

SYNTHESIS OF DAC PROJECT EVALUATION STUDIES

- FOOD AID -

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by

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The views and interpretations expressed in this report are those of the author and should not be attributed to the Agency for International Development.

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I. SUMMARY OF MATERIAL RECEIVED

1. Coverage.

Sixteen papers were received from various member country institutions for joint review by the United States and Canada. Of these, four were found not to be relevant for this synthesis because they were not evaluations and/or because they covered technological aspects not of general interest. One important document - USAID's "A Review of Issues in Nutrition Program Evaluation"^{1/} - was not synthesized or reviewed separately for obvious reasons, but some of its findings are referred to in the discussion in this section and in the Conclusions. Eleven studies are reviewed and synthesized in the following sections.

An overview of the key characteristics of each paper will be found on the chart Annex FA-1. The total of the aid provided in the country projects reviewed through the dates of the respective evaluations was the equivalent of about US\$193 million (the DM amounts are converted at an arbitrary DM 2.25 per US\$).^{2/} The total value of the projects covered is not given as a separate quantity because it was estimated or reported in only a few cases, where it consisted of the administrative overhead of the cooperating host country institutions.

Each of the eight single country evaluations reviewed was limited to one "project" for all practical purposes, but it must be borne in mind that implementation of food aid projects typically involves numerous field sites (in some cases, hundreds), especially in the case of "Food for Work" projects. This also means that the project's "size" can only be measured in terms of monetary resources: they ranged from a minimum investment of US\$ one million in Tunisia to a maximum of US\$134 million in Upper Volta. All eight were based on field visits by single experts or teams. The three overviews (including that of the four German country studies) were desk studies. Also, owing to the nature of food aid projects and because all but one of the country evaluations were commissioned for operational purposes (see below), the evaluations tend to focus mostly on effectiveness and impact, with occasional "efficiency" data and virtually no references to the long-term self-reliance of the target populations (as distinct from the host country as a whole); more on this subject in the Conclusions.

3. Problems of Comparability.

Comparisons are believed to be of general interest mostly between the sets of German and U.S. evaluations, which constitute seven of the eight country studies reviewed. (The French evaluation of the Tunisian project was done by one person, apparently without a prescribed outline, and can be considered atypical for this purpose.)

In view of the fact that the series of evaluations of which these reports are a part are obviously conceived and carried out quite independently of one another, certain similarities in the methods are striking. For example, all but one (the German evaluation in Senegal, which was

^{1/}AID Program Evaluation Discussion Paper No. 10, July 1981.

^{2/}In the case of Kenya, the value covers only one year.

done by only one person) were carried out by more-or-less inter-disciplinary teams composed of government officials and outside experts, and all allocated between two and four weeks to the field work, with a typical duration of three weeks. As a result, none of the evaluations could collect primary quantitative data or undertake representative surveys during their field work; all had to rely on existing data (subjected to additional analysis by at least one of the US studies) and on informal observations and interviews.

Another major similarity between the two sets of evaluations is that all but one (U.S. evaluation - Morocco, about which more later) were performed on ongoing projects, so that their terms of reference had to do quite importantly with recommendations for the modification, continuation or termination of the projects, rather than with more general conclusions and opinions.

The major difference in method and depth between the German and U.S. evaluations is the greater emphasis of the latter on a determination of the project impact on the target population, versus far greater attention to operational matters in the former. This difference may be primarily due to the marginality of the German direct, bilateral food aid in the recipient country's total food picture, especially when compared with the U.S. bilateral food aid programs (even those limited to "Title II"). Thus, the three U.S. country evaluations attempt to draw conclusions about the nutritional impact of the feeding programs from analysis of the Growth Surveillance System data developed and maintained by the project implementing institution, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) - Africa, in all cases. (That the country project evaluators and the AID "Issues Review" express considerable skepticism about the significance of the child growth charts is another matter, at least until a better, equally simple methodology for measuring nutritional status comes along.)

Moreover, the U.S. studies seem to make far greater use of structured and unstructured interviews with samples of project beneficiaries in order to determine their reactions to the projects as well as the degree to which mothers have learned innovative lessons in nutrition and health. This difference is presumably also due to the differences in project objectives and design that are discussed further on.

The evaluation of the Morocco project differs from those of the two U.S. Title II projects in sub-Saharan Africa in various ways: (1) it is an ex-post evaluation; (2) it was entirely an "in-house" effort and utilized only USAID employees, while the other two were contracted out to consulting firms although the field work benefited from active participation of USAID personnel; (3) being addressed to a much wider audience than the more "routine" internal evaluations for the agency's Food for Peace Office, the Morocco paper is briefer and more readable, and (4) it was more concerned with the long-term impact of the educational component than with the shorter-term results from the food intake.

While all evaluation efforts attempted to involve host government personnel from the outset, it appears that, on the whole, the U.S. ventures were more successful than the German studies in this respect.

The two Food for Peace evaluations for Kenya and Upper Volta have a great deal in common evidently because they were contracted by the USAID Food for Peace office under identical terms of reference and were carried out at approximately the same time, although by two different consulting

firms. Both studies were issued in April 1981 and were based on approximately three weeks of field work by teams of similar composition, including officials of USAID and of the host government. The implementing agency for the programs in both countries was Catholic Relief Services (CRS), and it should be noted that personnel of that agency did not participate in either evaluation. The task of synthesizing these reports was not made any easier by the absence of executive summaries; the conclusions were not summarized but they are found at the end of the analysis of each program component.

The evaluation of the Tunisian SAHA project was completely different from the others because it was a project designed to create a domestic food supplement producing facility without any external food aid component, and the magnitude of the problems were known before the evaluation started.

Quite aside from the comparability question, evaluation methodology of "food aid" projects is beset by two principal problem areas: (1) the lack of definition of what the objectives of a food aid project are, or should be (see below and Conclusions), and hence, what kind of inputs should be provided and what kinds of results expected; (2) the methodological inadequacy of the measurement of achievement of nutritional purposes, described in detail in the AID "Issues Review".

4. Objectives of the Projects Covered.

It appears to be a common characteristic of "food aid" projects that they began as - or arose from - projects for providing emergency relief to populations struck by natural or man-made disasters, or at least, as freely admitted by the German evaluation, from intentions to provide such emergency relief.^{1/} In those cases, there is no further need to rationalize the selection process. As a rule, it is quite clear that further project development represents basically a political and bureaucratic effort to "do something" in the country concerned in order to atone for the failure of emergency food aid to have arrived when needed (or for the donor to have misjudged the situation in the first place, as in the case of Honduras).

In such cases, food aid also tended to begin in earnest as bulk donations to the host governments without any strings attached, and the evaluations found that these were largely ineffective in meeting the donor's goals in terms of needy target groups although they often helped a host government achieve its political objectives. Then the focus shifted to "food security" as promoted by FAO, but the donors soon found themselves in a quandary when it was found that continued donations of food commodities risked conflicting with the donor's goal of assisting the host country achieve greater food self-sufficiency. (See also Conclusions.)

Both the German and the U.S. evaluations found that the objectives of the "Food for Work" projects had little to do with food aid, and that their conception under this category tended to lead to inevitable disillusionment over the results.

^{1/} The German analysis also questions to what extent food aid is motivated by the supplier countries' desire to dispose of agricultural surpluses.

Where donor expectations appear to have been fulfilled to the largest degree is in projects designed to assist with long-term supplementary feeding of the most vulnerable groups (mothers, infants and pre-school children) in very poor societies (e.g., North and sub-Sahara Africa), especially when combined with health and nutrition education, although the yardsticks for measuring impact are still quite imperfect.

With the partial exception of these latter programs it appears that the results of most of the projects did not meet original expectations - to the extent that these were specifically formulated at the outset - or that they met the expectations only minimally.

II. ANALYSIS OF SUBSTANTIVE FINDINGS

A. THE GERMAN FOOD AID STUDIES (Federal Ministry of Cooperation)

The five studies of German food aid made available by the Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation (BMZ) represent a possibly unique effort at relatively uniform evaluation of programs with similar objectives in four different countries. What makes the papers even more interesting is that the four country studies (plus two other studies which were not made available)^{1/} were summarized in an overall "Cross Section" paper.

Method.

The methodology followed in all four country reports, as indicated above, is substantially uniform, without at the same time seeming to be too rigid to allow for variations among the countries, the programs and the approaches of the evaluators. From the German side, three of the country reports were made by teams of experts composed of Ministry officials and consultants; one report -- for Senegal -- was written by a university professor, apparently without additional help. The country reports, based on field work performed between late 1978 and January, 1980, were issued with from three to nine months delay. The field visits lasted from two to four weeks following the study of the files in Bonn and in Rome. The summary report is dated December, 1980.

Complete collaboration of host government institutions in the evaluation was sought in all cases. However, the actual participation of host country personnel varied greatly, from virtually no participation in Mali to full participation by four local government representatives in Honduras. In Bangladesh two narrow specialists dealing with one of the sub-projects participated in part of the evaluation, but no planning or evaluation personnel were made available. Nevertheless, it is stated that in all cases the host government representatives agreed in principle with all of the important findings of the evaluators at the time the preliminary findings were informally discussed with them.^{2/}

Evaluation Objectives.

It will be recognized in the further discussion that the outline provided by the DAC group for the assessment of the country evaluation reports is not completely applicable in the case of the German Food Aid projects. Indeed, some of the questions posed in the outline cannot be answered because we are dealing with broad programs with shifting focus

^{1/} A sector report on food aid and food security in Senegal and an analysis entitled "Effects of Food Aid in Recipient Countries" -- a comparative analysis for Egypt and Bangladesh by Joachim von Braun.

^{2/} This may well be lip-service which would come under the same heading as the recipient government's ostensible agreement in all cases with the donor's objectives, as discussed below.

and varying components, while on the other hand the German evaluations raise some issues that are not considered in the DAC outline. Nevertheless, there is an interesting degree of coincidence between the organization of the BMZ reports and the DAC outline, as well as between BMZ and U.S. AID concerns (e.g., rural poor and the role of women).

One question that this assessment had to answer at the outset was whether it should include the evaluation of those projects or "sub-programs" that were only casually related to food aid as such and that, in fact, even according to the German evaluation reports were more in the nature of technical assistance projects than identifiable as food aid. The reviewer decided to draw the line below those program components or projects where either food supply in kind was a direct and important component or where host government expenditures were identifiably funded from sales proceeds of food commodities imported under a German grant. Thus, the seed production and Chittagong regional development projects in Bangladesh were dropped from this review.

The official designation of the evaluations is "inspections." Indeed, they appear to be a cross between audits and monitoring evaluations. One might, perhaps, observe at this point that the length of time devoted to the study of each program, and the size and composition of the teams, obviously did not permit in-depth treatment of either the financial/administrative area or the substantive aspects.

In any case, the principal stated objectives of the "inspections" were:

- information for the BMZ and the authorities in the recipient countries regarding the effectiveness of the resources furnished to date;
- elaboration of bases for the continuation of the various programs and projects as regards their conception, resource requirements and implementation;
- preparation of criteria for implementation, audit and evaluation of similar, future projects, including the consideration of mobilization of women's target groups.

The official reasons for the inspections were:

- the fact that the developmentally significant scope of food security had not been subjected to independent examination to date;
- the preparation of basic papers and guidelines for development policy in women's questions and for food security.

Another common characteristic of the four country studies is that all were designed to review ongoing programs and projects; in other words, they were in the nature of monitoring, rather than ex-post, evaluations. Furthermore, in all of the countries the more recent focus of the food aid, i.e. the funding of agricultural development projects from sales proceeds and the placing of German technical assistance personnel to help implement these projects, were at a rather early stage of implementation; in fact, in Senegal they had not even begun to be implemented.

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The country selection by the BMZ was based on representativeness, geographically and with regard to differences in the program focus. (The overall report does not state in how many countries German food aid was active at the time of the evaluation.)

A few general data concerning the reports are given in tabular form in Annex FA-1. The total estimated value of the aid provided by the government of the Federal Republic of Germany to the four countries, including the landed value of the food commodities as well as the cost of personnel, supplies, equipment and overhead, amounted to more than DM 75 million through 1979.

Project Objectives.

The country reports, as well as the summary report, make it clear that in all cases the objectives that prevailed at the time of the evaluation had changed substantially from those that existed when German food aid was originally initiated in the country concerned in the early 1970's. Indeed, in three of the countries (all except Senegal) the original objective of the German government was to provide immediate disaster relief in the form of foodstuffs. Subsequently, the objective became delivery of food in bulk under international multi-donor agreements for assisting developing countries to make up their food deficits, without any conditions and with distribution through the existing channels of the recipient government. It appears that a good deal of such commodity shipments from -- or donations in cash by -- Germany were undertaken within the framework of the World Food Program and of the EEC's overall food aid program.

Beginning in 1974, in concert with the new direction proposed by the FAO, German food aid began to concentrate on creation of long-term food security in the recipient country. Such food security was conceived basically in two senses: (1) creation of food reserves in the recipient country, including not only transfer of food commodities from food surplus countries but, perhaps more importantly, the utilization of local currency proceeds from the sale of the commodities for creating public reserves of indigenous products, together with technical assistance and some equipment aid for creation of a better logistic infrastructure and design of appropriate policies; (2) specific projects designed to increase the recipient country's self-sufficiency in food production. Subsequently, other important objectives were added, e.g., the promotion of increasing self-reliance among marginal rural populations and other equity and distributional considerations.

The overall report found in all cases that, whereas the global objectives were quite uniform as regards assurance of basic food supplies and consideration of marginal, low-income population, the individual measures and sub-programs were quite heterogeneous. The fundamental weaknesses with regard to setting of objectives, it was found, have to do with the lack of conceptual bases for the various country programs because there were no country and/or sector strategy papers. The concern is also expressed that food aid in general may not be based on completely altruistic rationale on the part of the donor country or countries: there appears to be some evidence that policies are at times dictated by commodity lobbies.

One has the impression that in practically all cases, the country programs represent a succession of improvisations based on both changing

circumstances in the recipient countries and changing policy emphasis in the BMZ. On the other hand, the investigations leading to the formulation of programs and projects appear to have been done with a certain amount of thoroughness, to the point where several of the evaluations point to the long lead time that had been required between the original country request for a program or project and the actual implementation.

As was indicated earlier, there appears in all cases to have been substantial, ostensible coincidence of objectives between the donor and the recipient government. However, some of the evaluations point out that the subscription of the formal agreements setting forth the joint objectives was sometimes delayed far into the actual implementation of the activities. Moreover, as the evaluations show, the lip-service paid by the recipient government to the so-called joint objectives was more often than not ignored when it came to the enactment and implementation of policies designed to achieve those objectives.

In two cases (Mali and Bangladesh), however, the original objectives of the donor and the recipient were quite divergent as regards the target populations to whom the food aid was to be primarily directed. It appears that the German government intended for the food to be distributed primarily in low-income rural areas where there were substantial signs of sub-nutrition, whereas the host governments, albeit for important political reasons of their own, had preferred to use the additional food in order to satisfy the demands of the urban population, which in both cases was clearly identified by the evaluation as representing essentially the civil servants and military personnel.

The question of whether donor expectations were reasonable can only be answered by approximate inference because the evaluation reports do not specifically address that issue; an answer would thus involve guessing what went on in the minds of the policymakers and project planners at the time the projects were conceived and approved. As will become apparent below, expectations were evidently not fulfilled in the case of the original emergency assistance; on the other hand, it is not known to what extent the donor country officials actually expected the recipient country to adopt the kind of policies and measures that would guarantee attainment of the basic objectives of the food-security, development-project type assistance on the basis of what in all cases was a marginal German contribution to the total food supply and government budget.

Effectiveness.

Judgment of the effectiveness of the programs and/or the projects within them can be generalized only in a few aspects. The one unequivocal overall generalization is that emergency food assistance did not work. It appears that in the three cases where the German food aid began with this idea (i.e., except for Senegal), the planning and logistics delays resulted in delivery of the relief commodities -- if at all -- long after they were needed. In one country (Honduras) food assistance did not begin to arrive until after the second harvest following the disaster that it was supposed to help mitigate. (Rather than trying to determine the causes of these delays, it appears that the evaluators chose to recommend that the Federal Republic not continue to offer bilateral aid of this nature.)

The evaluations do not specifically address themselves to the question of whether the projects were functioning according to plans or needs in terms of physical outputs. One would have to read between the lines to answer this question. In general, it appears that, with the exception of the emergency aid mentioned above, the physical outputs were delivered largely in accordance with what appeared to be original plans. What we mean by physical outputs in this case, of course, are the tangible objects that were produced either through food for work projects (such as road building) or food procurement, storage or production features of various types of food projects.

As indicated earlier, the effectiveness of the delivery system of inputs to the intended target groups or beneficiaries depended entirely upon the prevailing political and structural situation in the country concerned. The effectiveness of this aspect seemed also to be correlated directly with the degree of participation of the host country government in the evaluation, probably not by coincidence. Thus, the distributional aspects of the food aid deliveries were most satisfactorily handled in Honduras and least satisfactorily in Bangladesh and, especially, in Mali. The question could not be answered for Senegal because it was not applicable to the completed phase of the country program and it was too early for the phases that were in process of initiation or preparation.

Timeliness of project or program execution is not specifically discussed in any of the evaluation reports. Thus, it is assumed that the problem did not arise to an important degree except in the case of the emergency aid planning.

Efficiency.

Neither data nor time seemed to be available for making any benefit-cost estimates or even cost-effectiveness calculations in these evaluations. Only in the case of Honduras was an attempt made to calculate some unit costs; however, the data presented are much too sketchy to be meaningful and they cannot be compared with any of the other projects or with any similar projects in other programs. The Honduras report also makes specific mention of the high cost of what is called "accompanying measures," which had already reached 27 percent and were threatening to go up to 50 percent. However, it is not made clear what is meant by this term.

While there seem to have been some inevitable problems of management at the levels of the donor organization, of the implementing entities -- mostly consulting firms -- and, of course, of the host government, none of these problems seem to have been insurmountable and some were apparently successfully overcome through supply of appropriate expatriate technicians.

While no specific mention was noted in any of the country reports of tangible losses in storage -- even though sizable quantities of food commodities were involved -- the overall report speaks of "leakage losses" of up to 40 percent in the case of the bulk food shipments. It is not clear whether this term is meant to apply to physical losses or to pilferage, nor where the 40 percent figure comes from.

The Mali report points out that the cost of landing one ton of German wheat is about 3.5 times the cost of purchasing locally produced food grain and that, for the cost of transportation alone of each ton of imported grain, 1.8 tons of local grain could be procured. The Mali

report also estimates the cost of creating a security reserve as relatively high. On the other hand, several of the reports, notably that for Honduras, point out that the cost of assigning expatriate logistics experts to the field is amply compensated by the benefits.

Impact.

In view of the country and program differences, impact of the aid is best measured at the national level. However, the German summary report attempts an impact overview (under the heading of the neologism "Signifikanz," which is also used in the country reports). The key question asked by the summary report under this heading is whether the project had a lasting effect on the economic, social and cultural development of the country, the project region or the target group.

The only general conclusions that the summary report was able to draw were (1) that emergency food aid in the case of catastrophes only makes sense when it can be delivered on time to the population concerned and that this was not the case in any of the countries studied, and (2) that the food security programs have a greater impact potential than those limited to delivery of imported foodstuffs.

Other conclusions that might perhaps be drawn from the country reports as regards the impact of the programs are: (1) that accrual of benefits to particular target groups specified by the donor can be hoped to be assured only if the recipient country's structural, political and administrative framework is appropriate or, failing this, provided that the distribution of the commodities is under the direct or indirect control of the donor government; (2) that earmarking of sales proceeds from imported food donations is more easily agreed than done because of the relatively small value of the German donations in isolation.

Moreover, it appears that the multi-year experience of the German food aid in the four countries concerned does not yet permit a significant answer to an old dilemma: on balance and in the long run, is the massive donation of food commodities, an asset for the country's development or a liability? Several of the country reports make it quite clear that there was considerable suspicion in the evaluators' minds that the net effect of the food aid may have been: (1) to reduce the pressure on host governments to implement the policies and measures designed to accelerate national production, and (2) to discourage the investment of public funds in agricultural development. The overall summary report does not take sides on this issue.

A-1. HONDURAS

Project Objectives.

The Honduras program (known as COHAAT) is an example of a program where results are difficult to measure in view of the repeatedly shifting focus. It started as a relief operation conceived in 1974 as immediate aid for the hurricane-stricken areas to reduce famine (short-term), reconstruct damaged infrastructure and dwellings (medium-term) and contribute to the assurance of food self-supply (long-term). The proposal was appraised in 1975 and the appraisal recommended an additional long-term disaster prevention in susceptible areas (country-wide even outside the hurricane-damaged area), as well as price stabilization for basic

commodities. The later proposal included food-for-work projects for which the basic foodstuffs were to be procured locally, as well as institutional strengthening of agrarian associations and connection with planned FAO projects in the forestry area. The scheme became operational in the winter of 1975/76 at a time when two harvests had already been brought in since the hurricane. In addition, it is pointed out that the original idea of catastrophic food aid was perhaps not relevant, inasmuch as the destruction was almost entirely confined to the banana plantations belonging to transnational corporations. Thus, the budget approved for one or two years was focused on a long-term program of food security in the sense of bridging aid until such a time as the self-supply of the hurricane-damaged population with basic food commodities would be assured.

This focus remained until March, 1977, following which a drought in the south of Honduras led to an acute food shortage in two provinces and, thus, to a new project with short-term objectives (famine relief, creation of jobs and reduction of food price pressure), as well as a long-term objective (contribution to assurance of self-supply with foodstuffs). The new program is identified in summary as "support for self-reliance and social integration of sub-marginal and marginal rural groups in regions of development-political priority." Altogether, the Honduras program included six different sub-programs or projects, each one of which was implemented by a different national institution (two of them, respectively, in cooperation with FAO and IBRD).

The evaluation underlines the essential coincidence of the overall objectives between the donor and recipient country governments, despite two changes in government in Honduras during the time the project was being conceived and implemented. This coincidence was based primarily on the fact that the government of Honduras in this period was itself emphasizing simultaneously greater food security and improvement in the socio-economic situation of marginal populations through agrarian reform projects (at least rhetorically).

Nevertheless, the evaluation points out a number of contradictions within the system of objectives, both on the donor and recipient side. For instance, the emphasis on integrated programs with inter-sectoral coordination contradicts the requirement for sectoral and regional concentration leading to a reduction in bureaucratic requirements. Moreover, the limited project horizon arising from the one-year funding limitations contradicts the requirement that long-term objectives be pursued. Finally, the evaluation believes that the emphasis on priority aid for marginal groups contradicts the requirement to utilize existing implementing organizations.

Several of the contradictions that the evaluation purports to have unearthed are more difficult to understand, such as that the call for attractive producer prices contradicts that for improvement of living conditions for sub-marginal groups, or that the objective of price stabilization is in conflict with the requirement for implementation of food-for-work projects. These reported contradictions are not sufficiently documented to make the assertions credible; nor is it explained why the pressures on the Honduran marketing institutions from producers and consumers with respect to price levels lead to contradictions, since this is a common political phenomenon that tends to lead to some kind of a generally acceptable compromise.

Effectiveness

The effectiveness of the entire Honduras program is judged, in the evaluation, in terms of its functional aspects rather than in terms of its achievements. Thus, it is stated that as far as the BMZ is concerned, conceptual work was good but the administration of resources and the development of the program were unsatisfactory. Equally, it is judged that the technical development of some programs by the expatriate advisers was satisfactory, whereas the choice of sub-programs was not. Finally, the evaluation states that the consulting firm(s) that acted as intermediary in the development of the projects could stand some improvement as regards their "efforts in strategy and conceptualization as well as in goal-oriented replanning".

Of the estimated total project costs through 1977 (the first year of the new approach) of DM 7.4 million, 76 percent was represented by purchases of foodstuffs and directly related expenditures such as transportation, distribution and equipment. The remaining 24 percent represented personal services and other overhead expenditures. Two million rations had been distributed until mid-1978 and, although this distribution had reached 100 percent of the goal, the evaluation did not consider this as a measure per se. On the other hand, loss in storage or black marketing or other types of corruption was judged to have been minimal.

It may be significant that the evaluation report recommends to the consulting firms that they suggest to the BMZ the inclusion of sorghum in the food-for-work supplies, in view of the importance of sorghum both in the local diets and in the cropping pattern of small farmers. One wonders whether there may be some ethnocentricity in the officially-approved German list of foodstuffs that appears to exclude sorghum even when the program is based on local purchases, and why such a complicated bureaucratic procedure would be necessary to have it included.

Impact.

It is not until the evaluation report discusses the program's impact that it states that an express assumption underlying the objectives is the contribution of the project to price stabilization through the purchase of local foodstuffs. Appearance of this fundamental objective at the end of the report rather than at the beginning appears odd because it is one of the two basic justifications on which a donor government bases development projects that involve the purchase with its funds of food from the local market. In any case, the report judges that this condition was not met on a national scale. It wisely concludes that when the official purchasing and storage infrastructure in the host country is inadequate, the very limited resources which can be provided by a program such as the German Food Aid cannot be expected to make a tangible impact at the national level, especially when most of the purchases are made from government stocks in the first place. Nevertheless, aside from admitting that there was a regional impact in the South, in terms of greater food self-sufficiency, the report submits that a greater national impact in this sense might have been achieved if consultation and collaboration with the responsible government agency had been realized as planned. (It is added that one additional operational reason for the low impact of the project at the price and marketing level was the mid-stream change in the terms of reference of the project leader, under which his marketing functions were replaced by

management advisory services.) One of the evaluators' recommendations in this respect is that this type of project should attempt to purchase foodstuffs directly from producers, especially from producer associations and cooperatives. However, it is not quite clear how such a change (which would tend to increase the project's overhead expenditures) could produce any greater impact on the national situation in view of the limited overall resources. Moreover, rather than helping to strengthen national institutions, it would help repeat the objectionable habit of externally-financed projects of bypassing these institutions and thus not making any lasting impact after the end of the project.

Other Issues.

The overall evaluation of the Honduras program ends with a lengthy discussion of the comparative rationale for using this type of food assistance in complex projects for raising the long-term well-being and productivity of the rural poor, such as in the agrarian reform projects in the South. The basic problems, it was found, were: (1) that if the project is successful, the need for donated food supplies disappears rapidly, and (2) success of the project depends almost entirely on the effectiveness and efficiency of the local agencies and programs that the food aid project supports marginally at any point of time, as well on changes at the national policy level. The rate of absorption of foodstuffs, as well as their relative impact in the overall project and the proportion of overhead cost, it is concluded, are much more favorable in a works project such as labor-intensive road building. As part of this discussion, the report concludes wisely that, after all, "a food aid program that is carried out over a longer period of time is an indirect form of budgetary aid, i.e. a form of subsidy and concealed capital aid."

A-2. BANGLADESH

Evaluation Objectives.

The inspection was called for because of: (1) doubts over the attainment of the alleged objectives, (2) need for improvement of the effectiveness of the food security program, and (3) need for refinement of the mechanisms.

Project Objectives.

The Bangladesh program differs basically from the Honduras program in that the food aid consists of German soft wheat rather than locally purchased foods. As in Honduras, however, the original objective was to alleviate an acute emergency, in this case the situation created by the combination of the 1974 floods and the unrest that accompanied the independence struggle. It appears that the first shipment of German wheat did not arrive until early 1975. At that time the deliveries were already part of a complex program of food security negotiated with the Government of Bangladesh and supervised jointly by the German Government and the FAO. The program that was evaluated was composed of five parts, of which two comprised the delivery of soft wheat (partly to the Ministry of Food for direct distribution and partly to the Ministry of Relief and

Rehabilitation for food-for-work projects). The other three sub-programs consisted of backing for the Ministry of Food for improving food supply logistics, assistance to the Bangladesh Agricultural Development Corporation (BADC) for increasing wheat and rice seed production, and finally assistance to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forests in the agricultural rehabilitation program in the Chittagong District.

Total money resources allocated to the program between December of 1974 and November of 1978 were DM 16 million, of which 61 percent were for foodstuffs and transportation thereof. Only 17 percent of the funds was used for personal services, travel and administration.

The objectives are subjected to a good deal of critical analysis by the evaluators. The main points emphasized are the tendency for non-observance of some of the fundamental agreed objectives by the recipient government, which may readily subscribe to those objectives at the time that the food aid is being negotiated in order not to jeopardize the regular flow of commodities. The evaluation considers that the agreements were breached by the recipient government insofar as the rationing card system favored clearly certain elite groups in the urban areas, rather than the rural poor as had been stipulated, and because maintenance of very low food prices had a negative effect on domestic farm production. The report also warns that the justification of food aid through the creation of emergency reserves can lead to a permanent dependence on such aid unless it is continuously evaluated.

The report observes that both the food commodities (German wheat) and the money equivalent of their sale represent a very small percentage of the total food distribution, on the one hand, and of the government budget on the other. Therefore, it is stated, both contributions must be evaluated as part of the host government's overall food distribution and development effort. Moreover, the funds derived from the sale of German wheat were not clearly earmarked; since some difficulties were encountered with the host government funding of the seed production and the Chittagong development programs (whereas the sales proceeds fund theoretically was meant to be the nexus between the technical assistance type projects and the food aid deliveries), the German evaluation team considered those two activities as separate projects. In view of the rather tenuous relationship between the food aid and these two projects, their evaluation is omitted from this synthesis, as stated earlier. The present synthesis will, therefore, not concern itself either with the amplification of the program objectives to include integrated development of the rural poor, employment creation and the development of women, all of which concern the two technical assistance projects rather than the food aid activities per se.

Annual deliveries of wheat from Germany under the food aid program were relatively stable, between 38,000 and 55,000 tons. They represented approximately three to six percent of total food imports. It is noted that during the period under review only about 11 percent of total grain imports into Bangladesh were commercial; the rest were donations of an international or bilateral nature. All German wheat deliveries generated sales proceeds except 10,000 tons during 1978 that were earmarked for food-for-work projects.

As regards the food storage and delivery logistics, it appears that the terms of reference of the expatriate experts were unrealistic with regard to the extent and scope of the advisory services that the host government agencies were willing to accept. Unfortunately, there is no

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overall appraisal of the food supply logistics project. The somewhat detailed technical discussion of each aspect of this activity does not help the reader to form an opinion regarding its effectiveness, efficiency or impact.

In addition to the criticism of the rationing system, which is reported not only to have favored urban elite groups but also to have been riddled with corruption (forged ration cards), it is stated that the overall volume of food aid has apparently permitted the government to maintain grain support prices at relatively low levels in order to favor the politically important urban pressure groups.

The food-for-work program was initiated only in 1978 and was thus not yet ready for evaluation at the time of the team's visit. However, the report points out that the terms of reference of the technical consultants funded by the BMZ at the time of the visit had not yet been expanded to include supervision of the food-for-work program, which at that time was entirely handled by the Bangladesh Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation, without any guidance or control.

Information that could be obtained on the food-for-work program, therefore, did not permit a meaningful evaluation. On the one hand, it is stated that without these projects the rural workers would have been unemployed between December and February/March. On the other hand, it is said that cash-for-work projects would, perhaps, be more suitable than food-for-work projects (especially since part of the payments are made in cash anyway) with the caveat, however, that the handling of large amounts of cash could well lead to considerable corruption. It is also stated that the effectiveness of the projects was probably reduced by the fact that the workers had to bring their own tools, which in many cases had to be rented with part of their modest wages. Analysis of the effect of these projects on the production of foodstuffs and price developments is not possible with the data at hand. However, it is reported that an interim report on World Food Program projects concludes that the influence of the projects on the economy is small because of the many financial and technical problems. It was also learned by the evaluators that the 107 food-for-work projects to which the German wheat was channeled had originally been rejected by the World Food Program because of their lack of relation to increased food production.

A-3. MALI

Project Objectives.

The analysis of objectives in the Mali evaluation is instructive because it ascribes different objectives to the three German ministries involved in the decision making, each of which reportedly had its own political/bureaucratic ends (that had little if anything to do with the welfare or development of Mali). Indeed, it is stated expressly that there was no country aid program for Mali, that the country report on Mali of October, 1978, does not contain any hints regarding priorities for German aid, and that no sector paper for food aid or food security programs had thus far been prepared by the appropriate division of the BMZ. Instead, the BMZ referred the evaluators to the resolutions of multilateral organizations to which the German government subscribes. These resolutions, however, are not believed to have any operational significance because of their global nature. (The report indicates in a

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footnote that CFA had issued new "Guidelines and Criteria for Food Aid" in May of 1979; this document was not available for the present assessment).

The evaluators found, however, that there was a sort of operational setting of objectives implied in the intergovernmental agreements. Thus, "while the traditional deliveries of foodstuffs and immediate aid measures do not include any alleged objectives, the agreement covering the so-called Food Aid Bridging Program for the Sahel (1974-1976) and the follow-up Food Security Program (1977 and onward) contain a wide spectrum of alleged objectives." These are partly reflected in the documentation covering the donation awards to the executing consulting firm insofar as each situation required it.

As regards the host country, the Five-year Plan 1974-78 contemplates a grain security reserve through assurance of supply in exceptionally bad years and giving the state effective power over consumer prices. At a multi-donor conference in 1974, it was assumed that poor harvests could be expected every fifth year with a 50 percent deficit below demand, equivalent to about 70,000 tons, of which 70 percent is millet. The annual deficit estimations of an inter-ministerial group is the basis of aid requests. These are justified with the objectives of covering domestic food needs under special consideration of agricultural deficit regions (target groups being the rural population without income and food), and the improvement of the poor health conditions caused by poor nutrition. In effect, the report states, since the military coup of 1968, domestic politics has favored the politically active urban population, especially the civil and military administration, and that this has reflected on food policy. Besides, Mali seems to have become accustomed to almost automatic food aid deliveries. As a result, little effort goes into the preparation of aid requests, and "food aid, therefore, serves the tacit objective of easing the fiscal management problems (budgetary aid) through the distribution of subsidized foodstuffs to officials in the form of income supplements and utilization of the sales proceeds."

The report comments further that the objectives of the participants (Federal Republic, Mali and FAO) are only partly compatible and that the conflicts arise particularly over the German and FAO emphasis on agricultural production effort and the supply of foodstuffs to especially drought-vulnerable populations, whereas for the Government of Mali the de facto emphasis is on urban consumers even though the aid requests speak of food security.

In any case, the evaluators state that in no case is there an expected end-of-project status indicated in the documentation, which makes quantitative evaluation of attainment of objectives impossible.

Effectiveness and Impact.

The report's summary of the evaluation is, frankly, not very helpful inasmuch as it tends to concentrate on the mechanics and technical details of certain aspects of implementation. However, if several observations throughout the report are pieced together the following overall picture appears:

The deliveries of German wheat in the framework of multilaterally coordinated donor efforts were probably effective in alleviating food scarcity situations and balance of payments and budget problems. (However, the quantities were relatively small and -- since no information

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is given regarding the proportion they represented out of total food donations or the total amount of such donations -- it is not possible to form a judgment as to what would have happened without the German participation.) Beyond this, it would appear that the objectives of the German aid were not met. The target group problem has already been discussed. In addition, it is stated that the sales proceeds from the commodity imports were not used to create a special fund for local grain purchases to build up a national food security reserve, as had been agreed, but rather that the proceeds were used by the government to cover distribution costs (as in the case of Senegal --see below). This would seem to make any evaluation of the operation of the local purchasing and storage system rather academic, as far as the donor organization is concerned: the latter did not actually make a contribution to the program, except insofar as advice from technical cooperation personnel was offered and accepted, and thus had no effective control over the system. As regards the judgment of the program's efficiency, the report states that, "it can only be determined qualitatively that the outputs so far have been low in the fields of purchasing, counterpart training, organization, etc. The cost-benefit ratio (total investment 1975-78, about DM 20 million) was certainly low."

There is an interesting reference to a report prepared by the Agro-progress consulting firm (which implemented this and several other German food aid projects) dated March 17, 1977, and entitled, "Materials for the Assessment of Projects against their Basic Objectives," where, it is stated, the different cereal policies and food security aid programs are compared among the Sahelian countries. The Mali report recommends that a similar study be made comparing cost-effectiveness analyses among the same countries and that the "Gall study" contains appropriate points of departure for such an analysis. Unfortunately, neither of the two papers referred to were made available for review.

The overall impact analysis of the report is also quite inadequate; it refers mostly to technical and logistical measures. It concludes by stating merely that "the contribution in a development policy sense of these measures (inputs) can only be judged in relation to the grains policy and to the fulfillment of the remaining conditions."

The conclusions of the socio-economic analysis are couched in somewhat elliptical language. However, it is believed that the following represents a fair extract of the less equivocal statements: direct food import aid has not been satisfactory because food availabilities were not timely; inappropriate products were delivered, and there has been a market displacement effect on domestic production; within the prevailing framework of conditions, the possibilities for achieving improvements in the marketing system through a food security program are rather limited and attempts to apply such a program despite the limitations involved the program in a series of contradictions.

A-4. SENEGAL

At the time of the evaluation (November, 1979), bulk food aid shipments had been completed and the German contribution to the Food Security Program had only been under way for one year. The other projects were to become operational in 1980.

A major finding of the evaluation is that, with one exception, all project ideas were formulated by the recipient country. In the one case

that represented the exception (addition of millet flour to bread flour), the host government was, however, able to express its disagreement after a favorable technical finding had been brought to its attention.

The long-term objectives of the 1978 agreement for creation of a national grain security reserve are:

- improvement and increase of local grain production;
- promotion of market availabilities of local production;
- stabilization of the Senegalese grain market;
- improvement of storage practices;
- promotion of regional cooperation in grain marketing policies.

"German deliveries of foodstuffs can only have subsidiary functions..." in such a set of objectives, the report concludes. Nevertheless, evaluation of the system of objectives for the Food Security projects is rather positive, although essentially an ex-ante analysis in view of the status of the various projects. While the point is not explicitly made for Senegal, it appears that there was substantial agreement between donor and recipient on the main objectives:

- reduction of wheat import needs by 1985 from 300,000 to 100,000 tons by means of larger local production of millet, maize and rice;
- improvement of market structure for supplying the towns with locally produced millet;
- influencing urban consumption habits;
- "creation of security reserve.

Another positive finding is the commendation of the effort of the BMZ to develop a coherent food policy "in place of the previous uncoordinated and hardly controllable food deliveries". This is judged to be a promising development because it ties food donation deliveries to promotion of local production.

As regards the program's efficiency and its impact on development policy, the evaluator finds that both were heavily influenced by Senegal's sector policy and by the measures adopted by other countries. "Deliveries of food from other countries along the traditional donation system, i.e, without requiring earmarking of counterpart resources, can jeopardize the success of the German project which requires such earmarking of counterpart resources." Indeed, the evaluator decries the failure of the Senegalese Food Commission to deposit into the reserve fund for local food purchases the sales proceeds from 2,000 tons of German food aid rice delivered in 1978. It appears that the proceeds were instead used to defray local transportation costs. (This misapplication was

deemed to have resulted from faulty translation of the concept "food security account" in the agreement.)^{1/}

The evaluation believes that the government of Senegal has developed instruments with which to attain the common objectives, including an appropriate farm price policy, and that the country has an enormous potential for expanding millet production (though at the expense of grazing land). Nevertheless, concern is expressed over the lack of precision in the planning of buffer stocks (especially in the case of the short-term aspects), as well as over the lack of coordination of non-commercial grain imports with local millet stock management, except in the case of German deliveries. It is feared that the above-mentioned lack of enthusiasm on the part of the Senegal Food Commission for the creation of the local grain purchase fund could jeopardize the success of the main German objective.

Following an almost complete absence of information about the host government's capabilities for distribution of the food aid provided in the early 1970's, subsequent project planning included thorough study of the institutional structure for project implementation. However, there seems to have been a great deal of avoidable duplication of effort in this respect between two major projects prepared, respectively, in 1978 and 1979. While a two-year lapse between the host government's project request and signature of a project agreement was deemed both reasonable and necessary -- as was the case for the Food Security project -- it was found that the grain storage project took almost three years to design; every step seemed to require an excessive amount of time, but the greatest delay was found in the technical appraisal: the report was submitted 20 months after the contract had been let. Also, the Senegalese effort in project preparation was partially unsatisfactory, thus leading to difficulties for the German personnel in the start-up period. On the other hand, the large number of German agricultural projects in Senegal is said to require a resident specialist to assure their appropriate coordination within the framework of a general overview of the agricultural situation and of the prevailing institutional structure.

Efficiency of future project implementation is questioned by the evaluator in the case of the Food Security and Grain Storage projects. Though both are partly oriented towards grain storage, they are implemented by different institutions (at least on the German side). The need for thorough exchange of information between the Food Security and the Maize Growing Promotion projects is thought to be necessary because policy and institutional questions will be of major importance and the two projects are implemented by separate Senegalese institutions.

The evaluator comments very explicitly that the Food Security project in Senegal, as in the case of similar projects in other countries, though being a direct descendant of "pure" food aid, is in reality difficult to distinguish from technical cooperation projects in view of the variety of components and the wide spectrum of activities.

^{1/} By coincidence, the reviewer, while on a contract assignment for USAID in Senegal in early 1980, was told by an authoritative Senegalese source that, in view of the Senegal government's budget problems, the German government required the partial use of the sales proceeds for local transportation, and that this was considered a very positive, if unusual, procedure because it guaranteed that the food aid deliveries actually found their way to the intended target population.

B. UPPER VOLTA FOOD FOR PEACE/TITLE II EVALUATION
Final Report

Objectives

The objectives refer to those of the program. The report makes no reference to the objectives of the evaluation but it is assumed that they were similar to those listed in the Kenya report (see following synopsis).

While the evaluators were unable to determine whether the newly installed military government was about to make changes in the focus of the previous government's development plan (which had never been formally accepted by that government), they do assert that "all three major components of the CRS/FFP^{1/} program in Upper Volta are consistent with the major thrust of government policies." Nevertheless, some differences in operational strategies between the CRS and the specific host government agencies were noted by the team. The evaluators also found that the Upper Volta program was "in keeping with the developmental, nutritional and humanitarian objectives of PL480." In this connection, they note that the US commitment to Upper Volta was significant; for example, the total value of US food aid committed to that country between 1972 and 1978 was \$134 million, equivalent to nearly 39% of total food aid received by Upper Volta and nearly four times that provided by the World Food Program. It is also stated that the aim of the pre-school and school feeding programs managed by CRS is "to alleviate malnutrition among 0-5 year old and primary school children," and that some food for work projects "also relate to these objectives."

As regards the pre-school feeding program, a briefing paper of CRS examined by the evaluators states that "the underlying goal of the pre-school program is to ensure an adequate rate of growth in all enrolled children." For school feeding, the Food for Peace Handbook is quoted as stating that the objectives are "to encourage recipient countries to provide food to primary school children in order to improve school attendance by children of the poorest elements of the society and to improve their health, vigor, learning capacity, and nutritional status." Finally, according to the same handbook, the goal of the Food for Work projects is said to be "the achievement of needed agricultural/economic, and community improvements by providing commodities to support the labor of unemployed and underemployed local workers."

Effectiveness and Efficiency.

The evaluators judge the effectiveness and efficiency of the school feeding program (SF) to be high. They were unable to make a definitive judgment on the pre-school, or mother and child health, feeding program (MCH), partly because CRS had only recently geared itself up to full operation in this component. Finally the evaluators were unable to determine any demonstrable effect relating to food aid from the Food for Work component of the program (FFW).

^{1/} CRS = Catholic Relief Services
FFP = U.S. Government Food for Peace Program.

Obviously the delivery of the food rations to the mothers against their monthly fee, equivalent to about 40 cents, proceeded smoothly as did the weighing of the children for control purposes and the organization of lectures, all preceding the distribution of the food. However, it was found that the effectiveness of the centers depended essentially on the managerial capability of the staff. Almost one-fourth of the centers visited reported some irregularity in deliveries of the rations to the centers. Loss or deterioration of the commodities was rarely reported.

The effectiveness of the food rations per se was apparently judged to be greater than that of the education and training program that accompany distribution. In fact, CRS reportedly did not consider itself fully equipped to develop and implement a complete educational program, at least not without sharing its responsibility with host government agencies. These opinions are based on interviews with 28 village workers and 73 mothers' in an attempt to determine their level of knowledge of key elements of relevant nutrition information. (However, there is no comparison of the mothers' knowledge with that of a control group from non-project villages.)

Limited data suggest that the introduction of certain labor saving devices for women in villages, such as easily accessible water wells and mechanical grain mills, tended to have a positive effect on the women's participation in educational activities and thus in the adoption of health related advice.

As regards the effectiveness of the distributed rations reaching the children, the evaluators, on the basis of direct and indirect evidence obtained, believe that the food ration is shared among the household and that the children probably consume less than half of the ration brought home by the women. This probably meant that the children were theoretically obtaining a full day's protein requirements from the FFP ration (because the entire ration was found to provide over 200% of the requirement), but probably only one-fourth of the 1-to-3-year-old child's total energy requirements.

Impact

Pre-school Feeding. Tentative conclusions regarding the effect of the pre-school feeding on the children's nutritional status are that there is no significant difference in age-weight relation between children who had been participating for a sufficient time and new entrants into the program, if all age groups are thrown together in the analysis. However a significant difference in favor of the program participants emerges for the children of 25 to 36 months of age. Nevertheless, the evaluators warn that this difference may reflect an unusually high rate of malnutrition among the older new entrants rather than the effects of the feeding program. One of the evaluators hypotheses is that the lack of measurable effect among the younger age groups is due to the above-mentioned fact that the children do not receive the entire ration.

As far as the economic value of the ration is concerned, if measured at local market prices of the same commodities, the benefit to the recipient family is remarkable. At a total value of about \$123 per year, it is equivalent to more than three-fourths of the World Bank -estimated per capita income for the country. On the other hand, the market value of lower cost substitutes is equivalent to less than one

dollar because the two local protein and fat substitutes are collected and thus have no cash cost. However, the evaluators are fully aware that there is insufficient knowledge to determine either the real economic value or the nutritional impact on children of the rations to date.

The evaluators recommend that there be a "more systematic nutrition rehabilitation component for severely malnourished children." This recommendation apparently reflects their finding that the food rations are perhaps not going optimally to the most vulnerable of the target group.

School Feeding. The impact of the school feeding program could not yet be determined at the time of the evaluation, because the Growth Surveillance System (GSS) had been introduced only in 1979 and was being applied in only 10% of the schools. Also, at the time of the visit there was very little nutrition-related education in the curricula of the schools that were participating in the feeding program, and only one school had a garden for the production of vegetables.

The school lunch program certainly was meeting a far larger effective share of the children's energy and protein requirements (particularly of the energy, since presumably they were obtaining their full ration without having to share them with other members of the family).

Among the report's recommendations on the school feeding program, the first is that the take-home ration should be eliminated. However, there is little reference to this phenomenon in the analysis except that it is stated in one place that "many of the children ate their lunch immediately at school, some ate part and took part of it home, others took the entire ration home. Several children said their younger brothers and sisters would cry if they didn't share the food."

On the whole, the report finds "evidence that the school feeding program is having a positive effect on the nutritional status of the children, or to be precise that the lack of it was correlated with a deterioration in nutritional status." More than 3,000 children measured under the GSS system in January 1981 who had been without food supplement for at least three months and probably longer, were found to be "significantly more malnourished than they had been at this time a year earlier." Although the evaluators were reluctant to attribute this deterioration unequivocally to the lack of the school lunch, they could not find any environmental factors to explain such a deterioration.

It was found that normally most children do not eat a meal in the morning and in fact some only have a meal in the evening, so that "it seems quite possible that consumption of the school lunch provided by the CRS school feeding program may almost double the amount of food that the children consume." Teachers are quoted as thinking that the school feeding has a "positive effect on the learning ability and attention span of children, especially in the afternoon."

The economic value of the school ration at market prices of identical foods was even greater than in the case of the pre-school feeding: at \$135 per year it was equivalent to 84% of the per capita income. On the other hand, the total financial cost per participant in FY 80 was calculated to have been only \$50, almost identical to the cost per participant in the pre-school program.

A special issue unearthed by the evaluators was the unpopularity of the milk reconstituted from non-fat milk solids, probably because it tended to give the children diarrhea. This, it was assumed, indicated

"lactose malabsorption, although it could be due to improper preparation of the milk." In any case, the evaluators recommended dropping the powdered milk from the ration.^{1/}

Food for Work. The impact of the food rations on the FFW projects is deemed to have been relatively small (little over 3,000 tons of rice and corn meal in 1980) "and nutritional need is not a significant criterion in the selection of projects".

The origin of the FFW program in Upper Volta was in drought relief in the early 1970's. At the present time the projects respond more to local village initiatives that have nothing to do with the need for food.

The CRS estimates that 30,000 workers have participated in these projects annually, although the evaluators felt that the figure might be considerably higher. Other findings were that the majority of participants were men and that planning of the implementation of the local projects in the slack labor period is in practice often difficult because too many arrangements of an administrative, financial and technical nature are required to fall in place simultaneously to be able to time the projects with such precision. It was not possible for the evaluators in most instances to "determine exactly what quantity of food was being given out in return for a given quantity of work performed." The value of the monthly rations for the FFW projects was estimated at \$7.00 (Food was prepared mostly on the site and eaten during or after work.) Since this value is not related in the evaluation with the average time worked on the projects by each participant (which seemed to be unknown) it was obviously not possible to assess the economic value of the food ration to the FFW workers. However, it is stated that in two projects visited, money wages were paid in addition to the food. In one instance, the cash wage was approximately equivalent to the going agricultural labor wage in the area, so that the total wage was greater than the normal level.

On the basis of the CRS estimate of number of participants, the total cost per participant was a little over \$50, i.e. approximately the same as in the case of the other two program components.

Overall, the evaluators express a "general concern over the role of FFW commodities in stimulating community action at the village level." It is their opinion that "the role of FFW supplies in the whole process is debatable... if villagers have anything to contribute to a community development effort it is their own time. The more critical needs are financing for materials and technical assistance. FFW can... have the effect of discouraging them from making free contributions of their own time in the future. In short, villagers might develop a... gift mentality which might actually impede the execution of community development projects in the future." Even in the case of FFW projects that are simple to execute and have high priorities among the villagers, the report concludes, "one can seriously question the need for food...".

While the report suggests the complete elimination of the FFW program, it does endorse the CRS contention that the most useful projects would be those that relate directly to the other objectives and activities in the FFW program, such as construction of schools and feeding centers.

^{1/}Discontinuation of milk in the pre-school ration was not recommended because the "children under the age of 3 do not normally manifest lactose malabsorption."

C. FOOD FOR PEACE PL480/TITLE II EVALUATION
CRS KENYA PROGRAM

Scope and Objectives of Evaluation.

The evaluation was designed to focus on the activities and benefits of the Catholic Relief Services programs in mother and child health feeding (MCH) and in Food for Work projects (FFW). The Title II policies of various organizations and their effects on program effectiveness were to be studied. Only general evaluation objectives are listed, designed to clarify program objectives and identify ways of improving the food delivery system so as to increase benefits to the target groups.

Program Objectives.

The report summarizes the basic objectives of the AID Policy Handbook on Food for Peace (Handbook 9) as meeting famine or other extraordinary relief requirements; combating malnutrition, especially in children, and promoting economic and community development. The same handbook is quoted with regard to the MCH programs as aiming to "provide commodities to the vulnerable, high-risk category of women of child bearing age and their children under the age of 6, with emphasis on children under the age of 3." Emphasis is placed on the need for selecting target groups in terms of poverty and/or nutritional status. On the other hand, FFW objectives are aimed at "the achievement of needed agricultural/economic and community improvements by providing commodities to support the labor of unemployed and underemployed local workers." The report also points out that Food for Peace aims at increasing assumption of responsibilities for the programs by host government agencies "with the long term objective of carrying them on without US assistance."^{1/}

The list of substantive priorities taken from the USAID Mission's Country Development Strategy Statement (CDSS) contains no mention of any health or feeding programs, although perhaps both the MCH program and the FFW activities could fall under the heading of "planning and demonstration of multisectoral and community based approaches to meeting basic human needs." In any case, the budget for FY 80 for Title II activities of the Kenya mission is 8% of its total budget, and for 1982-86, "PL480 food resources make up 12% of USAID's proposed assistance level." Interestingly, the evaluation remarks that the CDSS contemplates the use of Title II resources increasingly for development purposes rather than for primarily humanitarian approaches as is the case with the CRS program. The CDSS also envisions the host government taking an increasing role in "using food to redress the nutrition problem."

"In Kenya" the report states "CRS's policy is to pursue the organization's goals and priorities without becoming unduly constrained by the agenda of other organizations." The desired goal of the MCH program is "the optimum growth of children living in vulnerable areas", for which

^{1/}The exclusive mention of government agencies in the FFW policy statement may well be questioned by the present US Administration.

supplemental food and improved health and nutrition practices are viewed as essential inputs. The FFW is viewed by CRS as an additional way of getting supplemental food to the needy, as well as a means for expanding its development oriented efforts.

While "the GOK does not appear to have a clearly articulated policy regarding overall Title II food assistance activities", the government of Kenya "stresses the link between agricultural growth and the alleviation of poverty." In the case of the MCH program, the government expects its use for cure and, where possible, prevention of malnutrition in vulnerable groups; it views the FFW program " as a means to relieve rural hunger and motivate community work...".

In summary, the evaluation states, "some important differences in perspective exist, but there are many shared objectives that provide a sufficient basis for a cohesive Title II assistance effort." One major area of agreement specified by the evaluation is that "new program activities which serve to decrease future dependence on external food aid should be supported", but no evidence of any such programs is to be found in the report.

There is an indication that there may be some divergences between the AID Mission and the CRS regarding the developmental versus immediate relief focus. In order to strengthen the food production development work, USAID Kenya is reportedly supporting the efforts of CRS to implement an oil seed production project. (However, the report does not question whether CRS is the best mechanism for initiating agricultural production projects.)

Effectiveness

In general the effectiveness of the mother and child (MCH) program was found to be high. More than 100 centers were distributing food with a total registry of over 56,000 children and 31,000 mothers. Total attendance averaged 80,000 in May 1980, a 26% increase over four months earlier. The CRS director in Kenya expected the attendance to reach 105,000 by the end of 1980. Country-wide, fewer than two percent of Kenya's children were receiving food, but the percentage rose to nearly 5% in the Central Province. The strong concentration in the Central Province, not necessarily the poorest area, was due to CRS logistic and administrative problems in the more outlying areas, which were being overcome. The evaluation found that in quite a number of food distribution centers the food availability had been inadequate to provide full rations.

With regard to the important component of nutrition and health education, the evaluation report is unclear as to whether its assessment is positive or negative. In general "the evaluators observed a great deal of variation in the education component of center operations." The report is particularly critical of the amount of ignorance found about the proper methods for preparing non-fat dried milk, and they "viewed with dismay the observation that at some centers the staff were recommending that mothers reconstitute the NFDM into liquid milk."

As regards the Food for Work program, the evaluation found that "the long term effects cannot be evaluated at this time" because the program was less than two years old.

Efficiency

No separate comments regarding the programs "efficiency" are made in the report.

Impact

The economic value of the ration distributed was found to be considerable. For a family receiving three rations per month, the retail value of the commodities furnished was calculated to be approximately \$203. This was calculated to be equivalent to about 18% of the annual household income of such a family with earnings of between \$700 and \$950, ranging up to 72% of the annual family income for a family earning less than the equivalent of \$236 per year. This evaluation deducts from the gross benefit represented by the value of the ration the time spent by the mother traveling back and forth and attending the food distribution center. On the other hand, the methodology of this evaluation does not attempt to calculate a local replacement value of the food ration on the basis of traditional foodstuffs.

As far as the composition of the standard ration is concerned, the evaluation found that it appeared "satisfactory to meet the stipulated CRS objective, that half the child's ration provide a substantial supplement to energy and protein requirements. The nutrient mix also appears satisfactory."

The evaluation team apparently encountered an odd problem with regard to its attempts to evaluate the nutritional impact of the program. It appears that they had been promised access to analyses of the so-called "Growth Surveillance System" (GSS) by the CRS regional office, which had developed this system for all of its African programs, but the data did not become available in time to be used for the report. On the other hand, it seems that CRS officers did not allow the evaluators access to the raw data until they had been analyzed by CRS. It is not quite clear how the evaluators really felt about the system. In one place they state that "the usefulness of these procedures was not assessed by the evaluators since they did not have access to the master charts, to the supervisors for a discussions of usefulness, or to supervisory reports." At another place, it is stated that "the Growth Surveillance System (GSS) which provides child growth data is not an evaluation system, but an administrative tool for monitoring and supervision."

The summary judgment regarding the nutrition health education component was that it showed great room for improvement. "Minimal attention is given to the health/nutrition component of the MCH system... consistent with the CRS theory which emphasizes that poverty, not ignorance, is the cause of malnutrition." The evaluation thought that the cause of the problem "apparently lies partially in the CRS contention that the growth chart is a necessary and satisfactory instrument for the dual purpose of nutrition surveillance and parental education."

As regards the nutritional surveillance system, the reports feels that "it appears to be well done at the clinic level. It is unclear whether it is used for supervision or for evaluation of nutritional impact."

With regard to the impact and future of the Food for Work activity, perhaps the most telling message of the report is that "it would be better to stop thinking about 'FFW projects'. CRS' 'FFW program' is to

supply food to a series of FFW assisted projects'. The projects are the responsibility of other organizations, not CRS typically. CRS's responsibility is to manage the FFW food efficiently..." The report also points out that coordination is critical for projects that involve food as wages and that sufficient resources should be available for these projects to receive technical assistance where necessary.

Other Issues

The report contains an interesting section on "Perspectives and Issues" which reflect discussions with policy makers and others regarding some of the basic issues underlying food aid. Thus, it was found that, while the CRS and other voluntary agency activities are greatly appreciated by the host country policy makers, the latter are also concerned about continuing dependence on foreign food supplies and they "are reluctant to take over or extend the program... [and] about having the government engage in any large scale effort except in cases of national food shortages or in areas where food production is a problem.... There was a general consensus that aid would be inappropriate during years of adequate harvests unless it was carefully targeted to reach highly vulnerable groups and/or to contribute to the development of marginal areas."

Furthermore, it is reported that the common view found by the evaluators and their interviews was that "food is appropriate and desirable when it fulfills essentially a relief function... during: (a) national shortage and drought; (b) seasonal shortages in particular areas, and (c) chronic food shortages.

In summary, the evaluators felt that the official CRS and Catholic mission policy in Kenya represents a middle-of-the-road strategy for distribution of food through local leaders without any strings attached during times of severe shortage or "if and when it fosters self-reliance in food production and improves feeding practices."

D. MOROCCO: FOOD AID AND NUTRITION EDUCATION
(USAID Project Impact Evaluation Report No. 8)

The project evaluated is an outstanding example of the successful use of food aid to accomplish a far broader and more lasting objective than merely helping a group of needy people eat better for a limited time. The evaluation was well-designed and it was executed so as to obtain maximum benefit from a visit of about three weeks in February, 1980 by a team of four AID specialists. The report does not follow the DAC outline model, but it is an unusual effort to combine readability with professional rigor (although a few additional descriptive details about the project would have been helpful).

This is not an evaluation of US food aid to Morocco, which began in 1957 and is continuing, but rather of an educational project conducted jointly by Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and "Entraide Nationale" (identified only as "the Moroccan counterpart institution") with an AID cash grant of US \$453,000 between 1975 and 1978, along with the distribution of food aid, in various parts of rural Morocco. (The report does not explain the geographic coverage nor the criteria for selection of participating villages.) The role of the food aid in the project is that of an incentive payment to attract village mothers into the scheme, on the one hand, while it is, of course, an essential instrument for making it possible for the mothers to apply to their children the nutritional lessons learned in the process.

Objectives

There is no statement of objectives, except (1) that the two implementing institutions in 1975 responded to (whose?) decision to combine the donation of PL 480, Title II commodities with nutrition education by "designing an AID Operational Program Grant which would integrate their ongoing food distribution efforts with a new nutrition and health education program," and (2) that the AID grant was approved "to introduce nutrition education into [the CRS'] 250 social education centers which were distributing PL 480 Title II food." As regards the purposes of the evaluation, it "had two major questions to answer: was the food plus nutrition education program dating from 1975 still functioning two years after the termination of AID funding and, if so, at what level of quality; and did the program have any impact on children's nutritional status and on mothers' practices and knowledge?"

The project's effectiveness seems to have been high; while the evaluation does not dwell on any operational aspects, one gathers the impression that there were no major problems in the availability and utilization of inputs and in the maximization of the outputs obtained from the resources. The project appears to have functioned according to plans and the implicit project goals were apparently attained within the originally contemplated time frame. There is no question about the project's having reached the target group. Moreover, the program has become institutionalized without further input aside from the food donations, and it reached national coverage in 1978 (or early 1979), when it was absorbed by the Ministry of Social Affairs (one assumes, without major damage at the time of the evaluation).

Outstanding among the project outputs and key intermediate products are: three years of degree-level training for four Moroccans at the Tunisian National Nutrition Institute; creation of a nutrition institute at Marrakech, Morocco; existence of 300 social education centers by 1979; training of 30 area supervisors chosen by national contest, and of 500 village women as local monitors.

Efficiency

The evaluation ranks the project high in terms of cost effectiveness. It is stated that the feeding program cost only US \$34.47 per person per year at 1980 prices, and that "food accounts for just over half of the total annual cost per beneficiary", with the host government and the local mothers providing the other half.^{1/}

There are no data regarding the incidence of administrative overhead of the educational project except for the global AID grant of \$453,000 and an estimate of "Ministry of Social Affairs contribution" of \$4.7 million yearly (which, this review assume, covers the educational as well as the food distribution costs). On the CRS side, it appears from the report that paid personnel was limited to the husband and wife team that represented the organization in Morocco.

Impact

Impact analysis is abundant and thorough, and the results appear impressive. The total number of beneficiaries was 450,000, of whom one-third were mothers and two-thirds infants and young children (up to five years of age); the program's outreach is calculated to have covered, at the time of the evaluation, "eleven percent of [the country's] poor families and six percent of all malnourished children under five." On the basis of the evaluators' analysis of data existing in CRS project files (both raw data and a survey conducted by CRS), a "staggering" 100 to 200 percent difference in nutritional impact was found between children in the same families who had only received extra food and those who had also benefited from nutrition education beginning in 1975. As regards the impact of supplemental feeding alone, the results were equally impressive: children entering the program were found to be more than three times as malnourished as those already participating, according to 1978 weight data.^{2/} The income effect on what are estimated to be 11

^{1/} Calculation of the figure of \$34.47 is shown in an appendix table on the basis of an average weight of food per participant per year of 45 pounds and a delivered cost (including the USAID valuation of the commodities plus ocean freight as well as local transportation and administrative costs) of \$0.7655 per pound. The commodities involved were flour, vegetable oil and wheat/soy blend; however, the report also mentions a weaning food named Actamine 5 as being "available." The total annual landed cost of the food commodities at 1980 prices is given as more than US \$9.5 million.

^{2/} Excellent simple charts illustrate these data in the text, and an appendix is devoted to explaining the methodology sufficiently in detail to permit replication elsewhere.

percent of Morocco's poor people (income below US \$260 per capita), who in turn make up 40 percent of the population, is deemed to be considerable: for a nominal monthly fee equivalent to US \$0.54 the families received -- in addition to the educational benefits -- three rations worth US \$73 at (1980?) Moroccan retail prices, which represents "an income supplement ranging from 4 to 24 percent of the \$50 to \$260 per capita incomes of these poorest families."

Marked, socially positive behavioral changes, attributable to the educational project, were also found by the evaluators among women, such as a spectacular decline in the proportion of women weaning their babies abruptly and "statistically significant increases in the consumption of protein foods, fruits and milk products by their two to five-year olds" and, last but not least, a remarkable upsurge of women's freedom to leave their homes unaccompanied and to join in community activities (implying a certain change in men's attitudes as well). The monitors also reported considerable evidence of both intra and inter-village diffusion of the educational program through informal contacts, curiosity and spontaneous requests for opening new centers.

The evaluators found the institutional setup to be "a solid, well-organized system" that, as was indicated earlier, had actually expanded after termination of the AID grant project with CRS (but not of course, of the food aid). Operational procedures were also found to be good, and the dynamism of the monitors and their "extraordinary level of interaction" with the village mothers were noted.

Other Issues

The evaluation properly raises the issue of the creation of dependency on food aid, but there is inadequate formulation of the macro-economic and family-level problems and insufficient distinction between the two (perhaps because the team did not include an economist). These issues are discussed in a broader context in the Conclusions of this chapter. Another issue surfaced by the evaluators is that of inter-institutional cooperation, specifically between the Ministry of Social Affairs, responsible for the feeding and nutrition education program, and the Ministry of Health. However, the situation is apparently not serious; the report observes that there substantial cooperation at the provincial and local levels and it does not mention any real obstacles to increasing cooperation between the two ministries.

Some of the "lessons" drawn by the evaluators from the experience of the Moroccan program (aside from some aspects already covered in the preceding pages) deal with the size of the ration as a determinant of the nutritional impact. This issue might well have been explored in greater depth, not only in the sense mentioned but also in relation to the minimum required to serve as an incentive for people to join - and remain - in an educational program. The report also makes a good case for the potential for gathering and analyzing "self-monitoring" data in a project of this kind without necessarily interfering with the project objectives. And finally, it underlines the vital importance to the success of the project of "the delicate balance of strong central management and standardization of procedures with local variation and 'bottom up' communication..."

One issue that might have been of considerable generalization interest was (perhaps intentionally) overlooked by the evaluation: the

question of how, in a political system such as that of Morocco in 1975, sufficient political support was secured for a program involving far-reaching implications for social change, on the one hand, and a long-term government commitment of support, on the other. Such an analysis would of course, also have profound international significance, for a long-term commitment by the recipient government to its poor (no matter whether explicit or not) would, as a rule, need to be based on an equally long-term commitment of food grant aid by the donor government.

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E. CEREALS FOOD AID IN SAHELIAN COUNTRIES
(Ministry of Cooperation, France)

This is a consultant's desk study of external food aid and its impact on production and politics in six Sahelian countries. Limited quantitative country data are used to suggest that food aid programs are poorly conceived in terms of the nutritional need of beneficiary population, local administration of the programs and their relation with agricultural production programs. In addition, many criticisms of a qualitative nature are made. The bases for the criticisms, such as country survey data or previous evaluation reports, are not identified.

The lack of adequate data is discussed for analyses of the efficiency or effectiveness of food aid programs: production data at the national level (all that is available from the sources used) indicate great variations in estimates and, indeed, probably understate real production in order to strengthen each country's case for food aid; similarly, since estimates of nutritional need are only available on a national basis, regional differences or relative need among different population groups cannot be determined. Surveys of final consumption at the village level tend to confirm the contention that the general estimates of need are overstated by both the recipient country and the donor's appraisers, each for their own reasons. An exact estimation of the food deficit, on which to base the quantities of food aid, is thus extremely difficult and the definition of goals and objectives of any specific assistance program is necessarily imprecise.

The report asserts that the methods used to evaluate country requirements are more responsive to the needs of the host government's fiscal and political needs -- through the resale of the donated commodities -- than to the human needs arising from food shortages. In the author's opinion -- though not necessarily in the opinion of the donors or of the beneficiary governments -- the objective of food aid is to help the population in need, not to simply shore up host government finances.^{1/} To meet this objective, the author suggests, beneficiary populations must be more precisely defined and evaluation techniques more carefully monitored.

According to the report, the actual amount of food aid delivered in any one year is also difficult to estimate because of differences in the reporting year, the confusion over firm and proposed deliveries, and the actual time of arrival. It is pointed out that France contributes about 10 percent of total food aid to the Sahel Region, that food aid represents 10.2 percent of worldwide development assistance of DAC members, and that the final use of all food aid from that source is approximately as follows:

66 % -	sales
16 % -	food for work
11 % -	direct nutritional programs
7 % -	emergency aid.

^{1/} The report estimates the following percentages of the total market value of food aid in total government budgets: Senegal, 3%; Niger, Upper Volta, Mali, 5-6%; Mauritania, 9%.

In the author's opinion, the impact of food aid programs in Sahelian countries often contradicts the stated agricultural development policy of the country. Food aid commodities often respond more to the food needs and preferences of urban populations than to rural needs. The subsidized imports quickly saturate the market and deprive rural producers of any incentive to produce. The relation between urban food needs and food aid programs -- it is alleged -- is indicated by the fact that the volume of food aid to the area since 1972 is approximately equal to the total urban food demand. Thus, it is concluded, food aid has often supported inconsistent government policies that promote increasing food production while maintaining low food prices for the politically powerful urban population. This view is supported by the frequent requirement that the recipient country pay transportation costs of distribution in country, and that this creates the incentive to sell the food commodities in the capital city. In Mali and Upper Volta, little free food is distributed while in Mauritania and Senegal, about one half of food aid is distributed without charge. Food aid is also sold and used for food security stocks. However, the primary role of programs, according to the report, is the financial support of national cereals offices and other public agencies; for example, in Mali the value of food aid received approached the value of subsidies paid out by OPAM (the national cereals office).

In summary, food aid programs are conceived by the author in terms of assistance to countries with emergency needs due to adverse climatic conditions or with structural weaknesses (e.g. extent of urbanization). However, he asserts, the real reasons for these programs are the donor countries' need for international political support and markets and the fiscal and political needs of governments of the recipient countries. Food aid (generally cereals), rarely reaches the really needy population because of the difficulty of distribution and the lack of political power of the rural poor.

The report offers a final brief discussion of methods for increasing domestic production as an alternative to foreign food aid. On the basis of very limited evidence, the report proposes improved rainfed farming as the more cost-effective alternative compared to irrigation.

F. A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF FOOD AID

(Report by Mark R. Bowden, Brunel University,
to the ODM, United Kingdom)

This report, prepared in 1974, is an overview of international food aid with special reference to the past and future role of the United Kingdom, which had just acceded to the EEC and was thus about to rejoin the 1971 Food Aid Convention (FAC) and to participate in future EEC food aid programs. The paper set out to "study what role food aid plays in coping with protein deficiency problems, and whether it effectively reaches those most in need, and those who can make optimum use of food aid." Moreover, it is stated that "any judgment on the humanitarian effectiveness of food aid must be tempered by analysis of its effects on agricultural development."

The following are the principal findings, opinions and conclusions that the reviewer found to be relevant for this assessment:

- "In general, the lesser developed countries found it harder to make use of food aid, as they faced higher costs in the handling and distribution . . .", and this led in part to the WFP's decision to allocate minimum percentages to the 25 least developed countries.

- "Unfortunately [the] concepts [applied to food aid by various donors] differ in the way they see economic development coming about; they are not always complementary, and may even conflict with each other, especially when several different donors give food aid with different aims in mind to a single country, and as such, can impede the effectiveness of the aid given."

- "Very little evaluation has taken place as to the impact of [Mother and Child Health] programmes". The major problem seems to be isolating and recognizing the target groups and establishing methods for distributing food to them. WFP is also quoted as asserting that the health and nutrition impact of food aid has remained largely unevaluated because of the shortage of qualified personnel. Exceptions are two WFP interim evaluations and an INCAP (Central American Nutrition Institute) study in Colombia, which are stated to have found: (1) a 70 percent decrease in third degree malnutrition cases as a result of WFP assistance and (2) that food programs for pre-school children have been a major factor in improving their nutritional status. However, the author of the report under review suggests that these results may have "been achieved in an economically inefficient way . . . primarily because of the types of food distributed . . ." He suggests that recent studies have shown that malnutrition among vulnerable groups does not result from protein deficiencies in the diet but from excessive protein conversion into energy because of insufficient caloric intake. His overall conclusions for so-called "human resource development" food aid projects are: (1) that "it is difficult to assess what impact these programs have had, since very little work has been done in establishing base lines against which changes can be measured"; particularly, it is not known whether these schemes reach the people most in need; (2) mother and child health schemes -- while undoubtedly important interim measures, "do not. . .

bring about long term dietary change, which will occur when incomes have risen"; (3) educational feeding programs, on the other hand may have made their most important impact by permitting an expansion of educational facilities and thus generating employment and allowing the training of greater numbers, rather than by improving the nutritional status of the most indigent, who, it is assumed, generally don't attend school at all; (4) these programs, by and large, cannot be shown to have resulted in market displacement of domestic produce because many of the commodities used are not locally available and because they tend to be supplemental foods.

The WFP projects designed to stabilize prices and create buffer stocks have been found to be relatively ineffective, mostly, according to WFP because of the insufficient scale of the programs. Moreover, it is suggested that such schemes in general "have to be undertaken in the more advanced of the developing countries, as the less developed amongst them lack both adequate facilities and sufficient statistical knowledge. . ."

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11.

TUNISIA: EVALUATION REPORT OF THE "SAHA" PROJECT

The report presents the findings of an evaluation study, performed by a consultant to the two sponsoring organizations (Tunisian Cereals Office and UNICEF), as required by the Plan of Operations of Project SAHA. The consultant was requested to review and analyze the actual accomplishments of the project against the proposed actions listed in the Plan of Operations, to review the organization and administrative aspects of the project and the activities of the participating national and international agencies, and to recommend a plan of action for the future. The evaluation mission lasted approximately three weeks, during which the consultant reviewed the project's progress with officials in Tunisia and at the regional UNICEF office in Algiers.

The project itself is in reality a capital and technical assistance project for testing a high-protein food supplement (dubbe SAHA) and the development of a domestic production and marketing and distribution system.

The project did not comprise the supply of imported foodstuffs.

Although the project Plan of Operations was signed by the Tunisian Government and various UN agencies in 1972, it was conceived earlier during discussions among the Tunisian Government, UNICEF and Sweden's SIDA. Research underlying the project indicated severe nutritional deficiencies among children at weaning age, as well as a particularly high rate of infant mortality of children under the age of four years. It was felt that the Tunisian project could be developed easily because of previous UNICEF experience in neighboring countries. Expectations for project implementation were high at the time of project agreement signing.

Objectives.

By pursuing the SAHA Project, the Tunisian Government sought to make available to the most vulnerable groups in the population, and particularly to those with the greatest need, a high-quality food supplement. Children within the age group of 6 to 25 months, the period of weaning, were the priority target of the project. Lower priority groups were children from two to six years, then school-age children and pregnant or lactating mothers. This broad goal translated into the following specific objectives:

- (1) The development of a domestic industrial capacity to produce a high-quality pre-cooked food made of local materials at the lowest possible price which could serve as an infant formula at the time of weaning or could supplement other local foods.
- (2) The organization of a distribution system and of a publicity program.
- (3) Annual production of the flour reaching 1,200 tons during the first five years of the project.

Initially, the marketing strategy contemplated maximizing purchases by public sector agencies from the factory, at a sufficient level to allow profitable operation.

Tunisian technicians were to be trained in maintenance and operation of the factory which would be built through project funds.

Summarizing, then, the project had two basic thrusts: first, the development of a high-quality food supplement which would increase the nutritional intake of the most vulnerable groups; second, economic development through the creation of a domestic production and marketing capacity.

Effectiveness.

The effectiveness of the program can be measured by the testing and development of the formula, the development of the production capability and the distribution of the formula, particularly to the population in greatest need.

Following tests of an Algerian food supplement, it was concluded that a high-quality food supplement that would contain nearly 20 percent protein and would be manufactured from local materials to the extent possible would be readily accepted in Tunisia.

The National Cereals Office was given the principal responsibility for the coordination of the project, including site preparation and construction of the factory. Because of problems with the availability of utilities and some construction materials and the need to redesign certain portions of the facility, preliminary development of the site was not completed until September of 1975. With the help of UNICEF and the technicians from the equipment suppliers, the factory was opened in June, 1976. Some of the contractors' experts remained on site to train Tunisian technicians in the operation of the factory.

Completion of this initial phase of the project was considerably behind the original schedule. Instead of 18 months, it took four years to get through product testing. However, effective operation of the facility and production of a high-quality food supplement have been achieved. The evaluation indicates that the factory remains in very good operating condition and that the same staff who were trained at the time of construction continue to operate the factory. In addition, continuous testing of the product indicates that its quality has been consistently high.

However, output of the food supplement fell far short of the project goal of 1,200 tons in the fifth year of production (which would be 1981). The factory produced only 86 tons of SAHA in 1976, 53 tons in 1977 and 208 tons in 1978. The report indicates that these low production levels were due to the lack of demand. Based on a normal operating schedule, the factory should have been able to manufacture the 1978 output in only seventy days.

Of the 1978 output, 173.5 tons were sold, 7 tons were distributed as free samples and 26.5 tons remained in stock until the end of the year. Of the 173.5 tons sold by the Cereals Office, 93 tons were purchased by pharmacies and 39 tons by food stores. Only 41.5 tons went to public services, clearly a divergence from the original goal of maximizing public sector purchases at full production. This, the evaluator states, indicates not only the failure of that sector to assume its responsibility in supporting the domestic production of SAHA, but it also calls into question the ability of the government to reach the highest risk segments of the population, as envisioned by the project design.

Efficiency.

One of the keys to Tunisia's capacity to produce SAHA on a sustained basis was to have been the development of appropriate pricing to reflect production costs and at the same time permit the product to be within reach of the target populations. At the time the Plan of Operations was signed, the Cereals Office and UNICEF agreed that the commercial price of SAHA would be 0.180 dinars for a 300 gram packet and that the price to public service agencies would be 0.150 dinars per packet. However, when the factory began production in 1976 the sale prices were set at 0.185 dinars and 0.180 dinars per packet, respectively, and they had remained unchanged since then.

Production cost analyses undertaken in 1976 were of questionable quality, and there had not been any further cost analysis as of 1978. The evaluator points out that without such information, SAHA management could not possibly know the breakeven price for any given volume of output. He indicates that this information was critical in order to stem the growing deficit of the enterprise. Employment of a staff economist was required by the Plan of Operation but this action was never implemented.

While the technical production end seems to be well managed, the principal difficulty has been the development of an adequate demand for the product, particularly in the public sector, even at the probably subsidized price. For example, the Ministry of Health was to assume a major role through distribution to hospitals and community health posts. Despite a memo from the Ministry to hospital directors in 1977 requiring that 60 percent of the funds reserved for the purchase of milk products were to be used for buying SAHA, only 20 percent were actually spent in this way.

The report also indicates that the Ministry of Education, identified as a potentially significant user of SAHA, placed only a single order for 48 tons in 1977. Reportedly, the school canteen directors, who received no funds for the purchase of SAHA, could not afford the expenditure out of their daily subsidy. In addition, the school canteens were receiving at that time important contributions of milk, rice and other foodstuffs from "USAID-CARE" (PL 460?). SAHA clearly could not compete with these gifts.

As regards commercial sales - mostly through drug stores and food stores - local merchants acknowledged an increasing interest on the part of consumers in SAHA, but total sales in 1978 were below the amount originally projected for the third year of the project.

Organizational and administrative problems have also constrained the development of the SAHA project. While the Office of Cereals was to assume the principal responsibility for the development of the Project, it was to be assisted by the Ministries of Plan and Health. Coordination among these three parties has proved difficult and, indeed, no mechanism had been established for that coordination by the time of the evaluation. The Ministry of Plan was responsible for identifying the public agencies that were to distribute SAHA, but specific funding was not allocated to those agencies. The role of the Ministry of Health has been discussed. On the other hand, the National Cereals Office, which had primary responsibility for the project, lacked the institutional mandate to follow through with all the necessary measures on the demand side.

Organizational problems also occurred within the Cereals Office. For example, the Plan of Operations called for the establishment of an autonomous division to manage the production of SAHA. This was never done and, indeed, the responsibilities of the position originally established as director of the SAHA project subsequently expanded to include all bread baking operations in Tunisia. In addition, as stated earlier, the economic analyst required by the Plan of Operations to conduct continual evaluations was never hired. These problems may well have accounted, at least in part, for the failure of the operation to mount a large-scale publicity campaign at an early stage. However, the report indicates that recent public education activities, including radio programs, were designed to promote greater public sector purchases as well as commercial sales.

While the report does not discuss the possible impact of price adjustments (to reflect actual production costs) on consumer demand it does report a price comparison between SAHA and other commercially available food supplements in 1978 that shows that SAHA was considerably cheaper (and nutritionally superior).

Impact.

The evaluation points to a major failure of the project in not reaching the population for which SAHA was developed. Because the public agencies fell behind their commitments for distribution, SAHA benefited largely the middle-class families who were able to purchase the product at local stores, rather than the lower-income families who were the principal target of the program. The report indicates that it can be estimated - with some difficulty - that approximately 7,000 poor children benefited from the 35.5 tons of SAHA which were distributed through hospitals or health centers, while approximately 15,000 children, largely middle or upper-class, benefited from commercial sales.

Other Issues.

While the project evaluation identified a number of factors internal to the project which have prevented its realization as originally conceived, it also identifies external factors which significantly constrained the Cereals Office's ability to market their product effectively. The most notable problem was competition from foreign food aid and from commercial products. One example concerned the United States contribution of free milk and other foodstuffs to the school canteen program and health centers while at the same time these organizations were not given sufficient budget allocations to purchase SAHA.

The evaluator's interviews with hospital and health post administrators indicated competition with SAHA from a number of directions: "USAID-CARE" and Catholic Relief Services distribute important quantities of free food, including milk products, to medical centers. In addition, a major donation of Nestle's Similac (out-dated at the time of distribution) by an unidentified source in 1973 was distributed directly to health centers. (Similac is sold commercially at twice the price of SAHA.) Finally, 35 to 40 percent of the production of Cerelac (470 tons), a locally produced supplement licensed by Nestle, was sold to health services, also at nearly twice the price of SAHA. Cerelac is

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nutritionally poorer than SAHA. Local officials were apparently reluctant to discuss the Cerelac purchases with the evaluator.^{1/}

^{1/}The reviewers suspect that there may have been a commercial attempt to disrupt the SAHA operation, but the report ignores this possibility and does not suggest any further investigation.

III. CONCLUSIONS

1. Relevance of Studies.

A fair judgment regarding the relevance of the reports reviewed for the main issues underlying food aid is made difficult by the lack of a definition of what constitutes -- or better, what should constitute -- (a) "food aid" and (b) a project. Indeed, in the absence of DAC guidance the reviewer had to use personal criteria to determine which of the papers submitted to him could be considered in the "food aid" category, and, to some degree, which components of the "projects" reviewed should be usefully included in the review. Thus, for example, even the German BMZ's evaluation of more than one country program, as well as one of the USAID - contracted PL480, Title II evaluations, explicitly question the appropriateness of categorizing so-called food-for-work projects as "food aid". And what about the Tunisian project, which was characterized by external assistance to a food supplement production facility and did not contemplate the importation of food? It might therefore be asked in the first instance how relevant the evaluated programs were to the subject of "food aid", and to what extent these often complex and multi-faceted programs could be meaningfully evaluated under a single set of criteria.

One surmises that the DAC synthesis exercise was conceived within a framework of external aid rather than of internal development efforts of LDC's. If that is correct, then the term "food aid" should be confined strictly to international transfer of food commodities as donations or on highly concessionary terms, including any measures designed directly to enhance the effectiveness of the commodity aid and to direct it to priority target groups. Under such a definition, external assistance to "food security" (production marketing, storage), consumption, nutrition, community development and other initiatives would not be considered food aid even if they were temporarily supported in part by donated, imported foodstuffs.

Several of the evaluations address themselves - albeit somewhat hesitantly - to what is probably the principal issue in food aid when it is defined as suggested above: when and under what conditions, does such aid become a net long-term development deterrent for the recipient country, even though the temporary humanitarian and "human capital" building effect may continue to be very positive? Several of the German and U.S. country studies, as well as the French review of food aid in the Sahel, ask this question in some form or other. Some sources point out the inherent contradiction between the objectives of external food donations and those of agricultural development policies and programs. They cite specific instances where the quantity of the free food supply, and its liberal administration, helped a host government to (a) implement short-sighted, low food-price policies and (b) postpone hard decisions on resource allocation for the development of greater food autonomy. Given the restricted terms of reference of the evaluations in question, it would be surprising if they had gone much further in their examination of this basic issue.

Another key issue that is addressed in some form by most of the evaluations is whether and how donors can and should attempt to earmark food aid for specified target groups, and above all, how to assure host country compliance with such objectives. However, virtually all the

reports stop short of proposing solutions to this problem, obviously because it is by no means confined to - or even particularly typical of - food aid.

Less attention is paid, on the whole, to the composition of the food aid and the appropriateness of the commodities for local diets and customs, including the question of conditioning of local tastes to foodstuffs that cannot be domestically produced. Indeed, some of the evaluations do not even specify the product mix of the food aid provided under the project. Notable exceptions are the unequivocal critiques of dried milk use for reconstitution (as contrasted with its admixture into traditional cooked foods) in two of the USAID reports.

2. Effectiveness and Impact.^{1/}

The so-called food aid projects were negatively affected in many cases by the confusion and conflicts in the formulation of objectives caused by the definitional confusion about what is food aid. The evaluations indicate that the greatest effectiveness and impact were attained where the objectives were few and clear and where the donated food commodities represented the key input. Thus, the German and the U.S. evaluations were in substantial agreement that, in terms of the use of the foodstuffs, the least effective of the components of the so-called food aid programs were the food-for-work projects. The reports did not deny the value per se of the type of small-scale, local-initiative development projects commonly favored by FFW programs; what they criticized was (1) that administration of these projects is an unreasonable burden for institutions designed to deal essentially with "food aid" distribution, in part because it requires an extraordinary degree of inter-institutional coordination among a number of host government agencies, and (2) except where FFW addressed an acute food shortage (or crop failure) situation, the use of food for the payment of wages may actually be counter-productive insofar as it may produce a beggar mentality among people who otherwise were willing to contribute their labor free of charge for projects of community benefit, and/or (3) where payment of wages is found to be justified (on whatever grounds), it matters little whether they are paid in cash or partly in food, and it may be administratively advantageous to pay in cash.^{2/}

As regards judgment of the effectiveness of other components of the projects identified as food aid, a distinction must be made in principle between the German and the U.S. "Title II" programs. As indicated in subsection 1 above, there were sharp differences between the two approaches, and the U.S. programs tended to be far more substantial in

^{1/}The reviewer found great difficulty in separating "effectiveness" from "impact", even in reviewing the country studies. He finds it impossible to maintain this artificial separation in the conclusions without loss of clarity and without being repetitious.

^{2/}Nevertheless, one report speculated that handling large amounts of cash in projects of this kind might be more conducive to fraud by public officials than the same value converted to bulky food stores.

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their^{1/} incidence on the host countries' total food supply than the German ones.^{1/} The evaluators of the latter admit quite unanimously that emergency food aid has not worked at all because of bureaucratic and logistic delays. There is also a consensus in the German studies regarding the low degree of effectiveness and impact of the untied bulk food shipments and of the "food security" - tied projects in the absence of -- or as intended leverage for obtaining -- appropriate host government policies. It appears that the BMZ had learned the lesson regarding the emergency and bulk shipments even before the present evaluations became available; the lessons to be drawn for "food security", it seems to the reviewer, are (1) that no good purpose is served by identifying them as "food aid", and (2) if the total money value of food and other aid supplied by a single donor country is relatively small, it is futile to expect this aid to give the donor any tangible policy leverage vis-a-vis the host country government. (The U.S. experience, despite much larger aid programs, underlines this, as well as many experiences of international agencies.)

The U.S. Title II programs evaluated in Africa, on the other hand, had as their sole and constant objectives (1) upgrading the diets of vulnerable groups in the population and (2) accompanying the feeding program with nutrition and health education for mothers and to a smaller extent for school children. Bearing in mind the explicit reservations about the measurement of nutritional impact, these programs appear to have been quite effective in their supplementary feeding goals (in some cases the annual ration represented more than half of the assumed average per capita income of the people concerned and, in the case of the lowest income groups, considerably more). Effectiveness of the educational effort was questioned in at least one of the evaluations, although none of them appeared to have fully adequate tools for determining such effectiveness.

Perhaps the key reason for the greater effectiveness of the U.S. programs compared to the German ones was that the intermediary organization for the former -- Catholic Relief Services, whose presence preceded the "projects" in the host countries -- was basically responsible for initiating, designing and implementing the projects, and also had a central and regional structure that backstopped the^{2/} country programs and assured (a) uniformity and constancy of objectives,^{2/} (b) a certain level of expert supervision, and (c) a certain desirable information flow among the country projects. In none of the U.S. evaluations does there appear any criticism of CRS (except as may be implied by the reported conflict between the contract evaluator and the CRS office in Kenya regarding availability of growth surveillance data). On the other hand, it seems (though the reports are somewhat fuzzy on the subject) that all of the

^{1/} This is not meant to be little the overall German food aid, which also include, in addition to contributions to the WFP, its share of the EEC's program and substantial programs and projects carried out by charitable and other private voluntary organizations. The quantitative supply differences between the two donor countries, of course, are obvious.

^{2/} Despite the interesting differences in program focus found between the USAID Mission and CSR in at least one country.

German projects were implemented by one (or more?) private consulting firm(s) which, at least in one of the reports, come in for some explicit criticism as regards project conceptualization and implementation.

If the definition of food aid attempted at the beginning of this section is accepted, then one of the major issues for the donor becomes how to assure delivery of the benefits to the target groups for which they were intended. In the case of the U.S. programs carried out by CRS, the only problem in this regard appeared to be the practical impossibility of discriminating the most needy -- by both nutrition and income tests -- among a given target population all of which was considered very needy by international standards. In the end, it seems that even the evaluators feel that, in the specific environments studied they were dealing with a false issue. The principal considerations in respect of equity impact are probably to design and implement the projects in such a way as to achieve reasonable priority, rather than exclusivity, of benefits for the most vulnerable groups such as infants, small children and lactating mothers. The German projects, on the other hand, made reference to low income and "marginal" target groups in their objectives but were not able to prevent in at least two countries the fact that food aid was distributed preferentially to the urban elites, for reasons having to do with the lack of leverage discussed above. The projects had better luck in this respect in the components related to food for work, but then it has already been suggested that such projects are not usefully classified as "food aid".

It is somewhat tranquilizing to note that these deeply humanitarian projects did not meet with opposition from selfish business interests except in one case, where the suspicion is noted by the reviewer, not by the original evaluator. On the other hand, the circumstances of this one case are disturbing enough to have warranted further investigation by UNICEF. That this was not done is even more disturbing, especially since the case involved the most important trans-national food corporation that has been a major target of critics in the worldwide infant formula controversy in recent years.

Two additional central issues in the food aid were practically ignored by the evaluators, perhaps for the same reasons cited at the beginning of this section in connection with the "main" issue: (1) free distribution of food to low-income groups versus sale at market prices, versus sale at subsidized prices; and (2) the dependency creation effect of external food donations. A great deal has been written about the first issue and interesting pilot programs have been undertaken in various places. However, none of the projects evaluated, and none of the evaluations reviewed, appeared to be concerned with the long-term implications of these alternatives.

As regards dependency creation, one or two passing references are made in the material reviewed, but none apparently dared address the issue head on. And yet, it must be faced rather sooner than later because of the tragic human and political consequences that would arise around the world if certain types of external food aid were suddenly to be withdrawn without a domestic capacity having been created to replace the external resources.

TITLE AND DATE OF REPORT	ISSUING COUNTRY AND INSTITUTION	AID RECIPIENT COUNTRY AND INSTITUTION(S)	NUMBER OF PROJECTS COVERED	VALUE OF AID PROVIDED (Million)	EX-POST(EP) OR MONITOR(M)	DESK(D) OR FIELD(F) STUDY	FOCUS OF REPORT (A-D)1/	AVAILABILITY ^{2/}
Querschnittsanalyse der in den Jahren 1978 bis 1980 durchgefuehrten Inspektion des MBZ aus dem Bereiche der NAHRUNGSMITTELHILFE, Dec. '80	Fed. Rep. of Germany, BMZ.	HONDURAS, Bangladesh, Mali, Senegal, various institutions.	Not Applicable	DM75.7	M	D	A, C	NA, M
Nahrungsmittelhilfe und Ernaehrungssicherung im Senegal, Jan. '80	Fed. Rep. of Germany, Institut fuer Landwirtschaftliche Marktforschung der Forschungsanstalt fuer Landwirtschaft, Braunschweig-Voelkenrode	Senegal, ONCAD et al.	One	DM25.7	M	F	A, C	NA, M
Hauptbericht zur Inspektion Nahrungsmittelhilfe in Mali, Dec., '79.	Fed. Rep. of Germany, BMZ	Mali, OPAM	One	DM26.1	M	F	A, C	NA, M
Inspektion "Integriertes Ernaehrungssicherungs-Programm Honduras (COHAAT)", Hauptbericht, 22 Mar. '79.	Fed. Rep. of Germany, BMZ	Honduras, various	One	DM7.8	M	F	A, C	NA, M
Inspektion "Ernaehrungssicherungs-Programm Bangladesh" (Projektnummer: 78.016 - 00.100/1200), Teil I: Textband, 20, Mar. '79.	Fed. Rep. of Germany, BMZ	Bangladesh, Ministries of Agriculture and of Food & Civil Supply	One	DM16.0	M	F	A, C	NA, M
L'Aide Alimentaire en Cereales Dans Les Pays Saheliens, Sept. '80	France, Ministère de la Cooperation	Haute-Volta, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Sengal, Chad	Not Applicable	Unknown	M	D	A, C	NC, I
A study of the Role of Food Aid, 1974	U.K., Brunel University	World-wide	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	EP	D	A,C	NA,T

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ANNEX FA-1

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<u>TITLE AND DATE OF REPORT</u>	<u>ISSUING COUNTRY AND INSTITUTION</u>	<u>AID RECIPIENT COUNTRY AND INSTITUTION(S)</u>	<u>NUMBER OF PROJECTS COVERED</u>	<u>VALUE OF AID PROVIDED (Million)</u>	<u>EX-POST(EP) OR MONITOR(M)</u>	<u>DESK(D) OR FIELD(F) STUDY</u>	<u>FOCUS OF REPORT (A-D)^{1/}</u>	<u>AVAILABILITY^{2/}</u>
Morocco: Food Aid and Nutrition Education; AID Project Impact Evaluation Report No. 8, August, 1980.	United States, AID	Morocco; Entraide Nationale/Ministry of Social Affairs and Catholic Relief Services.	One	US\$20.0	EP	F	A, C	P, I
Upper Volta Food for Peace/ Title II Evaluation, Final Report, September, 1981.	United States, AID (contract)	Upper Volta/Catholic Relief Services, Various Government Agencies.	One	US\$134.0 (1972-78)	M	F	A, C	P, M
Food for Peace, P.L. 480 Title II Evaluation, CRS Kenya Program, April, 1981.	United States, AID (contract)	Kenya, Catholic Relief Services.	One	US\$4.0 (FY 1980)	M	F	A, C	P, M
Rapport D'Evaluation deProjet "Saha" (Tunisie). June 30, 1979.	Tunisia, Office des Cereales and UNICEF, North Africa Office. (contract)	Tunisia, Office des Cereales	One	US\$1.1	M	F	A, C	NA, T

^{1/} A = Effectiveness; B = Efficiency; C = Impact; D = Self-reliance.

^{2/} P = Publicly available; R = Distribution restricted to DAC members; NA = Not available for distribution; NC = Not to be cited in any document distributed; U = Unknown; I = Printed; M = Mimeographed or Offset; T = Typescript.

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LIST OF "FOOD AID" MATERIAL SUBMITTED
THAT WAS NOT INDIVIDUALLY REVIEWED

Nordic Food Aid: Problems and Policy Issues in an International Development Perspective. Institute for Nutrition Research, University of Oslo, for Nordic Council of Ministers Secretariat.

ACCEPTABILITY TESTING OF FPC-B (Fish Protein Concentrate - Type B) in WFP PROJECT 2226 (EXP.) SUB-SCHEME "A", BANGLADESH. A Report for the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Prepared by: Mari Nes and Anne Liv Evensen, Dacca, Bangladesh, September 1980.

Innovatory Uses of Food Aid: A Task for the Eighties, by H.W. Singer.

A Review of Issues in Nutrition Program Evaluation, AID Program Evaluation Discussion Paper No. 10, July, 1981.

Two Reports on the Results of Milk Product Aid From A. Kohler, Switzerland.