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VILLAGES, VILLAGE ORGANIZATIONS,  
AND THE GOVERNMENT IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT

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## Villages, Village Organizations, and the Government in Rural Development

Probably the single most important characteristic of the international system which gradually emerged during the post-world War II period is that it is comprised of nation-states all committed in principle to rapid economic development.

Those states which were established as the colonial empires crumbled, as well as the traditional states which had escaped a colonial experience were largely rural. Limited industry, as it existed, was largely extractive and designed to serve the needs of the industrialized metropolitan centers. Therefore, when rapid economic development, often meaning industrialization, was adopted by ruling elites of these states as an overriding goal, the rural masses provided the basic resource to which the elites had to turn. In the absence of other sources of capital, peasants were the only source from whom surplus funds which could be channeled to the development effort would come. It was also the peasants who would produce the labor needed for industrial development. Briefly expressed, the peasants were given a new role in society, not necessarily because they desired such a role, but because that was the role envisaged for them by the national decision-makers.

Because the role of the peasant as envisaged by the ruling elite and the peasants themselves were hardly congruent, peasants have been perceived as constituting a problem by the former. "In every part of the world, generally speaking, peasantry have been a very conservative factor in social change, a brake in revolution, a check on that disintegration of local society which often comes with rapid technological change" (Redfield, 1956:137).

Societies with fundamentally different political systems, ideologies, and policies are united in identifying peasants as a problem, because economic development means "the replacement of peasant production by capitalist or state forms of production characterized by the application of advanced technology and increasing division of labor within the productive enterprise" (Williams in Gutkind and Wallerstein, 1976:141).

From the perspective of government the peasant problem may be viewed as a problem of penetration, defined as conformance to public policy enunciated by central governmental authority (Binder, *et. al.*, 1971:208-209). On the one hand, governments aspire to secure compliance to their policies irrespective of the choices, inclinations or desires of the peasants; on the other hand, they want the peasants to change in such a way that outlooks and goals similar to theirs will be held by them (*idem*:209).

Governmental desires to change the peasants in the direction of the visions of the ruling elite have given way to two types of policies. In the collectivist economies, governments have attempted to collectivize rural production, superimposing a new organization on the existing socioeconomic organization of villages. In the non-collectivist [1] economies, a standard instrument of rural

change has been the introduction of rural development programs. Development policies to affect change in the rural areas constitute a deliberate governmental effort to change the rural socio-economic environment. It should be emphasized, however, that governments are not the sole actors which stimulate change in rural areas. Although peasants are often depicted as being traditional, this does not mean that their attitudes and behavior are permanent (See Gusfield, 1966:351-362). Some change emanates from the rural areas without outside stimuli. It should also be pointed out that governments are not the sole actors in non-collectivist societies. There are national or regional private economic institutions such as corporations and banks. If the political system is competitive, there are also political parties and other voluntary associations which may affect peasant behavior in different ways than is intended by governments.

Both the nature of the peasants and the rural areas and the presence of other national and regional actors act as constraints on government plans to achieve rural development. Put differently, what governments want to achieve is development, that is, affecting change in a direction deemed desirable by the national decision-makers. What happens, being affected by other actors, is change which usually includes some development (as intended by the government) and other consequences. Some of these unintended and uncontrolled consequences may not be of concern to governments while others may be in harmony with governmental intentions or run counter to them. Therefore, the formulation and the execution of rural development policies calls for a continuous process of adjustment on the part of the governments if development is to be achieved.

Rural development policies are initiated in national centers and their target is the rural population. Rural development as a process, however, includes not only the rural population, but also people living in market towns, larger urban centers, centers of trade, business, finance, and the national capital (Butterfield in Shanin, 1971:8). This process, inevitably, results in the development and the modification of linkages between all of them.

This study will examine rural development efforts in Turkey. More specifically, it will examine how local rural actors are linked with regional and national actors in the process of rural development, the problems observed in the functioning of these linkages, and the consequences of the interaction between these two types of actors in the success or the failure of the achievement of rural development.

## RURAL ORGANIZATIONS

## The Nature of Peasant Economy

Rural sociologists have drawn attention to the fact that peasant economies are different from urban economies:

Everybody else works for society and obtains his means of existence from society through the operation of extant social mechanisms. This results from the social division of labor and the concept of occupation involves the individual's relationship to society. The peasant farmer's work lies partly outside this social mechanism for he himself creates the basic means of his existence for himself and his family. So it is not related to society to the same extent as work in other specializations. (Galeski, 1972:155).

Turkish villages are in the process of moving out of being peasant economies. Although none of the villages we studied was dependent on the national economy for all its needs, it is doubtful that any would have been able to survive if left exclusively to its own means. The degree of integration to the national economy naturally varies in each case.

Generally, it could be said that the economically better-off villages had come to a higher level of dependence on the national economy for two reasons. First, economic betterment is closely connected to specialized production of certain commodities, which bring in high cash income. Examples would be the production of pre or early season vegetables, milk products such as butter and cheese, or the raising of hazelnuts or tobacco. The production of cash crops has rendered the peasants more subject to nationally operative market forces; and political forces in the case of hazelnuts, wheat, and tobacco because the government pursues price support policies.

The increasing dependence of the peasant economy on the national economy does not, however, totally eradicate production for subsistence purposes, though it may reduce it. Almost each peasant family possesses several household animals for their milk, butter, cheese, and yogurt needs. Small patches of land are reserved for raising vegetables, corn or wheat, for household consumption.

The dependence of the economically better-off villages on the national economy increases over time for a second reason. Improved income increases peasant consumption while at the same time substituting nationally produced amenities for local ones. Two processes appear to operate here. To begin with, what constitutes "need" becomes redefined as income goes up. This is reflected in peasant ideas on what constitutes a good house, whether a refrigerator, a T.V. set, or a LPG stove is considered a luxury or a necessity.

Next, nationally produced goods and commodities which are easier to use are gradually substituted for local surrogates until it no longer remains possible to return to the locally produced items because they are either viewed as "not worth it" or because the technology of their production is forgotten. For the former instance, the adoption of our LPG stove may be cited. A typical fuel for cooking in Turkish villages of two decades ago was cow-dung. It was not an effective fuel because its caloric content was low, its speed of burning could not be controlled, and its potential use as a fertilizer was lost. With the introduction of LPG into the Turkish villages, dung has lost its importance as a fuel for cooking. It continues to be available in villages, and its production technology is simple enough that it does not get forgotten. Yet, LPG is so widely and regularly used, and the peasants are so used to it that its shortage does not lead to reverting to the old cooking practices, but intensified efforts by the peasants to acquire it in the black market.

In many areas of consumption, however, the technology for local production of certain goods is lost. Cloth, shoes, rugs are typical examples of this case. As the market substitutes make their way into the peasant economy, local production declines and often becomes extinct. The production tools are discarded, the technology of production is forgotten, and total reliance on the market economy obtains.

Despite changes which bring the peasant economy closer to the national economy, the idea of the village as an autarchical, or self-sufficient unit continues to occupy a prominent place in the peasant mind. Ninety-five of the peasants who responded to our question [2] on economic self-sufficiency of a village indicated that villagers should try to produce all that they need, rather than buying things produced outside the village. An ethic of autarchy in other words, it appears, continues to prevail in the peasant mind, in village relations with the outside world in Turkey.

### The Village as a Unit

The village itself constitutes a corporate unit ~~vis-a-vis~~ the outside world. The existence of a village identity which manifests itself against the external world cannot be taken to imply the presence of a sense of harmonious community internally, however. The basic unit within a village is the peasant family. Although other groups such as kinship groups, lineage groups, tribal groups, may exist and often do, they are neither corporate nor exhaustive (Stirling, 1965:236) in most instances. In the twelve villages which we studied, in only two were there tribal or ethnic divisions strong enough such that they could be called corporate and exhaustive; that is, peasants belonged either to origin A or B, and there was a geographical separation of the two groups. In others, there were various bases on which groups formed but most of them did not exhibit permanence or impermeability.

Because the nature of the village community is closely related to the emergence and the functioning of village organizations and to the way the village relates to the outside world, I would like to elaborate on the factors which affect the formation and the activities of the village community.

### a. The Physical Outlay of the Village

Our observation was that the more widely dispersed the homes in a village, the less intense the feeling of community. The dispersal of homes can take two basic forms: A village may be comprised of clusters of homes or hamlets which are distant from each other or it may be comprised of homes which are all distant from each other.

The way a village is built may be a function of natural, socio-economical, sociological and other administrative factors.

The easiest factor to explain is the administrative factor. Sometimes several mezraas (hamlets) which are within proximity of each other are designated a village, the smallest administrative unit in Turkey, not because they constitute a community, but because it constitutes an administrative convenience. Gündas, for example, is comprised of five hamlets which the government designated as a village, irrespective of the sociological reality that these units together hardly constitute a community capable of united action. In fact, the contrary is the case. Each hamlet perceives itself as a community and competes with the others to receive government projects like school buildings. Locally initiated projects are confined to the hamlets.

Sometimes a sociological and an administrative factor can operate together. This is the case in Dünerdere, where a new village was constructed by the Ministry of Construction and Resettlement. Peasants from another region of the country were settled there after their homes had been destroyed by floods. The land on which the new village was built was mostly government-owned. It was, however, within the boundaries of an existing village and the local villagers had come to view this land as their own. The new village and the old village are geographically separate, the residents of each are of different ethnic origin, yet they constitute an administrative whole. We observed talking to the bureaucrats that they meant only the new village in their references to the village, recognizing unconsciously and involuntarily, that the administrative unit did not correspond to a community. The consequence is that in one administrative space, two physically separate sociological entities exist. The new village dominates the relations with the outside world, creating a feeling of being neglected and outcast in the old village. Not being able to cope with the change which has been forced upon them by the government, the old village can only protest, often manifesting itself in destruction of community property and facilities in the new village. Intra-community (inter-community?) hostility was such that in the summer of 1979, a full-fledged battle took place between the old and the new village based on a false rumor that a new villager had been beaten up and wounded by the old villagers. A life was lost in the

exchange of gunfire.

The physical outlay of the village may be determined by natural and economic reasons as well. Eski Sayaca is located in a rugged mountainous area. Wherever there are patches of tillable soil, there is a hazelnut orchard and a peasant home. Because hazelnuts require intensive care and because traveling to the orchards from a central village would take an unque amount of time, this widely dispersed pattern of settlement appears to be a natural-economical necessity. Such geographical dispersal, complemented by a lack of roads between homes, renders it most difficult for a feeling of community to evolve. People are physically and socially isolated. There are two coffee houses near the road running through the western edge of the village boundary. The peasants get together there to go to the market. People know each other, but a community capable of united action does not exist.

The dispersal of homes may sometimes reflect cleavages already existing in the community. In Güneren, there are four hamlets. Villagers talk of the time when the village homes were together. As blood feuds broke out both between and among families, some groups physically removed themselves from the community, among other things, for security reasons. In such cases the community had ceased to function before the geographical dispersion came, but the physical distance makes it difficult to reconstitute the community.

Yolboyu appeared to be the only village where a geographically separate extension of the village constituted an integral part of the community. Repeated attempts to probe the reasons as to why a separate precinct evolved failed to reveal both the reasons for its emergence and the existence of two potentially competitive sub-communities. There appeared to be a price for the retention of community solidarity, however. Many benefits had to be provided simultaneously for the two parts of the village. Each part had received a hard surface road, a mosque, electricity, and water at about the same time.

The preceding discussion implies points on the role of the settlement patterns in the emergence of a "community" in a village:

1) A widespread dispersal of homes in a village may hinder the evolution of a sense of community.

2) The dispersal of homes, if in the form of hamlets, may suggest the existence of several communities within the same "village" administrative unit, each competing against the others for outside resources.

3) The existence of physical distance between hamlets may point to the existence of other cleavages in village society. Nevertheless, the dispersal of hamlets in itself may weaken tendencies working toward the evolution of community.

## b. Traditional Cleavages Within the Village

There are many sources of cleavage in a village. Those based on economic factors will be taken up later. Here I shall deal with traditional cleavages such as those deriving from lineage and ethnic differences.

Dağdeviren is ethnically homogeneous, but it is comprised of peoples which claim affiliation to two different tribes. A water fountain in the middle of the village marks the tribal boundary. Some of the peasants suggested that even animals were expected to observe this boundary. Village politics is dominated by the numerically superior tribal grouping. The numerically inferior tribal grouping tries to resist this domination in a destructive fashion. Members of the numerically superior grouping complained that "the others" had destroyed the water fountain several times because it was closer and more accessible to "our" part of the village.

Ayas emerged as a result of voluntary settlement of nomadic herdsmen along the Mediterranean coastline who engaged in raising early season vegetables and catering to tourists. Four lineage groups settled in physically separate locations. They compete for the domination of village politics and administration. The largest and the most prosperous of the settlements because of a booming tourist trade is currently interested in becoming an independent village. Yet villagers, though living in sub-communities, can cooperate either at the community level and as a coalition of sub-communities for projects such as bringing water and electricity to their sections. Mainly owing to the economic prosperity of the village, feelings of strong hostility between lineage groups (cum precincts) is lacking, although their relationship is competitive.

The significance of traditional cleavages in the formation and the functioning of a village community changes over time. Several factors appear to affect this significance. The first factor has already been alluded to above. Economic prosperity, if enjoyed by the whole village, appears to reduce the role of traditional cleavages in the village. The villages where traditional cleavages were most frequently referred to, and attached a significant role were also the poorest villages we studied. This suggests that the closer the peasants to economic subsistence, the more intense is the need to protect their means of existence and the greater the suspicion that other families and groups can only gain at the expense of them. In such cases, traditional groups provide a mechanism through which the peasant can insure his protection against other groups. Overall prosperity reduces the concern with subsistence and frees the peasant from reliance on traditional groups to insure the protection of his means of existence. Dağdeviren and Güneren were close to being subsistence economies and traditional cleavages appeared to be dysfunctional for the evolution and the operation of a village community. Ayas and Tirtar were, on the other hand, economically prosperous. Community and sub-community action seemed more likely to obtain.

The above analysis, if correct, may also be said to apply in reverse. That is, it may be predicted that economic decline may lead to the reintroduction of dormant traditional cleavages. We could not observe whether this would also be the case, because none of the villages we studied had experienced economic decline in recent years.

Second, if several traditional and other cleavages converge, the evolution of a collective village community and its acquisition of capability for united action appears less likely. In Dağdeviren, the dominant tribal group is led by a family which occupies a prominent place in the religious life of their group and owns the largest amount of land. The development of a community and the emergence of community action would work to undermine the domination of the village by this family. The continuation of the traditional cleavages, on the other hand, insures the dominant position enjoyed by it.

A different situation exists in Gündas. A family, more correctly one man, owns almost all of the land. He is of a different ethnic origin. Because landless peasants rely on him for their existence, he manages to get himself elected the headman term after term. The marginal existence of the landless peasants and the extraordinary wealth enjoyed by this man has led to antagonistic relations between him and the peasants. Such antagonism led to an attempt on his life in 1980. He hires people from other villages to protect himself. Although the fundamental antagonism is clearly of economic origins, the headman tries to render it an ethnic issue. He accuses the landless peasants of being disloyal to the government and of entertaining separatist tendencies. He enjoys a friendly disposition by the law enforcement agencies. Any formation of a community is detrimental to his interests. Fostering various kinds of divisions in the village insures his political and economic domination.

Third, traditional cleavages may lose their importance with changes in the nature of production. For example, Damarasi experienced a wave of settlement by nomadic herdsmen in the early 1940s. The locals were olive and tobacco growers, the newcomers cattle and sheep raisers. Both groups had, so far as the accounts of village history by the peasants are reliable, subsistence economies. The incursions of animals into olive orchards and tobacco fields were a constant source of friction, and sometimes fights between the two groups. In the early 1950s, land belonging to the village was distributed among the peasants by the government, making the herdsmen landowners. This coincided with introduction of cotton cultivation in the area. Now owning land, the herdsmen joined to locals in raising cotton. Because of the Korean war cotton prices were high. Everyone prospered. The old cleavage between the locals and the newcomers lost its significance. The village demonstrates high community spirit nowadays and the old cleavage is only of historical interest.

As can be noticed, a discussion of traditional cleavages such as ethnic, religious, and lineage differences cannot escape being infected by considerations, often of an economic nature. They can, nevertheless, constitute the focal point of divisions within a village, affecting the predisposition of the villagers to evolve into a village community capable of collective action.

### c. The Distribution of Wealth Within the Village

In the Turkish villages, as is the case in most of the rest of the world, land is wealth. In some cases, wealth may take the form of large animal herds or a modest enterprise such as a motorized flour mill or an oil press, but even in such cases, other forms of wealth are coexistent with land ownership.

Our general observation was that the more equitable the distribution of agricultural land in a village, the greater the chances of the existence of a feeling of community and the potential for collective action. The reasons for this are not difficult to trace.

To begin with, an equitable distribution of land in a village reduces the likelihood of antagonistic relations within the village by reducing the dependence of peasant families on others for their existence.[3]

Closely tied to this reasoning is the point that where wealth is equitably distributed, each peasant family develops a stake in the improvement of the environment in which it lives. In villages where landholdings are concentrated in the hands of a few, however, landless peasants do not develop an interest in village improvements. Many go away from the village for seasonal employment. Almost all of them harbor aspirations to move out of the village and settle in cities (See also Galeski, 1972:126).

The landless and those with an insufficient amount of land, also often, do not stand to benefit from community actions aiming to realize village improvements. For example, the electrification of a village requires contributions from the villagers both in money and in kind (materials and labor). The poor may not be able to afford the cost of electrifying their home after trunk lines are installed into the village. Similarly, the construction of a school building may simply mean a new institution which increases the marginal cost of having a child, for the poor.

On a more general level, it may be suggested that those contributing to the cost of a collective enterprise would expect to receive a benefit, which would justify the cost. It is more likely that the burdens and benefits of a collective community action will be distributed evenly among participants of comparable economic status, than among those of highly differentiated economic status. In the case of the former, the decision for action usually involves more participants, participants are more capable of insuring that benefits do not accrue unduly to a few individuals, and they are more capable of taking advantage of the benefit offered. In the

case of the latter, the opposite is more likely to be true. That is, decisions are likely to be made by a few, benefits deriving from collective action are unduly enjoyed by them while the rest do not receive commensurate benefits to the cost they may pay for the collective action.

GÜndas is an example of polarized land ownership as has been explained above. The accumulation of land and wealth in the hands of one man has created a situation such that community action is a meaningless concept for the average peasant. The landlord, on the other hand, is not interested in community development because he probably senses that any such effort would either undermine his domination or if the cost is to be shared, intensify within village antagonisms. He has chosen, therefore, a strategy of bettering his own environment. He has dug an artesian well which provides him water for both household and gardening purposes. He has a generator which provides him with electricity. He has even built a mosque which is used by himself and his clients.

Dönerdere, Damarasi, Ballinasar, and Ayas are examples of villages with equitable distribution of land ownership. In each of these villages, there were examples of successful community action. In all these cases, many of the peasants could take part in the community decision-making processes. They possessed sufficient means above subsistence such that they were capable of meeting the material cost a community action might entail; consequently, they were able to enjoy the benefits accruing from such action. And very importantly, in these villages, the peasant demonstrated some commitment to the village as their place of residence.

A special reference has also to be made to absentee landlordism which may take several forms. One form, which has little to do with the image the term might conjure relates to peasants who have emigrated to urban areas for lack of sufficient land. Many do not sell their land, but rent it out. In these cases, that the owner of the land is away from the village does not affect community life.

Another form is for the more prosperous of the peasant-farmers to move into a nearby town or city. Such a move is often justified by the desires of the farmers to give their children better and more education than is available in the village. The move may be followed by the opening of a place of business in town, reducing reliance on the village as a source of livelihood. Ballihisar is a case in point. We were struck by the number of homes which were vacant until the above explanation was offered. wheat is the major crop in this village. It is a crop which does not require continual and extensive care. This makes it possible for the city-dwelling farmers to plant their fields and get the crop by coming back to the village for the short periods to live. They may help the peasants with their business in town, but they are in fact abstracted from the village community, thereby losing interest in the development of the village.

A final form of absentee-landlordism is that which is more in line with the standard meaning attached to the term. In Yolboyu, the best land in the village is owned by landlords who have settled in the town which is only two miles from the village. Cotton which requires regular attention is raised. Generally, landowners either make a sharecropping arrangement or hire help to plant their fields. They have their own businesses in town, but regular trips to the village do not constitute a problem. The landlords do not think of themselves as peasants, and have no stake in the development of the village community or the betterment of the village environment. The resident villagers, some of whom are dependent of the absentee-landlords for their employment, express unhappiness that those who derive the biggest economic gain from the village contribute nothing to the village except a condescending attitude.

As I have tried to demonstrate, the distribution of land ownership in a village reflects wealth differences. The more polarized the ownership of land, the less the chances for a community to develop and community action to ensue. A higher concentration of land in the hands of a few also means little or no land in the hands of many, hence the presence of an impoverished group. Poverty runs counter to community action. Our observations confirm the following observation made elsewhere:

Our case studies reveal that there is disunity also among the poor in the village....They do not naturally gather to deliberate about the deprivation in their lives and their degrading social status or to explore what they can do together to improve their lives....On the contrary, spontaneous tendency seems to be either to go it alone or to lean for advice and relief on the very people who are in fact exploiting them and to compete with each other for land lease, wage employment, etc. (Development Dialogue, 1977:2, 115).

#### d. Village Traditions

In many Turkish villages, there are traditions of community help. This takes two forms. The first one, known as *imece* is not only a part of tradition, but it is also incorporated to the Turkish Village Code. The Headman and the Council of Elders are empowered to ask the peasants to contribute their labor to works intended for the benefit of the entire community.

There is also a second form of community cooperation in many villages which goes under different names. This form of cooperation does not involve the entire village but relates to several peasant families cooperating to solve common problems. In Ballinisar and İstiklalpaşı, for example, several families get together to hire a shepherd which is a convenience since it would cost too much in terms of manpower for each family to take care of its small flock. A similar practice is found in Damarasi and Yolboyu with regard to the planting of tobacco, and Tirtar and Ayas with regard to the watering of vegetable gardens.

Our question is, of course, whether these traditions are useful preconditions or experiences which contribute to the emergence of a community spirit eventually leading to community action. Our tentative answer is in the negative.

Starting with the tradition of cooperation below the community level, the cooperation arrangement is in the nature of an informal contract, to solve a specific problem several families encounter. The relationship between the families is based on a calculation of narrow self-interest and clearly reciprocal. If the norm of reciprocity is violated, the arrangement may end with hard feelings. If the experience is successful, it may continue until the needs of some of the partners change. In any case, it does not appear to generate a potential for broader cooperation on community-level projects.

How successfully the imece tradition will operate depends on the other factors which have been discussed before and village leadership which will be taken up next. Briefly expressed, the tradition itself does not appear to have an autonomy such that it would enhance community spirit or action, but rather that other factors determine the extent to which the tradition will be operative.

#### e. Village Leadership

A person's place in the village social system is determined by his lineage, sex, age, kinship, occupation, education, sometimes his religious knowledge and piety, reputation for honesty and reliability and his contacts outside the village (See also Stirling, 1965:290-293).

The formal leadership in the village includes a popularly elected headman and a Council of Elders, comprising eight to twelve members depending on the size of the population of village. The National Development Plans and various community development programs have treated the schoolteachers in the village and the imam (preacher) as part of the community leadership cadres.

The formal leadership in the village is only a partial reflection of the social relationships in the village. Put differently, the formal leaders may or may not reflect who leads the decision-making processes, who mobilizes the community for action, and who serves as a resource person for other villagers.

Stirling described the functions of the headman in the villages he studied as that of an "agent, guarantor, and communication channel for all business with government" (1965). This description of the role of the headman accurately reflects one of his functions. It should, of course, be added that the headman also serves as the "agent, guarantor, and communication channel for all government business with the village." In recent years, the government has accorded salaries to village headmen, formalizing their post as an extension of the national bureaucracy into the village. In these two capacities, the headman can be seen best as a "facilitator," not

as a leader. Whether he will also function as a leader depends on a number of other factors.

Kiray (1974:197) has noted that, "Whatever his position before or after the election, certainly while he is in office, the headman stands at the point of contact of the various control powers in the community." In villages of polarized land ownership (e.g., Gündas) or social and economic polarization (Dağdeviren, Güneren) the headman either is or represents the major power holders in the village. Apart from his government related duties, he is not a community leader because the interests he represents and those of others in the community are often conflictual. In the case of absentee landlordism (Yolboyu) the headman also serves mainly as a facilitator of business with government. In Damarası, Ballıhisar, İstiklalbağ, Tirtar, Ayas, and Dönerdere, on the other hand, the headmen do not appear to be the spokesmen for any single group, although in Tirtar and Ayas, lineage considerations play a role in their election. This is related to the fact that wealth is more evenly distributed in these villages. In these cases, the headmen perform their classical function of serving as a liaison between the peasants and the government. But peasants come to them with requests relating to the community, and if there are enough requests on the same point, they work as consensus builders in the village to generate community support for action.

What the peasants expect the headman to do and whether he will evolve into a leader depends on the talent and the means of candidates for this position as well as on the pool of potential candidates in the village.

Because the position includes representative function such as receiving visitors to the village, offering them meals and beds if necessary, a headman has to come from among those who have sufficient means. This means, the less equitable the distribution of wealth, the fewer the potential candidates for the position. The headman also has to be literate and reasonably capable of expressing himself to the government. This eliminates the illiterate and semi-literate as well as those who are not proficient in Turkish, if the most widely spoken language in the village differs from the national language. In Dağdeviren, Gündas, and Güneren, income distribution is such that there are a lot of poor, illiterate peasants not sufficiently proficient in Turkish. This renders them dependent for their outside relations, on the very people who have less stake in the development of the community.

In the villages where wealth distribution is more equitable, the pool of potential candidates is larger, but many peasants view the job as a chore. Since the job does not bring enough prestige and influence but is demanding in terms of time and money, the motivation to become a headman is ordinarily reduced.

What is expected from the headman varies with regard to each specific situation. That he perform his routine bureaucratic duties is, naturally, a standard expectation. Beyond that, if there is a specific village problem commonly acknowledged such as a road or the

construction of a school building, he may be expected to deal with that. If the headman has campaigned, with promises of achieving a certain goal, or the realization of a certain project, villagers may expect him to live up to his promises.

Expectations from the headman are also affected by two other considerations. For example, if there are people in the village with influential outside contacts (e.g., contacts with a political party) villagers may expect these people to help with the causes of the village. In Ballinisar, villagers want the road to their village to be made into a hard-surface road. It is an all season gravel road but it is very dusty, particularly during the summer. The villagers recognize that the decision to improve the road cannot be made at the subprovincial level or even the provincial level. It rests with the Directorate of Highways in Ankara. Therefore, they turn to T rather than the headman, because T has good connections with politicians.

A second consideration is the financial resources of the village community. If the village legal person has income from village properties and other similar resources, the headman is more receptive to requests for which these funds would be dispensed. If such funds are lacking, the expectations may be toned down. Damarasi, receives income from village property. Villagers want a wedding hall (which could also be used as a movie theater) to be built. This request appears to be popular, because among other reasons, it would not be necessary for the peasants to make personal contributions.

Two other leaders, as described in community development programs may or may not, in fact, be leaders. First, let us look at the imam. There are three types of imams. Some villages receive imams, appointed and paid by the government. Others hire an imam and pay him either cash or in kind. The cost is shared by the villagers on a "from each according to his means" basis. Finally, some hire an imam just for the holy month of Ramazan.

It can be inferred immediately from the above that a temporary imam can in no way be a leader. The imam on regular hire by the village is dependent on the charity of the villagers for his own livelihood. In situations of polarized wealth distribution, he sides with the wealthier, since his income derives mostly from them, thereby serving as a resource for the legitimation of their social control. In cases where the income distribution is more equitable, he is generally a neutral person, his function is to lead prayers in the mosque, give people religious advice on matters of a personal nature. In either case, he is not viewed as a secular leader.

The role of the government appointed imam in the village is similar to that of the imam on permanent hire by the village. He is an outsider whose residence in the village is temporary since the government changes his place of assignment after a period. If he exhibits thinking and inclinations not in harmony with those prevalent in the village, he is not listened to. The villagers may and do apply to sub-provincial authorities for his removal.

Our impression is that in the village world which is experiencing conflicts and contradictions as it is becoming more integrated into the national economy, the mosque and religious life of the community increasingly become the only aspect of village life where community solidarity can be best expressed. As a result, the imam is expected to contribute to community harmony, rather than serve as an exponent of change and progress which produces winners, losers, and therefore, conflicting relations within the village. In other words, his role is one of insuring social control in a world of change, not one of introducing and leading change.

Finally, the general knowledge of the world the imam possesses does not usually exceed very much those of the peasants except in the area of religion which is his recognized specialty. In many instances, therefore, his advice in non-religious matters is not sought.

The third type of leader is the schoolteacher. He is generally better educated than the villagers and is consulted by the villages for their clerical needs. But there are serious hindrances to his evolution as a village leader. Similar to the case of the government appointed imams, the teachers are outsiders, and their residence is temporary. During summer vacations, the school is closed and many teachers go away to their own hometowns and villages.

Because the teachers have to meet their needs mostly through buying, their comfort is in part related to the reception they get from the village. Rendering opinions regarding village matters may undermine their comfort and result in a denial of village hospitality.

There is often a fundamental difference of attitude between the villagers and the teachers, having its roots in the modernization strategies of both the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic. The teachers see themselves as part of the educated central, urban elites whose mission is to modernize the society. By modernization, cultural modernization is understood. Thus, the teachers see themselves as possessors of superior cultural values. Recognizing that they can affect little change in the village in the direction of their own values, they become culturally alienated from their own environment rapidly and view the peasants as an ignorant group of people whom they have to bear with.

In recent years, village teacher relations have been complicated by the ideological radicalization of many teachers. In Tirtar, for example, the schoolteachers were held responsible for the ideological factionalization of the village youth. In Yolooyu, the villagers also alluded to the politicization of the teachers.

The respect enjoyed by teachers in the village community has declined over time as some of the other peasants have given post-primary school education to their children. It is becoming apparent to the peasants that village teachers are often poorly trained. In Istiklalbağ and Ballinisar, for example, the more

prosperous villagers were sending their children to primary and middle school in town, saying that the quality of the local school was not good enough. Similar opinions were expressed in other villages.

Despite official ideology that the village teachers are leaders, this has not been supported by our observations. Only in one village did the peasants refer to a former teacher as a leader. We were able to find the teacher who is now the Assistant Director of Education in the sub-provincial capital. He was a man of peasant origin who lived in the village for ten years. He gained the confidence of the peasants by succeeding to raise tobacco seedlings in the schoolyard which the peasants had to acquire from the outside. Having acquired the confidence and the goodwill of the villagers, he got their support in the expansion of school facilities and projects of a similar nature.

We conclude by suggesting that it is possible that a particular schoolteacher, because of his specific characteristics or qualifications, may provide leadership in a village, but it is inaccurate to assume that a schoolteacher is a potential leader simply because he holds that position.

The members of the Council of Elders may or may not be village leaders. Usually one member is designated as the aide to the headman and performs headman's duties in his absence. The members of the Council as a whole may represent the important lineage groups, they may come from different hamlets if the pattern of settlement is dispersed. Alternatively they may simply be the yes-men for the family or families which dominate the village in cases of the polarized ownership of land and wealth. Or finally, they may have been elected mainly to meet the legal requirement that there be a Council of Elders, not reflecting any specific village or personal characteristics. Our observation is that the Council does not constitute a leadership group. Stirling's observation in two Turkish villages, regarding the Elders is probably valid for other Turkish villages including those which we studied. He notes:

No one took the slightest interest in their election or attached any importance to their activities. Instead, when something called for corporate action, in a matter which villagers considered important, the senior heads of households and lineage segments assembled either spontaneously or on the initiative of any villager with sufficient prestige" (Stirling in Shanin, 1971:42-43).

Let us now turn to informal leadership. In cases of polarized wealth, informal leadership usually means the head of the wealthiest household or households. As the distribution of wealth becomes more equitable, it becomes possible to speak of various types of leaders. We say various types of leaders because it is rather difficult to identify a leader-type who serves as a leader in every aspect of village life. Rather, depending on the qualifications of individuals, they may be recognized as leaders. Are there, however, common characteristics which can be attributed to informal leaders?

Several characteristics can be cited. The individuals whom the peasants turn to for advice, guidance, whom they have confidence in, and whose opinions they will respect are individuals who come from the middle to upper wealth group in the village, who are literate and articulate, who have greater familiarity with the outside world, and sometimes who possess a resource such as religious knowledge or a technical skill which other villagers do not possess. Very young are not perceived as leaders, but a person can become a leader after thirty or so. The opinions and advice of the aged may be sought but they are not expected to perform services requiring physical effort.

Depending on the types of cleavage in the village society, some individuals may be recognized as leaders by some groups in the village while not being recognized by others.

By way of conclusion, the formal leadership of a village, save the headman under certain conditions, do not appear to be agents who contribute extensively to the evolution of a sense of community or to the realization of a community action.

The effectiveness of village leaders, be they formal or informal, in the building of a community and its mobilization for action, seems to be determined mainly by other factors which have been discussed previously.

#### f. Village Relations with the External Environment

Some villages exhibit a higher level of community spirit than others. The preceding discussion was an attempt to analyze some of the internal factors, that is those factors emanating from the village itself which contribute to the emergence of community spirit and community action. In this discussion, a reference has to be made also to the relations of a village with the external world as a factor which may facilitate the evolution of a feeling of community.

A socially and economically hostile environment may strengthen community solidarity. As may be recalled, the new part of Dönerdere was built by the government to resettle peasants from another part of the country. These people came from a place with a different climate and were used to a different type of agriculture. The first three years of their life were trying years in terms of their battle against nature. Therefore, they had to give support to each other in overcoming the difficulties each was experiencing. Their sense of community was considerably enhanced, however, by the fact that their social environment was threatening. The surrounding villages were ethnically different. They had viewed the construction of a new village by the government as an undesirable intrusion to their environment which they expressed through acts economically harmful to the new village. Fields and animals had to be defended constantly against theft and destruction. Such defense could only be organized at the community level. Deemphasizing within village conflicts and emphasizing community cooperation derived from practical necessities but appears to have evolved into a norm. That the environment continues to be hostile supports the norm of strong identification with the community, and the high value placed on

village cooperation.

The peasants are sensitized to the fact that any within village conflict is dysfunctional for their ability to cope with their environment. Therefore, they try to avoid the sources of conflict. We were surprised, for example, that a village of this size, and level of prosperity did not have a single coffee house. It was explained to us that they were closed down when the heads of families agreed that they were a threat to village unity. Peasants gambled in them and inevitably fist-fights broke out.

If the initial efforts by the community to defend itself had failed, it is highly probable that the villagers would have returned to their original homes or search for employment in urban centers. They succeeded, and their commitment to community solidarity and cooperation has been reinforced.

Damarasi also exhibits high community spirit and cooperation. The peasants express a competitive spirit toward the surrounding villages. Extolling local virtues by denigrating the neighbors is a universal phenomenon. But this is rarely sufficient ground for concerted community action leading to community achievements. Damarasi has gained considerable community spirit by its being jealous of a neighboring village which has continually received more governmental favors because of its size. To cite two examples in 1963, the neighboring village was given a Post Office because of its size and central location. Damarasi had wanted one built in theirs, too, a request which had been denied. This prompted the villagers to build a post office, including a home for the postmaster.

In 1964, the village participated in a four village project for drinking water. When the leadership of the water system was captured by the neighboring village, Damarasi withdrew from the project despite official discouragement. Much to the amazement of everyone, the community, including females, was mobilized for action and proved capable of building a new water system within forty-eight hours. The peasants have developed faith in their community and pride in their achievements which facilitates other community action.

Ballihisar, because of a land dispute with a neighboring village in which they thought they had been treated unfairly by the government, voted almost unanimously for the Democratic Party in 1946 when the country was making a transition to competitive politics. They did the same again in 1950, but this time the D.P. won, and showered blessings such as a road, a new school building, a post office, flood control barriers, on the village. The peasants have discovered that political solidarity pays. They try to control the emergence of different political tendencies in the village.

In summary, relations of a village with the external world may constitute a threat, a challenge or a stimulus contributing to the emergence, reinforcement or continuation of a feeling of community, and promote community action.

## VILLAGE ORGANIZATIONS

The organizations in the Turkish villages may be classified into four types. The first type are informal organizations. These would include lineage and kinship groups, members of religious orders, tribal groups, residents of a particular section, customers of a specific coffee house, bachelor men and a neighborhood. Such groups are fluid; membership in them is not clearly defined; some are coherent and persist over time, others less so. From a perspective of rural development and development projects, these groups are usually not initiators, but constraints which have to be taken into consideration when community activities and actions are planned.

A second group of organizations is, of course, the formal organization of the village, comprising the headman and the Council of Elders, which have been discussed before under leadership. The Village Code also alludes to the village meeting (Dernek) as an organ of village administration, but this is only legal fiction, informal communication between heads of families is substituted for it, except during village elections.

A third group of organizations are the voluntary associations. These associations are established for various purposes. They may be grouped into three. First, there are those which are intended for leisure activities. The Soccer Club in Dönerdere or the Hunters' Club in Damarasi would be examples. The former organizes matches between the village team and those of other villages and towns. The latter organizes hunting and vacation trips for the villagers to spend their leisure.

A second group of voluntary associations are non-economic in nature. They may have been established to serve a specific purpose or they may pursue a broader goal. In many villages, a typical association is the Mosque Construction Association, aiming to build a new mosque or improve the existing mosque. These associations are established so that contributions from outside the village may also be secured, records of expenditures may be kept, and government support may be enlisted. Once their purpose has been achieved, they become defunct. On some occasions, they may continue by adopting a new but religion-related goal such as supporting the existence of a Koranic school. Similar associations are established sometimes for the construction of a new primary or a middle school building, again assuming supportive functions after the initial goals have been achieved.

An example of an association with a broader goal would be the Village Beautification or the Tourism Club. well intentioned, these associations are rarely active or successful. In Ballıhisar, there is a Tourism Club. The village is built on the ruins of the ancient city of Pessinus. Some excavations have been conducted by a Belgian archaeologist. The village has provided space from the village building for a small museum. The Club intends to render the village a more attractive place for tourists to visit, but lacking in funds and leadership, it is ineffective. The village is prosperous, and

the marginal income which would derive from a tourist trade does not capture anyone's fancy.

A third group of voluntary associations are those economic in nature. These include cooperatives and marketing unions which will be treated more extensively shortly.

Finally, there are organizations in the village which are either extensions of government agencies or inter-village organizations. DÜnerdere has a demonstration-breeding station operated jointly by the village and the government. Ballınisar operates a seed-selector in cooperation with the Government Agricultural Services. The village may also maintain the offices of an inter-village organization such as a water-union or a cooperative.

In the following section, because of their greater role in development, we will examine more closely the formal organization of the village and voluntary associations of an economic nature. These two types of organizations have been selected because of their greater relevance in the introduction and initiation of rural development projects. Other voluntary associations may concern themselves with projects, but these projects usually have two characteristics which distinguish them from those of an economic nature. First, these projects do not have consequences which affect wealth and power distribution in the village community. Second, the end result can be easily visualized by the peasants and the procedures for achieving the result are simple and comprehensible. In the case of a Mosque Construction Society, for example, a mosque is a physical structure which every villager knows. Its functions are also well-known. The procedures of the Association are simple enough. Collect enough money, then find a contractor to build a mosque or repair the old one.

#### **B. Formal Village Organization and Development**

The formal organization of the village possesses resources relevant for development organization and efforts. Since the headman functions as a liaison between the government and the village, he has reasonable access to the sub-provincial governor, representatives of national ministries and officers of national agencies at the sub-provincial level. This access not only renders it possible for him to communicate village problems to the authorities, but also provides a source of information on government programs from which a village may benefit.

Because of his position as the formal leader, government representatives work through him in their business with the village. When there is an item which concerns the village, it is him whom they invite to discuss the matter. When government officials come to the village, it is again him whom they look for first.

Whether and how a headman will utilize this potential is a function of his personal attributes as well as the characteristics of the village. At the personal level, a headman can be more

effective if he is more articulate, if he is capable of operating within a more urban framework (which includes his dress, his manners including his manner of speech, his familiarity with legal jargon). If he is, at the same time, an important man in sub-provincial political parties, he may get a better reception from the government officials. These characteristics in turn require that he be literate, be somewhat prosperous, and have frequent contacts with town. A larger number of people possessing the described characteristics are likely to be found in villages where land and wealth are distributed more equitably and where the level of economic prosperity is high.

In GÜndas, there was only one man with such characteristics and he was the lord of the village and the headman. In GÜneren, land distribution was somewhat better, but economic prosperity was low. There did not seem to be anyone among the people whom we met who had the appropriate characteristics. Dağdeviren was much like GÜneren. In DÜnerdere, land and wealth was very equitably distributed and the level of economic prosperity very high. The village had a large number of individuals who could fulfill roles such as that of the headman and the presidency of the local cooperative. Damarasi, Ballihisar, Ayas, and to a lesser extent, Istiklalbağ and Tirtar also exhibit similar characteristics.

What a headman will do, what kind of activities he will engage in, however, is influenced by the characteristics of the village he heads. As was noted earlier, the headman stands at the point of contact of various control powers in the community. The power structure of the community therefore determines his role.

In GÜndas, the headman is the landlord and as such at the peak of the socio-economic ladder. He commands the peasants and extracts obedience through economic sanctions. The peasants cannot exercise any control over him. The only formula they could devise to cope with him was an attempted murder, which, as explained earlier, failed. He is not interested in village development, but in controlling the village.

GÜneren has lineage divisions. The largest group elects the headman. Others are convinced that all that the headman does is to serve his clan and no others. The headman consults the heads of families in his group before he acts. Other lineage groups may be consulted only when a specific business concerns them. The feeling of distrust among groups is high. This suggests that the headman would be incapable of getting the village together for mutually beneficial efforts even if he wanted to, because others would not trust him.

Yoiboyu is mostly comprised of peasants with little or no land. The headman whom we met during our first visit was a man in his late 30s who had inherited a large sum of money from his father who had set up a business in a nearby town. He did not appear to be respected by the peasants. During our next visit to the village, he had lost his position because he was in prison for bearing arms unlawfully. A new headman was appointed by the sub-provincial

governor, after all of the members of the Council of Elders had refused the job. We also learned that the former headman has squandered village funds, and had accepted bribes from a cement-brick maker who has a plant nearby, for letting him get free water from the village although he should have paid for it. There are two points to be made here. First, the village experienced difficulties producing a headman; second, they could not affect his behavior and actions once they had found one. A government official in the provincial capital, comparing the two villages of Yolboyu and Damarasi said

The peasants in Yolboyu are like sheep. They do what they are told. Only the headman comes in for business. Those from Damarasi are different. They don't wait for the headman, they come and go as they please.

Damarasi is a different place. Wealth distribution is equitable and the level of economic prosperity is high enough that eight people in the village owned private automobiles. The relations between the headman and the peasants are collegial. The centrally-located coffee house in the village brings male heads of household together. Village business is discussed, people ask the headman questions and make requests. The headman needs to build consensus for his activities, and is held accountable to them by the villagers.

Dönerdere is similar to Damarasi. The headman is viewed as one of them, who is elected for a known period to serve the village. Consensus on what is to be done is achieved by conversations in front of the village mosque which serves as a congregation place. Frequent visits between families serves a similar purpose. The headman cannot initiate important actions without first consulting the heads of households.

The above examples give an indication of the process of decision-making in villages where socio-economic conditions are different. Even though there is a formal village organization led by the headman, decisions are not made formally but consensually, and only formalized if a formal decision is legally required. Whose consent has to be obtained appears to depend on the distribution of wealth and traditional cleavages in the village. Low level of economic prosperity renders it difficult for villages to find people suitable to serve, and to affect the behavior of those whom they elect. In these villages, the formal organization of the village appears to be weak and ineffective.

Who benefits from the activities of the formal village organization? The answer is, of course, closely related to what is done. The procedural services such as the conducting of weddings and the issuing of birth certificates are available to all. In the procurement of government services, the headman has a role in getting the services to his village. Many of these services, such as the construction of a road or the electrification of a village, produce benefits which are available to all local residents. Here, some of the burden has to be shared among the villagers. The

headman and the members of the Council decide on the distribution of these burdens, but often observing one's ability to pay is the rule. Activities where the benefits are divisible to individuals are usually not within the realm of action of the formal village organization. We will deal more extensively with such activities in studying voluntary associations of an economic nature, and later government projects.

Most formal village organizations in Turkey have very little income. The village law makes it possible for the Council of Elders to impose a Commune Tax when necessary, and establishes limits to the amount to be taken. Because the tax is not a regular tax, but an obligation which the village organization can introduce by choice, there is a reluctance on the part of the headman and the Council to introduce it, and the peasants to pay it. The limits stated in the Law have become meaningless because of the changing purchasing power of the Turkish lira over the years so that currently it is not worth the effort to collect it.

The second source of income for the village is income deriving from communally-owned property, gifts and grants made to villages and penalties imposed on villagers. In recent years, some villages have also begun to derive income from the sale of services such as electricity and water to the villagers. Some of this village income is spent for the necessary services to the village. Typical expenditure items include the hiring of watchmen for the village, the cost of construction materials for such things as mosque repairs, the building of a wall around the village cemetery, repairs of the school building. If the income is more substantial, then the effectiveness of the village organization is enhanced. For example, if the village funds cover it, the headman is less reluctant to travel for village business; the village is also more capable of inviting visitors from the sub-provincial and the provincial center, and entertaining them, thereby gaining better access to the town bureaucrats and gaining their goodwill.

Availability of village funds also render it easier for the village to put up the village share in getting government services to the village. Construction of such community facilities as a commune building, a laundry, or a bath is also facilitated.

Peasants, as is probably the case with townspeople, are more receptive to community improvements financed by common funds than to those which are financed by contributions from their own pockets. Requests for individual contributions unless a need is perceived as imminent and indispensable, triggers debate on whether the improvement is necessary, who should pay how much, and judgements by each head of household on how much benefit will be enjoyed personally. This is understandable since the marginal utility of personal funds varies across households. Therefore, it appears sound to suggest that the effectiveness of village organization may be improved by equipping it with independent sources of income, provided that some control over expenditures is exercised. In prosperous villages with equitable distribution of wealth, community control may be sufficient; in the less prosperous villages, and

those with an unequitable distribution of wealth, some outside guidance may be necessary.

### c. Voluntary Associations of an Economic Nature

The standard voluntary association with economic functions in the village is the cooperative. The introduction of cooperatives into Turkish villages can be traced back to a decision of the Central Government to promote a cooperative movement in the villages in 1935 (Basar, 1980:11).

Three types of cooperatives have developed since that time. The first type is the Agricultural Credit cooperative. The original intention of these organizations was to start a credit system initially financed by the government, gradually financed by the members themselves, to provide credit to the peasants for their agricultural needs. The idea was that peasants needed credit during the planting season to finance their seed, equipment, fertilizer, and insecticide needs. It would be paid back after the crop was lifted and sold. Credit would be made available in kind and in cash. Profits deriving from their activities would gradually increase the capital of these cooperatives and decrease their reliance on government funds.

The peasants viewed these cooperatives as a channel through which government credit could be obtained. Membership in a cooperative and the associated fees were seen as a necessary sacrifice to qualify for credit, rather than as a contribution to a community effort.

The legal requirements involved in the operation of the cooperatives were too complicated to be fulfilled by peasants themselves, which created a tendency in them to become bureaucratized under the guidance of the central government. Such bureaucratization was given support by the fact that a cooperative was often intended to serve several villages. A tradition of collective decision-making was lacking in many villages, let alone in inter-village cooperation. Therefore, decision-making by neutral outsiders was accepted without difficulty (See also Development Dialogue, 1977/2:82). The village constituted a corporate unit in the peasant cognitive map, peasants from several villages cooperating was not a part of that map.

Today, these cooperatives, for all practical purposes, function like a branch of the government operated credit institution, the Agricultural Bank. In fact, peasants from villages which are tied to the Credit cooperative cannot get agricultural credit from the Bank, confirming that the cooperatives are more like local extensions of a national agricultural credit institution. It is interesting to note that in the two villages which were tied to the credit cooperatives, most peasants forgot to mention that they were a member of the Credit cooperative, although they in fact were members. This institution was not seen as a village institution.

A second type of cooperative is the Marketing cooperative. These have been promoted again by the government. The line of reasoning behind the governmental policy was to create a marketing organization by peasants themselves so that each peasant would save on marketing efforts he would have to make in selling his produce. He would also be protected from economic exploitation by merchants by not having to negotiate his price individually. Although the line of reasoning appeared to be sound, it failed to take into account several economic realities, depending on how the produce is marketed.

In some instances, notably fruit raising, a merchant buys the produce of an orchard before ripening. Although the peasant may receive less for his produce this way, he is saved from the trouble of collecting the yield. He is also saved from the risks of nature and the market. Where income derives from a single crop, this is a method acceptable to the peasant because it minimizes his risk.

In produce where advance sales of the type described above are not practiced, merchants often extend carry-over credit to peasants in return for a promise to sell their produce to him at a price determined by him. Unfavorable as the terms of such a sale may be, it meets the immediate cash needs of a peasant. Although the Marketing cooperatives extend some credit to their members, its use is restricted to purchases of production inputs, not personal consumption. Depending on the produce, the merchants may pay cash for it on the spot or shortly after delivery if they are functioning not as a buyer or seller, but as a middleman. The ability to obtain a cash income without having to wait long for it renders dealing with a merchant more attractive.

The Marketing cooperatives, again like the Credit cooperatives, are organized on an inter-village basis. This also means that they may not have buying stations in each village which necessitates the transporting of produce to a buying station. This arrangement favors those peasants who have enough land to get a large crop because they can rent a truck and transport their produce to a station. Those who produce little find the cost of transportation prohibitively expensive. They are incapable, in most instances, to organize to rent transportation together. A merchant who pulls into the village with a truck, paying cash on the spot, is the most convenient, if not the most lucrative way of selling their produce. In Gatak, for example, peasants raised hazelnuts. Most produced a small amount. The Marketing co-op, Eiskobiclik, buying station was twenty miles away. Peasants noted that their product was too small to justify their joining the cooperative which was an expense in itself and that transportation was expensive. They were quite aware, however, that they would get a higher price at the cooperative. Similarly, in Güneren some cotton was grown, but the quantities grown did not economically justify affiliation with Çukobiclik, the regional cotton marketing cooperative because it was just too far and the crop too small.

The relationship between the merchant and the peasants is multiplex (See Bailey in Shanin, 1971:305). The relationship is one of friend (enemy sometimes!), business associate, patron and advisor. It is not affected by hard and fast rules, it is flexible according to need and circumstances. Such is not the case with the Marketing cooperative which has to conform to national legislation and bureaucratic procedures.

Marketing cooperatives in Turkey have been successfully operative only with regard to products of which the State is a major buyer and on which it maintains price supports. Even in these cases, the merchants sometimes provide an attractive alternative. The price policies followed by the government are affected by many considerations relating to the national economy only one of which is the economy of the producer (See Ergüder, 1981). The merchants, on the other hand, operate under only two major constraints: their own means and the market expectations, and many, therefore, offer prices comparable to or higher than that of the government when market expectations are good.

For reasons similar to those cited in the discussion of Agricultural Credit cooperatives, the Marketing cooperatives are also heavily bureaucratized, and are perceived to be extensions of government agencies into the countryside, rather than as institutions created by peasant initiative and supported by them.

Attempts to engage in cooperative activities in individual villages are not likely to succeed. An attempt was made in Ayas to market their produce of early season vegetables through a cooperative. It did not get official backing because, according to villagers, the merchants were pals with the bureaucrats, and they were influential in provincial political party organizations. The merchants also offered higher prices to selected members, weakening their commitment to the cooperative. The merchants, in other words, had the means and the vision to incur minor losses if necessary in the short run to resist a development which would undermine their economic gain in the long run. Many peasants lack that long-range perspective and the economic means to carry a long, drawn-out struggle.

Damarası has introduced a more practical solution for its marketing needs. Those peasants who grow a substantial amount of early season peppers have formed a Marketing Union. The Union, led by one of the prosperous peasants, hires trucks to ship produce to major markets like Ankara and Istanbul, bypassing the merchants in the provincial capital. Transport costs are shared and producers receive their money after the produce has been sold. A commission of eight percent is paid to the union for the services rendered. This income is used to pay the rent of the union office in the Village Building, the phone bill, since lots of long-distance calls have to be made to buyers and middlemen in metropolitan centers, and remuneration for the man who runs the business. The Union, however, is the club of the more prosperous peasants, and is operated by a person who has a stake in the sale of the produce because he himself is a large producer. The Union had begun to lose its importance the

second time we visited the village because the man who led it was of poor health, but more importantly, because local merchants had begun to offer comparable prices to those which obtained in the metropolitan markets.

The third type of cooperative, and the one most relevant for rural development projects is the Village Development cooperative. This type is a multipurpose organization. It can operate grocery stores, gas stations, and it is empowered to set up production businesses in the village. The government has encouraged the development of such cooperatives in recent years to realize a higher standard of living in the rural areas. Unlike the Credit and Marketing cooperatives, which have evolved into extensions of government agencies, a village development cooperative is a local organization. It is possible to establish them on an inter-village basis, and some governments have encouraged such a development. But more typical is the cooperative organized on a single village basis.

The government retains a list of projects which such cooperatives can adopt and extends credit for their realization. In the mid-1960s, peasants who were members of these cooperatives were given preferential status to go to Western Europe, mainly to Germany, as migrant laborers provided that they guaranteed to send a certain sum of money to the cooperative each month. This policy led to an upsurge of Village Development cooperatives, but many did not prove to be successful because the cooperative was seen to be a vehicle for becoming a migrant worker, not one for village development.

Dönerdere operates a very successful Development cooperative. Although the case is atypical, a study of why it has been successful may provide insights into the conditions which promote successful cooperative activity.

The government built Dönerdere before it resettled the peasants from the Black Sea Coast. Each family was given a similarly sized piece of land, which according to government calculations at that time (early 1960s) was sufficient to support a family of five. Because the peasants had moved away from their habitual environment into one which was naturally and sociologically hostile, community solidarity was essential for survival. The equitable distribution of land, combined with the need for intense cooperation, rendered pre-resettlement cleavages irrelevant.

During the first five years of resettlement, people were poor and could not afford to buy tractors. Funds from individual peasants were collected to buy four tractors. They were used to plow the fields, plant them, and harvest them. Wheat was distributed to each according to the size of his land. This was a solution, offered initially by an engineer and supported by the Ministry of Construction and Resettlement. But it was not imposed on the peasants. By discussions among themselves, each acquiesced his independence to meet the pervasive survival threat the community experienced. As the peasants have acquired more wealth and greater familiarity with their new environment, this arrangement has been

abandoned. That the yield from each field may be different because of the differences in soil quality, and the desire of each peasant to own his tractor which he may employ almost as a private automobile has terminated this interesting experiment. The possibility of reinstating the system was discussed in 1979 when relations with the neighboring village had grown tense, but let go after the inter-village conflict was resolved.

The idea of forming a development cooperative was offered by an engineer working on the construction of a road passing by the village. One villager, who has since left the village, found the idea appealing and rendered it a topic of village discussion. The idea was gradually accepted and the co-op was established in 1966. Fifty-five males were sent to Germany as migrant workers by accepting to become members and to send regular payments to the co-op from abroad.

Because excess milk was available both in the village and in the surrounding villages, a cheese factory was agreed on. The government built the plant, the co-op provided the machinery. The factory started to function in 1970. The initial experiment proved successful. Each peasant had found an outlet for the excess milk he got from his animals. Probably because milk was not an important source of income prior to the establishment of the cheese plant, and because people were assured of a subsistence through other activities, they could wait to be paid after the cheese was sold.

The success of the initial experiment with the cooperative encouraged new experiments. In its annual meetings, members offered new ideas, they were debated and passed on to the Executive Committee. In the 1970 Meeting, for example, the following suggestions were made and accepted:

- a) That a multi-purpose store be opened
- b) That a gas station be opened
- c) That a generator be obtained to electrify the village.
- d) That a motor pump be purchased to provide water for homes and gardens.

In 1978, when we first visited the village, all except the gas station had been realized. The village had a prosperous general store where peasants bought things they needed below the market prices. The village was electrified and each home had running water. They were still trying to get the State Petroleum Company to award a concession to the cooperative so that they could open a gas station.

Many ideas are put forth in the annual meeting. Those which are accepted by the membership, however, are not automatically realized by the Executive Committee. They conduct a simple investigation and a cost-benefit analysis. For example, it was recommended that the co-op buy a truck. An investigation revealed that another village had bought one, but had failed to operate it. The idea was abandoned. Similarly, it was agreed that the butter and cheese made by the co-op should be packaged in the village. A

market research revealed that the machinery for this purpose was simply too expensive.

What were the reasons for the success of the Development cooperative in Dönerdere? We have already observed that a hostile environment creates a high level of village solidarity which in turn promotes collective action.

We have also indicated that success breeds new experiments and possibly new success. However, the initial success, that of buying tractors to plow the fields together, would not constitute a sufficient basis on which the co-op experiment rested. In fact, that arrangement has ended after more prosperity had obtained.

In the case of Dönerdere, there was also official goodwill because the village was set up as a model village which the bureaucrats wanted to succeed. But official support has not proved sufficient in the case of other villages.

The egalitarian distribution of land, and the ensuing egalitarian spirit in the village undoubtedly facilitates cooperation and appears to be a necessary but not a sufficient condition. It may be reminded that it is possible that an egalitarian situation may exist in poverty and ignorance, too.

The villagers in Dönerdere had extensive contacts with the outside world. They had been resettled here in a remote area. Previous to their resettlement, many of the men had a tradition of going away to metropolitan areas for seasonal employment. Some people from their old village have settled in other parts of Turkey. They are in constant communication with them. Some have worked in Germany and have returned to the village. They know of a better life, they can envision doing new things. They also know people can improve their lot.

Most male peasants are literate. They have had contact with town institutions, they know how to do business, how to interact with businessmen, bureaucrats and politicians. These features make many a candidate or potential leadership in the community and in the co-op.

The peasants take turns in running village affairs. Headmen are usually elected for one term. The President of the cooperative is also elected on an annual basis. Continuity of leadership is secured by not changing every member of the co-op Executive Committee each year. Most peasants express the sentiment that leadership should not acquire permanence. Control of leadership, then, is partly achieved by turnover, partly by the discussions during annual meetings, and partly by community discussions about community affairs on a regular basis.

Effective leadership and its control by the ordinary members of an organization requires that all have basic skills in the understanding of laws, regulations, accounting and bookkeeping. The reason why co-op members have faith in their leaders is because they

understand what they are doing and can control them.

There are also constraints which are observed in the operation of the co-op which explains its success. Most services performed by the co-op are not related to household peasant production. Everyone produces their own wheat, raises his animals and gets their milk. The co-op enters where the peasant economy links to the market. It performs functions such as trade and the processing of local products which the peasant himself cannot either do or do successfully. The services the co-op provides such as water and electricity can be enjoyed by all and does not bestow an undue reward to any specific peasant or group of peasants.

The leadership is cautious in its actions, and recognizes that activities which result in economic loss would not only undermine their standing in the community but would also weaken the most important instrument of economic benefit and social solidarity in the community.

The leadership and the membership of the co-op can think ahead for long periods and plan the future. Planning worked in the past, which promotes confidence that it will work in the future.

Threats to the co-op are treated severely. A member sold his wheat once for a higher price to an outsider rather than selling it to the co-op. The co-op stopped buying his milk, cut his credit off, he was denied shopping in the General Store, and other members stopped talking to him. He was readmitted to the community only after having turned the excess profit he made by selling his wheat outside the co-op to the co-op.

In Dağdeviren, neighboring Dönerdere, there has also been talk of joining a co-op. This concern with a co-op has not been prompted by concerns internal to the village, but by a government program promoting an inter-village cooperation project. The Regional Directorate of cooperatives have sent agents to the village to promote the idea. Peasants have listened, but no action has resulted. The co-op which they were asked to join is headquartered in a nearby village where the peasants are of a different tribe whom the residents of Dağdeviren do not trust. During our second visit to the village, peasants were talking about how the head of the nearby co-op had usurped the funds donated as starting capital by the government. Nobody was paying their membership shares, and it was expected that the effort would end when the government donated funds were exhausted.

Some peasants in Dağdeviren would like to join the co-op in Dönerdere. Although the relations between the two villages are generally strained, the people in Dağdeviren admit that the resettled population of Dönerdere are honest and hardworking. When we inquired about the possibility of taking in members from the neighboring village, however, the reaction of the people in Dönerdere were strongly negative. They said that those from Dağdeviren would be interested in the benefits of membership, but would not live up to their obligations.

The distrust expressed by the people in Dağdeviren toward the new cooperative they were asked to join, was justified by tribal differences. We have noted earlier, however, that the village did not exhibit high community spirit, and that it had failed to conduct successful community activities. Therefore, further exploration of the situation might be useful.

A majority of the peasants in Dağdeviren are poor and illiterate. They cannot control and influence the behavior of the headman, for example. The political relationship between the leadership and the average peasant is constantly contaminated by their economic relationship. Under such circumstances, it is very difficult for everyone to distinguish between what is public and private domain. Public position becomes an instrument to be utilized in buttressing one's private position. Lack of control encourages corruption on the part of the leadership, and suspicion on the part of the ordinary peasant. The peasants recognize, for example, that the cooperative would be led by the very people who have been leading them in other affairs and whom they cannot control.

Government-sponsored projects such as cooperatives which assume participation and control by the peasants are not met with enthusiasm because the poor are not equipped with skills which can enable them to participate and control. This analysis is confirmed by the case of another village cooperative, told to us by the Regional Director of cooperatives:

In H.A. Village, we were trying to get a cooperative started. We furnished the starting capital and appointed one of the well-to-do peasants to head it until an annual meeting could be held. The man thought he had become a more important man because he had been asked by the government to lead the co-op. Other peasants lost interest since the man took the job to advance his private interest, uncontrolled by others.

The poor are apprehensive about cooperatives for another reason. They have fear of the unknown. If the experiment fails, they may not be able to bear the cost. The more prosperous will support a cooperative, if they can control it and improve their private position as a result of it. If it would threaten them, they can paralyze it by withdrawing their support and threatening poorer members with economic sanctions if they continue their affiliation.

Let us now turn to the experience of Istiklalbağ which also has a development cooperative. The initial interest in a cooperative came from two sources. The first were the shepherds in the village who had heard that they could go to Germany to work if there were a development cooperative village. The shepherds came from among the village poor who do not have enough land. It is quite apparent that a cooperative for them constituted a vehicle for employment. Once they discovered that it would require monetary contributions to form a cooperative, they lost interest.

The second source was a group of people who had extensive contacts with the outside world. Some among them were familiar with a successfully operated co-op general store at a nearby village. Others, it appears, were people originally from the village, but now working in the sub-provincial capital as teachers and petty bureaucrats. Some among them had persuaded their fathers of the desirability of a cooperative.

Those not interested in the affair included the village poor who felt it was too risky to join a cooperative and the village grocers who recognized the competition potential of a general store.

The co-op was established in 1968, the leadership coming from those who had given initial support to the idea. A building was acquired to serve as the General Store. The store itself operated very successfully in its first two years of existence. Then the man who was running it left. His replacements could not manage the business as efficiently.

The leadership of the co-op went to the government and asked for credit to develop the village. They were told that credit was given to specific projects. Viewing the projects for which credit was available, they decided on a project for chicken farming. The members did not accept the project. They found the initial investment too high, fearing that they might not be able to pay back the credit if the project failed. This fear was partly justified, in that no one had managed to go to Germany which would have insured a steady flow of income to the cooperative. Members also expressed concern that they might not be able to deal with poultry diseases.

The leadership, with its project rejected by the membership, lost interest in the cooperative. But there were other problems. Some leading members lived in the sub-provincial capital, and could not tend to co-op business regularly. It was also widely said that they were rather intolerant of criticism.

The operation of the General Store could have continued. That one man who ran it successfully left, to be replaced by a less able man was a problem which could have been dealt with by replacing the new man. The reason for the failure was more structural. Because of its meager financial means, the co-op could not extend sufficient on-credit buying to its members. Many members had to revert to buying their needs from the two grocers in the village who possessed greater means for extending credit. The business failed for lack of cash. Rumors that the store was operating at a loss and that the store manager was embezzling co-op funds, probably unfounded, served as a pretext to terminate business with the co-op.

In Istiklalbağ, the co-op effort was led by outsiders who thought it was a good idea. The experiment did not interest the poor. Its failure did not imply a significant loss for its founders. It was opposed by two grocers whose trade was affected. They might have undermined the members' confidence in the organization by initiating rumors, but their strong weapon was their economic resources which were superior to those of the cooperative.

Tirtar and Ayas also have development cooperatives. In both instances, a major motivation was to acquire fertilizer, insecticides, plastic for hothouses, and similar production inputs at below-market prices. Other motivations included frequent recommendations by town bureaucrats that a cooperative would be a good thing, and mimesis, that is, "other villages have cooperatives, so there should be one in our village."

The co-ops have not been successful. Lineage groups have competed for the domination of administration of these organizations, and those groups which have failed have lost interest, and have often refused to pay their dues. Equally important, merchants in the sub-provincial and the provincial capital have resisted the co-ops. For example, attempts at marketing the produce through the co-op have prompted a hostile reaction by middlemen, a challenge which the co-ops were unable to meet. Sellers of agricultural inputs, who also opposed the co-ops, were aided by economic conditions. Inflationary pressures reduced the operating capital of the co-ops, leading them to difficulties in buying sufficient supplies for their members and then distributing them on credit. Also the foreign exchange difficulties experienced by Turkey created a problem of insufficient imports of agricultural inputs, resulting in a general shortage. This rendered the co-ops unable to deliver to their members the major service which was expected of them.

In Ayas, some members living in two of the precincts which form part of the village wanted the co-op to borrow money from the government to dig a well and install a motor pump which would bring water to their orchards and homes. Other members refused because they would incur a debt in return for which they would receive no benefit, although the beneficiaries promised that they would pay the entire debt themselves. An eventual solution obtained by making only the beneficiaries legally indebted to the government.

The experiences of Istiklalbağ, Tirtar, and Ayas give some insights into the conditions which affect the formation and operation of development cooperatives. Peasants will take an interest in a cooperative, if it can deliver concrete results in a short span of time. If the cooperative cannot bring quick benefits, or if it stops delivering the benefits, members lose confidence and interest in them.

The cooperatives experience difficulties if members feel that its services are enjoyed more by some than by others. Therefore, activities the benefits of which may not be equitably distributed among members are likely to weaken or destroy a cooperative.

The cooperatives do not operate in an economic and political vacuum. Attempts by them to take over economic activities already performed by other actors in the economic system are met with resistance. The economic structure and the organizational unity of the cooperatives are generally weak, and make them poorly equipped to meet challenges to their successful functioning.

The cooperatives are not an instrument which appeal to the poor, subsistence peasants. Members need to have some slush funds; that is, funds which they can dispense with without a threat to their subsistence before they consider joining a cooperative.

A cooperative is not a "good" or a "bad" thing. Its encouragement as an abstraction, however, is unwarranted. Whether and how a cooperative will form and operate is closely related to the specific conditions and needs of a village.

Control of leadership in a cooperative appears to be problematical in most villages because its operation cannot be abstracted from the socio-economic power relations in a village. Professional leadership provided by government but subject to instructions from the general membership may be a way of removing the cooperative administration from the internal clashes of the village.

As the reader probably detected, village organizations cannot be discussed without alluding to organizations outside the village because the village is a part of a greater society. We will now turn to that outside world and how the peasants relate to it and how this all affects rural development.

## THE GOVERNMENT AND THE VILLAGE

### A. Introduction

"The modern state is characterized by its efforts to obliterate the divergence between the political goals of the state and those of the village" (Befu, 1967:615). Under its rule, the villages are seen as target areas which have to be integrated into the national political life and the national market economy. As the functions of government increase to penetrate new aspects of societal life, the villages also get their share. In fact, because they have been less affected by the state in earlier forms of political organization, the role of government in village life expands more rapidly than it does in urban areas where government presence has generally been stronger. Such expansion has several consequences. For example, villages become subject to many new outside forces which they cannot control. Village autonomy is eroded as the political power and the penetrative capabilities of the central government expands. On the other hand, benefits which were previously non-existent such as roads, electricity, better seeds, cheap credit to acquire modern implements, and health services are bestowed on the village (see also Befu, idem:617-619). Thus, the villages change, and a certain congruence between the aspirations of the peasants and the national policymakers are affected.

In most developing societies, a majority of the population is rural. This has rendered the peasant society the primary target for change and control by the center. The rurally based population explosion has intensified efforts to affect change in the rural areas because in most instances, rural overpopulation and poverty has been gradually translated into urban poverty. Peasant uprisings

and urban disturbances breed on this excess, underfed, underclad, unemployed population. Achievement of political stability and economic development in most developing societies is closely related to the abilities of central governments to design programs which will reduce the rate of population, and the rate of unemployment and underemployment (see also Myrdal, New Left Review 36:65-74).

In many developing societies the strategies of central governments to realize change and control appear to be based on three principles:

a) realization of national economic growth through industrialization. Agriculturally based rural economies are given a secondary role in this process of producing raw materials, and enough food to feed the country.

b) Conviction that centrally initiated, directed, and controlled policies are the only methods for realizing modernization, economic development and general societal change. Ideological orientations and political organizations differ across countries, but seeing politics and economics as a top to down process is widely shared.

c) Assumption that inputs from the international system such as capital and technology will be forthcoming (see also Development Dialogue, 1977/2:11).

These principles all bring the national centers to the forefront. It is assumed that change at the urban levels will trickle down to the rural areas. Policies, specifically designed for rural areas, on the other hand, are often utilized as instruments to achieve centrally determined goals.

## B. Turkish Government and the Turkish Peasant

The Ottoman Empire did not have a peasant problem. There were occasional peasant rebellions to be sure, but they were local affairs, and law and order were restored by agents of the Emperor without much difficulty.

The traditional Ottoman government, like most pre-industrial governments, was concerned with two main tasks: the maintenance of order and the collection of taxes. For both, armed forces were indispensable, and were maintained by taxes they helped collect. Both also required a political hierarchy, a bureaucratic organization, and at least in the towns, legal and judicial institutions. To the peasants, such a government is a kind of legitimate robber, legitimate because of the superior social rank of its agents, and justified because it is ordained by God. Political loyalty and obedience is owed not to a social entity, the Empire, not to specific officials, but to a remote individual, the Padishah"

(Stirling, 1965:267).

The founding of the Republic did not at the outset fundamentally alter the role of government in rural life. During the Independence War preceding the Republic, the peasants had been mobilized by the Nationalists to end the occupation of the country by foreign powers. With the emergence of the Republic, the Ottoman-style relationship between the peasants and the national government was gradually restored. The peasantry was honored in public statements made by the leadership. But in practice, nation substituted for God as the source of legitimacy, and bureaucrats continued to view the peasants as subjects from whom obedience was due.

In the first decade of the Republic, some measures, appearing to favor the peasants were adopted. Aşar, the rural tax collected in kind was repealed, and the institution of tax farming was abolished. A monetary tax, collected by the agents of the central government was introduced in its place.

The establishment of the Republic had marked the victory of a westernist Ottoman bureaucratic elite (Turan, 1981). This elite was committed to the cultural westernization of the country. The strategy of change adopted was the consolidation and the expansion of a corps of central elites who would eventually penetrate the countryside. Within this frame of thinking, the peasants were a real stumbling block, because they were the strongest source of resistance to cultural change. Persuasion was not something which the bureaucrats were used to and it failed to be effective in most cases, anyway. Coercion became a usual instrument for securing rural compliance. Gendarmes (rural police) was used to make peasants send their children to school, police kept the peasants away from disrupting the modern appearance of the main avenues in major cities.

Rural agricultural modernization in this period took the form of building huge model farms, which would produce examples of what modern farming would be like. These farms, operated by the state, were generally viewed by the peasants as government outfits not much related to their daily lives.

The rural population began to receive attention by the nationalist-centralist elite, only after the alliance between them and the commercial elites-local notables coalition was disrupted toward the end of the Second World War. Wealth accumulated in private hands during the war was attempted to be taxed by the government which had exhausted its means during the wartime mobilization efforts. The ensuing struggle between these elites paved the way to a transition to multi-party politics (for a discussion of this transition, see Turan, 1969 and 1981).

Both the newly established Democratic Party and the Republican People's Party, the party of the bureaucratic elite, began to court the peasants starting in 1946. After all, the country was still rural and it was the peasants who would determine the outcome of the

elections.

The RPP relaxed its modernization--secularization policies slowly, and as early as 1945, produced a land reform, which remained in the books except for distribution of some government owned land. The peasants' sense of suspicion of the bureaucratic elite was so strong, however, that such measures proved hardly sufficient to arrest a landslide victory by the Democrats in the elections of 1950. The Turkish peasant had entered national political life. His votes had changed a government, long thought to be unchangable, and he knew it.

Three other developments concomitant with the change of government but not a consequence of it, brought a new livelihood to many Turkish villages. The first was a shift of transportation policy from railroads to highways. The shift had been recommended by foreign experts and adopted as a policy by the single party government in 1948. Highway building equipment was provided by the United States under the Marshall Aid Program. The construction of highways going near villages resulted in a significant transformation of the rural scene. Towns and cities became more accessible. Peasants and produce could go out of the village much more easily now.

A second development, partly deriving from American assistance programs again was the beginnings of the mechanization of agriculture. The tractor revolutionized the rural landscape in two ways. First it was an important vehicle of transport, which when tied in with the highway construction improved peasant access to town and markets. Second, it was a machine which made it possible to expand production. Here is how a man from Ballihisar described what happened:

Before the tractor, most of us could not plow all our fields. It took too long and the season would pass too soon. Just before the harvest season, there would not be enough food to go around. When the first crop was ready, we all went to that field and harvested it. The wheat was distributed among the villagers. Now, no need for that.

The tractor not only increased the productive potential of the farmland, but along with roads, improved the economic standing of the peasant.

The third development was an unplanned favor by nature. Between 1951-1954, each year there was a bumper crop such that Turkey became one of the world's major producers and exporters of wheat and cotton. Many villages had achieved a level of wealth which would have been thought to be inconceivable by them only a decade ago. This also meant the emergence of new consumption needs and the stimulation of the market economy.

The improved political potential of the village as well as its economic betterment gave way to new demands on the government. New mosques, drinking water, a road, electricity, schools, agricultural

credits, health facilities were typical demands. Such demands, which do not in the short run challenge the existing power relationships in the village continue to dominate peasant requests from the government today. Added to the list, however, are high support prices for products which come under supportive buying schemes, and inexpensive availability of agricultural inputs.

Until the 1950s, village projects of an infra-structural nature were financed by joint contributions of the village and the government. Gradually, successor governments have eased the requirements regarding village shares. Although this may reflect the political wisdom of government parties, it has modified peasant expectations about government in an undesirable way from a perspective of mobilizing resources for rural development. The government has come to be viewed as a benevolent giver, not a helping hand in development efforts. Hence the burden is placed on the government to furnish it all, straining government resources, whereas local potential is not mobilized. Therefore, less than what is possible is done. The experiences of Istiklalpağ with regard to an irrigation project is a prime example. The village applied for the construction of a water collection pool and some irrigation canals in 1978. The Soil Conservation and Land Reclamation officer in the provincial capital negotiated with the peasants that the government would provide the cement and the village the sand, the stone and the labor for the project. Judging that they could get all of this free, a delegation of villagers went to Ankara to the Ministry. Because their village had steadily voted for the party then in government, they were able to convert the project into a government investment, removing the necessity for any village contribution. That the option of total financing from the government may be available reduces local desires to contribute to development projects. It is politically difficult to change this relationship. Because agricultural incomes are not taxed effectively, the urban parts of Turkey finance to a great extent rural development efforts, reducing the overall resources available for national economic development.

### C. Policymaking in the National Capital

The Turkish state is a heavily centralized organization. Decisions are made in the capital and executed by agents of the central government in the provinces and the sub-provinces. The tradition of local government is not strong, it is largely irrelevant in the case of rural areas. The only form of local government is municipal government. A unit needs a population of 2500 or more to establish municipal government; few villages are of that size. There is also a provincial assembly, but it is more fiction than reality. The peasants deal with their government through bureaucrats, who are appointed by the central government, and who are accountable to it. These people are then the nerves of government on the local scene.

As is characteristic of centralized administration, the flow of messages from the center are voluminous. The flow of messages from the periphery to the center are more limited. The bureaucrats in

this system are likely to perceive themselves more as representatives of the center than as representatives of the periphery to the center. This analysis suggests that national decisions regarding rural areas are often made without significant inputs from the field.

Let us briefly discuss the example of the soya-bean project to illustrate how a project was conceived and executed. In 1977, the country had begun to experience a shortage of cooking oil. A directorate in the Ministry of Agriculture developed a proposal, suggesting the raising of soya beans would be an ideal solution, particularly because it could be planted as a second crop, not intervening with the standard crop of the locality; it would enrich the soil in certain respects, and it would supplement peasant income. The Ministry accepted the project and imported soya bean seeds. Each provincial office was allotted a quota of seeds. Head provincial officers then invited sub-provincial officers and allocated a quota of seeds to each. It was incumbent on the sub-provincial office to find farmers who would be willing to plant soya beans.

In this particular example, to render the planting of soya beans more attractive, the Ministry initially decided that it would help those who raised them with the marketing of the produce. After the planting had been done, it changed its mind. The brave souls who had planted soya beans were left with their crop because it was too small to be marketed profitably by individual farmers. A local agricultural officer complained that his credibility was undermined and added: "No one ever bothered to ask us at the outset whether soya beans could even be grown in this district."

This example is not unique. It is common for the national ministries to perceive "rational" solutions without a sense of the empirical reality. It may be useful to examine the assumptions made by the national decision-makers regarding rural areas and projects and compare them with our field observations to identify problems which might come up in successful implementation of projects.

The decision-maker tends to think of village as a stereotype. His ideas are colored by his own personal knowledge, experience and judgements. In a changing society with a heterogeneous climate, land and population such as Turkey, any stereotyping might be misleading. It is to be admitted that national level policymaking cannot take into account specific variations among various villages, but this does not justify an assumption that most villages are alike. Securing inputs from the local branches systematically would probably serve a very useful purpose in allowing for local variations and pre-empting the problems which might be encountered in policy execution as would leaving more flexibility to local decision-makers.

The rationale employed by the national decision-maker and the rationale dictated by village conditions do not always coincide. For example, the Ministry of Village Works and cooperatives has designed a rug-making project. It appears attractive because

weaving can be done in spare time, not competing for time with agriculture. Female labor, not always fruitfully utilized, may also be recruited to rug weaving which is an in-house affair. The problem is that a minimum of fifty production sets are required. The Regional Director of cooperatives in Province I commented: "There are few villages in Turkey which are large enough to make that kind of investment." The economies of scale reasoning which was probably behind the original decision ran ashore in the face of the reality of the size of the ordinary Turkish village.

Another example is the breeding of local sheep with the Merino kind imported from Australia. The argument was that the mixed breed would yield more meat, more milk, and more and higher quality wool. The provincial chief-veterinarians were instructed to propagate the idea. Some peasants in İstiklalbağ and Ballinisar decided to experiment, but abandoned the project after two years. The peasants explained what the national decision-makers had forgotten about. "The Merino sheep requires more intensive care than we can give our animals because we have fields to take care of, too. Also these animals are too tender to stand our harsh climate, and the constant shifting of grazing land because there is not enough grass." There has been renewed interest in İstiklalbağ to the adoption of Merino breeding as sheep raising has become extremely profitable.

It is usually assumed by the national decision-makers that peasants will respond to material stimuli. Anthropologists who have studied peasant economic behavior have drawn attention to the fact that such an assumption may only be partly true. Chayanov has argued, for example, that peasant motivations are different than that of the capitalist; they aim at securing the needs of the family rather than make a profit (Related in Basile Kerblay in Shanin, 1971:151). Pointing to the basically social rather than economic way of reasoning observed among peasants, Shanin explains:

What sometimes remains overlooked is the fact that the stupidity exposed by peasants is not necessarily evidence of an absence of thought, but rather a frame of reference and patterns of thought peculiar to the group and actually serving their needs well (1971:246-47).

Scott, studying peasant behavior in southeast Asia has alluded to the subsistence ethic (1970: passim). Living close to the margin, peasants in pre-capitalist societies, Scott argues, are more inclined to minimize their risk than maximize their gain. Maximizing their gain requires taking risks. Risk by its nature is unpredictable, and failure might threaten existence. Ortiz has observed in Columbia that the peasant distinguishes between his activities which are guided by subsistence considerations and those which relate to the market. He does not sell food but behaves like an economic man, selling his coffee (Ortiz in Shanin, 1971:328).

Another dimension of the limits of market stimuli is pointed to by Stirling (1965:97), and we also encountered similar reasoning in our own observations. After a peasant achieved what he considers a sufficient income to meet his needs, he is not interested in

acquiring material wealth, because there is little he can do with it.

Turkish villages are too varied to speculate as to what kind of economic ethic might be operative. However, we can relate impressions. First, economic security, if not subsistence considerations, are important. This is not surprising since many non-peasants including corporation presidents behave in a similar fashion. Second, the lower the level of economic prosperity of the village, the greater the attention paid to subsistence considerations. A corollary of this observation at the individual level is that the poorer the peasant, the more he is concerned with subsistence, and the less with the maximization of economic gain. Third, the motivation to maximize gain is reduced after the peasant achieves a state of economic well-being considered as being satisfactory by himself.

Do these observations have implications for policymaking at the national level? First, it is important to be aware of the limits of the positive response to economic stimuli assumption. Second, policies may be designed so as to be responsive to the security considerations of the peasant. Third, policies may take into consideration the question of what is to be done with excess economic potential which may form as a result of successful policy implementation.

National decision-makers are usually not concerned with all the consequences of policies they formulate, but only those consequences in which they are interested. Referring to technical improvements, Galeski notes:

Technical improvements change methods of labor long established as the norm through education within the family and thus come up against the farmer's conservatism. In changing method of work, technical improvements also change the allocation of responsibilities in the family or lead to their inequitable distribution. Finally, they change the existing mode of family life, habits, patterns of activity established over generations. One cannot therefore isolate problems deriving from the introduction of improvements into peasant families from analysis of the entire system of village life based on that kind of agriculture (1965:50).

In GÜneren, there is a government irrigation project. A huge dam is in the process of construction which will irrigate the plain on which the village is located. Because of elevation differences, every field in GÜneren will not be able to receive irrigation water from the canals. Those fields not benefiting from the dam will be provided with water from artesian wells. Since it is easier and cheaper to open artesian wells, the government has already opened a number of wells in the village. Unequal benefit has threatened the power balance in the village. The beneficiaries of artesian wells are doing better and the rest are jealous. The result is frequent destruction of pumps and canals by unidentified persons.

This example points to the necessity of socio-technical thinking as opposed to purely technical thinking in the formulation and execution of policy.

Policymakers tend to perceive the village as a totality. In this frame, a point often escapes attention. Villages are not homogeneous and conflict-free entities. Therefore, any policy carries different implications and means different consequences for different segments of the village society. Of course, in a major policy like land reform, the intention is to change the socio-economic structure of the village, but in policymaking as usual, the assumption of a village as a homogeneous entity is substituted for a differentiated village. The result is policies which do not challenge the existing power relations in a village are more likely to be successful than those which might challenge them. The previous example on the irrigation project in GÜneren may be recalled here to clarify the point. It appears, particularly in cases of polarized distribution of land and wealth, class-neutral government policies are adjusted on the local scene so as not to run counter to dominant interests (see also Development Dialogue, 1977/2:119).

There is finally a difference between the policymaker's conception of time and the future and that of the peasant. Bourdieu has suggested that there are two perceptions of time: round time and time as arrow (Cited in Bailey in Shanin, 1971:315-16). Policymakers think in terms of time as an arrow and make long range plans. Peasants, on the other hand, find it difficult to envision what things would be like five or ten years from now. This implies that, while policies may be made with long range intentions, their application and presentation should be such that peasants should not be expected to think in those terms. It further means that policies should bring some benefit to the peasant in "round time" if his interest and support in policy execution is to be obtained.

In conclusion, the transformation of the rural areas as intended by governments may not be successful unless grass roots support is mustered. In order to secure greater support for policies, greater familiarity with how village societies operate, and how the peasant mind works is needed.

Many rural development programs designed at the national center, not sufficiently cognizant of the characteristics of the periphery which they are trying to change, experience difficulties. Our impression relating to Turkey is that little analysis of what went wrong is done, thus paving the way to other programs which encounter difficulties. In the case of a lack of success, there are three options open to national decision-makers. First, blaming the peasant for being unintelligent, backward and lazy. Second, coercing the peasant into doing what he does not do voluntarily. Third, analyzing what went wrong and why.

The first option may give self-satisfaction to the decision-maker, but does not promote progress. It may also increase his tendency to resort to the second option, that of coercion.

Rarely, however, does a political system have enough power which it can consistently apply to the village societies so as to transform them drastically. In a politically competitive society, politics imposes constraints on the employment of coercion as a policy tool. Therefore, as Bailey has expressed:

...the modernizer cannot compel, but must persuade; to do this, he must know what values the people already hold, how they see the world and the society around them. In short, he must know their cognitive maps. In this situation, knowledge is a substitute for--one might say a kind of--power; with an adequate map--an adequate understanding of the traditional way of life--the modernizer can most economically and most effectively deploy his limited resources (Bailey in Shanin, 1971:300).

#### D. The Government at the Provincial and Sub-Provincial Level and the Peasant

The organization of government agencies below the ministries in the national capital follows, for the most part, the administrative organization model of the country. The province (il) is the largest administrative unit. A town, frequently the largest city, serves as the provincial capital. It has a governor (vali) appointed by the Ministry of Interior. Most of the ministries have representatives at this level. The next is the sub-province (ilce). The national administration at this level is headed by a sub-provincial governor (kaymakam). Next down the line is district (bucak) headed by a director (bucak müdürü). This last administrative unit has lost its importance in recent years. It is usually marked by the existence of a rural police station (jandarma) but it is rare that any other government office exists in it, and therefore it is not relevant in a study of rural development. Finally, there is the village itself. Apart from the elected headman who serves the double function of representing the village vis-a-vis higher echelons of government, and representing the government in the village (the Council of Elders, as indicated earlier, is not very important), there are public service personnel in the village, such as schoolteachers, the preacher, and on occasion other personnel.

In recent years, some divisions in ministries have found it more functional to organize along regional lines. A region is defined differently according to each division. For example, State Water Works and Directorate of cooperatives have different regional arrangements.

The peasant comes into contact with government officials at all levels, but apart from the village itself, the typical contact point is the sub-provincial capital. Traveling further than the sub-provincial capital is usually not only more expensive, but also administrative tradition requires that contacts start at the lowest level and move up the administrative ladder.

There are various reasons why a contact may occur between peasants and government officials. The first reason is what may be called procedural or routine. If a peasant wants to get a driver's license, if he is poor, or aged with no one to take care of him, and wants old age pension, his applications have to be processed at the sub-provincial center. Legal problems would also fall into this category, although here the relationship is more complicated because there may be divergences between local traditions and national laws.

A second type of contact may be called ordinary service contacts. There are a number of services provided regularly by the government which a peasant may take advantage of, but whether he uses them is dependent on his volition. Some of these, like the health services, are not specifically designed for rural areas. Others, by their nature are rural-oriented. Technical Agricultural Services and veterinary services would be two examples. Here the contact may take place in the village or in the sub-provincial or provincial center.

A third type of contact relates to the control activities of the government. Here the contact is usually not initiated by the peasant, but occurs as a result of the activities of government agents. Scanning the countryside to see that not more than the licensed area is used for tobacco growing purposes come to mind for this type.

These three types of contacts, it might be noticed, do not directly involve the village community, but the peasants as individuals.

A fourth type of contact takes place when people request services from the government in the name of their community. This usually occurs at the sub-provincial and the provincial center. On occasion, a delegation of peasants may also travel to the national capital to plead their case. Such requests may include the construction of a road, the building of a reservoir or the appointment of an imam to the village mosque.

Finally, contacts with the village community may be initiated through visits by government officials either by visiting a village, or by their inviting village leaders to the sub-provincial, and on occasion, to the provincial capital.

From the perspective of rural development, ordinary service contacts, community requests for service and government initiatives for service to the village are more important. In the following pages, we will discuss the factors which may affect these contacts between government agencies and personnel and the peasants.

Let us begin by looking at the bureaucrats. These people, on the whole, perceive themselves to be a part of a national bureaucratic elite, marked by superior education and status. They are periodically moved around to different posts and many do not have specific local attachments.

They are members of a hierarchical bureaucratic organization and are accountable to their superiors. They are indirectly accountable to politicians through their Minister who himself is a politician.

Education in Turkey has gone hand-in-hand with a distaste for manual labor. In many instances, we observed that even officials whose job required traveling to the villages and an exertion of manual effort tended to prefer spending their time in their offices. His room and his desk appeared to be the place where the Turkish bureaucrat felt most at home.

It is, of course, misleading to suggest that all bureaucrats are alike, and behave in a similar fashion. Differences between them can be discerned. First, there are differences among government officials with regard to their level of education. Our observations lead to the following proposition: The university graduates are more likely to value desk jobs and exhibit claims of superiority and distance to the peasants than high or middle school graduates. Let us take the example of the Technical Agricultural Services. This service, operated by the Ministry of Agriculture, is staffed by two groups of people. The first are the agricultural engineers, graduates of agricultural colleges. The second is comprised of agricultural technicians, who have received their training at a vocational school, the agricultural high school.

Because of their higher level of education, the engineers are inclined to defer on-field duties to the technicians. The technicians who have more practical knowledge to begin with interact more frequently with the peasants, and have an opportunity to broaden their knowledge with experience. Their more modest social background makes it easier for them and for the peasants to communicate with each other. In turn, peasants refer to them more often for their needs.

The more difficult access to agricultural engineers may not exclusively be a function of their role perception, but also a defensive mechanism. Many engineers have learned about agriculture from books, and do not have field experience. An engineer, who had studied in an agricultural college in Eastern Turkey, explained frankly:

Our training is limited to books. As you know, over there (college town) the climate is very harsh. We could not get out to the field. When the crops would begin to grow in the late spring, we would be preparing for final exams. Then we all left for vacation.

Villagers, in many instances, expressed skepticism about engineers, and told stories about how they failed to distinguish plant from weed, or wheat from barley. We should note that the only two people we met in Technical Agricultural Services who kept a record of local production, size of animal stock, and other similar items were technicians who had learned it at school and not engineers, who, one might conclude, had not learned it at school.

There are differences between bureaucrats with regard to social backgrounds. Petty officials, for example, tend to come from peasant backgrounds. Although these officials are not decision-makers, they have access to higher echelon bureaucrats, and may guide the peasants on what they should do to produce the desired results. We have already indicated that the agricultural technicians communicate more easily with peasants for similar reasons.

Some bureaucrats are from local origins whereas others are strangers to the community. While it may be predicted that localness may be an advantage because local people would be more familiar with local tradition and local problems, our observations suggest that this may not always be the case. There are two types of problems which come up with regard to locals. First, the place of the bureaucrat in the local status system and his public role tends to get confused. Whether such confusion derives from impression or from behavior is irrelevant. It tends to undermine the confidence peasants place in the office. This is, it should be added, applicable to higher level bureaucrats, and loses its importance as one moves down the administrative ladder. Second, locals may have local interests which they may follow at the expense of their public duty. The pest control officer in Province "U", for example, appeared more concerned with his own fields than with his public duty. The assistant Land Reform Officer, on the other hand, told us that although he had a very difficult job, he could at least stand equidistant from all parties concerned because he was a stranger.

A local or a stranger, an official has to spend some time in his job in a particular locale before he becomes familiar with the conditions under which he will operate, to acquire familiarity with the clientele he will serve and to get acquainted with the problems which he will be asked to help solve. In recent years, the turnover rates of bureaucrats in a given locale has been high. Thus a lot of time is wasted by bureaucrats, not through their fault, in becoming familiar with their environment. By the time they may be ready to operate effectively, they may be leaving for another job (on this point, see Fisek, 1970).

Leaving the bureaucrats, let us now turn to the institutional capabilities of the government organizations which serve the villages. An unidentified stranger visiting Turkey is alleged to have said: "In this country the people are rich but the government is poor." Although such an observation might not be valid, at least not throughout the country, it captures one dimension of Turkish administrative life: the means available to the government agencies exceeds what is expected of them. By making this observation, I do not mean to imply that I am unaware of the fact that in government service, as in economics, demands are unlimited while the supply is limited. Rather, I am pointing to a management problem. Let me explain what I mean by way of examples. In every Technical Agricultural Service office, in every government veterinarian's office, we encountered the same problem. There were enough experts, but they were confined to their offices because there were not

enough vehicles for them to travel to villages to offer services. The few vehicles available were generally in poor condition, and most offices had already exhausted their allowances for fuel.

The investment agencies such as State Resettlement Offices are plagued with another problem. Their machine park is generally in better condition, they have projects but they have insufficient funds to realize their agenda.

The Agricultural Equipment and Supplies Office is yet marked by another problem. It carries a large stock of machine parts and fertilizers. Its stock is large because it often carries the wrong kind of things, that is, things which do not have high local demand. They do not keep good records of demand trends. When we inquired about fertilizer sales, for example, many offices engaged in on-the-spot calculations of the demand for various fertilizers three or four years ago.

Who enjoys the services of the government agencies? We have to distinguish between services the benefits of which go to individuals and those the benefits of which are enjoyed collectively. There is also an intermediate category where a benefit bearing a risk is extended to some in the hope that others will be inspired to benefit too. Experimenting with a new seed, a new fertilizer, are benefits of this kind.

At the level of individual benefits, peasants with more resources are more likely to go to town, establish contacts with officials and solicit information, advice, material benefits if these are available. A peasant who is wealthier than his co-villagers, more literate, more familiar with town ways achieves greater success.

The same is true in getting officials to come to the village. If there is a crop disease, if animals are sick, it is the wealthier peasant who can afford to hire transportation and pay for the fuel of the office jeep or truck to bring the expert to the village.

Let us repeat here an observation which was made earlier. The villages which have a higher level of economic prosperity and a more equitable distribution of wealth are likely to have a greater number of peasants who are able to mobilize government services for their own ends. In sub-province "O", all the officials knew about Ünerdere. "They always come, they always inquire, we don't have to go to them," was the typical official response. With regard to Dağdeviren, the response was different. "They don't have much to do with government. The headman comes and goes."

In the introduction of new seeds, fertilizers and similar innovations, the system is built so that if a benefit is to be enjoyed, it will go to the experimenter. The typical method of taking an agricultural innovation is the demonstration method. Although the government operates its own demonstration stations, there cannot be one in every village. Therefore, land belonging to one or more peasants is employed. The government may bear the

entire burden of the experiment, or may provide incentives such as free seed. The method used is to identify and enlist the support of villagers who are "model farmers."

What are the characteristics of model farmers? The criteria employed to identify model farmers is reasonably standard. First, of course, the village in which a demonstration will be conducted is to be selected. Apart from the natural consideration that the climate and the soil of the village should be suitable for the crop, preference goes to villages more easily accessible to agricultural experts. Access, however, has two dimensions. One dimension of it pertains to the physical access to a village. Does the village have a good road, is it close to the sub-provincial capital so that it can be visited frequently by experts? The second dimension relates to the attitude of the decision-maker. The question here is whether the agricultural expert considers the village accessible. His previous experience, the reputation of the village among other experts, impressions about the village from in-town contacts with the peasants, results in a judgement on whether the village would be a worthwhile place to attempt a demonstration. Here, then, is a pre-selection process which favors villages already open to experiment and innovation.

Within the village, discretion is exercised both with regard to field, and with regard to who owns it. The field itself should not be substandard in its soil quality, and it should be on the roadside. The owner of the field should, on the other hand, be relatively well-off, and own more land than is necessary for his subsistence. As an agricultural expert noted: "They don't want to starve, if the experiment fails." He should be an "enterprising" man, meaning a man who knows how to talk, who interacts frequently with the agricultural expert. And he should have a high standing in his community; he should be listened to by other peasants.

The guidelines followed in the selection of demonstration sites favor villages already somewhat more developed than other villages in the vicinity, and within each village, the better-off are favored. This is in general conformity with studies on the diffusion of innovations (Rogers and Shoemaker, 1971). That is, an innovation is diffused gradually, and it is adopted by the poorer, less-educated only after its value has been proven, but there are three ways in which inequalities may be introduced, or the existing inequalities reinforced through these methods. If the innovation is profitable, but requires substantial investment, the poor may not be able to adopt it, even though they may appreciate that it is a good thing. Alternatively, if the innovation requires skills and technology which is perceived to be too complicated, then its application may be limited to the more prosperous peasants, helping them to widen the socio-economic distance between themselves and the other peasants. This appears to be the case in Gundas, where the village is dominated by a landlord.

The adoption of innovation in one village may or may not encourage other villages to adopt it. In some instances, there may simply not be enough communication and interaction. In other

instances, those villages which have adopted innovations may be perceived to be so different (the differences may include perceiving the innovating village as being favored or supported more by the government) that other villagers may not see that what is done has relevance to them. This seems to be the case with Dönerdere. When the village was built by the government as a model village, the anticipation was that it would contribute to the development of the neighboring villages by serving as an example. For the most part, this has not been the case. As noted earlier, Dönerdere has not been a welcome addition to the environment, and its relations with the neighboring villages are tense. There is minimum interaction. In addition, in a neighboring village such as Dağdeviren, peasants perceive three types of difference between them and those living in Dönerdere, leading them to treat the model village as being irrelevant from their perspective. First, they recognize correctly that the villagers from Dönerdere are more educated and better-skilled than themselves. That is, they can get new things, use them, and cope more effectively with problems which arise. Second, they assume, possibly incorrectly, that they could not rely on the advice and support of people from Dönerdere if they adopted innovations successfully tried in the model village. Third, they assume, semi-correctly, that government support extended to Dönerdere which they think would not be extended to them, is a major factor in the successful adoption of innovations in the new village. Note that the third assumption is semi-correct. The assumption is not justified because government agencies do not have any reason to prefer one village over another. It is justified, however, from the viewpoint that the peasants in Dönerdere are more capable of asking for government support and getting it.

Finally, a process which operates in government-village relations leads the more prosperous villages to become the greater beneficiaries of government services, projects, and other benefits. The process may be described briefly as follows: Those villages which are more developed, more prosperous, more open to innovations, are selected by government agencies for their new experiments and projects because they are more likely to be successful. And, indeed, this often turns out to be the case. Thus, the officials are content and become more favorably disposed toward villages where there has been successful experiments and projects. The villagers, on the other hand, having benefited, become more inclined to get new projects from the government. They also improve their skills and abilities to extract new resources from government officials and agencies. In this way, villages already ahead move ahead more rapidly, while those behind begin to lag further behind through a process where government benefits create a cumulative developmental effect in favor of the former.

Dönerdere, for example, was contacted by the Technical Agricultural Services to serve as the center for a stud bull station. Knowing in advance that breeding animals with superior kinds would improve both the milk production and the market value of their animals, the village decided to cooperate. The government provided the materials and the village the labor for the construction of a barn. The government then appointed a salaried

caretaker, and the village undertook to feed the oulls for five years. To produce satisfactory feed for the animals, the Technical Agricultural Services intervened again, to promote the raising of Kocuyoga. This was raised on village communal lands; excess over what the animals would consume was sold to whoever wanted it, thus supplementing the income of the village organization.

It should be recognized that the process of cumulative development obtaining from government-village cooperation, which I have described above, is intended to serve as an ideal-type. It points to a major tendency. There are, naturally, countervailing forces such as the norm of equal treatment of villages constraining the bureaucrats, and the political power of villages which is sometimes mobilized to direct bureaucratic attention to specific villages.

In projects where the benefits are less divisible, villages are on more equal grounds. Projects such as roads, drinking water, or a health service building do not produce benefits which can be enjoyed by some and easily denied to others. These services are often provided free, and do not require continuous cooperation of the village as a collectivity or peasants as individuals. Regarding projects such as those cited as examples, government agencies make plans at the provincial level which are incorporated into the annual program of the concerned ministry after a review. After the enactment of the annual budget, the local branches of each ministry are given instructions regarding projects they should implement. The local branch or extension of a ministry has some flexibility in reordering priorities in its plans without exceeding the budgetary limits. Some projects may also be cancelled for lack of sufficient funds. Funds may be insufficient either because expenditures may exceed anticipated costs because of rising costs, or because the expected revenue from the state budget is not realized.

The flexibilities which exist both at the ministries and at the provincial level, as well as the fact that the possibility of having villages' requests incorporated into the proposed annual plan exists, makes for competition between villages to get their projects done first.

Local extensions of ministries follow guidelines in making their plans. Larger villages get priorities, for example, in road and school construction. A village centrally located in comparison to others may get the health building because of relatively easy access to it from the surrounding villages. Nevertheless, these guidelines are not hard and fast, and there is always room for judgement on the part of the bureaucrats who make the plans. The villages compete for the favors of bureaucrats. Favor may be obtained through persuasion, persistence, goodwill gestures like inviting the bureaucrat out to the village for a feast, or getting a prominent person in town such as a lawyer or a merchant to plead their case or alternatively, by mobilizing political pressure on the bureaucrat through the provincial or sub-provincial leadership of national political parties, and through the deputies of the province in the National Assembly. Because the vote of each peasant counts

the same, villages have similar chances in affecting government behavior through politics. We shall now turn to a brief examination of how Turkish peasants relate to political parties.

#### E. The Political Parties and the Peasant

In the transition to multi-party politics, the Democratic Party, the new challenger to the Republican People's Party, had scored its electoral victory by mobilizing the masses against bureaucratic domination typical of the single-party era. It is during the reign of the D.P. between 1950-1960 that the Turkish village got a flavor of competitive politics with its positive and negative consequences. Because of their voting potential, the D.P. was responsive to rural needs and they were catered to. Because, however, the party cleavage was introduced on top of the already existing cleavages in rural society, it tended to strengthen divisive tendencies existent in many villages. In fact, what up to the introduction of competitive politics had been purely local, acquired broader dimensions since it was now linked up with a national organization.

Taking into cognizance the unpleasant consequences of having party branches at the village level, the Constitution of 1961 outlawed village level political party organizations, while placing no restrictions on the peasant-citizens to become members of political parties through sub-provincial party organizations.

Politics is the instrument through which the peasant can affect harmony between his choices and those of government and the state bureaucracy. If the peasant feels incompetent to handle a problem with the government, he will enlist the assistance of an intermediary. Whose help he will want and what he will want him to do is related to the nature of his problem. For personal problems, the advice of a storekeeper from whom he buys regularly or the guidance of a petty official he knows may be sufficient. For legal matters, it may be necessary to consult a lawyer.

Referring to a political figure may occur under two circumstances. With regard to personal matters, a political contact may become necessary if other channels fail to produce action. In matters of broader scope, including community problems, a political contact may provide the beginning point, or it may be initiated if attempts with government agencies fail to make any or satisfactory progress. Sometimes, a political contact may be recommended by a bureaucrat, if the latter is supportive of a request, but it is not within his decision-making powers to grant it, or granting it could only be justified on political grounds.

Peasants interact with political figures more comfortably than they do with bureaucrats. Here the rules of the interaction are known. The political figures extend sympathy, understanding, guidance, help, and sometimes leadership to peasants and village leadership. In return, they expect their votes.

The major contact point of peasants, political figures and political organizations is the sub-provincial center. Near election time, candidates and incumbent deputies may visit villages, but our impression is that the villagers are reasonably skeptical of electioneering visits and are aware that these visits are not likely to produce results.

Contacts in the provincial center are less frequent, and take place only when a problem is important enough that such a contact is warranted. The sub-provincial organization may act as an intermediary in such contacts, unless there are among the village leaders political activists who are known to the provincial organizations.

For matters of great importance, a village leader or a delegation may take a trip to the nation's capital. The contact in the capital is generally not the national organization of a political party, but one or a number of deputies from the province, through whom peasant leaders may reach high ranking bureaucrats, the ministers, and, on rare occasions, even the prime minister.

Political organizations affect the distribution of governmental benefits several ways. Political interventions, for example, may expedite the decisions and actions of government agencies and bureaucrats. They may force officials to pay attention to problems which they have failed to in the past.

Political organizations at the sub-provincial and provincial level are usually not able to increase the resources available for rural development, but they influence their distribution within the province and the sub-province. In whose favor? Remembering that, political parties in power have the upper hand in the distribution of governmental rewards, those villages who have voted in the majority for those parties in power get a distribution in their favor. Here are two comments: "Whatever the government has given us has been under the Democratic and Justice Party Governments. When the Republicans came to power nobody would listen to us" (Istiklalbağ), and "Ecevit (RPP) built us our road" (Dağdeviren).

Villages which vote solidly for one party and villages which steadily vote over time for the same party tend to gain more if and when the party they have supported gets into power. The losers in this game try to compensate for their disadvantage by relying more on the bureaucrats (see also Stirling, 1965:281-82).

Economic prosperity of a village and the means available to the formal village organization facilitate their contacts with political organizations at all levels. For example, the headman in Dağdeviren would not entertain going to the national capital for village business because the village organization cannot finance it. The headman in Damarasi has gone to Ankara several times because the village has funds to pay for his trip.

Let us finally note that political connections may serve as an instrument of domination and control in villages where land and wealth distribution is polarized. This appeared to be the case in GÜndas where the landlord was able to hold the landless peasants in political line through the availability of massive economic sanctions at his disposal against defectors. In return, the political party with which he had close connections helped him meet challenges to his authority by supporting him in his dealings with government agencies.

Political parties in a competitive framework, irrespective of their professed ideology, are interested in maximizing their voting support. This creates a tendency, particularly among the local organizations, to work with the existing power distribution in a community rather than totally challenging it. That the national distribution of power and citizen preferences are different than what obtains at a particular locale enables the national leadership to pursue policies which may challenge existing power relationships in the latter, but local branches of political parties do not strike us as instruments dedicated or noticeably interested in realizing structural change, particularly in rural areas where social stratification is not clearly delineated, and where social class is not a very meaningful concept. Fringe groups advocating radical change have not been well received by major political parties and by the peasantry.

The emergence of the peasantry as a national voting force in Turkey has, however, modified the economic status of the rural areas, if not always the individual peasants. As Varlier has noted:

During the 1948-1976 period, price indices for agricultural products have risen more rapidly than either that of industrial products or other non-agricultural products. For the period in question, agricultural price indices increased fifteenfold as compared to twelvefold in industrial and non-agricultural price indices...Equally interesting is the point that agricultural price indices rose more rapidly in the election years or the years preceding an election (1978:3-5).

#### F. The National Economic Institutions and the Peasants

In the preceding sections, we have discussed how the peasants relate to the national economy through production, marketing and consumption. Although we have briefly alluded to credits, we have not discussed the relationship of the peasants to one of the major economic institutions of the national economy: the banks.

Banks serve two purposes which are utilized by the peasants. Their more important function is supplying credit to peasants for their production. They also serve as a reliable depository for rural savings.

The general level of saving in Turkey has been low throughout modern history, rendering commercial borrowing expensive. Much of the privately available credit has gone to commercial interests where the returns have been traditionally high. Making credits available to other sectors of the economy like industry and agriculture has been a governmental responsibility.

The state instrument for making agricultural credit available to the rural population has been the Agricultural Bank. This Bank, initially established for the same purpose during the Ottoman Empire, continued into the Republic. It has the largest number of branches in Turkey. If there is one bank in a Turkish town, it can be assumed that it is a branch of the Agricultural Bank, which operates as a commercial bank in addition to its major function as a distributor of agricultural credit.

The Bank makes three types of credit available to the peasants: operation credit, equipment credit, and project credit. Operation credit is the annual credit extended to agricultural producers, mainly to help them secure their production inputs. It is to be paid back at the end of the harvest season. Equipment credit, as the name indicates, is given so that modern equipment such as tractors can be acquired. Project credits, on the other hand, are given to the peasants who want to start the production of a new crop which requires capital investment: construction of hothouses for raising pre-season vegetables or establishing a chicken farm for the commercial raising and marketing of chicken are examples.

Several problems have plagued credit operations of the Agricultural Bank. The first and the most typical problem is that the credit extended is never sufficient. In Turkey, where government revenues have hardly been sufficient for the needs of a growing economy, and where prices have been rising steadily since the Second World War, this is understandable.

Who gets the credits? Because the Bank requires immovables as collateral for the loans it makes, the system favors the more wealthy and prosperous farmers. The landless, who may enter into share-cropping arrangements, do not qualify for credit. Those with insufficient land naturally qualify for little credit. Many of the poor are also afraid of having dealings with the Bank because failure to pay back may result in the loss of their land, the only security they have. The Bank has been lenient on the collection of loans it makes, but it does collect. The collection policy of the Bank is erratic. Usually it is the initiative of the local Bank director to collect or to defer the loans. The small size of the Bank loans and the uncertainties associated with it, pushes the poorest peasants to the more expensive but more flexible system of loan-sharking. The loan sharks adjust their demands on the poor, taxing them heavily in good years, thus forcing poor peasants into a vicious circle of subsistence but usually not letting them fall below the subsistence line. Inevitably, where land and wealth distribution was less equitable, we were told about loan sharks. We heard little on the topic in areas where there was economic prosperity and an equitable distribution of wealth.

Not paying the credit back on time is reported by local Bank directors to be typical behavior. There was general agreement among them that the poorer are more likely to pay their loan back for fear that they would not qualify for a new loan if they failed in their payments. The more wealthy are more reluctant to pay their debt back. They can use the money more gainfully in other areas than returning it to the Bank. They can also fight collection procedures by the Bank more effectively. Often a political intervention on their behalf is sufficient. One Bank director commented, "The rich pay back their loans only when the credit limits are raised. They walk in, pay their debt and walk out with a new, bigger loan."

The consequences of the credit policies pursued by the government through the Agriculture Bank has been summarized critically in a report prepared by the State Planning Organization on Rural Welfare Policies:

Agricultural credits have been extended to large landholders at the expense of small landholders, resulting in the emergence of two groups with immense differences of wealth. It is observed that the small landholders are pushed into experiencing increasing difficulties because of the structure of the production unit whereas large landholders have buttressed their socio-economic standing, taking advantage of the public resources which are made available to them (DPT, 1977:3-5).

The obtaining of credit is a bureaucratically complicated affair, but it is standardized and well known enough that peasants who qualify for credit can get it. But because credit taking requires frequent trips to town poorer peasants who qualify, but live far away from the sub-provincial center such that frequent, costly trips are necessary, are discouraged from taking advantage of the option. On rare occasions, bank officers set up temporary offices in such locations, but they appeared to us to be symbolic gestures rather than manifestation of a policy.

A distinction should be observed in the type of credit extended and who benefits. Operation credit is the most readily available credit and more peasants can qualify for it. In equipment credit, because bigger sums are involved, larger collateral is needed, reducing its availability to the holders of middle or large-sized land. For project credits, a similar tendency may be observed.

In villages which are relatively more prosperous, and in those in which the distribution of wealth is more equitable, one is likely to find more peasants who qualify for credit and use that option. In each of the six pairs of villages we studied, a higher percentage of peasants living in the more prosperous village of the pair reported that they had borrowed money from a bank.

The Bank does not provide the peasant with credit for personal consumption. Since the agricultural credit provided by the government is cheaper than credit secured from the market, the Agricultural Bank exercises some control over how the credit is

utilized. The standard form of control is giving the peasant purchase orders from the Agricultural Supplies Office or a similar agency to insure that he spends the money for the correct purpose. This practice presents a particular dilemma for the poorer peasants who find it difficult to distinguish between the needs of the farm and the household since the two are tightly integrated. If his needs for consumption are intense, what the poorer peasant does is to sell the materials which he has acquired on credit to a dealer below market prices to satisfy his cash needs. Thus, he ends up paying a higher interest rate than commercial credit, the difference going to the merchant who accepts the transaction.

The peasants also have relations with banks in general as institutions where they can keep their savings. What a peasant does with his savings concerns more the national economy than the rural economy in terms of its consequences, and as such need not be taken up here. Let us note in passing that there is reluctance among many peasants to use the bank for their savings. Only in totally commercialized village economies is the bank account a frequent occurrence.

In summary then, the Agricultural Bank constitutes the major economic institution with which the Turkish peasant has frequent contacts. The credit giving functions of the Bank are important for the peasant economy. The credit policies followed by the Bank tend to favor the peasants with medium and large landholdings, thereby unintentionally contributing to the intensification of rural inequalities but positively contributing to the productive capacity of the rural areas. It should be pointed out, however, that most of the credit in the agricultural sector (56 percent in 1973) is provided by the so-called unorganized credit market. As the size of the farm becomes smaller, so does the percentage of credit provided by organized economic institutions (30 percent in small landholdings) (Varlier, 1978:36). The increases in the share of credit extended to peasants by organized institutions in which preference is given to the owners of small holdings may help reduce rural inequalities.

#### THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES

How do the policies of rural development pursued by the Turkish government affect the distribution of political power? Who benefits from the resources made available to rural areas?

The discussion in the preceding pages has emphasized two structural factors which are relevant in answering the two questions asked above. These are the general level of economic prosperity of a village and the distribution of land and wealth in a village.

The general level of economic prosperity of a village affects whether that village is more or less capable of taking advantage of rural services, funds, and other public resources designated for the development of rural areas than other villages. The higher the level of economic prosperity of a village, the greater the likelihood that it will secure benefits offered by government.

The distribution of land and wealth in a village, on the other hand, determines who in the village will benefit from governmental resources. The more polarized that distribution, the greater the likelihood that those at the top of the socio-economic pyramid will enjoy exclusively the benefits extended.

If our analysis, emphasizing the role of the structural factors is correct, then governmental policies not concerned with structural change are bound to favor the already advantaged. Initiating structural change, however, may not be politically feasible or even possible.

In the early stages of rural development, extending public services to the villages such as roads, drinking water, electricity, schools, and modest health services may achieve a rise in their level of welfare of the rural population, but not affect the distribution of power in the rural areas. In any case, after these are achieved, the question of where do we go from here comes up.

The answer may not necessarily be in a rural oriented frame of reference. Many peasants in Turkey do not see the future of their children in the village but in the city. The rate of urbanization has been extremely high. This high rate has not reduced rural production; it has been rising steadily. Therefore, the strategy for ending the plight of the rural disadvantaged may be continued capitalization of agriculture to provide a base on which a rapid industrialization effort may be built.

## Notes

1. I have chosen to use "non-collectivist" rather than capitalist because I feel it to be more comprehensive than "capitalist." "Capitalist" economy connotes a specific set of economic relations not easily found in many developing societies. However, very frequently, it is employed, I think carelessly, to denote a residual category including all that is not collectivist, resulting in incorrect associations about socio-economic systems.

2. The question was: "Some think that the villagers here should produce all that they need and should try not to buy anything from outside the village. Others think that it is all right to buy many things such as food or clothes from outside the village, what do you think?"

3. By antagonistic relations I mean relations based on a conflict of interest where the conflict cannot be resolved by reasoning, cooperation and persuasion but by structural changes such as the redistribution of land ownership. See Development Dialogue (1977,2:115-116).

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