

**Management
Support to the
Jamaica Ministry
of Agriculture
Second
Integrated Rural
Development
Project**

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April 1981



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PREFACE

This report focuses on management issues arising from the second field visit of an IRD Project team to the Jamaican Ministry of Agriculture Second Integrated Rural Development Project (IRDP).^{1/} The field work occurred between March 2 and March 20, 1981. Activities consisted of gathering information, participating in project meetings, conducting workshops, and presenting and discussing a series of management recommendations with IRDP project staff. The goal of the work was to support the capacity of project personnel at all levels to effectively plan, coordinate, manage, and evaluate IRDP activities aimed at improving farm family welfare in the project area.

The consultant team consisted of Jerry VanSant of the Research Triangle Institute (RTI) with Thomas Armor and Robert Dodd of Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI). They were joined at no cost to AID or IRDP by a student intern, Beth Jackson, who effectively combined a learning role with significant contributions to the work of the team.

The activities reported here benefited from excellent support and cooperation by IRDP staff and long-term technical assistance personnel under the leadership of Mr. Dudley Reid, the project director. Their contributions included many thoughtful insights and suggestions which have become the substance of this report. Ultimately, the value of these ideas will depend on the continuing leadership of IRDP staff in directing appropriate follow-up action.

This report briefly describes the IRDP project, reviews the activities and process of the consultant team during the field visit, and comments on several issues both of significance to the project and of potential interest to the wider development community. Annex A reproduces material provided separately to the project staff during the visit and details several specific management recommendations. Annex B lists materials and suggestions for the new project training center. Annex C reports the team's field itinerary.

^{1/}A report of the first visit, entitled "Implementing Capacity Building in Jamaica: Field Experience in Human Resource Development," is available from Development Alternatives, Research Triangle Institute, or the Development Support Bureau of AID. Jerry VanSant and Tom Armor were members of the earlier team along with George Honadle and Paul Crawford of Development Alternatives, Inc.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
PREFACE	i
1 THE PROJECT	1
2 THE PROCESS	3
3 OBSERVATIONS	7
Technical Strategy	7
Beneficiary Participation	14
Information Flow	19
The Role of Women	22
The Project Environment	24
Benefit Sustainability	29
4 THE FUTURE	33
ANNEXES	
A. IRDP MANAGEMENT ISSUES	
B. TRAINING CENTER NEEDS	
C. ITINERARY	

Section One

THE PROJECT

The Jamaican Second Integrated Rural Development Project (IRDP) is a 5-year effort jointly financed by the Jamaican Ministry of Agriculture and the Agency for International Development (AID), involving a total of US \$26 million in loans, grants, technical assistance, and host country investment. The project evolved from the activities of a United Nation's Development Programme (UNDP)/Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) field survey initiated in 1967 which later led to a recommendation for a 10-year model watershed rehabilitation project. In 1977, AID agreed to finance IRDP, based on the UNDP/FAO proposal but with an expanded scope and accelerated time schedule. Field activities actually began in 1979 and the project is now scheduled to end in 1983.

Project goals are stated as follows in the project paper:

- . To improve farmers' standard of living by increasing income and providing improved roads, housing, electricity, and water; and
- . To establish an agricultural production model that can be replicated on small hillside farms.

In support of these goals, project purposes include increasing agricultural production on small hillside farms in the project area, controlling soil erosion in targeted watersheds, and strengthening the human resource capabilities of the Jamaican Ministry of Agriculture.

The IRDP focuses on two noncontiguous watersheds in the interior highlands of Jamaica. These watersheds, Two Meetings and Pindars River, are inhabited by approximately 4,000 hillside farmers, each with an average of 2.9 acres of land. Placement of the project in nonadjacent watersheds reflects an attempt to address priority needs in two of the most important of Jamaica's 18 severely eroded watersheds. However, this strategy also greatly increases administrative demands.

Through direct farmer contact and efforts to build cooperating local farmer organizations, IRDP attempts to provide incentives for the adoption of soil conservation practices and new agricultural production methods. Approximately half of the project's expenditures are earmarked for erosion

control activities. These activities include terracing, ditching, and pastureland treatment; reforestation of over 5,000 acres of hill land; stream control (waterway and check dam construction); and engineering works.

Credit and marketing components were included in the project plan but are not closely integrated with the agricultural extension program. Improvements in roads and housing and the provision of electricity and water were also added as part of an ongoing effort to increase rural infrastructure. Additional components deal with home economics, communications, agronomy, livestock, and local organizations.

The project is managed by a special unit within the Jamaican Ministry of Agriculture. The line management chain runs from the project director to assistant directors in charge of operations in each watershed. Field activities are segmented into 20 subwatershed areas staffed by officers representing major technical components such as soil conservation, agricultural extension, and home economics.

Supporting project management are technical officers at the headquarters and watershed levels who coordinate the various technical inputs. These personnel are further backed by a long-term American technical assistance team consisting of component specialists and a team leader.

Planned project outputs are stated primarily in terms of quantitative targets for component activities, employment generation, training, and local organization development. It has been recently proposed to adjust the principal component goal of 17,700 acres of treated land to 8,500 acres due to the unwillingness of some farmers to enroll in the program. This reluctance is due largely to factors of insecure land tenure. Other midcourse adjustments in project strategy include increased emphasis on the role of local organizations and a greater focus on agricultural extension and marketing needs. These changes are a recognition that decreasing soil erosion and increasing land under cultivation cannot alone guarantee increased production and income for local farmers.

IRDP is seen by the Ministry of Agriculture as a model for potential replication in other Jamaican watersheds. As such it is an important learning opportunity. Some of what we have learned from project experience to date is discussed in section three of this report. The following section describes the process of team interaction with IRDP during this visit.

Section Two

THE PROCESS

The work reported here, performed in March 1981, is best understood as part of a longer term relationship between IRDP and the DAI/RTI IRD Project. In May 1980, an IRD Project team worked with IRDP for three weeks on management training and organization development activities. These activities resulted in a number of specific recommendations originating from various groups within the project staff. The expectation was that action on these recommendations would be taken by the project staff within about 6 months. It was also anticipated that a return visit by a DAI/RTI team would be of value again at that time. For many reasons, some within the project and some without, neither expectation was fulfilled.

The team that did return to IRDP in March, 10 months after the first visit, represented a broader mix of skills and utilized a somewhat different approach to the work from the first project team. Two team members, who had been part of the previous team, had backgrounds in project management and organization development. Two new members had backgrounds in agricultural economics and rural sociology.

The March consulting exercise was less oriented to training than the first visit and followed an evolutionary model. The character and substance of each interaction between the consultants and the project staff were most directly influenced at each turn by immediately precedent interactions and learnings. Other than two prescheduled meetings (necessitated by logistical considerations), all activities were derived from information and analysis undertaken during the 3-week visit itself. In this regard it is fair to say that the substance, process, and outcome of the consulting visit was only loosely defined by the scope of work agreed to prior to the visit. This was a desirable situation and permitted the best application of the skills and resources represented on the consulting team.

The team attempted to be responsive to the expressed needs of the project (at several levels of the management structure) while also carrying out an analysis of the project from an independent and constructively critical perspective. Although consultants and their clients frequently agree in principle to such an arrangement, it is often difficult to carry

out. Consultants can easily end up being too responsive in an effort to please the client. Alternatively, because of the limited time and information available to them as outsiders, they can be too analytical or too critical and submit recommendations that may not be credible. In addition, such "expert" recommendations are often difficult or impossible to implement in the real world.

To minimize these difficulties, the consulting team

- 1) Defined the "client" to include
 - . several individual members of the IRDP staff and several management levels of the project (in contrast to a single high-level staff member or members);
 - . USAID/Kingston. In this way the interaction between USAID and the project was included; and
 - . AID/Washington. Since this activity is centrally funded, observations must be responsive to the broader interests of the "development community;"
- 2) Responded to the specific needs of the project as outlined in the scope of work and other correspondence between the team and project staff;
- 3) Addressed analyses of IRDP management issues or problem areas in separate "stand alone" written memoranda that comprised a whole, yet could be utilized on an issue-by-issue basis by project staff as they saw fit;
- 4) Held team meetings on a regular, daily basis to share members' thoughts and ideas and discuss potential implications of planned activities from the perspective of each member;
- 5) Planned, in collaboration with project staff, appropriate actions or interventions the team could take while at the project site as a direct technical assistance input;
- 6) Identified opportunities for the four team members to work individually, in pairs, trios, or as a full team with different groups or individuals in the project; and
- 7) Reviewed the substance of this report orally with IRDP staff to gain feedback and additional input.

The diversity of professional backgrounds on the team, combined with mutual respect and interpersonal compatibility, supported such an evolu-

team developed with one or more of the project's senior staff. Issues discussed varied from technical matters to consideration of more effective ways to organize and run meetings.

In all these interactions, emphasis was placed on developing and organizing IRDP staff members' knowledge based on their close familiarity with the project. The role of the consultants was to facilitate expression of ideas and, in some cases, suggest specific solutions to identified problems. More broadly, certain observations about IRDP can be made which may be of use to project staff and of interest to the wider development community. These observations are presented in the following section.

tionary approach to the 3-week exercise. In a like manner the project staff's previous favorable experience with the IRD Project team reduced their anxiety about such a flexible scope of work. This was a somewhat unusual circumstance for a development project (and donor agency monitors). Confidence and trust were facilitated by a conscious effort to distinguish consultant activities from any sense of "evaluation." Evaluation most often means one group making decisions about the performance of another group. By defining the client to include all relevant actors, this difficulty was minimized and joint assessments were distinguished from external judgement.

In taking direct action with various groups of the project, the IRD Project team used several different formats and approaches. For example, the team made a joint presentation of seven issues and related recommendations to the entire IRDP senior staff a few days before departure. These management-related issues were identified by the team as critical for immediate project consideration and response. In addition to this presentation, each of the issues was discussed in more detail in a written memo which was prepared and returned to the project a week later (see annex A).

Another means of interaction with project staff was a meeting held with IRDP subwatershed team leaders. In this meeting the consultants worked with the team leaders for several hours to help them identify issues related to their management role in the project. These points were then discussed with senior management. Interaction between managers from different project levels provided a useful opportunity for enhanced mutual understanding.

A third, less direct approach was utilized by the consultants in supporting the training division's workshop for Development Committee leaders. In this instance the team worked closely with the workshop director in reviewing his plans for the workshop. Ideas were discussed on a collegial basis with him, but control over the agenda and leadership of the workshop was effectively maintained by the IRDP training officers whose work was evidence of their own growing capacity. Among the benefits of this workshop was valuable feedback to the project from local farmers regarding the need for better coordination of IRDP component inputs.

A less visible way of interacting with the project staff was a series of one-to-one "consultant/client" relationships that each member of the

Section Three

OBSERVATIONS

Beyond the provision of short-term technical assistance, field work such as reported here presents an opportunity to record some of what has been learned in the course of a project's life. Project staff, long-term advisers, beneficiaries, and other observers who are close to a project all accumulate valuable information and insights as the project proceeds. Often outsiders have a unique opportunity to gather, organize, and report these insights, thus providing feedback to the project and useful information on implementation issues to the wider development community.

In this case, it is possible to make certain observations based on two visits to IRDP spaced 10 months apart. These observations are organized around six topical areas:

- . Technical strategy
- . Beneficiary participation
- . Information flow
- . The role of women
- . The project environment
- . Benefit sustainability

In addition to these findings, a set of specific management-related comments and recommendations was developed and presented by the team to IRDP staff in both oral and written form prior to departure from Jamaica. These reports are contained in annex A to this report.

Technical Strategy

The goal of IRDP is to improve the living standard of hill farmers in the two project watersheds: Pindars River and Two Meetings. The planned strategy to achieve this goal is the development of a replicable model that would control soil erosion, strengthen the capacity of professional staff, and increase farm production and farmers' income.

Soil Treatment

To date, measurable progress has been made in construction of various soil and water conservation structures on the land of cooperating farmers. A large staff is in place and a relatively sophisticated administrative system exists to expand and improve the soil conservation works of the IRDP. In a strictly technical sense, the project is nearing a point where the responsible managers can claim they have developed and tested a workable--if capital intensive and perhaps paternalistic--soil conservation model, which could be replicated under similar circumstances throughout Jamaica if sufficient funds were available. In the time remaining for IRDP implementation, however, a much greater contribution could be made by this project if other, less costly soil conservation methods were developed and tested. It is very unlikely that the current capital-intensive soil conservation model will ever be replicated.

Professional Staff Capacity

From the amount and variety of local and overseas training, improved capabilities of project staff can be assumed. Indeed, from observations and reports of senior project officers, it is apparent that staff capabilities and job performance continue to improve as a result of the project. Further, the technical assistance specialists, in their advisory role, are making important contributions to development of better skills and general effectiveness of project staff. One area, however, that would benefit from more attention is general project management. Emphasis to date has been on the technical aspects of project implementation, whereas a greater concern with effective management and coordination of project components and resources evidently is needed (see annex A).

Farm Production and Farmers' Income

Limited progress has been made toward achievement of project targets in farm production. The more important question of whether IRDP has increased the net incomes, and thus the welfare, of participating farmers also cannot be answered favorably at this time. A number of reasons account for this:

To date, almost exclusive emphasis has been given to the soil conservation aspects of the project.

- . Additional time is needed following major soil conservation works before increased incomes may become evident.
- . Basic "packages" of improved technology--ones which, if applied correctly, will result in higher farmer incomes--have not yet been developed and tested by the Ministry of Agriculture or the project for widespread farmer adoption. Almost no cost/benefit analyses have been conducted on major crop and livestock enterprises to date.
- . An integrated system has not been established to link research to extension and link extension to farmers' organizations and individual farmers in order to effectively transfer knowledge about improved farming practices.

Farm Product Market Uncertainties

In addition to the above, a major reason why farmers' net incomes have not shown demonstrable increases as a result of participation in IRDP is the uncertainty of the market for farm products. There are many reasons for this:

- . Jamaica has a limited domestic market for its farm products, particularly traditional starch crops such as yellow yams. This is due, in part, to the fact that there is a small total population, a high proportion of which is engaged in farming.
- . Most of the hill farmers plant much the same crops all at roughly the same time; thus large amounts of a few farm products come on the market simultaneously.
- . The export market is limited for most of the low-value crops which make up the major part of the project farmers' output.
- . Most of these crops do not store or ship well.
- . Good storage facilities are lacking in Jamaica.
- . Few means exist to process or otherwise preserve many of the farm products produced in excess of the fresh market needs.
- . For one reason or another, Jamaicans apparently have come to prefer rice as a food staple over their own native crops. They themselves do not grow rice to any important extent; therefore it is imported to satisfy this consumer preference and competes with local staple foods in the marketplace.

The result of the above factors is a farm market that is subject to frequent gluts and serious price depressions. The Agricultural Marketing Corporation (AMC), which was organized to alleviate this situation, provides small relief because shortages of funds prevent it from offering profitable prices to farmers. Small traders (higglers) often use the low AMC price as a base price upon which to negotiate a slightly higher, but still

unsatisfactory price on farmers' products. Because farmers are not generally organized for cooperative or group marketing activities, they are easily exploited by the small traders if, in fact, there is a market at all for their products.

A Market-Oriented Project Model

It is recognized by the IRDP project director that probably the major constraint to increased farm incomes is the extreme unreliability of the market for farm products throughout the project area. A marketing component has been added to the IRDP and the staff is starting to address the difficult problems outlined above.

As a contribution to this important task, there follows a proposed project implementation model^{2/} that emphasizes marketability of farm products at the start of the farmer's production cycle. The suggestions here are meant to stimulate discussions among IRDP senior staff and officials of the Ministry of Agriculture and USAID/Kingston. Hopefully, the ideas presented will contribute to the early adoption of a fully integrated system to assist farm families to plan, grow and sell their products at reasonable profits in order to truly benefit from the project.

1. Prepare Market Priorities List (MPL)

A list should be made of all farm products (plant and animal) that have good market acceptance. The list should indicate the months when each of the products is most in demand. This list should be prioritized where possible, amended when necessary, duplicated, and put into the hands of all project officers.

2. Establish Credit Eligibility

Crop and animal production credit should be keyed to the market priorities list. No credit should be granted for products not listed on the MPL. Credit should be allowed for products with a low priority and encouraged for products with a high priority on the MPL. No credit is automatic, of course, and each situation should be evaluated in terms of the farmer's interest and abilities, soil characteristics and the availability of inputs needed for any given enterprise.

^{2/} See annex A-III for recommendations regarding management responsibility for steps in this proposed strategy.

3. Collect Technical Data

For every crop and livestock enterprise listed on the MPL, a one-page technical data sheet should be prepared indicating all critical operations in growing the crop or raising the animal. Information should be gathered from all available sources; for example, research stations, commodity boards, the Ministry of Agriculture information office, and USAID. The technical sheets should be duplicated and given to all sub-watershed officers at scheduled training courses used to explain the technical data.

4. Conduct Agronomic/Livestock Trials

Three of the present five demonstration centers should be upgraded and properly staffed to conduct meaningful adaptive research trials. (The other two centers should be closed.) These trials should be limited to crop and livestock enterprises listed on the MPL; to new crops considered to have good potential such as peanuts, sorghum, and upland rice; and to vegetable crops grown in home gardens. Information gathered from such trials may be used to amend existing technical data sheets or prepare new ones.

5. Conduct Farm Management Studies

A principal component officer in farm management should be provided at the project headquarters by the Ministry of Agriculture and a technical adviser in the same field be provided by means of a contract arrangement. These two officers should conduct basic farm commodity cost/return studies on enterprises listed on the MPL. The results of these studies can be collected into simple farm management cost/return data sheets. These should be duplicated and given to all subwatershed staff. The economic studies would be used to modify the priorities of the MPL where appropriate.

6. Implement Integrated Extension/Information Program

The following officers should be assigned full-time duties exclusively in extension education and training:

- . Principal extension officer;
- . Principal home economics officer;
- . Senior extension and home economics officers;
- . Subwatershed extension and home economics officers; (except where one of these must also serve as subwatershed team leader);

- . At least two field assistants per subwatershed; and
- . Technical assistance personnel in extension and home economics.

Each subwatershed extension officer should establish a farm visitation schedule based on the division of the area into eight working units. Each unit should be visited on one day during a fortnightly period. The other two working days are to be used for office work and/or training on subjects related to crops and livestock on the MPL, or home economics subjects important for the visits during the upcoming period. The extension system could be carried out according to the following calendar:

EXTENSION SYSTEM (Each Fortnight)

DAY	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S
UNIT TO VISIT	1	2	3	4	T*	(OFF)		5	6	7	8	T*	(OFF)	

*T = Training (The training day may vary for each subwatershed team.)

This calendar is an example of an extension officer's fortnightly field visit schedule; it is repeated every 2 weeks. Each subwatershed extension team should, whenever possible, work on the same unit schedule to reduce transportation problems and increase work effectiveness. All field visits by extension officers should be written up in a field officer's notebook. These should be simple entries concerning the officer's visit and what was accomplished. The following should be included:

- . Name or number of unit visited
- . Date of visit
- . Names of leading farmers present
- . Names of other farmers present
- . Subjects discussed/demonstrated
- . Any problems encountered
- . Recommendations made
- . Follow-up actions needed

On the days scheduled for training, subject-matter specialists from the commodity boards, project headquarters, or watershed offices should meet with the officers from one or more subwatersheds at demonstration sites, central training facilities or a particular farm, to provide in-depth training and preparation for the upcoming period of visits. Training should be specific and directly related both to the MPL and to the current

farm operations being recommended. The role of the headquarters training officers is critical in scheduling this regular activity.

In addition to the above approach, the integrated extension education program suggested here should include the following elements:

- . Simple, illustrated single-sheet farmers' leaflets containing basic information about one crop or livestock enterprise on the MPL. These could be developed in conjunction with the Jamaican Adult Literacy Program. They should be produced in large numbers and provided to all subwatershed teams for distribution to farmers.
- . Simple, illustrated flip charts keyed to each of the farmers' leaflets described above. These should be available at the subwatershed offices for farmers' training meetings.
- . Radio programs related to the leaflets and flipcharts repeating the same information and reinforcing the main points for most efficient production of items on the MPL.
- . Identification and support of selected farmers to encourage them to become planting material producers in various areas of each watershed. Again, emphasis should be on commodities listed on the MPL.
- . Active support for present attempts by the home economics officers to develop school gardens as part of the extension effort. This is an excellent opportunity to teach good gardening practices as well as nutrition to young people.
- . Small, very specific, widely scattered, simple demonstrations on farmers' fields throughout each subwatershed. A goal of two demonstrations, related directly to crops or livestock on the MPL, should be set for each of the eight working units in each subwatershed. These should be small demonstrations of improved practices and varieties. No subsidy should be paid to farmers for these demonstrations, but the small amount of cash inputs needed should be provided. Demonstrations on neighbors' fields are believable, particularly if kept simple, while farmers often do not relate to activities on more complex demonstration farms or centers.
- . Concentration of extension efforts on leading farmers and, wherever possible, on work with farmer groups such as Development Committees, local Jamaican Agricultural Society groups or farmers' cooperative groups.
- . A Field Officers Handbook in the hands of all subwatershed agricultural officers. This should be a loose-leaf notebook that contains all technical data sheets prepared by the agronomy component and farm management cost/return data sheets prepared by the farm management officers. As revisions are made, new individual sheets should be prepared and sent to all officers to replace the old sheets.
- . A major effort to encourage the hill farmers (and home gardeners) in the project area to begin to apply basic organic farming

concepts. Organic, mixed farming practices including the regular use of composts, manure and legume cover-crops should be emphasized. The ideal is an integrated, mixed (crop and livestock) farming system that requires the minimum of expensive chemical fertilizers and pesticides. Wherever possible, a small-animal rearing enterprise involving chickens, goats, or rabbits should be incorporated into the farm system. The use of manures from the penned animals along with other composted materials and lime, where needed, should be encouraged as a means to improve soil tilth and fertility at minimum expense.

8. Provide Supervision and Control

The development strategy outline here requires a high degree of central control and supervision to ensure that all component parts are fully integrated. At present, only the project director can take on this coordinating/supervising responsibility. When the deputy project director position is filled, this could become one of this officer's major responsibilities. In the meantime, the Technical Coordinating Committee should meet and organize itself to respond to this challenge. The committee should establish appropriate small working component committees to develop, within 1 month, a detailed, time-phased implementation plan for the director's consideration.

Beneficiary Participation

A local organization strategy was conceived as one component of the IRDP design and implementation plan. According to the project paper, groups of small farmers were to be helped to achieve economies of scale by planning, borrowing, buying, and selling in a more concerted manner. It was assumed that no new organizations would need to be created; rather, organizational assistance was to be concentrated on the 33 existing branches of the Jamaica Agricultural Society (JAS) in the project area.

The role envisioned for local JAS groups had several facets (project paper, p. 34):

- . A conduit through which information, advice, and technical assistance could be disseminated;
- . A forum for discussion among farmers where local leaders could encourage others to adopt new behavior;

- . A structure wherein coordinated activity could afford local farmers economies of scale in buying and selling; and
- . A vehicle to community and political participation.

As implementation began, however, the local organization strategy was altered to include creation of new community-based groups called Development Committees (DCs). These committees were established under IRDP auspices and were intended to relate more directly to the project than was possible for the multipurpose JAS branches. To minimize duplication and confusion, each DC was to maintain a close relationship with the appropriate JAS branch. In practice this relationship varies considerably among the DCs but is generally uncertain at best. The most frequent link is maintained through common leadership. To date 22 Development Committees have been established, though not all are functioning.

The purposes of the Development Committees are to serve as a mechanism for communication between IRDP and farmers, a conduit for project benefit distribution, and a foundation for broader community self-help. So far they have served best as an arm of the project for soliciting expressions of community need and recruiting the participation of farmer leaders. They have been less successful as vehicles for broad dissemination of information or for stimulating collective self-help. These shortcomings, in turn, derive from a lack of consistent, widespread participation in the committees by farmers and the tendency of the DCs to focus attention on short-term project benefits rather than long-term community development. These problems are related. To the limited extent that project benefits are channeled through DCs, they are not closely linked to nor dependent on the participation or even awareness of the larger community. Nor is any meaningful local resource commitment to project or other development activities called for. Thus the roots of farmer participation in the DCs extend neither deep nor wide and tend to wither altogether when the visible project benefit stream slows down.

To counter these problems, IRDP is now pursuing a capacity-building strategy with DC officers, designed to increase their ability to identify and address local needs and mobilize local resources toward feasible solutions. It is hoped that this training will increase the value of the DCs in the eyes of local farmers and provide a firmer basis for the DCs to operate during the project period and after the expiration of the IRDP.

So far, this strategy has entailed the creation by IRDP of a Development Committee Council consisting of the officers of the various Development Committees. This council meets quarterly with IRDP staff. The March 1981 meeting was linked to a 3-day training workshop and additional such workshops are anticipated. The result of these activities is that participating DC leaders have a generally good understanding of the project and a noticeable commitment to expanding the level of general farmer participation in and commitment to project activities. For this to happen, however, some major constraints will have to be overcome. These include the Jamaican political culture and IRDP's own history of subsidizing farmer involvement.

Political Culture^{3/}

Despite the creation of local organizations, the recruitment of organizational leaders, the flow of resources to these organizations, and the delivery of benefits to farmers, meaningful participation by these farmers in IRDP remains below expectations. Part of the problem may well have historical roots, deriving from local understanding of and experience with similar organizations in the past. For most farmers, the perceived benefits of participation do not balance the costs of time and energy to attend meetings, let alone take a more active role.

There is a tradition in Jamaica of centralized control of resource flows to farmers. JAS branches depend on the Ministry of Agriculture for subsidies and policy guidelines. Local government is dependent on the central authority for 95 percent of its revenue and most policy initiatives. IRDP follows the pattern in its exercise of considerable control over the Development Committees and its provision of almost all the resources available to them. These resources are further circumscribed--sometimes

^{3/}The argument in this section is largely based on ideas of Harvey S. Blustain of Cornell University as presented to the IRD team personally and in a draft manuscript entitled "Participation and Political Culture in Rural Jamaica." In Dr. Blustain's 2-year association with IRDP, he has been a valuable resource to the project and to observers of IRDP. See Arthur A. Goldsmith and Harvey S. Blustain, Local Organization and Participation in Integrated Rural Development in Jamaica, Ithaca: Cornell University, Center for International Studies, Rural Development Committee, 1980. Also Harvey S. Blustain, "Social Aspects of Resource Management in the Second Integrated Rural Development Project," mimeographed, July 1980.

inappropriately--by the component targets of the IRDP project paper. In this environment inadequate attention is given to mobilization of local resources and to concepts of self-help in general. The project's few initiatives along this line--such as local cost-sharing for construction of small storage sheds--have not met with a favorable response. DC meetings tend to be dominated instead by discussions of how to increase external assistance.

In this context, there is neither a tradition of community development based on self-help or widespread participation, nor much involvement in formal local organizations such as the JAS. Moreover, local leadership roles depend more on political links to higher levels than on a broad local constituency. The highly political atmosphere also creates risks for any local group that becomes very visible by attracting widespread interest.

These factors work strongly against the success of the Development Committee strategy of IRDP. The barriers are further reinforced by the project approach of large up-front resource commitments and direct subsidies to farmers.

Subsidized Farmer Involvement

An individual is brought into the IRDP project by the preparation of a farm plan for his land, which provides him with access to project resources and expertise. In effect, farmer participation is purchased through subsidies which make initial involvement highly attractive.^{4/} This participation is not linked to Development Committee involvement but is arranged on an individual farmer basis. IRDP provides an initial soil conservation subsidy of 75 percent to cooperating farmers. This pattern is so solidly entrenched that efforts to reduce the subsidy have met with resistance by farmers who feel they are not receiving benefits to which

^{4/} This attraction dims considerably for farmers with insecure tenure (generally, the poorest) since they do not exercise the rights over their land which assure for them the benefits of participation. In the project area, less than 3 percent of the approximately 15 percent of all farmers who have insecure tenure are involved in the project. See Blustain, "Social Aspects of Resource Management in the Second Integrated Rural Development Project," mimeographed, July 1980.

they are entitled. Moreover, there is a tendency to overlook maintenance of terraces and hillside ditches since these activities are not subsidized by IRDP.

IRDP is typical of many large donor-assisted projects in its emphasis on large up-front resource transfers which rely heavily on imported technology and technical assistance and are locked into a set of quantitative component targets such as acres of land to be treated. Such projects are intrinsically antiparticipatory from the outset since their focus is on short-term measurable targets. Attention to these targets precludes strategies aimed at meaningful long-term farmer involvement.

It is late in the game now to begin thinking about expanded local resource commitment, an essential aspect of meaningful farmer participation. The perception that IRDP is another government "giveaway" program is already established. In retrospect, instead of a subsidy approach to farmer involvement in IRDP, a strategy might have been followed in which as part of the farm plan 'contract,' a farmer cost-sharing commitment was negotiated. This commitment could be keyed to a return-of-benefits concept that would not require assumption of financial risk by poor farmers. But it is important that a commitment of some kind be made to prevent accentuation of paternalism and dependency. Even now, the issue of farmer resource commitment should be pressed, notwithstanding the potential cost to achievement of acreage targets.

In general terms, IRDP staff are faced with the problem of attaining well-intended participation objectives in the context of an unsupportive political culture and an original project design in which local participation was an afterthought at best. The mandate to meet rigid, quantitative project targets continues to constrain achievement of meaningful local involvement despite the admirable attention now being given to capacity-building among the Development Committees. Above all, the entire subsidy concept has skewed the project toward soil conservation engineering rather than broader developmental needs.

Information Flow

Two approaches are helpful in understanding how the flow, organization, and use of information can support or impede the implementation of an IRD project. The first relates to strategy or policy issues and the second relates to the operational management of the project. These may be thought of as different shades of a single spectrum describing the information needs of any organization.

Strategy Decisions

In the case of information for strategy decisions, much can be learned from IRDP. As detailed under "Technical Strategy" above, a revised approach has been suggested by the IRD team, based in part on the fact that little systematic use is being made of market information for guiding the overall project strategy. In particular, information available about market conditions for farm products has little influence on decisions about extension strategy. Nor does it find a clear and reliable channel to area farmers for their own decision making.

This is not simply a project design issue that would ascribe the difficulty to an erroneous initial model. All initial models are potentially in error and implementors must develop information to test any strategy's effectiveness. In Jamaica, the particular instability of market conditions has given prime importance to the market component of the project. Farmers themselves have identified their need for market information and are asking why the project is not providing such information.

In light of this, why does the project not make better use of marketing information? One reason identified in discussions with project staff is their perception that a more central role for disseminating marketing information as part of the project strategy would require management and organizational changes which they felt to be beyond their influence.

Another aspect of this information problem is the emphasis on collecting information about individual component performance. No measures of overall project impact on farm families have been defined that might guide integrated action. For instance, considerable information is available about numbers of acres treated for soil conservation, amounts of planting

materials distributed, numbers of farmers visited by extension agents, and so forth. However, it is difficult to understand how (and if) these activities are improving production levels or families' incomes. Acres treated are not necessarily acres maintained or productively planted. Increased crop production is not necessarily a benefit if markets fail to materialize and credit payments are in default.

If information had been available about the mix of component activities and the resulting impact on farm families, an earlier signal might have alerted the project to the need for less emphasis on soil conservation and more emphasis on effective extension. The same case can be made for other component combinations such as marketing and credit. In fact, several such components were identified by farmer leaders as needing more coordination.

The difficulty seems to derive from the project paper's emphasis on quantitative measures of project outputs. Few qualitative measures are discussed in the project paper or "log frame." To be sure, such measures are more difficult to articulate, but they are essential for a supposedly integrated project such as IRDP. The technical background of most staff members would also predispose them to concentrate on such quantitative information.

It is interesting to note that an IRDP subwatershed team leader raised this concern for measuring broader impacts of the project. Another subwatershed team leader suggested that home economics staff were probably in the best position to measure changes in quality of life at the farm family level. This concern on the part of subwatershed team leaders highlights the point that concepts of integrated action are most operational and most recognized at this level.

Operational Management

The use of information for day-to-day management of the project is another concern. In general, too much reliance may be placed on informal information systems and not enough use made of the formal management structure for conveying and processing information.

The conditions for a reliable informal information system include:

- Reliable physical communication facilities (such as telephones and interoffice mail);

An example of management information not being used at all concerns vehicle utilization in the subwatersheds. Daily mileage figures are recorded by the drivers and tabulated on a monthly basis by the transportation maintenance manager. These data can be readily used to understand how effectively subwatershed team leaders are using the vehicles assigned to them. At present, however, this information is not made available to the team leaders or the watershed manager. The IRD team suggested a simple procedure whereby the subwatershed officer would note the daily mileage in his own records when he signed the driver out at each day's end. With this information, the subwatershed team leader would be better able to make scheduling and dispatching decisions about the other vehicles under his control. The current situation charges the expenses to one division, but gives control over those expenses to another. The suggested information-sharing procedure is a step in bringing the situation into alignment.

The Role of Women

Women are involved at all levels of the IRDP, both within the project staff and among the target beneficiaries. In traditional Jamaican society, women are relegated to positions inferior in status to men. However in IRDP no particular discrimination is evident.

Women farmers are not uncommon in Jamaica. In fact, several studies conducted in the IRDP area indicate that some 25 to 35 percent of the farm households are headed by women. Senior project officers assert that such women farmers are treated equally with men when it comes to benefiting from the project. They share equal access to project assistance in the development of farm plans, the installation of soil conservation structures, the obtaining of production credit and access to advice from the extension officers. It is worth noting that women farmers are often considered more responsive project cooperators than many of the men farmers. Also, women frequently are chosen as leaders by various farm organizations such as the Jamaican Agricultural Society and the IRDP-sponsored local Development Committees.

- . Clear differentiation of purely technical information from management decision-making information;
- . Clear understanding of management roles and technical or staff roles; and
- . Widespread knowledge of the responsibilities and authorities vested in different staff members or units.

Most of these conditions do not exist in IRDP and thus the heavy reliance on informal information systems is not effective. Severe problems result: meetings are missed, transportation costs are extraordinary, officers often have to miss appointments with farmers and farmer groups, and, in general, staff time is not effectively used. In addition, information that one unit or level thinks has been disseminated often has not been, with predictable problems.

The question arises as to why formal information systems are not used more regularly. They exist on paper and, for the most part, the essential positions are staffed (with some important exceptions). One answer seems to be a desire to avoid bureaucratic inertia, a laudable but apparently overestimated risk under the circumstances. Related to this is the expressed desire of the project leadership to maintain a "family" spirit and thus do much business in large meetings. The result is that proper management information channels are not given the opportunity to work. Ad hoc decisions are often made in a large meeting without adequate preparation or information.

One formal use of information that does seem to be effective is that of farm plans. In May 1980, concern was voiced about administrative delays in processing these documents; however these delays no longer seem to be a problem. Copies of handwritten drafts are now made available immediately to the subwatershed officers. These are used directly at this level, while eventually the typed and approved version is used as the basis for legal contracts.

An interesting anecdote from the time when delays were a problem illustrates an effective use of informal information systems. The forestry component head had undertaken to have field officers tell him on an informal basis of those farm plans that would require forestry activities. This allowed him about a 2-month lead for his own planning. This is an example of technical information that is utilized well by an informal system.

The IRDP employs women at all levels and in many different capacities. As might be expected, however, many more women are employed as daily paid workers and clerical staff than in professional roles. To some extent this disparity can be accounted for by government regulations which require an individual to graduate from the Jamaican School of Agriculture (JSA), or the equivalent, in order to receive a professional appointment with the Ministry of Agriculture. Since fewer women than men choose, or are permitted, to attend the JSA, the number of women available for professional assignments is limited. In spite of this initial difficulty, however, the IRDP employs several women in professional positions and provides advancement opportunities to them. Some female soil conservation officers and extension agents have been designated as subwatershed team leaders or promoted to the senior watershed technical officer position. Except in the fields of training and home economics, however, women are not represented in top positions at the project headquarters. This is probably the result of past discriminatory practices, the smaller intake of female students into the agricultural schools, and the fact that most of the women professional officers are too young and inexperienced at this time to move into more senior positions.

The home economics component of IRDP, though still getting established, has successfully encouraged project women to participate in its programs. Home economics was part of the original project concept but received relatively low initial priority. It was not funded until more than a year after the project started and the home economics officers are only now finishing their first year in the field. In Jamaica, as in most areas of the world, home economists must contend with slightly scornful or patronizing attitudes towards women's activities, both from male project staff and target families. They find they are often not taken very seriously and are still occasionally forgotten on meeting or travel agendas. In the field, several home economics officers spoke of a husband's unwillingness to give his wife a small plot of land for a home garden, to help with any of the cultivation, or to leave tools for her to use while he is in the field. Apparently, such non-cash-earning (though cash-saving) activities are not always recognized as very important. Regardless of these obstacles, however, the home economics staff and project leadership are working effectively to dispell such preconceived notions. They have made signifi-

cant progress during the short year they have been operating, and home economics is becoming a functioning, integrated component of IRDP.

Several observations can be made from women's involvement in IRDP that are relevant to IRD projects elsewhere. For example, the home economics component is having good success in organizing women into small, local groups that are effective units for training and extension activities. This has not been the case with men in the project area. Women apparently are more willing to join groups than are men, and this tendency allows the home economics extension workers to provide better quality assistance to more people than would be possible through an individual approach.

It is interesting that women, on the whole, seem to be more willing to accept change and new ideas than men. For this reason, if seriously involved from the beginning, women can become a tremendous support group for the type of lifestyle changes that integrated projects often advocate. Women are a vital resource that should be given a key role in the design and implementation of IRD projects.

The Project Environment

Three critical requirements are needed to support a successful development project: adequate and timely inputs, a rational implementation strategy and a favorable development environment. IRDP has adequate and, for the most part, timely availability of inputs necessary to make a significant contribution to development of the project area. However, implementation is constrained, at least to some degree, by the original project design and the existing development environment. This section briefly reviews how shortcomings in these two areas adversely affect IRDP goal achievement.

Design Constraints

A major IRDP objective is to develop a replicable strategy to reduce soil erosion and increase farm production (and by implication, net incomes) of small, hillside farmers in the mountainous areas of Jamaica. There is, however, an obvious inconsistency between this goal and the design being utilized for its achievement. Three examples are cited below:

1. Project Area Selection

Two noncontiguous watersheds were designated as the project area. Evidently social (number of poor families), resource conservation (severity of soil erosion) and perhaps political considerations took precedence over the original intent to create a model for replication elsewhere. It is difficult to rationalize how the present two watersheds were selected as the project area, except perhaps as a way to compare different implementation strategies. However, no such intent is evident in the project design. In fact, the selection of two noncontiguous project areas has become a permanent constraint to the development and testing of a model that can reasonably be replicated. This underlying constraint expresses itself in the following ways:

- . Headquarters management and technical staff can not adequately support the distant watershed program because of the 3-hour round-trip drive involved.
- . Substantial project funds are used to provide vehicles, drivers, maintenance staff and facilities just to serve the distant watershed.
- . Constantly rising gasoline costs result in a steady budgetary pressure to reduce the services provided.

2. Implementation Approach

The IRDP designers chose to repeat a development strategy that had been tried in the area previously without notable success. The concept of paying subsidies to farmers for their participation in soil conservation schemes had been the basis of earlier programs which generally failed to ensure continued maintenance by farmers of the subsidized soil conservation works and did little to increase production and incomes on the hill farms. The experiences of the earlier soil conservation programs evidently were not fully considered in designing IRDP, which now faces the likelihood of similar failings.

3. Project Costs

The capital intensity of the IRDP is another indication of the gap between the stated project goal of developing a replicable model and the actual project design. The total project budget of \$26 million, if divided by the 4,000 farmers within the project area, amounts to \$6,500 each. Therefore, in order to replicate this type of project for the estimated 150,000 hillside farmers in Jamaica, over \$900 million would be

required. Also surprising is that the project provided large sums of money to purchase heavy equipment for construction of the hillside terraces and roads in the area. The bulldozers have proven infeasible for most of the terracing activities because of the steep slopes as well as the small size and scattered locations of the farms. The road building is a relatively small part of the total project. Such a capital-intensive design cannot be expected to result in a replicable model for a country such as Jamaica.

The point to be stressed is that large, complex IRD projects, such as IRDP, take on a life of their own after the initial settling-in process. It is difficult, if not impossible, to readjust their direction once implementation momentum is established.

In the case of IRDP, a good opportunity to develop a balanced, rational and cost-conscious model that has reasonable chance of being replicated is being lost. The inappropriate original design and the later hesitancy to modify and correct that design makes the job of getting the project back on track very difficult. Strong action by the project leadership is needed to reidentify replicability as a key challenge, and to direct all the components toward meeting that challenge. The active backing of USAID/Kingston is also essential in support of this action.

Development Environment

Jamaican Political Considerations

The recent change of government in Jamaica has resulted in some additional tensions and difficulties for IRDP. Certain key professional staff have been transferred from the project and a number of new subprofessionals, in excess of project needs, have been added to the staff.

The main problem with this sort of political tampering is not only the positions required to be added or even the loss of some experienced professionals. It is, rather, the sense of insecurity felt by the entire project staff and the reduced morale that results.

The external donor agency, in this case USAID/Kingston, should use its influence by communicating to the host government the need to stop petty political interference in project implementation if project goals are to be achieved.

U.S. Political Considerations

The change of government in the United States also is a factor in how successfully the IRDP can be carried out. New attitudes toward the project, based upon preconceived concepts of how such projects should be implemented, and perhaps supported by quick visits to the field by senior AID/Washington officers, may result in reduced enthusiasm for the project. This is unfortunate because IRDP, now more than ever, requires active support from USAID/Kingston. A large investment has been made in IRDP to date. The main task now is not to criticize the project for its shortcomings but rather to help redirect its substantial resources toward development of a rational strategy for the time remaining in the life of the project. U.S. assistance and support are needed to help the IRDP identify less expensive, more generally applicable soil conservation methods that truly can serve as part of a model for later replication in other areas of the country. Also, support is particularly important now to establish an effective extension and marketing system that will address the basic project goal of increased farmer incomes.

Marketing Constraints

As explained elsewhere in this report, the inability of farmers to profitably market their products is a serious constraint to the achievement of project goals. Shortages of funds, lack of staff incentives, and inadequate management capabilities prevent the government's Agricultural Marketing Corporation (AMC) from fulfilling its role as the primary buyer of farm products. The prices set by the AMC are too low and, in fact, serve merely as a base price from which private traders negotiate with farmers to the disadvantage of the farmer. For example, the AMC offers farmers 50¢ per pound for green ginger. Because of production costs farmers feel the need to receive a minimum of 65¢ per pound. The traders negotiate a price that is based upon the AMC price but that is still not at a level profitable for most farmers, and that can even drop below the AMC price. The result is that farmers are forced to sell at unprofitable prices and there is little incentive for their continued production and marketing of certain commodities.

Import/Export Policy Constraints

Certain government policies regarding agricultural imports and exports evidently have detrimental effects on project farmers. Some imports directly compete with locally produced farm products at the time they are coming on the market. Imported rice, for example, competes directly with yellow yams as a food staple. Imported onions, apparently preferred because of their glossier sheen, also find their way into Jamaica and compete with local varieties. Quantities of meat products are imported, and again local producers feel the loss. This is not to imply that the Government of Jamaica should spoonfeed the farmers, but rather to suggest that the government should reduce, wherever possible, unnecessary competition for the local producers.

On the other hand, some government policies limit the export of certain commodities. Green ginger is a good example. Apparently, export of the green variety has been prohibited until recently in order to prevent its cultivation outside of Jamaica. Farmers are just beginning to test the green ginger export market and it is hoped that they will be able to establish effective marketing outlets. Although this prohibition of exports has been lifted, it is unclear how many other such laws are limiting the farmers' chances to earn additional income from the export market.

Bureaucratic Constraints

Slow-moving government bureaucracy is a continuing constraint on project achievement. For example:

- . Important senior staff positions are not filled (such as deputy project director and farm management specialist).
- . Release of funds is delayed (such as for construction of a produce grading and packing facility to improve the marketing situation).
- . Purchase of seriously eroded or extremely steep parcels of land for conversion to forest land is delayed by inflexible administrative obstacles.

Project staff are well aware of such delays but can do little to speed up government action. While, on paper, projects such as IRDP appear to command all the resources necessary to achieve their objectives, in reality they are seriously handicapped by the existing bureaucratic system within which they must function. It seems a fact of life for such a

project as IRDP that while the project works toward a specific goal within a definite time frame, the host government agencies on which the project depends for critical support work on a routine, business-as-usual basis with no particular concern about project goals or deadlines. Generating government commitment to supporting project goals is, therefore, one of the highest priority needs in improving IRD project performance.

Benefit Sustainability

The history of integrated rural development projects manifests a frequent absence of benefit continuation after external project interventions end. Problems of sustainability derive from a number of common circumstances including

- . Lack of clarity regarding what is to be sustained;
- . Failure to consider sustainability in the project design;
- . Lack of involvement by local populations;
- . Inadequate ongoing organizational capacity; and
- . Limited attention of project staff to sustainability.

Each of these problems characterizes IRDP to some degree. They are considered briefly below.

Lack of Clarity Regarding Objectives

IRDP was conceived and begun as a major soil conservation effort. Later it added an important local organization focus. Now it is recognizing the need for an integrated extension-marketing strategy if production and income targets are to be addressed. The result is a somewhat disorganized mix of objectives in search of a common strategy. Moreover, little attention has been given to how any of these objectives may lead to ultimate improvements in beneficiary welfare. No serious effort has been made to develop indicators of farm family welfare in the project area, let alone to measure project impact beyond achievement of physical component targets (see annex A-IV). Effective planning for sustainability is unlikely to take place in the absence of greater clarity regarding what welfare goals are attainable and worth being sustained after project termination.

Project Design Flaws

The design of IRDP itself is a major constraint to benefit sustainability. Not only did the project paper fail to address the question of sustainability, but the strategy of the project is so dependent on large external resource inputs that benefit continuation is virtually precluded. For example, in the project area the ratio of IRDP staff to farmers is about 1 to 35 compared with the general Jamaican pattern of 1 equivalent extension officer to 1,000 farmers. Project vehicles, including bulldozers, are visible everywhere in the project area. The monthly gasoline bill is running at a level near \$35,000 (US) per month. Overall, the project budget exceeds \$6,500 for each farm family in the target watersheds.

No one at the project level, the Ministry of Agriculture, or at USAID/Kingston appears to have given much thought to the upcoming major transition from the resource-intensive project phase to the time when continuing activities will be dependent on normal government inputs and whatever local organizational capacity survives. It is not known what levels of staffing will be maintained by the Jamaican government or whether any special project component inputs such as marketing, credit, and home economics will be continued. What is already apparent is that, even as the project continues, levels of maintenance of early terracing work leave something to be desired. This does not augur well for the maintenance of other benefits that may develop as the project continues.

Lack of Local Involvement

As noted under "Beneficiary Participation," levels of farmer involvement are limited by tradition and by project emphasis on external inputs. Sustainability of the Development Committees is doubtful if they serve primarily as a channel for identifying needs and as a conduit for project response. Without a greater problem-solving role and the capacity to mobilize resources, these committees will have no meaningful function after project termination.

Local involvement depends in large part on rational perceptions of benefits that are tangible and relatively short term. The main project "benefit" which meets these criteria is the one-time subsidy paid to enrolled farmers for land treatment. That subsidy, by design, does not continue. The development of other perceived benefits through effective

marketing and extension assistance may create local demand for continuation of these inputs. The effectiveness of this demand upon ongoing governmental structures may depend, in part, on local organizational capacity. Therefore, the greater attention of IRDP on building Development Committee competence and improving extension activities promises important and mutually reinforcing benefits. But there is a long way to go on both fronts and success is far from assured.

Inadequate Organizational Capacity

IRDP is managed by a special project unit within the Jamaican Ministry of Agriculture. This unit is unlikely to continue in its present form after the project ends. Therefore, the burden of transition to and continuation of a permanent staff presence depends on the Ministry of Agriculture and the local Parish offices in the project area. At this point, little thought seems to have been given to the future by these agencies of government. Moreover, since the project watershed boundaries are not contiguous with the boundaries of any Parish or group of Parishes, long-term project influence may be uneven at best. The subwatershed areas to which local project activities are keyed bear little relationship to community or Parish boundaries and the subwatershed organizational structure is unlikely to be maintained even on a reduced staff basis. Indeed, there is no assurance that staff trained under project auspices will even remain in the area. Therefore, the organizational structures developed by the project are likely to vanish with little or no impact on the organizational capacity of the remaining governmental framework, especially at the Parish level. In theory, Development Committees or JAS branches might help fill the gap but, as noted elsewhere, this possibility seems remote at present. In sum, in view of the doubtful prospect that project functions will be institutionalized within the Jamaican government structure, there is low probability that political and administrative support will be available to assure broad benefit continuation after external resources are withdrawn. At best it may be hoped that some component activities such as extension or home economics may be sustained in a way that will provide limited benefit continuation.

Limited Project Staff Attention

IRDP staff are not unaware of the constraints that are likely to limit benefit sustainability. But the demands pressed upon them by the array of quantitative component targets in the project plan, combined with the relatively thin management structure (see annex A-I), have precluded an adequate planning focus on steps to improve prospects for sustainability. Given the project's design flaws, a major effort is needed not only to formulate strategies to enhance benefit sustainability but to press for commitments from the Ministry of Agriculture to maintain the necessary levels of personnel and funding in the project area to assure a smooth transition to viable post-project arrangements. These should be considered as major agendas for the project staff and also for USAID/Kingston in its support role. Without this kind of planning and preparation for the post-project period, achievement of targets for land treatment, road building, tree planting, training, and even Development Committee creation will have little beneficial effect.

As argued elsewhere in this report, a market-oriented project strategy may offer an opportunity for increased project benefits both during and beyond actual project life. In retrospect, it seems likely that such a production strategy would have offered a better original basis for IRDP with soil treatment seen as a follow-up activity to be funded, in part, from increased local income. Instead, the original UNDP/FAO proposal for a 10-year soil treatment scheme was loaded with other components, cut in half timewise, and relabeled as an integrated project. But, in fact, the project has been dominated by soil treatment priorities from the beginning. It has lacked both the design flexibility and planning resources to effectively integrate its components or to offer its beneficiaries a sustainable benefit package.

Present initiatives--particularly the greater focus on extension and the Development Committee strategy--offer some promise. But without institutionalization of these activities in the Jamaican government structure, it is doubtful that the diligent efforts of IRDP staff can overcome the many marked constraints to lasting benefit flows.

Section Four

THE FUTURE

The first step in planning further activities involving the DAI/RTI IRD Project with the Jamaican IRDP is a discussion of the usefulness of the work done in March 1981, including this report and the specific management suggestions outlined in annex A. Such a discussion should await IRDP staff review of this report and decisions regarding appropriate follow-up activities. There are several possibilities for additional collaboration in the future. These possibilities should be reviewed in light of demonstrated commitment by IRDP, USAID/Kingston, and the Jamaica Ministry of Agriculture to implementing needed management strategies to increase project impact.

- . If the market-oriented development strategy is accepted as a useful model, assistance could be given to the project in implementing such an approach.
- . The need for management development and training can be met, in part, with consulting assistance. There are also local institutions and other resources that might be linked to the project with the help of the DAI/RTI team. This effort should focus on several levels of the organization.
- . If a deputy director is put in place, there would be a good opportunity for reviewing and articulating overall management responsibilities within the senior staff. Outside consultants can be very helpful in such an exercise.
- . If a more clearly delineated planning procedure is to be instituted, consultants could help design it and guide implementation through the first 3- to 4-week period.

In the two opportunities for interaction to date, productive relationships have been established between the IRD Project and IRDP staff. These relationships and the mutual understanding which has developed provide a good base for further, more targeted assistance with organizational and administrative aspects of this important integrated rural development project.

ANNEX A

IRDP MANAGEMENT ISSUES

IRDP MANAGEMENT ISSUES*

- I. Role Definition
- II. Coordination and Planning
- III. A Market-Oriented Project Strategy
- IV. A Strategy for Monitoring Family Welfare
- V. IRDP Evaluation
- VI. Project Meetings
- VII. Management Follow-up

* The contents of this annex were provided as a separate memorandum to IRDP project staff prior to team departure from Jamaica.

I.

ROLE DEFINITION

As is typical for an IRD Project, the Jamaica IRDP is staffed by persons in policy-making, staff, and technical roles. While individuals in each of these roles have management tasks to perform, the distinction in responsibilities between the Project's line management team on the one hand and persons in staff and technical roles on the other is not sufficiently clear. This is due, in part, to the inadequacy of the project's line management structure and, in part, to the lack of authority possessed by field-level officers who are expected to perform management functions. Both factors reflect the project's failure to take the role of management seriously enough.

A. The IRDP Line Management Team

It is remarkable that in a \$26 million project with nearly 300 staff, there are only 3 persons with primary line management roles - the Project Director and the two Assistant Project Directors. All other senior staff are in technical component or staff roles. Sub-watershed team leaders do not now have the authority to be considered line managers (see below).

Regardless of how capable they may be, three persons cannot meet the management needs of a project such as IRDP. The consequences are two-fold. First, many management demands are not fulfilled. Second, there is a tendency for technical and advisory personnel to engage by default in management functions which are not part of their job. When this happens, there is a loss of overall management coherence and lines of management authority and accountability are confused. Moreover, the flow of information essential for effective planning and management is diffused to the point of being out of control. A great deal of information is not available to the persons who need it, even though it often exists in some-

body else's files.

B. The Sub-watershed Team Leader's Role

The IRDP project's main link to its beneficiaries is at the sub-watershed level. It is at this level that technical inputs are made available to farmers as a theoretically integrated package designed to help them increase production and personal income. The importance of the sub-watershed level is reflected in the fact that the majority of project staff are employed at that level. Nonetheless, as presently organized, sub-watershed teams are not able to effectively plan, implement, or evaluate an integrated response to farmer needs. This inadequacy is due in part to a lack of information and in part to the absence of a clear management link between subwatershed teams and the project. These problems are evidenced most strikingly by the fact that very few designated sub-watershed team leaders know what the overall project goals are or that recent changes in those goals have been proposed. In essence they are treated by the project as technical staff only, not managers, even though they have a critical management function.

C. Recommendations

1. FILL THE VACANT DEPUTY DIRECTOR POSITION

The job description prepared by project staff and submitted to the Ministry of Agriculture several months ago is excellent. Highest priority should be given to securing approval to fill this position and to locating a highly qualified candidate. This person must have the authority to carry out major management responsibilities under the overall direction of the Project Director. These responsibilities would relate primarily to operational management at the Watershed and Sub-watershed levels including coordination of planning and evaluation functions.

2. FORMALIZE THE LINE MANAGEMENT ROLE OF SUB-WATERSHED TEAM
LEADER

Effective coordination of sub-watershed teams requires a clear managerial role for team leaders who, in that function, will report to their respective Assistant Project Directors. (In their technical roles, all sub-watershed officers should report to the appropriate watershed senior officers rather than directly to the Assistant Project Managers). To function effectively as team leaders, the designated officers will need basic project management information to facilitate decision-making that serves the total project effort. They will need to participate in periodic management meetings in their watersheds with the Assistant Project Director. These meetings would be distinct from meetings of watershed component groups or general watershed staff conferences.

Additionally, subwatershed team leaders need increased authority to fill their necessary management function. This authority would take the form of greater control over subwatershed personnel, including drivers, and responsibility for coordinating overall subwatershed activities.

To support them in these tasks, all sub-watershed team leaders should be given regular management training as part of the project training program.

Finally, consistent with the importance of the team leader's management role, the individuals in that position should be evaluated and rewarded based on their management performance as well as their technical work. The present incentive structure does not support attention to management needs or achievement of integrated project objectives.

To develop specific recommendations to upgrade the management role of sub-watershed team leaders, a task force consisting of Mr. Henry, Mr. McNish, and Mr. Walters is suggested to consider the above issues and make recommendations to the Project Director.

II.

PLANNING AND COORDINATION

The planning and co-ordination functions of management should be strengthened at the II IRDP. This should be done in relation to clarified project goals. We suggest the following actions be taken:

A. Goals and objectives:

1. The overall project goals should be reviewed and articulated in terms reflecting impact on improved welfare and quality of life for farmers and farm families. Qualitative project goals should be emphasized over quantitative component goals.

2. Each watershed should establish its objectives for meeting project goals. Such objectives would reflect any unique opportunities and problems in each watershed. These objectives would be results the watershed proposed to accomplish during the life of the project. They would be stated in both quantitative and qualitative terms and be related to overall project goals rather than individual component targets.

3. Each sub-watershed should establish its own objectives for meeting the watershed objectives. These may only be more detailed versions of the watershed objectives, however they also would be directly related to project goals rather than component targets.

4. Each component should establish its objectives, based upon those of the watersheds and sub-watersheds. These objectives should reflect the support and service nature of the components and be directly related to the needs of the watershed and sub-watershed implementation staff.

B. Operational Planning:

Once objectives have been determined they form the basis for operational planning. Such planning seeks to set realistic time targets

and sequencing for the objectives. In addition such planning identifies the resources needed to accomplish objectives and the points of critical co-ordination necessary between various project groups (i.e. components, sub-watersheds, and management levels).

1. A single operational planning calendar should be established. Fixed dates should be determined for completing items A1 through A4 above. Regular (i.e. recurring) dates should be established for the following activities (B2 through B7). These dates might well be determined in view of the budget cycle or some other existing cycle (e.g. planting seasons, weather, etc). Steps B2 through B7 should take approximately 4 weeks.

2. Each sub-watershed prepares its operational plan for the cycle to include:

- a) the objectives it will accomplish during that cycle;
- b) the sequence it proposes for accomplishing these objectives;
- c) the support activities it needs from other project groups for accomplishing these objectives;
- d) start and finish target dates within the cycle for these activities;
- e) resources (human and otherwise) it will need to carry out the operational plan.

3. The sub-watershed plans are reviewed by the watershed manager, modified as needed and agreed upon.

4. Each watershed group prepares its operational plan (as outlined in B2) to support the activities of the subwatersheds.

5. The Project Director and Co-ordinating Committee review the watershed operational plans and sub-watershed operational plans, modify and

discuss them as needed, and approve them.

6. The several components each establish their operational plan based on those of the sub-watersheds and watersheds (as outlined in B2).

7. The resultant plans are collected and made available as the project's operational plan for the cycle period.

C. Co-ordination:

The need for ongoing co-ordination of project activities must be met. The monitoring of progress on the various operational plans can provide the initial focus of such a co-ordination effort. We strongly urge:

1. A revitalization of the Co-ordinating Committee under the strong leadership of the Project Director. When (and if) a Deputy Director is in place, this would be a key role for him or her to assume. The membership of the committee should include all component heads, their technical advisors and the watershed managers and watershed senior staff.

2. This committee should meet fortnightly, alternating with (as suggested here) fortnightly meeting of the entire senior staff. Every effort should be made to use the committee meetings for issues of co-ordination of component activities. Issues of administration, general information, and policy formulation should be deferred to the senior staff meetings.

OUTLINE OF A PROPOSED MARKET-ORIENTED
PROJECT STRATEGY

A. Introduction:

The following is a summary of a proposed project development strategy that places a major emphasis on the marketability of the farmer's products at the start of the production and marketing cycle. It is hoped that this proposal will generate discussions leading to the adoption of such a strategy; one that coordinates the many component parts into a unified, integrated whole needed to achieve the qualitative goals of the IRDP.

B. Market Priorities List (MLP):

A list of all farm products with good market acceptance, noting the month when each is most in demand, is prepared and sent to all project officers. This MLP is modified as necessary.

Responsibility: Marketing Component, Headquarters.

C. Credit Eligibility:

All credit is keyed to the Market Priorities List (MPL). Credit is not allowed for items not on the MPL; it is encouraged for high priority items on the MPL.

Responsibility: Credit Component, Headquarters.

D. Technical Data:

A single page technical data sheet is prepared for each crop or livestock enterprise listed on the MPL. These are sent to all project field staff.

Responsibility: Agronomy and Livestock Components, Headquarters

E. Adaptive Research Trials:

Three of the existing five demonstration centers are staffed and supported to conduct meaningful adaptive research on commodities listed

on the MPL. Two of the existing centers are closed. Results of trials are used to modify or update the technical data sheets discussed above.

Responsibility: (a) Project Director, Ministry of Agriculture, USAID; for consolidation of existing demonstration centers; b) Agronomy and Livestock Components; for adaptive trials.

F. Farm Management Studies:

A principle officer in farm management and a technical assistance officer in the same field are added to project staff. These officers conduct basic cost/return studies on enterprises listed on the MPL. Resulting data get published as simple Farm Management Cost/Return Data sheets and distributed to project officers.

Responsibility: Project Director to request the two specialists; Ministry of Agriculture and USAID to provide these officers.

G. Integrated Extension/Information/Training:

The following officers will devote full time to extension education:

- . Principle Extension and Home Economics Officers.
- . Senior Extension and Home Economics Officers.
- . Sub-watershed Extension and Home Economics Officers. (Note: there are situations where this officer also serves as the sub-watershed team leader, in which case he/she will have divided responsibilities between management and extension).
- . At least two field assistants in each sub-watershed.
- . Technical Assistance Officers in Extension and Home Economics.

The following will be the basic elements of the integrated extension program suggested as a critical part of the strategy outlined here.

1. Training and Visit Extension Method:

This will be based on an 8 unit division of each sub-watershed

central control and supervision to ensure that all component parts are fully integrated. At present, only the Project Director can take on this coordinating/supervising responsibility. When the Deputy Director position is filled, this could become one of this officer's major responsibilities. In the meantime, the Technical Coordinating Committee should meet and organize itself to respond to this challenge. The Committee should establish appropriate small working component committees to develop within one month, a detailed, time-phased implementation plan for the Director's consideration.

Responsibility: Project Director: To coordinate and supervise. Deputy Project Director (when named): to replace the Director in this supervisory role. The members of the Technical Coordinating Committee: to assist and fully cooperate in implementation of the type of unified, integrated strategy suggested for the balance of the project.

J. Project Support:

- Complete understanding and active support of the IRDP by the USAID are essential if the project is to achieve its major goals. The IRDP is a large, complex, well-funded project which requires greatly increased involvement and assistance of USAID officers. Visits of those officers to the project must be frequently and regularly scheduled to permit continuous assessment of progress and a meaningful contribution from USAID to project implementation. USAID/Kingston should be an active advocate for the IRDP in discussions with AID/Washington and the Jamaican Ministry of Agriculture.

Responsibility: The Rural Development Officer and the IRDP Project Officer, USAID/Kingston.

to permit visits by extension staff to each unit every two weeks with two days each fortnight available for training of sub-watershed staff.

2. Simple, illustrated, single-sheet farmer's leaflets prepared on commodities listed on the MPL in cooperation with the adult literacy program.

3. Simple, illustrated flip charts and other teaching aids prepared for use by extension officers in the field.

4. Radio programs developed to reinforce the recommendations made by extension officers on commodities listed on the MPL.

5. Identification and support of producers of planting materials in various areas of the two watersheds. Emphasis will be on commodities listed on the MPL.

6. Simple, very specific demonstrations will be conducted in each sub-watershed on crops or livestock listed on the MPL. These would be on IRDP cooperating farmers' fields. A goal of two demonstrations in each of the 8 working units in each sub-watershed is recommended.

7. The focus of the extension effort will be on leading farmers and farmer groups.

8. Each field officer will carry a Field Officers Loose-leaf Handbook containing all technical and economic data on the crops and livestock on the MPL.

Responsibility: Project Director: to assign full-time extension responsibilities to the extension staff. All extension staff; to carry out comprehensive, integrated extension program as outlined by the Project Director. Training Officers: To coordinate all training needs as part of the Training and Visit Extension Method. Communications Officers: for all information materials, radio programs, etc.

H. Supervision and Control:

The development strategy outlined here requires a high degree of

A STRATEGY FOR MONITORING IMPROVED
WELFARE OF IRDP FAMILIES

The IRDP has reached a point when assessment of its qualitative impact upon the target population is appropriate. This is needed to better focus project activities during the remainder of the implementation period. Quantitative figures -- number of farm plans completed, home gardens established, acres terraced, crops planted -- are available. But the question of "what impact is IRDP having on improving the welfare of the project families?" has not been directly addressed to date. That is, it is not clear how the quality of life of participating families is changing due to the IRDP. Welfare is much harder to measure than project physical outputs, but nonetheless is stated as a specific project goal.

In meetings with sub-watershed team leaders, it was suggested that the Home Economics officers are in a unique position to observe first-hand the changes in the welfare of the project families. This is so because their activities bring them into the homes and in close contact with the project families. The Home Economics officers can more easily see the subtle changes in the beneficiaries' standard of living resulting from the project. This opportunity should not be overlooked.

The following proposal outlines a plan to measure qualitative impacts of the IRDP by capitalizing on the unique role of the Home Economics officers with project families:

A. Purpose

1. to establish within IRDP the capability to monitor the impacts of the project on the improved welfare of participant families;
2. to take advantage of the unique position of the Home Economics officer to see and assess the household situation, living

conditions and changes in family welfare.

B. Procedure

1. Coordinate this activity within the Home Economics component.
2. Determine "improved welfare indicators" and appropriate means to measure these. Indicators might include:
 - food consumption (meat, vegetables, milk)
 - improved nutrition
 - improved clothing, shoes
 - education opportunities
 - home improvements (tin roof, flooring, water, electricity, latrines, gas stove, for example)
 - medical care
 - increased expenditure on entertainment (radio, TV)
 - more conveniences, tools
 - transportation
3. Include a special "IRDP welfare impact" section in planned Home Economics survey.
4. From data gathered, develop standard list of welfare indicators; incorporate these indicators into ongoing monitoring and periodic evaluations of the project.

C. Results

1. Provide IRDP with some measure of its real impact on the intended beneficiaries themselves.
2. Complement the ongoing quantitative assessments within each component (# of farm plans completed, acres terraced and planted, home gardens established, etc) to provide project managers with the broader picture of IRDP impact.
3. Develop an improved capability within the proposed evaluation unit to conduct effective project monitoring and evaluation.

provide leadership for the in-depth evaluation.

3. The external, professional evaluator should be assisted in conducting the evaluation by three officers of the IRDP. Because of personal interests and in order to achieve balance in the evaluation team, the Project Director might consider assigning this task to:
 - . The Project Administrative Officer, Headquarters
 - . The Senior Soil Conservation Officer, Two Meetings Watershed
 - . The Senior Extension Officer, Pindars River Watershed
4. The three project officers selected should meet as soon as possible to begin to prepare for its evaluation. For this purpose they should:
 - a. Collect all available baseline data relating to the project area and families.
 - b. Gather any information about the various project components that will be of use in measuring progress toward achievement of the goals, purposes and objectives as set out in original or revised project documents.
 - c. Gather all technical reports and data generated by or about the project to date.
 - d. Interview any departing senior officers or technical assistance specialists regarding their accomplishments, problems and recommendations for future activities in their respective fields.
 - e. Consult with the Home Economics staff regarding the development of welfare indicators and the method by which such indicators can be incorporated in the overall project evaluation. See section IV for further details.

V.

PROJECT EVALUATION

A. Background:

1. Project field activities started: May 1979
2. Internal (USAID) evaluation: January 1980
3. Presently planned project termination: February 1983.

B. Purposes

In order to review the progress made in achieving project targets and, more importantly, to provide guidance to IRDP managers for the remaining implementation period, a formal, in-depth evaluation is suggested. This evaluation should have three major purposes:

1. To assess how effectively the IRDP is developing a pilot model for improving the welfare of small, hill farmers by means of recommended soil conservation measures and increased net income resulting from improved crop and livestock production practices.
2. To refine and sharpen the focus of the IRDP during its remaining implementation period so as to more adequately develop such a model that can be replicated in other, similar watersheds of the country.
3. To develop greater capability within the IRDP staff to monitor and evaluate this type of large-scale, complex Integrated Development Project.

C. Procedures

To achieve the above purposes, the following procedures are recommended:

1. The Project Director and USAID project officers should discuss the need for and agree on a time-phased plan to carry out the suggested evaluation.
2. The services of an internationally experienced rural development project evaluator should be requested for ten weeks during 1981 to

group discussion.

b) Another model is to discuss issues of general concern first, then identify the issues of concern to a smaller group (e.g. key decision makers, technical staff). Those people who want to participate are free to do so, those who have minimal interest are free to leave.

C. Building an Agenda

Perhaps the most important aspect of conducting a meeting is the process of building an agenda. It is far more effective to have a complete agenda agreed upon prior to any discussion of the agenda items themselves. At the conclusion of all introductory ceremonies the first thing to be done by the leader of the meeting is to build the agenda. This is most easily done by using a black-board or large paper sheet visible to all. (We suggest reading and correcting minutes of previous meetings not be done unless raised as a desired agenda item by staff members). The steps of agenda building are:

1. The leader lists those items he or she wants discussed at the meeting.
2. The leader asks attendees what other items they want on the agenda and calls upon those indicating they have a request. As these requests are stated the leader accepts them as appropriate for the meeting at hand by writing them on the board. If he feels the item is not appropriate for the agenda he briefly explains why (without getting into a discussion of the issue itself) and indicates where the issue should be referred. Good judgement must be used to accept items of interest to most and/or items that are timely and appropriate to the purpose of the meeting.
3. When these items are all listed the meeting leader should eliminate duplicates and combine related items. The resulting shorter list should be examined for logical priorities (that is, item 'A' might only be resolved after item 'B' has been discussed). After logical priorities

Meetings can serve as an important management tool as well as a means of establishing and maintaining a sense of team spirit among the staff. We have several suggestions for increasing the effectiveness of meetings for both purposes.

A. Meetings and Management

It is our suggestion that regular meetings only be used for dealing with issues or decisions that cannot be resolved through the existing management structure. In this way meetings can be shortened and the management structure strengthened. Assuring proper input to the decision making process is the responsibility of all competent managers.

B. Organization of Meetings

We suggest several points be considered when organizing and scheduling a meeting:

1. Establish fixed start and finish times. This will allow more effective use of staff time and focus discussions toward resolution rather than leave them open ended. Clearly, finishing times will have to be somewhat flexible, however the success of a meeting can often be gauged by its brevity.
2. Often the usefulness of a meeting can be increased dramatically by careful consideration of the purposes to be served and then organization of the attendance and timing accordingly. For instance:
 - a) the first part of a meeting can be held in several appropriate sub-groups and then reconvened as a total group to deal with issues of general concern. In such a case sub-groups could be tasked with identifying those issues of importance to their members and raising those issues in concise form for the agenda of the total

have been set, it is often useful to discuss the easiest and most quickly resolveable issues first, leaving the difficult and controversial issues for later.

D. Conducting Meetings

Once an agenda has been built actual discussion of the items can begin.

1. As discussion of an item begins it is useful for the leader to ask himself what is the desirable outcome of the discussion. In this way the discussion can be continually directed toward a meaningful end point.

- a. is a consensus decision sought?
- b. is a decision by a management decision maker sought? Who?
- c. is information sharing the concern?
- d. is a policy being formulated?
- e. is a problem being raised for suggested solutions?

2. After all items have been discussed and resolved or the time to end the meeting is reached the meeting should be concluded.

1. the leader should review the resolution or action taken for each agenda item in a few brief words.
2. this brief verbal review is the basis for members to take notes or for a single page 'mini-minutes' to be prepared and distributed within 1 or 2 days.

E. We suggest

1. Senior staff conferences be held every second week. They should be held at the training center to minimize disruptions (e.g. phone calls), increase comfort and reduce distractions.
2. The Co-ordinating Committee meet every second week (alternating with the senior staff conference).

3. Each watershed manager should meet monthly with his sub-watershed team leaders to deal with management issues.
4. Watershed staff meetings should be held monthly, perhaps utilizing the suggestion in item B,2,a) above. Every second or third such meeting should be a combined meeting of the two watersheds.
5. The day of the week and the week of the month for each of these meetings should be carefully reviewed and scheduled to best fit workloads, other commitments, and flow of information into and from the meetings.

Like any complex undertaking involving a large staff, substantial resource flows, and major information needs, IRDP has management problems. It is probably more aware of these problems than most project management teams. But IRDP's success in overcoming recognized management needs has not been satisfactory. At the core it is an issue of management follow-up or, as expressed by many project staff, turning talk into action.

Much of what has been observed and discussed here repeats old refrains. We have tried to add suggestions for specific management actions to deal with some of the problems in the hope of facilitating the follow-up that ultimately must be your responsibility.

By way of example, four representative set of management recommendations available to project staff over the last 18 months may be cited as opportunities which were largely lost.

A. The AID (DS/RAD) Evaluation of December, 1979:

This evaluation, conducted early in the life of project field activities, identified several issues which have become recurring themes. Among the main recommendations were:

1. Define broader developmental goals for IRDP to reduce emphasis on quantitative component targets.
2. Fill the Deputy Director position.
3. Improve information flow.
4. Conduct a management audit to establish lines of authority.
5. Improve the link between demonstration farms and extension activities.

There is no evidence that a strategy was developed to address these recommendations and so the problems remain. The point is not that all external observations are accurate. It is that they require an organized response.

B. IRDP Guidelines on Sub-watershed Meetings:

This document of uncertain date and authorship was provided to the May, 1980 IRD Management Training Team. It is an internal IRDP instruction dealing in some detail with sub-watershed meetings, work scheduling, and reporting. If taken seriously, it would have improved information flow from sub-watersheds as well as coordination and control of activities at that level. But procedures such as were indicated as IRDP policy in this document cannot be instituted by transmittal of a piece of paper alone. Personal instruction and guidance are needed through the management line of control. This did not occur.

C. The May, 1980 Management Workshops:

These workshops, among other things, generated a set of 119 management recommendations. Some were followed-up, mainly those dealing with certain facilities to improve routine communication and institution of regular meetings between Development Committee leaders and Project staff. Other recommendations dealing with sub-watershed planning and data collection, Team Leader responsibilities, and overall staff role definition were not. The general perception of junior project staff - who were the source of most of these recommendations - is a lack of concern on the part of senior management.

Recommendations of this sort call for one of three answers: We won't do it, we can't do it, or we will do it and here's how and when. To simply ignore such ideas is not an appropriate response, particularly when they reflect a systematic expression of the concerns of a sizable segment of project staff.

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We would suggest that a small task force be organized in the wake of any serious evaluation or management strategy intervention to organize and pursue appropriate follow-up action and communication of that action to project staff. The make-up of the task force would depend on the content of the recommendations but should include one or more of the three senior line managers.

D. Pindars River Watershed 1981 - 1982 Annual Plan of Work (Extension):

Recently this document was prepared by Pindars watershed staff. It represents a good example of concrete sub-watershed component planning and goal setting in cooperation with watershed leadership. Both general goals and specific targets are itemized and implications for training are outlined.

There is considerable risk that the opportunity to spread the benefits of this initiative will be lost due to lack of follow-up. For example, although the desirability of a similar planning exercise in Two Meetings has been voiced, no successful effort has been made to bring this about.

We would suggest that a task group be formed including Mr. Gilpin - the key person behind the Pindars plan - and the Two Meetings Senior officers. This group should work with Two Meetings sub-watershed personnel to develop a similar annual plan. The result would be both better planning and the extension of Mr. Gilpin's training and experience to Two Meetings senior officers. Similarly, the process could then be extended to other components or to an integrated bottom-up planning effort in each watershed.

Undertaking systematic follow-up of management ideas will be a demanding but rewarding undertaking. It underscores the need to expand management resources through addition of the Deputy Director and an increased role for sub-watershed team leaders. It requires giving highest priority to management functions as a necessary underpinning for effective, coordinated service delivery and improvements in beneficiary welfare.

ANNEX B

TRAINING CENTER NEEDS

TRAINING CENTER NEEDS

The effective use of the new IRDP Brooklyn Training Center will be enhanced by the addition of certain supportive equipment. Although our mandate did not include reviewing this issue in detail, several suggestions are offered:

- . Paper and pencils should be readily available for distribution to training groups when necessary.
- . A good moveable blackboard and chalk should be provided.
- . Pads of large paper (approximately 3x2½ feet) should be available along with felt tip marking pens and means for displaying worksheets.
- . Consideration should be given to the purchase of a Spirit duplicator and an adequate supply of stencils and paper. This "technology" is simple to use and does not require typing. This would permit production of training materials on the spot. In addition, it would provide a simple and inexpensive alternative to mimeograph (requiring typing and careful operation of a more complex machine) or photocopying (which is very expensive in Jamaica).
- . Placement of a telephone in the large classroom would not be appropriate.
- . A variety of kitchen equipment is felt to be necessary by the training center caterer (whose excellent culinary skills contributed much to the meetings held there). We express our appreciation by reporting her "wish list" here:

12	Meat dishes or platters
12	Milk jugs
12	Sugar bowls
16	Large pyrex
8	Medium pyrex
6	Gravy bowls
6	Large tea pots
6	Salt and pepper shakers
3	Large pans for washing clothes
4	Tongs - to serve ice
3	Sets of canisters
2	Large kettles
4	Aluminum graters
4	Large jugs to serve drinks
1	Meat pump (German type)
8	Strainers -- 4 large, 2 medium, 2 tea
4	Colandérs
6	Large kitchen knives
12	Kitchen paring knives
8	Large aluminum knives
6	Small aluminum knives

1 Electric blender
1 Electric mixing bowl for cake
2 Ironing boards
8 Large table cloths
5 Dozen forks (dining)
5 Dozen soup bowls
4 Very large mixing bowls
4 Cake bowls (to finish mixing a large batch of cakes)
2 Very large frying pans
4 Medium pots
2 Sets of layer cake pans
4 Medium cake pans
4 Large cake pans
4 Oblong cake pans
6 Very large aluminum basins
4 Pie pans
2 Large pressure cookers
6 Loaf pans of medium size
4 Round cake pans
2 Angel food cake pans with removable middle
3 Egg whisks
4 Egg lifters
2 Pie lifters

ANNEX C
ITINERARY

Itinerary

- 3/1 Travel to Kingston
- 3/2 Discussions with RD staff USAID/Kingston
Travel to Christiana
- 3/3 Meetings with IRDP staff to plan activities during field visit
- 3/4 Visit to Agricultural Fair at Falmouth
- 3/5 Meeting of Two Meetings Watershed Staff Conference at Spring Ground
Discussion with IRDP Administrative Officer
Discussion with Harvey Blustain, Cornell University
- 3/6 Meeting of T-5 Subwatershed Team at Bronte
Discussions with Project Staff, Christiana
- 3/7 Preparation for Development Committee Workshops
- 3/8 Meeting with Roger and Terri Newburn, former TA Team Leader and
Home Ec Advisor
- 3/9 Meeting with Pindars Watershed Staff - Kellits
Meetings with Sr. Staff - Christiana
Sr. Staff Weekly Conference - Christiana
- 3/10 Development Committee Council Seminar
Discussions with technical component heads and TA advisors
Visit of AID Administrator and retinue
- 3/11 Coordinating meeting with component heads and TA advisors
Development Committee Council Seminar
Marketing Coop meeting - Christiana
Discussion with Head of Transportation/Maintenance Section
Home Economics Officers Meeting - Kellits
- 3/12 Development Committee Council Seminar
Meeting with Assistant Project Director, Two Meetings
Meeting with TA Team Leader
Development Committee Council Quarterly Meeting
- 3/13 Subwatershed Officer training workshop
- 3/14 Report Preparation
- 3/16 Project Senior Staff Meeting - Management report from IRD team
- 3/17 Report Preparation
- 3/18 Final Presentation to Project Director and Training Officer
Return to Kingston
- 3/19 Meeting with USAID/Kingston IRDP Project Officer
Report Preparation
- 3/20 Meetings with Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Agriculture, and USAID
- 3/21 Return to USA