



EVALUATION OF USAID BIZCLIR PROGRAM

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ACRONYMS

AMCHAM	American Chamber of Commerce (in Jamaica)
AMEX	AMEX International, Inc.
ARDP	Agriculture and Rural Development Plan
BAH	Booz Allen-Hamilton
BizCLIR	Business Climate, Legal & Institutional Reform
COTR	Contracting Officer's Technical Representative
CTO	Cognizant Technical Officer
DFID	Department for International Development
EGAT	Economic Growth, Agriculture and Trade
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GOPh	Government of Philippines
GOT	Government of Tanzania
GTZ	German Society for Technical Cooperation
IADB	Inter-American Development Bank
IMF	International Monetary Fund
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MAFRD	Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Rural Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OAA	Office of Acquisitions and Assistance
PHAP	Private Hospitals Association of the Philippines
PM	Prime Minister
RFP	Request for Proposal
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WBG	World Bank Group
WTO	World Trade Organization

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background

USAID has been actively supporting business enabling environment reforms for decades in developing and transition countries. In 2002, USAID launched the “Seldon Project” for Global Trade Law Assessment and Assistance to develop and apply an assessment tool that identified inefficiencies in the commercial laws and institutions of developing countries.

As a continuation of this project, in 2006, USAID/EGAT/EG commissioned the BizCLIR — Business Climate, Legal and Institutional Reform Project vehicle to support and promote improved business climates, sustained economic growth, and transformational development through reform of commercial laws, regulations, and institutional capacity-building in target countries. The BizCLIR assessment tool offered a comprehensive methodology, created by Booz Allen and USAID, for business environment reform using a 360-degree stakeholder assessment. The methodology considered each of the *Doing Business* subject areas at a deeper level by analyzing more than 1,000 indicators.

The Purpose

The purpose of this evaluation was to assess the processes and resulting effectiveness of the program activity of the USAID-funded BizCLIR Project. The BizCLIR variations included BizCLIR assessments that mostly took *Doing Business* indicators and studied them more deeply, as well as more specialized BizCLIR assessments, such as AgCLIR, HealthCLIR and MicroCLIR. BizCLIRs are often comprised of paper assessments, series of underlying interviews, participatory workshops and round tables.

The Methodology

The methodology was based on studying five randomly selected sample countries where BizCLIR assessments were delivered and conducted over the last three years. Because it is too early to know the long-term impact, the team focused on the effectiveness in terms of outcome. The most important outcomes that were selected were 1) a perception of usefulness, 2) resulting follow up projects (i.e., the number of topics covered in BizCLIR assessment that were adopted by the follow up implementation projects), and 3) traction for reforms created. A project that led to reform with greater traction utilized more research areas in implementation projects and was perceived as more useful. More traction at the beginning led to wider awareness and greater ownership by stakeholders, which in turn, made reform implementation smoother and more impactful over the long-term.

The Results and Findings

Though they had varying degrees of effectiveness, there was a consensus that four out of five BizCLIRs were useful in terms of perception as well in terms of translating into follow up implementation projects.

The results of the comparative analysis were used to identify the best practices used in BizCLIR and inform future similar programming. Generally, the team found that the more focused the assessment and the higher the stakeholder engagement, the more usefulness the assessment.

The team determined the ideal assessment would have the following elements, assuming resource availability:

1. It would be initiated and tailored by USAID missions in close coordination with strategic stakeholders.
2. It would cover several select priorities and constraints for the development of the country.
3. It would be closely associated with *Doing Business* Indicators to borrow the traction already established for reforms by this popular index.
4. The assessment would be deep enough to allow the follow up implementation projects to focus more on actual implementation rather than additional research. It would clearly prioritize the most important reform steps, produce detailed business process mapping when appropriate, include an action plan, review other donor activities in respective areas, and set a baseline for the follow up implementation projects by USAID.
5. It would have at least one policy/law and one administration expert per each *Doing Business* indicator covered. Each of these experts would be coupled with local experts who would help connect the dots between desk research and realities in the field.
6. The team would engage a critical mass of stakeholders, by first interviewing them (200-300 of them in the capital, as well as regionally), and then throwing a large participatory workshop where around 100 stakeholders (including civil society, the largest business associations, international financial institutions, top policymakers and middle level government technocrats) would help develop and prioritize reform recommendations.
7. This would culminate in a second visit and a large round table meeting where the final recommendations would be presented and explained.
8. The final version of the assessment is distributed widely (at least electronically).

In the situation of resource scarcity, all of the above may not be possible and clients (USAID missions) would face a number of trade offs in order to make their strategic choices. With the benefit of hindsight, this paper is designed to help inform future decision-making.

I. INTRODUCTION

BizCLIR provided technical assistance and diagnostic tools to support and improve business climates. These tools focused on commercial law reform, institutional capacity-building, and streamlined regulations in numerous countries worldwide since 2006. Funding for the program has totaled approximately \$15 Million up to November 2010 with further extensions planned. The BizCLIR contract was assigned to Booz-Allen-Hamilton (BAH) by the US Agency for International Development (USAID), Office of Acquisitions and Assistance M/OAA/ESP, represented by the Cognizant Technical Officer (CTO) of USAID/EGAT/EG/EPG, EFFECTIVE DATE Sept 30, 2006; with estimated date of completion on Sept. 30, 2010. This contract No. AFP-I-00-04-0005-00, incorporated FAR and AIDAR Clauses (See ANNEX A).

BizCLIR has a three-pronged strategy that includes assessments, technical assistance and knowledge management. The assessment teams used a set of indicators to diagnose business climates. The assessment report sets forth recommendations and options for technical assistance. Lessons learned and best practices discovered through the BizCLIR assessment are to be shared with other countries through the knowledge management function. In total, 40 BizCLIR assessments were conducted in 35 countries.

The challenge for the evaluation team was to design and implement an evaluation that captured accurately the implementation and impact of BizCLIR. This assignment presented two primary challenges, which are discussed in the following paragraphs.

First, there was no *one* BizCLIR assessment. Each country's BizCLIR experience was unique, with different economic and business circumstances and environment, different assessment teams, different indicators, different data collection strategies, and so forth. Program variations make it complicated to aggregate results across program implementation sites and to obtain an overall BizCLIR appraisal. As a result of this, we looked for BizCLIR results that offered a more general interpretation and applicability. Figure 1, taken from BAH documents, highlights selected deliverables, benchmarks, and indicators of success.

BOX 1. Booz-Allen-Hamilton's technical approach to achieve success is based on three basic steps:

- 1) Revise the CLIR Global trade indicators into the next Generation BizCLIR Diagnostics, enhance their significant merits, and use them more closely in conjunction with World Bank *Doing Business* Indicators;
- 2) Utilizing the *Doing Business* and BizCLIR Diagnostics and performing high quality, effective TA through Bridging Activities and Pilot Projects; and
- 3) Expand and extend the project's impact through creative and capable knowledge management.

NOTE-1: REF. QUALITY CONTROL EXTRACTED FROM USAID-BAH CONTRACT

FIGURE 1.¹

Table 1. High-level summary of selected deliverables, benchmarks, and indicators of success

Deliverable	Benchmark(s)	Indicator(s) of Success
1.1.1 Doing Business Deeply	USAID Mission/World Bank and Stakeholder Cooperation and Coordination, Measurable Activity Impact, SOW design and initial execution, Budget Target Performance, Monitoring and Evaluation Plan, Scope and Quality of KM (distribution)	High Demand (#,000 downloads) for Report, Budget Targets Met, High-level of interest on Web Discussion, Multi-donor Follow-on Projects Targeting Weak Spots
1.1.2 Doing Business: Broader Studies & Workshops	Non-capital City Coverage, Workshop Materials Quality, Audience Participation, Scope and Number, Follow Up Material Quality, Budget Target Performance, Scope and Quality of KM (distribution)	High Demand (#,000 downloads) for Report, Budget Targets Met, High-level of interest on Web Discussion, Multi-donor Follow-on Projects Targeting Weak Spots, High Numbers of Work Shop Participants
1.2.1 Update BIZCLIR Indicators	Accuracy, Functionality, Clarity, Coherence, Utility and applicability of Cross-cutting, Connection to Doing Business Indicators, Intuitiveness	High Demand for Assessments, Validation from Experts and USAID Missions, World Bank references to indicators in Doing Business Reports and Activities
1.2.3 Develop Indicators for Eight Business Climate Areas	Accuracy, Functionality, Clarity, Coherence, Utility and applicability of Cross-cutting, Connection to Doing Business Indicators, Intuitiveness	High Demand for Assessments, Validation from Experts and USAID Missions, Complete of Four New Areas within First Six Months
1.2.4 Conduct Up to Sixteen CLIR Diagnostic Assessments	USAID Mission Cooperation, Team Mobilization, Team Performance (interview numbers, sectoral coverage), Report Quality, Timing (Deadlines), Workshop Outputs, Recommendations Clarity and Feasibility, Budget Target Performance	High-level USG/USAID Mission Participation, 100+ interviews, High Report Demand, Multi-donor Follow-on Projects Targeting Weak Spots, High Numbers of Work Shop Participants, Budget Target Met, High-level of interest on Web Discussion, Clearly Prioritized Reform Agenda
1.2.5 Conduct Three Regional Workshops	Workshop Materials Quality, Audience Participation, Scope and Number, Follow Up Material Quality, Budget Target Performance, Scope and Quality of KM (distribution)	Multi-donor Follow-on Projects Targeting Weak Spots, High Numbers of Work Shop Participants, High-level of interest on Web Discussion, Clearly Prioritized Reform Agenda
2.1.1 Conduct Eight Bridging Activities	USAID Mission and Stakeholder Cooperation and Coordination, Activity Impact, SOW design and initial execution, Budget Target Performance, Scope and Quality of KM (distribution)	High-level USG/USAID Mission Participation, Budget Targets Met, High-level of interest on Web Discussion, Multi-donor Follow-on Projects Targeting Weak Spots

¹ NOTE: This matrix was provided by BAH. It was scanned and could not be changed or manipulated.

Deliverable	Benchmark(s)	Indicator(s) of Success
2.1.2 Deliver Four Pilot Projects	USAID Mission and Stakeholder Cooperation and Coordination, Measurable Activity Impact, SOW design and initial execution, Budget Target Performance, Monitoring and Evaluation Plan, Scope and Quality of KM (distribution)	High-level USG/USAID Mission Participation, Budget Targets Met, High-level of Interest on Web Discussion, Improved Doing Business Survey Scores
3.1 Conduct Bi-weekly Consultations with BizCLIR CTO	Responsiveness, Availability, Agenda Maintenance and Implementation, Preparation	Regular Meetings Held, Project Activity Consensus Maintained, Agendas Updated and Maintained
4.3 Best Practices Development and Dissemination Strategy	Utility, Applicability and Practicality Across Countries and Regions, Downloads/Usage, Core Methodology	Used in 10 Countries and 4 Regions, High number of Downloads/Usage
5.2 Organize and Facilitate Donor-Stakeholder Information Sharing Events	Workshop Materials Quality, Audience-Participation, Scope and Number, Follow Up Material Quality, Budget Target Performance, Scope and Quality of KM (distribution)	High Demand (#,000 downloads) for Report, Budget Targets Met, High-level of interest on Web Discussion, Multi-donor Follow-on Projects Targeting Weak Spots, High Numbers of Work Shop Participants
6.1 Implement PMME Platform	Numbers of Users, Client Satisfaction, Data Timeliness, Accuracy, Accessibility	Regular Usage by Five to Eight Team Members, Positive Client Reviews, Real-time Data, Low-error rate

Second, while collecting data and information to initiate the design of the work plan, it was difficult to find well organized hard data unless it was specifically asked for and supplied directly by the actors of the BizCLIR contract. The data proved to be difficult to obtain because no systematic M&E had been applied and thus little in the way of measured or organized data was generated and collected.

BizCLIR's worth as a social investment lies in its usefulness. The type of questions that guided the evaluation included: Were there any noticeable knowledge results from this investment that others would find useful? How were they [assessments] used? By whom? Can the utility of the assessment process be enhanced? How? USAID is not contemplating an immediate direct continuation of the BizCLIR program. Considering the development of a new program will improve on the experience gained through the previous program. To this end, the evaluation of the BizCLIR process focused on best practices that would advance its future usefulness.

II. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

A. BizCLIR Outcome Definition: Usefulness and Traction

Early discussions with USAID/EGAT made it clear that the most relevant outcome to be measured should be *the usefulness of the BizCLIR in generating reform as suggested by the assessments* and recommendations and results for *the improvement of business environment in doing business*. In addition, interviews with USAID missions and the review of Statements of Works (SOWs) for BizCLIR assessments helped identify additional aspects of outcomes to be measured.

To demonstrate program effectiveness, the most important outcomes that were selected were 1) a perception of usefulness; 2) the resulting follow up projects (i.e., the number of topics covered in BizCLIR assessment that were adopted by the follow up implementation projects); 3) the depth/effort of an assessment as measured by financial resources invested per each reform area; and 4) the traction created for reforms. The more traction a program had the better the perception of BizCLIR usefulness and the more areas that translated into implementation projects. In addition, more traction also leads to higher stakeholder ownership and smoother reform implementation and greater longer-term impact.

The data collection protocols developed and applied by the team are presented in Annex C.


B. Defining Efficiency and Effectiveness

	Definitions	Measurement
Inputs	Resources used in BizCLIR assessments	Can be measured as financial, labor and time resources invested into the assessment
Outputs	Assessments produced	These can be objectively measured by the number of major subject areas covered.
Outcomes	The intended or achieved short-term and medium-term effects of an intervention's outputs, usually requiring the collective effort of partners. Outcomes represent changes in development conditions, which occur between the completion of outputs and the achievement of impact.	In agreement with USAID, it was decided to focus on measuring usefulness. How useful was the assessment for the USAID mission and how much traction for reforms it has created. These can be measured by the number of areas that were actually selected as a theme for a follow up project.
Impact	Positive and negative long-term effects on identifiable population groups produced by a development intervention. These effects can be economic, socio-cultural, institutional, environmental, technological or of other types.	Long-term effect on business environment. It can presumably be measured, by improvement in relevant <i>Doing Business</i> sub-indicators in the long-term. Measurement of impact is outside of the scope of this evaluation since it should be better measured in ex-post evaluations of the follow up implementation projects.

In most cases, it is too early to measure the impact of the assessments on business environment since most of the assessments are not even two to three years old. Impact would be better measured during mid-term, final or even ex-post evaluations of the follow up projects that come out of this assessment. For this evaluation, the team studied and extracted ‘Results’ and ‘Effects’ of the work and analyses generated by BizCLIR the projects.

Figure 2 shows inputs (usually financial resources) divided by outputs equals a measure of efficiency. If outputs or inputs are divided by (targeted) outcomes, that would measure effectiveness. In this case, the major measures of inputs were financial inputs, number of experts and time invested by the team of experts to produce assessments. The outputs were the number of major subject areas that was covered (e.g., tax policy, tax administration, trade policy, etc.).

FIGURE 2. Input, Processes, and Outcome



The most important expected outcome emerges automatically to determine usefulness. It can clearly be useful for USAID missions and EGAT in helping them formulate and design future planning of activities and projects. Therefore, we measured outcome as a number of subject areas that had been chosen by USAID missions as emphasized by the number of follow up RFPs that were issued. These reflect the usefulness and traction of reforms, because follow-up projects (i.e., RFPs) demonstrate proof of acceptance and support of the technical assessment recommendations by USAID missions, as well as possibly the host government authorities, private sector and even specialized sectors of civil society (e.g., Tanzania, Kosovo, West Bank, etc.)

The team derived efficiency of the process by studying the relationship between inputs and outputs. Effectiveness was measured as a ratio of expected outcomes to outputs. The team also found it useful to measure effectiveness and efficiency in one step by dividing aggregate financial inputs over outcome.

Furthermore, using a comparative in-depth case study analysis of the processes, their effectiveness, and stakeholder perceptions, the team developed recommendations on how the process could be made more efficient and effective. The team also identified relevant knowledgeable stakeholders’ perceptions of usefulness of various elements of the assessment process.

C. Random Site Sampling

The team used a qualitative case study design that included restricted random sampling of countries for our case studies. A total of five assessment countries, with one country from each continent, were selected for more in depth analysis. Use of random selection minimizes bias. The interview data and other information collected were analyzed using qualitative data analysis procedures. The analysis goal of the team was to emphasize results that would inform the development of a new program.

The logic of this process was based on considerations of information available on the BizCLIR website, monthly status reports, and general information supplied to the team by Booz Allen and USAID. In order to develop selection logic, sample size and country-candidacy, the team developed criteria from a simple inventory of assessments implemented in the five continents and the countries mentioned in the chart below.

BOX 2. Evaluation of BizCLIR – USAID Worldwide Program (December – 2010)

Regions for Intervention for BizCLIR Assessments:

- Africa: Burundi (3), Ethiopia (4), Ghana (2), Kenya (6), Nigeria (1), Rwanda (4), Tanzania (7), Uganda (7), Senegal (1), Zimbabwe (1)
- Asia: Pakistan (2), Afghanistan (4), Vietnam (5), Philippines (5), Cambodia (2), Indonesia (5), Laos (1), Kazakhstan (1)
- Europe & Eurasia: Albania (2), Armenia (1), Azerbaijan (1), Bulgaria (1), Croatia (1), Georgia (0), Kosovo (2), Macedonia (4), Poland (1)
- Latin America & the Caribbean: Costa Rica (3), El Salvador (3), Mexico (1), Honduras (3), Nicaragua (2), Guatemala (3)
- Middle East: Egypt (1), Jordan (1) and West Bank (NA)

Subject Areas (Sectors) of Analysis:

1. Business Enabling Environment (BizCLIR)
2. Commercial Legal Framework (CLIR)
3. Agriculture Enabling Environment (AgCLIR)
4. Empowering Women in Business (GenderCLIR)
5. Health Enabling Environment (HealthCLIR)
6. Specific Value Chains Analysis (MicroCLIR)

D. Data Collection Protocols

Once the countries were selected, the team created the data collection protocols. A semi-structured questionnaire with some close-ended, as well as a significant number of open-ended questions was used to guide key informant interviews and serve as basis for meeting summaries drafted after each meeting. The questionnaire went through several iterations

following reviews by USAID. The iterations focused on the types of questions asked, the information, and format. The data collection protocols are included in ANNEX E.

E. Data Collection Process: On-site, Off-site

The team relied on document reviews of assessments, reports, action plans, evaluations, and legal documents, as well as key informant interviews with mission personnel, implementing partners, government officials, and private sector and non-governmental representatives as the primary methods of data collection. The data collected documented evidence of BizCLIR's areas of impact and identified lessons learned. As data were collected on site in Kosovo and Tanzania, adjustments to the protocol were made in the field in response to conditions encountered. The adjustments were limited to formatting and not necessarily content. The off-site data collection involved telephone interviews with people in Washington, D.C., as well as some overseas offices.

F. Data Analysis

In analyzing qualitative data, the team looked for regular patterns in the data. Did certain types of responses repeat themselves? Did people with certain characteristics give similar responses to questions to the same questions? Did people living in particular neighborhoods respond to questions similarly? Are the activities that were fully implemented comparable to planned activities in program design?

Finding interpretable patterns in the BizCLIR evaluation data was difficult. As previously noted, the BizCLIR program was not uniformly implemented at all sites. This meant that people responding to the "program" at different sites were responding to different versions of the program. This made interpreting their response complicated. If their response was unique among the people interviewed, was that because they reacted differently to the same stimulus [BizCLIR] or reacted differently to a different version of BizCLIR? The team made efforts to understand the respondent's frame of reference for her/his response in the analysis of data collected.

G. Interpretation: What does the information and data reflect?

It is important in interpreting data from a respondent to get some feedback on what they meant by their answers, as well as ensuring they are interpreting the question the way it was intended. This type of feedback allowed the evaluator to make sure that he or she was interpreting the respondent's answer correctly. Accuracy in interpretation is vital in drawing conclusions and making recommendations from data. Because of this, the evaluators in the field routinely checked the accuracy of their interpretations.

III. EVALUATION RESULTS

A. BizCLIR Financial Overview

BizCLIR has a funding ceiling of \$15 million. As of November 30, 2010, \$12,955,507 of the \$15 Million (86%) had been obligated.² The average total expenditure in each of the twenty-six participating countries is \$498,269; the average amount expended (over the 26 countries) per assessment is \$224,962. BAH has core funding of \$500,000 for the general management of the program. The financial data is provided in ANNEX B.

Financial data for the five countries in our sample are presented in Table 1. The data shows how the activities carried out in these countries were sometimes supported by funding from multiple sources. The Philippines, for example, received funding from the USAID/EGAT Bureau and the Philippine mission to conduct its HealthCLIR assessment. This co-funding arrangement existed in other countries as well.

Depending on the purpose of the assessment, the perception of the amount of \$0.25 – 0.5 million per assessment may range from being insufficient to somewhat high. If the purpose of the assessment was to identify the most binding constraints, then the cost is somewhat on the higher side. For example, the annual cost of *Doing Business*, that helps identify and prioritize reform areas is much lower, around \$25,000 per country, or a total cost of around \$4.5 million a year for 183 countries. This amount covers both surveys and reform memorandums.³ On the other extreme, the amount is hardly sufficient to conduct a detailed analysis, produce process mapping and develop comprehensive recommendations for a range of 12-15 major reform areas (e.g., Tax Policy, Tax Administration, Trade, etc.). Therefore, for a BizCLIR assessment to have value, it should explore the reform areas as deeply as possible. This can be achieved by either increasing funding for each assessment or reducing (prioritizing) the number of reform areas to be covered by an assessment or both.

² Rose Marie Leong Son, Booz | Allen | Hamilton, 8283 Greensboro Drive, McLean, VA 22102

³ The reform memorandums that feature prioritizing reform areas and summarizing key reform recommendations into short-to-medium term perspective. See “Doing Business in Poland: Reform Memorandum,” June 30, 2010, link: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/POLANDEXTN/Resources/DB_memo.pdf

TABLE 1: FINANCIAL DATA FOR EVALUATION SAMPLE COUNTRIES

Country	Activity Name	EGAT Bureau	AGCI Bureau	Poverty Reduction Bureau	Kosovo Mission	Tanzania Mission	West Bank Mission	Philippines Mission	Total Spent 31 Oct 2010
Jamaica	BizCLIR Assessment	\$144,258							\$144,258
Kosovo	Rapid Response (BizCLIR)	\$18,250							\$18,250
Kosovo	Office of Prime Minister				\$133,477				\$133,477
Kosovo	AgCLIR Assessment				\$122,486				\$122,486
Kosovo	AgStrategy				\$252,867				\$252,867
Kosovo	Animal Product Study				\$203,963				\$203,963
Kosovo	Kosovo MAFRD				\$325,948				\$138,151
Philippines	HealthCLIR Assessment	\$137,883						\$40,000	\$177,883
Tanzania	BizCLIR Assessment	\$198,079				\$50,000			\$248,079
Tanzania	AgCLIR Assessment					\$522,246			\$419,763
Tanzania	MicroCLIR Assessment			\$151,833					\$151,833
Tanzania	Secured Transactions		\$493,389						\$493,389
Tanzania	Surge Capacity					\$176,670			\$162,765
West Bank	West Bank						\$540,000		\$374,728

B. BizCLIR Methodology

The methodology and procedures used in these assessments were perceived by the evaluation team to be the key of success in Booz Allen's contract implementation. The analyses are usually organized around *Doing Business* Indicators (Boxes 1 and 3). Throughout the evaluation process, the team found out that each step and phase to be well organized, well structured, and demonstrated increasingly good strategic thinking and risk mitigation.

The following description and information on the Assessment General Process Strategy is quoted from BizCLIR BAH documented methodology:

1. BizCLIR General Methodology

"The CLIR assessment methodology underpinning the BizCLIR Assessment addressed four dimensions of the business environment: Legal Framework, Implementing Institutions, Supporting Institutions, and Social Dynamics. Through these dimensions, a strategic paradigm emerges for understanding each country's systems for business, as well as a holistic view of their ability to trade efficiently and securely, and support agribusiness development and transactions. The assessment team developed a qualitative and quantitative report in each of above-mentioned areas, using the following framework:

- **Legal Framework:** How closely do existing laws reflect global standards? How well do they respond to commercial realities? Do embedded incentive structures track with social and economic objectives?
- **Implementing Institutions:** How well do implementers and enforcers carry out their duties in terms of efficiency, transparency, and predictability? Do institutional behaviors create barriers to participation and predictability?
- **Supporting Institutions:** How deeply rooted in civil society are the laws and institutions that governs economic life? Do the many needed individual parts of the "system" exist, and if so, do they work together efficiently?
- **Social Dynamic:** How well does the legal system respond to users' evolving needs? How receptive to change are the key stakeholders? What forces or factors govern the pace and direction of change in the system?"

2. Assessment Team and Approach

"The BizCLIR assessment team included specialists who interview a government ministries and agencies, private firms (domestic and foreign, large, small, medium, and micro sized organizations), and non-governmental agencies, academic institutions, and research organizations. The interview process involved sending a team of subject matter specialists to key agricultural areas to perform in-depth interviews aimed at creating a picture that sheds light on the areas of the country's business climate that may need reform.

Overall, the assessment approach involved:

- **Coordination:** The contractor sought to learn what donors and other US government agencies were undertaking in assessment areas. As appropriate, the assessment team

worked with USAID to coordinate with relevant government agencies on the assessment scope, report review, and public release and distribution as necessary relative to US Government policies and interest.

- **Preparation:** The assessment team utilized publicly available data, including previous reports and assessments, to generate a rich, detailed snapshot of the current agribusiness enabling environment. Much of this research was conducted by Booz Allen staff in Kosovo and compiled into a briefing book for the assessment team.
- **Fieldwork:** Interviews encompassed a 360-degree review of each subject matter area and include consultations with members of the government, regional trade associations, cooperatives, business chambers and associations, small and medium businesses, as well as multinational corporations, legal practitioners, trade officials, and members of civil society. The team worked in close partnership with the USAID Mission, as well as other US Government officials and implementation partners to integrate the assessment into existing and planned programs and goals without creating an additional management burden.
- **In-country Roundtable and Country Report:** The team will convene a half-day working discussion among key stakeholders (including those who were interviewed for the assessments) in the country to present and vet initial findings, allow participants to discuss key issues in smaller roundtable groups, and identify key recommendations/solutions. This remains to be decided and will be based on discussions with the Mission. Results from the assessment and the Roundtable will be used to prepare a Country Report for Kosovo that includes each of the subject matter areas mentioned, as well as the results of the quantitative analysis.”

BOX 3. BizCLIR and Doing Business Indicators*

The diagnostic process and this report are grounded in a methodology, established through USAID’s Economic Growth Office, which has been used in over 35 countries since 1998. In 2007, incorporating lessons learned from its first-generation legal, institutional, and trade diagnostic tool, USAID sponsored the development of an updated and redesigned set of indicators through its BizCLIR project. As noted, the indicators now substantially align with the structure of the World Bank’s influential *Doing Business* country reports. Since 2002, *Doing Business* has assisted countries in targeting where their regulatory environments may encourage or interfere with economic growth. For each of the areas it examines, the World Bank considers a few key indicia of whether and how the environment for doing business is “working.” This is measured by such means as the number of procedures involved in achieving a goal, the number of days it takes, and the costs of the procedures in relation to per-capita income. The World Bank now gathers data from 183 economies and ranks each, demonstrating how their respective regulatory environments compare to others throughout the world.

USAID’s BizCLIR indicators take the areas covered by *Doing Business* and delve deeper into their related legal frameworks, implementing and supporting institutions, and social dynamics to better understand *why* a country has a particular ranking. In short, BizCLIR regards the *Doing Business* findings as “the tip of the iceberg” and aims to assist countries in improving their *Doing Business* areas by addressing the *whole* iceberg. The BizCLIR indicators consider key business issues from a variety of perspectives, illuminating, for example, how certain business processes apply to rural communities, microenterprises, small and medium enterprises (SMEs), and women. The BizCLIR approach was chosen in response to a demand for deeper understanding of the issues highlighted in the *Doing Business* initiative and the need to help donors and countries understand how to reform.

*SEE: “COMMERCIAL LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORM DIAGNOSTIC OF THE WEST BANK,” USAID, MARCH 2010

FIGURE 3. BizCLIR Indicators

No.	World Bank Indicators	New BizCLIR Indicators
1	Starting a Business	Business Formation
2	Registering Property	Property Registration (Formerly Real property and IPR)
3	Getting Credit	Access to credit (Formerly secured transactions – financial crimes)
4	Protecting investors	Investor protection (Formerly FDI)
5	Trading across borders	Trade facilitation (Formerly: Flows of goods, services, people, money and infrastructure)
6	Enforcing contracts	Contract enforcement (Formerly Court administration and commercial dispute administration)
7	Closing a business	Business closing and restructuring (Formerly Bankruptcy)
8	Paying taxes	Taxes payments (new)
9	Dealing with licenses	License processing (new)
10	Employing workers	Employment framework (new)
11	NA	Competition policy

C. BizCLIR Comparative (Process) Analysis: Transforming Inputs into Outcomes

1. Jamaica BizCLIR

Good Focus, Relatively Effective, Efficient and Demand Driven. This was a demand driven assessment, requested by the office of the Prime Minister and spearheaded by the USAID mission (EG office) with cooperation from the American Chamber of Commerce of Jamaica (AMCHAM), a small and proactive business associations. The assessment focused on the five most binding constraints identified by the *Doing Business* indicators to get the most out of the limited resources available. This helped increase efficiency with regard to limited financial resources of USAID, as well as limited absorption capacity of the government. Reliance on *Doing Business* indicators allowed the assessment to gain additional traction for reforms since the government was keen on improving its *Doing Business* rating to attract more FDI. Each of the international team members were assigned a local counterpart by the AMCHAM. International experts considered their local expert counterpart as instrumental in the success of the paper.

Most of the respondents suggested that the report was useful in improving understanding that the reforms were needed. The effort can be assessed as 80% effective. The 80% was calculated based on the four out of five areas that were explored in the assessment and were

later the focus of follow up implementation projects. Project focus translated into cost savings, costing only \$36,000 (see row 15 of table N2).

In retrospect, the stakeholder engagement could have been wider. Notable difficulties encountered included a relatively low buy-in from the mid-level government (implementers) and a below optimal support from the broader business community.⁴ In addition, there were alleged conflicts between some facts in the assessment and realities on the ground. As one of the interviewees from business sector puts it, “We were made to vote on their, and not our recommendations.” Such comments about the conflicts between some information in the assessment and the realities on the ground were made about each of the reports. To some extent, it was due to the reliance on recent but already outdated publications.⁵

Some of the following may have helped improve the evaluation:

- Field visits extended or repeated;
- Institutional engagement extended to incorporate the biggest business associations, as well as the mid-level government technocrats who usually end up implementing the reforms;
- In addition to AMCHAM, which was proactive but relatively small, the biggest associations in Jamaica should have also been engaged;
- Probably most importantly, there should have been an end of the field trip workshop where businesses, government officials, donors and the business community are involved in the development and voting on recommendations (see BizCLIR experience in West Bank). This workshop would ensure better buy-in or at least better understanding of the recommendations developed by the broader business community and the government.

Early promises of impact. There are some early and promising indications that outcomes may translate into impact achieved by follow up implementation projects. For example, the time to get a construction permit in some pilot areas was reduced by 50%. As another example, there was a drastic reduction of the official costs of land titling. Originally, as identified in the BizCLIR assessment, the official cost of transferring and titling land was at least 13% of the value of the land (7.5% transfer tax and 5.5% stamp tax). These were reduced to the total of 8% (4% and 3% respectively). In addition, the taxes were reduced to 0% in pilot areas.⁶ Additionally, a follow up project implemented by Carana Corporation achieved a reduction in the time it takes to process a construction license application, down from 152 days to around 72 days.

⁴ As one of the interviewees put it “When the mid-level bureaucrats are not engaged (or at least informed) enough, they feel external and feel threatened by the reforms.”

⁵ To some extent, it was due to the reliance on recent but already outdated publications. At times, these were also due to differences between legislative and administrative practices, as well as the political sensitivity of some facts.

⁶ It should be noted that the BizCLIR published in 2008 seconded recommendations made by IADB in 2005. It is the IADB project which is addressing the issues now. The project cannot be directly/exclusively attributed to the BizCLIR assessment.

Yet in Jamaica, it is too early to discuss impact on the business environment since there is still little evidence of a notable increase in land titling and construction licenses issued. The actual land registrations were slow to pick up despite the drastic reduction in the costs of land titling.⁷

2. Philippines Pilot HealthCLIR

Poor stakeholder engagement, loose reliance on *Doing Business* framework, ineffective. HealthCLIR in the Philippines was a project initiated by the headquarters in Washington. This was a pilot assessment, and as with most pilots, it was not expected to be perfect. Despite some of the problems, there were some important lessons learned.

This assessment focusing on liberalizing the health sector through the use of a deeper and more focused assessment compared to a typical BizCLIR assessment. The HealthCLIR team identified important binding constraints to the development of the private hospitals and pharmaceuticals in the country. The subject areas were not aligned with *Doing Business* Indicators, and thus could not benefit from traction already created by this popular index. There was insufficient stakeholder engagement during field meetings. In addition, the workshop that proved so effective in building consensus and stakeholder ownership elsewhere, had not been procured in the Philippines. Consequently, the pilot project failed to create sustainable traction for reform.

The ineffectiveness was seen through its failure to materialize in any follow up projects. The board of the largest relevant business association—Private Hospitals Association of the Philippines (PHAP)—decided not to support the project and the USAID mission prevented the assessment from being published locally due to political sensitivity.

Stakeholder engagement becomes even more important when the number of areas is small and thus the avenues for cooperation with the government are limited. This situation resulted from two basic factors. First, the project was not demand driven. As a result, the USAID and the BizCLIR team should have exercised leadership, by identifying the most binding and potentially actionable constraints and building consensus around them. Since the focus was basically one sector, the effort was in danger of being undermined. Second, there was no sufficient joint effort by the BizCLIR Project and the USAID Health Office to do a proper stakeholder analysis to build consensus and identify more actionable areas of reform.

3. West Bank BizCLIR

Effective, optimal stakeholder engagement. The assessment was initiated by the USAID Mission in close cooperation with the Ministry of Economy. The assessment followed *Doing Business* indicators and thus benefitted from the soft power created by the latter. In addition, 300 people were interviewed in the capital and in the regions. Interviews took place in and near Ramallah, Taybeh, Nablus, Bethlehem, Jericho, Hebron, Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv. Participants were invited to a workshop conducted by the team at the end of the field mission, around 125 people attended. During the workshop, the problems identified were presented first. Then, the

⁷ The relevant discussion can be found on page 2 of “Uses and Abuses of *Doing Business* Indicators,” by Wade Channell.

participants were divided into groups, and under the guidance of the appointed group leaders, were tasked with developing solutions to the problems. In the end, the participants were asked to confidentially vote on recommendations electronically. As a result, a consensus was built, which increased stakeholder ownership. Respondents confirmed that the assessment and the workshop helped switch attention from external problems. The assessment was relatively effective since four areas (i.e., fiscal policy, trade/WTO issues, gender issues and starting business) out of 13 areas covered in the assessment (or 31%) were adopted by follow up projects (e.g., Multimillion Dollar Investment Climate Improvement Project). The Ministry of Economy is reportedly following up on the recommendations by drafting a law on protecting investors, fiscal law changes, etc. Finally, the financial effort (reflective of the depth of the analysis) per chapter/area was probably the one of the lowest, totaling \$27,000 per topic.

In retrospect: lower number of areas would allow for a deeper assessment. There is certainly a trade-off between the number of subject areas and the depth of the analysis. The greater the number of areas, the greater the number of options/avenues that translate into follow up projects. As we know from finance, options have value by allowing greater flexibility and greater choices for consensus building within business communities and the government. On the other hand, fewer subject areas to evaluate would allow for a deeper assessment given the same level of financing. A deeper assessment, which could include process maps and an action plan (setting a baseline and monitoring parameters), would help increase effectiveness of the follow up projects by making sure there is more emphasis on implementation rather than additional research.

4. Kosovo AgCLIR

Effective, good focus, efficient donor coordination. The assessment was initiated by USAID Mission and the Donor Community in Kosovo. These stakeholders engaged the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Development (MAFRD) and worked closely to identify the needs of the Government of Kosovo. The report covers 5 of the 10 *Doing Business* categories as prioritized by the USAID mission. Note that some of the topics that were selected were not flagged as the most binding constraints by the *Doing Business* indicators, but were nonetheless important. Approximately 150 people were interviewed and approximately 70 were present at the final workshop. Interviewees said they appreciated the workshop and indicated it helped build understanding of the obstacles faced by businesses.

There is no significant body of evidence about impact yet since a little time has elapsed since the report was published. However, there is abundant anecdotal evidence that traction for reform has been generated due to the assessment, workshops, and round table exercises.

The relative effectiveness of the assessment is promising since a number of the subject areas covered in the assessment are going to be adopted by a follow-up 4 year/\$15.9 million-project to improve the agriculture sector. The anticipated effectiveness is approximated at 40%, with two of five areas selected as focal areas for the follow up implementation project. The project has been designed but not yet implemented.

Finally, the report is perceived to be useful as it was reportedly used by 1) the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Development for its Agriculture and Rural Development Plan (ARDP); 2) the EU Twinning Project, which has adopted many of the recommendations from the AgCLIR and factored them into the design of their AGRD Kosovo-wide program with the Ministry of Agriculture (for access preparation of Kosovo to the EU); and 3) the USAID Mission for planning activities and drafting RFPs.

Limited systematic report distribution and follow-up. Eighty percent of respondents in Kosovo reported that they did not receive a copy of the report and thus they had difficulties commenting on the outcomes. However, businesses indicated that they would be interested in reading the report. Businesses are likely to use the report to 1) better benchmark themselves against others; 2) get new ideas; and 3) disseminate the report further to relevant people. It is advisable that a copy of the report should be e-mailed to all people interviewed and those who participated in the workshop.

Finally, some interviewees questioned the reliability of the data used in the assessment, citing a “short period of research, too many people engaged, turnover of people involved, and insufficient emphasis on field visits outside of the capital.” This feedback could not be verified independently.

5. Tanzania BizCLIR

Somewhat effective, wide stakeholder engagement. According to *Doing Business* rankings, Tanzania is one of the top reformers and thus received extra attention from the BizCLIR team. There were three BizCLIR assessments produced for Tanzania. One BizCLIR was produced in February 2008. It covered 12 areas, including all 10 of *Doing Business* and two additional topics (i.e., agriculture and infrastructure). All of them were initiated by the USAID Mission in Tanzania in close cooperation with the Government of Tanzania (GOT). It can be considered somewhat effective since it resulted in two follow up projects. These follow up projects focused on two out of 12 topics covered by the assessment (See Table 2):

- *Access to credit project:* Credit Guarantee to provide term loans to agriculture, \$20 million for 10 years.
- *Property registration:* Secured transactions reform program. First stage was two years and analyzed the legal framework to facilitate the potential of immovable assets to be used as collateral for bank credit and loans. It also included drafting Security in Bank Transactions law. Conducted and delivered seminars dealing with bank procedures and issues to various institutions. Next, it would go through legislature and be enacted. Afterward, the next stage would establish a central movable property registry.

The assessment was initiated by USAID Mission in coordination with the Donor Community in Tanzania, utilizing good stakeholder engagement. The stakeholders included the Ministry of Trade, the Ministry of Agriculture - Rural Development (MAG), the Prime Minister’s office, and other public sector ministries, as well as private sector representative institutions (i.e., Federation of Chambers of Commerce, local chambers of commerce, etc.). They were all consulted and worked with the BAH team to identify the needs of this sectors in Tanzania. More

than 250 people were interviewed and approximately 100 people were present at the final workshop. The feedback was positive. Interviewees expressed appreciation for the workshop and a better understanding of obstacles faced by businesses was built. Finally, a number of interviewees felt that adding local experts to the assessment team would improve the quality of the analysis, as well as the reliability of the data significantly.

A relatively low effectiveness and resulting high cost of an effective outcome (See Table 2) can be explained by low relevance of a standard BizCLIR assessment as applied to a predominantly agricultural economy. The lesson that followed was recognizing the limitations of applying regular BizCLIR to a predominantly agricultural economy. As a result, AgCLIR and MicroCLIR⁸ were conducted in 2010. The former had a focus on agricultural sector in general, while the latter focused on selected prioritized value chains (i.e., maize and rice).

It is still too early to judge about the effectiveness of AgCLIR and MicroCLIR. That said, the M&E team did find indications of an active dialogue between the private and the public stakeholders that was spurred by the latest assessments. The dialogue was marked by healthy discussions and disagreements concerning the source and reliability of data and findings (as expressed by the Executive Secretary – the Principal Executive officer of the Ministry of Trade) at the wrap-up Conference. The GOT decided to create a Governmental Technical Working Group composed of several ministries dealing with the improvement of information and the data made public in the AgCLIR assessment.

The team could not independently verify the claims of the poor quality of the data used in the report. The reaction of the government could at least partly be attributed to the high sensitivity of the reform issues. It should be noted that the Prime Minister and his officers placed high value on the assessment's findings and recommendations. The PM office had decided to adopt the assessment and use the information for designing a National Strategic Plan for economic development.

⁸ MicroCLIR was an assessment that looked into problems specific to maize and rice value chains.

TABLE 2. BIZCLIR PROCESS SUMMARY MATRIX

N	Issues	Jamaica BizCLIR	Kosovo AgCLIR	Philippines HealthCLIR	Tanzania BizCLIR	West Bank BizCLIR	Tanzania AgCLIR
0	Initiating stakeholder	Government Prime Minister's Office	GoK needs identified by Donors & USAID Kosovo	USAID/DC Initiating Pilot Study	USAID/Tanzania in coordination with GOT	USAID/West Bank	USAID/Tanzania in coordination with GOT
1	Choosing topics to be covered	Priorities based on Doing Business Ratings	At the request of USAID Kosovo, this report covers 5 of the 10 <i>Doing Business</i> categories as prioritized by the USAID mission.	There was a difficulty in linking the topics to <i>Doing Business</i> Indicators does to the specificity of the public health sector.	All 10 of <i>Doing Business</i> and 2 additional, that is agriculture and infrastructure.	Mirrored <i>Doing Business</i> indicators	USAID-Tanzania in liaison with GOT
2	No. topics covered	5	5	4	12	13	13
3	Pre-desk research activities	Booz Allen and assessors identified relevant publications and laws to be studied	Secondary research, primary research <i>in-situ</i> Consultation with GOK; Consultation with donors, needs assessments from CLIR program and USAID country mission	Booz Allen and assessors identified relevant publications and laws to be studied	Booz Allen and assessors identified relevant publications and laws to be studied	Booz Allen and assessors identified relevant publications and laws to be studied	Secondary research, primary research <i>in-situ</i> Consultation with GOT; Consultation with donors, needs assessments from CLIR program and USAID country mission
4	Desk research period, No. of weeks (average; includes research done for the briefing book and assessor's own research / BAH)	2	2	2	2	2	2
5	No. of international experts (do not include PC)	7	3	5	11	8	9
6	No. of local experts involved	3	2	2	2	2 facilitator 1 technical	4 facilitators 2 technical

N	Issues	Jamaica BizCLIR	Kosovo AgCLIR	Philippines HealthCLIR	Tanzania BizCLIR	West Bank BizCLIR	Tanzania AgCLIR
						expert	experts
7	Duration of the field trip, No. of weeks	1	2	2	2	2	3
8	No. of people interviewed	86	150	100	200-250	250-300	250-300
9	No. of people present at the workshop	0 No workshop. ⁹ There was a presentation on the last day to USAID and State Department personnel.	70	0 No workshop at the request of the Mission even though Booz Allen encouraged that the Mission sponsors one.	100	125	100
10	Major stakeholders engaged	PM's Office, Jamaica Chamber of Commerce	USAID/Kosovo, Gov't of Kosovo, PM's Office, Min. of Agriculture, Min. of Planning, Min. of Industry, NGOs, Int'l Donors (EU, WBG, EC, Austrian Embassy, Swiss Government), farmers	USAID/Philippines, Min. of Health, Dept. of Education, Local Gov't, Int'l Donors (UNDP, ADB, WHO, Development Bank of Philippines), University of Philippines, foundations (Ayala, Zuellig), hospitals, laboratories, clinics, drug stores, etc.	USAID/Tanzania, Gov't of Tanzania, Min. of Trade, Min. of Finance, Customs, NGOs, Int'l Donors, universities, lawyers, professional associations, etc.	Min. of National Economy, other relevant Ministries and PA institutions, private sector associations, business leaders, lending banks, donors	PM's Office, Min. of Agriculture, Tanzania Investment Center, FCC, banks, private sector associations, traders, business leaders
11	Number of topics chosen as an emphasis by USAID for	4 Tax policy/	2 1. Trading Across	0 The assessment	2 1. Legal framework	4 (Fiscal policy,	n.a. The project is still in the

⁹ The only roundtable discussion was an early introductory breakfast meeting arranged by the Jamaica Chamber of Commerce with the BizCLIR team and members of the local business community.

N	Issues	Jamaica BizCLIR	Kosovo AgCLIR	Philippines HealthCLIR	Tanzania BizCLIR	West Bank BizCLIR	Tanzania AgCLIR
	follow up project(s) so far (out of total assessed) ¹⁰	administration; access to credit; construction licensing; legislative process	Borders: (Farmers and products linked to markets; Food quality and safety improved) 2. Access to Credit: Increase Affordable and Accessible Credit The new agriculture project was designed (not yet procured), 4 year, \$15.9 mln.	was not disseminated in the country due to political sensitivity.	for use of movable property as collateral; 2. Credit Guarantee to provide term loans to agriculture	Trade/WTO issues), gender issues and starting business)	procurement stage.
12	Total cost of the assessment	\$144,258	\$123,390.38	\$177,883	\$248,079	\$353,465	\$480,272
	Summary Indicators						
13	Financial Effort (Depth of the assessment / width of engagement): cost of output (cost of one chapter, i.e., row 12 / row 2)	\$28,852	\$24,678	\$44,471	\$20,673	\$27,190	\$36,944
14	Effectiveness, %: i.e. outcome (row 11) / output (row 2)	80%	40%	0%	17%	31%	n.a.
15	Cost of the effective outcome, \$: i.e., cost (row 12) / outcome (row 11)	\$36,065	\$61,695	∞	\$124,040	\$88,366	n.a.

¹⁰ These are the verifiable outcomes that can be directly traded to the assessments.

D. Perceptions of BizCLIR Usefulness

Ninety-two percent of respondents suggested that BizCLIR assessments were useful. Most of those who viewed BizCLIR as useful (around 60%) suggested that its major usefulness was in creating a realization that improvement in the business environment is needed. The opinions split almost 50/50 as to why these were useful. Roughly 50% believed these were useful because they highlighted an opinion that change (reforms to the business environment) was needed. The remaining 50% suggested they were useful because the recommendations were taken into consideration by policy-makers and helped initiate activities that were targeted to improve the business environment.

The following are what many respondents indicated was useful about the assessment:

- Designing and informing follow up USAID projects
- Informing the dialogue with government counterparts
- Informing the follow up action plans of the government and at times other donors
- Raising awareness and prompting reform dialogue among different groups

Workshops were especially effective in creating traction for reforms with a wide range of stakeholders.

Other perceptions/quotes from respondents:

- “[The] assessment is just as good as the quality, quantity and diversity of interviews and information sources.”
- “The difference between 100 and 200 thousand dollars is that the latter can include measurable outcome indicators.”
- “It is about engaging champions within the government... engaging them early... keeping the government informed – so that they at least see what is coming.”
- “Keep engagement after the workshop.... Even if just to send a Power Point presentation afterwards.”

“There should be the right mix of people. Trade Policy and Trade Facilitation [customs and facilitation] are really two distinct areas. It is difficult to find a person who is good at both.”

By comparison, there were four categories of people that felt that BizCLIR was not as useful as it could be:

1. *People from the offices other than Economic Growth Bureaus.* These people often felt there was a lack of engagement and coordination between various USAID subdivisions. One of the respondents said, “BizCLIR was handled too much in-house by the Economic Growth Office.”
2. *People from other donor and development institutions.* These people suggested that there should be closer cooperation between the USAID BizCLIR team and these institutions to make a more efficient use of funds and resources. While we list possible ideas for successful cooperation (Box 3), we should note that full cooperation is often

impractical due to diversity of political and bureaucratic agendas, schedules, and conflicting institutional-donors' interests.

3. *People from follow-up projects and multilateral development institutions.* These people generally agreed that the assessments were useful and provided good content and guidance in defining areas of practical reform that added value and were complimentary to the *Doing Business* papers. However, they felt that an even more detailed/elaborated report would allow the follow up projects to place greater emphasis and focus on implementation rather than additional research. The desired additional elements that were suggested included mapping key processes, leaner public sector procedures, and practical action plans.
4. *The respondents in the Philippines where BizCLIR (namely HealthCLIR) was somewhat ineffective since it did not materialize in any follow up activities.* This lack of effectiveness was partly due to the insufficient stakeholder engagement, less than optimal coordination between various USAID bureaus, and the resulting political sensitivity of the contents of the assessment.

BOX 4. EXAMPLE OF US TREASURY COOPERATION WITH OTHER AGENCIES ON TAX POLICY/ADMINISTRATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Possible Avenues for Closer Cooperation followed by the US Treasury are as follows:

- Initial visitation and in depth needs assessment include discussions with donors identified by the Revenue Authority and by the Embassy (and by the donors themselves). This helps eliminate redundant assistance. The IMF is virtually always consulted.
- Some projects are constructed from the beginning as cooperative ones: Mongolia (IMF and World Bank), Nigeria (IMF); Jamaica (USAID); historically Ukraine (World Bank). The cooperation with the IMF starts from a joint mission and an aide-mémoire in whose preparation OTA participates. Each participant agrees on the work plan and on the project manager, who oversees the activities of all participants. Others: Sub-contract to IFC; sub-contract to IMF (e.g., Legislative drafting in Haiti).
- Field cooperation: A formal statement of work of all project managers includes the expectation of fostering in the field cooperation. Cooperation and harmonization of approaches seems to work well.
- Many of our advisors work also as peripatetic advisors for other agencies (IMF, World Bank, DFID contractors, USAID contractors) facilitating ease of communication and cooperation.

SOURCE: US TREASURY REVENUE ASSISTANCE, WASHINGTON, DC, 24 – 25 JANUARY 2011

E. Who used the BizCLIR Process and Results?

We identified several groups of people who may have been directly or indirectly involved in using the BizCLIR process and results:

1. Mission Personnel
2. The BizCLIR Team
3. Public Sector interviewees
4. Private Sector interviewees
5. Follow up implementation projects
6. Government agencies
7. Other donors, collaborators (World Bank, GTZ, etc.)

F. How was the BizCLIR Process Used?

1. To formulate / Write RFPs
2. Baseline for background for SOWs
3. To inform the follow up implementation projects
4. To stimulate dialogue and generate awareness at all levels
5. Generate reform ideas for programming
6. Inform and re-structure government action plans

G. Limitations of the Evaluation Results Analysis

As was stated previously, the absence of any evaluation of the BizCLIR may have caused limits to the credibility and utility of some components or parts of the evaluation, which were opinion-based and survey based.

The main limitation was the sources of data the team was able to collect from the implementing contractor, BAH, USAID, the World Bank and people and organizations in the five sample countries. These sources proved insufficient since we were able to contact only a small, non-random sample of people familiar with the BizCLIR program. In many cases, people familiar with the program had moved on to other assignments and were unavailable. To be fair, it should be noted that the people who were contacted and provided feedback were the ones who were the best informed and in most cases had a somewhat holistic view of the BizCLIR program and process in their countries.

IV. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: INFORMING FUTURE PROGRAM PLANNING

In general, the feedback about the BizCLIR assessments and their usefulness was positive. In most cases, it is too early to evaluate the effects (positive or negative) or expected impacts. However, the assessments and the subsequent recommendations were useful in:

- (a) identifying the most binding constraints to economic and business development;
- (b) strategically shaping activity portfolios of client USAID missions;
- (c) increasing and re-shaping dialogue with the government authorities;
- (d) drafting RFPs for follow up projects or adjusting existing ones;
- (e) getting a deeper insight into *Doing Business* indicators and components;
- (f) shaping research and implementation efforts by the follow up projects;
- (g) helping civil society/business associations formulate and voice their position on important business environment issues;
- (h) promoting inter-institutional and donor collaboration and coordination; and
- (i) generating immediate changes of attitude and/or new awareness in most of the business actors and stakeholders.

At the same time, there were certain challenges, such as engaging stakeholders and including top and mid-level government officials. In most countries, it is the technocrats who champion reforms (or at least they do not oppose it), but only if they are engaged and convinced of the purpose and objective. Other challenges included a trade-off between breadth versus depth and quality of the assessments and composition of teams, as well as the challenge in getting more detailed reform recommendations to allow for follow-up projects that placed more emphasis on implementation.

The recommendations presented below are hypotheses that generally received favorable feedback from informed interviewees and have been further developed by the team. The points have the potential to inform the development of a new BizCLIR-like program by suggesting ways to improve the preceding program. However, in the situation of resource scarcity, following all of the recommendations presented below may not be possible. Clients (USAID missions) would face a number of trade offs and should make strategic choices based on long-term goals. With the benefit of hindsight, the recommendations that follow are designed to help inform decision-making.

A. Scope of the Assessments

1. Breadth versus Depth of the assessment: Prioritize and limit the number of assessment areas to a selected few (3-5) most binding constraints to business environment and analyze these subject areas more meticulously. There is a substantial trade-off between covering as many subject areas as possible and the depth and quality of the analysis. This analysis suggests that covering 13-15 broad areas, such as tax policy, tax administration, trade and transport diagnostics, may not be practical under conditions of scarcity. This is especially true considering the limited financial resources of USAID missions, limited government absorption capacity, limited political capital of the reform champions, the

need for more stakeholder engagement, and at times, the limited timeframe (urgency) for reforms. Finally, a better quality and more detailed reform roadmap should allow the follow up projects to better focus on implementation rather than additional research efforts. All of these should increase the effectiveness of the assessments and the follow up projects.

2. Options have value: Keeping a greater number of research areas allows more room for exercising leadership. There is a body of evidence that suggests that keeping the number of research areas covered by the assessment at more than one or two narrowly defined subject areas may be preferable. The areas selected may well be the most binding constraints to development of a country. This requires more than a vague support for the reform on the part of influential stakeholders, like the government or the key business associations.

3. When evaluating several research areas, ensure strong government and civil society engagement before deciding on a single sector (i.e., the BizCLIR assessment only covers one sector, such as AgCLIR, HealthCLIR, etc.). The other extreme is focusing all the funds and the attention of the team on one or two narrowly selected topics within HealthCLIR or AgCLIR. These should allow for a more insightful look into a specific sector or subsectors, as well as the possibility of better informing follow up implementation projects. To minimize the chances of the efforts being seriously undermined by the lack of support or even hostility on the part of relevant stakeholders, it is necessary to get as much traction as possible by ensuring:

- Strong support and active cooperation among various USAID sectors (e.g., economic growth and health) to effectively identify relevant stakeholders to engage and subject areas to address;
- Strong engagement and ownership on the part of the government and civil society;
- A rough consensus and cooperation between various development agencies, such as donor agencies and multilateral institutions; and
- The analysis and underlying data is high quality.

4. Increasing geographical coverage within a country or a region helps gain better insight into trade facilitation issues (regional customs administrations versus those in the capital), gender, agriculture, and other sectors.

5. A deeper assessment would benefit from a menu of products such as an action plan, prioritized recommendations, a more detailed roadmap for reforms, business process mapping, and an overview of donor activities in the areas chosen. Most importantly, the assessment should determine monitoring indicators and set a baseline for the follow up implementation projects.

6. Setting a baseline for the follow up implementation projects, especially for those other than BizCLIR. Initial BizCLIR assessments relied heavily on *Doing Business* indicators. That meant that to some extent, *Doing Business* indicators could serve as a baseline for measuring impact for the follow up implementation projects. Yet, the newer assessments, such as AgCLIR, MicroCLIR and HealthCLIR, are unlikely to be able to rely on *Doing Business* for setting the baseline. Therefore, it would be desirable that the appropriate monitoring indicators are developed to guide the managers of the follow up projects, as well as facilitate the mid-term and final evaluations of the projects.

B. Creating Traction for Reforms

1. Build government ownership into the assessment process. The government should own, or at least, be consulted and well informed of the assessment process to avoid alienating key representatives. Interestingly, successful engagement is necessary but may not be a sufficient prerequisite for reforms. The engagement should ideally address both levels, including top decision-making elite, as well as the groups of mid-level authorities who would implement the reforms. Both groups may act to undermine reform efforts if not engaged properly. Finally, there were suggestions that it would be helpful to involve government representatives throughout the process and not just at the end.

2. Ensure broader engagement with the civil society. Civil society is one of the most important beneficiaries of the assessments and the follow-on research. It is important to engage them as widely as possible. In this respect, engaging the largest business associations (as was done in the West Bank) is at least as important as engaging a relatively small, albeit important, American Chambers of Commerce.

3. Ensure cooperation with the donors and multilateral institutions. A number of options for expanding cooperation with the multilateral institutions like the World Bank, IFC, *Doing Business* teams, and others should be considered. Options for increasing cooperation may include, but are not limited to, initial consultations, joint field visits with the World Bank *Doing Business* teams, inviting them to workshops to help develop recommendations, and guiding selected group discussions to help them come up with recommendations.

4. Increasing time and emphasis on workshops to enhance dialogue and participation/ownership/dissemination of ideas by private sector, government, NGOs, and donors through increasing the number and variety of participants and the time allocated for the preparation of the workshop could improve traction. Workshops engaging a greater number of people turned out to be more effective dissemination and consensus building mechanism. The more diversified the attendees at the workshop, the less biased the recommendations, because it was more difficult for any particular group to hijack the recommendations coming out of the assessment.

5. What gets measured gets done: Ensuring a linkage between BizCLIR and the *Doing Business* indicators. In a number of countries, authorities were interested in improving their *Doing Business* rankings. Governments often ask questions about which particular recommendations are going to help them improve their country's *Doing Business* rating. Thus, the greater linkage between BizCLIR and *Doing Business* helps increase traction for reform efforts. It is likely that one of the contributing factors to the less than desired outcome of the HealthCLIR in the Philippines was a loose association between *Doing Business* indicators and HealthCLIR.¹¹

¹¹ It should be noted that the BizCLIR team was having difficulties linking HealthCLIR to *Doing Business*. This was due to the specificities of publicly owned sector.

C. Team Composition

1. Increasing the use and participation of indigenous experts. For the most part, the assessments are conducted by ex-pats. This may restrict the country experience of the assessors and therefore the thoroughness and accuracy of their analysis; this issue was noted by several interviewees. Greater use of indigenous experts (e.g., coupling qualified local experts with ex-pats) would help address this issue. The best use of the local experts would be to help validate the preliminary conclusions emerging from desk research and field visits, and increase engagement/ownership of reform recommendations by stakeholders. Finally, hiring local experts often leads to better informed follow up efforts. Since the local experts are often retained for the implementation projects. It should also be noted, that a more extensive use of local experts may increase the cost of assessments noticeably in some countries.

2. Ensuring the right skills mix. A number of interviewees suggested that it was essential to keep a balance between legislative/policy analysis and administration issues. It has been noted that law experts often lack understanding of administration issues. Therefore, it is important to have people who are experienced in both or consider hiring two sets of experts per subject area. This would definitely drive the costs of such analysis up significantly. This competing priority makes it even more important to limit/prioritize the major economic areas (or *Doing Business* Indicators) covered by the assessments.

3. Conducting mid-term and final (End of Contract) evaluations of the follow up projects. Generally, the lifespan of a follow up project is between three to five years. Conducting mid-term and final evaluations of these projects would help build baseline data, inform re-design efforts, and further follow-up and design of project extensions, as well as revisiting the quality of roadmap recommendations made in BizCLIR assessments.

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**ANNEX A. EVALUATION SCOPE OF WORK & DELIVERABLES OF
BIZCLIR CONTRACT**

SECTION C – DESCRIPTION / SPECIFICATIONS/STATEMENT OF WORK

I. INTRODUCTION

USAID/Washington intends to conduct an evaluation of the USAID-funded program activity, BizCLIR – Business Climate, Legal and Institutional Reform Project to inform the design of future work in this area. BizCLIR is a task order under the CLIR IQC. It is being implemented by Booz Allen Hamilton (Booz), starting September 30, 2006 and ending September 30, 2010. The project is overseen by the Trade and Investment Team of the Office of Economic Growth, in the Bureau of Economic Growth, Agriculture and Trade (EGAT/EG/TI).

The Contractor shall provide an evaluation of the impact and secondarily performance of BizCLIR for several purposes:

1. Evaluate the *impact* of BizCLIR in countries where activities have been undertaken;
2. Evaluate the *impact* of BizCLIR on USAID’s promotion of business climate reform generally;
3. Evaluate the *impact* of BizCLIR on USAID mission activities, particularly project design;
4. Provide information to USAID and other counterparts on lessons learned that can guide USAID and others in better assessment, design and implementation of business environment reform projects for greater impact; and
5. Evaluate *performance* of Booz in meeting the contract requirements of BizCLIR in order to identify replicable practices, successes and weaknesses in performance (in order to improve program design and evaluation of contractor performance more generally);

The evaluation shall begin with the effective date shown under **Block 11b** of the cover sheet. The Contractor shall work directly with USAID and Booz, which will provide documents and contacts needed for a thorough evaluation. The contractor shall also contact relevant missions, MCC, USDA, FTC and the World Bank’s *Doing Business* and FIAS teams and other stakeholders as needed to obtain additional input. The evaluation should be completed and provided to USAID/EGAT/EG by January 29, 2011.

II. BACKGROUND

C.1 Improving Business Environments

1. From Roadmaps to CLIR: Developments in Business Enabling Environment Reforms

USAID has been actively supporting business enabling environment reforms for decades in developing and transition countries. These efforts advanced significantly in the early 1990s with support for Hernando de Soto’s work on informal economies, which identified the impact of regulation on investment and formal commercial activity. In 1993, USAID teamed with FIAS to create the Investor Roadmap diagnostics, an assessment approach that examined the barriers an investor might find in starting and pursuing a business in the country under study.

The Roadmaps highlighted the excessive regulatory burden found in developing countries, resulting in careful, voluminous documentation of processes, requirements, and even forms needed to invest. The Roadmaps also provided the conceptual framework in data used by Simeon Djankov and his World Bank team to develop the Doing Business indicators (www.doingbusiness.org), which measure regulatory burdens worldwide through proxy time and motion studies.

C.2 SCOPE OF WORK FOR PROJECT ASSESSMENT

Evaluation Objective

The overall aim of the project evaluation is to assess the progress made toward the objectives stated in the Scope of Work of BizCLIR Task Order:

- 1) Improve the efficiency and impact of assistance programs intended to help developing countries improve their enabling environments;
- 2) Improve both USAID's conceptual understanding of global principles in this field, and how that understanding can be applied most efficiently in the field;
- 3) Strengthen field missions' capacity to understand sequencing issues that may be critical to effectiveness, identify bottlenecks, and prioritize activities; and
- 4) Strengthen USAID's understanding of best practices, develop improved assistance tools, improve broader donor understanding of sequencing and prioritization.

III. Specific Evaluation Questions:

1. Program Effectiveness

- a. What impacts (intended or unintended; positive or negative) have been produced that can be attributable to the program? For countries, this shall include specific policy, legal and institutional reforms. For missions, this shall include any follow-on projects, redesign of existing projects, new activities, improved influence among donor coordination groups, direction for counterpart organizations, etc. For Washington, this shall include the extent to which other teams and bureaus ("other" meaning those besides EGAT/EG/TI) have benefitted from the use of the BizCLIR project through buy-ins or collaboration, and any impacts on programming, understanding or any other effects, positive or negative.
- b. Given that activities stated in the SOW were illustrative based on mission or Washington demand,
 - i. inventory the activities undertaken against those proposed in the SOW to determine what was not addressed during project implementation and why;

- ii. of the activities undertaken, determine the basis for selection (mission versus Washington priorities), and, within that context determine the level of satisfaction of the missions with any field programs; and
 - iii. assess to what extent the failure to pursue any of the initially proposed activities has affected USAID's ability to meet its objectives.
- c. BizCLIR Assessments. The project conducted a number of BizCLIR and AgCLIR assessments, ranging from three or four topic areas to eleven topic areas (Tanzania). In these assessments:
- i. For missions that funded an assessment in whole or in part, what was the basis of their decision to have an assessment? Did the counterpart government participate in the decision, either directly or through expression of need for reform?
 - ii. Was the range of topics appropriate and necessary for each mission? Where a mission requested a full assessment, was that mission satisfied that all areas were necessary and useful for their purposes? In retrospect, would any of the missions have asked for fewer areas to be covered, and, if so, which ones?
 - iii. Was the depth of research appropriate to mission needs? What changes, if any, would the missions recommend to improve or refine the assessment methodology? To what extent did the assessment move the overall level of understanding and recommendations beyond existing research on business environment in that country?
 - iv. Could the same quality have been achieved using primarily local consultants as opposed to an exclusively expat specialist team? (Note: In Pakistan, local consultants were also included.)
 - v. What impact was there from any workshops or other public events held? What impact, if any, was there on the work or knowledge of the US Embassy in each country assessed?
- d. To what extent have counterpart governments or other counterpart organizations in the field benefitted from the project? How do these counterparts perceive the utility or effectiveness of the relevant project activities?
- e. What are the lessons learned of the program?
- f. What have the major obstacles been to program success and how well did the implementing contractor respond to these challenges?

2. Project Management, Coordination and Partnership

- a. Project Management: Determine the strengths and weaknesses of both Booz and USAID in managing the various aspects of this project. Advise on what improvements could be made to improve management of similar activities in the future.
- b. Coordination:
 - i. To what extent did USAID Washington coordinate effectively with: (1) missions; (2) other bureaus and offices; and (3) World Bank Doing Business and FIAS Response Unit teams with BizCLIR in project implementation and design? Are there other potential partners that should be considered and engaged in future activities?
 - ii. To what extent did USAID coordinate planning and knowledge management and planning within EG? What could be done to enhance or improve internal coordination?

3. Program Relevance

- a. For the assessments, to what extent were the recommendations actionable without need for further assessment?
- b. How have missions or others used the assessments? This shall include an analysis of several assessments that pre-date BizCLIR, such as Ethiopia CLIR, CAFTA-DR or SEA CLIR (Southeast Asia) (available on the BizCLIR website). What reforms have been achieved through the use of this work and have they had a meaningful positive impact on the business environment?
- c. To what extent have various tools developed under the project (case studies, methodologies, expert opinions, for example) been utilized by others not directly related to the project?
- d. How useful is the project website (www.bizclir.com) for USAID? For other development practitioners? How can the strengths of the website best be preserved post-project?

4. Sustainability

- a. Assess the stand-alone utility of the various products developed. Are the diagnostic methodologies and supporting materials sufficiently clear for individuals who have not participated in an assessment to utilize them as is? What, if any, additional materials are needed to broaden use of the assessments by other business environment reformers?
- b. How effective has the project been in disseminating knowledge and use of the assessment tools and other resources so that they are used by contractors other than Booz? To mainstream the methodological approach as the standard enabling environment assessment methodology of USAID, what else needs to be done?
- c. How effective has the project been in obtaining buy-in from other donor organizations for the results and methodologies? To the extent that it is within the manageable interests of USAID or a contractor such as Booz, what else could be done to expand adoption of the methodologies?

IV. METHOD AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EVALUATION

The Evaluation team shall propose appropriate methods that shall be used to answer the evaluation questions in a credible and collaborative way, with all stakeholders, and in light of the data that is available.

Interviews shall be undertaken with the BizCLIR Project team, appropriate USAID Washington and Mission counterparts, and relevant implementing partners. (USAID/Washington office will assist in arranging interviews.) As part of proposal the evaluation team shall prepare and propose a data collection, analysis plan, and methodology for the evaluation. Key documents will be provided by EGAT/EG/TI and Booz. It is expected that most interviews shall be conducted in person with affected program beneficiaries and participants, and/or by telephone or e-mail, with travel limited to two missions or regions.

The review team shall work under the direction and technical guidance of evaluation manager Bhavani Pathak in coordination with the Management Team Leader, Theresa Stoll. The evaluation team leader shall be responsible for regular updates to Ms Pathak and Ms Stoll on the progress of the study during the fieldwork period, the design and management of the evaluation and evaluation team, and the final report.

V. TECHNICAL PROPOSAL

AMEX International's technical proposal dated July 15, 2010 as negotiated is hereby incorporated into **Section C as Attachment #1** below.

END OF SECTION C

SECTION F – DELIVERABLES OR PERFORMANCE

F.1 PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE

(a) The estimated period of performance for this task order is from the date of award through January 29, 2011.

F.2 DELIVERABLES

Deliverable 1: Within five weeks of award the contractor shall submit a draft work plan to the evaluation manager that describes planned visits, identified interviewees, and the methodology of data collection. USAID will provide comment to the contractor upon submission of work plan.

Deliverable 2: Within three weeks of work commencement the contractor shall debrief EGAT/EG [and Booz] on the preliminary findings of the study.

Deliverable 3: Within five weeks of work commencement the contractor shall provide a draft final report and brief EGAT/EG and Booz on major findings and recommendations. EGAT/EG and Booz will provide comments within one week of receipt of the draft.

Deliverable 4: Within 15 working days of receipt of USAID and partner comments, the contractor shall provide EGAT/EG with the final version of the report, after incorporating feedback on the draft, electronically and in two printed copies. The contractor shall also send one copy of the final report electronically to PPC/CDIE/DI, in order to make the document available in the USAID library and database.

The findings shall reflect specific evaluation questions and be supported with concrete evidence (quantitative or qualitative). The conclusions shall be based on specific findings, and recommendations shall be in line with the conclusions. Recommendations shall be practical and actionable. The recommendations shall guide USAID and the implementers in reprioritizing program activities, as needed, based on successes and shortcomings; they shall also provide useful guidelines for programming similar activities in the future.

Final Report: The Contractor shall prepare a final report that matches accomplishments to the specific paragraphs of the Scope of Work. The final report shall be drafted to allow for incremental improvements in the process, both generally within USAID and specifically with respect to this contract. The report shall also include an annex of lessons learned and recommendations for a follow on program that might complement the completed Task Order work.

F.3 TIME FRAME:

Presentation of Work Plan & methodology	5 weeks from award
Preliminary debriefing	3 weeks from work commencement
Initial Presentation of findings /draft report submission	5 weeks of work commencement
Submission of Final Report	15 Days after comments

F.4 EVALUATION TEAM COMPOSITION AND PARTICIPATION

It is expected that the evaluation team shall consist of a team of two or more members, including the following:

Subject matter expert. S/he shall be qualified as a business environment specialist with at least 10 years of experience in design and implementation of business enabling environment projects in developing countries. The team leader shall take the lead and be responsible for the overall assessment,

Evaluation expert: S/he shall be a qualified international development evaluation specialist with at least 10 years experience, a substantial amount of which shall be dealing with private enterprise development policy programs.

Consultant(s). One or more consultants with at least five years experience in development, implementation or evaluation of assessment methodologies, and experience in business enabling environment reforms.

Depending on the structure of the team proposed by the contractor, USAID estimates that the services of subject matter expert will be needed for approximately 25 working days, an evaluation specialist for 20 days of any consultant(s) for up to 10 days. They shall be expected to begin their assignment after contract award.

F.5 TECHNICAL DIRECTION AND DESIGNATION OF RESPONSIBLE USAID OFFICIALS

Kenneth E. Stein
Contracting Officer
U.S. Agency for International Development
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F.2 DELIVERABLES

Deliverables	
1. Microeconomic Diagnostics	The contractor shall deliver at least four Deep Diagnostic Doing Business Studies, one for every region (Africa, LAC, E&E, and ANE). The contractor shall conduct up to six Doing Business Broadly studies and workshops over the life of the Task Order.
2. "Seldon" CLIR Diagnostics	<p>The Contractor shall rework and refine the existing Indicators to incorporate lessons learned in previous diagnostics, and to make the Indicators more easily utilized in the diagnostic process. This will include "cross-cutting" indicators – analytical questions common to most or all business climate areas, many of which are currently spread throughout the CLIR diagnostic and need to be consolidated. The contractor shall deliver up to eight additional business climate area indicator sets.</p> <p>Each country diagnostic study shall entail the following elements:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>Team Formation:</i> The diagnostics shall be conducted by Diagnostic Teams that shall spend several days preparing for a two-three week visit in-country, and prepare a final report; 2. <i>Field work:</i> This shall consist of the activities conducted in-country by the diagnostic team, e.g., interviews, local meetings and research, preparation of a draft report, preliminary scoring. The following countries are among those that are currently being considered by EGAT/EG as potential participants: E.g. Year One could see one diagnostic in Asia (Afghanistan – [Note: The Contractor shall expect that additional security issues will need to be addressed for Afghanistan. USAID/Afghanistan shall provide special guidance concerning security requirements (and budget effect) for this diagnostic.]) and four diagnostics in Africa (Angola, South Africa, Mozambique, and Ghana); Year Two could see three diagnostics in Asia (Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Pakistan), and Year Three could see four diagnostics in Latin America (Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, and Peru). EGAT/EG anticipates conducting four additional diagnostics in Year Four [Note: The countries specified are based on EGAT/EG's ongoing dialogue with Bureaus and Missions, and are subject to substitution contingent on changes in government,

NOTE: The table provided above is from a original document provided by Booz-Allen (BAH). It could not be edited or manipulated.

	<p>bilateral relations, and funding.]. The Contractor shall have capacity to conduct an additional four country diagnostics (so that up to a total of twenty country diagnostics may be requested under this task order). The sequencing of country diagnostics is notional. The final sequence shall be developed in coordination with the CTO and incorporated into the Contractor's Workplan.</p> <p>3. <i>Mission Debrief & Country Conference:</i> Before departure by the team from the country, the contractor shall debrief the appropriate USAID mission official(s) and embassy personnel on key findings and areas of opportunity for future programming. The team shall also provide a half-day conference for selected counterparts to reveal the preliminary findings of the group.</p> <p>4. <i>Follow-up, Editorial Clean-up and Consolidation:</i> The contractor shall prepare a Final Diagnostic Report, which shall incorporate any comments/edits made to the draft report.</p> <p><i>USAID/Washington Debriefing:</i> The Contractor shall make a presentation on the results to USAID and the broader USG development assistance community.</p> <p>The Contractor shall convene up to three regional workshops. The Contractor shall deliver a regional report for each regional workshop held.</p>
3. Post-Diagnostic "Bridging" Services	<p>The contractor shall conduct at least six "Bridging" activities: EGAT/EG anticipates that 50% of USAID missions using diagnostic tools will require short term consultative services to bridge the gap between the diagnostic (that identifies problem areas) and initiation of mission-led follow-on projects. These bridging activities shall have at least one, but often several, of the following deliverables:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Public education campaign strategies developed; o Public-private dialogue forums organized and convened; o Process re-engineering analyses conducted and implementation plans designed; o ICT requirements determined; o Participatory processes for legislation drafting conducted. <p>□ Countries: Two from each region per year (Contractor should assume for budgeting purposes using Ecuador, Peru, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Angola, and Ghana).</p>
4. Pilot Projects	The Contractor shall conduct a pilot project in a different region, one per year, in coordination with EGAT/EG.
5. Knowledge	The Contractor shall:

Management

- 1) Capture, provide custodianship, and perform taxonomy of all information, data, analyses, and any other written material produced under the Task Order;
- 2) Create a standard framework for knowledge creation, sharing, and vetting;
- 3) Disseminate lessons learned, best-practices, and professional training in appropriate multimedia formats;
- 4) Provide technical-support and outreach to USAID Missions, client country decision-makers, and other domestic US and international development and support organizations; and
- 5) Coordinate donor and KM linkages.

The Contractor shall provide the following kinds of knowledge management services to USAID:

The Contractor shall update and supplement the Guide at EGAT/EG's direction.

The Contractor shall undertake to define best practices for business climate reform. Common mistakes as well as success factors are to be identified. Recommendations will be prepared for future USAID interventions. The Contractor shall deliver these findings by end of Year One of the Task Order.

The Contractor shall develop a strategy for disseminating best practices developed under the Task Order. Economic Growth officers, including Foreign Service National staff, shall be provided access and training in the use of Best Practices.

The Contractor shall design and implement a best practices strategy;

The Contractor shall also make available through the "Community of Practice" on its website (see next page) best practice information. The Contractor shall develop creative strategies to engage Economic Growth officers, program staff, State Department staff, and Washington, D.C.-based counterparts in best practices in discussions through a number of possible formats, including video-conferences, online discussions, and workshops.

The Contractor shall convene three regional workshops in which experiences in best practices in the above-referenced areas shall be shared. These workshops may be done in conjunction with other previously referenced workshops.

The Contractor shall assume the management and maintenance of the www.bizlawreform.com website once the Seldon task order is completed;

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In order for USAID to maintain, use and modify the diagnostic tool in the future, the contractor shall deliver a Programmer's Manual for the tool, which will include the high level design, database schema, data dictionary, source code and full supporting documentation. The source code is the form of software written in its native programming language, which is required to maintain software and to adapt and modify it.

The Contractor shall provide technical services in researching, assessing, and designing such indicators for USAID's use, as and when the need arises.

ANNEX B: FINANCIAL ASPECTS AND USE OF FUNDS DETAILS

USAID - Booz Allen BizCLIR Evaluation		
Financial Aspects and Use of Funds Details		
Type	Activity Name	Accrued - 30 Nov 2010 US\$
AgCLIR	AgCLIR PM / R&D	302,989
AgCLIR	Democratic Republic of Congo	280,318
AgCLIR	Ghana	237,731
AgCLIR	Kosovo	122,486
AgCLIR	Liberia	41,262
AgCLIR	Nigeria	266,685
AgCLIR	Senegal	302,741
AgCLIR	Tanzania	436,856
AgCLIR	Uganda	341,626
BizCLIR	BizCLIR PM / R&D	360,713
BizCLIR	Indicator R&D / Revision / Realign	273,636
BizCLIR	Afghanistan	452,990
BizCLIR	Burundi	198,644
BizCLIR	Jamaica	144,258
BizCLIR	Kenya	305,195
BizCLIR	Mexico	56,889
BizCLIR	Pakistan	415,918
BizCLIR	Peru	26,491
BizCLIR	Rwanda	83,064
BizCLIR	Tanzania	248,079
BizCLIR	Uganda	194,655
BizCLIR	West Bank	374,728
BizCLIR	Zimbabwe	209,515
EcoCLIR	EcoCLIR White Paper	5,300
GenderCLIR	GenderCLIR PM / R&D	171,844
GenderCLIR	Rwanda	223,516
GenderCLIR	Vietnam	259,929
GenderCLIR	Rwanda Gender TA	309,922
GenderCLIR	Vietnam Gender TA	35,712
General	PM	868,659
General	Project Start-up	105,215
HealthCLIR	Philippines	177,883
HealthCLIR	Uganda	235,494
KM	Knowledge Management PM / R&D	344,222

USAID - Booz Allen BizCLIR Evaluation		
Financial Aspects and Use of Funds Details		
Type	Activity Name	Accrued - 30 Nov 2010 US\$
KM	Best Practice	44,252
KM	Outreach Event (Reformers, DB launch, Reformers Club)	71,785
KM	Technical Publication	67,770
KM	Website	188,471
MicroCLIR	MicroCLIR PM / R&D / Cambodia	60,123
MicroCLIR	Social Dynamics Paper	22,000
MicroCLIR	Tanzania	151,929
Misc	Misc: Africa Bureau	10,650
Misc	Misc: Food Security CAADP	13,493
Misc	Misc: Tech Manual, Contacts Db, Process Tools	10,279
SC	Strategic Communication PM / R&D	60,700
SC	Ease of Doing Business in Agriculture Sector - APEC	111,690
SC	EG Training - South Africa	62,166
SC	EG Training - Thailand	16,215
SC	Federalist Society Meetings	29,208
Surge Capacity	Ghana	52,941
Surge Capacity	Tanzania	162,765
TA	Technical Assistance PM / R&D	267,072
TA	Africa Regional Financial Integration	11,208
TA	East Africa Mobile Payment	467,157
TA	East Africa Secured Transaction	38,676
TA	Kenya Infrastructure Financing	62,574
TA	Kosovo Animal Product Study	195,269
TA	Kosovo MAFRD	188,361
TA	Kosovo Office of PM	133,477
TA	Kosovo Strategy	252,867
TA	Rapid Response	35,197
TA	Rapid Response: Laos ICT Registry Purchase	138,000
TA	Rapid Response: CAFTA, Peru, Colombia, Regional Secured Transaction Matrix	33,007
TA	Rapid Response: UNCITRAL	2,835
TA	Tanzania Secured Transactions	509,177
TOTAL FUNDS USED (Up to dec-2010)		11,886,478

Note: The overall expenditure was reported to be \$12,995,507; the difference was defined to be unrealized/allocated funds.

ANNEX C. TYPES OF EVALUATION

Impact evaluation: A type of program evaluation that aims to determine if there have been changes in the target group members or in their activities because of the program.

Outcome evaluation: A type of program evaluation, which aims to assess program achievements, compared to planned objectives and activities. This type of evaluation focuses, in quantitative terms, on how many objectives and activities were accomplished.

Process evaluation: A type of program evaluation which focuses on trying to understand how program activities were implemented, primarily in qualitative terms. It can, however, include the collection of some quantitative information. Process evaluations seek to determine what approaches were used, what problems were encountered, what strategies were successful and why.

Source: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACH756.pdf

ANNEX D. EVALUATION PROTOCOLS

1. USAID Missions Protocol

BizCLIR Evaluation Data Collection Protocol: USAID Missions
--

Date _____

Mission _____

Person(s) Providing Data _____

Person Collecting Data _____

Topics

A. BizCLIR Activities

1. What BizCLIR activities (e.g., assessment, conference, surge capacity support) were implemented in your Mission?

Answer:

2. Were these activities completed satisfactorily?

Answer:

3. Did these activities provide services to your Mission that were useful?

Answer:

B. Assessments

1. What assessments were completed in the country? Include the name, focus and cost of each assessment.

Answer:

2. How was the decision made to have an assessment (or assessments) and who participated in the decision?

Answer:

3. Was the USAID Mission satisfied with the quality and usefulness of the assessment (or assessments)?

Answer:

4. Does the Mission have any recommendations for improving the assessment process?

Answer:

C. Technical Assistance

1. The BizCLIR assessment made several specific reform recommendations. How did the Mission decide on what recommendations to adopt? Who was involved in the decision process and how did it operate?

Answer:

2. How sufficient was the BizCLIR assessment for programming follow-on technical assistance?

Answer:

3. What technical assistance activities were implemented and what did each cost?

Answer:

4. Has there been any evaluation to determine the effectiveness of the technical assistance activities?

Answer:

5. Is the Mission satisfied with the BizCLIR technical assistance it received?

Answer:

D. BizCLIR Program Relevance

1. Has the USAID Mission used the information from the BizCLIR assessments?

Answer:

E. BizCLIR Program Benefits

1. Has BizCLIR analyses been useful to other organizations and in what ways has it been useful?

Answer:

2. Are any of the assessment tools and/or methods of the BizCLIR program being used by other organizations, such as NGOs or counterpart agencies? How?

Answer:

G. BizCLIR Program Management, Coordination

1. What have the major obstacles been to BizCLIR Program success and how well did the implementing contractor respond to these challenges?

Answer:

2. Are there specific changes in BizCLIR Program that would improve its effectiveness?

Answer:

2. **Entrepreneurs' Protocol**

**BizCLIR Evaluation Data Collection Protocol:
For Private Sector and Entrepreneurs**

Date: December __/ 2010 Country & Institution:

Person(s) Providing Data _____

Person Collecting Data

(NOTE: This questionnaire and your answers will be maintained totally CONFIDENTIAL)

Impact/ Effect of BizCLIR in countries where activities have been undertaken;

A. BizCLIR Activities

1. As a business person, did the Biz(Ag)CLIR assessment team asked you to be involved in:
 - a. Were you interviewed for opinion: Yes No
 - b. Participated in the final workshop: Yes No
 - c. Provided information, data, or contacts? Yes ___ No ___
 - d. Other (explain) _____

2. What were your expectations, for the workshop?
 - a. Get information only: _____
 - b. Roundtables for consultation: _____
 - c. Other: _____

B. Ref. Assessment

1. Do you know if BizCLIR (AgCLIR) Assessment activities attracted interest from the business community? Yes _____ No _____
Why? _____

2. Was the assessment useful for the business sector? Yes _____ No _____
 - a. Because it was the basis for reform? Yes _____ No _____
 - b. Because it created opinion that improvement is needed? Yes _____ No _____

- c. Other? Yes ___ No ___
3. If you participated in the assessment, do you have any recommendations for improving the assessment process?
-

D. BizCLIR Program Relevance`

1. Do you know if the recommendations lead to any reforms or activities to improve the business environment? Yes _____ / No _____
- a. New laws for improving doing business: Yes _____ / No _____
- b. New Governments policies for improving doing business: Yes _____ / No _____
- c. New Procedures for improving doing business and trading: Yes _____ / No _____
- d. New financial facilities for improving doing business: Yes _____ / No _____
- e. Are there any reforms still missing? _____
- f. Other issues? _____
2. The BizCLIR (AgCLIR) makes recommendations to improve the business environment in this country, from the following recommendations, which do you agree that are valid?
- a. _____ ? Yes ___ No ___
- b. _____ ? Yes ___ No ___
- c. _____ ? Yes ___ No ___
3. Have you seen a copy of the report and/or the recommendations for your Business sector?
- (a) Yes _____ No _____
- i. If yes, do you consider it reflects your reality? _____
- ii. If not, what are your suggestions? _____
-

E. BizCLIR Program Benefits

1. Has the BizCLIR assessment caused for private sector to change attitudes towards “doing business”? Yes _____ No _____
- a. Are Business institutions are looking for ways to propose REFORMS Yes ___ No ___
- b. Are Government institutions interested to propose/accept REFORMS Yes ___ No ___

- c. Other changes in business environment? _____
- 2. Do you believe these recommendations useful? Yes No
 - a. If yes, how? _____
 - b. New laws/regulations Yes No [Proof]

G. BizCLIR Program Management, Coordination

- 1. Was the method of contacting for the assessment appropriate? Yes ___ No ___
- 2. As a business are you interested in knowing the recommendations from the assessment? Yes ___ No ___
- 3. As a business person, what additional changes would you recommend? **{read recommendations for commercial law reforms}**
 - a. Yes _____ No ___ Not Sure_____
 - b. If yes, what changes would you recommend?

3. Institutional Protocol

BizCLIR Evaluation Data Collection Protocol: For Private and International Institutions

Date: December __/ 2010 **Country & Institution:**

Person(s) Providing Data _____

Person Collecting Data

(NOTE: This questionnaire and your answers will be maintained totally CONFIDENTIAL)

Impact/ Effect of BizCLIR in countries where activities have been undertaken;

C. BizCLIR Activities

3. Did you have any role in the Biz(Ag)CLIR assessment Activities? Yes ___ No ___
 - a. Participant
Role: _____
 - b. Only information, data, or contacts? Yes ___ No ___
 - c. Other (explain) _____

4. Did you or your institution participate in the different activities/process of AgCLIR Assessment
 - a. Where you visited for opinion or information? Yes ___ No ___
 - b. Participated in final presentation / Round tables work? Yes ___ No ___

 - c. Supplied write or phone information only: Yes ___ No ___
 - d. Other: _____

5. What were the participants' expectations?
 - a. Supplied information only: _____
 - b. Roundtables validation consultation: _____
 - c. Other: _____

6. Were the expectations met? Yes ___ / No ___
 - d. Why?

 - e. If not, what was missing _____

D. Ref. Assessment Do you know if BizCLIR (AgCLIR)

a. Assessment activities attracted interest from the business community?

Yes _____ No _____

b. Government? Yes ___ No ___ Business Institutions? Yes ___ No ___

c. Donor Community? Yes ___ No ___

i. Why?

d. Was the assessment useful for the business sector? Yes _____ No _____

e. Because it was taken into consideration? Yes _____ No _____

f. Because it created opinion that improvement is needed? Yes _____ No _____

g. Other? Yes ___ No ___

1. Do you know if the recommendations lead to any reforms or activities to improve the business environment? Yes _____ / No _____

a. What are the improvements?

b. Which improvements are still missing?

c. Other issues? _____

4. Do you have any recommendations for improving the assessment process?

D. BizCLIR Program Relevance`

2. From the following recommendations, that BizCLIR did which do you agree that are valid? (read from specific country and sector-specific mentioned in assessment report)

(a) Change of Commercial Law ? Yes ___ No ___

(b) _____? Yes ___ No ___

(c) _____? Yes ___ No ___

3. Did the assessment (and recommendations) influence your institution to do something about it:

(a) Yes _____ No _____

(b) If yes, mention in what manner?:

- i. Creation of committee for Policy & legal reform Yes _____ No _____
1.
- ii. Creation of new mentality for reform
- iii. Other? _____

4. Do you know if Government has taken any actions because of the recommendations of assessment?:

(a) Yes _____ No _____

(b) If yes, what changes have you noticed: _____

5. Did you/ your institution receive a copy of report?

(a) Yes _____ No _____

i. If yes, do you consider it reflects the reality? _____

ii. If not, what are your suggestions? _____

E. BizCLIR Program Benefits

6. Has the (BizCLIR) assessment caused or generated changes to improve business conditions?

(a) Yes _____ No _____

(b) If yes, in what way could it cause changes?

G. BizCLIR Program Management, Coordination

7. When doing assessments has your institution had lack of support or constraints from{public or private]

(a) Yes _____ No _____

(b) If yes, what kind? _____

8. Besides the recommendations we have discussed for reform on your sector, do you have any additional ones for improvement of the business environment?

(a) Yes _____ No _____ Not Sure _____

(b) If yes, what changes would you recommend? _____

4. **Ministries' Protocol**

**BizCLIR Evaluation Data Collection Protocol:
For Ministries and Public Sectors**

``Date: December __/ 2010 Country & Institution:

Person(s) Providing Data _____

Person Collecting Data

(NOTE: This questionnaire and your answers will be maintained totally CONFIDENTIAL)

Impact/ Effect of BizCLIR in countries where activities have been undertaken;

E. BizCLIR Activities

6. Did you have any role in the Biz(Ag)CLIR assessment Activities? Yes ___ No ___

a. Participant

Role: _____

b. Only information, data, or contacts? Yes ___ No ___

c. Other (explain) _____

7. Did you or your Ministry participate in the different activities/process [or conference for making recommendations] of Biz (Ag)CLIR Assessment

a. Were you visited for opinion or information? Yes ___ No ___

b. Participated in final conference / Round tables work? Yes ___ No ___

c. Did your Ministry provide technical information ? : Yes ___ No ___

d. Other: _____

8. If you participated in the final conference [for recommendations], what were the participants' expectations?

a. Supplied information only: _____

b. Roundtables validation consultation: _____

c. Other: _____

9. Were the expectations met? Yes _____ / No _____

a. Why?

b. If not, what was missing

F. Ref. Assessment

5. Do you know if BizCLIR (AgCLIR) Assessment activities attracted interest from the public sector [which Ministries]? Yes _____ No _____
- a. Ministry of? Yes ___ No ____
 - b. Public/Private Institutions? Yes ___ No ____ [which:]
 - c. Donor Community? Yes ___ No ____
 - d. Why? _____
6. Was the assessment useful for the public sector policy reform process? Yes _____ No _____
- a. Because it was used for new reforms? Yes _____ No ____ [which & proof]
 - b. Because it created interest in public policy reform? Yes _____ No ____
 - c. Other? Yes ___ No ____ [which/what/proof]
7. Do you know if the recommendations lead to any reforms or activities to improve the business environment? Yes _____ / No _____
- i. What are the improvements? {proof } _____
 - ii. Do you have other areas for improvement? _____
8. Do you have any recommendations for improving the assessment processes?
- _____
-

D. BizCLIR Program Relevance`

9. From the following recommendations, that BizCLIR did, which do you agree that are valid? (read from specific country and sector-specific mentioned in assessment report)
- (a) Change of Commercial Law ? Yes ___ No ____
 - (b) _____? Yes ___ No ____
 - (c) _____? Yes ___ No ____
10. Did the assessment (and recommendations) influence the Ministry to do something about it:
- (a) Yes _____ No _____
 - (b) If yes, mention in what manner?
 - i. Creation of committee for Policy & legal reform Yes _____ No _____

- ii. Creation of new mentality for reform
- iii. Other? _____

11. Based on those recommendations, did the private sector lobby for the reforms?

(a) Yes _____ No _____

(b) If yes, what reforms did they lobby for? _____

12. Did the Ministry/department receive a copy of BIZ CLIR report?

(a) Yes _____ No _____

i. If yes, did the Ministry take an action on the recommendations? What actions were taken? [proof] _____

ii. If not, what are your suggestions? _____

E. BizCLIR Program Benefits

13. Has the (BizCLIR) assessment caused or generated changes to improve business conditions?

(a) Yes _____ No _____

(b) If yes, in what way could it cause changes?

G. BizCLIR Program Management, Coordination

14. During the BIZCLIR assessment was there any constraint for supplying information, or participating in the assessment from your Ministry?

(a) Yes _____ No _____

(b) If yes, what kinds of constraints?

—

15. Besides the recommendations we have mentioned before, would you have additional ones for improving of the business environment?

(a) Yes _____ No ____ Not Sure _____

(b) If yes, what changes would you recommend? _____

ANNEX E. USAID – BOOZ ALLEN-HAMILTON BIZCLIR PROGRAM (Documents posted on the BizCLIR Website Oct. 2010)

Publications:

The publications listed below include documents produced as part of the BizCLIR project and links to other organizations' documents that might be of interest to users of this site. This list of documents has been the basis of our secondary analyses and source of information, in terms of work done by Booz Allen Hamilton with the BizCLIR contract with USAID:

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