

Namibia, Anticipation of Economic and
Humanitarian Needs: Zimbabwe and
Namibia

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FINAL REPORT

ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA

by

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NAMIBIA: AN OVERVIEW

Introduction

There are insuperable though not totally unmanageable problems that confront Namibia when it becomes independent. Most of the problems are closely linked, and they cut across all major sectors--economic, political and social--of the society. Among the most crucial needs of a developing countries, including Namibia, are the following: the natural and human.... resources; physical attributes conducive to development: the presence within the population of skills (education, technical, etc.); and political and group organization, leadership and cohesion essential for concerting efforts aimed at bringing about development.

The transition from colony to independent status in most new nations has been marked by recurrent crises and problems. Development has been thwarted, disrupted or shattered even in cases where newly emerging nations have been able to build on a relatively solid economic and political structure left behind by the departing colonial power.

Three conditions appear particularly crucial in stabilizing transition situations:

- (1) The presence of a relatively stable political structure, including the imposed colonial structure and indigenous structures, both of

- which assure a degree of continuity and stability in the transition situation (though they may later be modified or discarded);
- (2) A relatively substantial infrastructure, both economic and political, that provides a base for pursuing development programs in the transition and early post-independence situations; and
 - (3) The availability of indigenous educated, trained or skilled personnel to operate the infrastructures, especially the civil service, military and economic sectors.

The presence of the above factors does not assure the success of development efforts; but there is greater likelihood that a society will make a relatively smooth transition and be able to pursue its development goal if these conditions are met. Nor does the presence of these conditions necessarily assure a smooth transition, for example:

- (1) Numerous African states quickly have discarded or drastically modified imposed western political structures, sometimes for political reasons but in other instances because they did not suit the particular needs of the given society. The search for new and viable political structures

- (2) The political economy and infrastructures built by European powers in colonial societies were essentially geared toward the metropole's interests, viz, the extraction of the colony's natural resources and/or the utilization of indigenous people to provide support services (including cheap labor) for the white population. The withdrawal of the colonial power (and many of its people) has led in some instances to a destabilization, if not the shattering of the infrastructure and political economy of the new nation; and
- (3) The withdrawal of the metropole population (and especially their technical skills), as well as the exodus of external capital (be it from the metropole or other nations), has often created economic dislocations and instability, when the metropole has done little to train indigenous people as replacement personnel for operating the infrastructure and the political economy. This factor seriously impeded subsequent development efforts.

The manner in which European nations carved out their empires in Africa and elsewhere, arbitrarily cutting across ethnic and group boundaries (with some groups, such as the Owambos, being split between Angola and South West Africa),

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has created serious problems. In some instances, rival and competing groups were herded together, their own lands confiscated by the metropole settlers, resulting in the exacerbation of conflict between the indigenous groups competing for scarce resources. These conflicts, then have often carried over into the post-independent period, prompting continued ethnic/group conflicts that seriously detract from the nation's effort to pursue developmental (economic, political, social) goals. In Zaire, Nigeria and elsewhere, this group competition for power, privilege and resources has resulted in devastating civil wars which have taken innumerable human lives and destroyed the society's economy. Under such circumstances development is virtually impossible.

Some of the problems which have impeded development in other African nations will in all likelihood beset Namibia when it achieves independence. Namibia does have one factor in its favor: the presence of some natural resources. But other demographic/physical factors (desert, limited water supplies, few road/transport facilities, the lack of education and skills within the indigenous population, etc.) indicate the necessity of overcoming major problems (partly through externally assisted and funded development programs) which, unless confronted, will prevent Namibia from achieving any degree of self-sufficiency. Policies pursued by the South African government while it has controlled South West Africa have also had a debilitating effect upon Namibian society.

The following overview attempts to isolate the major features and characteristics of Namibian society. Major attention is directed toward those factors which are of crucial importance for development. There are two parts to the analysis. Part One includes three topics:

- (1) The general characteristics of Namibia, i.e., those factors that have been most significant in shaping the kind of society that it is, the society being treated as a functional whole in this instance;
- (2) The analysis of Namibia in terms of its economic, political and social organizations or sectors. This type of assessment is essential for defining more clearly the major problem areas for development (which assists in isolating and indicating possible development strategies and programs); and
- (3) The major issues or themes that emerge from the preceding analysis and further indicate the key areas or sectors toward which development aid from the United States should be directed.

Part Two explores the contemporary political situation in Namibia, focusing on transition issues, group views, and the possible implications of these for development in an independent Namibia.

PART ONE

Factors in Namibian Development

This part is divided into three sections, each of which, by viewing Namibia from a somewhat different perspective, provides a clearer picture of the fundamentals of that society, particularly in terms of the development problems it will face as an independent nation.

I. Characteristics of Namibian Society

Namibia's development problems are, in some respects, the consequence of a historical accident: namely, at the Berlin Conference (1884) an array of disparate groups were "lumped together" as "South West Africa." Germany laid claim to the territory, but the British preempted Walvis Bay, the only decent seaport in the area. The coastal area of SWA is mostly desert, and only inland, on the highveld, are there suitable farmlands. These the German army wrested from indigenous groups and gave to white German settlers. For years the Germans fought uprisings by indigenous groups, continuing to dispossess the latter of their most fertile lands. South Africa continued this policy after it took possession of the territory. Thus the people of South West Africa (now Namibia) have been for nearly a century the pawn of colonial powers, first Germany and more recently England and South Africa. Namibia's lack of development (in terms of benefitting the

indigenous populations) has resulted from its colonial status and the policies of the dominant power.

At that 1884 conference the European powers, divided Africa among themselves. The political boundaries established often arbitrarily divided African groups (e.g., the Owambos) between two newly designated "countries" coming under the control of two different European powers. Britain, as noted, laid claim to Walvis Bay and made it part of the Cape Province. When the Republic of South Africa was established in 1908, Walvis Bay became part of it, despite the fact that it is a small enclave almost midway along the Namibian coast and the only deepwater anchorage in that country. South Africa has contended that it will retain Walvis Bay even when Namibia is granted its independence. That would assure South African control of Namibian traffic, especially international trade, through Walvis.

Germany never established full control over the colony, especially in the north where the Owambos lived. But the Germans were ruthless in suppressing uprisings by various indigenous groups, and they confiscated the highveld lands for German settlers. During World War I a South African expeditionary military force defeated German troops in SWA and took control of the colony.

In 1919 the new League of Nations installed South Africa as the trustee over the mandated territory of South West Africa. The League declared that South Africa had "full

power of administration and legislation over the territory... as an integral portion of the Union of South Africa, and may apply the laws of the Union of South Africa to the territory, subject to such local modifications as circumstances may require." South Africa's responsibility under the League mandate was that of leading SWA toward independence at some later date. However, South Africa continued to govern SWA as a colony, intending to incorporate it as a fifth province. The United Nations rejected incorporation in 1946.

The Nationalist Party came into power in South Africa in 1948, and thereafter it increasingly brought SWA under its jurisdiction. During the 1960s, following the Odendall Report (1964) recommendations, it moved to implement a homelands policy in South West Africa similar to the one in South Africa. These steps brought it into increasing conflict with the UN and the International Court of Justice. The ICJ ruled in 1971 that South Africa's mandate over South West Africa was no longer valid. On that basis the UN demanded that SWA, which after 1966 it called Namibia, come under UN jurisdiction. South Africa rejected that demand.

However, in 1975 South Africa did initiate a constitutional conference within Namibia to determine the future of the country. Composed of selected groups within that country, the Turnhalle conference has continued to work toward a new constitution; and it has indicated that it believes Namibia should receive its independence by the end of 1978. The UN

has refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the conference, as SWAPO (South West Africa People's Organization), the political group that the UN has recognized as the legitimate "government" in exile, has not been allowed to participate in the proceedings.

Over several decades close links between South West Africa and South Africa have been forged. South Africa has administered SWA as part of its own country. However, rather than developing SWA for eventual independence under mandate terms, South Africa wrested the more productive farmlands from the Africans and reallocated them to white South Africans, usually Afrikaners. Following the Odendaal recommendations, South Africa proceeded to remove Africans to "homelands" which could not fully support their inhabitants. Moreover, the infrastructure that South Africa built (roads, transport systems, communications, etc.) were devised to support white enterprise and opportunities. Africans were generally neglected in the process. Many Africans were incorporated at what were below-subsistence wages within agricultural, mining, fishing and domestic sectors.

Major development in SWA prior to World War II was in the agriculture (white) sector; thereafter, the mining sector was developed substantially (there was some mining prior to this). Concessions were given especially to South African and foreign companies. But again the Africans hired were relegated to unskilled and low paying positions; and the

South African government did little to educate or train Africans for higher positions. To encourage development by foreign companies, the South African government granted exploration and concession rights on lucrative terms. The companies paid little in taxes and were allowed to extract large profits from their mining activities. This state of affairs has continued to the present.

The white sector has relied heavily upon African migrant labor, mostly Owambos from the north who, their limited lands unable to sustain their economic needs, have been forced to work for inadequate wages and live under substandard conditions.

What had evolved by the 1970s was a dual economy, the country's economic development aimed at benefitting the white South West Africans, as well as the metropole (South Africa). Africans have shared little in these benefits. Moreover, South Africa has retained control over African affairs, and it has used its power to resettle Africans in homelands that are woefully insufficient and incapable of sustaining the groups' livelihood. As a consequence, these policies have led to the pauperization of these African groups, forcing them into a dependency position where they are compelled to work within the white sector in order to survive.

Substandard work conditions and wages have prompted migrant worker discontent, for example the major strike of Owambo workers in 1971-72. South African policies also

prompted the development of nationalist and opposition groups; and that opposition led to repression. From this emerged the major liberationist group, SWAPO, which has launched guerrilla warfare in the north in an effort to drive South Africa out of the country. This in turn precipitated South Africa's efforts to set up the Turnhalle constitutional conference which would arrive at some type of political/economic system; which, though it left Namibia "independent," assured a continued link, especially economic, with South Africa. Independence for Namibia will come at some point, in one form or another. Whatever form it takes, a major possibility is that numerous links will remain that tie Namibia and South Africa together, and those linkages must be assessed in terms of Namibia's subsequent development.

What can be distinguished are a number of characteristics of Namibian society, all of which have immediate and significant relevance for the country's future development as an independent nation. These characteristics can be summarized in the following fashion:

- (1) The physical vastness of the territory, with some (though limited) resources, large tracts of uninhabitable land, the more productive lands presently in possession of the white population.
- (2) The existence of a dual economy, including (a) a modern sector in which whites possess and use the resources (land, minerals) largely for their own benefit in a market oriented economy, and (b) a subsistence (pastoral, agricultural) indigenous economy, the climate and land granted to Africans not capable of sustaining them, leaving Africans dependent upon the white sector.

- (3) Major geographic problems, including (a) inadequate roads and transport systems, creating problems for development and making transport costs exorbitant, and (b) the linkage of most roads/transport systems with South Africa (including through Walvis Bay), thereby leaving an independent Namibia almost totally dependent upon South Africa for its links with the outside world.
- (4) Virtually complete control of the infrastructures (political, economic) by whites who also possess and operate the major commercial/industrial, mining and other sectors of the economy. Their exodus could create serious operational problems and disruptions.
- (5) An almost total lack of skilled or trained African manpower who could operate infrastructures and the political/economic sectors. Most Namibians are presently migrant workers occupying unskilled or semi-skilled positions.
- (6) A lack of cohesive forces that could help bring together Namibians for the purpose of national development. This lack of cohesion results from: (a) the geography, where vast differences separate the disparate groups from each other, (b) the lack of road systems for adequately tying the country and groups together, (c) differences among the groups and suspicions of each other in some instances, (d) conflicting views within African groups, particularly between traditional authorities (supported by the South African government) and "modernizers," i.e., nationalists, (e) political policies of the South African government (particularly its homelands policy) that have led to disruptions and dislocations in the group life of the various communities, and (f) group suspicions and apprehensions (encouraged especially by South Africa) that independence will lead to eventual dominance by the Owambo.
- (7) The possibility that the moment of independence will lead to the abrupt withdrawal of many or most whites, resulting in the total disruption of Namibian society, unless those people crucial to the operation of the major political/economic sectors and the infrastructure are either retained or quickly replaced by other outsiders (few Namibians being trained or available for that task).

- (8) The likely dependence, in the short-run at least, of Namibia upon South Africa for both technical/economic assistance and economic links with the outside world. This relationship could create internal political problems for Namibian leaders, if that South African-Namibian linkage is seen as depriving Namibia of its independence and freedom.

The impact of each of these factors in terms of Namibia's development is spelled out below.

Physical and Demographic Characteristics of Territory.

Namibia, nearly two-thirds the size of the Republic of South Africa (approximately 318,000 square miles in size), is a sparsely populated, desert-like country that stretches along the Atlantic Coast from Angola to the Cape Province. It is bounded on the east by Botswana. Nearly the entire coast area and the border with Botswana are desert, the Namib on the west, the Kalahari on the east. The only major seaport, Walvis Bay, an enclave which South Africa claims as a part of the Republic. Most of the eastern border, as the western, is economically useless desert. Between the two desert areas is the highveld, lands taken from African groups and now owned by whites. This is used mostly for cattle and sheep, as climactic conditions are such that foodstuffs can hardly be grown. Foodstuffs have to be imported to a large extent, mainly from South Africa. The south, too, is largely barren land.

Except for that central strip owned by whites, the only decent terrain is in the north, a strip extending from the

Atlantic through the Caprivi Strip. The Kavango, Owambo and Caprivi live in that area. It receives the most rainfall, nearly 400 mm. annually (the other two-thirds of the country receives much less, or is desert). The lack of rainfall virtually precludes the possibility of agricultural or industrial development in most areas of Namibia. Nearly 60 percent of the entire African population lives in that northern strip, and it is thereby not capable of providing a subsistence living for its inhabitants, especially the Owambo. As a consequence, the Owambo are forced to become migrant workers for whites, in agricultural, mining, domestic or other sectors.

Historically, Namibia was not one nation, or state. Rather, the European nations arbitrarily turned it into a country when they set out the boundaries for "South West Africa." In that manner the diverse African groups were brought together, in relationships determined by European power politics.

Following publication of the Odendaal Report (1964), the South African government took steps to establish homelands for the African groups, relocating them when necessary into separate areas. In the process the remaining good lands (except for that northern tier) were taken from Africans for the "white homeland." Africans were moved to lands that were in some instances totally useless, forcing the Africans into a position where they were dependent upon the white government for their subsistence needs. What South Africa has

attempted to do has been to isolate Africans into ethnic enclaves, or homelands. Some of these had been established by 1976. The breakdown of the various population groups in Namibia (the South African government identifies these in terms of Africa, Coloured and White designations) for 1974 was as follows:

Population Groups: 1974 Estimates

African	Owambo	396,000	46.5
	Damara	75,000	8.8
	Kavango	56,000	6.6
	Herero	56,000	6.6
	Caprivian	29,000	3.4
	San (Bushmen)	26,000	3.0
	Kaokolander	7,000	.8
	Tswana	5,000	.6
	Other	<u>15,000</u>	<u>1.8</u>
	665,000	78.1%	
Coloured	Nama	37,000	4.3
	Coloured	32,000	3.8
	Rehoboth	<u>19,000</u>	<u>2.2</u>
	88,000	10.3%	
White	99,000	11.6%	

1970 breakdown by census

Afrikaans speaking	61,600
German speaking	20,000
English speaking	7,250
Other	<u>1,800</u>
	90,658

Through its homelands policy South Africa has moved to isolate the diverse groups. One consequence of this is the

accentuation of differences, creating, in turn, suspicions and dissension among groups. This policy has run at cross purposes with the development of Namibia as one "nation." South Africa has especially played upon fears that the numerically superior Owambos will dominate other groups. These inter-group suspicions, fostered by South Africa, could create difficulties for the Namibian government, as it attempts to hold together the society in the initiation and implementation of national development programs.

What has emerged, historically, as a consequence of South African control and policies is a society in which whites have political power, as well as pervasive control of the economy.

The Dual Economy. Namibia is characterized by a dual economy. Whites control and use the major resources of the cash economy (land, minerals) for their own benefit; most indigenous groups eke out a living in the subsistence agricultural economy.

Where the population size is such that the land cannot cope with the needs of the people, as is true in Owamboland, members of the group are virtually forced into the white economy in a subsidiary role. As migrant workers (roughly, 20,000 of them), they work for subsistence wages, remitting earnings to their families left behind in the homelands. Work conditions are often deplorable and salaries inadequate.

It was conditions such as these that precipitated the 1971-72 strike among Owambo migrant workers in the Windhoek area.

Thus there are two major features to the present Namibian economy, and both must be considered when Namibia achieves independence. First, there is the developed modern cash economy controlled by whites (often by outsiders, be they South African or other foreign multinationals). The African subsistence economy is distinctly subordinate. And, second, Namibia's economy is closely linked with that of South Africa. The latter's total withdrawal from an independent Namibia would have serious and adverse effects on Namibia's future economic development. This suggests three points that need to be raised concerning Namibia's economy: (A) the major characteristics of its market or modern economy, (B) the role of Africans in the economy, and (C) the problems of an independent Namibia's economic links with South Africa and the outside world.

A. There are three major sectors to Namibia's modern economy: mining, agriculture and fishing. The commercial and industrial sectors are negligible, meaning that Namibia has been highly dependent upon South Africa for finished products, foodstuffs, materials, equipment and other goods.

The extractive or mining industry is the largest single source of the country's Gross Domestic Product, constituting roughly 47 percent in 1967 but declining to approximately

25 percent by 1974 (according to a 1974 Survey published by the South African government).

Mining is the dominant sector of the economy. Most of it is in the hands of South African, British, American and other foreign companies. The major products include diamonds, copper, lead, zinc, cadmium, tin and, more recently, uranium. The mines are widely dispersed throughout the country. That has necessitated the building of roads and the importation of all equipment, thereby driving up production costs. However, companies have found mineral extraction to be highly profitable. Wages have been kept low, the South African government has provided tax inducements, and the companies have been able to quickly pay off exploration and development costs and repatriate profits with the government's well wishes. Skilled personnel are white, and the migrant workers are paid low salaries and given few opportunities for advancement. Figures are not precise, but it has been estimated that there were 16,000 Namibians working in the mining sector in 1974, declining from 18,862 in 1972, as a result of lowered markets and mechanization.

The second major sector of the economy is white farming. According to the 1967 South West Africa Survey, this sector accounted for 16.8% of the Gross Domestic Product. It occupies nearly a third of the white settlers. Livestock rearing, which once supported the African people, has been commercialized by whites who took over the better highveld

lands. Some cattle are still raised in the African areas in the north. Of the 583,000 cattle marketed in 1972, almost three-fourths were exported to South Africa. However, Namibia remains highly dependent upon South Africa for foodstuffs, having to import maize and its by-products, stock feeds and all farming equipment. Farming consists mostly of cattle and sheep raising, because the land and adverse climate are generally not conducive to the raising of other agricultural products.

The third major sector is fishing. That has been declining in recent years, but it does provide limited employment for Africans. In 1967 fishing constituted only 3.2 percent of the Gross Domestic Product. Moreover, most of the fishing is centered in Walvis Bay, which is occupied by South Africa. Independent Namibia would thereby benefit very little (except for migrant workers) from that industry, unless one assumes Namibian control of Walvis Bay and participation in the industry not existent now.

There are other areas of the economy that provide limited employment for Africans, including the commercial, construction, manufacturing, service and domestic sectors. And in all of these Africans have been restricted mostly to the unskilled positions.

Administered as an integral part of South Africa, Namibia has, as a consequence, drawn upon services and support from that country. Thus it has been dependent upon South Africa

for economic development, foreign capital, technical skills and expertise. Namibia is also a part of the Rand currency area; and virtually all support services, materials, machinery and other products (as well as food) are imported from South Africa. All of this is shipped in at high costs over a rail and transport system that is owned, subsidized and controlled by South Africa. Were there the withdrawal of all of these services and support with Namibian independence, economic disruption and dislocation must be anticipated--unless other sources are readily available to replace South Africa. Based on the experiences of other countries, the extent of support and services needed would not be readily available elsewhere.

B. The two components of Namibia's dual economy (the modern and subsistence) are integrally linked. Dispossessed of their lands, their own pastoral economies largely wrecked by the European intrusion, the Africans have become highly dependent upon government and that market economy for assuring their subsistence. A form of pauperization has occurred; the lands with which Africans have been left cannot support their increasing populations; and Africans are, as a consequence, forced to seek work in the modern sector. Most become migrant workers, living for extended periods away from their families. This in turn often creates social problems.

There is a basic difficulty in locating reliable data concerning the Black labor force. Projected figures from

one source indicate that for 1972 there were approximately 60,000 Africans working for whites. Of this total, over 43,000 were migrant workers. That migrant labor force was broken down as follows:

<u>Sector</u>	<u>Work Force</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Farming	10,900	25
Domestic service	2,700	6
Mining	12,800	30
Fishing	3,000	7
Government, commerce and industry	14,000	32
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	43,400	100%

Other estimates indicate that there are nearly 87,000 in subsistence agriculture, making agriculture the major sector of employment for Africans.

The role of the Owambos is significant, because almost all migrant laborers are Owambos. They are the backbone of the labor workforce in the European sector. The Owambo strike of 1971-72 suggests still another factor: since they live together in migrant camps and are of the same group, there is the greater possibility that they can be organized and politicized. That cohesion was evident in the strike. Although the South African government responded by forcibly repatriating the strikers to their homelands, the shortage of workers later necessitated that they be rehired.

Although the South West Africa Surveys for 1967 and 1974 indicate increases in African wage rates, the large disparities

between white and nonwhite rates have persisted. The disparity is also revealed in terms of the per capita gross domestic product, where in 1965 it was Rand 1,602 for whites, but R61 for Africans in the northern areas. The disparity between African and European wages is approximately 20:1.

Other estimates suggest that the poverty datum line for an African family of five for subsistence in Windhoek would be R60 per month in 1973. Yet in that year the average black wage in the mining sector was R36 per month and much lower in other fields.

What should also be noted is that substantial funds that could be retained in the country for development purposes leave the country in the form of profits and dividends to foreign companies and individuals. The percentage of the outflow is much higher than it is in independent African countries that allow the presence of foreign companies but put restrictions on the money they can take out of the country.

C. Namibia's dual economy, with control particularly within the mining sector in the hands of foreign companies and personnel, has broad implications for an independent Namibia. So, too, does the fact that the infrastructure of the country is basically operated, subsidized and controlled by South Africa. That infrastructure has been shaped to meet the needs of whites, many of whom will leave the country when it becomes independent. Moreover, the road/transport systems link with South Africa or the port of Walvis Bay claimed by

South Africa. Besides those transport/road/rail systems, South Africa also controls, operates and subsidizes water and electric systems, the post and telegraphic communications, etc. The modern or market sector of the economy is controlled by whites. Consequently, an independent Namibia would quickly need to determine how it would handle the replacement of technical and trained personnel by Africans, control over or nationalization of industry and mining, land reform or re-allocation, etc.

Yet another factor must be considered. The major road/rail links are with South Africa. There are few road or rail links with other African states, and the cost of developing such links might be prohibitive especially in terms of the low volume of traffic that would result. As a result, most of Namibia's exports are sold to South Africa and most of its imports (foodstuffs, grains, machinery and virtually everything else) come from South Africa at present.

The basic reality at the moment is that Namibia is economically dependent upon South Africa. Pragmatically speaking, it is a "colony" of South Africa. Namibian nationalists, once political independence is achieved, are intent on breaking that dependency to escape being a "client" state. To do so will require a herculean effort, and there is considerable question as to how and when that can be achieved.

Major Geographic Problems. A basic feature of Namibia is its geographical vastness. Long distances separate many of the groups in society; climate and terrain are such that large parts of the land are unproductive; and the limited road/rail/transport linkages create problems, escalate transport costs, isolate groups from each other, and thereby make development difficult. It will take diverse types of development aid and programs (economic, political and social) to help Namibia overcome the problems of its geography.

Control of Infrastructures. At present, virtually complete control over the infrastructure and political/economic sectors is exercised by (a) local whites, (b) the South African government and (c) external companies. South Africa, under the League mandate, was allowed to apply its own administrative structures for ruling over and promoting the development of South West Africa. This meant that it had total control over the country, a country that was a "nation" in name only. For the groups present did not think of themselves as a nation but as separate groups. Many of them resisted white (be it German or South African) policies that deprived them of their lands. Economic development prior to World War II centered in two areas: European farming and, to a limited extent, mining. But development was always oriented toward assisting the whites, not the Africans.

Economic development occurred more rapidly following World War II, but again its major benefits were directed

toward whites and South Africa. Thus, additional support services were provided for European farmers, Africans were dispossessed of more of their lands, the infrastructure was broadened to provide support for whites on the farms and in the towns--roads, rail links, water, electricity, communications, etc. All of this contributed to the development of agriculture and the small commercial, business and industrial sectors. Mining in particular burgeoned as foreign companies were encouraged to explore for and exploit the mineral resources of the country. Government policies were tailored to promote these enterprises. Africans only indirectly benefitted from this development, mostly as lowly paid workers on farms and in the mines. However, many joined the work force only because the lands they were forced to live on (after the expropriation of their most fertile lands) could not sustain them. Thus, whites benefitted the most, the Coloured groups were accorded limited opportunities, and African groups benefitted the least.

In terms of political organization and power, South Africa has accorded to whites in South West Africa some limited powers which are exercised through a Legislative Assembly that is comparable to the Provincial Councils of South Africa. However, South Africa retains control over major sectors of the society, including all affairs affecting the African and Coloured groups. Those two groups come directly under control of the South African Bureau of Bantu Affairs and the Bureau of Coloured Affairs.

White South West Africans have political representation at two levels: (1) within the South African Parliament, to which they elect six representatives, and (2) within their own Legislative Assembly. There are also white members of SWA in the South African Senate, one of whom (selected by the State President) is supposed to be aware of and represent the interests of "the coloured races of the territory." The SWA Legislative Assembly is restricted to whites, and it functions in both legislative and executive capacities in those spheres that have not been reserved by the South African government for itself.

Since South Africa enactments of 1968 and 1969, virtually all major legislative and executive powers have been removed from Windhoek to Pretoria. Policy-making and administrative prerogatives for South West Africa now lies almost exclusively with South Africa.

Based on the Odendaal Report (1964) recommendations, steps leading toward accelerated development within African and Coloured areas were undertaken. These steps included the establishment of homelands as well as the initiation of "authorities" or "governments" in some of these areas. These policies paralleled the homelands policy in South Africa, out of which were to emerge separate homelands that would be accorded "self-government." Three such "self-governing" bodies have been established in Owambo, Kavango and Caprivi, but their powers are virtually non-existent. South Africa

retains real power. In some of the Black townships surrounding white towns, Advisory Boards have been established for advising white governments, but their role is superficial. A separate type of government also exists among the Rehoboth Basters. However, the basic reality is that the South African government retains nearly absolute power over the nonwhite groups.

Thus, in looking at the political organization and administration of South West Africa, a number of basic points emerge concerning South African control and development. All of these factors have implications for an independent Namibia:

- a. In implementing the Odendall Commission's recommendations concerning administration (and a homelands policy for South West Africa), the South African government, by establishing purportedly separate administrations for various groups has further splintered and fragmented authority, making it more difficult for an independent Namibian government to establish central authority or control. This remains true although South Africa has indicated its intention to abandon the homelands policy in favor of a unitary state.
- b. The establishment of separate administrations for the Owambo, Kavango and East Caprivian groups also acts as a centrifugal force in splintering those groups and making them more suspicious of each other, creating still greater problems for a subsequent independent government intent on uniting all groups for purposes of nationhood and development.
- c. The forms of "self-government" established in those areas (and others) by the South African government does not lead toward self-development, for the South African government has retained full control over the most crucial areas of defense, economy and administration.

- d. The establishment of these diverse governments and administrative authorities, taken in conjunction with the bifurcation of power between the SWA Legislative Assembly and the South African government, further fragments political authority and development within Namibia.
- e. No real attempt has been made to ensure the participation of Blacks in decisions that affect them. Power remains with the South African government. Moreover, the political tactics of establishing homeland puppet governments that are supported by South Africa drives a wedge between traditional leaders and the modernizing groups (nationalists), a split that could seriously impede an independent Namibian government in its efforts to transform the society.
- f. The consequence of this complex of authorities, etc., means that when power is turned over to an independent new government, it will be confronted by nearly insuperable problems resulting from (1) a lack of trained personnel for administration, (2) conflicting groups and authorities, and (3) suspicions and animosities that make a cohesive developmental program difficult to implement.

African Manpower Shortages. There is an appalling lack of trained, educated and skilled Namibians to take over control of the infrastructure and government/economic organizations when the country becomes independent. This results from (a) the limited educational opportunities open to Africans or Coloureds, and (b) the restrictions against those groups from being employed at other than the menial, unskilled or, at most, semi-skilled positions. Coloureds have had a few more opportunities than Africans have had. There are a few Namibians who have been trained, but mostly outside the country. But in contrast to Zimbabwe, which has a relatively large number of educated and trained Africans, Namibia would have

difficulties replacing all the Europeans who might leave at independence. Skilled personnel are needed. Be they South Africans or other outsiders, individuals will be needed to help train Namibians.

Lack of Conditions of National Cohesion. The vastness of Namibia in size and the great distance that separates many of the population groups creates problems not only for economic development but also for political development. Groups, at least until 1964, were widely dispersed, but under the Odendaal proposals the government set out to establish group homelands, thereby forcing Africans into more restricted enclaves. Most of these are now in the north, including the Kaokos, Owambos, Okavangos, Damaras, Bushmen, Caprivians, and Hereros. The whites occupy most of the central highveld areas, where also can be found the Coloured, Rehoboth and Namas. The Tswana are clustered in one small enclave along the Botswana border. The implementation of the homelands policy has proceeded slowly and now reportedly is to be discontinued, but the emphasis on group identity and the isolation of these groups serves as a sophisticated version of an older imperial policy of divide and rule. Its intent is thereby similar to that of the homelands policy in South Africa. Moreover, South Africa has not been remiss in encouraging these groups to think of their own self-interests and be suspicious of other (and especially the Owambo) groups, a policy that could be disintegrative for nationhood in an independent Namibia. More-

over, by vesting power in the traditional authorities, South Africa splits that group from the nationalists and the modernizers. For it is the modernizing, more urban oriented members of nationalist groups who are interested in modernization (though not necessarily western forms) and national integration and development, and this puts them in opposition to most traditional African leaders.

The South African government has concentrated its support upon (and in turn received support from) the more traditional leaders. At the same time, the more traditional leaders also want independence from South Africa. The result is that they tend to support some federal or confederated form of government (as indicated in the constitutional talks) with restricted powers in the central government and greater freedom for the homeland areas. The nationalists, in general, support a unitary government and the abolition of the homelands principle as inimicable to national integration and development.

Whether or not group suspicions and rivalries can be muted in an independent Namibia will, in part, be determined by how independence is achieved, i.e., (a) how South Africa "allows" the constitutional convention and the political groups (presently not represented in the Turnhalle talks), and especially SWAPO, to work out constitutional arrangements, and (b) the type of political structures devised for the new government (confederated, federal, unitary or some other form).

These two factors will affect the character of national integration and development. The political ramifications of the present constitutional talks and the views of political groups are discussed later in this paper.

Dangers of Disruption in Transition. Also significant for an independent Namibia are decisions made concerning the control of infrastructure, political and economic sectors and the problem of recruitment of personnel replacements for whites leaving the country. There is a possibility for instance, that a large percentage of white administrative personnel will leave the country and settle in South Africa, and that some form of land reform policy (returning productive lands to Africans) will result in the exodus of white farmers.

If there is the withdrawal of white administrators, and if they are in the crucial sectors (administration, economy, transport, communications, etc.), the system could fall into disarray. This happened in Angola and Mozambique with the exodus of Portuguese. Some of these people could be replaced, but replacements are not always immediately available. This could have serious effects on government and other services, especially in Namibia because there are few educated or trained Namibians available. How serious a problem this will be, though, is partly dependent upon the types of development goals an independent government sets for itself, a point that is explored more fully later in the paper.

The withdrawal of white farmers may have less of an immediate impact, for at present most of the cattle they raise are for export. Land reform programs could result in production mostly for internal consumption. Nevertheless, the terrain is such that it cannot grow adequate supplies of foodstuffs for the population, and the foreign currency earned from the export of cattle helps pay for those imported foods.

Thus, the most immediate problem appears to be that of replacement of skilled personnel, and it is possible that Namibia will make some form of quiet arrangement with South Africa for support services for the interim (e.g., the technical services South Africa provides to Mozambique).

Dependence on South Africa. Given the crucial links between South Africa and Namibia, one major probability is that even with independence Namibia will find it necessary to work out some form of accommodation with South Africa, at least for a period of time. The South African linkage, at least in some form, is likely to persist despite sentiments among some Namibian nationalists who call for a total transformation of Namibian society and geopolitical relationships. However, even that could be achieved and some links be retained with South Africa, especially in terms of trade and development. While there is the possibility that an independent Namibia might nationalize its

industry and mining, there is also the probability that it will make some type of arrangement with international companies for assisting in the development and extraction of resources. The foreign currency gained from those export products would be invaluable for development purposes.

In summary, the foregoing discussion centers on Namibian society and its general features. These characteristics can be more sharply drawn, particularly in terms of their implications for development aid, by looking individually at the economic, political and social organization of Namibian society.

II. Linkages and Problems of Economic, Political and Social Sectors

The preceding section viewed Namibia as a functional whole, in order to identify major and interrelated characteristics of Namibian society. What is explored here are the political, economic and social components of that society. These three components are integrally linked, and their problems often converge. That linkage has other consequences as well. For development programs tailored for one of these sectors may well have a negative impact or consequence for another. This means that in terms of development policy decisions, the consequences or impact of programs should be closely appraised in advance. It is these anticipated

consequences which should determine both strategies and priorities in development policy.

Four very fundamental factors characterize Namibia, and they illustrate how the political-economic-social linkages have determined the development of Namibia. These four factors are:

1. That through its control over Namibia, South Africa developed a dual economy that benefitted almost exclusively both itself and the whites there. The type of development pursued tended to disrupt if not destroy indigenous economies, leading in the process to pauperization, social dislocation and disorganization among indigenous groups, transforming the latter into essentially dependent groups;
2. That South African political control has been exercised in a manner that has kept Namibia politically dependent. The homelands or separate development policy has been essentially a vehicle for keeping Namibian groups splintered, isolated and suspicious of each other, thereby (a) contributing to the perpetuation of conditions of dependency among African groups, (b) detracting from their efforts to organize in opposition to South African rule and (c) thwarting their efforts directed toward Namibian political mobilization and national integration;
3. That in order to maintain its control, assure the continuation of Namibia as a client state and restrict the incorporation of Namibians within political and economic structures, the South African government limited the opportunities for education and training of Namibians, thereby perpetuating the latter's continuation in a state of dependency; and
4. That to perpetuate its control, whether directly or indirectly, South Africa developed the economy of Namibia in such a way that (a) the country's infrastructure (road, rail, electricity,

administration, etc.) is so integrally connected to South Africa and (b) the commanding heights of the economy are so controlled by South African or foreign companies that (c) following independence (and possibly for an extended period thereafter) Namibia will find it difficult to break the ties that hold it as a "captive" or client state to South Africa.

What has emerged as a consequence are what Namibian nationalists (and particularly the proponents of Black Consciousness and Black Theology) identify as two forms of dependency, structural and psychological. Structural dependency derives from two factors: (a) the lack of education and training among Namibians, restricting their access to an incorporation within political and economic structures except at the lowest of levels, and (b) the tight control which South Africa retains over the Namibian economy.

Psychological dependency results from policies and practices of South Africa (be it by education or by other means) directed at instilling in Africans attitudes or behavior patterns which allow others, be it whites or traditional African leaders, to direct their lives. They are passive recipients, and both Black Theology and Black Consciousness movements criticize Africans who accept the belief that they are inferior to and less capable than whites. Not all Africans accept these beliefs, but those who do are more easily controlled by the government. Nationalists thus argue that both forms of dependency, structural and psychological, must be broken. They call for "liberation"

from these, for only through that liberation can Africans confront and resolve their problems. Only with that liberation, both structural and psychological, is fundamental and lasting development possible.

White dominance--as well as this dependency--are reflected in an assessment of the political, economic and social sectors of South West Africa/Namibia under South African rule, and this can be traced briefly.

The Political Sector

It is possible to isolate and distinguish the major characteristic of each of the major sectors, political, economic, and social. All may be construed as part of a broader "political economy." What is most fundamental is that major policy (including development) decisions are made within political structures. These include decisions that determine the allocation of resources and power and the strategies and priorities that will be set for development.

The following, then, emerge as the critical variables within the political sector:

1. Political control has been and is at present in the hands of South Africa. Its decisions have been most crucial in determining the character of development and the allocation of power, privilege and resources within South West Africa. In reality, Namibia has been administered as

a fifth province of the Republic (for whites) and as a colony (for nonwhites), its resources used for the benefit of South Africa and whites living in Namibia. This has been facilitated by establishment of a dual economy. South Africa has retained political control over African affairs within South West Africa, thereby assuring its power over nonwhite groups. Recently South Africa has also removed most of the substantial legislative and executive prerogatives that once rested with whites in South West Africa.

2. South Africa controls South West African and Coloured groups through various departments. Some of the groups (Kavongo, Owambo, Caprivi, Rehoboth) have been accorded a degree of autonomy in legislative councils or assemblies, but their functions and powers are limited. These were originally established as the first step toward "independent" homeland governments (based on the 1964 Odendaal Report), but they hardly serve as training grounds for self-determination since they have little power or authority. Through these political devices, and by limiting the education/training and incorporation of African and Coloured groups to the lowest levels in government and administrative (as well as other economic/political) sectors, South Africa has curtailed the political development of these groups.

3. South Africa has now agreed to independence for Namibia, but it structured the constitutional (Turnhalle)

convention in a manner that excluded political parties (including SWAPO), basing representation instead on the various "nationality" groups in the country. Although it has stated that Namibia is free to determine its own political structure, South Africa anticipates close economic links with Namibia, that being based on the fact that Namibia's economic ties presently leave it dependent upon South Africa.

4. Although South African policy has been aimed at splintering the diverse groups within Namibia, there is among both African and Coloured groups a growing sense of national identity and a desire for independence from South Africa, a sentiment apparent even among the more conservative groups represented in the constitutional talks.

5. Despite the intensifying national identity, numerous divisive factors are present that could prompt serious problems and political instability within an independent Namibia. Among these factors are: (a) disagreements over the type of political system that should be established for Namibia; (b) group suspicions of the political motivations and objectives of some other groups (for instance, fears concerning the Owambo, who are the numerically largest group in the country), thereby raising issues concerning the protection of minority or group rights, (c) disagreements between the "modernizers" and the traditionalists, policy differences centering around such issues as powers of the central government, cultural policy (i.e., the preservation of group cultures or the

establishment of a national culture); and (d) differences concerning the Namibian political economy (i.e., should it be market oriented or socialist, etc.).

6. Whatever the political system that emerges, and whatever group(s) emerge with power, that government must determine quickly the development strategies that it will pursue. It must, for example, make decisions concerning such fundamental issues as: (a) the character of the political economy it will establish; (b) the types of economic links (if any) that it will retain with South Africa, that decision significantly shaping the directions of Namibia's future development; (c) the thrust of economic development (i.e., a balanced or unbalanced growth strategy, etc.) and whether or not external groups, agencies or countries will be solicited for assistance; (d) the setting of priorities for development (e.g., decisions concerning development of local or national economy, export/import policy, rural vs. urban industrial development, etc.); and (e) the establishment of linkages with the external world, including other African countries.

7. In terms of the future, the Namibian government will need to pursue development strategies that will establish its legitimacy, credibility and efficacy in the eyes of the people. If it fails to do so, the possibilities for political conflict and instability are increased, especially if it

neglects to resolve the issues set out in Numbers 5-6 above.

The Economic Sector

The major features of the economic sector can be elucidated in similar fashion. The political and economic sectors are integrally related. The most crucial economic decisions are usually determined within the political system, for it is there that the strategies and priorities for development must be determined. Nevertheless, the major features of the Namibian economy, at present and after independence, can be fairly readily discerned:

1. Given its historical control, South Africa transformed South West Africa into a type of colony, exploiting and using the latter's resources (human and natural) mainly for South Africa's benefit. The result was a dual economy, including modern and subsistence sectors, with Africans relegated in the latter positions as subsistence farmers and in the former to serving as lowly paid labor. Control over the modern sector is in the hands of local whites, South Africa and foreign companies, and all three have benefitted greatly from the exploitation of Namibia's resources.

2. Given Namibia's physical features and problems, and given the fact that its vital road/rail/transport systems are connected exclusively with (as well as controlled by) South Africa, Namibia is virtually a "captive" of South

Africa in terms of crucial trade links with the outside world.

3. Because Coloured and African groups have been restricted to lower class positions and been restricted in their educational, training and employment opportunities, few Namibians are sufficiently trained to occupy the array of middle and upper level management or other positions within the economy of the country's infrastructure. In terms of development, this means that: (a) there must be instituted crash programs for training Namibian people and, in the interim, (b) the country must rely upon either South African or other foreign personnel for keeping the essential services and economy of the country from breaking down.

4. Given present South African discriminatory policies (in terms of education, training, employment, etc.), the new government must quickly move to abolish all discriminatory measures and assure that all Namibians have equal access and opportunity within all of these sectors.

5. The economic dependency of Namibians results largely from whites having dispossessed them of their more fertile lands, forcing many--as a necessity for survival--into the modern economic sector as wage laborers. Land reform, with the restoration or reallocation of lands and support services for improving African agricultural production, is thereby fundamental. If the present massive export of beef is not continued, however, Namibia must recognize that it will lose one of its basic

sources of foreign currency.

6. There is an imperative need for rural/urban development programs. Otherwise, unless confronted immediately, Namibia, as other newly independent African states, will face problems of massive migration to the urban areas, resulting in social/economic dislocations, problems of public health and welfare and concomitant social problems. This means, too, the need for rural development programs that serve to keep populations from fleeing to the cities where opportunities appear somewhat better.

7. As noted in the preceding section, among the more fundamental policy decisions that must be made are those determining the character of Namibia's economic system and development strategies and priorities. These have been spelled out in the preceding section.

The Social Sector

Factors within the social sector are particularly significant in terms of Namibia's future development. Historically, South African policies have created circumstances and conditions which could jeopardize efforts at national integration and development by an independent Namibia. Among the more significant factors are the following:

1. South Africa has imposed on Namibia racial policies similar to those followed in its own country, where class structure, education, training, employment and social relations

are determined by ascriptive racial criteria. Education as well as other policies and practices have all served as vehicles by which South Africa has attempted to inculcate Black and Brown groups with a belief in the racial superiority of Whites. This has been used as an ideology for rationalizing white privilege and power. In some few instances Coloured groups (Coloured, Rehoboth, Nama) have been granted a few more privileges and opportunities than Africans, but whites maintain their own privileged position. As a consequence, the role relations and behavior of groups (White, Brown, Black) that have been established over years may not be easily broken. Although innumerable whites will leave an independent Namibia, others will remain--and the breaking of prior behavior patterns (as well as attitudes) of groups toward each other may persist and exacerbate group tensions and conflict.

2. Related to the prior issue is that of breaking within people the long-instilled behavioral patterns based on psychological dependency, an attitude whereby individuals or groups find it difficult to cope with, adapt to or confront new types of situations, waiting always for others to direct or lead. In some instances this is based on the individual's feeling he is inferior to others. This is one psychological situation that Fanon analyzed among formerly colonized peoples, and at the core of Black Consciousness and Black Theology is the effort to break people away from that condition. Dependency,

as they note, may result from the control of a society's structures (political, economic, social) by an outside colonial power, but dependency is also internalized psychologically among colonial peoples. They must be "liberated" psychologically, perhaps through the establishment of numerous community or locally based programs which involve people in the decision-making process and makes them feel an integral part of the society. For only with that type of participation is self-development possible.

3. An early step an independent Namibia must take is that of eliminating all forms of discrimination, thereby terminating the inequities of the present society. In so doing, though, it must initiate immediately diverse programs for education, training, employment, etc. What must also be assured is that all groups have equal access to those opportunities, for otherwise group conflict and hostility could well ensue and seriously detract from national development efforts.

4. There are other sources of conflict among groups in Namibia which must be confronted and resolved. There are two particular sources of disagreement: (a) suspicions by groups of each other, in part exacerbated by South African government policies which have been aimed at splitting groups through differential treatment and/or creation of animosities based on other factors; and (b) policy differences

between traditionalists and modernizers, where in terms of development efforts the two oppose each other over such policy questions as political structures, authority, and the implementation of diverse programs that in one way or another appear to threaten a given group's power, status, and privilege.

5. Rural-urban development programs: With independence, most African states have found themselves beleaguered by massive population movements to urban centers as people seek job opportunities and a new way of life. This has created traumatic social dislocations that precipitated social pathologies and problems, especially within the mushrooming urban ghetto areas that become new sources of public health problems. Problems of this type will confront the Namibian government, and it will need to solicit external assistance for mounting corrective programs. Rural development, of course, becomes important in this respect.

6. The need for community participation and involvement in program development and implementation is evident in the political platforms of Namibian nationalist groups. Moreover, that type of involvement is seen as a fundamental means of breaking people away from psychological dependency and contributing to the restructuring of society. Likewise, because the successful implementation of programs rests upon people, they must be incorporated and feel committed. This is

especially critical in the implementation of locally based programs including, among others, family planning, housing, food production, community development, public health, preventive medicine and health care delivery systems. The successful implementation of these programs rests on community participation. That participation should help create in people the feeling that they have a stake in shaping their own future. Where this community participation is missing, as has been evident from numerous experiences in developing countries, programs usually fail.

7. It is also essential that Namibia move toward fulfillment of programs that assure equal opportunity, social justice and lead toward human dignity. These serve as fundamental themes of the Black Theology and political groups in Namibia. These beliefs could serve (along with those emerging nationalist feelings demanding independence from South Africa) as a cohesive force in pulling together Namibians to work for national development.

In terms of development policy, then, it is essential that the linkages of problems within these three sectors be recognized. It is also essential that Namibia's ties with South Africa be considered, for in the early post-independence period South Africa's control of road/rail/transport links to the outside world will critically affect Namibia's development. Moreover, the immediate withdrawal of whites from the

economy and infrastructure could have devastating economic and political consequences. Hence, some type of arrangement for African assistance (at least for the interim) seems imperative.

III. Major Issues and Themes for Development in Namibia

Major themes or insights concerning Namibia can be drawn from the preceding analysis:

1. There cannot be real development without decolonization and the breaking of dependency, both structural (i.e., control by whites and South Africa over political/economic structures) and psychological (i.e., where people, for whatever reasons, cannot take the initiative in making decisions.)

2. There must be a recognition of two virtually ineluctable factors during Namibia's early period of independence: (a) the country's physical factors (periodic droughts, limited rainfall and water, vast distances, scarce resources, limited transport linkages, etc.), and (b) the reality of the South African presence, with its control of rail/road linkages and Walvis Bay, both of which constitute Namibia's sole outlets to the world. Consequently, there is the necessity for working out an arrangement with South Africa, and that may temporarily put constraints upon Namibia's independence, economic and otherwise.

3. If it is to establish its own independence, Namibia must find some means for breaking those virtually monopolistic

ties that South Africa has over Namibia's economy, including that over transport, resources, land and the modern sector of the economy.

4. The political economy, presently based on a dual modern/subsistence economy which benefits whites almost exclusively (local, South African, foreign) must be fundamentally restructured and brought under the control of Namibia so that its citizens and not outsiders benefit from its development. To achieve this, major steps must include: (a) political restructuring; (b) rapid training of Namibian manpower for taking control; (c) establishment of an effective political system representing the people's wishes; and (d) the establishment of a new political economy that is Namibian-controlled and operated.

5. Programs must be established that: (a) terminate the present structural dependency; (b) break psychological dependency; (c) involve the community (for through locally-based programs, based on individual participation and involvement psychological dependency can be broken); and (d) help establish a national unity and identity that will serve as a cohesive and binding force in national development.

The bases on which these themes rest are discussed in the preceding pages and more fully in the series of papers that make up the remainder of this report. The following statements are simply a brief recapitulation of them: they are spelled out more fully, as indicated, in the other parts

of this report.

PART TWO

Politics and Development in an Independent Namibia

The future development of Namibia is dependent upon a number of crucial political factors, the most significant of which are: (a) the character of the political structures that emerge at and after independence, (b) the political views of emergent political groups and particularly those who hold power, and (c) the political decisions made by the government concerning the type of society they desire and the extent to which their policies, given the socio-economic conditions of the society, can be implemented.

There are two structural realities that an independent Namibian government must deal with: one of these is the dual economy, including the recognition that the two parts are integrally related; the other is the interlocking of Namibian and South African economies, at least for the moment, and the implications of that for development.

I. Strategies for Development: Opposing Views

Among the major factors that development planning must take into consideration are Namibia's periodic droughts, its vastness in size, the limited infrastructure (road/rail linkages, water, electricity, etc.), the heterogeneous population that is also limited in numbers, the limitations on resources

and fertile or productive lands, and the present lack of education and skills within the population. All of these factors suggest the imperative need for maintaining the country as one economic unit, for only in that fashion can it cope with and resolve such problems as (a) its present reliance for development capital on the export of mineral resources, (b) its overdependence upon South Africa for needed materials, and (c) the grip over resources and other sectors of the economy by foreign companies. These are issues that must be confronted and resolved if Namibia is to achieve any degree of self-reliance and independence.

South African strategies for the development of South West Africa have been directed along the following lines:

1. On the macro level emphasis has been placed on the extension of the infrastructure, including development of the water and electricity supply for the entire country, while at the micro level emphasis has been placed on development of an effective infrastructure for the homelands.

2. Emphasis for development has aimed at providing support and industrial and fishing sectors through (a) tax concessions, subsidization for transport, favorable treatment in other ways and (b) providing for the availability of a stable and cheap labor supply through policies which (indirectly at least) virtually force Africans into the labor system.

3. The development of secondary and tertiary industries

including the establishment of decentralized labor-intensive industries in the homelands.

4. The improvement of the traditional subsistence economy with improvements where deemed feasible.

5. The establishment of effective administrative systems in the various homelands, stressing the active participation (but mostly in advisory capacities) of the various population groups.

6. Strengthening of the economy through close links with the more highly developed South African economy, paralleling closely the pattern of relationships existing within South Africa between the government and its economy with its own homelands.

This strategy of development, as should be evident, leaves Namibia essentially in the position of a client state. Both economic and political power are retained by whites. While there is the possibility of some Black and Brown groups being given educational and training opportunities, even then most would be structurally incorporated only at the lower levels.

This development strategy, the intent of which is to keep even an independent Namibia dependent upon and under the economic control of South Africa, is rejected by most Black and Brown groups in Namibia. While some of these groups recognize and accept the necessity for maintaining some

economic ties with South Africa, most if not all reject policies that would result in the above type of situation. That situation, they contend, would deny their independence and leave them simply an economically-controlled satellite or client state of South Africa. One of the basic thrusts of Black and Brown political groups is aimed at achieving economic liberation from foreign control, be it South Africa or the multinational/foreign companies. What is envisaged is some form of classless, egalitarian and unified society. The emphasis is on self-development and self-sufficiency rather than the continuation of dependency (though in more subtle form) which would occur if the country remains too reliant upon export of its resources for foreign currency. These groups recognize that the country's resources are finite.

The basic development objectives of the Black and Brown groups, though there are some variations among them, can be subsumed under the following headings:

1. There must be the establishment of political structures that allow for the participation of all people. This would be as members of a unified state and not, as with the homelands policy, of supposed "national groups". However, there is considerable disagreement over what are the best possible political structures (e.g., federal, confederated, unitary or some other form) for achieving this.

2. The political system must be based on the participation of all people, hence programs of development in all sectors should, to the extent possible, incorporate that premise of community participation and involvement.

3. The society must be based on peace, social justice, human dignity, the elimination of poverty and equal opportunity for all. Neither discrimination nor privilege should be tolerated, be it based on one's race, ethnicity or religion. No group should be allowed special privileges or opportunities. Whites may remain in the society, but they are simply one among all the groups and have no special privileges.

4. The political and administrative systems must be indigenized as rapidly as possible, and while South Africans may be essential in the interim, other outsiders would be preferred. Thus a central task of development is that of providing rapid training for Namibians who will be incorporated as rapidly as they can be trained into positions at all levels of the society.

5. The political system must be free to make its own determination on development policy. It must be free to decide the forms of control it will exercise over the economy, industry, mining and all other sectors.

6. The future economy of Namibia must quickly become independent from that of South Africa and the present dependency relation between the two countries terminated.

7. A larger measure of state control and state undertaking but not necessarily nationalization may be necessary, and the government must be free to determine those development decisions.

8. The role of foreign investments and foreign participation in the development of the country must be controlled. Decisions should be made in terms of investment strategy, wages, profits, etc., and the government will make those decisions.

9. Immediate steps must be taken to eliminate the disparity between white and black wages and to train Namibians for structural incorporation at all levels. Discrimination in employment (as well as all sectors) must be immediately abolished.

10. Greater emphasis must be placed on the development of local economies, and the economy should not be so heavily dependent upon and geared toward export commodities. The local development will bring greater independence from that outside world and price fluctuations on export goods.

11. The notion of homelands or separate areas will be abolished. Greater efforts will be directed toward the localization of economic development so that areas can become self-sustaining. Nevertheless, the country must be seen as one economic whole, and programs must be developed for tying the entire society together.

12. Land reform and the equitable distribution of land, with crash programs for providing assistance for Namibian farms, must occur. This includes the redistribution of white farms that formerly belonged to indigenous peoples.

13. Termination of the compulsory migrant labor systems, with unions being encouraged to assist in the development of the society. Workers should have a greater voice in the management decisions that affect their well-being.

14. Within the social sector there is the need for development of programs, at both local and national levels, that encourage unity and break down the barriers between groups which cause suspicion and hostility. A basic purpose is that of creating one, united Namibian society.

15. Development of programs for both rural and urban sections, recognizing that independence will bring a flooding to the urban centers of people. This necessitates the development of programs for both areas that focus on such things as housing, public health and community involvement in the shaping of their own future.

With independence, it is the Black and Brown groups that will play the most significant role and hold power in the political system. Thus it is their views, as spelled out above, that will prevail. What can be anticipated is that Namibia will establish some form of socialist or social-democratic system, and its development strategies will be based on those principles spelled out above. The extent

to which it does so, though, will depend in part on how independence is achieved and the groups who are involved in that final process.

II. Political Views in Namibian Society

An indication of the directions in which Namibia might move in the future can be gained from a survey of political views as evident in (a) the constitutional talks at Turnhalle and (b) the pronouncements of political parties within the country as well as by the external liberationist groups, primarily SWAPO. These provide some indication of possible development strategies that will be pursued by the new government.

Since the 1950s various Namibian groups have spoken out in opposition to South African rule. They have received encouragement especially since the 1960s, gaining support from the United Nations and the International Court of Justice. These factors prompted political activity within the country, as well as guerilla action from outside the country. These and other factors prompted South Africa's initiation of the Turnhalle constitutional talks aimed at granting Namibia its independence.

Diverse views can be heard from among the Turnhalle participants, and both they and the excluded political groups (including SWAPO) represent a spectrum of opinion--ranging from some groups (Black as well as White) that support

separate development and close links with South Africa to those who demand immediate independence, the breaking of all links with South Africa and the establishment of a socialist society. Views range across the spectrum from those (mostly Whites and traditional leaders) who propose an independent state with limited central powers and "separate freedoms" for the various "national" groups in the country to those (mostly Black nationalist and modernizing leaders) who propose a unitary state in which the rights of individuals are guaranteed but there is no recognition of separate groups as such, since they see that as simply a continuation of South Africa's homelands policy.

In terms of Black-White attitudes there are also diverse views. One very clear view among nationalists is that Namibia, whatever its relationship with South Africa after independence, must unite and develop a national consciousness. This is seen as a form of "liberation," and it is reflected in the thought of both Black leaders and many church leaders (apparent in "Black Theology"). The role of churches is particularly important in Namibia, and Black Theology is seen as an instrument for liberating Namibians from psychological dependency. Although Black Theology proposes a breaking out from under White domination in all spheres, it is not anti-White in principle. Rather, it holds that Blacks and Whites can live together harmoniously in society, if the artificial

barriers of discrimination are removed and the Whites identify themselves with Namibian society and the aspirations of all Namibians. Whites must recognize that they have no special privileges in the society. Not all Blacks or Browns believe in that principle, but Black Theology does have a considerable following, and the church plays a significant role in the lives of Namibians.

There are diverse political views present among the various political groupings within Namibian society. By 1976 it was possible to identify a total of 29 political parties or groups. These included 23 Black and Brown parties, three White parties, and three "national" political organizations, including the National Convention, the Namibia National Convention and Namibia National Council. Most of these parties and organizations can be distinguished under one of three categories: "conservative," "middle" or "radical."

Within the conservative group can be found the ruling National Party, the rightwing Herstigte Nasionale Party, and generally the more traditional leaders of some homelands (who receive their support from the South African government and thereby support it and some form of homelands policy), as well as a few others. The conservative groups want closer attachments to South Africa after independence and support continuation of a homelands policy.

The "middle" group includes the largest number of parties

and organizations, including even the internal wing of SWAPO. These groups are more pragmatic in their outlook, and they acknowledge the need for economic relations with South Africa after independence.

Within the "radical" group can be found the radical internal wing of SWAPO, the external wing of SWAPO, and various other groups, many of which (at least to the present) are characterized by their strong socialist leanings. All three groupings, to the extent possible under the present restrictive measures of the South African government, contest for support within Namibia. Although it is the smallest of the three groupings, the radicals have their major support among the younger members of society who want modernization and demand the immediate and complete withdrawal of South Africa.

At the conservative end of the spectrum is the ruling National Party. But within it there are varying shades of opinion concerning the future of Namibia. Within some of the White and Black groups are those who propose continuation of a homelands policy based on the revival of traditional tribal authorities. However, that view is rejected by both the radical and middle groupings, for they see the homelands policy as a divisive force that would destroy national unity and development. Indeed, nationalism presently receives support from a majority of Black and Brown peoples and groups within Namibia.

Although the three "national organizations" noted (the National Convention, the Namibian National Convention, and the Namibian National Council) attempt to cut across and embrace the other groups within society, most of the political parties or groups have their base in one tribal or ethnic group. SWAPO has made some effort to cut across these various groups, but even it remains predominantly Owambo in composition.

As of mid-1976, of the three umbrella organizations, only the National Convention accepted Black, Brown and White members. The other two, the Namibia National Convention and the Namibia National Council excluded Whites from their membership. The Namibia National Convention has the greatest support from the various political organizations in the country. Among political parties (as separate from those umbrella national organizations), the two strongest parties are the white National Party and the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), whose principles are antithetical to one another.

Most of the Black and Brown parties support the principle of Namibia as one political entity, but they disagree over the type of political structure (federal, unitary, confederated, etc.) that should be established. That is clearly an issue that could continue to split the groups even after independence, for those opposed to whatever is implemented

may well use the political forum thereafter to push their views. Among the three white groups, the National Party supports the constitutional convention and believes it must determine the new political structure. The Federal Party has called for a federal republic, and the Herstigte Nasionale Party demands that South Africa annex South West Africa as its fifth province. What can be anticipated is that with independence that latter group, and possibly other whites as well, will settle in South Africa.

However independence comes to Namibia, be it (a) through the present constitutional talks which exclude SWAPO and other political parties, or (b) through expanded talks that incorporate these groups, or (c) by other means (e.g., civil war), Blacks and Browns will ultimately hold power. The paths that development takes will depend on which of those groups hold power. If SWAPO and others are excluded from a new government, civil conflict will certainly intensify and make development difficult if not impossible. If SWAPO and others are somehow incorporated, there remains the possibility that the more moderate groups in that middle grouping will hold the greatest power. Whatever strategies are decided upon, though, will rest within the government; but in all likelihood they will embrace the principles set out above. At present, most Black and Brown political parties and groups acknowledge the interest and involvement of South Africa in Namibia's future development. Even the Namibia National Convention has

conditionally acknowledged that, but it maintains that that involvement must be based on Namibia's terms.

Thus, future development in Namibia, and the forms it takes, will depend on how the new government comes to power, the political attitudes of the group(s) holding power, and the character of relations between Namibia and South Africa at that point.

NOTE:

The papers included herein by Donald G. Baker are three in number. These are:

- 1) Namibia: An Overview
- 2) Zimbabwe and Namibia: Development Problems and Prospects
- 3) Zimbabwe, Namibia and External Links: Independence and Interdependence

Zimbabwe and Namibia: Development Problems and Prospects

Zimbabwe and Namibia, though different in many respects, face strikingly similar development problems as newly independent nations. Where in the 1960s newly independent African states held sanguine hopes that development would quickly succeed (a belief held by most people involved in development efforts), the massive problems encountered have shattered any expectations that development in Zimbabwe and Namibia will come easily.

The glaring fact is that failure has characterized most development efforts in the Third World countries. There is a widening gap between the economic well-being of the "have" and "have not" industrialized and Third World countries, and many of the development strategies followed simply have not worked. The per capita income gap between rich and poor nations has increased, and conditions in developing nations are most aptly described by such terms as underdevelopment, inequality and dependency.

Poverty and unemployment persist and, indeed, increase in most developing countries; the development and utilization of human resources is neglected; and the economies of developing nations dependent upon the export of primary products have in most cases been shattered by the vagaries of fluctuating international market demands. The frustrations and failures of development have prompted both criticisms and reassessments of prevailing development strategies. There is, as a consequence, an increasing rejection of some of those strategies and a determined search for new development strategies; including, among others, a demand by many Third World nations for a

totally "new economic order." These factors will affect Zimbabwe and Namibia, for the "lessons" learned from the development experiences of other Third World nations may influence their development strategies and policies.

Although there are other factors, three in particular have shaped the post-independence development of numerous Third World (including African) countries. These factors include: (1) the colonial legacy, and especially the policies earlier pursued by the metropole (i.e., Britain, France, Portugal, etc.) and in-country white minority groups which enhanced white power and privilege at the expense of indigenous populations; (2) the "givens" of the country, including, among others, its demography, infrastructure and resource capabilities (human as well as natural); and (3) the particular development strategies and policies pursued by post-independence governments.

The first two points above provide the basis for the analyses found in Chapters 2-3. Chapter 2 traces the major characteristics (or themes) of Zimbabwe and Namibia. It illustrates how white policies (metropole and local) created or contributed to the conditions of underdevelopment, inequality and dependency that presently characterize these countries. The "givens" are also analyzed in that chapter. Chapter 3 traces the consequences that flow from the factors discussed in Chapter 2, illustrating how these factors affect the development problems and prospects of Zimbabwe and Namibia. The third point noted above (i.e., the development strategies and problems of Third World countries, including reassessments of those strategies) is appraised in Chapter 4, for those strategies have significant implications for development in Zimbabwe and Namibia (including

the development assistance policies of AID), and it is these aspects that are explored in Chapter 5.

Underdevelopment, inequality and dependency are conditions that persist in most Third World countries, but they are possibly more pervasive--and certainly more apparent--in Zimbabwe and Namibia. Within these two countries, these conditions are clearly the consequence of structural conditions created by that colonial legacy, i.e., the policies of the metropole and/or the local white government. The persistence of these conditions in other Third World countries, though, cannot be attributed solely to that colonial legacy. Vestiges of that legacy do persist and create problems, but the "givens" of the society and, perhaps more significantly, the development strategies followed by post-independence governments, significantly determine the persistence or elimination of such conditions as underdevelopment, inequality and dependency. Consequently, in situations where these conditions persist, Third World countries now question the validity of the development strategies that they have followed. In some instances failure may not have been directly the fault of those development strategies. Rather, there have been instances where marked economic growth and development did occur, but other factors seriously eroded or destroyed those gains. For example, catapulting oil prices since 1973, fluctuations in the prices paid for primary products of developing nations, inflation and recession, all have recently devastated world economies, including those of Third World countries. Thus, even though some growth and development may have occurred, many Third World countries now seriously

question their reliance upon development strategies that left them so vulnerable to these diverse forces. Industrial nations have generally been able to weather the storms of high oil prices, inflation and recession, but Third World countries have been less able to cope with these factors. Consequently, they question prevailing development strategies, for they are less sure that these will enable them to overcome the fundamental--and pervasive--conditions of underdevelopment, inequality and dependency.

In Zimbabwe and Namibia, overcoming underdevelopment, inequality and dependency may be more difficult, for prolonged white rule has deeply embedded these conditions in the very fabric of the society. Added to this are the "givens" of both countries (a dual economy, an infrastructure devised for white privilege, an African population explosion, an inadequate development of African human resource potential, etc.). Thus the above factors as well as the development strategies pursued by the new governments will significantly determine whether or not policies followed can break these conditions of underdevelopment, inequality and dependency.

Two sets of themes, as a consequence, merit close scrutiny in the analysis of Zimbabwe and Namibia. These themes derive from the development experiences of other Third World countries. They are: (a) the persistence of conditions of underdevelopment, inequality and dependency, and (b) efforts to break these conditions and achieve the goals of development, equality and independence. The analysis that follows traces two issues or questions: first, the extent to which the legacy, "givens" and conditions detract from the possible fulfillment of desired goals; and, second, the implications of how

particular development strategies and programs may contribute to or curtail fulfillment of the desired goals. As previously noted, part of the answer to (or at least insights into) the second question can be derived from an analysis of the development experiences of other Third World countries. These answers might provide guidelines for Zimbabwe and Namibia as they weigh alternative development strategies and policies aimed at achieving the goals of development, equality and independence.

The following analysis briefly traces the three points raised earlier: (1) the colonial legacy of Zimbabwe and Namibia; (2) the "givens" of the two countries; and (3) the question of development strategies, the experiences of other Third World countries providing a basis for assessing (a) development possibilities for Zimbabwe and Namibia and (b) the possible role for the United States (including AID) in providing development assistance should it be called upon to do so by newly independent governments within these two countries.

1. The Colonial Legacy

Although there are sharp differences (in demography, geography, resources, problems, etc.) that distinguish Zimbabwe from Namibia, both share a common tradition that clearly affects their future development: namely, a colonial heritage or legacy that has created conditions of underdevelopment, inequality and dependency. The consequence is that most Africans in both countries live at either a subsistence or below-subsistence level. Poverty is extensive; underemployment and unemployment are pervasive; traditional economic and political systems of indigenous groups have been disrupted or destroyed; the most fertile lands have been expropriated by whites who use them for their personal gain; and the dual economy that has evolved, consisting of modern and subsistence sectors, has been shaped and used al-

most exclusively for the benefit of the white population, the metropole (earlier, the British government in Rhodesia; presently, the South African government in South West Africa/Namibia) and multinational companies.

The legacy of white control has been, for Africans: (1) underdevelopment (characterized by the destruction of indigenous economic and political systems; the denial of or restrictions upon education, employment and other opportunities for Africans within political and economic sectors); (2) inequality (including differential rates of access to and opportunities within political, economic and social sectors or structures, these restrictions clearly and blatantly based on racial criteria); and (3) dependency (resulting from the expropriation by whites of African lands; restrictions upon African education and employment opportunities which curtail their ability to earn a livelihood; and a political system that restricts or denies Africans the right to a voice in political decisions affecting their lives).

The dual economy that prevails in both countries consists of modern and subsistence sectors. The modern sector exists almost exclusively for the benefit of whites, and the few Africans who are incorporated within it are restricted to the lowest (mostly unskilled) levels where they are paid subsistence wages. At any given moment nearly 80% of the African population in either country can be found in the rural or subsistence (residual) sector on lands incapable of sustaining their basic needs. The large tracts of more fertile lands were earlier expropriated by whites who still use them for their own profit. A few Africans (more in Zimbabwe than Namibia) have been educated and trained for incorporation and participation within the

modern sector, but African underemployment (i.e., holding jobs below their educational/skill training) as well as unemployment are widespread in both countries. This is caused by job reservations or restrictions (whether based on legislation or societal practices) that exclude Africans from positions viewed as "belonging" to whites. These practices persist even when there are white labor shortages. Blacks may be hired to fill the positions, but they are classified as "assistants" and paid at lower rates. Virtually all middle and upper level management as well as skilled and semiskilled positions, be they within the infrastructure, government or economy, are held by whites. Should independence prompt an exodus of whites, disruptions in these areas can be anticipated, though in the case of Zimbabwe there are more educated and trained Africans available for movement into many of these positions.

In Namibia, economic activity centers on the export of primary products (cattle, mineral resources). It is the whites, though, who control and benefit from these activities. The large percentage of Africans live in the subsistence sector and derive little benefit (except for workers in the modern sector) from it. Restricted in educational and employment opportunities, their lands incapable of providing even subsistence, many Africans are compelled to enter the labor market (mostly as migrant laborers), working in mines, on farms or as domestics. Wages are inadequate, and workers must thereby leave their families behind in the rural areas, sending their wages home to help their families survive. In Zimbabwe the highly modern sector coexists with the subsistence or residual sector; and, in both countries, the majority of Africans struggle to survive off the land

or in jobs within the white sector. The shortage of white labor has necessitated a greater reliance upon African labor within the Rhodesian economy, but wages are kept at a minimum, job opportunities are restricted, and most Africans live under substandard if not squalid conditions.

In both countries there are a few exceptions, but in general white policies and practices have precipitated the impoverishment of the African. This results from white policies in three key areas: land, labor and education/human resources. Thus, through their control and policies (particularly in these three areas), whites have kept Africans subordinate and pauperized.

Land policies. Historically, whites in both countries confiscated for themselves the most fertile and productive lands, relegating Africans to the less productive areas. Even so, Africans struggled to maintain themselves on the land, stubbornly refusing to work for the low wages paid within the European sector. Consequently, whites imposed hut and other taxes to coerce Africans into the labor market, for they needed cheap labor for the mining, agricultural and domestic sectors. As their population increased, Africans were forced to overuse their land, thereby wearing out its productivity. Thereafter, unable even to subsist on the land, Africans were compelled by economic necessity to enter the labor market. In a few cases, African farmers were able to compete with white farmers in the agricultural market, but the latter pressured for (and had enacted) legislation that severely restricted African competition and simultaneously provided agricultural/technical support services to white--but not to African--farmers. These measures contributed to the virtual destruction of African agriculture--be it for the commercial sale

or their own use. Given these conditions, Africans migrated to the white areas in search of employment. Land policies very directly created among Africans a condition of economic underdevelopment as well as economic dependency. Whites used that economic dependency for keeping Africans subordinate, politically as well as economically. Africans laborers on European farms receive subsistence wages, and the productivity and profits from these fertile lands (originally expropriated from Africans) benefits only the whites and the modern sector.

Labor policies. Whether openly intended as such, the taxation and land policies of Zimbabwe and Namibia have forced Africans into the modern sector economy at subsistence wages. Racial inequality is pervasive, and Africans are excluded (with a few exceptions) from all but the most menial or unskilled positions. By restricting the educational, vocational and employment opportunities of Africans, whites have created a vast, unskilled surplus labor force. Should African employees protest against work conditions or wages, they can be peremptorily fired and replaced by others. Moreover, prohibitions against or restrictions upon African labor or union organizational activities severely restrict or prevent blacks from mobilizing their members to bargain collectively. Restrictions upon African educational and vocational opportunities leave indigenous groups technically unqualified to fill the skilled (or even semiskilled) positions available in the modern sector. This, too, constitutes a form of underdevelopment that has evolved from white policies. This creates a condition of economic dependency, and the inequality that exists between white and black results from the policies systematically pursued by whites as a device for keeping Africans totally dependent and subordinate.

Education/human resource policies. By restricting the education and training opportunities of Africans--in industry, business, farming or elsewhere--whites have denied to most Africans the skill acquisitions (as well as opportunities) that they need for economic independence and self-sufficiency. These restrictive measures by Europeans have thereby deprived most Africans of the opportunities or capabilities needed for competing within the modern sector. By restricting their educational, vocational and job opportunities, whites have been able to keep African wages low; and this has contributed to higher profits for whites. Moreover, job reservations and restrictions prevent Africans from competing against whites for better jobs. In a similar fashion, African farm product competition prompted restrictive measures aimed at protecting white farmers, who also received technical assistance denied to African farmers. Thus, by denying or restricting the development of African human resource potentials, whites have buttressed their position of power and privilege within both countries. Indeed, by pursuing policies that created conditions of underdevelopment, inequality and dependency among Africans, whites devised the most effective means for protecting white power and privilege and keeping Africans subordinate. It is this legacy and these conditions that newly independent governments must confront and resolve. Moreover, those new governments in Zimbabwe and Namibia must also recognize the "givens"--and how to deal with them--as they pursue development strategies aimed at promoting independence, self-reliance, self-sufficiency and equality.

2. The "Givens" of Zimbabwe and Namibia

Among the factors that newly independent and developing nations (including Zimbabwe and Namibia) must consider if development is to

succeed are certain fundamental "givens." These may derive from the colonial legacy or be of a more determinate and constraining nature, such as the country's geography, lack of mineral and other resources. All are significant, for they can determine the success or failure of subsequent development efforts. The "givens" include, among others, demographic factors (including population), the presence or absence of resources, and a country's infrastructure and its political economy. There is an overlapping of these givens, but some can be isolated for the purpose of analysis. Here they are assessed in terms of the three major sectors of society--economic, social and political. The givens within the economic sector are particularly significant for the development of a country, and they are explored initially.

The economic sector. Despite all development efforts and activities, poverty and unemployment remain the fundamental problems of most developing nations. Poverty persists despite concerted development efforts, and its consequences are pervasive: malnutrition, disease, death, illiteracy, squalid housing and living conditions, social problems and others. Closely linked with and underlying poverty is the problem of unemployment. Developing countries have been singularly unsuccessful in fashioning programs that contribute to or help create employment within public and private sectors. Contributing to this is the problem of rural development. Nearly 80% of the population lives in rural areas in most developing nations. But the ineffectiveness (or lack) of rural and area development programs has prompted inhabitants to flee to urban areas in search of employment. But there, too, they are generally unsuccessful in finding employment and, as a consequence, they become part of the urban squatter

populations caught in poverty. This poverty is of such a magnitude that most developing country governments have not been able to cope with it. It remains the most fundamental of the givens, and at its core are the problems of employment and rural development.

Present development strategies and programs have not resolved the problem of poverty, and burgeoning populations (as in Zimbabwe) intensify the problem. Similar problems will confront newly independent Zimbabwe and Namibia governments. In these two countries the problems are largely the consequences of the colonial legacy. Rural as well as urban poverty is widespread in both countries. Present African lands, even if improved through technical assistance provided to farmers, cannot sustain the food needs of fast-growing populations. Land reform is essential. Indeed, it constitutes the most fundamental issue confronting new governments, for whites own the most fertile lands and African demands for land reform (if not, indeed, for expropriation of white lands) can be anticipated.

Closely linked with land reform is the issue of employment, or the broadening of the wage sector. Even with rural and land reform, many people will remain unemployed--especially in the urban areas. Both Zimbabwe and Namibia have (as "givens") dual economies, consisting of modern (wages) and subsistence (residual) sectors. In the residual sector are the people in the rural African areas. The modern sector consists of the mining, commercial, industrial and agricultural areas that are European owned, and in these areas Africans presently occupy the lower wage and skill level positions. Independence will prompt the exodus of numerous whites, and African demands for filling the vacated employment positions will necessitate government establishment of massive manpower training programs, for few Africans (there are, though, more who are already trained and qualified

in Zimbabwe than in Namibia) possess the requisite education, training or skills for these positions. Moreover, given a massive influx of Africans into urban areas (which generally occurs in newly independent nations), both repatriation programs to rural areas (taken in conjunction with rural development programs to provide them with land or other employment opportunities) and the expansion of job opportunities within urban areas (even the total replacement of Europeans by Africans in existing jobs will not provide employment for all of the unemployed in the urban areas) are essential if the problem of poverty is to be eradicated.

Closely linked, then, is the problem of human resource development. A basic requisite of development is the education and training of people for employment, be it in the agricultural or the wage sector of society. Given policies pursued by white governments in both countries, the educational opportunities available to Africans have been severely restricted. A larger percentage of Africans in Zimbabwe have been educated than in Namibia, but both new governments will have to establish education and training programs that will help citizens become self-reliant and self-sufficient.

Other "givens" in these countries include their infrastructure and resources. The infrastructure in Zimbabwe is more extensive and more highly developed than in Namibia, but in both countries that infrastructure (in terms of road/rail/transport systems, education facilities, electricity, health care facilities, etc.) has been structured basically for the benefit of whites. Transport and road links, for example, tie together white urban and rural areas, few such links existing in the African rural areas. The same pattern holds for electricity and sanitation facilities. Consequently, rural development

programs must build an infrastructure that is virtually non-existent in both countries.

In terms of resources, Zimbabwe is better off than Namibia. The former has better agricultural lands, capable of growing basic food staples as well as possible export commodities (cattle, cotton, tobacco, maize, etc.), and a climate that is conducive to agricultural development and the raising of staple commodities for feeding its population. Zimbabwe also has major mineral resources that can be exported for foreign currency. Although Namibia has some mineral resources, its climate and soil (even in the presently white-owned lands) is not conducive to the massive production of food staples. The presently white-owned lands are devoted almost exclusively to the raising of cattle for export, and food staples--given climactic conditions and terrain--are largely imported from elsewhere. Consequently, even with land reform, it may be necessary for Namibia to import vital foodstuffs for maintaining the people.

Zimbabwe, in terms of resources (educated Africans, agricultural lands, climate, mineral resources, etc.) is in a much better position than Namibia. However, its rapidly expanding population makes imperative the implementation of concerted and extensive programs aimed at overcoming poverty, bringing about agricultural reform and rural development, population control, the development of manpower resources and the rapid expansion of the wage sector for overcoming unemployment. Its political economy, consisting of a fairly sophisticated and developed modern sector and the subsistence sector, provides a substantial basis for future development. The modern sector can provide opportunities for employment, but without

rural development and land reform, a massive influx of rural people into urban centers will present a complex of problems that are difficult to resolve. Except for that small European sector, the dual economy in Namibia remains basically rural. Poverty and unemployment are the basic problems; and among the fundamental problems confronting the new government will be rural development, land reform, the training of manpower, and the establishment of policies concerning the extractive industries and urban development.

The social sector. The major "givens" within the social sector that both countries must confront are: health problems, squalid living conditions, illiteracy and human resource development. All of these are intertwined with the problems of poverty and unemployment. In terms of the health sector, malnutrition, disease and sickness are pervasive within the African community. Almost all existing health care funds and services are for the benefit and use of the European population. Resolving these basic health problems has proven virtually impossible in many developing nations, but there are models or countries (e.g., China, Cuba) where major steps (and successes) have been taken to establish preventive medicine and health care programs and to train personnel for careers in these areas.

Closely linked to the health care issue is that of living conditions in both rural and urban setting. In Zimbabwe and Namibia, housing, sanitation and other facilities and amenities for Africans are inadequate if not deplorable, and these factors contribute to the problems of health. Illiteracy remains widespread, though more so in Namibia than Zimbabwe, the latter having at least the rudiments of an African educational system. However, education in itself does not

mean the termination of poverty, for unemployment will persist unless (a) education and human resource development and training are geared toward the development needs of the country and (b) government policies are directed toward or assist in the expansion of the employment or wage sector. Consequently, the economic policies followed by new governments in these countries (especially in terms of rural development, land reform and industrial development, be the latter in rural or urban areas) are critical for assuring employment opportunities for all people and for breaking the hold of poverty.

The political sector. Among the major "givens" within the political sector are problems that derive directly from the colonial legacy of Zimbabwe and Namibia. There are others, but among the more basic problems are those of political participation and support, group conflict and competition, and shortages in trained personnel. These problems have beset other developing countries, and Zimbabwe and Namibia are no exceptions. White governments in both countries, by excluding or severely restricting the incorporation of Africans within the civil service and other government sectors, have left Zimbabwe and Namibia with few trained African personnel for operating successfully the governmental administration. Zimbabwe is somewhat more fortunate, for numerous Africans have received advanced education either within the country or elsewhere. Some of these presently work in governmental or other management-type positions elsewhere in the world and might possibly return. Likewise, there are educated Zimbabweans presently in the country who could fill some of these positions, thereby assuring against a total breakdown in governmental services. In all likelihood, though, both Zimbabwe and Namibia face critical shortages in trained personnel, at least for the interim, and they may have to draw upon personnel from other countries for assistance.

Another problem for new governments is that of political participation and support from the people. Developing governments often attempt to institute and administer programs from the "top down" without drawing for support or assistance from the local population. Where that occurs, such programs have often been unsuccessful. Consequently, there is the problem of mobilizing the community and involving it in the development process, a step that is essential if the goals of self-reliance and self-sufficiency are to be realized. The involvement of people in decision-making, though, often generates group conflict, controversy and problems. Where a one-party system exists, such controversies are somewhat lessened. But, in both Zimbabwe and Namibia, the pre-independence maneuvering among rival political groups suggests that possible group disagreements or conflicts could immobilize development efforts following independence.

Another aspect of political participation is the (at present) "given" of political dependency. The European destruction of African political systems, either by outrightly abolishing them or imposing white control over them (i.e., by placing power in the hands of "native commissioners") seriously restricted or totally denied to African groups political control over their own destinies. That circumstance, along with economic dependency, has helped create a condition of political dependency--where many African people grew indifferent to or allowed others to make decisions for them. Thus, if one aim of new governments is that of encouraging self-reliance among their people, programs will have to be established at the local level for involving people in decision-making processes. This is a major device for breaking the condition of political dependency.

As witnessed in other developing countries, involving people in community and decision-making programs is not easily achieved. Indeed, the time pressures upon development are often such that central government administrations pursue their policies relentlessly by forgoing local participation. The consequence is usually disastrous, the indifference of the people seriously eroding program implementation. The result is that the goals of self-reliance and self-sufficiency are seldom realized.

Still another "given," or at least one that has plagued newly independent Third World countries, is that of group conflicts which immobilize the government and disrupt its development efforts. This may result from suspicions and conflicts among ethnic and tribal groups, traditionalists and modernists, or other groups as they contest for control and power, be it for determining public policy or allocating power, privilege and resources within society. Some of these suspicions, splits and conflicts may result from the colonial legacy (the consequence of white "divide and rule" policies), but in other instances they are simply endemic as groups within society contest for power, whatever their motivation.

Thus the group conflicts that have beset other African states following independence might well occur within Zimbabwe and Namibia. Indeed, the present splinterings and factionalism among African nationalist groups in both countries indicate the likelihood of this happening. However, what should not be ignored is that nationalism, an initial coalescing of all groups, has also characterized some African states in their early post-independence period, and nationalism

can serve as a cohesive or centripetal force in rallying people together. Given the prolonged history of opposition to white rule in Zimbabwe and Namibia, nationalism might serve as a "given" on which the new leaders can build and bind together their people for national development.

These, then, constitute some of the major "givens" with which Zimbabwe and Namibia must cope in their national development efforts. The strategies and policies they pursue will have to take into consideration such factors as the colonial legacy and the "givens." Otherwise, if ignored or discounted, these factors could seriously jeopardize their development efforts. These factors, in conjunction with lessons learned from the development experiences of other Third World (and especially African) states, might well provide guidelines--in terms of development strategies and programs--for Zimbabwe and Namibia to follow.

3. Development and Development Strategies

By the mid-1970s, Third World countries were calling for a "new international economic order" as they concluded that prevailing development strategies were ineffective if not counterproductive in facilitating development or resolving the problems of poverty and unemployment. Despite the intensive development efforts of the past quarter century, poverty and unemployment persist. The goals of the UN's First and Second Development Decades (emphasizing economic growth, industrialization, foreign assistance, international trade and the export of primary products) have resulted only in limited growth and little development for Third World countries as well as a widening gap between them and the industrialized nations.

Measured in GNP terms, there has been a limited economic growth in some developing countries, but even that was shattered by economic events of recent years, particularly escalating oil costs, inflation, recession and the plummeting of prices for many Third World primary products. As primary producers, developing nations are integrally connected with the world economy, and they are as a consequence highly dependent on the whims and problems of that system. Moreover, where industrialized nations have been able to adapt to inflation, recession and higher oil prices, Third World countries have not been as fortunate. Consequently, the latter countries now question whether there are other development strategies and possibly a new economic order that might break their dependency position in the world economy.

The basic assumptions of this viewpoint can be briefly summarized. Fundamental is the principle that Third World countries must pursue development strategies that will (to the extent possible) break their dependency upon that external world economy and help them reach a point of economic self-sufficiency. This may necessitate cutting themselves off (or at least severely restricting) their involvement in the international economic system. At the least, they must create an internal economic structure where fluctuations in the world cannot seriously disrupt their own economies. This means, at most, a selective participation in the world economy and a rejection of prevailing notions that Third World countries should concentrate on being exporters of primary products and importers of finished products from the industrial world. That policy has brought dependency rather than self-sufficiency to Third World countries. The "trickle down" theory

of development assumes that if industrial countries are economically strong the benefits from that will trickle down and contribute to Third World development. However, these results have not been forthcoming. Rather, despite rapid economic growth in western economies since 1950, there has been only limited real growth and virtually no development in most of the less developed nations.

This condition has prompted the LDCs to emphasize the need for self-sufficiency and self-reliance, with only limited linkages to the external--and especially the world--economy. For if they neglect the development of their own economy and concentrate on exporting primary products, Third World countries will remain prisoners of international market price fluctuations (and demands) for their products. For example, because it relied upon its copper exports for foreign exchange, Zambia's economy was virtually destroyed when copper prices and demands plummeted. Other factors contributed to Zambia's problems (especially the border closure with Rhodesia), but the copper price drop (and decreased demand for copper) has had devastating consequences. Where a primary product such as oil is crucial to the industrial world and is controlled by a few countries, these countries can organize and control their product (as with OPEC) and set the market price. But there are few cases where a limited number of countries control scarce commodities, and it is thereby difficult for such groups to establish monopoly power over primary resources such as that which OPEC enjoys.

By accepting the "interrelatedness" of world economies and relegating themselves to being primary product producers, the LDCs have locked themselves into a position of structural dependency. Moreover, by following western models of development (and thereby

emphasizing and allowing capital rather than labor intensive industrialization), Third World countries have in some instances increased their GNP and achieved limited economic growth, but there has been little or no real development. The consequence is that massive poverty and unemployment persist.

These problems, Third World countries now argue, can only be resolved if new development strategies are followed. Rather than remaining primary producers, LDCs (it is argued) must achieve greater self-sufficiency. Industrialization is essential, but it must be labor intensive and geared to employment opportunities rather than simply increases in GNP. Development may proceed differently than in western nations which, until recently, have served as the model for development. For example, in western development agriculture played essentially a role of handmaiden to industrialization, the latter bringing masses to urban centers in search of work. In the Third World, though, up to 80% of the population is in the rural areas. Emphasis upon industrialization (especially if it is capital rather than labor intensive) could result in rural populations flooding into urban areas where they could not find work. Urban centers, as has occurred in many developing nations, cannot cope with the problems that result: lack of employment opportunities, poverty, malnutrition, massive slums, problems of health and sanitation, squalor, social problems and social disorganization.

What is now proposed as a corrective are rural and area development programs, including land reform, for keeping people out of the urban areas. Integral to these rural and area development programs is the building of an infrastructure in rural areas,

including roads, schools, health and sanitation facilities, housing, and small-scale labor intensive industries that will provide employment for the local population. These developments will induce people to remain in these areas and forego migration to the cities. Moreover, by being involved in the shaping and implementation of these programs, people become active participants in the country's development efforts, an essential step if patterns of dependency are to be broken. Thus, in terms of this new development perspective, poverty and unemployment are recognized as the key problems, and development must be geared to resolving these.

There are numerous implications that flow from these assessments of prevailing development strategies and policies. For instance, the basic emphasis is on achieving self-sufficiency as a means of breaking the prevailing dependency position of Third World countries within the world economy. It is argued that LDCs should, to the extent possible, cut themselves off from the world economy and terminate their role as simply the source of primary products for the world. The importation of manufactured products from the industrialized nations should be severely restricted, and steps must be taken to establish local industries as a means of import substitution. This integral development, taken in conjunction with rural/area development and indigenous-controlled and labor intensive industrialization, would also extend to local control over financial institutions and industry. Where there are instances of foreign-based firms being invited to participate in development, their commitment must be to local development, and severe restrictions must be placed on any expatriation of profits from their activities. Crucial, then, is control by Third World

countries over their own development and resources, and all measures must be directed toward the creation of such conditions as self-reliance and self-sufficiency.

The above view does not discount a limited involvement with the external world economy, but the first priority must be development of the country. Where there are links with the external world, this view holds, the greatest emphasis should be on regional links. Thus Third World countries should assist and cooperate with each other in developing themselves, building in the process a regional infrastructure. For example, following this premise, a newly independent Zimbabwe and Namibia would establish major links with central and southern African countries rather than the industrial world. The latter are not excluded, but a regional economy, comparable to the European Common Market or other such groupings, would mutually benefit all involved African nations. Their efforts at establishing such links would not succeed overnight (nor did the EEC), but the long-range goal would be that of making the countries (and region) less dependent upon the world economy.

In summary, then, the new development theory emphasizes: a rejection (at least in part) of prevailing western models of development; greater self-reliance and self-sufficiency; increased control by the LDCs over their own economies; a decrease in reliance upon the sale of primary products (which leaves the country less dependent upon the whims of international markets); the establishment of rural/area development and labor intensive industrialization, the intent that of creating employment opportunities and eliminating poverty; and attempts to establish . . .

regional rather than world links, thereby breaking the structural dependency of LDCs on the industrial world. By following these steps, Third World countries now argue, there is a greater possibility that existing conditions of underdevelopment, inequality and dependency can be broken. They do not discount the role that the industrial world can play in assisting Third World countries in achieving these goals, but the former must be willing to help bring about a new economic order. It is this point that Third World countries have recently emphasized in UN and other meetings, for they recognize that assistance from industrial nations is essential if existing patterns of dependency and underdevelopment are to be broken.

The basic argument of Third World countries is that prevailing development strategies have contributed little toward their development or solving the problems of poverty and unemployment. There is a recognition that other factors (e.g., high oil prices, inflation, recession, and a drop in primary product prices) have stymied their development, but the inability of prevailing development models to resolve their problems prompts this search for alternative development models and new solutions. There is also increasing recognition by LDCs that the western model, and especially one that envisions a future where their living standards are comparable at some point to those in rich industrial nations such as the United States, is simply inapplicable to their situation, given their limited resources. It is these issues and questions, then, that Third World countries now confront; and, as Zimbabwe and Namibia achieve their independence, they, too, must make policy choices that will determine their path of

development. Indications are that their emphasis will be on self-reliance, self-sufficiency and new development strategies. That will directly influence the types of development assistance they will seek from external sources, including possibly the United States.

Should either or both Zimbabwe and Namibia call upon the U.S. for development assistance, even their pursuit of new development strategies would, in general, appear congruent with AID interests. This seems evident from AID's basic rationale and goals as spelled out in a 1975 policy statement:

AID's development assistance strategy is cast in different form today than it was several years ago. The key elements are, we believe, consistent with the main themes of the 1973 Foreign Assistance Act.

--By concentrating our aid in the three key sectors of food and nutrition, population and health, and education and human resources development, we seek to help developing nations increase their capacity to meet basic needs of their people.¹

The AID statement thereafter notes that development assistance and programs are "directed toward reaching the poor majority within the populations of these nations" and, equally important, "we are emphasizing programs which involve the poor as active participants in the development process itself, avoiding any suggestion of a handout."²

From this it appears evident that if called upon, AID could work closely with new governments and support new development approaches aimed at breaking the chains of underdevelopment. This is reflected in the AID policy statement, both in its emphasis on

¹ Agency for International Development. Implementation of "New Directions" in Development Assistance. Printed for U.S. Congress Committee on International Relations, 94th Congress, 1st Session. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975, p. 3.

² Ibid.

the areas designated above and in its expressed interest in supporting pilot programs that focus on "new approaches" to solving the problems of development. These points are elaborated upon in the AID statement, and they merit quoting at length:

...AID support must be part of a development approach conducive to broad-based systemic change....

In pressing ahead with new legislation, AID assistance focuses on:

- concentrating on countries whose development policies we can support and that can utilize our assistance effectively;
- concentrating on key sectors (food and nutrition, population and health, and education) affecting the basic well-being of the poor;
- providing key components (frequently in concert with other bilateral and international donors) of development packages designed to involve and affect broad segments of the poor majority, thus multiplying the impact of our assistance;
- supporting selected pilot programs testing new approaches with potential for affecting many people, thus encouraging the experimentation needed to advance the art of development.³ Above all, we must be prepared to assume risks.³

Thus, in terms of U.S. policy, there appears to be a receptivity toward exploring new approaches to development, including "testing new approaches" and strategies for development, be those of a bilateral or multilateral nature. Should Zimbabwe and Namibia call upon AID (as well as other U.S. agencies and groups, governmental and voluntary) for assistance in their struggles to break the hold of underdevelopment, inequality and dependency, there is the possibility that the response will be positive.

What both Zimbabwe and Namibia must determine are the strategies and policies they will pursue in breaking their colonial legacy of underdevelopment, inequality and dependency. Likewise,

³ Ibid., p. 7.

they must deal with the "givens" of their situations, including their available and potential resources and resource capabilities, and determine what policies to pursue for achieving self-reliance and self-sufficiency. How they cope with their particular situations, and the policies they pursue, will determine whether or not they will be successful in bringing about development, equality and independence.

Both the colonial legacy and the givens are significant determinants of development for Zimbabwe and Namibia, and these determinants are treated extensively in Chapter 2. That chapter explores the major problems and issues that will beset both countries as newly independent nations. The implications or consequences that flow from these factors are analyzed in Chapter 3, and from it can be drawn basic inferences concerning areas for and types of programs that could assist in development. Problems that have beset other newly independent African nations, and the development strategies they have pursued, are explored in Chapter 4, particularly in terms of their implications for Zimbabwe and Namibia. There, too, is raised the issue of possible linkages on a regional basis. Finally, the possible implications for U.S. development support (including that by AID) to Zimbabwe and Namibia, should the U.S. be called upon for support in some form, is discussed in Chapter 5.

Zimbabwe, Namibia and External Links:
Independence and Interdependence

In their struggle to achieve development, equality and independence, Zimbabwe and Namibia can draw upon and learn from the experiences of other African and Third World countries undergoing development. The "lessons" they learn from these other countries can be invaluable in avoiding at least some of the development pitfalls and problems that have beset Third World nations. However, the conditions of underdevelopment, inequality and dependency, as indicated in Chapter 2, have been so deeply engrained for a prolonged period of white rule in Zimbabwe and Namibia that the breaking of the colonial legacy may be difficult. Nevertheless, both countries do have (as indicated previously) numerous advantages (particularly in resources) that most other African and Third World countries have not had. Likewise, by learning from the development experiences of other African Countries, Zimbabwe and Namibia might be able to circumvent some of the problems that have stymied or destroyed development efforts elsewhere.

In focusing here on the independence and interdependence of Zimbabwe, Namibia and the external world, the following points are explored: (1) the "lessons" to be learned from the transition and development experiences of other African countries; (2) the major areas or types of development problems that have confronted

other African nations which appear most likely to confront Zimbabwe and Namibia; and (3) the problems of independence and interdependence as they affect the links of these two countries with the outside world, with emphasis on breaking the conditions of underdevelopment, inequality and dependency as both nations struggle to achieve development, equality and independence. Each of these points is explored briefly in the following pages. Whatever form its development assistance to Zimbabwe and Namibia takes, the United States would be wise to base its programs on the "lessons" indicated above: namely, the lessons learned from prior or present development programs and problems of other African countries in their post-independence periods. What should also be evident is that Zimbabweans and Namibians are more likely to be receptive to advice and suggestions from their fellow African states than from other countries, and this may well indicate that if the U.S. is to play a role it may be in a more indirect (i.e., through multilateral programs) than direct (bilateral programs) way.

Three points thereby emerge that need to be considered in U.S. development programs: (1) programs must be aware of and take into consideration the numerous types of crises that often occur as nations proceed in their development efforts, for these crises or problems clearly affect the success or failure of development programs; (2) there should be an identification of the critical problems of development, this identification based on the development experiences of other African states, the consequent insights providing a basis for determining priorities in

development programs; and, closely linked (3), assessments, again based on the experiences of other African states, of what appear to be the most viable development programs and projects. Projected programs should thereby be measured in terms of: (a) their cost; (b) their effectiveness in promoting development, equality and independence, a major criteria here the extent to which such programs have a widening impact on development; and (c) the fulfillment of U.S. policy goals, i.e., the promotion of self-determination, independence and self-sufficiency of the country. These points are traced in the following two sections, following which the linkages of Zimbabwe and Namibia to the external world are assessed.

1. The Development "Lessons" of African Countries.

Nation-building, development and national integration, as evident from numerous studies (whether of African or other countries), is not a simple task. Countries undergoing development are confronted by innumerable problems, conflicts and crisis, all of which can prompt political and economic instability or chaos. Indeed, they may also precipitate political crises, coups and, in some instances, the installation of governments more interested in personal aggrandizement than the well-being or development of their people. Even if such problems do not result in extreme consequences, they may so immobilize the government that it cannot cope with the tasks and problems of nation-building and development programs that, at least in part, correct or overcome some of the major deficiencies or pitfalls. Thus, if there can be even a limited stabilization of development conditions, the possibility for the successful implementation of development programs is enhanced.

The following analysis of problems plaguing development in other African nations should be taken into consideration in assessing possible programs for Zimbabwe and Namibia, since they may have applicability there as well. There are, for instance, a number of basic questions or statements that can be made concerning development, these statements deriving from the development experiences of other African states. They are fundamental in determining the worthwhileness of development programs and projects:

1. Given the need for development (political, economic and social), what are the major problems and factors that determine the limits or parameters of development (e.g., availability of resources, human and natural; education and skill availability; geographical factors affecting development; cohesion or the lack of it in terms of national development; existing political, economic and social structures; cultural factors; land availability and conditions; employment; population growth and characteristics; social problems; etc.).
2. Given the resources at the disposal of the government, now or potentially, what political choices can be made for increasing the economic development of the country.
3. Given the resources at the disposal of the government, now or potentially, what political choices are possible, and what are their consequences (in terms of development) for assuring the necessary conditions, including the stability and support needed, for promoting the goals of development desired.
4. To what extent has it been and is it necessary for African (or other) countries to draw upon outside sources (e.g., other countries, international agencies, development groups) for technical, financial and other support services for the purpose of devising and implementing development goals, strategies and programs.

Based on an analysis of African states and their development, the basic problems and issues they have encountered in development can be summarized in terms of political, economic and social sectors. It is these factors that must be considered in the formulation, initiation and implementation of development programs in Zimbabwe and Namibia. They are discussed briefly below.

A. Basic Problems and Issues within the Political Sector:

Within the political sector, there are a number of fundamental issues and problems that post-independence African

countries have had to confront and resolve, many of which derived from their colonial legacy. All of these factors have significantly influenced their development efforts, and they can be spelled out in terms of the following statements:

1. There is a need for establishing political stability and achieving national unification or integration, whatever forms that may take, political instability or group conflict undermining authority and making difficult the fulfillment of development programs.
2. There must be the establishment of a political system capable (a) of making allocative or distributive decisions, (b) of accommodating group demands and conflicts, and (c) of diverse groups (ethnic, tribal, classes, etc.). Otherwise such tension and conflict, unless reduced, resolved or controlled, can lead to (a) political and/or economic destabilization or (b) the possible immobilization or overthrow of the government.
3. There is a need to make allocative/distributive decisions (in terms of programs and policies) and implement them without losing support. This may necessitate pursuing development strategies that do not alienate major sectors of support within the country.
4. There is a need to build political and administrative structures that can pursue and effectively implement those development strategies, thereby bringing about the degree of stability/order that is fundamental if any development (including changes needed) is to occur. Note: "stability" and "order", as used in this sense, do not (and the not must be emphasized) mean preservation of the status quo. The function of development is to bring about change toward predetermined goals. Stability and order mean the ability of the government to implement its decisions/goals without being thwarted by pervasive civil conflict, chaos and continued or concerted opposition and violence with which it cannot cope.

5. There is a need for control over security forces (military and police) in order to assure public order within the society.
6. There must be the pursuit of policies which assure that no new power or privileged classes emerge that work only for their own -- and not the society's -- benefit and development. Otherwise, the principles upon which development are based, i.e., the creation of conditions whereby people can become self-sufficient, self-managed and in possession of self-determination are thwarted.

Comments:

In terms of development and development strategies, some form of government planning and control is mandatory, for without it there can be no development. A crucial developmental decision is the government's determination of what forms of economic development will be pursued, be it in terms of a market, totally controlled, or some form of "mixed" economy. As witnessed in the development experiences of African states (and elsewhere in the world), neither market nor completely controlled economies have completely succeeded in resolving the problems of development. Consequently, countries must determine their own particular "mix", a decision based on their resources (human and physical), political circumstances and the particular conditions of the country. Besides the economic, decisions must also be made within the political and social sectors in terms of their impact on development. All of these decisions, though, must be made within the political structure, for that is where the legitimacy and authority of the system rest.

Development, as it occurs, necessitates an ongoing re-appraisal of the goal fulfillment of programs. Modifications in programs may be essential and/or the structures of society itself (political, economic, social) may have to be changed to fulfill desired goals. One major factor within the political sector is the decision of what forms of political structures are needed for the fullest participation of people (i.e., one or multi-party systems; representative structures; community-based systems, etc.). Likewise, determinations must be made concerning what types of administrative structures most fully involve the people and assist in the fulfillment of development programs. Most of these development decisions necessitate implementation of specific strategies and programs. Consequently, any U.S. development aid (be it bilateral, multilateral, or some other form) must assess priorities, especially in terms of the recipient society's development goals, the availability of U.S. funding, and the U.S. concern for its own development goals (self-sufficiency, self-management and self-determination for other societies).

B. Basic Problems and Issues within the Economic Sector:

1. There is a need to develop programs for promoting and sustaining economic development and modernization, and especially for increasing production, services and employment, and for building a self-supporting and a self-sustaining wage sector. Unemployment persists as the fundamental problem.
2. There is a necessity for establishing and developing agricultural programs that assure the full utilization of productive capabilities in that sphere, assuring that where the resources are available and can be developed, the society will

become self-sustaining to the extent possible.

3. There is a need to expand and develop the infrastructure of the society, particularly road and transport systems, which enhance economic development and promote national integration and the fuller incorporation of the people into the society, opening up new opportunities for them within the economic sector.
4. There is a necessity for rapid development of the industrial sector, particularly labor-intensive industries that provide job opportunities and thereby assure the emergence of a self-sustaining wage/labor force.
5. There must be development, especially of the total wage sector, that is crucial if people are to become economically self-sustaining. What is also included within that sector is the necessity for developing the agricultural population or workforce so that it, too, in these terms, is self-sustaining, whatever may be the form that agricultural development may take (e.g., individual farms, cooperatives, etc.).
6. There must be the pursuit of economic policies affecting economic development (e.g., financing, voluntary or involuntary forms; the extent of reliance upon outside technical and economic assistance; trade strategies; the character of goods and products to be manufactured, whether aimed at internal markets or for export as a means of generating foreign exchange; the role of imports; etc.).

Comments;

Implicit in the above statements, all of which derive from an analysis of the development problems in African states, is the basic principle of the need for rapid, sustained and structured economic development if the country is to achieve self-sufficiency and find the rudimentary degree of stability necessary for continued development. This leads to a second point or principle that is fundamental: development is virtually impossible.

(be it African or other states) without outside developmental support and assistance. That support/assistance may be in diverse forms (technical, financial, educational, etc.) or from diverse sources (international agencies, specific countries, etc.), but it is essential for the purpose of development. Thus, whatever form may emerge in terms of political and economic structures within Zimbabwe and Namibia (policy decisions that must be determined by the people of those countries), there will be an imperative need for development assistance from outside sources. Without it, possibilities for further development will be severely circumscribed.

In terms of development within these two countries what may be termed the wage sector (in agriculture as well as other fields) is crucial, for it provides people with a stake in the system. They become part of the society and, seeing a future, they become supportive of its development efforts. Unless the wage sector is broadened and developed rapidly, people cannot become economically self-sufficient. The social costs (in terms of welfare costs, social dislocations and possible disorganization, leading to increased costs for police, health services, welfare programs, etc.) of unemployment become prohibitive. This clearly contributes to discontent, political instability and conditions that undermine development efforts.

It is within the economic sector (though the decisions must be made within the political structures) that the major allocative/distributive decisions are made which determine the

character of the economic system. Those decisions also determine the particular "threat" that development will take. For example, the major developmental approaches appear to be: (a) a "big push" balanced growth strategy, (b) an unbalanced growth strategy, or (c) an emphasis upon development through capital formation that rests on the unlimited supply of labor and/or the presence of extensive resources. The latter are exported for bringing in the foreign exchange needed for development purposes. These are not mutually exclusive strategies, as evident in the instance of numerous African states, but all of them require governmental planning and action. There is a fundamental significance to this: whatever decisions are made, the probability is that the government, by action or inaction, will gain or lose support of some major sectors or groups (or even of a large proportion) of the country. This political factor must be taken into consideration by the government in its strategies and programs for development. Thus internal factors may determine the types or parameters for development aid or programs a government, including Zimbabwe and Namibia, can accept from outside sources. For example, given suspicions attached to bilateral forms of aid, outside countries wishing to assist Zimbabwe and Namibia may have to do so through indirect means (i.e., international agencies or development groups, through multilateral programs, etc.).

Moreover, in terms of strategies of development, a country must make numerous policy choices, including, among others: (a) given the limitations on its own funding, resources and external aid or assistance, in which sectors of the economy or society will the government invest its energies and funds for rapid development; (b) which types of projects should receive priority; and (c) should its development decisions rest upon resolving imminent needs or be directed toward assuring long-range development. These and other choices are all political decisions, and these decisions will have various political consequences, be it in terms of increased support or opposition to the government. Hence, the directions in which a government moves must take these factors into consideration. Other countries, in granting assistance and aid, must recognize such factors. But they must also determine whether or not development programs are congruent with their own fundamental notions about the function and basis for development assistance.

C. Basic Problems and Issues within the Social Sector:

1. There must be the resolution (generally through the formation of types of political structures that take these issues into consideration) of the problems and conflicts arising from tribalism, ethnicity and group conflict for access to or control over the political and economic structures through which the allocative or distributive decisions of society are made; otherwise, group conflict can tear apart the society.

2. The problems of education must be resolved. Given limited funds, funds must be allocated for educational or training systems/programs that most readily train and incorporate people within the economic sector, making them self-sustaining.
3. There must be a recognition of the problems generated by cultural differences, especially of conflicts between traditionalists and modernists. That conflict, unless dealt with, can undermine development efforts and programs.
4. There must be the resolution of social problems resulting from population movements, especially to urban centers where job shortages may lead to social dislocations and disorganization, which create social problems necessitating the use of limited funds for coping with these problems.
5. There must be development, via education or other means, by which people in a society are disposed to participate in development programs where goals are self-management, self-help and self-sufficiency. These programs especially help generate and develop new levels of leadership in society.
6. There must be the rapid development of social services and programs contributing to the health and welfare of the society. Poverty, illness and disease are destructive of efforts to develop a society. Poverty and unemployment are the fundamental problems; unless resolved, development is impossible.

Comments:

Group (be it ethnic, tribal, or other) suspicions, rivalries and conflicts have often precipitated or contributed to instability and immobilization within African countries. This has seriously eroded, endangered or destroyed development efforts and programs. These cleavages of groups, be they social or otherwise, must be recognized and acknowledged; otherwise, the conflicts go unresolved. Hence, governments must find a means

for transforming group conflict into creative tension and cooperation. Thus a fundamental effort must be directed at assuring that all groups enjoy equal access to opportunities, to government, to incorporation within all structures (political, economic, social), otherwise conflict and cleavages will result that make difficult or impossible the implementation of development programs. Likewise, programs for education, vocational training, and welfare as well as the cultural problems and social dislocations of society must be addressed. For unless resolved, they can seriously (and have in numerous instances in African and other developing countries) jeopardize implementation of development programs.

General Comments:

Based on the foregoing analysis of development problems encountered by other African states, it can be argued that these factors should be considered or serve as guidelines for determining the character, types and extent of U.S. aid and development programs for Zimbabwe. These decisions, though, must be in accord with the desires of the Zimbabwean government. It is essential, though, that the American government determine (based on (a) the development experiences and problems of other African states, and (b) American experiences with development programs) the development strategies and programs it is willing to pursue, and forms that they might take (e.g., bilateral, multilateral or development aid through other agencies).

In terms of the preceding assessment, the following general statements appear basic -- and should be considered in determining, along general principles, developmental aid for Zimbabwe and Namibia:

1. There must be political/economic stability if a society is to develop itself, for without that stability the consequent conflicts might well immobilize the society and prevent needed change.
2. A government must, at least to some extent, recognize the "givens" within which it must operate (i.e., possible problems of tribalism or group conflict; limitations on resources; attitudes of people; the extent and present types of development in the society; etc.) or at least realize that unless it takes those factors into consideration it may create conflict, hostility and opposition, thereby bringing about the failure of development programs and, at the extreme, possibly its downfall.
3. One of the basic essentials for stability and order if change and development are to occur is the presence of jobs for people: hence the emphasis on employment, the rapid training of people for jobs, and the development especially of labor-intensive industries or types of programs that rapidly incorporate people within the economic sector.
4. Opportunities for employment help promote the needed stability. While there may be momentary costs of inefficiency through the reliance upon labor-intensive industries, the social costs of unemployment (welfare, possible opposition because of lack of jobs, social disorganization, and the presence of a redundant and unemployable labor force that becomes receptive to radical proposals for change, etc.) may, in the long run, be much higher and indeed destroy opportunities for successful development.
5. In terms of development, emphasis should thereby be placed especially on three areas: (a) the development of the wage sector, (b) development of the agricultural sector, and (c) recognition especially of the sources of general dissatisfaction and/or discontent in the society that could endanger implementation of development programs.

All of these factors, then, must be considered in an assessment of development programs for Zimbabwe and Namibia. The characteristics and conditions found there do, in many instances, closely parallel those found in other African states. Hence it is essential that the experiences and lessons learned from the development of African states be applied in these two countries, for, as emerges from the preceding analyses of Zimbabwe and Namibia, the basic development problems of other African nations that are described below also appear to be among the more fundamental development problems that confront Zimbabwe and Namibia.

2. Major Development Problems of African States

Poverty, unemployment and population problems persist as the basic concerns of most developing nations. As indicated in Chapter 1, economic growth alone, measured simply in terms of GNP or per capita income, does not automatically lead to the elimination of poverty and unemployment or an improvement in the living standard of people. Indeed, despite economic growth, poverty and unemployment persist; and prevailing development strategies and piecemeal development programs, whatever the reasons, have not brought about the desired changes. Development, as a consequence, is increasingly being viewed in systemic terms, the linkages of all aspects of development seen as crucial if development is to occur, with programs assessed primarily in terms of their multiplier effect (i.e., in facilitating development in connected sectors).

Viewed in systemic terms, the major development problems of Third World (and especially African) nations are closely linked. They fall, roughly, under six major sectors or problem areas, all of which directly affect the fundamental issues of poverty and unemployment. The six development areas include: (1) political system problems; (2) political economy problems; (3) rural problems; (4) urban problems; (5) public health/welfare problems; and (6) human resource problems. Some of these could be grouped in different ways. For instance, both rural and urban problems could be subsumed under a heading of "area development problems," for

the linkages between these two nations are critical. Although Zimbabwe and Namibia are only briefly discussed in this section, the general applicability of these as development problems within both countries should be readily apparent.

A. Political System Problems

There are a multiplicity of development problems that emerge from the political sector for Third World countries. Although there is an overlapping, it is possible to distinguish analytically two major sources of these problems: (a) those that are the consequence of institutional/structural arrangements, and (b) those that are the consequence of policy choices. Problems within the first area are of a structural nature, dealing with such issues (or problems) as: (a) the legitimacy and efficacy of the political system, (b) the institutional arrangements, (c) the modes of participation and decision-making, (d) policy making and implementation, and (e) public order. Closely linked with, and fundamental to all of these is the related problem or issue of the government's mobilization of support for its policies. That support is crucial, for if the government itself (as well as its policies) are not viewed as legitimate, or if the efficacy of its policies is rejected, opposition could result. And, when the very legitimacy and actions of the government are disputed, realize or growing opposition can create political unrest, instability and even the termination of the government.

Institutional (or constitutional) arrangements may or may not fit the country's needs, and the flexibility of existing structures

to cope with and resolve problems may create instability, hence these factors must be taken into consideration by a government. Similarly, how and the extent to which people are or may be involved, and how the government itself is selected and how its decisions are made and administered, can also lead to support or opposition within the public. To ignore or discount these factors, or to pursue policies that precipitate considerable opposition, or to allow to exist conditions of chaos and disorder in society, can be destructive of a government's development efforts. Consequently, it must think in terms of public order, for it must have available the police/military power essential for maintaining order within society. That does not imply however, the use of such powers for the purpose of repression.

Policy choices concerning the above structural arrangements as well as other matters (including the allocation or reallocation of power, privilege and resources within society) are virtually forced upon a government. Even inaction or non-decision constitutes a course of action. And such decisions (or nondecisions) determine the path(s) that development will follow, and whether or not it will be successful. Support and/or opposition for these decisions or choices occurs not only at the policy-making level but also (and perhaps more pervasively) at the implementation level, where the public (or group) respond to the decisions and policies.

Both Zimbabwe and Namibia in their early post-independence periods will be confronted with the above political problems. Many are comparable to the numerous problems that earlier (and in some cases still) beset other African nations following their shedding of colonial status. Among the more fundamental political problems that will confront Zimbabwe and Namibia are the following:

1. The emigration or exodus of whites, and the disruptions in services caused as a consequence;
2. Possible political instability resulting from the transfer of power;
3. Possible disruptions in civil service and the administration of government services, programs and activities;
4. Disruptions and problems in local rural administration;
5. Possible disruptions in political order;
6. Possible rivalry, disagreement and even conflict among rival African groups contesting for power or in support of opposition to government policies;
7. African demands for equal access to or replacement of whites in job opportunities and in other sectors;
8. African demands for control of the economy (discussed more fully in the following section);
9. Social, economic and political dislocations caused by population movements, especially from rural to urban areas; and
10. Political conflicts over national development and integration policies.

These constitute "problems" in the sense that the governments must find solutions. There are other problems that will occur, but these are among the more crucial (and volatile). In each instance the new government must make decisions, or policy choices, concerning the directions it will follow. What each must take into consideration in making its decisions is the extent to which the choices decided upon will elicit support or opposition within the society, for those responses could well determine the success or failure of the government in its development efforts.

It is the decisions made within the political arena that fundamentally determine what will be the allocation of power, privilege and resources within society. These policy decisions will thereby determine the character of development. Many of the major decisions are of an economic nature, for it is these decisions in particular that grapple with the problems of poverty and unemployment as well as the character of the emergent political economy.

B. Political Economy Problems

All Third World (as well as other) countries must resolve the problems of poverty and unemployment. The strategies for economic development and the decisions which determine how institutions and the economy will be shaped and controlled have direct bearing upon the problems of poverty and unemployment. For example, it was earlier assumed that increases in the GNP would automatically broaden the employment sector and thereby decrease poverty. Hence steps were often taken to increase the export of primary products and facilitate rapid industrialization. But that industrialization was often of the capital-intensive rather than labor-intensive type, and the result was limited or little expansion in the wage sector. Poverty and unemployment thereby persisted. As a result of these measures, the country often became dependent upon the sale of its primary products, and any benefits that resulted generally accrued to the middle and upper classes of society as well as foreign corporations rather than to the people.

The above consequences, as indicated in Chapter 1, have prompted criticisms of existing development strategies and economic arrangements, for policy decisions concerning the political economy are most decisive for development. Among the major policy choices that a government must make are those determining control of the economy (whether it will be of a market, mixed or controlled type), growth strategies (whether balanced or sectoral), whether emphasis will be on import of primary products, and how the wage sector can be expanded with simultaneous attention directed toward development in the rural and agricultural areas. The issue of rural development, including land reform and agricultural development, are especially critical factors in development.

Both Zimbabwe and Namibia, as dual economies, include modern and subsistence sectors, the former geared almost exclusively to the benefit of whites. This holds true for the economic infrastructure as well, and the new governments will have to make policy choices that transform and redirect the economy so that it benefits all the people. An initial step in that direction will be the abolition of all discriminatory legislation and practices. Abolition by legislative decree is fairly easy. What is more difficult is the establishment of measures and programs aimed at providing equal opportunities (in education, training, employment, etc.) to all people, for, given scarce resources (in terms of funds, expertise and technology), the new governments will have to determine priorities for what measures, policies

and practices will receive immediate attention and which will be postponed. There is a possibility, though, that as a consequence of these decisions, some groups may see themselves as disadvantaged in contrast to others, and that could create opposition to government programs.

Given its more highly developed economy, the new Zimbabwean government may find greater resistance to social reconstruction efforts that threaten the entrenched power and privilege of some groups. Likewise, it can anticipate pressure from foreign corporations and others intent on maintaining the present economic system. Both internal and external pressures for preservation of the status quo (or some limited modification of it) can well be anticipated, but the new governments in both Zimbabwe and Namibia must deal with African demands for control of their own society and new economic structures. Hence the policy decisions that the governments make will clearly affect the future economic development of both countries.

C. Rural Problems

For most of Africa, up to 80% of the population live in rural areas in squalor and poverty. Earlier notions that rapid industrialization would broaden the wage sector and constrict the subsistence (or residual) sector have not been fulfilled. Rural poverty remains the fundamental problem of most African countries. There have been a few limited successes among rural development projects, but what most assessments of rural development programs

indicate is the need to view rural development (and programs) within a systemic context, i.e., as part of a total process of development, closely linked with development in other sectors (public health and welfare, urban development, human resource development, etc.).

In most African countries, including Zimbabwe and Namibia, there is the necessity for policy decisions concerning a variety of rural problems, among which are the following: the maldistribution of land (necessitating land reform); the poor (including over or under) utilization of land; poor farming practices; inadequate distribution and transportation networks for assisting peasant farmers in assuring markets for their products; pricing, marketing and credit policies that serve as disincentives for small farmers; and the lack of technological and other support services for encouraging agricultural development programs, especially for small farmers.

Viewed in systemic terms, there is a basic need to develop rural infrastructures, including roads, housing, sanitation facilities, health and welfare services as well as local industry, all of which are crucial for development in these outlying areas. These steps are essential not only for promoting the economic well-being of people in these areas but also for keeping them from migrating to urban centers in search of employment where, instead, they become part of the urban unemployed masses.

Critical policy choices await the new governments of Zimbabwe and Namibia. The most fertile lands in both countries are presently held by whites, and many of the products are exported, providing

needed foreign currency. The new governments will have to determine the types of land reform measures, i.e., ranging from nationalization of lands to the Kenya model whereby Africans supplanted whites but maintained the large farms. The decisions made will determine the character of subsequent agricultural production, including whether its emphasis will be export-oriented or focused on providing food for the country's population. Whatever policy decisions are reached, it is evident that both countries must move rapidly toward land reform and rural development if they wish to retain support of the people and want to find solutions to the problems of poverty and unemployment. Otherwise, conditions in the rural sector will quickly drive people into the urban centers in search of work, and there they will exacerbate the urban problems that already exist.

D. Urban Problems

Problems of urban development have plagued most African (as well as other Third World) countries. This holds true for Zimbabwe and Namibia as well, but the problems besetting the former, given its economic development, industrialization and urbanization, are of greater magnitude. In both countries a massive influx of the rural population has been restricted by influx control and pass laws during white rule, but independence and the termination of these regulations will result in a massive influx of people into urban centers. That will exacerbate urban problems, among which will be those of unemployment, malnutrition, housing, sanitation, disease, crime, delinquency and other social disorganization.

related programs. These problems have been prevalent in most if not all developing countries, and unless measures are taken by governments to cope with them, the problems and conditions will intensify and lead to social unrest.

Both Zimbabwe and Namibia will face similar problems. In addition, the new governments in both countries must correct the problems resulting from the racial policies of the preceding governments, particularly racial segregation in housing and other spheres. The intensity and scale of urban problems, characterized by the proliferation of squatter settlements and slums, imposes such demands on public services (from health/welfare services to police) that they are generally unable to cope with the need. Thus the deterioration of these public services, in conjunction with massive unemployment, virtually prevents governments from pursuing successful development measures.

There is the need to view these problems in systemic terms (e.g., improving rural areas to reduce the urban influx; land reform programs, pursuing policies that encourage development of labor-intensive industries and employment, etc.), for otherwise piecemeal projects have limited or no impact in resolving the interrelated problems. In this sense, both Zimbabwe and Namibia can learn from the experiences of other African countries, and it is clear that they must quickly address themselves to these issues if they hope to resolve the problems of poverty and unemployment.

E. Public Health/Welfare Problems

Poverty is also responsible for the basic problems related to health and welfare. The core health problems include fecally-transmitted diseases, air-borne diseases and malnutrition, contribute to the high incidence of infant mortality and low life expectancy. In some Third World countries, malnutrition and disease often reach near epidemic proportions. Better water supplies, sanitation and housing can reduce the incidence of diseases and thereby affect morbidity and mortality, and better nutrition can lower the incidence and effects of clinical disease. What is fundamental is the imperative need for preventive health/medicine programs, including preventive services and outreach programs. These, though, necessitate the rapid training of manpower for the needed services. Many of these problems result from over population and overcrowding, and these, along with poverty and unemployment, seriously destroy or render ineffective development efforts. Overpopulation is a serious factor, and numerous Third World countries are trying to establish effective family planning programs for cutting the birthrate, for they recognize that limited food supplies cannot meet the needs of an exploding population. Massive starvation could ensue, creating other health problems, ultimately leading to epidemics.

Better health, as nations have found, is a major form of welfare. The establishment of preventive medicine programs aimed at promoting better health cuts down the incidence of malnutrition, disease, morbidity, etc. What is sometimes forgotten is that

health also curtails absenteeism in the employment sector, and that increases productivity of both the individual and the economy, thereby enhancing the welfare of both.

Even within many African countries a large percentage of expenditures are still allocated for curative care and the maintenance of hospitals and highly skilled medical personnel, all of which serve only a limited and generally upper class population. The urban and rural masses are left with negligible or even no health care services. Most health care services and facilities are located in urban centers, and this also lures (along with the prospect of jobs) rural populations to the urban centers, exacerbating the urban problems noted above. Public health services cover only a small percentage of the total population in most developing countries, leaving large parts of the population without coverage. The social costs of this, i.e., in terms of disease, malnutrition, epidemics, etc., can have a devastating impact on development efforts. Although many developing countries have declared their intent to establish a "pyramid of health care" services and facilities for their people, few have managed to develop such programs.

All of these problems confront the newly independent Zimbabwean and Namibian governments, for virtually all present funds for health/welfare services are allocated for whites and their curative care. Africans in both urban and rural areas have limited opportunities for health care or medical facilities, and both countries must, as a consequence, have immediately to cope with these problems.

F. Human Resource Problems.

The most fundamental of resources are human resources; namely, the ability of people to utilize their intelligence and capabilities for becoming self-sufficient. This, though, demands literacy, knowledge and the acquisition of essential skills. Illiteracy, though, is widespread in most developing nations. Studies of rural development programs and problems, for instance, conclude that illiteracy is one of the basic causes for programs that fail. Limited communication and comprehension skills make it difficult for people to grasp or understand even the rudiments needed for agriculture or for various jobs within the wage sector. Consequently, education and training (formal, nonformal, vocational, etc.) are essential if people are to become self-sufficient, for literacy and education are fundamental requisites for development.

Given limited financial and technical resources, though, most developing nations must utilize their educational resources wisely. However, the education efforts of many Third World countries have often been misdirected. Instead of providing broadened opportunity, education resources are sometimes used for an emerging elite whose opportunities are thereby enhanced at the expense of the masses. Education has also been misdirected in another sense. People, despite being educated, remain unemployed because they lack the requisite skills for the types of jobs available. In this situation the education system is not tailored specifically

to the development needs of the country.

Rapid population growth along with misdirected education have resulted in an actual increase in the total number of illiterates within many countries, thereby contributing to the problems of development and poverty. The consequences of this have been a reformulation of educational goals in developing countries, the basic thrusts now directed toward:

1. The principle that every individual should receive a minimum education (to the extent that financial resources permit) that will make him literate and assist his achieving a higher degree of self-sufficiency;
2. The providing of education (formal, nonformal) and/or training in skills that fill specific job needs within the society, and particularly within the crucial development sectors (i.e., those spelled out in this section); and
3. The broadening of the base of education to embrace or incorporate members of groups previously neglected or ignored, including, among others, the underprivileged and women.

How these goals are to be achieved necessitates the making of the policy decisions concerning (a) the character and kind of education system, (b) who is to have access and opportunity, and (c) the steps to be taken to tailor the education system to the development needs of the country.

Zimbabwe and Namibia are confronted with the necessity of making these decisions. There are greater numbers of educated and trained Africans in Zimbabwe, but the educational system in neither country is presently tailored to their specific development needs. Consequently, in the educational sector (as in the other sectors noted above) both Zimbabwe and Namibia governments must move quickly in making policy choices that will meet the

conditions of underdevelopment, inequality and dependency. By viewing development in a systemic sense, and by addressing themselves to the development problems (and their linkages) noted above, both governments can bring about development. One additional (and fundamental) policy decision, though, must also be considered: namely, the character of the linkages of Zimbabwe and Namibia with the outside world.

3. Independence, Interdependence and Linkages