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1983-1984 African Food Crisis
Lessons Learned

I. Introduction and Summary

The continuing drought in Sub-Saharan Africa has produced a famine of historic proportions. In response, United States food aid to Africa has increased sharply. In FY 1984, A.I.D. contributed over 500,000 MT of emergency food aid to Sub-Saharan Africa. This was over three times as much emergency food aid as was provided in FY 1983 and five times that provided in FY 1982. Total PL 480 food aid to Sub-Saharan Africa reached 1.4 million MT compared to 1.1 million MT in FY 1983 and 880,000 MT in FY 1982. The dollar value of our aid to Sub-Saharan Africa in FY 1984 totaled \$417 million compared to \$302 million in FY 1983 and \$225 million in FY 1982.

The purpose of this paper is to report lessons learned from AID's emergency food aid response to the 1983-1984 African food crisis. Documenting this experience will enable AID to improve future emergency food aid programming. It is hoped other donors, private voluntary agencies, and the recipient governments may benefit as well.

The lessons learned were compiled from AID mission responses to the questionnaire included as Attachment A. Nineteen of the 26 African countries receiving emergency food aid in FY 1983-1984 (see Attachment B) responded. Questions were categorized into such areas as causes of the emergency, contingency planning, food needs assessment capability, etc. Lessons learned are listed below and discussed in more detail in the remainder of the report.

Lessons Learned

1. Drought was the main cause of the food emergencies. However, more fundamental underlying causes were often cited. These included weak production and marketing systems, inappropriate agricultural policies, and lack of financial resources. Food crises are likely to recur if these more basic causes are not addressed.
2. Multi-year monetization programs are more appropriate than emergency programs for addressing the deeply-rooted underlying causes of food emergencies.
3. Drought relief programs could probably have been more efficient and effective had emergency preparedness plans, food security plans, and food sector strategies been available and implemented.

4. With few exceptions, early warning information systems to forecast food crises are unreliable. Drought-prone countries and donors must give high priority to strengthening the accuracy and timeliness of these systems.

5. Donor coordination and involvement in food needs assessments are critical to assuring a rapid, effective emergency response.

6. Food needs assessments should include an evaluation of the country's logistical capabilities as well.

7. Programming requirements vary depending upon individual recipient needs and the country's financial, institutional, and administrative capability to support relief operations. These can range from modest expansions of existing food delivery systems to major campaigns to feed mass population groups.

8. An integrated package of program support components -- including food, financial and technical assistance -- is necessary to implement a successful emergency food aid response.

9. Title II monetization programs are well suited for financially-strained countries where local currency is needed to support relief operations and rehabilitation activities.

10. Commodity procurement can be made more timely by strengthening food emergency early warning systems; shortening Washington agencies' response time to emergency food aid requests, and improving transportation planning, particularly that for land-locked countries.

11. Where adequate food distribution systems exist, consideration should be given to packaging edible oil for emergency relief purposes in small containers (as opposed to 50 gallon drums) to facilitate distribution to family groups.

12. Commodities should be processed prior to shipment to avoid processing-related delays that may arise in-country.

13. Drought relief operations must be managed by an organizational structure with sufficient authority and expertise to effectively coordinate the multiple functions and ministries involved.

14. Logistical capabilities (shipping, port, inland, rail, water, and road transport) should be assessed in conjunction with the food needs assessment or as soon as possible thereafter.

15. Bureaucratic procedures should be streamlined to facilitate expeditious food distribution to recipients.
16. Disaster-prone countries should prepare food distribution plans as early as possible to ensure the needy are adequately targeted.
17. Extensive publicity should be given to the arrival of food imports, concessionary and commercial, to stem local food market disruptions.
18. The supply and distribution of emergency food aid must be carefully monitored to avoid possible disincentive effects upon local food production and marketing.
19. Countries and Missions should anticipate establishing or expanding food distribution monitoring systems as crises develop.
20. Emergency food shipments require additional staff time at all implementation levels. Food monitors, in particular, are essential in many countries to supplement host government and mission monitoring capabilities.
21. Evaluations of a country's emergency experience provides useful feedback on the effectiveness of emergency programs and how they can be better planned in the future.
22. Donor coordination facilitates more effective emergency programming, especially when established during the early stages of the emergency.

II. Lessons Learned

A. Causes of Emergencies

Drought was the main cause of the food emergencies. However, more fundamental underlying causes were often cited. These included weak production and marketing systems, inappropriate agricultural policies, and lack of financial resources. Food crises are likely to recur if these more basic causes are not addressed.

Underlying production-related constraints were mentioned in several countries. These included a poor natural resource base (Botswana, Gambia, Rwanda); a low level of agriculture production technology (Ghana, Mauritania, Rwanda); inadequate crop diversity (Gambia), and government neglect of investment in the agricultural sector (Zambia).

Weak marketing and transport systems also posed formidable constraints. For example, USAID/Accra reported that Ghana lacks the infrastructure capability to buy, store, and market normal crop production, let alone surplus quantities. Zambia's marketing system is weak due to over-centralization. (The GRZ is now reorganizing and diversifying maize collection and marketing responsibilities by upgrading agricultural marketing cooperatives.) Burkina-Faso also cited an inefficient market structure as a constraint. In Burundi, the pre-emergency drawdown of food reserves was a problem. This occurred because previous continual self-sufficiency in grain lulled the government into a passive maintenance of stocks.

In Tanzania, poor condition of roads and vehicles was a major cause of the emergency. USAID/Dar Es Salaam reported that many donors intend to cut back on food aid over the next few years. The general feeling is that transportation and policy constraints are the root causes of the need for food aid, not overall shortages. Ghana and Mali also mentioned inappropriate food policies as a basic cause.

A lack of financial resources plagued some countries. Somalia, Zaire and Zambia had insufficient foreign exchange to commercially import food. The lack of local currency to pay internal food transport costs and to support relief efforts was a constraint in Zambia.

Multi-year monetization programs are more appropriate than emergency programs for addressing the more deeply-rooted underlying causes of food emergencies.

Long-term as well as short-term solutions are often required to help alleviate or eliminate the causes and frequency of food emergencies. OAR/Rwanda, for example, believes Rwanda is facing a structural food deficit which can probably be better met in the future through a multi-year food aid mechanism as opposed to recurrent emergency aid. This alternative will be given serious consideration because of the opportunities it offers for promoting policy changes, institutional reforms, and using local currency generations in ways to assure that those most in need of food have access to it.

B. Contingency Planning

Drought relief programs could probably have been more efficient and effective had emergency preparedness plans, food security plans, and food sector strategies been available and implemented.

None of the reporting countries had a food emergency preparedness plan. Instead, most governments hastily organized

interministerial drought-relief committees and programs to respond to the emergencies. The performance of these committees and programs varied widely from country to country. USAID/Accra and OFDA/W are encouraging Ghana to prepare a comprehensive emergency preparedness plan -- and possibly a follow-on food sector strategy paper. The Government of Zimbabwe is formulating a general emergency preparedness plan and a food security plan in conjunction with the University of Zimbabwe.

USAID/Nouakchott reported the Government of Mauritania had several food security plans and/or food sector strategies which had been developed by outside experts under the auspices of major donors. However, none have been treated as action plans. On a more favorable note, the Government is currently preparing its own "National Food Security Plan" with FAO technical assistance. Burkina-Faso is also designing a food security plan.

Countries' vulnerability to the drought may also have been lessened had food sector strategies (FSS) been developed and implemented. Gambia, Mali and Senegal are the only countries that have developed strategies. Mali's FSS is currently being incorporated into the five-year national development plan and regional plans. Senegal's FSS is just now being implemented.

Other countries now drafting food sector strategies are Botswana, Burkina-Faso, Zaire and Zimbabwe. USAID/Lesotho is encouraging the Government to adopt an agricultural sector strategy. The adoption of food sector strategies provide useful frameworks for strengthening a country's long-run food self-reliance and, consequently, reducing its vulnerability to food crisis conditions.

C. Food Needs Assessment

With few exceptions, early warning information systems to forecast food crises are unreliable. Drought-prone countries and donors must give high priority to strengthening the accuracy and timeliness of these systems.

The FAO's "Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture" offers a good example of the type information such systems should monitor. This system estimates and forecasts production, consumption, imports and exports, food aid needs, availabilities, commitments and shipments, and cereal carry-over stocks. It regularly reports on prices and ocean freight rates. It also considers elements likely to affect the food supply/demand such as weather, animal and plant

diseases and pests, range and crop land conditions, transportation and storage facilities, and changes in government policies so far as they affect production, consumption, and trade of basic foods.

In the absence of reliable systems, most countries rely on outside specialists who visit the country for two to three weeks to assess the food situation. However, these experts face the same information constraints as local evaluators, and assessments are more often based on impressions rather than fact. Such "impressionism" can lead to disagreements between donors and governments over the accuracy of assessments and to delays in getting food to needy people. (On the other hand, if the assessment errs on the side of too much food aid, there is the potential for food waste and disincentive effects on local food production and marketing.)

USAID/Dakar attributes the success and timeliness of its emergency response in part to its own preliminary food assessment. It believes donors need not await definitive figures from the host government so long as alternative preliminary assessments remain reliable.

Donor coordination and involvement in food needs assessments are critical to assuring a rapid, effective emergency response.

USAID/Nouakchott highlighted the critical importance of donor coordination in making food needs assessments. It reported that "to the extent that donor opinion is diffuse and the sole analysis of needs comes from the host government, there is great potential for disagreement as to real needs. To the extent this does occur, it weakens the overall response to the emergency by distracting all parties from implementation."

Food needs assessments should include an evaluation of the country's logistical capabilities as well.

Botswana and Ghana stressed the importance of examining the country's food distribution capabilities. This is especially important where transportation infrastructure is not extensively developed and the population is sparsely settled over large areas.

D. Program Design

Programming requirements vary depending upon individual recipient needs and the country's financial, institutional, and administrative capability to support relief operations. These

can range from modest expansions of existing food delivery systems to major campaigns to feed mass population groups.

In some countries (Botswana, Burkina-Faso, Zaire), already existing food delivery mechanisms were expanded to meet drought victims' needs. Technical assistance was sometimes provided (Botswana) to assist in nutrition, logistics, and food distribution planning and management. USAID/Nouakchott contracted an epidemiologist from the USPHS Center for Disease Control to prepare a nutrition status survey. The survey was instrumental in demonstrating the seriousness of the emergency "in an internationally accepted way."

In other countries, where adequate food delivery systems were not in place, substantial additional programming requirements were needed to establish extensive relief networks. Additional requirements included program elements such as monetization to fund transport and other relief and rehabilitation-related costs; agricultural inputs such as seeds, pesticides and fertilizer to enable destitute farmers to get a new start; medical supplies; and technical assistance to improve relief operations.

An integrated package of program support components -- including food, financial and technical assistance -- is necessary to implement a successful emergency food aid response.

This lesson was perhaps best learned and demonstrated in Ghana. USAID/Accra insisted on an integrated support package to ensure other types of aid essential to successful food distribution come with food aid. This included adequate financial resources, technical assistance and personnel, equipment and spare parts, and medical supplies. An OFDA dollar grant, Title II monetization grant, and USAID-OFDA jointly funded technical assistance (food needs assessment, port and transport operations, food distribution supervision, field monitoring) made possible this integrated response.

Title II monetization programs are well suited for financially-strained countries where local currency is needed to support relief operations and rehabilitation activities.

Title II monetization programs made significant contributions towards providing food and financing the local currency costs of relief efforts in financially-strapped Ghana, Gambia, Zambia and Zimbabwe. USAID/Accra considered the Title II monetization an essential component of its integrated package response. One-third of Gambia's Title II government-to-government assistance was monetized to defray transportation and other drought-related costs. In Zambia, the GRZ and AID/Zambia

concluded that Title II monetization was the most responsive way to deliver large quantities of food to recipients and financially support drought relief activities.

Interviews with emergency food aid recipients in Zimbabwe revealed they would rather earn money to buy food through the commercial market system than receive a "handout." Similarly, the government preferred a monetized program because it lessened the possibility of a "welfare mentality" developing among the recipients. The government also favored this approach for the following reasons:

- it reduced the possibility of disincentive effects on local food production and marketing;
- sales proceeds were paid to recipients to work on relief and rehabilitation projects that enhanced their community's preparedness against future droughts;
- program participants acquired skills that could benefit them later; and
- to the extent the monetization program met the country's hunger problem, it reduced the food, transport and administrative costs of the government's free food distribution program.

A key factor underpinning the program's success was the existence of an effective private sector marketing system. Without it, food would have been unavailable for purchase and a monetization scheme would not have worked.

AID/Praia and the Government of Cape Verde also favor selling food aid because it prevents a welfare attitude from developing and sales proceeds can be used to employ otherwise unemployed people in public works projects. USAID/Praia concludes that "...less restrictions on the monetization of emergency food donations would be a major 'lesson learned' from the emergency food aid program last year in Cape Verde."

In Mali, USAID/Bamako believes its' Title II monetization program is an effective and necessary relief measure. It points out that

- sales to drought-affected producers and non-producers at official prices provide affordable grains and help dampen exorbitant market prices;
- sales can result in limited but well targeted free distribution because of the strong extended family in Mali;

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i.e., those who have the means to purchase these grains will share with family members whose purchasing power has been exhausted; and

- sales generate local currencies needed to cover inland transport and distribution costs of free distributions.

The Mission concludes that "Sales are an absolutely necessary complement to free distributions."

E. Procurement

Commodity procurement can be made more timely by strengthening food emergency early warning systems; shortening Washington agencies response time to emergency food aid requests, and improving transportation planning, particularly that for land-locked countries.

Relatively few missions responding to the questionnaire had problems with commodities arriving late. The adequacy of the country's Early Warning System was an important factor explaining late or timely arrivals. USAID/Senegal ensured timely delivery because it became aware early in the rainy season that the crop would be poor. It therefore submitted an initial emergency food aid request with the understanding it would be increased once crop production figures were available. USAID/Zaire identified the lack of a timely EWS as one of several factors explaining late commodity arrival. USAID/Zambia believes that "...with an earlier jump, program planning will move more rapidly in the future."

USAID/Zaire also believes the timeliness of commodity procurement can be improved by receiving quicker responses to emergency requests from Washington and by establishing GOZ food donor procedures for rapidly negotiating food aid programs. USAID/Ghana, where Title II monetized commodities arrived late, suggests that AID/W look at the commodity procurement and shipping process as it applies to emergency programs, and that all parties -- AID, USDA, PVOs freight forwarders, etc. -- give highest priority to meeting the urgent delivery of relief goods.

USAID/Dar Es Salaam reported late food arrival due to a delay in shipment. This would have caused the CRS emergency program to come to a halt had it not been for supplies made available from other donors. USAID/Mali reported its longest delay in procurement was awaiting DCC approval of its emergency request. The Mission submitted a call forward January 28, 1984 but did not receive DCC approval until March 12. The commodities nevertheless arrived early enough to meet needs.

USAID/Nouakchott similarly reported that it submitted its' emergency aid request for Section 416 butteroil on November 7, 1983 but didn't receive DCC approval until January 28, 1984. It suggests that the Section 416 approval process be streamlined in the future. USAID/Ouagadougou experienced late commodity arrival due to late DCC approval, booking changes by the CRS freight forwarders, and a shortage of trucks for inland transport.

Extended negotiations over the transfer authorization for emergency aid was a problem in Cape Verde; the TA was signed after the emergency shipment arrived. USAID/Praia suggests that a specialized or standard transfer authorization be considered for emergency aid which doesn't require extended negotiations.

Land-locked countries and remote regions of other countries seemed especially prone to procurement problems. Zaire encountered transportation delays between the port of discharge in South Africa and the port of entry in Zaire. Mali reports its most taxing procurement problem was clearing the port of Abidjan which took several weeks due to congestion and lack of trucks. Rwanda and Burundi similarly suspect they may encounter transport delays because of their land-locked positions.

None of the missions surveyed reported that commodities arrived at such a time as to cause disincentive effects on local production and marketing. Technical assistance (e.g., for food needs assessments, nutrition planning, logistics, food distribution supervision, and field monitoring, warehouse management) arrived on a timely basis.

The U.S. Government recently improved its emergency procurement system to reduce its commodity acquisition time by as much as one-third (from about 45 to 30 days). The improved commodity procurement system works as follows:

1. In the past, USDA had to purchase agricultural commodities for emergency programs from CCC stocks - regardless of where the stocks were located. Now, USDA is not restricted to purchases from CCC stocks. This permits purchases from locations closer to ports and thus reduces domestic transit time. When purchases can be made at ports, this virtually eliminates domestic transit time.

2. USDA now purchases commodities for emergency programs by telephone or wire. In the past, tenders were handled through the mail on a monthly cycle. If a cycle was missed, up to a month was lost.

3. Bags are now being stockpiled at ports to insure ready availability. This saves up to three weeks in procurement and shipping time to export sites.

While the U.S. has always had the most rapid response time of all international donors, the installation of this new system should serve to improve upon the efficiency with which the U.S. responds to emergency requests.

Where adequate food distribution systems exist, consideration should be given to packaging edible oil for emergency relief purposes in small containers (as opposed to 50 gallon drums) to facilitate distribution to family groups.

USAID/Nouakchott reported it lost valuable time in convincing Washington that distributing Section 416 butteroil in 50 gallon drums was impractical. When the buteroil arrived it was packaged in number ten sized cans, six to a carton. This packaging was durable, manageable and perfectly sized for distribution to family groups.

Commodities should be processed prior to shipment to avoid processing-related delays that may arise in-country.

In undertaking a monetized Title II program, USAID/Dar Es Salaam reported that disagreements arose over who should process crude vegetable oil and the price to be paid. This resulted in protracted negotiations between two GOT ministries, AID, and the processors. The Mission recommends that future programs provide refined vegetable oil to avoid such delays.

F. Administration

Drought relief operations must be managed by an organizational structure with sufficient authority and expertise to effectively coordinate the multiple functions and ministries involved.

Countries where administration appeared to be more effective were those where the government appointed a special coordinating unit to manage operations. In Ghana for example, the government relief efforts were led effectively by a National Mobilization Committee. This body grew out of a task force found earlier to resettle the half million or more Ghana citizens that Nigeria expelled. The Committee is credited with doing an admirable job as the focal point for relief operations and donor coordination. It was cited, in particular, for its efforts in reducing port and transport losses.

Senegal similarly named a "Commission De Suivi", chaired by the Ministry of Plan with GOS representatives from ministries for Rural Development and Commerce, the President's Office and donors (WFP and EEC). This unit was assigned to coordinate information and shipments, assist in preparing distribution plans, monitor status of shipments and distributions, and assist in unlocking bottlenecks.

USAID/Nouakchott could not overestimate the benefits of appointing a high-ranking authority to coordinate donors and ministries, set government priorities, and regulate disputes. In Mauritania, the Government assigned the Chief of Staff of the ruling military committee to direct the newly created National Drought Relief Commission. USAID/Accra similarly reported that the success of the National Mobilization Committee was in large measure due to the appointment of an administrator who had the strong backing of the President.

In Lesotho, the Government established a cabinet subcommittee on the drought below which was formed a policy-making Central National Disaster Committee. A Food Management Unit was placed directly under the cabinet as was a Logistics Unit to direct the distribution of relief commodities. This structure has proven to be effective and adequate to meet the needs of the emergency.

Other countries encountered administrative difficulties when a strong coordinating authority was not present. In Sudan, GOS relief efforts were fragmented and ineffective until two affected provinces developed a logical food distribution approach using local institutions to identify and assist drought victims. In Tanzania, the GOT didn't organize staff effectively and donors had to spend considerable time and effort to assess food shortages.

USAID/Bamako similarly reports that Mali's relief commission is composed basically of one man. Consequently, to adequately respond to the emergency, the USAID must maintain a full time coordinator of Food for Peace activities and two food monitors. It has also established a Mission Drought Relief Action Group, chaired by the Mission Disaster Relief Officer and composed of mission working staff on Food for Peace, health, policy reform, and livestock.

Relief efforts in Rwanda were delayed by a lack of cooperation between the Government and the donors. The GOR was unwilling to commit itself to a definitive food distribution plan until it knew total donor commitments. On the other hand, donors wouldn't commit themselves until a distribution plan was

specified. The problem was further exacerbated because there was no lead donor to "orchestrate the pieces."

Burundi reported that the GRB appointed a committee composed of one official from each of four ministries. However, the Mission concluded that, in Burundi's case, administration of an emergency program by committee is not effective.

In Zambia, where administration was weak, AID/Zambia urged the GRZ to encourage donor meetings and appoint a high-level coordinator of the PL 480 program with the GRZ.

G. Implementation

Logistical capabilities (shipping, port, inland, rail, water, and road transport) should be assessed in conjunction with the food needs assessment and again just prior to the shipment of food aid commodities.

Generally most countries managed well to deliver emergency food to recipients. There were a few exceptions. Gambia experienced delays in transport by road and river due to nationwide reductions in maintenance, repair, and replacement of capital assets. Zaire encountered considerable problems in transporting commodities from the port of discharge to the point of entry (rail line crosses South Africa, Zimbabwe and Zambia en route to Zaire). Senegal also reported that, for Mali shipments, the railroad was still unable to handle large quantities of food aid.

AID/Guinea-Bissau pointed out that logistical problems are greater during the rainy season (June-September) and, for this reason, the timing of food aid arrival is important. If food aid arrives during the rainy season, it takes twice as long to transport food to its destinations because of impassable roads and other logistical failures. In Burkina-Faso, early September rains impeded inland transportation to the Sahel Ord region. The roads were so bad, some truckers refused to take loads there.

Thus, to the extent logistical capabilities can be identified in advance, an early assessment of logistical capabilities can greatly facilitate emergency planning.

Bureaucratic procedures should be streamlined to facilitate expeditious food distribution to recipients.

Cumbersome bureaucratic procedures and red tape were not reported as problems by most missions. However, AID/Zambia

found that GRZ responsibilities for distributing food were scattered and were not modified to expedite emergency distributions. The lack of well-trained personnel for carrying out emergency programs was also a constraint.

Disaster-prone countries should prepare food distribution plans as early as possible to ensure the needy are adequately targeted.

Senegal's experience in determining where emergency food aid should be targeted and in what size rations is instructive in this regard. The Ministry of Rural Development found it difficult to differentiate the size of rations or number of distribution systems between adjoining areas with differing needs. Resulting disputes and delays stemming from such problems can be avoided to the extent eligibility criteria can be agreed to in advance.

USAID/Nouakchott cautions that, in formulating distribution plans, the Government be allowed flexibility in allocating food aid to geographic regions. For example, where particular donors are designated to support particular regions, allocation decisions should be based on objective need criteria as well as geographic location.

Extensive publicity should be given to the arrival of food imports, concessionary and commercial, to stem local food market disruptions.

USAID/Accra believes the publicity the GOG gave to expected food imports helped prevent hoarding and price gorging. That is, it is believed that grain speculators, seeing plenty of food moving into the countryside and prices stabilizing, decided to release grain rather than hold out for higher prices.

The supply and distribution of emergency food aid must be carefully monitored to avoid possible disincentive effects upon local food production and marketing.

Two countries, Botswana and Ghana, were concerned over the potential dependency effect that may result from reliance upon emergency food aid. In Botswana, the GOB is concerned that the emergency will not cease abruptly since some small farmers have lost their draft power and others have lost their desire to plow and plant after three complete crop failures. The GOB has initiated discussions on post drought measures to deal with this problem.

The Government of Ghana and donors are also concerned about avoiding dependency and other disincentive effects in the latter stages of the emergency program. The Mission identified the following concerns that must now be monitored:

- "residual relief stock distribution must be managed in such a way as to not have an adverse effect on harvesting and marketing the current local crop;
- relief assistance must not become an easy out for the GOG. It must make the policy decisions and resource allocations to deal with food production problems; and
- the continuation of food-supported development programs, primarily nutrition interventions and food-for-work projects, without creating a disincentive effect on food production."

H. Monitoring and Evaluation

Countries and Missions should anticipate establishing or expanding food distribution monitoring systems as crises develop.

Three missions - Ghana, Senegal and Tanzania - reported that food distribution monitoring systems were inadequate. In Ghana, it was necessary to expand the monitoring responsibility of the GOG's National Mobilization Committee (NMC). USAID/Accra supplemented the GOG's and PVO's monitoring capability by supporting additional staffing for PVO's and contracting for general program oversight and field monitoring. Further, USAID/Accra will help the NMC develop an improved capability to monitor the food sector and has agreed with OPDA to develop a disaster preparedness plan and country profile.

The Government of Senegal has a system of reports for monitoring food distributions but is unable to compile information into general status reports for the overall emergency program. The Mission suggests a study of problems at the central office of the food marketing agency might help. USAID/Dar Es Salaam plans to compensate for the GOT's weak monitoring capability by sharing information with PVO's, and by strengthening its own monitoring capability by relying on a PSC food monitor and increased reliance on the REDSO/EA RFFPO.

Emergency food shipments require additional staff time at all implementation levels. Food monitors, in particular, are essential in many countries to supplement host government and mission monitoring capabilities.

Food monitors, hired under personal services contracts, were considered essential in Ghana, Senegal, Gambia, Mali and Tanzania. This need - and a funding source for additional personnel - was also strongly voiced at the East Africa program scheduling conference in Nairobi. USAID/Accra praised the work of its field monitor "who spent much of his time in the field where he belonged, troubleshooting literally hundreds of project sites looking for problems and recommending corrective action. The field monitor's work all over Ghana enabled us to verify that in the main the food is getting to the people for whom it is intended and it is getting there on time."

USAID/Dakar determined that neither adequate nor periodic regularity of GOS reporting could be relied upon. It concluded that USAID-hired food monitors were a necessity. In Mauritania, where the emergency has created "an enormous drain on staff resources", the Mission has hired two food monitors. It is now requesting a third monitor for Dakar Port to reduce mishandling and damage to USG food aid transiting Dakar.

AID/Banjul hired locally a full-time monitor who will also evaluate the Mission's emergency assistance efforts. In Mali, the quantity of free food distribution is double that of any previous USAID program in Mali. The Mission believes a PL 480 drought relief coordinator and two monitors are essential to support operations. As already indicated, our mission in Tanzania plans to hire a food monitor because of imminent reductions in U.S. direct hire staff.

Evaluations of a country's emergency experience provides useful feedback on the effectiveness of emergency programs and how they can be better planned in the future.

Several missions noted that the USAID or host government have already completed or were planning evaluations of their emergency programs. The Government of Botswana, for example, has already conducted evaluations of specific aspects of their drought emergency experience; there have been several major reports or studies completed over the past six years. In Lesotho, the Government's Logistics Unit is evaluating their recent emergency experience.

The Government of Mauritania has been preparing a review of implementation of its emergency action plan for 1983-1984. The U.S. General Accounting Office has already made an extensive

review of the 1983-1984 emergency program in Mauritania. OFDA has also evaluated the use of aid funding provided through that office. USAID/Dakar will write a final report once USAID monitoring of the program is completed, and Church World Service/Senegal will undertake a final evaluation of its activities as part of its written agreement with USAID. AID/Banjul will use its' PSC emergency food monitor to evaluate and report on its' recent assistance in a final summary disaster report.

Our missions in Botswana and Senegal are also interested in learning the effectiveness of emergency programs in reaching intended beneficiaries. USAID/Gaborone believes an end-use survey on the "intrahousehold dynamics of emergency food aid utilization" would be desirable. Similarly, the regional controller has suggested the use of an in-country audit in Senegal to help assess receipts of food at the beneficiary level.

IV. Donor Coordination

Donor coordination facilitates more effective emergency programming, especially when established during the early stages of the emergency.

Missions reporting good donor coordination were often those where donor meetings were chaired by a multilateral agency (WFP or UNDP) representative (Botswana, Sudan), or an effective host government coordinating body (Ghana, Senegal). Another important consideration is timing. USAID/Gaborone believes that setting up a system of coordination during the initial year of the drought could have permitted less time being spent on coordinating and more time on more pressing issues. In Burkina-Faso, no one took an early lead in coordinating drought relief efforts and this caused much misunderstanding between the Government and donors. USAID/Ouagadougou stresses the importance of quickly establishing a donor coordinator and suggests that a multilateral agency representative assume this role.

USAID/Accra reported that an important factor accounting for Ghana's success was the support given to the chairman of the National Mobilization Committee by the highest level of government. This permitted the chairman to "cut across ministry lines and get things done." In Senegal, donor coordination produced an added benefit; it resulted in increased discussions concerning the use of food aid to influence food policy decisions and reforms.

AID/Zambia expressed the view that donor coordination is difficult because most if not all decisions on food aid programming are ultimately made in the respective donors' capital cities. It's also believed that donor coordination could have been better if the GRZ had been more forthcoming with information on the emergency.

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TAGS:

SUBJECT: AFRICA DROUGHT/EMERGENCY FOOD AID: LESSONS
LEARNED FROM 1983/84

1. FIRST FVA WOULD LIKE TO REPEAT CONGRATULATIONS THAT
THE AFRICAN USAID MISSIONS HAVE DOUBTLESS ALREADY HEARD
FROM OTHER QUARTERS ON THEIR RESPONSE TO THE FOOD
SHORTAGE OF FY 84. YOU CONTRIBUTED SIGNIFICANTLY TO ONE
OF THE LARGEST RELIEF EFFORTS IN HISTORY AND CAN BE
JUSTLY PROUD OF YOUR ROLE IN ALLEVIATING SUFFERING AND
SAVING MANY THOUSANDS OF LIVES.

2. WE ARE ANXIOUS TO HAVE THE VALUABLE EXPERIENCE
ACCUMULATED DURING THIS YEAR'S RELIEF EFFORTS
INCORPORATED IN OUR EMERGENCY PROGRAMS FOR THE COMING
YEAR. WE ARE THEREFORE REQUESTING MISSIONS TO TAKE AS
MUCH TIME AS THEY CAN SPARE FROM PRESENT OPERATIONAL
CONCERNS TO REFLECT UPON LAST SEASON'S EXPERIENCES AND
THEIR POTENTIAL APPLICABILITY TO FUTURE NEEDS. BY THE
LOOK OF IT, THIS FUTURE NEED WILL NOT BE ALL THAT
DISTANT IN MANY OF THE ADDRESSEE POSTS; THIS IS NO
ACADEMIC EXERCISE, BUT THE CHANCE FOR MISSIONS TO SPEAK
OF THEIR NEEDS IN TIME FOR US TO TRY TO SATISFY THEM,
AND OF THEIR ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN HOPES THAT THEY MAY BE

JCB
CG
WB

WP

UNCLASSIFIED

REPLICATED ELSEWHERE.

3. FVA HAS PREPARED THE QUESTIONNAIRE PRINTED BELOW TO ASSIST MISSIONS IN THEIR EFFORTS. WE RECOGNIZE THAT IN SOME AREAS/QUESTIONS WILL BE MORE RELEVANT THAN OTHERS IN DIFFERENT COUNTRY CONTEXTS. FEW POSTS WILL HAVE ALL OF THE INFORMATION REQUESTED BELOW. THE LIST IS ILLUSTRATIVE. IT IS MEANT TO GIVE MISSIONS AN OPPORTUNITY TO SHARE WHAT THEY HAVE LEARNED WITH AID/W, OTHER POSTS, AND WHEN THE RESULTS ARE COLLATED, WITH STUDENTS OF RELIEF WORLDWIDE.

4A. BASIC DATA

TOTAL DONOR FOOD EMERGENCY AID RECEIVED BY CALENDAR YEAR:
 DOLLAR VALUE.....1982.....1983.....1984.....
 METRIC TONS.....1982.....1983.....1984.....

AID FOOD EMERGENCY AID RECEIVED BY CALENDAR YEAR:
 DOLLAR VALUE.....1982.....1983.....1984.....
 METRIC TONS.....1982.....1983.....1984.....

NUMBER RECIPIENTS OF TOTAL EMERGENCY FOOD AID:
 --.....1982.....1983.....1984.....

B. CAUSES

-- - WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE FOOD EMERGENCY? TO
 -- WHAT EXTENT MIGHT IT BE ATTRIBUTED TO:
 -- -- MORE FUNDAMENTAL WEAKNESSES IN THE COUNTRY'S
 -- AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND MARKETING SYSTEMS?
 -- -- TO INAPPROPRIATE FOOD POLICIES?
 -- WHAT IS THE RELATIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF EACH OF THE
 -- FACTORS INVOLVED?

C. CONTINGENCY PLANNING

-- - DOES THE HOST GOVERNMENT HAVE AN EMERGENCY
 -- PREPAREDNESS OR FOOD SECURITY PLAN? IF YES, WAS
 -- IT IMPLEMENTED IN RESPONDING TO THE RECENT
 -- EMERGENCY? IS IT ADEQUATE? IS IT BEING REVISED
 -- IN LIGHT OF RECENT EXPERIENCE? IF A PLAN
 -- DOESN'T EXIST, DOES THE GOVERNMENT PLAN TO
 -- DEVELOP ONE? WHEN?
 -- - IS THE COUNTRY UNDERTAKING OR PLANNING DISASTER
 -- PREVENTION ACTIVITIES? IF SO, HOW ARE THESE
 -- EFFORTS PLANNED AND MANAGED?

- - DOES THE HOST GOVERNMENT HAVE A FOOD SECTOR STRATEGY? IF YES, IS IT BEING IMPLEMENTED? IS IT SATISFACTORY? IS IT BEING REVISED IN LIGHT OF RECENT EXPERIENCE? DOES IT INCLUDE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS OR FOOD SECURITY COMPONENTS? IF A PLAN DOESN'T EXIST, DOES THE GOVERNMENT PLAN TO DEVELOP ONE? WHEN?

D. FOOD NEEDS ASSESSMENT

- - WHAT TYPE OF DATA AND ANALYSES WERE USED IN ASSESSING THE COUNTRY'S EMERGENCY NEEDS, PARTICULARLY FOOD? DOES THE COUNTRY HAVE A RELIABLE AND TIMELY EARLY WARNING SYSTEM? IF SO, WHAT TYPE DATA DOES THE EWS CONTRIBUTE? WHO COLLECTS AND ANALYSES THE DATA? WAS THE DATA SUFFICIENTLY ACCURATE AND TIMELY FOR PLANNING PURPOSES?

E. PROGRAM DESIGN

- - HOW DID THE HOST GOVERNMENT, USAID, OTHER DONORS AND PVOS DECIDE WHAT TYPE OF EMERGENCY PROGRAM WOULD BE MOST APPROPRIATE IN TERMS OF FOOD DELIVERY MECHANISMS (TARGETED PROGRAM OR OPEN MARKET SALES), COMMODITY COMPOSITION, AND IMPLEMENTING ORGANIZATION?
- - WERE COMPLEMENTARY INPUTS (SEEDS, TRANSPORT, VACCINES, ETC.) INCORPORATED TO ENHANCE THE IMPACT OF THE FOOD EMERGENCY PROGRAM?
- - WAS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE NECESSARY AND HOW WAS IT PROVIDED FOR IN THE DESIGN?
- - WAS AID/W GUIDANCE REGARDING PROGRAM PROPOSAL PREPARATION CLEAR AND HELPFUL? IF NOT, HOW MIGHT IT BE IMPROVED?

F. PROCUREMENT

- - DID PL 480 COMMODITIES ARRIVE IN SUFFICIENT TIME TO AVERT SERIOUS HUNGER PROBLEMS? IF NOT, WHY? WHAT ACTIONS MIGHT BE TAKEN TO AVOID SIMILAR PROBLEMS FROM HAPPENING IN THE FUTURE?
- - DID PL 480 FOOD AID ARRIVE AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME SO AS NOT TO CAUSE DISINCENTIVE EFFECTS ON LOCAL PRODUCTION AND MARKETING?

- - DID TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ARRIVE IN A TIMELY MANNER?

G. ADMINISTRATION

- - DID THE GOVERNMENT ORGANIZE ITSELF EFFECTIVELY TO MANAGE THE EMERGENCY? DISCUSS IN TERMS OF RELIEF PLANNING, ORGANIZATION, RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS AND POST-CRISIS REHABILITATION PLANNING.
- - WHAT WAS AID'S ROLE IN THE EMERGENCY? WAS THE USAID ADEQUATELY STAFFED AND FUNDED TO MANAGE THE EMERGENCY? IF NOT, WHAT TYPE OF SPECIAL AND ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE WOULD BE REQUIRED IN THE EVENT OF ANOTHER EMERGENCY? IF THE EMERGENCY STILL EXISTS, WHAT TYPE OF ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE IS CURRENTLY NEEDED?
- - WERE PVOS ADEQUATELY STAFFED AND FUNDED?

H. IMPLEMENTATION

- - WERE LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS (PORT OPERATIONS, STORAGE, AND TRANSPORTATION) ENCOUNTERED IN DISTRIBUTING FOOD TO THE MOST SERIOUSLY AFFECTED AREAS? WHAT CAN BE DONE BETWEEN NOW AND THE NEXT EMERGENCY TO OVERCOME OR ALLEVIATE LOGISTICAL CONSTRAINTS?
- - WERE TARGETED DISTRIBUTION PROGRAMS EFFECTIVE IN REACHING THE MOST VULNERABLE POPULATION GROUPS? IF PROBLEMS WERE ENCOUNTERED, WHAT ACTIONS MIGHT BE TAKEN TO PREVENT THEIR REOCCURRENCE IN A FUTURE EMERGENCY?
- - DID THE PRIVATE SECTOR MARKETING SYSTEM FUNCTION WELL UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES? WAS THERE EXCESSIVE HOARDING AND UNFAIR PRICING ON THE PART OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR?
- - WHAT PLANS ARE BEING MADE TO TERMINATE THE EMERGENCY PROGRAM? ARE PRECAUTIONS BEING TAKEN TO INSURE THAT THE PROGRAM DOESN'T RESULT IN A CONTINUING FOOD AID DEPENDENCY ON THE PART OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT AND INDIVIDUAL RECIPIENTS?
- - HOW HAS THE EMERGENCY FOOD PROGRAM AFFECTED

-- IMPLEMENTATION OF OTHER PL 480 PROGRAMS?

I. MONITORING AND EVALUATION

- - DOES THE GOVERNMENT HAVE A RELIABLE AND TIMELY
-- INFORMATION SYSTEM TO MONITOR FOOD DISTRIBUTION,
-- PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS, AND CHANGES IN THE
-- EMERGENCY SITUATION? IF NOT, WHAT STEPS MIGHT BE
-- TAKEN TO INSURE AN ADEQUATE SYSTEM IS IN PLACE IN
-- THE EVENT OF ANOTHER EMERGENCY?
- - DO THE USAID AND PVOS RELY ON THE HOST
-- GOVERNMENT'S MONITORING SYSTEMS OR HAVE THEY
-- DEVELOPED THEIR OWN?
- - DOES THE GOVERNMENT, USAID, OTHER DONORS, OR
-- PVOS PLAN TO EVALUATE THEIR EMERGENCY
-- EXPERIENCE? WHAT STUDIES HAVE ALREADY BEEN DONE?

J. DONOR COORDINATION

- - WERE ADEQUATE MECHANISMS ESTABLISHED TO
-- COORDINATE DONOR RELIEF AND REHABILITATION
-- EFFORTS? DID THESE FUNCTION EFFECTIVELY? WHAT
-- PROBLEMS WERE ENCOUNTERED AND HOW MIGHT DONOR
-- COORDINATION BE IMPROVED?

K. LESSONS LEARNED

- - IN LIGHT OF THE PRECEDING DISCUSSION, WHAT ARE
-- THE 3 MAJOR LESSONS LEARNED IN RESPONDING TO THE
-- EMERGENCY?

5. MISSION RESPONSES ARE REQUESTED BY OCTOBER 12. 44

FY 1983-84 African Food Crisis

Country Recipients of Emergency Food Aid

Angola	Madagascar
Burkina Faso	Mali
Benin	Mauritania
Botswana	Mozambique
Burundi	Rwanda
Cape Verde	Sao Tome
Chad	Senegal
Djibouti	Sudan
Ethiopia	Somalia
Gambia	Tanzania
Ghana	Zaire
Guinea Bissau	Zambia
Kenya	Zimbabwe
Lesotho	