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AFGHANISTAN

Final Report

ACAP FINAL EVALUATION

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACAP	Afghan Civilian Assistance Program
AFP	Afghan First Policy
AGEs	Anti-Government Elements
AIHRC	Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission
AMs	Activity Managers
ANA	Afghanistan National Army
ANDS	Afghan National Development Strategy
ANP	Afghanistan National Police
ANSO	Afghan National Security Office
AOTR	Agreement Officers Technical Representative
ASF	Afghan Security Forces
CDC	Community Development Council
CERP	Commander's Emergency Response Program
CIMIC Team	Civil-Military Co-operation Team
COIN	Counter Insurgency
COTR	Contract Officer Technical Representative
CTG	Christian Thomas Group
DCI	Data Collection Instrument
DFPO	Deputy Field Program Officer
DSTs	District Stabilization Teams
FPO	Field Program Officer
GIRoA	Government <i>of</i> the Islamic Republic <i>of</i> Afghanistan
HQ	Head Quarters
ICFs	International Coalition Forces
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IMF	International Military Forces
IOM	International Organization <i>for</i> Migration
ICRC	International Committee <i>of</i> the Red Cross
IFO	International Field Officer
INGO	International Non -Government Organization
IP	Implementing Partner
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
LoEs	Level <i>of</i> Efforts
MoI	Ministry <i>of</i> Interior
MoLSAMD	Ministry <i>of</i> Labor, Social Affairs, Martyr and Disabled
MoPH	Ministry <i>of</i> Public Health
MRRD	Ministry <i>of</i> Rural Rehabilitation and Development
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NGO	Non- Governmental Organization
NSDP	National Skills Development Program
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
SDLR	Social Development & Legal Rights
SiKA	Stabilization <i>in</i> Key Areas
SoW	Scope <i>of</i> Work
UN	United Nation
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission <i>in</i> Afghanistan
UNDSS	United Nations Department <i>of</i> Safety and Security
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission <i>for</i> Refugees

1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1 Purpose, Goal and Objectives

This Final Evaluation focuses on the 2010 results of the Afghan Civilian Assistance Program (ACAP), implemented by the International Organization for Migration (IOM). ACAP is scheduled to end in 2011. The study was conducted because of the continued importance of supporting Afghan civilians that have suffered losses as a result of conflict. The evaluation assesses the effectiveness and impact of ACAP, its design and value as a stabilization program, and provides guidance for the remaining months of the program and for a follow-on ACAP II.

ACAP Goal and Objectives

Goal: Strengthen USG (United States Government) efforts to provide assistance to Afghan families and communities that have suffered losses as a result of military operations against insurgents, thereby contributing to overall stabilization efforts in Afghanistan and pre-emptively addressing potential causes of renewed disorderly migration.

Objectives:

1. Ensure that Afghan civilians suffering losses as a result of being caught between fighting between International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) and the insurgents receive timely and appropriate assistance to restore and continue their lives.¹
2. Establish and maintain a liaison network among key stakeholders on the international, national and provincial level.
3. Gather and disseminate information related to the ACAP program among stakeholders at the international, national and provincial level.

1.2 Methodology

Two international consultants carried out the evaluation over eight weeks. The team appreciated the cooperation of the ACAP management and staff - without which the evaluation would not have been possible. The evaluation gathered data across 10 provinces: Herat, Kunduz, Nangarhar, Laghman, Kabul, Wardak, Paktya, Khost, Kandahar, and Helmand. Methods used included 16 interviews in Kabul, 90 regional and stakeholder interviews, a phone and e-mail survey of 23 USAID Activity Managers, and a survey of 162 beneficiaries, 59 non-beneficiaries, and 26 local stakeholders.

1.3 Findings

Access and Verification of Beneficiaries. ACAP has been able to identify incidents but identification and verification of beneficiaries has been difficult and time-consuming. Beneficiary data indicates that sometimes relatives of a community elder or *shura* member with little or no damage were referred for assistance while eligible beneficiaries were neglected. In those cases, the communities were upset about what they saw as the unjust delivery of benefits. ACAP needs to meet potential beneficiaries in a community setting to mitigate this problem. If security prevents this, then community rather than individual-level assistance should be provided. In general, beneficiaries reported satisfaction with assistance, especially types with an impact on their livelihoods. ACAP

¹ „Timely’ is an indicator of the program but not in the objective of the agreement between USAID and IOM. It is included in the SOW objectives for the evaluation

has logged, but not started to address, a large number of incidents and potential beneficiaries across Afghanistan. Since April 2007, there are almost as many incidents that have not been addressed, as there are ones ACAP has assisted in some way.

Appropriateness.

The assistance is useful but could be of better quality and more closely meet the needs of the family. Assistance with longer-term impact on household finances was preferred by beneficiaries, stakeholders, and staff. The kits varied in usefulness. Education kits were favorably received and are having a positive effect; training has been well received; and tailoring and carpet weaving for women has also been well received. Sometimes improper beneficiaries received the assistance due to problems with ACAP processes or corruption. ACAP has a target for delivering the first assistance to beneficiaries 8-9 weeks after their first meeting with project staff.

Timeliness. Timeliness has varied - but the process has improved in the past few months. Beneficiaries believe the program should deliver higher-quality assistance more fairly, transparently, and quickly. Beneficiaries focus on how long it takes to receive the full package of support rather than first assistance.

Satisfaction and Impact. Beneficiaries viewed assistance as kind of an unexpected „gift.’ After an incident, beneficiaries had no to little expectation that anyone would support them - and were pleasantly surprised to be assisted by ACAP. Beneficiaries felt that the international community was aware of their problems and responding to some of their losses or needs. Beneficiaries receiving cash for a business or small business kits were most satisfied. Staff felt there was greater impact on the rural poor as the kits were a „luxury’ for them and that there was greater program impact in more secure areas with more transparency in the program and greater presence of the international community. Impact and satisfaction varies by incident, some household characteristics, and by type of assistance provided. ACAP respondents were most satisfied when cash, which is no longer provided as a part of the ACAP program, had been provided. Beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries suggested numerous ways to increase program impact. Community members were dissatisfied when households in the village had losses but were not beneficiaries of the program.

Engagement with Other Agencies/Organizations and Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). Sharing of program activities has been mostly with United Nations (UN). Some United States Agency for International Development (USAID)/Activity Managers met regularly with their ACAP representative, a few weekly and some monthly. Others indicated that they have been unable to meet with the representative and/or that it would be helpful to have more contact. Many government stakeholders were not aware of ACAP; others had minimal information and only information related to the verification process. A few had an awareness acquired from beneficiaries. The Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs, and Disabled (MoLSAMD) has an understanding of ACAP but no working relationship.

Branding, Dissemination and Stabilization. Stakeholder views varied as to the donor behind ACAP: some thought the International Military Forces (IMF), others the American government, IOM, the „international community’, or USAID and the „American people’. Almost no beneficiaries surveyed knew that the support was from the USG or USAID. In insecure areas, ACAP staff (whether IOM or Christian Thomas

Group) usually say the assistance is from IOM. Stakeholders felt it would be better to be open and indicate that assistance is from the „American people’ or the „international community.’ Assistance to households appears to have almost no impact on stabilization of the community. This is especially so when information about the donor is not provided and the assistance is not distributed in the village in a public forum.

Lessons Learned – Beneficiaries. Included are lessons learned based on interviews with the local beneficiaries and stakeholders.

- 1. ACAP must communicate and share information with local stakeholders (transparency) to build stability.**
- 2. ACAP must meet the beneficiary face-to-face (direct contact).**
- 3. ACAP cannot exclusively rely on local elders or community representatives for the identification and verification of incidents and beneficiaries or the delivery of assistance (triangulate data).**
- 4. ACAP assistance must meet beneficiary needs (appropriate and timely).**
- 5. ACAP must work with communities for stabilization (involve community).**
- 6. ACAP should focus on livelihoods (impact on rebuilding and recovery).**
- 7. ACAP must involve GIRoA for stabilization (Afghans first).**

1.4 Conclusions

Goal. *ACAP has not achieved the overall goal. ACAP has not provided appropriate and timely assistance to assist beneficiaries. Implementation focused on addressing a targeted goal of beneficiaries based on a budget allocation that provided standard, tailored packages of assistance rather than redefining approaches to increasing assistance as the number of civilian casualties increased. The security and logistical challenges of working with international and Afghan stakeholders and civilian losses across the country complicated the overall implementation and delivery of grant assistance. ACAP has little information sharing or networking, has not supported country ownership, has little visibility in the less secure districts where more incidents have occurred, and has little impact on stabilization beyond helping individual beneficiary households. A different program design was needed to reach the goal of contributing to overall stabilization efforts.*

- 1. ACAP assistance has had little impact on stability, especially in insecure areas; as access, transparency, working relationships and information sharing are minimal.**
- 2. More could be done for stabilization if ACAP better met beneficiary needs through more timely and visible delivery to households and communities.**
- 3. ACAP needs to work with community organizations to support stabilization. Engagement with village and district-level shuras and Community Development Councils is critical for stabilization.**

4. ACAP needs to involve GIRoA officials and local stakeholders in more than identification and verification; engagement in distribution is critical to stabilization.

5. Beneficiaries report assistance was useful and substantial satisfaction with the assistance. Assistance has had a stabilizing effect on individual families but not at the community level, except in villages with an extremely high proportion of beneficiary households. ACAP may have helped reduce the rage of some locals and the potential for them to seek revenge after an incident.

6. ACAP needs to reach a greater number of beneficiaries in a concentrated area to affect stabilization – it cannot be a one-off assistance program for scattered households to have an impact on stabilization.

Objective 1. This objective has been partly achieved. Assistance has been provided to a substantial number of eligible beneficiaries. While timeliness has improved the past year, especially in some provinces, ACAP processes have not been efficient and effective enough to reach the targeted number of beneficiaries or assist the growing number of households with losses from IMF conflict with insurgents. Compared to current packages, past assistance was more appropriate and more tailored to beneficiary needs. In mid-October 2010 the kits were standardized and the process streamlined. The results of this process have not been evaluated since pre-October 2010 beneficiaries received ‘old’ assistance packages. There are many issues with the quality, transparency, and fairness of the assistance provided. Beneficiaries note high levels of satisfaction – because they appreciate receiving any assistance – and then note a wide variety of problems with the assistance or issues that remain for their households. Beneficiaries were less satisfied with the assistance when they attributed their losses to IMF airstrikes or shooting, and more satisfied when victims of insurgent attacks or IEDs.

Objective 2. This objective was not achieved. ACAP has not established and maintained a liaison network among key stakeholders. Working relationships, information sharing and utilization of USAID, GIRoA and other organizations resources have been minimal - sometimes non-existent. Relationships depend on individual rather than institutional connections, which has limited impact given the rapid turnover of both ACAP and stakeholder staff (including USAID staff). Contacts focus overwhelmingly on incident and beneficiary identification. ACAP needs to do more briefings, institutionalize relationships, share more information, and find ways to incorporate GIRoA into assistance delivery.

Objective 3. This objective was not achieved. Changes in program implementation have made communication difficult. The way ACAP has used the partial waiver on branding has resulted in the majority of beneficiaries and stakeholders being unaware that ACAP is a USG program. A few briefings have been held in the past six months and working relationships are developing with individual USAID/Activity Managers but little information is shared with stakeholders. GIRoA officials expressed interest in more information and greater involvement in the program. More transparency and more information sharing/dissemination of ACAP program activity with beneficiaries and stakeholders and more involvement of local shuras/local elders will help program effectiveness and stabilization.

1.5 Recommendations

Overall. ACAP is a stabilization program both because it seeks to stabilize communities and requires some community stabilization to operate effectively. For stabilization:

- **Beneficiary assistance should only be approved after a face-to-face meeting with community leaders and beneficiaries and consultation with GIRoA and the USAID/Activity Manager.**
- **Assistance package should be delivered openly in a community setting with with GIRoA presence.**
- **If ACAP is unable to engage stakeholders, beneficiaries and GIRoA where perspective beneficiaries live due to insecurity, a second alternative is to hold meetings in a district or provincial center. If neither is possible, assistance should not be provided.**
- **Assistance package should focus on self-identified beneficiary needs.**
- **Assistance package should be substantial enough to have a demonstrable impact on livelihoods to stabilize a household as the provision of small business assistance (or cash to purchase the required equipment for a business) appears to have done.**

2.0 INTRODUCTION

2.1 Problems of Civilian Victims of Conflict

Afghan families and communities have suffered substantial losses as a result of international military operations against the insurgents. These civilian casualties and losses come on top of the tremendous costs of more than 30 years of conflict from 1978 to 2001. Increased operations by ISAF and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and the insurgents in recent years has led to greater numbers of civilian casualties and increased damage. ISAF has become increasingly careful in its operations to avoid harming civilian lives or property. Numerous reports from Afghan and international organizations agree that now some 75% of current casualties are caused by insurgent action (See Appendix 11). Civilian casualties and losses are of a great concern to Afghans and the Afghan government, and the USG has been committed to providing short-term, tailored, non-monetary assistance to affected individuals and families.

2.2 Context for ACAP

The Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) lists „war victims’ as one of two priority groups to receive improved social services and social services. Such services are vital to reducing poverty, strengthening livelihoods, and improving social protection. USAID stabilization programs are designed to contribute to social stabilization and social cohesion. Programs strive to work in partnership with provincial and district officials to expand and help fill gaps in services of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA).

2.3 Recent History and Evolution of the Program

The program has evolved and grown substantially through repeated extensions. USG and USAID strategies and the magnitude of the international effort in Afghanistan have changed dramatically over this period. While there have been important modifications in the ways ACAP is implemented, the original program design has not been changed in an effort to meet new USAID stabilization and transition goals. IOM initially implemented the „Leahy Initiative,’ providing assistance to war-affected communities in the southeast, as part of the Afghan Transition Initiative under the Office of Transition Initiatives between 2003-2005 at a cost of \$2.3 million. In April 2007, USAID/Afghanistan signed a Cooperative Agreement with IOM for a \$9 million three-year ACAP program, which has grown substantially through repeated cost extensions, particularly in late 2009 and 2010. The current ceiling is \$63.5 million funded through annual congressional earmarks. The program is scheduled to end on 31 March 2011; however a proposal is being considered to extend the program through 30 September 2011.

The complicated issues of civilian losses not only make the program difficult to administer but also hard to evaluate. In general, based on incidents, the program nominates households for grants. Each grant may include up to 10 families; some incidents have multiple grants due to the large number of affected households or prolonged processes of identifying and verifying potential beneficiaries. The program grew from 376 total grants at the end of 2009 to 875 in January 2011 according to the Operational System and Procedures Review report. Challenges with program management in implementation suggest that the numbers presented by ACAP should be considered rough and indicative rather than definitive. The data in Table 1 shows a

growing number of potential beneficiaries, with almost as many incidents uninvestigated and unverified as ones with nominations or grants. This ratio varies by ACAP office. New incidents that add to the potential pool of beneficiaries occur almost daily.

Table 1: ACAP Logged Incidents Since April 2007 (from January 27, 2011 ‘Matrix’

ACAP Office	Active Grants (some closed)	Nominations (approved/done)	Not Yet Nominated	Percentage Not Addressed
Central	53	14	85	64%
West	39	21	19	51%
South-East	101	24	16	7%
South	120	81	98	60%
East	189	21	106	40%
North	59	20	12	35%
Total	561	181	336	49%

3.0 EVALUATION: PURPOSE, TEAM AND METHODOLOGY

The evaluation focused on ACAP’s 2010 work and used three teams to gather data and address the 27 questions from the SOW: the core international team of Gerald Boardman and Lawrence Robertson plus three Afghan staff; the Checchi SUPPORT Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) staff supplemented by four additional national evaluators; and the Social Development and Legal Rights (SDLR) survey team. Methods used were: 1) a review and analysis of ACAP and other reports plus interviews with IOM, ACAP and other stakeholders in Kabul by the core team; 2) structured interviews with ACAP regional staff and stakeholders by the M&E team; 3) a phone and e-mail survey of USAID Activity Managers; 4) a survey of beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, and local stakeholders through SDLR; and 5) an analysis of the M&E and SDLR data and field reports. The core team appreciated the cooperation and openness of ACAP management and staff and would not have been able to do this evaluation without them.

First, the core team identified and analyzed ACAP and related USAID reports and documents, plus relevant reports from external stakeholders. The team conducted semi-structured interviews with ACAP central staff and informed international stakeholders in Kabul and interviewed a sample of USAID Activity Managers across Afghanistan by phone and e-mail.

Second, the team developed, tested, and revised data collection instruments (DCIs) and trained the Afghanistan SUPPORT M&E teams in their use. The SUPPORT M&E teams used the DCIs for structured interviews with ACAP staff, stakeholders, and Afghan USAID Activity Managers in communities and districts of ten provinces: Herat, Khost, Helmand, Kandahar, Kunduz, Wardak, Paktya, Laghman, Nangahar, and Kabul. The core team debriefed the M&E teams upon their return to Kabul and analyzed the data from the DCIs.

Third, the core and SUPPORT M&E teams developed, translated, tested, and revised survey questionnaires for ACAP beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, and local stakeholders. After translation into Dari and Pashtu, the instruments were back-translated to ensure that

the questions were understood the same in both languages as in English. A Dari version of the survey was used in Herat and Kabul; all other areas used Pashtu. SDLR conducted the survey independent of ACAP based on an oversample of ACAP grant sites with selected beneficiaries, their neighbors, and local stakeholders chosen by the core team from eight provinces: Herat, Khost, Helmand, Kandahar, Kunduz, Wardak, Laghman, and Nangarhar. The core team supervised SDLR's training of their supervisors and monitored the veracity and quality of interviews and data entry. The core team analyzed the data from the surveys and DCI's to determine findings, draw conclusions, and make recommendations.

The sampling had three stages. First, the team selected a wide variety of incidents from the ACAP „Matrix' where staff had been active in delivery or monitoring in 2010, excluding a range of grants from Helmand that ACAP staff are investigating as fraudulent. Next, the team selected a variety of grants based on these incidents from the ACAP database. Third, the team prioritized individual beneficiaries (up to 10 households) under each grant.

The sampling methodology was purposeful, not random. However, the survey provides unique information gained independently of ACAP and is informative about beneficiary, non-beneficiary, and local stakeholder experiences and perceptions. While views expressed by a small number of respondents are not enough for secure generalizations (such as those of the approximately 20 beneficiaries per province surveyed to the population of ACAP beneficiaries in that province), results supported by larger numbers and greater proportions of beneficiaries are more valid and reliable. The analysis of the survey data does not make strong claims based on the views of only a few beneficiaries or when differences between categories of beneficiaries are small. The survey was instructive about the difficulties in reaching individual Afghans, especially in areas with more conflict. In all, beneficiaries from 20 different districts and 56 villages/towns were surveyed. It was difficult to directly survey some potential target groups, in particular women. Despite using three women surveyors, the evaluation was only able to interview 5 women – not enough from which to generalize. SDLR received no response from approximately half of the beneficiaries they attempted to contact, which may have biased the sample by not capturing the views of beneficiaries that are the hardest to reach. These beneficiaries include people that have migrated and those in the most insecure areas (See Appendix 7A). Non-response was also likely affected by attempting to contact „fake' or fraudulent beneficiaries. SDLR also felt beneficiaries that were less satisfied may have been less willing to respond.

See Appendices 5, 6 and 7 for the survey instruments, ACAP grant sites, and survey data collected by SDLR. Appendices 4, 8 and 9 list and then categorize the people interviewed and DCI instruments used. Illustrative lessons learned are included in Appendix 10. Findings and conclusions are included in the text (Sections 4 to 8) and lead to the recommendations in Section 9. The tables included in the text focus on the beneficiary data as the beneficiary information is unique and most directly shows program impact on households. Where information is available, ACAP staff information is presented first, followed by the stakeholder information, and then the beneficiary information.

4.0 OBJECTIVE 1 – APPROPRIATENESS AND TIMELINESS: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

4.1 What Afghan Population Groups Harmed by Conflict between International Military Forces and Insurgents have been the most Appropriate for Targeting, i.e. Children and Younger Youth, Mothers and Wives as Household Breadwinners, etc.?

Finding. Incidents and beneficiaries were mostly concentrated in insecure areas. ACAP staff felt that rural households had greater needs and fewer options for rebuilding and recovery and were more appropriate targets for assistance. Households in towns have more capacity; there are more support facilities like hospitals, and the household is more likely to receive assistance from the government. ACAP staff and stakeholders suggested that the program should continue to prioritize households with deaths. They believe that, after a death, the deceased person’s young adult male family members (brothers and cousins) are vulnerable to joining the insurgents for revenge or economic reasons. Next, serious injuries should be given a preference, especially injuries to breadwinners; widows or children without a breadwinner need assistance to continue their lives. Focusing on women has been difficult to do given the conservative cultures of insecure areas. The challenge of reaching affected women has been all but unmanageable. Even in the cases where the ACAP beneficiary was a women, often a brother, father or uncle would benefit from the assistance and the impact on the women in the household remained unknown to staff.

Rural beneficiaries, the majority of those surveyed (103 of 162), were only modestly more satisfied with assistance than urban beneficiaries (66% compared to 56%). The data shown in Table 2 indicated that poor households were less satisfied with the assistance (56.6% compared to 81.3% for the middle SES).

Table 2: Middle Socio-Economic Status (SES) and Satisfaction

		Satisfied		Total
		No	Yes	
Middle SES	Frequency	6	26	32
	% within Middle SES	18.8%	81.3%	100.0%
Poor	Frequency	56	73	129
	% within Poor	43.4%	56.6%	100.0%
Total SES	Frequency	62	99	161
	Satisfied	38.3%	61.7%	100.0%

Data in Table 3 show that the type of incident had important effects on beneficiary satisfaction. These replies were consistent with the view of assistance as a gift. Beneficiaries with losses from airstrikes or IMF firing were less satisfied, while victims of insurgent firing and IEDs were more satisfied. It appears that the beneficiary

perception of the cause of their problem influenced satisfaction – since the type of incident does not appear connected to the types of assistance delivered according to the survey data.

Table 3: Type of Incident and Satisfaction

Type of Incident		Satisfied		Total
		No	Yes	
IMF attack	Frequency	50	41	91
	% within Incident	54.9%	45.1%	100.0%
IMF road accident	Frequency	2	5	7
	% within Incident	28.6%	71.4%	100.0%
Insurgent attack	Frequency	10	54	64
	% within Incident	15.6%	84.4%	100.0%
Total	Count	62	100	162
	% within Incident	38.3%	61.7%	100.0%

Poor households that received cash were more satisfied than middle SES households that did so (95% compared to 67%), but a lower percentage of poor households received cash (16% - 21 of 129 of poor SES households, compared to 25% - 9 of 36 middle SES households). Although we do not know why, poor households were less satisfied than middle SES respondents in all other forms of assistance. This is most notable in small business assistance, where 62% of poor SES households were satisfied (21 of 34), compared to all 8 satisfied middle SES business assistance recipients. One should be cautious drawing strong conclusions from these few non-poor beneficiaries.

ACAP staff, even the few women staff members, are seldom able to reach women in beneficiary households. The conservative cultures of communities that have the largest numbers of potential beneficiary households tend to keep women away from outsiders. This also affected the survey, which was only able to interview a few women. Thus neither the program nor the survey know directly about the effects of ACAP on women in households. Because even asking men about women in the household is sensitive in these communities, the survey did not attempt to elicit information from men about the impact of the assistance on women in the household. We also believe this data would not reflect the true opinions of women in the household.

Conclusion 1. As currently implemented, the perception is that the target beneficiaries should be households experiencing a death or serious injury of a breadwinner and widows who become the prime breadwinner. Determining the most appropriate beneficiary group for assistance depends on the objectives of the program along with security, manageability, and maybe satisfaction. Is the focus emergency relief,

rebuilding and recovery, stabilization, or sustainability? Now targets are determined by incidents, thus, by insurgents and the IMF. The program has had little guidance on beneficiary prioritization and will not be able to reach all households that potentially fit program criteria. The program should aim to reach the maximum number of potential beneficiaries with the limited time remaining in the award. Whether beneficiary satisfaction should be a criteria is debatable.

NOTE: Afghan Conceptions of Condolence ACAP explicitly states it is not a compensation program. The team felt that the program should be a condolence program more in tune to traditional Afghan practices.

A condolence program would not be about fault, but expressing sorrow about the incident and losses (condolence being *tasalyat* in Dari, *ghamshiraki* in Pashtu). Both Tajik and Pashtu cultures have these concepts, which are not about fault – but sympathy. A program could be similar to what is done in Afghan communities as third parties, those not involved in whatever caused the losses, visit the family to express their condolences and might contribute money to the family. There are likely huge differences across the country in these practices. This might be done by *shura* leaders or other well-off people in the community. The Arabic legal term used was *diyat* for the payment, which is reportedly also used in Afghan law, contrasted to *qusas* which was the consequences/sentence for a killing with intent (to be death by the Quran - but perhaps life in prison under Afghan law).

The program should also do more: bring the Afghan government with a third party implementer to the village, call all the victims together in one place with elders and shura leaders, explain what happened to cause these losses, express sympathy, clearly and openly provide condolence payments from this neutral party and GIRoA without implying fault, discuss how to avoid these incidents and losses in the future, and work to stabilize the community. This would build on what the GIRoA is supposed to do to provide a contribution to families with losses to help them survive.

The program would have to be implemented more quickly. The analogy is to killings between Afghans, where a killer would have about a week after the incident to apologize to the family of a victim to potentially avoid a ‚blood feud‘. Here a program would not have to be that fast, but the shorter the timeframe after the incident the better, so the program could express condolences and provide payment (*diyat*). While in-kind payments are possible, cash payments are better.

4.2 Was the Level of Non-Monetary Assistance Appropriate to the Needs of the Family?

Finding. The opinion of the ACAP staff was that the assistance was ‚Little to Somewhat Appropriate‘ (26 respondents out of 41). Items are useable but could be of better quality and there is need for more tailored assistance; i.e., items should more closely meet the needs of the family. Small business opportunity assistance and training were well received. The kits were somewhat appropriate; with the groceries included kits the most criticized since some items were expired and others were culturally inappropriate. Items were often sold in the bazaar; electrical items were sometimes provided to beneficiaries from rural areas without electricity, and occasionally education kits were provided to families with no children.

The more standardized kits currently being distributed would be more beneficial if they met the needs of beneficiaries. The kits are criticized for poor quality. The prices for procured items should be checked, since beneficiaries and staff believed they overstate

the value of the goods within them, and there were multiple requests that the quantity of assistance be increased. More vocational training should be made available, especially for woman along with other employment opportunities. The tailoring, home and education kits seem to be more appropriate than the other kits.

Consistent with ACAP staff opinions, survey beneficiaries felt that the assistance was like a ‚gift‘. In the wake of an incident that was a catastrophe for their household, they did not expect to receive anything to help them continue their lives. Then, all of a sudden, ACAP provided assistance, which was an unexpected surprise for which the beneficiaries were grateful. The beneficiaries then found problems with the assistance and readily suggested potential improvements. As a ‚gift‘ – they were glad to receive the assistance, even if it could have been better. Beneficiaries viewed the assistance as ‚useful‘ (83%, 134 of 162), but then amended this statement with a range of qualifications in their answers to the open-ended question, such as ‚to some extent‘ or ‚not according to my losses‘; 25% of those that found the assistance useful were ‚not satisfied‘ with the assistance; 52% of those that found assistance useful found the help advanced their household or economic situation, noting that it ‚helped a lot,‘ ‚improved my situation,‘ or before ‚I had nothing‘. Assessments of the usefulness of assistance varied only slightly based on the type of assistance; usefulness was between 81 and 87% for small business assistance and cash,² tailoring kits, home kits, education kits, agricultural kits, livestock, and livestock kits. The sample only found seven respondents that had received training or tutoring – not enough from which to generalize. The 17% (27 of 162) that found the assistance ‚not useful‘ criticized the poor quality of assistance that it did not make up for their losses, or had not been received at all or in full. When asked ‚What would you suggest the program do to address your needs?‘ 46% of respondents focused on additional needs, 26% emphasized addressing their losses, 28% focused on faster delivery – but 67% suggested providing cash.³ This suggests most households agree with the program emphasis on moving forward and developing family livelihoods.

Conclusion 2. Assistance should be substantial enough to have an economic impact on the household. A comprehensive monitoring system, with well-defined indicators, needs to be in place to ensure proper procurement type, quality, and quantity; delivery of assistance; and follow-up.

4.3 Do Beneficiaries Perceive that the Assistance was Delivered in a Fair and Transparent Manner?

Finding. The consensus of the ACAP staff was that the assistance was fair and transparent. Thirty-eight of 41 respondents, with 1 No Response, indicated a ‚Somewhat to Very Fair‘ rating. ACAP takes pictures of beneficiaries and signs a contract with those given the small business opportunity assistance, is careful to document, and feels the delivery process is transparent. The transparency process is improving as ACAP is trying to recruit more trustworthy staff. Sometimes it happens that fake beneficiaries receive the

² The survey asked where the cash had come from, and all 30 beneficiaries that reported receiving cash gave IOM as the source. As evaluators rather than monitors, the survey did not try to determine whether they beneficiaries receive cash directly or perceived that they were receiving cash. ACAP had used cash when ACAP staff accompanied beneficiaries to bazaars to purchase commodities such as vehicles and livestock to start or refurbish businesses. The \$3000 and \$3500 numbers for dollar volume suggest this, leaving only one anomalous recipient that reported receiving \$1000.

³ More than one suggestion was often encouraged to open-ended questions such as this one.

assistance due to an unclear process and/or corruption and continues to be an issue. Transporting the kits from ACAP warehouses to their homes, which is the responsibility of the beneficiary, poses cost and security problems in some cases. Some beneficiaries addressed these issues by selling the kits or taking the goods out of the boxes to be able to disguise the contents and travel home in greater safety

Seventy eight percent of beneficiaries felt the assistance had been provided in a „transparent and fair manner.’ However, they often qualified this, especially in terms of fairness, which they related to quality and quantity concerns rather than equity by established selection and nomination norms. Transparency to beneficiaries meant that their benefits were procured locally with their participation or presence or delivered openly to the rest of the community. Perceptions of transparency were very different between people that were included in the local procurement of assistance, as was done under ACAP, compared to those that received kits procured in Kabul. The survey identified at least two villages where the non-beneficiaries surveyed stated that beneficiaries had been selected by elders or community leaders in biased ways that left families with losses off grant lists - while including relatives that may or may not have had losses (in Herat and Kunduz). Local stakeholders from 11 of the 25 villages and towns surveyed stated that there were people with damages that had not received assistance. Thirty beneficiaries (19%) replied no to the question about delivery in a „transparent or fair manner,’ due to not being involved in the process, concerns that the cost of the goods was excessive, problems with quality, or the assistance not covering their needs. In the survey of the beneficiaries, those that volunteered comments on fairness or quality to the open-ended question of why (43 of 162 respondents), only 17 were satisfied (39.5%) with the assistance. Of beneficiaries that volunteered comments on transparency, a higher percentage 54% were satisfied (7 of 13). This suggested that quality and fairness were more important to beneficiaries than transparency.

Conclusion 3. Transparency and fairness continue to be issues for improvement. Insecure areas present especially difficult challenges. Local shuras and GIROA officials need to be part of the public delivery of assistance in a community setting to help prevent fake beneficiaries, increase the chances of not missing potential beneficiaries, and ensure the safe delivery of assistance. These methods also have the potential to increase stabilization.

4.4 Do Beneficiaries Perceive that the Assistance was Delivered in a Timely Manner?

Finding. ACAP opinion varied with about half the staff (21 of 41) indicating that the assistance was being delivered „On Time’ (within two months) and the rest indicating a „Late to Very Late’ delivery. Timeliness was better during the past six months, as ACAP was making an effort to be more responsive on the timeliness item. Previously, assistance was typically late, several years in some cases. Timeliness is a function of the incident and it can vary considerably. The two-month timeframe is the period following the family assessment to the delivery of the first installment that was agreed upon between USAID and ACAP and seems like a reasonable target. This is more than the ideal referenced in section 4.1 although realistically appropriate given the security and logistical constraints.

Beneficiaries reported their first meeting with ACAP was, on the average, 4.7 months after the incident. This average had substantial variation, with a median time to first

assistance at 3.4 months (and two months the most common single answer). Of those assisted (14 had not yet received assistance), 32% received their first assistance within two months of their first meeting, 14% in the third month, 14% in the fourth month, and 11% in five to six months. Of the 129 beneficiaries, who had received all assistance, 45% received everything within 4 months of the first meeting and only 22% had waits of longer than six months. However, when asked differently - based on household needs rather than the calendar - 57% (92 of 162) answered that the assistance was not 'delivered on time to meet their needs after the incident.' Timing has interesting relationships with satisfaction. While it helps satisfaction to have the first meeting between ACAP and the beneficiary quickly, quick first deliveries had little impact on satisfaction. There is little difference between satisfaction of 65% (52 respondents) when first assistance was within eight to nine weeks of their first meeting with ACAP, compared to 75% satisfied with first assistance after three to four months and 62% satisfied with the first delivery after more than four months (65 people). Satisfaction drops off after long time periods between the first meeting and the first assistance. What makes a difference for satisfaction appears to be the timing of the final or last delivery. Beneficiaries are 86% satisfied when assistance is completed within three months of the first meeting (30 of 35). Comparing views about whether the assistance was delivered on time to help meet beneficiary needs after the incident confirmed this emphasis on completing the delivery.

Table 4: Time to Final Assistance and Delivered In Time

Time to Final Assistance		Delivered In Time?			Total
		NR	No	Yes	
Less than 3 months	Frequency	1	13	21	35
	% within Time Final Assist	2.9%	37.1%	60.0%	100.0%
3-6 months	Frequency	0	37	29	66
	% within Time Final Assist	.0%	56.1%	43.9%	100.0%
7-12 months	Frequency	0	5	6	11
	% within Time Final Assist	.0%	45.5%	54.5%	100.0%
13-18 months	Frequency	0	12	2	14
	% within Time Final Assist	.0%	85.7%	14.3%	100.0%
More than 18 months	Frequency	3	25	8	36
	% within Time Final Assist	8.3%	69.4%	22.2%	100.0%
Total	Frequency	4	92	66	162
	% within Time Final Assist	2.5%	56.8%	40.7%	100.0%

Conclusion 4. Timeliness is an issue that needs more work as only about half the time is it perceived that the assistance is being delivered in a timely fashion. Beneficiaries are interested in the time to completion of the final assistance. Standardizing the kits was an attempt at reducing the time in delivery but appropriateness, quality and corruption have continued to be issues.

4.5 Do Beneficiaries Perceive that ACAP Assistance has Helped Them to Restore and Continue their Lives?

Finding. ACAP staff believed that the beneficiaries were satisfied with the assistance provided and it has helped them in continuing their lives. Thirty-nine of 41 staff indicated a positive opinion, 14 „Somewhat’ and 25 „Very Satisfied’. There was beneficiary satisfaction in knowing that the international community was listening and cared. Beneficiaries receiving small business opportunities were especially thankful for the opportunity to start a small business and their life and economy has improved. Beneficiaries who were injured and received kits were less satisfied (e.g., Kandahar, Helmand, Herat and Kunduz – See Appendix 9). There was unhappiness from staff, beneficiaries, and stakeholders that some items in kits were out of date and others were inappropriate (such as macaroni, tomato paste, and Pepsi). These are not items most Afghans know, purchase or eat.

The survey used a three-point scale for beneficiary satisfaction. Satisfaction with ACAP assistance was based on whether beneficiaries felt the assistance received from all sources was useful. Except for cash, for which 87% of beneficiaries were satisfied (26 of 30), satisfaction did not vary much based on the type of assistance: 69% of small business assistance recipients were satisfied (29 of 42), followed by tailoring kits at 68% (90 of 133), home and grocery kits at 65% (89 of 137), education kits at 64% (67 of 105), agricultural kits at 54% (52 of 96), livestock at 53% (41 of 77), and finally livestock kits at 49% (28 of 57). The sample only found 7 respondents that had received training or tutoring – not enough from which to generalize. Most other cases were where beneficiaries reported they were „somewhat satisfied’; only four to seven percent of beneficiaries from any category of assistance reported they were „not satisfied.’ There was a variation in satisfaction between provinces, with no one in Kunduz, half the respondents in Helmand, and 46% of the respondents in Nangarhar reporting „somewhat’ or „not satisfied’ with the assistance.

Beneficiary satisfaction differed depending on the beneficiary explanation of the incident; 87% (46 of 53) beneficiaries that described the incident as civilians affected by an IED or an insurgent attack against IMF were satisfied, while only 45% (41 of 91) that had an attack by IMF against insurgents were satisfied. This difference is not related to whether there were or weren’t deaths, but is linked to fewer beneficiaries in the wake of airstrikes getting cash, which is high in satisfaction, and many more of these recipients receiving the least satisfying types of assistance - livestock kits, livestock, and agricultural kits. This is not explained by more modest differences in satisfaction, where, overall, rural beneficiaries were more satisfied than urban beneficiaries (65% and 56%, respectively).

Conclusion 5. Staff argued satisfaction and the opportunity to restore and rebuild were related to household needs, any training assistance, or a business opportunity assistance, which can have an economic impact on the household. The beneficiary survey confirmed, that even if late, assistance is greatly appreciated. When assistance comes to victims that have no expectation of support, people view the support akin to a ‘gift’ and have some satisfaction.

4.6 What has been the Impact of ACAP Assistance on the Lives of Beneficiaries?

Finding. Twenty of 41 ACAP staff indicated that there was „High Impact’. There was a perceived greater impact in the secure areas as there was a tendency for more transparency. The international community was able to show more presence, which helped morale although impact varied by incident, family, and assistance provided. There was more impact when a household could set up a shop or business. ACAP respondents indicated that cash had the most impact. The beneficiary was able to take care of specific needs. Impact also depended on the socio-economic status of the beneficiary.

The 162 beneficiaries in the survey reported positive impacts from ACAP assistance on their households. These results came from their explanations for why the assistance was useful (an open-ended question). Beneficiaries focused on how assistance helped their household’s economic situation, especially given the difficult circumstances noted by many respondents. When asked whether their situation was better than before the incident, almost two-thirds (63.8%) of the respondents, indicated that they found the assistance useful and either implied or explicitly stated that their economic position was somewhat or substantially better than prior to the incident.

Conclusion 6. *Beneficiaries were pleased to have received assistance, viewing whatever they received from ACAP as useful – something of value in the wake of serious damages to the household that they had not expected to get. When beneficiaries were facilitated in continuing their lives because of training, a work opportunity and source of income, the impact was greater. Increased duration of the literacy/vocational training would increase impact. Property damage is easier to recover from than personal injury/death.*

4.7 How Effective was ACAP Support for the Establishment of Small Business Opportunities?

Finding. Twenty five of 41 ACAP staff indicated „Excellent’ effect and another 10 indicated „Moderate’, which indicated strong ACAP support for the small business opportunity assistance. The small business opportunity allowed beneficiaries to have a working opportunity (especially poor beneficiaries), to earn income and continue with their life. It is a route to sustainability and appears to be effective. Livestock is effective, as is targeted business support ideas of the family, such as a mobile phone repair shop, ice cream shop, tailoring or a taxi/car business.

The beneficiary survey showed that the small business kit was considered no more useful and only slightly more satisfactory than other kits. However, what appears to have made a substantial difference for beneficiaries was whether the entire package of assistance was sufficient to get the family back to or above their financial situation prior to the incident. Beneficiaries who had higher praise for the usefulness of the assistance were more satisfied.

Conclusion 7. *In general, the small business assistance was well received. This assistance should be expanded, which would increase the opportunity for impact on the lives of the beneficiaries. Again, the type of assistance provided depends on the goal and objectives of ACAP and the intended result.*

4.8 Does ACAP have any Significant Implementation Problems?

Finding. The main implementation problems mentioned by ACAP staff were in two groups: 1) those related to the field – security/logistics/accessibility, procurement/poor quality of items, and the challenges of addressing the backlog of old cases; and 2) those related to the organization - overwhelming documentation, complicated and convoluted process, insufficient staff training, and decision-making is more upper-management/top-down (international) rather than decentralized/broad-based (Afghan). The main implementation problem mentioned by the stakeholders was a lack of information sharing.

Beneficiaries expressed satisfaction with the program, but they made numerous qualifications and noted problems with timeliness, quality, and comprehensiveness of assistance – both in terms of what has happened in the program and what they suggest for future assistance. Non-beneficiaries and local stakeholders had similar critiques and suggestions.

Conclusion 8. *The security and logistics issues will be difficult to address with the current program design at a manageable cost. The organizational, stakeholder and beneficiary issues must be managed and resolved for better program performance.*

4.9 Are there Significant Needs Unmet by ACAP?

Finding. ACAP staff noted unmet needs (27 of 41 respondents). Significant needs were beneficiary ones – medical assistance, drinking water, food and shelter, as well as training and tutoring – especially to empower women. Since USAID regulations make it prohibitively difficult to provide medical assistance, ACAP sometimes provides food in lieu of medical costs. Staff also noted project needs –to link more with local NGOs, more training of staff prior to field deployment, higher quality to kits, and whether six months after an incident, beneficiaries really had urgent need of assistance.

Local stakeholders and non-beneficiaries noted numerous cases of households with losses that had not been assisted by the program. These unmet needs, as they saw them, detracted greatly from the value of ACAP and caused some discord among people in the villages, as there were people who felt they should benefit but did not. There were others that had connections to ACAP staff or that community leaders favored and received benefits whether they had losses or not. It is difficult to know how extensive these problems were from the survey, but it is clear that there were examples of both of these problems. Some grants were thought to be „wholly fictitious’ although the incidents were real. These cases were excluded from the ones from which the sample was drawn. Some beneficiaries noted receiving less than they expected or poor quality goods; and a few implied they were worse off after assistance since the expenses of taking care of cattle exceeded their worth.

When beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, and stakeholders were asked what kind of support should be provided, 67% of beneficiaries, 88% of non-beneficiaries, and more half of stakeholders, who had an opinion, suggested cash. Beneficiaries suggested assistance should be based on the needs of the household (46%), rather than the losses suffered (26%).

Conclusion 9. There were unmet needs in terms of incomplete coverage that left some families from incidents covered by ACAP unassisted and many incidents with thousands of households affected unaddressed by ACAP

4.10 What Methodologies Used by ACAP have been Relatively More and Less Effective?

Finding. The most effective method was when the field assistants were able to investigate the incidents directly; i.e., talk face-to-face to the beneficiaries and liaise with local *shuras*, district governors and other power brokers. National identity cards and photos of the beneficiary along with the family have been useful. Changing the program to more standardized kits has been effective in improving timeliness, but the staff has reservations about ability to meet beneficiary needs. Local flexibility is important to respond more positively to a situation. Less effective methods were some of the organizational issues mentioned in Section 4.8 above..

Conclusion 10. The effective methodologies related more to incident and beneficiary identification and less to delivery, monitoring and impact.

4.11 Are there any Unintended Consequences or Impacts from ACAP?

Unintended Consequences. Positive – based on ACAP staff comments: some of the beneficiaries were not expecting any assistance so the assistance came as a „happy’ surprise, beneficiary is happy that someone is willing to listen and that they have been heard, in some areas there has been a decrease in negative/bad ideas of beneficiaries against the international coalition forces, one of the beneficiaries threw away the kit bags and put the materials into local sacks to ensure safe transport, children are now reading from the books in the education kit to a family member, a community in Kunar rehabilitated a school which now has 440 students attending (150 girls), and a female is now earning some income from a small business opportunity.

Negative – neighbors want to know why ACAP is helping one person and not another (lack of transparency and fairness), do not understand the parameters of the program (lack of transparency); one of the beneficiaries who received kits, immediately sold them at a low price in the market (lack of security); sometimes the Provincial government will make promises and overstates what ACAP can provide (lack of GIROA involvement); and beneficiaries know what others have gotten and will come back and complain if they think they have been shorted (lack of fairness).

Conclusion 11. The unintended consequences varied; a few positive and a few negative. It was important to note that the negative consequences were mostly related to an informal information communication network between and among the Afghans; thus, making the point for clear and simple information sharing and messaging concerning the program parameters.

5.0 OBJECTIVE 2 – ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING A LIAISON NETWORK: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

5.1 To What Extent did ACAP Utilize the Capabilities and Resources of Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), and International Committee for Red Cross (ICRC)?

Finding. Thirty-four of 41 ACAP staff responded with a „High’ response to the question on „Do you work with other agencies/organizations?’ while only 12 of the 41 indicated that they „Shared Information’ with the agency/organization. The majority, 28 of 36 stakeholders, who had some understanding of ACAP, indicated a „Weak to Moderate’ working relationship with ACAP.

AIHRC has eight regional offices and 5 provincial offices and focuses on reporting on issues of civilian casualties and legal assistance to victims on an individual basis. AIHRC headquarters stated that they have a working relationship with ACAP in three provinces - Nangarhar, Kunduz and Kandahar and a minimal relationship in the other provinces. However, in Nangarhar, the program manager who has been in Jalalabad for a year stated that he had not seen anyone from ACAP. A draft MOU was prepared initially clarifying roles and expectations of AIHRC and ACAP/IOM but has not been signed by IOM.

UNAMA has a close working relationship with ACAP in Kabul and at the regional level. UNAMA shares basic information on incidents and beneficiaries with ACAP on a regular basis. ACAP staff should also report to UNAMA staff in the province on assistance delivery - but in practice this again appears to depend on individual relationships.

ICRC focuses on reporting on issues of civilian casualties and legal assistance to individual victims. At ICRC in Kabul, their main knowledge of ACAP came from the Checchi Mid-Term Evaluation team and the current team. Some ACAP offices have relationships with ICRC field staff. ICRC is open to informal contacts with ACAP. ICRC management has briefed their regional staff about ACAP. ICRC is a resource for linking ACAP to other local support providers.

Conclusion 12. The program design does not support strong connections between ACAP and other organizations. Nevertheless, ACAP needs to do more briefings at the central level and needs to be more actively engaged in the field in sharing information with related agencies and organizations. Sharing of ACAP program activities has been mostly with UNAMA and focused on incident and beneficiary identification and verification.

5.2 To What Extent did ACAP Utilize the Capabilities and Resources of the Afghan Government, including the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs, and the Disabled (MoLSAMD)?

Finding. The program design does not include GIRoA in its operations. Thirty-four of the 41 ACAP staff interviewed indicated that ACAP worked with the Afghan government, but almost half (19 of 41) indicated that they seldom/never shared information about their activities with GIRoA. As with international organizations,

contacts depended on personal relationships and were difficult to develop and maintain with the high turnover of ACAP and government staff. Government involvement has been an issue in some cases when the local authorities have made promises beyond the remit of ACAP, such as calling for the program to provide benefits to non-eligible households.⁴

Many Afghan government stakeholders in provinces and districts, where ACAP has beneficiaries, stated that they were not aware of ACAP; seven of 15 respondents in Nangarhar/Laghman, three of 10 respondents in Herat, two of nine in Kunduz, and eight of 14 respondents in Wardak, Paktya, and Khost. This included officials most involved in issues of civilian casualties such as police chiefs and intelligence personnel. Others had minimal information that was only related to beneficiary identification and verification. A few had learned a little about ACAP from beneficiaries. GIRoA stakeholders sought more information, particularly on the delivery of assistance. Some district governors and local police chiefs have helped ACAP staff with access, security and identification of beneficiaries. In Kandahar, a Provincial Council member had visited the ACAP office.

MoLSAMD had some understanding of the ACAP program from USAID but no working relationship although MoLSAMD has staff and offices in all 34 provinces. The MoLSAMD National Skills Development Program has a working relationship with a different IOM program. MoLSAMD officials suggested that they could provide some monitoring and evaluation for ACAP and would like a technical advisor in the Ministry. ACAP has had some contact with Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development (MRRD) in Kandahar/Helmand in the case of helping beneficiaries and with the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) for investigating health records for prevent dealing with „fake beneficiaries’.

Conclusion 13. There should be more sharing of information with GIRoA at all levels – especially on assistance delivery. ACAP staff should be officially introduced by government representatives that are perceived as legitimate to communities in the wake of incidents. ACAP should have a liaison officer to share and exchange information with the government. MoLSAMD seeks more involvement with ACAP and could potentially help beneficiaries through their vocational training centers. Government involvement is critical for stabilization and sustainability of civilian assistance programs and should be improved.

5.3 What has ACAP Learned about Coordination with the USAID Field Staff at Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), District Stabilization Teams (DSTs) and International Military Forces (IMFs)?

Finding. Some Activity Managers now meet regularly with ACAP representatives on a weekly or monthly basis and more often if the need arises. Meetings began in the Fall of 2010 as part of a new USAID strategy for managing programs nationwide. Information exchanges vary in quality with the most productive being those where the Activity Manager, ACAP staff, or both have made an individual effort to build a working relationship.

⁴ Eligibility criteria require that losses come from fighting between IMF and insurgents; damages caused by ANSF or by insurgent attacks that target ANSF for example are not eligible under these criteria.

There has been a contrast between the information provided by the ACAP staff and what has been able to be confirmed on the ground by the USAID/Activity Manager. Most Activity Managers indicated that they would like to see the ACAP monthly activity reports and more detailed information about progress on the assistance requests, as many have been limited to identification of incidents and verification information.

ACAP has provided occasional briefings in the past six months to components of the civilian-military military structures, to include representatives from USAID, and Department of State. ISAF coalition members differ in their delivery of *solatia* and damage payments and neither USAID nor ACAP have developed systems to identify whether victims have been compensated by the military for their losses.⁵ It would good to coordinate this with ACAP assistance. ACAP staff report most military units have been guarded and protective with casualty and damage information and minimally cooperative at best. ACAP briefings are a good start and have been well received but more is needed to build institutional relationships in an environment where the military also rotates out units rapidly.

Conclusion 14. Coordination is a challenge because of program design, institutional differences, and difficulties with access and confidentiality of information. Coordination rarely goes beyond a back and forth over incident and beneficiary identification and verification. There is need for improved working relationships – especially on assistance delivery, more information sharing and more briefings. Although difficult to coordinate, more can be done in leveraging other USAID programs, the District Stabilization Teams, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and maneuver units through Commanders Emergency Relief Program-funded (CERP) and programs.

5.4 How has such Collaboration and Coordination Efforts Improved Program Effectiveness?

ACAP other agency collaboration and coordination has been minimal, except for verification information, hindering overall program effectiveness, especially towards the goal of stabilization.

Conclusion 15:

- 1. Weaknesses in program design, mobility and turnover of staff in ACAP and in some stakeholder organizations has made it difficult to establish rapport.***
- 2. ACAP program effectiveness can be enhanced by involving USAID field staff in more than the reporting process and confirmation of incidents. ACAP needs to provide more awareness to staff on the roles of USAID field staff. GIRoA officials may be more inclined to provide accurate input if they sense that USAID is more closely involved in monitoring the investigation and assistance distribution. ACAP may be more inclined to provide faster turnaround in responses to USAID queries if they are***

⁵ While ACAP family assessments and the data base indicate that beneficiaries have been asked whether they received a *solatia* or damage payment, these documents almost universally state that nothing had been received by these families from ISAF, coalition members, or GIRoA. Asking almost certainly understates *solatia* and damage payment provision; when meeting ACAP, prospective beneficiaries almost certainly believe that they are less likely to benefit from ACAP if they have already been assisted and thus may be less than truthful.

required to report more frequently and directly on project status.

3. AIHRC and ACAP field representatives are minimally or not aware of their potential complementary roles. If information were shared, AIHRC could link ACAP to other support agencies as a number of agencies come to AIHRC, thus, improving program effectiveness.

3. Provincial, district, and local authorities should be present and engaged in the delivery of the assistance to help ensure accountability. ACAP should share the details of assistance to help with transparency, fairness, and stabilization.

4. ACAP needs to work on better collaboration and coordination with USAID Activity Managers, other international and national NGOs, and the Afghan government. More briefings, improved working relationships, better information sharing, and improved utilization of the resources that these organizations can make available can improve program effectiveness.

6.0 OBJECTIVE 3 - GATHERING AND DISSEMINATING INFORMATION: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

6.1 Has USAID's Branding Policy as Applied to ACAP and the Resulting Non-Promotion of ACAP as a USG Funded Program Helped or Hurt ACAP's Use as a Stabilization Instrument?

Finding. Few stakeholders and almost no beneficiaries in the survey connected USAID or the USG with ACAP. Some stakeholders thought the donor was the International Military Forces, the American or US government, and IOM or ACAP - rarely the „international community’, USAID, or the „American people’. In the highly insecure areas, ACAP staff usually just said that they were from ACAP or IOM. There have been occasions where agencies and beneficiaries have been targeted if it is known that the assistance comes from an international donor. ACAP management left it to staff in the field to decide themselves about whether it was safe to orally tell beneficiaries that the assistance was from USAID or the American people. Management expected staff to inform beneficiaries about the donor when it was safe to do so. ACAP paperwork includes check-boxes for beneficiary informed about source of assistance is USAID, which were checked in almost all family assessment forms we examined. However management appears not to have verified these data to check actual field practices. Staff do not seem to have informed beneficiaries, and beneficiaries have shared little information within the family or community about the source of assistance.

In the beneficiary survey, only 14 people knew the funding for ACAP was from the US (9%), and only 5% of beneficiaries (eight people) knew USAID funded ACAP – almost all from one grant in Wardak. Of all beneficiaries, only seven of the 14 reported learning of this US support from ACAP staff, and only 3 of the 8 asserted that they had been told of USAID support by ACAP. Asked independently - „who provided this assistance to you?’ - only nine people (5.6% of beneficiaries) noted USAID and two people (1.2%) „Americans’, while 84% stated the assistance was from IOM and 10.5% noted it was from ACAP.

Conclusion 16. *The program design does not facilitate ACAP's use as a stabilization instrument. In implementation, the non-promotion of ACAP assistance as a USG program has hurt ACAP's use as a stabilization instrument. In the future, for stabilization purposes, it would be better to be more open and indicate that the assistance was from the 'American people' or US government – or not provide it at all in communities where this cannot be done. More transparency and more information sharing on ACAP program activity with stakeholders (USAID Activity Managers, GIRoA officials, and NGOs), along with more involvement of local shuras and community elders will help stabilization. Non-promotion does little to mitigate the negative association of damages with US and ISAF forces that can be partly counteracted by showing that the 'American people' care about Afghan lives and livelihoods.*

7.0 OVERALL GOALS OF ACAP: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

7.1 What ACAP Innovations or Impacts can be Considered Major Achievements of this Program?

Finding. Despite a problematic program design, worsening security situation across the country, growing number of casualties and losses, frequent changes in program size and direction, and cumbersome operational systems and procedures, ACAP has been able to deliver assistance to a large number of Afghans that have suffered losses. ACAP achievements referenced by staff related to types of grants and beneficiary satisfaction. Staff noted: small business opportunity assistance, which was favorably received; education kits, which were having a positive effect; training, which was well-received; and tailoring and carpet weaving for women, which was also favorably received. Staff claimed an ability to affect the perception of the local people about the 'international community' when the assistance goes well. The only innovations or management processes noted by staff were the new stakeholder 'briefings.'

Included in Appendix 10 are lessons learned from illustrative beneficiary situations from districts visited by the M&E and SDLR teams. The lessons learned are included in Section 7.2. Most ACAP staff felt the system was working although it was top-down and cumbersome; staff would like more flexibility.

Conclusion 17. *Most achievements of ACAP have been stated in terms of numbers and types of assistance rather than lessons learned or methods and innovations.*

7.2 To What can We Attribute these Successes of the ACAP Program?

Attribution of Success. The reasons for successes in the delivery of assistance to households involved the support of local stakeholders, transparency in ACAP processes, appropriateness of assistance packages, the timeliness of assistance provision, support for household livelihoods, and meeting beneficiaries face-to-face. Illustrative lessons learned are included in Appendix 10 and were as follows: 1) Kunar - the community and ACAP worked together to rehabilitate a school environment, resulting in a more positive community perception (involve community); 2) Nangarhar – ACAP assisted the beneficiary in setting up a livelihood, there was a positive perception (impact on rebuilding and recovery); 3) Khost - ACAP assistance was appropriate to beneficiary

needs and timely, perceptions and lives changed (appropriate and timely); 4) Wardak – ACAP needs to make a stronger effort to communicate/share information with district officials (Afghans first); 5) Herat - ACAP cannot exclusively rely on stakeholders (triangulate data); 6) Kunduz - ACAP needs to make every effort to travel to the districts/communities and meet and monitor beneficiaries face-to-face (direct contact), and 7) Helmand – ACAP needs to clearly communicate the conditions of the program (transparency).

Conclusion 18. Lessons learned from ACAP successes and weaknesses included: involve the community, impact rebuilding and recovery at the community level, deliver appropriate and timely assistance, put Afghans first for stabilization, triangulate data, make direct contact with beneficiaries, and be transparent through a community setting.

7.3 Were the Indicators Used the Most Appropriate to Measure the Impact of ACAP?

Finding. The absence of strong indicators has hampered program management. The team did not find any efforts to develop indicators for Objectives 2 and 3. ACAP mostly collects quantitative data as part of program implementation under Objective 1; e.g., types of incidents, numbers of beneficiaries and grants and related family assessment data. These data do not appear to have been used by ACAP to assess impact. While the data are entered repeatedly into at least four different systems - the „Matrix, the database, supporting files, and the grants files (GECS) - the huge amount of information that is collected is seldom used for implementation or strategic decision making. For example, the family assessment asked about monthly income prior to assistance and monitoring reports ask about business income after assistance. This data could be used by staff to assess impact.

Beneficiaries in the survey stated that ACAP had come to monitor the assistance (70.4%). Their answers were the same when asked a different way. When asked how many times has IOM staff visited you?: 19% said once, 26% twice, 17% three times, and 10% more than three times. Staff constraints in language (the forms are only in English) and training and weaknesses in data quality control make using much of the information impossible. Since these data are hardly used, there has been little effort to address these problems.

The beneficiary records and files contain incorrect or missing data, as beneficiaries have moved, changed phone numbers, or gave an incorrect address initially. The evaluation team, through SDLR, found it difficult to trace beneficiaries to assess beneficiary impact. ACAP collects some impact data related to the small business and training assistance program; two rating scales – one on satisfaction and another on impact for the small business program plus an open question about how much the beneficiary has learned in the training program. These data appear not to have been used. No other follow up on beneficiaries is done. There is no cross-validation of the data. The indicator data transmitted to USAID for Stabilization Performance is simply a count of families affected by an incident between IMF and the insurgency – an indicator that is outside of management control.

Conclusion 19. The ACAP indicator data collected were mostly output numbers related to Objective 1 - types/numbers of incidents reported, numbers of beneficiaries

eligible for assistance, and grants provided. Challenge of data collection, cross-validation, and data quality for beneficiary appear to have received little attention and the data have received little use by ACAP in assessing impact.

7.4 Has ACAP Achieved its Current Stated Goal and Objectives?

Conclusion 20.

Goal. *ACAP has not achieved the overall goal. ACAP has not provided appropriate and timely assistance to assist beneficiaries. Implementation focused on addressing a targeted goal of beneficiaries based on a budget allocation that provided standard, tailored packages of assistance rather than redefining approaches to increasing assistance as the number of civilian casualties increased. ACAP should be commended for their effort and the assistance they were able to provide. The security and logistical challenges of working with international and Afghan stakeholders and growing numbers of civilian losses across the country complicated the overall implementation and delivery of grant assistance. ACAP has not supported country ownership and has minimal impact in the less secure districts, where more incidents have occurred. The program design left many challenges, which have not been modified or addressed sufficiently in implementation. The program has grown dramatically without making adequate strategic changes as incidents and casualties have increased sharply.*

Objective 1. *This objective has been partly achieved as some of the earlier eligible beneficiaries were provided assistance but far less than the target. Timeliness continues to be an issue. It has improved in some provinces this past year but the process is still lacking in overall efficiency and effectiveness. In mid-October 2010 the kits were standardized and the process streamlined. This process has not been fully tested yet since pre-October 2010 beneficiaries received 'old' assistance.*

Objective 2. *This objective was not achieved. ACAP has not established and maintained a liaison network among key stakeholders. Working relationships, information sharing and utilization of USAID, GIRoA and other agency/organizational resources has been minimal to non-existent and limited to incident and beneficiary identification. ACAP needs to do more briefings and be more actively engaged in sharing information with related agencies/organizations.*

Objective 3. *This objective was not achieved. Little information is shared about the ACAP program and the majority of the beneficiaries and stakeholders beyond UNAMA are unaware that ACAP is a USG program. A few briefings were held this past six months and some working relationships are developing with USAID Activity Managers but little information is shared with stakeholders. GIRoA officials expressed interest in more information and greater involvement in the program. More transparency, information sharing, and involvement with beneficiaries, GIRoA stakeholders, and local elders and shuras's would help program effectiveness and stabilization. Stabilizing effects were limited to individual families, only reaching community levels in a few cases where there were a large number of beneficiaries.*

7.5 Would a Different Program Design or Objectives be more Effective in Achieving the Goal?

Conclusion 21. The program goal was difficult to achieve under the current environment in Afghanistan. A different set of objectives and a more clearly defined program design would have helped. Growing casualties, an expanding program creating uncertainty in the implementing partner as to expectations and outputs, and insecurity made implementation difficult. Should the goal be emergency relief, strengthening household livelihoods, or community stabilization? Each would imply a different relationship with stabilization and a different program design. A more scaled down approach restricted to selected provinces and districts implemented by a more streamlined organization and more closely connected to GIRoA and communities would be more effective.

8.0 BROADER STABILIZATION GOALS OF ACAP: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

An overall stabilization question was asked of the ACAP staff along with five items based on the stabilization objectives included in a Department of State “Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy” as of February 2010.

NOTE: Stabilization activities need some level of security to enable program staff to operate. Well-designed programs can work in unstable to fluid environments if there are sources of stability. In unstable and fluid environments, programming is sometimes delayed, suspended or canceled due to insecurity. Programming tends to be quick impact and CERP funding support to initiate limited engagement with the population or GIRoA in limited service delivery areas. Population typically perceives government and political processes to be illegitimate and is skeptical of GIRoA and international community assistance.

8.1 To What Extent has ACAP Supported Stabilization Efforts?

Finding. Thirty three ACAP staff out of 41 responded somewhat positively with, ‘Most of the Time (9 respondents)’ and ‘Some of the Time (24 respondents)’ while 22 stakeholders out of the 36, who had an understanding of ACAP, responded positively, ‘Most of the Time (8 respondents)’ and ‘Some of the Time (14 respondents)’. If you include the 20 stakeholders who had no knowledge of ACAP and the 2 ‘No Response’ in the total, the positive stakeholder stabilization response reduces to 22 out of 58.

Local stakeholders felt their communities reacted positively to households with losses receiving assistance; exceptions were in cases where beneficiaries were misidentified or not identified correctly, which left families with losses unassisted (12 of 26 noted sadness or negative opinions about this lack of fairness).

Non-beneficiaries surveyed had only a little to say about their perceptions of their neighbors who had received assistance. Some, 15 of 59 were positive, while no reaction or negative opinions were noted from Garbed, Hawza 5, and other locations where they had losses but reported they had not been assisted by anyone. Local stakeholders reported that people in 11 of the 25 villages/towns surveyed had losses and had not

received assistance from anyone. Only an elder interviewed in Zhari asserted that the community was happy that the prospective beneficiaries had rejected assistance, since now they felt the Taliban would not retaliate against their village. The survey asked stakeholders „how has the village changed as a result of some households receiving assistance?’ No one noted any changes beyond the material benefits to particular households (88%); this was not seen as benefitting or changing the community as a whole.

Conclusion 22. With little training on stabilization, ACAP staff overstated program impact on stabilization. Stakeholders felt working more closely with government officials, local shuras’s and Community Development Councils would help stabilization. Stakeholders need more knowledge of and engagement with ACAP, and the program needs to have impact beyond the household for stabilization. Stakeholders felt that a larger number of beneficiaries needs to be reached, the assistance be delivered in a more timely manner, and more closely meet beneficiary needs to positively affect stabilization. Non-beneficiaries noted no change in the community as a whole. A design that focuses more on communities is needed for improved stabilization.

8.2 How Effective has ACAP been in Improving Afghan Citizens’ Perception of the International Community?

Finding. A single survey does not allow for asking directly whether people’s perceptions have changed as a result of receiving assistance. Beneficiaries were satisfied with assistance and found the assistance useful, but then qualified their assessment in numerous ways and only 10% had any idea that the support came from someone besides IOM and ACAP.

The situation was slightly better for non-beneficiaries. The surveys were only done in communities that had affected households and 12 of 59 neighbors had a general idea of where the assistance for the beneficiaries had come from (20%), eight knew the help was from the US and the other four asserted the help came from ACAP.

Conclusion 23. Beneficiaries in the survey only associated the program with IOM or ACAP. With minimal transparency in ACAP and IMF solatia and damages programs, only a few Afghan non-beneficiaries were aware of the source of the assistance. Only in high-profile large-casualty incidents; such as the Kunduz bombing and Arghandab campaign, where there was a greater involvement of the PRT, GIROA and community with ACAP, did staff and stakeholders perceive that there were improved local perceptions and increased public trust in the government and international community emerged from program activities (See Appendix 10).

8.3 How has ACAP Managed the Balance between Addressing Security Needs and Seizing Opportunities to Promote Stabilization Objectives by Influencing Popular Perceptions and Behavior?

Finding. ACAP staff views were obtained on two stabilization methods. First, on whether ACAP „Includes Local Government Officials in the Program Efforts,’ the ACAP

staff answered „Moderate (12 respondents) to High (nine respondents)’ based on responses from 21 of 41 respondents.

Interviews of government officials showed over a third of the officials had no knowledge (20 of 56) and others were minimally engaged with ACAP; that is, only involved in verification information. Second, on whether ACAP „Provides Direct Assistance to Families and Communities Suffering Losses due to International Military Operations,’ ACAP were staff was unanimously positive.

Beneficiaries did not associate the program with their government, although local, district, and provincial stakeholders are sometimes involved in incident and beneficiary identification. Not a single beneficiary surveyed noted receiving assistance from their government; only one non-beneficiary said they had received help from the government. Beneficiaries may not be completely honest (or knowledgeable if not head of household) about other streams of assistance to victims such as solatia, condolence, or GIRA programs – either to ACAP staff during family assessments or in this survey. No ACAP beneficiary said they had received assistance from IMF and only 1.2% from „Americans.’ Most beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, and local stakeholders did not connect the assistance to organizations besides IOM.

Conclusion 24. ACAP staff appeared to overstate their involvement with Afghan government officials. Despite security issues, ACAP was able to provide direct assistance to many families suffering losses due to the conflict between IMF and insurgents, which was widely perceived to have some impact on the beneficiaries. This was supported by the survey data, which also noted some family impact but little to no community-level impact. Program implementation has paid more attention to security concerns, which has had detrimental consequences on transparency and community involvement in the program.

8.4 To What Extent has ACAP Supported International Military Coalition and other Support Agencies to Provide Assistance?

Finding. Twenty-eight of 41 ACAP staff gave a somewhat positive response to the question on working closely with the IMF and International Community; „High (11 respondents) and Moderate (17 respondents). Interview comments from the staff were less supportive: 1) „We are not allowed to share information regarding ACAP activities (Wardak/Paktya/Khost);’ 2) „Currently, we do not work with other agencies or organizations while working with ACAP in the field and, I believe, there isn’t any need for this. (Kandahar);’ 3) „Due to security problems, we do not share information of ACAP activities with the staff of other organizations, many of these individuals are not trustworthy and we don’t want to take such a risk (Kandahar);’ and 4) „Sharing information with other agencies and organizations is not required (Herat/Kunduz).’ Beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, and local stakeholders did not connect ACAP assistance with anyone beyond IOM.

Conclusion 25. ACAP needs to improve working relationships and information sharing with other agencies and organizations if ACAP is going to work with and support other agency efforts and further stabilization. Working relationships have basically been restricted to incident and beneficiary identification and verification.

8.5 To What Extent has ACAP Supported Country Ownership and Putting Afghans in the Lead?

Finding. Only nine ACAP respondents out of 41 rated this „High’ compared to 20 respondents out of 24 rating the item „Low’. Afghan staff would like more responsibility, but ACAP has noted and caught instances of corruption by national staff when not under close international supervision. International staff are restricted by the difficult security situation in the field creating a dilemma for ACAP.

Conclusion 26. *While ACAP needs to do a better job in putting ‘Afghans First’ in the management of the ACAP program and increase connections with GIRoA and local stakeholders, the program needs strong processes, procedures, and systems and international management to minimize corruption possibilities.*

8.6 Was the ACAP Approach the Best Approach for Contributing to Stabilization Objectives?

By 2010, ACAP had largely completed its community projects, which had only been a small component of the effort. The project’s methodology focused on affected households. It is difficult to make a case for assistance to households leading to stabilization of communities. The program does little to explain what has happened to affected communities. Civilian casualties caused directly by IMF have declined since the McCrystal Tactical Directive and other changes in ISAF since mid-2009. Meanwhile, civilian casualties have grown as insurgent tactics have become more indiscriminate over 2009-10. Multiple researchers have noted that some 75% of casualties are now from insurgents, and note that Afghans themselves do not know or understand this trend.

While local stakeholders noted that assistance had changed their villages (23 of 26), they meant only that it had an impact on individual households benefitting from the program. Their assessment was that ACAP has not stabilized the village - only families within it. In more insecure areas, program implementation is less visible and sometimes remote, with less impact on the community since beneficiaries sometimes hide that they have received assistance due to fear of the insurgents. They do not disguise their losses from the fighting, but instead seek restitution. Where ACAP has suffered from corruption, the program may contribute to perceptions that the International Community is duplicitous or incompetent and be destabilizing. Some staff and activity managers share this opinion.

Conclusion 27.

- 1. ACAP assistance has had little impact on stability, especially in less stable areas; as access, transparency, working relationships and information sharing are minimal.**
- 2. If ACAP met beneficiary needs better and had more timely and visible delivery to households or communities, it could build greater trust and help change the perceptions of Afghans.**
- 3. ACAP needs to work with community organizations to support stabilization. Engagement with village and district-level shuras and Community Development Councils is critical for potential stabilization.**
- 4. ACAP needs to involve GIRoA at all levels and local stakeholders in the assistance,**

including involvement in an open distribution process, as important to build public trust and assist in the stabilization.

5. ACAP may have helped reduce the rage of some individuals and the potential for them to seek revenge after an incident. ACAP appears to have been able to change the perceptions of some individual beneficiaries of the International Community but overall is not the best approach for contributing to stabilization as currently implemented.

6. ACAP needs to reach a larger number of beneficiaries in a concentrated area to affect stabilization – it cannot be a one-off assistance program for scattered households if stabilization is sought.

9.0 RECOMMENDATIONS

Overall. ACAP is a stabilization program as it seeks to both stabilize communities and requires some community stabilization to operate effectively.

- Assistance should be approved only after a face-to-face meeting with the community leaders and beneficiaries and consultation with GIRoA and the USAID/Activity Manager.
- Assistance should be delivered openly with GIRoA in a community setting.
- If ACAP is unable to engage stakeholders, beneficiaries and GIRoA, where perspective beneficiaries live due to insecurity, a second-best alternative is to hold meetings in a district or provincial center. If neither is possible, assistance should not be provided.
- Assistance should focus on self-identified beneficiary needs.
- Assistance should be substantial enough to have a demonstrable impact on livelihood.

Appendix 1



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APPENDIX 1

SCOPE OF WORK FINAL EVALUATION

AFGHANISTAN CIVILIAN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT #306-A-00-07-00516-00)

I. BACKGROUND

Afghan Civilian Assistance Program (ACAP)

The USAID/Afghan Civilian Assistance Program (ACAP) is a stabilization program that provides timely and appropriate assistance to Afghan civilian families and communities that have suffered losses as a result of international military operations against anti-government elements (AGEs). Anti-government activity has increased dramatically in recent years; in turn, the U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A), International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have intensified their operations against AGEs. This increased level of violence has resulted in a higher number of civilian families and communities suffering losses.

In April 2007, USAID/Afghanistan signed a Cooperative Agreement with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to implement ACAP, which is known as the Leahy Initiative. The current ceiling is \$63.5 million funded through annual congressional earmarks. Although ACAP assistance is available nationwide, over 80% of the assistance is in the South, Southeast and East. IOM has 14 field offices, in addition to its Kabul headquarters, from where ACAP's activities are implemented. The current program will end March 31, 2011; however, a proposal is being considered to extend the program through September 30, 2011.

ACAP is the only international funded program that provides relatively short term, tailored, non monetary assistance to individuals and families to fit their circumstances. ACAP is not a compensation program, nor is it intended to provide condolence payments. There are no hand-outs of cash⁶ and the assistance is provided according to the needs of the family and is not per injury or death. The reason for the incident or who is at fault is not required by ACAP as a pre-requisite for assisting Afghan civilians harmed. However, verification of the incident meeting the ACAP eligibility criteria must be met before Afghan civilians receive any assistance. Examples of ACAP assistance include, but are not limited to:

⁶ One exception to this is the community shelter projects in high risk areas. Beneficiaries rebuild their own houses and ACAP provides cash in installments following monitoring visits. Implementation of these projects is done in close coordination with the local government and community.

- Vocational and business training for family members who have lost a main income earner, or have experienced loss of income
- Support for the establishment of small business opportunities
- Children's education support
- Housing repair and reconstruction
- Medical assistance for the injured, either in-country, or through a referral system outside Afghanistan
- Restoration of livelihood sources, such as livestock, orchards, etc.
- Rebuilding vital community infrastructure and essential buildings

The package of assistance is under review. To address the remaining backlog of approximately 2,500 families and new incidents, offering a limited choice of standard kits to families of new cases is being considered. ACAP no longer provides housing repair and rehabilitation to vital community infrastructure, such as clinics and clinics. To the extent possible, ACAP works with the international military to identify assistance that would qualify under the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) to complement or fill in gaps in assistance.

USAID's Stabilization Strategy

In February 2010, the new Stabilization Unit was formed, uniting all USG stabilization programs, including ACAP and planning capacity under one office. The Stabilization Unit ensures that USAID/Afghanistan's stabilization activities are coordinated, complementary and connected to the Mission's national-level development programming. The unit represents USAID/Afghanistan in civilian-military coordination with the U.S. military and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and socializing the principles of stability programming with key stakeholders in GIRoA and the USG. This unity ensures close coordination, collaboration and sequencing of programs to achieve USG stabilization priorities in Afghanistan. Wherever possible, USAID's programs, in partnership with district line officials, will align/re-align to support, augment, or fill gaps in GIRoA-delivered basic services (in line with national service guidelines).

USAID's stabilization programming is designed to contribute in the short and medium term to political and social stabilization, social cohesion, and better governance. Interventions addressing the causes of instability vary by locality. Broadly defined they can be: (1) quick-impact to resolve immediate conditions that threaten stability in a targeted area, and/or; (2) designed to reinforce and sustain initial gains with transition to longer-term programs. The majority of stabilization activities are implemented at the sub-national level to address sources of instability (SOIs) and build GIRoA capacity and legitimate Afghan governance at the community, district and provincial levels. Stabilization programs seek to address key SOIs by: engaging/supporting at-risk populations, extending the reach of GIRoA to unstable areas, providing income generation opportunities, building trust between citizens and their government, and encouraging local populations to take an active role in their development. These stabilization programs also support recently stabilized communities to sustain community stability and development.

U.S. Strategic Approach

The Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy outlines the U.S. strategy for supporting the Afghan and Pakistani Governments' efforts to defeat the extremist threat.⁷ The strategy includes job creation to undermine extremists' appeal, and governance to help develop more responsive, visible and accountable institutions. The USG recognizes the importance of security, governance, and development in establishing stability at the provincial and district levels where Afghan government officials are in closer contact to their constituents.

Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS)

The Consultative Peace Jirga of June, 2010 produced a mandate to adopt a “whole of government” approach, the essence of which is structural reform to create an effective, accountable and transparent government that can deliver services to the population and safeguard national interests. The first ever international conference in Afghanistan, convened on July 20, 2010, recognized that civilian casualties are of great concern to Afghan civilians and the Afghan government, and the Afghan and international military forces are committed to reducing civilian casualties.⁸

On April 21, 2008, President Hamid Karzai approved the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS): A Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction, for the five year period of 2008 through 2013. The ANDS places the “war survivors” as one of two priority groups to receive improved social services and social services delivery. Improving social protection is vital to reducing poverty and increasing the livelihood of Afghans. The Afghan Constitution obliges the Government to support the poor and most vulnerable. The National Social Protection Sector Strategy supports efforts to deliver coordinated programs and improve social protection. MoLSAMD is responsible for labor affairs, social protection and welfare and provide services to the poor and most vulnerable.

II. PROGRAM GOAL AND OBJECTIVES

Goal: Strengthen the U.S. Government's efforts to provide assistance for Afghan families and communities that have suffered losses as a result of military operations against insurgents and the Taliban, thereby contributing to overall stabilization efforts in Afghanistan and pre-emptively addressing potential causes of renewed disorderly migration.

Objectives:

4. Ensure that Afghan civilians suffering losses as a result of the being caught between fighting among ISAF troops and the Taliban/AGE receive timely and appropriate assistance to restore and continue their lives.

⁷ Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, “Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy,” February 2010, available at: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/135728.pdf>.

⁸ Kabul Conference Communique, “Kabul International Conference on Afghanistan,” July 20, 2010, available at: <http://www.afghanistan-un.org/2010/07/international-conference-on-afghanistan-kabul-20-july-2010/>.

5. Establish and maintain a liaison network among key stakeholders on the international, national and provincial level.
6. Gather and disseminate information related to the ACAP program among stakeholders at the international, national and provincial level.

III. PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

This evaluation is being conducted due to the importance of supporting Afghan civilians suffering losses as a result of the conflict and political importance of ACAP. As the USG continues to support stabilization initiatives, leverage resources and strengthen civilian-military collaboration, it is crucial that lessons learned are documented from previous efforts. It is critical that the successes and weaknesses of ACAP are studied and documented so that future stabilization efforts can benefit. ACAP is ending in 2011 and a follow on is planned.

The final evaluation will focus primarily on the period of performance from January 1, 2010 to present.

The purpose of this evaluation is to:

- qualitatively evaluate the impact and effectiveness of ACAP in support of stabilization efforts;
- evaluate the design and impact of ACAP to determine its value as a stabilization program in the context of the larger USG effort;
- qualitatively evaluate ACAP on how it impacted and complemented the overall stabilization effort of the USG in Afghanistan
- distill lessons learned on program design and implementation to guide future USAID stabilization initiatives projects in conflict affected environments; and
- provide guidance in how ACAP II, the follow-on program could be improved.

IV. EVALUATION QUESTIONS

Stabilization Goals

- To what extent did ACAP support USG stabilization efforts?
- How effective was ACAP in improving Afghan citizens' perception of the international community?
- To what extent did ACAP support international military coalition efforts?
- To what extent did ACAP support country ownership and putting Afghans in the lead?
- Conclusions?
- Recommendations?

Project Goal

Strengthen the U.S. Government's efforts to provide assistance for Afghan families and communities that have suffered losses as a result of military operations against insurgents and the Taliban, thereby contributing to overall stabilization efforts in Afghanistan and pre-emptively addressing potential causes of renewed disorderly migration.

- Did the project achieve its current stated goal and objectives?
- Did beneficiaries perceive that the assistance has helped them to restore and continue their lives? What was the impact on their lives?
- Did beneficiaries perceive that the assistance was delivered in a fair and transparent manner?
- What ACAP innovations or impact can be considered as major achievements of this program thus far? What attributed to this success?
- Were there any unintended consequences or impacts, significant implementation problems or unmet needs?
- Conclusions?
- Recommendations? Short-term recommendations for ACAP? For ACAP II?

Methodology

- Was the ACAP approach the best approach for contributing to stabilization objectives?
- Would a different program design or objectives be more effective in achieving the goal?
- What methodologies worked and which were less effective?
- Were the indicators the most appropriate to measure the impact of ACAP?
- Conclusions?
- Recommendations?

ACAP Objective 1: Ensure that Afghan civilians suffering losses as a result of the being caught between fighting among ISAF troops and the Taliban/AGE receive timely and appropriate assistance to restore and continue their lives.

- Was the level of non-monetary assistance appropriate to the needs of the family?
ACAP is not a compensation or condolence program, hence assistance is provided. As a 'no-fault' program, there is no attribution as to who is at 'fault', therefore ACAP provides assistance because families need help to alleviate their vulnerability as a result of the incident.
- How effective was support for the establishment of small business opportunities?
- What Afghan population groups harmed by international military forces against insurgent groups may be the most appropriate for targeting, i.e. children and younger youth, mothers and wives as household breadwinners, etc.?
- Conclusions?
- Recommendations? Short-term recommendations for ACAP? For ACAP II?

ACAP Objective 2: Establish and maintain a liaison network among key stakeholders on the international, national and provincial level.

- To what extent did ACAP utilize the capabilities and resources of Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Government of Afghanistan, USAID field staff at

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and District Stabilization Teams (DSTs) and international military forces?

- How has such collaboration and coordination efforts improved program effectiveness?
- What was learned about coordination with the military and USAID field staff?
- Conclusions?
- Recommendations, to include engagement of USAID field staff supporting stabilization initiatives? Short-term recommendations for ACAP? For ACAP II?

ACAP Objective 3: Gather and disseminate information related to the ACAP program among stakeholders at the international, national and provincial level.

- Was USAID's branding policy as applied to ACAP and the resulting non-promotion of ACAP as a USG funded program helped or hurt as a stabilization instrument?
- To what extent was the balance between security and opportunities to promote stabilization objectives pertaining to influencing population behaviors and perceptions? *USAID has a partial branding waiver which limits disclosure of who is funding the program.*
- Conclusions?
- Recommendations? Short-term recommendations for ACAP? For ACAP II?

V. PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE

The total time period allocated for this monitoring and evaluation exercise shall not exceed 42 working days, all of which will be spent in Afghanistan. Each Afghan national facilitators/interpreters will have 37 days level of effort. Afghan national evaluators will have up to 20 days of level of effort, depending upon the need. The suggested start date is a/o January 13 through February 24, 2011. A six day work week is authorized for this evaluation effort.

VI. MANAGEMENT

The evaluation team will work closely with Valerie Ibaan, Agreement Officer Technical Representative (AOTR) for ACAP.

VII. DATA COLLECTION/ANALYSIS ACTIVITIES

1. The consultants will review relevant documents provided by AOTR (attachments).
 - a) Program Descriptions and modifications
 - b) USAID Mid-Term Evaluation Report for ACAP, March 1-April 13, 2010
 - c) Quarterly Reports
 - d) RIG Audit Reports, December 15, 2009 and February 23, 2010
 - e) USAID partial branding waiver
 - f) Success Stories
 - g) UNAMA Human Rights, "Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2009", January 26, 2010, available at:
<http://vcnv.org/files/Protection%20of%20Civilian%202009%20report%20English.pdf>
 - h) Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, "Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy," February 2010, available at:
<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/135728.pdf>.

- i) Kabul Conference Communique, “Kabul International Conference on Afghanistan,” July 20, 2010, available at: <http://www.afghanistan-un.org/2010/07/international-conference-on-afghanistan-kabul-20-july-2010/>.
 - j) U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide, January 2009
2. Train Evaluation Team:
 - a) Advertise and select local Afghan NGOs or five teams of 2-4 Afghan male and female nationals to conduct at least three field visits each in the South, Southeast, Kabul, North and West.
 - b) Identify Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled, or MoLSAMD district and provincial level representatives to participate in joint evaluation with Afghan teams. De-conflict MoLSAMD’s list with USAID Field Program Officers to ensure representatives are viewed as legitimate, positive influencers. Include a MoLSAMD national level representative, if time permits for official.
 - c) Review questions for cultural appropriateness and ability to elicit the necessary response. Translate evaluation tool in both Dari and Pashtu.
 - d) Conduct workshop to: 1) clarify roles and responsibilities of the evaluators and facilitator, 2) review the schedule, logistical arrangements, and agenda, 3) review objectives of ACAP, 4) train Afghan evaluators in basic data collection and analysis taking into consider Afghan sensitivities.
 3. Conduct evaluation of ACAP:
 - a) Five teams of 2-4 Afghan nationals to conduct at least three field visits each in the South (Pashtu), Southeast (Pashtu), Kabul (Dari and Pashtu), North (Dari) and West (Pashtu). The international consultant is not expected travel to the provinces and districts given the time, security and cost considerations. S/he may decide to meet with USAID staff and beneficiaries on PRTs and Regional Commands.
 - b) Selected local level MoLSAMD representatives or GIROA sub-national representatives participate in evaluation.
 4. Analyze Data:
 - a) Facilitator works with Afghan national evaluators to reach consensus on findings, conclusions and recommendations.

VIII. METHODOLOGY

The contractor will refine the methodology for the evaluation. Consistent with Afghan First, building the capacity of Afghans has been incorporated into the methodology. The methodology will be presented as part of the draft work plan as outlined in the deliverables below. The evaluation team will be able to base their analysis on a variety of program implementation documents, including program descriptions, work plans, performance monitoring plans, quarterly reports, external audit reports, and weekly reports and program trackers.

The evaluation team should conduct key interviews with USAID/Afghanistan Stabilization unit staff, implementing partners within the Stabilization unit’s program and civilian-military teams. The evaluation team should consider the collection of data from the beneficiaries and communities of the ACAP program, and possibly with neighboring communities which did not receive assistance. This could be data previously collected or

designing a survey to be taken during the evaluation. USAID is open to primary analysis (e.g. surveys, other quantitative assessments) where appropriate.

IX. TEAM COMPOSITION

At least one international consultant team member shall have expertise in:

- Evaluating the management structure of programs and the interaction of the programs with the U.S. military and USG on a whole
- With a strong background in monitoring and evaluation of large, USAID integrated, politically high profile programs
- Experience directly managing a USAID program
- Experience managing a stabilization program

Below are the specific skills and competencies deemed necessary for carrying out this assignment:

Monitoring & Evaluation Team Leader – (one international consultant)

Required qualifications

- Minimum five (5) years experience providing leadership on design, monitoring and evaluation across organizations or programs, including managing and supervising M&E consultants and M&E staff
- At least two (2) years of field-based data collection and analysis experience
- Experience implementing and/or evaluating development projects in conflict environments and working with the military
- Experience in designing M&E methodologies and tools and the ability to coach and train others in their use
- Experience writing clear and defensible findings, conclusions and recommendations that clearly address the evaluation questions
- Experience working on USAID or international development projects

Desirable qualifications

- Experience working in Afghanistan or region
- Experience implementing and/or evaluating development projects in conflict environments

Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist – (one international consultant)

Required qualifications

- Experience implementing and/or evaluating development projects in conflict environments and working with the military
- Experience implementing and/or evaluating community-based social services development projects involving government officials and/or NGOs
- Experience writing clear and defensible findings, conclusions and recommendations that clearly address the evaluation questions
- Proficiency in written and spoken English

Desirable qualifications

- Experience working in Afghanistan or region
- Experience working on USAID or international development projects

Afghan National Evaluation Facilitators (2 facilitators/interpreters) -

Required qualifications

- Experience working with government officials and/or NGOs
- Experience interpreting for international organizations
- Proficiency in spoken English
- One facilitator/interpreter proficient in Dari is compulsory
- One facilitator/interpreter proficient in Pashtu is compulsory
- High school graduate

Desirable qualifications

- Experience with development assistance project/program monitoring and evaluation
- Proficiency in written English
- Experience implementing and/or evaluating conflict mitigation, stabilization, or counter-insurgency projects, specifically community-based social services projects

Afghan National Evaluators – (up to 20 evaluators; mix of male and female teams; 3 teams in the Southeast, South, Central; 2 teams in the North, West)

Required qualifications

- Experience working with government officials and/or NGOs
- Proficiency in written and spoken Dari or Pashtu is compulsory
- Experience working in Pashtu speaking regions for teams conducting field visits in the South, Southeast and West
- Experience working in Dari speaking regions for teams conducting field visits in the North and some provinces in the West
- High school graduate (or equivalent working experience)

Desirable qualifications

- Experience with development assistance project/program monitoring and evaluation
- Experience implementing and/or evaluating conflict mitigation, stabilization, or counter-insurgency projects
- Proficiency in spoken English

Attention needs to be paid to hiring staff from the area of focus. The level of access of the staff to information and security affects their ability to gather information.

Table 1. Level of Efforts (LOE) in days Estimate:

Position	Prep	Travel	In-Country	Travel	Total
M&E Team Leader	2	2	40	2	42
M&E Specialist	2	2	40	2	42
Two CCN Translators			36 x 2 CCNs		72
CCN Teams			15 x 20 CCNs		300
					456

X. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS AND DELIVERABLES

1. **Evaluation Work Plan** covering (a) develop a work plan and methodology to be approved by USAID/Afghanistan prior to arrival Afghanistan. The plan will include the overall design strategy for the evaluation; (b) the data collection plan; (c) a list of the team members, and which one will serve as the team leader and primary contact (an e-mail and phone contact for the team leader should be provided); and (d) the team's schedule for the evaluation. Submitted with five days of arrival in country for AOTR approval.
2. **Initial Briefing:** Hold an initial briefing on strategy and methodology prior to fieldwork. Discussion of lists of potential interviewees and sites to visit.
3. **Mid-term Briefing:** Hold mid-term briefings with USAID and IOM on the status of the assessment and potential challenges and emerging opportunities.
4. **Draft Evaluation Report**, consistent with guidance provided in Section XI below. Length of the report: not to exceed 20 pages in English, excluding annexes in Times New Roman 12 point, single space, consistent with USAID branding policy. The draft evaluation report should be submitted to USAID with the agreed timeframe under the delivery schedule below. The report will address each of the issues identified in the SOW and any other factors the team considers to have a bearing on the objectives of the evaluation. Any such factors can be included in the report only after consultation with USAID. Submitted within six to eight days after analysis of data and prior to departure.
5. **Oral & Powerpoint Presentation/Briefing** to present key findings and recommendations in separate meetings with USAID and IOM. Conducted at least five days prior to departure.
6. **Final Evaluation Report** incorporates final comments from the Stability Unit/AOTR the Team Leader and IOM management. Final report submitted to the Stability Unit one day prior his/her departure from Kabul.

XI. FINAL REPORT FORMAT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Executive Summary states the development objectives of the program/project evaluated; purpose of the evaluation; study method; findings; conclusions, lessons learned and future design implications. Maximum: 4 pages

BODY OF THE PAPER

1. Context in which ACAP took place, relevant history, demography, political situation that prompted USAID to implement the project
2. Evaluation Purpose and Methodology
3. Team Composition
4. Evidence /Findings and their Analysis -- of the study related to the questions
5. Conclusions drawn from the analysis of findings stated succinctly
6. Summary of Recommendations

APPENDICES shall include:

16. A copy of the Scope of Work
17. The relevant USAID targets and results (Operational Plan Program Elements)
18. Evaluation Design and Methodology
19. A list of interview questions
20. A list of documents consulted
21. Individuals and agencies contacted
22. Technical topics, including study methodology if necessary
23. Schedule of activities in an Excel format
24. IOM comments to initial draft
25. Powerpoint presentation/brief

Appendix 2

APPENDIX 2: RELEVANT USAID PROGRAM
ELEMENT TARGETS AND RESULTS

Stabilization Performance Plan and Report FY 2009 Indicators															
PROGRAM AREA	PROGRAM ELEMENT/ INDICATORS	DQA Completed	Targets 2009	Results 2009	Target 2010	Results 2010	Target 2011	Target 2012	Target 2013	Deviation Type	Explanation of deviation greater than 10% of FY09 results from FY09 targets (1000 characters limit including spaces).	Indicator Narrative:	Afghan Info	CBJ	PMP
1.6 Conflict Mitigation and Reconciliation	1.6.1 Conflict Mitigation									a. Shift in programming priorities b. Increased commodity and/or fuel price c. Delay in receiving funding d. Delay in start-up of program e. Unforeseen country circumstances (natural disaster, political crisis, conflict) f. Other		Please use this space to explain the reason for adding/dropping indicators. For new indicators, the explanation should include the baseline. For health indicators, you need to note the data source. Please also explain how the targets were derived for out years.			
	Number of people trained in conflict mitigation/resolution skills with USG assistance		1,360		173	173	100	50	50				YES	YES	
	1.6.2 Peace and Reconciliation Processes														
	Number of community-based reconciliation projects completed with USG assistance		115	127	188	393	400	300	200		Project facilitators with community shuras identify reconciliation projects.			YES	

	female-headed households														
	food insecure				63,114										
	HIV-affected														
	number of men				141,930										
	number of women				11,982										
	other targeted vulnerable people				8,341										
6.1 Program Design and Learning	6.1.1 Program Design and Learning														
	Number of Special studies		20	28	52	27	2	1	1						
	Number of Evaluation				1	1	1	1	1						

Appendix 3



**APPENDIX 3: FINAL WORK PLAN
FINAL EVALUATION OF THE
USAID/Afghanistan Civilian Assistance Program (ACAP)
USAID Cooperative Agreement No. 306-A-00-07-00516-00
February 19, 2011**

The Assessment Team proposes the following workplan for the final evaluation of the USAID/ACAP program implemented by the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

A. SCHEDULE OF DELIVERABLES:

January 20:	Initial meeting w/USAID
January 23:	Initial meeting w/IOM
January 25:	Submit Initial Work Plan to USAID/AOTR
January 27:	Briefing with USAID on Initial Work Plan
January 28-29:	Survey and Data Collection Instrument (DCI) Development,
January 30-31:	Survey and DCI Development, Refinement, and Training with Checchi SUPPORT Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Team
February 1:	Refine Survey Instruments, Protocols, Training, and Monitoring with SUPPORT M&E Team
February 2-3:	Pre-test survey protocols, instruments, training, and monitoring with expanded Checchi M&E Team on beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, and stakeholders in Kabul
February 5:	Reflect and revise final survey instruments
February 5-6:	Test, reflect, and revise DCIs and retrain expanded Checchi M&E team
February 7-8:	Checchi M&E teams travel to field
February 9:	Initial meeting with MoLSAMD
February 9-23:	Four Checchi M&E teams work with DCIs in Herat, Khost, Helmand, Kandahar, Kunduz, Wardak, Laghman, and Nangahar
February 4-13:	Subcontract drafting and contracting for survey
February 4-13:	Incident, beneficiary, and stakeholder selection for survey
February 12-24:	Checchi M&E teams compile data and reports
February 16-28:	Checchi M&E teams report
February 19:	Submit Final Evaluation Work Plan with revised survey instruments and protocols to USAID
February 19-27:	Survey preparation, training, and fieldwork, supervision of SDLR
February 17-March 3:	Reflection on findings, conclusions, and recommendations from DCIs and interviews
February 22:	<i>Proposed</i> Mid-term Briefing Update to USAID/AOTR
February 23:	<i>Proposed</i> Mid-term Briefing Update to IOM
March 2:	SDLR delivers survey data to team
March 5:	Submit draft Evaluation Report to USAID/AOTR and IOM
March 6:	Submit Power Point Presentation to USAID/AOTR and IOM
March 7:	Brief USAID on Evaluation findings, conclusions, and recommendations (including ACAP II)

- March 7: Brief IOM on Evaluation findings, conclusions, and recommendations (excluding ACAP II)
- March 8: SDLR delivers final survey report to team
- March 9: IOM comments submitted (if desired) to team in writing on Draft and Power Point
- March 10: Submit Final Evaluation to USAID/AOTR
- March 11: Team departs Kabul

B. INTERVIEWS:

The assessment team will meet with appropriate individuals from the following organizations: (specific contacts will be included in the list of individuals and agencies contacted, which will be a working document and updated regularly and included in the final report as Annex 7).

United States Government (USG)

USAID ACAP/AOTR
USAID Field Program Officers
USAID Deputy Field Program Officers

IOM

Mission management
Program management
Program staff

GIRoA and Local Government Authorities

Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, and Martyrs and Disabled (MoLSAMD)
Ministry of Interior
Provincial Governors
District Governors
District Shuras
Village Shuras

Other Stakeholders

Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC)
United Nations Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA)
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
Other NGOs
Village elders

Project Beneficiaries

A sample of the households/families engaged with ACAP in 2010 across the 6 regions of Afghanistan (9 provinces)

Non-Beneficiaries

A sample of households/families not engaged with ACAP

C. METHODOLOGY

The main data collection methodologies and instruments to be used in the ACAP Final Evaluation are described in the following section.

To address the 27 distinct questions in the SOW, the evaluation will use three teams: the core international team of two plus two Afghan staff; the Checchi SUPPORT M&E staff supplemented by 4 additional national evaluators; and the Social Development and Legal Rights (SDLR) survey team. Four methods will be used: a review and analysis of ACAP and other reports plus interviews with IOM, ACAP, and other stakeholders in Kabul by the core team; structured interviews with ACAP regional staff and stakeholders by the SUPPORT M&E team; a survey of beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, and local stakeholders through SDLR; and the analysis of the SUPPORT M&E and SDLR data and reports by the core team.

The core team will then prepare and submit a Draft Evaluation Report, as well as prepare, submit, and present Power Point presentations on findings, conclusions, and recommendations to USAID and IOM separately. After comments and discussion with USAID and IOM, the team will complete and submit the Final Evaluation Report to USAID.

1. **Desk/Document Review and Interviews**– the team will identify, read, and analyze IOM and related USAID annual and quarterly reports, work plans, PMPs, websites, and relevant other reports from external stakeholders, as well as conduct semi-structured interviews with IOM central staff and informed international stakeholders of ACAP in Kabul. The team will interview a sample of American USAID Activity Managers across Afghanistan by phone and e-mail.
2. **Structured Interviews with ACAP Staff and Stakeholders - Data Collection Instrument and Survey Questionnaire Development, Training, Testing, and Refinement** – the team will develop data collection instruments (DCIs), test and revise them, and train the SUPPORT M&E teams in their use. Separate DCIs will be created for ACAP Staff, Stakeholders, and USAID Activity Managers. The M&E teams will visit ACAP offices and stakeholders in selected districts as well as nine provinces: Herat, Khost, Helmand, Kandahar, Kunduz, Wardak, Laghman, Nangahar, and Kabul. M&E teams will also interview Afghan USAID Activity Managers when available in these provinces. The M&E teams will debrief the core team upon returning to Kabul.
3. **Survey of ACAP Beneficiaries, Non-Beneficiaries, and Local Stakeholders -** The team will develop separate survey questionnaires for ACAP beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, and local stakeholders. After translation into Dari and Pashtu, the instruments will be back-translated to ensure that the questions are understood the same in both languages as in English. The core team will train the SUPPORT M&E team in their use and conduct a pre-test of all three in Kabul. The core team will then revise as appropriate. The core team will contract with SDLR to conduct the survey and provide an unbiased selection and oversample of ACAP project sites, beneficiaries, and local stakeholders to interview in eight provinces: Herat, Khost, Helmand, Kandahar, Kunduz, Wardak, Laghman, and Nangahar. The core

team will supervise SDLR's training of supervisors, as well as provide data bases for data entry by SDLR. The team will develop and implement a plan to supervise a sample of SDLR teams and a monitoring plan to check the veracity and quality of interviews. SDLR will survey 192 beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, and local stakeholders from at least two different incidents/project sites in each province and deliver the raw data and survey reports to the core team for analysis.

4. **Compile and Analyze Data** – the core team will gather and analyze the data from DCIs and the survey as well as qualitative information gathered through interviews. The core team will discuss field experiences and data with each M&E team and with SDLR to reach findings and conclusions. The team will re-interview or make more extensive interviews with some Activity Managers, ACAP staff, stakeholders, beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, and local stakeholders if necessary.
5. **Write and submit Draft Evaluation Report** – the team will draft an evaluation report with findings and conclusions for the 27 questions from the SOW, as well as broader conclusions about the current ACAP project. The Draft submitted to USAID will also include recommendations for the development of ACAP II; the draft submitted to IOM for their comment will not.
6. **Draft and present power point presentation** – the team will prepare presentations and report to USAID and IOM separately.
7. **Revise and submit Final Evaluation Report** – the team will reflect and finalize the evaluation report taking into account discussion and comments from USAID and IOM.

D. PRELIMINARY FINAL REPORT OUTLINE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (4 pages)

Briefly summarizes the objectives of the program, the purpose of the evaluation, the methodologies used, the main findings and conclusions, and the main recommendations for ACAP (and ACAP II).

BODY OF THE PAPER (16 pages)

7. Introduction

Problems of civilian victims of conflict
Context for ACAP
Recent history and evolution of the program

8. Evaluation: Purpose, Team and Methodology

Objective 1: Appropriateness and Timeliness - Findings and Conclusions (4 pages)

1. What Afghan population groups harmed by international military forces against insurgent groups have been the most appropriate for targeting, i.e. children and younger youth, mothers and wives as household breadwinners, etc.?

2. Was the level of non-monetary assistance appropriate to the needs of the family?
 3. Do beneficiaries perceive that the assistance was delivered in a fair and transparent manner?
 4. Do beneficiaries perceive that the assistance was delivered in a timely manner?
 5. Do beneficiaries perceive that ACAP assistance has helped them to restore and continue their lives?
 6. What has been the impact of ACAP assistance on the lives of beneficiaries?
 7. How effective was ACAP support for the establishment of small business opportunities?
- 4. Objective 2: Establishing and Maintaining a Liaison Network - Findings and Conclusions (2/3 pages)**
8. To what extent did ACAP utilize the capabilities and resources of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), and International Committee for Red Cross (ICRC)?
 9. To what extent did ACAP utilize the capabilities and resources of the Afghan Government, including the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs, and Disabled (MoLSAMD)?
 10. What has ACAP learned about coordination with the USAID field staff at Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), District Stabilization Teams (DSTs) and International Military Forces?
 11. How has such collaboration and coordination efforts improved program effectiveness?
- 5. Objective 3: Gathering and Disseminating Information - Findings and Conclusions (1 page)**
12. Has USAID's branding policy as applied to ACAP and the resulting non-promotion of ACAP as a USG funded program helped or hurt ACAP's use as a stabilization instrument?
- 6. Overall Goals of ACAP: Findings and Conclusions (3/4 pages)**
13. What ACAP innovations or impacts can be considered as major achievements of this program thus far?
 14. To what can we attribute these successes of the ACAP program?
 15. Are there any unintended consequences or impacts from ACAP?
 16. Does ACAP have any significant implementation problems?
 17. Are there significant needs unmet by ACAP?
 18. What methodologies used by ACAP have been relatively more and less effective?
 19. Were the indicators used the most appropriate to measure the impact of ACAP?
 20. Has ACAP achieved its current stated goal and objectives?
 21. Would a different program design or objectives be more effective in achieving the goal?
- 7. Broader Stabilization Goals of ACAP: Findings and Conclusions (2 pages)**
22. To what extent has ACAP supported USG stabilization efforts?
 23. How effective has ACAP been in improving Afghan citizens' perception of the international community?

24. How has ACAP managed the balance between addressing security needs and seizing opportunities to promote stabilization objectives by influencing popular perceptions and behavior?
25. To what extent has ACAP supported international military coalition efforts?
26. To what extent has ACAP supported country ownership and putting Afghans in the lead?
27. Was the ACAP approach the best approach for contributing to stabilization objectives?

8. Recommendations

For USAID and IOM on ACAP

For USAID on ACAP II

APPENDICES

26. Scope of Work
27. Relevant USAID Program Element Targets and Results
28. Final Work Plan: The Design and Methodology for the Evaluation
29. Schedule of activities with full contact information
30. Summary of Comments by Question from Data Collection Instruments
 - A. Activity Managers
 - B. Stakeholders
 - C. ACAP Staff
31. Survey Questionnaires
 - A. Beneficiaries (Survey questionnaire)
 - B. Non-Beneficiaries (Survey questionnaire)
 - C. Local Stakeholders (Survey questionnaire)
32. Survey Sites Selected
33. List of Documents Consulted
34. IOM Comments on Initial Draft⁹
35. Power Point Presentation

⁹ IOM will be given the opportunity to submit written comments which will be included in this annex should IOM choose to respond to the draft and briefing by March 9, four days after their receipt of our draft.

Appendix 4

APPENDIX 4: SCHEDULE OF ACTIVITIES WITH FULL CONTACT INFORMATION

Kabul, Nangarhar, Laghman, Herat, Kunduz, Kandahar, Helmand, Maidan Wardak, and Khost.

Organization	Interviewee	Email/Phone	Date/Time	Remarks
USAID-Stabilization Unit/Kabul	Valerie Ibaan General Development Officer/ Program Manager ACAP	vibaan@usaid.gov +93(0) 798 405 685	Thursday, Jan 20 10:30- 12:00AM	Orientation
ACAP/IOM/Kabul	Catherine Northing Program Manager ACAP “Leahy Initiative”	cnorthing@iom.int +93 (0) 700078 212	Sunday, Jan 23 2:00- 3:00PM	Orientation
IOM/Kabul	Marco Oasso Chief of Mission	mboasso@iom.int +93(0) 794 100 518	Sunday, Jan 23 3:00- 4:00PM	Orientation
IOM/Kabul	Oscar J. Costilla Deputy Chief of Mission	ocostilla@iom.int +93(0) 794 100 528	Sunday, Jan 23 3:00- 4:00PM	Orientation
ACAP/Kabul	Siddiq Kakar Central Regional Coordinator	skakar@iom.int +93(0) 793 500 600	Monday, Jan 24 10:00- 11:30AM	Orientation
DAI/Kabul	Belqis Ahmadi, Gender Advisor RAMPUP-EAST/ Team Leader/ACAP Mid Term Evaluation	Belquis_ahmadi@ram-up-east.org + 93 (0)793 712 179	Tuesday, Jan 25 11:00- 12:00AM	Interview
ACAP/Herat	Gudrun Kroner International Field Officer	gkroner@iom.int + 93(0) 707 185 062	Monday, Jan 31 4:30- 5:30PM	Interview
ACAP/Farah	Giacomo Mascoli International Field Officer	Giacom.acap@gmail.com +93 (0) 706 819 016	Monday, Jan 31 12:45- 1:45PM	Interview
ACAP/Herat	Nematullah Merrikhi Regional Coordinator	nmerrikhi@iom.int +93(0)799 224 308	Monday, Jan 31 4:30- 5:30PM	Interview
ACAP/Kandahar	Patrick Knapp International Field Officer	Patrick.acap@gmail.com +93(0) 706 819 014	Tuesday, Feb 1 2:30- 3:30PM	Interview
ACAP/Kunduz	Valentina Rigamonti International Field Officer	Kunduz.acap@gmail.com +93 (0) 706 819 015	Tuesday, Feb 1 3:30 – 4:30PM	Interview
ACAP/Kandahar	Jeffrey Jonkers International Field	Jeffrey.acap@gmail.com +93 (0) 793 370 522	Tuesday, Feb 1	Interview

	Officer		2:30-3:30PM	
USAID/Bagram Regional	Jeff Kaufman Activity	Jeffrey.kaufman@afghan.swa.army.mil +93(0) 700 261 247	Feb-5-19	Email
USAID/Kapisa	Erick Jacob Activity	Erick.p.jacob@ugove.gov	Feb-5-19	Email
USAID/Paktika	Melody Jenkins Activity Manager/International	Melody.a.jenkins@ugov.gov +93(0) 337 0772	Feb-5-19	Email
USAID/Baghlan	Alyson Mcfarland Activity Manager/International	Alyson.a.mcfarland@ugov.gov +93 (0) 797 777 348	Feb-5-19	Email
USAID/Kunduz	Jody Stallings Activity Manager/International	jstallings@usaid.gove +93(0) 702 591 351	Feb-5-19	Email
USAID/Herat	Harry H Wheeler Field Program Officer/International	Harry.h.wheeler@gmail.com +93(0) 793 662 013	Feb-5-19	Interview
USAID/Maidan Wardak	Armando Banze Activity Manager/International	Armando.a.banze@ugove.gov	Feb 5-19	Email
USAID/Badghis	David Daines Activity Manager/International	David.r.daines@ugov.gov +93(0) 706 162 577	Feb-5-19	Email
USAID/Ghor	Jason Chau Activity Manager/International	Jason.k.chau@ugov.gov +93(0) 706 797 141	Feb-5-19	Email
USAID/Uruzgan	George Zegarac Activity Manager/International	gzegarac@usaid.gov +93(0) 797 999 786	Feb 5-19	Email
USAID/Nangarhar	Abdul Rauf Piaweray Activity Manager/Afghan	Apiaweray.usaid@gmail.com +93(0) 799 455 442	Feb-5-19	Interview
USAID/Herat	Mohd Aref Abdullah Deputy Field Program Officer Activity Manager/Afghan	Aref.abdullah@ugov.gov +93(0) 799 822 351	Feb-5-19	Interview
USAID/Paktya	Sahar Sahar Activity Manager/Afghan	Sahar.m.sahar@ugov.gov +93(0) 799 822 353	Feb-5-19	Interview
USAID/Zabul	Waheedullah Stankzai Activity Manager/Afghan	Waheedullah.stanakzai@ugov.gov +93(0) 793 663 062	Feb-5-19	Interview
USAID/Helmand	Faiz Roshaan Activity	Faiz.m.roshaan@ugov.gov +93 (0) 708 694 603	Feb-5-19	Interview
USAID/Baghlan	Abdul Wahab Langari Activity Manager/Afghan	langariw@ugov.gov +93(0) 798 405 677	Feb-5-19	Email
USAID/Uruzgan	Farid Gul Hemat Activity Manager/Afghan	fhemat.usaid@gmail.com +93(0) 799 197 673	Feb 5-19	Email
ACAP/Kabul/Cetral	Ahmad Hamid Sajid	Hamid_sajid7@yahoo.com	Sunday ,	Interview

	Regional Field Assistant	+93(0) 700 051 035	Feb 6 9:00AM	
ACAP/Kabul/Central	Haji Abdul Fatah Field Assistant Monitoring	afatahmt@gmail.com + 93(0)700 223 405	Sunday, Feb 6 9:00AM	Interview
ACAP/Kabul/Central	Haji Habib-u- Rahman Wardak Field Assistant	lbrahim_w@yahoo.com +93(0) 700 241 675	Monday, Feb 7	Interview
ACAP/Nangarhar	Amanzeb Sakhi Provincial Coordinator	Sakhi.ctg@gmail.com +93(0) 774 148 271	Monday, Feb 7 13:30-15:30	Interview
ACAP/Nangarhar	Ismatullah Field Assistant	Ismatullah.2010@gmail.com +93(0) 700 055 091	Monday, Feb 7 01:30	Interview
ACAP/Kandahar	Abdul Wahid Hilali Provincial	hilali.wahid@gmail.com +93(0)700 327 527	Monday, Feb 7	Interview
ACAP/Nangarhar	Fazel Tahir Field Assistant	Fazaltahir.fazli@gmail.com +93 (0) 774 148 271	Tuesday ,Feb 8	Interview
ACAP/Kandahar	Bilal Ahmad Field Assistant	Email N/A +93(0)700 336 669	Tuesday, Feb 8	Interview
ACAP/Kandahar	Haji Abdul Rashid Field Monitoring	hajiabdulrashid@gmail.com +93(0)700 327 755	Tuesday , Feb 8 10:30	Interview
GIRoA/Kandahar	Haji Sarwar Khan Head of Development Council Zhrae District	+93 (0) 707 960 524 +93(0) 799 395 349	Tuesday, Feb 8 2:30PM	Interview
ACAP/Kabul	Linda Phillips International Field Officer/ Senior Monitoring & Evaluation/Helmand	Linda.acap@gmail.com +93(0) 793 370 530	Tuesday ,Feb 8 9:00AM	Interview
AIHRC/Kabul	Ahmad Nader Nadery Commissioner-	nadery@aihrc.org.af +93(0) 20 2500676	Tuesday, Feb 8	Interview
AIHRC/Kabul	Mohammadd Shafiq Noori Special Investigation Team Member Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission	Sit.aihrc@gmail.com +93 (0) 798 986 000	Tuesday, Feb 8 2:00-3:00 PM	Interview
ACAP/Kabul	Scott Hussey Public Information/Liaison Officer	scottacap@gmail.com +93(0)793 370 531	Tuesday, Feb 8 10:30 AM	Interview
ACAP/Herat	Mohammad Aman Program Assistant	maman@iom.int +93(0) 700 404 117	Tuesday, Feb 8 9:00	Interview
ACAP/Herat	Suraya Mosawi Reporting Assistant	mosawisuraya@gmail.com +93(0) 795 597 153	Tuesday, Feb 8 13:00	Interview
ACAP/Herat	Zahra Mirhazar Field Assistant	zmirazar@gmail.com +93(0) 794 270 721	Tuesday, Feb 8 14:30	Interview

ACAP/Herat	Tahira Sharifi Reporting Assistant	sharifistr@gmail.com + 93(0) 795 446 622	Wednesday, Feb 9 09:00	Interview
ACAP/Herat	Zobair Zafari Field Assistant	Zobair_zafary@yahoo.com + 93(0) 779 840 521	Wednesday, Feb 9 10:30	Interview
ACAP/Nangarhar	Sima Wafa Field Assistant	Seemawafa666@gmail.com + 93 (00 776 864 536	Wednesday, Feb 9	Interview
ACAP/Herat	Zubair Zafari Field Assistant	zobairsalar@gmail.com +93 (0)779 840 521/772 347 696	Wednesday, Feb 9	Interview
ACAP/Nangarhar	Zahira Hashimi Reporting Assistant	Zshashimi1@gmail.com +93 (0) 777 300 000	Wednesday, Feb 9 10:00-11:15	Interview
GIRoA/MoLSAMD	Waheed Saifi Director General, Policy, Planning, and External Relations.	Waheed.saifi@yahoo.com +93 (0) 799 418 303	Wednesday, Feb 9 3:00- 3:30PM	Interview
GIRoA/MoLSAMD	Abdul Rahim Nasry National Program Coordinator National Skills Development Program	arahimnasry@gmail.com +93(0) 700 24 86 98	Wednesday, Feb 9 3:30- 3:45PM	Interview
ACAP/Kabul	Andrew Halassy Operational Officer	operationsofficer@gmail.com +93 (0) 706 819017	Wednesday, Feb 9 10:00	Interview
ACAP/Kabul	Bob Resseguie ACAP Operational Assessment Team Leader	RWRret@aol.com +93 (0)795 822 794	Wednesday, Feb 9 2:30PM	Briefing Presentation
ACAP/Kabul	Dan Blumhagen- ACAP Operational Assessment Team Member	DBlumhagen@live.com + 93(0)797 717 938	Wednesday, Feb9 2:30PM	Briefing Presentation
GIRoA/Maidan Wardak	Abdul Hakim Administrative Manager Provincial Council Office	+93(0) 799 690 000	Wednesday, Feb9	Interview
GIRoA/Maidan Wardak	Ramazan Rasooly Deputy Provincial Council	+93(0) 772 812 253	Wednesday, Feb9	Interview
GIRoA/Maidan Wardak	Haji Janan Head of Provincial Council	+93(0) 707 827 811	Wednesday, Feb9	Interview
GIRoA/Maidan Wardak	Abdul Khalid Police Commander Jal-rez District	+93(0) 708 103 075	Thursday, Feb10	Interview
GIRoA/Maidan Wardak	Afzal Khan Amanzada Admin Manager/Acting District Governor/Jal- rez District	+93(0) 707 090 929	Thursday, Feb10	Interview

GIRoA/Herat	Abdullah Nasrat Acting District Governor Kushke-Robat Sangi District	+93 (0)797 584 847	Thursday, Feb 10 9:00AM	Interview
GIRoA/Herat	Munawar Wahidi Technique <i>and</i> Sector Services Manager Kushke-Robat Sangi District	+93(0) 799 451 404	Thursday, Feb 10 9:00AM	Interview
ACAP/Herat	Abdul Haq Majrouh Field Assistant	Abdulhaq_majroh@yahoo.com +93(0) 799 773 448	Thursday, Feb 10	Interview
GIRoA/Herat	Gulabu-ddin Popal District Gozra District Governor	N/A	Thursday, Feb 10 11:30	Interview
GIRoA/Herat	Haji Mohammad Shams Shakor Khani village Deputy Shura Leader Guzra District	+93(0) 700 474 894	Thursday, Feb 10	Interview
GIRoA/Herat	Ghulam Sarwar Chil Dokhtaran Village Elder Khushke Robat Sangi District	N/A	Thursday, Feb 10 9:00	Interview
GIRoA/Herat	Salih Jan Chil Dokhtaran Village Elder Khushke Robat Sangi District	N/A	Thursday, Feb 10 9:00	Interview
GIRoA/Herat	Haji Qomandan Chil Dokhtaran Village Elder Khushke Robat Sangi District	N/A	Thursday, Feb 10 9:00	Interview
GIRoA/Herat	Amanullah Malikzada Head of Yakatoot village Shura Khushke Robat Sangi District	+93(0) 789 679 430	Thursday, Feb 10 9:00	Interview
GIRoA/Herat	Salahuddin Village Affairs of Directorate Clerk Khushke Robat Sangi District	+93(0) 700 441 057	Thursday, Feb 10 11:00	Interview
GIRoA/Herat	Najibullah Mohammadi Village Affairs Directorate Manager Guzra District	+93(0) 700 405 138	Thursday, Feb 10 11:00	Interview
USAID/Nangarhar	Laiq Shah Kamawi Deputy Field	lkamawi@usaid.gov +93(0) 797 777 314	Thursday, Feb 10	Interview

USAID/Nangarhar	Abdul Raouf Piawary Activity	apiaweray@usaid.gov +93(0) 708 694 527	Thursday, Feb 10	Interview
USAID/Nangarhar	Rodney J. Stubina Activity Manager/International	Rodney.j.stubina@ugov.gov +93(0) 797 148	Thursday, Feb 10	Interview
USAID/Nangarhar	Mohammad Sabir Nasiry Project Management Specialist/Afghan	snasiry@usaid.gov +93 (0) 798 186 825	Thursday, Feb 10	Interview
GIRoA/Kandahar	Haji Agha Lalai Provincial Shura Member	+93 (0) 799 573 434	Saturday, Feb 12	Interview
GIRoA/Nangarhar	H.M.Anwar Ikram Deputy District Governor Surkh-Road District	+93 (0) 700 601 746	Saturday, Feb 12	Interview
GIRoA/Nangarhar	Sayed Ali Akbar Sadat District Governor Surkh-Road District	+ 93 (0) 777 393 804	Saturday, Feb 12	Interview
GIRoA/Nangarhar	Noor Mohammad Head of Intelligence Department Surkh-Road District	+93 (0) 794 977 595	Saturday, Feb 12	Interview
AIHRC/Nangarhar	Prof. Dr. Rafiullah Bidar	Rb_humanrights@yahoo.com +93 (0) 799 394 284	Saturday, Feb 12	Interview
AIHRC/Nangarhar	Naqibullah Monitoring &Investigation Officer	Naqib.aihrc@gmail.com +93 (0) 799 346 111	Saturday, Feb 12	Interview
MoLSAMD/Nangarhar	Said Hakim Shirzad President	+93 (0) 706 831 604	Saturday, Feb 12	Interview
GIRoA/Nangarhar	Haji Niamatullah Noorzai District Governor Batikot District	+93(0) 773 625 089	Sunday Feb 13	Interview
GIRoA/Nangarhar	Mohammad Hassan Mayor Batikot District	+93 (0) 776 019 046	Sunday Feb 13	Interview
GIRoA/Nangarhar	Lutfullah Administrative Manager Batikot District	+93(0) 776 421 142	Sunday Feb 13	Interview
GIRoA/Nangarhar	Awal Khan Musazai Deputy Chief of Police Department Batikot Police Department	+93 (0) 700 622 909	Sunday Feb 13	Interview
UNAMA/Kabul	Georgette Gagnon Director, Human	gagnong@un.org +93 (0) 798 560 630	Sunday Feb 13	Interview
USAID/Maidan Wardak	Abdul Qader Activity Manager/Afghan	Abdul.qadir@ugov.gov +93(0) 799 822 346	Sunday, Feb13	Interview

UNAMA/Kabul	Denise Lifton Human Rights Officer	lifton@un.org +93(0) 798 291 683	Sunday Feb 13 2:00PM	Interview
GIRoA/Laghman	Khalil –U-Rahman Niazi Head of Intelligence Department Laghman Police Department	+93 (0) 706 629 200	Tuesday, Feb 15	Interview
USAID/Laghman	Aziz –u-Din Pirzada Activity Manager/Afghan	Azizuddin.pirzada@ugov.gov +93(0) 793 550 108	Tuesday, Feb 15	Interview
GIRoA/Nangarhar	Agha Jan Head of Terrorism Department Surkh-Road Police Department	+93 (0) 774 235 365	Tuesday, Feb 15	Interview
GIRoA/Nangarhar	Abdul Malik Head of Intelligence department Batikot Police Department	+93(0) 772 885 243	Tuesday, Feb 15	Interview
GIRoA/Laghman	Hidayatullah Qalandarzai Deputy Governor Laghman Governor Office	+93 (0) 799 004 965	Tuesday, Feb 15	Interview
GIRoA/Laghman	Ghulam Aziz Gharanai Chief of Police Laghman Police Department	+ 93 (0) 707 070 344	Tuesday, Feb 15	Interview
UNAMA/Nangarhar	Nwannea Kolam Vwede-Obahor Human Rights Officer	Vwede-obahor@un.org +93 (0) 793 1010 248	Wednesday Feb 16	Interview
UNAMA/Nangarhar	Ghafoori Civil Rights Officer	+93 (0) 775 274 002	Wednesday, Feb 16	Interview
ICRC/Kabul	Nicole Ven Rooijen Protection of the Civilian Population Coordinator	Prot.kab@icrc.org +93 (0) 707 174 334	Wednesday, Feb 16 2:00PM	Interview
ACAP/Paktya	Sayed Ahmad Tutakhil Field Assistant	Said.tutakhil2@gmail.com +93(0) 799 111 381	Wednesday, Feb 16	Interviewed
ACAP/Paktya	Abdul Matin Abid Field Assistant	amatin.abid@gmail.com +93(0) 776 893 499	Wednesday, Feb 16	Interviewed
ACAP/Paktya	Mir Hamza Field Assistant/ Nomination	mirhamza123@gmail.com +93(0) 799 538 862	Wednesday, Feb 16	Interviewed
ICRC/Kabul	Katja Gysin Protection	Prot.kab@icrc.org +93 (0) 700 279 070	Wednesday, Feb 16	Interview

ACAP/Paktya	Abdul Wadod Zazi Field Monitor	wadoodzazai@gmail.com +93(0) 776 079 961	Thursday, Feb 17	Interviewed
USAID/Helmand	Carl Harris Activity	Carl.harris@ugov.gov +93(0) 706 797 419	Thursday, Feb 17	Telephone &
USAID/Kandahar	Andrew Golda Activity Manager/International	Andrew.golda@ugov.gov +93 (0) 706 644 365	Thursday, Feb 17 3:00PM	Telephone & Email
ACAP/ Kunduz	Rahmatullah Mazloom Field Assistant/ Investigation	Mazloom2007@gmail.com +93(0) 799 389 804	Thursday, Feb 17 15:00	Interview
ACAP/ Kunduz	Mohammad Sarwar Tawan Field Assistant	msarwart@gmail.com +93(0) 799 477 360	Thursday, Feb 17 13:30	Interview
ACAP/Khost	Dr. Akbar Khan Mandozai Field Assistant	akbarmandozai@gmail.com +93(0) 799 422 652	Saturday, Feb 19	Interview
ACAP/Kunduz	Kobra Field Assistant	N/A	Sunday, Feb 20 9:30	Interview
ACAP/Kunduz	Asif Khan Ahmadzai Field Assistant	Aka_ahmadzai@yahoo.com +93(0) 700 408 262	Sunday, Feb 20 10:30	Interview
ACAP/Kunduz	Nabiullah Safi Reporting Co- ordinator	Nabi.safi@gmail.com +93(0) 799 270 404	Sunday, Feb 20 13:00	Interview
ACAP/Kunduz	Fatima Ayoubi Field/ Reporting Assistant	Fatima_ayoubi@yahoo.com +93(0) 796 450 591	Sunday, Feb 20 14:45	Interview
GIRoA/Khost	Murad Khan Head of Provincial Council	+93(0) 798 403 072	Sunday, Feb 20	Interview
GIRoA/Khost	Wali Shah Himat District Governor Mandozai District	+93(0) 799 136 090	Monday, Feb 21	Interview
GIRoA/Khost	CDCs' Leaders Malik Habibullah Haji Ahmad Gul Jalandar Shan	+93(0) 799 080 668 +93(0) 778 981 050 +93(0) 799 137 267	Monday, Feb 21	Interview
GIRoA/Khost	Bahader Khan Police Commander Mandozai District	+93(0) 774 943 598	Monday, Feb 21	Interview
GIRoA/Khost	Mohammad Daud Sabir Principle of Sarband High school Mandozai District	+93(0) 798 255 655	Monday, Feb 21	Interview
GIRoA/Khost	Mateullah Meeting Manager for Provincial Governor's Office	+93(0) 798 696 865	Monday, Feb 21	Interview
GIRoA/Khost	Haji Abdullah	+93(0) 799 322 160	Monday,	Interview

	Advisor for Provincial Governor		Feb 21	
GIRoA/Kabul	Shal Mohammad Khan Deputy Intelligence Department District 13th Police Department	+93 (0) 799 341 585	Monday, Feb21 11:00 AM	Interview
Local Shura/Kabul	Malim Ismail Head of 7 th district	+93 (0) 798 032 660	Monday, Feb21 13:30	Interview
UNDSS/Kunduz	Joao Ociveira Security Officer	Oliveira5@un.org +93(0) 700 222 772	Monday, Feb21 9:00	Interview
GIRoA/Kunduz	Qudratullah Safi Executive Officer Khan-Abad District	+93(0) 799 264 505	Monday, Feb21 10:15	Interview
AIHRC/Kunduz	Hayatullah Amiri Head of AIHRC	Hayatullah_amiry@yahoo.com +93(0) 799 212 845	Monday, Feb21 15:00	Interview
GIRoA/Kunduz	Nasrullah Sahak Shura Leader of Now-Abad Khan-Abad District	+93(0) 799 822 415	Monday, Feb21 11:00	Interview
GIRoA/Kunduz	Hanan Omerkhel Villaha Elder of Ali- Abad District	+93(0) 778 443 478	Monday, Feb21 12:30	Interview
ICRC/Kunduz	Ian Macdonald Protection Delegate	Maz_mazar@icrc.org +93(0) 705 500 569	Monday, Feb21 13:45	Interview
GIRoA/Kunduz	Mohammad Nasim Ibrahim Khil Executive Officer Ali-Abad District	+93(0) 700 732 254	Monday, Feb22 9:00	Interview
USAID/Kunduz	Joy Stallings Activity Manager/International	jstallings@usaid.gov +93(0) 797 999 718	Monday, Feb22 14:30	Interview
UNAMA/Kunduz	Annie Macmorris Reports Team Leader	mcmorris@un.org +93(0) 708 873 894	Monday, Feb22 10:00	Interview
UNAMA/Kunduz	Nassir Atif Women Reports Assistant	atifn@un.org +93(0) 700 222 775	Monday, Feb22 10:00	Interview
USAID/Paktya	Sahar Mohammad Sahar Activity Manager/Afghan	Ssahar.usaid@gmail.com +93(0) 799 822 353	Tuesday, Feb23	Orientation
AIHRC/Paktya	Shafiqullah Nyazi Acting Head of Human Rights	+93(0) 799 732 223	Tuesday, Feb23	Interview
GIRoA/Paktya	Abdul Malik Acting Head of Provincial Council	+93(0) 799 889 650	Tuesday, Feb23	Interview
GIRoA/Helmand	Alaudin Sultani	+93(0) 799 176 725	Tuesday,	E-mail

	Provincial Council Member Helmand Province		March01	
GIRoA/Helmand	Haji Abdul Samad Member of District Development Association	+93(0) 708 898 221	Tuesday, March01	E-mail
ACAP/Helmand	Ziaulhaq Field Assistant	ziaroohani@gmail.com +93(0) 708 994 188	Tuesday, March01	E-mail
ACAP/Helmand	Abdul Ahad Mobin Field Assistant Focal Point	abdulmobin@gmail.com +93(0) 703 466 163	Wednesday, March 2	E-mail

Appendix 5

الف: هِي _____

ب: زِيَابْتِي ضِي _____

ج: دَتَارْزِيْبَتِ اَقْتَصِرْدِي ضِي تَاي _____

د: دَكْرُ دَهْلِكِيْتِ تَاي _____

ه: رُوْلَهْكَ ضِي) _____

و: پُّيْرِم _____

ز: خُابْ لَرْم _____

ک: چِيْرِي لَف: هِي يِيْ بِنِيْتِيْ اِيْ ذِ وُضِي.

الف: خُ كِهْرِي ضِي دِي؟ خُابْ وُلَهْكَ يِي

تَلْ بِنِيْ اِيْ كِرِي پِ خُ صُ رُنْگِيْبِنِي چِ اَهْ طَلُوْقِ رُّي:

خُ كِهْرِي دِي؟

الف: اِيْ دِيْ دِيْ پِيْ ذَاكْ گِي _____

ب: بِنِيْ خِيْ دِيْ دِيْ پِيْ ذَاكْ گِي _____

ج: اِيْ هَا ضْمُ دِيْ دِيْ پِيْ ذَاكْ گِي _____

د: بِنِيْ خِيْ هَا ضْمُ دِيْ دِيْ پِيْ ذَاكْ گِي _____

ه: بَتَلْ اِيْ چِ دَا قَتَصْر اَدِيْ پِلْ فِعْ اَلْ وُ _____

و: بَتَلْ بِنِيْ خِيْ چِ دَا قَتَصْر اَدِيْ پِلْ فِعْ اَلْ وُ _____

ز: اِيْ مَطْر _____

ح: بِنِيْ خِيْ مَطْر _____

ک: رُوْلَهْكَ ضِي) _____

ل: پُّيْرِم _____

م: خُابْ لَرْم _____

ک: چِيْرِي ب: زِيَابْتِي يِي تَلْفِيْ بِنِيْ وُضِي:

الف: خُ كِهْرِي ضِي _____

تَلْ بِنِيْ اِيْ كِرِي پِ خُ صُ رُنْگِيْبِنِي چِ اَهْ طَلُوْقِ رُّي:

الف: اِيْ دِيْ دِيْ پِيْ ذَاكْ گِي _____

ب: بِنِيْ خِيْ دِيْ دِيْ پِيْ ذَاكْ گِي _____

ج: اِيْ هُنْمُ _____

د: بِنِيْ خِيْ هُنْمُ _____

ه: بَتَلْ اِيْ چِ دَا قَتَصْر اَدِيْ پِلْ فِعْ اَلْ وُ _____

و: بَتَلْ بِنِيْ خِيْ چِ دَا قَتَصْر اَدِيْ پِلْ فِعْ اَلْ وُ _____

ز: اِيْ مَطْر _____

ح: بِنِيْ خِيْ مَطْر _____

ک: رُوْلَهکِ ضی) _____

ل: پَ ئِرم _____

م: خُ اب لرم _____

4. مَرَتاوی وُکری غُ دَلمرس تَ چَ نَسُ تَ رَ لاسَ کَ رَوی تَشری حی وُکری؟

خُ اب

_____ وُلهکی:

تَل بِنِ اُ وُکری پَ غُ صُ رُنگِ بِنِی چَ دَمرس تَ اَنسِرتِ گِی دَکَس لال عولپَر اس اس ی:

الف: غُ نپوی سی _____

ب: د ت ج ا ر ت رَکی سی ت _____

ج: د بِنِ ی سی ت _____

د: د خِاطی سی ت _____

ه: کَری سی ت _____

و: د خاری سی ت _____

ز: خاری _____

ح: د کَر د سَول سی ت _____

ط: د کَر ج ر ل تالی ر غ ل _____

ث: خِاطی _____

ج: بِنِ گِیتَ ه ع ا ش ر ک ل _____

د: د ل رُ ز د ک ر ا ک ا ا ت _____

ه: د د ر ه ل ی د ل گِ بِنِ ت ه ج ر ی ر ک ل _____

و: رُوْلَهکِ ضی) _____

ز: پَ ئِرم _____

ح: خُ اب لرم _____

ک: چَری غُ ذی بی سی کَ ر ل ضی ی:

۳. الف: بیای سی چا وُکری دی؟

_____ خُ اب لَهکی

کَتَ گَری:

5. مَرَس تَ کَتَ رِ ی؟ کُی _____، پَ ئِرم _____ - خُ اب لرم _____

ک: چَری کُی ی:

ه ل ا ف: مَرَس تَ خَ ر گِ گَ تَ ر _____؟ خُ اب ی تَ تَ طَ بَ ر دَ لَ پَ غُ جَ لِ سَ ر چَ کَ تَ اَنسِرتِ گِی عَ س لال عول
بَ ر ک ا ر کُی وُلهکی؟

ر: رُولکُضی) _____

ز: پُیُرم _____

س: خُاب لُرم _____

8. تاس د رانل وکوی پاری خ رُولی کُی چ پُرگام س تاس پوت و پراس اش ی؟

بَل بِن اُیکری پ غ ص رُگبزی چ هَطی ق ر ی:

الف: IOM تله ذهرست د کُر ی دلتوی پو اس اس ترنر کُری _____

ب: IOM ای ذهرست ک رُدی ای پو اس اس ترنر کُری _____

ج: IOM ای ذ غ ذوی پیسی رُکری _____

د: IOM ای ذ غ ی زیوا ذ ضی ضی ژرت ر ژر کُری _____

ر: رُولکُضی) _____

ز: پُیُرم _____

س: خُاب لُرم _____

9. تاس خُ مری د غ مرسیت و چ ی د IOM ل خ اش ی ی رضی ی لست؟

رضی یون _____، لبر خ هُلی یون _____، رضی یون _____ فتر آس هی مرسیت

تر لاسکری ذر _____، پُیُرم _____ - خُاب لُرم

11. آطرات اس پُیُری چ کُم ی اد IOM اُتپیسی رُکری دی؟

کُی _____، _____، پُیُرم _____، _____

خُاب لُرم _____

ک چیری خُاب هی، پُیُرم، خُاب لُرم ی ا پُت یته لار شی.

ک چیری خُاب کُی ی:

• الف: کُم ی اد IOM پیسی رُکری دی:

الف: د اموکا هت ذر ای الات _____

ب: رُولکُضی) _____

• اب: کُمی اداری IOM پیسی رُکری دی؟

الف: د هاجی پُپار اداری) IOM) _____

ب: د اموکا د متذیل الات پُر متخولی اداری) USAID) _____

ج: رُولکُضی) _____

د: پُیُرم _____

ر: خُاب لُرم _____

• ج: د چا خُ ه مغل هات تر لاسکری؟

الف: IOM _____

ب: بی طیل وللیت ل _____

ج: لف غل ت ای دک مت _____

کت گری:

17. د سرتی بلخ تل پ ختکی د تل ی د گری کس لال علی ستاس پ راندی خرگ ؟ خ اب ولکی:

کت گری:

لاذی تل وینتی:

18. ستاس د کزوی دخی نس چوی د خ شری و دی؟

خ خ ت پ بن کری چی هت طی ق ری:

الف: کرن

ب: تجارت

ج: دکشی کار

د: رولک ضی)

: پ یرم

: خ اب لرم

لوفی تش خلی و د مرکی پ پلی کی د مرک چولخ ا پت شپیر دل س ری ک ش:

هوکی د پای خت

هک ی پی ی : کی ،

ایتاس د پت ی پیت د وینتی لایب اریخ ظ لری ؟ کی

Appendix 5B

پُیْرَم _____

خُأب لَرَم _____

کَ چھری ہوی پُیْرَم، پُیْرَم ی گری .

۱. جی اتاس کُہ ہ مرسِت لَ غَ خَ رَسِتَ چہ تالی درتس یقی دی اہت دی؟

خُأب

وُلھکی:

گُی _____ پُیْرَم _____ - خُأب لَرَم _____

کَ چھری ہوی پُیْرَم، پُیْرَم ی گری .

۱. دی اتاس کُہ ہ مرسِتَ چہ دژد دہلست لپار کوک گری اہت دی؟

خُأب لَھکی

گُی _____ پُیْرَم _____ - خُأب لَرَم _____

کَ چھری خُأب _____، پُیْرَم اَ خُأب لَرَم، دُوی پُیْرَم اہتَ مَراج گری .

کَ چھری خُأبتلی ی:

۱. ج. لَف: ہت اُی گری غَ دَل مرسِتَ چہ ہتر لاسگر پُیْرَم ی گری؟

خُأب لَھکی:

تَل بَن اُی گری پَ غَ ص رُنگبہنی چہ دمرست اہت گسی د کس لال غی پر اس اس ی:

لَف: غُیھیسی _____

ب: دکر ج رُل ہتلی ر غ ل _____

ج: دکر س ایل سہت _____

د: ددرہلی د لہنت ہجرولی ر کُل _____

ر: رُؤ لَھکی (ضی) _____

پُیْرَم _____

خُأب لَرَم _____

کَ چھری غُیھیسی کُپرل ضی ی، ۱. ج. لَف س اہتَ ج ا ب کُری:

۱. ج. لَف: ہپیسی چہ کُری دی؟

خُأب لَھکی

کَت گُری:

۱. ج. لَف: ای امرست گت رُ؟ گُی _____، پُیْرَم _____ - خُأب لَرَم _____

کَ چھری خُأب کُی ی:

۱. ج. ب. ۱: خُرگ مرسِت گت رُ؟

خُأب تَطپیر دَلپ غُجول سُر چہ گت اہت گسی کس لال عمل ہنکار کُی وُلھکی؟

ک چیری خُ ابُ کی ی:

۲. ب. ل ف: کُم یُ اد؟

خُ ابُ لکی _____

تَل بِن اُ کی پِ خُ ص رُ گبنی چی هتقی ق ر ی:

ل ف: د ا هک هت ذذ ای الات _____

ب: ر (ر) لکی ضی _____

ج: پُ ی ر م _____

د: خُ اب ل ر م _____

ک چیری خُ ابُ کی ی ک هی اداری؟

خُ ابُ لکی _____

ل ف: ف خ ی ا _____

ب: د ا هک د هت ذذ ط الات پ ر متخ ط ی ادار (USAID) _____

ج: د ه ا ج ی پ ا ر ادار (IOM) _____

د: ر (ر) لکی _____

ه: پُ ی ر م _____

و: خُ اب ل ر م _____

۲. ج: تَل ی د گ ر ع ک س ال عول دُ خُ چ پ ه ق ب ل ک ب نی چی ی ه ر س ت ت ر ل ا س ک ر ی ذ خ _____؟

خُ ابُ لکی _____

ک ت گ ر ی:

۲. ه س ت ا س ع ک س ال عول دُ خُ چ پ ه ق ب ل ک ب نی چی ه ر س ت ی ی ت ر ل ا س ک ر ی ذ خ د ی؟

خُ ابُ لکی _____

3: ا و ی ل ت ا س پ ظ ر خ د ل ه ر س ت ک ر ی ت ر ک ل ی ض ی ، ت ر خ د د ی س ر ک و ک ض ی ا د

ه خ ل ه ف پ ر ض د د چ ر ی پ ک ی ج گ ب نی ت ر س ی ن ی ت ا ق ی ی ی ض و ا ض ی؟

ل و ف ت ش خ ی و د م ر ک ی پ پ ی ک ی د م ر ک چ ل خ ا پ ت ش ی پ ر د ل س ر ی ک ش ی:

د م ر ک ی د پ ا ی خ ت _____

ه ک ی پ ی ی ی گ ی _____، _____

آ ی ت ا س د پ ت ی ی ی ت د و ی ن ی ل ی پ ا ر خ ظ ل ر ی؟ ک ی

Appendix 5c

ج: ۱۰-۲۰ _____

د: د ۲۰ خخ زوات _____

د: پټیوم _____

د: خاب لرم _____

۱. ج: ای ا ه ز ک ر ئ ت ک ه م ر س ت ن د ی ر غ ی ا ج ث ر ا و پ خ ا ط ر ر س ت ل غ خ خ چ ی ت ا ا ی ر ن ر س ی ت ی د ی ک ر ل ض ی د ی ؟

گ ی _____ پټیوم _____ خاب لرم _____

ک چیری خاب ، پټیوم ا خاب لرم ی د و ی پ ن ت ی ت م ر ا ج ع گ یری . ک چیری خاب کی ی :

۱. د: م ر ت ا ی گ ر ی غ د ل م ر س ت چ ی د ی ت ر ل ا س گ یری د ی ط ی خ یری ؟

خاب لکی :

ب ل ن ب ا ی ک یری پ غ ص ر ب گ ب ن ی چ م ر س ت ا خ س ت گ ی د ک س ل ا ل غ ی پ ر ا س ا س ی :

الف: غ ن ی و ی س ی _____

ب: د ک ر ج ر ل ن ت ی ا ر غ ل _____

ج: د ک ر س ا ی ل س ی ت _____

د: د ر ه ل ی د ی د ی ب ن ت ه ج ر ا ی ر ک ل _____

د: ر ل ل ک ض ی) _____

د: پټیوم _____

د: خاب لرم _____

ک چیری غ ن ی و ی س ی ک ر ل ض ی ی :

۱. دالف: د ل ی س ی چ ا ک یری د ی ؟

خاب لکی _____

۱. الف: ای ا م ر س ت د د ی ل ی ا ر ک ت ر ؟ کی _____ پټیوم _____ خاب

لرم _____

ک چیری خاب کی ی :

۱. ب: خ ر گ م ر س ت د د ی ل ی ا ر ک ت ر ؟

خ ا ب پ ت ط ی ر د ل پ غ ج و ل س ر چ ک ت ا خ س ت گ ی ک س ل ا ل ع ل ب ن ک ا ر ک ی و ل ک ی ؟

ک ت گ ر ی :

ک چیری خاب ی :

۱. ل ت ی ا س ف ک ر ک ی چ م ر س ت ک ت ر ؟

خ ا ب پ غ ج و ل س ر چ ک ت ا خ س ت گ ی ک س ل ا ل ع و ل ب ن ی د ی ل ک ی :

خُاب لَهکي _____
گي _____ پُيَرِم _____ - خُاب لَرِم _____
4. اي اې کلي وکي دُغی هرتیل اهل اچي دُغی "کَرِي سَرِضِي دِي، خ تَغِي رات رانجِي دِي؟

خُاب لَهکي _____
گي _____ پُيَرِم _____ - خُاب لَرِم _____
ک اچي رِي خُاب لَهکي ي:
4. لَف: خَرگ بِن لَوِي کلي وکي دُغی هرتي ل اهل اچي دُغی "کَرِي سَرِضِي دِي، رانجِي دِي؟

خُاب لَهکي _____
ک ت گ ر ي
5. اهل تاس پُ ظر خ دِل هرتي کَرِي ت پکار د اچي ر کلي ضي، تر خ د دِي سَرِکوک ضي ا
خ ت ا لي چي د ه لَهف پَرِض د د اچي ر يپ نَچ گ ب ن ي ت ر س و ن ل ي، پ خ و ا ض ي ؟

لاذِي ص خ ي د ه ر ک و پ پ ا ي ک ي د ه ر ک چ ي ل خ پ تَط پ ر ل د س ر د ک ض ي:

د ه ک ي د پ ا ي ت خ _____
ه ک ي پ ي ي : گ ي _____ ، _____
ا ي ت ا س د پ ت ي پ ي ت د و ي ن ي ل و ي پ ا ر خ خ ل ر ي ؟ ک ي _____

Appendix 6

PENDIX 6: SURVEY SITES SELECTED							
Province	Grant	District	Village	Type of Incident	Deaths	Stage In Process	Incident Date
Herat	IOMHRT113	Guzara	Gardbid	air strike	Y	closed	October-09
	IOMHRT125	Guzara	Gardbid	air strike	Y	closed	October-09
	IOMHRT139	Kushk-e-kohna	several	IED	Y	del comp some monitor	May-10
	IOMHRT129	Rabat Sangi	several	IED	Y	on-going	June-10
Khost	IOMGDZ047	Mandozay	several	suicide bomb	Y	del and some monitor	November-08
	IOMGDZ078	Mandozay	several	suicide bomb	Y	del and some monitor	November-08
	IOMGDZ087	Mandozay	several	suicide bomb	Y	del and some monitor	November-08
	IOMGDZ107	Kondai	central	rocket attack	Y	assist completed	May-09
	IOMGDZ104	Bak	Salkala	firefight	N	assist completed	March-10
	IOMGDZ137	Mandozai	Painda Khil	suicide bomb	Y	on-going	October-08
	IOMGDZ134	Kondai	District center	night raid	Y	some del	December-08
	IOMGDZ020	Sabari	Khalbesat area	IED	Y	assist completed	December-07
Helmand	IOMKDH287	Nahri Saraj	Shuraki	air strike	Y	some del	July-07
	IOMKDH033	Nahri Saraj	Grishk Bazaar	suicide bomb	N	some del	November-07
	IOMKDH116	Nahri Saraj	Grishk Bazaar	air strike	Y	some del	July-07
	IOMKDH128	Nad Ali	Lui Bagh	firefight	Y	closed	January-09
	IOMKDH072	Nad Ali	Lui Bagh	air strike	Y	some del	October-08

2nd	IOMKDH230	Lashkar Gah/Nad Ali	several	IMF rockets	N	del and some monitor	February-10
	IOMKDH231	Lashkar Gah/Nad Ali	several	IMF rockets	N	del and some monitor	February-10
	IOMKDH268	Lashkar Gah/Nad Ali	several	IMF shoot	Y	on-going	February-10
	IOMKDH293	Nad Ali	Zarghun	IMF rocket	Y	some del	December-09
	IOMKDH260	Lashkar Gah	Bashran	air strike	Y	some del	April-09
3rd	IOMKDH245	Nahri Saraj	several	suicide bomb	Y	del and some monitor	September-07
	IOMKDH246	Nahri Saraj	several	suicide bomb	Y	del and some monitor	September-07
	IOMKDH203	Nahri Saraj	several	suicide bomb	Y	assistance del	May-09
	IOMKDH209	Nahri Saraj	several	suicide bomb	Y	assistance del	May-09
	IOMKDH144	Lashkar Gah	Safiyan	IMF shoot	Y	closed	February-09
	IOMKDH208	Nahri Saraj	several	suicide bomb	Y	assistance del	May-09
	IOMKDH206	Nahri Saraj	several	suicide bomb	Y	assistance del	May-09
	IOMKDH207	Nahri Saraj	several	suicide bomb	Y	assistance del	May-09
Kandahar	IOMKDH279	Kandahar city	District 7	suicide bomb	Y	some del	February-10
	IOMKDH269	Kandahar city	District 7 - Karakan	IMF shoot	N	some del	December-09
	IOMKDH049	Zhari	Sanzari	crossfire	Y	assist compl to close	November-11
	IOMKDH249	Zhari	Sanzari	IMF shoot bus	Y	nom approved no del	April-10
2nd	IOMKDH109	Kandahar city	District 5 - Khojak Baba	suicide bomb	Y	assist del some mon	April-08

	IOMKDH185	Kandahar city	Karta-e-Malimeen, Mohammadi Masjid, District 5	suicide bomb	Y	assist compl	March-08
	IOMKDH247	Kandahar city	District 5	IMF shoot		assist compl	July-07
	IOMKDH159	Zhari	Sanzari - several	crossfire	Y	assist compl	November-08
	IOMKDH190	Zhari	House-e-Madad, Ghulam Sakhi Masjid	suicide bomb	Y	assist compl	July-09
3rd	IOMKDH110	Zhari	several	suicide bomb	Y	some del	December-06
	IOMKDH175		District 5 - Khojak Baba	suicide bomb	Y	assist compl	January-06
175 not in m	IOMKDH179	Kandahar city	District 2 - several	suicide bomb	Y	closed	January-09
	IOMKDH165	Kandahar city	District 5-Hazratje Baba	firefight	Y	assist compl	September-09
	IOMKDH250	Kandahar city	District 10 - Lo Wala	air strike	N	assist compl	December-09
	IOMKDH233	Arghandab	Barkalai	IED and shooting	N	assist compl	November-09
	IOMKDH235	Arghandab	New Kalai Babasab	firefight	Y	closed	November-09
	IOMKDH234	Arghandab	several	IED	N	assist compl	November-09
	IOMKDH270	Arghandab	Jeleran	IMF shoot	Y	assist compl	December-09
Kunduz	IOMKDH079	Kunduz city	Zarkharid	firefight	Y	grant approved	June-09
	IOMKDH080	Kunduz city	Zarkharid	firefight	Y	grant approved	June-09
	IOMKDH047	Chahar Dara	Yaqoob Bai	tanker airstrike	Y	some del	September-09

Wardak	IOMKBL026	Jalrez	Esmailkhel	air strikes	Y	some del	October-07
	IOMKBL018	Maidan Shar	1km from city	air strike	N	assist compl to close	May-08
	IOMKBL018	Maidan Shar	1km from city	air strike	N	assist compl to close	May-08
	IOMKBL055	Sayad Abad	District Center	suicide bomb	N	some del	August-08
	IOMKBL074	Sayad Abad	Haft Asyab	fire fight	Y	some del	October-08
	IOMKBL131	Maidan Shar	Da Afghanan	insurgent rocket	Y	some del	October-08
	IOMKBL101	Maidan Shar	Malaa Khel village	airstrike night	Y	some del	August-08
Laghman	IOMJBD280	Mihtarlam	Omarzai, adjacent?	road accident	N	some del	Feb-10
	IOMJBD218	Mihtarlam	Shikano, adjacent?	IMF operation	Y	assist compl to close	Dec-09
Nangahar	IOMJBD260	Surkhrud	Bawli	night raid firefight	Y	some del	May-10
	IOMJBD093	Surkhrud	Mirayzan	road accident	Y	closed	March-09
	IOMJBD101	Surkhrud	several	road accident	N	assist compl	May-07
	IOMJBD067	Bati Kot	Farm 3	suicide bomb	Y	assist compl to close	November-08
	IOMJBD249	Bati Kot	Chownay	night raid firefight	Y	some del	March-09
	IOMJBD036	Bati Kot	Takway	raid	Y	closed	November-07

Appendix 7

APPENDIX 7A: SUMMARY OF BENEFICIARY SURVEY DATA

Table i: Number of Beneficiaries Surveyed by Province

Province	Number	Percent of all 162 Surveyed
Helmand	22	13.6
Hirat	20	12.3
Kabul	4	2.5
Kandahar	23	14.2
Khost	21	13.0
Kunduz	20	12.3
Laghman	13	8.0
Nangarhar	19	11.7
Wardak	20	12.3
Total	162	100.0

Non-Response

SDLR found it difficult to local beneficiaries, despite using four methods to do so.

Table ii: Non-Response Rates by Province and Reason

Location	Emphatic Respondent Refusal	Respondent not at Project Site	Respondent Moved	Respondent unable to respond	Respondent deceased/ill	Respondent Tel No. Not in the system or wrong	Total
Nangarhar	1	4	1	0	0	3	9
Laghman	0	5	1	1	0	3	10
Wardak	0	4	8	0	1	12	25
Kundoz	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Khost	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Helmand	21	15	5	2	0	30	73
Kandahar	5	5	7	0	0	12	29
Herat	0	0	0	0	0	8	8
Total	27	33	22	3	1	72	158

SDLR used the phone numbers listed in the ACAP database to call the selected beneficiaries directly, their local knowledge to try to locate them through community leaders, connections with local government representatives, and asking other beneficiaries from the community to locate the selected beneficiaries. SDLR had to try to contact 320 beneficiaries in order to survey 162 of them for a non-response rate of 49.4%. Non-

response rates were particularly high in Kandahar and Wardak (where many of the selected beneficiaries were nomadic Kuchis) and astronomical in Helmand where beneficiaries were afraid to receive calls from anyone they did not know well. There may be systematic biases in non-response in that beneficiaries that were less satisfied may have been less willing to respond.

Some of the errors in telephone numbers are likely mistakes by ACAP in the database or reflect that people often change their sim card numbers - especially in insecure areas. The inability to address wrong numbers reflects the unwillingness of people contacted to investigate the whereabouts of beneficiaries to be truthful about other people due to security concerns in insecure areas such as Wardak, Kandahar and Helmand. It is likely that many of the wrong telephone numbers represent fraudulent beneficiaries. These are the two plausible explanations for the cases where neighbors, community leaders, and government authorities were not able to connect SDLR supervisors with selected beneficiaries.

Table iii: Observed Rural or Urban - by Surveyor

Status	Frequency	Percent
Rural	103	63.6
Urban	59	36.4
Total	162	100.0

Table iv: Observed Socio-Economic Status (SES) of Household – by Surveyor

Status	Frequency	Percent
Middle SES	32	19.8
Poor SES	129	79.6
DK	1	0.6

Q1. How many people are there in your household? WRITE NUMBER

Table 1. Total Number of Family Members

Size of Family	Frequency	Percent
1-6 members	40	24.7
7-10 members	69	42.6
11-18 members	39	24.1
> 18 members	14	8.6

Q1A. How many are men or boys? WRITE NUMBER

Table 1A. Number of Males in Household

Number of Males	Frequency	Percent
1-3	35	21.6
4-5	82	50.6
6-9	34	21.0
> 9	11	6.8
Total	162	100.0

Do not ask how many are women or girls. SUBTRACT 1A from 1

Table 1a. Number of Females in Household

Number of Females	Frequency	Percent
1-3	17	10.5
4-5	85	52.5
6-9	40	24.7
> 9	20	12.3
Total	162	100.0

Q2. Please tell me about the incident and losses that happened to your family as a result of International military operations against insurgents. WRITE ANSWER

Table 1. Type of Incident

Type of Incident		
	Frequency	Percent
IMF Bombing or Shooting	91	56.2%
Insurgent IED, Suicide Attack, or Shooting	64	39.5%
IMF Road Accident	7	4.3%

Q3. What kind of losses did you have? WRITE ANSWER

Table 3. What kind of losses did you have?

Loss	Yes	
	Frequency	Percent
Death	79	48.8%
Serious injury	64	39.5%
Economic	29	17.9%
Household	34	21.0%
Other	2	1.2%

IF A: DEATH, ASK:

Q3A. Who was killed? WRITE ANSWER

Table 3a. Who was killed?

Death of		
	Frequency	Percent
Male Breadwinner	69	42.6%
Female Breadwinner	6	3.7%
Male Child	14	8.6%
Female Child	5	3.1%
Male Other	5	3.1%
Female Other	2	1.2%
Male Elder	18	11.1%

IF B: SERIOUS INJURY, ASK:

Q3B. Who suffered a the serious injury? WRITE ANSWER (MAY BE MORE THAN ONE)

Table 3b. Who suffered a serious injury?

Who was injured?	Yes	
	Frequency	Percent
Male Breadwinner	51	31.5%
Female Breadwinner	7	4.3%
Male Child	6	3.7%
Female Child	5	3.1%
Male Other	4	2.5%
Male Elder	10	6.2%

Q4. Please describe the types of assistance you have received? WRITE ANSWER

Table 4. Type of assistance received

Type of Assistance	Received		Not Received		Total	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Cash	30	18.5%	132	81.5%	162	100.0%
Small_business	42	25.9%	120	74.1%	162	100.0%
Education	105	64.8%	57	35.2%	162	100.0%
Tailoring	133	82.1%	29	17.9%	162	100.0%
Agriculture	96	59.3%	66	40.7%	162	100.0%
Livestock_Kit	57	35.2%	105	64.8%	162	100.0%
Livestock	77	47.5%	85	52.5%	162	100.0%
Home	137	84.6%	25	15.4%	162	100.0%
Shelter	1	.6%	161	99.4%	162	100.0%
Training	1	.6%	161	99.4%	162	100.0%
Tutoring	6	3.7%	156	96.3%	162	100.0%
Graduation	4	2.5%	158	97.5%	162	100.0%
Medical	13	8.0%	149	92.0%	162	100.0%

Q5. Was the assistance useful? Yes _____ No _____ DK _____ NR _____

Table 5. Was the assistance useful?

Useful	Frequency	Percent
No	27	16.7
NR	1	.6
Yes	134	82.7
Total	162	100.0

IF YES, THEN

Q5A How was the assistance useful? WRITE COMPLETE ANSWER IN RESPONDENTS OWN WORDS

IF NO, THEN

Q5B Why do you think the assistance was not useful? WRITE COMPLETE ANSWER IN RESPONDENTS OWN WORDS

Table 5A and 5B: How was the assistance useful?

Useful, combined Q5A and 5B	Frequency	Percent
-----------------------------	-----------	---------

Did Not Improve Economic Situation	23	14.2
Useful For Home	12	7.4
Met Some Economic Needs	12	7.4
Modestly Improved Economic Situation	39	24.1
Improved Economic Situation	44	27.2
Total	130	80.2
NR	32	19.8
Total	162	100.0

Q6. Who provided this assistance to you? WRITE ANSWER

Table 6. Who provided the assistance to you?

Provided by		
	Frequency	Percent
International Community	13	8.0%
USA	2	1.2%
IOM	136	84.0%
ACAP	17	10.5%
USAID	9	5.6%
Local Leaders	1	.6%
Other	1	.6%
Don't know	7	4.3%
No Response	1	.6%

Q7. How did you find out about this program? WRITE ANSWER

Table 7. How did you find out about this program?

	Yes	
	Frequency	Percent
IOM came to me after the incident	61	37.7%
Previous IOM beneficiary informed me	10	6.2%

International authorities informed me	5	3.1%
Local authorities informed me	18	11.1%
Household member went to IOM to inform them	23	14.2%
Other	47	29.0%
Don't Know	4	2.5%

Q8. What would you suggest the program do to address your needs? WRITE ANSWER

Table 8. What would you suggest the program do to address your needs?

How should meet needs?		
	Frequency	Percent
IOM provide assistance based on needs of the family	74	45.7%
IOM provide assistance based on losses of the family	42	25.9%
IOM provide money	108	66.7%
IOM provide the same things faster	51	31.5%
Other Change	8	4.9%
Don't Know	1	.6%

Q9. How satisfied are you with the assistance provided to you through IOM?

Satisfied ___ Somewhat Satisfied ___ Not Satisfied ___ Not yet received assistance ___ DK ___ NR ___

Table 9. Satisfaction

Satisfied

	Frequency	Percent
No	62	38.3
Yes	100	61.7
Total	162	100.0

Less Satisfied

	Frequency	Percent
No	112	69.1
Yes	50	30.9
Total	162	100.0

Not Satisfied

	Frequency	Percent
No	151	93.2
Yes	11	6.8
Total	162	100.0

Q10A: Do you know what country and organization provides the money to IOM?

Yes _____ No _____ DK _____ NR _____

Table 10a. Know source of funding for IOM

Source	Frequency	Percent
No	145	89.5
Yes	17	10.5
Total	162	100.0

IF YES

10A What country provides the money to IOM ?

Table 10a. What country provides the money to IOM?

Country		
	Frequency	Percent
USA	14	8.6%
Other	2	1.2%
Don't Know	2	1.2%
No Response	1	.6%

Q10B. What organization provides the money to IOM? WRITE ANSWER

Table 10b. What organization provides the money to IOM

Organization	Know	
	Frequency	Percent
IOM	5	3.1%
USAID	8	4.9%
Don't Know	3	1.9%

Q10C: Who did you find out this information from? WRITE ANSWER

Table 10c. Who did you find out this information from?

Source	Frequency	Percent
IOM	8	4.9%
GIRoA	7	4.3%
Local Leaders	5	3.1%
Neighbors	2	1.2%

**ASK ONLY IF ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN PROVIDED BY ACAP, BASED ON Q8
IF THE ANSWER TO Q8 WAS 'NOT YET RECEIVED ASSISTANCE', GO TO Q16**

Q11 How long after the incident was your first meeting with IOM?

WRITE ANSWER

Table 11. How long after the incident was your first meeting with IOM? (in months)

	Frequency	Percent
Within 1 month	18	11.1
1-2 months	58	35.8
Between 2-3 months	30	18.5
Between 3-4 months	5	3.1
More than 4 months	51	31.5
Total	162	100.0

Q12 How long after your first meeting with IOM did it take to receive the first assistance? WRITE ANSWER

Table 12. How long after your first meeting with IOM did it take receive the first assistance? (in months)

	Frequency	Percent
Between 3-6 months	52	32.1
Between 7-12 months	21	13.0
Between 13-18 months	24	14.8
More than 18 months	65	40.1
Total	162	100.0

Q13. How long after your first meeting with IOM did it take to receive the final installment of assistance? WRITE ANSWER

Table 13. How long after your first meeting with IOM did it take to receive the final installment of assistance? (in months)

Length of Time	Frequency	Percent
Less than 3 months	35	21.6
Between 3-6 months	66	40.7
Between 7-12 months	11	6.8
Between 13-18 months	14	8.6
More than 18 months	36	22.2
Total	162	100.0

Q14. Was the assistance delivered to you on time to help you meet your needs after the incident? WRITE ANSWER

Table 14: Assistance Delivered On Time

	Frequency	Percent
No	96	59.3
Yes	66	40.7
Total	162	100.0

Q15. Has anyone come to monitor the assistance? Yes ___ No ___ DK ___ NR ___

Table 15. Has anyone come to monitor the assistance?

	Frequency	Percent
No	47	29.0
DK	1	.6
Yes	114	70.4
Total	162	100.0

IF YES,

15A How many times has IOM staff visited you? CHECK BOX

Once ___ Twice ___ Three times ___ More than three times ___ DK ___ NR ___

Table 15A: Frequency of ACAP Monitoring

How many times?	Monitored	
	Frequency	Percent
Once	31	19.1%
Twice	43	26.5%
Three Times	28	17.3%
More Than Three Times	14	8.6%
Don't Know	1	.6%

Q16. Do you think that assistance was provided to you in a transparent and fair manner?

CHECK AND WRITE THEIR ANSWER

Yes; _____ Please explain briefly _____.

No _____ Please explain briefly _____

Table 16: Transparent and Fair

	Frequency	Percent
Transparent and Fair	Yes	126 77.8
	No	30 18.5
	NR	6 3.7
	Total	162 100.0

Q17. What has been the reaction of your community to you receiving assistance?

WRITE ANSWER

Table 17: Reaction of Community to Assistance

Respondent	Frequency	Percent
NR	5	3.1
good reaction	3	1.9
Good reaction	27	16.7
I have not let them know	1	.6
I have not let them know due to security reasons	21	13.0
Most were unhappy.	1	.6
No reaction	5	3.1
People are Happy	1	.6
People are not happy as everybody has not been assisted	9	5.6
People are unhappy as all the affected ones were not assisted.	8	4.9
People are unhappy as they also wanted to be assisted	5	3.1
People are unhappy, they think I should be taken by IOM for treatment abroad	1	.6
People were happy	2	1.2
People were satisfied	1	.6
Some people were happy and some unhappy	5	3.1
The people were happy	1	.6
The were happy	2	1.2
Saying I have sold my son for 4 cows (shameful)	1	.6
They were emphasizing why the incident happened but still happy for the assistance.	2	1.2
They were feeling happy	13	8.0
They were happy	46	28.4
Nothing	1	.6
They were unhappy	1	.6
Total	162	100.0

Q18. What is the main means of financial support for your household? WRITE ANSWER

Table 18. What is the main means of financial support for your household?

	Main Means of Support	
	Frequency	Percent
Agriculture	91	52.6
Business	27	16.0
Government	5	3.0
Other	47	27.8
NR	1	0.6
Total	169*	100.0

*Total exceeds 162 respondents due to multiple responses to this question.

Appendix 8

ANNEX 8: SUMMARY OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

Province	ACAP Staff	GIRoA and Stakeholders	USAID Activity Managers& FPOs	Total Number of Interviews
Herat	6	10	2	18
Kabul	10	6	4	18
Kandahar	3	2	1	6
Khost	1	7	0	8
Kunduz	6	9	1	16
Laghman	0	3	1	4
Maidan Wardak	2	5	2	9
Nangarhar	5	12	3	20
Paktya	5	2	2	9
Helmand	2	2	1	5
Others	4	3	7	16
Total	45	61	23	<u>129</u>

Appendix 9A

APPENDIX 9 - A: ACTIVITY MANAGER COMMENTS – DCI INTERVIEWS

23 RESPONDENTS: 12 Internationals and 11 Afghan Nationals

QUESTION - WORKING RELATIONSHIPS

International:

I, only, recently became the Activity Manager. My COTR has been very responsive in linking me to IOM/ACAP. It took me a few emails to hear back from IOM to discover my point of contact. IOM hesitated to accept my nomination for two families killed from an IED. They asked me if the IED was meant for the „International Military Forces’. I think it is quite obvious that the IEDs are the weapon of choice for the insurgents and families of Afghan Civilians who hit them should be considered eligible. IOM/ACAP is now investigating the two cases. My correspondence is by email.

I am in contact with ACAP about once per month. More contact would be beneficial.

I am in contact with ACAP once per week although would appreciate more contact.

I am not an Activity Manager. I work at the regional platform-level. I am copied on the ACAP activities and that is appropriate for my level.

I meet weekly with the IOM project manager. We evaluate the progress of the incidents. I have also visited the ACAP warehouse and have been present when affected families or beneficiaries receive their assistance kits.

As to the quality of the relationship, at times there is a contrast between the information provided by the IOM field staff and what we are able to confirm on the ground. For example, I reported an incident of a civilian breadwinner who bled to death as a result of an IED in his village. Notwithstanding, the fact that I was on hand when the man was treated at the FOB Field Surgical Unit and I took down the names of the man and his injured son, IOM did not nominate the incident because their field staff said the names were relatives of the District Governor and they qualified the incident as „fraudulent’. (October 11, 2010, Sini Village, Morghab District)

In a more striking example, we reported the bombardment of a civilian compound occupied by insurgents in Joi Khoja Village, April 2010. We expected ACAP to respond with rebuilding assistance once the villagers returned, which occurred in May and June. When the nomination form came months later, it listed many names of civilians killed and wounded. Evidently, the IOM staff bought into the idea that the killed and injured were not insurgents, which is entirely opposed to the conclusions of the extensive investigations at the time of bombardment. (Villagers have since lobbied us and the military for rebuilding assistance, but I have never heard them claim help related to those who died.)

Yes – more contact with ACAP would be beneficial.

To an extent there is a working relationship and some information sharing with the USAID/FPO and DFPO (Nangarhar) although ACAP has not sent any report of their activities except for cases of verification.

Working relationship is good; ACAP is sharing activity reports and we are meeting weekly (Kunduz).

Afghan:

We meet weekly and bi-weekly. I personally try to visit the IOM/ACAP office. More weekly emails and telephone calls would be helpful.

I have regular contact with the ACAP staff although more contact would be useful.

ACAP is doing an adequate job but not to the level expected.

Would be helpful to have more contact with ACAP representative – it would help us to know more about the progress and issues and we would be better able to help coordinate for the achievement of ACAP objectives.

We share incident reports with ACAP for verification purposes (Herat).

IOM should have their own compound or building – difficult to meet with them as they are stationed at UNAMA under UN rules and regulations.

There has been very little activity (distributions) during the past nine months (Uruzgan).

As the USAID representative for Baghlan since 2007, I have been unable to meet with an ACAP staff member and there has been no information sharing about Baghlan. It would be great if we could have any kind of coordination and contact with ACAP.

QUESTION – SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT

International:

Hiring local staff within the province would help expedite the distribution process – currently beneficiaries need to wait a long time to receive assistance.

Need better IOM management – currently, poorly managed. Everything from the IP side has been mismanaged and the IP does not seem vested in carrying out the activities – no IP representative in the province.

Separate the ACAP operation from the other IOM projects/programs - overall management is weak.

Copies of the mandatory monthly reports sent to IOM/ACAP headquarters should also be sent to each Field Program Officer (FPO). ACAP should always maintain regular contact with us.

The relationship needs to be closer with more ACAP/IOM supervisory presence in the province. ACAP success can be enhanced by involving USAID field staff in more than the reporting process and confirming incidents. For example, GIROA officials may be more inclined to provide accurate input if they sense that USAID is more closely involved in the monitoring of the investigation and assistance distribution. IOM/ACAP may be more inclined to provide better turnaround in their responses if they are required to report more frequently and directly about project status.

The frequency of our weekly meetings is appropriate. The ACAP project manager is very responsive to my suggestions and recommendations, and shares data and reports as appropriate. There are issues to be resolved but these are not a reflection of the working relationship. IOM/ACAP has flagged issues such as expiration dates on food, which take up precious warehouse space, and some overstocking.

I would suggest that ACAP increase interaction with the FPOS. Rather than learning about what the program did, it would be great to hear what the program is going to do. It would also be great to keep the FPOs informed about the progress of the different requests for assistance. Ultimately, it would be good to have most, if not all requests, for assistance expedited since the need for assistance is soon after the accident, rather than later.

The ACAP staff are not satisfied with the ‘kits’ received for distribution from the ACAP HQ and the beneficiaries complain that they are not aware of what they should receive. Better communication is clearly needed all the way around; perhaps, a good training video or, minimally, an improved training package is needed. Timeliness is another issue – it usually takes two years or longer to settle claims.

ACAP HQ needs to be more responsive and make decisions faster.

Expired groceries should be made available for animal consumption.

ACAP is a family-based assistance program and, thus, very hard to measure impact extent on stabilization; impact is small at best. Don’t know how we change this.

Afghan:

Need to purchase from local vendors- this saves on transportation costs and helps reduce breakage and low quality items. There should be no imposed goods (standard kits), no electric irons, and give priority to beneficiary choices. More small business assistance (taxi, tractor, and livestock) would be useful.

Coalition delivers „solatia’ payment – would be good to be coordinated with ACAP assistance; although difficult to coordinate with other donor programs - more can be done in leveraging with other USAID programs; for example, CERP and Cash for Work.

More attention needs to be given to women beneficiaries.

ACAP process in provinces should be supervised by USAID FPO or DFPO.

Employing former Afghan military persons would enable improved travel to the various sites, improve interfacing with the international forces, and expedite information exchange.

My interaction with IOM/ACAP has been limited until the last two months. I assumed the Wardak team lead in December of last year. Since then, I have been working extensively to streamline the way we work with our implementing partners, mainly by requesting additional meetings. Working relationship has been good. Time lag in delivery of ACAP assistance has been an issue.

The FPO and DFPO (Nangarhar) commented that the standard kits are not according to the beneficiary needs and need to be, which is affecting the satisfaction of the beneficiaries and the effectiveness of the assistance.

Appendix 9B

APPENDIX 9 - B:STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS – DCI INTERVIEWS

58 INTERVIEWS (36 of 56 had some understanding of ACAP; 2 had No Response): Kabul -6; Wardak/Khost/Paktya– 5/7/2; Nangarhar/Laghman– 12/3; Kandahar/Helmand–2/2; Herat/Kunduz– 10/9

QUESTION 1. UNDERSTANDING OF ACAP

Kabul:

MoLSAMD –Director General of Policy & Planning - several meetings with USAID/Stabilization Unit - yes , has understanding of the ACAP program; Project Coordinator MoLSAMD/NSDP – has a working relationship with IOM separate from ACAP – yes, has an understanding of the ACAP program.

AIHRC - Commissioner – yes, has understanding of the ACAP program as the IOM/ACAP was initially set up in consultation with AIHRC.

UNAMA – Director of Human Rights Unit and Human Rights Officer – yes, they have an understanding of the ACAP program.

ICRC –Protection Coordinators – new person (1 month) had no knowledge and experienced person (1 year) had knowledge – mostly from Checchi mid-term evaluators.

Local Stakeholders – Local elder and Deputy of Crime Detective Department – both were aware of ACAP but not aware of type of assistance provided nor if the assistance was received, only helped with incident verification.

Wardak/Paktya/Khost:

Eight of 14 stakeholders (excluding USAID) interviewed had no knowledge/understanding of ACAP. Six were GIRoA officials in districts impacted by ACAP, one a provincial governor and the other a member of a Provincial Council.

The Wardak Provincial Council was informed as once a week the field assistant shared information with the Council. The Paktya Provincial Council was aware and had some knowledge and the Khost Provincial Council was minimally knowledgeable.

Nangarhar/Laghman:

Seven of 15 stakeholders (excluding USAID) interviewed had no knowledge/understanding of ACAP (Nangarhar/Laghman).

GIRoA officials varied in their awareness of ACAP. Some of the GIRoA officials, who knew about ACAP, got their information from beneficiaries in their area and not from ACAP.

UNAMA had an understanding of ACAP. AIHRC had an understanding only because the Program Manager was aware from his role in a similar position in Paktya province prior to Jalalabad.

Kandahar/Helmand:

The two stakeholders (provincial officials) were aware of ACAP.

Provincial Council member has general understanding, meets with the ACAP staff and has visited the ACAP office.

District development Shura head has understanding and closely assists ACAP field staff in identifying incidents and beneficiaries.

Herat/Kunduz:

Two district-level sub-governors (where ACAP is active) had no knowledge of IOM/ACAP plus one other district-level GIRoA official (Herat); the other seven stakeholders interviewed knew that ACAP helps suffering families from military operations (Herat).

Two of nine stakeholders interviewed had no understanding of ACAP (Kunduz).

The source of information was the ACAP field assistants.

All stakeholders in the three districts visited were familiar with ACAP/IOM (Kunduz) although in two of the districts, officials were unaware of any action taken regarding the initial beneficiary assessment. The stakeholder information came from the ACAP/IOM field staff.

QUESTION 2. WORKING RELATIONSHIP

Working relationship with ACAP (summary): Excellent -8; Moderate - 10; Weak-18; No Response - 2

Kabul:

Currently, MoLSAMD working relationship with ACAP is weak to non-existent. There is a need for an improved working relationship—recommends 2/3 technical team members of ACAP2 be officed directly at MoLSAMD

AIHRC – The intent was to work closely with AIHRC. This has happened in only a few provinces; e.g., Jalalabad, Kunduz and Kandahar. In each case, the IOM/ACAP representative has made an effort to work with the AIHRC. Once the IOM/ACAP was granted the fund, for the most part, there has been a minimal working relationship except as noted in the three provinces identified.

UNAMA – UNAMA has a close working relationship with IOM/ACAP at both the Central and Regional-level (8 offices). IOM/ACAP field officers are in regular contact with the Regional offices and the Head of the Human Rights Unit meets with the ACAP Program Manager. Staff of both organizations is requested to work with each other's organizations.

ICRC –No working relationship although the ICRC regional staff are informed about ACAP from ICRC management and asked to make contact so they have an awareness level of the players on the ground.

Wardak/Paktya/Khost:

The AIHRC Acting Director was aware of ACAP and had a visit from an ACAP staff member during one of the incident investigations.

All three provincial councils requested that ACAP be more open and share activity information with them on a regular basis.

Nangarhar/Laghman:

Some GIROA officials were involved in the verification process while others had no involvement. The officials would like to have more involvement, including being present at the delivery process venue.

The program manager for AIHRC has been in Jalalabad for one year and hadn't seen anybody from ACAP. Only his monitoring and investigation officer had any contact with ACAP and stated that the working relationship was very weak and limited to case verification. Likewise with UNAMA, the working relationship was limited to verification approval.

Kandahar/Helmand:

There is a good working relationship as provincial and district officials work closely with ACAP field from identification and documentation of beneficiaries through the delivery of the assistance.

When tribal elders have concerns about ACAP activities, we share it with the ACAP staff and advise accordingly (provincial council member); likewise, ACAP staff should share activity details of each assistance provided as it will ensure transparency.

We (district Shura head) would like to be present at the delivery of the assistance to help ensure accountability; it is also important to deliver the assistance in a more rapid way.

Herat/Kunduz:

Working relationship involved contacting ACAP staff for reporting and sharing incident reports and sharing other relevant information (Herat).

IOM/ACAP needs to increase their field visits, stay in touch with the field more, and increase their contacts and relationship with the communities (Herat).

We assist in verification of incidents and beneficiaries (Kunduz).

IOM/ACAP needs to meet with the district officials and explain their program and provide us with an activities report after implementation (Kunduz).

QUESTION 3. USE OF OTHER AGENCY RESOURCES

Utilize ‘Resources’ of the Stakeholder (summary): Most of the Time -6; Some of the Time -20; Seldom/Never -10; No Response - 2

Kabul:

MoLSAMD has representatives in all 34 GIROA Provincial offices—these staff could be useful in implementation and monitoring of ACAP activities - they could easily come and go to the districts/CDCs and local Shuras - this is a resource that should be tapped.

AIHRC –A draft MOU was prepared in the beginning clarifying roles and expectations – this MOU has never been signed. AIHRC has 13 offices (8 regional - Jalalabad, Kabul, Kandahar, Gardez, Kunduz, Mazar, Herat, and Bamyan and 5 provincial – Badakhshan, Fariab, Ghor, Helmand, and Uruzgan). AIHRC could be helpful in the verification of incidents and beneficiaries and in monitoring. IOM/ACAP needs to do a better job of seeking AIHRC information. A number of organizations come to AIHRC seeking information but IOM/ACAP has minimally utilized the AIHRC resources.

UNAMA shares basic information on incidents and beneficiaries with IOM/ACAP on a regular basis. UNAMA has a strong local „network’ and gathers information from a variety of sources; thus, providing an invaluable resource for verifying beneficiaries.

ICRC –No. ICRC is mostly involved in the legal side of civilian protection, collect information in a confidential manner and share selectively.

Wardak/Paktya/Khost:

All three Provincial councils reported that ACAP staff used their resources when needed.

Nangarhar/Laghman:

In all cases, the use of agency resources was restricted to verification approval.

Kandahar/Helmand:

ACAP utilizes our resources most of the time (provincial council member); would like to have more input into the people ACAP recruits, which would help ensure improved accountability.

Our current working relationship is only by phone (district Shura head); would like weekly face-to-face coordination meetings.

Herat/Kunduz:

The main stakeholder resource utilization was incident related information.

Sometimes we send an escort to the field with ACAP into the incident area (Kunduz).

QUESTION 4. INFORMATION SHARING

Share Information of ACAP Activities with Stakeholder (summary): Most of the Time 3; Some of the Time - 12; Seldom/Never -21; No Response - 2

Kabul:

Little, if any information, about ACAP activities is shared with MoLSAMD – main source of information has been USAID/Kabul – which happens only occasionally (every couple of months).

AIHRC has never seen an IOM/ACAP report. Mobility of ACAP is also an issue as it has made it difficult to establish rapport. Many of the field representatives are untrained and

not aware of the role AIHRC can play. If information were shared, AIHRC could link ACAP to other support agencies as a number of agencies come to AIHRC.

AIHRC could link ACAP to loyal contacts. AIHRC is aware of a „fake tribal person‘ ACAP met with in Kandahar. AIHRC is aware of beneficiaries complaining that the amount of assistance is less than expected (amount signed for), poor quality of items, and long delays in receiving assistance.

Some of the time ACAP program activity information is shared with UNAMA although mostly it is a sharing of the UNAMA resources with IOM/ACAP. UNAMA has a mandate to act as an advocacy for the Protection of Civilians, which provides a direct resource for IOM/ACAP.

ICRC has not seen an ACAP report nor have they attended an ACAP briefing. ICRC mostly engages with the regional command/ISAF briefings and that is on a legal basis.

Wardak/Paktya/Khost:

All three Provincial councils requested that they be allowed to be present at the ACAP distributions in order to assist in building confidence in the government and that they receive updated activity reports on a regular basis.

Nangarhar/Laghman:

For all stakeholders, there was limited to no sharing of ACAP program activity information.

Kandahar/Helmand:

ACAP mostly contacts us when they need help (district Shura head); would like regular coordination meetings; complete beneficiary information should always be available with ACAP (Kandahar).

Herat/Kunduz:

GIRoA stakeholders indicated their desire that ACAP share their beneficiary activity information with them, in particular, the households that they have assisted (Herat).

ACAP should work more closely with the government so we can cooperate – we need to know the kind of assistance provided in our district.

QUESTION5. DONOR FINANCIAL SUPPORT

Kabul:

AIHRC, ICRC, UNAMA and MoLSAMD all knew that ACAP is funded through USAID. Local stakeholder officials were unaware of who funded the ACAP assistance program.

Wardak/Paktya/Khost:

The stakeholders reported that the beneficiaries think the money spent at the national level in Afghanistan is USG money but that spent in the communities is UN money.

Nangarhar/Laghman:

For those GIRoA officials who were aware of ACAP, none knew who was funding the program. UNAMA and AIHRC knew that USAID was funding the program. Most beneficiaries were unaware of the donor. They only knew ACAP.

Kandahar/Helmand:

Provincial council member and district Shura member understand that funding is USAID but believe the beneficiary thinks it is American Military; would be better to announce to all the people by the Afghan government that the funding is coming from USAID.

Herat/Kunduz:

None of the stakeholders interviewed knew who provided the financial support for IOM/ACAP (Herat); ACAP needs to be more transparent in this knowledge (Herat).

Most stakeholders knew the US was providing the assistance (Kunduz).

QUESTION 6.KNOWLEDGE OF ACAP ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Kabul:

MoLSAMD, AIHRC and ICRC have limited knowledge of ACAP accomplishments; UNAMA has some knowledge because of a closer working relationship.

Wardak/Paktya/Khost:

Stakeholders were unaware of any main accomplishment of ACAP.

The stakeholders reported that ACAP has to involve GIROA in all activities and GIROA can then help provide security and guide ACAP in achieving its activities.

Nangarhar/Laghman:

UNAMA was the most positive about ACAP accomplishments but stated that in order to become more effective, they needed to deliver assistance on time and immediately after the accident. GIROA saw the small business opportunity assistance as the most effective accomplishment.

Kandahar/Helmand:

In general, beneficiaries are satisfied; provision of vehicles, giving cash, and small business are good although it would be better if the assistance were based on the need of the beneficiary.

Assistance should be given to beneficiaries at one venue and ceremony in the presence of the government authorities.

Current incident/nomination approval process is good; incident comes from Media to ACAP and to the District Governor's office, then referred to the District Shura, and finally back to ACAP.

Herat/Kunduz:

ACAP needs to do a better job of communicating with the local councils and village elders – more than just incident verification and the related incident information (Herat).

Assistance was significant - cars, cows, reconstruction of houses, and \$3000 worth of materials (Kunduz).

QUESTION 7. STABILIZATION

Support Afghan Government Stabilization Efforts (summary): Most of the Time - 8; Some of the Time - 14; Seldom/Never –13; Don't Know – 1; No Response - 2

Kabul:

MoLSAMD - Limited knowledge.

AIHRC - Mostly don't know - as an agency is not regularly informed. For improved stabilization, ACAP needs to work more closely with the GIROA and be more transparent and clear in its connections to the communities.

UNAMA – Some knowledge as they are party to IOM/ACAP briefings as a part of the UN family.

ICRC – Limited knowledge.

Wardak/Paktya/Khost:

The stakeholders agreed that ACAP can be a useful tool in contributing to confidence building between the Afghan government and the local people and can help in bringing security to the region.

Nangarhar/Laghman:

Most GIROA officials felt that if ACAP would work more closely with the government that it would help in stabilization. In general, stakeholders felt if the project met beneficiary needs and delivered the assistance in a timely manner, that it could have a positive effect on stabilization.

Kandahar/Helmand:

To effect stabilization, it would be important to reach a greater number of beneficiaries; for example, ACAP should include the civilian casualties of the Afghan National Army Operations.

Example of success – In Sarayo area, an injured man was given a cow which has helped him in recovery and changed his perception about the International Military Forces.

Herat/Kunduz:

Stakeholders felt that ACAP was having little to no effect on stabilization. The feeling was that there had to be more stakeholder information sharing and community involvement to effect stabilization (Herat).

The beneficiaries knew someone cares and with the significant assistance that was provided in a transparent way, it provided an alternative to joining the insurgents (Kunduz/Ali Abaad).

Appendix 9C

APPENDIX 9 - C: ACAP STAFF COMMENTS - DCI INTERVIEWS

41 INTERVIEWS: Kabul- 10; Wardak/Paktya/Khost- 2/5/1; Nangarhar/Laghman- 5/0; Kandahar/Helmand - 3/3; Herat/Kunduz - 6/6

QUESTION 1. MOST APPROPRIATE BENEFICIARY GROUP

Kabul:

Rural household is more appropriate – household in the city has more capability and is more likely to receive assistance from the government.

It is best to help “someone” who no one else is helping; good to help the „immediate” families.

Need to help those that are not helped by the military.

Keep the focus on the immediate family and the women followed by the extended family.

Wardak/Paktya/Khost:

Priority should be given to families with a death.

GIRoA officials request that families be provided with assistance who have a member killed by National Military action against the insurgents in addition to IMF actions.

Nangarhar/Laghman:

The most appropriate incidents for assistance is when there is a death as the deceased person’s young adult male family (brothers and cousins) would be more vulnerable to join the insurgents; and, secondly, rural people are very poor and an easier target for recruitment.

Mostly, male members of the household are more appropriate for assistance as they are the breadwinner for the household.

Kandahar/Helmand:

The need is to focus on the small family rather than the extended family; would be good to focus on the spouse but is difficult to do.

Incidents which have caused civilians deaths or personal injurer should be given preference because the person might be a husband and his widow and children are left without a breadwinner; therefore, they need the assistance the most in order to continue his/her life.

The city should be given preference because many suicide attacks and bomb blasts occur inside city and when the assistance is provided to the casualties in the city, many people become aware of such assistance which has a positive effect on their perception.

The assistance should be extended more in rural areas rather than city because there are more facilities in the city which can be used by civilians, like more equipped hospitals and doctors but in rural areas there are limited facilities.

ACAP should help all of injured people, even those who are not victimized in international military operations but in Afghan National Forces operations.

Herat/Kunduz:

IED victims of the insurgents, not helped by anyone else, in contrast to airstrike victims which receive compensation from IMF, are an appropriate group.

Widows, need female staff to try to make sure assistance goes to them not men.

All three types of incidents, personal injury, death, and property damage are appropriate.

The majority of the incidents take place in rural areas – where there is a lower level of education, presence of government is weak, and it is easier for the Taliban to gain access for their activities.

Members of the immediate household are the most appropriate group for targeting ACAP assistance – normally the head of household.

Assistance is provided to head of household followed by next male/female elder breadwinner in the family (Kunduz).

More incidents occur in the rural area as the Taliban strongholds are mostly in the rural areas and the local governance is not strong enough to secure the lives of the locals.

QUESTION 2. APPROPRIATENESS OF ACAP ASSISTANCE

How Appropriate was the ACAP Assistance – did it meet Beneficiary Needs (summary): Very Appropriate - 14; Somewhat–22; Little – 4; Don't know - 1

Kabul:

Items are useable but could be of better quality; need to coordinate with ICRC as there is a need for medical items; also, need for more specialized items such as water pumps and bigger irrigation pumps.

Kits are hit and miss; better to provide small business opportunities; livestock is good.

Sustainability is positive for the livestock/small businesses opportunity.

Afghans who have lost their family members in the military operations should receive more assistance than others.

Wardak/Paktya/Khost:

There needs to be more quality control on the kits.

Assistance needs to be need-based; there were some electrical items given to rural families with no electricity.

Nangarhar/Laghman:

Mostly, the items in the kits were seen as appropriate except for some grocery items that were expired, electric items (irons) for rural areas where there is no electricity, and education kits for families with no children.

Kits are appropriate but need to be according to the beneficiary needs, else there is little satisfaction or benefit. Small business opportunities are well-received.

There is a need for treatment assistance for the injured people as most of them are not able to pay the expenditures of their treatment.

Kandahar/Helmand:

The assistance is somewhat appropriate although it would be good if the quantity of assistance could be increased because the price of goods is increasing day by day, the Kits coming are of poor quality, and beneficiaries should be asked what they really need and provided assistance according to those needs.

For those beneficiaries whose house is completely demolished the Kits are not sufficient. The quantity should be increased especially the Business Opportunity assistance.

Tailoring and home kits are good as well as the agriculture and livestock/small business assistance, although home kits were less appropriate for city-dwellers. Grocery kits were mostly sold in the bazaar.

Some items are not culturally appropriate; e.g., Pepsi and macaroni (Helmand).

Herat/Kunduz:

In the past. ACAP assistance was more appropriate as it was based on the needs of family; now by standardizing, the assistance is less appropriate

Carpet weaving is good for the region's women.

The quality and prices of assistance should be inspected.

More vocational training, based on the beneficiary field of interest, should be made available, especially for women, along with other employment opportunities.

The kits are less appropriate; when the kits were locally purchased, there was better quality and volume. The tailoring, education, and home kits are more appropriate than the other kits.

There was a case in Farah where the beneficiary sold his livestock assistance and set up a successful ice cream shop instead.

Small business opportunity assistance is the most appropriate – the kits are worthless and most beneficiaries do not appreciate them (Kunduz).

QUESTION 3. FAIR and TRANSPARENT

How Fair and Transparent was the ACAP Assistance (summary): Very Fair -24; Somewhat - 14; Little – 1; Don't Know – 1; No Response - 1

Kabul:

Family structure is an issue as wife is also daughter of someone and typically has a brother; would be good to reach agreement through local Shura.

There are difficulties with assisting in isolated incidents, communities of beneficiaries reduces scope for corruption.

Corruption is an issue, especially with some false beneficiaries. More transparency is needed to help resolve this issue. Also, sometimes the beneficiary never knows what he/she is entitled to.

Previous International Field Officer was not differentiating among beneficiaries, which created a fairness issue. Currently, more fair.

Wardak/Paktya/Khost:

There is a difference in the quality of the items and the cost associated with the items creating a transparency issue.

Nangarhar/Laghman:

Because of a procurement corruption issue a year ago, the staff is careful to document everything and feel the delivery process is transparent.

Kandahar/Helmand:

Transparency was considered low but in the past few months the process has been improved as we are trying to recruit more trustworthy staff and place more emphasis on this area.

ACAP takes pictures of beneficiaries and signs a contract with those who have been given the Small Business Opportunity.

The provision of assistance to beneficiaries is somewhat transparent and fair. When the incident occurs, the real families of people who have been victimized must be identified; sometimes it happens that fake people receive the assistance due to unclear process.

Transport of packages creates a security problem – need to convert to cash in order to travel in less secure areas. Even with cash, sometimes the real beneficiary will have part of the assistance stolen.

Herat/Kunduz:

More fair and appropriate if targeting IED victims, provide assistance according to losses.

The procurement should be done regionally; USAID should conduct periodic monitoring; and some of the contents in the grocery kits are out of date and not worth the money.

Some families are aware of the assistance provided – but others less so (Herat).

Some corruption difficulty with heads of CDCs; should have more than two ACAP staff present for distributions (Kunduz).

QUESTION 4. TIMELINESS OF ASSISTANCE

How Timely was the ACAP Assistance that was provided to the Beneficiary (summary): On Time (within 2 months) - 21; Late (3 to 5 months) - 16; Very Late (6 or more months) - 4

Kabul:

Timeliness is better now – before it was very late.

The aim for delivery of the first installment of the assistance is 8/9 weeks after the Family Assessment – this is being corrected. In the past, for some cases, it has taken several years for the assistance to be delivered.

Wardak/Paktya/Khost:

There have been delays in the delivery of assistance in Wardak and families are calling and asking about their assistance.

There has been some movement of the families from the place of the incident and the ACAP staff has had difficulty in locating the beneficiary (one family moved from Paktya to a village in Khost).

Nangarhar/Laghman:

ACAP feels timeliness is a function of the incident and it varies considerably. Incident nomination and verification processes are the most time consuming. Grant approval and the quotation process can also take time. Delivery is going more smoothly.

Kandahar/Helmand:

Kandahar has the most incidents; timeliness has now decreased to three weeks from family assessment to delivery of first installment.

Before the assistance were very late. Since the Internationals have arrived in Kandahar, the process has been accelerated as they have put pressure on the Kabul Management Team. The grants for different cases now get approved on time, even within a month. The current process is good and I have no suggestion for improvements.

Helmand has been particularly challenging – security, corruption and a need for more staff training.

Helmand still has some ‘old’ cases open after five years; better to focus on the recent cases.

Herat/Kunduz:

In the past the assistance was not timely, due to standardization, now timeliness is better.

Beneficiaries typically pick up their assistance in the provincial center which means they have to provide the transport, which also creates certain security issues.

To be effective, ACAP assistance needs to be delivered in a timely manner.

More responsibility to the sub-office will facilitate the time frame while involvement of NGOs will cause delays.

HQ should approve the nomination faster – HQ does not reply to us in months, we still have cases open from 2007 (Kunduz).

QUESTION 5. BENEFICIARY SATISFACTION WITH ASSISTANCE

How Satisfied were the Beneficiaries with the ACAP Assistance (summary): Very Satisfied –25; Somewhat - 14; Little – 1; Don’t Know - 1

Kabul:

The assistance meets basic needs and the beneficiary is generally satisfied.

Do have strong success stories, but all anecdotal.

There is some beneficiary satisfaction knowing that the international community is listening and pays attention to people as much as the assistance provided.

Wardak/Paktya/Khost:

Beneficiaries are satisfied; an example was given of a family in Nizya village (Paktya) who loss 8 family members and ACAP reconstructed their home and provide a small business and another family who started a barber shop and is making 1000 Afs/day.

Nangarhar/Laghman:

According to the ACAP staff, the beneficiaries are satisfied with the assistance; especially, those receiving small business opportunities because since they have started the small business, their life and economy have improved.

Kandahar/Helmand:

The ones injured are less satisfied with their kits; they are always requesting more. There is also an issue of making sure the beneficiary is provided with assistance that meets their need.

Satisfaction varies. The rural poor are more appreciative as the standard kits are a luxury for the poor.

Useful kits are the Home Kit, Tailoring Kit and Stationary Kit. In general, beneficiaries are satisfied but quantity seems to be an issue as they would like more.

Herat/Kunduz:

Constant changes to program, different strategies for different beneficiaries is not good for beneficiary satisfaction.

Beneficiaries know what others have gotten, and will come back and complain if they think they were shorted.

ACAP monitoring reports indicate a high level of beneficiary satisfaction, especially with the small business opportunities assistance; in general, satisfaction with the kits is less.

ACAP has a good reputation in the North.

There is unhappiness with the grocery kits.

Kits and groceries are not what people need, replace them with small business assistance (Kunduz).

There should be a different level of assistance depending on the type incident and loss.

QUESTION 6. MAIN IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS

Kabul:

Providing assistance to outlying areas is difficult because of security issues.

Sometimes the Provincial government makes promises and overstates what ACAP can provide.

Quality of items is poor – need for due diligence in procurement. Warehouses are packed – seems to be undue emphasis on making procurement payment and less on quality and the procurement process.

Is ACAP an Emergency Relief program or follow-on assistance program – goal needs clarification.

Decision-making is more upper-management/top-down (internationals) rather than decentralized/broad-based and according to local needs (Afghans).

Procurement is the major issue along with overwhelming documentation.

High turnover in staff – both internationals and Afghan resulting in less-trained and experienced individuals.

Very complicated and convoluted processes – multiple layers of paperwork, needs to be streamlined, works but is time consuming, project hindered by administration.

IOM/ACAP needs more presence on the ground.

There is a need for more follow up after delivery of the assistance.

Still a lot of old cases to be resolved.

Military has been minimally cooperative at best. They have been extremely guarded and protective.

Ambitious aims and large expansion from small start-up without staff or systems, program evolves rather than changes after strategic review.

Always expanding, not a finite number of incidents.

The IFOs are more humanitarian in their experience and not necessarily a good fit to the job.

There has been a shift from tailored assistance to more standardized assistance for the sake of improving the timeliness of delivery, which is affecting the appropriateness of the assistance and quality control.

Information from the US Special Forces is confidential and they don't share the information.

Nangarhar/Laghman:

Case verification is a difficult step because we have to have 2/3 international sources and finally the approval of USAID.

Also, security is a challenge especially in some of the remote areas.

Kandahar/Helmand:

Security is the main implementation problem; inability to travel enhances potential for corruption as it limits being able to meet entitled beneficiaries and to monitor the assistance provided.

Logistics/accessibility is a major challenge. In the insecure areas, need to work more through the local Shura.

There has been high staff turnover and there has been is a lack of training for the National staff – new staff arrive untrained.

Security is the issue; beneficiaries will sell their kits to keep from being identified by the insurgents; and quality of items continues to be an issue.

Another implementation issue is transport. ACAP pays \$600 a month for transport when we go to the field, yet, we still find it difficult to find rental vehicles that are willing to take the risk.

Sometimes beneficiaries receive threats from Anti Government Elements to avoid receiving their assistance.

Herat/Kunduz:

Difficult to explain program and train team – process is cumbersome.

Constant international rotation for partners, especially military, creates uncertainty and inconsistencies.

Constant changes in program difficult on staff, e.g. 15 changes to MVR in 2 months; ACAP HQ is very slow.

Security and procurement continue to be issues – quality and volume.

QUESTION 7. UNMET NEEDS

Were there any Unmet Needs (summary): Yes - 27; No -14

Kabul:

Quality and volume could be improved – could provide more.

Unknown if people really have unmet needs, after old incidents; think window of opportunity to help is half a year.

ACAP goal needs clarification – emergency relief, stabilization, rebuilding or recovery – the goal affects unmet needs as well as the timeliness in delivery.

There is a need to link more with the local NGOs and a need to provide medical assistance.

Nangarhar/Laghman:

According to two ACAP staff, in the small business opportunity assistance, the beneficiary has to make a contribution to the small business and most are not able to

contribute. Also, the small business opportunity is now more limited than before and, thus, more difficult to tailor to the beneficiary need.

Many of the families were in need of food and drinking water – this need was not addressed. Instead many were provided with kits that were not according to their needs. Some of the beneficiaries still are in need of shelter, yet that is no longer being provided.

Kandahar/Helmand:

There are some unmet needs, like sometimes a beneficiary requests a cow and is given a taxi; that is, the assistance does not meet the need stated by the beneficiary.

Herat/Kunduz:

There will be unmet needs soon, without training/tutoring, the assistance will no longer be empowering, especially for women.

Many of the injured beneficiaries seek medical treatment; paying for such treatment is not in ACAPs assistance package.

There is a need for more training of staff prior to deployment to field. ACAP staff are not well trained, which will present even more challenges in training of NGOs as many in the North are not well established and are corrupt. .

Beneficiaries are requesting more classes and requesting ‚cash’ vs. ‚stuff’.

Medical treatments are of the highest priority (Kunduz).

QUESTION 8. EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION/METHODS

Kabul:

There has been a recognition of the Afghan people that they have been heard and that someone is willing to listen and help although getting ‚stuff’ may not be the answer.

Support of the community in the process is important.

A strategic choice was made: tailored assistance which takes time or standardization for speed and low cost. Changing the program to “appropriate assistance” (standardization) has been effective in improving timeliness of delivery but staff has reservations about ability to meet beneficiary needs.

Wardak/Paktya33/Khost:

The completion of the nomination forms has been good.

Nangarhar/Laghman:

The documentation process of each step is effective but is time consuming and involves a lot of paper work.

The monitoring team is now checking after each step is completed to be sure all forms are properly filled and procedures have been followed.

Kandahar/Helmand:

The most effective method is when field assistants are able to investigate the incidents; i.e., talk to the beneficiaries and liaise with the local Shura, district governors, and other power brokers.

Local flexibility is important in being able to respond more positively to the situation.

The use of National Identity cards and photos of the beneficiary along with his/her family has been useful.

The providing of the Small Business Opportunity assistance has been very effective along with providing carts to beneficiaries in rural areas. The current method of ACAP is good and the monitoring aspect helps this program to be delivered transparently and fairly.

Herat/Kunduz:

Direct contact with beneficiaries is effective (when done properly).

Family needs assessment, tailored assistance, and team work are the most effective methods.

Investigation of incidents is good.

Family needs assessment, good working relationship with CDCs, and the small business opportunity for livelihood are the most effective (Kunduz).

QUESTION 9. OTHER AGENCY WORKING RELATIONSHIPS (EXCLUDE GIROA)

Do you work with Other Agencies/Organizations (summary): Yes - 29; No -12

To what extent do you Share Information about your Activities with Other Agencies/Organizations: Most of the Time - 9; Some of the Time - 8; Seldom/Never – 20; Don't Know - 4

Kabul:

Yes - UNAMA, International Military, ICRC, UNDSS, and FPO/PRT – mostly in cross-checking incidents and in verification of beneficiaries.

Brief military and USAID/DOS staff regularly, need to as people change often.

More briefings at the central level are needed. There is a need to even share matrix with them.

Need to be on the ground and more actively engaged in sharing information.

Sharing of ACAP program activities has been mostly with the UN organizations.

Wardak/Paktya/Khost:

ACAP is only working with agencies that can help with incident verification. There is little information sharing of program activities conducted with other agencies/organizations including UNAMA.

ACAP staff are not allowed to share information regarding ACAP activities.

Nangarhar/Laghman:

ACAP has a working relationship with AIHRC and UNAMA, in particular, related to verification of the incidents. When the ACAP assistance collects incident information, then it is sent to these organizations for verification approval.

There is no follow-on correspondence with the agencies or sharing of program activities or beneficiary assistance provided; both of which would be appreciated.

The same is true of the FPO, there are verification inquiries but no follow-on report of activities.

Kandahar/Helmand:

PRTs/IFOs, ISAF and UNHCR –the purpose is mostly to identify incidents and verify beneficiaries; activity information sharing is only really done with the PRT (Kandahar).

The deputy FPO has been active in support of ACAP; there are weekly meetings and briefings (Kandahar).

ACAP Field Staff have not been working with the other organizations or agencies at the provincial level (Kandahar); would recommend monthly coordination meetings of the related INGOs and NGOs.

Currently, we do not work with other Agencies or Organizations while working with ACAP in the field and I believe there isn't any need for this (Kandahar).

I don't have any working relationship with other agencies/organizations (Helmand).

Due to security problems, we do not share information of ACAP activities with the staff of other organizations, many of these individuals are not trustworthy and we don't want to take such a risk.

Herat/Kunduz:

UNDSS – sends ACAP the incident report, which is then followed up by an ACAP field assistant.

Sometimes, German PRT and also ICRC, informally (Kunduz).

As of late, there is some sharing of activity information with the DFPO and FPO/PRT but otherwise the information sharing primary relates to beneficiary identification and verification issues. With the activity manager designation, it is now easier to get more frequent meetings (once per week); where previously the average was closer to three weeks (Herat).

Depends on individual relationships.

Sharing information with other agencies or organizations is not required. In order to share, we would need to have coordination meetings with other NGOs and organizations (Herat).

UNAMA has less information.

Meet weekly with USAID and share reports; other meetings if emergency arises (Kunduz).

It is important to have more than one or two sources to verify an incident (Kunduz).

QUESTION 10. GIROA WORKING RELATIONSHIPS

Do you work with the Afghan government - GIROA (summary): Yes - 34; No – 4; No Response - 3

To what extent do you Share Information about your Activities with the Afghan Government (summary): Most of the Time - 12; Some of the Time - 9; Seldom/Never – 19; No Response - 1

Kabul:

Some informal personal contacts with the Afghan Provincial Governor, ANP, and ANA, and, on an informal basis, with the Ministry of Interior.

Reports of activities are mostly to the IOM/ACAP headquarters and sometimes USAID locally.

There should be more briefings and sharing of information for GIROA at both the central and local level.

There is a need for improved working relationships with the district government offices and the local Shura.

There is a need for more one-on-ones.

Wardak/Paktya/Khost:

ACAP only works with GIROA in incident identification and beneficiary verification.

ACAP staff reports that there is no need for further working relationships or sharing of information with GIROA.

Nangarhar/Laghman:

GIROA officials (Laghman/Mehterlam and Nangarhar/Barikot) had little to no knowledge about ACAP activities. Only in Nangarhar/Sorkhrud, where they were consulted, mostly about case verification, did the officials have more knowledge.

Overall GIROA working relationships were weak; most indicated an interest in closer coordination and would like to be involved more in project activities.

Working more closely with GIROA would help support the stabilization efforts of the government.

Kandahar/Helmand:

Mostly Afghan staff talk with ANPs for investigations, MRRD in the case of helping beneficiaries, and MoPH for investigating health records to prevent dealing with „fake beneficiaries”.

The local Police Chief of the villages has been helpful with access, security and identification of beneficiaries as well as some district Governors.

ACAP staff should be officially introduced by the PRT or Governor which would help ensure more cooperation of Governmental Officials; currently, the staff is not introduced officially so sometimes they give time to ACAP staff sometimes they do not.

There isn't a lot of coordination with Governmental Officials but when there is an incident, we share information with them about our activities and request required information.

ACAP shares information with the Governmental Authorities when we are monitoring a case or cross checking information about an incident and/or beneficiary.

A local qualified person should be hired to contact and keep a proper working relation with GIROA and local elders; this is necessary to get their full support with security arrangements and to assist with beneficiary assistance approval and delivery (Helmand).

Some challenges include weaknesses in the monitoring system and some illegal demands of some powerful local entities that operate in the area..

Herat/Kunduz:

Use for verification: FPO can provide the introduction to district Governor, deputy Governor, and ANP; use CDC and Shura leaders locally

Government officials at the district level should be briefed about ACAP and its activities.

In the insecure areas, ACAP should work more closely with the government officials; should brief the government about assistance delivered to beneficiaries in their areas; and should have a liaison officer to share and exchange information with the government.

ACAP tries to meet with provincial/district governors and district elders, where possible. Relationship is good – mostly in touch with district governor and community leaders more so than provincial governors (Herat).

Face-to-face communication is the most effective.

ACAP staff tries to brief the GIROA about ACAP goals and objectives and number of households assisted (Kunduz).

QUESTION 11. DONOR FINANCIAL SUPPORT

Kabul:

Beneficiary likes ACAP – it is not linked to the International Military but more to the international community although when a local is seen with an international, it is a risk for the local.

Believe staff usually tells beneficiary that support is “from the American people”, need to encourage staff to do this, with guidance on when and where not to.

More information needs to be shared here – it will vary case by case but would be good to indicate that the assistance is provided by „the American People’ vs. „the American Government’.

Insurgents inquire as to who is providing the assistance; ACAP is the typical answer.

Wardak/Paktya/Khost:

ACAP staff report that the beneficiaries know who is funding ACAP and there is no need for further recognition.

Nangarhar/Laghman:

Except AIHRC and UNAMA, local stakeholders did not know about the donor of ACAP. The general feeling was that ACAP staff has to work more closely with the stakeholders and share information in order for improved stakeholder and beneficiary recognition of the donor to occur.

Kandahar/Helmand:

Mostly, beneficiaries think the assistance comes from the International Military Forces; for the most part, they don't know it comes from the US.

Those who think US, think US government as opposed to USAID or the „American People’.

It would be better if the beneficiaries were briefed that the assistance comes from the „American People’.

Many locals see the International Military Forces as occupiers.

In secure areas, beneficiaries understand that assistance is coming from USAID but in insecure areas it is said to them by ACAP staff that this assistance is coming from IOM.

Tribal elders can contribute to donor recognition because they are among the people who are trusted locally.

As per my understanding, in delivery of the assistance, the beneficiary is told that the assistance is from ACAP.

Herat/Kunduz:

Should be low profile and confidential for safety of field staff. GTZ was promoting themselves and was targeted (Kunduz).

Safety/security determines whether ACAP can tell beneficiaries that assistance is from USAID.

Locals do not understand the difference between USAID and the US Military and the US Government – important to use the term „American people’.

Some don’t know but many believe it is USAID or the American people (Kunduz).

QUESTION 12. SMALL BUSINESS OPPORTUNITY ASSISTANCE

Does ACAP provide Small Business Opportunities in your Region (summary): Yes –40; No – 0; Don’t Know - 1

What is the Effect of the Small Business Opportunity on the Beneficiary (summary): Excellent – 25; Moderate – 10; Little – 1; No Response - 5

Kabul:

I have heard that the small business opportunity assistance has been well received where it is provided although it is not included among our kits right now and I have no experience with it.

Small business assistance is a route to sustainability in the project.

Livestock has been well-received as a small business opportunity.

Wardak/Paktya/Khost:

Small business assistance has been successful with an excellent effect on the beneficiary and a positive change in income earned.

Nangarhar/Laghman:

Beneficiaries, who request for „cars’ for their small business, are satisfied.

The small business opportunity is allowing beneficiaries to have a working opportunity (especially poor beneficiaries) and to earn some income and continue with their life.

Kandahar/Helmand:

Some beneficiaries don’t know their options relative to the small business assistance or are insecure about it.

ACAP provides Small Business Opportunities to the beneficiaries in Kandahar Province and the effect is moderate to excellent. I would recommend that the quantity of such opportunities be increased then there would be an even greater impact on the lives of the beneficiaries.

Herat/Kunduz:

Livestock is effective, as is targeted business support ideas of the family such as mobile phone repair business or where already in business.

Grocery kit ineffective, not right stock, quality is not culturally appropriate for Afghanistan; do not think anyone could open a store with this.

In general, small business assistance is well-received; if cash is received, beneficiary can start or upgrade a business, which will help lead beneficiary to a normal life. Beneficiaries provided with small business opportunity have an income source for their families now and the effect is positive.

QUESTION 13.MAIN ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF ACAP

Kabul:

The outreach activities have been the most successful; it is important to be able to vary the assistance based on needs.

The use of the small business opportunity assistance has been a successful strategy.

Negative – They want to know why you are helping one person and not another – do not understand the parameters of the program.

ACAP has transformed people's lives; a substantial number of people have been reached with a unique program, especially those benefitting from the small business opportunities.

Unexpected: makes Congress feel good.

Would recommend that in the future that a more local or national (Afghan) organization run ACAP; a more open and professionally run organization that is able to work more closely with the Afghan organizational structures would be helpful.

Wardak/Paktya/Khost:

The main accomplishment has been the small business assistance.

Some families cried they were so happy while other families rejected the assistance – they said first you kill our children and families and then the American sends assistance.

Nangarhar/Laghman:

A school project in Kunar province was an unexpected accomplishment.

In some areas there has been a decrease in negative feelings/bad ideas of beneficiaries against the international coalition forces.

Many beneficiaries were not expecting any assistance so the assistance came as a „happy’ surprise.

Kandahar/Helmand:

The small business kits, which are usually delivered through the local Shura, are a major accomplishment as both the Shura and the local beneficiary benefit from the transparency of the assistance.

A main accomplishment of ACAP is the provision of Small Business Opportunities; i.e., in Spin Boldak, four years back, a suicide attack occurred, which resulted in the demolition of many shops. ACAP extended Small Business Opportunity assistance, which had a positive impact on the lives of the beneficiaries.

A positive unexpected result was when we distributed kits to the beneficiaries, one beneficiary threw away the bags and put the materials from the Kits into local sacks to ensure he wouldn't be recognized by the Taliban while transporting the materials to his village.

A negative result was when one of the beneficiaries received the Kits, he immediately sold them all at a low price in the market.

A main accomplishment of ACAP is the ability to affect the perception of people about International Community in Afghanistan.

Use of briefings was a successful method utilized in the „Arghandab’ case.

When the assistance goes well, beneficiaries feel that they are responded to, an effort has been made, and they are affected positively.

Education support kits have been favorably received and are having a positive effect.

Herat/Kunduz:

Conduct of literacy/vocational training, tailoring for women, carpet weaving for women, and other small business opportunities are good, and delivering all of the assistance in one installment would be good.

Recommend verifying the incidents and receiving confirmation letters from the heads of local councils prior to delivering assistance.

Illustration provided of where children are now reading from the books in the education kit and another of where a female who lost her husband is now earning some income from a small business opportunity (Herat).

Education kits for children, employment opportunities for the unemployed, and vocational trainings are the main accomplishments (Kunduz).

QUESTION 14. IMPACT ON BENEFICIARY LIVES

To what extent have the Lives of Beneficiaries been Impacted (summary): High Extent – 20; Moderate – 19; Low -2

Kabul:

There is a greater impact in the secure areas – able to show more international presence and helps morale.

Kunduz tanker incident; beneficiary claim so much anger and bitterness, probably 600 would have joined Taliban, but not heard of anyone doing so because of help.

Impact varies by incident, family, and assistance provided. When no one else helps, it has an impact on beneficiaries; especially, in desperate situations, after a dire incident, when left with big problems.

Maybe it would be better to pump „cash’ into the effected communities thru a „cash’ for work project or by supporting a CDC identified project or a CERP supported project.

ACAP is more „top-down’ than „bottom-up’.

ACAP should provide more of a focus toward stabilizing families; particularly, „genuine’ families.

Wardak/Paktya/Khost:

There was a more positive impact on the poor families.

Nangarhar/Laghman:

For the most part, the impact on the beneficiary has been positive; some beneficiaries have been facilitated in continuing with their lives because of a working opportunity and source of income, others feel that because someone cares that they have been helped in their recovery efforts, and some say that the assistance has met their needs.

Kandahar/Helmand:

Cash has had the most impact on the beneficiary; the beneficiary is happy and can start a business and/or take care of specific needs.

Impact depends on the socio-economic status of the beneficiary and the incident – death vs. injury vs. property damage. Property damage is easier to recover from than personal injury/death.

The impact of ACAP assistance on the lives of people is high because ACAP helps beneficiaries by providing Kits and Small Business Opportunities at a time when they need it most.

Herat/Kunduz:

Beneficiaries are mainly happy.

More impact when household can set up a shop or business.

Assistance is more sustainable when training and empowerment of women are included.

Increase and extend the duration of the literacy/vocational trainings would increase impact.

When the beneficiary is happy, it helps them come back and start re-building.

Beneficiaries are complaining about the kits – they would like cash and/or vocational trainings (Kunduz).

QUESTION 15. STABILIZATION

To what extent does ACAP support Afghan Government Stabilization efforts (summary):

Most of the Time – 9; Some of the Time – 24; Little/Never –6; Don't Know - 2

- 1. Improves the Local Perception and Visibility of the International Community (summary): High –9; Moderate – 23; Low – 8; Don't Know -1**
- 2. Works Closely with the International Military Coalition and Other Support Agencies to Provide needed Assistance (summary): High – 11; Moderate – 17; Low – 12; Don't Know - 1**
- 3. Includes Local Government Officials in the Program Efforts (summary): High – 9; Moderate - 12; Low – 20**
- 4. Places Special Emphasis on Putting 'Afghans First' in the Management and Delivery of the Program (summary): High – 9; Moderate – 12; Low – 20**
- 5. Able to Provide Direct Assistance to Families/Communities Suffering Losses due to International Military Operations (summary); High – 35; Moderate – 6; Low - 0**

Kabul:

The ACAP assistance helps stabilization in the secure areas – has a minimal effect in the high security areas. It would be good to be able to increase overall presence and to provide assistance to more districts and areas.

Lesson Learned – Once you do a family assessment, the beneficiary takes it as promise and it is not good to not be able to provide assistance.

Argue assistance adds up – number of families assisted leads to stability, evidence is happy beneficiaries.

There is minimal impact when there are little civilian losses and the beneficiary sells their assistance.

It is crucial to support the stabilization effort, however and to whatever extent possible.

Support of the community is critical for improved stabilization, which means the support of the local district and local Shura.

A „big' incident usually leads to a community project; such as, a turbine for electricity or water supply system; such a project has a higher chance of effecting stabilization.

It is important to have USAID field visits and contact with USAID.

Wardak/Paktya/Khost:

Staff reported working closely with international military but less with GIROA.

Nangarhar/Laghman:

More ACAP involvement of GIROA, participation in the PDC and DDA meetings, and with the CDCs, including involvement in the distribution process, would help public trust and assist in the stabilization effort.

Kandahar/Helmand:

Spend – spend sometimes fuels corruption, which is negative for stability when it does.

For improved stabilization, it is very important to bring the local stakeholders into the decision-making process/meetings; Arghandab is an example of a success where IOM/ACAP worked closely with the PRT to contribute to local civilian rebuilding and improved local perception.

Visible cooperation with the local Shura and Afghan government along with trained Afghan staff, and quicker implementation is important for improved stabilization. ACAP tells the people that foreigners are not here to harm Afghans but they are here to help Afghans and bring them security; i.e., in Zhare and Shah Wali Kot Districts, there is an increase in the trust of the people in the Government, resulting in improved cooperation with the Government.

Herat/Kunduz:

The question is raised on whether ACAP is an “emergency” program or a program with some development.

ACAP has had some success in making beneficiaries less angry; beneficiaries are taken seriously and are met individually.

There is the question of how the ACAP assistance helps the community and whether it should have a community focus, which would help stabilization.

Need to lift hold since Oct 17, keep program as is rather than standardize – but also be faster.

ACAP assistance has helped reduce the rage of the locals for seeking revenge for the incident and has positively been able to change the perception of some of the beneficiaries.

Overall, ACAP has had some impact on stabilization, especially, where livelihood opportunities and vocational trainings have been provided (Kunduz).

Appendix 10

APPENDIX 10: LESSONS LEARNED FROM BENEFICIARY FOLLOW-UP NANGARHAR/LAGHMAN/KUNAR

1. Tesha village, a middle school in Kunar Province was destroyed on 11 April 2006 by insurgents, because it was located very close to IMF. In this incident 8 students were killed and two teachers and 34 students were injured. ACAP project provided kits, learning classes and small businesses for the victims and also reconstructed the school with construction of a boundary wall, which was not present before the incident. ACAP provided the school with desks for student and furniture for teaching staff. Teaching quality has improved and teachers and students are encouraged and interested in a good teaching and learning environment. Presently, there are more than 440 students attending, with 150 first time girls and an increase in the number of males.

Lesson Learned. Community and ACAP worked together to create an improved teaching and learning environment and a more positive community perception.

2. On 14 May 2009, in Dehsarak, Achin District of Nangarhar Province, a group of insurgents raided a civilian house close to an IMF. Two civilians were killed and one injured. The injured became disabled and not able to continue his education or employment. Faced with poverty, the beneficiary wasn't able to support his family. ACAP assisted with a grocery shop as a small business and the beneficiary was able to earn a livelihood to support his family.
3. On 7 July 2010, in Base Ekmahthi, Behsud District of Nangarhar Province, insurgents fired three mortars towards an IMF base, two mortars struck a private residence and one male (my brother – a medical doctor) was killed and two injured, including a woman. Shortly, after the incident, a flood come over our house and destroyed our home and all belongings. ACAP assisted and gave us a home kit and provided us with a grocery shop, which has helped with our financial problems.

Lesson Learned. ACAP assisted the beneficiary in setting up a livelihood.

4. In Bati kot District of Nangarhar Province the district governor, Mayor, administrative officer, chief of police and his deputy were interviewed by the evaluation team (February 2011). The team found that there were some incidents in their location. The officials were aware that ACAP assistance was provided (kits and small business) to some of the victims in their district, but they didn't know who provided the assistance. The district governor said that he got his information from one of the beneficiaries. The Deputy Chief of Police said, „you are the first group I have met in the last two years' and „I haven't seen or met anybody from IOM or ACAP to consult with us regarding these activities”.

Lesson Learned. ACAP must communicate/share information with district officials.

WARDAK/PAKTYA/KHOST

1. In Ismail Khail district/Khost Province (December 2008) there was a car bomb explosion at the district governor's office gate during a stationary distribution ceremony for school children. The Sarban high school was located next door.

Nine students were killed and 29 students were injured. In total 11 people were killed, 61 injured and 52 families were affected. ACAP was able to provide small business (\$3000 equivalent) for each family, home kits, education kits, tailoring kits, livestock kits, and agriculture kits. The government also provided 50,000 Afs (\$1000) for each injured and 100,000 Afs (\$2000) for each deceased. The families were not expecting any assistance and were greatly appreciative of the assistance. Some cried they were so happy to receive the assistance.

Lesson Learned. Rural beneficiaries appreciate assistance, especially small business and cash assistance, with kits as a supplemental item. This allowed the beneficiary to meet family needs arising from the incident and recover.

2. During the Checchi M & E interviews, 2 October 2011, with the acting district governor and police commander of Jal Rez district/Wardak Province, they stated they were unaware of any ACAP assistance in their district. The officials requested that ACAP brief them on their activities, keep them informed, and that they be present at the time of distribution. In checking the ACAP data base, it was found that there was an air strike in Jal Rez in October of 2007 in which 13 persons were killed and another air strike in September 2009 in which 3 persons were killed. There has been no ACAP verification and follow-on activity for the 2009 air strike. This is symbolic of the Central Region, where there have been 162 incidents, most since 2008, and only 67 have been followed up on.
3. My home is Wardak. An American forces operation targeted my home with bombs (Meena Village/Maidan Shar) and then broke my doors and windows/ house with a tank. After a long time, about one year, through the village elder, I found out about ACAP and eventually received assistance. I had to go to Kabul, where I realized the items were bought at a high price, and I had to sell half of my wheat to transport the items back to my village. I am not happy.

Lesson Learned. ACAP has been slow in communicating with community elders, and district and police officials creating real challenges in verification of beneficiaries and eventual distributions and a need for more transparency.

HERAT/KUNDUZ

1. After an IMF operation against insurgents in *Gerdbid* village, *Guzrah* district (Herat), the head of the village went to the ACAP/IOM office in *Herat* and requested assistance for the families of victims. ACAP staff, apparently without visiting the village, verified that there was an operation and losses, not whether the list was accurate or complete. ACAP then provided assistance to families on the list. However the head of the village had provided a list packed with his relatives, some of whom had not suffered losses, and not included many villagers with losses, including even a death. The community is upset about the unjust delivery of benefits by ACAP.

Lesson Learned: ACAP cannot exclusively rely on stakeholders.

2. After a bombardment by US airplanes of *Qirghiz* village/Kunduz Province (November 2001), many residents of the village received personal and property damages. The case is an old case where a lot of ineligible people were included on

the beneficiary list as the result of some corrupt persons on the CDC. After considerable follow up (December 2010) and direct consultation with villagers, more CDC members and the district governor a new list has been compiled.

Lesson Learned: In spite of security issues, ACAP needs to make every effort to follow up directly with the beneficiaries in the field and triangulate the verification information.

3. In September of 2009, a NATO airstrike targeted two hijacked fuel tankers in Omer Khil village, Ali Abad district/Kunduz Province. There was confusion about the number of civilians injured and killed vs. insurgents. The civilian losses occurred while the civilians were receiving and/or taking fuel from the tankers and bad perceptions resulted in the village and district. The community assisted in the identification of the eligible beneficiaries. ACAP was able to provide assistance to 75 beneficiaries with another 10 beneficiaries still under consideration. The assistance included small business, such as livestock kits, and some private classes and tutoring. The beneficiaries are satisfied and the resulting perceptions are good. No complaints have been received – only success stories.

Lesson Learned: ACAP followed up directly in the field and worked with the local elders and villagers in determining eligible beneficiaries. Assistance was tailored to beneficiary needs, resulting in a positive perception of the assistance.

KANDAHAR/HELMAND

1. After an IMF operation against insurgents in Char Bagh village in Arghandab/Kandahar Province in December 2009, many civilians were bombarded while farming and irrigating their lands. Several civilians were injured and perception was not good. The incident shook the entire district. ACAP assisted all affected with small business livestock (cows), education kits, tailoring kits, agricultural kit, and home kit. This rural village was very satisfied and happy; lives and perceptions were changed and the beneficiaries are now making a living.
2. IMF conducted an operation in Chinarto area of Shah Wali Kot district/Kandahar Province in November of 2008, and civilians attending a wedding were killed and injured – including women and children. The accident shocked the entire district. ACAP assistance was provided and included small business opportunity (taxi's) and kits. The beneficiaries were happy and changed their perception as the small business assistance is helping to earn some small incomes.

Lesson Learned: ACAP assistance was appropriate to the beneficiary needs and perceptions and lives were changed. (NOTE: Security issues continue to be the major concern in following up with beneficiaries.)

3. I lost 18 members of my family (Loi-Bagh Vilalge/Naad Ali district) due to an air strike – only 7 survived. I lost a home worth 1,370,000 Afs (about \$27,000). I was provided with a shop worth about \$3000. People who have lost family members and more extensive property should receive greater compensation. I am not happy.

Lesson Learned. ACAP assisted the beneficiary in setting up a livelihood but assistance was less than expected.

Appendix 11

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Appendix 12

APPENDIX 12: ACAP Comments on Draft Evaluation Report 9 March 2011

1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1 Purpose, Goal and Objectives

The Final Evaluation of the Afghan Civilian Assistance Program (ACAP), implemented by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), examines the successes and weaknesses of the program so future stabilization efforts can benefit. The focus is on 2010 impact. ACAP is ending in 2011 and a follow on is planned. The study is being conducted because of the continued importance of supporting Afghan civilians suffering losses as a result of the conflict and the political importance of ACAP. As the United States Government (USG) continues to support stabilization initiatives, leverage resources and strengthen civilian-military collaboration, it is crucial to study the results from previous efforts. The evaluation assesses the effectiveness and impact of ACAP, its design and value as a stabilization program, and provides guidance for ACAP II.

The Goal and Objectives of ACAP

Goal: Strengthen the USG's efforts to provide assistance for Afghan families and communities that have suffered losses as a result of military operations against insurgents, thereby contributing to overall stabilization efforts in Afghanistan and pre-emptively addressing potential causes of renewed disorderly migration.

Objectives:

7. Ensure that Afghan civilians suffering losses as a result of the being caught between fighting among International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) and the insurgents receive timely and appropriate assistance to restore and continue their lives.
8. Establish and maintain a liaison network among key stakeholders on the international, national and provincial level.
9. Gather and disseminate information related to the ACAP program among stakeholders at the international, national and provincial level.

1.2 Methodology

Two international consultants carried out the Final Evaluation over a period of eight weeks. The team greatly appreciates the cooperation, openness, and engagement of ACAP management and staff - without which the evaluation would be impossible. The evaluation used four Checchi SUPPORT third-party monitoring and evaluation (M&E) teams and a survey team (Social Development and Legal Rights - SDLR) to gather data from across 10 provinces (Herat, Kunduz, Nangarhar, Laghman, Kabul, Wardak, Paktya, Khost, Kandahar, and Helmand) and address 27 distinct questions from the scope of work (SOW). Five methods were used: 1) review and analysis of ACAP and other reports plus interviews with IOM, ACAP, and other stakeholders in Kabul by the core team (16 interviews); 2) structured interviews with ACAP regional staff and stakeholders by the M&E team (90 interviews); 3) e-mail survey of USAID/Activity Managers (23), 4) a survey of 162 beneficiaries, 59 non-beneficiaries, and 26 local stakeholders through SDLR (247 total interviews) selected independently using ACAP's data bases; and 4) analysis of the M&E and SDLR data, interviews, and reports to draft, present and finalize the Evaluation Report.

1.3 Findings

Access and Verification of Beneficiaries. ACAP has been able to identify incidents but identification and verification of beneficiaries is difficult, time-consuming, and incomplete. ACAP cannot rely exclusively on stakeholders or community representatives for identification. The beneficiary data indicated that sometimes relatives of the community elder or Shura head with little or no damage were referred for assistance while eligible beneficiaries were neglected. In those cases, the community was upset about the unjust delivery of benefits by ACAP. It is important that ACAP visit directly (face-to-face) with potential beneficiaries in their communities to mitigate this problem. If security prevents this, then community-level assistance should be provided rather than individual-level assistance. While in general, beneficiaries report satisfaction with the assistance, especially types with larger economic impact, they have many qualifications where they note problems and suggest improvements. ACAP has logged but not started to address a tremendous number of incidents and potential beneficiaries across Afghanistan over the last three years as the number of civilian victims of the conflict has grown substantially.

Appropriateness and Timeliness. Items are useful and usable but could be of better quality and there is a need for more tailored assistance; i.e., items should more closely meet the needs of the family. Assistance with longer-term impact on household finances was preferred by beneficiaries, stakeholders, and staff. Staff emphasized that training was well-received. The kits varied in usefulness. Sometimes improper beneficiaries receive the assistance due to problems with ACAP processes and/or corruption. Timeliness varies but in the past few months, the process has focused on time to first assistance and improved delivery through additional staff. Beneficiaries believe the program should deliver more, faster, and with higher quality.

Satisfaction and Impact. Beneficiaries appreciate knowing that the International Community had noted their problems and responded to their losses or needs. Beneficiaries receiving small business opportunities were thankful for the chance to start a business and their life has improved. The rural poor were more satisfied as the kits were a luxury for them. There was unhappiness with the grocery kits. Staff believed there was greater program impact in more secure areas as there is more transparency and presence of the international community. Beneficiaries noted impact varies by incident, household, and assistance provided. There was more impact when a household could set up a shop or business. ACAP respondents indicated that cash has had the most impact as the beneficiary can then address their specific needs themselves.

Engagement with Other Agencies/Organizations and Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA). ACAP needs to do more briefings and be more actively engaged in sharing information with related agencies/organizations. Sharing of program activities has been mostly with United Nations (UN) organizations. Some United States Agency for International Development (USAID)/Activity Managers meet regularly with their ACAP representative; a few weekly and some monthly. Others indicate that they have been unable to meet with the representative and/or that it would be helpful to have more contact. Many government stakeholders were not aware of ACAP; others had minimal information and only information related to the verification process. A few had a little more awareness acquired from beneficiaries. The Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs, and Disabled (MoLSAMD) has an understanding but no working relationship.

Achievements, Problems and Unmet Needs. Main achievements referenced by the ACAP staff were the small business opportunity assistance; ability to affect the perception of people about the „International Community’ when assistance goes well; education kits have been favorably received and are having a positive effect; training has been well-received; use of briefings have been successful, where used; and tailoring and carpet weaving for women have been favorably received. Beneficiaries viewed assistance as kind of an unexpected „gift;’ with no or little expectations of support, they are thus pleasantly surprised to be assisted by ACAP.

Staff mentioned two groups of problems: 1) those related to the field – security/logistics/accessibility, procurement/poor quality of items, and the old cases backlog; and 2) those related to the organization - overwhelming documentation, complicated and convoluted process, insufficient staff training, and decision-making is more upper-management/top-down (international) rather than decentralized /broad-based (Afghan). Staff felt beneficiaries need more – including a need for medical assistance, drinking water, food and shelter, more training/tutoring as the assistance will no longer be empowering, especially for woman, and more livelihood assistance. The project needs stronger links to stakeholders, especially with GIRoA, community leaders, and local NGOs, more training of staff prior to deployment to the field, improved quality, and to determine how to handle the extensive backlog of old cases – both unaddressed incidents and beneficiaries that have not been reached after attempting to for more than six months.

Branding, Dissemination and Stabilization. Views of stakeholders vary as to who is the donor of ACAP. Some think it is the International Military Forces (IMF), some the American government or US government, some IOM or ACAP, some the „International Community’, some USAID, and some the „American People’. Almost no beneficiaries surveyed knew their support was from the USG or USAID. In high security areas, ACAP staff usually use IOM in program implementation. Stakeholders feel it is better to be open and indicate that assistance is from the „American people’ or the „International Community’. More transparency and more information sharing/dissemination of ACAP program activity with beneficiaries and stakeholders, USAID/Activity Managers, GIRoA and Non-Government Agencies (NGOs), and more involvement of local Shuras and community elders will help program effectiveness and stabilization. ACAP has not supported country ownership and putting Afghans first and, because of security issues, staff have only minimally traveled throughout the high insecurity districts, where most incidents have happened.

1.4 Conclusions

ACAP Goal. ACAP has partially strengthened USG efforts to provide assistance for Afghan families and communities that have suffered losses as a result of military operations against insurgents. Addressing these losses with increasing casualties is extremely difficult. IOM has not been able to develop systems, processes, and personnel able to adequately address the overwhelming access, security, and logistical challenges of working with Afghan stakeholders and civilian losses across the country. ACAP is only peripherally connected to other efforts by IMF to address civilian costs of conflict, and there is little in the design, implementation, or impact that supports stabilization.

Objective 1. Timeliness continues to be an issue. It has improved in some provinces this past year but the process is still lacking in overall efficiency and effectiveness. Appropriateness of assistance was better before when it was more tailored to beneficiary

needs and is less now as the kits have been standardized to improve timeliness and partly address the backlog of cases. Quality of items is still an issue. ACAP has focused on this objective and the objective has been partially accomplished.

Objective 2. ACAP has not established and maintained a liaison network among key stakeholders. Working relationships, information sharing and utilization of USAID, GIRoA and other agency/organizational resources has been minimal to non-existent and limited to incident and beneficiary identification.

Objective 3. The achievement of this objective was not accomplishment. Branding has been an issue and the majority of the beneficiaries and stakeholders are unaware that ACAP is a USG program. A few briefings were held this past six months with the Military and USAID/DOS and some working relationships are developing with a few USAID/Activity Managers. Little information is shared with stakeholders; GIRoA officials express interest in more information and greater involvement in the program, especially in the delivery of assistance.

1.5 Recommendations

Overall. Beneficiary assistance should be approved only after a face-to-face meeting with the beneficiary and consultation with GIRoA and the USAID/Activity Manager.

For USAID and IOM on ACAP.

Option A - No Cost Extension. Provide a no cost extension to the ACAP program through 30 September, 2011 for IOM to implement the key short-term recommendations from the USAID/Afghanistan ACAP Operational System and Procedures Review and deliver limited assistance to the largest number of victims of conflict through a focus on the more manageable and accessible beneficiaries. ACAP must produce a detailed work plan explaining which potential beneficiaries can be reached using existing resources.

Option B - Modest Cost Extension. Recommend a modest cost extension to the ACAP program through 30 September, 2011. ACAP must implement the key short-term recommendations from the Operational System and Procedures Review, produce a detailed work plan that justifies IOM's costs for delivering assistance to a larger number of beneficiaries, and accurately log the continuing stream of victims if an ACAP II is planned.

2.0 INTRODUCTION

2.1 Problems of civilian victims of conflict

Afghan civilian families and communities have suffered substantial losses as a result of international military operations against the insurgents. These recent losses come on top of the tremendous costs of 30 years of conflict from 1978 to 2001. Fighting has increased in recent years, resulting in increased operations by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) against the insurgents and a higher number of civilian families and communities suffering losses. Civilian casualties and losses are of a great concern to Afghans and the Afghan government, and the USG has been committed to providing short-term, tailored, non-monetary assistance to affected individuals and families.

2.2 Context for ACAP

The Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) places „war victims’ as one of two priority groups to receive improved social services and social services delivery. Such services are vital to reducing Afghanistan’s poverty, increasing the livelihoods of Afghans, and improving social protection. USAID stabilization programs are designed to contribute to social stabilization and social cohesion and strive to work in partnership with provincial and district officials to expand and help fill gaps in services the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) delivers.

2.3 Recent history and evolution of the program

IOM initially implemented the „Leahy Initiative’ (assistance to war-affected communities in the southeast) as part of the Afghan Transition Initiative under the Office of Transition Initiatives between 2003-2005 at cost of \$2.3 million. . In April of 2007, USAID/Afghanistan signed a Cooperative Agreement for a larger ACAP program which has grown substantially through repeated cost extensions, particularly in late 2009 and 2010. The current ceiling is \$63.5 million funded through annual congressional earmarks. The program is scheduled to end on 31 March, 2011; however a proposal is being considered to extend the program through 30 September, 2011. The program grew from 376 total grants at the end of 2009 to 875 according to the Operational System and Procedures Review report (although challenges with program implementation suggest numbers presented by ACAP should be considered rough and indicative rather than definitive). The „Matrix’ used to track the program suggests the tremendous and growing number of potential beneficiaries, with almost as many incidents apparently uninvestigated and unverified as ones with nominations or grants (although this ratio varies by ACAP office).

3.0 EVALUATION: PURPOSE, TEAM AND METHODOLOGY

The evaluation focused on the program’s 2010 work and used four teams to gather data and address the 27 distinct questions in the SOW: the core international team of Gerald Boardman and Lawrence Robertson plus three Afghan staff; the Checchi SUPPORT M&E staff supplemented by 4 additional national evaluators; and the Social Development and Legal Rights (SDLR) survey team. Five methods were used: 1) review and analysis of ACAP and other reports plus interviews with IOM, ACAP, and other stakeholders in Kabul by the core team; 2) structured interviews with ACAP regional staff and stakeholders by the M&E team; 3) e-mail survey of USAID Activity Managers; 4) survey of beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, and local stakeholders through SDLR; and 5) analysis of the M&E and SDLR data and reports by the core team in order to draft, present, and finalize the Evaluation Report. The team greatly appreciates the cooperation, openness, and engagement of ACAP management and staff and would not have been able to do this evaluation without them.

First, the core team identified, read, and analyzed IOM and related USAID reports and documents, plus relevant reports from external stakeholders. The core team conducted semi-structured interviews with IOM central staff and informed international stakeholders of in Kabul in person and interviewed a sample of USAID Activity Managers across Afghanistan by phone and e-mail.

Second, the team developed, tested, and revised data collection instruments (DCIs) and trained the M&E teams in their use, which the M&E teams used for structured interviews with ACAP Staff, Stakeholders, and Afghan USAID Activity Managers in cities and districts of ten provinces: Herat, Khost, Helmand, Kandahar, Kunduz, Wardak, Paktya, Laghman, Nangahar, and Kabul. The M&E teams debriefed the core team upon returning to Kabul (See Appendix 8 and Appendix 9 for people interviewed and a summary of the DCI data, respectively).

Third, the core team with the M&E teams developed, translated, tested, and revised survey questionnaires for ACAP beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, and local stakeholders. After translation into Dari and Pashtu, the instruments were back-translated to ensure that the questions were understood the same in both languages as in English. SDLR conducted the survey on an unbiased selection and oversample of ACAP project sites, beneficiaries, and local stakeholders chosen by the core team from eight provinces: Herat, Khost, Helmand, Kandahar, Kunduz, Wardak, Laghman, and Nangahar. The core team supervised SDLR's training of their supervisors and monitored the veracity and quality of interviews. The core team analyzed these data from the surveys to reach findings and conclusions, and make recommendations (See Appendices 5, 6 and 7 for the survey instruments, sites, and summary data).

4.0 OBJECTIVE 1 – APPROPRIATENESS AND TIMELINESS: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

4.1 What Afghan population groups harmed by international military forces against insurgent groups have been the most appropriate for targeting, i.e. children and younger youth, mothers and wives as household breadwinners, etc.?

Finding. Incidents and ACAP beneficiaries are concentrated in insecure areas. We concur with the consensus of staff that rural households have greater needs and less options for rebuilding and recovery and are thus better targets. Households in the city have more capacity; there are more support facilities like hospitals, and the household is more likely to receive assistance from the government. Program emphasis should remain on deaths. Although we have no direct evidence, staff believe that after a death, the deceased person's young adult male family members (brothers and cousins) are vulnerable to joining the insurgents for revenge or economic reasons. Some anecdotes support this view. Then, serious injuries should be given a preference. Death or serious injuries to breadwinners should be a priority; widows and children without a breadwinner need assistance to continue their lives. Lastly, it would be good to focus on women, but this has been overwhelmingly difficult to do given the conservative culture in affected areas and the tremendous, perhaps insurmountable challenges, of reaching them at any manageable effort or cost; in practice, often the brother, father or uncle will benefit from the assistance with the impact on women unknown.

Rural beneficiaries, the majority of those surveyed (103 of 162) were only modestly more satisfied with assistance than urban ones (66% compared to 56%). The survey was instructive about the difficulties in reaching individual Afghans, especially in areas with more conflict. It is extremely difficult to directly address some potential target groups, in particular women. Despite using three women surveyors, the evaluation was only able to interview 5 women – not enough to generalize from.

Conclusion. As implemented, there is little evidence that the impact of ACAP assistance varies much across types of beneficiaries. Determining the most appropriate beneficiary group for assistance is a challenge and depends on the goal and objectives of the program along with security and manageability. Is the focus emergency relief, rebuilding and recovery, stabilization, or sustainability? Clearly defined goals would point to better targets for beneficiaries. Now targets are determined by incidents, thus by insurgents and the IMF, and the program is unrealistically supposed to reach all qualifying households.

NOTE: ACAP explicitly states it is not a condolence program. The Afghan team opinion was that the program should be a condolence one – the program would not be about fault, but expressing sorry about the incident and losses (condolence being *tasalyat* in Dari, *ghamshiraki* in Pashtu). Both Tajik and Pashtu cultures have these concepts which are not about fault – but sympathy. A program could be similar to what is done in Afghan communities (although they noted there are huge differences across the country in practice) as third parties, those not involved in whatever caused the losses, would visit the family and express their condolences and might contribute money to the family. This might be done by Shura leaders or other well-off people in the community. The Arabic legal term used was *diyat* for the payment (to be 100 camels for a death in the Quran) which is reportedly also used in Afghan law, contrasted to *qusas* which was the consequences/sentence for a killing with intent (to be death by the Quran but maybe life in prison under Afghan law).

The Afghan team thinking was that the program could also do more – by bringing the Afghan government in with a third party implementer together to the village to call all the victims together in one place with their Shura and explain what happened to cause the losses, express sympathy, and clearly and openly provide condolence payments from this neutral party and the GIRoA (without implying fault), discuss how to avoid these incidents and losses in the future, and work to stabilize the community. This would also build on what the GIRoA is supposed to do now, to provide a contribution to families with losses to help them survive. They felt the UN organizations had a head start in popularity and recognition as a neutral party to work with them.

The other emphasis was that the program would have to be faster. Their analogy was to killings between Afghans, where they felt a killer would have about a week after the incident to apologize to the family of a victim to potentially avoid a „blood feud“. Here a program would not have to be that fast, but the closer to a week of the incident the better, so the program could express condolences and provide payment (*diyat*).

What the team found from talking to ACAP staff, and from pre-testing the survey, was that people viewed ACAP assistance as a „gift“. They didn't expect anything, but all of a sudden, long after their losses, the program gives them some things, an unexpected surprise to them, for which they are grateful – and then find problems with it. But as a „gift“ – you are still glad you received it, even if it could have been better.

4.2 Was the level of non-monetary assistance appropriate to the needs of the family?

Finding. The majority opinion of the ACAP staff was that the assistance was „Little to Somewhat Appropriate“ (26 respondents out of 41 with 1 Don't Know). Items are useable but could be of better quality and there is a need for more tailored assistance; i.e., items should more closely meet the needs of the family. Small business opportunity

assistance and training were well-received. The kits were somewhat appropriate with the grocery kit the weakest; some items were expired and others were not culturally appropriate. Items were often sold in the bazaar; electrical items were sometimes provided to beneficiaries from rural areas without electricity, and occasionally education kits provided to families with no children.

The more standardized kit, currently being distributed, would be more beneficial if it were more tailored to the need of the beneficiary. The kit is continuously criticized for poor quality. The prices of assistance should be inspected and there were multiple requests that the quantity of assistance be increased. More vocational training should be made available, especially for woman along with other employment opportunities. The tailoring, home and education kits seem to be more appropriate than the other kits.

Beneficiaries overwhelmingly viewed the assistance as „useful’ (83%, 134 of 162), but then amended this statement with a range of qualifications in their answers to the open-ended question, such as „to some extent’ or „not according to my losses’; 25% of those that found the assistance useful were „not satisfied’ with the assistance; 52% of those that found assistance useful found the help advanced their household or economic situation, noting that it „helped a lot,’ „improved my situation,’ or before „I had nothing’. Assessments of the usefulness of assistance varied only slightly based on the type of assistance; usefulness was between 81 and 87% for small business assistance, tailoring kits, home kits, education kits, agricultural kits, livestock, and livestock kits. Our sample only found 7 respondents that had received training or tutoring – not enough to generalize from. The 17% (27 of 162) that found the assistance „not useful’ criticized the poor quality of assistance, that it did not make up for their losses, or had not been received, at all or in full.

Conclusion. The type, quality and quantity of assistance need to be carefully reviewed in terms of the goal and objectives of the program. A comprehensive monitoring system with well-defined indicators needs to be in place to ensure proper procurement, quality, delivery and follow-up.

4.3 Do beneficiaries perceive that the assistance was delivered in a fair and transparent manner?

Finding. The consensus of the ACAP staff was that the assistance was fair and transparent. Thirty eight of 41 respondents, with 1 No Response, indicated a „Somewhat to Very Fair’ rating. ACAP takes pictures of beneficiaries and signs a contract with those given the small business opportunity assistance, is careful to document, and feels the delivery process is transparent. The transparency process is improving as ACAP is trying to recruit more trustworthy staff. Sometimes it happens that fake beneficiaries receive the assistance due to an unclear process and/or corruption and continues to be an issue, more transparency is needed in these cases. Transport of the kits also creates problems and beneficiaries sometimes sell the items or remove the boxes to ensure more safety.

Seventy eight percent of beneficiaries felt the assistance had been provided in a „transparent and fair manner.’ However they then often qualified this assessment, especially in terms of fairness, which they related to quality and quantity concerns. Transparency to beneficiaries meant that their benefits were procured locally with their participation or presence or delivered openly to the rest of the community. The survey

also turned up at least two villages where beneficiaries had been selected by elders/community leaders in biased ways that left many families with losses off grant lists while packing them with their relatives that may not have had losses at all (in Herat and Kunduz). 30 beneficiaries (19%) replied no to this question, due to not being involved in the process, concerns that the cost of the goods was excessive, problems with quality, or the assistance not covering their needs.

Conclusion. Transparency and fairness continues to be an issue and needs further improvement. Insecure areas present real challenges. In the more stable areas, local Shuras and GIRoA officials need to be present at the delivery point to help prevent fake beneficiaries and ensure the safe delivery of the assistance.

4.4 Do beneficiaries perceive that the assistance was delivered in a timely manner?

Finding. ACAP opinion on timeliness varied with about half the respondents (21 of 41) indicating that the assistance was being delivered „On Time’ (within two months) and the rest indicating a „Late to Very Late’ delivery. Timeliness is better now and an effort is being made to be more responsive on the timeliness item – before it was always late, even several years in some cases. Timeliness is a function of the incident and it can vary considerably. The two month timeframe is the period following the family assessment to the delivery of the first installment and is a reasonable goal.

Beneficiaries reported their first meeting with ACAP was, on average, 4.7 months after the incident, with the average time to first assistance 4.8 months after this meeting. This average however had substantial variation, with median time to first assistance 3.4 months (and two months the most common single answer). Of those assisted (14 had not yet received assistance), 32% received their first within 2 months of their first meeting, 14% in the third month, 14% in the fourth month, 11% in 5-6 months - so 71% received their first assistance within 6 months of the first meeting. Of the 129 that had received all assistance, 45% received everything within 4 months of the first meeting and only 22% had waits of longer than 6 months. When asked a different way that focused on household needs rather than the calendar, 57% (92 of 162) answered that the assistance was not „delivered to you on time to help meet your needs after the incident.’

Conclusion. Timeliness is an issue that needs to be worked on as only about half the time is it perceived that the assistance is being delivered in a timely fashion. Standardizing the kits was an attempt at reducing the time in delivery but appropriateness, quality and corruption have continued to be issues.

4.5 Do beneficiaries perceive that ACAP assistance has helped them to restore and continue their lives?

Finding. ACAP staff perceived that the beneficiaries were satisfied with the assistance provided and it has helped them in continuing their lives. Thirty nine of 41 staff indicated a positive, 14 „Somewhat’ and 25 „Very Satisfied’ opinion. There was beneficiary satisfaction in knowing that the international community was listening and cared. Beneficiaries receiving small business opportunities were especially thankful for the chance to start a small business and their life and economy has improved (See Appendix 9). Those beneficiaries who were injured and received kits were less satisfied (e.g.,

Kandahar, Helmand, Herat and Kunduz). The rural poor were more satisfied as the kits were a luxury for them. There was unhappiness with the grocery kits.

The survey also used a three-point scale for beneficiary satisfaction. Satisfaction with ACAP assistance was highly correlated with whether beneficiaries felt the assistance received from all sources was useful. Except for cash, for which 87% of beneficiaries that received it were satisfied (26 of 30), satisfaction again did not vary much based on the type of assistance received from IOM: 69% of small business assistance recipients were satisfied (29 of 42), followed by tailoring kits at 68% (90 of 133), home and grocery kits at 65% (89 of 137), education kits at 64% (67 of 105), agricultural kits at 54% (52 of 96), livestock at 53% (41 of 77), and finally livestock kits at 49% (28 of 57). Our sample only found 7 respondents that had received training or tutoring – not enough to generalize from. Most other cases were where beneficiaries reported they were ‘somewhat satisfied,’ only 4-7% of beneficiaries from any category of assistance reported they were ‘not satisfied.’ There is substantial variation in satisfaction between provinces, with no one in Kunduz, half the respondents in Helmand, and 46% of respondents in Nangahar reporting ‘somewhat’ or ‘not satisfied’ with the assistance provided through IOM.

Strikingly, beneficiary satisfaction differed depending on their explanation of the incident; 87% (46 of 53) beneficiaries that described the incident as civilians affected by an IED or an insurgent attack against IMF were satisfied, while only 45% (41 of 91) that had an attack by IMF against insurgents were. This difference is not related to whether there were or weren’t deaths, but is linked to far fewer beneficiaries in the wake of airstrikes getting cash that is high in satisfaction and many more of these recipients receiving the least satisfying types of assistance - livestock kits, livestock, and agricultural kits. This is not explained by more modest differences in satisfaction, where rural beneficiaries overall are more satisfied than urban ones (65% and 56% respectively).

Conclusion. Staff argued satisfaction and the opportunity to rebuild and recover are related both to household needs and any training or assistance, such as a business kit of funding for business, that potentially has a substantial economic impact on the household. Staff felt, and the beneficiary survey confirmed, that even if late, assistance is greatly appreciated. Assistance comes to victims that have no expectations of support; people thus view the support akin to a ‘gift’ that one cannot be too critical of.

4.6 What has been the impact of ACAP assistance on the lives of beneficiaries?

Finding. Twenty of 41 ACAP staff indicated that there was ‘High Impact’. There is a perceived greater impact in the secure areas as there is a tendency for more transparency and the international community can show more presence which helps morale although impact varies by incident, family, and assistance provided. There was more impact when a household could set up a shop or business. ACAP respondents indicated that cash has had the most impact as the beneficiary can take care of specific needs and/or start a business, whichever is more appropriate. Impact also depends on the socio-economic status of the beneficiary.

The 162 beneficiaries in the survey report many positive impacts from ACAP assistance on their households. These results come from their explanations in their own words for why the assistance was useful (an open-ended question). Beneficiaries overwhelmingly focused on how assistance helped their household’s economic situation, especially given

the difficult circumstances noted by many respondents. When evaluated to see whether they noted their situation was better than before the incident, almost two-thirds (63.8%) of respondents that found the assistance useful implied or explicitly noted that their economic position is somewhat or substantially better than prior to the incident.

Conclusion. Beneficiaries are mainly pleased to have received assistance, viewing whatever they get from ACAP as a gift – something of value in the wake of serious damages to the household that they had not expected to get. When beneficiaries are facilitated in continuing their lives because of training, a work opportunity and source of income, the impact is greater. Increased duration of the literacy/vocational training would increase impact. Property damage is easier to recover from than personal injury/death.

4.7 How effective was ACAP support for the establishment of small business opportunities?

Finding. Twenty five of 41 ACAP staff indicated „Excellent’ effect and another 10 indicated „Moderate’, which indicates strong ACAP support for the small business opportunity assistance. The small business opportunity is allowing beneficiaries to have a working opportunity (especially poor beneficiaries) and to earn income and continue with their life. It is a route to sustainability. The assistance appears to be effective. Livestock is effective, as is targeted business support ideas of the family, such as a mobile phone repair shop, ice cream shop, tailoring or a taxi/car business. The beneficiary survey showed that small business kits were considered no more useful and only slightly more satisfactory than other kits. However what appears to have made a substantial difference for beneficiaries was whether the entire package of assistance, including cash, was sufficient to get the family back to or above their financial situation prior to the incident. Beneficiaries that had higher praise for the assistance in „how the assistance was useful’ were more satisfied.

Conclusion. In general, the small business assistance is well-received. This assistance should be expanded, which would increase the opportunity for impact on the lives of the beneficiaries. Again, the type of assistance provided depends on the goal and objectives of ACAP and the intended result.

5.0 OBJECTIVE 2 – ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING A LIAISON NETWORK: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

5.1 To what extent did ACAP utilize the capabilities and resources of Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), and International Committee for Red Cross (ICRC)?

Finding. Thirty four of 41 ACAP staff responded with a „High’ response to the question on „Do you work with other agencies/organizations?’ while only 12 of the 41 indicated that they „Shared Information’ with the agency/organization. The majority, 28 of 36 stakeholders, who had some understanding of ACAP, indicated a „Weak to Moderate’ working relationship with ACAP.

AIHRC is stated to have a working relationship with ACAP in three provinces - Nangarhar, Kunduz and Kandahar and a minimal relationship in the other provinces but, in Nangarhar, the program manager has been in Jalalabad for one year and hasn't seen anyone from ACAP. A draft MOU was prepared initially clarifying roles and expectations of AIHRC and ACAP/IOM but has never been signed by IOM. AIHRC has eight regional offices and 5 provincial offices.

UNAMA has a close working relationship with ACAP/IOM at both the Central and Regional level. UNAMA shares basic information on incidents and beneficiaries with ACAP/IOM on a regular basis.

ICRCs main knowledge of ACAP has been from the Checchi Mid-Term Evaluation team and the current Impact Evaluation team. ICRC management has briefed their regional staff about ACAP. ICRC could be a resource for linking ACAP to other local support providers.

Conclusion. ACAP needs to do more briefings at the central level and needs to be more actively engaged in the field in sharing information with related agencies/organizations. Sharing of ACAP program activities has been mostly with the UN organizations.

5.2 To what extent did ACAP utilize the capabilities and resources of the Afghan Government, including the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs, and Disable (MoLSAMD)?

Finding. Thirty four of the 41 ACAP staff interviewed indicated that they worked with the Afghan government, while almost half (19 of 41) indicated that they seldom/never shared information about their activities with GIRoA.

Meanwhile, many Afghan government stakeholders at the provincial and district-level, where ACAP had beneficiaries, were not aware of ACAP; seven of 15 respondents in Nangarhar/Laghman, three of 10 respondents in Herat, two of nine in Kunduz, and eight of 14 respondents in Wardak/Paktya/Khost. Others had minimal information and only related to the verification process. A few had a little awareness acquired from beneficiaries. GIRoA stakeholders indicated a desire that ACAP share their beneficiary activity information with them, in particular, the households that have been assisted. Local Police Chiefs of the villages have been helpful with access, security and identification of beneficiaries as well as some District Governors. In Kandahar, a Provincial Council member had visited the ACAP office.

MoLSAMD has an understanding of the ACAP program from USAID but no working relationship even though MoLSAMD has provincial offices in all 34 provinces. The MoLSAMD/National Skills Development Program has a working relationship with IOM (non-ACAP program). ACAP has had some contact with Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development (MRRD) in Kandahar/Helmand in the case of helping beneficiaries and with the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) for investigating health records for prevent dealing with „fake beneficiaries’.

Conclusion. There should be more briefings and sharing of information with GIRoA at both the central and local level. ACAP staff should be officially introduced by the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) or Provincial Governor, which would help ensure

more cooperation of government officials. ACAP should have a liaison officer to share and exchange information with the government. In particular, MoLSAMD would like more involvement with ACAP, for example, beneficiaries could have access to the MoLSAMD vocational training centers and MoLSAMD could provide a monitoring and evaluation function. MoLSAMD would like a technical advisor located directly at the Ministry. Government involvement is very important for longer term stabilization and sustainability of civilian assistance programs and needs to be improved.

5.3 What has ACAP learned about coordination with the USAID field staff at Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), District Stabilization Teams (DSTs) and International Military Forces (IMFs)?

Finding. At the field level, some USAID/Activity Managers are now meeting regularly with their ACAP representative; some weekly and some monthly, or more often if the need arises. Others indicate that they have been unable to meet with the ACAP representative and/or that it would be helpful to have more contact with the ACAP representative. These information exchanges vary in quality with the most productive being those where either the USAID/Activity Manager or the ACAP representative or both have taken some initiative to make the working relationship meaningful.

As to the quality of the working relationship, at times there has been a contrast between the information provided by the ACAP staff and what has been able to be confirmed on the ground by the USAID/Activity Manager. Most Activity Managers have indicated that they would like to see the monthly ACAP activity reports and more detailed information about the progress on different requests for assistance as many have been limited to identification of incidents and verification information.

At the central level, ACAP/Kabul has provided an occasional briefing in the past six months to the Military and USAID/Department of State (DOS). The Military Coalition delivers a „solatia’ payment. It would good to coordinate this with ACAP assistance. The Military has been guarded and protective with their information and minimally cooperative at best. Likewise, with the Special Forces, information is confidential and they don’t share information. The briefings are a good start and have been well received.

Conclusion. Coordination is a challenge because of access and confidentiality of information. There is a need for improved working relationships, more information sharing and more briefings although there has been some recent improvement. Although difficult to coordinate, more can be done in leveraging with other USAID programs and with the District Stabilization Teams; for example, with the Commanders Emergency Relief Program (CERP) and Cash for Work programs. There is a suggestion that ACAP progress in the field be supervised by the USAID/Activity Manager.

5.4 How has such collaboration and coordination efforts improved program effectiveness?

ACAP other agency collaboration and coordination has been minimal, except for verification information, hindering overall program effectiveness. Included are conclusions related to the need for improved collaboration and coordination efforts.

Conclusion:

1. ACAP program effectiveness can be enhanced by involving USAID field staff in more than the reporting process and confirming incidents. For example, GIRoA officials may be more inclined to provide accurate input if they sense that USAID is more closely involved in the monitoring of the investigation and assistance distribution. ACAP may be more inclined to provide better turnaround in their responses if they are required to report more frequently and directly about project status.
2. AIHRC has never seen an ACAP report. Mobility of ACAP is an issue as it has made it difficult to establish rapport. Many of the ACAP field representatives are untrained and not aware of the role AIHRC can play. If information were shared, AIHRC could link ACAP to other support agencies as a number of agencies come to AIHRC, thus, improving program effectiveness.
3. We (district Shura head) would like to be present at the delivery of the assistance to help ensure accountability. ACAP should share activity details of assistance provided with us as it will help with transparency and program effectiveness.
4. In summary, ACAP has a need for better collaboration and coordination with USAID Activity Managers, other international and national NGOs, and the Afghan government. Program effectiveness can be improved by more briefings, improved working relationships, better information sharing, and improved utilization of the resources that these organizations can make available.

6.0 OBJECTIVE 3 - GATHERING AND DISSEMINATING INFORMATION: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

6.1 Has USAID's branding policy as applied to ACAP and the resulting non-promotion of ACAP as a USG funded program helped or hurt ACAP's use as a stabilization instrument?

Finding. While staff stated that in most cases beneficiaries were informed that the program was funded by the American people, USG, or USAID (except in the most dangerous districts), few stakeholders and almost no beneficiaries in our survey connected USAID with the program. Some think it is the International Military Forces, the American or US government, IOM or ACAP, the „International Community’, USAID, or the „American People’. In the high security areas it varies more as the ACAP staff, usually, just says ACAP or IOM. There have been occasions where agencies and beneficiaries have been targeted if it is known that the assistance comes from an international donor. In the survey, only 14 people knew the funding for IOM was from the US (9%), and only 5% of beneficiaries (8 people) knew USAID funded ACAP. Of these beneficiaries, only 7 of the 14 reported learning of US support from IOM, and only 3 of the 8 asserted they had been told by IOM. Asked a different way, „who provided this assistance to you?’, only 9 people (5.6% of beneficiaries) noted USAID and 2 people (1.2%) „Americans’, while 84% stated the assistance was from IOM and 10.5% noted it was from ACAP.

Conclusion. The non-promotion of the ACAP assistance as a USG program has been effective to-date although, in the future, it would be better to be more open and begin to indicate that the assistance is from the „American people’ or, possibly, the „International

Community’, whichever is appropriate. More transparency and more information sharing/dissemination of ACAP program activity with stakeholders (USAID/Activity Managers, GIRoA and NGOs) along with more involvement of local Shuras and community elders will help stabilization. There is a negative associated with the US Military that can be counteracted by showing that the ‘American People’ and ‘International Community’ cares.

7.0 OVERALL GOALS OF ACAP: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

7.1 What ACAP innovations or impacts can be considered as major achievements of this program thus far?

Finding. The main achievements referenced by the ACAP staff were the small business opportunity assistance; ability to affect the perception of people about the ‘International Community’ when assistance goes well; the education kits have been favorably received and are having a positive effect; training has been well-received; use of briefings have been successful, where used; and tailoring and carpet weaving for women have been favorably received. It was interesting to note that no innovations or management processes except ‘briefings’, which were minimal, were mentioned.

Included in Appendix 10 are lessons learned from illustrative beneficiary comments from the provinces/districts visited by the Checchi M&E teams and the SDLR survey teams. Most ACAP staff felt the system was working albeit it was top-down and cumbersome; staff would like more flexibility.

Conclusion. Based on ACAP Quarterly Reports, the quantity of beneficiaries and grants provided has been impressive given the security conditions and turbulent situation. The assistance achievements listed and lessons learned are noteworthy.

7.2 To what can we attribute these successes of the ACAP program?

Attribution of Success. Included are lessons learned from illustrative examples: 1) where the community and ACAP worked together, they created an improved school and more positive community perceptions; 2) better results from where ACAP made a stronger effort to communicate/share information with district officials; 3) where ACAP assistance was appropriate to beneficiary needs and timely, perceptions and lives changed; 4) ACAP assisted the beneficiary in setting up a livelihood, there was a positive perception; 5) ACAP cannot exclusively rely on stakeholders; and 6) in spite of security issues, ACAP needs to make every effort to travel to the districts/communities and meet and monitor beneficiaries face-to-face.

Conclusion. The reasons for success involved local support, transparency, appropriateness, timeliness, support for livelihood, and meeting beneficiaries face-to-face.

7.3 Are there any unintended consequences or impacts from ACAP?

Unintended Consequences. Positive – Based on ACAP staff comments: some of the beneficiaries were not expecting any assistance so the assistance came as a ‘happy’ surprise, beneficiary is happy that someone is willing to listen and that they have been

heard, in some areas there has been a decrease in negative/bad ideas of beneficiaries against the international coalition forces, one of the beneficiaries threw away the kit bags and put the materials into local sacks to ensure safe transport, children are now reading from the books in the education kit to a family member, a community in Kunar organized a school which has 440 students attending (150 girls), a female is now earning some income from a small business opportunity, and makes Congress feel good.

Negative – Neighbors want to know why ACAP is helping one person and not another, do not understand the parameters of the program; one of the beneficiaries who received kits, immediately sold them at a low price in the market; sometimes the Provincial government will make promises and overstates what ACAP can provide; and beneficiaries know what others have gotten and will come back and complain if they think they have been shorted.

Conclusion. The unintended consequences varied; a few positive and a few negative. It was important to note that the negative consequences were mostly related to an informal information communication network between and among the Afghans; thus, making the point for the need for clear and simple information sharing and communication of the ACAP assistance program parameters.

7.4 Does ACAP have any significant implementation problems?

Finding. The main implementation problems mentioned by ACAP staff were in two groups: 1) those related to the field – security/logistics/accessibility, procurement/poor quality of items, and the challenges of addressing the backlog of old cases; and 2) those related to the organization - overwhelming documentation, complicated and convoluted process, insufficient staff training, and decision-making is more upper-management/top-down (international) rather than decentralized/broad-based (Afghan). The main implementation problem mentioned by the stakeholders was a lack of information sharing. While beneficiaries surveyed express satisfaction with the program, they made numerous qualifications to note problems with timeliness, quality, and comprehensiveness of assistance – both in terms of what has happened in the program and what they suggest for future assistance. Non-beneficiaries and local stakeholders had similar critiques and suggestions.

Conclusion. The security and logistics issues are more difficult to address with the current program design at a manageable cost. The organizational and stakeholder issues must be managed and resolved for better program performance.

7.5 Are there significant needs unmet by ACAP?

Finding. The response from the ACAP staff was „Yes’ from 27 of 41 respondents. The significant needs were beneficiary needs – medical assistance, drinking water, food and shelter, and need to provide training/tutoring as the assistance will no longer be empowering - especially for woman; and project needs – need to link more with the local NGOs, more training of staff prior to deployment to the field, quality of kits, and whether after six months (old cases) beneficiaries really have a need.

Stakeholders and non-beneficiaries noted numerous cases of households with losses that had not been assisted by the program. These unmet needs, as they saw them, detracted greatly from the value of ACAP and caused some discord among people the villages as

people that they felt should benefit did not, while sometimes others that they speculated had connections to ACAP staff or that community leaders favored received benefits whether they had losses or not. It is difficult to know how extensive both of these problems are from the survey, but it is clear that there are numerous examples of both of these problems. Some other grants are thought by staff to be „wholly fictitious’ although the incidents are real. These cases were excluded from the ones from which the sample was drawn. Some beneficiaries also noted receiving less than they expected or poor quality goods; a few even implied they were worse off after assistance since their expenses taking care of cattle provided by ACAP exceeded their worth to them.

Conclusion. There are unmet needs although the beneficiary needs relate to whether ACAP is an emergency relief program or a follow-on assistance program. The other unmet needs relate to project management.

7.6 What methodologies used by ACAP have been relatively more and less effective?

Finding. The most effective method is when the field assistants are able to investigate the incidents directly; i.e., talk to directly to the beneficiaries and liaise with the local Shuras, district governors and other power brokers; the use of the National identity card and photos of the beneficiary along with the family has been useful; changing the program to more standardized kits has been effective in improving timeliness but staff has reservations about ability to meet beneficiary needs; and local flexibility is important to respond more positively to a situation. Less effective methods were some of the organizational issues mentioned in Section 7.4.

Beneficiaries differed little in their satisfaction or assessment of the usefulness of the variety of ACAP assistance, with the exception of cash which garnered the highest level of satisfaction (87%). In asking beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, and stakeholders about what kind of support should be provided, 67% of beneficiaries, 88% of non-beneficiaries, and half of the stakeholders suggested cash. Beneficiaries suggested assistance should be based on the needs of the household (46%), rather than the losses suffered (26%).

Conclusion. The effective methodologies related more to incident and beneficiary identification and less to delivery, monitoring and impact.

7.7 Were the indicators used the most appropriate to measure the impact of ACAP?

Finding. ACAP mostly collects quantitative data; e.g., types of incidents, numbers of beneficiaries and grants and related family assessment data. These data are entered to a data base. The beneficiary records and files contain incorrect or missing data, as beneficiaries have moved, changed phone numbers, or gave an incorrect address initially. The evaluation team, through SDLR (Social Development and Legal Rights) found it very difficult to trace down beneficiaries in order to assess beneficiary impact. ACAP collects some impact data related to the small business and training assistance program; two rating scales – one on satisfaction and another on impact for the small business program plus an open question about how much the beneficiary has learned in the training program. No other follow up on beneficiaries is done. There is no cross-validation of the

data. The indicator data transmitted to USAID for entry to the Stabilization Performance is a count of families affected by an incident between IMF and the insurgency.

Conclusion. The ACAP indicator data collected is mostly output and related to objective 1; types/numbers of incidents reported, numbers of beneficiaries eligible for assistance, and grants provided. The challenge is the data collection, cross-validation, and data management of quality beneficiary and stakeholder indicator data – output or impact.

7.8 Has ACAP achieved its current stated goal and objectives?

ACAP Goal. ACAP has partially strengthened USG efforts to provide assistance for Afghan families and communities that have suffered losses as a result of military operations against insurgents and the Taliban. The goal has only been somewhat achieved as the challenges were many and the effort valiant but the organizational and access/security/logistic demands were overwhelming. ACAP/IOM should be commended for their effort and the assistance they were able to provide.

Objective 1. Timeliness was an issue from the beginning. It has improved in some provinces this past year and the process is still lacking in overall efficiency and organizational effectiveness. Appropriateness of the assistance was better before when it was more tailored to beneficiary needs and is less so now as the kits have been standardized to improve timeliness and the backlog of cases. Quality of items is still an issue. Overall, ACAP did its best job on this objective and the objective has been partially accomplished.

Objective 2. The establishment and maintenance of a liaison network among key stakeholders was not accomplished. Working relationships, information sharing and utilization of GIROA and other agency/organizational resources were minimal to non-existent. Only in the area of incident and beneficiary identification was there some networking.

Objective 3. The achievement of this objective was not accomplished. Branding has been an issue and the majority of the beneficiaries and stakeholders are unaware that ACAP is a USG program. Program reports were not shared with the stakeholders. A few briefings were held this past six months with the Military and USAID/DOS and some working relationships are developing with a few USAID/Activity Managers.

7.9 Would a different program design or objectives be more effective in achieving the goal?

Conclusion. The program design was difficult to achieve under the current environment in Afghanistan. A different set of objectives and a more clearly defined program design and goal would help. The task was over daunting and it kept changing and expanding during the implementation phase, creating uncertainty in the implementing partner as to expectations and outputs. Should the goal be emergency relief, follow-on assistance or development? And what should be the relationship to stabilization? A more scaled down approach restricted to selective provinces or districts, implemented by a more streamlined organization, and more closely connected to GIROA would be more effective.

8.0 BROADER STABILIZATION GOALS OF ACAP: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

An overall stabilization question was asked of the ACAP staff along with five items based on the stabilization objectives included in a Department of State “Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy, February 2010.

8.1 To what extent has ACAP supported stabilization efforts?

Finding. Thirty three ACAP staff out of 41 responded somewhat positively with, ‘Most of the Time (9 respondents)’ and ‘Some of the Time (24 respondents)’ while 22 stakeholders out of the 36, who had an understanding of ACAP, responded positively, ‘Most of the Time (8 respondents)’ and ‘Some of the Time (14 respondents)’. If you include the 20 stakeholders who had no knowledge of ACAP and the 2 ‘No Response’ in the total, the positive stakeholder stabilization response reduces to 22 out of 58.

Local stakeholders felt their communities reacted positively to households with losses receiving assistance; exceptions were in cases where beneficiaries were misidentified or not identified correctly, which left families with losses unassisted (and 12 of 26 noted sadness or negative opinions about this lack of fairness). Non-beneficiaries surveyed mostly had nothing to say about what they thought about community perceptions of their neighbors receiving assistance, 15 of 59 mainly positive. However no reaction or negative opinions were noted from Garbed, Hawza 5, and other locations where they themselves had losses but reported they had not been assisted by anyone (negative opinions were expressed by 5 of 59, only a minority of the 25 households that reported having losses but receiving no assistance). Local stakeholders reported that people in 11 of the 25 villages/towns surveyed had losses and had not received assistance from anyone. Only the elder interviewed in Zhari asserted that the community was happy that the prospective beneficiaries had rejected assistance, since now they felt the Taliban would not retaliate against their village. The survey also asked stakeholders ‘how has the village changed as a result of some households receiving assistance?’ No one noted any changes beyond the material benefits to particular households (88%); this was not seen as benefitting or changing the community as a whole.

Conclusion. With little training on stabilization, ACAP staff overstated their impact on stabilization. Stakeholders felt that if ACAP staff worked more closely with government officials, local Shuras and Community Development Councils, it would help stabilization. Stakeholders need more knowledge of and engagement with ACAP, and the program needs to have impact beyond the household level for stabilization. Stakeholders felt that a greater number of beneficiaries need to be reached and the assistance delivered in a more timely manner as well as more closely meet beneficiary needs to positively affect stabilization. A design that focuses on communities is needed for potential stabilization.

8.2 How effective has ACAP been in improving Afghan citizens’ perception of the international community?

Finding. A majority of the ACAP staff responded positively with 32 respondents out of 41 responding with either a ‘High (9 respondents) or ‘Moderate (23 respondents)’. The ACAP staff data indicated that many of the beneficiaries are satisfied and there has been a

positive impact on individual beneficiaries, 61 percent (25 of 41) indicating high satisfaction and 49 percent (20 of 41) indicating high impact on their lives, especially where the business opportunity assistance was provided.

A single survey does not allow for asking directly whether people's perceptions have changed as a result of receiving assistance. Beneficiaries were satisfied with assistance and found the assistance useful, but then qualified their assessment in numerous ways and only 10% had any idea that the support came from anyone besides IOM. The situation was slightly better for non-beneficiaries. Of the 31 of 49 non-beneficiaries that reported their communities had losses and that some families had received assistance, 8 (26%) knew that this help came from the US (and 8 noted from USAID). Only 6 asserted the help came from IOM, and two of these people knew this was US funding while 6 noted USAID funding. Since the surveys were done only in communities that had affected households, really only 12 of 59 neighbors had a general idea where assistance to victims came from (20%).

Conclusion. Staff perceptions appear overstated as almost all beneficiaries in the survey only associated the program with IOM or ACAP. With minimal transparency in ACAP and IMF compensation/solatia programs, Afghan non-beneficiaries at large are not aware where assistance comes from. Only in high-profile large-casualty incidents; such as the Kunduz bombing and Arghandab campaign, where there was greater involvement of the PRT, GIRoA and community with IOM, did staff and stakeholders make a persuasive case that greater transparency, improved local perceptions, and increased public trust in the government and international community emerged from program activities (See Appendix 10).

8.3 How has ACAP managed the balance between addressing security needs and seizing opportunities to promote stabilization objectives by influencing popular perceptions and behavior?

Finding. ACAP staff perceptions were obtained related to two stabilization objectives: 1) „Includes Local Government Officials in the Program Efforts’ - the data indicated a „Moderate (12 respondents) to High (9 respondents)’ response by ACAP staff (21 respondents of 41) responding positively while actual interviews of government officials showed over a third of the officials with no knowledge (20 of 56) and others minimally involved; that is, only involved in verification information; and 2) „Provides Direct Assistance to Families/Communities Suffering Losses due to International Military Operations’ – the data was overwhelmingly positive with 41 out of 41 ACAP respondents positive, „Moderate (6 respondents) and High (35 respondents).’

Beneficiaries do not associate the program with their government, although local, district, and provincial stakeholders are sometimes involved in incident and beneficiary identification. Not a single beneficiary surveyed noted receiving assistance from their government; only one non-beneficiary said they had received help from the government. Beneficiaries may not be completely honest (or knowledgeable if not head of household) about other streams of assistance to victims such as solatia, condolence, or GIRoA programs – either to ACAP staff during family assessments or in this survey. No ACAP beneficiary said they had received assistance from IMF and only 1.2% from „Americans.’

Conclusion. On the first question, there was an overstatement of involvement of ACAP staff with Afghan government officials. This raises some question about a self-promotional aspect of the ACAP staff and an over concern by ACAP on security vs. traveling to meet and share program activities with GIRoA officials directly.

On the second question, ACAP was able to provide direct assistance to many families suffering losses due to International Military Operations, which was perceived to have some impact on the beneficiaries. This was supported by the beneficiary data although community-level impact was less, as transparency and greater community involvement was weak due to security concerns.

8.4 To what extent has ACAP supported international military coalition and other support agencies to provide assistance?

Finding. The 28 of 41 ACAP staff indicated a somewhat positive response to a stabilization question on working closely with the IMF and International Community; „High (11 respondents) and Moderate (17 respondents), while interview comments were less supportive:

Staff noted: they „are not allowed to share information regarding ACAP activities (Wardak/Paktya/Khost);’ „currently, we do not work with other agencies or organizations while working with ACAP in the field and I believe there isn’t any need for this. (Kandahar);’ „Due to security problems, we do not share information of ACAP activities with the staff of other organizations, many of these individuals are not trustworthy and we don’t want to take such a risk (Kandahar);’ and “Sharing information with other agencies and organizations is not required (Herat/Kunduz).” Beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, and local stakeholders overwhelmingly did not connect ACAP assistance with anyone beyond IOM.

Conclusion. There is a need for ACAP improvement in working relationships and sharing information with the international military coalition and other agencies and organizations if ACAP is going to work with and support other agency efforts in the assistance area. ACAP other agency working relationships has been restricted to verification information only.

8.5 To what extent has ACAP supported country ownership and putting Afghans in the lead?

Finding. Only nine ACAP respondents out of 41 rated this „High’ compared to 20 respondents out of 24 rating the item „Low’. Afghan staff have been critical to the program, since international staff are even more restricted by the difficult security situation in the field. But ACAP/IOM have noted and caught instances of corruption by national staff when not under close international supervision and thus requires international supervision.

Conclusion. ACAP needs to do a better job in putting ‚Afghans First’ in the management of the ACAP program but needs strong processes, procedures, and systems to minimize corruption possibilities.

8.6 Was the ACAP approach the best approach for contributing to stabilization objectives?

By 2010, ACAP has largely completed its community projects. The project's methodology focuses on affected households. It is difficult to make a plausible case for assistance to households leading to stabilization of their communities. The program does little to explain what has happened to affected communities and why they have suffered these losses. Although civilian casualties caused directly by IMF have declined dramatically since the McCrystal Tactical Directive and other changes in ISAF since mid-2009, overall civilian casualties have grown as insurgent tactics have become even more indiscriminate and deadly over 2009-10. Although multiple researchers have noted that some 75% of casualties are from the insurgents, Afghans themselves do not know or understand this trend. Local stakeholders noted that assistance has changed their villages (23 of 26), but only through its impact on individual households that benefitted from the program. Their assessment is that ACAP has not stabilized the village – only families within it. In more insecure areas, program implementation is less visible and sometimes remote, with less impact on the community since beneficiaries sometimes hide that they have received assistance (but do not disguise their losses from the fighting) – due to fear of the insurgents. In areas where ACAP has suffered from corruption, the program may contribute to perceptions that the International Community is duplicitous or incompetent and be destabilizing. Some staff and activity managers share this opinion, although we do not have any direct evidence for this effect.

Conclusions:

1. ACAP assistance has had little impact on stability, especially in less stable areas; as access, transparency, working relationships and information sharing are minimal.
2. If ACAP met beneficiary needs better and had more timely and visible delivery to households or communities, it could build greater trust and help change the perceptions of Afghans.
3. ACAP needs to work with community organizations to support stabilization. Engagement with village and district-level Shura and Community Development Councils is critical for potential stabilization.
4. More ACAP involvement of GIRoA at all levels and local stakeholders in the decision-making process/meetings, including involvement in an open distribution process is important to build public trust and assist in the stabilization effort.
5. ACAP may have helped reduce the rage of some locals and potential to seek revenge for an incident and appears to have been able to change the perceptions of some individual beneficiaries of the International Community but overall is not the best approach for contributing to stabilization objectives as currently implemented.
6. ACAP needs to reach a greater number of beneficiaries in a concentrated area to affect stabilization – it cannot be a one-off assistance program for a scattered households if stabilization is sought.

Appendix 13



USAID | **AFGHANISTAN**
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

ACAP Final Evaluation

Afghan Civilian Assistance Program

EVALUATION Team:

Lawrence Robertson
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Tamim Jebran

March 7, 2011

SUPPORT Project

Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc.
and its Subcontractor
The Louis Berger Group, Inc.

ACAP Project – Goal



- Strengthen USG efforts to provide assistance for Afghan families and communities that have suffered losses as a result of the military operations against insurgents, thereby contributing to overall stabilization efforts in Afghanistan.

ACAP Objectives

1. Beneficiaries receive timely and appropriate assistance
2. ACAP establishes and maintains a liaison network among key stakeholders
3. ACAP gathers and disseminates information about ACAP program among stakeholders

Multiple Methodologies and Sampling

- Developed multiple methodologies to collect data
- Focus on 10 provinces – Herat, Kunduz, Nangarhar, Laghman, Kabul, Wardak, Paktya, Khost, Kandahar and Helmand
- Structured interviews in Kabul with ACAP and other stakeholders – 16 interviews
- Structured interviews with ACAP regional staff and stakeholders (including GIRoA) by Support M & E team – 90 interviews
- Survey of beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries and local stakeholders by SDLR – 247 interviews
- Survey of USAID/Activity Managers (international and national) – 23

To Triangulate Information on Impact

Challenges

- Insecurity
- Selecting diverse project sites
- Targeting and locating individual beneficiaries
- Some contact information incorrect
- Need to access locals through locals and use elders
- Dispersed and mobile beneficiaries
- Some unknown to locals or unwilling to answer because of insecurity
- Few female beneficiaries even with female interviewers

General story consistent - from 162 beneficiaries, 59 non-beneficiaries,
26 local stakeholders

Objective 1: Beneficiaries – Satisfied, But ...

- 83% find assistance useful
- 62% satisfied, 31% somewhat satisfied with assistance
- Cash (87% satisfied) preferred
- Small variation in satisfaction by type (69% business, 68 tailoring, 65% home, 65% education) – least in agricultural (54, 53, 49%)
- Little variation urban/rural, family size, type of beneficiary, kind of loss
- Only 45% satisfied when incident results from IMF action
- 84% satisfied when incident result of insurgent attack
- Communities dissatisfied when some have losses but are not beneficiaries
- Local stakeholders, non-beneficiaries, and beneficiaries want more impact

Appropriateness, Timeliness, Satisfaction and Impact

- Appropriateness – about a third of ACAP staff said ‘very appropriate’, items are usable but could be of better quality, small-business opportunity and training well-received, kits varied in usefulness
- Timeliness – has improved some in recent months as ACAP moved to a more standardized kit (ACAP staff - about 50% within 2 months now)
- Survey finds median time to first meeting 4 months, first assistance 3.4 months, final assistance 3 months
- Satisfaction – in general, beneficiary was satisfied (ACAP staff – about 60%), happy that international community was listening and cared, rural poor more satisfied, unhappiness with the groceries in kits
- Impact – more impact when a beneficiary could set up a shop/business and assistance met beneficiary need (ACAP staff – about 50% high extent)

Objective 2

Working Relationship with other Agencies/Organizations and GIROA

- Need more briefings and sharing program information
- Some USAID/Activity Managers now meet regularly with ACAP
- Many GIROA stakeholders unaware of ACAP
- Little to no working relationship with MoLSAMD, AIHRC, ICRC, etc.
- Most ACAP working relationships related to incident and beneficiary verification

Objective 3: Branding and Dissemination

- View of stakeholders varied as to the funding for ACAP – many do not know while others think IMF, some think American/US Government, IOM or ACAP, USAID, others ‘International Community’, and a few ‘American People’
- Stakeholders would like to see more transparency and more information sharing/dissemination of ACAP activity information
- Beneficiaries only know ACAP or IOM – USG or USAID rare exception
- Local shuras and community elders would like more information and involvement

Findings: Problems and Unmet Needs

Field Problems:

- Security/logistics and accessibility
- Procurement/poor quality of items, many unmet needs
- Tremendous number of unaddressed incidents – both old and a growing number of new incidents

Organizational Problems:

- Overwhelming documentation
- Complicated and convoluted process
- Insufficient staff training
- Top-down decision making

Unmet Beneficiary Needs

Beneficiaries, Non-Beneficiaries, Stakeholders Suggest: ACAP Staff Suggest:

- Cash
 - Medical assistance
- Unassisted but 'eligible'
 - Drinking water
- Quality
 - Food and shelter
- Faster delivery
 - Livelihood assistance
- Greater impact on livelihood.
 - Provide more training/tutoring,
especially for women
- Quality of kits

Impact on Stabilization

- Country ownership, Afghan ‘first’, and working with other agencies a low priority for ACAP
- ACAP focus on assistance to households, little impact on broader community
- May be some changed perceptions and impact on local stabilization in major incidents with many assisted beneficiaries
- Stakeholders and staff assessed impact on stabilization as ‘seldom/never’ and ‘some of the time’.

Lessons Learned

- ACAP must communicate/share information with local stakeholders (transparency)
- ACAP must meet beneficiaries face-to-face (direct contact) and cannot exclusively rely on local elder or community representative (triangulate data)
- ACAP assistance must meet beneficiary needs (appropriate and timely assistance)
- ACAP must work with communities for stabilization (involve community)
- ACAP should focus on livelihoods (impact on rebuilding and recovery)
- ACAP must involve GIRoA for stabilization (Afghan first)

Is ACAP Achieving its Goal and Objectives?

Goal – ACAP has not achieved the overall goal. ACAP has not developed a grant assistance process to adequately address the access, security, and logistical challenges of working with Afghan stakeholders and civilian losses across the country. ACAP has not supported country ownership and has minimal travel to less secure districts, where more incidents have occurred.

Objective 1 - *Partly achieved.* Timeliness is still an issue in about half the cases, there is still a backlog of cases, quality of items is still an issue, and appropriateness is less with the standardized kits.

Objective 2 – *Not achieved.* ACAP has not established and maintained a liaison network among key stakeholders.

Objective 3 – *Not achieved.* ACAP has done little to gather or disseminate program information among stakeholders. Almost no beneficiaries and few stakeholders are aware ACAP is a USG or USAID program.

Recommendations

OVERALL.

- Beneficiary assistance should be approved only after face-to-face meetings with beneficiaries and consultation with GIRoA and the USAID Activity Manager
- Assistance should only be delivered openly with GIRoA in a community setting
- Assistance should focus on self-identified beneficiary needs
- Assistance should be substantial enough to have a demonstrable impact on livelihoods

For USAID and IOM on ACAP through 30 September 2011.

No Cost Extension. Implement key short-term recommendations from the Operational System and Procedures Review. Develop a detailed work plan to deliver limited assistance to the largest number of victims.

Modest Cost Extension. Implement key short-term recommendations from the Operational System and Procedures Review. Develops a detailed work plan to deliver limited assistance to the largest number of victims. Explain IOM's costs and the value-added of additional funding.

For USAID on ACAP II

No ACAP Follow-On. The challenge of helping victims of conflict in Afghanistan is basically undoable at present at a reasonable cost.

ACAP II Emergency Relief Focus. Design a follow-on program to use emergency relief methods to rapidly deliver cash to victims.


ACAP II Recovery Focus. Design a follow-on program with substantial resources and strong administrative systems to deliver tailored assistance to help households recover.



ACAP II Community Development Focus. Use Leahy-directed funds to support community development to help communities recover after incidents.

Appendix 14

Appendix 14: Non beneficiary graphs


Non-BENEFICIARIES GRAPHS






Graph #4



If not death, have received any assistance to help you rebuild and recover after loss?







Graph#5



Types of assistance you have received?



















Appendix 5



Appendix 15: Stakeholders graphs



STAKEHOLDERS GRAPHS













Graph#10



What has been the reaction of people in your village to some households receiving assistance to help them rebuild and recover?



Graph#11

Has the village changed as a result of some households receiving assistance?






Graph#14

Does assistance come to the households that are entitled to it in the village, those that have suffered losses due to fighting against insurgents? Why or why not?



Graph#15

How has the village changed as a result of some households receiving assistance?



Graph#16

What kind of support do you think households should receive to help them rebuild and recover after losses due to fighting against the insurgents?

