

AID Review of the Role of LDC Institutions and Joint Organizations as
Program Intermediaries for Increasing Local Action Capability

Findings and Implications

I Introduction

The object of this review is to evaluate prior experience with selected intermediary organizations to derive a set of findings or lessons about their characteristics that promise to be useful for future foreign aid programming. We are trying to gain insights from past experience but not to establish specific patterns or models to be followed. Early in the study it became apparent that we should not let ourselves be trapped into concluding that one or more of the intermediaries studied should be recreated in other countries. Instead we have attempted to identify characteristics which were causally related to success or failure so that we could hypothesize about what combinations would predispose an intermediary to successful operation at the local level as a catalyst to development.

We use the term intermediary to refer to organizations or mechanisms which serve as linkages between development resource providers and ultimate users. There are many functions and purposes which a program intermediary can serve. For the purposes of this review we have concentrated our attention on mechanisms which are or were active in achieving development at local levels. The basic function of a local action intermediary, which may be performed in a number of ways, is to facilitate the delivery of outside resources in a usable form to local levels and to combine them with local

resources to achieve desired results.

The term "resources" is used here rather broadly. It includes the development assistance resources of financing, commodities and technical assistance, but also refers to a number of less tangible resources which are necessary for the effective accomplishment of most development purposes. These include such things as leadership, doctrine and ideology, authority, legitimacy, information, political support, managerial ability, and so forth. The importance of these latter factors will become more apparent in the examination of case experiences.

In preparing for the review we have been primarily concerned with the organizations examined as a means to an end rather than an end in themselves, i.e., we have looked at the use of institutions not the creation of them. In analyzing experiences and judging results we have placed emphasis on the effectiveness of the intermediary mechanism as a catalyst to development at the local level irrespective of the level at which the intermediary itself existed or the major function performed. One (the Comilla Academy) existed close to the local level. The others at the national level. All performed more than one function, but their range of activity and program or development purpose ranged from quite specific to highly general.

In terms of organizational identity the cases examined fall into four categories:

1. Bi-national organizations (Servicios in Latin America and the Chinese-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction).

2. Host government organizations (the Philippine Rice and Corn Production Coordinating Council).

3. Semi-independent organizations which are connected with the government but are not part of the formal governing structure and which have a high degree of autonomy (the East Pakistan Academy for Rural Development).

4. Non-government organizations (the Brazilian Institute of Municipal Administration).

The methodology adopted in preparing for the review has included the preparation of a case study on each of the above organizations. We were working under a time and manpower constraint which focused our attention on a limited number of case studies and forced us to rely primarily on readily available data and knowledgeable individuals. Within these limitations we attempted to select representative case studies for each category. The author of each study was asked to isolate any factors which made the case distinct, from whatever standpoint, from other known cases within the same general category and to seek to isolate country or situationally specific aspects of each case.

The studies have been intensively analyzed by a small working group to identify the positive and negative causal factors relating to success or failure of the organization in each instance. The results of the analysis of each case are presented in the appendix to this paper. These results formed the basis for the findings in Section II and the implications in Section III.

In analyzing causal factors the working group sought to suppress to the extent possible any preconceived biases towards a particular type of organization or type or style of assistance and to examine each case as dispassionately and objectively as possible. The group does not judge any of the case examples to have been a complete success or a complete failure. Some of the mechanisms examined have clearly had greater impact than others, but this is due as much to the differing size, scope and complexity of their operations and to the external advantages they enjoyed as it is to differences in their intrinsic qualities or capabilities. We have tried to identify the various factors which we feel most served to account for the relative success or failure of each mechanism and to generalize these factors so that they could be used to estimate the likely success or failure of other intermediaries or to identify strengths to be capitalized on or weaknesses to be overcome if prospects for success in the use of any particular mechanism are to be maximized. We have looked at basically two sets of factors; intrinsic organizational features and, less specifically, environmental characteristics; as well as the interrelations between the two. While each of our cases is quite unique--in terms of the characteristics of the intermediary mechanism, its environmental supportive qualities, and the scope of its operations-- we have found a remarkable commonality among what we judge to be the most important causal factors in each case.

Our original intention was also to utilize data from the Conference on Title IX Implications of CORDS and USAID Programs and Operations in Vietnam. This proved difficult since the Conference concentrated on programs whereas the Review is focused on mechanisms

for carrying out programs. Nevertheless, there are some interesting points for further analysis in the Vietnam experience, particularly in terms of (a) the use of specially designed U.S. and host government organizations as intermediaries, e.g., the U.S. "CORDS" organization and the Vietnamese Central Pacification Council; (b) the use of local government (province and village) as a program intermediary; (c) the effects of large-scale U.S. inputs on intermediaries and the programs they support; and (d) goal conflicts between security and development interests. Each of these aspects could be analyzed in relation to the basic factors described below. We have not tried to do this in the review preparations due to lack of sufficient data. However, for illustrative purposes we are including the report of the Vietnam Conference with our background material and have included Vietnam local government in our matrix comparisons of causal factors.

II General Findings

The following factors emerged from our comparative analysis as having the most significant causal impact.

1. Quality of leadership. This was a very strong factor in virtually every case. Strong and effective indigenous leadership is virtually a prerequisite for success. Foreign leadership is not a substitute for domestic leadership. Leadership traits which were most strongly identified were organizational, managerial and motivational.

2. Mutuality of interest. In selecting an intermediary it is extremely important to assess the congruence or divergence of interests existing between the assistance provider, the leadership of the

intermediary, the target population which the intermediary is intended to reach and other important actors within the local environment-- particularly the host government leadership, both local or central. It is important to know the extent to which the activities to be undertaken or facilitated can be linked with the government's basic interests, policies and programs or conversely the extent to which they will be in conflict with them and how severe the impact of that conflict will be. Such conflict may not always be a negative factor. Local intermediaries may sometimes effectively use or circumvent negative influences of higher authority. But the evidence indicates that this aspect should be thoroughly and explicitly analyzed both before and during the period of utilization of the intermediary mechanism so that the extent to which central authority supports or inhibits program application by the intermediary can be judged.

3. Basic environmental factors. There are a number of factors in every local environment which influence any attempt to stimulate local action--levels of health, education, social stratification, political tensions, prior contact with outside influences, etc. The optimal situation is one in which the basic environmental factors are conducive to the activities which the intermediary mechanism is to undertake or facilitate. However, this happy situation rarely exists. More often the basic factors will be highly adverse and the critical aspect for analysis will be the extent to which the intermediary mechanism has taken into account and is able to neutralize or overcome these factors.

4. Utilization of past experience. This is closely linked to factor #3. The most effective intermediaries seem to make a point

of carefully assessing past experience and using it as a guide to action and as an initial resource base on which their own capabilities can be built. Intermediaries which ignore past experience or attempt to supplant what exists with something totally new usually find themselves in trouble, even though program goals may require a marked departure from past practice. No matter what faults and weaknesses existed within past efforts they should be carefully examined to identify what can be learned and what can be salvaged and built upon. The degree to which intermediaries study and utilize past experience is an important indicator of their awareness of and ability to deal with basic environmental factors.

5. Autonomy (freedom of action). Like leadership, a degree of autonomy is almost a prerequisite to the successful functioning of an intermediary mechanism. In the most successful cases autonomy is identified as the ability of intermediary leadership to act on its own initiative without resort to other authority. However, autonomy is clearly a double edged sword. It can be an asset or a liability depending upon the manner in which the leadership of the intermediary uses it. Autonomy badly used can create a situation of isolation, lowered legitimacy or competition. However, without a basic degree of autonomy it is unlikely that the intermediary mechanism will have the ability to act swiftly and authoritatively or to avoid being neutralized or dominated by other organizations which may be antagonistic towards, jealous of or threatened by its activities.

6. Legitimacy (acceptance of role by others). Legitimacy is closely related to autonomy with the former helping either to create or destroy the latter. Autonomy may or may not facilitate legitimacy,

and autonomy used unwisely can adversely effect legitimacy. Legitimacy requires an initial acceptance of the role of the intermediary by others within the environment on whom its existence and effectiveness depends. Maximized effectiveness requires a continuing increase in the amount of legitimacy accorded to the mechanism by such others. These "others" are principally (a) the target population on the local level with whom the mechanism is to interact, and (b) the host government or other elements of significant influence within the local society whose support or acquiescence in the intermediary's existence and effective functioning is desired or required.

7. Basic resources (funds, quality and quantity of manpower, status and authority). Any mechanism needs a given amount of resources in order to achieve its purposes. The initial resource endowment of an intermediary mechanism is an important factor to be analyzed and measured because it is a strong indicator of the degree to which the other factors listed here exist or can be developed. It is not of itself a sufficient indicator, however, since the conferral of a large resource endowment upon an intermediary mechanism, either by a foreign assistance provider or domestic sources, does not guarantee that it will have or be able to create the other factors essential to its success. Conversely an extremely able intermediary may be able to overcome limited initial resources.

8. Managerial effectiveness (how well resources are utilized). The capabilities of an intermediary mechanism are best measured over time by examining the ways in which it employs and expands its initial resource endowment. The intermediary mechanism can utilize its

resources to achieve its direct and immediate purposes and objectives or it can utilize them in exchange with other elements of the local environment in ways which tend to enhance its ability to survive and continue to perform effectively in the future. The best intermediary mechanisms use their resources towards both ends simultaneously.

9. Use of other organizations (extension and outreach). This factor is closely related to #8. To be effective as an intermediary for local action, a mechanism must extend itself into the local society. We found that the most effective intermediaries we examined did this through the use of what might be called "sub-intermediary organizations" at the local level. They either worked with and through existing ones or created new ones. In either case they used their resources in ways which facilitated the effectiveness of some form of lower echelon organization, preferably one in which local people could effectively participate.

10. Degree of congruence and integration with broader national interest, policies and programs. The intermediary must relate not only to target elements of the population it is intended to channel resources to, but also to other forces either parallel or about it in the national system. Its own effectiveness is enhanced to the extent that it can correlate its intentions or efforts with those of other forces. Where a sufficient mutuality of interest exists, this is possible; where there is not, isolation, competition or conflict is likely. Even where broad mutuality exists, competition between different entities oriented to the same purpose can emerge.

11. Extent of concentration or dispersion of resources. Since very few intermediaries are sufficiently well endowed to permit them to cover the entire spectrum of possible activity or to reach all members of the target population, the most effective ones tend to concentrate their efforts. This is not inconsistent with the basic history of foreign assistance for local development purposes. Almost invariably initial large general programs have tended to become more concentrated as awareness of the difficulties and costs of achieving results on a large scale has increased. One way of concentrating the effort is to work through sub-intermediaries which can marshal some resources of their own and thus extend the influence and effectiveness and limit resource demands on the primary intermediary. Another way is to delimit either the scope of concern or the target area or group so that needed resources can be furnished in sufficient quantity to have a meaningful impact. Local circumstances and the nature of the effort to be undertaken seem to be the best guides as to which of these courses should be taken.

The foregoing factors put together constitute a profile of an ideal intermediary mechanism. To summarize, a high potential intermediary mechanism is one which has:

- good leadership;
- a high mutuality of interest with the foreign assistance donor, the target groups which it intends to support and important power elements within the country;
- an awareness of basic environmental factors and their influence on its prospects for accomplishing its goals plus a well conceived plan for maximizing the advantageous factors

and overcoming adverse one;

- a willingness and ability to learn from past experience in setting out its own courses of action;
- a considerable degree of autonomy, i.e., freedom of decision making and ability to act on its own;
- been accorded legitimacy of function and purpose by others;
- a high basic resource endowment;
- a demonstrated record of managerial effectiveness;
- operates through a variety of other organizations and mechanisms;
- works in congruence with the basic development policies, programs and trends within the country;
- concentrates its effort to the extent necessary to achieve its projected goals.

In assessing potential intermediaries or evaluating existing ones it is important that these factors not be taken account of in isolation from one another but rather in interaction with one another.

We doubt that any of these factors are unique to a particular type or form of organization. We believe there has sometimes been a tendency to consider certain forms of organization as a critical factor (e.g., jointness) and to feel that these characteristics would have to be replicated in order to insure success of an intermediary mechanism. Even if jointness was a critical factor in the JCRR and Servicio cases, which some of us tend to doubt, its significance stems from the extent to which it either facilitated or impeded the existence or development of the other factors listed. Clearly there are other ways of securing their existence. We believe that this is

probably true in other cases where a particular type or form of organization has been emphasized. Thus, we question, particularly in the abstract, whether any particular format of intermediary operation is an essential prerequisite to or sufficient guarantee of effective functioning. Conversely, we would argue that an intermediary mechanism is unlikely to succeed, regardless of its form or function, if the foregoing characteristics are not present in a sufficient degree and correlation to one another. Since our sample is rather small and the research and analysis of each case has been limited and hurried, this conclusion and the factor identifications on which it is based need to be tested further. We look upon this exercise as only an initial step.

Figure 1

Matrix of Most Significant Causal Factors

	Servicios	JCRR	EPARD	IBAM	RCPOC	Vietnam Local Govt.
1. Leadership quality	low generally	high	high	high	high	low
2. Donor/Recipient/ Clientele Mutuality of Interest	variable	high	variable	modest	high	low
3. Basic Environmental Factors	adverse	advantageous	adverse but overcome	adverse	advantageous	adverse
4. Utilization of Past Experience	low	high	high	fairly high	high	generally low
5. Autonomy - (Freedom of Action)	high	high	mixed	limited	high	generally low
6. Legitimacy - (Acceptance of Role by Others)	variable	high	variable	mixed	high	low
7. Basic Resource Endowment (Funds, Manpower, Expertise)	high	high	modest	modest	high	high
8. Managerial effective- ness (How well resource endowment utilized and expanded)	modest	high	high	fairly high	high	low
9. Use of other Organi- zations (extension and outreach)	limited	high	high	mixed	mixed	mixed
10. Degree of Congruence and integration with broader interests, policies & programs	mixed	high	mixed	low	high	mixed
11. Extent of concen- tration on dispersion of resources	mixed	concentrated	concentrated	mixed	concentrated	mixed

III Implications

Developing local action capabilities has been designated as a TA/DA key problem area. A basic rationale for this review is our desire to refine our knowledge about intermediaries as mechanisms for stimulating local action. We proceeded on the assumption that intermediary organizations are a highly useful, perhaps even essential means of assisting the development of local action capability, since it is usually not possible for foreign aid agencies to reach directly to the local level and stimulate the popular involvement implied by the term local action.

Thus, we have two contexts in which to consider the implications of our findings. The first is their relevance for future use of intermediary organizations, whatever the assistance purpose. The second is their implications for use of intermediaries in conjunction with aid strategies and programs in which local action is an important factor. To facilitate discussion we will attempt to state the implications in the form of propositions relating to one or both of these contexts:

Since the factors identified in Figure one have emerged as critical factors in each of the cases studied, we hypothesize that the greater their presence in positive form in other intermediaries the more likely that the intermediary will be successful.

The factor identifications offer a useful basis for the assessment of the relative virtues of different intermediaries where conditions of choice exist. They also provide a basis for determining priority of effort in improving the capability of chosen intermediaries.

We believe that this is the single most important implication of the findings.

It is apparent that most of the causal factors we have identified are related and in some cases even overlap one another. However, we felt that it was important for analytical purposes that they be separately identified for three reasons. First, each one emerged as a separately distinguishable factor in our case studies. Second, we do not know that the presence of any one is in itself a sufficient basis for presuming that any of the others would be present. Third, it is probably premature at this stage to say definitely that these factors encompass all the critical variables or that any or all of them are necessary or sufficient to insure the success of an intermediary.

In applying these factors to other cases we believe that they can be usefully categorized in two ways.

The first categorization is as independent, wholly dependent, or partially dependent factors. Factors which we see as being basically independent, in the sense that their presence does not depend on any of the other factors, and may not be controllable by them are:

Leadership

Mutuality of interest

Environmental factors

Of these three, environmental factors are largely unalterable, at least over the short run, and must simply be dealt with. But the degree and manner in which they will need to be dealt with and the likely ability of the

intermediary to be able to deal with them, are things which should be considered at the outset.

By contrast leadership and mutuality of interest are things which are not given and may be alterable if analysis indicates the need. Since they are independent factors and because they were very strongly identified in each of the cases studied we can hypothesize that they should stand along with the analysis of ability to deal with environmental factors as basic determinants of whether an intermediary has a reasonable chance of success and that projected use of intermediaries which lack these qualities should be re-considered unless the situation can be favorably altered.

We classify the following factors as partially dependent variables because while they may be subject to influence by the leadership of the intermediary, their presence as a positive causal factor in determining the organization's effectiveness does not lie wholly within the control of its leadership. These factors are:

- legitimacy
- autonomy
- resources available
- congruence
- use of other organizations

These should be viewed as next most essential to the first three and should be analyzed carefully to determine whether the intermediaries' activities will tend to facilitate them to the extent that they are not initially present in high quantity and whether there are influences beyond the control of the organization's leadership which will negate

efforts to achieve them.

The balance of the factors we would classify as wholly dependent variables since they are determinable by the leadership of the organization. These are:

Use of past experience

Managerial effectiveness

Extent of concentration of resources

These are factors of lowest priority among those identified since they can be altered most easily and with greatest prospect for success.

The second way in which the causal factors can be categorized is in terms of whether they are extrinsic or intrinsic to the intermediary itself. This is an important distinction because intermediary organizations frequently are evaluated on the basis of their internal merit with inadequate regard to external factors. However, our findings indicate that

external factors are often more important than internal factors in determining the extent and speed with which success is obtained.

In our cases the intermediaries with the highest presence of positive causal factors are the JCRR and the RCPCC. We would judge them to have been objectively the most successful of the cases reviewed. They are distinguished from the others by three external causal factors: mutuality of interest, supportive environmental factors, and congruence of basic policies and programs. None of these was probably sufficient to insure success without the positive intrinsic causal factors they enjoyed, but they did permit the intermediary in these two instances to ride the wave of a basic forward development

thrust. It is perhaps worth noting that political factors were a very strong consideration in both instances.

In the absence of strong central government support, private or semi-government intermediaries are unlikely to do well.

This is an unpleasant proposition which poses a severe problem for foreign assistance providers such as ISDI, and elements of AID such as PRI and Civic Development offices, who are predominantly concerned with private sector development. Intermediaries they support will have to be carefully chosen with due regard for country conditions if significant short-term results are to be attained. In other instances they will probably have to settle for a more patient long-range institution-building effort which aims at creating mechanisms whose full value may only be realized at some future date, and with the real risk that an adequate development return on the investment may never be realized.

The implication of both the IBAM and the EPARD cases and to a degree the Vietnam case, is that it is hard for a private or semi-governmental entity or a local government to play a significant role as an intermediary unless it has strong government backing and its efforts are congruent with the central government's operative policies and major development thrusts. Clearly organizations such as IBAM or EPARD cannot in their present form greatly expand their efforts or achievements in the absence of host government support, except by taking the drastic step of assuming an adversary role against the government. More is required from government leadership than professions of good intention and lip serve pronouncements of support

for the doctrines and programs of the intermediary organization. They must gear the government's operations in ways that are supportive of the intermediary's activities rather than detrimental to it. Often, however, the intermediaries' activities are seen as a threat to the central government's political control. The center government is, and will be for some time, in most LDC's the primary controller and pace-setter of development. Thus, some element of the center government may be the best intermediary choice particularly where a short-term, high impact pay-off is envisioned. But in many instances the central government's capabilities for stimulating local action are limited by its adverse standing in the eyes of the local population.

Finally, there is the influence of host government attitudes on the donor. It seems doubtful that a foreign assistance provider would be willing, or indeed able, to make a sufficient investment in an intermediary mechanism, say a tenant farmer's union or a cooperative league, to significantly increase its role and effectiveness in the absence of central government support.

Autonomy is both a critical causal factor in determining the success of an intermediary and a characteristic which makes intermediaries attractive mechanisms for extending assistance for local action purposes.

The first part of this proposition is self-evident from the findings. The latter part is deducible from a consideration of how autonomy facilitates the role of the intermediary. An intermediary is a linkage instrument, often a broker between diverse interests. It must have freedom to act as the situation demands to maintain its status and legitimacy among the different groups with which it interacts.

Autonomous intermediaries can often establish relationships with groups at the local level and work with them in ways which neither the host government or a foreign assistance provider can. The involvement of popular local organizations was an important factor in most of the cases studied. The intermediary needs autonomy in order to have an effective relationship with such groups. It is important that neither the host government nor the foreign assistance provider jeopardize the autonomy of the intermediary by their actions. A major problem emerges from the fact that autonomous intermediaries may be most needed in circumstances in which autonomy is hardest to maintain either because of a control orientation of the host government or because of a need for the bulk of their support to come from outside sources. It is not accidental that the strongest indigenous intermediaries are usually found in the more developed locales.

The existing level of development, what might be called "initial state conditions," of the country in which the intermediary operations is the single most important determinant of the nature and form of intermediaries, the purposes they serve and the ratio of external to internal resources required.

This proposition arises out of a consideration of the varying results obtained by several of the cases studied and the extent to which the prior level of development pre-conditioned results. We hypothesize that the JCRR and the RCPCC enjoyed a congruence of favorable causal factors and were able to achieve greater results largely because they had a headstart, i.e., the general level of development of the countries in which they functioned was much higher than that which existed in the other countries at the time the

intermediaries examined were functioning. The general level of development provided a higher indigenous resource base to build on and increased the degree and rapidity of achievement of program results.

This poses a development dilemma which is not unique to the question of utilization of intermediaries, but which may be worth considering in this context. Where should external development resources be concentrated--where the need is greatest or where the opportunities are greatest? Once this question has been answered what will be the implications for the intermediary mechanisms to be employed?

The weight of evidence in the findings is that technical competence is required (not our technology but a technology suitable to the local environment) but that it alone is an insufficient guarantor of success for an intermediary organization. Furthermore, linking of outside funds with indigenous technical competency will not do the job. Organization and management ability are essential ingredients and intermediary mechanisms which lack them are poor bets. The basic dilemma which this poses is that if we are to rely on indigenous technical competency and organizational expertise our chances for success are greatest where the need is least. We can help the countries or segments of countries who are fairly well along in the transitional stages of development because that is where the indigenous capacity exists to be built upon, but we can do little which will have a significant short-term development impact in countries or segments of countries which are still highly traditional--unless an intermediary capability is imported, as was done in the

case of the Servicios. Where a country is highly dualistic it is theoretically possible to import the intermediary capability from one segment of the country to the other if the local will and desire to do so exists. But in those countries which are still in a predominantly traditional state, this capability will have to be brought in from the outside, if it is to be there at all. Despite the problems and greater costs involved, this suggests that some form of bi-national or multi-national intermediary may still be needed to provide development opportunities and services to people who otherwise will simply not have access to them because indigenous capacity to deliver resources does not exist.

In our case studies the type, amount and form of foreign assistance ran the gamut. It included money, supplies, technical advice, policy and program guidance and even operational control. The requirements depended principally on the extent to which the assistance furnished was augmenting locally available resources or substituting for the lack of them. The RCPCC was successful with limited directly associated foreign assistance inputs but a considerable amount of prior assistance had helped build the indigenous capability. Timing and quality of foreign assistance and the level at which advice was provided were of greatest importance to the immediate effort. There is a real question as to whether the timing or level of advice could have been equalled in the absence of a continuing U.S. presence in the country.

The JCRR, the Servicios, and the Vietnam cases all required continuing U.S. presence because of the nature and extent of the

assistance provided. But in the case of the JCRR, that presence was neither numerically large or dominant due to the existing level of development and the presence of the mainland Chinese, who were themselves an external input. A continuing U.S. presence was not essential for either IBAM or PARD and probably would not have increased their effectiveness in any essential degree.

The manner in which foreign assistance was provided had a greater significance in some cases because it tended to influence attitudes, legitimacy of the enterprise and perceptions about whose interests were being served, e.g., Servicios originally created as a means of accomplishing a U.S. need. It also tended to determine whether the primary and secondary (local) organizations utilized would be essentially indigenous or foreign transplants. Where U.S. influence is dominant in the basic intermediary it also strongly influences the development of secondary organizations, e.g., Vietnam. These are basically arguments for making greater use of and giving more autonomy to indigenous intermediary mechanisms. But it seems likely that the more strictly this criteria is applied the more likely it will become that our assistance will go to the more developed of the less developed countries or to the more developed sectors within LDC's. This can be mitigated by a conscious and determined effort to find and more fully utilize indigenous mechanisms like PARD and IBAM which have good leadership, technical and managerial competency, and are oriented towards channeling resources to the most underdeveloped sectors. But this should only be done where ways can be found to circumvent negative causal factors which reduce their effectiveness.

Appendix

Resume of Findings in Each Case

This resume deals only with the causal factors and does not summarize the nature or experience of the individual cases examined. Readers are encouraged to review each of the case studies to obtain this background. Figure 2 provides a comparative tabulation of the most significant characteristics of each case.

A. The Servicios in Latin America

The servicios as a general organization mechanism were difficult to evaluate for two reasons. First, there were many of them and their effectiveness varied greatly. Second, although there is a considerable amount of data available on them it is not definitive, in fact it is remarkable for its lack of specificity. Hence, our findings in this instance must be qualified by the recognition that they are drawn from highly generalized information. There are undoubtedly a number of individual exceptions to each of the general conclusions set forth below.

The following factors emerge as primarily negative causal factors in the experience of the servicios. However, it should be recognized that they were a pioneering effort without precedent to benefit from, and that the historical conditions in which they operated were primarily responsible for a number of the negative factors.

They were basically a U.S. creation. The servicios originated during World War II as a response to U.S. war needs, either for the supply of raw materials or as a trade-off for base rights or other host government concessions. The fact that they

were initially more responsive to U.S. than to local needs and interests surrounded them with an aura which, though probably subsequently undeserved, remained difficult to overcome.

The servicios had a high degree of individual autonomy and authority. This was an important factor in their success in meeting the purposes for which they were established and is certainly a factor which helps to account for their longevity. Their autonomy became somewhat dysfunctional as time went on, as the basic rationale for assistance extended through servicios began to change towards a more fundamental indigenous development purpose. The degree of autonomy which the servicios enjoyed stemmed from the individual bilateral agreements by which they were created. The fact that their initial resource endowment was largely provided by the U.S., was quite high relative to other entities with whom they interacted; and the fact that they were mostly directed by U.S. personnel tended to exaggerate their autonomy from the host government ministries to which they were attached. The autonomy enjoyed must be judged to have been poorly utilized in that it resulted in a situation of competition with local counterpart agencies and, for the most part, failure to establish horizontal and vertical functional linkages which could have increased their developmental effectiveness.

The servicios, particularly during the latter stages of their existence, suffered from a severe role and mission conflict. They appear to have originally functioned more to superimpose development than induce it. U.S. technical expertise was provided in a self-contained package as a substitute for the nonexistent

local expertise. During the 1950's, as the basic purpose of the U.S. aid program changed the servicio leadership and staff seemed to have had difficulty in shifting to the development-inducer role which emerged as a fundamental premise of Point Four. Subsequently when the emphasis shifted again in the early 1960's to an emphasis in national infrastructure and large capital programs, the servicios became almost totally incongruent with basic U.S. assistance strategy and U.S. assistance to them was rapidly phased out.

Efforts to develop local capabilities by the servicios were by and large inadequate. Training and advising assistance was of limited effectiveness. Little attempt was made (partly due to antagonistic host country administrative cultures) either to integrate efforts with host government agencies or to develop local sponsoring organizations through which the servicios program could be expanded and sustained. Where an attempt was made to do this, as for example in the case of the Peruvian agricultural servicio SCIPA, which developed and worked through agricultural community committees, the results seem to have been highly beneficial. But for the most part the servicios seemed to have functioned as self-contained organisms bringing the benefits of their technical expertise to the local scene but not becoming an integral part of it.

Many of the above deficiencies have been attributed by those who have examined the performance record of the servicios to faulty leadership and organizational management. The general feeling is that a mistake was made in placing technical specialists in charge-- that the latter were neither oriented towards or capable of exercising

the kind of administrative management which could enable the servicios to play a broader developmental role. The logic which follows is that if less emphasis had been placed in technical knowledge and experience and persons with more broad gauge executive and managerial talent had been placed in charge, the servicios might have been more adaptable to a new style of operation and able to develop the supporting linkages necessary to perform a development catalyst role more effectively.

However, it should also be recognized that the environment into which the servicios were inserted was hardly conducive to the performance of such a role. For the most part the servicios operated at the local level and outside the capital area. During the bulk of their lifetime national level penetration of the rural areas in the countries in which they operated had only barely begun. The rural areas remained for the most part in a highly traditional feudalistic condition. With the possible exception of some elements of the plantation sub-sector of the rural society, local institutional and technological awareness and capacity were virtually nonexistent. It is not surprising in this situation that highly trained and skilled technicians found it easier and more immediately productive to substitute for rather than to create local technical and institutional development.

To have maximized their development impact in this type of situation the servicios probably would have needed to scale down the sophistication of their efforts considerably, expanded their time frame, and broadened their approach to place greater emphasis on the nontechnical nature of the feudal, traditional rural environments

in which they were immersed and the constraints these environments imposed on their efforts. It is questionable that foreign management, no matter how skilled, could have effectively met this challenge. Thus, U.S. direction of the servicios would probably have remained a negative causal factor irrespective of the capabilities brought to bear, though certainly the negative impact might have been ameliorated.

Clearly during their 20 year history the servicios did have a positive local impact. This is evidence by the fact that local governments moved to assume and provide the wherewithal for a number of the functions being performed by servicios when the U.S. Government made its rather precipitous decision to withdraw support to them. But a final important negative factor in the case of the servicios was lack of mutuality of interest. At the outset they were of high interest and value to the United States. Towards the end they were of greatly diminished interest and value to the United States but of higher interest and value to the local government and people. If these interests could have been brought into better phase, the effectiveness of the servicios as a development mechanism would probably have been greatly increased.

B. The Chinese-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR).

The JCRR has frequently been compared to the servicios since they were both joint organizations. There are some other common factors as well but there are also some significant differences. One of the most important of these differences is the question of

mutuality of interest. In the case of the JCRR a high degree of mutual interest was present at the outset. The Chinese Government and the Taiwanese people wanted and desired the JCRR and the services it provided very much. The JCRR was seen by the Nationalist Chinese Government as an important manifestation of commitment to it and as a highly useful mechanism for sustaining that commitment. The basic rural development purpose of the JCRR was seen by both governments (U.S. and GRC) as a very valid and necessary response to a potential internal security threat. The JCRR programs softened the impact of the imposition of the GRC on the Taiwanese and provided a protective device by enhancing the autonomy of the local government and the farmers associations.

This clearly perceived and strongly felt mutuality of interest even though based on somewhat different concerns, accounts for a number of other critical causal factors associated with the success of the JCRR. First, both the U.S. and the Chinese Governments conferred an extremely high status to it. It was negotiated into existence at the highest diplomatic levels and legitimized by an act of the U.S. Congress. The best leadership available both on the U.S. and Chinese side was sought to run it. It was given an extraordinarily large financial resource endowment and an extremely broad mandate within which to employ its resources. In addition to the resources made available to it directly, the JCRR benefitted from the extremely large levels of foreign assistance provided to Taiwan through other means, particularly following the Korean War and Chinese involvement in it.

Like the servicios the JCRR also enjoyed a high degree of

autonomy and independence of operation. It was able to use its autonomy and independence more effectively since there was no directly competing organization. This lack of competition stemmed in large part from the peculiarity of the central government--province relationship. When the GRC moved to Taiwan it did not establish a national Ministry of Agriculture; there was no need for one since the provincial (island-wide) had its own agricultural department. The JCRR operated throughout the island as an instrument of support to the provincial government agriculture and rural development organizations without being perceived as a competitor or as a threat. It did find itself challenged by the USAID Mission leadership, but this did not seriously threaten its autonomy.

The JCRR, unlike most of the other intermediaries studied, operated within an extremely favorable local environment. Large numbers of highly trained Chinese technicians had transferred to Taiwan from the mainland. The island itself limited the geographic area to be covered and afforded a favorable concentration of both population and infrastructure. The principal facilities through which JCRR operated were located at the township level and were directly reachable by virtually every farm family.

Furthermore, the existing level of development was very advantageous to the JCRR's operations. The island had undergone 50 years of organizational and technological development of the rural areas under the Japanese. Taiwanese farmers had already demonstrated an ability to increase production on existing cultivable land, a benchmark point in the passage from a traditional to a

transitional rural society. In addition, crop production was already diversified; the groundwork had already been laid for technification of farming practices; and farmers were already organized at the local level.

It is to the JCRR's credit that it took excellent advantage of these pre-existing conditions. It was instrumental in helping to accomplish a series of land reforms and the democratization of the farmers associations, thus extending and building upon the previous steps in the transformation of Taiwanese agriculture and setting the stage for a rapid and broadly based productivity increase.

Beyond this the JCRR was a part of a very comprehensive and well prepared national development strategy and integrated its own operations into that strategy effectively. It effectively localized the development process by working through lower level private and public entities, and also demonstrated organizational adaptability and program flexibility in its operations and in accommodating itself to various changes in policy, focus and direction by both the Chinese and U.S. Governments.

C. The East Pakistan Academy for Rural Development (PARA)

Despite differences in scope and scale of operations, causal factors in the case of PARA are in many respects quite similar to those noted for the servicios and the JCRR. First among these is the quality of leadership and staffing within the organization. Clearly the success of the Comilla Academy owes a great deal to the leadership provided by its first director, Mr. Akhter Hameed Khan. His individual influence is so great that it thoroughly

penetrates several of the other causal factors.

PARD also functioned as a semi-autonomous intermediary mechanism. Its degree of autonomy stems in part from the status and prestige of Khan himself and in part from the Ford Foundation support which it received. Though an agency of the government, it managed to avoid being dominated by other elements of the extremely powerful civil service apparatus. For at least a portion of its existence it was able to integrate itself with other development activities of the government and to extend its own role through them without sacrificing freedom of action in pursuing its own development values and goals.

Like the JCRR the Comilla Academy has built effectively on past experience. Akhter Hameed Khan had been the Provincial Director of the forerunner Village Aid (V-Aid) program. He carefully analyzed the strengths and weaknesses of that program and took them into account in designing the strategy and tactics associated with the success of PARD in its activities in Comilla Thana. Briefly these are: a recognition of the need for a highly concentrated albeit comprehensive effort, for local level organization which provides a high degree of popular participation in support of that effort, and a clear understanding of the intensive and meticulous work involved in building village level organizations for this purpose within a highly traditional, resource -- poor rural society.

The development philosophy upon which the PARD operates emerged from this comprehensive and detailed examination. The philosophy is also directly associated with personality and personal values of Akhter Hameed Khan. It places egalitarian development and

social justice goals ahead of increased production and rapid economic growth both for ideological reasons and from an awareness that the only other development path possible in East Pakistan is a highly authoritarian one. However, with the exception of the rural works program, the development ideology and methodologies of PARD have not been successfully extended beyond the confines of Comilla Thana (county) in which the Academy is located. Thus the development approach of the Academy is in fact both a positive and a negative factor. It has been a positive factor in the success of the Academy's operations within the limited sphere of Comilla Thana where PARD has control of the situation, but a negative factor in extending these operations to the remainder of the province for reasons explained below.

Other factors significant in explaining the success of the Academy are its wholistic approach to dealing with an unfavorable environment--that is, its recognition that there are a number of social, political and psychological as well as economic and technical factors which must be taken account and dealt with in achieving basic development goals. This requires a comprehensive approach linking research, evaluation, training and action, including use of feedback and continuous evaluation, to derive lessons from field experience and reorient program activity. By these means PARD imparted maximum relevance and value to its efforts and avoided over-reliance on external technology of dubious value within the constraints of the local environment.

The Academy has made effective use of East Pakistan's most

abundant resource--its people--and has been unusually effective in overcoming the constraints on utilization of people for development within a highly traditional society. It has done this by means of a rather paternalistic but nonetheless effective combination top down--bottom up operation. The program framework for development operations within Comilla Thana was conceived, installed and managed by PARD through its training programs and extension functions. However, the program has afforded meaningful opportunities for popular participation through lower level popularly controlled organizations--the cooperatives and the union councils. Thus, like JCRR, the Academy has increased its effectiveness by operating through sub-intermediary organizations. However, in PARD's case these organizations had to be developed in a more intensive fashion and at a slower pace due to much more adverse circumstances than existed on Taiwan. Nonetheless, the procedures have in their basic aspects been quite similar, and have included a heavy emphasis on training, re-training and a direct linkage of training with operations.

During its period of maximum effectiveness, PARD activity was highly congruent with broader government policies but this has been less true in recent times. The earlier linkage of PARD with the Government's Basic Democracies and Rural Works Programs assured it of top level endorsement and support, and considerably extended the resources to which the Academy could lay claim. Despite these assets, the Academy's ability and authority to cope with the extremely adverse East Pakistan environment has been limited mainly to Comilla Thana, and its operations have not always been congruent with broader

policy preference of the Pakistan leadership. Pakistan is an administrative state governed by a well-entrenched civil and military elite, not altogether congenial to transfer of significant power to other groups within the society. Such a power transfer is an integral part of the PARD approach, and the attitude of existing elites has impeded both horizontal and vertical replication of the PARD's success in Comilla Thana. Beyond this of course, the East-West antagonisms have had an adverse effect on all development activity within the East Wing.

There is a further inherent limitation in the PARD approach. It is of necessity and by design long range and gradualistic, and program philosophy emphasizes social equity, even at the expense of short-term growth. Hence it cannot respond well to demands for immediate dramatic results,

and it has difficulty competing for resources with more dynamic fast-moving programs, several of which have been strongly pushed within East Pakistan within recent years to the detriment of the PARD's value as an intermediary mechanism.

Finally, there is the individual influence of Akhter Hameed Khan. Notwithstanding the fact that he has been a critical factor in the success of the Academy, his influence has been so dominant that it is unlikely that the Academy could regain its past level of effectiveness in his absence.

D. The Brazilian Institute for Municipal Administration (IBAM)

In the case of IBAM positive and adverse causal factors seem to be almost evenly balanced with the result that it is able to exist and function as an intermediary mechanism but without significant

success within the highly centralized Brazilian administrative environment.

The most consequential positive factors in the case of IBAM are the leadership, particularly again, as in the case of Comilla, the very strong influence of one individual who also attracts a high level of technical competence to the organization. Technical competence is of particular importance here since IBAM emphasizes technology in its operations. However, there is apparently also an underlying social philosophy, as in the case of Comilla, but it not and perhaps dare not be as manifest in IBAM's functions.

External assistance has been extremely important factor in this case, since the survival of the organization has depended on it. External assistance has kept IBAM alive domestically and has helped it to achieve a hemispheric role and reputation by facilitating an intermediary role for it in other countries where the environment is more conducive to its purposes than that which exists in Brazil at present. There is a negative aspect to external support in this case, however. Rather than in increasing autonomy with alternative sources of support, it has lead to dependency since it is doubtful that IBAM could survive without U.S. assistance.

Within Brazil IBAM operates in the face of strong centrist tendencies by the national government. The low value which the Brazilian national leadership places on the form of development IBAM is intended to facilitate has both limited IBAM's resources and adversely effected its operating environment. Consequently, it has been unable to achieve the level of program activity projected by

its leadership and anticipated by the AID strategy underlying its selection and support as an intermediary mechanism. Lack of mutuality of interest and congruence with basic policies and programs in regard to the national government, have been strong negative factors in this case, only partially modified by a significant congruence of interest with local governments and their officials, who are themselves relatively powerless.

E. The Philippine Rice and Corn Productivity Coordinating Council (RCPCC)

The RCPCC was successful because it capitalized on a number of the factors which have been identified in connection with the other case studies.

It had extremely strong and able leadership in contrast to somewhat similar predecessor agencies in the Philippines. It examined and built upon past experience and took advantage of the existing development trends within the country. It had highest level backing, buttressed by a strong political incentive to promote its work. It developed an integrated program which maximized the use of available resources and targeted those resources at a selected clientele. It operated with sufficient autonomy and authority to insure timely and adequate availability of funds and other basic resources. Although it was located at the central level, it decentralized authority and responsibility to field teams in order to insure maximum local impact. It established effective linkages with other elements within both the public and private sector through which

its activities could be extended and from which complementary inputs could be obtained. It expedited the flow of information both internally among its subordinate components and externally between itself and other elements of the environment.

Although the primary emphasis of the RCPCC was on technological and economic change, it took into consideration sociological, psychological and political factors and for the most part effectively dealt with them in moving towards accomplishment of its basic goal.

The effectiveness and value of the RCPCC as an intermediary is constrained by its success only as a mechanism for achieving a short range, limited albeit important development purpose. The ability of its successor organization, to serve as a continuing dynamic mechanism for broad scale development and social change in the Philippine, remains to be demonstrated. It cannot be considered to have fully institutionalized itself, and it did not really attempt to create a subsidiary web of local organizations through which negative factors within the local environment could be permanently altered. These negative factors had frustrated earlier efforts to increase agricultural productivity, and their continuation will certainly inhibit permanent improvement in the rural sector. The increased productivity stimulated by the RCPCC probably cannot be sustained without a higher level of support than the government is willing or able to provide. Loss of the leadership which served as the RCPCC's driving force and the dissipation of the congruence of interests which helped to account for its initial success have lead to a significant reduction in the resources available to it and its successor organization.

Figure 2
Some Selected Characteristics of the Cases Examined

	Initial state conditions	National authority attitudes	Quality of activities or institutional leadership	Primary and secondary rationale for undertaking	Degree to which effort coincides with sites and activities	Degree and effect of autonomy	Source of autonomy	Authority level and source	Level of resources employed (govt, inst, & material)	Relationship to other entities	Scope of operations	Form of operations	Level of operations	Breadth of emphasis	Time frame	Targeting of effort in relation to resources	Relation to prior dev. level & experience	Form, level & impact of input	Impact at local level
1. Services	Poor - limited rural penetration & local inst. to apply the	Mixed but seldom enthusiastic support	Mixed - often parochial in outlook	Initially security changed to development	Generally limited effort at integration	High degree generally adverse effect	U.S. resource input	High foreign	Very high	Competitive	Introduction & application of advanced technology	Direct application	Local	Narrow Technical	Short-range	?	Ignored	Extensive financial technical	Beneficial but not sustaining or catalytic
2. JCRR	Excellent - able to build or develop trends started by Japanese	Strong Chinese & U.S. high level support	Strong	Security & development	Well integrated	High degree generally positive effect	U.S. & GRC resource input	High local & foreign	Very high	Supportive	Org'l dev. social change develop & facilitate use of local technology, money input	Training & financial & commodity support	National thru local intermediaries	Broad social/technical	Medium range	Intensive	Built on it	Extensive financial technical	Highly productive catalytic & sustaining
3. EPARD	Poor - very traditional society. No pre-existing dev. inst. at local level	Continuously favorable but no strong commitment	Very strong charismatic	Development & Social values	Well integrated initially less so now	Fairly high degree positive effect	Indigenous leadership + U.S. resources input	High local	Medium	Supportive of some competitive for others	Social change org. dev. some techn. input	Training & field supervision & guidance	Interradiate thru local intermediaries	Organic considers all aspects of local society	Long-range	Intensive	Built on it	Financial advisory limited	Productive catalytic & sustaining
4. ISAM	Poor - leftist tendencies Atrophied municipal government	Hostile	Very strong managerial	Development in technical sense primarily	Contrary & conflicting	High degree favorable for survival negative for effect	Indigenous leadership + U.S. resource input	Low local	Low	Supportive	Introduction of new technology	Training consulting publication	National thru local intermediaries	Narrow technical	Long-range	Diffuse	Unknown	Limited financial but dominant	Significance can't be estimated
5. RCPDC	Fair - due to a number of earlier basic investments locally	Strong political support at highest level locally	Very strong managerial	P/Political necessity S/economic development	Well integrated	High degree favorable effect	Indigenous leadership	High local	High	Integration	Introduces & facilitate use of new technology	Operation management financial & commodity support field support	National extended to local level	Broad social technical	Short-range	Intensive	Built on it	Limited financial & advisory important but not dominant	Productive catalytic but not sustaining
6. Vietnam - Local Govt.	Poor - highly traditional society with colonial overlay like E.Pak, but without excessive pop. problem	Mixed but basically unenthusiastic	Good at times but generally weak	P/Security S/Econ. dev.	At times security & development goals and programs in conflict	High degree mixed effect	U.S. resource input	High foreign	High	Competitive	Broad social transformation	Highly varied	National extended to local	Broad social political econ. tech.	Short-range	Mixed	Generally ignored	Extensive financial & operational	Mixed frequently overwhelming