

A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY PART I

(BEFORE FILLING OUT THIS FORM, READ THE ATTACHED INSTRUCTIONS)

IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. REPORTING A.I.D. UNIT: <u>USATD/Mogadishu</u> (Mission or AID/W Office) (ES# _____)	B. WAS EVALUATION SCHEDULED IN CURRENT FY ANNUAL EVALUATION PLAN? yes <input type="checkbox"/> slipped <input type="checkbox"/> ad hoc <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Eval. Plan Submission Date: FY ___ 0 ___	C. EVALUATION TIMING Interim <input type="checkbox"/> final <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ex post <input type="checkbox"/> other <input type="checkbox"/>			
D. ACTIVITY OR ACTIVITIES EVALUATED (List the following information for project(s) or program(s) evaluated; If not applicable, list title and date of the evaluation report)					
Project #	Project/Program Title (or title & date of evaluation report)	First PROAG or equivalent (FY)	Most recent PACD (mo/yr)	Planned LOP Cost ('000)	Amount Obligated to Date ('000)
649-0123	Refugee Self-Reliance	83	3/88	6,000	6,000

ACTIONS

E. ACTION DECISIONS APPROVED BY MISSION OR AID/W OFFICE DIRECTOR Action(s) Required	Name of officer responsible for Action	Date Action to be Completed
Since this was a final evaluation, there are no "action decisions" to be taken for this particular project.		
(Attach extra sheet if necessary)		

APPROVALS

F. DATE OF MISSION OR AID/W OFFICE REVIEW OF EVALUATION: mo ___ day ___ yr ___

G. APPROVALS OF EVALUATION SUMMARY AND ACTION DECISIONS:

	Project/Program Officer	Representative of Borrower/Grantee	Evaluation Officer	Mission or AID/W Office Director
Signature Typed Name	 R. Cooley, ARD	 M.O. Dubed, NRC	 E. McPhie, PROG	 L. Richards
	Date: _____	Date: _____	Date: <u>July 27, 1988</u>	Date: <u>8/7/88</u>

H. EVALUATION ABSTRACT (do not exceed the space provided)

This project was designed to test strategies and interventions that would assist refugees in becoming more productive and self-reliant. It was intended to begin in early 1983 and end three years later; however, it was subsequently amended to end after five years rather than only three. The project was designed to meet the emergency needs of a large number of refugees living in isolated and underdeveloped areas of Somalia at a time when the Government of Somalia had not yet formulated a long term policy on the refugee situation (e.g., whether they would be allowed to remain in Somalia and, if so, under what conditions). The project provided both skills training and wage earning opportunities to refugees with the idea that, over time, they would be able to acquire sufficient resources to invest in more long-term and self-sustaining economic activities.

This was a final evaluation to assess impact and replicability. The general conclusion to be inferred from (though not explicitly stated in) the evaluation is that refugees (as well as surrounding non-refugee populations) benefitted significantly from short-term activities under the project (in short-term jobs provided and new job skills learned as well as in access to resources such as farm land and roads) but that the longer-term aspects of the project (e.g., institutional changes within the Government of Somalia, identification of more "durable solutions for refugees") were far less successful. This conclusion is consistent with the time frame allowed for implementation.

The evaluation was performed by an expatriate PSC and a USAID FSN engineer who traveled to project sites throughout the country, interviewed available project participants and beneficiaries and reviewed project documents. Because all PVO subprojects had ended by the time of this evaluation, relatively few PVO staff remained to be interviewed, thereby handicapping the evaluation team to some extent. The final report was heavily edited (and, in parts, rewritten) by the USAID project assistant since the original report was not acceptable as received.

The major lesson learned is that projects designed specifically to address relatively short-term (i.e., urgent) problems should not attempt simultaneously to address longer-term institutional needs as well. The project has demonstrated that refugees are willing and able to help themselves if provided the resources and opportunities.

I. EVALUATION COSTS

1. Evaluation Team Name	Affiliation	Contract Number QR TDY Person Days	Contract Cost QR TDY Cost (US\$)	Source of Funds
Richard Schmid	PSC	649-0123-S008005-01	\$11,529	Project
Ahmed Y. Abdillahi,	USAID/ENG	--	--	OE

2. Mission/Office Professional
Staff Person-Days (estimate) 50

3. Borrower/Grantee Professional
Staff Person-Days (estimate) 5

A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY PART II

J. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Try not to exceed the 3 pages provided)

Address the following items:

- Purpose of activity(ies) evaluated
- Purpose of evaluation and Methodology used
- Findings and conclusions (relate to questions)
- Principal recommendations
- Lessons learned

Mission or Office: USAID/Mogadishu

Date this summary prepared: May 1988

Title and Date of Full Evaluation Report: Refugee Self-Reliance Project Final Evaluation Report

April 1988

Purpose of the Activity Evaluated - This was an experimental project to test what strategies and interventions would best increase the self-reliance (i.e., income opportunities and skills) of refugees. The project goal was "to increase the capacity of refugees in Somalia to become more productive and self-reliant, thereby improving their economic status while reducing their dependence on the Somali Government and donor countries."

Purpose of the Evaluation and Methodology Used - This was a final evaluation to assess the overall project success in achieving stated objectives, the degree of impact on the target population and the replicability of the project in other countries and/or in other situations. The evaluation was performed by an expatriate team leader hired under a Personal Services Contract and a USAID FSN engineer; the team was assisted and accompanied by one of the USAID project staff who subsequently redrafted the report when the team leader's initial draft was deemed unacceptable by the Mission. The team interviewed available project staff from USAID, National Refugee Commission (NRC) and PVOs, traveled to a number of project sites and reviewed relevant documents available from USAID and the NRC.

Findings and Conclusions - The Project was composed of four components. The findings and conclusions regarding each are as follows:

- (1) Institutional Support to the NRC: This component produced mixed results. Training and skills upgrading activities for NRC staff were undertaken successfully. However, the evaluation notes that the life of project was too short to expect to have created significant institutional changes, e.g., in the systems of coordination and cooperation required to effectively plan and implement the continuation of refugee programs.
- (2) Socioeconomic and Technical Studies: This component did not meet design expectations "in providing a flow of scientifically objective data for use in planning overall refugee activities." Of six studies completed, only three were useful in helping identify "durable solutions" to the refugee problem. The evaluation does not note the reason(s) for the relative failure of this component.
- (3) Self-Reliance Subprojects: The overwhelming share of the project's attention and budget (80% of the AID dollar input) went to a series of PVO activities in agriculture, skills training, infrastructure and regional development. The results of these PVO activities were mixed, depending primarily upon the type of project and the PVO. In general, however, it can be said that these PVO activities showed that refugees are willing and able to work to help themselves when provided the opportunities and resources. As a result of these subprojects, 1,235 hectares of rainfed land and 320 hectares of irrigated land were developed (respectively more and less than expected), 240 kilometers of road were constructed or rehabilitated,

new potable water sources explored, and large numbers of refugees were employed and trained in new job skills. The evaluation team finds these accomplishments valuable for improvements in the refugee situation in Somalia.

(4) **Monitoring and Management:** The report notes that USAID staff was as effective as possible in implementing the project given too few people to assist with the monitoring of the PVO subprojects; the report also notes that, as the result of a management reorganization by USAID, too much project emphasis was placed on paperwork at the expense of field visits. The NRC was unable to share full management and monitoring responsibility, as a result of insufficient institution building time, as noted under component (1) above. The evaluation's conclusion appears to be that this component could and should have been handled better with more staff and more time.

Principal Recommendations - Since this was a final evaluation, the report does not offer recommendations but instead states future options as "lessons learned".

"Lessons Learned" -

- (1) Projects that address a temporary and volatile situation such as refugee assistance: (a) should be stated in broad and realistic terms; (b) should frequently evaluate socioeconomic, technical and policy issues affecting the project; (c) should not depend on timely provision of resource inputs by agencies and/or donors outside the management control of the project itself; and (d) should be able to respond rapidly and effectively to opportunities as they arise during implementation.
- (2) Refugees respond to opportunities to earn income; many refugees are able farmers who adapt well to new farming techniques.
- (3) PVO sub-projects should rely on one donor only to avoid delays, miscommunications and conflicts.
- (4) PVOs can be effective and efficient implementors of refugee projects.
- (5) Programs in which local businessmen train refugees in an apprenticeship arrangement is an effective training approach.
- (6) There is a need and a seemingly large market for business advice services in accounting and small business practices in rural Somalia.
- (7) Labor intensive road rehabilitation is economical and technically feasible in Somalia. To be effective, the supervision of experienced engineers is important.
- (8) Resettlement of refugees can best be promoted through assistance projects that focus on regional development, such as the provision of minimal basic infrastructure.

K. ATTACHMENTS (List attachments submitted with this Evaluation Summary; always attach copy of full evaluation report, even if one was submitted earlier)

ATTACHMENTS

The Refugee Self-Reliance Project Final Evaluation Report

L. COMMENTS BY MISSION, AID/W OFFICE AND BORROWER/GRANTEE

MISSION COMMENTS ON FULL REPORT

Evaluation report was not acceptable as submitted and had to be rewritten. Mission should have exercised greater care in selection of evaluation team.

THE REFUGEE SELF-RELIANCE PROJECT
(USAID Project No. 649-0123)

FINAL EVALUATION REPORT

Mogadishu, Somalia
April, 1988

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Acknowledgments

A thank you must first go to the people of Somalia including the refugees for their hospitality and helpfulness throughout this evaluation.

Many people assisted with this evaluation either by providing information or by working with the evaluation team. Those who shared their knowledge are named in Appendix. Among those who worked to enable the evaluators to complete this report a special thank you must go to Lalitha Jayaraman, of RD/RA who shared her knowledge of the project and arranged all support services and smoothed the way through both the USAID and GSDR bureaucracies allowing the evaluation to be completed in a timely manner. Special thanks must also go to Frank Catania, the project management coordinator, USAID, who made himself constantly available for questions and suggestions as to sources of information.

Without the complete cooperation of Mohammed Omar Dubed, Deputy Commissioner of the National Refugee Commission, and Marion Warren, USAID, this evaluation would not have been possible.

I would like to thank Bruce Bradshaw the USAID representative in Hargeisa and his wife for their help and hospitality while the evaluators were in Hargeisa.

The hard work and patience of the typists, Kafia Ali, Sado Mohamed, and Ahmed Elmi Farah, all of USAID are greatly appreciated.

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Preface

Evaluation of the Refugee Self-Reliance Project was undertaken between December 13, 1987 and March 6, 1988. The Project was evaluated by Richard Schmid with the able assistance of Ahmed Y. Abdillahi of the USAID engineering office who provided technical reports of the irrigation, road building and drainage system repair activities of the sub-projects. The team spent three weeks reviewing the numerous files and records and visiting Project sites. The final report was written between January 29th and March 6th, 1988.

The evaluation team had access to all of the Project records and some of the records of the implementing PVOs. Probably due to lack of staff at the time, records of the first half of the project were scant and some apparently missing.

The USAID management team for the latter half of the Project was still working at USAID. However, no USAID personnel involved in the Project design was available to the evaluators. Unfortunately, except for three people, none of the PVOs staff was still in Somalia. All the GSDR counterpart staff were extremely generous with their time.

List of Abbreviations

AFSC	American Friends Service Committee
CDA-F	Cooperation for Development in Africa (Forestry)
CDU	Community Development Unit
DDD	Domestic Development Department
EIL	Experiment in International Living
ESL	English as a Second Language
FLP	Family Life Program
GSDR	Government of the Somali Democratic Republic
IITT	Institute for In-Service Teacher Training
ILO	International Labor Organization
LOP	Life of Project
MCC	Mennonite Central Committee
MOA	Ministry of Agriculture
MOE	Ministry of Education
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NRA	National Range Agency
NRC	National Refugee Commission
NW	Northwest (Region)
NTF	New TransCentury Foundation
OPG	Operation Program Grant
PACD	Project Activities Completion Date
PDEM	Program Design and Evaluation Manager
PfP	Partnership for Productivity International

I. Executive Summary

The Refugee Self-Reliance (RSR) Project and a sister Project, CDA Forestry CDA-F, were funded in FY 1983 under the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act. The theme underlying both the Projects is to provide refugees with income opportunities and skills, and in the case of CDA-F, address damage done to tree resources during the earlier refugee emergency period; and to relate these refugee activities to the Somali milieu.

The RSR project agreement was signed on 22 December 1982. The Project Activities Completion Date is March 1988. Sub-project activities began in April 1983 and were completed in September 1986. In order to provide technical assistance to the National Refugee Commission, the Project was extended until March 1988.

Funding levels were established at:

\$ 6,000,000	USAID Grant
\$ 2,390,000	GSDR equivalent local currency contribution
\$ 2,859,000	PVO and third party contribution
\$ 11,249,000	Total

The goal of the RSR Project was to "increase the capacity of refugees in Somalia to become more productive and self-reliant, thereby improving their economic status while reducing their dependence on the Somali government and donor countries." The Project was experimental in its purpose of testing what strategies and interventions would best increase the self-reliance of refugees. Full self-reliance was not anticipated during the life of the Project, and it was understood that only a limited number of refugees would benefit. Non-refugees in the areas of the camps were also to share in the benefits.

Project components were:

1. Institutional Support to the National Refugee Commission;
2. Support for Socio-Economic and Technical Studies on Refugees;
3. Direct Assistance to Refugees through PVO field projects and
4. Monitoring and Management Assistance to the Project.

The bulk of financing (9,844,000 US\$/US\$ in So. Shs.) in this Project was devoted to supporting specific refugee self-reliance interventions implemented by the following four private and voluntary organizations (PVOs).

1. Save the Children Foundation (SCF);
2. Partnership for Productivity (PfP);
3. New Transcendy Foundation (NTF); and
4. The Experiment in International Living (EIL).

Project objectives were generally met with refugees engaged in income-productive activities, studies contributing to policy formulation, and the NRC and related managers benefiting from training in improved management skills. The Project has been very successful in training a significant number of Somali professionals in various development activities. Engineers, extensionists, trainers and administrators held responsible positions with PVOs and gained first hand experience in the design, implementation and evaluation of projects.

While the number of beneficiaries targeted has been approached, the number of sub-projects anticipated never materialized due to lack of comprehensive final proposals. The PVOs were generally efficient in the implementation of sub-projects. The RSR Project implementation led to the discussions between the GSDR and the USAID Mission in the development of durable solutions on refugee matters such as refugee settlement and in 1986, to the initiation of the Refugee Settlement Project. USAID and the US PVOs have become familiar with successful project implementation formulas for rural development in Somalia.

Through the implementation of the RSR Project the Mission established a good relationship with PVOs which extended the effectiveness of USG assistance to Somalia.

However, the activities under this Project were faced with problems common to all project activities in Somalia -- difficulty in communication, cholera epidemic in the project area, fuel shortages, delays in local currency disbursement by the Ministry of Finance, and late arrival of commodities.

A summary of impact of project components is as follows:

Institutional Support to NRC

Support to the NRC Planning Unit (PU) produced mixed results. Advances were made towards the projected outputs. The implementation managers provided sound technical advice. An internal and external information system for the PU was designed. A standardized system for monitoring and evaluation of camp based activities was introduced. Seminars organized by EIL helped establish communication at camp and regional levels between the different agencies. The provision of out of country educational opportunities for PU staff resulted in better trained personnel. The PU has benefited from their increased skill. The efforts to improve the overall infrastructure of the PU was moderately successful. However, there is little evidence that the PU has developed staff potential for the coordination between the departments within NRC, or line ministerial cooperation for effective planning. The Project life period seems too short to create such significant changes. The objectives set out in the Project Paper (PP) appear overly ambitious.

Socio Economic and Technical Studies (SETS)

The activities envisaged under SETS have not met expectations in providing a flow of scientifically objective data for use in planning overall refugee activities. However, some relevant studies led to the designing of the present USAID funded Refugee Settlement Project.

Out of the six completed studies three (B. C. Spooner's Refugee Settlement in the Lower Shabelle Region, Africare's Jalalasi Socio-Economic Survey, and the Settlement Analysis by Planning Unit/NRC) were useful in the planning of program strategies and investigation of a 'durable solution' for refugee settlement. The other three studies did not yield important data and answers to key refugee-related development issues.

Self-Reliance Sub-Projects

The Project called for sub-project inputs to agriculture, skills training, infrastructure and regional development. A summary of impact in each of these sectors follows.

Agriculture:

Meeting all the agricultural development objectives as described in the PP was problematic, given the uncertainties surrounding refugees' access to farm land in and around the camps. The project design called for the development of 1300 ha. of irrigated land and 700 ha. of rainfed land to benefit 7,400 households over the four year project life. Development of rainfed land exceeded the target (1,235 ha. developed) while irrigated land development fell short (320 ha. developed). Project extension activities consisted of distribution of improved seeds, tools and tractor services to the beneficiaries, and on the job training to refugee extensionists and farmers. The Project has provided a total of 4,275 refugee households with irrigated/rainfed land (.1 to 1 ha. per household). A larger number of indigenous farmers benefited from the extension services. In general, the Project dispelled the myth that refugees are not willing to do any work. Many of the refugees are capable farmers and quickly adapt to different farming techniques. Increasing farming activity is observable in and around Qurioley and Agabar refugee camps which were the two major Project areas targeted .

The implementation of SCF's irrigated agricultural component was affected. The major factors affecting the implementation were non-availability of suitable farm land, policy issues regarding land and plot size for distribution to refugee farmers, delays in the access to UNHCR funding and needed equipment, and internal PVO management difficulties.

Skills Training:

Under the PFP sub-project, vocational skills and management training programs were developed for both refugee and non-refugee beneficiaries. The overall success of the sector to promote enterprise development seems to have been achieved through:

- a. adaptation of the activities to the reality of the local economy;
- b. assistance of ongoing businesses in the project area through business advice to new enterprises/entrepreneurs;
- c. training of people to upgrade their existing skills so that they could contribute to the local economy and;
- d. planning surveys to determine what local businesses see as needs and opportunities. The interviews with local business people revealed that the PFP sub-project has had a lasting impact. Somali refugees are anxious to acquire and up-grade skills and business training.

The EIL sub-project provided administrative skills needed in the management of refugee related projects through a series of field workshops and training programs for planners and implementors involved with refugee assistance projects. The effects this had on the targeted beneficiaries is unclear.

Infrastructure Improvement:

Two hundred forty (240) kilometers of roads were constructed, rehabilitated or worked on by NTF in the Northwest and Awdal regions using intensive wage labor. This effort was well received by the people of Awdal and the Northwest. The improved roads facilitated easier and more efficient transportation of refugee rations to Darayamaane, Darbi Hore and Tugwajaale refugee camps and cut transportation time by half. The road building component has certainly shown that refugees as a group are ready and willing to do labor to contribute to their own support. The extra income of the refugees has contributed to increased business by the stores, shoemakers, furniture makers and blacksmiths within the camps.

Regional Development:

In addition to the absence of a good road network, the scarcity of developed water sources is a major constraint to development in the Northwest region which hosts more than 65% of the Somali refugees. NTF's impact on water exploration work was significant. They found large amounts of water at new locations near Borama and Baki where other conditions favor refugee settlement potential. NTF has established an on-going metal fabrication capacity in Hargeisa town, which will provide significant employment, conserve foreign exchange for Somalia and provide critically needed gabion to the region for agriculture and infrastructure construction and maintenance. This sub-project also created employment opportunities through refugee participation in the construction of the Hargeisa city drainage system.

Monitoring and Management:

The USAID management was proficient. Decisions were made in a timely manner. The field monitoring was undertaken in a reasonable and responsible manner. The management team in place at the end of the Project feels that they could have better managed and monitored the Project with the addition of at least one more person. The PP underestimated the needed management resources by failing to consider the following circumstances. The NRC was not capable of sharing the management responsibilities due to their poor infrastructure, and also AID was expected to do direct emergency work simultaneously with institution building -- too much in too little time, with conflicting objectives. The reorganization of the management structure by USAID changed the situation by placing more emphasis on the paper work than aspects of managing the Project. This redirection was at the expense of field monitoring, reducing information needed for decision making. The RSR sub-projects encompass a number of technical field work including irrigation engineering, civil engineering, small business management and ESL course writing. The PP assumed that periodic technical backup would be available to the USAID management team in most of these fields from REDSO/ESA. REDSO/ESA makes a travel plan a year in advance but issues arose constantly and often required on-site inspection by technical experts.

Lessons Learned:

1. Projects of this type, e.g., impacting on a 'temporary' and volatile refugee situation; (a) should be stated in broad and realistic terms at the goal and purpose levels; (b) should have an evaluation plan which provides for frequent examination of socio-economic, technical and policy issues; (c) should not be dependent on the timely provision of resource inputs by agencies and donors outside the management control of the project itself; and (d) should have sufficient design flexibility to take advantage of targets of opportunity during the project life.
2. Refugees respond to the opportunity to earn additional income and many refugees are able farmers who adapt to new farming techniques.
3. Sub-project should never have more than one grantor where performance of one component is dependent on the funding of the other grantor.
4. PVOs can be effective and efficient implementors of refugee projects. They bring tested corporate strategy to project implementation. This strategy provides a framework for their activities, increasing the likelihood of success. Due to their well tested field experience they can initiate project activities effectively.
5. Programs in which local businessmen train refugees in an apprentice type arrangement is an effective training approach.
6. There is a need and seemingly large market for business advice services on accounting and small business practices in the rural areas of Somalia.

7. Labor-intensive road rehabilitation (maintenance) is economical and technically feasible for most of the tract between Borama and Dharbi-Hore. To be effective this kind of work should be controlled by experienced engineers who understand drainage principles and can design ditches and erosion protection devices on the spot.
8. Resettlement of refugees can best be promoted through assistance projects that focus on regional development, such as the provision of minimal basic infrastructure.

II. Introduction

By mid-1981 refugee relief activities in Somalia (which had begun in 1977 with the arrival of ethnic Somalis) were ending. By end-1981, the efforts of all the donors and the GSDR had resulted in the refugees having a reliable source of food and health services. CARE was assisting in assuring food delivery and the Refugee Health Unit (RHU), a GSDR agency within the Ministry of Health, was reducing the number of supplementary feeding units. Some of the PVOs had departed, while remaining PVOs were beginning to turn some of their attention to development. A December 1981 UNHCR task force had recommended attention to development programs. A GSDR shift in policy in March 1981 permitted refugee farmers to cultivate family plots. The character of the crisis had changed. Therefore, the donor response to refugee assistance changed from relief to development.

The Refugee Self Reliance Project which was initiated in 1982 represented AID's efforts to provide development assistance to the 700,000 refugees in 35 refugee camps throughout Somalia. The Project was experimental in its purpose of testing what strategies and interventions would best increase self-reliance of Somali refugees. The ultimate hope was that, through future efforts built upon the experience gained in this Project, the refugee dilemma would be resolved. Broadly speaking, the Project tested approaches to assisting refugees directly, while a second part of the Project assisted the GSDR in building a capability to manage and evaluate activities to meet for future development needs.

The planning for this Project started with a joint State Department/AID Mission to Somalia in 1982 to establish basic policies and guidelines for future U.S. support to the refugee program, as the immediate crisis of feeding and sheltering of the large influx of refugees had passed. Recommendations were that unless voluntary repatriation of refugees occurred, the priorities in US assistance were to act to reduce dependence on external assistance, improve the government's capabilities to manage refugee assistance programs, restore the refugee-caused environmental damage, and reduce the cost of their care and maintenance.

As a response to this, the Refugee Self-Reliance Project Identification Document (PID) for a three-year, six million dollar project was approved in June 1982. The funding for the Project was authorized by the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act. The PP was written in December 1982 for implementation to begin in 1983.

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The RSR Project was designed by the same team that designed the CDA Forestry Project, Phase I. The two Projects are conceptually similar and were designed to be interrelated. They were simultaneously implemented by the same USAID staff and final evaluations were done concurrently.

A. The Setting

The setting for the RSR Project is a country with extremely low rainfall, average 500 mm per year, and frequent droughts. The extremely arid soil makes for limited areas of arable land. Only 13% of the land area is considered suitable for cultivation. Somalia's economy is very weak with a negligible number of industrial enterprises. The average per capita income per year is less than US \$300. The economy in and about the camps is one based on free rations.

The refugees were predominantly ethnic Somalis and Oromos from Ethiopia. They were mostly herders who had led a nomadic existence prior to their living in the camps. The camp populations were thought to be 90% women and children with a small percentage of men. The policy of the GSDR at the time of the drafting of the PP was that the refugees would not permanently settle in Somalia.

The program goals as enunciated in the PP were:

"Increasing the capacity of refugees in Somalia to become more productive and more self-reliant, thereby improving their economic status while reducing their dependence on the Somali Government and donor countries."

A further goal is to encourage economic participation in Project areas by Somalis who reside near the refugee camps.

The expected Project outputs were:

- up to 8,000 refugee families farming on irrigated and/or rainfed land producing an average of 20-30 percent of the food they eat and a surplus to trade for other needed items;
- 2,000 or more hectares of arable land put into production by refugees;
- 5,000 farmers trained in improved agriculture practices;
- 5,000 refugees trained in other marketable skills;
- environmental degradation in the refugee regions under control;
- GSDR capacity to plan and manage refugee and other disaster projects.

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Achievement of the objectives would be done through four Project components.

1. Support of the Planning Unit (PU) of the National Refugee Commission (NRC)

This component of the Project is aimed at strengthening of a planning, monitoring and evaluation capacity within the NRC. In a two-year period, AID support was to help create planning and implementation systems within the NRC for future use by national planning personnel. Technical resources provided by AID were to include expatriate managerial assistance with supporting staff and facilities for the NRC Planning Unit. U.S., third country or Somalia-based participant training could also be provided.

2. Socio-Economic and Technical Studies (SETS)

Gaining a greater understanding of refugee needs, aspirations, incentives, resources and the socio-economic issues that confront the refugee populations and their Somali neighbors, as a means of developing and implementing more effective self reliance programs, was the objective of AID-supported studies funded by the second Project component. By the end of three years, the GSDR and AID were expected to have from four to seven program-related studies which would further inform program planning, policy and strategy development, lead to recommendations for changes, expansion or reapplication of existing projects or programs, provide a sounder basis for review of proposals for new activities and plans, provide firmer requirements for baseline data collection, monitoring and evaluation, and allow identification of issues for further investigation.

3. Sub-projects

The third Project component provided funding for directly assisting refugees and their Somali neighbors to enhance their productivity, economic livelihood and work skills through such activities as:

- a) A series of sub-projects in selected areas having potential for irrigated or dry land agricultural development;
- b) Selected labor intensive infrastructure improvements to link camps with agricultural and forestry interventions and improve access to regional centers; and
- c) Opportunities to enable participants to increase their skills for self-support.

4. Project monitoring and management

USAID/Somalia Refugee Project Assistants (RPAs) were to be responsible for programming and monitoring both the Refugee Self-Reliance and the CDA Forestry Phase I Projects. Monitoring the performance of the RSR would include efforts in program design, management, evaluation of impact and identification of problems. USAID was to conclude personal services contracts with the RPAs who would then be assigned activities in support of each area of program concentration.

The projected total expenditure for the Project was US\$ 11,209,000. The funds committed by the U.S. was six million dollars. The GSDR agreed to commit U.S. \$2,350,000. The participating PVOs and other donors were to contribute U.S. \$2,859,000. Following is a table showing the projected use of money to be committed under this Project. Included is the money provided by the GSDR through the use of local currency generated through the granting of US Public Law 480 funds (referred to as CIPL or DDD funds). Also displayed, in parenthesis, is the funds committed as of the end of the Project.

Financial Plan (\$1000) Illustrative
By Project Component and Category For Three Year Life of Project

Component	Category Inputs							Total (AID)	GSDR	PVOs	Project
	Tech. Assist.	Conslu. Servs.	Common- ities	Infrast. Const.	Operate- Costs & Training	Counting Inflate.	A.I.D.				
Support to the NRC Planning Unit	453	0	64	0	80	103	700 (633) ^{2/}	85 (839.5) ^{3/}	0	785	
Socio-Economic and Technical Studies	-0	250	-0	0-	0-	0-	250 (216)		0	250	
Project Monitoring and Management	184	0	64	0	26	0 56	330 (550)	0	0	330	
Refugee Self-Reliance Sub-project Activities	1,110	475	435	565	505	1,259	4,720 (4,601)	2,265 ^{1/} (153,344.4)	2,859	9,844	
TOTAL	1,747	725	563	565	591	1,389	6,000 (6,000)	2,350 (152,504.9)	2,859	11,209	

^{1/} GSDR contribution includes \$1,303,000 of food-for-work as part of sub-project activity.

^{2/} Amount committed at EOP

^{3/} Stated in Somali Shillings ('000).

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B. The Project Concept

The Project was to explore and seek the most efficient and effective means to enhance refugee self-reliance. Therefore, a concept of what the designers meant by self-reliance is necessary in order to evaluate the Project.

Self-reliance as envisioned by the PP implies providing refugees with the knowledge, skills and ability which will enable them to become self-supporting in the future. When the PID and PP were written, the GSDR had not stated a long-term policy solution to the refugee situation. Therefore, designers considered refugee self-reliance under all options, settlement, urban or rural, repatriation, and continuation of the camps and food rations.

The Project was to foster self-reliance in two ways. First, by teaching skills to the refugees, they could partially or completely support themselves, thereby reducing the need for rations. PVOs were solicited for proposals to teach improved agricultural methods, small business skills, such as carpentry, crafts making, bookkeeping, etc. Second, the Project was designed to give refugees short-term wage earning opportunities. The CDA Forestry Project was also to provide paid employment to a large number of refugees. It was hoped that the skills acquired in the course of this employment would later be marketable. But the primary thought was that the refugees would be acquiring disposable income that could be invested in capital goods, livestock, or small businesses that would provide a more permanent source of employment and income for refugees. The PP envisioned that some Somalis (i.e., non-refugees) would be included in the training and work opportunities.

C. The Project Design

The RSR Project was a weaving of a number of objectives to achieve the purpose, "the capacity to become more productive and self-reliant"...

One theme was that a limited number of refugees would be exposed to activities designed to increase their productive capacity. The PVO sub-projects offered agricultural opportunities by clearing land, providing seeds and extension services. These sub-projects were implemented by SCF and NTF. PFP created opportunities for vocational skills training and also counseling business persons in business skills. NTF trained refugees and non-refugees in earthen road maintenance and erosion prevention. These interventions were looked upon as experimental as to the types of incentives necessary to obtain refugee participation and the efficacy of the intervention.

A second theme was that work opportunities would be provided for refugees, the assumption being that, because their basic needs (food, health services, and housing) were provided, any excess income would be invested in productive capital goods, making them more self-reliant. The capital goods ideally would be investments in business inputs such as donkeys, carts, tea shops, stocks for a store, etc.

A third theme emphasized the experimental nature of the Project, to indicate whether refugees were amenable to farming and could contribute to the Somali economy. The Project planners had two underlying aims in mind: (1) to refute the myth that refugees were intentionally idle, and on the other hand, (2) to give refugees a sense of worth through employment which would help to dispel the apathy which accompanies enforced idleness. Moreover, the expository nature of the agricultural and skills training would give the GSDR and donors a basis for making policy and designing future projects.

A fourth theme was an upgrading of the NRC's ability to plan, evaluate and monitor. The end sought was to promote well-designed development projects to help the refugees to be more self-reliant.

The experimental and expository themes together with financial restraints, explain why the Project was designed to reach only a small number of refugees. Consequently the Project's impact, success or failure, has to be measured in both quantitative and qualitative terms.

Another minor thread was assisting the PVOs to turn their interests to development. PVOs had only been working in Somalia since 1978. Therefore, the Project was to begin the process of developing and refining operating procedures between GSDR and the PVOs for future projects.

D. The Project Input/Output

The Institutional Support to NRC

The inputs relative to infrastructure strengthening, technical advisors within the NRC and skills training for field staff were envisioned to put planning, monitoring and evaluating systems in place and to train the necessary staff to contribute to and utilize the systems. Funding for third country schooling was also planned. There was a covenant that the government would assign adequate staff to the PU to receive experience and training in the functions of a planning department. Commodities such as typewriters and office equipment were to be supplied.

The inputs for skills training led logically to the outputs of a trained field staff. The design was a 'traditional' one of upgrading the capability of the individual staff members, and also trying to put in place systems in which they may better use their skills.

The planned technical assistance and training seems short for institutionalizing what in effect was a foreign evaluation, monitoring, and research procedures system. It was thought that there would be expedient action on resolving the refugee situation which made it imperative to introduce the inputs over a short period of time.

There was a contradiction inherent in the short term of the Project. The Project was to assist in moving from a crisis mode to a development mode. But by placing all the inputs into a short term the perception would still be of crisis management.

The Socio Economic Technical Studies

The funds for SETS were sufficient for the number of studies envisioned. The management of the component was planned to be by an expatriate research manager and his counterpart

Self-Reliance sub-projects

The input of money and work opportunities planned by the PVOs was to produce employment. The skills training opportunities were to be brought to the target population, helping to ensure participation. In the agricultural field, the inputs of seeds, fertilizers, tools, plus extension services were positively related to the outputs. There was a covenant for the provision of land. The extension services would train refugees. The period of training, two years, would seem short in relation to the success of extension programs with non-refugee and refugee farmers in Somalia. However, as part of an experimental program to test interventions the time period was a necessary compromise.

The agricultural sector outputs and refugee training lead to the purposes of enhancing refugee productivity. Improved roads were necessary to ensure that the refugees have a market access for greater economic well being. The failure to include additional support to the Refugee Agricultural Unit (RAU) may have been a serious oversight. The use of RAU personnel may have involved more refugees in farming. The additional training of RAU employees may have helped refugees then and in the future. This may have been considered and rejected based upon RAU's former reputation of incompetence.

The PP projected a skills training output of training centers for women. There was to be a complete feasibility/needs study. This was a necessary output to attain the purpose of training in vocational skills. Obviously, not everyone has the inclination to farm. Furthermore, it is doubtful there is sufficient suitable farm land in Somalia.

The purposes lead logically to the goals. The strengthening of a planning capacity within the GSDR is logically necessary to achieve the goal. The training of refugees to enhance their productivity and work skills increases their capacity to become more productive and self-reliant.

While the inputs in the design are adequate to reach the projected number of beneficiaries, they are a small percentage, about 10% out of the total refugee population. Further development programs are necessary to reach all the refugees. The program was designed in a time of uncertainty as to the future of the refugees and envisioned as a large experiment.

An implicit assumption untested in this design is that the refugees want to farm or engage in business even if it means losing their rations. In none of the sub-projects have the refugees given up any rations due to their involvement in the Project. Therefore, it is strictly speaking, impossible to say that they would engage in the activities or sub-projects if it meant losing their rations. At the time of implementation it was impractical to reduce the rations or stop them. The distribution system was not sophisticated enough to allow for such a reduction.

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E. Assessment of Implementation

The original design was implemented with some deviations. The main deviation was the smaller number of sub-projects. This was unavoidable due to lack of comprehensive final proposals and underestimation of needed funding. While the PFP sub-project used effective methods, a second project with a different design would have provided a comparison. Similarly, a labor intensive sub-project in the south may have been better received.

The refugees were receptive to all of the projects. Activities of two of the PVOs stand out as being particularly effective. SCF encouraged significant community participation in their project. This was most visibly shown by the refugees' decision to distribute the irrigated land in plots smaller than planned. SCF facilitated discussion to the point that the community felt it had a voice in the matter. The community also gave priority in the plot distribution to widows or female family heads - a positive feature indicating that SCF facilitated careful consideration of fair and equitable distribution of land.

SCF also assisted in the distribution of land to 4,120 refugees. This was monitored by its community outreach team. While there were problems, they were minor disputes considering the importance of the amount of land to each refugee and the scale of the distribution. PFP, through careful study identified Somali businessmen who would train others in their skills. This emphasized the knowledge and dignity of the local population, and it provided a source of continued advice for the trainees.

All of the PVOs encouraged women to participate in their sub-projects. PFP trained three women as business advisors. Women took part in many of the vocational courses. NTF employed women in the road crews when working close to camps. SCF encouraged women farmers, particularly by giving improved seeds and extension services to women's groups for demonstration plots. Women as well as men directly benefited from the sub-projects.

Some of the obstacles are symptomatic of all developing countries, e.g. transportation or communication difficulties, and epidemics. Others, such as fuel shortages, are not generally as predictable, but steps should be taken to guard against these occurrences.

The PVOs were generally efficient in the implementation of the sub-projects. However, all were slow in bringing staff into the country. The start up of sub-projects was affected by USAID's cooperative agreement signing procedures. The time between verbal notification to PVOs and agreement signing was often lengthy, and this led to the problem of slow starts.

Two of the PVOs encountered problems in their hiring of upper level staff. Apparently, this was due to disputes involving both the right to hand out valuable resources and misunderstandings as to the terms of the cooperative agreement. The delays were up to three months and in the end the PVOs were able to hire those candidates they considered best qualified.

The majority of the programs ran smoothly and made consistent progress towards their goals. None of the projects diverted from their agreement goals or from the stated outputs. NTF did stray slightly from its goals by working on the Hargeisa drainage system. NTF and SCF employed large numbers of refugees. They efficiently managed a large work force, providing supervisors, and needed support services.

An exception to the general efficient professional management was the SCF sub-project. Its project depended on the construction of an irrigation system. SCF failed to have adequate management in place in Somalia. There was also failure to place qualified project level staff on site in a timely manner. The project implementation was further adversely affected by UNHCR funding for costs of the irrigation canal. This funding was provided in a piecemeal manner and late. The management problems were avoidable. Proper management may be ameliorated the funding problems. The sub-project's construction component was beyond SCF International's corporate ability. USAID and UNHCR may have faulted for giving grants to perform the work without greater assurances of SCF's capabilities.

PVOs encountered delays in commodity arrivals from abroad due to long delivery times. Borrowing of replacements, or other strategies prevented serious adverse effects. Fuel shortages throughout the project life adversely affected the performance of all the sub-projects. One fuel crisis was precipitated by UNHCR's decision to stop supplying PVOs with fuel unless they had a grant from UNHCR. This was another example of problems caused by relying on funding from two or more grantors.

The NRC was unable to coordinate activities involving other GSDR ministries due to lack of infrastructure. This required USAID and the PVOs to spend more time on coordination. This in some cases, particularly with the Ministry of Finance resulted in significant delays. NRC has been cooperative in approving extensions to cooperative agreements, and other actions as needed. USAID assisted NRC in managing the project in an extremely professional manner. However, it took some time for USAID to restructure its management and monitoring staff to handle this additional burden. The restructuring did not occur until the end of the second year of the Project.

During the latter half of the project, the USAID Project officer and two assistants oversaw nine PVO implemented sub-projects and eleven components of this and CDA Forestry. The sub-projects included forestry, road and drainage construction, irrigation canal construction, farming, management training, and small businesses assistance. In hindsight, there was understaffing but this impact was kept to a marginal level by qualified staff.

USAID showed hands on management throughout. PVOs were invited to make proposals. When one fell behind, steps were taken to assist and remedial action was taken. Assistance was given in resolving problems as they arose and in helping PVOs work with the GSDR. USAID actively sought out other PVOs when some of the original proposals could not be carried through. This, for example, brought PFP into the Project.

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A major defect in the implementation of RSR was failure of USAID to follow through on the commitment that it would assist PVOs in collecting baseline data by providing the services of an economist to help design the gathering process. A related problem was USAID's failure to insist upon uniform and complete data collection by the PVOs. This precluded greater attainment of the Project purpose of a better understanding of the refugee needs. Judging by the long time delay in arrival of commodities USAID could have been more efficient. This was a serious problem, with office equipment taking a year and vehicles up to two years to arrive.

F. Assessment of Results

The Project was a qualified success. Many of the quantitative projected outputs have not been reached. However, most of the PVOs reached their output requirements. On the qualitative side, the strengthening of the PU in its planning, monitoring and evaluation capacity did not come about. But, a greater understanding of refugees desires, capabilities and needs did occur.

Planned Output

1. 7,000 refugee families growing 20-30% of their food.
2. 2,000 hectares of land cultivated.
3. 3,000 refugee farmers trained.
4. 2,500 refugees trained in vocational skills.
5. Five Somali managers trained.
6. Access roads, 25 km constructed 50 km improved.

Project Achievements

1. 4,265 refugee families farming. Farm production generally sold for cash to meet household need. 132 refugee families are also earning cash through beekeeping.
2. 1,555 hectares of land cultivated.
3. 4,400 refugee families and 400 non-refugee families were trained in agriculture and provided with agriculture extension services.
4. 734 refugees received vocational skills training or benefited from business advisory services.
5. Four NRC senior staff and two RHU administrators were given two months management training at EIL in Vermont. 250 field staff attended seminars on management skills.
6. 159.5 kilometers of earthen road constructed or improved.

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|---|--|
| 7. 850,000 man days of employment for refugees and nationals. | 7. 597,471 person days of employment for refugee and nationals. |
| 8. Environmental improvements in place. | 8. One sub-surface water storage dam constructed;
One reservoir cleaned;
9,410 meters of Hargesia drainage system renovated or constructed.
8 test holes drilled; 4 struck water, 2 of which had potable water. |

The extent of land under cultivation and refugee families farming were less than planned because, less than the projected number of agricultural sub-projects were funded. The three PVOs implementing agricultural programs met or exceeded their sub-project targets. The number of refugee farmers trained can not be determined from the available data, but extension services were made available to a number larger than the specified outputs.

The cost of all the sub-projects exceeded the cost estimated in the PP. The PP states that its estimation of costs for the PVO programs is based on preliminary PVO estimates without specifying the estimates and the mix in number of agricultural, vocational, and construction projects (PP, p.38.).

The estimated costs were low. It is probable that the NTF project which produced significant unplanned outputs was not fully budgeted for. Construction of 75 kms. of road was projected, 159.5 kms. was achieved, together with 12 test drillings of wells. It is not possible to determine the percentage of food needs being produced by the farmers due to lack of baseline or production data.

The number of refugees to be trained in vocational skills was not attained. PFP, the PVO doing the preponderance of training, attained its planned target.

On the qualitative side there have been successes and failures. Three of the SETS studies concerning particular regions of Somalia have contributed to the understanding of refugee needs and socio-economic issues. Equally important, the sociological studies performed for all the sub-projects have contributed to the knowledge about refugees.

There is evidence that many refugees want to farm or work. This has been shown in the sociological studies done as part of the PVO sub-projects and a few of the SET studies. The sub-projects have shown the refugees' eagerness to work in income producing activities, their capacity to farm, albeit, largely in the traditional manner, and the desire for skills training and small business advice. Moreover, techniques to introduce these skills have now been tested.

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The achievement of the program goal cannot be judged at this time. The small percentage of refugees trained and allowed to use farm land have the means to earn income to become partially self-reliant. There is no measure of whether they have become so. However, a greater understanding of refugee needs, aspirations and socio-economic issues has been gained by USAID and GSDR. This will be a great benefit in the future for the design of future projects and in considering the future development needs of Somalia.

Some of the problems identified and that should be addressed or anticipated in future projects are discussed below.

The size of the USAID management team should have been larger by at least one. The original design of three field monitors and a project officer was changed two-thirds of the way through the Project. The change replaced the field monitors with two office staff with monitoring responsibility. A management staff of three was insufficient. Given the large number of sub-projects more staff was necessary.

Release of local currency funds by the DDD of the Ministry of Finance seriously hindered the progress of all of the sub-projects. The possible solutions at the level of sub-projects are impractical (not use local currency funds, to make the Ministry of Finance signatory to all agreements promising to adhere to a different schedule than now, continue to rely upon clauses in the grant agreement that the implementing agency will assist). A higher level approach and solution are necessary because the problem is continuing to affect current PVO activities.

Faster approval of Cooperative Agreements is necessary. This is in part to facilitate PVO start up. Secondly, it sets an example to the GSDR.

In hindsight, there are few changes in Project design that should have been made that would have facilitated implementation of impact.

G. Impact and Lessons Learned

It is premature to judge the impact of this Project. However, it has dispelled the myths that refugees are not willing to do any work. Given opportunities and resources they are willing to toil long and hard. Further laid to rest is the belief that none of the refugees knows how to farm. Many are capable farmers who want to farm. They quickly adapt to different conditions. The increased farming activity is observable in the Qurioley area and around Agabar. These are two sites where refugees were given opportunities to farm. A second impact is the increased economic activity at Agabar sparked by PFP. A measure is the increased number of recreational businesses in the camp.

Lessons Learned:

1. Projects of this type, e.g., impacting on a 'temporary' and volatile refugee situation; (a) should be stated in broad terms at the Goal and Purpose levels; (b) should have an evaluation plan which provides for frequent examination of socio-economic, technical and policy issues; (c) should not be dependent on the timely provision of resource inputs by agencies and donors outside the management control of the Project itself; and (d) should have sufficient design flexibility to take advantage of targets of opportunity during the project life.
2. Refugees respond to the opportunity to earn additional income and many refugees are able farmers who adapt to new farming techniques.
3. Sub-projects should never have more than one grantor where performance of one component is dependent on the funding of the other grantor.

III. Evaluation of Project Components

Component I

A. Institutional Support to Planning Unit of the National Refugee Commission

1. Description

The Project design sought to improve resource allocation for refugee self-reliance by strengthening the infrastructure of the National Refugee Commission. Briefly, the Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Unit of the NRC (Planning Unit or PU) was to be assisted by provision of expatriate advisors, training, and provision of commodities (vehicles and office equipment).

The NRC was formed in 1979 to coordinate all refugee related activities. In 1981, it became an autonomous agency with ministerial status. Originally, the NRC was an operating unit but beginning in 1980 its tasks of specific departments, such as the Refugee Health Unit, were gradually being transferred to the relevant ministries. Concurrently, the NRC's role was changing from direct management to planning and coordination. Reflecting this change, the PU of the NRC was established in March 1982 to be an advisory body for the NRC. The PU was functionally to:

- (1) Serve as the NRC's internal mechanism for the review, monitoring and evaluation of refugee assistance programs;
- (2) Collect and disseminate available social, economic and technical data on the camps and the refugees, and to identify additional research and study priorities; and

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- (3) Provide a strong working level linkage between the NRC and other donor, UN and GSDR agencies on the planning, coordination and execution of refugee assistance projects, including those in the field of self-reliance (PP,p. 9).

The PU was the recipient of substantial support from the GSDR and other donors. The GSDR seconded highly educated personnel to the professional positions. UNHCR was providing funds for enhanced salaries to GSDR personnel, an expatriate senior planner, as well as some operational expenses.

The NRC field staff working in the 35 camps and at regional levels were drawn from GSDR, the refugee population, and the local population. Their educational background varied from little to graduate level.

The PP provided for technical assistance and commodities over a two-year period valued at \$700,000. This included an implementation manager, a research manager, and an administration assistant. A Somali implementation officer would also be funded. Commodities, including vehicles and office equipment were to be provided.

Plans were made to ensure that upgrading of the PU or the GSDR planning capacity would not cease when the expatriate advisors left. The PU was to assign counterparts to the expatriates to be trained to assume the expatriate position at the end of two years. Furthermore, the GSDR intended to assign 5 staff from different ministries both to assist in the planning efforts and to receive training.

The PP also projected that EIL would train the NRC PU and field employees through seminars on management and administrative subjects.

The objectives of this component as proposed by the PP are:

- a) A long-term implementation scheme based on NRC priorities; this will promote the disadvantaged camps to a point where there is no significant difference between camps in the allocation of resources proportional to needs;
- b) A data collection, storage and retrieval system with a data base regularly updated; this will include an index, by camp, of all existing projects;
- c) A standardized system for the evaluation of camp based activities, measured against NRC goals and objectives;
- d) A corps of national planners acquainted with specific management tools such as the logical framework;
- e) A foundation for strong inter-departmental, inter-ministerial and inter-agency cooperation that would address the development needs of Somalia.

Production of outputs obviously required a skilled team of professionals, managing two or more highly structured information collection, storage, and retrieval systems. The information to feed such a system had to move quickly from the 35 camps to Mogadishu. Such a system is only viable if the organization members have a clear perception of the organization's mission and management is committed to the implementation of the systems.

2. Implementation

Review of implementation will be done according to the different inputs, i.e., technical assistance, training, and commodities.

a. Technical Assistance

Implementation Manager

The implementation manager began work in July 1983. His scope of work was:

- a) Review the implementation, reporting and evaluation plans of all projects submitted to the NRC to assure their adequacy;
- b) Monitor the implementation status of on-going projects, identify implementation problems and advise agencies concerned to take corrective actions;
- c) Assure that project evaluations take place on schedule, review results as to their adequacy and take steps to have this information used for improving performance as well as for addressing more general program problems;
- d) Prepare reports to the director of the PU on general program performance of NRC's self-reliance program and make recommendations as to the improvements;
- e) Make recommendations and reports to the director on concerns related to implementation issues; and
- f) Perform other tasks within the general scope of services outlined above, as required by the extraordinary commissioner of the NRC or which may facilitate improved performance of PU refugee self-reliance directed efforts.

Within six months of his arrival the implementation manager developed a set of criteria for evaluating project proposals, proposal submission procedures, and a format for reports of visits to project sites. Plans for reorganization of files and a request that PVOs submit copies of all reports to the PU along with a complete inventory and indexing of current projects in the refugee relief area were also prepared.

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The PU was reorganized in December 1983 along the lines recommended by the implementation manager. The implementation manager also made recommendations for a panel composed of GSDR agencies and UNHCR to review project proposals to hasten the yearly UNHCR program approval process. Subsequently, he proposed review schedules and procedures for UNHCR funding of projects. Documentation requirements were augmented to include monthly work plans. Further, standardized clauses for all project agreements were developed.

Other activities of the implementation manager included working with EIL, meetings and establishment of policy guidelines concerning settlement schemes, review of proposals submitted to the NRC under the the RSR Project, trips to project sites, and reports as needed by the extraordinary commissioner.

The first implementation manager left the PU in July 1985, to become USAID project management coordinator for the RSR Project. There was a gap of 15 months before a replacement.

The new implementation manager undertook the job at the beginning of August 1986. At the end of the first year, the scope of work was expanded by the NRC to include recommendations on budgeting and other concerns relating to project evaluation and implementation.

The manager's actual activities included a supervisor role to NRC project officers for water, agriculture, income generation and education projects, and a coordinating function for PU staff. Additional responsibilities were report production, drafting correspondence, liaison with related NGOs, UNHCR and USAID, and production of proposed agendas for bi-weekly staff meetings.

The second manager introduced a number of simple methods to track correspondence within the PU. He participated in site visits and evaluation of various NRC implemented refugee projects. His evaluation reports were noticeably frank. The manager played a very strong role in liaison between NRC and UNHCR. There were many favorable comments about his ability in this sensitive area. While there was now an appreciation of the role of the position, his success seems most directly attributable to his ability to work within the organization and to handle issues sensitive to the staff in an acceptable manner.

The Program Design and Evaluation Manager

The program design and the evaluation manager (PDEM) assumed his position in August 1983.

The scope of work was:

- a) Inventory all existing socio-economic studies on refugees in Somalia and assess their findings;
- b) Review project proposals to assure they included provision for the collection of baseline data as part of their overall evaluation plans;
- c) Prioritize needed survey and studies;
- d) Establish criteria against which PVO sub-projects can be evaluated as to impact and development effectiveness;
- e) Monitor studies and surveys commissioned by the NRC;
- f) Make recommendations on the dissemination of completed studies;
- g) Prepare reports to the NRC on implications of conclusions of the evaluation program for the direction of NRC's program efforts.

In response to the above detailed scope of work the PDEM performed the following tasks:

- a. completed a listing of all research projects that are of relevance to refugees in Somalia;
- b. drafted;
 - 1) "Criteria for Evaluation of Refugee Research Proposals;"
 - 2) "Guidelines for Preparation of Refugee Self-Reliance Research Proposals;"
 - 3) "Review and Approval Procedure Proposals for Refugee Research;"

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- c. drew up methodology for remote sensing and mapping of refugee camps for population estimates;
- d. established a library for materials on refugees and development research in Somalia;
- e. established a working bibliography on refugees and research in Somalia;
- f. did extensive work on a SOMAC proposal for study of urban refugees;
- g. wrote memoranda on proposal and research subjects;
- h. took a leading part in a number of seminars.

Administrative Assistant

This position was held for three years by the same individual. That person was very successful in improving administrative support for the PU. Her activities included on the job training and teaching office skills in collaboration with EIL to the NRC secretaries.

b. Training

In order to further strength the PU, NRC requested training for three inter-department heads. USAID agreed to fund seven NRC personnel for additional schooling in third world countries. The schooling received was as follows:

3 individuals went to University of Nairobi obtaining schooling in public administration.

3 individuals went to University of Nairobi obtaining schooling in finance and project management.

1 individual went to Tennessee University, obtaining training in ecological analysis.

EIL gave management and administrative training to the PU staff and facilitated seminars on issues relevant to the Somalia refugee situation. The PU staff took part in seminars on internal and external information collection and other issues. Training in administrative, personnel, and management subjects were given to field staff. The training was made available to all field staff.

3. Assessment

The scope of work for the first implementation manager and PDEM, were carefully targeted to provide the base for meeting projected outputs. The addition of the EIL program, adding training for field staff and the design of internal and external reporting information collection systems completed the needed inputs. The first implementation manager and PDEM produced impressive amounts of substantive, important recommendation reports and research in compliance with their scopes of work.

The PU had requested the assistance of the two advisors. In hindsight, it appears that the implementation manager and PDEM were not utilized to the optimum level. It is possible that the NRC, because of its weak infrastructure failed to understand the implications of agreeing to the USAID designed project.

Advances have been made towards targeted outputs. A listing by camps and activity areas was started by the first implementation manager. Internal and external information systems were designed. They have not been implemented possibly because they were too complicated and never translated into Somali. Simpler ones have been proposed. The PDEM compiled a listing of all research relating to Somali refugees.

A standardized system for evaluation of camp based activities was proposed. Recently, full reports of camp visits have been produced. A corps of national planners have not been trained primarily because the six designated individuals were never assigned to the PU.

A foundation for NRC departmental cooperation has not been made. This may have been an overly ambitious project goal. Noteworthy though are the indications that EIL seminars facilitated communication at camp and regional levels between the different agencies.

The provision of educational opportunities have resulted in better trained personnel. In some cases, they have benefited the PU with their increased skill. It has been reported that their increased training has acted as a normative influence on the other staff. However, the impact has been diluted by reassignment of staff to other ministries. Other individuals, with their increased schooling have left government service. The absence of personnel in school has also seriously reduced the staff size on occasion.

The effort to improve organizational effectiveness of the PU was moderately successful. For example, staff now submit written reports of site visits to monitor projects. The continual receptiveness to expatriate implementation managers reveals an appreciation for the purposes of the Project. An extremely able and energetic individual heads the PU. He was promoted to Deputy Commissioner in 1983, and continues to manage the PU. All commentators have ascribed most of the PU's successes to this individual.

Component II

B. Socio-Economic and Technical Component (SETS)

1. Description

The SETS Component was intended to fund studies of the social and economic dynamics effecting the Somali refugee situation and to provide a basis for improved refugee program strategies. The PP included guidelines for selection as follows:

- a. Address the socio-economic or technical context which defines opportunities for or constraints to refugee self-reliance and productivity;
- b. Address issues which affect implementation of current activities or planning for future activities regarding refugee self-reliance;
- c. Identify improved program strategies which reflect what has been learned about socio-economic and technical factors that affect progress toward greater economic participation of refugees; and
- d. Analyze quantitative or qualitative data with the aim of improving GSDR capacity to develop a long term, positive resolution of the refugee problem.

The PP budgeted \$250,000 and projected 4 to 7 studies. \$90,000 was subsequently reprogrammed to the management and monitoring program component.

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2. Implementation

Selection of proposals was done collaboratively between USAID and the NRC PU. SETS Proposals were submitted by November 1985, five were approved and four completed. The following is a summary of scheduled studies, some of which were not done.

A review of conditions affecting the potential for self-reliance in the Northwest. NTF prepared a report concentrating on physical infrastructure constraints.

A study on the effect of self-reliance activities in camps and on the local economy has not been done due to lack of suitable proposals..

An assessment of the potential for development of different types of small industries was done under separate funding by ILO and hence a study on the same topic was not done under this component.

A study of socio-culture changes in such areas as household roles and community organizations was addressed in "The Jalalqsi Socio-economic Survey".

Problems faced by urban and non-camps refugees was the subject of a study by SOMAC.

An assessment of the long range implementation of refugee relocation, with presentation of policy options and possible future study option. The Sudan Study Tour by NRC members examined some of these issues. The Refugees and Development in Somalia, by Naima Ali Hasci summarized some of these issues. Refugee Settlement in the Lower Shabelle Region by B.C. Spooner, explored issues connected with settlement options for a specific region.

3. Assessment

Though the activities envisaged under SETS have not met expectations in providing a flow of scientifically objective data for use in planning overall refugee activities, the studies were relevant. The recommendations led to the designing of the present USAID-funded Refugee Settlement Project.

Out of the 6 completed studies, the first three studies (B. C. Spooner's Refugee Settlement in the Lower Shabelle Region, Africare's Jalalqsi Socio-Economic Survey and Settlement Analysis, by NRC) were useful as investigations of a 'durable solution' to the refugee problem.

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Component III

C. Self-Reliance Sub-Projects

a. Description

This component to be implemented by PVOs was designed to provide direct assistance to the refugees. The PP projected three types:

- a) Increasing agriculture skills while allowing the refugees to earn income from sale of food;
- b) Offering vocational and skills training to refugees, and providing management and administrative skills training to individuals engaged in managing refugee assistance programs; and
- c) Improving access roads and water crossings in camp vicinities using labor intensive methods.

1. Experiment in International Living (EIL)

a. Description

A Cooperative Agreement was signed on March 10, 1983, with an initial term of two years. There were subsequent amendments, on June 12, 1985, and July 29, 1986, extending the agreement through July 1987. The funds for the entire period of EIL activity was \$739,000 from USAID and \$377,000 in local currency from GSDR funds.

The purpose of the sub-project under the initial Cooperative Agreement was:

"... to improve the planning and management capabilities among Somali personnel and agencies working on refugee assistance projects."

Specific implementation activities as stated in the Cooperative Agreement were:

1. A workshop for professional staff of the NRC PU, three to five days in length, to assist them in clarifying and identifying ways to achieve its purpose, objectives, and special functions as a branch of the NRC;
2. A three day seminar for central office representatives of refugee assistance agencies to explore ways of improving counterpart training and interagency cooperation;

3. Quarterly field seminars in each of the four regions for field staff of agencies working in refugee aid, and PU professional staff members, to strengthen and improve the coordination of activities between central office and field staff; and the several implementing technical, coordinating, and donor support agencies in the field.

b. Implementation

In June 1984 the implementation activities were amended. The expected outputs and end of sub-project achievements were:

Outputs	Achievements
1. conduct quarterly training field seminars on regional basis at seven sites, expanding the number of training courses from 16 to 28.	37 seminars conducted on on regional basis at seven sites.
2. an on-the-job training course for Somali counterparts of the NRC's PU, to assist them in gaining the skills and appropriate experience necessary for eventual assumption of duties and responsibilities currently carried out by expatriates.	a five month course in office skills was designed and taught to all NRC secretaries. Additional seven months training was given to three English speaking secretaries.
3. quarterly field courses over 18 months for selected field staff of NRC, the National Range Agency (NRA), and Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) in basic management skills and practices as they relate to their specific jobs.	16 field seminars conducted for 250 participants from 25 government and voluntary agencies on management skills, financial management and community development
4. Formal and on-the-job training, for six Somalis hired as counterparts by EIL to form a cadre of skilled, professional trainers by the end of the sub-project.	six trainers trained, who in turn designed and conducted field seminars and management workshops.
7. four periodic seminars to provide a forum for in-depth analysis of selected topics that affect the delivery of development assistance in Somalia.	two three day seminars on making the transition from relief to development organized for PVOs, GSDR ministries and UN agencies.

8. on-going assistance for Somali agencies in proposal writing to help Somali organizations, in submitting project proposals to potential donors and government agencies. 30 hour seminar offered in report writing
3 one day workshops offered on proposal writing and review procedures.
9. an office skill training course intended for use by the expatriate office manager of the PU for his administrative counterpart. a five month course in office skills designed and taught to NRC personnel.
10. performance of other tasks as identified and requested by the Extraordinary Commissioner of the NRC, in keeping with the goals of the NRC and the scope of activities agreed upon by relevant parties. performed tasks as requested.
11. a management information system developed to assist the PU to collect data from outside ministries, UN organizations and voluntary organizations; an expatriate advisor to identify needed information and catalog reports submitted to the NRC, to create system to organize, store and retrieve documents within headquarters. an EIL management information system officer working at NRC, to introduce information systems to PU and offer systems seminar to NRC staff; workshop for 20 GSDR
20 GSDR participants conducted for five days.
12. an English language teaching program for IIT teachers and other camp personnel created; a TOEFL expert to design and implement an English teaching program using distance teaching and correspondence methods. an English language program designed.
13. four NRC personnel to participate in a management training seminar; the participants to develop expertise needed to plan and implement refugee settlement programs. four NRC officials attended a four week management training program at EIL's United States School.
14. two RHU physicians to participate in a management of primary health care course. two RHU doctors attended a 6 week course on delivery of health services.

The First Cost Extension

In June 1985, the Cooperative Agreement was amended and a 1-year cost extension was granted for a new purpose. The sub-project during the extension was to strengthen the planning, management and service delivery capacity of 4 agencies working in refugee assistance:

- Refugee Health Unit (RHU)
- Family Life Program (FLP)
- Community Development Unit (CDU)
- Institute of In-Service Teacher Training (IITT)

The expected outputs and end of sub-project achievements were:

Outputs	Achievements
1. EIL team conducts a needs assessment within the four on planning and management of current needs; agency heads to contribute to needs assessment design and analysis of results.	needs assessment conducted within the 4 agencies.
2. each agency receives upto 35 days of 14 major training courses in the areas of project planning and management training for development.	93 staff from 4 agencies received training on program planning, management, evaluation and community development.
3. EIL offers up to 12 days of follow-up (3 days per agency), to assist in the integration and application of the training.	EIL offered follow-up courses for 4 targeted agencies.
4. one 3-5 day seminar to provide a discussion forum on a resettlement and/or development issue.	due to lack of response from the agencies the planned seminar did not occur.

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| 5. production of up to 9 English units by ESL curriculum development specialist for IITT's Distance Education Program. | technical assistance given by EIL curriculum development specialist, one unit of six lessons and tapes produced. |
| 6. ongoing discussions between ESL curriculum development specialist and Lafoole Teacher Training College to explore ways to integrate the ESL component of IITT's Distance Education Lofooole's program. | discussions not held due to lack interest from the Ministry of Education. |
| 7. EIL national trainers receive in-service training in project design and project management. | EIL national trainers received additional training in community development, two trainers attended professional management training course in USA. |
| 8. evaluation of training's immediate and short-term impact. | an in-house evaluation conducted. |

The Second Cost Extension

The second extension-amendment was signed in June 1986, extending the agreement to March 31, 1987. The planned outputs and end of sub-project achievements were:

outputs	achievements
1. produce a management training manual in English and Somali, incorporating all the materials on management training developed under the EIL sub-project.	a manual titled "Management in Action" produced in Somali and English, incorporating all information on management training.
2. train 4-5 employees in each of the four refugee units in ways to use the manual in their agencies.	a 3 day orientation workshop on using the training manual conducted.
3. provide on-the job training to EIL's national trainers in materials development.	EIL trainers trained over a period of two years in materials development.
4. develop and write 4 units of materials for teaching English through distant education methods.	developed three course units and two tapes.

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| 5. provide counterpart training to 2 Somali course writers in writing and implementing ESL distance education materials. | counterpart training provided to two Somali ESL experts from the Ministry of Education. |
| 6. provide English instruction for approximately 1200 refugee teachers in four regions of Somalia. | this output was not accomplished due to reasons unknown. |

c. Assessment

EIL, after initial delays, implemented its program for both the GSDR staff and the PVO community. There were notable activities in some areas.

The methods used in the seminars are critical to an understanding of the impact of the sub-project. A topic was presented by the teacher/facilitator during a two to three hour period to 20 to 40 people. The presentation was a planned series of questions designed to draw from the audience their knowledge and intuitive understanding of problems or obstacles on the planned subject. Then by a directed conversation, handouts or demonstration, new information was presented. Conversation was invited to expose areas not comprehended and to reinforce the learning. Visual aids, demonstrations, and play acting were tools used in the teaching.

Management training component

A 1985 EIL survey of participants in all the regions showed satisfaction with the field seminars on management training. A number reported acquiring specific skills such as supervisory follow up and supervision problem solving, planning of their work, office filing, and conducting meetings. Many noted they gained new ideas of how to do their jobs. A major by-product was that the field seminars induced field level communication between government agencies and non-government organizations. This was cited by the majority of the respondents as the most important accomplishment.

However, many respondents felt that the training could have been improved if the trainers had been more knowledgeable of the existing situation. They also wanted more materials, and follow-up for reinforcement. One person felt the course only produced temporary and superficial understanding of the materials.

Interviews conducted by the evaluation team elicited responses indicating satisfaction with the courses but an inability to name subject matters they utilized in their jobs as the result of the courses.

While the subjects offered were applicable to office and management skills, there was never a needs assessment done as to exactly what were the most pressing needs of the organization. While it is reasonable to assume filing skills are always necessary, many refugee camp offices do not have any means to keep files. A needs survey could have produced a better targeted core curriculum.

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Along with the lack of a needs survey was lack of any follow-up instruction. There was no provision made by EIL or the other parties to the agreement for a second round of reinforcement instruction. Many of the concepts being taught were new to the trainees and reinforcement would be necessary for full comprehension.

The most important project output was the schooling of 6 national trainers. One trainer was a woman. They served as facilitators and teachers in virtually all of the programs EIL was to offer during the following three years of the agreement.

EIL planned and conducted 4 workshops on topics important to the organizations working in refugee relief. The topics were chosen after consultation with others and were well distributed among practical issues, exchange of ideas on important policy issues, and sharing of research.

The office skills training course for NRC secretarial staff was partially successful in producing some competent secretaries. The other secretaries dropped out.

Management training for NRC agencies

The continuation of the program, targeting four agencies, does not appear to have been nearly as effective as the initial contract period. While EIL had done a pre-agreement needs assessment of the four agencies, its project design included further needs assessment. The upper level management did not appear to be interested in taking part. There were also inevitable problems of too many demands on agencies barely able to keep up with their workload. The RHU had difficulties in participating in the needs assessment or some training projects due to a cholera outbreak in the Northwest Region.

There apparently was a problem of trying to fit EIL's offerings, instruction in management and human development skills into the needs of the four agencies. EIL offered instruction in Western management, planning and office skills. The impediments of low pay for government employees and resulting disincentives are accepted wisdom. Other factors making Western management skills and techniques less applicable to Somalia, are the strong oral preference of most of the people, and the mores of a recent nomadic inheritance. This would suggest that other techniques may be better suited to Somalia. While inventing such systems was clearly beyond EIL's mandate, there appears to have been no personnel involved with backgrounds in non-Western management systems in the design of EIL's program. A design consultant with knowledge of systems and skills used in other African or Arabic countries might have produced a better targeted program.

A manual titled "Management in Action" produced in both English and Somali offered a range of seminar/lesson plans in human development, management, office skills, and community development skills. While the manual was designed to provide all that a skilled trainer should need to offer a seminar on the topic, it fails to take advantage of the Somali oral tradition by suggesting alliterate memory aids. A three day orientation workshop on using the training manual given to selected employees of CDU, FLP, and IITT seemed to be a very short training session considering the EIL trainers were similarly trained over a two year period. However, the manual was well received in that 25 were sold to PVOs and individuals. An obvious need was being met.

ESL component

As noted by the EIL internal evaluation, the ESL project was treated as a sideline. One person was left in Mogadishu to work on the project. The demand on her time placed by administrative matters, along with burdens, imposed by the NRC decision to not allow EIL to continue to use a word processor bought with project funds were major obstacles. This person's reluctance to admit that the goals, in face of the abstracts, were not attainable led to misunderstandings at the end of the sub-project as to the amount of work finished.

The EIL project was conceived with the purpose of assisting GSDR in planning, evaluating and writing proposals for refugee self-reliance projects. Donor support for all programs decreased. This was seen as a serious impediment to the EIL program. While new programs would have required increased GSDR capacity to plan and implement, retrenchment put as many pressures on the government. More effective management techniques and skills were and are needed. EIL impact should be measured against the training in basic planning and management skills they offered. It appears that they did not have the in country experts to train top level GSDR staff. This would explain some of the resistance to their program.

The sub-project had a number of strong points. It was a good first step in introducing administrative management and clerical skills to the NRC and other GSDR staff in different offices. Non-traditional teaching methods were used with success, paving the way for acceptance and the technique's further development in Somalia.

2. Partnership for Productivity (PFP)

a. Description

PfP is a PVO concentrating on the development of small business enterprises. PFP was not working in Somalia but USAID requested that a proposal for funding under RSR be submitted.

On January 23, 1985 a Cooperative Agreement was signed for activities to extend through September 15, 1986 (19 months). The contract activities were all to occur in the Northwest and around Hargeisa. The agreed compensation was US\$ 725,000 from USAID and US\$ 301,000 in Somali shillings from the GSDR (in AID generated local currency) for the original contract. GSDR contributed US\$ 59,000 in Somali shillings to extend the sub-project through February 28, 1987.

The specific objectives of the sub-project were:

1. Develop vocational training programs to provide new and up-graded marketable skills to refugee entrepreneurs in areas of production, processing, service and retail enterprises;
2. Develop management training programs for refugee entrepreneurs to provide basic business training in areas including, but not limited to, cash flow management, inventory control, cost accounting, marketing, and bookkeeping;
3. Through a main office and two satellite offices, conduct business clinics for small groups or individual business persons to address constraints of supply, distribution, marketing, commercial transport and other problems common to the group;
4. Benefit 500 refugee entrepreneurs through vocational and management training workshops, advisory services and business clinics;
5. Provide technical advisory services to relieve crucial bottlenecks and facilitate access to supplies, markets, and transportation as identified in business clinics;
6. Develop the capacity of local staff to conduct enterprise development programs independently through an in-house staff development training program in topics such as: program administration, basic business skills, and business assistance methodologies;
7. Establish an on-going internal monitoring system to document and evaluate methodologies throughout the life of the project;
8. Collaborate with other research activities in the Northwest to collect and analyze socio-economic data relevant to enterprise development projects.

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b. Implementation

Obstacles to implementation were encountered immediately after the signing of the Cooperative Agreement. A cholera epidemic broke out in the Northwest refugee camps. This delayed implementation for a month. A second obstacle was the delayed approval of the Ministry of Labor to PFP's hiring of local Somali staff. This delayed implementation for two months.

The sub-project was implemented in 4 program areas.

1. Skills Training Program

PfP sponsored and supervised skills training and upgrading programs generally conducted by local businessmen in their own establishments, PfP technical and management assistance provided as needed in this "apprenticeship" model of business skills training.

182 persons (113 and 29 male and female refugees respectively, 40 non-refugees) were given training in 17 different skills. The skills ranged from tailoring to advanced construction and agriculture. Identification of the skills taught was done by analysis by the PfP staff of the region's needs, requests from applicant trainees, and availability of trainers. Also considered was the capital investment both in terms of length of training and tools needed to enter the trade. All the trainers but one were local businessmen who agreed to teach the skills in their own business or shop. One shoemaker was brought from Mogadishu to teach the making of new styles of foot ware. Instruction was imparted on a master/apprentice model. This also allowed for the imparting of business management skills through observation and case study. Trainers were selected from applicants who first indicated the skill they wished to learn. They were then interviewed and tested for aptitude by the contracted businessman/trainer.

In keeping with PfP's philosophy of avoiding handouts, trainees were given a subsistence allowance of So.Sh. 100 a day. The allowance was given to the trainer for distribution. The trainers were often required to live in Hargesia, as opposed to the refugee camps.

A follow up study conducted by the PfP project manager and a consultant found that of 19 skills training graduates interviewed soon after the training, nine had used the training to enter a new profession. Six had received training upgrading in their existing job skills and the remaining four were unemployed. The same study suggests that the trainees have increased their income as a result of the training.

Other benefits of the apprenticeship program were that the trainer and trainee maintained contact after the training. In many instances, the trainees were employed by trainers or borrowed tools to conduct their own business. This is significant in that it suggests that the method reduces conflict between local businessmen and refugees seeking to enter the marketplace.

2. Vocational Training Program

Formal skills training courses sponsored and supervised by PFP were held at Ministry of Education facilities with curricula collaboratively developed by regional MOE and PFP staff.

71 trainees participated in 4 courses; carpentry and joining, specialized carpentry joining, masonry/building, construction, and baking/confectionery. 85% of the participants were refugees, half of them urban dwellers.

Training materials for the carpentry and masonry courses were written jointly by PFP and the MOE. PFP designed a short, 6-week course in specialized carpentry and joining to teach the making of a few simple consumer goods. The course was found to be too short to impart the necessary skills.

All but 2 of the 7 carpentry trainees were unemployed prior to training while a post instruction survey found that, of those interviewed, all were employed using the skills training.

3. Business Management Training

Formal classroom courses were designed, providing a general introduction to business administration and instruction in basic accounting/bookkeeping practices for entrepreneurs. These courses, generally lasting 10 days, were conducted by PFP's own local staff.

Eight courses were taught between November 1985 and December 1986. The courses brought together groups of 10-20 businessmen for 2-3 hours of instruction for 10 days. A manual written in Somali, was given to each participant. This book was later used for bookkeeping instruction by the MOE. 39 of the 101 trainees were refugees. They were taught by the PFP staff. The courses were well received. A PFP survey of three trainees indicated that the participants acquired the skills taught, i.e. use of cash book, creditors and debtors book.

4. Business Advisory Service

Extension services were provided by PFP's local staff -- business advisors -- offering business management counseling to existing businesses and self-employed graduate trainees without accompanying financial assistance. From PFP sub-offices and a main office, PFP business advisors regularly visited entrepreneurs at their place of business to assist them in remedying management and technical problems specific to their enterprises. Two of the sub-offices were in refugee camps, Agabar and Saba'ad.

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PfP placed the greatest emphasis on this component. Twelve nationals, including three women, were employed and trained for eight weeks. The business advisors were selected on the basis of prior business experience and self-initiative. All had considerable academic achievements, some at the university level. The instruction emphasized bookkeeping, accounting, financial analysis of business assets and liabilities, profits and losses. Training in marketing their services was also given. They were made aware of the economic context in which they worked by acting as information takers for a business survey of two target refugee camps.

Between September 1985 and October 1986, the service advised 380 individuals, (51% male and 19% female refugees and 30% non-refugees). PfP attempted to concentrate on production as opposed to trade: 39% of all and 50% of the refugee clients were in productive enterprises.

The business advisors varied the levels of their assistance to the scale of the business activity. The project attempted to target the small enterprises. A majority of the clients had been in the type of enterprise less than 5 years; and 40% of the beneficiaries were under 30 years of age. 83% of the clients said they were the owners of the business. Interviews of business persons assisted and 5 of the business advisors taken by the PfP project manager indicated that the program had a substantial impact upon recipients.

Record keeping

PfP was the only PVO under RSR Project Cooperative Agreement to keep and maintain baseline data. PfP also paid careful attention to keeping records throughout the life of its sub-project, recording its progress and impact.

Record keeping was considered an important skill for infrastructure strengthening. These small details highlighted the apparent dedication and professionalism of the PfP staff.

c. Assessment

The overall success of the sub-project seems to have been achieved by PfP's practice of adapting their program to the reality of the local economy. They assisted ongoing businesses by introducing and teaching vital skills to upgrade the business. They trained people to assume jobs that may not be vacant but do exist and will not readily disappear. Those jobs contributed to the local economy and did not overly depend on external factors or markets. The PfP program built on the existing economic system in an attempt to produce growth from within.

PfP complied with its quantitative goals of training 481 refugee entrepreneurs against a goal of 500. An additional 253 local entrepreneurs were trained. This was done within the original contract period. Additional work was done in the area of agriculture and assistance to the Ministry of Education.

This evaluator spoke with two former trainees, one was still employed as a sign painter, the second as a cook and driver. They both felt the training had imparted important skills. The two recipients of the business advisory services reported satisfaction with the service, saying they felt it gave them an advantage over other businesses.

Those young trainees being in an apprentice setting had the opportunity to observe and learn some of the business skills necessary for a successful enterprise.

PfP appears to have had an impact on the business community through the offering of advice. The one business advisor still living in Hargesia stated to this evaluator that former PfP clients still come to him for advice. PfP's internal evaluation claims that the business persons on occasion sought to join the program. The fact that without offering credit or any material assistance, businessmen continued to participate in the program over a period of time is significant. This is probably based upon PfP's services which teach entrepreneurs the management skills necessary to increase chances of business success: delivering costs/profits, cash flow, merchandising and simple bookkeeping. PfP's sensibility to the local business environment is shown by the surveys and assessments they conducted prior to offering consulting services. PfP had an added success in that it broke new ground in employing three women as business advisors to the Somali business community.

The local businessmen employed as trainers were accepting of the program. Many viewed it as good for their business, the general community, and contributing to their own stature. Interviews with participants revealed that the interacting of some young refugees with non-refugees reduced tensions between the groups.

The internal evaluation also supports a conclusion that the skills training led to increased earnings by the trainees. There are recorded comments by business persons that their businesses were prospering.

In the short term, the skills training appears to have had an impact, providing valuable technical skills to young people. Most of them seemed to have been employed in trade soon after completion of the courses, providing income and contributing to the community.

Based upon interviews of program participants conducted by the evaluation team and the PfP's internal evaluation, the project seems to have had a lasting impact. It certainly proved that all Somalis are anxious to acquire skills and business training. This is so with little or no immediate incentive being offered. Moreover, PfP has created a model for future skills training.

On a quantitative and qualitative basis the project is successful. Equally important, it is hoped that it has shown that the refugees are anxious for vocational training, that business persons need and want advice. The process of showing that advisory services are beneficial has begun. Most importantly, a model for future programs has been demonstrated.

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3. New TransCentury Foundation (NTF)

a. Description

A Cooperative Agreement was signed on September 27, 1984, for a contract term of 18 months. Four cost extensions increased the time period to May 15, 1987, (31.5 months). The funds for the entire period of NTF activity was \$2,080,260 from USAID and So. Shs. 129,934,198 from the GSDR. The GSDR contribution includes value of in-kind materials, i.e. land.

The sub-project purpose was:

"...to increase the capacity of the refugee to become more self-reliant through labor intensive employment opportunities, expanded agriculture production and skills training in infrastructure maintenance and construction".

The specific objectives of the sub-project were to improve self-reliance condition in the Northwest and Awdal Region by producing the following outputs:

1. Provide three hundred fifty nine thousand (359,000) person days of refugee employment in road maintenance, irrigation reconstruction and dam reparation, generating So.Sh. 57,860,000 income;
2. Benefit up to 1,710 refugee family members farming 285 hectares of previously uncultivated land adjacent to Tug Wajale, Dare Ma'an, Ari Addeys and Darbi Hore refugee camps (beneficiary estimate based upon six persons per refugee family);
3. Through its subcontract with BCI Geonetics Corporation, complete a feasibility study to identify sustainable sources of quality water drilling for up to 12 exploratory drilling and perform tests;
4. Improve and maintain 240 kilometers of earthen road between Boroma and Darbi Hore Camp and other roads as identified;
5. Generate agreement and commitment with the appropriate government ministries for continued maintenance of improved roads and irrigation systems;
6. Conduct an environmental assessment to address potential environmental degradation caused by infrastructure and agriculture development activities;
7. Conduct a social soundness analysis to determine methods of community participation, identify beneficiaries and insure benefits are accrued to project participants.
8. Design a rock filled gabion causeway in the Hariod River of approximately 1 km. length. Implement the construction labor intensively;

9. Design and construct labor intensively approximately 6,800 meters of new storm drains, provide cleaning and improvement of 810 meters of existing drains, provide gabion protection for 1,800 meters of large eroded gullies and repair a spillway, and large culvert in the City of Hargeisa;
10. Design and implement 12 km of road rehabilitation between the villages of Kalaboyed and Dila using heavy machinery crews, to provide for the emergency movement of refugees and food supplies...;
11. Design and construct a new 16 to 20 km earthen road link between Baki,... and Boroma using an appropriate combination of machinery and labor intensive methods....

b. Implementation

Road maintenance

NTF performed road upgrading and maintenance using refugee and local laborers. The 50 person crews were supervised by a Community Development Unit (CDU) site supervisor. The laborers were paid So.Sh. 100 per day and 75 in food allowance. In March 1986, the pay was increased to So.Sh 120. Because the work was usually far from the laborers' homes, camps for crews of 50 were established. These camps included tents, camels, and health technicians. The camps were moved by camels, which also carried water, firewood and food.

For the most part, the rehabilitation of the roads consisted of leveling, filling and compacting the road bed, and digging drainage ditches. The roads were not surfaced. The necessary technical planning was done by expatriate engineers.

The roads worked on	distance	number of workers
Dharbi Hore - Hariod	21 km	50
Boroma to Dharbi Hore	81 km	250
Daryma'ane Road	5.5 km	50
Gannet Road	1.2 km	40 including 8 women
Bihin Dule	10 km	100
Biyole	4 km	100
Baki to Gebile	17 km	200
Boroma to Baki	9.8 km	equipment intensive
Tug Wajale	17.2 km	50

Agriculture

NTF had Tuskegee Institute do a study of agricultural activities in the Northwest region and make recommendations. Tuskegee also worked with the RAU farm managers on the study and gave them instruction in basic agricultural practices. In all of the projects, TransCentury worked under agreements with RAU wherein RAU provided the services of its farm manager and plowing services, while NTF provided seeds and other inputs including tools, irrigation pumps and, in a few cases pesticides. TransCentury and RAU decided to start the new cultivation at Tug Wajale: 205 has. of rainfed land was prepared for growing sorghum.

Plowing was done for two Gu seasons. Yields were reported to be high (average 700-800 kg/ha). Of equal importance, farmers were reported to be planning to raise money for additional plowing.

TransCentury assisted with 130 additional hectares of land at 8 other refugee camps. Similar agreements to that at Tug Wajale were made with RAU for each camp. In some cases, courses on agricultural practices were presented as a pre-condition of refugees receiving the right to use land.

The cultivation of vegetables was encouraged by NTF by the distribution of seed. Some of the sites reported harvest and sale of So.sh 62,500 tomatoes from part of a 6 hectares site; So.sh 93,250 of watermelon, tomatoes, radishes, beet and onions from 3.8 hectares plots.

The sites sizes, and beneficiaries are listed below:

Beneficiary Families

Location	Hectares	Refugee	Indigenous
Daryma'an	11.2	15	3
Dharbi Hore	36	40	0
Adhi Addeys	6	12	0
Halaye ("A")	4	4	1
Saba'ad	3.8	38	0
Agabar	29	42	0
Geed Habeeya	20	10	2
Tugwajalle	205	150	0
Halaye ("B")	20	7	1
Total:	335 ha	318	7

NTF stated that 335 ha were assisted in cultivation exceeding their Cooperative Agreement target by 50 hectares.

Water Supply and Irrigation Facilities

Work in conjunction with the Refugee Water Supply Unit (RWSU) was as follows:

- a) Saba'ad. Constructed a subsurface dam. Purpose was to recharge several existing wells.
- b) Boroma. NTF first assisted with the construction of a water in take structure. Flooding later damaged an adjacent gabion dam, which NTF assisted in rebuilding to specification higher than the original. 548 person days of employment were generated by this activity.

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c) Bashi Hore. A 70 meter long masonry diversion structure and canal were rehabilitated. Work was never completed due to flood damage.

d) Halaya Balli. Expansion of a farm reservoir near a refugee agricultural project. The labor intensive methods used resulted in 180 person days of employment.

e) Saba'ad Wells & Reservoir. Work was on an existing well, pipe system, and reservoir. Later, repairs were made to the systems pump.

f) Arabsiyo. Two shallow wells, 9-10 meters deep were hand excavated and lined. Reservoirs were also built.

g) Reservoir at Qoljeet. 600 cubic meters of silt were removed by front end loaders.

h) Agabar. Eight wells were hand dug producing 165 person/days of employment. The wells are used for irrigation.

i) Gabion Fabrication. Gabions, used in road and water resource construction, are expensive and supplies are limited. TransCentury, imported the wire, and adopted a procedure invented in Haiti to manufacture its own. In the process, it interested two Somali firms in constructing them. One of these firms produced 3,000 meters of gabion. Introduction of this technology may create a new industry.

Hargeisa Drainage

Pursuant to an agreement to provide engineering and supervision to the City of Hargeisa, TransCentury assisted with the following.

- Construction of several new large drainage ditches. Clearing and repairing of existing ditches. Work was done on 1,800 meters of the eroded gullies, 6,800 meters of new storms drains constructed and 810 meters of existing drains cleaned and improved. These drainage ditches within the City were filled with silt and debris impeding water runoff. Water pipes and telephone cables which contributed to the siltation were removed.
- Major repairs to the support of a small bridge.
- Fabrication and placement of concrete slabs for Vehicles or pedestrian traffic over culverts .
- Lining of 1.8 km of a large gully leading to the Hargeisa Tug was subcontracted out to a local firm.

Well Drilling

Pursuant to the Cooperative Agreement, NTF was to explore, select sites and drill 12 test wells. The selection of sites was done by a method of mapping and assessing the potential of fractured bedrock aquifers.

The drills used were leased from Water Development Agency (WDA) and manned by WDA personnel. TransCentury provided a 50 person crew for support activities as part of its agreement with WDA, and provided materials and spare parts. Drillings were made at the following sites.

Boroma: Three wells were drilled; all produced water of acceptable quality. One well had an estimated return water volume in excess of 300 gallon per minute.

Baki: Five test holes were drilled; one produced potable water, two warm brackish water, 2 were dry.

The Cooperative Agreement called only for drilling of test wells, therefore no active producing wells were established. Not only would additional funds be needed to exploit the wells, but clarification of rights to the water would have to be resolved. MOA with the World Bank's assistance is planning to exploit these wells.

c. Assessment

NTF operated over a very large area, some sites being 217 km from their base in Hargeisa. They appear to have efficiently managed this far flung labor-intensive operation with a predominately national staff. The technical and managerial backup was provided by three expatriates. The Northwest, being under a constant night time curfew and the army forming a second bureaucracy from which travel permits and other authorizations had to be obtained, was especially problematic to work in.

Obtaining Somali Shillings for the Ministry of Finance was a continuous problem. The large labor component of the project made local currency funding particularly important. Delays in approval and release of the currency caused two complete close down of the sub-project. The first close down was for three months, the second for four months. NTF has stated that the second, close down was especially damaging in that it caused work on two sites to be compressed to a short timeframe.

Agriculture

NTF had considerable success with its dryland and irrigated farming projects by ensuring that mechanical plowing was completed prior to the rains allowing timely planting. Other steps taken to optimize harvests were provision of hybrid seeds and tools. Also provided were services of RAU extension agents to advise the farmers. The targeted sites reportedly had good harvests due to good rains and appropriate technical advise.

At Tug Wajale, 150 families many with no former farming experience were given land. These people successfully cultivated average or better yields of soughum for two seasons. Thus, they have acquired a skill which, given adequate land, would allow them to be self-sufficient. The Tug Wajale RAU Farm Manager confirmed the farmers satisfaction with the increased harvests. However, the positive experience did not cause them to pay for second plowings; they are still waiting for UNHCR to pay for them.

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The farming component was successful in two respects. 318 refugees from 7 Northwest camps were given the opportunity to farm. Second, the refugees were shown that timely plowing, planting, improved seeds, adequate tools coupled with adequate rains will result in substantial harvests.

Water Drilling

This evaluation has not looked at the water drilling portion of the project, because it was beyond the expertise of the members of the team. NTF was required only to explore for water and do test drillings. This they did. Some GSDR officials have expressed dissatisfaction in that operating wells were not established.

Labor Intensive Road Construction

159.5 km of roads were constructed or renovated under this project as against the project target of 240 km. The roads were very beneficial to all of the inhabitants of the Northwest. They were highly praised upon their completion for facilitating easier transportation of passengers and commodities.

ELU/CARE food monitors related that the roads made the transportation of rations much easier and more efficient, cutting transportation time to one refugee camp in half. However, they noted that the roads deteriorated in about nine months or at the arrival of the first rains. The roads then reverted to close to their original condition. This has caused intense criticism of NTF. Regular and periodic maintenance work on any road particularly earthen roads is always needed. To provide for this the GSDR agreed to maintain the roads after the completion of the project. This has not been done. Blame should not be assigned to NTF.

NTF provided 197,441 person/hours work to both refugees and non-refugees (this figure only covers through the first contract extension, more complete figures were not available). NTF was in effect for a period of time the public works department in the Northwest. At various times it held up its work plans to await word on whether other roads would have to be repaired to facilitate transfer of refugees from one camp to another. It completed substantial amounts of needed work. More importantly, it provided a substantial number of jobs. It is probable that, after the Government, NTF was the largest employer in the area. The results of its activities are both in the roads repaired and the impact on those refugees and local Somalis who were given work.

Best Available Document

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NTF and work gang supervisors interviewed all expressed satisfaction with the quality of work produced and the work habits of the laborers. While no laborers were spoken with it can be assumed from the reported large number of applicants and the low turn over rate that they were agreeable to doing the work. A work gang supervisor related that work was satisfying for the refugees as opposed to the boredom of the camps.

Ideally, all of the refugees would have taken the average So.Sh. 3,600 per month and invested it in capital goods promoting their self-sufficiency. NTF and the interviewed work gang supervisor claimed that this occurred. The supervisor knew of laborers buying donkey carts, goats, starting bakeries, and forming a meat buying cooperative. Others have interviewed refugees who claim they spent any earned money for food for their families.

The extra income enters the refugee camp economy and contributes to increased business by the stores, shoemakers, furniture makers, and blacksmiths within the camps. The money undoubtedly has had a positive impact on the refugees and, hopefully, the refugee camp economy.

The road building component has certainly shown that the refugees as a group are ready and willing to do labor to contribute to their own support.

While the road work and drainage system renovation were originally praised by local officials, the use of labor intensive methods was not. They generally agreed that providing productive work to the refugees was good and the results positive. However, they said they would not recommend that the GSDR use the method because the citizens are opposed to using labor intensive methods. The method is perceived as too expensive. Employing the large number of people is thought to be expensive. Operation of heavy machinery is perceived as less costly. Moreover, heavy equipment is a modern way of doing the work. The equipment is in Somalia so it is the proper way to do road construction. The government officials dismissed notions that manual labor of this type was looked down upon, or that it was seen as a remnant of colonialism.

Consequently, while by some objective standards NTF has proven that intensive labor methods of road rehabilitation are viable, the GSDR does not seem likely to make use of the method

Drainage System

The officials spoken with were satisfied with the work done on the drainage system with one notable reservation. An inspection of the work showed it to be high quality work and attractive in appearance. It was reported to adequately handle the rains.

The design work done by NTF was for a system serving most of the city area north of the Tug. This was an efficient use of engineering resources. Unfortunately funds were available to only renovate and expand 1/3 of the designed system. NTF worked on the portion of the system selected by city officials. Nevertheless, there seems to be a belief that NTF was obligated to complete all of the designed system.

During the last months of the project, NTF's work plan called for it to stabilize a large ditch running next to the city stadium. In places, the ditch is 20 meters deep and 50 meters across. The design called for placement of walls made of gabions. Work was delayed for 4 months awaiting release of So.Sh. funds by the Ministry of Finance. When the funds were released, weeks were left until the end of the project. NTF supervised the work of the local sub-contractors. All of the necessary work was completed under NTF supervision. NTF has stated that while the work did not meet all its criteria, it was acceptable.

Since then, the work has deteriorated, with parts of the walls collapsing and some of the gabions moving. The exact cause of the failure is beyond the scope of the work of this evaluation. Areas of inquiry may be as follows. Design was by the same NTF engineer who did the other completed portions of the drainage system. Based upon his years of experience, obvious competence in other design work, it is unlikely the design was defective. Likewise, the work was performed and inspected by the parties who did the same on the other completed portion of the drainage system. The remaining possibilities are that the 2% chance of a rain that would top the walls did occur, or more likely there have been changes, new roads, diversions dug, up hill from the ditch increasing the run off. Without further investigation, it is an example of what may occur when work is rushed.

Other Activities

NTF accomplished a number of other tasks including assisting other PVOs; funded with lining wells, and upgrading water systems all contributing to the end results of other projects.

Personnel from the Ministry of Public Works were seconded to NTF. Pursuant to agreements between NTF and CDU, NRC worked with NTF. Those people who were spoken with reported that the experience was very beneficial in that they were able to improve their engineering, construction, and supervision skills. The number of people involved were one engineer with M.P.W. and about 8 people with CDU.

The Director of the Northwest Region, Ministry of Public Works, reported that the skills of the machine operators who worked with NTF had improved considerably, due to their training. The project must be termed successful for meeting all the planned goals.

4. Save the Children Foundation (SCF)

a. Description

A cooperative agreement was signed on July 1, 1983 for a three year period of activities. SCF had performed considerable relief and development work in the project area, Qurioley, prior to this Project. At the time of verbal project approval by USAID, an SCF proposal for the construction of an irrigation canal in the project area, was awaiting project approval by UNHCR. The proposal was ultimately approved by UNHCR shortly before the cooperative agreement with USAID and GSDR.

The money committed under the RSR Project was:

	USAID	GSDR	SCF	TOTAL
Committed 1983	\$473,000	\$505,000	\$79,000	1,057,000

The overall plan was that UNHCR would provide funds for the hard costs of the construction of the irrigation canal, (U.S. \$795,000). While the cooperative agreement funds would be used for the salaries of engineers and agronomists essential to the project and other costs required for the development activities.

The purpose of the sub-project was:

"To provide individual farmers access to improved land, tools, equipment, extension services and market outlets that are needed for increased agriculture and related self-reliance augmenting productivity".

The projected outputs were:

- 1) Project irrigation system designed, tested and operating;
- 2) Irrigation canal between Shabelle river and project site completed;
- 3) 320 hectares of land prepared for irrigated farming and 1,600 refugee families each farming 0.2 hectares of improved irrigated land;
- 4) 900 hectares of dryland prepared for cultivation and 900 refugee families each farming 1 hectare of rainfed land;
- 5) 400 non-refugee families benefiting from project placed irrigation system;
- 6) 75 refugee family heads employed in beekeeping;
- 7) Up to 3,500 refugee and non-refugee farmers acquire improved farming methods through demonstration and training.

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The cooperative agreement also contained a time schedule with projected completion of the main canal by December 1983, and all preparation work on the irrigated farm completed by June 1985. The rainfed farm land was on a much shorter schedule.

b. Implementation

The 900 hectares of rainfed farmland have been distributed and cleared in 1 ha plots by the refugees. A viewing of a small portion of the farmland in January 1988, revealed that the land is cleared, divided into plots and being extensively farmed. Most of the clearing was done by hand by the refugees who would farm the plots.

The irrigation system as finally designed includes a 5.2 km main canal, a main drain, two reservoirs, and 4 pumping stations. Water is pumped once from the reservoirs to the 12 watercourses which in turn feed 77 tertiary canals. All the water courses, drains and reservoirs are earthen. The concrete structures are limited to the head regulator, diversion boxes and turnouts. The construction of the waterways was done with both heavy equipment and labor intensive methods employing refugees. The infield structures, division boxes and farm turnouts were built by local artisans using forms provided by SCF. This will allow for local repair and replacement. The main canal was completed in Oct 1983, the pumps were delivered and installed in September 1985. The irrigation system has been completed though it can only irrigate 80% of the entire design area because of lack of essential land leveling. Testing of the watercourses of the system occurred in the 1986 Der season. The test was reported as a success.

Land has been assigned to 3,200 refugees (as against the target of 1,600) who have cultivated it. The reports are unclear as to how many farmers were ever provided with irrigation. Presently much of the land is not farmed because of uncertainty caused by an announced land reassignment.

Extension services have been provided along with the provision of seeds, tools, and some fertilizer. Extension services were provided by fourteen refugees trained as extension agents, and RAU staff who visited individual farmers, and through demonstration farm plots which were visited by farmers.

The beekeeping activities were successfully implemented reaching 132 refugee families as against the target of 75 refugee families.

Using its own funds and a U.S. matching grant SCF, conducted community development activities and also implemented an oxen plowing project, ran motor repair shops, encouraged farming by various groups and built a community center.

SCF is still active in Qurioley and working to ensure that the irrigation canal will be operational. Siltation of the canal and some of the water courses will probably now prevent the realization of the full use of the canal. This problem was anticipated because the beneficiary farmers are not willing to clean and maintain the canal.

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SCF worked with non-refugees. They received some of the rainfed land, and also extension services. Local farmers are now benefiting from the main canal. Women were included in all the activities. Most significant was that the camp elders decided to give priority to widows and female family heads in distribution of the irrigated land.

In May 1985, SCF requested additional funding from USAID to complete the project. The request was denied, on the basis that the proposed extension was not viable because UNHCR would not provide additional funds to allow completion of the canal works and land leveling. Moreover, irrigation of two-thirds of the proposed target was possible. The original SCF proposal called for leveling by the individual farmers. It is now recognized that mechanical leveling is necessary. This may have been foreseen if SCF had placed an experienced irrigation engineer on the project either in the design phase or at project start-up.

c. Assessment

Management problems together with funding problems resulted in SCF not achieving the project goals of construction of an irrigation system and training of refugees in irrigated agriculture.

Because SCF did not complete the canal in a timely manner, and it is unclear how many refugees received irrigation. At the sub-project's end, there was no operating system with refugees trained in its management or improved agricultural practices. While refugees had limited use of the land and hence exposure to extension services it seems unlikely that they could acquire skills within the abbreviated time periods.

Implementation was hampered by a number of serious problems. The management problems consisted of lack of continuity of top level management. During the LOP there were three country directors and one acting director. This lack of continuous upper level management contributed to a lack of direction, and exacerbated funding problems which adversely affected the project. From the beginning, SCF failed to appreciate the technical needs of the project, and failed to adequately evaluate, manage and monitor its activities.

Within six months of the project start it became apparent that the design and engineering performed by a local firm were seriously defective. While SCF was reimbursed for the salary of an irrigation engineer, that person's input was insufficient to discover the mistakes in the original design or prevent other lapses in the construction. Apparently, SCF never had the design work reviewed by independent or knowledgeable in house staff before work began.

SCF's failure to properly staff the project seriously hampered its completion. A year after project implementation the project manager position was being filled by the agricultural project co-ordinator who had just recently begun work. More importantly, the irrigation engineer position was vacant for 14 months until it was filled by a civil engineer without experience in third world irrigation projects.

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As a result of not having knowledgeable staff to review the original engineering work, underestimation of the cost of the excavation work was not discovered until after the funding from UNHCR was agreed upon. This resulted in under funding for the canal work. Recruiting staff to work in Somalia is a problem, but that should be a consideration when making the project proposal and budgeting for staff.

The situation was aggravated by the piecemeal yearly release of UNHCR funds. Thus, at one point a civil engineer was on site when there were no funds for construction. Further aggravating the situation, was that the yearly release of the funds usually took place late, just as the Gu rains began, further delaying construction.

USAID responded to these problems by bringing in a REDSO engineer to help with a short evaluation of the work. USAID also insisted upon SCF writing a new timetable to show the steps it was taking to move towards project completion.

SCF did obtain the service of an engineering consulting firm in February 1984 to evaluate the project design. That firm made numerous recommendations, including a redesign of the head regulator and planning for adequate land leveling.

The MOA requested meetings with SCF in July 1984. These meetings apparently resulted in SCF retaining another engineering firm to do a third redesign of the head regulator.

SCF's supervision of the construction improved in late 1984 and for the rest of the construction period. Close inspection of the work on the head regulator was carried out, resulting in ~~work~~ of acceptable quality.

SCF's actions suggest that it did not have the organizational experience to implement an irrigation canal construction project. USAID should have looked closer at SCF's prior corporate experience. A researcher who worked on SETS component of the RSR project for two months stated that this project was beyond SCF's previous worldwide experience.

The cooperative agreement called for 0.2 ha plots of irrigated land to be distributed. The UNHCR agreement called for 1 ha plots. The elders of three of the four Qurioley refugee camps determined that distribution of 0.1 ha plot would benefit more people. The fact that the refugees felt they had the right to determine the distribution of the benefits is commendable. Distribution of irrigated land to 3,200 families occurred in 1983. In August 1984 the GSDR stated its position that the irrigated land had to be allocated in 1 ha plots to enable self-sufficiency. This led to much debate between the parties to the cooperative agreement. SCF has declared that the decision prevented it from meeting project goals. The confusion and uncertainty among the 3,200 refugees assigned land has reduced their participation in the extension activities.

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Extension activities consisted among other things, distribution of tools, improved seeds, and the planting of demonstration farm plots. SCF did provide training in farming on the 900 ha dryland farming site. Limited training was given on irrigated land, but no training was given in operating a complex and expensive irrigation scheme. These activities were reported to have all been successful. However, at this time, there is no empirical data to show adoption of new methods, or improved crop production by the refugee farmers. The sub-project design does not call for collection of such data. The sub-project logical frame work simply lists as means of purpose verification land use records and site visits. SCF reports speak of the visibility of the demonstration plots and the introduction of improved practices but there are no production records, or accounts of observations of farmers using the introduced methods. Therefore it is not possible to comment on the extension services resulting in the adoption of improved farming methods.

Fourteen extension agents received on the job training and some formal education. SCF also provided a short three week intense program to a number of graduates from the Afgoi agricultural secondary school. SCF's activities in this area were extensive and continually ongoing.

A product of the program has probably been increased refugee income from the sale of excess food, grown or rations. A dryland farmer interviewed by the evaluator said that after the 1987 Gu he sold 11 quintals of maize and stored five. This theoretically should result in providing the refugees and local merchants with additional income. A second by product may be making the refugees more likely to accept sedentary agriculture as a sole means of livelihood. Observers note that there is considerable more farming occurring Qurioley during the past three years. While it may be caused by many factors, it is possible that the SCF project contributed.

The project has been successful in making it possible for 4,100 refugee families to farm for varying periods of time. A small number of these acquired some experience in farming on irrigated land. Approximately 132 families were introduced to beekeeping. It is not possible to say that the extension services had any impact. A number of extension agents were trained. Unfortunately, the most visible result is the problems inherent in building and operating an irrigation system.

Component IV

D. Project Monitoring and Management Assistance

1. Description

Monitoring of the RSR and CDA Forestry field activities were to be undertaken by three expatriate RPA and one Somali RPA. Supervision of the RPAs was by the USAID Refugee Affairs Office and its successor RD/RA. The PU was to assist with the administration and management of the components and sub-projects.

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The scope of work of the RPA's were:

- a) Comprehensive monitoring of the refugee situation in the regions and the refugee camps - including population status, commodity management, GSDR administration and management, UNHCR activities and PVO projects.
- b) Monitoring of UNHCR projects, in particular the health, transport and logistics, water supply, agriculture/forestry sectors and the United Nations Volunteer program.
- c) Monitoring the performance and assisting U.S. funded activities, including efforts in project design, management, evaluation of impact, effectiveness and identification of problems.
- d) Periodic reporting describing progress towards objectives, problems, issues and remedial action taken or recommended.

The rationale behind the creation of RPAs doing primarily field monitoring was to provide an additional source of information to the NRC and USAID to monitor the projects, but equally important to use in evaluating and planning of future projects.

The evaluator team has not undertaken an evaluation of the RPAs activities and the initial management plans. The mid term evaluation praised the RPAs efforts and their flexibility in assuming office administration activities when needed, p. 23-24. Because USAID staffing was unable to keep up with administrative matters, the RPAs reduced their field monitoring and took up administrative duties. During mid 1985, USAID restructured the monitoring and management of both the CDA Forestry and Refugee Self-Reliance Project. A Project Management Coordinator (PMC) and Project Operations Specialist (POS) were added to RD/RA to monitor and manage the two Projects.

2. Assessment

The PPs underestimated the management needs of both the Refugee Self-Reliance and CDA Forestry Projects. This is the conclusion of the mid term evaluation and this evaluation. The reorganization of the management structure changed the situation by placing more emphasis on the paper work aspects of management, but this redirection was at the expense of field monitoring.

USAID was proficient despite understaffing. Decisions were made in a timely manner. Most problems were discovered within a reasonable period of time and addressed. During the second year of the Project life USAID recognized that one PVO was not meeting its goals. USAID reacted correctly requiring remedial action while simultaneously bringing in technical assistance from REDSO to advise on the situation. Paper work was completed within reasonable time frame. All the evidence indicates responsive, hands-on managing. The final and the mid-term evaluations favorably comment on the USAID management and monitoring. The PMC had, among other qualifications 2 years experience in Somalia as implementation manager for the NRC Planning Unit. The POS had five years field experience in food distribution to Somali refugees. Their education and experience helped surmount many of the obstacles.

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Appendix

Persons Interviewed

Partnership for Productivity

Abdi Ahmed Aabe
Abdi Warsame Roble
Mohamed Hebaan Huusein
Mouliid Ahmed
Ibrahim Ederus Ahmed
Fosiya Ali
Abdi Muuse
Jama Muhumad Shide
Ali Hassan Abdullahi
Mohamed Abdullahi Muhumad

New TransCentury Foundation

Lisa Wiggins
Bootan Samatar
Ahmed Hassan Ardale
Abdirahman Haji Hussein
Ahrab Ali Fahiye
Five district ELU/CARE food monitors
Abdi Hashi
Hassan Hussein Jama
Ahmed Hassan Abdale
Abdirahman Jahi Hussein
Mohamed Ahmed Hussein

Save the Children Federation

John Marks
Hassan Ibrahim
Mohamed Islam
Abdi Qoodan Qayley
Abuukar Kaalnoy Dhaqane
Chris Cassidy

Experiment in International Living

Stanley Andrews

Africare

Mohamoud A. Hamoud

USAID

Marion Warren
Emily McPhie
Frank Catania
Lalitha Jayaraman

National Refugee Commission

Mohammed Omer Dubed
Mike Dockrey

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR):

Guy Prim

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