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

Civil Society and Democratic Development: *A CDIE Evaluation Design Paper*

February 1994

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CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT
A CDIE Evaluation Design Paper

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CONTENTS

Purpose and scope of the study: an overview 1
- This evaluation 2
- A qualification to the evaluation 3

Audience and use of findings 4

Defining democracy and "civil society" 4
- Democracy 4
- Civil society 4

Civil society and democracy 8
- What to include 8
- Widening participation 9
- Deepening policy accountability 9

Supporting civil society: two basic strategies 10
- Sequencing the strategies 11
- Limitations of civil society 12

A model for civil society and democratic development 13
- The presence of "other factors." 15
- Two levels of analysis 15

Civil society development strategies 16

Questions and issues to be addressed 20

Assessing civil society 20
- The enabling environment for civil society 21
- Institutional structure and strength 22
- Institutional activities and their impact 24
  - CSO activities 24
  - Civil society impact on state policy 25
  - Policy impact on democratic development 27
- USAID (and other donor) impact on civil society and democratic development 28

Secondary issues for study 30
- Sustainability, pluralist competition and corporatism 30
- Problems with success 31
- Sectoral differences 31
- Sequencing and strategies 32
- Host country policy framework 32
- Civil society and "distortions" 32

Conducting the field study 33
- Field study methodology 34
- Field study teams 34
- Bangladesh: a pilot study 34
- Selecting CSOs for study 35
- Subsequent country studies 35
- Country sample 36

General references 39

Bangladesh NGO references 43

Appendix A. USAID project activity in the civil society area 45

Appendix B. USAID assistance for democracy promotion activities, FY 1991-FY1993 48

Appendix C. Field research agenda: key questions and assessment methodology 49

Figures and Tables

Figure 1. Relationship of civil society organizations to NGOs and society 7
Figure 2. Civil society and democratic development 14
Figure 3. Field study timetable, 1994 38

Table 1. Levels of analysis in assessing civil society and democratic development 16
Table 2. Development strategies incorporating civil society 19
Table 3. An enabling environment for civil society 22
Table 4. Institutional structure and strength 23
Table 5. CSO activities 24
Table 6. Civil society impact on state policy 26
Table 7. Policy impact on democratic development 27
Table 8. Donor impact on civil society and democratic development 29

CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT
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Purpose and scope of the study: an overview

Among programmatic initiatives in recent years, democracy represents a fundamentally new direction in which USAID seeks to move. For the Clinton Administration, it has been declared as one of the four core areas — along with economic growth, environment, and population and health — that will be accorded top priority in the Agency's overall goal of promoting sustainable development (see USAID 1994).

Although since the 1960s USAID has had little background in promoting democracy as such, it has accumulated considerable experience at supporting various component parts of democracy as aspects of activities in other sectors, and it behooves the Agency to evaluate this experience as it charts its course in promoting democratic development in the 1990s.

One of those component parts is "civil society" — the wide range of voluntary associations that occupy the broad terrain between the individual and the state, and which are the primary means by which citizens can articulate their interests to both the state and to the society at large (the concept is delineated in more detail below). In some ways, the importance of civil society has been recognized. For instance, in its 1991 Democracy and Governance policy paper, the Agency points to civil society (along with elections, representative political institutions and free informational flows) as a key means for strengthening democratic representation. And its Democracy Strategy paper, strengthening civil society finds prominence as a key component of USAID's approach to the democracy area (A.I.D. 1991: 8; USAID 1994: 21 &ff.).

USAID has had considerable involvement with civil society development efforts, though only rarely have projects been framed to deal exclusively with civil society. More often civil society has been one among several foci included in a project, or has been an area not originally planned but taken up only during project implementation, and even then sometimes more by implication than by conscious decision. A recent estimate, made using the CDIE/DI database of USAID documents for projects active during and after FY 1985, indicated that the Agency has included what appear to be at least some civil society components in projects with a total LOP funding of more than $700 million (see Appendix A). Moreover, there is good reason to believe that this initial key-word-based search only scratches the surface.[1] Many of these

[1] In the Dominican Republic, for instance, which will likely be one of our field studies, a more intense search of the DI database revealed that, whereas in the first run (cf. Appendix A) only two projects emerged as having civil society components, in fact there have been over thirty such projects over a somewhat longer timeframe (cf. Berthin et al. 1993: Table 1). And if one were to stretch the coverage back over the Alliance for Progress

projects have been evaluated from various standpoints, but thus far they have not been assessed individually or collectively as efforts to build civil society.

Another approximation (see Appendix B) comes from a survey made by USAID for the General Accounting Office, which endeavored to pinpoint the assistance provided to civil society activities in the last several years, arriving at an estimate of $156 million during the fiscal years 1991-1993, or about 22 percent of USAID spending on democracy during this period.[2]

This evaluation. This will be the second evaluation to be undertaken by the Center for Development Information and Evaluation (CDIE) in the general area of USAID's democracy initiative, following the Rule of Law assessment that began in FY 1992 and is now essentially complete (cf. Blair and Hansen 1994).

As with CDIE evaluations generally, the civil society assessment has both retrospective and prospective goals. It will review the experience of USAID and other donors in supporting civil society to assess how such support has contributed to democratic development and how it might do so in the future. Given that the Agency does possess some significant experience at supporting civil society, the study will have a retrospective aspect, harvesting and distilling the USAID experience. At the same time, assuming that supporting democracy will be a major Agency initiative for some time to come, this study will draw out management implications relevant to prospective USAID support for civil society in the future.[3] The purposes of this evaluation, then, are to:

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era of the early 1960s, the Title IX Participation strategies of the late 1960s and the New Directions mandate of the early 1970s, the list would surely grow a great deal longer. This evaluation, however, is designed to focus on USAID and other donor experience in the more current period of democratization, what Samuel Huntington (1991-92) has called the "third wave."

[2] See GAO (1994: 12-13). If the GAO's "civil society" is interpreted more generously to incorporate the civic education ($51 million) and human rights ($48 million) categories (both of which are in large part — though not completely — included in this CDIE evaluation), the total comes to some $255 million over these three fiscal years, or about 36 percent of total USAID spending ($703 million) on the promotion of civil society-related efforts in support of democracy.

[3] Several other sectoral evaluations in the general area of NGOs and/or civil society are also under way or contemplated within the international donor community:

- CDIE has launched a sectoral evaluation of "Development through PVOs and NGOs" that will analyze the role of such organizations in promoting development generally (Barclay et al. 1993).
- The World Bank has proposed a series of studies of NGOs that focuses *inter alia* on their relationship with the state (World Bank memo 1992; see also World Bank 1992).
- The Expert Evaluation Group of the Development Assistance Committee (a unit of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) has been exploring plans for a number of evaluations under the rubric of "Participatory Development and Good Governance" (e.g., DAC 1993).

The present CDIE evaluation will be coordinated with these other efforts to the extent possible (e.g., choice of countries for case studies, exchange of preliminary findings).

- assess *recent experience* of USAID and other donors with efforts to promote democracy by supporting civil society; and
- derive implications for *future programming* in the civil society sector that would be useful to USAID.

In the civil society assessment thus far a theoretical background essay and a concept paper have been prepared (Blair 1992; Blair 1993; CDIE 1992), laying out the general ideas to be pursued in the study. The present paper builds on that concept paper as well as a subsequent draft design proposal (Hansen 1993), drawing out and modifying the ideas expressed in these two pieces while endeavoring to "operationalize" those ideas so as to enable the actual assessment to get under way. In the process of writing the draft design proposal, an initial literature search was launched, and a working bibliography has been prepared (McHugh 1993).

In this paper we will lay out a schema or model of how we believe civil society works to foster democratic development, how USAID has tried to support that dynamic and how the outcome of such supportive efforts can best be measured. Two annexes to the paper offer an illustration of how the design can be applied to assess the role of civil society in supporting democratic development in the Dominican Republic and Bangladesh as case studies, setting out first what can be learned from desk study work in Washington and then what might be assessed from a field visit to each country (Berthin et al. 1993 & 1994).

But this is only the beginning of our effort to understand how USAID as the U.S. Government's principal agency promoting Third World development can best contribute to sustainable democratic development by supporting civil society. Just as democracy in the late 1980s and early 1990s represents a sectoral area still relatively new to USAID programming, so too it is also new as an area for program evaluation. The present assessment, then, is moving in largely uncharted waters. Accordingly, we have tried to draw up an evaluation design that is sufficiently concrete and specific to get started on the task at hand, but is at the same time flexible enough to accommodate the knowledge we anticipate building up as the assessment proceeds.

A qualification to the evaluation. As mentioned earlier, only rarely has USAID built a project around civil society as its central activity. More often, civil society has been only one of several project components or absent from a project design altogether (cf. Tables 1 and 2), even though the project itself may have turned out to give substantial support to civil society by assisting NGOs to take up efforts that had (or led to) civil society consequences. Thus in a very real sense, this CDIE evaluation will assess USAID's experience along dimensions and in sectors of activity that the Agency was not consciously pursuing.

Is such an indirect approach legitimate? Two points are in order here. First, supporting democratic development will be a major thrust of USAID strategy in the 1990s, and civil society will necessarily be a central component of that thrust. Accordingly, it is essential that relevant experience in this new area be harvested and distilled, so as to inform and guide Agency strategy. Second, CDIE assessments are emphatically neither designed nor intended to be evaluations of specific Agency projects. They are not substitutes for mid-term or final project reviews. Instead they are intended to analyze USAID experience in a particular sector of activity over several countries and regions. In other words, this evaluation will not be

"grading" specific mission pr ·ects or strategies. Its intended canvas for analysis is the Agency's experience as a whole.

Audience and use of findings

This evaluation is intended for two principal audiences:

- Senior USAID managers. For the Agency's senior managers and policy makers, the study will address the central question of whether (and if so in what ways) USAID's civil society activities are effective in promoting democracy. Are they a good investment in democracy? Are there strategic policy or programming changes that might enhance civil society's contribution to democratic development?

- USAID program managers. Program and project designers at field mission and regional bureau level will be able to use this assessment to plan better future projects (or modify present ones) that include civil society components, as well as in project evaluation.

Def· ing democracy and "civil society"

Democracy. Over the millennia since Plato's Athens in the fourth century B.C.E., democracy has been defined in countless ways, but for the purposes of this evaluation, we shall specify it as having the following characteristics:[4]

- Popular sovereignty — government is *accountable* to its citizenry and it is *accessible* to them on a regular basis (i.e., through elections) as well as on a continuous basis (through the rights of petition and advocacy);
- Political equality — all citizens enjoy the full range of *human rights*, and they are allowed and encouraged to *participate* in making public policy decisions; and
- Political liberty — *freedom of speech and assembly* are guaranteed, especially for *minorities*.

Civil society[5] inhabits the area between individuals (or families) and the s ·nd is made

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[4] The following listing is adapted (with some additions) from Greenberg and Page (1993: 24-28 &ff), and is typical of contemporary formulations.

[5] The term "civil society" itself has come into the political science literature only quite recently; earlier terms with a similar meaning were "i ıterest groups" or "pressure groups," but these were applied largely to the political systems of the advanced industrial countries. Today "civil society" is the term most widely used to describe this sector in the development field. The concept itself of associational life as an essential part of democracy has a long history, of course, as the frequent references to Tocqueville (1835) in the political science literature attest.

There is considerable debate on just what should be included under the rubric of "civil society," and a consensus understanding on this issue is yet to emerge. For instance, some (e.g., Diamond 1992a) would include the media as a part of civil society (as we do), while others (e.g., Bratton 1986) would exclude it, essentially restricting the definition to voluntary organizations. For an interesting discussion of these matters, see Diamond (1992b). For a more philosophical approach to defining civil society, see Blaney and Pasha (1993).

up of associational groupings of all sorts. In its widest sense, civil society would range from political parties on the more public side of this terrain over to business corporations on the more private side, and it would include groups aiming to influence the formation and implementation of public policy as well as groups that had no concern for the public domain at all.

From the CDIE evaluation standpoint, however, it makes sense to narrow the definition of civil society so that it embraces primarily non-governmental organizations emphasizing public rather than private goals, i.e., voluntary groups concerned *inter alia* with influencing state policy. At the same time, they are essentially autonomous from the state, i.e., they are not a part of the state or creatures of it. A concentration on influencing the state need not be an NGO's principal concern for it to be of interest here, but such a focus must be at least potentially a significant part of the group's activities. For the most part we would exclude such essentially single-purpose organizations as an individual business enterprise, a single labor union or a political party; the firm's main goal is to make a profit, while the union's is to further the interests of its members vis-à-vis those of the firms where they work, and the party's is to take over state power (as opposed to influencing it, as with the institutions of civil society).[7]

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[6] The "state" as used in this paper has been in widespread usage at least since the mid-1980s – longer than "civil society" but still relatively new in its meaning here as the whole set of governmental organizations, ranging from local to national, that make and enforce rules for the society. The state is thus not only the political leadership or the bureaucracy, and it does not exist only at the national or (as in the United States) intermediate level, but rather it is the collectivity of office-holding political leaders and bureaucracy at all levels. For an overview of recent analyses of the concept of "the state," see Skocpol (1985) and Rueschemeyer and Evans (1985); for a critique, see Almond (1988).

[7] Some political parties might get included in civil society by this definition, if their primary goal is to act as a pressure group rather than take power; the Green Party in Germany would be an example here. The number of such parties in the Third World is probably small, however, especially in the absence of the proportional representation electoral systems that tend to encourage their continuance in the Western European political scene.

Another reason to exclude political parties as such from the definition of civil society is that the corpus of research and literature in political science on parties is so large that to include them in any credible way would mean having to devote a great deal of effort to them, which would necessarily come at the expense of analyzing other elements of civil society. Assessing the donor experience here would also add a new dimension to the evaluation, given the large role that the National Endowment for Democracy, the National Democratic Institute and the National Republican Institute have all played in this field. To assess their activities would in essence be a separate evaluational exercise, far outside the scope of the current one. At some future point, a CDIE evaluation of donor support for political parties may be undertaken.

In its *Democracy and Governance* policy paper, USAID at one point includes under civil society "professional associations, civic groups, labor organizations, business groups and other non-governmental advocacy groups" (1991: 8). In the same document at another place, the definition is considerably broader: "a wide variety of organizations, from political parties through national professional associations (such as legal, medical and business societies or societies of chartered accountants), to research institutes (universities, academies or private think tanks) and associations of citizens (neighborhood community organizations, labor unions, women's organizations or parent-teacher associations)" (ibid.: 6). For the present CDIE evaluation, the shorter definition is closer to the mark.

Needless to say, our definition will have to be flexible enough to encompass the various settings in which USAID operates. In countries where individual business firms or labor unions have great influence on state policy but are not actually part of the state, they would included as part of civil society. And in all cases, we would seek to include associations of firms (e.g., chambers of commerce, trade associations) and unions (e.g., trade union congresses), which generally have as one of their central purposes to influence the state.[8]

The characteristic institution of civil society is what we may call a "civil society organization" (CSO), which can be defined as a non-governmental organization (NGO)[9] that has as one of its primary purposes influencing public policy. Thus while some NGOs are CSOs, many — in fact probably most — NGOs are not. In most Third World systems, only a portion of the total society is included within the total universe of NGOs, and only a portion of all NGOs are also CSOs, as indicated in Figure 1. We should emphasize at this point that CSOs should be interpreted to be the full universe of non-governmental organizations that try to influence state policy — those supported by USAID, by other donors, and those receiving no foreign support. We intend to look at all three types, but our attention will focus principally on the first two.

A critical issue with respect to CSOs is that of autonomy from the state. In the former Communist systems of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, most associations were of course notoriously creatures of the state, but a lack of autonomy has also characterized much of associational life in many corporatist political systems, as in Latin America. Still other organizations that would seem at first blush to be fully autonomous turn out on investigation to be much less so, as with associations reliant on state subsidies, newspapers dependent on government advertisements, etc. In some nominally democratic countries, key associations may be so constrained by ties to the state that civil society is at most only embryonic or incipient. In still others, oligarchies may exercise such pervasive influence over public life that they have for all practical purposes become the state, squeezing out any genuine civil society in the process. There would appear to be some kind of spectrum between CSOs with little-to-no influence on the state and oligarchies or elites that have in effect taken over the state.

One important research issue for this study, then, will be to address the autonomy issue. We want to focus on the middle part of the spectrum, but we intend also to be attentive to its edges, especially to presently powerless CSOs that could become players in civil society on the one end and overweening oligarchs whose grip might be pried loose from the state on the other end.

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[8] We should emphasize that we do not intend in this assessment to look at *all* actors or agencies that affect state behavior — only at civil society actors. There are, of course, many other factors influencing state behavior, such as the economy, culture and even individuals (see the discussion of Figure 2, further on in the text), but we are focusing on civil society in this role.

[9] In the present paper, we have followed the most prevalent usage within USAID in employing the term NGO to refer to domestic LDC institutions, while reserving the term "private voluntary organization" (PVO) for American-based organizations.



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The media do not fit neatly into the framework constructed thus far, for a newspaper or broadcast station is more in the nature of an individual firm than a voluntary association. Moreover, the media as an entity are not so much *organizations* like CSOs but rather are a *process*, somewhat like strikes, demonstrations, mobilization drives and the like. But the media have a special quality as a process in view of their critical role in ensuring transparency and accountability and in publicizing citizen opinion such that we include them in our definition of civil society.[10]

[10] Another way to put the importance of the media here is to observe that civil society and democracy could function effectively without processions and demonstrations (provided other avenues of public expression such as lobbying or petitioning or strikes were available), but they could not function without free media, because there really is no "other avenue" to call in as a substitute for the media. It is difficult to imagine a vibrant civil society (or even one that works very well at all) without free media. The opposite holds true as well: to the extent that the media are suppressed or controlled by the state, civil society suffers.

One useful way to think of civil society is to characterize it as having a kind of "in-betweenness." In its usual definition, civil society lies between the state on one side and the individual or family on the other. But civil society also sits between what is usually thought of as the public and private sectors (some writers see it as a "third sector" in addition to these two). And there is an additional dimension as well, in that CSOs are usually not (although some may be) profit-seeking, but neither are they generally what we think of as non-profit, service providing organizations (though at times they might be).

To sum up, civil society comprises the collectivity of those social organizations that:

- enjoy a significant degree of autonomy from the state; and
- have as one important goal among others to influence the state on behalf of their members.

Civil society and democracy

At its highest and most general level, civil society (or the CSO) organizes people to act outside government for one or more of four basic ends:

- delivery of goods and/or services (the traditional role of NGOs in the development sphere, which is continued by many CSOs);
- self-governance, in which the CSO acts as a supplement or substitute for the state in formulating and maintaining rules of behavior;
- participation, i.e., enabling and/or empowering citizens to take part in public life; and
- accountability or advocacy, i.e., pressing the state on policy issues to become more responsive to its citizenry.

What to include. Taken collectively, the four ends listed just above can be considered as the overall purpose of donor-assisted efforts to promote civil society. All four ends are important, and the last three relate directly to democracy, but this study will focus principally on the latter two. We exclude CSO delivery functions because, unlike the other three functions, they belong essentially to the wider universe of NGOs in general and would best be evaluated under that rubric.

We also exclude self-governance, for while it is indeed a strong and even fundamental aspect of democratization in some countries,[11] it would make the present study largely unmanage-

[11] e.g., in many African systems, where the state is in effect incapable of acting as such, particularly at the local level. At a deeper level, it can be argued that past experience in self-governance is the key variable in making for an effective democratic state (see Putnam 1993); by this reasoning, self-governance should be accorded a very high priority in civil society programming. On the other hand, it can also be argued that, because self-governance through NGOs is necessarily limited to local level and a relatively small scope, in the end it must be the state that delivers the bulk of the developmental goods. As one observer puts it, "NGO projects are important, but they do not by themselves provide solutions to problems on a national scale" (Clark 1991: 65). Accordingly, the third and fourth functions of civil society — participation and accountability — must assume a higher priority over the long run than self-governance. For alternative but essentially similar interpretations

able. By spreading the analytical scope too wide, we would make it too thin to produce a useful piece of work. The governance functions of civil society will have to be left to another evaluation. This assessment, accordingly, will focus on promoting participation and advocacy as purposes of donor-supported civil society strategies.

Widening participation. How do participation and accountability relate to democracy? A strong civil society directly supports democracy by widening participation in several ways:

- educating and mobilizing citizens generally to exercise their right to participate (e.g., through civic education programs);
- encouraging previously marginalized groups (e.g., women, minorities, the poor) into the political arena to participate; and
- building a complex net of groups having members with overlapping multiple affiliations in many organizations, thereby serving to moderate the potentially destabilizing effects of single memberships in exclusive groups (especially those based on ethnic, religious, territorial or economic cleavages).

Deepening policy accountability. A strong civil society also supports democracy by deepening policy accountability to its citizens — the distinctive hallmark of democracy — along two dimensions. In a negative sense the state must be kept from abuse and venality, which is the theme of the preceding paragraph. But accountability also has a positive aspect, in that the state must be responsive to the needs and wants of its people.[12] The citizenry, in other words, must be able to exercise a role in telling the state what policies to pursue. Both aspects embody a deepening involvement of the people in the affairs of the state, in contrast to the participatory dimension discussed above, which concerned primarily a widening involvement, as more and more citizens are brought into political life.

A strong civil society promotes this positive accountability in either a pluralist or a corporatist fashion.[13] In the pluralist variant, which is more familiar in the United States, the political universe is one of rough-and-tumble competition between all corners. Here civil society enhances accountability by:

- facilitating a constant flow of citizen inputs to the state, which , being continually reminded of what its citizens want, finds it difficult to wander too far from those wishes;
- fostering pluralist competition by encouraging all groups to press their agendas on the state, which accordingly discovers itself having to accommodate conflicting

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of this point, see Clark (1991: 64 &ff.) and Carroll (1992: 124-125).

[12] Elections serve this accountability function, of course, but they occur only at periodic intervals and by their very nature demand accountability for a program, i.e., a whole package of issues. The kind of accountability civil society provides, on the contrary, can take place anytime —whenever CSOs can press its case successfully with the state — and it concerns particular issues, i.e., those of interest to the CSO involved in presenting them.

[13] The participation aspect of civil society discussed just above in the text applies similarly in both pluralist and corporatist democracy. It is only this policy accountability aspect that operates differently in the two variant types of democracy.

voices in such ways that it cannot surrender to any one voice or small coterie of voices.

In the corporatist version of accountability, which is more common in the continental European democracies, citizen interests are generally aggregated into apex organizations representing farmers, women, health sector workers, etc. Here the behavioral mode is one of bargaining and negotiation between representative organization and the state rather than the conflict and competition that characterizes pluralist systems. In this milieu civil society promotes accountability through:

- representing citizen interests to the state; and
- negotiating on behalf of those interests.

Supporting civil society: two basic strategies

In supporting civil society to strengthen democracy, donors have two basic strategies that can be pursued:

Basic Strategy 1 (BS1). Donors can focus on the "enabling environment" or "rules of the game" for civil society by working to improve the conditions in which it can function effectively;

Basic Strategy 2 (BS2). Donors can work within a given civil society environment by supporting specific CSOs.

Although BS1 logically precedes BS2 (in that the conditions propitious for civil society should be in place before it can function most effectively), in fact USAID in the past has tended more to support BS2, even when the conditions aimed at in BS1 were not in place. That is, the Agency often supported specific CSOs as part of its project effort despite a weak civil society environment in the host country.

At least three reasons can be adduced to account for what at first glance might seem such an illogical approach. First, BS2 was to a large degree the limit of the possible in many situations, given Cold War strategic concerns, USG geo-political considerations, etc. In such circumstances, when USAID at times found itself it supporting authoritarian regimes, pressing host country governments to open up their political systems to CSO participation was often not a feasible policy option. Accordingly, USAID for the most part could only follow BS2, which meant supporting the delivery and (to a lesser extent) self-governance purposes of civil society.

Second, geo-politics quite aside, donors including USAID have until fairly recently tended to "think apolitically," operating primarily within the context of a "technology transfer" model of development, in which economic growth was the main goal and donors focused mainly on projects rather than policy. In this milieu, the donor emphasis tended to be on "thinking technically" or "thinking bureaucratically" rather than on "thinking strategically" and "thinking politically."

Third, where USAID and other donors like the Asia Foundation have "thought politically" in devising their aid strategies, it was reasoned that supporting BS2 could itself be a transforming approach — a way to improve an inauspicious enabling environment, on the idea that some civil society activity could itself lead to a better environment for civil society. Such an approach could be described as "doing a little may make it possible to do more;" to reverse a metaphor often used in characterizing economic development strategies, this approach might be labeled a "trickle-up strategy." This kind of civil society effort, of course, had to be largely participatory in nature, as opposed to policy accountability-oriented, in view of the relatively unfriendly enabling environment extant at the time.

As the 1990s began, however, the Cold War ended, making the first constraint on BS2 much less powerful. In addition, donors had by that time already been thinking for some time along policy lines in the economic development sphere, e.g., in pushing "structural adjustment" approaches. In a word, it had become much more feasible to engage in BS1 as well as BS2.

As a research issue, BS2 implies a political behavior approach in which the central questions are: what happened? who did what? who got involved in decisions? who made policy? On the other hand, BS1 implies more a political economy approach, where the guiding queries become: who benefits? who loses? what classes are in control?

Sequencing the strategies. As implied in the discussion above, the two Basic Strategies have been sequenced in several different ways, which can be set forth as follows:

- BS1 leads to BS2. This is the logical sequence, in which the donor first works to improve the enabling environment for civil society and, then when the climate is suitable, begins to support individual CSOs as they pursue civil society activities. In this approach, the two strategies could overlap, if the donor feels that the climate is sufficiently receptive to BS2 to begin work along that avenue but wants to continue pushing to shore up the environment even while supporting BS2. Thus the donor could be working both to continue improving the environment (BS1) and to support civil society efforts (BS2) in the existing environment.
- BS1 is unnecessary, BS2 proceeds. Here the environment is already receptive to CSOs, and so the donor can simply move ahead with BS2.
- BS2 leads to BS1. In this "transforming approach," the donor finds itself constrained (usually by geo-political considerations) from pursuing BS1 but is able to give some support to BS2. The organizations supported are likely to be NGOs that are not at the same time CSOs (cf. Figure 1), but the donor hopes to turn them into CSOs in the course of supporting them. It hopes further that these incipient CSOs will have some catalytic impact in improving the civil society climate in the host country.
- BS2 stands alone, independent of BS1. This is the pattern alluded to above in which donors "think apolitically" and use a strict "technology transfer" approach, or, even if they would like to "think politically," find themselves

unable to do so because of policy concerns from the donor government.[14] Among the four basic ends of civil society listed above, the CSOs supported in this pattern would most likely engage in delivery and self-governance activities, as opposed to the participation and accountability efforts. As implied in earlier discussion, we will not be looking at countries in which this fourth approach was employed.

Limitations of civil society. In addition to the constructive effects on democracy explored here, there are also indications that civil society can have more dampening repercussions, in both its pluralist and corporatist versions. In the advanced pluralist democracies in particular, concern has grown that too much interest group influence on the state over too long a period may well lead to immobilism and a hardening of the democratic arteries or "gridlock" rather than to a rich and vibrant democratic polity.[15] A debilitated state continuously pummeled by conflicting special interest groups may well then become too feeble to act in the interest of the citizenry as a whole.

In corporatist democracy, on the other hand, the representational monopoly accorded to apex groups and the relatively small number of such groups can lead to a parasitic mutual dependency between civil society and the state, in which rigid allocation of public benefits inhibits innovation and growth. An associated danger here is Michels' (1915) famous "iron law of oligarchy," according to which organizational leadership (in this case unconstrained by rival groups threatening to steal its membership base) comes to substitute its own interests for those of its members.[16]

There is also the danger that with both types of civil society, any real sense of the larger public good may be effectively suffocated in the rush of interest groups to appropriate societal goods for themselves. If the polity becomes consumed either with smaller, competing groups (the pluralist system) or with larger, negotiating groups (the corporatist system), the overarching national good may get lost in the shuffle.

Civil society, then, is not an unmitigated blessing, and it may have deleterious as well as beneficial effects on democracy.[17]

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[14] Policy determinations at the multilateral donors should be mentioned here also. The World Bank, for instance, sees its charter as prohibiting it from engaging in much of what we label here as civil society activity (see World Bank 1992: 5).

[15] A recently coined term for this condition in the domestic American context is "demosclerosis" (see Rauch 1992; also Olson 1992 & 1993). It is also possible that, even if they do compete vigorously with each other, CSOs may simply become so numerous that they clog up and overwhelm the state's capacity for responding, as Huntington feared some 25 years ago (1968). For a broader critique against pluralist strategies in the LDCs, see Macdonald (1992).

[16] In addition, corporatism is also a political culture that can have stifling effects on the very emergence of meaningful democracy, as has often been the case in Latin America (see Wiarda and Kline 1990, esp. 112 &ff).

[17] For an extensive discussion of the negative sides of civil society, see the special issue of *Politics and Society* devoted to "Secondary Associations and Democracy" (1992), in particular the long essay by Cohen and Rogers (1992).

A model for civil society and democratic development

The two Basic Strategies for supporting civil society to promote democratic development are portrayed in Figure 2. As indicated in the Figure, USAID and other donors support civil society either by endeavoring to improve the enabling environment (BS1) or by supporting specific organizations within civil society (BS2). BS1 is more policy-oriented (and thus more abstract, as hinted by the dashed lines in the Figure), while BS2 is more project- or institution-oriented (and hence more concrete, as indicated by the solid-bordered boxes in the Figure's central portion). To the extent that BS1 works (or is unnecessary because the enabling environment is already in place) and BS2 succeeds (i.e., CSOs pursue their activities successfully), they affect state policy, with the ultimate result of furthering sustainable democracy within the host country's polity, as shown by the box in the lower right-hand corner of the Figure entitled "democratic development."

The model shown in Figure 2 invites assessment at several steps. First, with respect to BS1, we can ask whether and to what extent an enabling environment is in place, and what if any role USAID and other donors had in creating such an environment. And then second, BS2 can be assessed in its several stages, as depicted with the Roman numerals: the institutional structure and strength (labeled I in the Figure) of civil society; the activities (II) undertaken by the groups constituting civil society; the effects (III) of those activities on state policy; and the ultimate impact (IV) of state policy on democratic development.[18] A fifth focus of assessment can be directed to USAID's contribution to the other four steps. Constructing a methodology for assessing these phases will be taken up later on in this evaluation design paper.

[18] There is of course beyond this the issue of democracy's contribution to economic growth, a topic on which there has been much discussion and debate (see e.g., Haggard 1990; Diamond 1992c). For this CDIE evaluation, however, sustainable democracy will be seen as the end objective of civil society strategies. To pursue the inquiry beyond that point would be to risk making the assessment too large and cumbersome to manage.

Figure 2. Civil society and democratic development



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The presence of "other factors." An important component of the model depicted in Figure 2 is the box in the lower left-hand corner labeled "other factors." These would include such factors as the following:

- the economy (in both its internal and external dimensions, e.g., effects of fluctuations in world commodity prices upon host-country political systems);
- the political system (e.g., the ebb and flow of political party fortunes);
- society generally (e.g., religious movements); and
- even individuals (e.g., through kinship links with political leaders).

To the extent that any development effort succeeds, it is always a difficult process to disentangle the donor contribution to that success from all these other forces at work in the system. This is true even in sectors where "results" are relatively well documented and susceptible to quantitative analysis. For instance, even though statistical evidence may be quite solid in an area like infant mortality, how much of the improvement in a given country can be attributed to donor programs and how much to rural-urban migration (which puts parents into more contact with preventive and curative health programs already in place)? With civil society endeavors, it is difficult even to measure what has happened, let alone gauge a donor-assisted program's contribution to making it happen. Still, there has been considerable progress recently in beginning to measure democracy, as well as in assessing the effects of outside efforts in promoting it.[19] We will be following in this path. Trying to separate out the relative contributions of USAID and other donors shown in the upper left-hand box of Figure 1 from those of "other factors" in the lower left-hand box will be an important focus of this evaluation. Once again, we should emphasize that we will not try to analyze the entire range of elements that have an effect on the state; we will focus on civil society in this regard. But we will be attentive to these "other factors," in particular to what patterns they display in influencing the state and what such patterns might imply for civil society.[20]

Two levels of analysis. The discussion thus far of the two basic strategies implies two levels of analysis for our assessment, and this is indeed the case, as Table 1 indicates. At the first level (corresponding to BS1), the issue to be addressed is to what extent USAID and other donors have been able to improve the conditions for civil society itself (i.e., the enabling environment), while at the second level (BS2), the question is how civil society (that is, the collectivity of CSOs) have impacted democratic development, either with or without donor assistance. This kind of analysis can also be seen in terms of independent and dependent variables, as indicated in the Table. As is also indicated in the Table, both levels of analysis invite attention to the "other factors" discussed just above.

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[19] On measuring democracy see for instance Inkeles (1990), Hadenius (1992), as well as the more established efforts in place from Freedom House (e.g., McColm 1992). On the even more difficult (because it lies at a further remove from the events themselves) task of assessing donor contribution to democracy, see Carter (1993 draft).

[20] For example, in his study of business associations and politics in Bangladesh, Kochanek (1993) observes that the deep cultural pervasiveness of personalistic connections in decision making (*tadbir*) tends to direct business leaders to work individualistically in seeking to change state policy rather than through groups. Such a pattern would imply not only an uphill struggle for associations seeking to represent the business sector to the government but also a serious constraint on the development of civil society as an active component of the political system.

Table 1. Levels of analysis in assessing civil society and democratic development

Level	Independent variables	Dependent variables
Basic Strategy I	1. USAID & other donors 2. Other factor _____ 3. Other factor _____	Civil society (enabling environment)
Basic Strategy II	1. Civil society 2. Other factor _____ 3. Other factor _____	Democratic development

Civil society development strategies

One good way to gauge what civil society can do in an activity- or project-related sense to support democracy is to ask, "What problems can civil society-based efforts address?" In posing nine such problems, Table 2 endeavors to be reasonably comprehensive in answering this question, though it is surely not exhaustive; other problems amenable to civil society approaches can be expected to come into view as our assessment progresses.[21]

The civil society strategies presented in Table 2 are first categorized in row 1 according to whether they are basically aimed at the enabling environment (i.e., BS1 strategies) or are focused on support for specific CSOs to further either participation or policy accountability (BS2). Each of the nine strategies (row 2 of the Table) is cast first in terms of the "development problem" to be dealt with (row 3), then the program purpose and longer term goal (rows 4 and 5). In the sixth row are shown the major project elements likely to be chosen. Row 7 lists some examples of the kinds of NGOs that might be enlisted to implement these project elements, while row 8 gives the most likely motivations for these groups to become involved.

The ninth row indicates expected "end-of-project" outputs for the different strategies, and the next row lists some initial ideas for measuring project success in realizing those outputs. Rows 11 and 12 present first issues and problems that might create difficulties for the various strategies and then some tentative responses to such challenges.

An example will illustrate. "Democratic culture" strategies (depicted in column 1 of Table 2) are aimed at institutionalizing democratic political participation and so fit into BS1, or the

[21] The intent in Table 1 is to be inclusive, but significant categories of civil society activity may have been omitted. One priority for this CDIE assessment will be to build a typology of civil society strategies that is at the same time both as inclusive and as parsimonious as possible. Unless the typology can be consolidated into a small number of strategies, however, it is unlikely that we will look at them all; rather we will have to be selective.

"enabling environment" box shown in Figure 2. Thus "democratic culture" is found in the first section of row 1 (i.e., Basic Strategy 1). Such a strategy would be especially appropriate in some of the more advanced developing countries of Latin America, where the polity has only recently emerged from a period of sustained authoritarian rule. The social infrastructure in terms of education, media, associational life, etc., is there to support democracy, but the democratic environment or culture is still somewhat feeble and artificial; it has not yet taken firm root and thus far is still in danger of a relapse into authoritarian rule (as happened in Peru in 1992 or was threatened more recently in Guatemala). The development problem, then, as indicated in row 3, is a democratic system that is in place but may well prove unsustainable over time. Accordingly, a democracy project addressing this challenge would have as its purpose (row 4) contributing toward a stable democratic polity; but such a polity can be sustained over the longer term (row 5) if it is supported by an enduring democratic culture, that is a commonly held set of social values within the citizenry that believes democracy to be the only acceptable way to manage the country's affairs.

A USAID project in this context (row 6) would likely be one in the civic education area, which would support efforts to inculcate and strengthen democratic values in the population. Appropriate NGOs to undertake such work (row 7) might be in-country groups similar in their functions to what the League of Women Voters does in the United States, local election monitoring groups and the like. Such associations could be expected to be motivated (row 8) largely by middle-class impulses toward good government and public rectitude of the sort that stimulate similar groups in the United States. The most important tangible result of a project in this area (row 9) would be continued adherence to democratic practices (which over time would contribute to the purposes and goals shown in rows 4 and 5). One way to measure success (row 10) in strengthening democratic culture would be to use opinion surveys to assess how people feel about democratic values. A major problem to be expected over time (row 11) is that of keeping up the momentum of such a project; people can become fatigued with repeating the same task again and again, e.g., in promoting civic studies efforts with successive cohorts of schoolchildren or monitoring successive elections. To counter such flagging enthusiasm, somehow the motivation for such efforts has to be continually reinvigorated and reinforced (row 12), perhaps by recruiting successive cohorts of CSO participants (e.g., university students to assist with civic education aimed at elementary and secondary students).

Examples of countries where such a democratic culture strategy could usefully be taken up are Chile, the Czech Republic and Uruguay — all of which are not only recent recruits to democratic ranks, countries where most of the institutional infrastructure is already in place to support democracy, but also are countries where the possibility of a relapse to authoritarianism can by no means be ruled out.

Civic-minded CSOs are scarcely the only kind of organizations to be supported through civil society strategies, however, as a second example will illustrate. Self-promoting NGOs, concerned primarily with the welfare of their members, can also become CSOs contributing to sustainable democratic development. The "democratic capitalism" strategy depicted in column 5 of Table 2 is such an approach. Here, for example, agricultural water user associations might be encouraged to form an alliance to lobby the state at both local (the district water engineer) and national (the water development ministry) levels. Their agendas could be more farmer control over water allocation, more equity for "tail-enders" in surface

water irrigation systems, more systematic canal rehabilitation, etc. For these associations, civil society activity will not be the main goal; rather such efforts would be a by-product of their principal enterprise, in this case providing water to their members. In the process, though, the water user associations would be ameliorating state control of the economy by contributing to decision-making and pressing the state to be more responsive to public demands. What appears to happen in these cases is that an NGO finds it can only go so far in pursuing its substantive mission before it runs up against government policy constraints. To expand and continue its work further, the NGO must in effect become a CSO.[22]

There are dangers in such strategies, to be sure. Too many self-seeking groups making demands on the state and realizing those demands can lead to an interest-group gridlock that effectively immobilizes the polity, a condition that has been called "demosclerosis" in the American domestic context (Rauch 1992; see also Olson 1992 and Olson 1993). One answer to gridlock would be more autonomy for the executive branch to act in a national interest, as opposed to the parochial interests of the CSOs.

In any given country, not all the nine strategies depicted in Table 2 will be in place. In Bangladesh, for example (which will probably be our first field study), an initial analysis of material available on the CDIE/DI database indicates that strategies corresponding to columns 1, 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of Table 2 are or have been directly or indirectly pursued in the past decade. Within the range of strategies found in a country, we will pick several on which to focus our own analysis, and then pick several CSOs to study in depth for each.[23] In the course of the entire study, it may not be possible to analyze all the nine strategies of Table 2, but we should be able to cover most of them, and to do so across more than one country setting, so that it will be possible to devote some time to comparative analysis in the final evaluation synthesis.

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[22] For an analysis of water users groups affecting state policy in Southeast Asia, see Bruns (1993); Tendler (1993) offers similar examples from small farmer organizations in Brazil, as does Dawson (1993) for child survival NGOs in Peru. David Korten (1987, 1990) offers a somewhat similar picture with his concept of a "third generation" in NGOs (the first two being relief-and-welfare service delivery and small-scale, self-reliant development promotion, but he is more concerned with *policy implementation* in his third generation, whereas for this CDIE assessment the focus is more on *policy advocacy*.

[23] Obviously, in some cases a particular CSO will be engaged in more than one strategy. For example, the water users associations mentioned above in the text might well be involved in what are labeled "democratic capitalism" and "democratic pluralism" strategies in Table 2.

Table 2. Development strategies incorporating civil society

1	"Basic Strategy" & category (cf. Figure 2)	Basic Strategy 1: Enabling environment			Basic Strategy 2: Organizational support					
					Category A: Participation				Category B: Policy accountability	
2	TYPE OF STRATEGY	1 DEMOCRATIC CULTURE	2 HUMAN RIGHTS	3 DEMOCRATIC INTEGRITY	4 DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION	5 DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM	6 DEMOCRATIC PLURALISM	7 SOCIAL MOBILIZATION*	8 HUMAN RESOURCES	9 SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT
3	The development problem	Unsustainable democratic system	Human rights abuses	Unaccountable & corrupt government	Autocratic state with minimal participation	State control of economy, "dirigiste" rigidity	Unrepresentative government	Marginalized groups	Counterproductive state policy on PQLI NGOs	Natural resource mismanagement
4	Program purpose	Stable democratic polity	Decline in abuses	Corruption decline	Widening political voice	More inclusive market economy	Expanded body politic	Group empowerment	PQLI improvements	Natural resource decline reversed
5	Longer term goal	Sustainable democratic culture	Secure human rights	Integrity, predictability in government	Transition to democracy	Sustainable economic growth	Pluralist polity	Equal opportunity society	Healthy & productive society	Sustainable natural resource regime
6	Project elements	Civic education	HR monitoring HR reporting HR advocacy	Investigative journalism, political reporting	Support all NGOs (some will become CSOs)	Market-oriented & producer organizations	Organization building	Adult literacy & conscientization	Umbrella NGOs	NR monitoring NR reporting NR advocacy
7	NGO examples	LWV-groups, election watch groups	In-country HR advocacy groups	Investigative journalism NGOs	All NGOs	Chambers of commerce, water user associations	Professional associations, peasant groups	Women's rights, minority rights groups	Health sector umbrella NGOs	Environmental advocacy CSOs
8	Motivation for groups	Democratic norms	Human rights	Journalistic professionalism, whistle-blowing	All motivations	Self-seeking	Representing membership	Self-assertion	Service delivery	Public goods
9	EOP outputs	Adherence to democratic practices	Effective HR CSOs operating	Active media	Some CSO influence on the state	Interest group lobbying	New groups pressuring state	Micro- & macro-level advocacy	CSOs influencing state policy	User group & environmental group advocacy
10	Performance measures	Acceptance of democratic values (surveys)	HR improvement	Corruption exposed	Movement away from autocracy	More players in system, more state responsiveness	Increased representation at all levels	Increased minority representation	Spatial & class equity in PQLI	Decreasing environmental degradation
11	Issues & problems	Sustaining momentum	State opposition	Rent seekers' opposition	Government hostility	Gridlock, "demosclerosis"	Continued elite domination of polity	Ethnic tension, majority backlash	Urban bias	Collective action issue
12	Possible responses to problems	Continual reinforcement	International publicity	Public pressure	Lower CSO advocacy profile	Executive autonomy	Stronger non-elite advocacy CSOs	Consociational polity	Rural focus	User groups

Acronyms: CSO = civil society organization; NGO = Non-gov'tal organization; EOP = End of project; NIS = Newly Indep. States; HR = Human rights; NR = Natural resources; LWV = League of Women Voters; PQLI = Physical quality of life index

* This strategy should also be included under "B: Policy accountability"

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Questions and issues to be addressed

The principal questions to be addressed in this CDIE assessment are:

- How and to what extent has USAID (and other donors) by fostering civil society contributed to democratic development?
- What can be distilled from this experience that can guide and inform future USAID efforts in supporting democratic development?

In addition to this primary focus of the study, several other issues have emerged as eminently worthy of study from the exploratory work done thus far. These secondary topics will be raised later on in this paper, but for now the discussion will focus on the principal questions to be pursued.

Assessing civil society

The model of civil society and democratic development presented in Figure 2 also serves as a starting point for assessing the efficacy of civil society strategies in promoting democratic development. Our basic plan here is to evaluate civil society as such a promoter in four sequential phases, using key indicators to measure progress in each stage. The phases follow the flow of Figure 2, beginning with the enabling environment that is the focus of BS1, then passing to BS2, starting with institutional structure and strength (box I in the Figure), leading on to the activities pursued by civil society institutions (the arrows labeled II), the impact of those activities on public policy (the arrows depicted as III), and finally the impact of that policy on the wider society (the arrow noted as IV). The successive phases in Figure 2 can also be framed as consecutive questions:

- (BS1) In what ways have there been changes in the legal, political (including political culture) and policy environment regarding civil society over the past two or three decades?
- (BS2, phase I) What, broadly speaking, is the nature and composition of civil society?
- (BS2, phases II-III-IV) Did CSO activities supported by USAID and other donors lead to improvements in participation and policy accountability that affected state policies in ways that have had a positive impact on democratic development?
- (BS1 and BS2) What was the involvement of USAID and other donors with civil society, both in terms of the enabling environment and with respect to CSOs?

In what follows a schema is offered that takes the four questions posed just above and pinpoints in successive columns three things:

- specific <u>aspects</u> of each of the phases shown in Figure 2;
- possible <u>indicators</u> for assessing change in that aspect; and
- feasible methodologies or <u>means for verifying</u> those indicators.

The enabling environment for civil society (see the first three columns of Table 2, Table 3, and Figure 1). As noted above, the key questions here are:

- In what ways have there been changes in the legal, political environment, political culture and policy environment over the past two or three decades?
- How propitious is that environment for civil society activity?

The focus of analysis here is on what has happened to the enabling environment over time and on what it is like today in terms of facilitating the characteristic activities of civil society. In Table 3, as in the succeeding tables presented to illustrate our assessment methodology, the first column shows the aspect to be assessed (in this case the dimensions of the enabling environment). The second column portrays what seem *ex ante* to be the most likely indicators that will show change in that aspect, and the third column suggests means for verifying these indicators. At this point, we are not yet concerned with the role of USAID and other donors in improving the enabling environment; that will come later on in this schema.

It should be emphasized that all three columns in each of our methodology tables are at this point suggestive rather than definitive. In each country study we will find some measures, indicators and methodologies more suitable than others, and we anticipate modifying our approach as we proceed.

Table 3. An enabling environment for civil society

DIMENSION	INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION
Legal environment (*de jure*: what do the rules say?)	Constitutional provisions, laws, regulations in force, guaranteeing: • human rights • freedom of speech & assembly • public accountability	Legal documents
Political environment (*de facto*: what is the actual situation?)	Military/police are not suppressive of: • human rights • freedom of speech & assembly	Int'l monitoring reports (Amnesty Int'l, State Dept, etc.), interviews
	State supporting free speech: • print media (censorship, newsprint allocation, govt advertising) • broadcast media (private stations permitted)	Interviews, knowledgeable outsiders
	Public accountability assured through: • regular elections • transparent decision-making • access for CSOs	Documents, interviews, knowledgeable outsiders
Political culture (do social values support civil society?)	Public opinion supports civil society	Opinion polls
	Sustainability of environment over time	Historical track record
Policy environment (what do political elites want to do?)	Political agendas of elites	Interviews, knowledgeable outsiders

Institutional structure and strength (see Table 4 and the box labeled I in Figure 2). As noted above, the key question here i..

- What, broadly speaking, is the nature and composition of civil society?

If the groups that constitute civil society are to be effective in promoting democratic development, they must have attained a certain minimum capacity for engaging in public affairs. Each group must have:

- an identifiable and self-aware constituency;
- a self-conscious idea of mission that is both credible and compelling to its membership;
- a leadership that in fact represents the membership and is firmly linked to it;
- an action strategy focused on influencing state policy;
- a dependable financial base to fund its activities; and
- sufficient autonomy from the state that it can credibly endeavor to influence the state without being (or becoming) captive to it.

An additional factor contributing to institutional strength is

- leveraging — the additional effectiveness a CSO can attain by working with other like-minded groups or placing its own personnel in government positions.

Table 4. Institutional structure and strength

CHARACTERISTIC	INDICATOR	MEANS OF VERIFICATION
Constituency	Identifiability	Outsider views, media
	Composition	Documents, interviews, knowledgeable outsiders
	Self-awareness	Focus groups
Mission	Coherence	Documents, interviews
	Credibility to members	Focus groups
	Cogency to members	Focus groups
Leadership	Representativeness (Boards of directors, headquarters personnel, key actors)	Interviews, knowledgeable outsiders, team judgment
	Dedication	Interviews
	Linkage to grassroots	Meeting records, focus groups
Action strategy	Feasibility	Documents, interviews, knowledgeable outsiders
Financial base	Funding sources	NGO budgets, donor allocations
Autonomy	Independence from state (or other outside) control	Interviews, knowledgeable outsiders, team judgment
Leveraging	Coalitions/alliances with other CSOs	Interviews, knowledgeable outsiders
	Exchanging personnel with government	

Institutional activities and their impact (see columns 4-9 of Table 2, the arrows labeled II-IV in Figure 2, and Tables 5-7). Here the key questions are:

- What did the CSOs analyzed in the previous step actually do, both individually and collectively to promote participation and policy accountability?
- Did these activities in fact have an effect in making state officials more accountable to the citizenry or in producing changes in state policy?
- Did improvements in accountability or changes in state policy have any effect on democratic development?

The following three tables address in sequence each of the three questions posed above.

CSO activities. Table 5 focuses on institutional activities, which correspond to the arrows labeled II in Figure 2.

Table 5. CSO activities

ACTIVITY	INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION
Mobilization for participation (BS2, category A in Table 2, Box A in Figure 2)	Organizational growth, networks of members	Membership rolls, evaluation of same by knowledgeable observers
	Activism of members	Meeting minutes, observation, focus groups
	Electoral participation (support for candidates, voting patterns)	Interviews, knowledgeable observers, voting data, media reporting
Advocacy for policy accountability (BS2, category B in Table 2, Box B in Figure 2): energizing at grass roots	Members' efforts toward particular policy makers (letters, visits)	Interviews, documents, focus groups
	Members' wider efforts (demonstrations, public protests)	
Advocacy for policy accountability: lobbying with policy makers	Formal interaction (e.g., boards, hearings)	Interviews, documents
	Informal interaction	Interviews, evaluation by knowledgeable outsiders
Extending through other organizations (e.g., umbrella NGOs)	Support for other CSOs; alliances with international NGOs/-PVOs	Interviews, knowledgeable observers, budget & other documents

In analyzing CSO activities, we will endeavor to focus both on what individual CSOs are doing and on what the collectivity of CSOs are doing. In each country studied, we will pick for scrutiny a number of CSOs judged to be illustrative of the CSO sector, and much of our field research effort will be devoted to tracing through their activities. But we will also be interested in what CSOs in general are engaged in. Thus (referring to Table 5) we will be trying to assess what individual CSOs are doing to mobilize potential constituencies, lobby policy makers, etc., and at the same time building a picture of what CSOs in an overall sense are doing here. "Umbrella NGOs" (which usually purport to represent the organizations working in a particular sector, such as health) will be an especial focus of interest in this regard.

Another dimension of interest here will be the level of activity in which a CSO engages. To affect public policy, a CSO must initially mobilize a constituency for action (first activity in Table 5). Then it must in some fashion activate that constituency (second activity in the Table) and/or its own leadership (third activity) to press for change. And then finally, at least some CSOs will join forces with other like-minded organizations to function as an alliance to affect public policy (fourth activity). We will be focusing on all four levels of activity in this evaluation.

Civil society impact on state policy (Table 6 and the III arrows in Figure 2). The central purpose of the activities discussed just above is to influence state policy. But merely undertaking an activity (which is what the indicators presented above can measure) does not automatically mean that such effort will have an impact. Launching and completing a petition campaign urging legislators to change land tenancy statutes, for instance, does not by itself mean that the laws on landholding will be changed. This is a separate process, which also must be explored and verified.[24] For this phase the key question is:

- Did the institutional activities analyzed in the previous step have an effect in making public officials more accountable to the citizenry or in changing state policy?

[24] In political science terms, the principal concern in focusing on civil society's impact on state policy is with state *decision-making*. In the text's next section dealing with policy impact on democratic development, the major consideration is with *outcomes*. The first can be characterized as a more behavioral approach (what happens?) and the second as one more akin to political economy (who benefits?). There is a longstanding debate within political science as to which approach is more fruitful, going back at least to the 1960s (for two summaries of the argument, see Polsby 1980 and Domhoff 1978). This CDIE assessment will in effect employ both approaches.

Table 6. Civil society impact on state policy

IMPACT	POLICY CHANGE INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION
Executive branch: upper levels	Executive policy statements, regulations, program initiatives	Documents, interviews, media, knowledgeable observers
Executive branch: lower levels	Implementation regulations (e.g., police rules of procedure)	Documents, interviews, media, knowledgeable observers
Legislative branch	Legislation responsive to civil society demands	Documents, interviews, media, knowledgeable observers
	Legislators responsive to civil society organizations	Interviews, media, knowledgeable observers
Local councils	Councils responsive	Documents (e.g., minutes), interviews, knowledgeable observers
	Council members responsive	Interviews, knowledgeable observers, focus groups
	Direct CSO participation in council activities	
Justice system	Access to system for wider constituencies Use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms	Documents, interviews, knowledgeable observers

The successive columns of Table 6 chart out how the study will determine the extent to which CSO activity has been translated into changes in state policy in the various branches of government and at different levels. As with the institutional activities outlined just above in Table 5, here also we will be concerned with the impact on state policy not just of individual CSOs but also of CSOs collectively. To what extent, for instance, do legislators find they must listen to a range of CSOs rather than to only a few? Do many different kinds of CSO have access to local councils, or only some? Do middle-farmer water user associations, for example, enjoy such access, while groups trying to represent landless agricultural workers or small-scale rural food processors (e.g., rice huskers) find themselves denied it? These are the types of question to be asked here. The indicators and means of verification listed in Table 6 will enable the CDIE teams to assess what policy changes have actually worked.

Policy impact on democratic development (see Table 7 and the IV arrow in Figure 2). The key question in this section of analysis is:

- Did improvements in accountability or changes in state policy have any effect on democratic development?

Just as CSO efforts to impact state policy do not necessarily have such an impact, so too changes in state policy do not by themselves mean that the new laws, regulations or decisions will in fact be carried out. To trace the land tenure example given in the section above, new land tenure laws or decrees by no means guarantee that the *de facto* (or even *de jure*) situation regarding land tenure in the countryside will change. The history of recent decades resonates with land reforms enacted (sometimes cynically and sometimes with genuine purpose) but unimplemented.

Table 7. Policy impact on democratic development

SOCIAL IMPACT	INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION
Wider participation (e.g., affirmative action program)	Previously exclusive positions now open (e.g., to women)	Lists of officeholders, organization members, office staff; focus groups
	Greater representation in civil society (a feedback loop)	Membership data on CSOs
Improved human rights situation	Decreased human rights abuses	External monitoring (State Dept, Amnesty Int'l annual reports, etc.), media
Improved public probity	Higher public standards for probity and behavior	Media, opinion surveys

There are two levels or orders of impact involved here, the first on democratic development and the second on the wider goal of sustainable economic development. The first order impact occurs when the state seriously undertakes to implement a new policy, whereas the second order comes as the policy actually has a significant impact on society. To follow through with the land reform example, the first order impact will happen when the state has started to confiscate land declared surplus and deed it over to former tenants. The second order impact will be the effect of this process on agricultural production and trade, rural employment, the rural political economy, etc. The ultimate goal of a foreign aid project involving tenancy reform is of course to effect improvements in this second order impact area, but in this CDIE assessment we will not be looking toward this kind of long term effect. Rather we will be studying the first order impact, assessing policy impact on sustainable democracy. To put it another way, here we will be looking at democracy more as an end in itself than as a means to a larger end.

Certainly not all the effects of civil society on democratic development can be anticipated to be positive. Indeed, the "law of unintended consequences" can operate through CSOs to wreak considerable havoc on the polity. To take another example from the land tenure reform sphere, pressure from tenant farmer CSOs could spawn land reform legislation that would benefit the tenants by making them owners, but have the longer term effect of making it more profitable for them to replace former hired laborers with family labor, thereby severely weakening a whole sector of rural society, as happened in the Indian state of Kerala to a considerable extent in the 1960s (Alexander 1980). One group grew stronger while another suffered. One task of our assessment will be to explore such possible negative consequences stemming from what appear to be successful civil society strategies.

USAID (and other donor) impact on civil society and democratic development (see Table 8, and the arrows leading from the left-hand boxes in Figure 2). This is the "attribution issue" where the key question is:

- How can we tell if what USAID and/or other donors did actually contributed to what happened?

In many ways this is the most difficult of evaluation questions to answer, for the Agency is not the only factor promoting change (or "independent variable") in any country. There are all kinds of forces at work in every "real-life" situation in all societies — political, economic and social — and these have effects on what happens to democracy, as is indicated by the box titled "other factors" in Figure 2 and the dashed arrows leading from it to the "enabling environment" rectangle of BS1, the "civil society organizations" box of BS2, and the "state policy" and "democratic development" boxes on the right side of the Figure that represent developmental outcomes.

Table 8. Donor impact on civil society and democratic development

OBJECT OF DONOR IMPACT	INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION
I. Institutional structure & strength	Use of USAID/other donor resources	Documents, budgets, interviews
II. Institutional activities	USAID/other donor role in deployment of institutional structure & strength	Documents, budgets, interviews
III. State policy	Effect of USAID/other donor-supported activities in changing state policy	Interviews, knowledgeable observers
	USAID/other donor role in policy dialogue: securing policy acceptance	
IV. Policy impact on democratic development	Implementation of policies supported by USAID/other donors	Documents, media monitoring, interviews
	USAID/other donor role in policy dialogue: securing policy implementation	Interviews, knowledgeable observers
	Downstream impact of policy on social welfare	Interviews, knowledgeable observers, socio-economic data

Discerning a USAID effect to civil society can be expected to become successively harder as one progresses through the stages of Figure 2 (referred to in Table 8 by the roman numerals denoting successive rows). It should be reasonably straightforward to determine what was actually contributed to CSO institutional structure and strength by support from the Agency and other donors (row I), and perhaps only slightly less difficult to ascertain what such support did for CSO activities (row II). But tracing a donor thread in how these activities affected state policy (row III) and in turn how state policy impacted on democratic development (row IV) becomes more and more exacting as the effects move ever further "downstream" from the source.

Not the least of the problems here in assessment will be the role of "policy dialogue" between donor and host country government, which can bypass the whole causal civil society chain, as shown by the dotted line in Figure 2. Such policy dialogue can often be a most effective complement to a donor's civil society strategy (e.g., by reinforcing a host country government's resolve to do what civil society is urging it to do anyway), but from an assessment standpoint it can be hard to disentangle the causal roles of are in fact three intertwined

threads: international donor support; the "other factors" discussed above; and policy dialogue. Table 8 indicates how we would begin to unravel the causal agents by endeavoring to distinguish between donor efforts and policy dialogue. In theory, once these two threads are separated out, it would be relatively straightforward to discern the contribution of "other factors" simply by assigning them residual effects, much as the "error" term in a regression equation is made to account for all the unexplained variance. In fact, of course, this will all be much more difficult, but Table 8 does lay out our scheme for beginning to grasp the nettle of donor attribution.

Secondary issues for study

It was mentioned earlier that from the work done thus far on this assessment, a number of secondary issues have emerged as suitable for study. They stem largely from developing our model of civil society and the methodology for conducting the evaluation. Most of them can be addressed with the data we develop as the evaluation progresses. Other such issues may well surface as the study moves along, but every effort will be made to hold their number down to a concise and manageable list, in order to best focus and concentrate our energies in ways that will be useful to USAID planners and strategists. At present the most important of these secondary issues appear to be those discussed below, which are presented in what now appear to us as their order of priority. As the evaluation proceeds and tentative findings emerge, it may become worthwhile to change this priority.

1. **Sustainability, pluralist competition and corporatism.** How can a civil society best sustain itself and in the process sustain democratic development? Under what circumstances has civil society failed to sustain (or contributed to a failure in sustaining) democracy? The answers would appear to differ according to whether the polity is more pluralist or corporatist in orientation.

- Pluralist sustainability. Here the key factor is **ensuring competition.** Unless groups energetically compete with each other, the polity faces serious dangers, either (1) that a few CSOs will dominate the policy terrain and skew things in their own interest, or (2) that a larger number of CSOs will simply collude to divide benefits (especially subsidies) among themselves at public expense, resulting in a kind of "interest group gridlock" that hobbles the political system. The crux of the problem is that excessive accountability to individual groups (or coalitions of groups) can mean a lack of accountability to the polity as a whole. Only a healthy competition can prevent such untoward outcomes. How can this competition best be achieved and maintained?

- Corporatist sustainability. With its emphasis on "consociational" behavior (wherein leaders of potentially hostile or competing constituencies negotiate coexistence arrangements), corporatist democracy also runs a double risk. The first danger is that group leaders will cut deals that immobilize the polity and economy by dividing up all available resources into rigidly fixed shares and thus locking public policy into place indefinitely, while the second is that a self-serving cabal of leaders will themselves benefit inordinately while depriving associational

members (who have no recourse in the corporatist setup that provides only one hierarchical structure for each societal grouping). Yet another danger is that, in a society organized along corporatist lines (as with many Latin American countries), civil society as a mechanism for ensuring accountability may never really get launched, for the state will prove too strong in its desire to control social life through corporatist organizations. In the corporatist case, accountability has to come from competing political parties and an energetic media that will ferret out and publicize corrupt behavior. How can such accountability best be maintained?[25]

2. Problems with success. Just as an anemic or undernourished civil society is dysfunctional to democracy, so too an overactive civil society may well bring problems of its own. Two in particular deserve mention in this context.

- Policy insulation. Policymakers are generally thought to need some insulation against populist pressures if they are to undertake serious efforts at structural reform, especially in the economic sphere. In some cases, strengthening civil society may make policy reform more difficult (e.g., stronger labor unions better opposed to dismantling wasteful parastatals, or an energized "comprador" business community against trade deregulation). What are the trade-offs here? Is there a case to be made for supporting NGOs selectively rather than across the board?

- Antidemocratic civil society. Under certain circumstances, civil society could become antithetical to democracy itself; it could in a sense lose its civility. The institutions of civil society can after all promote destructive ethnic conflict and religious intolerance just as they can foster constructive pluralism. There may also be other ways in which competition can go too far beyond pluralism in destructive directions. In Latin America, civil society has often in the past disintegrated as the corporatist tendencies within it have blotted out all autonomy, and what was at least potentially an embryonic civil society became a handmaiden of a grasping, elite-dominated state. Are there ways to help channel civil society into more constructive paths? Could this be done without manipulation and co-optation?

3. Sectoral differences. As is evident from Table 2, civil society covers a wide variety of sectoral activities. Donor-supported civil society development strategies range from assisting virtually all NGOs in a attempt to build pre-conditions for democracy (column 4 of Table 2) to directing such assistance to very specific activities such as human rights or civil education (columns 1 and 2). At least a couple of issues arise from these differences:

- Sectoral effectiveness. Are NGOs more effective at influencing the state in some sectoral areas (e.g., agriculture) than others (e.g., legal reform)? To the extent

[25] On the extent of the challenge presented by the tendency toward corporatism, especially in Latin American political systems, see Wiarda (1994).

that such differences exist, what can explain them? Are the patterns here more pronounced within host countries or between them?

- Sectoral priorities. Aside from the question of relative effectiveness posed just above, are some sectors (e.g., women's organizations) more critical for democratic development than others (e.g., environmental advocacy groups)? If there are differences here, are they sufficient to warrant directing civil society programming efforts in particular directions? Implied here is a more strategic question: should USAID support all types of CSOs, or only certain types, or is there too much variation across regions and countries and levels of democratic development to make any such judgments?

- "Benefit/cost analysis." Is the civil society return on investment greater in some areas (perhaps human rights, where a little work can sometimes have a large impact) than in others (perhaps legal assistance, where even *pro bono* legal aid is managerially costly if given on a case-by-case basis)? If they exist, what are the program implications of such differences? Given that specific civil society strategies (as indicated in Table 2) appear to be more appropriate than others in particular country settings, it would not necessarily be productive to insist on moving to the cheapest strategy. What guidelines might be suggested here? It should be noted that no rigorous econometric treatment is intended here; rather the analysis will be essentially qualitative, along the lines charted out in Table 3-8. Thus the term "benefit-cost analysis" is placed in quotation marks in the paragraph heading here.

4. Sequencing and strategies. In laying out our understanding of Basic Strategies 1 and 2, we have held that each is conceptually an independent entity, irrespective of which comes first (see the earlier discussion of sequencing). But this may not be true. BS2 may look somewhat different, according to whether it precedes, succeeds or occurs altogether independently of BS1. This empirical issue will be addressed in the course of the study.

5. Host country policy framework. Donor support for civil society assumes a host country policy framework that is favorable to NGO growth. Under what circumstances do host country governments favor NGOs or oppose them? What are the impacts of such policies on democratization? Can donor support for NGOs in an unfavorable policy framework help democratization in the longer term? The general issue of host-country receptivity to PVOs and NGOs is being addressed a CDIE study now in progress (see Barclay et al. 1993), and we hope to draw on its findings to illuminate our own work here.

6. Civil society and "distortions". Neo-classical economic theory tends to posit that any economic system differing from its own model suffers from "distortions" of one sort or another, which, if removed, will yield an optimal market system (in which consumer welfare is maximized and the most efficient use of scarce resources is attained). Such thinking assumes that the neo-classical form is a near-perfect (if not perfect) type, virtually a Platonic "form" which real-world economies are imperfect imitations of.

It is tempting to employ a similar approach to democracy, holding that a competitive, pluralist model is the norm (or Platonic "form") to which all actual systems should aspire, and that anything blocking movement in that direction constitutes a distortion to democracy. This idea, however, assumes that we know just what the ideal pluralist type of democracy is (an idea few American political scientists would currently accept with respect to our own political system), and also – at least implicitly – that the American version of pluralism is the best one for all systems to aim at emulating. A more eclectic approach might posit several Weberian "ideal types" of democracy (perhaps in pluralist and corporatist versions), to which real-world cases could be compared, but this tactic presents similar problems as well. To convincingly deal with these matters would be far beyond the scope of this study, but we do intend to explore it a bit, particularly with respect to the pluralism/corporatism issue addressed briefly above. Specifically, it would be useful to address (if only in an initial fashion) the issue of whether it makes more developmental sense to conceive of pluralism and corporatism as two alternative democratic types or to see them as variations on a single theme of pluralism.

Conducting the field study

Conceivably the unit for study in this CDIE assessment could be individual CSOs, USAID projects focusing on CSOs, or host countries within which CSOs assisted by USAID have been operating. Given the diffuse nature of so much CSO activity and the need to assess CSO impact collectively within the context of a political system as well as individually, the most suitable unit for study appears to be the nation.

The first need, then, is to find countries where there has been a USAID track record in supporting civil society (hopefully supplemented by efforts from other donor agencies, though this will not be determinative in choosing countries). A second need will be to determine an appropriate balance between regions where the Agency has been active in supporting civil society. The data compiled for Appendix A seemed to be a good place to start, and this is in fact where our choosing process began. We employed the DIS database[26] to ascertain which countries had the most CSO-related material available at USAID/Washington, then chose candidate countries for an initial pilot study to test out the validity of our model relating civil society to democratic development. The initial step in this process has been to choose two possible venues — the Dominican Republic and Bangladesh — then conduct a background desk study on each (Berthin et al. 1993 and 1994), with the intention of picking one of the two for our first field visit.

An additional reason for embarking on a pilot study is that our sister CDIE evaluation on "Development Through PVOs and NGOs" proceeded in this manner with an initial field study of Belize, and found the exercise most productive, leading the CDIE team to modify its evaluation design in a number of significant ways before proceeding with the main study. The

[26] The Agency's Development Information System (DIS) database includes all USAID reports sent in from overseas missions and from offices at USAID/Washington. Because these reports must be sent to the database in order to be included as part of it, the collection is by no means complete. Some missions and some USAID/W offices supply more material than others. But it is as close as it is possible to get to a complete inventory of all Agency material on any given topic.

material available at USAID/Washington, they found, was simply insufficient to give a comprehensive picture of what had gone on with USAID-supported PVO and NGO efforts. In consequence, they decided on several evaluation design changes. It is conceivable that we may undergo a similar experience.

We anticipate sending a CDIE-intensive team on the first country visit, including perhaps three CDIE staff professionals and one senior-level contractor, with the idea that each of these initial team members would then become team leader for subsequent field visits, thereby enabling us to conduct more than one country visit at a time as the assessment progresses. The PVO/NGO evaluation mentioned just above successfully employed a similar approach in its early work, and this experience seems worth emulating.

Field study methodology. The successive parts of our approach to the field study work has been elaborated above in the section on "Assessing civil society," but it would be appropriate to sum up this methodology by farming it in terms of "key questions" and the ways in which we intend to go about answering them. Appendix C sets forth an outline along these lines. It should be emphasized, however, that the schema offered in Appendix C is at this point a tentative one. The questions listed here seem at the outset to be the critical ones to ask, but we anticipate the possibility of modifying these questions (as well as the ways in which we answer them) as our assessment moves along.

Field study teams. Composition of the field study teams is critical for all evaluations, for it is essential that an appropriate mix of disciplines and experience be included. For this assessment, teams will be composed as indicated below. It should be noted that a single team member will likely have more than one of the attributes listed here.

- the team leader will be a CDIE direct-hire person, though a contractor who has participated in an earlier CDIE-led field study in this evaluation could be assigned this task; preferably the team leader will be a political scientist;
- a political scientist country specialist for the particular state being studied will be a team member; the combination of political science and country expertise is especially important here for at least one of the team members;
- at least one team member will have an extensive background in focus group methodology;
- language skills will be essential for work in Latin America or francophone Africa (though all the team members need not have high levels of language proficiency).

Bangladesh: a pilot study. Bangladesh appears to be the most feasible country for our pilot study for the reasons listed just below. For an initial analysis of civil society in Bangladesh, see Berthin et al. (1994).

- there has been considerable track record of USAID effort in support of NGOs and CSOs for a number of years that has been documented in the DIS database;
- a number of other donors (e.g., Canadian CIDA, Swedish SIDA, NORAD, DANIDA) have vigorously supported NGOs and CSOs over this period as

well, thus facilitating a wide range of donor/CSO linkages to study, as well as a wider range of CSOs themselves than would be found in many countries;

- in addition, there is a rich literature available on NGOs in Bangladesh (see the list of Bangladesh NGO references at the end of the general references for this paper);
- in the course of the past three decades, the country has variously come under a succession of regime types — authoritarian, quasi-democratic and democratic — thus offering a record of experience with both BS1 and BS2 under different conditions;
- there appears to have been a secular trend (if an uneven one) in the direction of widening of civil society over the last two decades, at least some of which may be attributable to donor activity;
- the "developmental language" in use there is English, which means that ability in another "developmental language" (i.e., Spanish or French) will not be necessary for any of the CDIE core team members (as would be the case if we took the Dominican Republic for our first country visit);
- having been openly democratic for the past three years, Bangladesh at present provides a receptive country system for an evaluation of the type proposed here;
- several different civil society strategies (as per Table 2) could be explored;
- Bangladesh is undeniably a truly less developed country, which would be better for our first study than an ADC; and finally
- none of the potential CDIE team members has been involved in designing or implementing USAID programs or projects that have supported democratic development in Bangladesh.

Selecting CSOs for study. In choosing CSOs for detailed analysis, we will seek to include a good variation along the three dimensions depicted in Figure 2 and Table 2, as follows:

- basic strategy – we want to look at CSOs involved with both basic strategies – enabling environment and organizational support;
- principal focus of activity – under BS2 (organizational support), we wish to include CSOs concerned mainly with participation as well as those primarily concentrating on policy accountability;
- type of strategy – within the larger participation and policy accountability categories, we want to analyze CSOs pursuing the various specific strategies (as shown in row 2 of Table 2);

For Bangladesh this selection process should prove relatively simple, because in addition to the DIS database there are several other ancillary resources to draw upon in view of the prominent role NGOs have played in the development process over the last two decades and more. Specifically, it will be possible to tap the abundant literature available on NGOs, and the widespread knowledge about them that exists within the donor community. For subsequent field studies, CSO selection will probably prove somewhat more difficult, because even though the DIS database will be available, these ancillary sources of knowledge will be harder to find.

Subsequent country studies. After completing and writing up the pilot study, the CDIE team will split up, with its different members serving as team leaders for the remaining country

studies, as indicated in Figure 3, which offers a couple of possible scenarios. The countries (which are still tentative at this point) have been chosen on the basis of what could be gleaned from an initial search of the DIS database plus personal knowledge and experience gleaned from the CDIE team and its consultants to include:

- a wide regional coverage (subject to the requirement that a sufficient USAID track record be in place to permit country field study assessments);
- a range of civil society strategies employed (as per Table 2); and
- a variety of development problems and contexts, so that the sample includes both LDCs and ADCs, and includes some countries further along the democratic path than others.

Our present design begins with the Bangladesh study noted above and then moves to three field studies to be conducted more or less simultaneously. A third wave of two field visits will finish up the empirical work in late summer 1994, to be followed by writing the evaluation synthesis, which should be completed in the fall of the same year. In accord with CDIE's current approach to its evaluations, brief accounts of the field studies will be written up, but elaborate published technical reports will not be prepared. Instead, the country-level work will be aimed principally at the final synthesis report. In the evaluation synthesis (indicated at the right-hand side of Figure 3) we will pull together what has been learned from the country studies as well as the more general knowledge that this evaluation design and ancillary CDIE home-office activity have generated to provide a final report for this assessment.

Country sample. At the outset of our study, the country sample beyond Bangladesh looks tentatively as shown below. As the studies progress and we deepen our understanding of civil society's role in democratic development, we may modify the sample.

- The Dominican Republic has seen a great deal of USAID-assisted CSO activity over several decades and appears to be an excellent illustration of long-term support for democratic development. As noted earlier, we have begun preparing a background desk study on the Dominican Republic (Berthin et al. 1993).

- Thailand represents a relatively advanced developing country that after much wavering back and forth is now reasonably well launched on the democratic path. USAID has a long experience of substantial support for NGOs there to be studied, and in addition, two prominent American PVOs have been working in this sector in recent years, the Asia Foundation and PACT. The USAID mission in Bangkok is currently slated to close in the near future, but that should not affect the validity of studying Thailand, for our purpose is to distill specific donor experience in order to draw general lessons, not to make recommendations for individual country programs.

- Eastern Europe has seen substantial USAID investments in support of democratization over the past several years, and there is every prospect that this interest will continue over the near-term future and probably longer. By this time there should be enough experience in supporting civil society to justify inclusion of an Eastern European nation in our sample. The actual choice made will be in

consultation with the Democratic Initiatives Office in the Europe and Newly Independent States Bureau.

- The Latin America and Caribbean Bureau has worked longer in supporting democracy than other regional bureaus within USAID, and has an especially rich experience in civic education efforts (strategy 1 in Table 2). Accordingly, it makes good sense to include a second LAC country in our sample, and it would be appropriate to select a case in South America, where the developmental course has been quite different from what occurred in the Central American and Caribbean region. Chile appears to be a good example of civic education, particularly with its *Participa* CSO. As an ADC that has recently undergone a democratic transition from an authoritarian regime, Chile would also seem to have much in common with the ENI region, for which its experience might be instructive.

- We plan to visit at least one country in Africa, but at this point are not sure which of the many USAID-supported countries in that region would be most suitable. Given the wide range of experiences among the African countries, the best course here would be to make our selection in consultation with the Africa Bureau's Democratic Initiatives Office after our first field study, when we should have a better picture of which particular civil society issues we want to focus on. At the outset, the most appropriate countries would appear to be Kenya, Madagascar or Zambia.

Figure 3. Field study timetable, 1994



NOTE: Two scenarios are offered here. The actual countries visited may shift in terms of sequencing, but the general scheme should remain similar to that indicated above.

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Appendix A. USAID project activity in the civil society area

Projects with probably civil society components active in FY 1985 and later

Type	Country	Proj #	FYs	Project name	LOP $m
EUROPE					
2	Ex-Sov reg	110-0007	?	Dem Plur Initiative	8.0
2	En Eur reg	180-0003	90-91	Reg Dem Initiative Pgm	14.0
2	En Eur reg	180-0017	91-95	Political Process	47.7
	En Eur reg	180-0020	91-95	Rule of Law	5.1
	En Eur reg	180-0021	91-95	Soc Proc/Cult Plur	17.3
	En Eur reg	180-0042	91-92	Citizens' Democ Corps	1.0?
2	Poland	181-0007	89-92	Asst to Dem Insts	0.7
2	Hungary	185-0001	89-92	Spt for Dem Pluralism	0.3
	(Bureau total)				(94.1)
NEAR EAST					
3	Egypt	263-0220	91-94	PVO Development	9.0
3	Egypt	263-0231	93-98	Strengthening Governance	35.0
3	NE reg	398-0280	87-	Hum Rts	2.9?
	NE reg	398-0375	91-92	Dev Dem Institutions	2.0
	(Bureau total)				(48.9)
ASIA					
	Afghanistan	306-0290	87-87	Afghan PVO Support	3.6
2	Nepal	367-0159	87-97	PVO Co-financing II	15.0
2	Nepal	367-0163	92-95	Democratization in Nepal	3.0
3	Sri Lanka	383-0101	87-95	PVO Co-financing II	15.0
2	Sri Lanka	383-0109	90-95	Nat Res & Env Policy	12.0
2	India	386-0522	92?	Dem Apprch to Resource Eff	4.0?
2	Bangladesh	388-0072	88-95	Pvt Rural Initiatives	10.0
2	Bangladesh	388-0079	89-93	Inst Stren/Civic Partic	3.3
	Bangladesh	388-0091	90-90	Hum Rts Support	<0.1
	Pakistan	391-0515	91-95	Strengthen Dem Processes	18.0
2	ANE Reg	398-0280	88-93	Hum Rts	1.5
2	ANE Reg	398-0377	92-95	Democ Institutions Spt	10.0
3	Mongolia	438-0002	93-96	Tng for Mkt-based Econ	?
3	Philippines	492-0345	80-86	PVO Co-financing I	7.0
3	Philippines	492-0367	84-91	PVO Co-financing II	17.5
3	Philippines	492-0419	89-93	PVO Co-financing III	12.3
	Philippines	492-0421	87-88	NAFP Civic Action	15.0
	Philippines	492-0466	92-97	Dem Pluralism Initiative	12.0
3	Philippines	492-0470	93-97	PVO Co-financing IV	25.0
2	Thailand	493-0342	85-92	PVO Co-financing II	11.2
2	Thailand	493-0345	88-94	Natural Resource Mgt	40.0
2	Indonesia	497-0336	82-91	PVO Co-financing II	29.8
3	Indonesia	497-0364	91-94	Str Inst Dev (PVO CoF 3)	17.6
3	Asia Reg	498-0251	79-89	Civil & Hum Rts Dev	23.7
	Asia Reg	499-0002	91-93	Asia Democracy	4.0
	(Bureau total)				(310.6)

LAC

2	Bolivia	511-0610	88-93	Democratic Institutions	1.7
3	Costa Rica	515-0232	86-87	Pvt Agencies Collab Tog	2.6
3	Dom Repub	517-0247	89-94	PVO Co-financing	9.5
2	Dom Repub	517-0265	92-96	Democratic Initiatives	9.0
2	El Salvador	519-0321	86-90	Am Inst Free Labor Dev	11.7
3	El Salvador	519-0368	90-93	Am Inst Free Labor Dev	15.1
2	Guatemala	520-0398	90-94	Str Democ Institutions	6.0
3	Haiti	521-0181	84-90	NGO Support II	7.2
3	Haiti	521-0182	85-87	NGO Support III	2.7
2	Haiti	521-0188	87-88	NGO Support V	1.4
2	Haiti	521-0236	91-95	Democracy Enhancement	10.2
2	Haiti	521-0238	91-96	Admin of Justice	?
	Haiti	521-0240	92-97	Spt Constitutional Dem	15.0
2	Honduras	522-0296	87-94	Strengthen Dem Insts	21.5
2	Nicaragua	524-0316	91-95	Str Dem Institutions	14.0
	Panama	525-0307	91-91	Democratic Initiatives	2.3
2	Peru	527-0356	92-96	Democratic Initiatives	1.2?
2	Jamaica	532-0076	82-85	Small Bus Associations	0.4
3	Jamaica	532-0085	83-89	Voluntary Sector Dev	3.9
	Jamaica	532-0170	92-94	Local Partic in Dev	1.2?
2	CentAm reg	597-0003	85-90	Strengthen Democracy	12.7
3	CentAm reg	597-0008	86-89	Free Labor Dev (AIFLD)	8.0
2	LAC reg	598-0591	78-?	Hum Rts Initiative	16.2?
3	LAC reg	598-0634	85-88	PVO Sector Pol/Pgm Design	0.6
	LAC reg	598-0663	?	Citizen Participation	?
2	LAC reg	598-0790	90-92	Am Inst Free Lab Dev	21.1
2	LAC reg	598-0798	92-96	Dem Initiatives Tech Spt	7.5
3	LAC reg	598-0806	93-97	Dem Trade Union Dev	31.7
	(Bureau total)				(234.4)

AFRICA

3	Kenya	615-0236	85-95	PVO Co-financing	8.7
	Angola	654-0002	92-92	Democratization	2.0
	Mozambique	656-0217	90-93	PVO Support	30.0
	Ethiopia	663-0007	92-94	Spt for Dem & Governance	5.0
2	So Africa	674-0301	86-96	Com Outrch & Ldrship Dev	59.8
1	So Africa	674-0305	80-	Hum Rts Support	22.4
1	So Africa	674-0306	87-91	Bldg Dem Institutions	1.0
	So Africa	674-0310	91-91	Transition to Democracy	10.0
1	So Africa	674-0311	92-98	Promotion of Democracy	?
1	Africa reg	698-9801	80-90	Hum Rts Fund-Africa	21.3
3	Africa reg	698-0529	90-96	African Women in Devel	2.5
	Africa reg	698-0539	92-	African Bureau Dem Fund	14.0
	Africa reg	698-0542	91-93	Dem/Gov Prog Dev & Spt	4.5
3	Senegal	685-0284	90-91	PVO/NGO Support	11.2
2	Rwanda	696--0133	92-94	Dem Initiatives	5.0
	(Bureau total)				(198.0)

Agency grand total **886.0**

NOTE: This list includes projects active during or after the later-1980s that are likely to have included a civil society component (by which is meant some emphasis during LOP on NGO participation in the political arena in an advocatory role, or as representing their members to the state, etc.). The sources for the list were the *Congressional Presentation* for FY 1993 and the CDIE/DI project database.

Type 1 = projects in which civil society appears to have been the main focus of effort.
Type 2 = projects in which civil society appears to have been one among several foci of effort.
Type 3 = projects in which civil society was not explicitly included as a focus initially, but is likely to have become such a focus as the project was implemented.
No type = projects not yet classified; CDIE database retrieval as yet is insufficient to do so.

Civil Society-related Projects by Region and Type
(Projects active in FY 1985 and later)

Region	Civil society as main project focus		Civil society as one focus among several		Civil society as possible project focus		Total all projects	
	# projects	LOP $m	# projects	LOP $m	# projects	LOP $m	# projects	LOP $m
EUROPE			5	70.7			5	70.7
NEAR EAST					3	46.9	3	46.9
ASIA			11	139.8	8	118.1	19	257.9
LAC			15	134.6	9	81.3	24	215.9
AFRICA	4	44.7	2	64.8	3	22.4	9	131.9
TOTAL	4	44.7	33	409.9	23	268.7	60	723.3

NOTE: This table includes those projects from the previous table that could be included in types 1, 2 and 3. The remaining 20 projects could not be immediately classified on the basis of information available in the DIC database, but appeared quite likely to have some civil society component. Those that do fit into the classification employed here would most likely fit into type 3.

Appendix B. USAID assistance for democracy promotion activities, FY 1991-FY1993
(current year $ millions)

Activity	1991	1992	1993	Total	%
Civil society	$30	$60	$66	$156	22.2
Civic education	11	19	21	51	7.3
Human rights	6	18	24	48	6.8
Free speech	15	13	22	50	7.1
Legislatures	25	17	33	75	10.7
Rule of law	41	52	67	160	22.8
Elections	10	30	35	75	10.7
Leadership training	na	8	17	25	3.6
Executive accountability	6	7	12	25	3.6
Other democratic initiative	38	0	0	38	5.4
TOTAL	$182	$225	$296	$703	100.2

Source: Derived from GAO (1994: 12-13), which uses data supplied by USAID.

Appendix C. Field research agenda: key questions and assessment methodology

KEY ASSESSMENT QUESTION	CIVIL SOCIETY ASPECT TO BE ASSESSED	MAJOR INDICATORS	SOURCES OF INFORMATION
In what ways have there been changes in the legal, political (including political culture) and policy environment regarding civil society over the past two or three decades?	Legal environment (*de jure*: what do the rules say?)	Constitutional provisions, laws, regulations in force, guaranteeing: ▸ human rights ▸ freedom of speech & assembly ▸ public accountability	Legal documents
	Political environment (*de facto*: what is the actual situation?)	Military/police are not suppressive of: ▸ human rights ▸ freedom of speech & assembly	Int'l monitoring reports (Amnesty Int'l, State Dept, etc.), interviews
		State supporting free speech: ▸ print media (censorship, newsprint allocation, govt advertising) ▸ broadcast media (private stations permitted)	Interviews, knowledgeable outsiders
		Public accountability assured through: ▸ regular elections ▸ transparent decision-making ▸ access for CSOs	Documents, interviews, knowledgeable outsiders
	Political culture (do social values support civil society?)	Public opinion supports civil society	Opinion polls
		Sustainability of environment over time	Historical track record
	Policy environment (what do political elites want to do?)	Political agendas of elites	Interviews, knowledgeable outsiders

KEY ASSESSMENT QUESTION	CIVIL SOCIETY ASPECT TO BE ASSESSED	MAJOR INDICATORS	SOURCES OF INFORMATION
What, broadly speaking, is the nature and composition of civil society?	Constituency (what is the public or audience a CSO addresses?)	Identifiability	Outsider views, media
		Composition	Documents, interviews, knowledgeable outsiders
		Self-awareness	Focus groups
	Mission (what does a CSO see as its purpose?)	Coherence	Documents, interviews
		Credibility to members	Focus groups
		Cogency to members	Focus groups
	Leadership (what kinds of people manage a CSO's affairs?)	Representativeness (Boards of directors, headquarters personnel, key actors)	Interviews, knowledgeable outsiders, team judgment
		Dedication	Interviews
		Linkage to grassroots	Meeting records, focus groups
	Action strategy (what is a CSO trying to do?)	Feasibility	Documents, interviews, knowledgeable outsiders
	Financial base (how is a CSO funded?)	Funding sources	NGO budgets, donor allocations
	Autonomy (how free is a CSO to pursue its own path? how beholden to others?)	Independence from state (or other outside) control	Interviews, knowledgeable outsiders, team judgment

KEY ASSESSMENT QUESTION	CIVIL SOCIETY ASPECT TO BE ASSESSED	MAJOR INDICATORS	SOURCES OF INFORMATION
What did the CSOs analyzed in the previous step actually do, both individually and collectively to promote participation and policy accountability?	Mobilization for participation (how does a CSO activate its potential constituency?)	Organizational growth, networks of members	Membership rolls, evaluation of same by knowledgeable observers
		Activism of members	Meeting minutes, observation, focus groups
		Electoral participation (support for candidates, voting patterns)	Interviews, knowledgeable observers, voting data, media reporting
	Advocacy for policy accountability: public energizing (how does a CSO try to hold authorities accountable by working openly? promote policy change?)	Members' efforts toward particular policy makers (letters, visits)	Interviews, documents, focus groups
		Members' wider efforts (demonstrations, public protests)	Interviews, documents, focus groups
		Use of public fora (the media, international organizations like Amnesty Int'l, etc.)	Interviews, documents
	Advocacy for policy accountability: lobbying with policy makers (how does a CSO try to hold national authorities accountable by working directly with them? promote policy change?)	Formal interaction (e.g., boards, hearings)	Interviews, documents
		Informal interaction	Interviews, evaluation by knowledgeable outsiders
	Extending through other organizations (e.g., umbrella NGOs) (how does a CSO leverage its efforts?)	Support for other CSOs; alliances with international NGOs/PVOs	Interviews, knowledgeable observers, budget & other documents

KEY ASSESSMENT QUESTION	CIVIL SOCIETY ASPECT TO BE ASSESSED	MAJOR INDICATORS	SOURCES OF INFORMATION
Did these activities in fact have an effect in making state officials more accountable to the citizenry or in producing changes in state policy?	Executive branch: upper levels (have national leaders been affected by a CSO's efforts?)	Executive policy statements, regulations, program initiatives	Documents, interviews, media, knowledgeable observers
	Executive branch: lower levels (has the bureaucracy been affected?)	Implementation regulations (e.g., police rules of procedure)	Documents, interviews, media, knowledgeable observers
	Legislative branch (have members of national/regional legislative bodies been affected?)	Legislation responsive to civil society demands	Documents, interviews, media, knowledgeable observers
		Legislators responsive to civil society organizations	Interviews, media, knowledgeable observers
	Local councils (have members of local legislataive councils been affected?)	Councils responsive	Documents (e.g., minutes), interviews, knowledgeable observers
		Council members responsive	Interviews, knowledgeable observers, focus groups
		Direct CSO participation in council activities	
	Justice system (has the legal system become more responsive?	Access to system for wider constituencies Use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms	Documents, interviews, knowledgeable observers
Did improvements in accountability or changes in state policy have any effect on democratic development?	Participation (has it inreased? e.g., affirmative action program)	Previously exclusive positions now open (e.g., to women)	Lists of officeholders, organization members, office staff; focus groups
		Greater representation in civil society (a feedback loop)	Membership data on CSOs
	Human rights situation (has it improved?)	Decreased human rights abuses	External monitoring (State Dept, Amnesty Int'l annual reports, etc.), media
	Public probity (has it increased?)	Higher public standards for probity and behavior	Media, opinion surveys

KEY ASSESSMENT QUESTION	CIVIL SOCIETY ASPECT TO BE ASSESSED	MAJOR INDICATORS	SOURCES OF INFORMATION
To what extent did the efforts of USAID and/or other donors actually contribute to any improvements in civil society and democratic development that may have occurred?	Did donor activity affect CSO institutional structure & strength? (cf. I in Figure 2)	Use of USAID and/or other donor resources	Documents, budgets, interviews
	Did donor activity affect institutional activities? (cf. II)	USAID and/or other donor role in deployment of institutional structure & strength	Documents, budgets, interviews
	Did donor activity affect state policy? (cf. III)	Effect of USAID and/or other donor-supported activities in changing state policy	Interviews, knowledgeable observers
		USAID and/or other donor role in policy dialogue: securing policy acceptance	
	Did donor activity affect policy impact on democratic development? (cf. IV)	Implementation of policies supported by USAID and/or other donors	Documents, media monitoring, interviews
		USAID and/or other donor role in policy dialogue: securing policy implementation	Interviews, knowledgeable observers
		Downstream impact of policy on social welfare	Interviews, knowledgeable observers, socio-economic data

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