

PN AAQ 990

THE CONSEQUENCES OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION  
FOR SENDING COUNTRIES IN THE THIRD WORLD

by

Jason L. Finkle and C. Alison McIntosh

Center for Population Planning  
University of Michigan

Report prepared for the Bureau of Program and Policy  
Coordination, U.S. Agency for International  
Development. Grant No. AID/otr-G-1848.

March 1982

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In recent decades, the volume of international labor migration has greatly increased but systematic research on the consequences of these migrations for sending countries in the Third World has not developed commensurately with research on other aspects of migration. Until recently, most migration research was undertaken by western scholars who were primarily interested in its consequences for their own countries. Research is handicapped by an acute shortage of relevant data about sending countries. Most significantly, there was an initial assumption among governments, international agencies and individual scholars that international migration was, by definition, beneficial to individual migrants as well as to sending and receiving countries.

Among students of international migration there is general agreement that labor migration is a response to social and economic inequalities among nations. Beyond this point of agreement, however, there have developed two theoretical perspectives under which the work of most individual scholars can be subsumed. The first perspective regards international migration as a mechanism for restoring economic equilibrium between sending and receiving countries and as beneficial to both. The second perspective embodies

the notion of "cumulative causation." It regards international migration as a loss of human capital which is likely to generate changes increasingly detrimental to the sending country. This perspective is closely related to the theory developed by Marxist scholars, who see international migration as bound up with the dependent position of developing countries within the world economic order. All of these "theories" are expressed in highly abstract terms which do not readily lend themselves to empirical testing.

Since the end of the Second World War, international migration has come to involve almost every region of the world. Among the most significant flows are those from the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America to the industrialized countries of North America, Europe and Oceania; the circular labor flows to northern and western Europe from southern Europe, the Mediterranean basin and Turkey; complex movements within Latin America and the Caribbean and from these two regions to the United States and other advanced nations; large scale migrations within both West and Southern Africa; and those which have recently developed to the oil-rich states of the Middle East, both from other countries within the region and from other regions. These migrations flowing from less to more developed nations greatly outnumber the counter flows of high level manpower from developed to developing countries in the Third World.

Generally speaking, scholars do not expect much expansion in the volume of international migration in the years ahead. While economic disparities are expected to persist, it is thought that political problems generated in receiving countries by the presence of large numbers of foreign immigrants will serve to restrict the size of the flows. However, most scholars believe that the demand for short-term, skill-specific labor migration will continue in many regions of the world.

## CHAPTER II

### CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR MIGRANTS

In this chapter, an attempt is made to draw together available information about the personal characteristics and occupational status of international migrants prior to their departure.

It has been customary in the past to analyze migration decisions in terms of "push" factors at the sending end, "pull" factors at the receiving end, and a of "intervening obstacles" to be overcome by the potential migrant. While useful at a general level, push-pull theory is not sufficiently precise to explain important features of contemporary labor migration. Although the literature does not yet provide a full theory of the determinants of labor migration, it does suggest two concepts which illuminate certain features of the selection process.

First, there is evidence that most migration decisions are to some extent "linked." In essence, this means that the decision about who will move and whether it will be an internal or an external move, is not taken by the emigrant himself but by his extended family as part of a coordinated plan of social betterment. The working out of the plan is an evolving process which may involve several generations of migration. At least two corollaries relevant to migration decisions follow from this proposition. First, the use made of remittances is determined by the extended family rather than the individual migrant. Secondly, the fact of linkage suggests that most migration is not intended to be permanent. However, few studies explore these ideas in depth.

Secondly, it has been suggested that, given an initial willingness on the part of the sending country citizens to participate, the major stimulus to migration comes from developed country employers seeking labor to fill low-level positions no longer acceptable to indigenous workers. Evidence of such active recruitment has been adduced both for historical labor migrations and for contemporary migration streams. The implications are that it is the needs of potential employers that determine the countries involved in international migration, the skills required and the types of experience gained by emigrants while they are abroad.

An important issue not directly addressed in the empirical literature concerns the relationship of internal to international migration and the combined effect on development. One theorist has advanced the notion that international migration is essentially a phenomenon associated with the early stages of development when the tiny modern sector is unable to absorb much of the surplus rural population. Later, when the modern sector is expanding rapidly, more work is available for the rural surplus and emigration tends to be reduced. However, there is a transitional stage during which both forms of migration are in process.

Historical and contemporary studies indicate that migration attracts individuals in the prime of life. At the same time there is evidence that international migrants are slightly older, on the average, than are internal migrants.

In terms of sex, it is generally agreed that on a global basis a large majority of international migrants are male and that they tend to travel alone without their wives and families. In Latin America, the Caribbean, the Philippines and Western Europe, however, migration streams contain significant numbers of women. Where the distance covered is great and the duration of the stay likely to be relatively lengthy the proportion of female emigrants rises. Women are less likely to emigrate from societies where they are enclosed or regarded as markedly subordinate to men.

Data on the educational and occupational status of emigrants are much less adequate than those for sex and age as few societies collect such information from departing citizens. Universally, however, it is found that: a) migrant streams contain a disproportionately large number of the better educated and more skilled relative to the base population; b) a single sending country may supply migrants with different characteristics to a variety of different destinations; c) regardless of the average level of education and training among emigrants, migration selects primarily from the middle-level socio-economic classes. The very poorest families cannot afford to send emigrants abroad while the richer families have no need to do so. Although data on the occupational status of emigrants prior to departure are both scarce and unreliable, the available evidence suggests that emigration attracts a disproportionate number of individuals who were already in employment.

### CHAPTER III

#### EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR MIGRATION ON EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY

Before presenting our findings on the consequences of international migration for sending countries, the reader is reminded that the review in this and succeeding chapters is based on a fragmentary literature that in no way constitutes a test of any theory of migration or development. In

addition, the two dominant perspectives on which the literature is based permit differing interpretations of the same empirical data. The conclusions drawn from the findings are, therefore, based upon value judgments and the images of development in the minds of analyst and reader.

Among "equilibrium" theorists, international migration is thought to benefit sending countries by drawing off the rural surplus population, lessening the burden of unemployment, and stimulating technological progress in agriculture. At the same time, many scholars believe that emigration will do little to reduce unemployment in countries with large and rapidly growing populations. otherwise have started to fall.

Evidence from sending countries all over the world suggests that there is a tendency for out-migration to continue long past the stage at which the surplus rural population has been absorbed. In some of these communities, there is widespread evidence of declining intensity of agricultural production. In some countries like Jordan, it has been necessary to import replacement labor for agriculture. In general, the evidence suggests that rigidities in the labor markets of receiving countries have prevented the attainment of a wage equilibrium between sending and receiving countries and have therefore prevented the cutting-off of emigration.

In urban areas, many reports have spoken of shortages of skilled industrial workers which are attributed to out-migration. Empirical data on this problem are sparse. In general, where relatively systematic research findings are available, they suggest that the shortages are not yet serious. Although spot shortages undoubtedly occur from time to time, the evidence suggests that most vacant jobs are filled relatively quickly. The efficiency with which vacancies for skilled workers are replaced depends in large measure on the flexibility of the labor markets in the countries concerned, and on the extent to which industry steps in to develop training programs for replacement workers.

A series of regional studies in four southern European sending countries and Turkey around 1970 suggests that emigration had been helpful in reducing the pressure of rural job-seekers on urban labor markets. These studies also show that the decrease in urban unemployment was not all attributable to international migration. Other development processes like declining activity rates among women and children were at work. While supplies of labor were generally plentiful, spot shortages of skilled workers had been experienced in most of the countries and had been severe in parts of Greece. The authors noted that few returning migrants with skills (or without) had sought employment in industry; the vast majority preferred to up independent businesses. The study concluded that while

international migration had initially relieved congestion in the urban labor market, the longer-term outlook was bleak as emigration seemed to be creaming off the more skilled workers.

#### CHAPTER IV

#### REMITTANCES

In the minds of sending country governments, migrants' remittances probably constitutes the leading benefit of international migration. In some countries, the sums remitted constitute a significant part of the nation's export earnings. Some countries openly admit that remittances are the main source of income for many of their citizens. Others note that remittances have enabled them to pay their rising oil bills since 1973.

Very recently, a number of analysts have questioned whether remittances are of major economic importance for more than a few countries. While remittances may constitute an important treasury resource, they may only denote increasing dependence on external economies. It is pointed out that both the data and analytical models needed to evaluate the role of remittances in development are lacking.

At the level of individual families, remittance incomes have been instrumental in raising the standard of living for countless migrant families. At the same time, there is substantial evidence that remittance-receiving families tend

to reduce their level of agricultural productivity. The availability of remittances to some but not all families in a community is also reported to increase income inequality in the community. Price increases which follow increased demand by those with remittance incomes are harmful to families without remittance incomes. In the minds of sending country governments, however, the biggest problem with remittances is that very small amounts are invested in "productive" enterprises.

Probably the most firmly substantiated research findings in the field of international migration concern the utilization of migrants' savings and remittances. Wherever studies have been undertaken, the evidence indicates that by far the largest part of migrants' savings--usually between 90 and 95 percent--is expended on day-to-day consumption needs. Next in line come a variety of uses, varying in order from society to society, which include: repayment of debts incurred in financing emigration; improvement or building of a house as security for old age; expenditures on social and religious obligations; purchasing of education for children; and, finally, investment in a small business or purchase of a parcel of land which could provide subsistence in old age. In many cases these larger investments can take place only slowly through several generations of emigration.

Sending country governments and most students of international migration are concerned that these investments contribute little to productivity and economic development. Occasional studies of long-term emigration from the Indian sub-continent, however, suggest that families engaged in "linked" migration plan their expenditures with care and, over a period of several generations, considerably improve their socio-economic position. One long-term student of international migration has observed that while the sums invested by individual migrants are extremely small, when aggregated at the national level they can contribute useful amounts of development capital.

Two explanations are offered for the pattern of remittance use. First, the literature supports the view that it is the norms and values of the mainly rural home community that provides the frame of reference within which migrants' investment decisions are taken. Migrants' aspirations are focused on a desire for the esteem of their peers and for security in old age. Both of these needs can be most readily supplied by the acquisition of an ostentatious house, and by other forms of conspicuous consumption. Great prestige is also attached to "independence." In the village context, this is most often translated into either the purchase of land, which may not be used but which is available as a source of subsistence in old age, or the acquisition of a small business in the home village.

The second explanation focuses on the lack of investment opportunities available in most rural villages in developing countries. The literature reports scattered instances where migrant families have availed themselves of investment opportunities to invest "productively" where these have been available locally. In general, however, analysts tend to believe that emigrants have more confidence that their savings will bring in a return if they are invested in more advanced, receiving countries.

## CHAPTER V

### ACQUISITION OF SKILLS AND RETURN MIGRATION

Conventional wisdom in recent years has assumed that one of the main benefits conferred by circular labor migration would be the new skills and attitudes relevant to industrial development brought back by migrants returning from industrialized countries. Underlying this expectation was an assumption that returning migrants would be eager to employ their new skills in modern industrial enterprises. To date, there have been few systematic attempts to study these issues but the available data suggest that with a few minor exceptions neither proposition can be supported.

Studies in several countries which have sent emigrants to Western Europe and North America suggest that few emigrants have learned new skills relevant to development at home. A large majority have been employed while abroad in low-level "socially-undesirable" jobs in which there are few

skills to be learned. In addition, many of these immigrants are employed in small-scale enterprises and may be better equipped to function in the informal sector in their home countries than in the modern sector. Among those who do take work in industry while abroad, few manage to rise to more skilled and supervisory positions. Finally, like the original emigration, return migration tends to be selective. Unlike out-migration, however, return migration selects predominantly from the less skilled; the more skilled and more successful immigrants are likely to be offered permanent jobs in the receiving country.

We have found almost no information on the acquisition of skills in other regions. However, since a majority of the emigrants to the Middle East are employed as construction workers, it seems unlikely that they will be able to contribute materially to development at home. Similarly, mine workers in Southern Africa are not likely to have learned skills relevant to the subsistence farming in their home countries. In agriculture, it has been observed that the skills learned by Mexicans in the large-scale, irrigated production of fruit and vegetables in the United States do not match with those required in the small-scale, rain-fed production of cereals in Mexico.

Most of the materials we have found on return migration deal with return from Western Europe. The studies suggest that not only do a majority of immigrants fail to acquire industrial skills, their aspirations do not lead them in the

direction of industrial, or even urban, occupations. A majority of emigrants appear to regard their experience as a means of attaining independence. On their return, therefore, many prefer to settle down to live off their savings, augmented by a little subsistence farming. Alternatively, if they can raise the necessary funds, they may invest in a small local business--a bar, a taxi, or a small grocery store. If and when these endeavors fail, they are more likely to re-emigrate than to seek paid employment in industry and agriculture.

Studies in Turkey suggest that a somewhat larger proportion of returning migrants than in Southern Europe have returned to take up paid work in urban centers. Some have also banded together and established small cooperative enterprises. Nevertheless, by far the largest number have returned to their former occupations, and many more have been unable to find work.

An important study of return migration to Southern Italy from the United States introduced a typology of returning migrants which appears to have wider relevance as a frame of reference. A large majority of returnees were classified as either "failures," "conservatives," or "retirees." None of these groups had any potential for development in the home country. Only the "very few" classified as "innovators" had any potential for development. In Southern Italy, however, their efforts were

blocked by traditional clientalism and, in the end, they settled down, bitterly disappointed, to live as "conservatives."

A study of return from the United States to the Philippines found that men who had emigrated during the 1930s and 1940s fell into a similar pattern on their return. In the Philippines, however, "innovators" were less thwarted by clientalism and members of this group had established successful truck-farming business on the outskirts of Manila. The author attributed the differences among returning migrants to the length of time they had been abroad. He argued that those who returned after only a few years had not had enough time to absorb the values, skills and attitudes relevant to modernization.

It may not be realistic to generalize these findings to the clearly short-term, contract labor migrations that appear to be becoming more common. It should be borne in mind, however, that migrants working under contract will still be in the prime of life when they return. Against this must be the fact that most of them will have been employed in low-skill, construction work. It is quite possible that they will not have acquired either the skills or the values and attitudes relevant to development.

## CHAPTER VI

### SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES

The shortage of empirical studies on the consequences of international migration is especially acute in the social and political spheres. We have been unable to locate a single study that specifically and in depth examines political effects in sending countries. The data on social effects are biased in that researchers have tended to focus on small societies or communities that have suffered serious depopulation as a consequence of prolonged out-migration.

Before embarking on this study, we hypothesized that international migration would accelerate "social mobilization," a process in which "major clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior." We have found little evidence, however, to suggest that the changes wrought by international migration in sending countries are of a type which fosters development at least in the first generation. We have found scattered findings that suggest the beneficial effects emerge slowly if at all, and may not appear until the second or later generations.

The social consequences about which we have found information cluster in three principle areas: effects at the community level; effects on the family; and effects on

women's roles and status. We have also included a brief section on women's fertility. In all of these areas, the research findings are fragmentary in the extreme.

### Community Level Effects.

In this area we have found conflicting evidence on social mobility and stratification. In most countries, returning migrants appear to be accorded esteem largely through the "great wealth" they are thought to have amassed. Where linked migration has continued through several generations, some social mobility has occurred as sons and daughters have been able to marry into higher social classes and/or families have been able to extend their land holdings or buy a small urban business. In European sending countries, few signs of upward social mobility have been detected. In Turkey, considerable downward mobility has been documented as individuals in white-collar occupations have sought blue-collar jobs abroad. This downward social mobility is thought to explain some of the reluctance of returning migrants to take jobs in industry. Overall, while there is evidence of upward mobility among individuals and families most studies suggest that, at the societal level, international migration has increased social stratification by emphasizing the difference between families who can afford to send emigrants abroad and those who are too poor to do so.

### Age and Sex Structure.

Societies with heavily male-dominated out-migration have produced marked imbalances in sex- and age-structure. In Ireland, males are said to have become isolated and fearful of sexual relationships with women. In the Caribbean, various forms of polygyny have become institutionalized. Age-structural imbalances occur as men and women in the most active years depart leaving only the old and the very young behind.

Quality of Life. In the very small societies that have received most study, anthropologists report a marked decline in the quality of social and community life as emigration and depopulation proceeds. Traditional modes of social control break down and traditional forms of organizing community work are abandoned. In general, social life tends to disintegrate and some societies have reported an increase in mental illness and depression. Since the populations of these small emigrant communities are declining, the cost of public services rises commensurately. Many of these communities thus find themselves without roads, schools, medical and social services. We stress once again that we have found few studies of social effects in societies where out-migration has reached this level.

### Family Level Effects.

Within the family, international migration exerts strong pressures toward nucleation and tends to undermine traditional authority relations. Even where migration is most clearly "linked," the greater financial independence of young people enables them to up on their own when tensions arise within the extended family.

In societies where authority is traditionally exercised by the male, the absence of fathers is reported to have introduced new problems of child socialization. In some places, a lack of discipline has spread to the schools and many children are cutting their education short because they expect to work as unskilled laborers abroad. The question of child socialization is not systematically addressed in the literature, however, and there is evidence that in Turkey some mothers are taking a more responsible attitude toward controlling their children.

Roles and Status of Women. The effects of international migration on women, whether or not they themselves emigrate, are also mixed and inconclusive. While some researchers have reported changes in women's roles as a consequence of international migration there is no agreement on whether these role changes have been accompanied by changes in status. The types of role--and possibly status--changes experienced by women appear to be related in part to women's traditional status in the countries of origin. Where the status of women is markedly inferior to that of men, international migration may result in even greater seclusion

of women. By contrast, where women have traditionally been accorded higher status, as in West Africa, international migration may enhance women's independence.

Opinions differ on the extent to which women's roles have expanded during their husbands' absences abroad. In the subsistence economies of Africa and the Middle East, from which much of the available data are derived, women are left responsible for most of the agricultural work. Many writers point out, however, that in these societies most of the day-to-day work in the fields has always been done by women. The evidence is mixed upon the extent to which women are now taking on the more managerial tasks formerly performed by men. One study in Africa noted that while women were taking over previously male tasks in agriculture, agriculture had itself been devalued as a consequence of migration and development. Control over a cash income, still a male prerogative, had become the major source of status and esteem.

The family life cycle appears to be a major determinant of whether or not women will choose to emigrate and whether, once abroad, they will seek paid employment. The types of employment open to women in the host country are often constrained by women's need to care for young children.

Employed female migrants in Europe have demonstrated high levels of political activism directed toward improving working conditions. Such women have also shown themselves to be competent in managing their financial affairs, often

at the cost of conflict between husband and wife. Studies of women emigrants from Turkey suggest, however, that these behavioral changes may be limited and may not spill over into areas of social life not immediately affected by emigration. One scholar has termed the effects of emigration on Turkish women as "pseudo-emancipation" rather than emancipation.

Fertility. It is usually contended that international migration acts to lower fertility among women in migrant families. Occasionally, it has been asserted that fertility may be increased. To our knowledge, there is no evidence in the literature for either assertion. However, a review of mechanisms through which fertility might conceivably be raised as a consequence of development suggests that international migration is unlikely to lead to higher fertility among migrant families.

#### Political Consequences.

In principle, there are three ways in which political development might be influenced by international migration. First, international migration might remove potential political leaders from the sending country. Secondly, international migration might provide an outlet for otherwise unsatisfied aspirations, thereby lessening political discontent. Thirdly, the experience of

international migration might stimulate political awareness, leading to increased political activism among returning migrants.

We have found nothing in the literature that addresses the first hypothesis and, indeed, it is difficult to suggest how such an effect might be measured. With regard to the second hypothesis, it is frequently assumed that migration is perceived by emigrants as a means of satisfying social and economic aspirations that cannot be fulfilled at home. Whether or not this has prevented political unrest that would otherwise have occurred is not addressed in the literature we have located. However, there are suggestions that governments frequently perceive emigration as a safety-valve in this sense.

Most discussions of political consequences address the third hypothesis. There is some evidence from the Caribbean that a majority of political leaders in recent decades have had several years of experience abroad, often as students. It is also common knowledge that many leaders of African independence movements were educated in developed countries.

So far as ordinary labor movements are concerned, most of the evidence suggests that international migration, far from exerting a "radicalizing" effect on migrant workers, tends to encourage conservative behavior among returning migrants. In Europe, returning emigrants who have found conditions at home less satisfactory than they anticipated

have tended to re-emigrate rather than attempt political action at home. At least one study has made a similar point for Mexico.

The literature also suggests that heightened political awareness and action may not appear until the second generation. There have been cases in which the sons of first generation emigrations, frustrated at the lack of potential for occupational advance in the host country, have returned to the home country to lead protest movements against the home government.

A possible reason for the lack of political activism among first generation migrants returning from Europe may be that they have had access to legitimate channels for articulating their demands on the home government. Political participation in home country politics by emigrants abroad has been actively fostered by home country governments in southern Europe and the Mediterranean basin. Some governments have gone so far as to provide free travel home to vote in national elections. We are unaware of similar arrangements being made by sending country governments in other regions of the world.

## CHAPTER VII

### CONCLUSIONS

The empirical findings on the consequences of international migration are mixed and contradictory. In large measure the contradictions can be attributed to the complexity of the process itself, and the variety of perspectives from which it can be viewed. Effects that may be desirable from one perspective and in the short term may appear less positive in the longer term and from a different perspective. The appearance of confusion is greatly increased, however, by the fragmented and haphazard character of the available research which precludes systematic comparative analysis.

Despite these shortcomings in the research, several consequences are widely reported. In general, we can say that international migration has allowed countless Third World families to enjoy a higher standard of living and more leisure than was formerly possible. International migration has eased the balance of payments problems of many Third World countries and may have lessened the burden of un- and underemployment. Despite claims to the contrary, it may not have seriously affected the supply of skilled labor for industry. At the same time, there is widespread evidence of generalized socio-economic decline and loss of morale in many rural sending communities. By undermining agricultural

productivity, moreover, international migration may have increased dependence on foreign countries. None of these findings is well established and their implications for development have not been addressed in the empirical literature. In particular, we are unaware of any studies that have attempted to identify the relationships among international migration, internal migration, and other development processes.

The most significant conclusion we have reached is that international migration cannot be understood from an exclusively economic perspective. Although international migrants are motivated by economic concerns, these are regarded as instrumental to social goals formulated by the extended family. The decisions about who will emigrate, what use will be made of their savings and remittances, and what they will do on their return home, are all largely determined by the family's overall objectives. Thus behavior that appears irrational from an economic perspective may be perfectly rational from the perspective of the migrant.

We have also reached a tentative conclusion that international migration is not a strong force for social mobilization. The scanty literature on this issue suggests that the extent of value change experienced by most international migrants and their dependents is relatively superficial and unlikely to generalize to situations not closely related to migration itself. Clearly, social change

is taking place in sending countries and some of it may be accelerated by international migration and its consequences. The literature suggests, however, that most migrant behavior is governed by the values and norms of village life in the country of origin.

Finally, our review of the literature indicates that international migration is a dynamic process with consequences that are cumulative and which feed back to change the character of the sending communities in ways that often precipitate further out-migration. The dynamic nature of international migration has important implications for research. While most research to date has employed a cross-sectional design and has dealt with migration as a static event, there is a need for carefully planned systematic research carried out over time. It is possible, however, that the available data do not readily lend themselves to longitudinal research.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . i

I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . 1

    Topics and Issues in Migration Research:  
    An Overview  
    Theoretical Perspectives on International Migration  
    The Scope of Labor Migration Today  
    Future Prospects for International Migration  
    Scope and Plan of the Report

II. CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR MIGRANTS . . . . . 34

    "Individual" versus "Linked" Migration  
    Recruitment by Developed Countries  
    Internal Migration, External Migration and Development  
    Selection by Age  
    Selection by Sex  
    Selection by Education and Occupation  
    Summary

III. EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR MIGRATION ON EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY IN COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN . . . . . 75

    Introduction  
    Effects on Employment and Productivity  
    Migration as a "Safety Valve"  
    Effect on Rural Areas  
    Effects in Urban Areas  
    Regional Effects

IV. REMITTANCES . . . . . 106

    National Budgets, and the Balance of Payments  
    Remittances and the Standard of Living  
    Utilization of Savings and Remittances  
    Reasons for Lack of Productive Investment  
    Aspirations, Expectations and the Ideology of Return  
    Lack of Investment Opportunities  
    Summary

V. ACQUISITION OF SKILLS AND RETURN MIGRATION . . . . . 140

    Acquisition of Skills  
    Return and Reintegration of Migrants  
    A Typology of Return Migration

Empirical Findings on Return  
 Migration  
 Return to Turkey  
 Return to Other Third World Countries  
 Summary: Long-term Effects of  
 International Migration

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| VI. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF<br>INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION . . . . .  | 165 |
| International Migration and Social<br>Mobilization<br>Community Level Social Effects<br>Stratification and Social Mobility<br>Changes in Sex Ratios<br>Changes in Social and Community Life<br>Effects of International Migration on<br>the Family<br>Family Organization and Structure<br>Socialization and Education of<br>Children<br>Roles and Status of Women<br>Women Who Remain Behind<br>Women Who Migrate<br>Effects on Fertility<br>Political Consequences of International<br>Migration in the Countries of Origin<br>Conclusions |     |
| VII. CONCLUSIONS . . . . .   | 221 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . .   | 232 |

## Chapter 1

### INTRODUCTION

In the years following the Second World War, international migration has assumed a magnitude that rivals, and may possibly exceed, that of the great transatlantic migrations of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Large and growing wealth among individuals and nations, wars, cheap transport, and the call of adventure have encouraged millions of individuals and families to uproot themselves from their homes in search of a better life. The flows encompass every sort of population movement known to man, from the flights of refugees to the deliberate and voluntary resettlement of families in what is intended to be a permanent new home. The past-war years have also witnessed the expansion of a specific type of international migration: the voluntary movement of labor on a short-term, seasonal or daily basis. The primary characteristic of this type of movement is the desire of individuals to sell their labor in receiving countries where wages are higher than at home and permit a more rapid accumulation of savings.

The volume and scope of contemporary population movements has attracted the attention of numerous scholars but the diversity and geographical spread of the movements have foiled attempts at systematic study. The result is a large literature, sometimes insightful, but resembling more the erratic path of a butterfly in flight than the

concentrated, in-depth study that yields dividends in understanding. In a little over twenty years, interest--and research funding--has passed from the problems associated with the movement of highly educated professionals, the so-called "brain-drain," to those arising from the mass movement of lesser skilled workers. Questions regarding the civil and political rights of migrant workers in the host countries have yielded place to discussions about ways of closing national borders against their arrival. Simultaneously, the attention of scholars has been drawn to the problems of refugee asylum and assimilation, and the issue of illegal immigration.

The present document represents an attempt to draw together and analyze the research findings in one but extremely important area of migration research--the impact of labor migration on sending countries in the Third World. For reasons that are elaborated below, until the last 10-15 years, effects in sending countries have been neglected by students of migration. The available literature is still scanty in amount and patchy in quality. Generally speaking, it tends to be long on assertion and short on empirical evidence. There is a noticeable bias in favor of studies of economic impacts, while social and political consequences receive short shrift from a majority of students. Even within the economic sphere, the literature is highly fragmented, focusing on the use of remittances in one country, the effects of productivity in another, and the

occupations of returning migrants in a third. Thus, in no way can the accumulated body of research be regarded as providing a full description or analysis of the impact of international labor migration in any one country, sending or receiving. Still less does it furnish a test of any theory of migration or development. Despite this very important deficiency in the literature, the present authors have been struck by the recurrence of many of the same themes in widely different societies in many different parts of the world. This repetition suggests that, beneath the idiosyncracies of individual migration streams, there lies a recognizable sequence of processes and events that may be expected to appear as any migration stream matures. If the consequences of labor migration are to be understood, however, it seems imperative that ways be found to mount a few broadly-based and systematic studies in single countries. Such studies should take account of social and political as well as economic impacts in both the short and the long term.

#### Topics and Issues in Migration Research: An Overview

Historically, the large and fragmented literature on international migration has focused almost exclusively on more developed countries, whether they have been countries of origin or destination. Until very recently theoretical arguments for or against international migration were usually formulated with possible benefits for the richer country in mind. Mercantilist political-economists in the

17th and 18th centuries believed that emigration would weaken the sending country both economically and militarily and urged the introduction by the state of measures to foster immigration, especially of skilled workers (Spengler, 1960, pp. 28-19).<sup>1</sup> Classical economists of the 19th century looked favorably on emigration if it was associated with colonization, as this was seen as a means of exporting surplus capital and developing empty lands from which raw materials could be purchased at low cost.<sup>2</sup> Empirically, once the vast movements of European poor to North America got under way, the attention of scholars was mainly drawn to the problems arising at the receiving end.<sup>3</sup> Especially in the United States, a rich literature developed dealing with the integration and assimilation of a diversity of cultural

---

<sup>1</sup>One of the best and most comprehensive reviews of mercantilist population theories is that of Strangeland (1904), pp. 194-198.

<sup>2</sup>See, for example, J. S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy (1848). Mill's ideas about emigration and colonization are found scattered throughout the entire work. But see, especially, pp. 330, 339-340, 721-22 in the 1909 edition, edited by W. J. Ashley. See also Nassau Senior (1836), pp. 26ff., 81-80.

<sup>3</sup>An exception is Robert F. Foerster's fine study of the impact of out-migration from Southern Italy during the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Foerster, 1919). Foerster's work describes processes and effects that are almost indistinguishable from those described in Third World countries today. Very recently, Italian scholars have started to make a more systematic study of the effect of the large migrations out of Italy. Some of these studies are reviewed in Tomasi (1979). Another outstanding exception is Hugh Brody's (1973) study of Ireland which is cited extensively in Chapter 6.

groups into the "melting pot" of American society.<sup>4</sup> Generally speaking, the imagination of novelists and poets has been fired more by the adventure of moving than by the fate of the community left behind.<sup>5</sup>

During the past two or three decades, the study of international migration has become more varied as scholars and governments have attempted to identify the causes and consequences of the recent vast increase in every sort of international population movement. An important part of the contemporary literature is devoted to the task of measuring the numbers and personal characteristics of the individuals

---

<sup>4</sup>Contemporary works that build on this literature include Barton (1975) and Gans (1962). For an extended bibliography on ethnicity and assimilation in the United States, see Barton (1976). For assimilation not related to the 19-20th century transatlantic migrations see Eisenstadt (1954).

<sup>5</sup>Even Vilhelm Moberg, the great novelist of Swedish-American migration, in a substantial oeuvre, makes almost no mention of the impact of the outflow on the Swedish countryside. An exception to our generalization is Oliver Goldsmith's poem, The Deserted Village, written in 1770, which graphically portrays the decline of English villages after the out-migrations engendered by the enclosures.

moving across international borders.' Because of the poor migration statistics kept by a majority of nations, including highly developed countries, attempts to assess the size and composition of migration streams and to develop methodologies for data collection and analysis are likely to remain a major part of the research for many years to come.'

Another large part of the post-war migration literature deals with the "brain-drain," the migration of highly educated manpower from less to more developed countries. Although by far the largest number of qualified international migrants is drawn from countries in the Third World, it was the more developed sending countries, especially the United Kingdom, that first expressed alarm

---

'Among major efforts of recent years the following may be cited: UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (1979): the country monographs prepared by the UN Economic Commission for Western Asia (ECWA) in the general series entitled The Population Situation in the ECWA Region (ECWA, 1979-1980) which covers fertility and mortality as well as migration and also includes some material on labor force activity: the studies of international migration within and to the Middle East undertaken by J. Stace Birks and Clive A. Sinclair for the International Labor Office (ILO), summarized in Birks and Sinclair (1980); the World Bank/OECD sponsored study of internal and international migration in West Africa carried out under the supervision of K. C. Zachariah and Julien Condé and summarized in Zachariah and Condé (1978). The UN South Pacific Commission is currently undertaking a study of migration, employment and development in the South Pacific that includes some work on up-grading migration statistics in the region. In addition, numerous individual scholars have attempted to assess the size and direction of specific migration flows. See, for example, Ecevit (1981); Kritiz (1981).

'The deficiencies of migration data are well known. A recent and concise statement is contained in UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (1975), pp. 6-11.

over the loss of talent. Indeed the term "brain-drain" was first used in the report of a Royal Society study commission, which established that the United Kingdom was losing substantial numbers of her most qualified personnel to the United States (Royal Society, 1963). The first clear sign of Third World interest in the brain-drain did not appear until 1967 when a "tendentious, heated and political" debate in the United Nations General Assembly culminated in the adoption of a resolution expressing grave concern over the issue. The Secretary-General was requested to make a study bringing together the views of member countries and laying out the advantages and disadvantages of brain drain to both sending and receiving countries.' Publication of the Secretary-General's report the following year heralded the virtual demise of scholarly interest in the brain-drain as a separate issue.' The report, and the General-Assembly debate that followed its appearance, showed clearly that sending country governments in the Third World were unwilling to attempt to restrict or regulate the flow. They

---

'UN General Assembly, Official Records, 22nd Session, 1967, Resolution No. 2320. Some idea of the tone of the debate can be obtained from the discussion in the US Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Brain Drain: A Study of the Persistent Issue of International Scientific Mobility (1976), pp. 7-8.

'UN General Assembly, Official Records, 23rd Session, Second Committee (1968). Outflow of Trained Personnel from Developing Countries: Report of the Secretary-General (Document No. A/7294). The report was based on reports from the specialized agencies including UNITAR, UNESCO, ILO, and WHO. The UNESCO and UNITAR reports have both been published under the names of their authors. See Knight (1971) and Henderson (1970).

appreciated that most less developed countries lacked the technological capacity to absorb large numbers of highly educated professionals and that the real problem was not the brain-drain per se but the "Westernization" of education in less developed countries. Because the educational systems of most developing countries have been designed along Western lines, products of the system, especially at the highest levels, are not well prepared to work in developing countries, nor are those countries able to offer the type of rewards that western-educated professionals expect. In the course of the debate, it became clear that delegates had come to the realization that the loss of educated manpower was "inherent in the very process of social and economic development" and that human rights would be violated if freedom of movement was restricted at either end of the migration stream.<sup>10</sup> Moreover, it has been observed that allowing dissatisfied professionals and business leaders to leave may lessen the risk of political instability or, as in Cuba after 1959, remove impediments to revolutionary change (Landstreet, 1976, p. 175; Dominguez, 1978, p. 13). Since the UN debate of 1968, the brain-drain issue has been integrated into the regular program of the Department of International Economic and Social Affairs (formerly the Department of Economic and Social Affairs) where it has been considered under the rubric of "transfer of technology." In

---

<sup>10</sup>UN General Assembly, Official Records, 23rd Session, Second Committee. Summary Record of Meetings, 25 September - 13 December, 1968.

recent years, scholars have tended to treat the migration of high level manpower as part of the larger question of international labor migration.<sup>11</sup>

Prominent among the migration issues currently attracting the attention of governments as well as scholars are the problems of illegal immigration and refugees. Understandably, because of the large numbers involved, illegal immigration has stimulated most concern and study in the United States.<sup>12</sup> However, illegal immigrants appear throughout the world in any country in which a demand for

<sup>11</sup>An exception is the small literature that has developed on compensating developed countries for the loss of highly educated personnel to more advanced societies. The most prolific writer on this theme has been Jagdish N. Bhagwati. See Bhagwati 1972, 1976; and Bhagwati and Partington, eds. (1976). Roger Böhning has recently reviewed the literature on this issue. See Böhning (1979), pp. 11-28.

<sup>12</sup>Discussion has centered on the volume of the flow, the size of the stock of illegal migrants in the United States, and ways of bringing the problem under control. Less attention has been paid to possible impacts on the US economy and to underlying factors that "push" Mexicans to seek work over the border. The literature is so extensive that it seems invidious to single out a few examples for citation here. However, reference is made to the following: Briggs (1975); Bustamente (1977); Cornelius (1978); Fragomen (1973); North and Houston (1978); Piore (1977); Reichart and Massey (1979 and undated). Official sources of value include: US Congress, House, Select Committee on Population, 95th Congress, Second Session (1978), Legal and Illegal Immigration to the United States; US Departments of Labor, Justice and State, Interagency Task Force on Immigration Policy, Staff Report (1979); US, Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, US Immigration Policy and the National Interest (1981), pp. 35-85; Idem. Staff Report (April 1981), pp. 371-409. For illegal migration outside of the United States see Johnson and Williams (1981). The best and most up-to-date bibliography of illegal migration studies is contained in the Staff Report of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy (1981), pp. 863-901.

labor exists side by side with restrictions on entry and long waiting lists or delays in processing applications. Thus, during the post-war period, a large proportion of immigrants to France took advantage of existing legislation which permitted regularization of status to enter illegally (France, 1978, pp. 6-9). This type of illegal entry is, however, entirely different from the clandestine immigration of workers that occurred for the first time in France after the border was closed in 1974 (Tapinos, 1978, p. 229). In general, it is thought that the number of undocumented foreign workers in Western Europe has risen steeply since the border closings of 1973-74.<sup>13</sup> Illegal foreign workers are also known to be present in the Middle East.<sup>14</sup>

Understandably, perhaps, the refugee problem has been discussed primarily with reference to the immediate problems of asylum and resettlement, and the legal questions raised by these issues.<sup>15</sup> There are also some studies of

---

<sup>13</sup>Around 1978, the EEC estimated that there were at least 600,000 illegal immigrants in Western Europe, and it is claimed that there are between 200,000 and 300,000 in West Germany alone. See Jonathan Power, "The Great Debate on Illegal Immigration: Europe and the US Compared," Journal of International Affairs 33, 2 (Winter 1979), p. 244.

<sup>14</sup>J. Stace Birks and Clive A. Sinclair, International Migration and Development in the Arab Region (Geneva: International Labor Organization, 1980), p. 84.

<sup>15</sup>See, for example, Garcia-Mora (1956); Grahl-Madsen (1972); Aiboni (1978); Hanson (1978); Barnes (1977); Bernard, ed. (1972); Cnossen (1964); US Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Review of Refugee Resettlement Programs and Policies (1979); Martin (1965); Taft, North and Ford (1979).

persecution, of refugee experiences in camps, and of later assimilation but, in general, the literature on refugees is thin. A leading US student of refugee issues, Barry Stein, attributes what he terms the "scholarly inattention to refugee problems" to the nature of the problems themselves. Stein notes that while some aspects of refugee research, mental health of refugees or refugee problems in specific regions of the world, for example, fit quite neatly into a single disciplinary or area studies framework, the majority of issues call for a multi-disciplinary approach.' ' The well known difficulties of getting multidisciplinary research off the ground are compounded, in Stein's opinion, by a pervasive feeling that refugee problems are unique, and non-recurring. Thus scholars have tended to regard refugee problems as vehicles for testing their own disciplinary theories rather than as social problems sui generis (Stein, 1980, pp. 2-3). ' '

By far the most significant body of literature to appear during the past two or three decades is that which deals with the international migration of labor. Official and scholarly interest in this topic emerged during the 1960s when it became apparent that, contrary to earlier expectations, intra-European labor movements were going to

---

' 'Examples of studies of this type are Stein's own study of African refugees (Stein, 1981) and Stern (1955).

' 'Professor Stein has also compiled a bibliography of refugee research (Stein, 1979). The Select Commission of Immigration's Staff Report includes a less extensive bibliography on pp. 836-841.

continue and even increase in volume. Since that time, interest has extended to labor movements in other parts of the world, and especially to the recent, very large, migrations to the Middle East and North Africa. It remains true, however, that the literature on international labor migration is dominated by the post-war experience in Western and Northern Europe.'\* Within this field, moreover, receiving countries have received the most intensive analysis.'

It is hardly surprising that research on international migration should have focused so overwhelmingly on the more developed country, whether it was the country of origin or of destination. Until very recently, migration research, like research in other social science fields, has been undertaken primarily by western scholars whose purpose was

---

'\*There is, of course, a large and growing literature on US immigration. However, US immigration differs in several respects from the labor migrations in Europe, the Middle East, South Africa and other places. For example, most migration to the US is intended, by both the migrant and the US government, to be permanent. Although there are some programs for the entry of temporary migrants of the "guest worker" variety, these involve insignificant numbers. Traditionally, the US demand for temporary migrant labor has been met by illegal immigration. See Zolberg (1978a).

'\*Once again, the literature is so voluminous that it is difficult to select a few examples for citation here. General studies include: Castles and Kosack (1973); Freeman (1979); Crane (1979); Miller (1978); Power (1979); Rist (1978); Schiller (1975); Tapinos (1978). In addition, every receiving country has an extensive literature in its own language which has not been reviewed by the present authors.

to study their own societies.<sup>20</sup> For centuries, moreover, many scholars and philosophers have regarded migration as a purely beneficent process since it results from the free choices of individuals.<sup>21</sup> Thus, the main focus of interest was on the individual migrant and his integration or assimilation into the host society. At least one authority on 19th and early 20th century international migration has concluded that "the process of diffusion was on the whole mutually beneficial to sending and receiving countries" (Thomas, 1968, p. 29).<sup>22</sup> An assumption that this is true of all international migrations appears to have underlain the willingness of European nations to engage in large-scale labor migration after the Second World War (OECD, 1975, pp. 7-11).

The ground was prepared for a broadening of the focus of migration studies when countries participating in the post-war intra-European migration started to abandon the strictly bilateral framework of agreements on international

---

<sup>20</sup>Exceptions that in no way invalidate this proposition are the studies of migrant labor in colonial territories, made by scholars and officials of the metropolitan powers, notably on the African continent. See, for example: Gulliver (1957); *Le problème de la main-d'oeuvre au Congo Basin* (1930-31); Mitchell (1957); Powelsland (1957); Richards, ed. (1954); Rouch (1954); Harris (1959).

<sup>21</sup>This view is still current among some scholars. See, for example, Johnson (1968); Zolberg (1981).

<sup>22</sup>J. K. Galbraith (1979, pp. 120-139) also argues that emigration from Scotland, Ireland, Sweden, Italy and other European countries in the 19th and 20th centuries benefitted both the sending and receiving countries. However, Galbraith presents little evidence to support his claim.

labor migration and moved toward multilateral action. Thus organizations such as the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (later to become the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD), the International Labor Office (ILO) and the Council of Europe came to be deeply involved in migration from and to their member countries (OECD, 1975, p. 7; Böhning, 1976). It was then only a matter of time before sending countries in Europe started to question the benefits to themselves of continued mass labor migration.<sup>23</sup> Much of what is known of the consequences of international labor migration today, for receiving as well as sending countries, comes from programs of study undertaken by the OECD and the ILO at the request of sending countries during the 1970s.<sup>24</sup> One outcome of the OECD project has been the development of the concept of the "migratory chain," a framework for analysis that encompasses the determinants and consequences of every aspect of international migration from the decision to emigrate to the reinsertion of the returning migrant into the home economy

---

<sup>23</sup>According to Böhning, the first authoritative statement questioning the assumption that labor migration was wholly beneficial to the sending countries was that of Xenophon Zolotas, then Governor of the Bank of Greece (Zolotas, 1976).

<sup>24</sup>The ILO's Migration for Employment Project, organized within the World Employment Program, has resulted in over 40 Working Papers and numerous articles. The OECD's program entailed setting up a Working Party on Migration, as well as sponsoring a number of in-depth studies.

and society (OECD, 1978). The adoption of this framework would ensure that adequate attention is paid to both sending and receiving countries.

Growing concern over the vast expansion of international labor migration from developing countries has generated a series of large studies funded by international organizations concerned with economic development. One of the most extensive of these efforts was the study undertaken on behalf of the ILO by Stace Birks and Clive Sinclair in thirteen countries in the Middle East and North Africa.<sup>25</sup> Others include the World Bank funded studies of internal and international migration in West and North Africa (Ecevit, 1979, 1981; Ecevit and Zachariah, 1978); and the studies on social and economic impacts in Pakistan (Gilani, 1980; Bilquees and Hamid, 1980) and Bangladesh (Islam, 1980; Rahman, 1980; Habibullah, 1979; Ashraf Ali, 1979; Siddiqui, 1979). In addition, the South Pacific Commission has recently mounted an investigation of migration, employment and development in the South Pacific (South Pacific Commission, 1979). Finally, the United Nations Economic Commission for West Asia (ECWA) has prepared a series of country monographs on the population situation which include

---

<sup>25</sup>Birks and Sinclair (1980). This volume contains the final report of the research. These findings were also presented serially as a of country-specific Working Papers in the ILO's Migration for Employment Series (listed in the bibliography) and as Working Papers in the Migration for Employment series of the Department of Economics, Durham University, England. Other versions have been prepared for the World Bank, USAID, and articles in scholarly journals.

some materials on migration (ECWA, 1979, 1980). In addition, in 1981, ECWA sponsored an international seminar on The economic effects of intra-regional migration.<sup>24</sup> Several of these large projects have devoted much of their attention to estimating the direction and volume of the flows.

#### Theoretical Perspectives on International Migration

An important cause of the shift of focus in migration research in recent years has been a change in the most widely accepted theoretical perspective on international migration. The term "theoretical perspective" has been selected with care as existing theories of migration per se do little to illuminate the development consequences of labor migration. As late as 1966, Everett Lee observed that while there have been "literally thousands" of migration studies since the publication of Ravenstein's classical exposition of the "laws" of migration in 1885 and 1889, "few additional generalizations have been made" (Lee, 1966, p. 48). Lee's own theory was essentially an attempt to elaborate on Ravenstein's laws and to develop a framework for the analysis of migration decisions. As Zolberg has

---

<sup>24</sup>Individual papers presented at this conference will be cited, where appropriate, throughout this report. The present authors understand that the papers are to be made available in one volume at a later date.

pointed out (Zolberg, 1978b, p. 3), Lee's theory and others advanced by the sociologists Stouffer (1940), Zipf (1946) and Hoffman-Nowotny (1970) have in common,

the notion of individual actors exercising some choice on the basis of information concerning conditions at the point of origin and destination as well as the costs of getting from here to there, all of which affect classes of actors differentially and shape their decisions to leave as well as their trajectories.

Helpful as are these sociological theories in identifying the personal and psychological motivations of individual migrants at the point of departure, they do not assist the scholar to come to grips with the essential characteristic of contemporary labor migrations. That is, they do not permit the analyst to explain the structural factors that "produce a patterned movement, sustained over extensive periods of time and predictable as to directionality and size" (Portes, 1977, p. 1). Development scholars have commented, moreover, that the sociological theories are too generalized to be useful as a guide to policy (Todaro, 1976, p. 19). Todaro and his associates have attempted to elaborate an econometric model that would be more useful to policymakers but their efforts refer specifically to rural-urban migration within developing countries (Todaro, 1968, 1969; Harris and Todaro, 1970; Johnson, 1971; Porter, 1973; Bhagwati and Srinivasen, 1974; and Fields, 1975). Students of post-war international labor

migration have tended therefore to assess the consequences of international migration within the general framework of theories of economic development.

Among students of migration there is general agreement that labor migration is a response to social and economic inequalities between nations and regions within nations. Seeking to better their positions, individuals are led to migrate from the more disadvantaged regions to those in which their opportunities are greater. Beyond this point of agreement, there have developed two distinct theoretical perspectives under which the work of most individual scholars can be subsumed. The first perspective regards international migration as beneficial to both sending and receiving countries, at least within certain limits. The second tends to see international migration as favoring the receiving country or region and as inimical to development in the country or region of origin. The development theories underlying both perspectives are expressed in abstract terms difficult to test in concrete cases. Nevertheless, the competing theories inform the design of most studies and the interpretation of empirical data.<sup>27</sup>

The first perspective regards international migration as a mechanism for restoring social and economic equilibrium between more and less developed regions and nations. Emigration is thought to reduce population pressures in

---

<sup>27</sup>A more extended discussion of these two perspectives may be found in Portes (1977).

economically stagnating areas and to provide the labor needed by the economically growing region. This abundance of labor allows the economy of the receiving country to grow rapidly without a concomitant rise in wages. Indeed, in the pure case, wages should gradually fall to the point at which equilibrium is restored between the two regions and migration ceases.

The "equilibrium" perspective on international migration draws on the two-sector development model of W. Arthur Lewis (Lewis, 1954) as modified by Ranis and Fei (1961; see also Fei and Ranis, 1964). When applied to international migration, the sending country as a whole is regarded as the agricultural sector of the model while the receiving country takes the place of the industrial sector (Kindleberger, 1967, p. 88). In the sending country, emigration is supposed to eliminate redundant labor. This process "raises the marginal productivity of labor to the going wage and eventually stimulates replacement of men by machines" (Kindleberger, 1967, p. 11). In addition, capital generated by immigrants in the receiving country finds its way back to the sending country in the form of migrants' remittances, and becomes available for capital development projects in the home country (Griffen, 1976; Lutz, 1961; Berg, 1965; Kindleberger, 1967, pp. 91-95; Friedlander, 1965). Where the migration is intended to be circular or rotating in form, as was the assumption underlying the intra-European case, sending countries are also expected to

benefit by the industrial skills brought home by returning migrants. Kindleberger has argued, however, that the essential factor is the rationalization of agricultural production which comes about through the consolidation of land holdings and the introduction of more advanced technologies under the stimulus of dwindling labor supplies in areas of out-migration (Kindleberger, 1967, pp. 103-107).

The "equilibrium" perspective on international migration emerged as part of the intellectual climate of the early post-war years, when capital accumulation was thought to be the key to economic development in Third World countries. As such, the equilibrium view provided the intellectual justification for the massive intra-European migrations of the 1950s and 1960s (OECD, 1975, pp. 7-11). By the mid-1960s, when development theorists were starting to pay more attention to rural development, students of international migration had themselves become aware of empirical facts that vitiated the model. Kindleberger had always argued that international migration would be harmful to the sending country if it proceeded past the point at which the surplus population had been absorbed. At the same time, he thought it could do little to relieve countries like Turkey in which the surplus population is very large (Kindleberger, 1976, p. 106). Moreover, Lewis himself observed in 1964 that rigidities in the labor markets of receiving countries had prevented the fall of wages that would have brought immigration to a halt (cited in Portes,

1977, p. 6). As development models based solely on capital accumulation and industrialization fell into disfavor, students of international migration were forced to look for a different explanatory paradigm.

The second, and currently dominant, perspective on international migration derives from Gunnar Myrdal's notion of "cumulative causation" (Myrdal, 1957). Myrdal (p. 13) argued that it is erroneous to assume that social changes will regularly call forth reactions that will pull the system back into a stable equilibrium. He proposed, rather, that social change "tends to become cumulative and often to gather speed at an accelerating rate" unless stopped by exogenous forces that bring the movement to a halt. Unlike equilibrium theorists, Myrdal held that market forces tend to increase inequalities among countries and regions as labor, capital and trade are inevitably attracted to more rapidly expanding areas. Rather than calling forth a reaction tending to draw the social system back into equilibrium, this process, referred to as "backwash effects," tends to continue and even to accelerate, leading to stagnation or regression (p. 26). Rather than relieving sending areas of their surplus populations, Myrdal argued that emigration from underdeveloped nations, by attracting individuals in the most productive period of their lives, tends to compound the already unfavorable age-structure brought about by high fertility (p. 27).

Myrdal's theoretical ideas bear a striking resemblance to those of a group of scholars, mainly from the Third World, who have examined the origins and nature of the economic links between advanced capitalist nations at the center of the international economic system and underdeveloped nations at the periphery of the system (see, e.g. Prebisch, 1950; Fann and Hodges, 1971; Cockcroft, Frank and Johnson, 1972; Cardoso and Faletto, 1979). These scholars argue that countries at the periphery are underdeveloped because they are locked into a world economic order in which the terms of trade are determined by and act in favor of nations at the center. As a consequence, developing countries are constantly drained of their surplus, including their surplus of human capital, and therefore grow more slowly than center nations, or may even stagnate. Any growth experienced by developing countries is regarded as having been determined and shaped by the needs of the capitalist countries at the center, a condition termed "dependency."

In terms of economic growth and social development, dependency theory and cumulative causation tend to generate like consequences for developing countries. The two "theories" differ in that, while Myrdal believed that the decline of developing areas arises as a consequence of market forces--the actions of ordinary men protecting their interests--dependency theorists regard it as a consequence of the exploitative nature of the world capitalist system.

Like equilibrium theory, dependency theory is expressed in highly abstract terms that are not readily amenable to empirical testing. One study that attempted to operationalize "dependence" in the context of international labor migration found no evidence that the sending country, Algeria, was in a dependency relationship with the receiving country, France (Adler, 1977). Dependency theory has also run into difficulties explaining such unquestioned facts as the economic growth experienced by many developing countries.<sup>20</sup> The limitations notwithstanding, cumulative causation and dependency theory together shape the design of most current research on international labor migration.<sup>21</sup>

#### The Scope of Labor Migration Today

A major difference between the massive population movements of the 19th century and those that are taking place today is the direction of the flow. While the earlier movements flowed primarily from the more developed European

---

<sup>20</sup>See, especially, Bill Warren, "Imperialism and Capitalist Industrialization," New Left Review 81 (September-October 1973) and the reply to Warren by Emmanuel, Arghiri and McMichael, New Left Review 85 (May-June 1974).

<sup>21</sup>While it is indisputable that by far the greatest amount of contemporary migration research is economic in orientation and may be subsumed beneath one of the two major development theories just outlined, some scholars, particularly anthropologists, have given greater attention to social and psychological variables in both the causes and the consequences of international migration. Reference is made to this work throughout the following chapters. Recently, one economist has attempted to incorporate social and psychological variables into his theory of immigration. See Piore (1979), esp. Chapter 3.

nations to new lands in North America and Oceania, as well as to colonial territories in Asia and Africa, the migrations of today flow mainly in the reverse direction. It is true that in both periods there have been important exceptions to the main direction of the flow. As imperial administrators moved out from Europe to govern colonial possessions, economic means were employed to induce subject peoples in Asia and Africa to move from regions with low development potential to others of greater potential productivity. In the post-independence era developing countries are sending hundreds of thousands of their sons to labor in low-status occupations in the advanced industrialized countries, while a counter movement of high level manpower streams from developed to less developed nations. These reverse flows are composed principally of professional and technical personnel, engineers, physicians, teachers, administrators and management experts, often under contract to developing country governments but also as consultants to international organizations and as staff members of multinational business corporations. Despite the large numbers involved in counter flows and their economic significance to developing countries, the greater concern today is not the brain drain from more to less developed nations but the larger flows of ordinary workers from less to more developed countries.

Among the more significant migration flows of recent years are the massive influxes of migrants from the developing countries of Asia (excluding Japan), Africa and Latin America to the developed countries of Europe, North America and Oceania. Although the numbers are hard to establish with any degree of reliability, a recent United Nations estimate suggests that by mid-1974, approximately 9.5 million nationals of developing countries were resident on a "long-term" basis in the developed regions cited.<sup>30</sup> Of these, more than half, approximately 5.3 million, were found in the New World countries of North America and Oceania (UN, 1979, p.3). These figures, which of necessity exclude undocumented aliens, are almost triple those for 1960, when only 3.2 million developing country aliens were resident in Europe, North America and Oceania combined.

Overlapping in part with the migration streams just mentioned, are the mass labor migrations to the advanced, industrialized nations of northern and western Europe from less developed countries in Southern Europe, the Mediterranean basin, and Turkey. It is said that between the end of World War Two and the late 1970s, this movement had involved more than 30 million people (OECD, 1979,

---

<sup>30</sup>"Long-term" or "permanent" migration, as defined in the UN study, signifies changes of residence of more than one year' duration. The authors of the study note, however, that few countries provide data that conform to this customary definition. They remark that "the available statistical series of immigrants and emigrants vary in concept from one country to another and lack comparability." (p. 3). Where a choice could be made, the authors used statistical series that excluded short-term migrants.

p. 16). According to UN estimates, some 5.5 million immigrants from southern Europe, and 4.2 million from North Africa and Turkey, were resident in north-west Europe in 1974, immediately before the major receiving countries closed their borders (UN, 1979, p. 3). These figures, also, show a rapid increase over the 1960 figure of approximately 3 million when most of the immigrants in Europe were citizens of former colonial territories and were resident in France and the United Kingdom (Ibid). Although European receiving countries have attempted to prevent the further inflow of foreign workers since the oil crisis of 1972-73, the "stock" of foreign nationals resident in only six major receiving countries<sup>3</sup> increased to just under 11 million in 1979 as a consequence of efforts to stabilize the foreign populations (SOPEMI, 1980, p. 16). In 1979, moreover, the Federal Republic of Germany and Switzerland both registered small positive migration balances for the first time since 1973 (Ibid, pp. 20-21; 29-30). Germany in 1979, had a foreign population 4.14 million, slightly larger than the previous maximum of 4.12 in 1974 (Ibid, p. 42).

Very complex migration systems, involving at least four types of movement, also exist in Latin America and the Caribbean. The different systems include: a) movements of unskilled laborers between contiguous countries, including Mexican immigration to the United States, Brazilian

---

<sup>3</sup>Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland.

migration to Paraguay, Salvadorian to Honduras, and similar movements elsewhere; b) movements of populations attracted to specific development poles within the region, especially Argentina and Venezuela;<sup>22</sup> c) movements away from the least developed countries including Colombia, Bolivia, Haiti, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and many small Caribbean islands (Diaz-Briquets, 1980, pp. 5-8). The fourth type of international migration found in this region is that to the United States and Canada and, to a lesser extent, Europe (Kritz, 1981, pp. 214-222). Scholars are still attempting to estimate the volume and directions of this maze of international migrations and it is impossible to present their findings in short compass. However, some idea of the orders of magnitude involved can be given. In 1974, for example, the International Labor Office estimated that international migration from Latin America and the Caribbean to ten countries in Latin America totalled more than 3 million (cited in Diaz-Briquets, Table 1). Estimates prepared by Mary Kritz indicated that legal immigrants to the United States from Latin America and the Caribbean amounted to some 845,300 between 1972 and 1976. Emigration

---

<sup>22</sup>Recent newspaper reports speak of a growing desire among Argentinians to emigrate in order to escape 78% annual inflation, economic stagnation and growing unemployment. Diplomatic sources estimate that 2 million of Argentina's 28 million population are seeking information from foreign consulates. These prospective emigrants are said to represent a cross-section of Argentinian society and to include doctors and lawyers as well as plumbers and bricklayers. See New York Times, 25 October 1981.

from Latin America and the Caribbean accounted for 43 percent of all legal immigration into the US during that time (Kritz, p. 215, Table 2).

Significant population flows are also taking place on the African continent, especially in West Africa. Based on an study undertaken by Dr. K.C. Zachariah for the World Bank, nearly 2.2 million West Africans live in a country other than the country in which they were born, and nearly 3 million live in countries other than their countries of ethnic or tribal origin. On a net basis, nearly 1.2 million West Africans changed their country of residence between 1965 and 1975 (OECD, 1979, p. 6). In Southern Africa, the volume of migration to the mines and plantations of South Africa from neighboring independent states has decreased somewhat in recent years. According to the Mine Labor Organization in Johannesburg, the number of mine workers of foreign origin was only 214,556 in 1976 compared with 296,105 in 1974. (Elkan, 1980, p. 587, table 2). The Economist weekly also notes that the number of immigrants in South Africa fell from 470,000 in 1975 to 355,000 in 1977 (Economist, 18 August 1979, p. 93).

Finally, the most recent, most dynamic and in many ways the most interesting of contemporary migration systems is the one that has developed since 1973 to the oil-producing countries of the Middle East. The exact number of immigrants in these countries has not been determined with any degree of exactness as the recording systems in most of

the sending and receiving countries are primitive, the movements are complex, and there is a significant amount of illegal border crossing from contiguous states. Once again, however, it is possible to give an idea of the orders of magnitude. Zafar Ecevit estimated that the number of foreign workers in 10 Middle Eastern and North African countries was approximately 1.9 million in 1975<sup>33</sup> (Ecevit, 1979, p. 5, table 2). Ecevit's estimate agrees quite well with that of Birks and Sinclair (1980, p 137, Table 13) for the same year. These authors give a total foreign worker population of 1.8 million in 11 countries.<sup>34</sup> Birks and Sinclair also judged that the number of foreign residents (including non-workers) in the same group of countries totalled 3.5 million in 1975 (1980, pp. 138-39, Table 14). There is no doubt, moreover, that the numbers have grown steadily since 1975. The Economist (August 1979, p. 92), for example, estimated that there were some 2.5 million foreign workers in the oil-producing states in 1979, of whom 75 percent were Arabs.

#### Future Prospects for International Migration

The large and rapid increase in the flow of labor migration from developing countries during the last twenty to thirty years must clearly have had a marked effect on the

---

<sup>33</sup>Algeria, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

<sup>34</sup>The list is the same as Ecevit's if Iran is removed and Jordan and the Yemen Arab Republic are added.

process of socio-economic development in these countries. What are the prospects for a continuation of the current high levels of international labor migration, say between now and the end of the century? Some observers have suggested that the demand for foreign labor in the Middle East may decline shortly as the construction boom is nearing its end (McClelland, 1979; Green 1978; India Today, 1979; Wilson, 1979; Sweeny, 1980). A recent World Bank study which projected the demand for labor in the Middle East until 1985, concluded however that the oil-rich states will continue to require large inputs of foreign labor, in part because they have fallen behind in training their own nationals to participate in modern sector activities (Sirageldin, Socknat and Birks, 1981, esp. pp. 13-26). Indeed, these researchers found that the demand for all categories of worker except unskilled laborers will more than double by 1985. In 1976, Roger Böhning of the International Labor Office (ILO) attempted a computer simulation to project the future need for migrant labor in Europe. Taking into consideration such variables as increasing leisure, the growth of capital and consumer demand, Böhning concluded that worker emigration to Europe would level off and even start to decline in the ensuing decade. The principle reason advanced by Böhning for this decline was that governmental efforts to control inflation

would result in idle production facilities and lower economic growth (Böhning, 1976). So far, Böhning's prediction has been quite accurate.

Böhning's forecast, as far as it went, agrees with a more qualitative assessment made by Hilde Wander for the United Nations in 1977 (Wander, 1979, p. 287). Dr. Wander anticipated little demand for migrant labor in Europe outside of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and Scandinavia until the mid to late 1980s. Thereafter, she expects a slight increase in the demand for skilled foreign workers until the end of the century and a higher demand after the year 2000 as the populations of more European nations start to decline. Wander also anticipates a growing demand for immigrant workers in South Africa, although she believes that political considerations may prevent the demand being met. She also expects to see a steep rise in the number of both highly qualified and less skilled immigrant workers in the Middle East. In general, Wander sees less scope than used to exist for long-term or permanent migration but an increasing demand for short-term, skill-specific worker migration in many parts of the world (p. 287).<sup>35</sup>

---

<sup>35</sup>Timothy King of the World Bank has also argued recently that international migration is likely to decrease in relative importance in the years ahead. This is not because he anticipates a reduction of income disparities among countries but rather that richer countries will attempt to restrict immigration because of the political problems it causes (King, 19981, pp. 6-7).

### Scope and Plan of the Report

The purpose of this report is to bring together what is known about the social and political consequences of international migration as they affect the economic development of sending countries in the Third World. In order to accomplish this objective, the present authors have found that before turning to the literature on social and political impacts, it is first necessary to review and analyze the more purely economic consequences, especially those that affect rural and urban productivity and the use of remittances. There are basically two reasons why this course of action is necessary. First, we have found that the literature on specifically social impacts is extremely sparse, while that on political effects is almost non-existent. Secondly, the more deeply we read in the literature, the clearer it becomes that social, economic and, to a more limited extent, political consequences (and causes) are inextricably intertwined. Attempts to separate them verge on meaninglessness and are likely to encourage the drawing of unwarranted conclusions. In presenting our findings on the economic consequences, however, we make no claim to have analyzed them from the perspective of an economic theorist. Rather, we have attempted to focus attention on those aspects that are more generally socio-economic in nature and that clearly form part of the overall context within which decisions to migrate and to return are taken.

The following chapter summarizes current thinking on the selection of migrants and presents materials on the characteristics of contemporary international migrants in different parts of the world. Chapters 3 and 4 bring together research findings on the economic impacts of out-migration on sending countries and communities. Chapter 3 deals with effects on labor supplies and productivity in urban and rural areas. Chapter 4 treats migrants' savings and remittances and, in particular, the uses to which they are put. Chapter 4 also discusses the literature on migrants' aspirations and expectations as they help to explain both the pattern of remittance use and the occupations taken up by migrants on their return home. The acquisition of skills by migrants and their re-entry into the home economy form the content of Chapter 5. Chapter 6 presents the more sparse research findings on social and political concomitants and consequences of international migration, including its effect on social mobility, women, and the family. Finally, in Chapter 7, we attempt to draw some conclusions about the effects of international migration on sending countries and the nature of the work that remains to be done in this area.

## CHAPTER 2

## CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR MIGRANTS

It seems self evident that the impact of out-migration on the countries and communities of origin is determined as much by the personal characteristics and skills of those who leave as by the use made of their savings and remittances, the skills they acquire, and the employment they engage in if and when they return. The departure of the able-bodied, educated and employed will obviously have different, and more deleterious, consequences than the loss of the uneducated, unskilled and unemployed. In this chapter, we attempt to draw together what is known about the characteristics of contemporary labor migrants in order to the stage, as it were, for the analysis of the effects of international migration that constitutes the remainder of this report.

Migration, both internal and external, has long been known to be a selective process, generally attracting the more intelligent, able-bodied, educated, resourceful and intrepid members of the sending community. Research on contemporary international migrants, reported below, supports this generalization, at least as far as age, education and previous occupation are concerned. Any theory of international labor migration, however, must be able to explain not only why certain individuals are selected rather than others, but also why the movements are patterned and

directed to some countries and not others. It has been customary in the past to analyze the motivation to migrate in terms of the relative strength of "push" factors in the sending country and "pull" factors at the receiving end, and their combined ability to overcome various "intervening obstacles," especially financial and other costs, distance, and lack of information about job opportunities (Lee, 1966). At a sufficiently high level of generalization, the push-pull "theory" can stand as an acceptable model of the determinants of international migration. There is no doubt that economic disparities between sending and receiving countries underlying the bulk of contemporary labor migrations. There is also evidence that the high cost of international travel is a powerful obstacle to the emigration of the poorest members of the sending society. Conventional push-pull analysis has difficulty, however, in accounting for the selection of certain classes of individuals and the neglect of others. It is unable, for example, to explain why the poorest members leave less frequently even today, when many contract workers have their fare paid by their employers or when wage differentials are large enough to make it feasible to go into debt to cover the initial cost of movement. In addition, push-pull analysis cannot readily explain the highly specific choice of countries of origin and destination.

The literature does not yet provide either a full theory of labor migration or an analytical framework that relates the push variables at the sending end to the pull variables in the receiving countries. Nevertheless, evidence is accumulating that suggests there are distinct and recognizable factors and processes in both sending and receiving countries that shape the composition and direction of international migration streams. To deal first with sending countries it is a truism to assert that international migration would not exist if large numbers of individuals did not believe they could better their position by selling their labor in a foreign country. Yet the stark image often invoked of impoverished masses forced by unemployment to abandon hearth and home does not fit with recent research findings on how the decision to migrate is taken. Much more common in the literature is a picture of the migrant and his family actively exploiting the possibility of migration in order to achieve a variety of social objectives. As Tapinos, among others, has pointed out the decision to emigrate involves much more than a decision to leave.

A migrant has a plan which determines his attitude with regard to the choices he will subsequently face: professional training, social mobility, returning home, etc. At each stage of the process, the decisions that the migrant must make are narrowly circumscribed by his initial plan (Tapinos, 1979, p. 3).

### "Individual" versus "Linked" Migration

In their extensive review of the literature on migration from rural areas, Connell et al. (pp. 24-26) make a distinction between emigration which is "individual," or intended to benefit mainly the migrant himself, and migration which is "linked," or intended to benefit the wider family remaining in the village. On the basis of their research, Connell et al. believe that purely individual migration is relatively rare, possibly limited to villages where there is a long tradition of out-migration. An example would be the migrations of Mossi youths to Ghana and the Ivory Coast which take place purely for the individuals' economic gain (Skinner, 1966). The essence of linked migration, on the other hand, is that it forms part of a global strategy by means of which an extended family or household is enabled to secure and advance its economic and social status by pooling its resources and diversifying its sources of income. We cannot overemphasize the significance of social motives as a cause of much international migration. As will become clear in later sections of this report, the social implications of improved economic status go far to explain migrant behavior, including the use made of savings and remittances, and the jobs taken by migrants of their return home.

Linked migration would seem to be the usual form of population movement on the Indian subcontinent. Writing of Pakistani migration to Great Britain, Verity Kahn says (1977, p. 70)

The head of the household, or of the immediate Viradari grouping, selects the emigrants and makes the preparation. The joint decision reinforces the ties with kin and community, thus cementing ties of affection and determination. The migrant knows he has support and he is strongly motivated. The preparations before the departure include a stream of advice, mostly admonitions to profit financially from Vilayat (Britain) but not to succumb to the bad ways of the West.

Ballard and Ballard (1977, p. 27) add to this picture, speaking specifically of the Punjab but also, they believe, of other rural areas of India.

Almost all of the migrants have been drawn from families of middling wealth and status, and none of them regarded their departure as permanent and final. Their aim, almost always, was to earn money to restore or to improve the prestige and status of the family.

Dahya, also, observes how the Pakistani "family head plans and finances the migration of young members in order to fulfill his socio-economic goals" (1973, p. 253). Dahya describes the efforts made by the extended family to preserve the loyalty and affection of the young migrants. Although a marriage may be arranged before the young man departs for Great Britain, the marriage does not usually take place until the migrant returns for his first home leave. Thereafter, the young man may have to wait for his second or third vacation before he is permitted to take his bride back with him to England. Even then the first child

may be kept in Pakistan by the grandparents in order to ensure the continued flow of remittances and the eventual return of the couple. This may not occur until the patriarch dies and the eldest son returns home to assume his father's position--and to dispatch his own son abroad to maintain the flow of remittances (Dahya, pp. 253-254).

It is not possible to judge the prevalence of linked migration in other parts of the world since few migration studies discuss the decision making process. It has been described in Argentina (Wylie, 1973), Polynesia (Allen, 1969; Shankman, 1976) and Hong Kong (Watson, 1975). Connell et al. (p. 25) believe that most rural migration is to some extent linked as it is almost always undertaken partly in the hope that it will help the migrant's family of origin. A recent study of emigrant households in five Mexican cities with higher than average rates of out-migration to the United States shows that linked decision making is not confined to emigration from rural communities (Selby and Murphy, 1981). Selby and Murphy found that urban families sending members to the United States are better able to move out of poverty than are families without migrants. They argue that sending migrants to the United States is one strategy employed by families which are a little above the poorest strata to enable them to enhance their social and economic status by establishing a traditional three-generation family. The capacity of the family to exploit the possibility of emigration depends first on its ability

to cover the financial costs of sending some of its members to the United States. This is easier for families which have several members contributing to the household budget. The attainment of a large family depends, in turn, on the persuasiveness of the family head in inducing his married children to remain within the household and in attracting under his roof more distant members of the extended family (Selby and Murphy, pp. 13-14). At first glance, this "theory" appears to contradict the more common assertion that Mexican emigration is facilitated by kinship and friendship networks within the United States (Cornelius and Diez-Canedo, 1976; Cornelius, 1978; Tienda, 1979; Mines and de Janvry, 1980). However, the two positions are not mutually inconsistent. Citing his own research in the Jalisco region of Mexico, for example, Cornelius has observed that "in many cases it appears that the sending of workers to the same US employers each year has become a family and community tradition (Cornelius, 1979, p. 100).

Linked migration may be seen as one mechanism whereby migration streams are continually fed by new recruits, at least as long as employment possibilities exist in the receiving countries. It is not yet possible to judge its effect on the propensity of emigrants to return to the home country. Selby and Murphy believe that linked migration indicates that a majority of Mexican emigrants to the United States do not intend to remain there. This view is implicit in Dahya's analysis of Pakistani migration and becomes

explicit in the passage by Ballard and Ballard quoted above. Dahya observes, however, that migrants returning to Pakistan on vacation tend to find that the reality no longer accords with their idealized recollections of the homeland. The disillusionment accompanies a growing involvement in the life of the Pakistani community in Britain. Taking the two influences together, Dahya (pp. 274-275) suggests that migrants increasingly recognize that they "will have to work out their future in this country" (Great Britain). A similar point is made by Watson concerning the return--or non-return--of emigrant families to rural Hong Kong (Watson, 1975, pp. 129-131).

#### Recruitment by Developed Countries

The research just reported seems to call for some revision of the conventional assumption that the economic condition of potential migrants constitutes the major stimulus to international migration. This assumption is also challenged by research which suggests that the initial impetus to international labor migration comes from the need of developed country employers for labor to fill low-level positions no longer acceptable to a majority of indigenous workers. The clearest expression of this hypothesis comes from Michael Piore (1979, esp. pp. 19-24), who bases his argument on study of the migrations of southern and eastern peasants to the United States in the late 19th and early 20th centuries; the contemporary guest worker movement to

Western Europe; the clandestine movement of Mexican and some Caribbean workers to the United States; and the structurally similar movement of southern Blacks to the industrial north of the United States. Piore contends that, while certain conditions must obtain in the sending countries for migration to take place at all, the critical factor triggering mass labor migrations is active recruitment by industrialists seeking labor for positions in the secondary labor market (see also Tapinos, 1979, p. 3).

Evidence of such active recruitment either by industrialists themselves or their agents--often steamship or railroad companies--has been documented for migration to the United States from Europe in the 19th and early 20th centuries (Erickson, 1957, Ch. 1-6; Korman, 1967, pp. 15-40); and from Mexico and the Caribbean since the 1880s (Taylor, 1933, p. 55; Clark, 1908, p. 471; Piore, 1976, pp. 109-128).<sup>3</sup> Recruitment by industrialists is also said to have triggered the movement of southern Blacks to the industrial north of the United States (Brody, 1960, pp. 96-111; Spero and Harris, 1968, pp. 149-182). Active recruitment by potential employers is also well documented for the post-war migration to Western Europe (Castles and Kosack, 1973, pp. 28-45). In addition, contemporary Asian workers for the Middle East are largely recruited by government agencies in the sending countries, acting in

---

<sup>3</sup>See also the review of this literature by Cornelius, 1979, pp. 128-139, and the sources cited therein.

response to demands for labor by the governments of receiving countries (Keely, 1980, pp. 18-22). In this case, sending country governments appear to have entered the recruitment business partly to exert some control over who leaves and to ensure decent working conditions for their citizens overseas (Ibid., pp. 22-25). Finally, there are signs that industrialists and receiving country governments in the Persian Gulf are actively recruiting workers elsewhere than in the Middle East and Asia. For example, press reports in 1978 and 1979 discuss recruitment of Mexican and Nicaraguan workers by Saudi Arabia (CEPAM, 1978, 1979).

Piore's hypothesis about the critical role of employer recruitment in stimulating international labor migration has recently been criticized by Alejandro Portes (Portes, 1981). Portes (p. 3) cites several large contemporary labor migration flows from and within Latin America and the Caribbean, in which there is no evidence of deliberate recruitment. He argues that Piore's theory is "ahistorical," the implication being that the determinants of labor migration change through time. Portes believes that deliberate labor recruitment was characteristic of international labor migration in an "earlier era in which economic inducements had little use and less impact on the population of regions outside the European capitalist sphere" (p. 4). In Portes' view, the penetration of Third World countries by "large-scale, oligopolistic industries"

based in industrialized centers obviates the need for active recruitment in peripheral countries (p 8). Potential labor migrants are made aware of economic conditions and opportunities in the "center countries" not only through kinship and friendship networks, but also through "commercial networks" that "reach the most remote corners of the planet" (p. 9). Portes elaborates on this theme to suggest that the type of development strategy adopted by developing countries is an important determinant of the type and size of the outflow (pp. 18-29). Specifically, economies oriented to export-led growth tend to experience outflows of both professional and manual workers. This is because these workers become familiar with the consumer goods which they manufacture for the developed countries but cannot acquire them for themselves as it is in the employers' interest to keep their wages low. They therefore emigrate in search of better incomes (p. 22).

Both the Piore and Portes theories are helpful in explaining some contemporary labor migrations, especially those flowing to advanced industrialized nations, but neither can be regarded as inclusive theories of international labor migration.<sup>37</sup> Neither is very helpful in explaining migrations, such as those within West Africa, which flow from one non-industrialized country to another. Neither theory casts much light on the selection of the individuals who comprise the migration streams among

---

<sup>37</sup>Neither theorist makes any claim to be so regarded.

countries. They cannot explain, for example, why the search for labor to fill unskilled positions at the lowest end of the socio-economic scale should succeed in attracting so many individuals who, by the standards of the home country at least, are above the average in education, skill and experience. Finally, neither theory can address the question of the relationships between internal and international migration, an understanding of which would seem to be essential for a full appreciation of the development consequences of international migration.

#### Internal Migration, External Migration and Development

One cannot read for long in the literature on international migration without becoming aware that many of the countries providing significant amounts of labor for the international market are simultaneously experiencing important volumes of rural-urban migration.<sup>3\*</sup> We have, however, been unable to locate any empirical studies that directly address the relationships between internal and external migration and attempt to delineate their combined influence on the development process in developing

---

<sup>3\*</sup>For example, Connell et al.'s comprehensive review of studies of migration from rural areas refers to many studies of countries which clearly have both kinds of migration.

countries.''' On the conceptual-theoretical level we have found one attempt, by Michael Piore, to relate the two and them in a development context (Piore, 1979, pp. 133-140). Drawing on the experiences of the United States and Europe, Piore speculates that international labor migration is a phenomenon associated essentially with the early stages of economic development when the modern industrial sector is unable to absorb much of the surplus rural population. Later, when the urban areas of the sending country are undergoing rapid economic growth, they are able to provide work for their own rural populations and external migration is eventually brought to an end. This stage has recently been reached, Piore argues, in Italy and Spain (p. 136). In due course, as economic growth proceeds, previously sending countries may themselves become importers of labor, as did many Western European nations after World War Two (Ibid).<sup>40</sup>

Within individual sending countries, Piore tentatively argues that external migration selects initially from aspiring members of the urban middle class, themselves

---

''Connell et al. make no distinction between the two types of migration, and, for the most part, it is not possible to judge which type of migration is under discussion at any given point. Yet in many important respects, especially the remittance of foreign currency, the two types of migration have entirely different consequences for the sending community.

<sup>40</sup>Piore (p. 133) argues that the US imported immigrant workers at an earlier stage than did European nations in order to avoid having to rely on domestic labor supplies from the rural South.

frequently sons of the country's first rural-urban migrants who are unable to find suitable employment in the infant modern sector. The urban middle class is attracted to emigration, not only because there are no suitable job openings at home, but also because information about opportunities abroad, banks, travel agencies and consular offices exist, at this stage, only in the larger urban centers. Later, through the informal agency of these early emigrants, information seeps back to the rural areas and gradually mobilizes the less educated and less skilled rural population. At this point many rural emigrants move directly to the foreign country while others may engage in step migration, moving first to a city within the home country and only later going abroad. Thus there is a transitional period before external migration is halted when both internal and external migrations are proceeding together (Piore, pp. 135-140).

Piore's discussion of the evolution of migration streams is an interesting and plausible attempt to relate internal and international migration to economic development. It should be noted, however, that the "theory" makes no attempt to assess the influence of migration on the development process. So far as the selection of migrants is concerned, however, Piore's framework accords fairly well with much of the empirical data on contemporary migrants. A discussion of these findings constitutes the following section of this chapter.

### Selection by Age

In an overview of migrant characteristics written in 1959, Donald Bogue wrote, "Only one migration differential seems to have systematically withstood the test--that for age" (Bogue, 1959, p. 504). Bogue found that persons in their late teens, twenties, and early thirties are much more mobile than younger or older persons. In 1976, Connell et al., reviewing the literature on internal and international migration from rural areas in all parts of the world concluded that "almost everywhere migration concentrates extremely heavily on villagers aged 15-30" (1976, p. 39). According to these authors, "most migrants first leave their villages at the lower end of their 'working age period'" (p. 40). Most students attribute the propensity to migrate at very young ages to the scarcity of economic opportunities for the young in underdeveloped rural communities but detailed micro-level studies suggest that social reasons also play a role. A number of such studies have found that the low status of young people in traditional societies and their limited integration into the local social system, have been important stimuli to migration (International Development Research Center, 1973, p. 5; Indian Statistical Institute, 1962, p. 6; Riddell, 1960, p. 90; Lea, 1964, p. 53).

Despite these generalizations, there is some evidence to show that international migration tends to attract slightly older emigrants than internal migration. In part, this is because internal migration flows contain a significant proportion of young people seeking education (e.g., Schultz, 1971; Caldwell, 1969), but it is also a consequence of the greater cost of most international travel. Philpott, for example, found that because of the high cost of travel from the Caribbean to Great Britain, emigrants from Montserrat were concentrated in the 20-45 age bracket (Philpott, 1970, p. 16). Weist found that in Mexico, younger men tend to move internally while older men go to the United States. (Weist, 1970.) Other authors suggest that the acquisition of worldly wisdom and social competence, as well the possession of specific skills and financial resources are necessary preliminaries to a move abroad (e.g., Douglass, 1970, p. 29). These qualities are often developed in the course of a period of internal migration to a town or city.

### Selection by Sex

It is generally agreed that on a world-wide basis a large majority of migrants are male, and that they tend to move alone without wives and families. So widespread and well-established is this assumption that many students of contemporary labor migration omit to mention the sex composition of the migration streams they are studying. It

is true that where labor is brought from abroad under contract, as is the case with labor for the mines in South Africa and imported construction and other workers for the oil-rich states of the Middle East, the vast majority of migrants are not permitted to bring their wives and families with them.<sup>41</sup> Nevertheless, in several parts of the world migration flows include significant numbers of women.

Two factors stand out as determining the number of women who migrate. First, where the distance covered is long and the duration of the stay likely to be relatively lengthy, the proportion of female migrants rises. Thus, Philpott (1970, p. 16) found that men greatly outnumbered women in intraregional migration from Montserrat to other parts of the Caribbean, but where the migration was to England women were almost equal in number. Likewise, Diaz-Briquets (1980, p. 40), observes that within the Caribbean and Latin America, men clearly dominate in migration streams oriented to rural areas where there is a demand for agricultural labor, while women are better represented in international flows to urban centers, where women are in demand as domestic servants.

---

<sup>41</sup>Some of the longer-term receiving countries in the Persian Gulf region have significant numbers of women in their foreign populations. Preliminary results from the Kuwait census of 1980 indicate that 37.4 percent of the foreign population is female. The proportion of women varies by country of origin. Only 53 percent of Jordanians and Pakistanis and 52 percent of Lebanese are male while 60 percent of Syrians, 79 percent of North Yemanis and 84 percent of Southern Yemanis are male (Yeslam, 1981, p. 6).

The second factor is more closely linked to the migration of women independently of men. This is the normative structure regulating the behavior of women in the sending society. In Islamic or other societies in which women are enclosed or markedly subordinate to men, the emigration of single women, other than as dependents, is rare. In societies where women have higher status, out-migration of single women may be quite substantial. This is particularly the case in the Caribbean. Between 1965 and 1969, 65 percent of emigrants from Trinidad and Tobago were women (Harewood, 1975, p. 23) and in Montserrat just over half of the 8000 passports issued between 1946 and 1964 were for women (Philpott, 1973, p. 38). Nancy Foner has reported that, in contrast to the predominance of men in Jamaican emigration to Great Britain during the 1950s and early 1960s, women have comprised the larger part of Jamaican migration to the United States since the passage of the U.S. Immigration Act of 1965. (Foner, 1977, p. 127.) That the high ratio of female emigrants for the Caribbean is exceptional may be inferred from the fact that women from countries of the European Economic Community (EEC), who may be assumed to have relatively high status vis-à-vis their male compatriots, comprised only 32.5 percent of EEC immigrants to France in 1979 (SOPEMI, 1980, p. 14). The Philippines is another country with a significant amount of female emigration, although the exact numbers and proportions are not available. According to some accounts,

the training of Filipino nurses for export has taken on the characteristics of an industry (Association of Philippine Medical Colleges, 1971, cited in Abella, 1978, p. 31). The Philippines also provides many of the female domestic servants found in Europe and other advanced societies (Jayme, 1979, pp. 46, 58).

### Selection by Education and Occupation

Although sending countries are now attempting to collect more systematic data on emigrants, reliable information on the educational and occupational status of emigrants from many countries is still inadequate for the purpose of assessing the impact of their departure on the countries of origin. Many studies of contemporary international migration give only impressionistic accounts of the educational and occupational composition of migrant flows; others concentrate on emigrants in the highest skill categories but give no indication of what proportion of the total outflow they comprise. Where more information is available, it is frequently based on surveys carried out in small communities--a village or group of villages. To be useful as a means of judging the impact of emigration on sending countries, data on the educational and occupational skill level of emigrants needs to be related to corresponding information for the population at large. It would be helpful, also, if more detailed information were available about the functioning of the labor market in

sending countries. It is reasonable to assume, for instance, that a heavy loss of persons in skilled categories will be less disruptive in countries like Jordan, where there are good opportunities for upward social and occupational mobility, than in countries like Egypt where the labor market is less flexible (Birks and Sinclair, 1980, pp. 90-95).

Based on an examination of the literature, we infer that the educational and occupational composition of migrant streams is determined by a number of factors including, importantly: a) levels of education and skill attainment in the country of origin; b) employment opportunities in the country of origin; c) the structure of the demand for labor in the receiving country; and d) the cost of travel to the receiving country. In addition, as we have just reported, a number of authors have suggested that the character of a migration stream is not stable over time. As more information becomes available about conditions in a specific receiving country, and as stronger links are forged between sending and receiving countries, it becomes easier for individuals of lower educational background and less familiarity with conditions in the modern sector to emigrate (Piore, 1979, pp. 135-40; Böhning, 1974, p. 62). Finally, it is important to bear in mind that the total outflow from a given country may comprise a number of distinct migration streams flowing to different destinations, each attracting a different type of emigrant.

Despite the paucity of reliable information, there is evidence to show that, as in the case of internal migration, international migration tends to select disproportionately from the better educated and more skilled strata of the sending countries. In general, the unskilled and uneducated find it difficult to emigrate unless there is unskilled work available in a neighboring country to which the cost of travel is relatively small, or if they are recruited by a firm or agency which pays the cost of transport. Because of the complexity of international migration, it is not possible to present a complete discussion of the educational and occupational backgrounds of emigrants. Instead, we attempt to illustrate the foregoing remarks by summarizing the trends in some of the more significant contemporary migration streams.

West Africa. According to the scant information available, intraregional migration in West Africa appears to siphon off surplus population from the rural areas of less developed countries to the more developed countries of the region. Using census data, the authors of the World Bank-OECD project on migration in West Africa found that immigrants have a lower level of instruction than non-immigrants in the countries of destination (Zachariah, Clairin and Condé, 1978, p. 74). In the Gambia, for example, the census of 1973 showed that 15 percent of Gambian men had completed primary school compared with only 7 percent of non-Gambians.

The difference was less marked for women, the corresponding percentages being 7 and 5.2 (Zachariah, 1979, p. 36, Table 20). In the 1974 census in Sierra Leone, more than 88 percent of non-nationals of African origin in the age-group 20-44 had never attended school. The inference is that in these two cases, immigrants have lower levels of education than nationals. However, an estimate prepared by the World Bank in 1970 found that 85 percent of the Gambian population was also illiterate, so the difference between nationals and immigrants is of little practical significance. (Okoye, 1979, pp. 31-33). A majority of these uneducated immigrants in West African countries find work as agricultural laborers or as unskilled workers in industry or transport (Zachariah and Condé, 1978, p. 200, Table 74).

Despite the low educational level of international migrants in West Africa, there is fragmentary evidence that migration may still select disproportionately from the better educated strata of sending societies. The 1975 census in Upper Volta carried information on 166,000 Voltaic emigrants who had returned to their home country between 1970 and 1975. On the basis of this sample, Condé calculated that former emigrants had a higher level of literacy than non-migrants; twenty-two percent of male migrants were literate compared with only 11 percent of non-migrants. Likewise, among female migrants the literacy rate was 9 percent compared with 3 percent for non-migrants

(Condé, 1979, Table 44).<sup>42</sup> In general, however, within West Africa, internal rural-urban migration attracts the best educated migrants and this group of internal migrants occupies higher status positions than any other group of migrants, internal or international (Zachariah and Condé, 1978, p. 13).

The most likely explanation for the education-occupation data from West Africa is that throughout the region agriculture is still the principal industry. Export-oriented, cash crop, or plantation agriculture in the more developed countries of the region provide places for underemployed unskilled labor from subsistence areas of the poorer countries. At the same time, within each country, at whatever level of development, the better educated are able to find work in the modernizing sector of their own country and therefore have no need to emigrate. It appears probable that the large-scale migration to the mines and plantations of South Africa follows a similar logic. Work in the mines is restricted to a one-year, or at most two-year, stint and the migrants are mainly drawn from the subsistence sector of the home country (Elkan 1959, 1980; Rozen-Prinz and Rosen-Prinz, 1978; Sebatane, 1979). However, no information on the educational level of migrant labor to South Africa appears to be available.

---

<sup>42</sup>It is possible, of course, that the ability to read might have been acquired while the emigrant was abroad.

Caribbean. The educational and occupational composition of the widespread and diversified migrations within and from the Caribbean basin also appear to be determined in large measure by the character of the demand in receiving countries. Glaessel-Brown has pointed out that since most Caribbean societies are islands which are themselves emigrant societies, they are not prone to welcome immigrants without specific skills (Glaessel-Brown, 1979, p. 234.) Emigrants from the Caribbean are therefore attracted to destinations outside the region--formerly to the United Kingdom and France, increasingly to the United States and Canada--where the demand is for skilled and semi-skilled labor. Writing of Jamaica in 1977, Foner reports that a majority of emigrants were in the skilled and semi-skilled categories but that less than 10 percent were white collar. She adds that because of the emphasis on skills in the United States preference system, the United States tends to attract a disproportionate number of Jamaicans with higher skills. In line with Piore's theory of the development of migration streams, Foner notes that Jamaican emigration has gradually come to include larger numbers of unskilled workers. However, skilled and semi-skilled emigrants still predominate.

Another example of the selectivity of migration streams in the Caribbean is cited by Segal (1975) in his study of Haitian emigration. Here, there are two distinct flows, unskilled agricultural laborers going to the Dominican

Republic, often as seasonal labor for the sugar plantations, and skilled and semi-skilled workers going to the United States, Canada, France and Africa. Like Foner, Segal adds that professionals, craftsmen and "operatives" dominate the flow to the United States.

Ugalde et al. (1979, p. 242) argue that emigration from the Dominican Republic tends to be predominantly an urban and middle class phenomenon. The authors cite two kinds of evidence for their claim: a) the occupational categories of Dominican immigrants in the United States as given both by the DIAGNOS survey carried out by the Dominican government in 1974, and by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service in 1975; and b) educational and household characteristics of migrants reported by the DIAGNOS survey (Ugalde et al, pp. 239-244). In 1974, 96 percent of emigrants from the Dominican Republic were literate compared with 61 percent of non-migrants; 70 percent of these had more than grammar school education and 31 percent had some university training. Corresponding percentages for the non-migrant population were only 18 percent with grammar school and 3 percent with university education (p. 243). In addition, 64 percent of emigrants had houses with at least four rooms compared with only 22 percent of the non-migrant sample, and 83 percent of migrant families had electricity compared with only 47 percent of non-migrant families. According to both the DIAGNOS survey and INS statistics, only about one-third of Dominican immigrants to the United

States took jobs as farm laborers or service workers; by contrast, 20 percent were employed in professional, technical, managerial or clerical work (p. 242). Ugalde et al. observe, moreover, that many of the immigrants probably take work for which they are overqualified.

According to a number of survey reports, the educational and occupational composition of emigrants from the Dominican Republic to the United States is very similar to the composition of flows to the United States from other Western Hemisphere countries with the exception of Mexico. As North and Houston have shown (1976, pp. 64-66), Mexican immigrants in the United States, especially illegals, have had significantly lower levels of income, education and occupation than have US immigrants from the Caribbean. Wayne Cornelius reports, however, that Mexican emigrants to the United States tend, like emigrants from other countries, to be drawn disproportionately from the intermediate socio-economic levels. Very rich landowners and merchants have contributed little to the migration flows, while the poorest classes find the financial costs of emigration, and especially illegal migration, too great (Cornelius, 1979, p. 92; Selby and Murphy, 1981). In terms of occupation, farm laborers form a larger, and professional and technical personnel a smaller, proportion of Mexican migration streams than is the case for migration from other Caribbean and Latin American countries (Cornelius, 1979, p. 95). Within Latin America, there is also some migration of unskilled

agricultural laborers from less to more developed countries in the region (Gillespie and Browning, 1979). However, we have not been able to locate studies that indicate how the characteristics of these migrants match with those of the economically active populations in the countries of origin.

The Mediterranean Region. Migration from the Mediterranean basin to the industrialized countries of Western Europe since the 1950s also seems to have attracted relatively well qualified immigrants, despite the "socially undesirable,"<sup>43</sup> nature of the available work. Because there is more information available in English for Turkey than for any other country, we select data principally from Turkey to illustrate this trend.<sup>44</sup> Notwithstanding efforts by the Turkish government to recruit a fair share of emigrants from the more backward rural areas, Turkish labor migration has attracted emigrants of higher educational and occupational background than is found in the general public. In her thorough study of Turkish emigration, Suzanne Paine (1974) cites four surveys carried out by the Turkish Employment

---

<sup>43</sup>Term used by Roger Böhning to describe the types of jobs usually taken by immigrants.

<sup>44</sup>Emigration from Turkey has been particularly heavy and most migrants have gone to the Federal Republic of Germany. In 1978, four years after the German borders were closed to immigrant workers, there were still approximately 1.5 million Turks living in West Germany. This number represented 0.35 percent of the total population of Turkey; 5 percent of total employment; 14 percent of domestic, non-agricultural employment; and 40 percent of domestic industrial employment (Adler, 1981, p. 34).

Service (TES) among returning workers between 1968 and 1971. According to these surveys, the percentage of illiterates among emigrants varied between 1.0 percent and 10 percent of the samples. By contrast, in 1965, the illiteracy rate for males aged 16-65 was estimated at 33 percent of the total population, and that for females at 71 percent. Corresponding figures for the total population in 1970, though reduced somewhat, were still 27 and 63 percent. Even the economically active population aged 20-40, was estimated to contain 46 percent of illiterates in 1970 (Paine, 1974, p. 79). These figures are similar to those cited by Begtić (1972, pp. 25-26) for Yugoslavian emigrants to Western Europe but they are lower than illiteracy rates among Portuguese emigrants around 1970 (Livi-Bacci, 1971).

As far as occupation is concerned, the TES surveys of returning migrants who said they intended to return permanently, showed that skilled and semi-skilled workers comprised 60 percent of the sample interviewed in 1967, 55 percent in 1968, 54 percent in 1979 and 50 percent in 1971 (Paine, p. 81). Another small survey undertaken by the Turkish State Planning Organization in 1971, found that 47 percent of returning migrants had occupied skilled positions prior to their departure (Ibid). By way of comparison, a Tunisian survey carried out in 1975 indicated that 76 percent of Tunisian emigrants to France were classed as "skilled" and "white collar," and 5.5 percent as "highly

skilled" (Birks and Sinclair, 1980, p. 141, Table 18).<sup>43</sup> However, Paine draws attention to the difficulty of interpreting data on the previous employment status of emigrants, especially in countries with very high unemployment. She points out that as rural areas are increasingly tapped, it is possible that higher levels of disguised unemployment are involved and that migrants reporting skills may have been unemployed prior to emigration. Additionally, in Turkey, as waiting lists for visas grew<sup>44</sup> it became more and more important for potential emigrants to put their names on the list even before they sought work within Turkey (Paine, p. 83). With the start of the migration boom in the Middle East, increasing numbers of Turks, unable to get work visas for Germany, have taken up employment in that area, mostly in Libya and Saudi Arabia. Workers travelling to the Middle East under the auspices of the Turkish Employment Service alone numbered between 23,000 and 24,000 in 1979 and 1980 (Abadan-Onat, 1980, p. 9).

The data from Europe illustrate one more aspect of the selectivity of migration. While it is well known that labor migration developed a number of well-defined streams-- Turkish workers going mainly to Germany; Italians to Switzerland; Algerians and Portugese to France, etc.--there

---

<sup>43</sup>However, more than 57 percent of Tunisian emigrants going to Libya were manual workers and less than 3 percent were classed as "highly skilled" (Ibid).

<sup>44</sup>By 1974, when West Germany closed her doors, there were over one million Turks on the waiting list for visas.

is also evidence of selectivity at a more micro level. Using anthropological methods, Rhoades observed that emigrants from the village of Alcurdia in the Spanish province of Grenada moved mainly to West Germany and tended to stay there for up to 10 years before returning. In contrast, emigrants from neighboring villages have tended to move internally to Spanish cities or to take part in seasonal migration to agricultural areas within Spain or in south-west France (Rhoades, 1979, pp. 59-61). By way of explanation, Rhoades proffers the suggestion that as Alcurdia is situated on an exceptionally fertile stretch of land its citizens have had more education than is usual in the area. They are therefore better equipped than are the populations of neighboring villages to venture to distant, more advanced countries and to find and keep jobs there.

The Middle East. One of the most interesting of contemporary labor migrations is that which has developed within and to the oil-producing countries of the Middle East. While there has long been a considerable inflow of labor from neighboring Arab states to the older oil-producing countries, e.g., Libya, Iran, and Kuwait, the volume of migration has increased enormously since 1973. The rise in oil prices since that time has stimulated the oil-rich countries of the Arabian Peninsula to undertake massive industrial development which has necessitated the importation of labor on a large scale. The size and

rapidity of the increase in migration to the region has severely overstrained the statistical-administrative capacity of the countries involved and although there are impressionistic data, systematic collection of information on the size and composition of these streams is still in its infancy. Nevertheless, some idea of general trends can be given.

Unlike most receiving countries, the oil-producing states have need of labor at all skill levels, from top-level professional and managerial personnel in both the public and private sectors to unskilled construction workers. A majority of these workers, 58 percent in 1975, come from nine Arab states<sup>47</sup>, 18 percent (in 1975) from India and Pakistan, 6 percent from Europe and North America. The remaining 17 percent come from the Philippines, Korea, Bangladesh, Turkey and other countries in Africa and East Asia (Ecevit, 1981, pp. 260-63; Birks and Sinclair, 1980, pp. 28-29). An interesting development has been the emergence of the idea of a single sending country contracting for the construction of complete projects like the building of an airport or a port. In such cases, the

---

<sup>47</sup>By the mid-1970s, for example, well over half of the population of Kuwait was foreign (Halliday, 1977, p. 279). It is thought, moreover, that 98-99 percent of the work forces of North and South Yemen migrate for work at some time in their lives. Most of these persons cross the border into Saudi Arabia (Yeslam, 1981, p. 6; Halliday, p. 277). Another source suggests that over 600,000 men from the Yemen Arab Republic were working in Saudi Arabia around 1977. This is about 40 percent of the YAR work force (Cohen and Lewis, 1979, p. 525).

contracting firm may undertake to provide materials and personnel for every stage of the project from design to operation. This type of project export has been most successfully pursued by Korea, but there is little reliable information about the numbers and categories of workers involved. We have been informed that the Korean government restricts access to data on temporary labor migration to its own analysts.<sup>40</sup>

Within the Middle East little is known about the exact composition of migrant streams from individual countries. In most cases, even the large research project undertaken by Birks and Sinclair on behalf of the ILO was unable, to do more than estimate the overall dimensions of the flows from individual countries. We have already reported that nearly 60 percent of Tunisian immigrants in Libya in 1975 were manual workers, compared with only 20 percent of Tunisians in France. Birks and Sinclair (1980, p. 39), who report these data, observe nevertheless that Tunisians migrating to Libya have higher levels of education than the Tunisian

---

<sup>40</sup>Gayl D. Ness, personal communication based on interviews with Korean officials, 1981. A recent study reports that workers from North African countries who are no longer able to find work in Western Europe have as contract workers with industrial firms. The authors argue, however, that in order to secure contracts in the Gulf, foreign firms have to bid low and have therefore to cut costs on their wage bills. The authors suggest that wages for North African workers in the Gulf states are drawing closer to those offered in their countries of origin and that "the advantages of emigration have been reduced considerably" (Chekir and Garson, 1981, p. 20).

Table 2.1

## Arab Migrant Workers in the Arab Region, 1975

| Country of Employment                                    | Country or area of origin and percentage distribution between countries of employment |      |         |      |                   |      |                  |       |                      |       |         |       |
|--|---|------|---------|------|-------------------|------|------------------|-------|----------------------|-------|---------|-------|
|  | Egypt   |      | Yemen   |      | Jordan, Palestine |      | Democratic Yemen |       | Syrian Arab Republic |       | Lebanon |       |
|  | No.   | %    | No.     | %    | No.               | %    | No.              | %     | No.                  | %     | No.     | %     |
| Saudi Arabia   | 95,000  | 23.9 | 280,400 | 96.6 | 175,000           | 66.1 | 55,000           | 77.9  | 15,000               | 21.3  | 20,000  | 40.3  |
| Libyan Arab Jamahiriya                                   | 229,500   | 57.8 | --      | --   | 14,150            | 5.3  | --               | --    | 13,000               | 18.5  | 5,700   | 11.5  |
| Kuwait   | 37,558  | 9.4  | 2,757   | 1.0  | 47,653            | 18.0 | 8,658            | 12.2  | 16,547               | 23.4  | 7,232   | 14.6  |
| United Arab Emirates                                     | 12,500  | 3.1  | 4,500   | 1.6  | 14,500            | 5.5  | 4,500            | 6.4   | 4,500                | 6.4   | 4,500   | 9.0   |
| Jordan (East Bank)                                       | 5,300   | 1.3  | --      | --   | --                | --   | --               | --    | 20,000               | 28.4  | 7,500   | 15.1  |
| Iraq   | 7,000   | 1.8  | --      | --   | 5,000             | 1.9  | --               | --    | --                   | --    | 3,000   | 6.0   |
| Qatar  | 2,850   | 0.7  | 1,250   | 0.4  | 6,000             | 2.3  | 1,250            | 1.8   | 750                  | 1.1   | 500     | 1.0   |
| Oman   | 4,600   | 1.2  | 100     | 0.0  | 1,600             | 0.6  | 100              | 0.1   | 400                  | 0.6   | 1,100   | 2.2   |
| Bahrain  | 1,237   | 0.3  | 1,121   | 0.4  | 614               | 0.2  | 1,122            | 1.6   | 68                   | 0.1   | 129     | 0.3   |
| Yemen  | 2,000   | 0.5  | --      | --   | 200               | 0.1  | --               | --    | 150                  | 0.2   | --      | --    |
| Total  | 397,545   | 100  | 290,128 | 100  | 264,717           | 100  | 70,630           | 100.0 | 70,415               | 100.0 | 49,661  | 100.0 |
| Percentage distribution of migrants by country of origin |   | 30.7 |         | 22.4 |                   | 20.4 |                  | 5.5   |                      | 5.4   |         | 3.3   |

(Continued on next page.)

65A

Table 2.4 (continued)

| Country of Employment                                    | Country of area of origin and percentage distribution between countries of employment |       |         |       |        |       |        |       |         |       | Total |                 |           |
|--|---|-------|---------|-------|--------|-------|--------|-------|---------|-------|-------|-----------------|-----------|
|  | Sudan   |       | Tunisia |       | Oman   |       | Iraq   |       | Somalia |       |       | Algeria Morocco |           |
|  | No.   | %     | No.     | %     | No.    | %     | No.    | %     | No.     | %     |       | No.             | %         |
| Saudi Arabia   | 35,000  | 76.3  | --      | --    | 17,500 | 45.6  | 2,000  | 9.7   | 5,000   | 76.4  | --    | --              | 699,900   |
| Libyan Arab Jamahiriya                                   | 7,000   | 15.3  | 38,500  | 99.6  | --     | --    | --     | --    | --      | --    | 2,500 | 98.2            | 310,350   |
| Kuwait   | 873   | 1.9   | 49      | 0.1   | 3,660  | 9.4   | 17,999 | 87.3  | 247     | 3.8   | 47    | 1.8             | 143,280   |
| United Arab Emirates                                     | 1,500   | 3.2   | --      | --    | 14,000 | 36.4  | 500    | 2.4   | 1,000   | 15.2  | --    | --              | 62,000    |
| Jordan (East Bank)                                       | --  | --    | --      | --    | --     | --    | --     | --    | --      | --    | --    | --              | 32,800    |
| Iraq   | 200   | 0.4   | --      | --    | --     | --    | --     | --    | --      | --    | --    | --              | 15,200    |
| Qatar  | 400   | 0.9   | --      | --    | 1,870  | 4.9   | --     | --    | --      | --    | --    | --              | 14,870    |
| Oman   | 500   | 1.1   | 100     | 0.3   | --     | --    | --     | --    | 300     | 4.6   | --    | --              | 8,800     |
| Bahrain  | 400   | 0.9   | --      | --    | 1,383  | 3.6   | 126    | 0.6   | --      | --    | --    | --              | 6,200     |
| Yemen  | --  | --    | --      | --    | --     | --    | --     | --    | --      | --    | --    | --              | 2,350     |
| Total  | 45,873  | 100.0 | 38,649  | 100.0 | 38,413 | 100.0 | 20,625 | 100.0 | 6,547   | 100.0 | 2,547 | 100.0           | 1,295,750 |
| Percentage distribution of migrants by country of origin |   | 3.5   |         | 3.0   |        | 3.0   |        | 1.6   |         | 0.5   |       | 0.2             | 100.0     |

-- = no migrants recorded for this country or area.

Source: Birks and Sinclair, 1980, Table 10, p. 134-35.  
Data drawn from a variety of official sources.

656

population as a whole. Even so, they suspect that many applicants for visas understate their qualifications in order to enhance their chances of getting a visa.

Egypt has long provided professional personnel, especially engineers, teachers and medical doctors, to other Arab states in the region. Until 1973, however, the numbers involved were relatively small (Choucri, 1977, p. 423). Since the recent increase in demand, Egypt has also supplied growing numbers of technical, clerical, and skilled workers. Nevertheless, Birks and Sinclair estimated that in 1975 that only around 3 percent of the total workforce of approximately 12.5 million persons was employed abroad, even though some 1.6 million persons were unemployed in the Egyptian modern sector alone (Birks and Sinclair, 1980, p. 44 and Table 20).

In contrast to Egypt, the high levels of education enjoyed by the Jordanian population, including women, make Jordan one of the biggest suppliers, relative to population size, of technical, professional and skilled workers for the oil-producing states of the Middle East and other industrialized countries. Birks and Sinclair estimated that emigration accounts for around 28 percent of the Jordanian East Bank labor force--but some 46 percent of the modern sector work force (1980, p.48). Approximately half the Jordanian emigrants have found work within the Middle East, the remainder going principally to Europe (33%) and the United States (10%) (Ibid. p. 48 and Table 58). It should

be borne in mind when reading this section that the estimates cited were pieced together from a variety of sources, all of which are deficient in one or more respects. The figures for the geographical distribution of Jordanian emigrants, for example, include many who were not in the active labor force but were students studying in Europe and the United States.

Rather than attempting to further discuss materials on the composition of the migration streams within the Middle East, we present three tables that summarize the geographical provenance and occupational distribution of immigrant workers in selected Middle Eastern labor importing countries as of 1975.<sup>4</sup> Table 2.1 shows the country of origin of immigrants to ten receiving countries in the Middle East. Table 2.2 provides a breakdown by occupational category of immigrants in five selected labor importing countries, and Table 2.3 shows the educational/occupational distribution in one oil producing country, Kuwait, which has particularly reliable labor force statistics.

Asian Emigration to the Middle East. For well over a century the Indian sub-continent has maintained commercial links with the Middle East and there has long been a significant, if numerically unimportant, Indian presence in

---

<sup>4</sup>In addition to the composite report already cited. Birks and Sinclair, produced a series of individual and group reports on Middle Eastern countries are listed in the bibliography. However, virtually all the materials and tables have been included in the consolidated report.

67-11

Table 2.2

Occupational Distribution of Immigrant Labor in  
Selected Labor Importing Countries in the Middle East, 1975  
(in percent)

|  | Bahrain | Kuwait | Libya* | Oman  | U.A.E. |
|--|---------|--------|--------|-------|--------|
| Professional, Technical<br>and Related Workers | 8.6     | 15.1   | 16.6   | 8.4   | 8.2    |
| Administrative,<br>Managerial Workers          | 2.2     | .9     | .7     | .5    | 1.5    |
| Clerical and Related<br>Workers                | 5.7     | 9.5    | 3.1    | 7.7   | 9.7    |
| Sales Workers                                  | 5.2     | 8.5    | 1.1    | .7    | 5.9    |
| Service Workers                                | 24.3    | 21.4   | 4.6    | 6.9   | 13.8   |
| Agricultural Workers                           | 4.9     | 1.8    | 9.4    | +     | 2.9    |
| Production and<br>Related Workers              | 49.1    | 42.8   | 64.5   | 75.8  | 56.7   |
| Others   | --      | --     | --     | --    | 1.3    |
| Total  | 100.0   | 100.0  | 100.0  | 100.0 | 100.0  |

\* 1973 figures

+ = Included in production and related workers group.

Source: Ecevit, International Labor Migration in the Middle East and North Africa, p. 10, Table 4.

Data drawn from: Kuwait: Census, 1978  
Libya: Census, 1973  
Oman: Employment survey, 1975  
Bahrain: Estimates

the Gulf States (Weiner, 1980, p. 1). Since the mid-1970's, the Middle East development boom has attracted much larger numbers of technical personnel and laborers from Asia to the oil-producing states. With World Bank support, both Bangladesh and Pakistan have undertaken detailed studies of the effect of these migrations on the sending countries (Siddiqui, 1979; Ashraf Ali, 1979; Habibullah, 1979; Rahman, 1980; Islam, 1980; Burki, 1979; Bilquees and Hamid, n.d.; Gilani, 1980). We draw on these studies in several places in the ensuing chapters.

In 1976 the Bangladesh government established a Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training (BMET) for the purpose, inter alia, of implementing a policy of "selective promotion of foreign employment of Bangladesh workers" (Siddiqui, p. 1). Prior to this, Bangladesh nationals seeking employment abroad had to do so independently. According to BMET records, as of 1979 some 58,000 Bangladeshi nationals were employed in the Middle East. Based on a 10 percent sample (N=3000) of the addresses kept by the BMET since 1977, it has been found that more than 70 percent of emigrants to the Middle East were in the 20-35 age bracket (80 percent in the urban part of the sample) (Islam, p.12). Less than 6 percent were illiterate, one-third had either completed or entered primary school, and less than 10 percent were university graduates (Islam, pp. 12, 18; see also tables on pp. 13-17). Nearly 29 percent of emigrants were either students or otherwise unemployed prior to their

departure and do not represent a loss to the Bangladesh economy. Skilled workers, technical personnel and professionals comprised another 30 percent of the sample (Islam, pp. 12-18). In 1979 also, nearly 60 percent of Bangladeshis were working in skilled, technical or professional occupations in the countries of destination (Islam, p 18). The author of this report observes, however, that the occupational distribution of Bangladeshi workers abroad does not necessarily imply that they have acquired additional skills that can be counted as a benefit to Bangladesh as many were unemployed prior to their departure or were working in jobs in which they did not utilize skills they already possessed (Ibid., p. 18).

In the late 1970s, a survey of 15,000 Pakistani emigrants departing for the Middle East found that 45 percent were unskilled, 41 percent were skilled, 4 percent were professionals, and the remaining 10 percent had clerical, sales, business or other miscellaneous skills (Gilani, 1980, p. 2). Among the skilled workers, the greatest number were drawn from the construction sector and comprised masons, carpenters, plumbers, electricians, etc. The second largest group came from the manufacturing sector and included machine operators, mechanics, and others with related skills. Among the professionals 60 percent were engineers (Ibid., pp. 2-3). The survey indicated that 75 percent of the sample was less than 30 years of age and that only 7 percent were unemployed prior to departure. Another

Table 2.3

Kuwait: Occupational Distribution of Selected Migrant Communities by Skill Level, 1975  
(Percentages)

| Occupational Category  | Country or Area of Origin |        |        |         |       |                      |        |          |       |                          |        |
|--|---------------------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------------|--------|----------|-------|--------------------------|--------|
|  | Palestine                 | Egypt  | Jordan | Lebanon | India | Syrian Arab Republic | Iraq   | Pakistan | Yemen | Demo-<br>cratic<br>Yemen | Iran   |
| A-1 Professional jobs usually requiring a science- or mathematics-based university degree                  | 10.8                      | 7.2    | 6.5    | 4.0     | 3.6   | 1.7                  | 1.9    | 2.1      | 0.3   | 0.2                      | 0.1    |
| A-2 Professional and subprofessional jobs usually requiring a university arts degree                       | 3.3                       | 3.3    | 2.8    | 3.8     | 1.0   | 1.6                  | 1.2    | 1.0      | 1.3   | 0.5                      | 0.2    |
| B Technicians and other jobs which usually require one to three years of post-secondary education/training | 35.9                      | 21.1   | 17.6   | 17.5    | 9.0   | 8.8                  | 4.1    | 5.5      | 1.3   | 0.7                      | 2.7    |
| C-1 Skilled and semi-skilled office and clerical occupations   | 22.7                      | 7.9    | 26.1   | 26.5    | 21.7  | 21.1                 | 12.7   | 11.7     | 16.2  | 40.9                     | 13.9   |
| C-2 Skilled and semi-skilled manual occupations  | 14.2                      | 25.6   | 25.8   | 27.8    | 12.9  | 39.7                 | 40.8   | 59.5     | 12.6  | 4.7                      | 48.3   |
| D Unskilled occupations  | 13.2                      | 34.9   | 21.2   | 20.4    | 51.8  | 27.1                 | 39.3   | 20.2     | 68.2  | 53.0                     | 34.8   |
| Total  | 100.0                     | 100.0  | 100.0  | 100.0   | 100.0 | 100.0                | 100.0  | 100.0    | 100.0 | 100.0                    | 100.0  |
| Total number of migrants   | 8,200                     | 37,500 | 38,900 | 7,200   | 2,400 | 16,500               | 17,800 | 11,000   | 2,700 | 8,600                    | 27,500 |

Source: Birks and Sinclair, 1980, p. 144, Table 24.  
Data drawn from the Kuwait Census, 1975.

169

10 percent were students (Ibid., p. 3). In addition, the authors of the report noted that there were marked regional variations in the skill composition of the sample. A majority (60%) of workers from the Frontier province was unskilled while only 34 percent of workers from the Punjab and Sind were unskilled. Finally, the data showed that, as one would expect, the proportion of unskilled workers in the total sample was increasing over time (Ibid., pp. 3).

Compared with the systematic information that the World Bank-funded studies have recently made available for Bangladesh and Pakistan, the data for India are scanty and impressionistic. A small survey carried out in a village in Kerala, a region of heavy outmigration, found that, of 139 emigrants, only 21 had secondary school leaving certificates or higher education, 49 were unemployed before leaving for the Middle East, and 19 were employed in low status cottage industry, mainly beedi making<sup>50</sup> (Prakash, 1978, pp. 1107-08). However, it is also known that Indians fill many professional, technical and commercial positions in the Gulf, the continuation of a centuries old tradition (Weiner, 1980).

The Philippines. Since early in the century Filipinos have emigrated in search of better opportunities. By the late 1970s there were thought to be at least 490,000 Filipino

---

<sup>50</sup>The making of a form of cheap cigarette. A cottage industry.

immigrants in the United States, some 50,000 in Canada, and several thousand more scattered in smaller concentrations around the world (Abella, n.d. p. 7). Since the mid-1960s a growing number of Filipinos have turned to temporary labor migration and many more have travelled abroad as seamen. In three years, from 1970 to 1973, registered temporary contract workers increased from 5.6 percent to 47 percent of total out-migration from the Philippines. This number excludes an uncertain number of workers who emigrated extra-legally or through the mediation of unlicensed recruitment agencies. Since 1975, the principal destination has been the Middle East, although significant numbers have also gone to the United Kingdom and continental European countries (Ibid. pp. 7-12).

One of the most striking features of temporary migration from the Philippines is the high educational and educational status of Filipino emigrants. Table 2.4 shows the occupational distribution of contract workers, other than seamen, recruited between January 1975 and June 1977, only 21 percent of whom may be considered unskilled. The educational background of the 82,373 seamen who were registered as of July 1, 1977, is equally impressive. Over 32 percent had college degrees and a further 15.6 percent had some college education. Only 5 percent of seamen had primary education or less. Occupationally, seamen were drawn from the practice of law, accounting and teaching, as well as from lower status jobs (Ibid. pp. 95-97).

71A

Table 2.4

Philippines: Occupational Distribution of  
Contract Workers Other Than Seamen  
1975-1977<sup>+</sup>

| Occupation   | Number | %      |
|--|--------|--------|
| Professional, Technical and Related Workers            | 7,569  | 16.5   |
| Managerial, Executive and Administrative Workers       | 196    | 0.4    |
| Clerical and Sales Workers                             | 1,170  | 2.5    |
| Artists and Entertainers                               | 9,124  | 19.8   |
| Craftsmen, Construction and Production Process Workers | 18,041 | 39.3   |
| Transport and Communication Workers                    | 949    | 2.0    |
| Farmers, Loggers and Miners                            | 239    | 0.5    |
| Service Workers  | 8,658  | 18.8   |
| All Occupations  | 45,946 | 100.00 |

<sup>+</sup> Data on OEDB placements cover the period from January to March 1977. Data on placements of private fee-charging agencies cover the period from January 1975 up to end of June 1977.

Source: Abdella, p. 13.

The Philippines does not yet have complete data on the previous employment status of applicants for temporary labor contracts but Rebecca Jayme has calculated that the annual outflow of temporary workers constitutes only about 0.4 percent of the country's labor force (Jayme, 1979, p. 78). Since recruitment is undertaken with some care by those agencies that are licensed, Jayme thinks it likely that "a great proportion" of emigrants were previously employed (Jayme, p. 89). It is not known to what extent these are immediately replaced by comparably trained workers but it seems unlikely that the Philippines can long sustain the heavy drain on professional, technical and other skilled workers without incurring some costs (Ibid., pp. 88-93).<sup>51</sup>

### Summary

The evidence just reviewed suggests that while unskilled emigrants generally outnumber the skilled and highly skilled workers in migration streams, migration nevertheless selects disproportionately from the more educated and more skilled members of sending communities. While this represents a loss to the sending countries, in terms of the cost of education and training, its significance for productivity cannot be determined a priori. There is also a need to consider the extent to which

---

<sup>51</sup>A recent paper (Stahl, 1981) notes that the number of contract workers increased more than five times between 1975 and 1980 and that some industries were reporting skill shortages. We return to this topic in Chapter 3.

emigrants, especially those with skills, were employed prior to departure; the availability of replacements; and the costs of training them and bringing them up to the level of competence of those who left. To date, few sending countries have good enough data on the skills of departing workers and their employment status prior to departure to enable researchers to anticipate the likely effects on productivity in the countries of origin.

The evidence indicates that the composition of migration streams is closely related to the nature of the demand for foreign labor in receiving countries, and is highly skill specific. Emigrants from any given sending country may move to a variety of destinations, each stream being differentiated educationally and occupationally in accordance with the skills in demand in receiving countries. But while the details of the selection process are thus highly determined by economic factors, there is a growing literature that suggests that the fundamental reasons for emigration are primarily social. That is, the extended family is willing to underwrite the costs of sending one or more of its members abroad in order to obtain the economic resources it needs to enhance or consolidate its social position at home. This motivation takes on its greatest significance at the point at which families decide how they will use the savings and remittances of its migrant sons and

in the occupational choices made by returning emigrants. These topics are discussed in greater detail in Chapters 4 and 5.

### CHAPTER 3

## EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR MIGRATION ON EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY IN COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN

### Introduction

In this chapter we attempt to bring together research findings on the effects of international migration on employment and productivity in the countries of origin. As we noted in Chapter I, the empirical literature on the impacts of emigration on sending countries is both sparse and fragmented, dealing with remittances in one country, investment in another and productivity in a third. Although most writers have taken a static approach to their work, we have endeavored to place our analysis within a more dynamic framework that helps to identify the cumulative and long term effects of international migration. Nevertheless, because of the nature of the data, our conclusions are tentative and partial and in no way constitute a test of any theory of migration or development.

In trying to understand the development implications of international labor migration for sending countries, it is important to recognize that underlying the two dominant theoretical perspectives discussed earlier in this report, are two very different visions of development. Implicit in the work of the equilibrium theorists is an image of the development process as based upon capital accumulation and

the creation of a modern industrial sector. From this perspective, emigration assists in the development process by drawing off surplus labor. In response to labor shortages, wages rise, thereby stimulating capital investment and technological change (e.g., Kindleberger, pp. 103-107; Lutz, 1961). The alternative theoretical perspective grows out of the broader concept of development that has evolved since the late 1960s. In this more recent view, less emphasis is placed on macro-economic factors at the societal level, and there is more concern for regional and local development, for distribution as well as accumulation. From this second perspective, emigration is more often seen to lead to a decline of productivity in regions of out-migration and to create bottlenecks in the supply of certain categories of essential skills in the modern sector.

We emphasize the differences between the two orientations to migration and development not so much because one perspective is preferable to the other--although contemporary scholars seem increasingly to favor the second view--but because the two theoretical approaches permit different interpretations of the same empirical facts. For example, while the Governor of the Bank of Greece acknowledged that over the four-year period 1962-1966 the gross value of agriculture output in real terms rose at about the same rate as in the previous four years, he was concerned that there had been little or no development in

the agricultural sector. He reports that labor shortages had necessitated a shift from highly productive, labor intensive crops like cotton, to less productive but less labor intensive crops like wheat, whose profitability was ensured by price supports (Zolotas, pp. 47-48). Kindleberger, discussing the same facts, argued that the important point was that there had been consolidation of land holdings and reorganization of production techniques. Moreover, whether this had been stimulated by labor shortages resulting from emigration or whether the causal link ran the other way, from reorganization and innovation to labor surplus and emigration was, in Kindleberger's opinion immaterial (pp. 89-91).

Similarly, while several scholars have commented on the collapse of the traditional sugar-cane and coffee industries in Puerto Rico under the stimulus of labor migration and massive infusions of US capital, evaluations of this process differ widely among authors. Piore (p. 131), for example, appears to regard this as part of a "natural" process of development;<sup>52</sup> Orlando Patterson (1978, pp. 122-123), on the other hand, seems to view it as nothing less than a disaster. In Patterson's view, the collapse of the

---

<sup>52</sup>Piore notes that the devaluation of traditional occupations in the minds of young, returning emigrants produced a generational differentiation in occupations. Older workers were willing to continue in the old occupations in sugar-cane and coffee while younger workers were not. As a consequence, as the older population started to age and die, there was created a rural labor shortage, side by side with high levels of unemployment among younger workers (Piore, p. 131).

traditional economic base dislocated the rural population, stimulated mass emigration to the United States, was an open invitation to multinational industries to invest in Puerto Rico, and produced a divided demoralized population dependent on continued aid from the United States.

The interpretation given to empirical findings on the development consequences of international labor migration depends in large measure, therefore, on the image of development in the mind of the reader. The authors of this report tend to the view that neither of the definitions just discussed says the last word on development. In our view a "correct" definition would contain elements of both concepts. We sense, moreover, that in any of the multiple ways in which emigration may influence development there is a fine line between what is desirable and what may become deleterious. In addition, both the dominant schools of thought are somewhat circumscribed in their approach. If equilibrium theorists tend at times to be cavalier in their lack of concern for individuals and local communities, scholars of the dependency and allied schools sometimes give the impression that they deplore any change at all. It seems important to remember that all development implies some change; the questions are what type? how much? and how fast?

### Effects on Employment and Productivity

In Chapter I we also observed that one of the fundamental justifications advanced for international labor migration is that it tends to reduce the burden of un- and under-employment on impoverished developing economies releasing capital for investment in productive activities. Some theorists of the "equilibrium school" go further to claim that the benefits of international migration to the sending country are mediated primarily through the pressure of labor shortages which enforce the consolidation of land holdings and mechanization of agricultural production (e.g., Kindleberger, 1967, pp. 11, 103-107). By contrast, theorists of the dependency school, and those who follow Myrdal, tend to regard international migration as a loss of human capital which exerts harmful effects on the country of origin.

In a penetrating analysis of the effects of international labor migration, Saskia Sassen-Koob has argued that, in order to cope with surges in demand, any kind of development<sup>3</sup> that involves large-scale industrialization requires the existence of a labor surplus (Sassen-Koob, 1978, pp. 130-131). Sassen-Koob finds it useful to distinguish analytically between an "apparent labor surplus" and a "hard-core surplus." By the first term, Sassen-Koob

---

<sup>3</sup>Capitalist or centrally-planned.

refers to "those segments of the labor surplus which would become a necessary labor supply in the case of significantly expanded industrialization." By the second term she means "those segments of the labor surplus that would not be absorbed even in the event of such expansion." (Sassen-Koob, 1978, p. 531.) The distinction is, as Sassen-Koob recognizes, largely analytical and it is probably impossible--as well as unnecessary--to identify precisely which types of worker fall into each category or even how large a share of the surplus can be considered "hard-core." The point is that "a segment or the whole of the surplus is apparent surplus, a fact which should be taken into account in any examination of the effects of labor exports" (p. 131). The following pages will examine the literature on the impact of international labor migration on employment and productivity, taking up first the question of job creation in developing societies and the idea of emigration as a "safety-valve." Later, we will review the literature that focuses on the labor shortages that many claim have appeared as a consequence of mass labor migration.

### Migration as a "Safety Valve"

It is frequently argued that international labor migration is beneficial to sending countries as a "safety-valve" for reducing the pressures on developing country governments of high levels of un- and underemployment. In speaking of external migration in these terms, writers

appear to have two different types of effect in mind. First, and most commonly, the argument is made in economic terms and stresses such impacts as the release of funds for capital investment and relief from the gargantuan task of job creation in countries with high rates of population growth.<sup>54</sup> Secondly, some writers have moved beyond this point and have regarded international migration as a relatively costless means of satisfying rising aspirations among the poor and the unemployed that might otherwise erupt in political protest. We take up the question of a political safety-valve in the discussion of political effects in Chapter 6; here, we attempt to summarize the literature on migration as an economic safety-valve.

A review of the literature on international migration from countries with very high levels of population growth as well as from small island nations like those of the Caribbean, suggests that many developing country governments perceive mass international migration as affording them a breathing spell and an opportunity to push forward economic development. Writing of the Caribbean, a number of authors have discussed the significant part played by emigration in curbing the increase in unemployment that would otherwise have followed the rapid growth of the labor force during the past two or three decades. Roberts observed in 1974 that

---

<sup>54</sup>With the exception of the most orthodox Marxian dependency theorists, it may not be an exaggeration to observe that virtually all analysts explicitly or implicitly subscribe to the view that migration can be an economic safety-valve.

Jamaica would face a massive problem of unemployment if substantial emigration to the United States were halted for any reason (Roberts, 1974, p. 174), and Ebanks noted that the government intended to continue its policy of encouraging the emigration of unskilled workers (Ebanks, 1975, pp. 49-71). Similar observations have been made for Trinidad and Tobago (Farrell, 1978), Haiti (Glaessel-Brown, 1979), Barbados (Ebanks, 1975, p. 35) and other islands.<sup>5</sup>

Writing in 1980, Diaz-Briquets observed that "in many of the smaller Caribbean countries, population pressures on existing resources are frequently cited as impediments to development, and governments openly admit to viewing emigration as a 'safety-valve'" (Diaz-Briquets, 1980, p. 87). Diaz-Briquets also assumes that many governments in Latin America feel the same way about emigration though they do not say so openly (Ibid.). Dawn Marshall (1979, p. 49) speaks of "emigration as an escape valve" as the "basic tenet" of migration policy among West Indian governments. And Elsa Chaney (1979, p. 37) also speaking of the Caribbean, has suggested that only massive improvement in employment opportunities would reduce emigration. Chaney believes that moderate improvement would tend to increase emigration since more people would then be able to afford the journey (Ibid.). While the evidence that emigration is regarded as a safety-valve by Caribbean governments is

---

<sup>5</sup> Diaz-Briquets notes that the Barbadian government provides financial assistance to prospective emigrants irrespective of skill level (p. 75).

impressive, Diaz-Briquets (p. 94) concludes that "relatively little is known about international migration in the Caribbean, Middle America and South America."

There is also suggestive evidence from Asia that the effect of international migration on employment is regarded as highly desirable by some governments. The World Bank/Bangladesh project appears to have been based largely on the premise that increased international migration would benefit Bangladesh, particularly if Bangladesh could "develop an image of a reliable source of quality manpower as opposed to that of a supplier of that of cheap labor (Siddiqui, 1979, p. 1). The project also undertook an examination of the cost of training replacement labor in various types of skilled and highly skilled occupations (Rahman, 1980). In the Philippines a recent government report lists ten ways in which the nation stands to gain from international migration (Philippines, OEDP, 1978, p. 16). The list includes better utilization of unproductive manpower and reduction of the problem of job creation.

None of the articles cited offer clear evidence that international migration has indeed provided relief from unemployment and made the provision of jobs easier. However, a number of authors have attempted to describe the magnitude of the task of job creation in the rapidly growing populations of the Third World which make such an assumption appear reasonable. Robert Fox of the Inter-American

Development Bank points out that "the U.S., in its best year since the Second World War (1977), created four million jobs; but Latin America, with one-fifth to one-sixth of the economic base (GDP) must from now to the end of the century annually create four million jobs just in order not to fall behind in its present high rate of unemployment" (Inter-American Development Bank, 1980).

A short article in The Economist compares the rate of population growth--and hence of labor force growth--in developed and underdeveloped countries, and concludes that "there will be a need for international migration for many years to ease the burden of unemployment in LDCs" (Economist, 1979, pp. 32-33). The article points out that, in 1975, 44 percent of LDC populations was under 15 years of age compared with 24 percent in the developed world. In 1970, 85 percent of the LDC labor force was still in agriculture compared with 51 percent in middle income countries, 39 percent in centrally planned economies, and only 11 percent in Western industrialized states. These figures give some indication of the amount of job creation that will be called for in the years ahead.

A more sophisticated analysis for the Philippines concludes that the labor force will grow from 16.6 million in 1978 to 33.6 million in the year 2000. In order to keep unemployment from above the targeted level of 4 percent, jobs will have to be created at the rate of 600,000 a year between 1978-1982; 650,000 between 1983-1987; and 800,000

annually from 1988 to the end of the century. To achieve these targets, domestic capital formation at constant prices would have to grow at 8.9 percent per year between 1983-1987 and at 8.5 percent per year thereafter (Jayme, 1979, pp. 70-71).

The authors cited so far have tended to perceive international migration as a means of easing population pressure and unemployment in the countries of origin. It is possible, however, that the opportunity to participate in seasonal or short-term may have the effect of delaying the onset of fertility decline, thereby exacerbating, or even creating, over-population. Walter Elkan, who has studied labor migration with Southern Africa for more than twenty years, has recently written of Lesotho that,

the rise in population has been sustained, if not caused, by the opportunity provided by migration to South Africa, and the propensity to convert savings out of wages into livestock that has exacerbated soil erosion by causing severe overgrazing which removes the protective cover of vegetation. As population pressure has increased, agriculture has become increasingly risky, and the well justified pessimism about the likelihood of successful investment in farming has further enhanced the alternative of working in South Africa . . . (Elkan, 1980, p. 593).

The example suggests that international migration cannot help development if it is regarded as a substitute for development instead of as short-term support of increasing development efforts.

#### Effect on Rural Areas

In terms of the equilibrium theory of international migration two things should happen in rural areas as a consequence of emigration. First, there should be an improvement in per capita income and general living standards since there will be a reduction in unemployment. Secondly, there should be a better utilization of the factors of production as those who left were either un- or underemployed. The literature we have just reviewed suggests that international migration is perceived by both governments and scholars to yield substantial benefits to the sending country in reducing the surplus population.

Equilibrium theory is based on the assumption that there exists a true labor market which, by bringing wages in sending and receiving countries into balance, brings international migration to a halt at the point where surplus population has been absorbed. We have already noted that, by 1964, W. Arthur Lewis himself had recognized that rigidities in receiving country economies prevent the operation of the labor market and allow migration to continue beyond this stage (see Portes, 1977, p. 6). The same point has also been made by other students of international migration. Tapinos, for example, has argued that the labor market is so imperfect that only government intervention can prevent the continued flight from the land after the surplus has been absorbed (Tapinos, 1974, pp. 176-177). Indeed, Tapinos reviewing a variety of effects in sending countries has concluded that there is no

automatic mechanism by which economic progress can be transferred through international migration from one country to another (Ibid, p. 190).

Accumulating empirical evidence suggests that in most cases the labor market has not functioned as expected nor have governments generally attempted to up barriers to migration.<sup>5</sup> At the start, therefore, emigration has provided relief for unemployment; but, as the flow has continued, it has cut more or less deeply into the apparent labor surplus. In Greece, the Caribbean, Spain, Italy, rural Hong Kong, Jordan, Oman, the Yemen Arab Republic, West Africa, the independent countries of Southern Africa, as in Southern Italy in the late 19th and early 20th centuries and in Mexico during the bracero program, reports indicate that international migration has resulted in declining intensity of cultivation, a shift to less labor intensive but less valuable crops, abandonment of animal husbandry, neglect of needed maintenance of rural infrastructure (buildings, irrigation ditches, terraces, etc.) and, in some countries, reliance on food imports and imported replacement labor of

---

<sup>5</sup>Typical is the remark of the Jordanian Labor Minister quoted by Anani (1978, p. 368): "There is no way to stop this labor hemorrhage . . . No, we cannot impose restrictions on our labor migration to Arab countries." The Bangladesh government's Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training has attempted vigorously to pursue overseas employment. At the same time, it has attempted to encourage the departure of individuals who could be "spared" by the Bangladesh economy (Keely, 1980, p. 21). By contrast, in the early 1970s, both Greece and Yugoslavia imposed restrictions on the emigration of some categories of workers (Papademetriou, 1976, p. 22).

lower quality. (Zolotas, 1967, pp. 47-48; Philpott, 1973, pp. 84-95; Lowenthal and Comitas, 1962, p. 204; Watson, 1975; Amin, 1974, pp. 95-100; Birks and Sinclair, 1980, pp. 86-93; Swanson, 1979, pp. 73-76; Shankman, 1976; Lewis, 1961, p. 293; Elkan, 1980, pp. 592-593; Wilson, 1976, p. 476; Foerster, 1919, pp. 450-451; Papademtriou, 1976, p. 7). Even in a labor surplus country like Yugoslavia, it is claimed, there has been a decline in agricultural production in the traditional emigration areas of the Dalmatian hinterland, western Herzegovina and south-western Bosnia (Baučić, 1972, p. 33). Perhaps the most devastating aspect of declining rural productivity, mentioned by virtually all the analysts cited, is the devaluation of agricultural work in the minds of young people. Impressed by the glamorous tales of life in foreign cities brought back by emigrants from the village, young men are tending more and more to plan their lives around eventual emigration.

Two factors, the lack of young men and the availability of remittances, appear to be particularly important in accounting for the decline of agriculture in emigrant communities. Because emigration is highly selective of men in the prime of life, much of the farm work at home is left to those who are less able-bodied--women, youths and older men. There is a tendency, therefore, to reduce the amount

of land under cultivation, to avoid working the more distant and difficult fields, and generally to concentrate efforts on the easiest crops.

Miracle and Berry (1970, pp. 90-93) have analyzed the factors that influence the extent to which productivity in rural areas is affected by out-migration. In their view, the most important variables are the length of the migrants' absence; the social organization of production; and climatic and other factors that influence the production possibilities in sending communities. It has also been argued that, in Mexico at least, less land would be taken out of production when young men emigrate to the United States if small farmers were given more incentives to keep the land in production during their absence (Cornelius, 1979, p. 177). Cornelius has suggested that it is the lack of access to credit facilities and low-cost fertilizer, and the inadequacy of irrigation and marketing arrangements rather than international migration per se, that account for declining productivity (Ibid.). This argument seems somewhat circular, however; one might conjecture that it is the lack of such inputs that makes employment abroad such an attractive proposition.

To a considerable extent, the changes in productivity that we have outlined appear to have been made possible by the availability of remittance incomes.<sup>57</sup> Because of remittances, emigrants' families have been able to cultivate less intensively, both on their own account and as hired labor, without suffering a decline in their standards of living. Some communities, especially those with small populations and an established tradition of emigration, have all but ceased production and become communities of consumption. Typical of these small communities is the rural Hong Kong community described by Watson in the early 1970s:

Except for a few handicraft items nothing of any real value is produced in San Tin. The village women spend their idle hours assembling plastic flowers and weaving rattan purses, but these activities are not taken very seriously. The money they earn is hardly enough to cover the women's entertainment and tobacco expenses (Watson, 1975, p. 155).

Textile exporters from Hong Kong have attempted to involve the women of San Tin in cottage industry. In this village, however, where all but a handful of men now work in the United Kingdom,

these knitting shops have had little impact on the local economy because they are a marginal source of income. In fact, San Tin has a bad reputation

---

<sup>57</sup>Equilibrium theorists do not appear to have anticipated that remittances would have a critical impact on productivity. Kindleberger (1967, p. 104), for example, considered that remittances are useful as a source of foreign exchange and development capital but that their contribution to development is of minor importance compared with the stimulus provided by the "shock to the system" of labor shortages."

among the entrepreneurs of the New Territories because the available workers, mostly unmarried girls, are not highly motivated (Ibid.).

On the basis of our research, unrestricted international migration may ultimately result in declining productivity in rural areas of heavy out-migration. However, this statement requires some qualification to take account of circumstances in which emigration may be less destructive. Rural productivity is unlikely to be seriously affected until the emigration stream starts to cut deeply into the apparent labor surplus. As the sources listed above suggest, erosion of the apparent surplus may occur fairly rapidly in small populations such as island societies or localized "emigrant communities" within a wider population.<sup>55</sup> In low income countries with very rapid population growth, like Bangladesh, Pakistan, and the Philippines, a limited period of international migration may significantly ease the problem of creating jobs for the surplus population. However, where fertility remains very high, as in Mexico and Turkey, even large out-migrations carried on over a considerable length of time have failed to lower unemployment rates significantly (Cornelius, 1979, p. 171; Paine, 1974, p. 83).

The relationship between emigration and unemployment is complicated by the fact that international labor migration today is increasingly of the short-term, rotational type.

---

<sup>55</sup>In Jamaica, for example, emigration during the 1960s caused an absolute decline in the size of the labor force (Roberts, 1974, p. 57).

Many, if not most, emigrants can be expected to return within a few years and their departure does not necessarily reduce the problem of job creation in the longer term. For this reason some analysts have questioned the value of the mechanization that is said to have occurred as a result of emigration from Libya (Hilal, 1969), Vietnam (Sansom, 1970, pp. 144-145), and the Indian Punjab (Lipton and Firn, 1974). Connell et al. (p. 146), for example, have commented that:

Migration, in part a response to high man/land ratios--and hence to scarcity of productive earning prospects--seems to create, back in the village, temporary labor shortages, leading to mechanization and further reduction (and maldistribution) of productive employment. As population growth proceeds, mechanization (unless, exceptionally, it creates jobs) must increase later migration.''

Occasionally, agricultural productivity may be increased by international migration. Whereas earlier emigration from the Dalmatian hinterland of Yugoslavia caused farms and vineyards to be abandoned, the recent creation of a tourist industry in parts of the Dalmatian coast has stimulated a return of viticulture and market gardening in these areas. Remittance incomes from contemporary emigration have been utilized to bring back the farmland that had earlier been abandoned (Bennett, 1979). Swanson (pp. 74-75), suggests that increased productivity resulting from mechanization in fertile parts of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) may even have reduced the amount of emigration from these areas. It should be borne in mind,

---

'Emphases in the original.

also, that while declining agricultural production may be deplored in most cases, it is possible that some areas of the world are so inhospitable that they are unlikely ever to be capable of providing more than subsistence standards of living for their inhabitants. In such places, out-migration may offer the best promise of a decent and productive life for much of the population.

### Effects in Urban Areas

Information on the effects of labor migration in urban, industrialized sectors of sending countries is relatively more restricted in both time perspective and geographical coverage than the information on rural areas. Sophisticated, in-depth analyses are, for the most part, available only for those Mediterranean nations that were the main source of migrant labor for Western Europe during the 1960s. Some information is also available for Middle Eastern and Asian nations that are currently providing migrant labor to the oil-rich states of the Persian Gulf, but much of it is anecdotal and impressionistic.<sup>60</sup> Exceptions are Bangladesh and Pakistan, where the governments, in collaboration with the World Bank, has just completed studies relative to the effects of migration on

---

<sup>60</sup>Charles Keely, who studied international migration to the Middle East from five South Asian countries in 1979, found that there was almost no systematic information available in any of the countries or on any aspect of migration. Anecdotes and speculation were abundant. See Asian Worker Migration to the Middle East (New York: The Population Council, 1980).

the labor force. Some data are also available for the Philippines, where the government has also started to study the implications of emigration. Because of the data limitations our discussion will focus mainly on the experiences of the countries participating in the European migration.

By far the most commonly reported effect of international migration on urban areas is the development of shortages of skilled labor. Virtually every emigrant country about which we have information has experienced such shortages, which may extend to include semi-skilled workers and which may exist side-by-side with urban and rural unemployment. While most reports speak of bottlenecks and production delays, the overall effects on output appear to vary quite widely in accordance with the size and rate of development of the industrial sector, the size (or lack of) the labor surplus, the flexibility of the labor market, and the speed with which jobs vacated by departing migrants can be filled by other workers with comparable skills.

Among the countries sending labor to Western Europe, shortages seem to have been felt most acutely in Greece, which has had low rates of fertility and population growth, and in Yugoslavia, from which out-migration has been particularly heavy. The Governor of the Bank of Greece observed that soon after emigration was extended to Western Europe from the traditional receiving countries around 1959, "increasingly acute" labor shortages had appeared in the

industrial as well as the agricultural sector (Zolotas, 1967, p. 50). Because of the scarcity of skilled workers and technicians in several branches of manufacturing and construction Zolotas claimed that it had become increasingly difficult to bring about a rise in output and, especially, to carry out planned investment projects. The scarcity of certain categories of technician had also caused production delays and reduced the rate of increase in investment.

Zolotas argues that labor shortages not only create production delays and bottlenecks but may also give rise to less obvious and more serious consequences. First, if wages rise at a faster rate than the rate of increase in productivity they will contribute to cost inflation (p. 16). Secondly, while labor shortages may encourage industry to increase production by means of capital-deepening, as equilibrium theorists predict, it is questionable whether the introduction of labor saving techniques on a large scale is an appropriate response in developing countries with high levels of unemployment. In these countries the principal need is usually to create employment, not to reduce it (pp. 14-15). Thirdly, if wages and production costs rise substantially, potential overseas investors--the "crucial" source of investment capital and entrepreneurship in developing countries--will seek to invest their resources elsewhere. According to Zolotas, both of the first two consequences had occurred in Greece (pp. 51, 48). With respect to the third potential problem, although Zolotas

mentions that there had been a reduction in the rate of increase in investment, it is not clear whether this referred to Greek or foreign investors.

In Yugoslavia as in Greece, the shortage of skilled workers is said to have "limited development in individual firms and industries" (Baučić, 1972, p. 18). According to Baučić, the effect has been particularly severe in Slovenia and Croatia where emigration rates are high and where efforts to attract emigrants to return have failed, apparently because wages offered by Yugoslavian firms, despite significant increases, are still lower than those offered in Western Europe (Ibid., pp. 19-20). Yugoslavia has also had to bring in replacement workers from Eastern Europe to keep the tourist industry going (Ibid. p. 19).''

In contrast to the findings in Greece and Yugoslavia, Suzanne Paine's analysis of Turkey suggests that, despite the complaints of Turkish employers, there is little evidence of "serious and persistent skilled labor shortages" (Paine, p. 126). Surveys carried out by the Turkish Employment Service between 1970 and 1972, when Turkish emigration was at its peak, show that most of the vacancies posted by industrial employers were filled "relatively quickly"--usually within three months. Moreover, while wages for skilled fitters, carpenters and bricklayers had

---

''Baučić does not specify the number of workers imported but notes that agreements were signed with Czechoslovakia in 1970 and Poland in 1971.

risen in Istanbul, providing an indirect index of shortage, there had been no general increase in the wages of skilled workers either in Istanbul or in the country as a whole. Paine therefore concluded that it is unlikely there had been a reduction in output as a consequence of out-migration (pp. 126-131).

The information available for countries sending labor to the Middle East is less abundant and reliable than that for sending countries of Europe. In particular, we have not been able to locate any studies that have attempted to go beyond labor market analysis to assess the impact of labor emigration on production. Within the Middle East itself, Egypt and Jordan, the two most urbanized sending countries, have responded in entirely different ways to the demand for labor in the oil-rich states. Egypt has long been an important source of high-level personnel--teachers, physicians, engineers--for her Arab neighbors, but this brain drain has imposed little hardship on Egypt itself. Because of an overemphasis on higher education which has produced graduates in excess of Egypt's own absorptive capacity, this type of emigration has been a welcome source of high level employment, at least until recently (See Birks and Sinclair, 1980, pp. 43-50, 91-99).

Since the construction boom started in the Arabian Peninsula Egypt has also provided skilled workers and technicians in growing numbers. Although the number of skilled Egyptian emigrants is small relative to the size of

the demand, it is nevertheless large compared with the number of skilled workers in Egypt. Increasingly acute shortages of skilled labor and technicians have developed, and Egypt has even imported skilled and semi-skilled replacement labor from the Far East to complete some construction projects in Cairo (Birks and Sinclair, 1980, p. 89). The shortage of skilled labor in Egypt is aggravated by what two students of international migration in the Middle East regard as the exceptional rigidity of the Egyptian labor market. For a variety of reasons, the labor market is highly segmented and there is comparatively little mobility among the segments. Thus the vacancies created by the departure of Egypt's skilled and experienced tradesmen, craftsmen and technicians are not readily filled by upward occupational mobility from below although there is significant urban unemployment and considerable rural under-employment (Birks and Sinclair, May 1978, pp. 23-27; 1980, pp. 94-98).

The situation in Jordan appears to be reverse of that in Egypt. Jordanians have responded in large numbers and at many skill levels to the demands for labor from the Gulf states. If the estimate of 150,000 Jordanians working in other Arab countries (figures cited by Under Secretary of Labor in 1977) is correct, approximately 28 percent of the total Jordanian labor force and 46 percent of the modern sector, non-farm civilian work force, was abroad at that time (Birks and Sinclair, 1980, p. 92). However, shortages

of agricultural workers have been severe and Jordan has had to import foreign replacement labor for the rural sector, mainly from Syria, Egypt and Pakistan.

There is little systematic information available about the effect of migration to the Middle East on sending countries in Asia. Korea is reputed to have suffered shortages of managerial personnel and skilled construction workers, which have been characterized by the Economist (London, March 1979, p. 20) as "one of the most serious drags on fast economic growth." We have been unable to find any more extended reports on the Korean situation, however, and we have been informed that the government is reluctant to make available its data on international migration. In Sri Lanka, a government report compiled in 1979 describes the numbers and occupational characteristics of Sri Lankans who have emigrated in the short time since records were first kept in 1976. The report mentions bottlenecks that have developed in development projects as a consequence of shortages of skilled workers, but, once again, we have been unable to locate any more detailed information (see Sri Lanka, 1979).

Bangladesh, Pakistan, and the Philippines, have all experienced spot shortages that do not appear to have been serious. A study conducted by the Bangladesh Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training, with the support of the World Bank, attributed the shortages to the fact that manufacturers in Bangladesh had not before experienced a

situation in which demand for labor exceeded the supply. Industries were not, therefore, accustomed to providing training for replacement workers. The study appeared to assume that training programs would be established in the future (Siddiqui, 1979). After considering a number of other factors, including Bangladesh's high level of un- and underemployment and the remittances sent back by Bangladeshi emigrants, the authors of the report concluded that "there appears to be no escape from following a policy of promotion of employment abroad" (Ibid. p. 7).

In the Philippines, one study of national manpower requirements and emigration concluded that the "brain drain" is unlikely to harm the economy for some years. The study noted that a large proportion of college graduates are currently unemployed and the supply of graduates is even likely to increase in the future. (Abella, pp. 22-28). The author concluded that external migration did not appear to have caused "serious shortages in middle level skills up to now." The report continues, however,

This is not the same thing . . . as saying that it has not caused problems for certain local industries. It may well be that productivity has dropped in certain establishments due to the loss of well-trained foremen or very experienced machinists. But the facts available to us tend to

support the view that the skills we lose temporarily to foreign employers are still in large supply or are easily replaceable.”

Somewhat similar findings have come from Pakistan where the loss of production workers is said to have resulted in declining output in the manufacturing and construction sectors. The PIDE study already cited found that the decline in productivity occurred not because of the unavailability of replacement workers, but because the quality of their work was below acceptable standards (Gilani, pp. 12-13). It seems that the skilled jobs vacated by departing emigrants had been filled by formerly unskilled workers who had been given hasty training in the required skills. The researchers estimated, however, that the cost of training replacement workers to satisfactory levels would be low, both in time and money (Ibid).

### Regional Effects

Before concluding this section it will be of interest to consider the results of a study carried out by Bernard Kayser for the OECD (Kayser, 1971). The study, or series of studies, examined manpower movements and labor markets in five Southern European sending countries<sup>63</sup> around the 1971, when emigration to Western Europe was at its height.

---

<sup>62</sup>Abella, p. 41. While Abella's remarks were based on 1975 figures that showed there were some 85,000 contract migrants, the number had increased to about 493,000 (including seamen) by 1980. Stahl (1981) reports that in 1980 a number of industries claimed to have experienced skill shortages. He suggests that research is needed to determine the significance of the shortages.

<sup>63</sup>Greece, Turkey, Italy, Spain and Portugal.

Recognizing that labor markets are "extremely selective geographically" and thus "unsuited to macro-economic analysis," the researchers focused on specific regions of pronounced out-migration. As far as possible, each study concentrated on a particular modernizing city, industrial area or labor market, together with its geographical environment, whether rural or "semi-urban." The study appears to be unique in its examination of the interplay between internal and international migration and their interactions with other factors that influence development.

Summarizing the findings, Kayser (p. 147) reports that in the eleven cities studied<sup>4</sup> unemployment had been reduced during the period of heavy emigration and that "relaxation of pressure from rural workers on the urban labor market has encouraged a better balance between supply and demand." It is far from clear, however, that these benefits were entirely due to international migration. Kayser observes that out-migration had assisted by "drawing off a far from negligible quantity of labor from the active urban population, particularly in certain cases (Turkey), and has reduced the surplus of the labor force over the requirements expressed" (Ibid.). At the same time, several other factors had contributed to the state of "semi-equilibrium." There had been a decline in the activity rate which partly reflected changes in demographic structures and which were,

---

<sup>4</sup>Bari, Brindisi and Taranto in Italy; Seville in Spain; Izmir, Izmit and Zonguldak in Turkey; and Salonika, Kavala, Volos and Patras in Greece.

in part, a consequence of the abandonment of traditional practices like the employment of women and children. There had also been a striking increase in the number of jobs available in certain sectors but, contrary to what might have been expected, not in the industrial manufacturing sector. It was found that, while many new industrial firms had opened, the jobs they created had been offset by the closing of traditional firms. The overall increase in jobs was found mainly in the construction sector and in the service sector. The construction industry draws heavily on the rural population which uses experience in the building trade as "preparation" for alternative employment. By contrast, the service sector is more specifically urban (pp. 147-48).

The studies found that although labor was generally plentiful in most of the regions examined, shortages of skilled labor had appeared and were serious in Greece. Even in Greece the lack of skilled workers could not all be attributed either to emigration or to inadequate training facilities for replacement workers, although both these factors contributed to the shortages. The researchers found a considerable number of trained and experienced craftsmen and tradesmen who preferred to remain in independent employment (pp. 133-134). This latter finding is of especial interest as other research has shown that a desire for independence lies behind the reluctance of many returning migrants to take jobs in industry. The desire for

independence also contributes heavily to the investment decisions of international migrants (Piore, pp. 52-59; Tapinos, 1974, p. 186; Shankman, 1976, p. 50; Philpott, 1973, pp. 111-112; Rhoades, 1979, p. 64; Watson, 1975, pp. 164-165; Swanson, 1979, p. 71, Connell, et al., 1976, pp. 104-104; Dahya, 1973, pp. 245-247).

The studies under discussion had little to say about return migration, partly because the number of emigrants who had returned at the time of the studies were conducted was small, and partly because they tended to blend with the general labor force and were almost impossible to trace.<sup>5</sup>

In his conclusion, however, Kayser reports that:

All the rapporteurs have drawn attention to the absence of any really favorable factors in the process of re-integrating the returning emigrants. Apart from a few individual cases, it has not been possible to quote any conclusive example in which the labor concerned has been used in any way at all conducive to the development of the process. In no way do the returning emigrants fulfill the expectations of the community either in the use of the savings they have accumulated abroad . . . or in the use they make of the experience which they have acquired. (p. 150)

Taken overall, these studies suggest that the initial impact of emigration at the regional level had been beneficial in terms of numbers. At the same time,

---

<sup>5</sup>In Turkey industrial firms reported that they had employed returning emigrants, but their numbers did not equal the numbers who have left the firms in order to emigrate (p. 124). In Greece several industries reported that negotiations with returning migrants had failed because of the returnees wage demands (p. 132). In Spain, two workers had been employed on the basis of their experience abroad (p. 112). In general, there was little evidence of industries benefiting from the skills of returning migrants.

emigration had permitted developments that bode less well for the future. Because it had selected disproportionately from the more skilled members of the population, emigration had produced a qualitative decline in the labor force. At the same time, out-migration had enabled a significant proportion of workers to subsist on casual labor, which prevented their entry into regular industrial jobs where they would be more efficiently employed (pp. 151-152).“ Kayser goes on to say that emigration "stimulates the consumption of modern manufactured products which are in most cases provided by external markets" (p. 152). Finally, in a statement that serves to bring together the disparate findings we have reported in this section Kayser concludes that,

Unless emigrants are attached to the regions from which they originate, emigration is in the long run, nothing but a factor of impoverishment. At the outset it relieves congestion but little-by-little it becomes corrosive. As there can be no qualitative control over departing emigrants, the cream is bound to be skimmed off. In this way a community loses its structure while its economic system disintegrates.

---

“Böhning comments (1975, p. 274) that the Turkish government was "by no means delighted" by a 1972 agreement between the Turkish and German governments for a jointly sponsored training program which would give one year's additional training to skilled-level Turkish emigrants wishing to return home to up independent small businesses. The Turkish government was not happy with the idea of businesses being started that might not fit into their development plans.

Chapter 4REMITTANCESNational Budgets, and the Balance of Payments

In the minds of sending country governments, the effect of migrants' remittances on national budgets and the balance of payments probably constitutes the leading benefit of international migration.' Although the sums involved are difficult to calculate with any exactitude since varying proportions are remitted through informal channels, there is no doubt that in many countries they are substantial. In 1974, Hendricks reported an unofficial estimate that over U.S. \$12 million was remitted annually to the Dominican Republic from residents in the United States alone (Hendricks, 1974, p. 42). In Barbados, remittances increased from \$7.7 million in 1964 to \$10.4 million in 1970 (Ebanks, 1975, p. 35). It is estimated that about five percent of Haitian GNP comes from remittances sent home by emigrants

---

'This statement is based on inference from the attention paid to remittances in studies undertaken by sending country governments and international agencies (see, e.g., Ashraf Ali, 1979, and Islam, 1979 (Bangladesh); Burki, 1980, and Gilani, 1979 (Pakistan); and Abella, 1978 (Philippines)). The significance of remittances for Third World countries has increased significantly since the rise in oil prices, even in countries like India where the number of emigrants is negligible relative to the size of the population (Franda, 1978, p. 1). A number of countries in Africa and Asia attach so much importance to remittances that they require their nationals to remit a specified proportion of their earnings through formal banking channels.

(Allman and May, 1979, p. 12). Wilson (1976, p. 475) reports that migrants from Lesotho working in the mines of South Africa sent back R.5.8 million in 1972,<sup>11</sup> but says that this figure greatly underestimates the actual sums transferred by various informal means. One estimate, which included informal remittances, cash in hand, and goods carried back by returning migrants, brought the total value to nearly R.16 million in 1973--approximately two-thirds of each migrant's total earnings in South Africa (McDowell, 1973, cited in Wilson, 1976, p. 475). As the United Nations Economic and Social Council observed around 1970,

If South Africa imposed restrictions on migrant labor from Lesotho, it is hard to see how Lesotho could cope economically with the loss of income that would follow the return of thousands of Basotho (Wilson, p 111).

Comparable figures can be cited for Europe, the Middle East and Asia. The Turkish Ministry of Finance reported that remittances increased from \$107.3 million in 1968 to \$740.2 million in 1972, the latter figure being equivalent to 83.6 percent of total exports (Miller, 1976, p. 155).<sup>12</sup> The Department for Migration Studies at the University of Zagreb estimated that between 1954 and 1970, migrants' remittances totalled approximately \$1,300 million and accounted for "a large proportion of Yugoslavia's foreign

<sup>11</sup>The South African rand is approximately equal in value to the U.S. dollar.

<sup>12</sup>Between September 1980 and September 1981, the figure rose to \$2,476 billion, an increase of \$783 billion over the previous twelve months (Abadan-Unat, 1981, p. 11).

currency reserves" (Baučić, pp. 21-22). Similarly, the Bank of Greece reported remittances amounting to \$205.9 million in 1965, approximately half of which came from Western Europe (Zolotas, p. 38). In 1978, the 700,000 Asian workers in the Middle East sent home some \$6 billion in remittances (Wilson, 1979). In the same year, Bangladesh's foreign exchange balance was boosted by remittances to the value of Taka 2,120 million, a sum that was second only to that earned by the export of raw jute and jute manufactures which are the major sources of Bangladesh's export earnings (Islam, 1980, p. 1).

In 1978, also, South Korea received \$2 billion in compulsory remittances from the Middle East; the Philippines received \$200 million; Thailand, \$100 million from 20,000 emigrant workers; and India, \$3.2 billion (Wilson, 1979). Another commentator observed that remittances from the Gulf enabled India to survive the oil price rises of 1973 and later. Despite rising prices, India's foreign exchange reserves almost doubled in 1976-77 and again in 1977-78. By early 1978, reserves were estimated to be about \$5 billion, a reversal of the situation prior to 1976, when India had suffered a chronic trade deficit of \$1.5 billion or more (Franda, 1978, p. 1). In 1979, migrants' foreign currency remittances were estimated at approximately U.S. \$600 million for Jordan; U.S. \$100 million for the Syrian Arab Republic; U.S. \$1.423 million for the Yemen Arab Republic; and U.S. \$310 million for Democratic Yemen (Yeslem, 1981,

p. 10).<sup>70</sup> In some countries in the Caribbean, remittances account for larger foreign currency revenues than any one export commodity (Cornelius, 1979, p. 174). Jamaica, for example, received an estimated \$49 million (Jamaican) in 1974 (Palmer, 1977, p. 245), while transfers to Haiti from the U.S. alone were thought to amount to U.S. \$16.5 million in 1970 (Segal, 1975, p. 204). For Mexico, North and Houston (1976, p. 81) believe that remittances from the U.S. probably amount to several billions of dollars each year.

For countries with significant amounts of external migration, remittances present governments with two basic problems. First, there is the question of how to maximize the amounts remitted by migrants to the home country. Secondly, there is the problem of ensuring that remittances are used in a way that contributes to the nation's development. We will take up the second question in the section on the use of savings and remittances below; here we will say a few words on the problems that confront sending country governments in attracting remittances.

Reports from sending countries suggest that although most migrants live frugally while abroad, and save a substantial proportion of their pay, the sums actually

---

<sup>70</sup>Cohen and Lewis provide a different estimate of remittances to the Yemen Arab Republic. They state that in 1977, remittances from the 600,000 Yemani workers in Saudi Arabia reached \$1.5 billion. However, these authors note that two-thirds of the sums remitted are held as cash outside of the formal banking system (Cohen and Lewis, 1979, p. 525).

remitted to the home country fall short of the amounts saved, sometimes by a considerable margin. Surveys carried out by the Turkish State Planning Organization showed that Turkish workers in Europe saved an average of 47 percent of their incomes, but remitted only 11 percent (Paine, p. 103). Likewise, Baučić estimated that while Yugoslavian workers spent about 30 percent of their earnings on their own maintenance abroad, they remitted only 20 percent (approximately) through formal channels. Of the 50 percent of earnings that is unaccounted for, a small part finds its way home in the form of goods and equipment, but by far the larger part is "saved privately" or deposited in foreign banks (Baučić, pp. 21-22).

Even when savings are remitted there is a tendency for workers to utilize a variety of formal and informal channels for the transfer of funds. In Bangladesh, for example, only half of the 277 migrant households surveyed by Islam in 1979-80 received remittances exclusively through the banks. Nine percent received monies through a combination of formal and informal channels, and another 35 percent through informal channels only (Islam, 1980, pp. 23-26). However, when funds are carried home in the pockets of returning migrants and their friends additional problems arise for governments. Such funds do not appear in the national accounting system; they may find their way into the currency black market, and, moreover, there is no way the government can exert any influence on the way they are utilized.

The literature contains a number of possible explanations for the reluctance of migrants to send home the whole of their savings. In a foreign country, many migrants feel a need to put something aside for a rainy day; migrants returning home permanently or for visits are expected to bring gifts and money must be put aside for this purpose; and some migrants contrive illegally to take home consumer durables in excess of their own needs with the intention of selling them at a profit. Many analysts place the blame on more structural factors: inadequate banking facilities near the places where the migrants work; cumbersome transfer procedures that cause delays in the arrival of the money; uneducated migrants' lack of familiarity with banks and banking.''

Other observers have cited lack of confidence in the safety and liquidity of funds deposited in bank accounts in the country of origin. For example, remittances to the Democratic Republic of Yemen declined following nationalization of enterprises there (Chandavarkar, 1980, p. 37). Similarly, Baučić (p. 25) reported that the savings of most Yugoslavian migrants were kept in foreign banks which were believed to be safer. Baučić also believes that socialist development policies that discriminate against private enterprise in Yugoslavia encouraged migrants to invest their surplus in real property abroad--a practice

---

'Ashraf Ali (1979) contains a full analysis of the weaknesses of the Bangladesh banking system that discourage emigrants from using formal channels.

that, in Baučić's view, considerably reduced prospects for the eventual return of the emigrant (Ibid.). In addition, remittances decline sharply whenever a migrant is joined by his wife and family.

Governments wishing to maximize the amounts remitted by temporary workers overseas have basically two options: mandatory requirements to remit a specified proportion of earnings, and positive incentives to encourage the transfer of funds. Several Third World countries have chosen the first method. Compulsory repatriation of funds, often up to 60 percent of wages, appears to have been standard practice for the Southern African countries that regularly provided labor for the mines of South Africa. Since these workers normally paid tax on their South African earnings in the home country, the recruiting agency was often authorized to deduct the taxes owed and to pay them directly to the home government (Wilson, 1976, pp. 474-475).

Mandatory remittance of funds is also practiced by some countries that have more recently adopted the practice of providing migrant labor under contract. Companies employing Korean contract workers are required to deposit 80 percent of workers' wages in foreign currency accounts in Korean banks (Keely, 1980, p. 27). Similarly, companies employing Filipino seamen are required to deposit 70 percent of seamen's wages in Filipino banks. Filipino contract workers are required to remit 30 percent of their earnings to specified dependents or to place it in Filipino banks

(Keely, p. 27; Far Eastern Economic Review, September 1980, p. 26). Interestingly, a study of Filipino migrant workers in Iran, carried out in 1978 by the Philippines Institute of Labor Manpower Studies, showed that workers there were remitting an average of 70 percent of their salaries, although only 30 percent was required (Philippines, 1978, p. 8). A plausible explanation for this practice is that foreign workers in Iran were exceptionally well paid; the same study found that Filipino workers in Iran were receiving, on average, a little under ten times their former salaries (Ibid., p. 6).

Countries that do not require compulsory repatriation of savings have attempted in a variety of ways to encourage voluntary remittances. Some countries have tried to improve their banking facilities and services in foreign countries and have made efforts to inform migrant workers of the various services offered. Countries like India and Bangladesh have endeavored to keep the official exchange rate for migrant remittances equal to the market rate, and others permit migrants to keep foreign currency accounts while they are abroad and for some years after their return. Finally, many countries use customs policy to encourage repatriation of funds, waiving or reducing the duty payable on specified goods brought back by returning migrants or purchased with foreign currency after their return. Customs policies also allow governments to exercise some influence

over the way in which remittances are used, by giving more favorable rates for goods and equipment intended for productive purposes than for "luxury" consumer goods.<sup>72</sup>

Before leaving this discussion of remittances at the national level, it should be pointed out that a number of careful analysts have cautioned about assuming that remittances are of major economic importance for more than a few sending countries in the developing world. Ricardo Moran (1980, p. 23) points out that while, in 1977, migrants' remittances amounted to more than 25 percent of either imports or exports in four countries and more than 10 percent in nine additional countries, in only one of these cases did remittances exceed more than 4 percent of GDP.<sup>73</sup> In India, remittances were valued at only 1.0 percent of GDP. Yet Timothy King (1981, p. 6) believes that the effect of remittances on the balance of payments is likely to be of major importance only in large countries. According to King, there is a tendency for large countries to have a low ratio of international trade to GNP and, in these countries, the effect of remittances on foreign exchange balances is likely to be the most significant consequence of international labor migration.

---

<sup>72</sup>Chadavarkar, 1980, gives a good brief discussion of ways in which countries have attempted to attract remittances and influence their use.

<sup>73</sup>The country referred to is the Peoples Republic of Yemen. Moran notes that in 120 of 181 states, the data available to the World Bank-IMF does not permit calculation of these ratios.

Another sophisticated student of international migration has several times warned sending country governments against allowing their assessments of the impact of international labor migration to be dominated by apparently very large financial gains to the national budget and the balance of payments. In 1974, Georges Tapinos noted that while important financial benefits clearly accrue to a country with strong out-migration, these do not have a determining action on strategic variables of development. In Tapinos' words, "there is no endogenous link which, in a market economy, ties emigration to development" (Tapinos, 1974, p. 182). In 1981, Tapinos repeated his warning, pointing out that the long-time significance of remittances can only be assessed within the overall economic context of the society. High ratios of remittances to imports may constitute an important treasury resource but, on the other hand, they may only denote a high level of dependence on external economies. Tapinos notes that while numerous small businesses have been established in countries in the Mediterranean basin with the help of remittance incomes, these have had little impact at the macro-economic level. Clearly, more research is needed on the economic effects of remittances but Tapinos points out that a lack of both data

and explanatory models prevents researchers from examining the economic effects induced by salary transfers (Tapinos, 1981, pp. 14-15).'<sup>4</sup>

### Remittances and the Standard of Living

In addition to their favorable effects on national budgets, remittance incomes have been instrumental in raising the living standard of countless families in the countries of origin. In some cases, whole communities have come to depend on remittances. In the Dominican Republic, Hendricks speaks of the "almost complete dependence of the population" of the village of Aldea on remittances from the United States. In Aldea, apart from a few government positions as teachers, mechanics, policemen and laborers, "there is almost no employment for those without land. Those jornaleros who find irregular agricultural or construction work earn one peso a day plus a meal" (Hendricks, p. 42). Much the same can be said for other Caribbean communities (e.g., Philpott, pp. 129-147 passim;

---

<sup>4</sup>Using a different type of analysis, Böhning has also questioned the long-term value of remittance incomes to developing countries. Böhning (1975, pp. 270-271) notes that, in the decade 1962-1971, Yugoslavia had permanently lost some 92,000 skilled workers through emigration, in addition to short-term losses and losses of semi-skilled and unskilled workers. Remittances from the skilled group would have totalled no more than U.S. \$504.9. Based upon World Bank estimates of the cost of creating a new job in the period 1967-1971, this sum would have been sufficient to create only 22,000 new jobs. Since skilled workers are essential to job-creation activities, Böhning questions whether Yugoslavia could long support the "large gaps" torn in the labor market and the growing "dependence on remittances, and therefore, on the whim of foreign countries" (p. 271).

Manners, 1965). In the San Tin village of rural Hong Kong, also, "most . . . households derive only a small proportion of their income from non-emigrant sources. . . . Twenty-four households (63 percent) were totally dependent on remittances. . . . Only three of the households operated without any remittance aid, and two of these were barely able to survive" (Watson, 1975, pp. 136-137).

This extreme degree of dependence on remittances and the lack of productive employment is regarded by the authors just cited as largely a product of heavy out-migration. The benefits of remittance incomes, however, have been observed in less dependent societies. Stephen Adler (1977, p. 15) cites an Algerian government estimate that remittances provided an income for approximately 2.5 million Algerians annually around 1970. Adler's estimate receives support from the staff of the OECD Development Center who have asserted that the survival of migrants' families in the Mahgreb might be threatened without the monthly postal order (1979, p. 112). This is despite the Center's belief that the larger part of migrants' savings are accumulated in the host country and are probably not repatriated (p. 109).

In 1979, the Jordanian Under Secretary of Labor, recognizing that remittances seldom find their way into productive investment, was nevertheless moved to comment, "I just wonder what some people would have done without remittances." (The Middle East, 1979, p. 106). The author of a recent report on Pakistan calculated that "every year,

the workers are remitting to their households amounts equivalent to three times as much as the pre-migration family income" (Burki, 1979, p. 19). And Swanson, speaking of the Yemen Arab Republic, writes that "there can be little doubt that consumption levels have been upgraded significantly in emigrant villages" (Swanson, 1979, p. 64). Between 1971-72 and 1975-76, there was a ten-fold increase in the value of food imports into the Yemen, not all of which could, in Swanson's view, have been accounted for by world wide increases in food prices, or the decline in local production. In addition, Swanson infers that the people are dressing better as the value of textiles imported into the country increased by almost six times in the same period (pp. 65-66).<sup>75</sup> Finally, piecing together information from several sources, Cornelius estimates that the number of Mexicans dependent at least in part on remittance incomes increased from 2.25 million (about 11 percent of the rural population) in 1956-57, to around 13.6 million (approximately 21 percent of the total population) in 1978 (Cornelius, 1979, p. 175). A better idea of how the lives of migrants' families are being transformed, in ways that are clearly beneficial, as well as in ways that may be less

---

<sup>75</sup>Despite these signs of higher living standards among migrant families, a recent study of the Yemen Arab Republic suggests that the large increase in the money supply has triggered a level of inflation that may leave them with little to invest once their daily needs are met (Cornell University, 1980, p. 181). The effect of inflation on families without remittance incomes is presumably more devastating.

desirable, can be obtained from a consideration of the uses made by migrants and their families of their savings and remittances.

#### Utilization of Savings and Remittances

Until recently it was assumed that one of the main benefits of international migration to sending countries would be the availability of migrants' savings as development capital. During the past decade, most students of mass labor migration have concluded that investment in productive enterprise is the exception rather than the rule. Virtually every description of the effects of international migration on sending communities has a colorful passage describing the boom in construction as migrants repair their homes or build new ones, the grocery stores well stocked with imported goods, and the proliferation of taxis, bars and other small businesses in areas that lack the population to support them. In-depth studies point to substantial sums being utilized to satisfy social and ceremonial obligations (e.g., Hendricks; Shankman; Watson; Philpott); for the servicing of debts (e.g., Lipton, 1976; Shankman; Commerce Research Bureau; Islam); and to finance the emigration of other family members (e.g., Hendricks; Philpott; Watson; Lowenthal; Shankman). There is a consensus that sums invested in enterprises that have potential for generating further employment, are small in absolute and relative terms.

Based on extensive reviews of the literature, a number of scholars have listed what seem to be migrants' priorities for the use of their savings. There is a strong degree of overlap among these lists irrespective of the geographical area covered. Tapinos (1974, p. 175-76), dealing primarily with intra-European migration, finds that savings and remittances are mainly used for five purposes:

- (a) Payment of debts.
- (b) Consumption of home produced goods.
- (c) Housebuilding.
- (d) Consumption of imported goods.
- (e) Hoarding

In an attempt to assess the costs and benefits of this pattern of remittance use, Tapinos finds that while the effects are probably beneficial in the short term and at the individual level, they turn out to be less advantageous in the longer term and on the community level (pp. 183-84). He points out that basic consumption needs inevitably absorb a large part of migrants' savings as a majority of migrant families are extremely poor. Such expenditures are therefore beneficial. Commenting, moreover, on the common observation that consumption of imported goods is high and that savings expended on them are lost to the developing countries, Tapinos makes the point that imported consumer goods tend to be cheaper than the same articles produced locally. He suggests, therefore, that once emigrants and their families have become accustomed to having these goods,

insistence on imported goods is sound economic behavior. 0 Tapinos also notes the psychological importance for migrant families of housebuilding. He points out, as have other researchers, that ownership of a good house signifies upward social mobility in the home community. Although Tapinos believes that hoarding is probably the most common use of remittances, he nevertheless considers that while the small sums "truly saved" (i.e. invested productively) are small, they can be extremely useful sources of development capital (pp. 175-76). At the same time, however, he believes that remittances have an inflationary effect and, more seriously, that, by making existing conditions more tolerable, they tend to reinforce the status quo and inhibit changes that are essential for development. He concludes, therefore, that a country which has seen a gross increase in its per capita GNP as a result of migrants' remittances, is condemned to continue exporting its labor force if it wishes to avoid diminished revenues in the next generation (p. 183).

Lipton's survey of remittance use in rural areas undertaken for the World Bank produces a very similar listing of priorities which includes: payment of debts and financing the education of sons; purchase of consumption goods to meet everyday needs--estimated by Lipton to absorb about 90 percent of the sums remitted; education of younger siblings; and "investment" (Lipton, 1976, pp. 34-35). Cornelius reports that most Mexican studies indicate that

approximately two-thirds of migrants' remittances are used for "family maintenance." The balance is usually spent on repaying debts; building or improving a house and furnishing it; investing in agricultural equipment; paying for secondary or higher education for children; purchasing a car or truck; or on vacations and other recreational activities (Cornelius, 1979, p. 180).

Rempel and Lobdell (1978), whose survey included a large number of studies from sub-Saharan Africa as well as from South and South-East Asia, also found "scattered evidence of investment of remittances in productive rural activity" (p. 334). On the whole, however, Rempel and Lobdell agree with the conclusions reached by J. C. Mitchell (1969) concerning migrants in Southern Rhodesia, that the migrant faces a life-cycle of obligations to his home area. These obligations include money for marriage payments; school fees for younger siblings; building a house for wife and children; money to pay taxes; money to repair and maintain housing; payments involved in kinship obligations to parents, parents-in-law and sisters; and purchase of cattle and farm equipment to maintain agricultural production (Rempel and Lobdell, p. 335).'<sup>7</sup>

The findings of two of the more detailed studies of remittance use, both carried out on the Indian sub-continent during the late 1970s, support the more general findings we

---

<sup>7</sup>'It is not clear to what extent Rempel and Lobdell's survey was based on international migration either within Africa or external to that continent.

have just reported. One of these, a study undertaken by the Commerce Research Bureau, attempted to assess the impact of remittances to the Indian state of Kerala, thought to have the largest inflow of any state in the country (Commerce Research Bureau, 1978). The researchers note that the lack of reliable information about the number of migrants and the size of the sums remitted makes the assessment of remittance use extremely difficult and the results tentative. However, using a variety of assumptions, they estimated the total inward flow of remittances during 1977 to have been in the region of Rupees 2,350 million (\$291.9 million), or approximately R11,700 (\$1,435) per migrant. However, between 1970 and 1976, bank deposits in Kerala grew only by 204 percent compared with 230 percent for the country as a whole. The researchers conclude that most of the money received was spent on daily consumption items, buildings, land, jewelry and the repayment of debts (p. 978).

At the household level, the average value of assets per migrant household in the Commerce Research Bureau's study worked out at approximately R158,000 (\$19,627) compared with only R11,615 (\$1,443) for all rural households in Kerala. The value of land owned by remittance-receiving households averaged R119,000 (\$14,782), and jewelry was valued at R15,137 (\$1,880) on the average (p. 979). Although some migrant families reported financial investments like life insurance, "chit funds," and bank deposits, investment in debentures, shares, and securities was "almost nil." Of the

402 migrant families surveyed, only one had started a factory (p. 979). Finally, the study notes that the rush to buy land had precipitated serious inflation in land prices. On the benefit side, the flurry of building activity had created jobs for workers from outside the migrant villages, and small shops and restaurants had sprung up to serve them. The authors conclude with the observation that the multiplier effect of foreign money spreads directly from the primary (agricultural) to the tertiary (service) sector and, as others have also found, tends to bypass the more productive secondary (industrial) sector (p. 979).

The amount and use of remittances was also examined by the Pakistan/World Bank project, which found a higher level of productive investment than any other study we have been able to locate (Gilani, pp. 10-12). The study showed that with the exception of professionals, who consume as much as one-third of their salaries abroad, the estimated 1.25 million Pakistani emigrants in the Middle East remit between 70 and 80 percent of their earnings either in cash or in kind. On the average, approximately Rs. 31,000 is remitted annually in the form of cash, Rs. 7,500 is brought in with migrants when they visit their homes, and another Rs. 2,500 is remitted in kind (p. 10).<sup>77</sup> The survey showed that as much as 13 percent of remittances is productively invested

---

<sup>77</sup>When urban-rural weights (not described in the summary available to the present authors) are applied, these sums are reduced to R27,000 in total of which R18,000 are remitted in cash.

in agriculture, industrial or commercial projects. In other respects, the uses made of remittance incomes by Pakistani families differs little from the pattern found in other countries (see Table 4.1).

The findings of this large survey of remittance use by families with emigrant sons in the Middle East accords well with Dahya's more general discussion of the use of migrants' savings by Pakistani families with sons in Great Britain. Based on anthropological data, Dahya's study makes clear the almost all Pakistani emigration to Great Britain is "linked," in the sense used by Connell et al., and that the family head makes all decisions about who shall go and what shall be done with remittance monies. As this migration has continued for two or more generations, it is possible to discern a clear pattern of remittance use (pp. 254-257). According to Dahya, remittances received during the first eighteen months to two years of a given emigrant's departure are used to pay off debts incurred for his travel, and for minor improvements to the family home. After this period, savings are used to extend the family's land holdings, the object being to increase the family's regular income. Later still, the family is likely to expand into commercial enterprises. At first this investment is made locally through the purchase of a flour mill or a brick kiln. Later, there may be a commercial undertaking in a nearby town which may take the form of a small shop or an investment in some form of rural-urban transportation.

Table 4.1

## Uses of Remittance Incomes in Pakistan (percent)

|   | %   | %   |
|---|-----|-----|
| Household Expenditures                            |     | 62  |
| Food, clothing, accomodation                      | 57  |     |
| Household durables                                | 3   |     |
| Marriage ceremonies                               | 2   |     |
| Real Estate                                       |     | 22  |
| New house for own use                             | 12  |     |
| Improvements to existing house                    | 2   |     |
| Commercial purpose                                | 6   |     |
| Agricultural land                                 | 2   |     |
| Other Investments                                 |     | 16  |
| Agricultural machinery, land<br>improvement, etc. | 2   |     |
| Industrial and commercial                         | 9   |     |
| Financial   | 2   |     |
| Gold, jewellery, etc.                             | 3   |     |
|   | 100 | 100 |

Source: Gilani, 1980, pp. 11-12.

Finally, when the emigrant son returns for good, often after spending most of his active life in the United Kingdom, he is likely to advertise his socio-economic success by building a large pakka house--in which, commonly, only two rooms are used (p. 255).'<sup>7</sup>

Another detailed study of remittance use was undertaken by the Bangladesh Foundation for Research on Human Resources Development as part of the World Bank/Government of Bangladesh project (Islam, 1980). The Bangladesh study looked at the expenditure patterns of 277 households receiving foreign exchange remittances and 277 control households, which did not receive remittances, in both rural and urban areas of Bangladesh (pp. 3-7). An effort was made to ensure that the non-remittance households had incomes roughly similar to those of migrant households, but this objective was not fully achieved. In the urban samples, the average monthly income for remittance households was reported to have been Taka 5,354 (\$487), and in the control

---

<sup>7</sup> Nermin Abadan-Unat, writing of Turkey, makes a similar point about the building of large, imposing homes in which the family actually uses only one or two rooms. Abadan-Unat infers that the changes in life style wrought by international migration are relatively superficial (1977, p. 53). Watson (p. 162-165) notes that the large "Sterling" houses built in San Tin with money from Great Britain are often left empty to the point of deterioration while their owners are away in Britain. According to Watson, such houses are never let out for rent, despite a housing shortage in the area. He concludes that the houses serve two functions: as status symbols and sources of esteem, and as security for old age. In Watson's words, Sterling houses are "the only security investments available in a village with a non-productive economy."

households Taka 3,386 (\$308).'' In the rural samples, monthly incomes averaged Taka 5,201 (\$473) for migrant households, and Taka 2,685 (\$244) for controls. In all cases, the sample incomes are very much higher than the national averages, which are Taka 629 (\$57) in urban areas and Taka 463 (\$42) in rural areas (p. 28). All the households in the survey are therefore unusual in that they fall in the top decile as regards income.

The Bangladesh study found that among remittance-receiving households, approximately 45 percent of rural and 42 percent of urban incomes was spent on daily consumption items (p. 75). The balance was spent mainly on repayment of debt, purchase of land and jewelry, and construction and repair of housing. Rural households spent a significant proportion of their incomes on festivals and ceremonial obligations, but urban households invested more than 17 percent in "business." Comparing expenditure patterns between remittance and non-remittance households, very few differences were found except in expenditures by migrant households on construction and improvement of housing. Average total monthly expenditures were almost identical. As monthly income is higher among remittance-receiving households, however, the similar levels of total expenditures in emigrant and non-emigrant households implies

---

''The author claims that the difference is not statistically significant.

that remittance-receiving households also save more than non-remittance households. The study also found that:

(Islam, pp. 34-70.)\*\*

- (a) expenditures on daily consumption items differ only slightly, with remittance households spending more than non-remittance families on clothing, furniture and leisure activities. However, very few of the differences were statistically significant.
- (b) remittance receiving households spent somewhat more on some consumer durables than non-remittance households but, once again, very few of the differences were statistically significant.
- (c) the number of households purchasing land, and the amounts spent on land, were both significantly higher for remittance-receiving households in both urban and rural areas.
- (d) the number of households investing in the construction of houses is much higher in remittance than in control households, and the difference is significant in rural areas. Investment in improvement and repair of houses is greater among remittance-receiving households in rural areas, but in urban areas it is non-remittance households that spend more. Both of these differences are statistically significant.
- (e) in the field of "productive" investment, there was very little difference in the amounts invested in agriculture, business or industry by rural households with or without remittance incomes. In the urban areas, slightly larger amounts were invested in business by non-remittance than by remittance-receiving households but the difference was not statistically significant. No households in the urban samples made investments in industry or agriculture.

---

\*\*This lengthy passage contains a large number of detailed tables. Unfortunately, the data are presented in such a way that one cannot determine the proportion of total expenditure represented by any one sub-category of expenditure.

- (f) in rural areas, a smaller number of remittance-receiving than control households expressed an interest in making a productive investment (setting up a small manufacturing enterprise, purchasing a tube well or transport equipment) and this pattern remained when, hypothetically, government assistance in financing the venture was offered. In urban areas there was little differentiation between migrant and non-migrant households but the proportions interested in making such investments were smaller (Table 37, p. 89).<sup>11</sup>

The author explains his findings by conjecturing that, prior to migration, a majority of migrant families had been much poorer than the control families whose behavior and lifestyles they were attempting to emulate. In support of this hypothesis, Islam observes that although the consumption patterns of remittance-receiving households had changed markedly for the better, they followed the form and levels by traditionally richer families and did not attempt to go beyond this (p. 54). The same pattern of evaluation against the standards by relatively rich non-migrant families appears in the level of expenditures on housing. Although migrant families spend a great deal of their new wealth on bringing their homes up to the standard of those of richer families, they did not try to surpass them (p. 36). The author proffers two reasons for the great importance apparently attached to housing. First,

---

|                   | <sup>11</sup> Interest Expressed | Conditional Interest Expressed |
|-------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Rural Migrant     | 37.2                             | 43.8                           |
| Rural Non-Migrant | 49.2                             | 59.2                           |
| Urban Migrant     | 10.5                             | 14.5                           |
| Urban Non-Migrant | 10.5                             | 15.8                           |

especially in rural areas, housing is viewed as the best and safest form of security. Secondly, in urban centers like Dacca and Chittagong, houses built for rent bring exceptionally good returns. Overall, however, the author concludes that migration has done little as yet to generate productivity. Moreover, since migration selects predominantly from the better educated middle- and upper-income families, Islam believes that the additional remittance incomes serve to increase income inequality in the population as a whole (p. 92).

Finally, a survey carried out in Jordan during the summer of 1980 contained a small section on the use of remittances. The study investigated expenditures in a purposive sample of 1800 households, including households containing current migrants, returned migrants, and no migrants. Households were drawn from high, middle, and low income urban areas, as well as from rural areas and refugee camps in Amman Governorate (Saket, 1981, p. 6). The investigators found that expenditures by current migrant households were significantly larger than those made by families with returned migrants and those without migrants. By far the largest sums were spent on daily needs including, importantly, children's education. Spending on housing was also significant for current migrant households. The survey suggested that the proportion of migrants' remittances devoted to investment was larger than it was prior to 1975; however, investment in agricultural and industrial

undertakings fell far short of the level desired by government. The author of the report warned that, despite the survey, information on remittance use is "fragmentary" (p. 25). In part this is because the number of questions asked was small; in part it was because many of the respondents were concerned with the daily tasks of household maintenance and did not know anything about investments. Additionally, some respondents were reluctant to confide in the interviewers.

#### Reasons for Lack of Productive Investment

Given the very low standards of living and small cash incomes enjoyed by a majority of international migrants prior to their departure, it is not surprising that a large part of the sums remitted to their families is absorbed by expenditures on daily consumption needs. What does require explanation is the overwhelming propensity of migrants and their families to invest their savings in non-productive endeavors--land that lies untilled, lavish houses and furnishing, jewelry, gifts and, above all, small service enterprises--often in remote rural areas that offer no possibility of future employment or development. Two different "theories" have been advanced to explain this pattern of investment. The more dominant of these cites the motivations and aspirations of migrants as obstacles to productive investment. The other reasons in terms of the lack of investment opportunities in a majority of sending

countries. On the basis of our examination of the literature we are inclined to see the two not as in competition with each other, but as mutually reinforcing. We will discuss both theories in turn.

### Aspirations, Expectations and the Ideology of Return

One of the most frequently recurring themes in the literature on development effects of international labor migration centers on what Tapinos (1974, p. 186) has called "the enormous gap between the needs of industrial development in sending countries and the aspirations of the migrant." There is a growing consensus that it is the norms and values of the, mainly rural, home community that provides the frame of reference for migrant behavior, rather than a desire to participate in the creation of a modern industrial society. Although there is an important economic incentive for international labor migration, it is probably true to state that in a majority of cases, the anticipated economic gains are viewed as instrumental to the attainment of social goals defined as desirable by the home community (Piore, pp. 54). Students of international migration in many regions of the world would agree with Michael Kenny's remark, made in the context of Spanish migration to Western Europe, that "the most powerful motive still for emigration is the desire to make good, return, and reap the praise of one's family and community" (1972, p. 126).

There is evidence that much of the behavior of labor migrants is shaped by this "ideology of return." In the host country, the dream of return enables the migrant to endure the harsh conditions in which he finds himself.

"Take away a man's dream," said a West Indian migrant in Great Britain, and what have you got left? Nothing. As long as he is convinced that he is going to go back home, he will walk until his ankles are swollen to find a job. . . . He is tired like hell, but he is going to work all the same (Hinds, 1966, p. 189).

It is the expectation that he will return, even though it may be years before he does so, that accounts for the importance attached by the migrant to fulfilling his social obligations in the village: contributing generously to religious, ceremonial and social projects; spending lavishly on gifts for family and village notables; making frequent return visits; and in other ways maintaining close ties with the home community.

Because the expectations and aspirations of the migrant worker are so intimately bound to the home community, his behavior, both while abroad and after his return, is primarily oriented to the improvement of his social status in the village (see, e.g., Tapinos, p. 186; Shankman, p. 50; Philpott, pp. 111-112; Rhoades, p. 64; Watson, pp. 164-165; Swanson, p. 71; Connell et al., pp. 103-104; Piore, p. 117; Dahya, pp. 245-47). As numerous students of international labor migration have noted, the most unequivocal evidence of social mobility that a migrant can demonstrate can be summed up in the word "independence." It is inconceivable to the

peasant migrant that he should return after years of work abroad, to a job in agriculture--except as an independent farmer--or to an urban position that is salaried or wage-earning. In the eyes of the returning emigrant, therefore, the most important investment he can make, after providing for his security in old age, is the purchase of a taxi, a bar, or some other small local business. Failing this, his preference is to sit back and live off his savings. When these are exhausted, he will reemigrate rather than seek paid work at home. For only in a foreign country where he is unknown, is it possible for him to submit to the indignity of salaried employment. (See Piore, pp. 52-59 as well as the sources cited above.)

#### Lack of Investment Opportunities

The second explanation for the investment behavior of labor migrants focuses on the dearth of investment opportunities in developing countries. Notwithstanding the almost universal pattern of non-productive investment that has been described above, there is scattered evidence that many returning migrants are willing to invest in more productive endeavors if they perceive an opportunity to do so. Dahya (1973, pp. 254-257), speaks of investments in tube wells and irrigation pumps, in shops and flour mills made by the heads of extended families in Mirpur, Pakistan, with monies remitted over time by family members in Great Britain. Diaz-Canedo describes a flourishing textile

industry that developed in the Jalisco region of Mexico entirely on the basis of migrants' savings (see Piore, pp. 123-25).

In the Yemen Arab Republic, Swanson found that in one of the three villages he studied, the acreage under cultivation had been extended, and productivity increased from one to two crops a year, through the investment of remittance monies in irrigation pumps. In the other two villages, however, there existed physical and institutional constraints on comparable investments, and most of migrants' savings were spent on consumption (Swanson, pp. 73-74). The Cornell University research project on the Yemen Arab Republic found that emigration rates are low in areas where there are alternative sources of income. For the most part, these are the areas devoted to the growing of gat--a mild stimulant much enjoyed in the Arabian Peninsula and neighboring regions. The researchers note that when informants were asked about investment of remittances, investments in gat and marriage were most commonly mentioned. Nevertheless, the authors agree that Swanson that investment opportunities are very limited and they question the long-term benefit of international migration (Cornell University, 1980, p. 182).

In Yugoslavia, Baučić observed that migrants' savings have been put to good use to increase the productivity of small holdings in certain regions near to tourist centers (p. 32; see also Bennett, 1979). But he goes on to say

that, in general, the 10 hectare limit placed on the size of privately owned land holdings as part of the post-war program of agricultural reform militates against investment in agricultural technology. Similarly, in Baučić's view, the fact that socialist policy systematically discriminates against private enterprise leaves the migrant with only two options: salaried employment in a state run enterprise or reemigration.<sup>12</sup> According to Baučić, whose analysis is supported by that of Besemeres written some years later (1980, pp. 175-187), a large number of Yugoslavs have chosen the second alternative.

There is some evidence, therefore, that where migrant workers perceive an opportunity to do so they are willing to invest their savings in ways that are conducive to development. For the most part, however, these investments are limited to agricultural and other rural endeavors. This should not be surprising given the average migrant's knowledge, experience, and frame of reference. What needs to be explained is the lack of productive investment in business and industry by migrants returning to urban areas. One possible explanation might be related to the distinction made by Hirschman (1958) between investment in developed and developing countries. Hirschman argued that, while one of the major difficulties confronting developed societies is

---

<sup>12</sup>Baučić specifically cites a successful, national-level trucking industry started by returned migrants which was banned by the government when it threatened to take business away from the government-owned, much less efficient, trucking concern (p. 35).

how to accumulate the necessary supply of savings for investment, the problem in developing societies is not the supply of savings--which Hirschman believed to be available in excess of the capacity of the modern sector to absorb them--but the size of the modern sector itself. In his words,

The ability to invest is acquired and increased primarily by practice; and the amount of practice depends in fact on the size of the modern sector of the economy. In other words, an economy secretes abilities, skills, and attitudes needed for further development roughly in proportion to the size of the sector where these abilities are already acquired and where these attitudes are being inculcated. . . . Intangible factors such as the ability to promote new enterprises and to enlist cooperation for this purpose, the ability to perceive new opportunities and to act on them may, in a first approximation, be supposed to be similarly related to their actual breeding ground (Hirschman, 1958, p. 36).

Assuming that Hirschman's "theory" has some validity for explaining the lack of modern-sector investment by migrant workers, it is reasonable to argue that migrants' experiences in developed societies might furnish them with some of the "modern" skills needed to perceive investment opportunities and take advantage of them. Equally or more important, it underscores the need for sending country governments to develop institutions for such purposes as mobilizing migrants' savings, providing consultancy services to migrants wishing to make investments, and assisting migrants to develop a "savings psychology" during the time they are receiving high wages. (For a list of suggestions along these lines see Chandravarkar, p. 39).

### Summary

In summary, the evidence on the value of remittances for sending countries is mixed. There is no doubt that the sums involved are significant and may have been sufficient, in some cases, to offset balance of payment problems arising out of the increase in oil prices. On the other hand, some analysts have suggested that the number of countries in which they are likely to have exerted a marked effect on development is small.

It is also clear that remittance incomes have raised the standard of living for innumerable migrant families all over the Third World. Concurrently, however, income inequality between remittance-receiving and non-remittance-receiving households has been increased. In particular, the rise in prices that has followed increases in demand for consumer goods by remittance-receiving households has placed families without such additions to income at a greater disadvantage than before.

The most controversial aspect of migrants' savings and remittances concerns the extent to which they are invested in "productive"--employment generating--activities. While the evidence shows that almost all the sums saved by migrants are expended on daily consumption needs and non-productive ventures, some sophisticated analysts believe the small sums invested productively can be extremely helpful to

governments. To the extent that migrants' savings are lost to the development process it is worth pondering Georges Tapinos' comment that

Not enough stress has been laid on the paradoxical character of the desire to assign to the migrant the burden of accumulating capital, especially since uncertainty as to the economic development of his country may cause him to doubt his chances of seeing his standard of living improve tomorrow as a result of his investments today (Tapinos, 1979, p. 9).

More serious, perhaps, is the well-documented effect of remittances on productivity in rural areas. By enabling migrants and their families to raise their standard of living despite labor shortages, and lowered productivity, many analysts believe that remittance incomes have inhibited the introduction of technological changes that might have improved agricultural output. These analysts thus see international migration as a conservative force that tends to preserve the status quo.

Finally, there is evidence that if the opportunity presents itself, many immigrant households are willing to invest part of their earning in "productive" ventures. In the absence of opportunity to invest, emigrants seek to provide for their old age by building secure and comfortable homes and purchasing small parcels of land on which they can subsist if need arises. It appears, therefore, that efforts by governments to create safe opportunities for migrants to invest their savings might effect a marked change in the pattern of remittance use.

Chapter 5ACQUISITION OF SKILLS AND RETURN MIGRATION

Throughout this report we have repeatedly lamented the lack of reliable empirical data on specific issues critical to an understanding of the developmental effects of international labor migration. Nowhere is this lack more keenly felt than in the area of return migration and the reintegration of former migrant into the home society and economy. Even Bovenkerk, whose comprehensive review of the literature published in 1974 mentions that he found more materials available than he expected, notes the paucity of research on the impact of returning migrants on the home community (Bovenkerk, p. 31).

For the most part, the few empirically based studies of return migration that do exist refer to migration from European countries, either the intra-European migration of the 1950s and 1960s, or migration to more distant countries like the United States and Australia. Apart from these, some studies refer to agricultural innovations introduced by returning migrants, internal as well as international, in Africa, South-East Asia and the Pacific. These studies are of interest as they demonstrate how innovative ideas are diffused; however, they seem to have marginal relevance to the industrially-oriented labor migrations of today. Many of them, moreover, were undertaken during the colonial

period, when political conditions and the levels of development were vastly different from those that obtain today. We have not yet located a single study that deals with the return of workers from the recent migration boom in the Middle East. Since these flows only got under way in the mid-1970s, it is probably too early to expect such studies.

Conventional wisdom in recent years has assumed that one of the main benefits conferred by contemporary, circular, labor migration would be the flow of new skills and attitudes relevant to industrial development brought back by returning migrants from advanced industrialized nations (eg. Miracle and Berry, 1970; Friedlander, 1965). It was also implicitly assumed that returning migrants would be eager to employ their skills in modern industrial enterprises, either as entrepreneurs, managers, skilled workers or tradesmen. We have already touched upon this issue and will return to it shortly. First, however, we will review what is known about the skills acquired by migrants during their stays abroad.

#### Acquisition of Skills

During the past 10-15 years, there have been several that have attempted to measure the acquisition of skills by migrant workers during their sojourns abroad. Based on a survey of Turkish migrants, Miller and Cetin found a marked

141A

Table 5.1

## Acquisition of Skills by Turkish Emigrants Abroad (percent)

| Skill Level            | Before |       |       | Abroad (Fourth Year) |       |       |
|------------------------|--------|-------|-------|----------------------|-------|-------|
|                        | Total  | Urban | Rural | Total                | Urban | Rural |
| Unskilled              | 50.7   | 32.4  | 75.3  | 30.1                 | 13.2  | 51.9  |
| Semi Skilled           | 2.2    | 2.4   | 2.0   | 15.6                 | 5.9   | 17.0  |
| Skilled-General        | 6.9    | 9.6   | 3.3   | 30.0                 | 36.8  | 7.4   |
| Skilled-Master Workman | 23.6   | 29.0  | 16.3  | 17.8                 | 22.1  | 3.7   |
| Skilled Technician     | 4.7    | 7.7   | 0.7   | n.r.                 | n.r.  | n.r.  |

n.r. = not reported

Source: Miller, 1976, p. 166.

increase in the skills reported by workers after four years abroad, compared with the skills they claimed prior to departure (Miller, 1976, p. 166). As Table 5.1 shows, however, while there was an increase in the proportion claiming increased skills after four years abroad, the number claiming to be master workmen declined. A survey carried out by the Turkish Employment Services in 1971, also inquired about the acquisition of skills by Turkish migrant workers. Although the statistics show a net gain in skills (see Table 5.2), Suzanne Paine who cites them comments that the increase was disappointingly small. While 50 percent of the sample were unskilled prior to departure, 40 percent were still unskilled after their return. Moreover, Paine observes that many Turkish factories are wary of taking on ex-migrants as they allege that returnees commonly inflate their skill level (Paine, 1974, p. 133, n. 2).

A survey conducted by the Phillipines Institute of Labor Manpower Studies in Iran prior to the 1979 revolution (Phillippines, 1978, p. 10), showed that 58 percent of the 310 Filipino migrants interviewed said they had acquired new skills during their stay, and 59 percent claimed to have upgraded skills acquired earlier. Approximately 40 percent said they had learned to use new tools and equipment; 18 percent that they had learned new techniques and methods of production; and 12 percent that they had acquired

supervisory skills. At the same time, 40 percent reported that they had neither learned new skills nor perfected old ones.<sup>13</sup>

Finally, Stephen Adler (1977, p. 22) reports that during the late 1960s and early 1970s, Algeria deliberately made use of emigration to France as a means of upgrading the skills of its workforce. Men who had some education but lacked skills were encouraged to seek work in France while men who already had skills were discouraged from leaving. Adler notes that the policy was successful in reducing the proportion of skilled emigrants from about 15 percent of the total to about 2 percent. He also observes that Algerians are among the most upwardly mobile of foreign workers in Europe and that they are over-represented in government-run centres for professional training. He infers, therefore, that Algeria gained significantly in the potential to repatriate workers who were better trained and more highly skilled than when they left Algeria (Ibid.). However, Madeline Trebous, who studied migration and development in Algeria at about the same time, concluded that few Algerian migrants had learned skills relevant to Algeria's needs (Trebous, 1970).

There are obvious limits to the validity and usefulness of self-reported surveys of skill acquisition by workers overseas. The definition of "skill" is inevitably imprecise

---

<sup>13</sup>It is not clear how these various percentages overlapped.

143-A

Table 5.2

Percentage Distribution of Turkish Migrant Workers by Skill  
Level Before Departure and on Return, S.P.O. 5

| Category                        | Before Departure |       |       | On Return |       |       |
|---------------------------------|------------------|-------|-------|-----------|-------|-------|
|                                 | Total            | Urban | Rural | Total     | Urban | Rural |
| a Unskilled Workers             | 47               | 27    | 73    | 29        | 17    | 44    |
| b Semiskilled Workers           | 2                | 2     | 2     | 4         | 7     | 1     |
| c Skilled Workers               | 7                | 10    | 3     | x         | x     | x     |
| d Apprentices                   | 1                | 1     | 1     | 0         | 0     | 1     |
| e Qualified Workmen             | 4                | 7     | 0     | 2         | 3     | 0     |
| f Master Workmen                | 24               | 29    | 16    | 23        | 33    | 8     |
| g Chief Masters                 | 2                | 3     | 0     | 4         | 6     | 1     |
| h Technicians                   | 5                | 8     | 2     | 8         | 12    | 2     |
| i Officials                     | 5                | 8     | 2     | 8         | 12    | 2     |
| No Reply                        | 0                | 0     | 0     | 21        | 14    | 30    |
| Unemployed                      | 4                | 5     | 2     | 7         | 3     | 12    |
| Employment in<br>Private Sector | 89               | 85    | 95    | 69        | 81    | 54    |
| Employment in<br>Public Sector  | 11               | 15    | 5     | 3         | 3     | 3     |
| No Reply                        | 0                | 0     | 0     | 28        | 16    | 43    |

x = Category not included in questionnaire

Totals may not add to 100 because of rounding.

Source: Paine, p. 194, Table A19.

and subjective, and even the most sought after skills will be wasted to the sending country if the migrant elects to remain abroad, or takes up unrelated employment at home. The Philippines survey is a case in point. One respondent, a midwife, reported as a new skill her recently acquired knowledge of Iranian cooking (Phillipines, 1978, p. 10). Moreover, only 6 percent of the Philippines sample said that they planned to return home when their contracts expired. Of these, only one-third (seven individuals) reported having learned a new skill.

One condition that appears to be necessary for successful transfer of technology from the host to the home country is that the occupations of the migrant, during and after his stay abroad, should be closely related. Norwegian farmers who worked in agriculture in the United States were apparently very successful in introducing new agricultural techniques after their return to Norway, and were among the first in their districts to mechanize (Semmingen, 1961). Similarly, rural migrants from the Eastern Highlands of New Guinea to coffee plantations on the plains, successfully introduced coffee growing to their home villages, creating in the process the only source of cash income in the village (Mayano, 1973). At the other end of the technological scale, the Economist weekly has suggested that the "economic miracle" of South Korea under President Park was made possible by the return of hundreds of highly trained engineers, managers, accountants, and lawyers from the

United States where they had gained years of experience in their professions while awaiting a suitable opportunity to return (Economist, March 3, 1979, p. 4). If there is any truth in this claim, it illustrates the point made by Böhning (1975a, p. 25) who suggested that the existence of a favorable political climate--one oriented to industrial development--is essential to effective utilization of returning migrants.

By far the more common finding is that a majority of labor migrants fail to acquire the skills needed at home. Although many of them are drawn from the ranks of the better educated, more skilled and experienced at home, abroad they most commonly find themselves in what Böhning has called "socially undesirable jobs:" that is, the heavy, dirty, low status, unskilled and poorly paid jobs that indigenous workers will not take and in which migrants learn few transferable skills (see, for example, Böhning, 1975b; Castles and Kosack, 1973; Piore, pp. 16-19; North and Houston, 1976, pp. 152-53). In particular, for a variety of reasons, including language deficiencies, migrant workers seldom progress to supervisory positions; yet supervisory and other middle-level skills are among those most in demand for industrialization in sending countries. In Europe and the United States, many migrant workers do not even get exposure to the discipline of working in large-scale industrial plants. As Piore (p. 121) has observed, a large number of them spend their working lives while abroad in

small-scale enterprises, as waiters and dishwashers in restaurants, domestic servants, and in service occupations in general. Thus, in Piore's view, most returning emigrants are better equipped to function in the informal sector than in large-scale industrial concerns.\*

In the agricultural sector, it has been reported that returning Mexican emigrants are unable to utilize the agricultural skills they acquired in the U.S. Cornelius explains this observation by the mismatch between the skills utilized in the "large-scale, irrigated production of vegetables and fruits" in the U.S. and those required for the "rain-fed agriculture and common cereal crops" that predominate in the home community (Cornelius, 1979, p. 182). Finally, there is also evidence that return migration is no less selective than the original out-migration. But while out-migration selects the better educated and more experienced workers, return migration flows are composed disproportionately of the less skilled and less successful (Böhning, 1976, p. 267; Kayser, 1971, p. 131).

---

\*For discussions of the role that could be played by the informal sector in development see, International Labor Office, Employment, Incomes and Equality: A Strategy for Increasing Productive Employment in Kenya (Geneva: ILO, 1972), esp. pp. 133-144 and 503-508; and Idem, Small Enterprise Development: Policies and Programmes (Geneva: ILO, 1977).

## Return and Reintegration of Migrants

In Chapter 4, we presented a picture of migrant aspirations that appeared to explain, in part, the pattern of remittance use and, by extension, the occupations sought by migrant workers on their return home. To what extent does this image of migrants returning to their villages to seek independence and security accord with what is known about the reintegration of returning migrants? Unfortunately, we have been unable to locate enough empirical information to enable us to provide a definitive answer. The picture of migrant aspirations was built up from the accounts of students of migration in many parts of the world. By contrast, empirical information regarding the integration of returning migrants is almost exclusively based on European countries. Even in Europe, many of the data are impressionistic or based on very small surveys. Moreover, as we have already indicated, in urban areas returning migrants are difficult to locate as they seem to blend with the general population (Kayser, p. 150).

### A Typology of Return Migration

One of the more important studies of return migrants is that conducted by Francisco Cerase (1974), who secured in-depth interviews with 219 of an estimated 3,000 Italian emigrants who returned to Southern Italy from the United States between 1964 and 1968. On the basis of his interviews, Cerase derived a typology of return migration

that provides a useful framework for the present discussion. Four types of return were distinguished. First, what Cerase termed the "return of failure," comprised individuals who could not cope with life in urban, industrial America. If these men had held a job at all, it was unskilled. Most of this group returned within one or two years of their departure and, once returned, picked up the threads of their old lives as if nothing had intervened.

A second type of returnee, termed the "return of conservatism," included migrants who had been relatively successful in the United States but whose hopes and dreams had remained fixed on their ultimate return to the old country. Individuals in this group had usually spent 10-15 years abroad, interrupted by several visits home. At the time of their final return they were still in the prime of life. However, few of this type of labor migrant had acquired new skills, and those they had learned tended to be forgotten during extended visits home. As soon as these "conservatives" had accumulated sufficient savings to build a house and purchase a small piece of land, they returned permanently to take up the life of a peasant farmer. "Rich" they may have been by the standards of the home community, but they remained peasants in attitude and aspirations. After their return, most of this group went back to subsistence farming, possibly combined with a cash crop to provide a source of money income. Cerase says of this type of returnee, "the social order they seek is one without

tensions and frictions and where each one can live off his own property, a conception they have derived from an idealization of their rural world" (p. 156).

The third group was given a self-explanatory designation: the "return of retirement." This group had lived much of their adult lives in America but now found that their health was failing and that their social security pensions went further in Italy than in America. They seemed to be satisfied with their lives and, in Cerase's words, "ultimately, they are of little consequence in the society" (p. 258). Of the four types of return, only the last, termed by Cerase the "return of innovation," appears to have had any potential for stimulating development in Southern Italy. Cerase describes this type of returnee as one who,

expects that his new ideas will encounter the opposition of vested interests and traditional ways of thinking. But his new tendency to regard everything in terms of efficiency, within a network of social relationships ruled by limited and specific obligations, makes him envisage himself as the ultimate winner in the struggle. He considers himself an innovator. But facts prove him wrong and in the end he is bitterly disappointed (p. 258).

According to Cerase, two things account for the failure of the innovator once he has returned home. First, the lack of opportunities in the village; secondly, the traditional clientalism through which the "middle stratum, caught between the landowners and the peasants, has been able to survive by dividing the administrative posts available locally and controlling the granting of favors" (pp. 259). In short, returnees of this type--and Cerase notes that

there were "very few" among his sample--are thwarted in their attempts to innovate by obstructions up by petty authority. Before long they abandoned their efforts and settled down to live within the system (p. 260).

### Empirical Findings on Return Migration

The typology of return migration provided by Cerase has clear affinities with the description we built up in Chapter 4 of migrants' aspirations for their return. How closely do Cerase's types accord with other empirical data on return migration? How common are the four types of returnee in Italy and other countries? What happens to those who left from, and presumably return to, the towns and cities?

Very little information is available to answer these questions. Table 5.3 shows Cerase's breakdown of return occupations among migrants who had been employed in agricultural and non-agricultural occupations prior to their departure. It will be seen that a majority of returnees either went back to their earlier type of work, or were still unemployed at the time of the survey. However, no information is given about the duration of the respondents' stay abroad, or the length of time they had been back in Southern Italy.

Robert Rhoades (1978) studied Andalusian migrants who returned from West Germany, approximately between 1970 and 1976. On three occasions Rhoades also travelled home with a group of migrants and was thus able to roughly chart their

intended destinations. Rhodes (pp. 139-40) found that returnees from Andalusian villages tended to fall into three groups.

- a) Young, unmarried migrants, usually less than 30 years of age at the time of departure, who tended to join established internal migration streams. The more successful of this group headed for the cities where they planned to take jobs in "industry, construction, and the service sector." Those among them who might be considered "returnees of failure" joined the agriculturally-based seasonal migration streams and hoped to reemigrate later when Germany reopens her borders to guest workers. Only 17 percent of the sample fell into this category.
- b) Young married migrants, typically in their twenties at first emigration, also planned to return to "urban-industrial centers, provincial capitals, and especially coastal towns." These young married migrant couples--whether or not the wives had been abroad with their husbands--may perhaps be classified as potential innovators. However, there is little evidence that they intended to engage in "productive work." Rhoades reports that the favorite investment among this group was in pisos, apartments or condominiums which they hoped to rent to others. Thirty-two of 93 migrant families fell into this category.

Table 5.3

Returned Migrants According to Employment Status at Time of Departure From Italy and First Job Upon Return

| Employment Status at Time of Departure from Italy |                                   |                                |                      |                                       |                                |                      |   |                                |                      |                        |                                |                      |       |
|---|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------|---|--------------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------|-------|
|   | Employed or Self Employed in      |                                |                      |                                       |                                |                      | In School or Looking for First Occupation |                                |                      | Keeping House          |                                |                      | TOTAL |
|   | Agriculture First Job Upon Return |                                |                      | Non-Agriculture First Job Upon Return |                                |                      | First Job Upon Return                     |                                |                      | First Job Upon Return  |                                |                      |       |
|   | Agri-<br>cul-<br>tural            | Non-<br>agri-<br>cul-<br>tural | Not<br>Employ-<br>ed | Agri-<br>cul-<br>tural                | Non-<br>agri-<br>cul-<br>tural | Not<br>Employ-<br>ed | Agri-<br>cul-<br>tural                    | Non-<br>agri-<br>cul-<br>tural | Not<br>Employ-<br>ed | Agri-<br>cul-<br>tural | Non-<br>agri-<br>cul-<br>tural | Not<br>Employ-<br>ed |       |
| NO.   | 63                                | 15                             | 25                   | 6                                     | 21                             | 38                   | 3   | 6                              | 12                   | 3                      | 0                              | 27                   | 219   |
| %   | 28.8                              | 6.8                            | 11.4                 | 2.7                                   | 9.6                            | 17.4                 | 1.4                                       | 2.7                            | 5.5                  | 1.4                    | 9.9                            | 12.3                 | 100   |

Source: Cerase, p. 255.

151-A

c) Finally, the remainder of the sample, approximately 50 percent, married men who migrated in their thirties or later, planned overwhelmingly to return to the home village. From Rhoades' description of emigrant villages, it is obvious that Cerase would classify this group as "returnees of conservatism." Returnees in this group were engaged in building new houses and were furnishing them lavishly in the German style. Many had purchased pieces of land in the mountains, not for farming but rather as weekend retreats or small gardens. Some of the more enterprising, "innovators" perhaps, had opened small businesses, bars, grocery shops, or petrol stations. In Rhoades's opinion, however, it was only a matter of time before these ventures failed as the population of the village was already too small to support them and was still declining. In conclusion, Rhoades observed that, rather than increasing the skill level of the village, emigration tended to take skills out of the labor force. A number of skilled workers, welders, masons, and mechanics, who had worked at these trades prior to emigrating, no longer exercised any profession. They now live in retirement on their savings and investments.

A very similar picture of return migration emerges from the studies of regional labor markets reported by Bernard Kayser, to which we have already referred. Except for the Portuguese component, these studies employed a different

methodology from those of Cerase and Rhoades. Rather than surveying returning migrants, the researchers focused their inquiries on factories and industrial concerns in provincial cities in Italy, Spain, Greece and Turkey. Even from this different perspective, the findings support those of Rhoades and Cerase. Briefly, though many migrants were known to have returned to the regions studied, few had sought employment in industry. In Seville, the researchers located one man who had been employed by a plastics factory on the strength of references from Germany. Another hoped to get a job with the Renault plant as he had been employed by Renault in France (p. 112). In Greece, there had been few applications for skilled jobs in industry from migrants who had returned from Germany during the recession of 1967-68. The author noted that German sources said that few Greeks had been employed in skilled jobs in that country. It was generally thought that wages in Greece were too low to attract Greek workers from Germany where they earned 150-200 percent more than the going rate in Greece. Moreover, it was said that German employers were reluctant to part with skilled workers. The researchers judged that while some Greek returnees returned to their villages, a majority came back to the towns and cities and attempted to up in the informal sector as independent tradesmen, or in small shops or haulage businesses (pp. 130-31). In Italy and Portugal it was the same story. Returning migrants had few marketable skills and those who did not return to their

villages up in the towns as rentiers or independent craftsmen (pp. 102-103, 139). By contrast to these findings, Bennett reported a resurgence of market gardening and tourist-oriented activity among emigrants returning to the Dalmatian coast of Yugoslavia (Bennett, p. 80).

### Return to Turkey

We include a special section on return migration to Turkey, not because the findings are different but because there are somewhat more of them. Suzanne Paine reports that surveys carried out by the State Planning Organization (SPO) in 1971, the Turkish Employment Services in 1967, 1968 and 1969, and two independent surveys, Akre (1972) and Tuna (1967), all agreed on the migrants' dislike of wage-employment and preference for self-employment (Paine, p. 111). In the SPO study, only 17 percent of the 361 migrants surveyed wished to take up salaried or wage employment. In the TES studies, only 328 men and 46 women out of over 13,000 respondents wanted factory jobs. Moreover, when the TES contacted all the industrial firms in the country employing more than 20 workers, they were able to locate only 1,300 of the estimated 70,000 migrants who were thought to have returned from Germany during the recession of 1967-68 (Kayser, p. 126).

The jobs actually taken by returning migrants differed from their stated intentions, however. The SPO surveys found a small increase in wage employment, mainly because

some previously agricultural workers had returned to the city and taken paid work. In general, as Kayser's team also found, a majority had returned to very much the same work they had done before their departure to Germany. Perhaps the biggest concern in Turkey, however, was the high rate of unemployment among returnees--between 7-10 percent at the end of the 1960s--almost as high as the estimates of open unemployment for the nation as a whole (Paine, p. 111). Despite this concern, two students of Turkish migration policy conclude that "policies to make the most of returnees' assets and experience have not taken shape" (Lieberman and Gitmez, 1979, p. 204). Throughout the 1960s and 1970s the Turkish government had encouraged emigrants to place their money in joint industrial partnerships or in cooperatives of various sorts. According to Paine, however, Turkish migrants demonstrated their dislike of communal ventures by failing to support these concerns. Both schemes failed: the first, largely because members lacked managerial experience (Paine, pp. 114-116); the second, because of general ignorance and mistrust of such institutions (Ibid., pp. 116-117).

Finally, one researcher attempted to compare the earnings of emigrants before and after their return (Kölan, 1976). Using data from the SPO surveys on earnings over a 10-year period before, during and after migration, Kölan found that urban migrants: a) received a large increase in earnings while they were abroad, and b) received less on

their return than they would have done had they not left. Rural emigrants, on the other hand, received an even greater increase while they were away than did urban migrants, and received slightly more on return than they could have expected had they not gone abroad. Kölan advanced three alternative explanations for her results. First, since many migrants were turning to self-employment (50 percent of her sample) the low earnings might indicate that they were receiving negative returns to their capital investments. Secondly, she suggests that the positions might not exist in which migrants could productively use their acquired skills. Thirdly, she suggests that the gains from migration might be expended in the form of increased leisure. Suggesting that more research was needed on this subject, the author noted that better data might yield different results.

#### Return to Other Third World Countries

We have already noted that information about the return and reintegration of former migrants is virtually confined to the experiences of European sending countries. The few studies of return migration to developing countries we have located appear to have little direct relevance for contemporary, mass, circular labor migration. A number of anthropologists who have studied the growth of Sikh and Pakistani settlements in Great Britain have expressed doubts about the likelihood that many such post-WWII emigrants will return, despite the universal expression of a desire to do

so (Ballard and Ballard, 1977; Dahya, 1973; Kahn, 1977). Very similar doubts have been expressed by Watson concerning the Hong Kong Chinese in Britain. These authors tend to believe that the gradual development of genuine communities of South Asian ethnic groups in Britain, the fact that the children of first generation emigrants were often born in Britain and have received their education there, and a host of other links that have been forged with the receiving society, will prove to be sufficient to weaken the resolve to return permanently, at least until retirement.''

A recent volume on the anthropology of return migration contains two papers that deal with return to a Third World country, the Philippines (McArthur, 1979; Griffiths, 1979). Both papers deal with the return of migrants who left villages on the Ilocos coast of the island of Luzon to work on the sugar plantations in Hawaii during the 1930s and 1940s. Many of these emigrants moved to the United States mainland during or after World War II and have only recently returned to their homeland to live out their declining years on their U.S. social security and retirement benefits. Discussing the return of these former emigrants, McArthur specifically rejects the idea of classifying them as "successes" or "failures" as Cerase has done, arguing that the length of time spent abroad can explain their

---

' 'These studies were both concerned with migration to the United Kingdom. One would expect that long-term emigration to other industrialized countries, the U.S., Canada, Australia and New Zealand would have the same effect.

differential impacts on the home community (p. 90). Despite this disclaimer, McArthur's descriptions of the development impacts of return migration to Luzon bear striking resemblances to those described by Cerase.

Based on length of stay abroad, McArthur identifies three categories of returning migrants which he terms "Short Timers," "Old Hands," and "Pensionados." The latter group is clearly the Filipino equivalent of Cerase's "return of retirement." Most of this category are men who remained in the United States for 30-40 years and qualified for U.S. pensions that make them rich men in the Philippines. Once home, however, they have little impact on community life or development. Too old to farm and lacking the social connections that would allow them to assume leadership positions, they desire simply to live out their lives in the comfortable homes they have built and in the care of young brides for whom they have paid handsome dowries (pp. 93-95).

"Short-timers," in McArthur's terminology, are men who remained abroad for only a few years, 6-10 at most, and returned prior to or soon after World War II. McArthur argues that the time spent abroad by men of this category was too short to enable them to absorb new ideas or values. Having accumulated some savings they returned to the barrios and invested in small plots of land. Thereafter, they picked up the threads of the old life, offering little in the way of innovative behavior (pp. 90-91). In terms of

impact, this group, which comprises a majority of the men who left the district for Hawaii in the 1930s and 1940s, are clearly similar to those Southern Italians classified by Cerase as "conservatives."

The third and final category, the "Old Hands," comprises men who remained abroad for some 20-30 years but returned to Luzon while still in their active years. McArthur argues that this group had more time abroad to absorb new values and attitudes than did the Short Timers. Some had advanced to supervisory positions on the plantations and others had found better paying positions outside of agriculture. Both McArthur and Griffiths remark on the entrepreneurial capacity of this group of returnees. On their return, most of them had bought land and farmed it in earnest. They were among the first to adopt the new varieties of rice that have since become established in the area (McArthur, pp. 92-93). In Griffiths' opinion (pp. 136-138), the way in which they responded to the rising demand for onions and garlic for the Manila market was largely responsible for raising the level of agricultural productivity in the area. In contrast to Cerase's potentially innovating group of returnees to Southern Italy, the Filipino innovators were able to use their savings to free themselves from the shackles of clientalism, largely because, in Griffiths' opinion, traditional landowners were seeking to sell their lands to finance their entry into the professions and politics (Griffiths, p. 131).

Notwithstanding the apparent similarities between the Philippines and Southern Europe in the processes of return and reintegration, it would be unwise to generalize from the experiences of these communities to other international migration streams today. International migration from South and South-East Asia to the Middle East, for example, takes place under very different conditions from the earlier migrations from the Philippines, to the United States, or indeed, from contemporary intra-European migration. Receiving countries in the Persian Gulf, in particular, are making serious attempts to prevent the absorption of foreign workers into the host societies. To an increasing extent, immigrant workers are housed in barracks near the work site and at some distance from the population centers of the host society. Few, if any, of the oil rich countries of this region are willing to grant citizenship status to foreigners, no matter how long they have been in residence in the country. In addition, a large majority of labor immigrants are unskilled laborers in the construction or allied industries. It is unlikely, therefore, that many will acquire the skills that might contribute to the development of their own countries.

Summary: Long-term Effects of International Migration

The materials we have gathered on economic effects of international migration on sending countries leave no doubt that in the short run a number of distinct benefits accrue both to individual migrants and their families and to the

sending societies themselves. Remittances have raised the living standards of thousands of migrant families and greatly eased balance of payments problems of developing country governments. During the past decade of high and rising energy prices, it is no exaggeration to say that remittances have enabled many countries to keep their heads above water. Additionally, in countries of rapid population growth, international migration from rural areas appears to have been helpful in reducing the level of open and disguised unemployment. In the modern sector, international migration does not as yet appear to have resulted in generalized labor shortages. Spot shortages of skilled labor have appeared but, contrary to some reports, do not seem to have been serious enough to have reduced the level of productivity. The loss of skilled labor does, however, entail additional costs to industry from the creation of bottlenecks, the additional cost of training replacement workers, and the removal of the more experienced workers. In general, however, there seems to be a paucity of detailed studies of the urban labor market effects of international migration.

While costs such as these may be a low price to pay for the undoubted benefit of increased foreign exchange reserves and higher living standards, there are unmistakable signs that in the longer term international migration may impose unacceptable costs on sending countries. As a number of students have pointed out, international migration generates

its own dynamics which, if not controlled, enable out-migration to continue long past the point at which it is no longer beneficial or even tolerable to the sending country." At the same time, it is difficult for sending country governments to control the flow. Governments in the countries of origin are understandably reluctant to impose direct controls on the freedom of movement of their citizens, which is recognized by the United Nations as a basic human right. Yet incentive measures likely to be successful in preventing the departure of necessary workers are difficult to devise. Wage increases that a sending country can afford, for example, are likely to be small relative to the increase that can be attained by working abroad.

One of the most serious problems arising from international migration is that produced by the almost universal lack of interest displayed by migrants in investing their savings in ways that would assist the

---

\*Many authors have noted that out-migration from a community increases as the flow of information back to that community from early migrants grows (see, e.g., Lee, 1966, pp. 54-55; Piore, pp. 128-129). From the perspective of the receiving country, Böhning (1974, pp. 61-67) has described what he calls the "sociology of self-feeding migration." In essence, Böhning suggests that as the number of immigrants in a receiving country reaches a significant level they generate a demand for consumer items that can only be satisfied by industrial expansion. This in turn generates a demand for further immigration. The process is accelerated when immigrants are joined by their wives and families and settle down for a prolonged stay in the host society. Finally, one might speculate that if most migration is indeed "linked," the concept of migrants as target workers may need to be expanded to include the notion of families with a never-ending series of targets.

development process in their own countries. Writer after writer has commented on the false air of prosperity that surrounds emigrant villages as returning migrants embark on elaborate projects of house construction, import quantities of modern consumer durables, and settle down to live off their savings and subsistence farming. Judging by the empirical studies we have found, the reality underlying the construction boom is that international migration exerts a cumulative effect on sending communities, in which a decline in productive activity leads to a decrease in the number of job openings for young people. The lack of employment, in turn, encourages further emigration. As numerous observers of migrant communities have noted, international migration has failed to create conditions that would foster positive social and economic change. By raising incomes without inducing changes in the values, attitudes and aspirations of migrants and their families and neighbors, international migration has served rather to preserve the status quo. Many close observers believe that once a community has come to depend on remittance incomes for its livelihood, it is condemned to depend on continued emigration for its existence.

Finally, a number of writers have drawn attention to the role of international migration in increasing economic inequality. Because migration selects predominantly from those in middle-income groups, the benefits reaped by migrant families serve to widen the gap between them and the

poorer families who cannot afford to emigrate. Inflation of land prices makes it increasingly unlikely that the latter will ever be able to buy land and raise themselves to a position of economic independence. Increases in the price of food and other necessities consequent on the increased demand generated by families receiving remittances cause disproportionate hardships for those who have no such incomes.

In the last analysis, however, few students of international migration are prepared to argue on the basis of these empirical findings that international migration should be prevented. On the contrary, they see that international migration, if contained within reasonable limits, can bring undoubted benefits both to the sending countries as societies and to individuals and families. However, they argue that ways must be found to ensure a more productive use of migrants' savings so that the benefits can be more equably distributed.

Chapter 6  
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF  
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

Throughout this report we have been confronted by a paucity of empirical research on the consequences of international migration for sending countries. The problem is even more acute when we turn to an examination of social and political effects. In the course of our research we have been unable to locate a single study that deals specifically and in depth with political consequences of international migration in sending countries; our discussion is therefore based mainly on inferences drawn from discussions of social and economic changes that appear to have relevance for political life in the community. The stage, as it were, for the analysis of the effects somewhat biased in that researchers have tended to focus on small societies or communities which have suffered depopulation and societal decline as a consequence of out-migration.

In presenting our findings in this chapter, our discussion will focus first on social consequences at the level of the community; secondly, on the effects of emigration on relationships within the family; thirdly, on the roles and status of women; and, finally, on political effects. Before embarking on a discussion of the empirical

literature, however, it will be helpful to outline a conceptual approach to the analysis of social and political effects on sending communities.

### International Migration and Social Mobilization

Conceptually, the social and political effects of international migration may be approached by considering the range of social structural changes likely to be in motion by the movement of population. Inevitably, the departure of an individual leaves gaps in the society and the polity, just as it deprives the sending country of the migrant's economic contribution. The movement of large numbers of people, therefore, produces changes in the social structure that under appropriate conditions may lead to development and progress; alternatively, under less than ideal conditions, international migration may result in social and political breakdown and even political conflict. The rate and direction of these changes cannot be determined a priori. They will depend in large measure on the capacity of government and society to channel their responses to out-migration in productive ways and to satisfy the aspirations of emigrants and their families.

More than many other types of change, international migration may be expected to instigate and foster the process of "social mobilization," a seminal concept advanced by Karl Deutsch to illuminate the development process (Deutsch, 1961). According to Deutsch, social mobilization

refers to "the process in which major clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior" (p. 494). The process is in motion when large numbers of people experience simultaneously a variety of specific changes in residence, occupation, social roles, social relationships, institutions, experiences and expectations. As described by Deutsch, social mobilization breaks down traditional thought patterns and social norms and prepares people for the new roles they must play if modernization and development are to proceed. At the same time, however, social mobilization draws new groups into the politically relevant strata of society--those social groups and classes whose opinions and demands have to be taken into account by governments--and increases the potential for political participation. If governments are unable or unwilling to respond to the demands made by newly mobilized groups, or fail to provide avenues for legitimate political participation, growing political discontent may erupt into political disorder (pp. 497-500).<sup>17</sup>

Based on the foregoing remarks, we have formulated a set of propositions which illustrate the types of social and political change that may take place in sending countries as a consequence of international migration. Very few of these

---

<sup>17</sup>The potential for political disorder, mentioned by Deutsch as a possibility, has been elaborated by Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 1968.

potential changes are directly addressed in the literature. They are mentioned here to underscore the deeper, non-economic implications of mass labor migration for Third World sending countries and to draw attention to significant gaps in the existing research.

- a) International migration facilitates social and occupational mobility among both those who leave and those who remain. The process of social mobilization may be accelerated thereby, and the potential for modernization and political disorder may both be increased.
- b) The departure of large numbers of unemployed or underemployed individuals from rural areas may act as a "safety-valve," lessening the pressure for social and political change. This may promote political stability in the short term while delaying the emergence of a political system capable of responding to demands for change.
- c) The departure of highly educated but underemployed professionals removes a potentially disaffected group of political "influentials" and may contribute to political stability.
- d) Observing the economic benefits that accrue to emigrants, the economic aspirations of non-migrants will rise. If these new expectations are not satisfied there may be a tendency to blame the government and political leaders.

- e) The tendency of emigrant families to invest their savings in land causes inflation in land prices and may price landless laborers out of the market. This process may perpetuate, if not intensify, social class barriers to socio-economic mobility.
- f) The departure of young adult males from rural areas accelerates the breakdown of traditional agricultural practices and the social relations inherent in them. This may provide opportunities for social and occupational advance among women. It may also deprive the elderly of their sources of social and economic support leading to increased demands for public provision of social programs for the elderly.

#### Community Level Social Effects

The literature on social effects of international migration at the level of the community tends to deal with two broad topics. First, there are discussions of social-structural effects such as class relations, social mobility, and changes in age and sex ratios. Secondly, a number of articles deal with changes in social and community life within emigrant communities. We will deal with each of these in turn.

#### Stratification and Social Mobility

Findings on class structure and social mobility as a consequence of international migration are mixed, varying widely from one society to another. Both Form and Rivera

(1958) and Feindt and Browning (1972) found that as a consequence of labor migration to the United States, social stratification in Mexico had become less rigid in the rural and urban communities they studied. Form and Rivera attributed this loosening of the class system to a widening of the rural middle class. By contrast, Alvirez (1970, pp. 111-116) found no occupational mobility among emigrants returning to Monterrey.

A recent study in another Mexican community indicates increasing stratification among emigrants themselves. Mines and de Janvry (pp. 13-15, 17-18), find that emigrants from Las Animas to the United States can be divided, quite early in their careers, into a "fortunate" and an "unfortunate" group. Men in the fortunate group attain legal status in the United States and are thereby able to find permanent, semi-skilled, well-paying jobs. Their savings allow them to become landowners in Mexico and, significantly, they are usually able to acquire legal status in the United States for their children. Men in the unfortunate group are unable to regularize their status and are condemned to a life of shuttling back and forth across the border, searching for unskilled, ill-paid jobs in the United States whenever they have a need for cash. Members of this group are unable to save enough to buy land and usually fail to achieve legal status for their sons.

In other countries, researchers have usually found that migration has served to accentuate class distinctions. The authors of the Commerce Research Bureau's study of Indian migration, write that "one of the disquieting features of emigration and inward remittances is the glaring inequalities and social polarization that it has engendered" (p. 980). They note that the "sophisticated gadgets" used by remittance-receiving families and the contributions migrant families are able to make to social and religious institutions, as well as the very high bride price they can command for their daughters or advance for their sons, has "graduated them to an upper social and economic class" (Ibid.).

In Montserrat, the tiny Caribbean island, Lowenthal and Comitas also found that emigration magnified class differences by depleting the colored middle class. They observe that "the dominant Labor Party, unable to recruit leaders of talent or education, can today hardly communicate at all with the employers, the small, white upper class" (Lowenthal and Comitas, p. 208). In Europe, however, Livi-Bacci and Hagmann (1971) found that 72 percent of the 80,000 returning migrants in their Italian sample were doing almost exactly the same sort of work on their return as before departure. In their opinion, this finding confirms the general opinion that the recent intra-European migration has done little to change traditional structures.

Among the studies we have found, there is little to explain the lack of upward mobility among European migrants. One possible hypothesis which receives some support in the literature is that social change takes place more slowly than economic change and may not become visible until the second generation. Lopreato (1967), who examined return migration to southern Italy from the United States, found that while a majority of returnees were "pitiful failures" who were unable to assimilate the changes that had taken place in the country during their absence, they nevertheless invested their savings in education for their children. As a result, the second generation was enabled to gain secure positions in the new middle class. Cornelius (1979, pp. 182-183) and Dinerman (1978) both suggest that most upward social mobility arising from international from Mexico takes place in the second generation as a result of investment in children's education. Dahya's study of Pakistani migrants in Great Britain showed that families to which migrants returned were able to rise considerably in social status. Through their larger income and enhanced prestige they were able to marry their daughters hypergamously with members of the urban professional and commercial classes. Dahya (pp. 269-71) notes that even members of low status service castes are no longer forced to marry within their caste groups.

A second hypothesis is that, like other aspects of international migration, social structural effects are conditioned in part by the characteristics of the existing structure prior to migration. We do not have the necessary data to test this hypothesis but it is reasonable to assume that the increased rigidity of class divisions in the Caribbean may be related to the physical basis for stratification in Caribbean societies and the positive evaluation of light skin color. Philpott (pp. 46-62) notes that in Montserrat, as in other Caribbean societies, social classes are distinguished by color. The miniscule upper class is white--or passes for white, the middle class, which comprises about 10 percent of the population, is colored while the remaining 90 percent is lower class and black. Throughout the first half of the present century, international migration drew heavily on the middle class (Lowenthal and Comitas, p. 207). Late in the 1950s, the government increased the number of secondary school places for lower class children and some of these graduates were able to take middle class positions, mainly in the civil service. However, the number of jobs in the civil service is small and upwardly mobile blacks use them as jump off positions for emigration. Thus the buffer between white upper class and black lower class has been eroded. Concurrently with this polarization of Montserratian society, Philpott (pp. 108-10) reports that Black migrants returning to Monserrat are accorded a type of higher status

by their lower class peers. This additional status is based in part on the simple fact of their having had a socially valued experience; to a greater extent, however, it is founded on the assumption that the returning migrants have amassed great wealth. Peer esteem is withdrawn if the returnee fails to live up to community expectations of generosity and lavish hospitality, and reprisals are likely to be taken against him.

Finally, an even more complex picture of social mobility and its consequences for the sending country emerges from the more detailed studies of Turkish migration to the Federal Republic of Germany. These studies have shown that, while industrialization within Turkey has resulted in considerable upward social mobility--defined as a shift from agricultural to industrial occupations--among both migrants and non-migrants, migration to Germany has been accompanied by a substantial amount of downward social mobility (Abadan-Unat, 1974, pp. 389-397; see also Abadan-Unat, 1981, pp. 16-17). As evidence of downward mobility Abadan-Unat cites the "complete disappearance among migrants of occupations involving responsibility and . . . authority over others, such as managerial and executive work, sales personnel and diverse agrarian occupations," which accounted for 21 percent of premigration occupations (Abadan-Unat, p. 391). In 1974, for example, some 9,000 former primary school teachers were working in blue-collar jobs in the Federal Republic (Ibid., p. 389).

Abadan-Unat argues that downward social mobility is to a large extent a consequence of the migrants' belief that money alone will enable them to satisfy their aspirations. They are therefore reluctant to spend time and effort learning the language of the host country or taking vocational training courses that would increase their chances of promotion to a more skilled level. However, migrants who move down in the social scale are liable to experience stress as a consequence of "status inconsistency" (Lenski, 1953, 1956), viewing themselves as white collar workers but being despised by members of the host society. On the basis of "unrepresentative" but in-depth interviews, Abadan-Unat concludes that this experience leads migrants to develop a strongly negative evaluation of industrial work and pushes them towards jobs in the service sector when they return. If their savings are not sufficient to enable them to establish a small business, they are likely to become "poly-annual migrants," constantly returning abroad rather than settling down to a steady job in Turkey (pp. 395-397).

#### Changes in Sex Ratios

A second type of social-structural change that receives some attention in the literature is that caused by sexual imbalances in emigrant communities. Brody (1973) suggest that one of the most striking features of social structure in the west of Ireland is the disproportionate number of bachelors between the ages of 25 and 50. In this region,

young women emigrate in much larger numbers than young men. Brody observes (p. 39) that, presumably as a consequence of insufficient interaction with members of the female sex, men in Inishkillane, the fictional name given the community he studied, are nervous of women and become embarrassed at encounters with them. Even in the summer months, when women tourists fill the bars and pubs, native men keep their distance.

In the Caribbean, sexual imbalance has become institutionalized and societies have learned to adapt to chronic shortages of men. Hendricks (p. 95) reports that polygamous unions are a common fact of social life in the Dominican Republic. Dominicans have institutionalized what is known as Free Unions, socially recognized arrangements whereby a man may live with a woman in New York or elsewhere while maintaining a legal wife and nuclear family unit back in the village. Despite the number of extra-marital unions among emigrants, marriage rates are higher among migrant than non-migrant men of comparable age, presumably because emigration enables a man more easily to accumulate the funds needed to support a wife (Hendricks, pp. 95-96). Extra-residential mating involving single women is also sanctioned in some other Caribbean societies in which emigration is customary and socially obligatory. This is reported to be the favored pattern in Carriacou, the Cayman Islands and South Andros (Lowenthal, p. 219). By contrast, in Barbados,

family structure adjusts to sexual imbalance by idealizing the nuclear household and reasserting the migrant's obligation to the family (Ibid.).

### Changes in Social and Community Life

Most of the studies we have located dealing specifically with changes in social and community organization brought about by international migration have focused on societies in which out-migration has reached an advanced stage. The Caribbean Islands, Watson's small rural them in a development context (Piore, 1979, most of our material. We have been struck, however, by the seeming parallels between these accounts of social change and the more economically focused analyses of contemporary European sending communities we have already discussed. We had hoped to find some analysis of the part played by the late 19th and early 20th century transatlantic emigration in the socio-economic development of European sending countries, but our rather brief search proved fruitless. We understand that Italian scholars have recently turned to an examination of this question in their own country. So far, it appears that they have found little to suggest that emigration changed social or economic structures in ways conducive to development in the sending communities (Tomasi, 1979). With the exception of Kayser's study of labor markets in southern European provincial areas (Kayser, 1971), we have found no empirical research that attempts to

link the localized effects of international migration with development processes in urban centers. To our knowledge, the gap between community decline and national development has been bridged only by the formulations of macro-economic theorists.

The empirical discussions we have located that treat the social consequences of international migration for sending communities provide a sorry tale of unrelenting societal disintegration. It is clear that in these communities emigration has gone far beyond the removal of the "hard-core" surplus. According to Brody (p. 87), for example, almost every person in the west of Ireland community he studied is "socially isolated and every unmarried person could be said to be sexually isolated." More than one-third of Inishkillane households are made up of people who have no close kin in the neighborhood other than an older brother or sister with whom they share the family farm. The age-structure has become greatly unbalanced, the middle-aged and elderly predominating, and there is a total absence of children of less than school age. Because women emigrate in greater numbers and at younger ages than men, sexual gratification, within or outside of marriage, is transferred to distant cities, inside or outside of Ireland, and there is little reason to expect that the age-sex structure of rural Ireland will improve (pp. 87-108). Brody says that there has been an increase in the incidence of mental illness associated with

isolation (p. 100). The deleterious effect of migration-induced isolation is also reported by Watson for San Tin (Hong Kong) where there has been an increase in suicides and where a significant proportion of the population report taking sleeping pills (pp. 167-68).

Brody (pp. 92-96) also speaks of a change in attitudes toward the traditional occupation of farming, contrasting them with the attitudes that prevailed during and after the famine. He argues that while emigration during the 19th century was an adaptive response to the overpopulation associated with the potato blight, farming was still a highly valued occupation and a majority of those who emigrated would have preferred to remain at home had it been possible to make a living there. Today, however, isolation and demoralization have become so acute that young people no longer value the farming life and wish to abandon it. Men who remain on the land do so only because they feel social pressures to remain behind to help elderly parents or a middle-aged sister with work on the family farm. Thus, Brody concludes, emigration breeds further emigration.

Other writers do not present quite such an acute picture of social disintegration as Brody, but the differences appear to be differences of degree only. Philpott (pp. 134-36), Watson (pp. 42-43), Piore (p. 58), Böhning (1976, p. 571), among others, speak of the devaluation of traditional rural occupations, a psychological change which exerts a push toward further out-

migration of young people. Several writers speak of the decline of traditional institutions for accomplishing community or family projects on a reciprocal labor basis (Philpott, p. 102; Shankman, pp. 90-93; Brody, pp. 134-35). In Samoa, emigration has undermined the complex social system called fa'-asamoa, an institution run by tribal elders for the purpose of redistributing wealth (i.e. food) from richer to poorer members of the society, for managing community undertakings, and for the exercise of social control in general. The system has broken down largely because the young men who control remittance resources now have more power than the tribal elders and can therefore escape their control. Moreover, as leadership positions in fa'-asamoa are honorary--that is, not financially compensated--it is becoming impossible to find people willing to take on the job (Shankman, pp. 90-93). Watson also speaks of the difficulty of finding young men willing to accept positions of active leadership in the traditional lineage organization of the Mans in San Tin (p. 166-67).

The decline of traditional community organization in societies with heavy and prolonged out-migration is frequently accompanied by a decline in--or failure to develop--public, non-traditional social services. As many advanced industrialized nations are finding, lower population densities and declining tax bases in rural areas make it more and more difficult to provide the schools, roads, medical and social services that are still demanded

and expected by the people who remain behind. In these situations, as Lowenthal and Comitas (p. 206) point out, the problem for the public authorities is that decline or stagnation of production is not immediately followed by a decline in living standards:

Politics, conscience, and sentiment help to ensure that they [those who do not leave] will not go without antibiotics, electricity, or cricket pavilions. Political reapportionment always trails population realities; the Montserrats, Skyes, and other decrepit rural communities of the world, retain an influence that is out of proportion to the number of people who live in them.

As a consequence of this decline, societies with heavy out-migration become increasingly dependent on outsiders for their public services. Lowenthal and Comitas note that Caribbean societies have been deprived by emigration of those who would normally have assumed leadership positions. We mentioned above, for example, that 95 percent of recent Montserratian secondary school graduates had left the country. As a result, the rate of turnover in government offices during the late 1950s was enormous, reaching 70 percent in the both Treasury and the Post Office in 1959 (Lowenthal and Comitas, p. 207). One of the problems faced by small emigrant communities in underdeveloped countries, therefore, is that of declining efficiency and productivity caused by the promotion of inexperienced and untrained people to empty posts.

"Temporary" promotions inadequately fill the empty places; junior clerks become inspectors, typists in one department are lent as supervisors to

another, and the chief of any office may at any moment find half of his subordinates on secondment elsewhere. (Lowenthal and Comitas, p. 207).

The problem of inadequate services is not confined to Montserrat. In the Dominican Republic, Hendricks (p. 27) reports that "there are no medical facilities in Aldea, and no one sufficiently trained to give even the most rudimentary nursing care or medical information." An attempt to train local girls in basic nursing skills was frustrated when about half the class left for New York within six months of completing the course. (Ibid.).

#### Effects of International Migration on the Family

Although there is an extensive literature on the effects of socio-economic development on the family, the part of it that deals with the effects of international migration is still small and inconclusive. The fragmentary materials we have located focus primarily on three topics: changes in family organization and structure; socialization and education of children; and the changing roles and status of women.

#### Family Organization and Structure

Based on a mere handful of sources, the picture that emerges is one of increasing nucleation of the family and changing authority relations within it. In general, researchers report a decline in parental authority which they attribute to the economic independence of the younger

emigrant generation and/or the dependence of the older generation on their children's savings and remittances. In rural Hong Kong, this financial independence allows young men to pay for their own marriages and thus to escape the obligation to submit to an arranged match (Watson, p. 167). In addition, Watson comments that young women are themselves starting to drive hard bargains, demanding to be taken abroad with their husbands instead of being left in seclusion in the homes of their parents-in-law.

Rose (1969, p. 56) regards international migration as exerting pressures toward nucleation of the family among migrant families in India and Pakistan. He observes that when quarrels and tensions arise between a young woman and her parents-in-law, the economic independence given the young couple by their savings often enables them to leave the son's parental home and up on their own. Rose also implies that the behavior of migrant couples in this regard is now being used to legitimize the establishment of nuclear households by non-migrant couples. Both of these examples concern countries in which most migration is thought to be "linked." The pressures that have been observed toward growing independence among young migrants suggest, therefore, that social tensions within the extended family are increasing.

In Turkey, also, emigration to Germany has been a force for greater nucleation of the family. Here, Turkish students of the family have noted that while the three-

generation extended family has long been the idealized norm, in practice, more than 60 percent of households have in fact been nuclear in form, if only because high infant mortality and low expectation of life have truncated the family (Kiray, p. 212; Abadan-Unat, 1976, pp. 39-40). Despite this de facto nuclear structure, however, authority relations have remained as in the classical extended family, the senior male making all the important decisions. In the opinion of one student of the Turkish family, the effect of emigration, has been to complete the nucleation process by placing the locus of decision making within the nuclear family itself (Kiray, p. 214). As in the other cases we have described, it appears to be the presence of remittance incomes that forces this increased independence. Remittances are sent to the woman and she controls the remittance budget. Moreover, the woman's authority over the remittance budget spills over into other areas of life. If the nuclear family owns land, it is the woman who decides what will be planted and how the crop will be marketed; if there are children, it is the mother who arranges for their education (pp. 221-222).

The Turkish family appears to have responded extremely flexibly to the opportunities and the demands of international migration. Several authors have mentioned the diversity of forms adopted by the Turkish migrant family and the changes in its composition from time to time. Wives of migrants travel to and from between Turkey and Germany for

varying lengths of time. They may or may not work in Germany and they may or may not be accompanied by some or all of the children. The critical factor determining who moves where, and whether the mother can undertake paid work while in Germany, is the age of the children and the arrangements that can be made for their care and education. Sometimes, a grandmother or an older daughter will spend a stretch of time with the family in Germany caring for the children so that the mother (wife) can also work to increase the family's savings (Kudat, 1975; Kiray, pp. 214-220; Abadan-Unat, 1976, pp. 39-40). The importance of the life cycle of the family in determining the migration of women and their participation in the labor force of the host country has also been observed for other nationalities (Moch and Tilly, 1979, pp. 21-24).

Changes in the structure of the family are not effected without some intergenerational tensions. Watson (pp. 166-69) has noted that, where traditional or quasi-traditional arrangements persist, it is recognized that remittance incomes can introduce delicate problems of authority. He cites one household in which the father is still the nominal head but in which the daughter-in-law receives the remittances and controls the remittance budget. In this case, the woman's migrant husband sends a special remittance of several hundred Hong Kong dollars to his father at the end of each year. Ostensibly, this remittance is intended to reimburse the father for out-of-pocket

expenditures incurred on behalf of his grandchildren. In reality, the old man has no other personal income and the remittance is intended to give him a source of independence.

Dependence of the parental generation on remittances from sons and daughters abroad has also undermined the traditional authority of the father in the west of Ireland. According to Brody (pp. 120-26), father-daughter relations, always distant, have become increasingly remote as migrant daughters have adopted the norms and values of the cities. As the young women now arrange their own marriages, fathers no longer have a role in the negotiations with her fiancé's family and the last basis for a relationship has been eroded. Even on the farm, the father's dependence on the son whom he has persuaded to remain on the land, has undermined the father's traditional authoritarian role and replaced it with a chronic anxiety that the last son will also one day decide to leave. However, Brody also observes that, while traditional marriage relations were distant, the social isolation and lack of community life today have induced a more romantic conception of marriage, drawn from magazines and movies, and introduced a greater degree of intimacy within marriage (p. 128). Unfortunately, because of the heavy out-migration of young women, the number of marriages is small.

Before concluding this section we should point out that our findings of increasing family nucleation contradict the findings of Connell et al. in their review of migration from

rural areas (p. 211). These authors found that migration may often work to extend and cement relationships across kin outside of the immediate family. They speak of extended families strengthening their informal exchange relationships; of sibling linkages developing across villages; and of the emergence of "share families" straddling village and city, in which different relatives migrate in turn. One possible explanation for the different findings may be that Connell et al. are concerned mainly with internal migration, in which remittances are usually smaller in amount and less regular than is the case in international migration. It is reasonable to hypothesize, therefore, that families involved in internal migration cannot afford to reduce their farming activities and are forced to become more dependent on each other for labor and other support when their active and able-bodied sons leave the home.

#### Socialization and Education of Children

A number of authors in recent years have spoken of problems arising over the socialization of children left for long periods without a father in societies where the male traditionally exercises parental authority. We know of no in-depth studies of this issue but scattered references have come from Hong Kong, the Caribbean, the Middle East, and Pakistan. (Watson, pp. 184-194; Hendricks, p. 38; Paul Wilson, 1979, p. 39; Bilquees and Hamid, circa 1980, p. 4).

The problem appears to be most acute when children are left in the care of grandparents, traditionally indulgent toward grandchildren, without the presence of a parent to add a restraining note (Watson, pp. 184-92, Hendricks, p. 38). Where only the father has left, the mother may take over his role in controlling the children. Kiray (pp. 226-27) reports, for example, that in the Turkish village he studied, mothers left to bring up their children alone had become much more responsible about controlling them in the absence of the father. Where traditionally mothers had tended to spoil their sons, treating them much more indulgently than their daughters, when left alone they had become more serious about teaching the boys to become responsible adults

In San Tin (Hong Kong) and the Dominican Republic, the problem of indiscipline in the home has carried over into the schools. In both these societies discipline is highly valued but discipline in the school is seen as an extension of parental authority and not part of the function of the school. Hendricks (p. 37) reports that physical punishment is all but unknown in Dominican schools as the teacher "relies heavily upon sanctions for misbehavior to come from within the culprit's household." In San Tin, likewise, teachers look on discipline as a lineage responsibility and "hesitate to punish the children in case they get reported to the school board, which is composed of lineage members"

(Watson, p. 192). In San Tin, the problem is compounded by the fact that the teachers do not live in the village but come out from Hong Kong every day.

From a development perspective, the most serious aspect of the discipline problem may be the marked decline in achievement motivation that seems to have accompanied it. Both Hendricks and Watson remark on the children's disinterest in acquiring more than a rudimentary education. Boys in the Dominican Republic question the value of an education in Spanish when they expect to spend their working lives in New York. Both authors note, moreover, that children observe uneducated men returning from abroad with money in their pockets and conclude that it will be possible to succeed in life without an education. As one student remarked to Watson, "What good are history and geography to me? How will it help me to work in a restaurant? I know how to read and use an abacus and that's enough for anyone" (p. 193). Watson observes that although returning migrants are annoyed to find that their children can barely read or write after years in the village school, very few have thought it necessary to send the children to schools with better reputations, nor do they encourage them to attend secondary schools. "Like their children, most of the adults are not convinced that a high level of education is a necessity for prospective restaurant workers" (Watson, pp. 193-194). The significance of this decline in education is pointed out by Watson (p. 195) who comments that "San Tin

has become such a specialized community that the Mans no longer socialize their children to be competitive in local society." Watson believes that if anything happens to cut off emigration to better trained counterparts from other [non-emigrant] villages."

Bilquees and Hamid (circa 1980) report similar findings from Pakistan. In the village they studied, the education patterns of children differed between migrant and non-migrant families. During the first three years of schooling, a higher proportion of emigrants' than non-emigrants' children attend school but, beyond the third year, the position is reversed. Because of drop-outs among the children of emigrant families only 14 percent of their children are at school beyond the third year compared with nearly 18 percent of non-emigrant children. Here again, according to the authors (p. 4), parents and children share the view that education is pointless as the children plan to work abroad as unskilled laborers. In Turkey also, interest in secondary education for boys has declined in areas of heavy out-migration (Kiray, p. 228). When boys reach the age of 11 or 12, plans are made for them to join the father in Germany. The idea is that if the boys turn 16 while in Germany, they are entitled to apply for a job straight away. By this time, they have become accustomed to life in Germany and are supposedly in a position to fit easily into the work situation.

These scattered reports of declining motivation to acquire an education should be against the equally scattered mentions we reported in Chapter 4 of migrants' savings being used to pay for children's education. One possible explanation for the discrepancy could be that attitudes toward children's education vary by social class or educational status of parents. The value attached to education may also vary in accordance with migrants' perceptions of the possibility of upward social mobility in the host society. We know of no study that has addressed this question in the context of international migration.

#### Roles and Status of Women

In recent years there has been a growing realization that international migration must inevitably have consequences for the roles and status of women, whether they are women who themselves migrate or women who remain behind to take care of the household and family. In 1979, however, the authors of a report on women and migration prepared for AID for the International Center for Research on Women (ICRW) found that "there is very little information on the living and working patterns of these women, and very little comparative evidence showing the effects of immigration and emigration patterns of these countries" (ICRW, 1979, p. 65).

The present authors have also found only scattered research on the effect of international migration on women. There is a much larger literature on women and internal

migration, which is ably reviewed in the report to which we have just alluded. We hesitate, however, to extrapolate from internal to international migration studies because, although there are overlaps, there are also significant differences in distance, duration of absence, degree of cultural change and, more importantly, the amount of remittances, all of which are likely to change the nature of the migration experience.<sup>11</sup> In this section, we discuss changes in lives, roles and status of women who are themselves migrants and those who stay at home, recognizing that there may be considerable fluidity between these two groups. Before concluding, we undertake a brief review of the fragmentary research bearing on the effects of international migration on women's fertility.

In summarizing our findings on the effects of international migration on the lives of women we find it necessary to make an analytical distinction between effects of women's roles and the implications of these role changes for the status accorded women by their husbands and others in the society. International migration almost inevitably requires a woman to take on additional role functions, whether she herself is a migrant or whether she remains behind. However, we find that changes in role are not

---

<sup>11</sup>We also draw the reader's attention to the body of literature produced by government departments, doctoral students and independent researchers in the various countries of in-migration, particularly in Europe. We have not sampled this literature to any extent because of the variety of languages involved and the difficulty of obtaining the materials.

always accompanied by changes in status. We also infer, albeit on the basis of limited information, that the status traditionally accorded women in a society is a powerful determinant of how the migration process will affect their way of life.

Where women are traditionally enclosed, the restraints on their movements and independence may become tighter. Studies of Pakistani immigrant communities in Great Britain, for example, show that women "are subject to a stricter form of purdah than in the home village. Cultural and religious preference, the improved financial condition, and urban life have restricted the movement of women who in Mirpur have an active, outdoor life." (Kahn, 1977, pp. 77). The same author goes on to say, "Women in Britain contribute less to, and have less control over, the household income, due to the lack of home-centered activity and the independent earnings of their husbands" (Kahn, p. 78; see also Ballard and Ballard, pp. 43-51). Young women left behind in the home country may also be confined when their husbands are no longer present. In the Chinese village of San Tin, for example, Watson (p. 182) reports that young wives of absent men are secluded by their parents-in-law and carefully protected against meeting other men. In Watson's view, these restrictions on the movements of young women make life extremely uncomfortable for them. He also reports that

elderly women state that the restrictions are traditional but that they have been much more strictly applied since migration became widespread (Ibid.).

In contrast to the increased seclusion of many Asian women when they are left behind by their husbands, African women, whose status has traditionally been much higher, are taking on additional roles. In West Africa in particular, women from Niger who have migrated to Ghana, Nigeria and the Ivory Coast and become independent traders, "retain a clear awareness of belonging to a superior category" (Diarra, 1972, p. 234). Such women, it seems, never go back to their native villages but stay on in the capital where their status is secure. Niara Sudarkasa has also reported that West African women who migrate with their husbands to coastal cities tend to establish much closer relations with their spouses. Not infrequently husband and wife establish a trading partnership--an almost unheard of arrangement in the village where both partners pursue their own occupations independently (Sudarkasa, 1977, p. 187). A similar pattern of greater sex role equality has also been found in the families of rural migrants to Mexico City (Kemper, 1977).

#### Women Who Remain Behind

In subsistence societies it is customary for a majority of women to remain behind to take care of the household and farm while the husband emigrates to find a cash income. Whether or not the absence of the men in such cases brings about changes in the roles and status of women is a matter

of some dispute. In southern Africa and the Yemen Arab Republic, where the pattern of circular male migration exists, women and children are centrally involved in the management of the household's agricultural tasks. It is questionable, however, whether this indicates a change of role or status. In both these societies, women have traditionally played the major role in agricultural production, the men coming in mainly to perform the heavier tasks like clearing fields, ploughing, and, in the Yemen, maintaining irrigation ditches and terraces (Kuper, 1947; Marwick, 1940; Myntti, 1978). Myntti's study of women in the Yemen suggests that women's roles have changed very little since their menfolk started migrating in large numbers. There are still enough older men left behind to plough the fields, and the availability of large remittance incomes has encouraged neglect of the heavy work on terraces and ditches when labor is in short supply (1978, p. 43; Birks and Sinclair, 1980, p. 90). In neighboring Oman, Birks and Sinclair (June 1978, p. 30) observe that as younger men have come to spend more extended periods abroad--an average of 9.4 months among the families surveyed--there have been increasing pressures on older men to remain at home to run the household.

In southern Africa, perhaps because remittances are much smaller than is usual in international labor migration and therefore insufficient to maintain the family, there is some evidence that women are taking on some of the male

tasks like clearing fields and cattle-tending (Rosen-Prinz and Rosen-Prinz, 1978, p. 20). Rosen-Prinz and Rosen-Prinz have argued, however, that although women's roles have expanded, their decision-making powers remain relatively limited. Because land is allocated to males, women can gain access to it only through men (fathers, brothers, sons or husbands). Decisions about undertaking new activities, or filing applications for loans for the purchase of seeds, fertilizer, and equipment needed for agricultural expansion, can only be made by men. Rosen-Prinz and Rosen-Prinz argue therefore that while women are able to maintain previous levels of agricultural output, they are unable, without the presence of their menfolk, to introduce agricultural innovations. These authors do not speak directly about women's status but their data imply that there cannot have been any significant rise in status as a consequence of their taking on additional agricultural roles.

Another interesting sidelight on the effect of international migration on women's roles and status comes from Martha Mueller who studied the families of migrant laborers in Lesotho (Mueller, 1977a). Mueller found that women play the leading role in agriculture in Lesotho, undertaking all the usual women's tasks of planting, weeding and harvesting. In addition, women now make all the arrangements for mobilizing cooperative working parties to manage the heavy work, simply writing to inform their husbands about their decisions. Women also predominate on

the local Village Development and Land Allocation Committees, positions to which they are elected on equal terms with men. These committees are political institutions established by the government, ostensibly as channels through which villagers are enabled to transmit their demands and views to government but in reality, in Mueller's view, as instruments of control (1977a, p. 159).

It is evident, therefore, that women command a certain level of esteem in the community. Nevertheless, Mueller argues that this status, tied as it is to agricultural pursuits, is still secondary to that of men, which is dependent on their control of cash incomes. While women now occupy leadership positions in the system of government control, they are still dependent on their husbands' willingness to send them remittances for day-to-day household needs while the men keep the larger part of their savings and make all the decisions about major expenditures. More importantly, in Mueller's view, Lesotho's growing dependence on remittances, together with the stagnation of the agricultural sector,<sup>1</sup> has devalued agriculture as it has increased the value placed on money incomes. Thus, while women's influence in the "cooperative structures of village life and the integrative structures of political

---

<sup>1</sup>Mueller does not argue that this stagnation is attributable directly to the absence of young men. Rather, she finds that as the men migrate externally and without their families, their departure does not stimulate a demand for agricultural products as would rural-urban migration of the entire family. There is therefore little impetus to agricultural innovation.

life may be growing, as absence of husbands and other men increases in time and scale, it is power within a context of increasing powerlessness" (1977a, p. 166). Irrespective of whether male emigration brings significant changes in women's roles and status, a little evidence is starting to accumulate that the absence of their husbands places considerable emotional strain on women left behind. The strain appears to increase as the duration of the absence grows longer (Mueller, 1977b; Gordon, 1980; both cited in Chaney, 1980, p. 25).

#### Women Who Migrate

An in-depth study of female immigrants in Europe by Moch and Tilly (1979, pp. 12-13) makes the important point that the underlying objective of women's migration is to be understood in terms of women's contribution to the family income and not in terms of personal motivations. Whether, and at what times, a woman accompanies her migrant husband (or migrates independently), and whether she takes up paid employment abroad, is closely bound up with the life-cycle of the family (Ibid., p. 21). The age of dependent children, whether they need their mother's care or may safely be left in charge of a grandparent or older daughter, either at home or abroad, is the primary determinant of women's emigration and work in the host country. Moch and Tilly's analysis, based in large measure on studies of North African and Portuguese women in France, receives scattered

support from other societies. The multiple forms taken by the Turkish migrant family, to which we have already referred (Kiray, 1976; Abadan-Unat, 1976, Kudat, 1974) reflect the different arrangements made by individual migrant families at different stages of the family life-cycle to maximize the earning potential of the family. Watson, likewise (1975, pp. 120-122), observes that grandmothers are frequently dispatched from rural Hong Kong to London to take care of the homes of young migrants in order that their wives may be freed to work in the family restaurant.

One implication of this finding is that there can be no clear distinction between women who migrate and women who remain behind.'° Especially where the distances are not great and the cost of the journey not too daunting, women may move back and forth between the home and the host country several times in the course of their husbands' stay abroad. Another important point made by Moch and Tilly is that, because of their family responsibilities, women immigrants are frequently forced to take jobs where they can keep their young children beside them. Failing this, they must work at times when their husbands are available to

---

'°Clearly there are some exceptions to this generalization. Where contract workers are not permitted to take their dependents with them, as in the case of mine labor in South Africa or general laborers in the Gulf states, women are normally unable to participate in international migration.

watch the children frequently at night (p. 23).'' Single women, though not quite so disadvantaged, frequently migrate as dependents of men who will be regarded as the principle bread winner; their choice of work is therefore more constrained than if they were completely independent (Ibid., p. 24).''

By far the most insightful studies we have encountered are those of Kiray and Abadan-Unat which we have already discussed in connection with changes in the family. We have already reported Kiray's finding from one Turkish village that women who had been abroad had become more emancipated and more responsible. Such women were able to run their households more capably, manage the remittance budget, deal with bankers and post-office officials, and plan the family's agricultural activities. Kiray also notes that women involved in emigration display a greater appreciation

---

''Similar patterns of women's employment has been observed in internal migration in developing countries (See, ICRW, pp. 105-107).

''A volume of interviews with women migrants in Europe produced by the World Council of Churches, and entitled Migrant Women Speak (Geneva: World Council of Churches and London: Search Press Ltd., 1975), vividly conveys a sense of the conditions under which women migrants live and work. We have already made reference to Niara Sudarkasa's study in which she spoke of the enhanced status of west African women who migrate across national borders to become independent traders. In Germany, Greek, Turkish and Yugoslavian women have successfully led unofficial strikes which forced employers to make important concessions, (Kosack, 1976, pp. 374-378). Women interviewed by Kosack claimed that their experience had taught them how to assert themselves more forcefully than had been their wont prior to emigration. An important question is to what extent this assertiveness carries over into other areas of life.

of the uses of literacy. She observes that in earlier years it was a common finding that village women had forgotten how to read and write because they had had no need of these skills. At the time of the study, however, no women under 35 years of age was illiterate; moreover, among the children, 100 percent of the girls were attending school (Kiray, p. 222).

In a penetrating analysis of women's changing roles, Nermin Abadan-Unat, who has studied Turkish women in Germany and at home in Turkey, takes a less rosy view of the effects of international migration on women. Abadan-Unat's analysis does not contradict Kiray's findings; in many areas her remarks endorse those of Kiray. Rather, Abadan-Unat places the examples of emancipated behavior in a wider context in which they appear less pervasive. In Abadan-Unat's view, the innovative behavior of Turkish women migrants--those who stay behind as well as those who leave--tends to be confined to those aspects of their roles that have to do with money, remittances, control of the budget and labor force participation, and to be largely imitative of European women. In other areas of social life, women tend to retain their more traditional customs. While women in Germany will be careful to keep their savings in separate accounts from those of their husbands in order to retain control over them, their investments are more conservative than those of

men and have less productive potential.''' Compared with other European nationalities, Turkish women in Germany are more likely to leave young children in the care of older daughters when they go to work rather than placing the children in day care centers. Thus, Abadan-Unat comments that the emancipation of Turkish women tends to be at the cost of their daughters, who are deprived of the opportunity to get a good education (p. 43). Finally, although women take a more dominant role in decision-making, there is a cost in increased tensions between husband and wife when husbands feel that their authority is shaken (p. 41).

Back in Turkey, Abadan-Unat discerns few changes in the overall way of life of migrant families. In the spacious new homes built with the family's savings, children pore over their homework in crowded, noisy rooms, while the "guest room" remains unoccupied save for a collection of modern consumer durables. These are frequently unusable as they require electricity and many of the villages have not been wired. Women may handle business affairs but in social questions, like the marriage of daughters, it is still customary to consult the extended family (pp. 52-53).

---

''For example, a favorite investment among women is the purchase of a car, not for their own use, to to sell at a profit in Turkey after their return. Abadan-Unat's point is that while this puts some extra cash in the women's pockets, it generates no further productive activity (Abadan-Unat, 1976, p. 45).

In conclusion, Abadan-Unat observes that while international migration may promote emancipation in some areas of women's roles, it also creates "a false climate of liberation which actually does not surpass increased purchasing power." She prefers to call this state "pseudo-emancipation" (p. 55). Watson (pp. 195-198) makes a somewhat similar point about the changes in the "world view" of emigrants from San Tin (rural Hong Kong). He notes while emigration has broadened the horizons of migrants in areas related to travel and the running of their business in England, "it has not really changed the way they look at the world" (p. 197). Watson contrasts the disinterest of San Tin residents in world events with the intense interest and involvement in these events displayed by residents of Hong Kong city. In the view of the present authors, however, it seems reasonable to assume that "modernization" is a slow and continuing process and that changes in some aspects of women's lives and roles may well pave the way for further changes at a later date.

#### Effects on Fertility

It is usually assumed that international migration has a negative effect on population growth in sending areas, both directly as a consequence of the departure of significant numbers of people, and indirectly by causing the separation for long periods of couples in their prime reproductive years. It is thought, moreover, that if women

accompany their husbands abroad to modern industrialized societies, the advantages of smaller families will be perceived and acted upon. The literature contains some basis for this assumption. Glen Hendricks, for example, observes that Dominican residents in New York restrict their families for reasons of convenience, even if there may have been no change in the value attached in general to a large family (Hendricks, p. 98).

In countries like India, Turkey or Mexico, where migration is small relative to the size of the base population, it is unlikely that any effects of individual fertility among migrant couples will translate into effects in the birth rate at the national level. This is particularly so when the migration is not permanent. According to Cornelius, the base population, higher fertility among non-migrants and the predominantly temporary character of Mexican migration in the United States have prevented any change in fertility in Mexico despite high levels of out-migration over many years (Cornelius, 1979, p. 171). By contrast, in his study of international migration from the Yemen Arab Republic, Jon Swanson states (pp. 68-69) that there has been a rise in fertility among the wives of emigrants. Swanson presents no evidence to support his assertion but notes that he has observed that visits home by emigrant husbands often result in the addition of a new baby to the family.

A recent article by Moni Nag reviews some concomitants of modernization that, in principle, could have the effect of increasing fertility (Nag, 1980). Some of these factors appear to have relevance for fertility in developing countries with high out-migration. Nag's discussion draws attention to: a) increasing fecundability as a consequence of a decline in the length of breast-feeding; b) increasing fecundability as a consequence of better nutrition which may lower the age of menarche and postpone the advent of the menopause; c) lower incidence of miscarriage and stillbirth due to better nutrition and control of debilitating disease (eg. malaria); d) lower incidence of sterility caused by venereal disease; e) decrease in the amount of voluntary abstinence; f) a possible increase in the amount of sexual intercourse made possible by larger houses which afford couples more privacy; g) increasing age of widowhood or widowerhood. However, Nag concludes that the evidence suggests that antinatalist concomitants of development far outweigh the possible pronatalist effects. Indeed, only for 19th century Britain is there any evidence that fertility may have been temporarily increased. It seems reasonable to infer that, in the context of international migration, Nag's fertility-stimulating factors would be even more outweighed by anti-natalist pressures.

Cynthia Myntti has discussed some of the effects of international migration that might conceivably influence the fertility of Yemani women, and, by extension, the fertility

of migrant wives in other sending societies (Myntti, 1979). Myntti says that there has been an increase in bottle feeding among Yemani women who have remittance incomes and can afford to buy milk powder. Among these women, a reduction in the period of post-partum amenorrhoea can be expected. On the other hand, Myntti reports increasing use of contraception by some Yemani women. Birth control clinics are few and far between, however, and the quality of the services and information they provide is not high. She observes that many men returning on visits from Saudi Arabia, the destination of most Yemani emigrants, bring supplies of the pill with them. It appears that these men have usually received very thorough instruction in how the pills should be used. Myntti therefore inclines to the view that fertility is unlikely to have risen, although she specifically notes that there is no evidence either way.

Finally, Myntti also discusses changes in attitudes toward children, observing that it is no longer possible in the Yemen to live entirely off the land and that old people are therefore forced to rely on cash support from their sons. Many couples, especially those who lived in Aden during the colonial regime where they were exposed to modern ideas, now say that it is better to have fewer sons and to give them more education. Thus, there appears to be strong forces exerting an antinatalist effect. On balance, Myntti feels that it is not yet possible to determine conclusively the effect of international migration on fertility.

From Turkey, however, come reports that lend some substance to Swanson's claim that international migration might lead to increases in fertility among women left behind. Both Abadan-Unat and Kiray observe that women left alone for long periods find that the emotional void created by the absence of their husbands can be partly filled by bearing and nursing a child. According to these authors, such women plan to become pregnant each year when their husbands return for vacations. In one village, the midwife reported that in March 1973, nine months after the summer vacation, thirty babies were born compared with the usual monthly average of one or two. The women giving birth argued that as they could afford to feed the extra children there was no point in preventing their arrival (Abadan-Unat, p. 48). Kiray (p. 225) reports, however, that while women in the village she studied deliberately seek to become pregnant during their husbands' visits, average fertility in the village is no different from Turkish fertility in general: 5.4 children compared with 5.1. It may be, therefore, that anti- and pro-natalist forces tend to offset each other. Unfortunately, Kiray gives no indication about how the fertility was measured or how migrant status was defined.

Political Consequences of International Migration  
in the Countries of Origin

On the conceptual level there appear to be three broad ways in which international migration could exert an influence on political life and political development in the countries of origin. First, it is possible that international migration, by selecting from the most innovative and adventurous members of the society might remove potential political leaders and reduce the level of political activity among the populace. Secondly, by providing an avenue for the satisfaction of rising aspirations among the disadvantaged, international migration might defuse discontent and reduce pressures for political change. Thirdly, it is possible that returning migrants might contribute to political destabilization through "their contribution to the revolution of aspirations and the radicalizing influence of their imported industrial organization ideas" (Papademetriou, 1976, p. 16; see also Barkin, 1967, p. 508).

To the limited extent that the literature deals with political effects of international migration in sending countries the focus is almost entirely on the third hypothesis. Our literature search has failed to uncover a single article that considers the loss of potential political leaders. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive what indices could be designed to measure this effect. Yet, as we have documented a serious loss of leadership in the

social and economic spheres, it is highly probable that sending countries are also experiencing a loss of political leadership at the local level.

We have located only fragmentary research that addresses the hypothesis that international migration provides an outlet for political dissatisfaction. Richard Mines (1980, p. 103), speaking of Las Animas in Mexico, states that emigration to the United States has had a "profoundly conservatising" influence on the community. Even though the Mexican government was viewed as a hindrance to local economic development the possibility of legal or illegal migration to the United States has defused opposition. In Mines' view, "there is no potential under present circumstances that anti-government hostility will express itself politically" (Ibid.). The possibility of finding good jobs in the Gulf states has also tended to dissipate political activism among Palestinian refugees in the Middle East and has undermined their resolve to continue the struggle for a Palestinian homeland (Badran, 1981).

There is scattered evidence that many political leaders have perceived emigration to act as a safety-valve for the release of political tensions. Several scholars have claimed that members of the urban middle class were permitted to leave Cuba after the Castro revolution because their departure was seen as removing a powerful threat to the success of the revolution (Landstreet, 1976, p. 175;

Domingues, 1978, p. 13). The tolerant attitude of many Third World governments to the brain drain from their shores may also be interpreted--partly at least--in this light.

Most of the literature bearing on political consequences of international migration addresses the third hypothesis concerning the destabilizing potential of returning migrants. The evidence on this question is conflicting but, except where ethnic or racial consciousness is involved, it tends not to support the hypothesis. It is well known, of course, that many of the leaders of independence movements in colonial countries in the early post-war period had been educated and "radicalized" abroad. It is less clear, however, how much of their enhanced political awareness and skill derived from the experience of life in a modern democracy, and how much can be attributed to their student status in radical educational institutions--an experience not shared by the mass of labor migrants. Lowenthal (1972, p. 231) has observed that "West Indians who return home with university degrees often automatically become cultural, community or political leaders." He notes that "many are tapped for leadership while they are still students abroad; others are swept into prominence the moment they return." According to Lowenthal, many of these returning graduates do not live up to their advance billing. Others,

come home to play significant roles in Caribbean society. Their energy and self-awareness equip them at least to articulate if not to solve problems that defy traditional West Indian

approaches. Virtually every major Caribbean leader, in fact, has spent several years abroad (Lowenthal, 1972, p. 223).

It is significant, perhaps, that the only empirical evidence we have found of heightened political consciousness among international labor migrants emanate from the Caribbean.'<sup>4</sup> Both Lowenthal (1972, p. 229) and Sutton and Makiesky (1975, p. 115) refer to an increase in "racial" awareness and sense of West Indian nationalism among West Indian emigrants, attributable to their experiences as immigrants in Great Britain and the United States. Lowenthal remarks that people in Britain and the United States do not differentiate among immigrants from different Caribbean societies. As a result, West Indians abroad, seeking mutual support, discover their common backgrounds, aspirations and problems. "These shared experiences foster a type of West Indian unity. Prior to emigration, ethnicity was significant to West Indians, but migration makes ethnicity become less divisive" (Lowenthal, p. 229).

Basing their remarks on field work carried out in Barbados in the late 1950s and again in the early 1970s, Sutton and Makiesky also describe an increase in awareness of ethnicity and race as a result of emigration. They observe that in 1950, race was only a latent factor in

---

<sup>4</sup>We do not intend to suggest that political effects are only significant in the Caribbean. It is possible that other factors--proximity to the U.S., long-standing migrations, and the small scale of Caribbean societies which may make political change more visible--account for this area having been studied more intensively.

Barbadian political awareness. In their view, Barbadians migrated to England with no developed sense of ethnic distinctiveness but with a racial consciousness of being black in a white world. By contrast, emigrants to the United States went with a clear ethnic awareness, and apprehension over their racial identity. Once in the United States, the feeling of ethnic distinctiveness disappeared and the meaning of being black in a white society became clearer. Thus emigrants to both countries returned with a highly developed sense of racial consciousness, and a strong Black Power ideology, which peaked in 1969. A visit by Stokely Carmichael at about that time created such alarm in Barbados that the government introduced a Public Order Act that forbade public meetings without permission from the police. In general, however, the unrest gave the government enough political leverage to compel local and foreign companies to open decision-making positions to non-White Barbadians for the first time (Sutton and Makiesky, pp. 135-138). Sutton and Makiesky also note (p. 140) that there were similar demonstrations of Black consciousness in Trinidad, Jamaica, and some of the smaller West Indian islands.

Apart from these reports of heightened racial and political awareness in the Caribbean, the fragmentary materials available suggest that international migration has served, if anything, to inhibit political activism in countries of origin. In Spain, returned migrants "appear to

be voices of moderation in Spain's present political experiment" (Rhoades, 1979, p. 70). Rhoades observes that "resentment and bitterness can be found in many parts of Andalusia, especially in latifundia areas controlled by a strong rent-capital elite." He adds, however, that these are areas characterised by internal seasonal migration rather than long-term migration to northern Europe. Rhoades also remarks that there is little empirical support for the widespread belief among the Spanish middle and upper classes that returning emigrants have been radicalized and will introduce a powerful leftist trend in politics. An analysis of provincial voting patterns in the 1977 elections showed that

villages heavily involved in intra-European migration, especially to industrial Europe, appear to follow relatively conservative parties. Published election results giving village breakdowns in Grenada reveal a strong pro-government sentiment (i.e. support of Union Democratico Centro, the government party picked to carry forward the policies of Franco and the Monarchy) in villages with strong ties to Germany. Communities without the economic outlet of emigration or those which face constant uncertainty in the fight for seasonal contracts tended to have a greater percentage of socialist or communist votes (Rhoades, p. 69).

A lack of radicalization may also be inferred from Cerase's analysis of potentially innovative returnees to southern Italy from the United States. It will be recalled that the few returning migrants in Cerase's study who fell into this category tended soon to give up the struggle against entrenched clientalism and settled down to live within the system (Cerase, pp. 258-259). It is possible, of

course, that when the return of emigrants is dispersed through time, potential political activism is dissipated for want of support from others who have shared the same experiences (Bovenkerk, p. 47).

It is also possible that the anticipated radicalizing influences may come, not from the migrants themselves but from their sons. Piore (pp. 129-130) has pointed out that in the case of migration to the United States, there has been a tendency for the second generation to become involved in disruptive politics in the home country. In Piore's view, these efforts

seem to be related to the problems of the second generation abroad: frustration in their attempts to achieve assimilation and upward mobility and a consequent desire both to establish a positive individual identity and cohesive groupings in which the home country and its image become critical points of reference.

Piore has found evidence of such second generation political activity by northern blacks in the southern black civil rights movement, and by Puerto Rican youths from New York in the Puerto Rican Independista movement. He also cites the historical involvement of Irish Americans in the Irish Republican movement, the support by American Jews of the Zionist movement and the Israeli state, and the work of Greek Americans for the Greek independence movement (p. 130).

The lack of political activity among returning intra-European migrants is surprising given the thorough political education many of them receive during their stay in Western

Europe. Contrary to the generally held view that immigrant workers are "citizens without a state," politically inactive, voiceless and powerless to influence their environment (see eg. Castells, 1975; Hoffman-Novotny, 1973; Withol de Wendel, 1975), recent research has found that many are politically active in a variety of ways in the host country (Sica, 1977; Miller, 1978). It is true that immigrants are not yet permitted to vote in national elections except in Sweden (since the election of 1976), but the right of immigrants to vote in local and regional elections has already been accorded in several European nations and is under consideration in others (Sica, pp. 149-151). Quite apart from voting rights in local and national elections in the host country, Miller has documented immigrant worker participation in a variety of forms of non-electoral politics. Immigrants have been found to be active participants in the organs of political democracy in the factory, and as worker and immigrant representatives on governmental consultative boards. They have been involved in collective bargaining between management and workers, and have played an active role in trade unions. On a number of occasions, immigrant workers have led effective strike actions (Miller, 1978, esp. pp. 61-85).

With the exception of Rhoades' analysis of Spanish returnees, we have found no study that examines in depth the political views and activities of migrants once they have

returned home. Ideas about their effect on political life in the home country must therefore remain in the realm of speculation. It is possible, however, to advance some hypotheses to explain the political conservatism of migrants returning from extended periods in Western Europe. It could be argued, for example, that emigrants who have accumulated savings and acquired property have also undergone a process of embougeoisement which disinclines them to participate in radical political activities that might threaten the safety of their property.''

The absence of radicalism may also be related to the fact that most sending country governments have worked hard to maintain the political allegiance of their citizens working in Western Europe, using a variety of means. First, most countries sending large numbers of emigrants to Europe have multiplied their diplomatic and consular links with the host countries and employ administrative means to keep their nationals in active touch with the home government (Miller, pp. 141-142). One survey carried out in Germany found that 78 percent of Turkish gastarbeiter in the Federal Republic had had some contact with a consular office during their stay, if only to register births and deaths (p. 142). Miller cites one student of Turkish migration to Germany as saying

---

'The embougeoisement thesis states that as industrial workers become more affluent, they adopt the norms, values and behavior patterns of the middle classes. The thesis was tested in a sample of affluent industrial workers in England in the 1960s but was not supported by the data. See Goldethorpe et al., 1968(a), 1968(b), 1969.

that the time Turkish migrants are required to spend on administrative matters with both the home and the host government officials is an important reason for their relative inactivity in political affairs (Ibid.).

Secondly, the governments of most if not all the countries which supply immigrant labor to Europe, support and subsidize a variety of "fraternal associations" in the countries that receive their citizens (Miller, pp. 143-153; Castro-Almeida, 1979). Ostensibly apolitical and intended to foster national and cultural solidarity among emigrants, these societies also act as "pro-government organizations seeking to maintain the allegiance of migrants to the homeland regime" (Miller, p. 143). Miller continues that

these organizations also function as mediators between the homeland government and its nationals abroad. Migrants express their political demands upon homeland governments through these fraternal organizations and try to influence government policy in their favor. Host society governments rely on these protean organizations to maintain order among foreign workers in case of conflicts.

Many of the fraternal organizations have large memberships in several countries and most try to promote or maintain the workers' identification with the political party in power in the home country. Thus the associations of Spanish, Portuguese and Moroccans work to prevent the radicalization of their members by steering them into the more conservative trade-unions with Church affiliations; by contrast, the enormous Amicale des Algerians en Europe tries to prevent Algerian workers being contaminated by bourgeois ideas. Only the Italian government subsidizes a variety of trade-

union, religious and social-welfare organizations to carry on the work of maintaining links with Italy and not with any particular political party (Miller, pp. 150-153).

Thirdly, a majority of sending countries encourage their citizens abroad to participate in the political life of the home country by enabling and encouraging them to vote in national elections (Miller, pp. 156-158; Pekin, 1979; Mendez, 1979). A number of countries, including Spain and Portugal, allow voting by mail, by proxy or through the consulate, and other countries are considering the adoption of one of these methods. Italy, Greece and Turkey all require their citizens to return home to vote although Turkey is thinking of adopting some other means. In Italy, the government provides free transportation within Italy for citizens returning home to vote, and both the German and Swiss governments provide free transportation to the Italian border. As a consequence of this arrangement, Italian emigrants have made a substantial showing at the polls, mainly voting for the left wing parties (Miller, pp. 158-162; Mendez, pp. 214-215).

It is possible, then, that foreign workers in Europe see no need for radical political activity after their return because they have had the opportunity to express their political views and press their demands through normal political channels during the period of their absence abroad. In addition, these countries have made considerable efforts to prevent the possible contamination of their

emigrants by radicalizing forces in the industrial West. Lacking research on the politicization of international labor migrants we cannot judge how effective these efforts of conservative European and Mediterranean governments have been. Neither can we guess what may be the effect of international migration on foreign workers who are denied legitimate and institutionalized means of participating in the political life of their own, or the host, country while abroad.

### Conclusions

It is difficult as yet to come to any firm conclusions about the social and political effects of international migration on sending countries. There appears to have been little research dealing specifically with these questions and the studies that have been done yield conflicting results. Some, for example, find evidence of upward social mobility while others do not; some find changes in women's roles while others question whether the changes have been more than superficial. The most systematic work we have found has been done by anthropologists who have studied entire, but very localized, communities which have experienced heavy out-migration over several generations. Summarizing the central message contained in these reports one might conclude that, while international migration undoubtedly raises the standard of living for the families and households involved, the improvement is achieved at the

cost of declining quality of life. In making this judgement, however, it is important to remember that these small societies may not be typical of sending communities in general. Moreover, we cannot tell how this localized decline relates to overall development at the national level. Most significantly, there is no way of judging if the temporary migration, often under contract, that is increasingly becoming the model for contemporary international migration will have similar consequences.

In terms of the social mobilization thesis, the limited materials we have found suggest that international migration exerts a conservative influence on sending countries. Politically, as in the economic sphere, international migration appears to be a mechanism that channels energies away from the home community and releases them in foreign countries. There is suggestive evidence, however, that important effects may not appear until the second generation. Once again, however, it is necessary to bear in mind that research on these questions has barely started and, in the political sphere at least, raises extremely sensitive issues that are difficult to study. Finally, the question remains whether the effects of contemporary circular migration will parallel those of more permanent migration.

## CHAPTER VII

### CONCLUSIONS

This review of the empirical literature on the consequences of international migration for sending countries has yielded mixed and contradictory results. Advocates of international migration, as well as those who question its value for sending countries, can both cite research findings in support of their position. To date, there seems to be no clear criterion against which to measure the disparate findings and to determine which most clearly reflect reality. In part, the contradictions are inherent in the complexities of international migration and the different perspectives from which it may be assessed. International migration may produce results that are clearly desirable at the level of the individual or family, for example, but which may appear much less beneficial from the perspective of the society. The assessment may change, moreover, when the perspective shifts from immediate but possibly superficial effects to longer term changes affecting the structure of the economy or society.

Uncertainties about the consequences of international migration are compounded by the fragmented and haphazard character of the available research. Those in-depth studies of specific issues we have been able to find lack comparability in that the sending countries studied vary

along important dimensions such as population size, stage in the migration process, and duration of stay of individual emigrants, all of which appear to have a strong bearing on the results. Moreover, we have found too few studies of any one aspect of international migration to be able to classify them while controlling for country characteristics. One of the few firm conclusions we have reached, therefore, is that future research needs to be carefully planned to systematically address a range of issues in a variety of types of sending country. We appreciate, however, that the paucity of basic data on many aspects of international migration makes this a difficult and expensive project.

Reviewing briefly the findings already reported, it is fairly clear that international migration has proved beneficial to individual migrants and their families, at least in the short term. Thousands of people in the Third World are better fed, better clothed and housed, have better medical care and more leisure as a result of international migration. Many families have managed to assure themselves of shelter and a minimum level of subsistence in their old age. It is hard to argue that these effects are insignificant or that they are unlikely to exert some measure of positive influence on development in the long run. However, at least one study showed that the incomes of migrant families after the return of the migrant members fell back nearly to the level of non-migrant incomes in the same communities.

On the basis of our research, the effects on individuals and families in the longer term are much more varied. Many studies report a reduction in productivity: family land is left untilled, heavy maintenance work is neglected, and animal husbandry is abandoned as remittance incomes more than compensate for the production foregone. Other studies, especially from the Indian subcontinent, provide evidence of growing economic independence and upward social mobility made possible by carefully planned international migration carried out through two or even three generations. In terms of human capital development, some emigrants claim to invest part of their savings in the education of their children. At the same time, there is disturbing evidence from some emigrant communities that children have become school drop-outs, doubting the value of education in a world where international migration is possible. While we suspect that the more deleterious effects are found in societies where international migration has affected a significant proportion of the population, leading to a decline in morale, the data do not permit us to make such a claim with any certitude.

At the societal level, research has yielded results that are every bit as varied and conflicting as those on individuals and families. International migration may help, hinder, or be neutral in the area of job creation. It has been suggested that the heavy losses of skilled workers and technicians from some societies may handicap the development

of industry and creation of modern sector jobs in the country of origin. Simultaneously, many studies have demonstrated that international migration develops an internal dynamism that permits the outflow to continue long after the surplus population has been removed from rural sending areas. As a result, localized sending communities and small-scale societies can quickly become depopulated. They may lose productive capacity, and jobs for young people may disappear. A spiral of decline may be initiated in which morale falters and emigration serves to encourage further emigration. Studies in southern Europe suggest, moreover, that where emigration had proved useful by reducing pressures on urban labor markets, it was not the only factor at work. Internal migration, declining activity rates among women and children, and other development processes were also involved. We know of no studies that have explicitly examined the interactions between international migration, internal migration, and other development processes in sending communities or countries of origin.

Anthropological studies in small communities tend to find signs of declining productivity in rural areas of out-migration. It is argued that as the able-bodied young men depart, individual migrant families tend to leave some of their fields uncultivated. The case is usually made that the availability of remittance incomes allows such families to substitute commercial food products for home-produced

food. At the same time, many studies of remittance use indicate that the purchase of land is highly favored by migrant families. It could be hypothesized, therefore, that land abandoned by one family may in time be bought and cultivated by another without a loss of productivity at the community level. The literature contains examples of societies in which the market in land appears to function in this way. However, it also contains examples of societies in which land bought by returning emigrants is allowed to lie idle, serving as a source of esteem and as security against old age. To our knowledge, the reasons for these differences have not been explored in the literature, although we suspect they have to do with the way in which social status is defined in different societies.

In urban areas, it is often asserted that industry has experienced bottlenecks and production delays because of shortages of skilled workers. There is no doubt at all that many urban areas have experienced temporary shortages of such workers and that these may have increased the costs of production. Nevertheless, studies carried out in populations with large numbers of un- and under-employed have suggested that on the whole these shortages have not been serious. Most of such societies continue to encourage international migration, hoping that the establishment of training programs by industry will ensure satisfactory replacement of skilled workers. On the other hand, countries like the Sudan and Egypt which have small reserves

of skilled personnel may have been hurt by the departure of trained and experienced workers. Much depends on the flexibility of the labor market in individual countries and the extent to which industry is willing to absorb the cost of additional training.

One of the more interesting questions in international migration concerns the effects of migrants' savings and remittances on the countries of origin. It is known that migrant families in all parts of the world allocate their expenditures in remarkably similar ways, first satisfying their daily needs and fulfilling social obligations, later investing in projects that satisfy more psychological needs like security and esteem. It is also known that governments attach great importance to remittances as a source of foreign exchange. Beyond this monetarist effect, little is known about the impact of remittances on the economies of sending countries. What is the economic effect of the countless small businesses that spring up in migrant communities? How significant are the small sums invested in enterprises economists consider productive? To what extent are these offset by declining productivity in agriculture? Does agricultural productivity actually decline as a consequence of the availability of remittance incomes or is the neglect of agricultural tasks so widely reported merely the first stage of a process that will result in the consolidation of land holdings and eventual rationalization of agricultural production? Is capital intensification of

agricultural production desirable in countries with large surplus populations? We know of no empirical studies that address these issues and it is unlikely that the necessary data are available.

The uses made of savings and remittances by migrant households appear to be determined in large measure in accordance with an overall plan for future betterment of which emigration itself forms only a part. The investment of savings is thus closely related to migrants' aspirations and their hopes and expectations regarding employment after their return. It is in this area that the expectations of sending country governments have gone most seriously awry. There is widespread evidence from sending countries in all parts of the world, that a large majority of returning migrants would consider themselves dismal failures if they were forced to take up paid employment in either industry or agriculture. Governed still by "peasant" norms and values, emigrants everywhere are hoping to fulfill their aspirations for achieving independent status. It is to this end that loneliness and indignity are endured, wages saved, and countless small businesses of dubious viability started.

Over and above the desire for independence exhibited by most international migrants, it seems to be quite clearly established that few international migrants learn skills that could be used in the expansion of industry in sending countries. It is possible, indeed, that emigration impedes industrial development by denuding the country of trained

and experienced workers. It appears, moreover, that return migration is highly selective of the less able; immigrants with skills and good work habits are more likely to find permanent work in the host country. It has been suggested, therefore, that the talents, experience and savings of emigrants might be more productively employed if sending country governments provided encouragement and support for small-scale ventures in the informal sector, rather than trying to induce reluctant returnees to enter industrial employment.

The most significant conclusion to which we are drawn from our reading is that the behavior of international migrants--and indirectly, therefore, the consequences of international migration for sending countries--is not to be understood within a purely economic framework. It is true, as is commonly assumed, that the motivation to emigrate for employment is economic in the first instance. The literature makes it quite clear, however, that for a majority of international migrants, the money they earn is regarded not as an end in itself but as instrumental to various social objectives. Important among these is a desire for independence, security, and the esteem of one's neighbors in the home village. For many if not most international migrants, their move is part of a grand design, frequently involving the extended family, in which departures, returns and investments are carefully planned as steps toward the attainment of a more prestigious and secure

socio-economic status within the home community. Once this reality is grasped, migrant behavior, often superficially irrational, ostentatious and wasteful, can be seen to have an underlying order and reason as measured against the standards of the village. Unless this reality is understood, sending country governments will be handicapped in their efforts to create institutions capable of taking advantage of the development opportunities provided by emigration.

We also infer from our literature review, that international migration is unlikely to lead to markedly accelerated social or political development. The research on return migration, remittance use and women all suggest that while emigrants and their dependents quickly learn to adapt those parts of their behavior that are most immediately affected by international migration, these changes are relatively superficial. Thus emigrants may acquire an air of sophistication in that they become accustomed to dealing with banks and consulates and learn to submit to the discipline of the workplace. Their expectations for the future and their behavior on their return home, however, continue to reflect the values of the home community. This should not be surprising since the enclave conditions in which most labor migrants live isolate them from life of the host community which might otherwise help to broaden their horizons. Similarly, in the home community, dependents soon learn to accommodate to changes

brought about by international migration: a decrease in the labor supply, for example, or an increase in cash incomes. The small literature suggests, however, that apart from these changes in economic behavior, the overall pattern of social life continues much as before.

It would be absurd to imply that international migration exerts no influence on social development. Throughout this report we have documented migration-inspired changes in several domains. Within the family there is evidence of increasing nucleation and changing authority relations. In the community, researchers report changing patterns of social relations, especially those organized around agricultural work. On the basis of the literature, however, we have no way of assessing the development consequences of these changes. Moreover, it is difficult to separate the changes brought about by migration from other changes consequent on the development process in general. On the basis of the scanty empirical literature, however, and with due acknowledgement of the important issues that have not been explored, it seems reasonable to infer that international migration has not yet acted as a strongly mobilizing force for social change.

Before concluding, we would like to draw attention to one more feature of international migration which has implications for the direction of future research. It seems clear that the development consequences of international migration cannot be fully understood unless emigration is

recognized to be a cumulative process, kept going by its own internal dynamic. It has generally been found that within the sending country or community, the loss of young people has brought about changes which themselves alter the total socio-economic environment in ways that encourage further out-migration. These changes are most evident in the small communities or small-scale societies studied by anthropologists, where the loss of young people quickly results in changing patterns of production and an eventual in a loss of jobs. Under these conditions, young people are increasingly forced to emigrate in search of work.

It is entirely conceivable that under certain conditions the direction of the cumulative spiral of events could change, as happened in one part of Mexico where migrants used their savings to start a new industry that eventually provided employment for the entire neighborhood. The important point, however, is that migration is not a static event but a process. Elucidation of the dynamics of the process itself, as well as identification of the mechanisms whereby it exerts its influence on socio-economic development, calls for detailed study of the same sending community carried out through time. To date, probably because of data limitations, a disproportionate amount of empirical research has been cross-sectional and has dealt with short-term effects. There is now a need to expand the focus of research in order to get a clearer picture of the cumulative effects of emigration on development.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abadan-Unat, Turkish Workers in Europe, 1960-1975.  
Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976.
- Abadan-Unat, "Implications of Migration on Emancipation and Pseudo-Emancipation." International Migration Review 11, 1 (1977), pp. 31-57.
- Abadan-Unat, "Turkish External Migration and Social Mobility." In Turkey: Geographic and Social Perspectives. Ed. Peter Benedict, Erol Tümertekin and Fatma Mansur. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974, pp. 362-402.
- Abadan-Unat, Nermin. "Turkish Migration to Europe and the Middle East; Its Impact on Social Legislation and Social Structure." Paper prepared for the Social Science Research Council Conference on Social Legislation and Social Structure in the Contemporary Near and Middle East, Rabat, Morocco, Sept. 25-29, 1981.
- Abella, Manolo I. Export of Filipino Manpower. Unidentified report given to Keely in the summer of 1978. I guess its date must be about 1978. The author later left the Philippines to work for ILO in Bangkok.
- Adams, Walter. The Brain Drain. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1968.
- Adler, Stephen. International Migration and Dependence. Westmead, Fairborough: Saxon House, 1977.
- Adler, Stephen. A Turkish Conundrum: Emigration, Politics and Development; 1961-1980. I.L.O. World Employment Program, Migration for Employment Project. Working Paper No. 52. Geneva: ILO, 1981.
- Adler, Stephen. "International Migration and Dependency Theory: The Case of France and Algeria." Paper presented at the American Political Science Association, Annual Meetings, Washington D.C. Sept. 1-4, 1977.
- Aiboni, Sam Amaize. Protection of Refugees in Africa. Uppsala: Swedish Institute of International Law, 1978.

- Allen, B. J. "Markets, Migration and the Mangaians." In Pacific Peasantry: Case Studies of Rural Societies. Palmerston North: New Zealand Geographical Society, 1969.
- Allman, J. and J. May. "Haitian International Migration, 1950-1980: Recent Trends and Their Implications." Columbia University, Center for Population and Family Health, 1979. (Mimeo).
- Alvarez, David. The Consequences of Migration in the United States on Men from Monterrey and Cedral, Mexico. Unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Texas, Austin, 1970.
- Amin, Samir. Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974(a).
- Amin, Samir. "Modern Migrations in West Africa." Modern Migrations in West Africa. Ed. Samir Amin. London: Oxford University Press, 1974(b), pp. 65-123.
- Anani, J. A. "The Labor Situation in Jordan: Paper prepared for the Seminar on Population, Employment, and Migration in the Arab Gulf States, Arab Planning Institute, Kuwait, December 1978, pp. 359-376.
- Ashraf Ali, Sayed. Home Remittances by Bangladesh Nationals Working Abroad. World Bank Project on Export of Manpower from Bangladesh to the Middle East, December 1979. Mimeo.
- Badran, Nabil. "Palestinian Migration: Trends and Socio-Economic Consequences." Paper prepared for the ECWA Conference on International Migration in the Arab World. Cyprus, 9-14 May 1981.
- Ballard, Roger and Catherine Ballard. "The Sikhs: The Development of South Asian Settlements in Britain." In Between Two Cultures. Ed. James L. Watson. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977, pp. 21-56.
- Barkin, Solomon. "The Economic Costs and Benefits and Human Gains and Disadvantages of International Migration." The Journal of Human Resources 2, 4 (Fall 1967), pp. 495-517.
- Barnes, Thomas J. Of All the 36 Alternatives: Indochinese Resettlement in America, Washington, D.C. U.S. Department of State, Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy, 1977.

- Barton, Josef. Peasants and Strangers: Italians, Rumanians and Slovaks in an American City, 1890-1950. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975.
- Barton, Josef. Brief Ethnic Bibliography: An Annotated Guide to the Ethnic Experience in the United States. Cambridge, Mass.: Press of the Langdon Associates, 1976.
- Baučić, Ivo. "The Effects of Emigration from Yugoslavia and the Problems of Returning Workers." European Demographic Monographs. No. 2. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972.
- Begtić, M. "Yugoslav Nationals Temporarily Working Abroad." Yugoslav Survey 13, 1 (February, 1972).
- Bennećt, Brian C. "Migration and Rural Community Viability in Central Dalmatia (Croatia), Yugoslavia." In The Anthropology of Return Migration. R.E. Rhoades.(ed.) University of Oklahoma, Department of Anthropology. Papers in Anthropology. 20, 1 (Spring 1979.), pp. 75-83.
- Berg, Elliot. "The Economics of the Migrant Labor System." In Urbanization and Migration in West Africa. Ed. Hilda Kuper. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965, pp. 160-81.
- Bernard, William S. Ed. The Dynamics of Immigration Integration and Ethnic Relations. New York: American Immigration and Citizenship Conference, 1972.
- Besemeres, John F. Socialist Population Politics. White Plains, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1980.
- Bhagwati, Jagdish N. "The United States in the Nixon Era: The End of Innocence." Daedalus, Fall 1972, pp. 25-47.
- Bhagwati, Jagdish N. "The Brain Drain." In, International Labor Office, Tripartite World Conference on Employment, Income Distribution, and Social Progress, and the International Division of Labor. Background Papers, Vol. II. International Strategies for Employment. Geneva: ILO, 1976.
- Bhagwati, Jagdish N. and M. Partington, eds. Taxing the Brain Drain, I: A Proposal, and The Brain Drain and Taxation, II: Theory and Empirical Analysis. Amsterdam, New York and Oxford: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1976.

- Bhagwati, Jagdish N. and T. N. Srinivasen. "On Re-analyzing the Harris-Todaro Model: Policy Rankings in the Case of Sector-Specific Sticky Wages." American Economic Review, June 1974, pp. 251-277.
- Bilquees, Faiz and Shahnaz Hamid. "Impact of International Migration on Women and Children Left Behind." Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, n.d. (circa 1980).
- Birks, J. S. and C. A. Sinclair. A Preliminary Assessment of Labour Movement in the Arab Region: Background, Perspectives and Prospects. International Labour Organization, Migration for Employment Project. Working Paper No. WEP 2-26/WP 15. Geneva, October 1977.
- Birks, J. S. and C. A. Sinclair. The Sultanate of Oman: Economic Development, the Domestic Labor Market and International Migration. International Labor Organization, Migration for Employment Project, Working Paper No. WEP 2-26/WP 28. Geneva, June 1978.
- Birks, J. S. and C. A. Sinclair. Human Capital on the Nile: Development and Emigration in the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Democratic Republic of the Sudan. International Labour Organization, Migration for Employment Project. Working Paper No. WEP 2-26/WP 27. Geneva, May 1978(a).
- Birks, J. S. and C. A. Sinclair. Nature and Process of Labour Importing: The Arabian Gulf States of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and United Arab Emirates. International Labour Organization, Migration for Employment Project. Working Paper No. WEP 2-26/WP 30. Geneva, August 1978(c).
- Birks, J. S. and C. A. Sinclair. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Libyan Arab Jamahuiya: The Key Countries of Employment. International Labour Organization, Migration for Employment Project. Working Paper No. WEP 2-26/WP 39. Geneva, May 1979.
- Birks, J. S. and C. A. Sinclair. International Migration and Development in the Arab Region. Geneva: International Labour Office, 1980.
- Bogue, Donald J. "Internal Migration." In, The Study of Population. Philip M. Hauser and Otis Dudley Duncan, eds. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1959, pp. 486-509.

- Böhning, W. Roger. "The ILO and Contemporary International Economic Migration." International Migration Review 10, 2 (Summer 1976), pp. 145-156.
- Böhning, W. Roger. Migration, the Idea of Compensation, and the International Economic Order. ILO, World Employment Program, Migration for Employment Project. Working Papers No. 45, December 1979.
- Böhning, W. Roger. "The Economic Effects of the Employment of Foreign Workers: With Special Reference to the Labor Markets of Western Europe's Post Industrial Countries." In The Effects of the Employment of Foreign Workers. Paris: OECD, 1974.
- Böhning, W. Roger. "Basic Aspects of Immigration and Return Migration in Western Europe." International Labour Organization, Migration for Employment Project. Working Paper No. WEP 2-26/WP 1. Geneva: ILO, July 1975(a).
- Böhning, W. Roger. Mediterranean Workers in Western Europe: Effects on Home Countries and Countries of Employment. International Labour Organization, Migration for Employment Project. Working Paper No. WEP 2-26/WP 2. Geneva: ILO, July 1975(b).
- Böhning, Roger W. Future Demand for Migrant Workers in Western Europe. International Labor Office. Migration for Employment Project, Working Papers. WEP 2-26/WP 4. Geneva: ILO, 1976(a).
- Böhning, W. Roger. Emigration from the Mediterranean Basin to Industrialized Europe. University of Rome, Institute of Demography, 1976(b).
- Bovenkerk, Frank. The Sociology of Return Migration: A Bibliographic Essay. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974.
- Briggs, Vernon, Jr. "Mexican Workers in the United States Labor Market: A Contemporary Dilemma." International Law Review 112 (November 1975), pp. 351-368.
- Brody, David. Steelworkers in America. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960.
- Brody, Hugh. Irishkillane: Change and Decline in the West of Ireland. London: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1973.

- Burki, Shahid Javed. "What Migration to the Middle East May Mean for Pakistan." December 1979. (No institutional affiliation or publication details given for this mimeographed paper.)
- Bustamente, Jorge. "Undocumented Migration from Mexico: Research Report." International Migration Review 11, 2 (1977), pp. 149-177.
- Caldwell, John C. African Rural-Urban Migration: The Movement to Ghana's Towns. London: Hurst, 1969.
- Cardoso, Fernando Henrique and Enzo Faletto. Dependency and Development in Latin America. Transl. by Margory M. Urquidi. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979. (First published in Spanish in 1971).
- Castells, Manuel. "Travailleurs immigrés et luttes de classe." Politique d'aujourd'hui. March-April 1975.
- Castles, Stephen and Godula Kosack. Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe. London: Oxford University Press, 1973.
- Castro-Almeida, Carlos. "Consultative Participation and the Role of Immigrants' Associations in Relation to the Country of Origin (Interrelationship with the Country of Employment)." International Migration 17, 1-2 (1979), pp. 189-208.
- CEPAM, Acontecer Migratorio, Vol. 1, No. 7 (October-December 1978); Vol. 2, No. 9 (March-April, 1979).
- Cerase, Francisco P. "Migration and Social Change: Expectations and Reality. A Case Study of Return Migration from the United States to Southern Italy." International Migration Review. 8,2, 2, 1974. pp. 245-62.
- Chandavarkar, Anand G. "Use of Migrants' Remittances in Labor Exporting Countries." Finance and Development. 17,2, June 1980, pp. 36-39.
- Chaney, Elsa M. "Foreword: The World Economy and Contemporary Migration." International Migration Review. Special Issue: Caribbean Migration to New York. Vol. 13, Summer 1979, pp. 204-211.
- Chaney, Elsa M. Women in International Migration: Issues in Development Planning. Report prepared for the Office of Women and Development, USAID. AID/OTR-147-80-46. June 1980.

- Chekir, Hafeedh and Jean-Pierre Garson, "North African Migration in the Arabian Gulf." Paper presented at the Economic Commission for West Africa Conference on International Migration in the Arab World, Nicosia, 11-16 May 1981.
- Choucri, Nazli. "The New Migration in the Middle East: A Problem for Whom?" International Migration Review 11, 4 (Winter 1977), pp. 421-443.
- Clark, Victor S. "Mexican Labor in the United States." U.S. Bureau of Labor Bulletin, 78 (September 1908), pp. 466-522.
- Cnossen, T. "Integration of Refugees: Some Observations on the Hungarians in Canada." Research Group for European Migration Problems, Supplement No. 7, June 1964.
- Cockcroft, James D., André Gunder Frank and Dale L. Johnson. Dependence and Development: Latin America's Political Economy. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1972.
- Cohen, John M. and David B. Lewis. "Capital Surplus, Labor-Short Economies: Yemen as a Challenge to Rural Development Strategies." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 61, 3 (August 1979), pp. 523-528.
- Commerce Research Bureau. "Inward Remittances into Kerala." Commerce. December 9, 1978, pp. 976-980.
- Connell, John, Biplab Dasgupta, Roy Laishley and Michael Lipton. Migration From Rural Areas: The Evidence from Village Studies. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1976.
- Cornelius, Wayne. "Mexican Migration to the United States: Causes, Consequences, and U.S. Responses." MIT, Center for International Studies, Migration and Development Study Group. Cambridge, Mass., July 1978.
- Cornelius, Wayne. Mexican and Caribbean Migration to the United States: A Report to the Ford Foundation. 1979. Draft.
- Cornelius, Wayne and Juan Diez-Canedo. "Mexican Migration to the United States: The View from Rural Sending Communities." MIT, Center for International Studies, Migration and Development Study Group. Cambridge, Mass., June 1976.

- Cornell University, Rural Development Participation Project. Rural Development and Local Organization in Hajja and Hoderdah, Vol. I. Ithaca: Cornell University, 1980. Mimeo.
- Dahya, Badr. "Pakistanis in Britain, Transients or Settlers?" Race (1973), 14,3, pp. 241-277.
- Deutsch, Karl W. "Social Mobilization and Political Development." American Political Science Review 55, 3 (September 1961), pp. 493-514. A slightly abridged version of the paper is reprinted in Political Development and Social Change. Eds. Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1971, pp. 384-405.
- Diarra, Fatoumata A. "Les relations entre les hommes et les femmes et les migrations des Zarma." In International African Seminar, No. 11. Modern Migrations in Western Africa. Samir Amin ed. London: Oxford University Press for the International African Institute. 1972, pp. 226-38.
- Diaz-Briquets, Sergio. International Migration Within Latin America and the Caribbean: A Review of Available Evidence. Paper, prepared for the Population Reference Bureau, Inc., April 1980 (Mimeo).
- Diez-Canedo. "Migration Return and Development in Mexico." Ph.D. dissertation. MIT, Department of Economics, 1979.
- Dinerman, Ina R. "Patterns of Adaptation Among Households of U.S.-Bound Migrants from Michoacan, Mexico." International Migration Review 12, 4 (Winter 1978), pp. 485-501.
- Domingues, Jorge I. "Comparative Politics in the Caribbean." Paper presented at the Joint Seminar on Political Development, Harvard University and MIT, December 1978.
- Douglass, W. A. "Peasant Emigrants: Reactors or Agents." In Migration and Anthropology. R.F. Spencer, ed. Seattle: University of Oregon Press, 1970.
- Ebanks, G. Edward. "Barbados." In Population Policies in the Caribbean. Aaron L. Segal, ed. Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Company, 1975.

- Ecevit, Zafer H. "Labor Imports/Exports for Economic Development--The Middle East Experience." South Asia Country Programs Department, India Division. The World Bank. Washington, D.C., 1979. Mimeo.
- Ecevit, Zafer H. "International Labor Migration in the Middle East and North Africa: Trends, Effects and Policies." In Global Trends in Migration. Eds. Mary M. Kritz, Charles B. Keely and Silvano M. Tomasi. New York: Center for Migration Studies of New York, Inc., 1981, pp. 259-275.
- Ecevit, Zafer H. and K. C. Zachariah. "International Labor Migration." Finance and Development 15, 4 (1978), pp. 32-37.
- The Economist. 24 February 1979. pp. 22-33.
- The Economist. 3 March 1979. Survey, pp. 1-22. "From Rags to Riches."
- The Economist. 18 August 1979. pp. 92-93. "Migrating to Work."
- Eisenstadt, Shmuel Noah. The Absorption of Immigrants. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954.
- Elkan, Walter. "Migrant Labor in Africa: An Economist's Approach." American Economic Review. 49,2, May 1959, pp. 189-97.
- Elkan, Walter. "Labor Migration from Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland." Economic Development and Cultural Change. 28, 3, April 1980, pp. 583-96.
- Erickson, Charlotte. American Industry and the European Immigrant, 1860-1885. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957.
- Fann, K. T. and Donald C. Hodges, eds. Readings in US Imperialism. Boston: Porter-Sargent, 1971.
- Far Eastern Economic Review. 26 September 1980. "Exported . . . then Exploited."
- Farrell, Trevor M. A. "The Unemployment Crisis in Trinidad and Tobago: Its Current Dimensions and Some Projections to 1985." Social and Economic Studies. 27,2, June 1978, pp. 117-52.
- Fei, John C. H. and Gustav Ranis. Development of the Labor Surplus Economy: Theory and Policy. Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, 1964.

- Feindt, W. and H. L. Browning. "Return Migration: Its Significance in an Industrial and in an Agrarian Town in Mexico." International Migration Review. 6, 1972, pp. 158-65.
- Fields, G. "Rural-Urban Migration, Urban Unemployment and Underemployment." Journal of Development Economics (Amsterdam), June 1975, pp. 165-187.
- Foerster, Robert F. The Italian Emigration of Our Times. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1919.
- Foner, Nancy. "The Jamaicans: Cultural and Social Change Among Migrants in Britain." In Between Two Cultures. James L. Watson, ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977, pp. 120-150.
- Form, W. H. and J. Rivera. "The Place of Returning Migrants in a Stratification System." Rural Sociology. 23, 1958, pp. 286-97.
- Fragomen, Austin T., Jr. The Illegal Alien: Criminal or Economic Refugee? New York: Center for Migration Studies, 1973.
- France, Secretariat of State for Immigrant Workers. La Nouvelle Politique de l'Immigration, n.d. (Circa 1978), pp. 18-20.
- Franda, Marcus. "India, Iran and the Gulf." American Universities Field Staff Report, No. 17. 1978.
- Freeman, Gary P. Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies: The French and British Experience, 1945-1975. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979.
- Friedlander, Stanley L. Labor Migration and Economic Growth: The Case of Puerto Rico. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965.
- Galbraith, John K. The Nature of Mass Poverty. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979.
- Gans, Herbert J. The Urban Villagers. New York: The Free Press, 1962.
- Garcia-Mora, Manuel R. International Law and Asylum as a Human Right. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1956.

- Gilani, Ijaz, in collaboration with Fahim Khan, Munawar Iqbal, et.al. "Pakistani Emigration to the Middle East: A Cost-Benefit Analysis (Summary of findings)." Paper prepared as part of the World Bank, UNICEF and Government of Pakistan Project on International Migration. Undertaken by Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad. 1980 (Mimeo).
- Gillespie, Francis and Harley Browning. "The Effect of Emigration Upon Socioeconomic Structure: The Case of Paraguay." International Migration Review 13. 3, Fall 1979, pp. 502-18.
- Glaessel-Brown, Eleanor E. "Seasonal Labor Migration on Hispaniola: A Policy of Convenience." In Patterns of Policy: Comparative and Longitudinal Studies of Population Events. John Montgomery, Harold D. Lasswell, Joel S. Migdal, eds. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1979, pp. 235-56.
- Goldthorpe, John H., David Lockwood, Frank Bechhofer and Jennifer Platt. The Affluent Worker: Industrial Attitudes and Behavior. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968(a).
- Goldthorpe, John H. et al. The Affluent Worker: Political Attitudes and Behavior. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968(b).
- Goldthorpe, John H. et al. The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969.
- Gordon, Monica H. "Caribbean Migration: A Perspective on Women." In Black and Hispanic Female Migration. Ed. Delores Mortimer. The Smithsonian Institution, Research Institute on Immigration and Ethnic Studies, 1980.
- Grahl-Madsen, Arle. The Status of Refugees in International Law, Vol. II, Asylum, Entry and Sojourn. Leiden: A. W. Sijhoff, 1972.
- Green, Paul R. "Wanted: Joint Ventures Africa/Latin America Call: Overseas Construction Association of Korea." World Wide Projects. October/November 1978. pp. 76-85.
- Gregory, Joel W. "Underdevelopment, Dependence and Migration in Upper Volta." In The Politics of Africa: Dependence and Development. Halifax: Longman and Dalhousie University Press, 1979, pp. 73-94. (Dalhousie African Studies Series).

- Gregory, Joel W. and Victor Piché. "African Migration and Development Capitalism." African Perspectives. 1, 1978. Leiden: African Studies Center, 1978.
- Griffin, Keith. "On the Emigration of the Peasantry." World Development 4,5, 1976, pp. 353-61.
- Griffiths, Stephen. "Emigration and Entrepreneurship in a Philippine Peasant Village." In The Anthropology of Return Migration. Robert A. Rhoades, ed. Papers in Anthropology, Vol. 20, No. 1: Department of Anthropology, University of Oklahoma. Spring 1979, pp. 137-143.
- Gulliver, P. H. "Nyakusa Labour Migration." Rhodes-Livingston Journal (Lusaka) 21 (1957), pp. 32-63.
- Habibullah, A. K. Md. Demand for Manpower in the Middle East and Prospects and Possibilities of Manpower Export from Bangladesh. World Bank Survey on the Export of Manpower from Bangladesh to the Middle East. January 1979. Mimeo.
- Halliday, Fred. "Migration and the Labor Force in the Oil Producing States of the Middle East." Development and Change 8 (1977), pp. 263-91.
- Hanson, Christopher T. "Behind the Paper Curtain: Asylum Policy versus Asylum Practice." New York University Review of Law and Social Change. Winter, 1978.
- Harewood, Jack. The Population of Trinidad and Tobago. 1974. World Population Year. C.I.C.R.E.D. Series. 1975.
- Harris, M. "Labour Migration Among the Moçambique Thonga: Cultural and Political Factors." Africa 29 (1959), pp. 50-66.
- Henderson, Gregory. Emigration of Highly Skilled Manpower from the Developing Countries. New York: UNITAR (United Nations Institute for Training and Research), 1970.
- Hendricks, Glenn. The Dominican Diaspora: From the Dominican Republic to New York City--Villagers in Transition. Teachers College, Columbia University, NY: Teachers College Press, 1974.
- Hilal, J. M. Family, Marriage and Social Change in Some Libyan Villages. Unpublished M. Litt. thesis, University of Durham, 1969.

- Hinds, Donald. Journey to an Illusion: The West Indian in Britain. London: Heinemann, 1966.
- Hirschman, Albert O. The Strategy of Development. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1958.
- Hoffman-Novotny, H. J. Soziologie des Fremdarbeiter Problems. Stuttgart: Ferdinande Enke, 1973.
- Hoffman-Novotny, H. J. Migration: Ein Beitrag zu einer Soziologischen Aufklärung. Stuttgart, 1970.
- Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968.
- Indian Statistical Institute. The National Sample Survey, No. 53, Tables with Notes on Internal Migration. Delhi, 1962.
- India Today. Vol.2, No.2, 1979. pp. 18-25. "Chasing a Mirage."
- Inter-American Development Bank. Paper presented at the Global conference of the Future. Toronto, Canada, July 21, 1980. (Robert W. Fox).
- International Center for Research on Women. Women in Migration: A Third World Focus. Report prepared for the Office of Women in Development, U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C. June 1979.
- International Labor Office. Employment, Incomes and Equality: A Strategy for Increasing Productive Employment in Kenya. Geneva: ILO, 1972.
- International Labor Office. Small Enterprise Development: Policies and Programmes. Geneva: ILO, 1977.
- Islam, Rizwanul. "Export of Manpower from Bangladesh to the Middle-East Countries: The Impact of Remittance Money on Household Expenditure." National Foundation for Research on Human Resource Development, Dacca. April 1980.
- Jayme, Rebecca B. "Implications of Labor Emigration from the Philippines" (approximate title). Master's thesis from the Department of Economics at the University of the Philippines, Quezon City. (Mimeo, no date. Circa 1978-79.)

- Johnson, G. "The Structure of Rural-Urban Migration Models." East African Economic Review (Nairobi), June 1971, pp. 21-28.
- Johnson, Harry G. "An Internationalist Model." In The Brain Drain. Ed. Walter Adams. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1968, pp. 69-91.
- Johnson, Kenneth F. Mexican Democracy: A Critical View. Rev. ed. New York: Praeger Special Studies, 1978.
- Johnson, Kenneth F. and Miles W. Williams. Illegal Aliens in the Western Hemisphere. New York: Praeger, 1981.
- Kahn, Verity. "The Pakistanis: Miripuri Villagers at Home and in Bradford." In Between Two Cultures. James L. Watson, ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977, pp. 57-89.
- Kayser, Bernard. Manpower Movements and Labour Markets. Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1971.
- Keely, Charles B. Asian Worker Migration to the Middle East. Center for Policy Studies, Working Paper, No. 52. New York: The Population Council, 1980.
- Kemper, Robert V. Migration and Adaptation: Tzintzuntzan Peasants in Mexico City. Sage Library of Social Research, Vol. 43. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1977.
- Kenny, Michael. "The Return of the Spanish Emigrant." Nord Nytt 2. 1972, pp. 119-29.
- Kindleberger, Charles P. Europe's Postwar Growth: The Role of Labor Supply. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967.
- King, Timothy. "Population Growth, International Resource Transfers, and International Migration." Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, Population and Human Resources Division, Discussion paper No. 37, August 1981.
- Kiray, Mübeccel, B. "The Family of the Immigrant Worker." Turkish Workers in Europe, 1960-1975. Nermin Abadan-Unat, ed. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976, pp. 210-34.
- Knight, Allan D. Scientists Abroad. Paris: UNESCO, 1971.

- Kölan, Tufan. "An Analysis of Individual Earnings Effect Due to External Migration." In Turkish Workers in Europe, 1960-1975. Nermin Abadan-Unat, ed. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976, pp. 139-53.
- Korman, Gird. Industrialization, Immigrants and Americanizers: The View from Milwaukee, 1800-1921. Madison, Wisconsin: The State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1967.
- Kosack, Godula. "Migrant Women: The Move to Western Europe--A Step Towards Emanicipation?" Race and Class. 17,4, 1976, pp. 369-79.
- Krane, Ronald E. International Labor Migration in Europe. New York: Praeger, 1979.
- Kritz, Mary M. "International Migration Patterns in the Caribbean Basin: An Overview." In Global Trends in Migration, ed. Kritz, Keely and Tomasi, pp. 208-233.
- Kritz, Mary M., Charles B. Keely and Silvano M. Tomasi, Global Trends in Migration. New York: The Center for Migration Studies of New York, Inc., 1981.
- Kudat, Ayse. "Sociological Impacts of Turkish Migration." International Institute for Comparative Social Studies of the Science Center, Berlin, Reprint Series, No. p/74-7, November 1974.
- Kuper, Hilda. An African Aristocracy: Rank Among the Swazi. London: Oxford University Press for the International African Institute, 1974.
- Landstreet, Barent F. Cuban Population Issues in Historical and Comparative Perspective. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, Latin American Studies Program, Dissertation Series, No. 75, 1976.
- Le Problème de la Main-d'oeuvre au Congo Belge. Rapport Général de la Commission de la Main-d'oeuvre indigène, 1930-31. M. le Major A. Cayen (rapporteur). Bruxelles, 1931.
- Lea, D. A. M. Abelam Land and Sustenance: Swidden Horticulture in an Area of High Population Density, Maprik, New Guinea. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Australian National University, 1964.
- Lee, Everett S. "A Theory of Migration." Demography 3, 1 (1966), pp. 47-57.

- Lewis, Oscar. "Mexico Since Cárdenas." In Social Change in Latin America Today. Ed. Richard N. Adams et al. New York: Vintage Books, 1961.
- Lewis, W. Arthus. "Development With Unlimited Supplies of Labor". In The Manchester School. 22, May 1954. pp. 139-191.
- Lieberman, Samuel S. and Ali S. Fitmez. "Turkey." In International Labor Migration in Europe. Ed. Ronald E. Krane. New York: Praeger, 1979, pp. 201-220.
- Lipton, Michael. "Migration from Rural Areas of Poor Countries: The Impact on Rural Productivity and Income Distribution." Employment and Rural Development Division, Development Economics Department. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Washington, DC, 1976.
- Lipton, Michael and Firn, J. The Erosion of a Relationship: Britain and India Since 1960. London, Oxford University Press, 1974.
- Livi-Bacci, Massimo and M. H. Hagmann. Report on the Demographic and Social Pattern of Migrants in Europe, Especially With Regard to International Migration. Strasbourg Council of Europe. 1971.
- Lopreato, J. Peasants No More: Social Class and Social Change in an Underdeveloped Society. Chandler, San Francisco. 1967.
- Lowenthal, David. West Indian Societies. London: Oxford University Press, 1972.
- Lowenthal, David. "New York's Hispanic Immigrants." The Geographical Review 99, 1 (1976), pp. 90-92.
- Lowenthal, David and Lambros Comitas. "Emigration and Depopulation: Some Neglected Aspects of Population Geography." Geographical Review, 52, 1962, pp. 195-210.
- Lutz, V. "Some Structural Aspects of the Southern Problem: The Complementarity of Emancipation and Industrialization." Bauca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, 14, 1961.
- Marshall, Adriana. The Import of Labour. Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1973.

- Marshall, Dawn. "The International Politics of Caribbean Migration." In The Restless Caribbean: Changing Patterns of International Relations. Eds. Richard Millett and W. Marvin Will. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979, pp. 42-50.
- Martin, Jean I. Refugee Settlers: A Study of Displaced Persons in Australia. Canberra: The Australian University, 1965.
- McArthur, Harold J., Jr. "The Effects of Overseas Work on Return Migrants and their Home Communities: A Philippine Case." In Robert A. Rhoades. The Anthropology of Return Migration. pp. 85-104.
- McClelland, Donald H. The Economy of the Arab Republic of Yemen. (Draft). A report for AID/W, NE/DP/Planning, September 1979.
- Manners, Robert A. "Remittances and the Unit of Analysis in Anthropological Research." Southwestern Journal of Anthropology. 21,3, Autumn, 1965. pp. 179-195.
- Marwick. The Swazi. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 1940.
- Mayano, D. M. "Individual Correlates of Coffee Adoption in the New Guinea Highlands." Human Organization. 32, 3, 1973. pp. 305-314.
- Mendez, José Ignacio Cases. "The Migrant's Participation in the Political Life of His Country of Origin in the Context of his Integration." International Migration, 17,1/2, 1979. pp. 209-225.
- The Middle East, March 1979, pp. 106-107. "Middle East 'Labor Exporters' Seek Returns."
- Mill, John S. Principles of Political Economy. Ed. W. J. Ashley. London: Longmans Green and Co., 1909.
- Miller, Duncan. "Exportation of Labor." In Nermin Abadan-Unat, ed. Turkish Workers in Europe. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976.
- Miller, Mark J. The Problem of Foreign Worker Participation and Representation in France, Switzerland and the Federal Republic of Germany. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1978. (Three vols.)

- Mines, Richard. Las Animas, California. Division of Agricultural Sciences, University of California, San Diego, April 1980. Mimeo.
- Mines, Richard and Alain de Janvry. "Changing Patterns of Mexican Migration to the United States: A Case Study." University of California, Division of Agricultural Sciences, Working Paper No. 149, August 1980.
- Miracle, Marvin P. and Berry, Sara S. "Migrant Labour and Economic Development." Oxford Economic Papers, 22, 1, 1970. pp. 86-108.
- Mitchell, J. Clyde. "Africans in Industrial Towns in Northern Rhodesia." In Report of the Duke of Edinburgh's Study Conference. London: Oxford University Press, 1957.
- Mitchell, J. Clyde. "Structural Plurality, Urbanization and Labour Circulation in Southern Rhodesia." In Jackson, J.A., ed. Migration. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1969.
- Mock, Leslie Page and Louise A. Tilly. "Immigrant Women in the City: Comparative Perspectives." University of Michigan, Center for Research on Social Organization. Working Paper No. 205. September 1979.
- Moran, Ricardo. "International Migration and World Poverty--Background and Notes on Some Issues and Magnitudes." Unpublished Discussion Paper, Washington, D.C. The World Bank, January 1980. Mimeo.
- Mueller, Martha. Women and Men in Rural Lesotho: The Periphery of the Periphery. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Brandeis University, 1977.
- Mueller, Martha. "Women and Men, Power and Powerlessness in Lesotho." Signs 3,1, Autumn, 1977(a). pp. 154-166.
- Myntti, Cynthia. Report on Female Participation in Formal Education, Training Programs, and the Modern Economy in the Yemen Arab Republic. Report to AID, April 1978.
- Myntti, Cynthia. "Population Processes in Rural Yemen: Temporary Emigration, Breastfeeding, and Contraception," Studies in Family Planning 10,10, October 1979. p.382-389.

- Myrdal, Gunnar. Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions. London: Gerald Duckworth, 1957.
- Nag, Moni. "How Modernization Can Also Increase Fertility." Current Anthropology, 21,5, October 1980. pp. 571-587.
- North, David S., and Marion F. Houston. The Characteristics and Role of Illegal Aliens in the U.S. Labor Market: An Exploratory Study. Washington, D.C.: Linton, 1976.
- Okoye, Chike S. Migration in Sierra Leone. Report prepared for the World Bank. OECD project on Demographic Aspects of Migration in West Africa. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1979.
- Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The Migratory Chain. Paris, 1978.
- Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Staff of the Development Centre. "Economic Consequences of Migration from North Africa to France." Development Digest 17, 4 (October 1979), pp. 102-115.
- Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Migration in West Africa. Report of the Seminar held in Ovagadougou, Upper Volta, January 16-19, 1979. Paris: OECD, 1979.
- Paine, Suzanne. Exporting Workers: the Turkish Case. London: Cambridge University Press, 1974.
- Papademetriou, Demetrios G. "The Effects of Labor Migration in and to Europe on the Countries of Worker Origin." Paper prepared for the International Studies Association Annual Meeting, Toronto, Canada, 25-29 February 1976.
- Patterson, Orlando. "Migration in Caribbean Societies: Socioeconomic and Symbolic Resource." Human Migration. Eds. William H. McNeil and Ruth Adams. Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1978, pp. 106-145.
- Pekin, Huseyin. "Participation of Migrants in the Political Life of their Country of Origin in the Context of their Adaptation (with Special Consideration of the Situation in Turkey)." International Migration. 27,1/2, 1979. pp.226-229.
- Philippines, Institute of Labor and Manpower Studies. "Filipino Migrant Workers in Iran,". Mimeo. 1978.

- Philippines, Overseas Employment Development Board, "Overseas Employment: The Philippine Experience." Undated. Mimeo. n.d. (circa 1978).
- Philpott, Stewart B. "The Implications of Migration for Sending Societies." In Migration and Anthropology. R.F. Spencer, ed. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1970.
- Philpott, Stuart B. West Indian Migration: the Monserrat Case. New York: Humanities Press, 1973.
- Piore, Michael J. Birds of Passage. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
- Piore, Michael J. "Undocumented Workers and U.S. Immigration Policy." MIT, Center for International Studies, Migration and Development Studies Group, 1977.
- Porter, R. C. Labor Migration and Urban Unemployment in Less Developed Countries: Comment. University of Michigan, Discussion Paper, No. 29. Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1971.
- Portes, Alejandro. "Migration and Underdevelopment." Paper prepared for the American Political Science Association, Annual Meetings, Chicago, September 1977. Duke University, Department of Sociology, Latin American Immigration Project, Occasional Papers, November, 1977.
- Portes, Alejandro. "International Labor Migration and National Development." Paper prepared as a contribution to the Immigration and Refugee Project sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation. New York, November 1981. Mimeo.
- Powelsland, P. Q. Economic Policy and Labour: A Study in Uganda's Economic History. Kampala, Uganda. East African Institute of Social Research, East African Studies, No. 10.
- Power, Jonathan. Migrant Workers in Western Europe and the United States. Pergamon Press: Oxford, 1979.
- Power, Jonathan. "The Great Debate on Illegal Immigration: Europe and the U.S. Compared." Journal of International Affairs 33, 2 (Winter 1979), pp. 239-248.
- Prebisch, Raoul. The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems. New York: United Nations, 1950.

- Rahman, Quazi Mafizur. "Cost of Training Migrants." World Bank Study of Manpower from Bangladesh in the Middle East." Institute of Statistical Research and Training, University of Dacca, January 1980. Mimeo.
- Ranis, Gustav and John C. H. Fei. "A Theory of Economic Development." American Economic Review. 51, September 1961. pp. 533-565.
- Ravenstein, E. G. "The Laws of Migration." Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 48, Part 2 (June 1885), pp. 167-227.
- Ravenstein, E. G. "The Laws of Migration." Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 52 (June 1889), pp. 241-301.
- Reichert, Josh and Douglas Massey. "Patterns of U.S. Migration from a Mexican Sending Community: A Comparison of Legal and Illegal Migrants." International Migration Review 13, 4 (Winter 1979), pp. 599-623.
- Reichert, Josh and Douglas Massey. "Guestworker Programs: Evidence from Europe and the United States and Some Implications for U.S. Policy." University of California, Berkeley, Institute of International Studies, Program in Population Research, Working Paper No. 1. Undated.
- Rempel, Henry and Richard A. Lobdell, "The Role of Urban-to-Rural Remittances in Rural Development." Journal of Development Studies. May, 1978. pp. 324-341.
- Rhoades, Robert E. "Intra-European Return Migration and Rural Development: Lessons from the Spanish Case." Human Organization. 37:2, 1978. pp. 136-147.
- Rhoades, Robert E. "From Caves to Main Street: Return Migration and the Transformation of a Spanish Village." In The Anthropology of Return Migration, R.E. Rhoades, ed. Papers in Anthropology, 20,1, Dept. of Anthropology, University of Oklahoma, Spring 1979. pp. 57-74.
- Rhoades, Robert E. The Anthropology of Return Migration. Papers in Anthropology, 20,1, Dept. of Anthropology, University of Oklahoma, Spring, 1979.
- Richards, Audrey I. Economic Development and Tribal Change: A Study of Immigrant Labour in Buganda. Cambridge, England: Heffer. For the East African Institute of Social Research, 1954.

- Riddell, J. C. Labour Migration and Rural Agriculture Among the Gbannah Mano of Liberia. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of Oregon, 1970.
- Rist, Ray C. Guestworkers in Germany: The Prospects for Pluralism. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1978.
- Roberts, G. W. "Growth Prospects". In Recent Population Movements in Jamaica. 1974 World Population Year. C.I.C.R.E.D. Series.
- Roberts, George W. et al. Recent Population Movements in Jamaica. Kingston, Jamaica. Country report prepared for World Population Year, 1974. C.I.C.R.E.D. Series.
- Rose, E. J. B. Colour and Citizenship: A Report on British Race Relations. London: Oxford University Press. Institute of Race Relations. 1969.
- Rosen-Prinz, Beth D. and Frederick Rosen-Prinz. Migrant Labour and Rural Homesteads: An Investigation into the Sociological Dimensions of the Migrant Labour System in Swaziland. International Labour Organization, Migration for Employment Programme, Working Paper, No. 31. Geneva: ILO, 1978.
- Rouch, Jean. Notes on Migrations into the Gold Coast. First report of the mission carried out in the Gold Coast from March to December, 1954. Accra, 1954.
- The Royal Society, Emigration of Scientists from the United Kingdom. London, 1963.
- Saket, Bassam K. "Promoting the Productive Use of Remittances." Paper presented at the ECWA Conference on International Migration in the Arab World. Nicosia, Cyprus, 11-16 May 1981.
- Sansom, R. L. The Economics of Insurgency in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam. Cambridge, Mass., 1970. (No further publication details given.)
- Sassen-Koob, Saskia. "The International Circulation of Resources and Development: The Case of Migrant Labour." Development and Change. 9, 1978. pp. 509-545.
- Schiller, Günter. "Channelling Migration: a Review of Policy." International Labor Review 3, 4 (April 1975), pp. 335-355.

- Schultz, T. P. "Rural-Urban Migration in Colombia". Review of Economics and Statistics. 53,2, 1971. pp. 157-163.
- Sebatane, E. Molapi. An Emprical Stuy ofthe Attitudes and Perceptions of Migrant Workers: The Case of Lesotho. International Labour Organization, Migration for Employment Project. Working Paper No. 42. Geneva: ILO, 1979.
- Segal, Aaron. "Bahamas." In Population Policies in the Caribbean. Aaron L. Segal, ed. Lexinton, Mass.: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Co. 1975. pp. 103-125. insert 473
- Selby, Henry A. and Arthur P. Murphy. "The Mexican Urban Household and the Decision to Migrate to the United States." Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Institutions (ISHI). Occasional Paper on Social Change, No. 4, 1981. Mimeo.
- Semmingsen, I. "Emigration and the Image of America in Europe." In Immigration and American History, H.S. Commager, ed. Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1961. pp. 26-55.
- Senior, Nassau. Political Economy. London: W. Clowes, 1836.
- Serageldin, Ismail, James Scoknat and Stace Birks. International Labor Migration in the Middle East and North Africa. World Bank, Technical Assistance and Special Studies Division, MENA Region. 1981.
- Serageldin, Ismail, James Scoknat, Stace Birks, Bob Li, and Clive Sinclair. Manpower and International Labor Migration in the Middle East and North Africa. Final Report of the Research Project on International Migration and Manpower in the Middle East and North Africa. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1981.
- Sica, Mario. "Involvement of the Migrant Worker in Local Political Life in the Host Country." International Migration. 25,213, 1977. pp. 143-152.
- Siddiqui, A. M. A. H. "Policy Implications for Bangladesh in Promoting Overseas Employment." Paper prepared for the Steering Committee of the World Bank Bangladesh Study Group Project on Migration. ILO/Asia Regional Project on Strengthening Labour Manpower Administration, Bangkok. December, 1979. Mimeo.

- Shankman, Paul. Migration and Underdevelopment: the Case of Western Samoa. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1976.
- Skinner, Elliott P. "Labor Migration Among the Mossi of the Upper Volta." In Urbanization and Migration in West Africa. Ed. Hilda Kuper. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965, pp. 60-84. insert 494
- South Pacific Commission, International Labour Organization, and United Nations Fund for Population Activities. Migration, Employment and Development in the South Pacific. Project Proposal. Suva. South Pacific Commission, 11 November 1975. Mimeo.
- SOPEMI (Continuous Reporting System on Migration). Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 1980.
- Spengler, Joseph J. "Mercantilist and Physiocratic Growth Theory." In Theories of Economic Growth. Ed. Bert F. Hoselitz. New York: The Free Press, 1960, pp. 3-64, 299-334.
- Spero, Sterling D. and Abram L. Harris. The Black Worker: The Negro and the Labor Movement. New York: Atheneum, 1968.
- Sri Lanka, Ministry of Plan Implementation. Migration of Sri Lankans to the Middle East Countries. Colombo. June 1979. Report compiled by L.K. Ruhunage.
- Stahl, C. W. "Contract Labour Migration from the Philippines: Trends and Issues." Paper presented at the Economic Commission for Western Asia Conference on International Migration in the Arab World, Nicosia, 11-16 May 1981.
- Stein, Barry N. Refugee Research Bibliography. Michigan State University, December 1979. Mimeo.
- Stein, Barry N. "The Refugee Experience: Overview of Refugee Research." Paper presented at a conference on The Refugee Experience sponsored by the Royal Anthropological Institute and the Minority Rights Group. London, England, 22-24 February 1980.
- Stein, Barry N. "Refugees and Economic Activities in Africa." Paper presented at a Refugee Seminar sponsored by the Commissioner for Refugees, Sudan, 27-30 September 1981.

- Stern, Henri. "The Aftermath of Belsen." In Flight and Resettlement. Ed. H. B. M. Murphy. Paris: UNESCO, 1955.
- Stouffer, Samuel A. "Intervening Opportunities: A Theory Relating Mobility and Distance." American Sociological Review 5 (December 1960), pp. 845-867.
- Strangeland, Charles Emil. Pre-Malthusian Doctrines of Population: A Study in the History of Economic Thought. Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, Vol. 21, No. 3. New York: Columbia University Press, 1904.
- Sudarkasa, Niara. "Women and Migration in Contemporary West Africa". Signs. 3,1, Autumn 1977. pp. 178-189.
- Sutton, Constance R. and Susan R. Makiesky. "Migration and West Indian Racial and Ethnic Consciousness." Migration and Development: Implications for Ethnic Identity and Political Conflict. Helen I. Safu and Brian M. Du Toit, eds. Mouton Publishers, The Hague, 1975. pp. 113-144.
- Swanson, Jon C. Emigration and Economic Development: The Case of the Yemen Arab Republic Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979.
- Sweeny, Christopher. "The End of a Building Boom." Far Eastern Economic Review. July 25, 1980.
- Taft, Julia V., David S. North and David A. Ford. Refugee Resettlement in the U.S.: Time for a New Focus. Washington, D.C.: New Trans Century Foundation, 1979.
- Tapinos, Georges. "The Economic Effects of Intra-Regional Migration." Paper presented at the ECWA Conference on international Migration in the Arab World, Cyprus, 9-14 May 1981.
- Tapinos, Georges. "Enquête sur les perspectives des migrations à long terme en RFA et en France." Studi Eimigrazione (Rome) 15, 50 (June 1978), pp. 213-245.
- Tapinos, Georges. "The Economics of International Migration." ECWA, Second Regional Population Conference, Damascus, 1-6 December 1979.
- Tapinos, Georges. L'économie des migrations internationales. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin et Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1974. pp. 172-191.

- Taylor, Paul S. A Spanish-Mexican Peasant Community: Arandas in Jalisco, Mexico. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1933.
- The OECD and International Migration. Paris: OECD, 1975.
- Thomas, Brinley. Migration and Economic Growth: A Study of Great Britain and the Atlantic Community. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1954.
- Thomas, Brinley. "'Modern' Migration." In The Brain Drain. Ed. Walter Adams. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968, pp. 29-49.
- Thomas, Brinley. Migration and Urban Development: A Reappraisal of British and American Long Cycles. London: Methuen, 1972.
- Tienda, Marta. "Familism and Structural Assimilation of Mexican Immigrants in the United States." University of Wisconsin, Madison. Center for Demography and Ecology. Working Paper No. 79-11, May 1979.
- Todaro, Michael P. "The Urban Employment Problem in Less Developed Countries: An Analysis of Demand and Supply." Yale Economic Essays. New Haven: Yale University, Fall 1968, pp. 329-402.
- Todaro, Michael P. "A Model of Labor Migration and Urban Unemployment in Less Developed Countries." American Economic Review, March 1969, p. 138-148.
- Todaro, Michael P. Internal Migration in Developing Countries. Geneva: ILO, 1976.
- Todaro, Michael P. and J. Harris. "Migration, Unemployment and Development: A Two-Sector Analysis." American Economic Review, March 1970, pp. 126-142.
- Tomasi, S. M. "Emigration Studies in Italy, 1975-1978," International Migration Review. 13, Summer 1979, pp. 333-346.
- Trebous, Madeline, Migration and Development: The Case of Algeria, Paris. Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development. 1970.

United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Trends and Characteristics of International Migration Since 1950. Demographic Studies, 64. New York: United Nations. 1979.

United Nations, Economic Commission for West Africa. The Population Situation in the ECWA Region. Beirut: ECWA, 1979-1980.

United Nations General Assembly. Official Records, 22nd Session, 1967. Resolution No. 2320.

United Nations General Assembly. Official Records, 23rd Session, Second Committee. Outflow of Trained Personnel from Developing Countries: Report of the Secretary-General, 1968. Document No. A/7294.

United Nations General Assembly. Official Records, 23rd Session, Second Committee. Summary Report of Meetings, 25 September - 13 December 1968.

United States Congress, House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Brain Drain: A Study of the Persistent Issue of International Scientific Mobility. Study prepared by the Sub-Committee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, 1974.

United States Congress, House of Representatives, Select Committee on Population, 95th Congress, Second Session. Legal and Illegal Immigration in the United States, 1978.

United States Departments of Justice, Labor and State. Interagency Task Force on Immigration Policy. Staff Report. Washington, D.C., 1979. Mimeo.

United States Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service. Review of Refugee Resettlement Programs and Policies. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979.

United States Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy. U.S. Immigration Policy and the National Interest. Final Report and Recommendations to the President. Washington, D.C., March 1981.

United States Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy. U.S. Immigration Policy and the National Interest. Staff Report. Washington, D.C., April 1981.

- Ugalde, Antonio, Frank Bean and Gilbert Cardenas. "International Migration from the Dominican Republic: Findings from a National Survey." Special Issue: Caribbean Migration to New York. International Migration Review. 13,2, Summer, 1979.
- Wander, Hilde. "Future Prospects of Magnitude and Trends of International Migration." Prospects of Population: Methodology and Assumptions. UN, Department of Economic and Social Population Studies. No. 67, 1979. New York: United Nations, 1979. ST/ESA/.SER.A/67. pp. 278-88.
- Watson, James L., ed. Between Two Cultures. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977.
- Watson, James L. Emigration and the Chinese Lineage. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975.
- Weiner, Myron. "Indians in the Gulf: The Beginning or the End of a Diaspora." Paper prepared for a meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Washington, D.C., March 23, 1980.
- Wiest, Raymond E. Mexican Farm Laborers in California: A Study of Intragroup Social Relations. San Francisco: Rand E. Research Associates, 1977.
- Wiest, R. Wage Labor Migration and Household Maintenance in a Central Mexican Town. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of Oregon. 1970.
- Wilie, R. W. "Towards a Behavioral Model of Peasant Migration: An Argentine Case of Spatial Behaviors by Social Class Level." Population Dynamics of Latin America. R.N. Thomas, ed. Conference of Latin American Geographers, Boston. 1973. pp. 83-114.
- Wilson, Francis. "International Migration in Southern Africa." International Migration Review, Vol. X, No. 4 (Winter 1976), pp. 451-488.
- Wilson, Paul. "The Middle East Boom Starts to Trail Off." Far Eastern Economic Review. May 11, 1979, pp. 38-40.
- Withol de Wenden, Catherine. L'Univers politique des Immigrés dans l'Aisne. Paris. Memoire du Troisième Cycle. FNSP. 1975.
- World Council of Churches. Migrant Women Speak. London: Search Press, Ltd., and Geneva: World Council of Churches, both 1978.

- Yates, Paul Lamartine. El Campo Mexicano. Two volumes. México: D. F. Ediciones El Caballito, 1978.
- Yeslam, Sulerman Faraq. "Major Issues in Sending Countries." Paper presented at the ECWA Conference on International Migration in the Arab World, Cyprus, 9-14 May 1981.
- Zacharia, K. C. Migration in the Gambia. Report prepared for the World Bank/OECD Project on Demographic Aspects of Migration in West Africa. Washington, D.C. World Bank, 1979.
- Zacharia, K. C. and Julien Condé. Demographic Aspects of Migration in West Africa. Report prepared as part of the World Bank/OECD project on Demographic Aspects of Migration in West Africa. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, June 1978.
- Zachria, K. C., R. Clairin and Julien Condé. Aperçu sur les Migrations en Afrique de l'Ouest. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Development Center CD/R(78)30. Paris: OECD, 1978.
- Ziff, George K. "The P<sup>1</sup>P<sup>2</sup>/D Hypothesis: On the Intercity Movement of Persons." American Sociological Review, December 1946, pp. 677-686.
- Zolatas, Xenophon, International Labor Migration and Economic Development. Athens: Bank of Greece, 1967.
- Zolberg, Aristide R. "The Main Gate and the Back Door: The Politics of American Immigration Policy, 1950-1976." Paper presented at a workshop of the Council on Foreign Relation, Washington, D.C., 12 April 1978(a).
- Zolberg, Aristide R. "The Patterning of International Migration Policies: A Macro-Analytic Framework." Paper presented at the World Congress of Sociology, Uppsala, Sweden, 1978(b).
- Zolberg, Aristide R. "International Migrations in Political Perspective." In Global Trends in Migration. Eds. Mary M. Kritz, Charles B. Keely and Silvano M. Tomasai. New York: Center for Migration Studies of New York, Inc., 1981, pp. 3-27.