U.S. Agency for International Development
Center for Development
Information and Evaluation

USAID Education Program Staffing

A Review of the Data and Experience

Prepared by

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Management Systems International

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Executive Summary

USAID is engaged in examining the appropriate levels and types of staffing to meet its future program management needs. A key element of this discussion is the need for and the role of USAID direct-hire (USDH) technical staff. Although this issue is common to all technical areas, the Agency's third goal – human capacity built through education and training – was selected as the development sector in which to open the inquiry.

This study is intended to address the issue of where direct hire education staff (Human Resource Development Officers – HRDOs) are most needed and effective in terms of enabling USAID to achieve results. Of corollary concern are questions of the condition of the current corps of HRDOs and the relative effectiveness of other, non-HRDO staff configurations used to support education assistance programs.

The study has both qualitative and quantitative dimensions. Survey and interview techniques were used for the qualitative component, while USAID staff and budget databases were the source of input for the quantitative analyses. The qualitative part of the study articulates the roles and responsibilities of education technical field staff, including U.S. direct hires and others, and examines relationships that exist between various staffing structures and program management characteristics. To provide a degree of commonality across country programs, the qualitative inquiries focused on those countries that are presently or have recently been engaged in basic education or girls' education activities. The quantitative analysis complements the qualitative by examining trends in the numbers of education USDH staff and in funding over time compared to other technical areas, as well as the deployment of education USDH *vis-à-vis* the location of education programs.

Summary Conclusions

1. Strong HRDOs are the best bet but a rare commodity. Other options are workable, but not without costs and risks. There is broad consensus among Mission managers, HRDOs and others with first-hand knowledge of USAID education efforts that education sector program design and management by a technically strong HRDO is generally the best option for USAID. Other staffing options may be necessary in times of scarce OE resources, and can be effective, but these are more risky and impose additional burdens on the Mission. Unfortunately, the corps of HRDOs has been seriously depleted. It needs to be enlarged, re-invigorated, and re-oriented.

In most instances, having non-education USDH manage education programs is believed to result in serious shortcomings in technical interactions (quality and frequency) with partners and donors, and less engagement in sector issues within and outside the Mission. There is also wide belief that non-USDH (US-PSCs and FSNs/TCNs) who are put in charge of education programs are handicapped due to their lower status in the Mission organizational hierarchy, authorities that are circumscribed by USAID rules and regulations, and unfamiliarity in accessing other resources and support, e.g., from USAID/W. The chart below portrays this view in terms of staff type and program management effectiveness.

2. New approaches to education support need to be widely shared and better understood. Rather than top-down vertical, input-focused interventions common in USAID projects in the 1970s and 80s, broad-based sector reform efforts, involving policy, financing, pluralism and grass roots initiatives, such as those pursued in the 1990s in Africa, will likely continue as USAID's approach to education improvement. Skills to provide effective management of such programs derive from a core knowledge of education principles and processes such as any educator will possess, but need to be enhanced through more orientation and training in USAID's sector support approach and through experiences gained in multiple development settings.

Education Program Management Effectiveness



3. Education staff of all types need new and different skills to be effective. Developing and managing basic education programs for USAID requires different skills today than ten years ago. There is less need for expertise in specific technical areas, such as curriculum design, teacher training and non-formal education, but better understanding of inter and intra-sector linkages as well as of broader social sector policy and financing issues. Training in team and resource management and negotiation deserves particular attention. Also, in light of recent emphasis on partnership and donor interaction, there is heightened need for staff of all categories to become more skilled and comfortable in this arena.

4. There appears to be an imbalance in and misallocation of existing HRDO staff, despite a preference in the field for such personnel. Education Officers have the smallest professional corps compared to the three other sectors examined (agriculture, health/population, environment). While the recent R4 reports project a slight decrease (of 1) in demand for HRDOs from 1998 to 2001, the use of non-USDH for education program management remains highest (7.6 non-USDH for each HRDO) among four other sectors examined (agriculture, health/population, environment, democracy). Of the 18 Missions with education SOs or IRs reviewed, 13 are managed by USDH, and only 9 (50%) are managed by HRDOs. Finally, of the 18 USDH Foreign Service Officers listed as having education as their primary skill code, 11 are currently posted to Missions, and of these only 8 are managing education programs.

5. USAID needs to be more deliberate and comprehensive in addressing the training and mentoring needs of its education program management staff. Even with the strengthened recruitment efforts argued for in this report, new employees will not be job-ready when or soon after they are hired. A program to orient these new employees as well as to update existing staff is critically needed.

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List of Acronyms

AAAS	American Association of Applied Scientists
AFR	Africa Bureau
AFR/SD	Sustainable Development Officer of the Africa Bureau
AGR	Agriculture Backstop/Sector
ANE	Asia & Near East Bureau
BS	Backstop
BS-60	Education (60) Backstop
DVTR	Development Training Officer
ENI	Europe & New Independent States Bureau
FS	Foreign Service (Officers)
FSN	Foreign Service National employee
GDO	General Development Officer
G/HCD	Global Bureau Human Capacity Development Directorate
GS	Civil Service employee/grade
HCD	Human Capacity Development (Agency Goal/Sector Council)
HG	Host Government
HRDO	Human Resource Development Officer (Education Officer)
IDI	International Development Intern
IR	Intermediate Result
LAC	Latin America & Caribbean Bureau
MD	Mission Director
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OE	Operating Expense Budget
OYB	Operational Year (Program) Budget
PHN	Population/Health/Nutrition Officer
RF	Results Framework
RSSA	Resources Supporting Services Agreement (employee)
SO	Strategic Objective
SOT	Strategic Objective Team
PASA	Participating Agency Services Agreement (employee)
PDO	Project Development Officer
PSC	Personal Services Contractor
TA	Technical Assistance
TAACS	Technical Advisor in AIDS & Child Survival
TCN	Third Country National employee
TDY	Temporary Duty (short term assistance visit)
USDH	United States Direct Hire (USAID career status) employee
US-PSC	United States (American citizen) Personal Services Contractor

I. Introduction and Background

As part of an ongoing workforce analysis, USAID has been examining the appropriate levels and types of staffing to meet its program management needs. A key element of this discussion is the need for and the role of USAID direct-hire (USDH) technical staff. With increasingly reduced staffing levels in the Agency, the mix of technical staff, i.e., education, health, democracy, environment, etc., and the placement of technical staff need to be clarified so that optimal utilization and deployment of this scarce resource can be pursued.

Although the staffing issue is common to all technical areas, the Agency's third goal – human capacity built through education and training – was selected as the context in which to open the inquiry. This study therefore was designed to address the issue of where direct hire education staff (Human Resource Development Officers – HRDOs) are most needed and effective in terms of enabling USAID to achieve results. Of corollary concern are questions of the condition of the current corps of HRDOs and the relative effectiveness of other, non-HRDO staff configurations used to support education assistance programs.

Since answers to these questions will be used to inform issues currently being considered by the Agency's Management Council and its Technical Staffing Working Group, the study was designed to present a quick analysis and findings using qualitative and quantitative data. The Academy for Educational Development (AED), with support from Management Systems International (MSI), was asked to undertake the study under the Research and Reference Service III (R&RSIII) contact from mid-December 1998 to mid-January 1999.

II. Purpose and Scope

The study has both qualitative and quantitative dimensions. The qualitative analysis is intended to articulate the roles and responsibilities of education technical field staff, including U.S. direct hires and others, and to identify relationships (if any) that exist between various staffing structures and program results. To provide a degree of commonality across country programs, the qualitative inquiries were focused on those countries that are presently or have recently been engaged in basic education or girls' education activities.

This part of the study attempts to answer the following questions:

1. Describe how the technical and management responsibilities of the USDH education officer and other education staff have changed in past the 10 years due to nature of programs, changes in USAID policies and priorities, downsizing, etc. Describe formal and non-formal roles and responsibilities for missions in managing an education program, especially in light of Strategic Objectives/Intermediate Results (SOs/IRs), SO Teams (SOTs), Results Frameworks (RFs). Identify the clearly critical/non-critical roles of various technical staff in the field.

2. In the absence of USDH education officers, describe various means used to provide support to the development and implementation of field education programs, i.e., new education recruits, non-education USDHs, US-Personal Services Contractors (PSCs), Foreign Service Nationals

(FSN), Third Country Nationals (TCNs), American Association of Applied Scientists (AAAS) Fellows, institutional contractors (AID/W- and field-based), etc.

3. Provide examples and describe perceived effectiveness of the different staffing/support models. Cite where/how management and/or technical capacity, or lack thereof, has affected the planning, design, implementation and outcomes of education programs. Identify, if any, the relationship between the staffing structure and results.

4. Provide examples where education program development decisions were made, deferred, or rejected based (in part) on the availability of USDH education officers.

5. As a framework to analyze the need for additional education officers, describe the characteristics of the professional corps of direct hire education officers, including their recruitment, retention and career incentives.

The quantitative analysis examines trends in the numbers of education USDH staff and in funding over time compared to other technical areas, as well as the deployment of education USDH *vis-à-vis* location of education programs. The analysis attempts to address the following five questions:

1. What are the comparative trends for the number of overseas technical USDH staff among selected sectors compared to funding for the sector?

2. What are the actual staffing and projected (market demand) staffing for USDH technical staff and non-USDH technical staff among selected sectors in the field?

3. Where are the present backstop 60 (backstop codes for Direct Hire Education Officers) positions and who is in them?

4. Who is managing the education project work in the field?

5. Where are the USDH FS Employees with Primary Skill Code 600?

III. Methodology

For the qualitative analysis, five respondent categories were identified:

- USDH Education Officers (HRDOs) with experience or knowledge of education program management and performance
- Mission Directors and Deputy Directors with current or previous oversight responsibility of education programs
- Other USDH (non-education) employees with knowledge of education program management and performance
- Foreign Service Nationals and Third Country Nationals (FSNs/TCNs) with education program responsibilities

- Education Specialists (outside of USAID) with first hand experience with design, management and implementation of USAID education programs.

The study questions of the SOW were rephrased to suit a telephone interview and email questionnaire format, and tailored slightly to fit the characteristics of each respondent category. The survey questions are presented in their various versions in Annex 2. A list of over seventy potential respondents was constructed representing knowledge of USAID education programs in the Africa (AFR), Latin America & Caribbean (LAC) and Asia & Near East (ANE) regions.

Individuals were not put on the list randomly, but rather for their particular exposure to education programs. Some respondents were actively engaged in education activities, while others had more distant vantage points; some operated from inside USAID, others had the perspective of partner; some witnessed program performance from the top while others from the bottom. In total, it was felt this 360 degree evaluation of staff roles and program effect would best inform the study questions. Study constraints did not allow for host country recipients of USAID assistance to be interviewed – a recognized shortcoming, but one found somewhat compensated for by the relative heavy emphasis on those who have worked with host country officials in implementation.

The final respondent list contains 59 individuals, of which 40 (71%) provided responses, either by telephone or in writing. The responses were analyzed for similarities and differences across and within categories, and findings deduced from the trends. A summary of all responses by category of respondent is presented for the five areas of inquiry: role of the USDH HRDOs, management by non education USDHs, management by non-USDH education specialists, staffing suggestions and quality of HRDOs in Annex 1. Response rates by category are given in Appendix 1.

The Findings Section presents side-bar narratives with quotations from survey respondents that are particularly insightful or articulate best common (or contrasting) views of the respondents. These narratives and identifying details about individuals, programs or countries have been sanitized to protect the identity of the authors since confidentiality was requested in several cases.

A special note is needed on the Mission Director questions. An initial attempt to get narrative replies to open ended questions resulted in a poor response rate – only 5 out of 19. A second attempt was made to prompt a response by rephrasing the questions into “agree-disagree” statements. This yielded an additional eight responses, some of which contained explanatory comments.

The quantitative analyses were based on data from the M/HR employee and R4 databases, M/B budget and activity code databases, Report of the Technical Staffing Working Group, Memorandum of the HCD Sector Council, and additional information provided by M/HR staff. These data were gathered and compiled according to the following:

1. Trends in USDH education officers and funding compared to other sectors: Data in support of

the answer to the question are organized to provide a picture of the number of USDH foreign service staff in the field compared to the volume of funds programmed by selected sectors. The two reference years are 1992 and 1998 and the sectors are education, agriculture, environment, and health/population.

2. Actual and projected staffing needs for selected technical areas: Data from the Mission R4s provide a view of 1998 technical staffing in the field and Mission projections of future staffing patterns. Projections are based on Mission understanding of personnel ceilings, funding earmarks and levels, existing program demands and future needs, etc. The 1998 numbers of technical staff expressed as the ratio of non-USDH to USDH are compared to the projected ratio of non-USDH to USDH in 2001 for the same sectors as question 1 above.

3. USDH education positions and incumbents: Data on the education (backstop 60) positions present the breakout of those positions between Washington and the field, between foreign service (FS) and civil service (GS), and indicate whether staff in those positions are rated as backstop 60s.

4. Managers of education programs in the field: Mission Staffing Pattern Reports provide the job titles, grades and employee hiring authorization at the time of hiring (USDH, USPS, FSDH, FSPS). A review of higher grade education job titles for 18 Missions with education SOs or IRs of $5 million or more provides an indicator of who is managing education project work.

5. Deployment of USDH FS employees with education as their primary skill code: A sort on FS personnel with education listed as their primary skill code provides a notion of the size of the existing professional corps of USFS direct hire education officers and where they are working.

IV. Findings and Conclusions

1. Trends in USDH education officers and funding: comparisons with other sectors

Findings[1]

Data were analyzed to provide a picture of the number of USDH foreign service staff in the field compared to the volume of funds programmed by selected sectors. The two reference years are 1992 and 1998 and the sectors are education, agriculture, environment, and health/population.

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[1]Sources:

1. Technical Staffing: Working Group Report in: People for Development: Workforce Alignment. A Draft Report by the USAID Management Council, October 19, 1998.
2. M/B RPT: MA9094XW 12/27/96. Activity Codes by Budget Category World-Wide for all Accounts (in $ 000)
3. M/B RPT: EA-A 1/19/99. FY 1998 Primary Emphasis Coding (Request Amount) (in $ 000)

Table 1: USDH Overseas Technical Staff and Sector Funding

Backstop	Overseas USDH 9/92	6/98	% chng	$ actual 9/92	$ reqst 98	% chng
Education	26	11	- 58	345.1	189.1	-45.2
Agriculture	110	32	- 71	398.6	294.7	-23.8
Environment	25	24	- 4	475.7	481.7	+ 1.3
Health/Pop	64	43	- 33	874.8	971.0	+11.0
Total	225	110	-51	2,094.2	1,936.5	-7.5

Additional data from the same source reveal from 1992 to 1998, the proportion of USDH technical staff in USAID has remained relatively constant when compared to overall USDH staff: FS - 39.11% to 39.03 %, GS - 10.12 % to 11.61%. The percentage change in the total number of direct hire technical officers in all sectors from September 1992 through June 1998 has dropped 34%.

Conclusions

The Technical Staffing Working Group Report to the Management Council in the Council's Draft report on Workforce Alignment of October, 1998, compares the USDH workforce overseas across technical sectors and over time. It states that the percentage change in the total number of direct hire technical officers in the field in all sectors from September 1992 through June 1998 dropped 34%. Since the ratio of technical staff to total staff remained constant during the same period, that means the overall Agency workforce also dropped approximately 34%. By comparison (as seen in the table above) education dropped from 26 to 11 positions or 58%. Agriculture changed from 110 to 32 positions for a 71 % drop. Health/population was closer to the average at a 33% drop from 64 to 43 and environment dropped only 4% from 25 to 24 positions.

A review of sector funding for the same period adds another dimension to the view of those changes. Agriculture and education both dropped in funding levels while health/population and environment both increased.

A meaningful picture of the changes in both personnel and funding is provided by the change in the ratio of program funds to the number of overseas USDHs by sector.

Table 2: Ratio of Program Funds to the Number of Overseas USDHs by Sector

$ millions per Overseas USDH			
Backstop	9/92	6/98	% chng
Education	13.3	17.2	+ 29.3
Agriculture	3.6	9.2	+155.6
Environment	19.0	20.1	+ 5.8
Health/Pop	13.7	22.6	+ 64.9

The rank order for $ millions of funds per overseas USDH for 6/98 is: Health/Pop (22.6), Environment (20.1), Education (17.2), and Agriculture (9.2).

2. Changes in roles and responsibilities of education staff in USAID missions

Findings

There is remarkable agreement among respondents on the list of functions that are best or only performed by a USDH HRDO in education program development and support. Surprisingly, these functions bear only moderate resemblance to those a typical HRDO would have faced prior to 1990. Functions which would not likely to have appeared ten years ago or would have been less prominent are: policy dialogue, negotiation of reforms, sector/trend analysis, represent the USG in high-level meetings, donor coordination and partner collaboration. Other functions which are not new but still seen by most as important to the USDH HRDO role include: technical direction and advice (within and outside the Mission), program design and management, contract management and procurement, and program reporting and accounting.

Not surprisingly, some functions emphasized by one category of respondent were not mentioned by others. Only HRDOs and non-AID education specialists listed "serving as an advocate for the education sector" as important. Mission Directors, other USDH and FSN/TCNs did not. Most respondents, except Mission Directors, indicated that an important function of the HRDO was solving implementation problems. But important to Mission Directors and not mentioned by others was the ability of HRDOs to access and use support and financial resources of USAID/W. Only a few respondents limited the necessary functions of the

Comment from a non-USAID Education Specialist:
"The role most importantly played by a knowledgeable USAID direct-hire education officer has been that of maintaining both policy and technical dialogue with the government, other donors, and other actors in the education sector. By policy dialogue I mean the ability to meet with ministers and high level cabinet officials and discuss the general orientation and strategy for educational development within the country. …The importance of a direct-hire education officer for this role is that USAID needs to be officially represented in these discussions, i.e., someone needs to say what USAID's position is *vis-à-vis* different approaches to educational development, and be able to state what USAID will or will not support. At the technical level, the USAID direct-hire person is less necessary …and PSCs or project staff can and often do fulfill this role quite effectively. But the ability of a USAID representative to engage in those kinds of discussions is critical to the Agency's

USDH HRDO to those dictated by USG legislation or USAID policy/regulation, such as procurement, participant visa applications and press releases. These respondents feel all other functions could be adequately performed by non-HRDOs. Only two respondents (5%) believe there are no functions only or best carried out by HRDOs.

Many examples were given by respondents of HRDOs performing exceptionally well in the higher order functions such as policy dialogue, negotiation and collaboration and donor coordination. Pakistan was often cited as an ideal case to illustrate the unique effectiveness that can result from a strong, experienced HRDO managing an education program. Other examples were mentioned where HRDOs failed to operate effectively within the new policy-politics-partner domain.

Five of six (83%) Mission Directors expressed agreement (or strong agreement) with the statement, "From my personal experience, the design and/or management functions of education programs are best performed by a USDH compared to others such as US-PSCs, FSNs/TCNs, PASAs."

Conclusion

Among international education development specialists there is fair agreement that the education sector must be viewed as a system (usually national but sometimes regional). This system is complex with many intra- and inter-sectoral interactions that determine its state and performance. This view suggests that assistance efforts must start from an analysis of these linkages as a basis for identification of sector improvement opportunities. This contrasts with past approaches which judged education gains to be largely the result of improvements in the stream of sector inputs (e.g., schools, books, curriculum, teachers). Not much attention was accorded to broad economic factors, efficiency and equity of sector investments, or stakeholder interests.

The implications for USAID is that education programs will generally follow this orientation, resulting in larger, more complex efforts that are often national in scope and heavily imbued with social and financial policy reform elements. The staff that design and manage these programs need to be skilled and comfortable functioning in this environment. They will have to be adept at using policy dialogue as a programming intervention, engaging the conversation with an analytic mind and credible voice. Teacher training experts, curriculum development specialists and other trained educators will have the requisite knowledge of education techniques to function well at the sub-sector level – the comfortable domain of past education officers – but may lack the tools and understanding to be effective in extra-sectoral matters. The welding of both knowledge sets will make the effective manager of USAID education programs in the future.

The effective USAID education manager will also need to be expert at using the full range of resources available. S/he will need to work in the Strategic Objective Team and with other partners in pursuing program results. Managing for results means the ability to understand sector and program developments from a technical perspective, to know alternate courses of action when problems or opportunities arise, and to be adept and willing to change course as conditions dictate. This posture is quite different from the rigidities log-frame anchored projects imposed

on past HRDOs. Today's HRDOs will need to see change as commonplace and expected.

Finally, the modern HRDO needs to be a collaborator and consensus builder among partners, beneficiaries and other stakeholders (communities, parents), including other donor groups. Collaboration and cooperation have long been buzz words for USAID officers, but in today's development environment they have taken on new meaning with real implications for program performance potentials.

1. Actual and projected staffing for selected sectors in the field

Findings[2]

Given the preference for USDH education officers in the field, what is the current and projected staffing situation in the education sector? How does education compare to other sectors? An anlysis of M/HR data based on R4 reports show a stable number of USDHs overseas in all backstops from 705 in 1998 projected to 2001 at 706. USDH projected growth (shrinkage) from 1998 to 2001 in selected sectors in rank order follows:

Table 3: USDH projected growth (shrinkage) from 1998 to 2001; N= 705

Backstop	Sector	Projected Growth
12	Democracy	+5
12	GDO	+2
40, 50	Environ/Health/Pop	+1 ea.
60	Education	- 1
10	Agriculture	- 2

As part of the ongoing workforce planning initiative, the Administrator asked M/HR to do a review of BS 60 positions. Analysis showed that by the year 2003 the Agency would have four fewer staff than positions. The Management Council approved the study and the Administrator approved the recruitment of four IDIs for education. Recruitment will occur in FY 1999 for duty to begin in FY 2000.

Non-USDH technical backstop positions overseas are projected to drop 50.5 positions from 988 in 1998 to 937.5 in 2001. The projected changes among selected sectors in rank order follow:

Table 4: Non-USDH Backstops Total O/S for Missions

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[2] Sources:

1. M/HR run of R4 data on US direct hires for 1998 and projected staffing patterns through 2001on 12/17/98.
2. Technical Staffing: Working Group Report in: People for Development: Workforce Allignment. A Draft Report by the USAID Management Council, October 19, 1998.
3. Personal Communication with Mary Beth Zankowski of M/HR on 01/07/99.

Non-USDH Backstops	1998	2001	Change
50 Health/Pop	186.5	190	+ 3.5
10 Agriculture	89.4	89	-0.4
60 Education	98.5	93	- 5.5
40 Environment	116.0	110	- 6.0
12 GDO (+democracy)	194.8	164	-30.8

Conclusions

The change in the ratio of non-USDH to USDH personnel in the field over the same time period provides a picture of what the above changes might mean. The rank order of ratios of field non-USDH/USDH in selected sectors follows. The figures represent the number of non-USDH personnel for each USDH. The ratios in the education sector currently exceed all others, and that difference is expected to increase.

Table 5: Ratio of Non-USDH to USDH Personnel

Field Ratio of Non-USDH/ USDH	1998	2001	Change
60 Education	7.6	7.8	+0.2
10 Agriculture	2.8	3.0	+0.2
12 GDO (+democ)	2.5	2.0	-0.5
40 Environment	5.0	4.6	-0.4
50 Health/Pop	3.7	3.7	0.0

4. Support for field education programs in the absence of USDH backstop 60 education officers

Findings

During the late 1980s and early 1990s there was an upsurge in the recruitment of HRDOs, both IDIs and mid-level hires. Presumably, this was in response to the increase in demand for these staff that was resulting from the earmark in basic education imposed by Congress in 1988. At the time there already was a recognized shortage of BS60s, so the legislative requirement for eight additional USAID missions to begin education programs in three years only exacerbated the problem.

In addition to the new recruits, the Agency, particularly the Africa Bureau, hired non-USDH staff to support the new initiative. The Department of Labor provided education specialists under a RSSA, a few AAAS Fellows were hired and an institutional contract was tapped to provide additional technical support. These staff were intended to support the heavy design requirements of the new program as well as to provide occasional short-term technical support to Missions with ongoing or new education activities.

Missions with education portfolios were competing fiercely for the limited supply of experienced

HRDOs during this time. Where they were not successful with such postings, other alternatives were pursued. In some instances, Missions argued successfully with USAID/W to assign freshly recruited HRDOs to them, although in most instances these staff were short-changed in the process. They had not had the recommended tenure in Washington for orientation to the USAID approach to education sector assistance. Also, several were posted to Missions that lacked the staff and sector experience that would serve as a good mentoring environment for the new employee. Despite these hardships, in the main these individuals did satisfactory or better jobs managing their new portfolios. Credit for the successes belongs also to the USAID/W education staff (USDH and non-USDH) who shuttled back and forth to the Missions to provide on-the-spot project management assistance.

In the mid-1990s due perhaps to continuing shortages of experienced HRDOs, several Missions started using other, non-HRDO employees to perform the primary management function for their education activities. There were basically two variations: use of non-HRDO USDH staff, such as GDOs, PDOs and PHNs, and use of US-PSC employees with education credentials. In most cases these employees were supported by a professional-level FSN/TCN staff, usually, but not always, with education expertise. Although FSN/TCN staff were widely used to assist with Mission education programs, this study was able to reveal only two cases – Morocco and Indonesia – where they assumed the principal management responsibilities.

Conclusion

Due to a shortage of experienced HRDOs in the late 1980s and 1990s, Missions increasingly used non-standard approaches to support their education program interests. These included pre-mature postings of newly recruited HRDOs, heightened reliance on USAID/W technical support (principally by non-USDH contractor personnel), cross-over assignments of non-education USDH and hiring of US-PSC education specialists. FSNs/TCNs were also used, but generally not in significant management roles.

These approaches worked, in the sense that education programs were designed and implemented according to timetables imposed by the Congressional earmark and Missions' own country program development schedules. Indeed, Missions and USAID/W are to be commended for the flexibility and creativity exercised in meeting the acute shortage of HRDOs. However, these alternative approaches produced their own set of program and organizational consequences

Comment from Mission Director:
"The Agency should again request greater authority from Congress for the TAACS program and seek other means of acquiring staff (Fellows, US-PSCs, etc) for the basic education sector. The Agency should not abandon its assistance efforts in this sector, but should focus them to make sure there are enough resources in any given country to make a difference Fewer and larger programs with adequate staff are the way to go from my experience."
Comment from HRDO:
"The fundamental decision revolves around whether or not USAID is to be a strong field based Agency. I don't think that maintaining a long laundry list of activities at the expense of quality representation and management is of any lasting value, other than flag waving. We should either have the resources to manage all things well or cut back to only those programs that we can manage well. (Isn't this what Reengineering is about?)"

that are only starting to be documented through the outcomes of this survey (below).

5. Staff capacity, staffing structures, and reported effects of different configurations

Findings

The HRD Sector Council identified 18 countries as having an education SO or IR with a life of project funding of $5 million or more. Of the 18 countries listed, a USDH FS appears as manager for 13 of them: Benin, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, South Africa, Uganda, Egypt, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras. Of those 13 officers, nine appear as education backstop 60s. A USPSC appears as manager in two countries: Guatemala and Nicaragua. A Foreign Service National serves as the manager in Morocco. Cambodia has a vacant USPSC position. Amidst this diversity, two strategies stand out for management where there is no USDH HRDO:

The USDH Generalist Model

1. Respondents broadly agreed that programs can be managed effectively by non-education USDH, but only when other conditions exist. First, the USDH must be an experienced development professional and a highly skilled manager, and second, have available and be able to use a technically strong staff, preferably including a US-PSC. Third, the chances of success will be greater if the program is on-going rather than just starting, and not anticipated to face major sector or implementation issues.

2. There is also broad agreement among respondents that this staff model brings significant trade-offs which must be recognized and found tolerable. The non-education USDH is likely to i) be more passive on sector issues (within and outside the Mission); ii) lack a broad or deep vision of the sector; iii) offer scant technical direction on design and implementation matters; iv) impose extra burden on other Mission staff; v) have less influence among donors and less stature and interaction with partners; and vi) be unfamiliar with the technical support network and supplemental resources available from USAID/W and elsewhere.

3. Additional particular concerns expressed by HRDOs and institutional contractors are that non-education USDHs will tend to i) be slower in making decisions; ii) pursue technically unsound or wasteful ideas; iii) rely too heavily on limited or biased perspectives of FSN staff; and iv) produce conflicts with the Technical Assistance team, e.g., by imposing extra "USAID" work on them.

4. Malawi was mentioned by several respondents as a case where program performance and results were seriously compromised under the direction of a non-education USDH. As a counterpoint, several informants claimed that the program in Uganda has performed very well under the management of a (former) PHN officer. Other countries mentioned where non-education USDH presided over programs with performance problems are Mali, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Ecuador, Haiti, India and Nepal. Zambia and the Dominican Republic were offered as examples of countries where designs were technically weaker due to lack of USDH HRDO involvement.

5. Four of seven (57%) Mission Directors expressed disagreement (or strong disagreement) with the statement, "From my personal experience, USDH non-education specialists (e.g., GDOs, PHNs, PDOs) can usually be relied upon do an acceptable to excellent job of designing and/or managing education programs."

The Non-USDH Education Specialist Model

1. Most respondents agreed that while not an ideal nor necessarily less costly solution, US-PSCs can serve as effective managers of education programs. But, as with non-education USDH, certain conditions should be met. The PSC should be technically strong, and this is most likely if recruitment is wide and rigorous. The US-PSC should also have familiarity with the USAID bureaucracy, or able (and willing) to quickly acquire this. Without USAID tools and knowledge, the additional work placed on other Mission staff and management can be significant. Even when so equipped, limitations on authorities will force higher level involvement in matters that otherwise could be dealt with by the PSC.

2. HRDOs and education contractors caution that PSC education program managers can lack institutional commitment to USAID and USG interests, be inadequately supervised within the Mission and, because of their lower Mission status, be less influential in internal program and resource decisions. They also report that PSCs are at times hired for reasons other than their technical skills, e.g., due to Embassy policy favoring the hiring of spouses and/or because of the lower costs of hiring locally. (Mission Directors and other USDH did not mention these issues.)

3. HRDOs and education contractors reported that US-PSCs faced problems managing education programs in Ghana, Namibia and Malawi, but did well in Benin and Guinea.

4. Only a few respondents believe that FSNs can serve as effective education program managers under current conditions. The factors commonly mentioned as working against their potential to assume broader management responsibilities include regulatory limits on authorities that can be delegated to FSNs, lack of development experience and sector knowledge outside of their own countries, a tendency to be risk-adverse and deferential, weak management and communication skills, and unfamiliarity with USAID policies and practices.

5. Reflections on TCN management effectiveness were too few to draw any conclusions, although one respondent pointed out that TCNs are almost as expensive as US-PSCs, but are faced with most of the same limitations as FSNs and US-PSCs.

6. Several respondents also reported that FSNs are often hired for their facility with English rather than technical skills, particularly in non-English speaking countries, and that strong FSN performers are difficult to retain in USAID because of limited career paths and non-competitive salaries and benefits.

7. Morocco and Jamaica were mentioned as cases where FSNs had performed exceptionally well in lead education program management positions.

8. Four of seven (57%) Mission Directors disagreed (or strongly disagreed) with the statement, "From my personal experience, non-USDH staff (e.g., US-PSCs, FSNs/TCNs, PASAs) can usually be relied up to do an acceptable to excellent job of designing and/or managing education programs."

Conclusion

Survey results reveal successes and problems with each staffing model, including management by HRDOs, other USDH, US-PSCs and FSNs. Examples of the positive and negative for most models are mentioned in the report. It would be unjust to blame any individual for poor program performance based on the evidence gathered for this study. It is similarly specious to construct linkages between performance and staffing configurations. Education programs, particularly the types commonly being implemented now, are so complex and so subject to external forces to make the impact of an individual program manager difficult to assess. Trends are also elusive because the universe of programs being implemented under any particular staff model is much too small. These caveats aside, the study was able to discern characteristics of each model which can serve to raise the antennae of decision-makers and allow for compensatory measures to be taken.

Use of non-HRDO USDHs is likely to present difficulties, but they can be ameliorated. On the part of this USDH, there is likely to be reduction in donor and partner collaboration; inability to provide technical guidance in program matters and to follow and analyze sector trends; and unfamiliarity with USAID/W technical support networks and central program resources. The provision of technically strong FSN staff is likely to only partially mitigate these limitations. In general, the use of a non-HRDO USDH, especially in complex, policy intense education programs is viewed as risky.

Use of US-PSCs is also likely to present difficulties, although the model is viable under the right circumstances. Complaints can be expected regarding the perception (if not the reality) that PSCs are lower status Mission employees. As such they feel less well positioned than USDH staff in resource allocation exercises, and probably less institutional loyalty to USAID. They will likely have less knowledge of USAID systems and processes, and less authority to take action in program matters, resulting in increased burdens being placed on other Mission staff. Like non-HRDO USDH, they may be handicapped in accessing USAID/W support networks and central program resources. However, what they lack in USAID knowledge and commitment, they can make up for in technical expertise and the ability to engage professionally with outside partners and beneficiaries. On balance, the US-PSC manager model offers less risk than that of the non-HRDO USDH. This risk will can be reduced further if recruitment is widely (internationally) competitive, and the applicant profile tailored to particular program and/or country needs–an opportunity not available under the USDH model.

Use of FSNs in a principal management role for education programs is likely to present problems that cannot be easily overcome. As with US-PSCs, the FSN employee will suffer from reduced status and authorities in the Mission, as well as from weak knowledge of USAID/W support systems. In addition, this employee is likely to have only limited knowledge of development

experiences and education practices outside the host country. The FSN will find it more difficult than US-PSCs in dealing with donors and partners, and counterparts may feel USAID has downgraded the status of their relationship. As with the other two models, use of an FSN manager will impose extra work on other Mission staff, most likely Mission directors or deputies. An additional caution is warranted regarding FSN retention: strong performers in countries where demand is high and outside opportunities attractive, may not last through the duration of the program.

6. Effects of the availability of USDH education officers on education program development decisions.

Findings

No examples were cited by the survey respondents (Mission Directors) where staff availability or unavailability was a controlling factor in determining whether or when to go forward with the development of a new education program. Rather, the responses indicated that other factors such as sector needs, grantee commitment and assurances of adequate funding weighed much heavier. However, a couple of Directors suggested that if the picture was bleak for securing technically strong staff to manage the activity, the program design might be adjusted to reduce its technical complexity.

Eight out of eight (100%) Mission Directors agreed (or strongly agreed) with the statement, "If shortages of USDH education officers are to continue, the Agency should use other types of staff (e.g., US-PSCs, FSNs/TCNs, PASAs, TAACS, Fellows), rather than abandon its assistance efforts in the sector." An additional four (of five) agreed with this position.

Six out of nine (67%) Mission Directors disagreed (or strongly disagreed) with the statement, "My decision to develop a new or follow-on education program would be significantly influenced by the anticipated availability of an experienced USDH education officer to fill a Mission position."

Conclusion

Mission Directors generally feel that programming decisions are not significantly influenced by availability or unavailability of a USDH HRDO. Factors of greater importance include the overall development environment, conditions of the sector and its institutions and anticipated budget levels (OE and OYB). Obtaining staff to design and manage an education program is a subsidiary concern, and can be dealt with through options such as those mentioned above.

7. Recruitment, retention and career incentives for direct hire education officers

Findings[3]

HRDO Corps Positions

Appendices 7 through 8 present data on education sector positions, locations, title, and staff in USAID. Of the 28 current USDH positions listed as Education Backstop 60s, 17 are Foreign Service (FS) and 11 are Civil Service (GS). There are three vacancies leaving 16 FS and 9 GS positions filled. The 9 GS positions are in Washington and the 16 FS positions are split with 10 in the field and 6 in Washington. That adds up to 15 filled positions in Washington and 10 filled positions in the field. Those field positions cover 6 countries and one Regional Office. All but two of the 25 filled positions are Backstop 60 personnel.

Table 6: Education (Backstop 60) Positions, 1999

		FS	GS
Totals:	28 positions	**17**	**11**
	25 positions filled	**16**	**9**
	23 positions filled by BS 60	**14**	**9**
	10 filled positions in the field	**10**	**0**
	15 filled positions in AID/W **6**	**9**	

There are eighteen USDH FS personnel identified by M/HR as having education (SC 600) as their primary skill code. Of the 18 primary skill code 600 staff listed, 11 are identified as working in the field and seven in Washington. Of those 11 working in the field, eight are working in education and four of the seven in Washington are working in education. The three field staff working in something other than education are the Deputy Mission Director in the Dominican Republic, a Health/Population Development Officer in Ethiopia, and a Democracy Officer in Egypt.

Comment from FS HRDO
"Currently a critical mass of good, experienced education officers is lacking, and this threatens USAID's education goal. If the Agency is serious about partnerships, there is need to engage partners in the countries. This engagement comes from being available to help, advise, discuss, listen as needs arise. This engagement comes from gaining the professional respect and credibility from the partners in technical matters. The USAID officer needs to become part of the professional community, including the donors, NGOs, ministry and school officials. An example of this, is the current trend in education to focus at the school level and inside the classroom. This change, which is being endorsed and pursued by other donors, will drive future program and investment decisions. But those who are not educators don't understand the theory and concepts behind this development, and thus cannot effectively engage in the partnership forces that are leading education in new directions."

Findings

Quality of the HRDO Corps

1. There is almost unanimous belief among the respondents that the

Sources:

1. M/HR sort of BS 60 positions by organization on 12/18/98 listing both FS and GS and employee backstop (excludes TDA, IG, M, EDP, OSDBV, LPA, ES, GC).
2. M/HR run of FS employees with primary skill code 600 on 01/07/99 [excludes TDA & IG-PGM BE (PSC 600)].

cadre of HRDOs is badly suffering in quality and quantity. Other technical backstops such as PHN, AGR were mentioned as being noticeably stronger with a better sense of a "professional corps." Reasons cited for this were many and varied: the RIF of 1997, a rash of recent retirements, low hiring levels during past years, *laissez-faire* recruitment practices, a high rate of attrition due to the sector's relative low priority in USAID, perceptions that BS60 is a dead-end career track, and declining opportunities for HRDOs to use their technical skills.

2. Five of the five (100%) Mission Directors who offered their opinion disagreed (or strongly disagreed) with the statement, "Relative to USDH in other technical backstops, I feel that the overall quality of USDH education officers has improved over the past 10 years." Using their own words, three others agreed with the view that HRDO quality has recently declined. None thought that it had improved.

Suggestions for Improving Staffing in the education sector

1. Despite the shortcomings and risks cited by respondents in using non-HRDOs to manage education programs, there was fair agreement across categories on suggestions for dealing with HRDO shortages. Most common were those dealing with PSCs (and by extension TAACS, PASAs and Fellows). Authority to hire these staff should be given to field Missions, and recruitment should be made more competitive and focused on technical skills. The Agency should develop career paths for them, provide adequate orientation to USAID methods and policies and empower them with full USDH authorities.

2. Mission Directors were probed further than others on the question of how to deal with shortages of HRDOs. They replied that while HRDOs would be the preferred staff option, reality dictates consideration of other models. In addition to the suggestions provided above, they would consider the use of non-education USDH by assuring SO team members were technically strong, planning to make greater use of contractors and consultants, endeavoring to secure an exceptionally strong TA team, and perhaps reducing or reshaping the scope of the program.

3. Suggestions concerning FSNs were also common across respondent categories, and similar in nature to those for PSCs. Improvements in FSN recruitment, training, career opportunities and benefits were mentioned. Promising FSN performers should be delegated more authority and provided opportunities to visit and/or work in other countries and USAID/W to broaden their development perspective.

4. HRDOs suggested more BS-60s should be hired, especially IDIs, but that recruitment needs to be made more strategic and rigorous.

5. Many respondents mentioned that USAID needs to provide more and better training and technical backstopping to all categories of staff working with education programs. Recent efforts by AFR/SD was cited by several as a good model that should be build upon and expanded.

6. There were a few suggestions for making more efficient use of existing USAID staff. These

included designing programs with more focus, minimizing USAID requirements that have little effect on program performance and giving more program management and implementation responsibilities to contractors, grantees and private local organizations.

Conclusion

One cannot ignore the widespread observation that the HRDO corps is in decline. The numbers substantiate this, as do the anecdotal accounts from many survey respondents. HRDOs themselves feel little sense of belonging to a professional corps and are moreover discouraged by limited assignment opportunities that they see as career enhancing. Many also are exposed to pressures from colleagues in other backstops to leave BS-60 as a more efficient path to promotion and management positions.

The strong preference for HRDOs over other staff options to manage education programs also cannot be ignored. Mission directors and deputy directors see benefits of and prefer having HRDOs develop and manage education programs for their Missions if reasons exist to assist the sector (see Appendix 10 for a summary of their responses). As with any USAID FS officer, Missions want only strong HRDO performers to manage their education portfolios, and to be strong in the context of today's programs requires skills that were not common or emphasized in the past. They are prepared to accept others as education managers despite recognized risks and shortcomings, because they widely agree that assistance to education should not be abandoned by the Agency despite the current sad state of the HRDO corps.

To build up a strong cadre of HRDOs, several concerns will have to be addressed. First, is the belief that past recruitment efforts have been *laissez-faire* and that new hiring – whether for IDIs, mid-levels or education TAACSs – needs to be targeted to those with skills more closely aligned with current education programs, e.g., graduates of international education programs. Second, there is a need to delineate more precisely the functions an HRDO is expected to perform in managing education SOs, working with SO team members and dealing with outside partners and donors. Third, opportunities are almost totally lacking, except in the Africa Bureau, for HRDOs to share their SO management program results experiences, and to become current with new education program concepts and strategies. This last concern is particularly widely felt by HRDOs and across other respondent categories. USAID, therefore, needs to be more deliberate and comprehensive in addressing the training and mentoring needs of its education program management staff. Even with the strengthened recruitment efforts argued for in this report, new employees will not be job-ready when or soon after they are hired. A program to orient and mentor these new employees as well as to update existing staff is critically needed.

Recent AFR/SD efforts to systematically monitor, report and share through workshops the lessons learned in the Bureau's education policy reform based programs of the 1990s are worth expanding and deepening. Such training and/or mentoring needs can be met in several ways, including annual regional and/or worldwide workshops, regular "counseling" visits to Missions (perhaps by roving mentors with proven abilities to link education development theory with practical field lessons), and use of distance education and information technology methods such as audio/video-conferencing.

Topics deserving particular attention in such programs include, social sector development theory and assistance models (including community action and participation models), policy dialogue and negotiation techniques, social sector/public policy formation and reform (theory and practice), education economics and financing, education systems development and sector performance monitoring, various technical issues such as classroom and school based improvement models, and team management and partnering skills.

V. Summary Conclusions

1. Strong HRDOs are the best bet but a rare commodity. Other options are workable, but not without costs and risks. There is broad consensus among Mission managers, HRDOs and others with first-hand knowledge of USAID education efforts that education sector program design and management by a technically strong HRDO is generally the best option for USAID. Other staffing options may be necessary in times of scarce OE resources, and can be effective, but these are more risky and impose additional burdens on the Mission. Unfortunately, the corps of HRDOs has been seriously depleted. It needs to be enlarged, re-invigorated, and re-oriented.

   In most instances, having non-education USDH manage education programs is believed to result in serious shortcomings in technical interactions (quality and frequency) with partners and donors, and less engagement in sector issues within and outside the Mission. There is also wide belief that non-USDH (US-PSCs and FSNs/TCNs) who are put in charge of education programs are handicapped due to their lower status in the Mission organizational hierarchy, authorities that are circumscribed by USAID rules and regulations, and unfamiliarity in accessing other resources and support, e.g., from USAID/W. The chart below portrays these views in terms of staff type and program management effectiveness.

Education Program Management Effectiveness



2. New approaches to education support need to be widely shared and better understood. Rather than top-down vertical, input-focused interventions common in USAID projects in the 1970s and 80s, broad-based sector reform efforts, involving policy, financing, pluralism and grass roots initiatives, such as those pursued in the 1990s in Africa, will likely continue as USAID's approach to education improvement. Skills to provide effective management of such programs derive from a core knowledge of education principles and processes such as any educator will possess, but need to be enhanced through more orientation and training in USAID's development settings.

3. Education staff of all types need new and different skills to be effective. Developing and managing basic education programs for USAID requires different skills today than ten years ago. There is less need for expertise in specific technical areas, such as curriculum design, teacher training and non-formal education, but better understanding of inter and intra-sector linkages as well as of broader social sector policy and financing issues. Training in team and resource management and negotiation deserves particular attention. Also, in light of recent emphasis on partnership and donor interaction, there is heightened need for staff of all categories to become more skilled and comfortable in this arena.

4. There appears to be an imbalance in and misallocation of existing HRDO staff, despite a preference in the field for such personnel. Education Officers have the smallest professional corps compared to the three other sectors examined (agriculture, health/population, environment). While the recent R4 reports project a slight decrease (of 1) in demand for HRDOs from 1998 to 2001, the use of non-USDH for education program management remains highest (7.6 non-USDH for each HRDO) among four other sectors examined (agriculture, health/population, environment, democracy). Of the 18 Missions with education SOs or IRs reviewed, 13 are managed by USDH, and only 9 (50%) are managed by HRDOs. Finally, of the 18 USDH Foreign Service Officers listed as having education as their primary skill code, 11 are currently posted to Missions, and of these only 8 are managing education programs.

5. USAID needs to be more deliberate and comprehensive in addressing the training and mentoring needs of its education program management staff. Even with the strengthened recruitment efforts argued for in this report, new employees will not be job-ready when or soon after they are hired. A program to orient and mentor these new employees as well as to update existing staff is critically needed.

Annexes

1. Summary Table of Responses
2. Survey Questions
3. List of Respondents
4. Scope of Work

Annex 1

Annex 1: Response Summary (n=40, 71%)

Respondent by Category	Functions best/only performed by HRDOs	Program effects of using non-ed USDH	Program effects of using non-USDH ed spec'lsts	Suggestions for better staffing of ed programs	Quality & treatment of HRDO backstop	Ed progr decisions depend on HRDO?
USDH HRDOs (n=11, 39%)	Policy dialogue Negotiation with HG Represent the USG Donor coordination Partner collaboration Sector leadership Sector analysis Advocate for sector Program guidance Solve prog. bottlenecks Prog. design/monitor Staffing matters Funds management Procurement "Show the flag" Deal with press	Generally, Non-Ed USDH mgmt of ed prog has flawed, esp in policy arena Ed progs in Malawi, Mali, Guatemala, India, Ecuador, Haiti, have suffered Uganda is exception, but result of unique factors Non-Ed USDH can be good manages, but lack sector vision Lack credibility/respect with counterparts Can't provide tech direction nor tech judgements Bad/delayed decisions Slow implementation & waste resources Ed progs managed by Non-Ed USDH seen as low AID priority by HG, donors & NGOs	PSCs, can be effective if technically skilled & know AID processes PSCs can't compete for resources due to lower status & authorities With support of a tech strong SOT, PSCs cand do well in day-to-day program mgtmt If PSC hired through wide competitive process can be tech strong (stronger than HRDO), & effective, but often PSCs are spouses of USG staff, with weak tech skills PSCs may lack commitment to AID, USG interests & ed sector PSCs had problems with ed progs in Ghana, Namibia & Malawi; did well in Benin & Guinea FSNs & TCNs lack status in Missions Legal constraints limit their effectiveness FSNs tend to be cautious, deferential, non-objective Many FSNs hired for english vs tech skills Good FSNs hard to retain Partners view FSNsas reflecting low AID priority for sector	Strategic HRDO hiring Resume hiring Ed IDIs Re-hire RIFed HRDOs Hire education TAACS Hire stronger PSCs Enhance FSN roles Enhance FSN benefits Provide trg to any/all who manage ed progs Ease hiring processes Let Missions/SOTs decide staff levels Give field authority on PSCs Rationalize BS60s with positions Focus programs to reduce mgmt/staff needs Transfer funds to IPOs, eg, UNICEF	Shortage exists of viable, strong BS60s HRDO corps needs new blood & ideas Personnel system gives low priority for hiring BS60s Personnel system gives low priority for hiring BS60s Recruit strategically, but incentives low for strong applicants IDIs hired in 90s lack experience & vision No sense of prof'l corps Low reputation in AID Hard to tell real BS60s G/HCD does little to enhance status of BS; AFR does better BS60s need recharging & more trg IDIs in 90s had premature, unmentored postings Perception in 60s in a dead-end BS and are pressured to leave For senior mgmt, must leave BS60 High attrition yields more junior corps RIF hit BS60s hardest	N/A (question only asked of Mission Directors & Deputies

Respondent by Category	Functions best/only performed by HRDOs	Program effects of using non-ed USDH	Program effects of using non-USDH ed specialists	Suggestions for better staffing of ed programs	Quality & treatment of HRDO backstop	Ed prog decisions depend on HRDO?
Mission Directors/Deputies (n=13, 68%)	Policy dialogue/reform Negotiating reform Represent the USG Donor contacts Partner Collaboration Policy reform analysis Follow sector trends Project design Tech advice to MD Resourcefulness in AID Contract management Procuring services SOW development Funds accountability FSN staff development 5 (of 6) MDs agreed ed program design/mgmt best performed by USDH staff	For Non-Ed USDH to work best, must have strong mgmt & inter-personal skills, able to rely on tech skills of other staff, have strong TA team & program that is well designed (by an HRDO) Trade-offs can include weaker design of ed Rps (Zambia), difficulty accessing tech resources (eg, in AID/W), more passive role in sector dialogue (less influence with donors & stature in HG), less critical eval of proposals; reduced cooperative partnerships with grantees & increased burdens on Mission management Four (of 7) MDs disagree that Non-Ed USDHs can do acceptable or better job managing ed progs	PSCs can work well, but often more burden on Mission management Not preferred solution; used due to scarce staff Can be costly as USDH, and have only limited loyalty to AID vis-a-vis grantees FSNs key to program impact, & important for insights on local realities Main FSN role in day-to-day prog support & monitoring AID needs to improve recruiting, training & retaining FSNs FSNs often hired more for enlish than tech skills Good FSNS hard to retain Four (of 7) MDs disagree that Non-USDH ed spec's can do acceptable/better job managing ed programs	Give USDH authority to non-USDH Hire more TAACs, PASAs, PSC, Fellows Provide career paths for PSCs Team PSCs with good generalist USDHs More trg for PSCs Enhance role of FSNs More trg and internat'l exposure for FSNs Increase G Bureau design & implementation of field programs Assure strong TA teams 8 (of 8) MDs agree support to education should continue even w/out HRDOs	HRDOs are a vanishing breed, HRDOs depleted by RIF and retirements Best HRDOs were fired Hard to find HRDOs, esp for hardship posts Recovery of BS will take long time 10-year view of sector support needed, followed by new hiring Good HRDOs must be multi-dimensional; policy oriented, up-to-date, skillful in AID PHN & AGR are technically stronger Bss 5 MDs (of 5 with opinions) believe HRDO quality has declined	Ideal to have HRDO design & manage ed program, but not realistic to expect Need for HRDO less important to manage ongoing program Can use consults & contractors instead of USDH Can manage with Non-Ed USDH and tech support staff 6 (of 9) MDs feel availability of HRDO would not seriously influence decision on ed program support (but scope/shape of ed program may be influenced)

Respondent by Category	Functions best/only performed by HRDOs	Program effects of using non-ed USDH	Program effects of using non-USDH ed spec'lsts	Suggestions for better staffing of ed programs	Quality & treatment of HRDO backstop	Ed progr decisions depend on HRDO?
Other USDH (n=3, 60%)	Policy dialogue Represent the USG Donor collaboration Program Management	For model to work, Non-Ed USDH must be strong manager & able to use staff (with tech skills) Under Non-Ed USDH mgmt, ed programs in India doing well, but in Nepal and Ethiopia problems exist	Morocco ed activity doing well under mgmt of FSN Kenya makes good use of FSNs& PSCs as prog managers, but roles limited by AID regulations Common constraint to FSN effectiveness is inability of supervisors to use them well	Give Mission total flexibility on staffing Improve mgmt skills of supervisors	HRDO corps is weak & weaker than others Hiring methods random, yielding mediocre recruits Hard to hire/keep BS60s when tech role declining Rewards and pressures exist for leaving BS60	N/A (question only asked of Mission Directors & Deputies)

Respondent by Category	Functions best/only performed by HRDOs	Program effects of using non-ed USDH	Program effects of using non-USDH ed spec'lsts	Suggestions for better staffing of ed programs	Quality & treatment of HRDO backstop	Ed progr decisions depend on HRDO?
Non-AID Education Specialists (n=9, 100%)	Policy dialogue Negotiate with HG Represent the USG Donor collaboration Interact with partners on technical matters Advocate sector needs Develop programs Guide/monitor program Manage NPA component Fulfill reporting needs Judge tech soundness Mesh sector-AID needs Provide objectivity Provide institut'l memory Interpret AID policies Guide to AID systems Inform about resources Solve prog bottlenecks Contract tech mgmt Support Embassy interests (To one respondent there are no functions only/best done by USDH)	Non-Ed USDHs can be effective if they recognize their tech limits, & consult with & use staff well; but such qualities are rare Generalists hesitate to engage tech problems & interact with counterparts; but rely too much on FSNs and others Programs can suffer absent good tech direction Decisions take longer due to subject unfamiliarity Conflicts with TA can result when tech direction role is abused Non-Ed USDH don't advocate in the Mission for the sector Extra burdens fall to TA team Mission Directors get involved in issues otherwise avoided by timely tech intervention In AFR, in only 1 of 5 Missions has mgmt by Non-Ed USDH worked satisfactorily Malawi is example where this model hasn't worked	A US-PSC can be an effective substitute for USDH HRDO if rigorously recruited, has good interpersonal qualities, and enjoys support of Mission Director A good PSC ed specialist will do a better job than a USDH generalist Often PSCs not hired for their tech skills, not well managed, and limited authorities constrain their actions and AID loyalties Some PSCs micro-manage prog implementers, & lack experience with other AID progs to draw upon FSNs bring deep local knowledge but limited understanding of AID's broad interests, strategies and processes Their lack of int'l exposure and experience limits their vision, ideas and resourcefulness FSNs don't function well as strategic managers, but tend to be assigned menial prog work Many FSNs are hired for english vs tech skills; & good ones not paid well	Rely more on PSCs, contractors, local firms Build up AID technical support capacity, eg, AFR/SD Better orient non-HRDOs for postings More trg & expereince sharing for all ed staff, esp in areas of dev't theory, mgmt/supervision, & negotiation Develop cadre of traveling trainers & mentors in ed Use IT more for trg & dissemination Streamline decision-making Develop reg'l strategies & tighter design criteria Focus ed prog efforts to reduce mgmt burder Reduce reporting requirements and other non-productive aspects of USDH work Provide incentives for prof upgrading (One respondent believes no staff model works well, but a new approach is needed)	Generally, HRDO quality has degraded although some are stronger now than those 10 years ago Strong BS60s exist, but by chance, not plan Newer HRDOs less experienced, less knowledgable of AID, & tend to micro-manage & exert too much control Some are reticent in dealing with HG & donors on substantive issues HRDOs need upgrading in mgmt & social & policy change theory More HRDOs needed, esp in AFR Good BS60s RIFed, transferred or retired Preserve AID's lead role with donors in sector by better hiring & retaining BS60s BS60s not well recruited or rewarded New hires must be knowledgeable in tech & social policy issues AID career not as attractive for tech strong BS60s as before HRDOs tech skills atrophy from disuse AID bureaucracy works	N/A (question only asked of Mission Directors & Deputies)

Respondent by Category	Functions best/only performed by HRDOs	Program effects of using non-ed USDH	Program effects of using non-USDH ed spec'lsts	Suggestions for better staffing of ed programs	Quality & treatment of HRDO backstop	Ed progr decisions depend on HRDO?
FSNs/TCNs (n=4, 80%)	Counterpart dialogue Sector/trend analysis Design programs Judge tech soundness Offer sound solutions Overall program mgmt	Non-Ed USDH can be effective if program is well running, is teamed with tech skilled staff, and is able/willing to use them	TCNs and FSNs can be effective under right conditions (able and confident supervisor) Often strengths are not fully utilized They suffer from low status in AID organization, restricted authorities, limited access to contacts (eg in AID/W) & can't entertain officially FSN communication skills are generally weak FSNs with strong tech & mgmt skills scarce, in high demand & hard to retain	PSCs must be competent Use skills of TCNs & FSNs better Give FSNs more trg & int'l & AID/W exposure Provide FSNs/TCNs with more authorities & pay Focus USDH role on higher level issues Support USDH non-ed staff with S/T consultants Give more program mgmt to HG and/or contractors		N/A (question only asked of Mission Directors & Deputies)

Annex 2

Survey Questions

A. Questions for Mission Directors/Deputies

Version 1

1. From your observation, what are the roles/responsibilities in developing and managing education sector programs that are best performed, or can only be performed, by a USDH?

2. If you have had experience using USDH non-education specialists (e.g., GDOs, HPNs, PDOs) to perform the development/management function of education programs:

   a. What was the effect of this staffing model on the Mission and/or the program?
   b. Was the effect caused more by personal strengths/weaknesses, or by the staffing model itself? Please explain.

3. If you have had experience using non-USDH staff (e.g., US-PSCs, PASAs, FSNs/TCNs) to perform the development/management function of education programs:

   a. What was the effect of this staffing model on the Mission and/or the program?
   b. Was the effect caused more by personal strengths/weaknesses, or by the staffing model itself? Please explain, detailing the type(s) of non-USDH staff used and how they were situated in the Mission organization.

4. If shortages of technical staff are to continue, are there other options the Agency should consider (assuming policy or regulation changes as necessary) in order for its programs in the education sector to be adequately designed and managed?

5. In considering whether to develop a new/follow-on education program, how significant would the anticipated availability of an experienced USDH education officer to fill a Mission position be?

6. What is your assessment of the quality and availability of FS education officers, compared to those in other technical backstops and compared to 5 to 10 years ago?

Version 2

Respond to the following statements with:

0 – no opinion
1 – strongly disagree
2 – disagree
3 – agree
4 – strongly agree

1. From my personal experience, the design and/or management functions of education programs are best performed by a USDH compared to others such as US-PSCs, FSNs/TCNs. PASAs.

2. From my personal experience, USDH non-education specialists (e.g., GDOs, HPNs, PDOs) can usually be relied upon do an acceptable to excellent job of designing and/or managing education programs.

3. From my personal experience, non-USDH staff (e.g., US-PSCs, FSNs/TCNs, PASAs) can usually be relied up to do an acceptable to excellent job of designing and/or managing education programs.

4. If shortages of USDH education officers are to continue, the Agency should use other types of staff (e.g., US-PSCs, FSNs/TCNs, PASAs, TAACS, Fellows), rather than abandon its assistance efforts in the sector.

5. My decision to develop a new or follow-on education program would be significantly influenced by the anticipated availability of an experienced USDH education officer to fill a Mission position.

6. Relative to USDH in other technical backstops, I feel that the overall quality of USDH education officers has improved over the past 10 years.

B. Questions for USDH Education Officers

1. What, if any, are the functions you perform as the developer/manager or leader of an education SO/SpO/IR, that can only be done by you as a USDH?

2. If you have experience with non-USDH (e.g., FSNs/TCNs, US-PSCs, RSSAs/PASAs, institutional contractors) assuming roles/responsibilities that otherwise you would perform, what has been the effect on the program and/or the Mission?

3. If you have experience with or knowledge of USDH non-education officers (e.g., GDOs, HPNs, PDOs) taking on education program or SO/RP responsibilities, what has been the effect on the program and/or the Mission?

4. If shortages of technical staff are to continue, are there other options the Agency should consider (assuming policy or regulation changes as necessary) in order for its programs in the education sector to be adequately designed and managed?

5. Relative to other USDH technical backstops, how do you feel about the way the Agency recruits, retains and rewards its education officers?

C. Questions for Non-Education USDH and Non-USAID Education Specialists (Institutional Contractors, US-PSCs, Fellows, RSSAs, etc.)

1. To your knowledge, what, if any, are the functions of USAID direct-hire education officers that are best, or can only be, performed by them as compared to other USAID American or non-American staff?

2. If you have had experience with USAID staff who are not US direct-hire education sector specialists (e.g., direct hire generalists/program officers, host country staff, US personal services contractors) who provided the overall management/monitoring role for an education program, what was the effect on the program and/or support to the implementation contractor?

3. What are some other ways, if any, USAID can/should provide effective professional support to its education sector programs other than staffing approaches used to date?

4. Over the past 10 years, what, if any, changes have you noticed in the quality of USAID's US direct-hire education officers?

Questions for FSNs/TCNs

1. How important is it for the USDH employee to have expertise in the sector, particularly if that expertise can be gotten through other staff such as FSNs, TCNs, contractors/consultants? In what ways does the USDH employee having the technical expertise make a difference, if at all?

2. How did you as a human resource development expert feel constrained in what you did because of your FSN/TCN status? Are there ways that USAID could have better used your skills to support the program than it did, whether because of regulatory constraints or for other reasons?

3. Since USDH staff shortages are likely to continue, USAID wants to explore all options for maximizing use of its existing cadre of technical personnel, both American and non-American. How can/should this be done from your perspective?

Annex 3

List of Respondents

USAID USDH Education Officers

1. Emily Vargas-Baron, G/HCD
2. Julie Owen-Rea, AFR/SD/HRD
3. David Evans, LAC/RSD/EHR
4. Patrick Fine, USAID/South Africa
5. Marion Warren, ANE/ORA
6. Peter Kresge, USAID/Ghana
7. Sarah Wright, USAID/Malawi
8. Steve Grant, USAID/El Salvador
9. Lisa Franchette, USAID/South Africa
10. Susie Clay, G/WID
11. Jim Hoxeng, G/HCD/BELS

USAID Mission Directors/Deputies (current/former)

1. David Eckerson, USAID/Ethiopia
2. Walter North, USAID /Zambia
3. Terry Myers, USAID/Indonesia
4. George Carner, Director, USAID/Guatemala
5. Dawn Laberi, USAID/Uganda
6. Phylis Dichter-Forbes, USAID/Haiti
7. Dwight Smith (Acting), USAID/Malawi
8. Kenneth Ellis, Director, USAID/El Salvador
9. Thomas Park, USAID/Benin
10. Joanne Hale, USAID/Nepal
11. Elena Brineman, , USAID/Honduras
12. Joel Schlesinger, DAA/LEG & PB/AFRS (formerly USAID/Mali)
13. David Johnston, USAID/Nepal

Other USAID USDH (current/former)

1. Elizabeth Warfield, ANE/SEA/SPA
2. Marcie Bernbaum, formerly with PPC/CDIE, LAC Bureau, M/HRDM/TRG, USAID/Kenya
3. Bill Douglass, USAID/Nepal

USAID FSN/TCN Education Staff

1. Isla Winarto, IDP/Indonesia (formerly with USAID/Indonesia)
2. Tassew Zewdie, USAID/Ethiopia
3. Christine Kiganda, formerly with USAID/Uganda
4. Monique Bidaoui, USAID/Morocco

Non-USDH Education Specialists

1. Marcia Ellis, Vice President, Academy for Educational Development (former US-PSC)
2. Bill Kromer, Uganda SUPER Project AED Chief of Party
3. Karen Tietjen, Consultant (former RSSA with AFR/SD)
4. Ash Hartwell, American Institute of Research
5. Joe DeStefano, Learning Communities Network (former RSSA with Afr/SD)
6. Tom Tilson, Ethiopia BESO Project AED Chief of Party
7. Sue Grant-Lewis, Harvard University Grad School of Ed (former AAAS Fellow, US-PSC)
8. Wes Synder, Harvard Institute for International Development (former Chief of Party)
9. Mitch Kirby, DOL/RSSA, AFR/SD/HRD

Annex 4

Scope of Work
for
USAID Education Staffing Study

Background

As part of an ongoing workforce analysis, the Agency has been examining the appropriate levels and types of staffing to meet its program management needs. A key element of this discussion is the need for and the role of technical staff. With increasingly reduced staffing levels in the Agency, the mix of technical staff, i.e., education, health, democracy, environment, etc., and the placement of technical staff need to be clarified. This short-term analysis is designed to help refine the issue of where direct hire education technical staff are most needed and effective in terms of enabling us to achieve results. AED, with support from MSI, is being asked to identify the role and Avalue-added@ of U.S. direct hire technical staff in policy dialogue, strategic planning, program design, project implementation and monitoring of AID and host country performance in the education sector.

Purpose

The purpose of the analysis is to clearly articulate the roles and responsibilities of education technical field staff, including U.S. direct hire and others, and to identify relationships (if any) that exist between various staffing structures and program results. The study will attempt to answer the following questions:

AED Analysis:

1. Describe how the technical and management responsibilities of the USDH education officer and other education staff have changed in past 10 years due to nature of programs, changes in USAID policies and priorities, downsizing, etc. Describe formal and non-formal roles and responsibilities for missions in managing an education program, especially in light of SOs/IRs, SOTs, RFs. Identify the clearly critical/non-critical roles of various technical staff in the field.

2. In the absence of USDH education officers, describe various means used to provide support to the development and implementation of field education programs, i.e., new education recruits, non-education USDHs, US-PSCs, TCNs, FSNs, RSSAs, AAAS Fellows, institutional contractors (AID/W- and field-based), etc.

3. Provide examples and describe perceived effectiveness of the different staffing/support models. Cite where/how management and/or technical capacity, or lack thereof, has affected the planning, design, implementation and outcomes of education programs. Identify, if any, the relationship between the staffing structure and results.

4. Provide examples where education program development decisions were made, deferred, or rejected based (in part) on the availability of USDH education officers.

5. As a framework to analyze the need for additional education officers, describe the characteristics of the professional corps of direct hire education officers, including their recruitment, retention and career incentives.

MSI Analysis:

Questions

1. What are the comparative trends for the number of overseas technical USDH staff among selected sectors compared to funding for the sector?

2. What are the actual staffing and projected (market demand) staffing for USDH technical staff and non-USDH technical staff among selected sectors in the field?

3. Where are the present backstop 60 positions and who fills them?

4. Who is managing the education project work in the field?

5. Where are the USDH FS employees with primary skill code 600?

Possible Data Sources: M/HR, PRISM, APRs, R4s, CPs.

Methodology

AED & MSI will conduct interviews with key informants, review relevant documents and examine all data available for trends in funding and staffing. Informant interviews will involve USAID/W staff responsible for education program and personnel issues, USAID field staff with direct or supervisory responsibility for basic education program development and implementation (including Mission Directors and Deputy Directors), and others who interact with education field staff on a regular and professional basis (e.g., implementation contractors), and other technical staff (FSNs, RSSAs, PASAs, US-PSCs, US-TCNs, etc) . Documents for review will include recent Agency workforce analyses, Annual Performance Reports, R4 reports and syntheses, Mission implementation reports and evaluations, and other summaries of education program performance for selected USAID missions. Data sources for the quantitative analysis will include Agency historical funding by earmark, ACSI codes, and staffing databases.