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COMPARISON OF TWO-PARTY AND MULTIPARTY REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENTS

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Although modes of representation come in a variety of institutional forms, they can be usefully divided into two categories: (1) those that seek to have each voter represented by a person or party coming fairly close to a voter's position on the issues, and (2) those that seek to limit a voter's choice to two candidates or parties which encompass a broad cross-section of interests and ideologies. These chapters discuss and compare these two modes of representation in terms of (1) the normative properties of the final outcomes of public policies under each system, (2) the stability of each system, and (3) the possible alienation of voters and resulting instability under each system. I also analyze the specific procedures to be used to best achieve the relative advantages of each system.

Those countries that seek to have separate ideological and interest groups represented by different parties or individuals employ some form of at-large representative system. A voter in a given geographic district votes **for one party** or individual, or perhaps **ranks** the different individuals, and two or more parties or individuals are allowed to win votes from the district. These systems do generally result in several parties holding seats in the Parliament. I show that the best procedure for obtaining multiparty representation is the party list system with the entire nation treated as a single district. If one prefers to have voters choose individuals as well as, or instead of, parties, the best procedure is the single-transferable-vote system in which voters rank **the different candidate**.

All of the so-called "two-party" democracies elect their representatives from **single-member** districts as in the House of Representatives in the United States. Although this mode of representation does tend to produce fewer parties in the legislature than the at-large systems, it does not generally result in only two parties in the legislature or ensure that one party has a majority of the seats. As I explain in these chapters, a more effective way in the long run to achieve the objective sought **from** a two-party system is to treat the entire nation (or in federalist systems the region or city) as a district, have voters vote for one party, and if no party receives an absolute majority of votes, have a run-off election between the two parties which received the most votes in the first election.

The logical justification for the two types of systems is quite different. With the **two-party** system, the goal is to pick that party whose program is deemed best, or which is deemed best to run the government from this election to the next one. The individual voter is closer to comparing the **final** outcomes he hopes to obtain **from** government during the next electoral period than merely selecting a representative in the legislature. In contrast, with a multiparty system the voter is choosing that person or party that will represent him best in the legislature.

The actual outcomes must be much more in doubt, however, since the voter cannot know what his party's fraction of total seats will be nor that of the others, and thus the issues that will win under the legislative voting rule. The normative properties of the outcomes chosen will depend on the rule used and these **are** discussed, as are the properties of outcomes under the two-party system.

The stability of each system is discussed at length. An advantage of two-party over multiparty systems is alleged to be their inherent stability. A majority party can implement its program, and survive until the next election. We explain that (1) multiparty systems can be and,

in several countries, have been quite stable. Moreover, the instabilities that have befallen some, e.g. the Weimar Republic, some of the previous republics in France, and post- World War II Italy, are a **result** of their having combined the executive and legislative functions in the **parliament**. As I discuss at length, combining these two functions is appropriate in a two-party system, but is not advisable in a multiparty system. A separate executive branch or chief executive should be combined with a parliament assigned a purely legislative function in a multiparty system.

Voters are less likely to be alienated from the political **system under a multiparty than** under a two-party system, because the party which they vote for generally takes positions on issues closer to what the voter favors than under a two-party system. Evidence consistent with this proposition is **discusscd**.

The Two Systems of Representation Compared

In the preceding two chapters we have described four "ideal types" of representation: (1) proportional representation of voter preferences by **elected persons** (PR-persons), (2) proportional representation of voter preferences by elected parties (PR-parties), (3) two candidate competition, where the candidates are persons, and (4) two candidate competition, where the candidates are parties. Toward the end of Chapter 10, we gave reasons why option (4) clearly dominated (3) when the goal of the electoral process is to choose a government. Thus, in this chapter we shall confine our attention to the first, second and fourth options. We begin by contrasting the properties of the ideal types, and then examine the characteristics of their real world analogues.

A. The Ideal Types Contrasted

1. Choosing representatives versus choosing outcomes

The fundamental difference between PR systems, be they to elect persons or parties, and a two party system (2P), is that in the former the citizen elects representatives, who will literally represent his views in the legislative assembly with the selection of policy outcomes to be made later in the assembly. In voting for a particular party or person **under a PR system, the** voter cannot make a very good prediction as to the effect of his vote on the final policy choices that will be made by the legislature. In contrast, under a 2P system, the voter knows that the party he votes for will be able to implement its entire platform if it so chooses. Thus, in choosing a party the voter comes much closer to actually choosing a final set of outcomes.

A PR system will produce a much closer correspondence between the views promoted by the party or person for whom a voter voted, and those of the voter. Neither alienation nor indifference should keep voters from voting under a PR system since (1) every voter should be able to find at least one party or person with a position on the issues that comes tolerably close to that of the voter, and (2) significant differences in the positions taken by the various parties will exist.¹ With only two parties in the final competition, many voters are likely to find that neither party comes close to their most preferred position. If the two party equilibrium is one in which both parties take the same position on the issues, indifference is also a real danger with a 2P system. Thus, both alienation and indifference seem more likely under 2P than under PR systems, and one expects greater voter turnouts under the latter. Breeding alienation and indifference and thereby lower voter participation may be judged undesirable features of an electoral process. If they are, then PR would seem to have an advantage over 2P systems. But the objective of 2P systems is to choose a government, to choose more directly the final outcomes from the political process. A final judgement on the relative merits of the two processes must consider their effects on the chosen outcomes.

In Chapter 10 we discussed one set of outcomes from 2P competition that led to an equilibrium like M in Figure 10.1, reproduced here as Figure 11.1. Under the assumption that voter decisions are based on the differences in expected utilities from the two parties' platforms, M would maximize a weighted sum of the utilities of all voters. What would be the policy outcome under a PR system? The answer to this question depends, of course, on the voting rule used in the legislative assembly. We describe three

options in Chapter 12, and we briefly relate the outcomes each produces to that of a 2P system.

The simplest of the three is a qualified majority rule. The winning issue must obtain \underline{m} fraction of the votes in the assembly. If $\underline{m} = 1$, a point in the pentagon formed by the ideal points of the five groups,² i.e., a point in the Pareto set would be chosen. While an $\underline{m} < 1$ will almost certainly be deemed optimal to discourage strategic behavior and save time, even an \underline{m} of $3/4$ or $2/3$ might be expected to produce results that are Pareto optimal most of the time, under sensible parliamentary rules to avoid cycling.

Under the point voting system, the representatives of the five groups each would be given vote/points in proportion to the number of votes they received in the election. Starting from a status quo point, say $\underline{x} = y = 0$, each representative would vote to increase or decrease the amount of \underline{x} and y provided by assigning her/its points to that issue. The procedure results in the collective choice of a combination of \underline{x} and y that maximizes a weighted sum of the utilities of the voters. Thus, in principle it could result in the same outcome being chosen as under 2P competition, \underline{M} . In practice voter turnouts, campaign contributions and the like will differ between 2P and PR systems, and thus both the weights implicitly assigned to the different groups' utilities and the chosen outcome will differ between the two systems. But their general properties--a chosen outcome that maximizes a weighted sum of voter utilities--are identical. Thus, a choice between the two must rest on considerations other than the normative properties of their theoretically anticipated policy outcomes.

Under the probabilistic majority rule, a lottery is formed among the five proposals of the representatives, i.e., their five ideal points, with the probability assigned to each point being the fraction of the voters

represented at each ideal point. Rational, risk averse representatives will unanimously prefer a compromise proposal within the pentagon-shaped Pareto set to the lottery. Thus, the third of the procedural options more fully described in Chapter 12 can also be expected to produce outcomes like **M** in the Pareto set. If the constitution specifies a voting rule for the legislative assembly that encourages compromise among the represented groups ideal points, then the outcomes from that assembly formed under a PR electoral formula should be normatively comparable to obtainable under a 2P system.

2. Consensus versus dissidence building

J. Rolland Pennock (1979, pp. 358-9) describes 2P systems as consensus building, and PR systems as the opposite (see also, Hermens, 1938, pp. 256-60). The above discussion implies that the difference between the two is not whether or not a consensus is reached, but where it is reached. With voter preferences as depicted in Figure 11.1, either one group dictates its most preferred outcome or some compromise among the most preferred outcomes of the five groups must be reached. Under a 2P system the compromise is made during the electoral campaign as each party tries to woo voters **from all** five groups by choosing a combination of **x** and **y** with some appeal to each group. Under PR the compromise must be reached after the election, when the representatives of the five groups meet in the legislative assembly to decide on the quantities of **x** and **y**. That a compromise is necessary is dictated by the lack of agreement among the five groups of voters on what is the best outcome.

Whether the representatives of the five groups can reach a compromise depends on many factors: the distance separating their positions on the **issues**, the proclivities of the **representatives** to engage in strategic

behavior, and of course, most importantly, the voting rule used in the legislative assembly. We shall argue in Chapter 12 that the voting rules mentioned above, and still others, can produce outcomes like M in a legislative assembly. But it is one of the fundamental lessons of public choice that no voting rule is perfect.³ Under PR radical minorities can elect representatives to the national assembly. Suppose one or more of these obtains representation, and refuses to compromise,⁴ or worse still works relentlessly "to bring the system down". The collapse of the Weimar Republic was in part due to the presence in the parliament of parties on the far left and right, e.g. the Communists and the Nazis, and their unwillingness to compromise (Almond and Powell, 1978, pp. 227-8). The frustrating inability of Italian parties to form stable coalitions in recent years has also been attributed to their unwillingness to compromise (Macridis, Allen, and Auselem, 1978, p. 492). Although the radically different nature of our ideal PR system from these real world cases (executive separated from legislative, focus on positive sum collective actions, alternative parliamentary voting rule) makes these forms of instability far less likely, they can not be ruled out entirely. A possible danger from representing heterogeneous groups in the legislative assembly is that they somehow fail to reach agreement on issues that could be of mutual benefit--they shoot themselves in their collective foot.

There is, however, a negative side to the 2P scenario also. Those like Hermens and Pennock, who see 2P government as consensus building, assume that the competition for votes pulls the two parties toward the middle of the ideological distribution of preferences. The distribution is assumed to be either unimodal, or if bimodal abstentions from alienation are not

significant enough to upset the equilibrium with both parties taking similar positions at the center of the ideological spectrum, point **C** in Figure 11.2. The desire to win election forces parties to move away from their ideological supporters on the left and right and to compete for the votes of the uncommitted citizens in the center,

But suppose abstentions due to alienation are so great when parties move to the center that the equilibrium under 2P competition has the parties at positions **L** and **R**. We now have the potential difficulty of large swings in policy -outcomes following a change in the governing party. The kind of stop-and-go macro policies, and nationalization-denationalization actions that took place in Great Britain in the 60s and early 70s as the reigns of government passed from **Labour** to the Conservatives and back again. What is more, these radical swings can occur following only slight shifts in voter support. The **Labour** Party in the **UK** increased its fraction of seats in the Parliament from 41.0 to 50.3 between the 1959 and 1964 elections by increasing its fraction of the popular vote from 43.8 to 44.1 (**Mackie** and **Rose**, 1989, pp.). While our ideal 2P system with run-off elections would not allow a party to obtain a majority of the seats in a parliament without obtaining a majority of the votes, it would allow the transference of government to ensue following slight shifts in voter support. Under the 2P form of government the difference between having 50.1 percent of the vote and 49.9 is the difference between implementing one's platform, and objecting to the other party's implementing its platform. Note that with a distribution of voter preferences as in Figure 11.2, a PR system coupled with a parliamentary voting rule that did force a compromise on policy, would actually produce policies closer to those favored by the voters at **C**, even though a party representing these voters would be much smaller than either of

the parties centered at L or R. The application of a voting rule like point voting would force the parliament to choose outcomes that gave positive weights to the welfare of all represented groups, while a 2P system with parties positioned at L and R would effectuate outcomes that gave positive weights to only one of the two major groups of voters.

We conclude that, when the ideal types of representation work as designed, they both can be expected to result in policy outcomes with attractive normative policies. Indeed, they can be expected to result in very similar policy outcomes in some cases. But with respect to each one can conjure up examples in which the outcomes are not so attractive. In choosing between the two, the constitution framers must try and envisage the kind of outcomes that can be expected from each system for their particular country. In making such a judgment, the experience of other countries with similar systems may be helpful.

B. Ideal Types and Real World Systems

There are a few electoral systems extant that approximate fairly closely the ideal types described in Chapter 9 and 10. The procedures in France for electing the President are identical to those described for an ideal 2P system--an at large contest across the entire country with a run-off election between the top two candidates, if no candidate gets an absolute majority of the votes cast on the first ballot. The major difference between this system and our ideal type, and it is major, is that the President of France cannot simply implement the policies he espouses, and thus the voters cannot choose from among the presidential candidates on the expectation that whoever is elected will implement his promised platform.

The list systems used in the Netherlands, Israel and for half of the seats filled in the Federal Republic of Germany's Parliament follow our ideal

PR-parties, and at large election across the entire country in which each voter casts one vote for the party of his choice, and the seats in the parliament are allocated nearly in proportion to the votes cast for each party. There is no run-off to-ensure that all voters are represented by parties for which they voted, but the most significant difference between the Dutch and Israeli systems and our ideal type is the requirement that a government, i.e. a cabinet, be selected by the elected parties using the simple majority rule. This requirement can, as argued in Chapter 9, lead to instability problems. Israel in particular has found it difficult to form stable coalitions among its many parties in recent years.

In many U.S. cities the governing assembly, the city council, is elected in an at large election across the city. In some cases the elections are nonpartisan, i.e. the candidates do not declare a party affiliation. These electoral systems resemble our ideal PR-persons system with the exception that an elected member of a city council gets to cast but one vote in the city council, regardless of the number of votes she received, while our ideal system would give each representative votes in proportion to the number she received from the electorate.

All of the ideal systems envisage parties or persons competing for votes in an at large election. To be decided in the national legislative assembly are the issues that affect the entire nation: expenditures on defense, immigration policy, environmental issues affecting the entire nation. The vote of a citizen of Paris is to count the same as that of a citizen from Dijon, and each is to have the same options as to choice of party or person to represent them. Similar electoral rules would be chosen to elect representatives to regional, metropolitan and perhaps even neighborhood legislative assemblies. Most real world legislative assemblies differ from

these ideal types, and the few real world examples given above, in that the nation is divided into electoral districts, and the citizens in each district vote separately for the party or person to represent them. The votes from Paris are counted separately from those from Dijon.

Real world systems of this type can differ in both the number of districts into which the nation is divided, and the number of persons that can be elected from each district. Our ideal PR systems have but one district and as many persons elected from that district as their are seats in the legislature. The fewer the number of districts into which the polity is divided and the more person elected per district, the more a **geographically-**based system will resemble our ideal PR system. When but a single person can be elected to represent each district, the electoral **system** resembles our ideal 2P system for that district. With this distinction in mind we shall divide our discussion of real world systems into two parts depending upon whether they allow one representative per district, or more than one. We shall call the former "multirep" systems, and the latter "singlerep" systems.

1. Multirep systems

a. Multirep list systems

To see how multirep systems work consider Table 11.1. A nation of 10,300,000 voters is divided into 10 districts based on geography. Seats in the parliament are apportioned to each district in proportion to population, e.g., district 1 has twice the population of district 2, and therefore can fill twice as many seats. We have assumed that the population in each district is such as to make the allocation of seats exact. Every 100,000 voters can elect one representative. Usually of course even the fairest apportionment of seats results in some differences in voters per seat across' districts. There are 8 parties seeking seats in the parliament, but all 8 do

not choose to run candidates in each district. When a party fails to enter a list of candidates **in** a district, an NL (no list) is entered. A voter in any district votes for a single party. The seats assigned to that district are allocated in proportion to the votes cast in that district. We have assumed that the allocation rule is the largest remainder rule. Under this formula, one first calculates the Hare quotient

$$q = \frac{v}{s} \tag{11.1}$$

where v is the total number of votes cast in a district, and s the number of seats it can fill. The number of seats won by each party is determined by dividing the number of votes won by the party, v_p, by q. This division gives a nonnegative integer I plus some fraction f, $0 \leq f < 1$, i.e.

$$\frac{v_p}{q} = I + f \tag{11.2}$$

The allocation of seats to parties proceeds by **first** giving each party a number of seats equal to its I. The remaining seats are assigned to each party according to which parties have the largest remainders, f. For example? on the basis of the Is for each party, the allocation of seats in district 1 gave 3 seats to A, 1 to D, and 2 to C. The remaining to seats were given to A and H, since they had the highest remainders.

The last column of Table 11.1 gives the totals of votes **and seats won by** each party across the nation. The distribution of seats corresponds reasonably well to the distribution of votes across the entire nation. **But** the correspondence is not perfect. Despite being the formula that gives the greatest degree **of** proportionality between votes and seats (Lijphart, 1986), the largest remainder formula when applied to the total votes cast in the nation would assign an extra **seat** to parties D and F, and one less seat to B

and G. But the correspondence is still quite close. Thus it is reasonable to treat **multirep** list systems, in which the voters choose parties, as leading **approximately** to the outcomes one would expect under an at large **PR-parties** system. The fewer the districts into which the polity is divided, and the more seats assigned to each district, the closer this approximation will be (Rae, 19 , pp.). Table 11.2 presents the number of districts, and seats per district for several PR-type countries. Note that in Finland, Italy, Spain and Switzerland, some districts are assigned but one seat, and thus for these the electoral rule is the singlerep system.

b. Single-transferable-vote (STV) systems

In STV systems the voter votes for a particular candidate, or more accurately candidates, rather than for a party per se, although of course a candidate's party is likely to be an important consideration of the voter. Under the STV a voter rank orders the individual candidates running in his district. The determination of winners is made using the Droop quota, d.

$$d = \frac{v}{s+1} + 1 \tag{11.3}$$

where v and s are the total votes and seats in a district as before. One first determines the number of candidates with first place votes in excess of d. These candidates are all elected. Any **first** place votes for a given candidate above those required to reach d are assigned to the voter's second choice. If this candidate has more than d, the votes are assigned to the voter's third choice, and so on until the s seats are filled. STV is currently employed in both the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland, Malta, and in some of the elections in Australia.

When voters confine their ranking of candidates to those from a single

party, STV results in the same party representation as under the largest remainder formula (Lijphart, 1986, p. 175). The main difference between STV and a **multirep** list system is that under the party leadership gets to **determine which persons fill the seats one by the party** In a district, under STV the voters make this determination. Under STV the voters may depose a party leader, for example, by giving her very low ranks, while under a list system she could be elected with the same number of seats won by her party, if she were placed at the top of her party's list.

SW would seem to have all of the merits of a party list system--the voters can after all rank the candidates in the same order as that advocated by the party--plus the obvious advantage of allowing the voters to provide the additional input into the election process of their views on the relative merits of the party members.⁵ On the other hand, if the parties are disciplined, one elected representative will wind up voting as do all others. Her differential impact will have to come through the impact she has in the party's deliberations. A particular advantage claimed for STV is that it allows ethnic, religious, and gender groups to single out party members from their group for election (Hallett, 1984, pp. 122-3). This potential may obviously be an **advantage** for these groups in present real world systems, and may even be one in our ideal system. But in the latter, the focus of the legislature is to be on providing public goods and resolving prisoners' dilemmas, reaching decisions that potentially benefit all members of the community. Is **there a** Catholic position on defense that differs from the Protestant position, a black position on environmental protection that differs from that of whites? **If so**, then **STV** has an advantage over a party list system. But it also has the possible disadvantage of encouraging a shift in focus of the legislature to the divisive, 'zero-sum game issues that

often divide these groups. Issues, which in our ideal constitutional system, will be taken up elsewhere in the institutional structure.

Although STV would seem to resemble in some ways a PR-persons system in that the voter **votes** for persons rather than parties, it would seem to be inferior to our ideal PR-persons system, because the persons elected each only get to cast one vote in the parliament regardless of the amount of support they receive. If one candidate gets twice as many first place votes as another, should that person not have greater influence in the parliament? Under STV each has the same single vote in the parliament if both are elected. In this way STV would seem to throw away a lot of information about voter preferences relative to our Ideal PR-persons system. This feature also makes STV resemble a, PR-parties system more than a PR-persons system.

c. Limited voting

Under limited vote. systems each voter can cast \underline{c} votes, $\underline{c} < \underline{s}$, where \underline{s} is the number of seats to be filled in the district. The \underline{s} candidates receiving the most votes in a district assume its seats in the parliament. The votes are cast for persons rather than parties, and so limited voting resembles STV in a way since the voter can indicate which members of a party he wishes to see in the parliament. But the voter can also cast his votes for persons in different parties. With \underline{c} and \underline{s} fairly large, limited voting will tend to produce representation resembling a PR system. The only country in which limited voting with $\underline{c} > 1$ is used today is Spain, where it is used to elect the upper house.⁶

Limited voting is a compromise between pure PR systems in which the parties or persons receive votes in the parliament in direct proportion to the votes cast for them, and plurality systems in which representatives are elected with greatly different numbers of votes. This latter characteristic

creates strategic problems **for** both the voters and the parties running candidates. Suppose, for example, 4 seats can be filled from a district, and each voter can cast 3 votes, the typical case in Spain. A voter might like to see all 4 seats filled by representatives from his most preferred party, but can cast but three votes. If the party runs four candidates, the voter must choose one candidate not to vote for. If all voters who support this party choose the same person not to vote for, only three members of the party can possibly be elected. If the number of voters supporting this party is **large, however, all four seats might have been filled by representatives of this party under an alternative pattern of voting.** This may lead some voters to vote for their fourth choice from the party, say, and not for their first **choice, under the expectation that their first choice will receive way more than the number of votes required to get elected.** But if large numbers of voters act the same way, **their first choice might fail to get elected,** while their fourth choice is elected.

A symmetric problem faces the parties in choosing the number of candidates to run. A party that runs 4 candidates for 4 seats might spread its votes so thinly that it elects only 2, say, when by running 3 it could **have elected 3.** If it runs only 3, however, it passes up the chance of electing 4. These strategic considerations suggest that limited voting systems are less attractive means for eliciting information on voter preferences than PR party list and **STV** systems.

d. Single-nontransferable-vote svstems (SNTV)

A special case of limited voting has $\underline{s} > 1$, and $\underline{c} = 1$. When both \underline{s} and \underline{c} equal 1, we have the plurality **system**, so that **SNTV** is clearly closer Co a plurality system than limited voting systems with $\underline{c} > 1$. Indeed, when $\underline{c} = \underline{s} > 1$, limited voting resembles STV, so that limited voting approximates PR or

plurality systems as s and c are large or small. The only country currently using SNTV at the national level is Japan. As one might expect, given its halfway house status between pure PR and plurality systems, SNTV achieves a degree of proportionality between votes and seats in the parliament somewhere between that of the PR list and STV systems (Lijphart, Lopez Píntor, and Sone, 1986). If one's objective is to obtain an accurate reflection of the voter support for different parties or persons at the national level, SNTV would seem to be inferior to the more popular PR systems.

2. Singlerep systems

In singlerep systems each party runs but one candidate in a district, and thus the voter always votes for a particular per person in these systems, even though this choice may be heavily or exclusively influenced by the candidates' party affiliations. Singlerep electoral systems are of two types: plurality systems in which the candidate receiving the most votes in a district is elected to the legislative assembly, and majority systems in which the candidate receiving the most votes in a district is elected, if she also has received a majority of the votes cast. When the latter does not occur on the first vote in a district, a run-off is held between the two highest vote recipients on the first ballot, thus assuring that one receives an absolute majority of the votes cast on this second ballot.

The plurality system is used to elect representatives to the national legislative assemblies in Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and to fill half of the seats in the Federal Republic of Germany's Parliament. No country uses a simple majority formula for electing representatives to the national assembly of the type just described. The Australians use a form of majority-STV system, however. As under STV the a voter expresses his ranking of the candidates, not just his first choice. As

under a plurality/majority system, however, a single candidate is chosen from each district. If a candidate receives an absolute majority of the first place votes, she is elected. If **no** candidate receives an absolute majority of first place votes, the second place votes of the candidate receiving the fewest first place votes are transferred to the other candidates. If following this transfer a **candidate** now has an absolute majority, she is the winner. **If** no candidate still has an absolute majority, the second place votes of the candidate receiving the second fewest first place votes are transferred to the other candidates. This procedure is followed **until one** candidate achieves an absolute majority (Lijphart, 1984, pp. 152-3).

In France a combination plurality/majority system is used. On the first ballot a candidate needs an absolute majority of the votes cast to be elected. If no candidate from a district receives an absolute majority, a second balloting occurs and the candidate with a plurality of the votes cast is elected, On the second ballot, all candidates who did not receive at least 15 percent of the first ballot votes are removed, however. This feature makes France's system approximate a straight majority system (Lijphart, 1984, pp. 153-4).

3. Why geographic representation?

The idea the one person should represent an entire constituency, as under the plurality system, evolved in Great Britain from the **predemocratic institution of representing** corporate bodies by persons sent **to** London (Eckstein, 1963, p. 248). That this system, when adapted to represent persons, should have some inadequacies in serving this function is perhaps not surprising. Nevertheless, it is this system that the English speaking democracies, Ireland excepted, have adopted in one form or another. Even the countries with PR-type systems **have with** but a couple of. exceptions chosen to

subdivide the national polity into geographic districts, and elect representatives to the national parliament by geographic district. If the objective of the national parliament is to resolve questions of national consequence, what justifies a geographic mode of representation?

One justification would be that there are significant homogeneities of preferences on national issues within geographic areas, and strong heterogeneities across regions. Such might be the case in a country in which religious, ethnic, and economic groups resided in different areas, and if these groups tended to have preferences on national issues that were homogeneous within the groups and heterogeneous across them.

A second justification for electing representatives by geographic district would be **make the representative process more personal.** **Local** "boys and girls" are sent off to the national capital to represent **the "folks back home"**. With electoral campaigns geographically constrained, the chances of a voter's seeing and hearing a candidate in person increase. The candidates can learn the wishes of the electorate through direct contact.

While there is certainly merit in **these arguments**, their importance should not be exaggerated. Both would carry more weight in a bygone era than they do today. The increasing mobility of citizens in all developed countries has made a citizen's present geographic location a poorer predictor of his religion and ethnic background than was true a century ago.

Increasing levels of education should reduce the correlation between ethnic and religious background and views about national policy issues. In most countries, citizens obtain their information about candidates for national office from national newspapers and magazines, and from national television and radio networks. Even in the United States where "local newspapers" remain dominant, these papers are increasingly becoming parts of national

chains, rely on national news services to cover stories of national importance, and print the commentary of nationally syndicated columnists. The modern voter watches a public debate on television rather than in person at a nearby auditorium.

The one issue upon which the views of citizens within a given geographic district are most homogeneous, and over which there is most likely to be disagreement across districts, is the merit of funding projects out of the national budget that provide benefits only to the citizens of that district. **The danger** of electing representatives to the national **legislature** on a geographic basis is that they become lobbyists for **local interests instead of** representatives of citizen views on national interests, that they become ombudsmen for their local constituents. The plethora of projects from metropolitan transportation systems to dams and bridges, that are funded out of the national treasury in **the** United States indicate that this **danger** is a real one. Although many of these projects can be viewed as legitimate public goods from the point of view of the citizens in the **local area in which they** take place, when viewed from a national perspective they are obviously a form of geographic redistribution from the rest of the country to the district benefited. That the European parliamentary systems have produced somewhat similar results can be explained in part by their also having **chosen** geographically based modes of representation.'

Yet another reason for choosing a geographically **based representation** system is that **one** does not seek to obtain an accurate representation of citizen preferences across the nation **on** national issues. The goal is the second of the two discussed here, that of choosing a government in a 2P system. The claim has often been made, indeed it has been proclaimed to be a **law**, that **geographically based plurality/majority systems produce two party**

government.⁸ This claim is part of a broader set of hypotheses linking election laws to the number of parties to which we now turn.

C. Electoral Laws and the Number of Parties

When only one representative can be elected from a district, a candidate can guarantee herself victory only by securing at least 50 percent of the vote. This characteristic encourages parties adjacent to one another in the ideological spectrum to merge, and discourages minority parties. A party with a dedicated following of no more than 10 percent of a district faces the dreary prospect of never electing a representative. Thus, plurality/majority systems encourage some parties to merge and others to withdraw, and thereby tend to evolve toward a situation in which two parties compete for a majority of votes in the district.

If the relative size and ideological perspective of parties is the same across all districts, a plurality system will tend to produce a two party system at the national level. But if, say, a party with a 10 percent following at the national level has its support concentrated in a few districts, and can therefore elect representatives from **these** districts, there is nothing in the logic of a plurality system to prevent it from producing several parties with continued representation in the national parliament.

By allowing voters to elect several representatives from each district, **multirep** systems lower the required number of votes a party must obtain to elect a representative. If a district **can** fill 10 seats in the parliament, a party can guarantee itself representation by securing 10 percent of the vote, and can in most cases elect a representative with a far smaller fraction. Thus, **multirep** systems can keep minority parties alive by offering them reasonable chances of electing some members of the parliament.

Although **multirep** systems make it easier for minority parties to survive, they do not of course necessitate their appearance.. Should ideological differences in a country be such as to divide the polity into basically two large groups, only two parties might easily emerge under a **multirep** system. Thus, the logic of electoral representation is not such as imply unconditionally the survival of but two national parties in singlerep systems and numbers **greater** than two in **multirep** systems. We will anticipate, however, that when singlerep systems produce multiparty representation, there will be important regional differences in ideology that give some parties large followings in some regions, and modest support in others. Two parties should dominate in **multirep** systems only when the ideological differences separating voters are few, and relatively uniform across the entire country.

The United States epitomizes the singlerep-two party system. In the elections for the House of Representatives in 1990, all 435 seats were filled by **candidates** from either the Republican or the Democratic Parties. In the 1988 Presidential election minority party candidates won a cumulative total of less than one percent of the votes cast across the nation. **While** offering seemingly strong proof for the law that singlerep systems produce two party representation, the United States' results must be qualified to some extent. The U.S. system is characterized by loose party discipline. Party affiliation is a less accurate guide to a representative's ideology and likely vote on a given issue than it is in Canada or Great Britain. A Democrat from rural Mississippi can vote quite differently from a Democrat from the Bronx (New York City). If one were to define a party as a group of individuals of similar ideological persuasion, who vote the same way on

issues, than the number of "parties" present in the U.S. Congress is larger than two.

In the election of the President, the entire nation is effectively a single electoral district today, the Electoral College having devolved into a rubber stamp of the popular vote. Thus, the two party nature of these contests does not refute the argument above that singlerep systems produce 2P outcomes at the electoral district level, but not necessarily at the national level.

Regional differences in ideology in the United States were at their apex just before the Civil War when parties and the nation were divided by the issues of slavery. The same singlerep-plurality system that exists today produced in 1860 four major parties. and the two Presidential candidates from the Republican and Democratic Parties won a combined total of less than 70 percent of the popular vote (Mackie and Rose, 1989, p.). Had the United States somehow managed to survive without the Civil War and with the institution of slavery in tact, one expects that the number of parties in Congress, and the number of parties running for the presidency would have remained greater than two for some time.

Canada resembles the United States in size, stage of economic development, and overall ideology. Yet regional differences in ideology and party strength have consistently produced at least three parties with representatives elected to the Parliament, and more often four or more, despite its having a singlerep-plurality system. The same is true in Great Britain. United Ireland, the Scottish Nationalists, The Welsh Nationalists, and the Ulster Unionists and Loyalists have won seats from time to time, as have the more nationally oriented Liberal and Social Democratic Parties. One

party has not won an absolute majority of the votes cast in Great Britain in a Parliamentary election since 1931. In a pure 2P system one always would.

Austria provides the best example of the converse situation. This small country's population divides essentially into two ideological groups, Catholics and **socialists**, and the Peoples and Socialist Parties have dominated Austrian Parliaments since World War II (Lijphart, 1984, pp. 150-60).

Causality in the relationship between electoral laws and number of parties is generally assume to run from laws to parties. The use of a multirep system leads to the creation of new parties. But there is historical evidence of two-way causality. When religious or ethnic or other ideological differences are held to be significant having all citizens of a district represented by a person with of necessity a single religious or ethnic or ideological background can lead to demands by the "unrepresented" minorities of a district for proportional representation. Such has occurred in Switzerland in the 19th century.

Switzerland is today regarded as a model of stable democracy, a counterexample to the proposition that PR systems inevitably produce political instability, and it is. But it is a country with considerable ethnic and religious diversity. In the 19th century, when the country employed the plurality system for choosing representatives, violence broke out first in Ticino and then spread to other parts of the country as ethnic and religious minorities protested to their not being represented in the national Parliament (Lakeman and Lambert, 1955, p. 289). It resulted in Switzerland's substitution of a multirep, modified list system for its plurality system. Belgium replaced its plurality system with a PR system in 1899 following racial disputes over the representativeneso a singlerep system

(Lakeman and Lambert, 1955, p. 291). More recently elections in Northern Ireland have taken place under a STV PR system by mandate of the British parliament to ensure representation of the catholic minority and to avoid the violence a lack of such representation might cause (Hallett, 1984, p. 117). Thus, PR systems are observed in some countries because of the numerous ideological differences that divide the citizens and the need for several viable parties to adequately represent them.

To examine the relationship between electoral laws and the number of parties, we need a way of counting parties. In a country in which two parties have all of the seats in the parliament, with one having 48 percent and the other 52 percent, it seems obvious that we wish to characterize the country as a two party system. But what if the two parties divide the seats 70/30, or 90/10? In the last case it would seem that we have nearly a one party state, and should characterize the country as effectively having fewer parties than in the 48/52 split case.

A fairly simple way to count parties and take into account differences in their relative sizes is to compute a numbers equivalent (NE) for the country. We can define a numbers equivalent for a nation both with respect to the fractions of votes each party receives in the election, and the fraction of the seats it wins in the parliament. Let v_p be the number of votes of party p , s_p the number of seats it has in the parliament, and v and s the total numbers of votes and seats, respectively. The numbers equivalent measures for votes (NEV) and seats (NES), respectively are defined as

(11.4)

If five parties each have 20 percent of the seats in the parliament, $s_p/s = 0.2$, and $NES = 5$. If, however, the fractions of seats held by the five parties are respectively, **0.5**, 0.25, 0.15, **0.05**, and **0.05**, then $NES = 2.9$, the greater relative importance of the first two parties leads to a smaller number of parties effectively represented in the parliament.⁹

In **Table 11.3** we present **NEVs** and **NESS** for the leading democratic countries since World War II. We have placed the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan in a category in between the **singlerep** and **multirep** systems, since the FRG elects half of its Parliament using each procedure, and Japan using the SNTV system, which is a compromise between the two to some degree. The table reveals both the exceptions and the general tendencies. **Singlerep** systems do average around two parties being effectively represented in the legislative assembly. France is the major exception here having been a multiparty state under both **multi-** and **singlerep** modes of representation for over a century (Lakeman and Lambert, 1955, pp. 300-2; Macridis, 1978). The **multirep** systems average roughly double the effective number of parties represented, with Austria again being essentially a 2P state. The FRG and Japan fall in between as predicted.

D. Electoral Laws and the Representativeness of Electoral Systems

1. The proportionality of representation

Under the ideal PR and 2P systems with run-off elections, **every** voter is represented in parliament by someone he voted for, and the correlation between representative votes in the parliament and citizen votes in the election is perfect. Without run-off elections this correlation is reduced but remains high. With representatives selected from geographic districts this correlation is weakened further, but can be expected to be greater under **multirep-PR** systems than under **singlerep** systems. As an index of

proportionality of representation we sum the differences between the fractions of seats in the parliament each party gets and their fractions of votes, divide the sum by two, and subtract it from 100. A score of 100 is a perfectly representative system. The last column of Table 11.3 presents these indexes for 1982 and for the most recent elections. As expected the PR systems score higher in their degree of representativeness. The in between case of the FRG produces a very high correspondence between votes cast for a party and its share of seat in the parliament, however. But, perhaps the most dramatic observation revealed by the data is how little difference there is in these indexes across the countries.¹⁰

The impression given by the figures in the last column of Table 11.3 is a bit misleading, however. In a one party state, the index of proportionality would be perfect. On average a citizen in a PR system has twice as many parties from which to choose than does a citizen in 2P system. **Thus** the correspondence between the positions taken by the party a citizen votes for and the citizens views will be closer under a PR system. This property of PR systems coupled with their **greater indices of proportionality** suggests a considerably more accurate reflection of voter preferences under actual multirep systems than under their singlerep counterparts.

2. Representing minority interests

The inherent logic of PR systems is to represent all groups of voters in the polity in proportion to their number. One expects therefore to find minority groups better represented in PR systems than under plurality systems. Lakeman (1984, p. 50) reports a higher percentage of women in **parliaments elected using PR** rules than in those elected by the plurality/majority method. As we have already noted it was this expectation that lead Switzerland, Belgium and Northern Ireland to switch from a

plurality to a PR-type system. **And it was the expectation of greater black** and Puerto Rican representation that lead to the adoption of STV on New York City school boards. Given these considerations and the history of PR, it is somewhat surprising that a movement has been under way in the South in the United States to replace PR systems for electing city councils with singlerep plurality systems. Indeed, PR has even been challenged in the courts as violating blacks rights to equal representation.

PR systems were adopted in many cities in the United States between 1915 and 1964 as part of a reform movement, in part, with the hope of increasing minority representation on city councils (Weaver, 1986, pp. 140-1). In the 70s, blacks in the south began attacking PR as a mode of representation pointing to a lower degree of representation of black citizens in cities using at large PR than in cities electing representatives from singlerep districts using the plurality method. The following figures for the ratios of seats held by blacks on city councils to black population in the city reflect the issue.¹¹

Singlerep district elections	.922
Multirep at-large elections	.616
Multirep at-large elections with residence requirements	443

Part of the explanation for these figures appears to be that blacks have found it more difficult to get on the ballot in cities in which at-large elections are held (Engstrom and McDonald, 1986, p. 204). But to the extent this is the cause of the discrepancy, the remedy would seem to be to make it easier for blacks to get on the ballot in at-large contests.

With blacks and whites both equally able to run for election, it is difficult to see why a PR system would not be better at producing a close correspondence between the number of black voters and blacks elected if, as seems to be the presumption, that blacks only vote for blacks and whites for whites. Another possible explanation for the above figures is that denominator used is not black voters but black residents. Blacks have considerably lower registration and voting participation rates than whites. This is revealed in the above figures by the much lower figures in at-large elections with election requirements. If 40 percent of a city's residents are black, but only half as many blacks register and vote as do whites, only 20 percent of the city council will be black under a full representation of voters by race. Singlerep district representation will favor blacks, if blacks and whites live in geographically separated communities, and blacks have significantly lower participation rates than whites. That the lower representation rates of blacks is due to lower participation rates is suggested by the dominance of socioeconomic factors, i.e., the kinds of factors that explain voter participation rates, over electoral rules in explaining black representation (MacManus, 1978; Cole 1974).

PR systems are designed to represent the preferences of voters more accurately than is possible with singlerep plurality systems. But if citizens do not vote, they cannot achieve this objective. The attack by Southern blacks on PR systems as **being unrepresentative** suggests an alternative criterion for representation. Individuals should be represented regardless of whether they vote or even whether they register to vote. But how, if they do not vote can one know for whom they would have voted had they voted? The obvious presumption in the challenges to PR in the South is that the blacks who did not vote would have voted for blacks, and that it does not

matter who represents the nonvoting blacks on city councils, so long as they are back. This notion of representation is far removed from that underlying our ideal systems of representation in which information on citizen preferences for those collective actions that benefit all members of the community is sought through a system of representation.

3. Rounding off remainders

With the total number of seats in the legislative assembly and the number assigned to each district fixed, it is almost always the case **that** the representatives are elected with different numbers of votes. The question then arises as to how to apportion seats on the basis of the number of votes each person or party receives. Several formulas exist and all produce **a reasonable correspondence between the total votes cast for a party and the number of seats it obtains**. The largest remainders formula illustrated in Section B of this chapter produces the closest correspondence and it would **appear to be the best choice if one adopted a PR-list system**.¹² But it is not obvious why any formula is really needed.

The principle of "one man one vote" has an obvious appeal when applied to citizens, but why should it be applied to their representatives? If A receives more votes than B, why should she not have more influence, e.g. more votes, in the legislative assembly? Indeed, does the principle of **one-man-one-vote** applied to citizens not require that their representatives have unequal voting power if they have received unequal numbers of votes?

Complete obedience to the one-man-one-vote principle can be achieved under either an ideal PR system or an ideal **2P** system by giving each party **winning seats votes in proportion to the number of votes received by the party**. Suppose, for example, in an at-large national election to fill 300

seats in the parliament, the 11,648,921 votes cast are divided among the five competing parties as in Table 11.4.

Table 11.4

Allocation of Votes and Seats in Parliament under One-Man-One-Vote Formula

<u>Party</u>	<u>Popular Votes</u>	<u>Seats in Parliament</u>	<u>Votes per Seat</u>
A	1,413,782	37	38,210
B	1,884,096	49	38,451
C	4,002,891	103	38,863
D	989,623	26	38,062
<u>E</u>	<u>3,358,529</u>	<u>85</u>	<u>39,512</u>
Totals	11,648,921	300	

The largest remainder formula would allocate the 300 seats as in column 3. But if each representative were given votes as in the last column, the relative voting strength of each party or person would exactly reflect their support from the citizens.¹³ Under a 2/3 majority rule, and issue one now require 7,765,947 votes to pass, but this is of no matter. Electronic voting devices and computers can handle the arithmetic.

The same principle could be easily applied to our ideal 2P system. It could also be extended to systems in which representatives are selected by geographic districts, although the accuracy of the formula will decline as the number of representatives selected per district declines. Even under a plurality system it would seem to offer some advantages over the present formulas, however. Does an elected representative, who receives 70 percent of the 1.2 million votes cast in her district, not represent in a meaningful sense more voters than one, who defeats two other close challengers with only 40 percent of 0.8 million votes cast? Why ought these two persons have the same power to influence electoral outcomes in the legislature?

E. The Stability of PR and 2P Systems

We observed in Chapter 9, that political instability is not a congenital problem of PR systems of representation. When the instability problem has arisen, it has been because the constitutional rules require that the legislative assembly elected under PR rules must not only vote on **legislation**, but must choose a prime minister and form a cabinet. The major cause of instability can be removed by separating the legislative and executive branches (Johnston, 1984, p. 68).

The only country to have attacked the instability problem of a PR system by constitutional reform separating the executive and legislative branches is **France in 1958**. France both separated the executive from **the** legislature and replaced a PR system for electing representatives to **the legislature** with a majority/plurality system. As Table 11.2 reveals, the latter reform has not, as yet anyway, created a two party structure in **the French National** Assembly. Nor did 'a double ballot majority/plurality system produce stability and 2P government on those occasions when it was used between 1819 and 1945, when the executive **and** the legislative functions were combined through a **cabinet-**type of government (Lakeman and Lambert, 1955, pp. 300-1). The stability France has **enjoyed post-1958** relative to pre-1958 must be attributed to the creation of the post of President independent of the National Assembly, and the authority given the person occupying this position to name the prime minister and choose the cabinet.

Other countries have succeeded to combine PR and political stability using other means. The **FRG's** Parliament is elected by PR and plurality formulae on a **50/50 basis**, and this may help explain the two-and-a-half party structure that has emerged. But also important is the requirement in the constitution (Grundgesetz) that the Parliament (Bundestag) cannot remove a

person prime minister (Chancellor) unless it can agree on his successor, the so-called "constructive vote of no-confidence" (Deutsch and Smith, 1978, p. 216).

In Norway there is simply no provision in the constitution for dissolving the Parliament during the four year electoral cycle. Minority governments, when they have formed, have managed to maintain the basic institutions of government satisfactorily (Castles, 1978, p. 467). In Switzerland it has become a tradition not to dissolve the Federal Council (the Swiss version of a cabinet) in between the normal elections at four year intervals (Lakeman and Lambert, 1955, p. 291). Parliamentary chaos can be avoided.

The civil disturbances in Switzerland and Belgium that led to the replacement of plurality singlerep plurality systems with **multirep** PR-type systems remind us that the former can generate their own forms of instability. Advocates of **2P** plurality systems seem often to assume that the radical groups on the left and right, who consider themselves to be unrepresented in these systems, calmly accept their fate and go about their business as model citizens. If and when they take to the streets, however--as they often seem to do, the instability that 2P plurality systems avoid in the parliament gets transferred to the streets. An important issue to be considered in choosing between PR and 2P systems of government is where one **wants** opposition to government policies to be expressed, in the parliament or on the street in front of it?

F. Parties or Persons

In Chapter 9 we described ideal PR systems in which the representatives are either parties or persons. Under the latter each voter would choose that person running at large for the legislative assembly whom he most preferred,

and the elected representatives would cast votes in the assembly in proportion to the votes they received.

At large elections in some cities in the United States resemble the system just described except that the persons elected have but one vote a piece regardless of the number of votes they receive in the election. The experience with these contests indicates that voters consider party identification an important source of information about candidate positions on issues. When such identification is lacking, i.e. in nonpartisan elections, voter turnout is lower and voters are more likely to vote for "name" candidates.¹⁴ The rational ignorance of many voters in U.S. city council and school board elections seems to prevent them from becoming informed about candidate positions on the issues. These findings offer up a challenge to any system of representation that tries to eliminate parties as representatives, and simply have people represented by **people** in the legislature. Can television and the other means of communication in a modern society be harnessed to inform voters of candidate positions on issues without the aid of party Labels? If the answer to this question is "no". then only a PR-parties system of government remains an attractive option within the PR category.

G. Conclusions

The purpose of government is to provide those collective goods that individuals cannot efficiently provide for themselves acting independently or through voluntary cooperation with others, to take collective actions that make all citizens better off. To know what collective goods to provide and **actions** to take information must be obtained from members of **the** community. The method for obtaining this information that is most consistent with the principle of individualism is for each citizen to express his views as to the

most desirable collective actions directly--the method chosen by the ancient Athenians.

When numbers and time preclude all members of the community's direct participation in the collective decision process, then a community's collective decisions inevitably get made by only some of its members. All collective decision processes other than direct democracy are elitist to some degree. They differ only with respect to the strength of the relationship between the preferences of the individual citizens and the choices made by the elite on their behalf.

In this chapter and its two predecessors we have described two alternative methods of making collective decisions that promise a close tie between the collective outcomes chosen for a community and the preferences of each of its individual members with respect to those outcomes. Under the one method, a representative for each member of the community is selected, whose preferences with respect to the collective actions are close if not identical to those of the individuals she represents. The assembly of citizen representatives then makes collective decisions on behalf of all citizens using the same type of voting procedures as the citizens themselves would use, if they met in assembly.

Under the second method two parties compete for the votes of the citizens on the basis of the set of collective actions they promise to undertake, or on the basis of their ability to make those decisions for the community that best advance its welfare. The periodic need to compete for votes against another party is relied upon to maintain the link between the preferences of the individual citizens and the elite acting in their behalf.

All elitist mechanisms contain the danger that the elite will not undertake the same actions that the citizens themselves would, if numbers and

time were not an obstacle. All suffer from the principal/agent problem. These two mechanisms are not exceptions. Each has its advantages and disadvantages vis-a-vis the other.

The 2P alternative has the advantage of always insuring that someone has the authority to act on behalf of the community. In time of war or economic crisis, when failure to act might cause irreparable harm and hardship to a community, the decisiveness inherent in a 2P system may be invaluable.

2P systems should function best when a fair consensus exists in the community regarding the kinds of collective actions that should be undertaken, and the opponents of this consensus are distributed symmetrically on both of its sides. In this environment, the competition for votes between the two parties will lead them to take up **similar positions** on the issues. Voters will be forced to choose between the parties on the basis of judgments **regarding the relative competence and integrity of the party leaders, and** other difficult to evaluate factors. Many voters will find little to choose between in the positions of the parties. Some will find the positions of both parties so far distant from their own preferences, that it will not matter whether the positions are the same or not. A danger under 2P systems, even in the circumstances when they promise to work best, is that they can breed indifference and alienation and thus lead citizens to drop **out of** the political process, thereby severing the link between electoral outcomes and citizen preferences.

A possibly worse situation can develop in a 2P system when a consensus on collective actions within the community does not exist. If the community is divided into two or more groups of citizens with radically different views as to what actions should be taken on behalf of the community, the power to

act inherent in a 2P system can become a disadvantage producing a set of actions that advances the welfare of only one segment of the community.

Such cannot occur, or can so with a far lower probability, under a PR system, if the assembly of representatives employs a voting: rule that induces compromise and consensus. Such a voting rule combined with the representation of all citizens' views may result in no action being taken, when citizen representatives take disparate positions on issues. The twin to the danger of a tyranny of the majority under 2P government is the danger of a paralysis of the government under a PR system, And, should the community's commitment to democracy not be strong, this paralysis could in turn lead to the substitution of an elite system for making a community's decisions that pays little heed to the preferences of the people. „

The choice between 2P and PR government thus depends in part on the nature of the **community**, the distances separating citizens' views **as** to what the best collective actions are, and in part on the procedure that would be relied upon under a PR system to reconcile differences among the representatives of the citizens. We have only touched upon these procedures so far. The following chapter takes them up directly.

FOOTNOTES

1. If no party takes a position close to that most preferred by a voter, he is said to be alienated. If the parties take positions so close to one another that the voter cannot discriminate among them, he is said to be indifferent. Both indifference and alienation can lead voters to abstain from voting. See Mueller (1989, pp. 181-2, and references therein).
2. If the utility voters gets from x is independent of the amount of y they consume, and vice versa (i.e., their utility functions are separable), then the contract curves between any two voter ideal points are straight lines and the Pareto set is the drawn pentagon, see Enelow and Hinich (1984, pp.).
3. This message is conveyed in many forms starting with Arrow's (1951, 1963) famous theorem. See also, Sen (1970a), Gibbard (1973), Satterthwaite (1975).
4. Some voting rules do not require that minorities agree to compromise. Under point voting, for example, a pacifist party might place all of its points on reducing the defense budget, no matter how low it is. If a small minority, it would succeed in reducing the budget somewhat, but could not bring it to zero. The representation of hawkish parties on the far right would also tend to offset the influence of a pacifist party.
5. **For a spirited defense of STV, see Hallett (1984).** See also Katz (1984).
6. For a discussion of limited voting in general, and the Spanish experience in particular, see Lijphart, Lopez **Pintor**, and Sone (1986).
7. It is interesting to observe in this regard that the only two countries that have not adopted a geographically based mode of representation are Holland and Israel--countries so small that most "local" public goods do have significant spillovers onto most of the other parts of the nation.
8. The first claim that it is a law is attributed to Duverger (1946, 1954).
9. **For additional discussion of this and other measures of party numbers,** see Lijphart (1984, pp. 116-26). See, also Sartori (1976, pp. 119-25).
10. The 1982 figures are from Rose (1984), and it is this message that Rose seeks to convey in his essay.
11. Karring and Welch (1982, p. 107) as cited in Engstrom and **Mcdonald** (1986, p. 211).

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12. See discussion and review of the literature by Lijphart (1986).
 13. The voters of any party that did not obtain enough votes to get even one seat would go unrepresented, but this should not **be a serious shortcoming**.
 14. For a discussion and review of the literature on this topic see Cassel (1986).