activities to stimulate the private sector, including vocational training and credit.

d. Critical Assumptions/Causal Relationship

The Team anticipates that there will continue to be no central government for the foreseeable future. It is also assumed that in some parts of the country, embryonic, rudimentary LAS will continue to be formed and function. The Team also assumes that in some areas, traditional clan animosities will be overcome and that the political, legal and social environment will allow NGOs to operate relatively unimpeded.

e. Commitment/Capacity of Other Partners

There are a host of partners who are excited by the prospects of working with the LAS within Somalia and who are committed to initiatives directed at their development. These partners include the United Nations Development Programme, the EU, and the Italian and Swedish Governments. Each of these partners has contributed financial resources to carry out LAS strengthening activities, sustaining the momentum in the LAS sector through 1997. With some demonstrable successes, it is anticipated that donor support will continue well beyond this date. The EU is also committed to NGO activities and the reemergence of private entrepreneurs.

f. Sustainability

Assuming stability, LAS should be able to increase revenue collection, thereby improving the chance of sustainability. Income generating activities should also, if well-managed and successful, be able to attain sustainability. The sustainability of Somali NGOs is more problematic, given their current dependence in many cases on outside support for their existence. However, given the success of CARE and others in working with this target group, there is a reasonable prospect for the sustainability of a core group of Somali NGOs.

V. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS AND PROGRAMMING OPTIONS

A. Resources

Program

The strategy is "integrated" not just in terms of staff participation in developing it but also by integrating the different "pots" of resources the USG has to achieve the SOs/SPO outlined. Any adjustment under an SO may impact on the ability to achieve that particular SO and a commensurate increase in the other "pots" may be required. Consistent with the parameters provided, the strategy assumes program resources at the following levels:

- \$4.0 million in development assistance (DFA/DA)
- \$6.0 million in disaster assistance (OFDA)
- \$5.5 million in P.L. 480 Title II food aid (FFP)

Both OFDA and FFP resource levels are estimates which will be adjusted based on actual scenarios which produce appropriate emergency response proposals which are within funding guidelines. In addition, State/PRM contributions to UNHCR in FY 1997 will equal approximately \$5 million and in FY 1998 approximately \$2 million. In 1996, State/PRM contributed \$5.5 million to UNHCR's Horn of Africa Appeal, part of which was intended for the repatriation/reintegration of Somalis from Kenya and Ethiopia.

In the parameter setting process, the Team was encouraged to explore the use of 116(e), self-help funds, Title II development resources, and GHAI resources so long as the proposed activities were consistent with the GHAI programming principles. The Mission, with the State Somalia Watcher, will review the use of 116(e) and self-help funds to support conflict prevention activities but are concerned about the management intensiveness of such grants. On the Title II Development resources, the Mission staff concluded that it did not have the capacity to manage such a program. In addition, the operating environment, particularly in the agricultural areas of Somalia, is too unpredictable for one of our NGO partners to develop a multi-year program. However, the Mission is greatly interested in the prospects of a Title II "transitional assistance" program as was alluded to in the parameters session reporting cable. Finally, the Mission is interested in GHAI resources particularly as it would relate to returnees and conflict prevention and will be working with the GHAI staff in REDSO as opportunities present themselves. In addition, the Team recommends GHAI resources for harmonizing vulnerability assessment methodologies in the region (see Implementation Issues section).

Operating Expense (O.E.)

USAID/Somalia is already at the bare bones in terms of squeezing the OE budget. Travel expenses, which should be expected to be high because of the Mission's location outside of Somalia, are actually very low, since Mission personnel are allowed to fly free on WFP and UNICEF flights. If this free flight situation should change and Mission personnel are charged for their passage, then Mission OE expenses could increase dramatically. Therefore, the Mission needs a straightlined or only slightly declining OE budget to accomplish this strategy.

Staffing Mix

In order to achieve the results intended, a minimum of 4 staff persons in the USAID/Somalia Mission on a permanent basis and short-term staff person for MER will be required. This same number will be needed even if the SPO is dropped.

(a) One Full-Time Position: An AID Representative spends considerable time traveling in Somalia. While time-consuming, it is unavoidable, if we are to know what is happening on the ground and to help monitor U.S. progress towards achievement of the strategy. In addition, the AID Representative must devote an enormous amount of time to donor coordination, especially with the SACB, which meets 2-3 times per week. There are also a tremendous number of meetings with implementing partners and customers. With a joint strategy, coordination time spent with the Somalia Watcher and the Refugee Coordinator will also need to increase and that burden will fall on the AIDREP.

(b) One Half-Time Position: Given that this program has been historically classified as a humanitarian assistance program and hence, not expected to achieve measurable results, USAID/Somalia, along with its partners, has little experience in results monitoring and reporting. Extensive work will be needed in creating systems for USAID and our partners in identifying data sources, developing collection mechanisms, establishing baselines and targets, as well as refining the indicators proposed in this document. Therefore, a short-term (six months to one year) M&E person is needed. This person could come from RESDO or be hired under a short-term PSC contract. The Mission may require additional resources to cover the cost of this contract.

© One Half-Time Position: One person needs to spend at least part-time managing OFDA grants. This person should have had some experience working on emergency programs.

(d) One Full-Time Position: One person to work full-time on food assistance issues. This person would work closely with WFP and also manage the FEWS contract, keeping track of drought conditions and pockets of food deficit.

(e) One Full-Time Position and One Half-Time Position: One and a half person-time to perform a combination of Program Officer and Project Development Officer functions. These individuals would be called on to implement the results packages and also to help produce the Congressional Presentation and other USAID/W documentation requirements as well as the design, implementation and monitoring of development assistance activities. In addition, the full-time person would act as the AID Representative in his absence and also attend the many meetings where USAID attendance is required.

In addition, this strategy will require the support of a number of staff outside USAID/Somalia including:

(a) State/PRM Regional Refugee Coordinator (based in Nairobi): assists in donor coordination, ensuring that UNHCR's approach and this USG strategy work in tandem.

(b) State Department Somalia Desk Officer and State/PRM Horn Refugee Officer: provide guidance on State Department policy directives that are Washington-driven.

© State Somalia Watcher (based in Nairobi): assists in donor coordination on political/security issues and monitors political issues and events and advises Washington on appropriate action.

(d) Somalia Desk Officers in BHR/FFP and BHR/OFDA: assure that centrally funded activities adhere to this strategy and provide appropriate support to the Mission.

(e) Somalia Desk Officer in AFR/EA: assures that bilateral development assistance adheres to this strategy and provides support to the Mission.

B. Alternative Scenarios

High/Medium/Low Scenario (\$,000)

	High	Medium	Low
Development Assistance	4,000	3,000	2,000
Disaster Assistance	6,000	5,000	4,000
Food Assistance	5,500	5,500	5,500
TOTAL	15,500	13,500	11,500

The strategy outlined in this document represents the high scenario.

The medium scenario would allow the Mission to continue progress under SO1 and SO2, but would drop the SPO. Thus there would be no assistance to the development of civil society. If this is the case, the USG loses a valuable opportunity to begin the process of moving towards sustainability as well as an indirect support for conflict prevention and resolution.

At the low scenario, the Mission would not have the funds to address SO1 or the SPO. The OFDA and FFP resources would focus solely on SO2. The DA resources would be utilized for the limited rehabilitation components under SO2, maintaining a rudimentary primary health care network system and some rehabilitation of water sources. A focus solely on SO2 means that USAID/Somalia would not be progressing toward the goal of a less vulnerable, more self-sufficient population. Rather, the focus would be almost entirely on simply keeping people alive. The ISP Team then recommends disbanding the Mission at this funding level and channeling the resources through REDSO/ESA.

USAID/Somalia also feels it needs more than the allocated FFP budget, particularly to achieve results under SO1. In the current year, the Mission can make do with the resources budgeted because WFP, USAID's current implementing partner, has carry-over stocks to continue running programs at necessary levels. The most critical program is the monetization project, which is the primary resource (in conjunction with Food For Work) to be used to achieve results under SO1. Without monetization proceeds to complement food for work schemes, the Mission feels it would need to greatly reduce proposed results in the agricultural sector.

Cut-Off Point for the Program

Both level of resources and staffing will influence the cut-off point for the program. As discussed above, the low scenario will mandate ending the program as designed. At three staff, the Mission can continue to function, but many of the tasks will either be left undone or our ability to manage certain grants will be greatly reduced. For instance, staff will have to monitor progress under grants through reports rather than reports combined with regular partner interaction and site visits. At anything less than three staff, the Mission cannot continue to manage the portfolio. In which case, the ISP Team again recommends disbanding the Mission and focussing on a strictly emergency program (SO2) to be channeled through REDSO/ESA.

VI. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES

In addition to the above resource requirements, the Team has identified the following actions as important to achieving the results outlined in this document.

A. Field Issues

1. Pressure should be applied to the SACB to be more aggressive on pressing programmatic issues. The U.S. should take an active role in setting the agenda for the SACB. In particular, the SACB should use the Somali media to the advantage of the international community, articulating carefully and disseminating widely the internal constraints caused by faction leaders and bandits to international responses to humanitarian crises. An important example is the closure of Mogadishu port, which impedes the flow of relief commodities into southern regions. A broadcast announcing that the closure is a result of factional bickering would put the onus on Somalis to rectify the situation, rather than placing blame on the international community for not delivering food to needy people. In addition to pressure on the port closure, the SACB should be pushing Somalis on the lack of access to Baidoa and responses to the upcoming hunger period.

2. Donor coordination should be enhanced. All of the partners for Somalia face increasingly tight budgets. By enhancing coordination, each donor can use its limited resources in a manner that will complement and strengthen each other's programs. During the strategy vetting session with our key partners, all agreed that the partners should follow up with multi-donor strategies for each region.

3. While the USG supports UN air operations, our NGO programs rely heavily on continued air support by the EU. At the present time it appears as though EU will be able to continue financing the NGO air operations. However, we must be prepared to contribute further to the costs of expensive, yet necessary, air operations for our implementing partners if other donor funding is not forthcoming. In addition, the USG should encourage the UN agencies to consolidate their air operations in order to maximize scarce resources.

4. Based on the recommendations of Section IV in the Prendergast report, the field team (USAID/Somalia, the State Somalia Watcher, and the Refugee Coordinator) should consider a half day session every six months or so with an appropriate facilitator to brainstorm about the current operating environment, looking at such issues as the capacities and vulnerabilities within Somalia, and current political and social dynamics that our programming could impact.

5. State/PRM should advise UNHCR to notify USAID/Somalia of repatriation and reintegration plans so that USAID/Somalia can work with UNHCR to possibly include such populations in its activities.

B. Washington Issues

6. The State Department should continuously review the political situation to determine appropriate diplomatic initiatives. Other more active interventions should not be undertaken for the time being since Somalis need time to sort things out themselves. Our interventions at this time should be minimal, just keeping abreast of internal political progress and set backs as well as fostering local capacity building to enhance Somalis abilities to solve their own problems.

7. As recommended in the Prendergast report, the GHAI Task Force should explore further how we can harmonize our vulnerability assessment methodologies, building on current vulnerability models for Sudan and Ethiopia, and share this with our partners.

8. USAID and State/PRM, both Washington offices and the field, need to look more closely at proposals and grants to ensure that "social contracts," as suggested in the Prendergast report, are in place with the communities we work with in Somalia.

9. As the Mission moves towards a results orientation, it will be increasingly dependent upon FEWS/FSAU for data. The FEWS project should work closely with the Mission to ensure that it is being responsive to these information needs.

10. The Team observed that Somalia is the only country in the region that uses development assistance resources to support the administrative costs of an emergency food aid program. These resources have proven critical to the implementation of this program. However, it seems to the Team that this is not the best use of scarce DA resources, particularly when WFP receives a significant level of funding from the USG to support its operations worldwide. The Team would rather see these DA funds used for agricultural or capacity building activities. Therefore, the Team recommends that Washington explore alternative means of funding the administrative costs of WFP in Somalia, particularly the option of WFP/Rome payment of such costs.

11. Programming food aid in Somalia presents unique challenges. While food aid can be a tool to prevent crisis by keeping people from moving during drought, it can also be a source of conflict by providing a commodity for looting in the Somalia context. USAID, with its partners, has had to be flexible in its

programming to support the former while avoiding the latter. This has included food-for-work activities and monetization using Somali traders, to support food- and cash-for-work projects and local purchase programs. This flexibility must be maintained. Therefore, the Team recommends that BHR/FFP work with the Mission in developing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that will give the Mission the flexibility it needs while satisfying BHR/FFP requirements.

12. State/PRM should work with USAID/Somalia to develop standards and guidelines for UNHCR QIPs.

13. Consideration should be given to USAID/Somalia for the use of GHAI resources to test pilot activities on reintegration of returning refugees.

ANNEX A INTEGRATED STRATEGIC PLANNING

A. Background

With few exceptions, the countries of the Greater Horn do not fall neatly into the traditional "development" or "disaster" categories. Most are either transitioning out of, or into, crisis or have neighbors in crisis. This "gray" area between relief and development, arguably the most complex to program, is least understood within USAID and historically has suffered from the absence of Agency experience, expertise and procedural guidance.

An informal process of integrated planning has occasionally emerged in response to the need to operate more effectively, particularly in the "gray" area between acute emergency and long-term sustainable development activities. These informal processes were the result, at least in part, of a growing recognition by many practitioners and observers of the critical and complex interrelationships of relief, development, political and military resources used in transition situations. But these processes had not been formalized nor translated into implementation plans.

The Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI) promotes the idea of strategic coordination among all involved players, within and outside of the U.S. government, to assure maximum use of all available resources for the region. This approach complements USAID's new strategic planning guidelines as outlined in its Automated Directive Systems which also emphasizes greater strategic coordination within USAID itself.

Within the context of re-engineering and the GHAI, an experimental approach to the USAID Country Strategic Plan (CSP) is underway. While the GHAI task force and working teams refer to this approach as Integrated Strategic Plans (ISPs), it fully reflects USAID strategic planning guidance as outlined in ADS Chapter 201 for CSPs. In our view, the ISP reflects the process which we believe is critical to achieving a sound USAID CSP for transition countries. In addition, it takes the planning process one step further by making the document a reflection not just of USAID's strategic direction but of our other U.S. government partners as well. This may lead to modifications of USAID's review and approval processes that are different from those established for USAID's new CSPs. The USAID "Management contract" will also likely look somewhat different (see outstanding issues, below.)

B. What is Integrated Strategic Planning?

The GHAI Team on Rapid Transitions from Relief to Development, the USAID Africa Bureau, the USAID Bureau for Humanitarian

Response and State Department staff have been discussing the content of ISPs, incorporating re-engineering guidelines in their effort. The following principles emerged from these discussions:

1. An Integrated Strategic Plan (ISP) is prepared jointly by all relevant **USG** partners, both field and Washington staff, in a given country. It provides a coherent, integrated **USG** assistance package for a given country, reflecting mutually agreed upon strategic objectives and program outcomes as well as a plan for measuring results. Consultations are not enough - they must be team members, whether virtual or field. In exchange, there must be a commitment by all USG partners to making the process happen.

2. These partners work as an inter-agency team to define the strategic planning process, from selecting program and budget parameters, identifying team members or necessary technical expertise, researching issues, strategy development, review and approval.

3. Consistent with the USAID ADS Strategic Planning guidelines, parameters must be established: i.e., "indicative resource levels, guidance on earmarks and updated guidance on the Agency's goals and objectives over the proposed planning period. As appropriate, the Bureau [sic] may provide additional guidance to operating units on the strategic direction of the program, key management or performance issues, and any special foreign policy interests in the country." Initial parameter setting for an ISP, however, should reflect full USG commitment on the above.

Parameter setting will help determine early on whether the country in question is going to be viewed as a "sustainable development" country (a USAID term describing those countries that are considered high priority, have potential to achieve real results in the area of sustainable development, and toward which the Agency will make concerted effort to provide significant human and financial resources) or a "crisis prevention" country with more modest goals of alleviating human suffering and stabilizing the situation but without a significant investment of USG resources. This determination will foster more realistic expectations on the part of the USG and others regarding the immediate and future levels of USG resources to flow into that country. Given the unstable operating environment in which transitional programs often operate, the parameters meeting can provide for a shorter planning period, such as 2-3 years.

4. Once parameters are set, the inter-agency team, with both virtual and field members, develops the ISP. The ISP should lay out USG objectives in the country, review resources from all USG agencies, recommend appropriate USAID and State responses within those objectives, and recommend a field and headquarters management structure which will enable a well-coordinated, effective and expeditious transitional program. Through this

process, USAID and State will give a commitment of estimated resource levels, both human and financial, with the caveat that such resources are subject to availability.

5. Once the ISP is drafted, it should be reviewed by involved USAID and State actors (and other USG agencies as appropriate) at the headquarters level.

6. During the review of an integrated strategy, USAID and State should review staffing and agree to base staff allocation levels on the number of personnel needed (direct hires or non) to effectively monitor and manage the TOTAL AMOUNT of USG resources (including food aid) flowing into a country from all accounts, not just the amount in a bilateral USAID Mission's OYB.

7. Although responses to quick onset crisis may not be addressed in an ISP, program planning for prevention, mitigation, longer-term humanitarian assistance and transition activities, as well as their relationship to current or potential development programs, is central to the ISP process.

C. Operationalizing Integrated Strategic Planning - the Somalia Experience

As noted above, USAID and State staff working in Somalia agreed to use Somalia as a "test case" for operationalizing integrated strategic planning. Somalia was chosen because it has excellent interagency working relationships and a relatively small USG program. It is also a country where relief and rehabilitation programs, foreign policy objectives and regional factors are overtly intertwined. While the process is not yet complete some of the "lessons learned" to date are:

1. The multi-agency team concept proposed by the ISP has proven to be highly effective to date. In the case of Somalia, operational level staff from AFR/EA, AFR/DP, AFR/SD, BHR/PPE, BHR/FFP, BHR/OFDA, PPC, State/AF/E and State/PRM, as well as the Mission, jointly developed the planning process, drafted the issues paper for the parameter setting meeting, and acted as either virtual or field team members in the development of the strategy. Our expectation is that this consensus-building process will improve and speed implementation of the strategy.

2. Co-chairing the parameter exercise was an effective way to have fruitful discussions across agencies and bureaus as well as set out the broad outlines of the program. In the case of Somalia, this meeting was jointly chaired by the DAA/AFR, DAA/BHR and the Director of State/AF/E. We hope to retain this approach in the strategy review process.

3. Given that decision making authority is split for programs and policies between Washington and the field, virtual team

membership in Washington has proven key in this process to date. The field team wrote daily reports to its two person virtual team (representatives from AFR/DP and BHR/PPE) who called together relevant staff to get immediate feedback on issues of concern to the field team. As a result, key Washington staff were able to weigh in early in the process on areas of concern to headquarters. The field team was able to tap into technical expertise in Washington and get immediate answers to their questions. This approach is particularly important for those resources/policies that are primarily developed and managed in Washington, such as the State Department Population, Refugee and Migration Bureau.

4. That said, there is no substitute for Washington staff participation (particularly from the central bureaus) on the field team. Given that many, and in some instances the majority, of the resources going to the GHAI countries are centrally managed (food aid, for example), it is important to have Washington issues and concerns factored into the development of the strategy. It is perhaps even more crucial that Washington staff managing central resources benefit from the first-hand experience of developing a strategy in the field. While a team in Washington can provide support, it can not take the place of the "give and take" discussions and process of conceptualizing and articulating an ISP and its Strategic Objectives. In the Somalia case, three key members of the Washington ISP planning team (the desk officer and backstops from BHR/FFP and BHR/OFDA) participated on the field team.

5. In addition, the field and virtual teams were inter-agency, including both the State Somalia Watcher and the Refugee Coordinator in Nairobi on the field team and the State desk officer and State/PRM on the virtual team.

6. Further work on how to do strategic planning for complex emergency and transitional countries would be useful. The ADS Strategic Planning guidelines have a strong development orientation to them and leave many operational questions unanswered. The flexibility offered in ADS guidelines in strategic planning for emergency and special case country program is a necessity for quickly changing complex emergency and transitional countries. However, the "newness" of strategic planning in these circumstances means that teams have little experience to draw from. And because of its developmental orientation, the ADS offers no additional guidance. In addition, these country programs will need additional support in order to develop monitoring, evaluation and reporting systems.

D. Outstanding Issues

There are a myriad of outstanding issues with regard to the nuts and bolts of integrated strategic planning and its implementation.

1. We need to strengthen our ability to think beyond bilateral issues and incorporate regional approaches and mechanisms.
2. Further work is needed to enable the different USG agencies to understand each other's roles and responsibilities so that our efforts can be better integrated in a strategic plan.
3. The ADS Strategic Planning guidelines require a participatory approach with our partners in developing the strategy. This can pose unique challenges in countries where there is conflict. In such cases, how do we go about a participatory approach? Is it even feasible?
4. It is unclear what standards complex emergencies and transition countries will be held to under the ADS guidelines. Questions that came up in the development of the Somalia ISP included: (1) how do we track results when, due to conflict, there are no data and hence, no baselines? (2) Before people-level impact can be achieved, systems and institutions have to be re-built. Does this process count as impact?
5. Under ADS 201.5.12a(3), "Definition of a Management Contract," greater decision making authority is given to the field for implementation of the strategic plan. How will this work with centrally-managed resources? How do State and other USG agencies fit into the management contract?
6. A future goal of USG integrated strategic planning processes might be to consider more carefully the relationship between bilateral USAID programs in refugee hosting countries like Kenya and Ethiopia and US-supported refugee assistance programs in marginal areas of these countries. Without parallel development opportunities, humanitarian aid programs can exacerbate tensions between refugees and local populations, destroy community structures by encouraging migration into camps and thereby dramatically increasing relief costs to the international community.

ANNEX B - Section Three, "The Somali Conflict Context" of the
"Review of the Integrated Strategic Plan for Somalia" by John
Prendergast

**ANNEX C - "Review of the Integrated Strategic Plan for Somalia"
by John Prendergast**

Available upon request.

ANNEX D - USAID/Somalia's R2a report for FY 1995

Available upon request.

ANNEX E - Prior Year Funding for USAID/Somalia

ANNEX F - Parameters Cable