


**BHR PORTFOLIO REVIEW**  
**SOUTHERN SUDAN**

February 12 - March 1, 1996



## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A team from USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Response (BHR) undertook a review of the BHR Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and BHR/Office of Food for Peace (FFP) portfolios in southern Sudan from February 13 to March 1, 1996. The team was composed of Valerie Newsom, OFDA Regional Team Leader for the Horn of Africa, Catherine Farnsworth, OFDA Regional Advisor, Carolyn Mutamba, FFP Emergency Programs Officer and Larry Meserve, Head of USAID/REDSO's Sudan Field Office (SFO) in Nairobi.

The team worked in two groups thereby allowing greater coverage of BHR-funded project sites in southern Sudan. The FFP group visited FFP-funded programs in Eastern and Western Equatoria and OFDA-funded programs in both areas as time allowed. The OFDA group visited OFDA-funded programs in Western Equatoria, Lakes and Bahr el Ghazal. In addition to interviewing beneficiaries at project sites, both groups met extensively with civil authorities, the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and U.N. representatives.

The nine principal findings of the team are presented, including recommendations, beginning on page 7. Below is a brief description of the team's observations.

The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) is moving in a new direction towards developing a civil society which includes responsible civil authorities and grass roots development structures. As part of these efforts, a conference on civil administration is scheduled for April, a blue print for rehabilitation and development has been developed and the SPLM is participating with Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) in the dissemination of groundrules on humanitarian principles. While steps to create technical "ministries" are also underway, the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA) -- established with support from the international community to serve as a civilian interface with the SPLM on humanitarian relief issues -- overshadows these traditional organs of civil society. Without concerted outside support for the nascent structures, this dominance of the SRRA will continue. That said, the SRRA remains an essential counterpart to the international humanitarian community on relief and rehabilitation issues and a strengthened SRRA is needed to insure better accountability for humanitarian efforts. The SRRA remains influenced by the demands of the military and only further capacity building of the organization will enable it to resist pressures and better assist the relief community to meet the needs of the civilian population in SPLM-controlled areas of southern Sudan.

The Relief Association of Southern Sudan (RASS), the South

Sudanese Independence Movement's (SSIM) counterpart of the humanitarian community, has had more difficulty gaining credibility with the international community. Barred from receiving OLS funding following the embezzlement of program money in 1994 by its former chairman, RASS has been operating on a shoestring budget while undertaking reforms of the financial system. Claiming "full rehabilitation" and a belief that OLS is likely to resume funding them on par with SRRA, RASS made a plea to the team to support capacity building and, more urgently, to identify and fund programs in SSIM areas. RASS representatives noted that the SSIM area has been largely a "no-fly zone" for nearly a year and that health and nutritional levels are critical. [Note: Currently OFDA funds the International Rescue Committee (IRC) in the SSIM area to manage community health activities and, through UNICEF, World Food Program (WFP) and Save the Children/UK (SCF/UK), supports the distribution of other food, medicine, seeds, tools and other relief goods in both SSIM and SPLM areas.]

Health programs constitute a significant portion of the OFDA portfolio. While the framework of the health care programs and community health worker training have been standardized through UN coordination efforts, their remain aspects of programs that require more coordination for longer term sustainability. Additionally, the team noted that because of security and lack of access, health care often fails to reach the most vulnerable groups. While some NGOs are adopting program designs (i.e. mobile teams) that permit at least a minimum input to insecure areas, the question remains as to whether OLS is aggressively attempting to meet the most critical health care needs.

The food economy model, introduced to WFP by SCF/UK consultants, has been widely accepted by relief agencies in southern Sudan as a method of assessment. The model stresses the need to take into account the various traditional sources of food (livestock, exchange, local production and wild fruits) when determining food needs. Food security is measured by the collection of data from key informants and other sampling. The model allows for the collection of baseline information in many of the communities where NGOs are working in the south so that, should a disruption occur, the level of vulnerability can be determined rapidly. The use of the food economy model has definitely provided a better understanding of the various coping mechanisms in place and relief programs should now be able to take these into account so that traditional coping mechanisms are supported and not destroyed. However, the team was concerned by reports that WFP is relying too heavily on the model at the field level when making food aid decisions, given the built in biases that exist (e.g. use of

translators, insufficient numbers of key informants, variations in interview styles). OLS/WFP staff in Nairobi assured the team that the food economy model is intended to be used as one of several tools to assess food security and, in response to team comments, agreed that greater effort was needed to identify qualified field staff to handle the model and make food aid decisions.

Working through Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and WFP, FFP provided over 42,000 MT of food commodities (cereals, pulses and vegetable oil), valued at \$23.7 million, to vulnerable groups in displaced camps and war-affected rural communities in 1995. Progress has been made in strengthening management and monitoring aspects of food aid programs and achieving more reliable population estimates. Overall requirements for emergency food aid should continue to drop if rains are adequate and no large scale displacements of civilians occur because of the civil conflict. Monitoring of food aid continues to be an important concern of FFP as does the growth of a food aid dependent population. In visits to Eastern Equatoria, the FFP team noted a total lack of initiative by the displaced population to begin preparing land for cultivation despite the distribution of seeds and tools and the availability of land to cultivate. In meetings with SRRA officials, a stern message was delivered, urging the SRRA to mobilize and sensitize the population to the importance of building some measure of food self reliance participating in their own livelihood. To carry out this message, the NGOs with SRRA concurrence, will delay the next food distribution until the displaced make an effort to prepare their lands. According to other travelers, the displaced were at work the day after the FFP visit. The FFP team also provided a message of strong support for the CRS and NPA strategy to halt distributions after the harvest for approximately two months, depending on growing conditions.

Excepting those in camps and in areas of conflict, most populations have achieved a measure of food security in southern Sudan. This stems from comprehensive distributions of seeds and tools by OLS and good rains. An increased focus in this sector in the marginal production areas is to introduce improved farming techniques. Consequently, programs emphasize activities such as the use of ox plows, the development of improved farm implements, the testing and dissemination of high performing seed varieties and extension work. However, the team noted a lack of overall coordination and collaboration amongst NGOs working in the agricultural sector which results in the duplication of effort, differences in approach and a real risk that inappropriate seeds will be introduced into some areas. OLS is cognizant of this fact and intends to organize regular

consultations and workshops with NGOs in the agriculture sector.

Barter shop programs designed to exchange surplus production in Western Equatoria for non-food items have been enormously successful, but redistribution of the surplus to deficit areas has been problematic. Security and logistical constraints as well as overall improved levels of food security have altered the original target populations of the exchanged surpluses. World Vision, with 1,000 MT of bartered grain in Yambio, proposes to move most of this grain to Tonj County to meet the needs of flood affected and new war displaced populations. NPA also requires an estimated 450 MT to support war displaced in Yirol. Use of surpluses to meet needs in Lakes and parts of Bahr el Ghazal will reduce the need for costly airdrops, the only other option for these populations once the rains begin. The Governor of Bahr el Ghazal pledged that the SPLM will ensure the security of the stored food in pre-designated areas. The team believes that the SPLM should be challenged to uphold this pledge. Decisions to undertake these overland movements must be made in the next one to two weeks in order to ensure delivery before the rains. Over the medium term, should the roads to Uganda open up, surpluses in Western Equatoria offer trading opportunities for the Greater Horn region.

The achievements of Sudanese NGOs (SINGOs) in their first year of partnership with international NGOs have been mixed. The intent of supporting SINGOs was to build the capacity of the NGOs and to identify groups that could deliver assistance more effectively over the long term. Such measures help reduce the cost of assistance and foster self reliance. However, capacity building takes time and results are difficult to measure during the grant period normally allotted. In most cases, the goals and objectives of the programs were too ambitious, increased involvement of the international NGO partners is warranted and the SINGOS require more discipline and focus on the activities they undertake.

The southern Sudan operations depend heavily on the ability of UNICEF and WFP staff in Lokkichokkio to schedule and deliver cargo to the NGO and UN programs. With over 40 organizations demanding space on the Buffalo, twin Otter and two Caravans, and nearly 1,000 staff moving into, out of and around southern Sudan each month, the logistics challenges are overwhelming. The team heard repeatedly that cargo backlogs are delaying program implementation, just as the need to strike a balance between cargo and passengers delays movement of project personnel as well. NGOs in one location must share the little space on one aircraft and thus

difficult tradeoffs must be made every step of the way. Some NGOs charter their own planes to supplement the limited cargo space they are able to receive through OLS. Flight clearance from Khartoum also dictates the pace of program implementation; programs in Western Equatoria which enjoy virtual total access due to approved flight clearances, receive over 60 percent of OLS flights; programs in Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal are behind schedule or even stopped due to the lack of flight clearances. Flight clearance denials also result in last minute changes in the cargo space available, which has led many NGOs to place logistics staff in Lokki, resulting in an expanded OLS base camp. Issues of OLS base management structures will be addressed in the ongoing U.N. Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) review of OLS.

## INTRODUCTION

A team from USAID/BHR undertook a review of the OFDA and FFP portfolios in southern Sudan from February 13 - March 1, 1996. The original schedule included a visit to programs in the north, however the suspension of the U.S. diplomatic presence made such a visit impossible during the trip time frame. Visits to Khartoum are to be rescheduled by OFDA and FFP at a later date.

The team was composed of Valerie Newsom, Regional Team Leader for the Horn of Africa, OFDA, Catherine Farnsworth, Regional Advisor, OFDA, Carolyn Mutamba, Emergency Programs Officer for FFP, and Larry Meserve, Head of the Sudan Field Office in Nairobi.

The team split into two groups, OFDA and FFP, and was able in this way to visit programs throughout OFDA and FFP's areas of support in the south. The FFP team visited programs of CRS in Eastern Equatoria and NPA in Western Equatoria, looking at OFDA programs as their time allowed. The OFDA team visited OFDA funded programs in Western Equatoria, Lakes and Bahr el Ghazal. A full travel schedule is attached to this report. In view of time and travel factors, all programs were not visited on this mission.

The team's report consists of two parts. The main body of the report, Part I, constitutes joint team findings and observations on cross cutting themes and issues which relate to humanitarian operations in south Sudan. Recommendations for action are included. The second part of the report, attached as an annex, consists of a program by program comment and review for the purposes of program monitoring and prioritization at OFDA by the OFDA team, and a general trip report by the FFP team.

The paper is not a policy or strategy document nor does it reflect a review or clearance by other members of the State Department or USAID. Its contents are the sole responsibility of team members who invite readers to comment and discuss our findings and observations. It must be remembered that Southern Sudan is a huge area and there are many actors involved. A short visit can only realistically reflect what the team encountered in its travels and thus this report cannot adequately represent conditions and developments in southern Sudan as a whole. Nevertheless the team hopes that the comments herein will contribute to the wider dialogue on Sudan within the United States Government.

**FINDING 1:** A major shift appears to be occurring within the SPLM, characterized by new emphasis on the development of civil society and civil administration.

**DISCUSSION:** Most UN and NGO representatives working in southern Sudan agree that a major shift is occurring within the SPLM, characterized by new emphasis on the strengthening of civilian structures other than the SRRA. Some believe outsiders (i.e. Ethiopians/Eritreans) are responsible for the change while others believe it is the inevitable step in the development of a guerilla movement which ultimately needs the support of the people to survive. Whatever the motivation, civil administration is making its presence known and important grass roots efforts are underway to empower local communities to direct their own affairs. However, the civil administration lacks even the basic accompaniments of offices and transportation and governors admit that their main strength is in mobilizing the SPLM to provide law and order in their areas of responsibility. The presence of a comparatively resource rich SRRA which is composed of technical divisions that parallel the "ministries" of the civilian administration further relegates the latter to a fairly insignificant role at present and is a source of tension evident to field travelers.

While struggling with few resources, the civilian administration is being thrust to the forefront through meetings such as the Chukudum and New Cush conferences in 1995. These meetings, attended by the SPLM/SPLA, SRRA, civilian authorities, and international community representatives have been seminal in charting the new course that the Movement intends to take in the "New Sudan." The meetings served as the fora for discussion and exchange of views on tough issues including abuses of humanitarian aid by the military. The fact that the SPLA invited such criticism of its actions reinforced to many observers the notion of fundamental reform taking place within the movement.

The guiding document referred to by civilian authorities and SRRA representatives is "The Way Forward," a five year blueprint for rehabilitation and development in southern Sudan. The approach of "The Way Forward" is on community-based development implemented by the creation of village development committees, called Joint Relief and Rehabilitation Committees (JRRCs), throughout the south. Once created, the committees will provide a forum for discussion of development and rehabilitation needs, set priorities and solve problems. The committees are also tasked with reporting any malfeasance by SPLA troops in their areas. This grass roots approach to relief and

rehabilitation in the southern is a major step forward in the development of a participatory, eventually democratic, society and in building accountability at all levels of performance within a movement that has previously been seen by many southern Sudanese as a force of occupation.

Another aspect in the development of civil society is the re-establishment of a civil judicial system. The new Supreme Court has been named and judges have been assigned to various regions to explain and disseminate information on the civil justice system. The role of customary law in this domain is particularly significant and lawyers are anxious to ensure that the relationship between customary law and civil law is properly defined.

The UNICEF/OLS groundrules dissemination campaign complements the reform within the SPLM. Over the past few months OLS/Southern Sector has been sponsoring a number of workshops with SRRA and RASS to discuss humanitarian principles. In mid-1995, basic agreements were drawn up with each faction laying out the basic principles of OLS humanitarian operations and defining the rules of conduct for the activities of OLS agencies, SRRA and RASS, including respect for humanitarian assistance, cultural sensitivity by NGOs, rules related to employment of staff as well as regulations governing rents, taxes, licenses, etc. Over 30 dissemination workshops are currently underway throughout the south. The workshops focus not only on the OLS groundrules but also are used as a platform for instructing participants in international humanitarian law, Geneva Conventions and Rights of the Child. Attendance at the workshops/meetings include local officials, military commanders, international and local nos and private citizens. The meetings are facilitated by UNICEF and the SRRA. The meetings encourage frank discussion of the principles of OLS and invite citizens to share their concerns. The OFDA team had the chance to meet and travel with the groundrules team in Bahr el Ghazal and were told that the dissemination meetings are often very lively with citizens animated in their listing of SPLA/SSIM violation of groundrules.

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS:**

1. BHR/OFDA should join other donors in contributing to the UNICEF/OLS groundrules dissemination campaign. Dissemination and adherence to these groundrules will help insure the level of accountability for relief and rehabilitation operations that donors have insisted upon.
2. The BHR team encourages wider U.S. Government

participation in this aspect of southern Sudan activities. Notably, the team recommends attendance at the forthcoming meeting in New Cush by Africa Bureau Democracy/Governance officials.

3. The BHR team urges continued dialogue with members of the civil administration by the State Department Sudan Watcher.

**FINDING 2:** The function of SRRA/RASS in southern Sudan is primarily to provide coordination of humanitarian assistance but structures remain weak and dependent on OLS for financial support. (NOTE: This finding will focus primarily on SRRA as no RASS sites were visited on this trip although the team did meet with RASS representatives in Nairobi.)

**DISCUSSION:** SRRA/RASS serve as the humanitarian counterparts to OLS, representing the SPLA and SSIM respectively (RASS has only been in existence since Riak Macher's split with John Garang in 1991 and is consequently less developed as an organization). In the early days of OLS, staff were transferred frequently from SPLA to SRRA assignments, thus giving the perception that the SRRA was merely an SPLA cover. Similar perceptions applied to RASS. Pressured by the international community to be more accountable for relief and to be more responsible partners, both the SRRA and RASS have tried to reform. With the help of OLS, capacity building programs have trained SRRA/RASS staff in Nairobi and in the field and have provided the financial support necessary for the relief arms to maintain permanent presences in Nairobi. OLS' goal in building SRRA/RASS capacity lies in the belief that accountability for humanitarian assistance can only improve if NGOs have a legitimate counterpart which understands humanitarian assistance and has credibility and strength in its dealings with the military wing of the SPLM/SSIM.

Despite these efforts SRRA/RASS have a long way to go towards fulfilling a purely humanitarian mandate and coordinating relief activities at the field level. NGOs still complain that weak SRRA/RASS structures in the field make coordination of activities, as well as resistance to the pressures of the military, difficult. (Note: The BHR team traveled only to SRRA areas on this trip and thus will not comment on RASS field performance. The team met with SRRA representatives in each location visited thus permitting the opportunity to understand the range of duties and activities of the SRRA, and the complexity of their relationships with the NGO community and with the SPLM/SPLA.)

SRRA representatives are involved in a wide range of activities which mark them as both humanitarian coordinators and civil authorities. It was also evident that the personalities of the individual representatives were critical in determining the types of relationships that developed between the NGOs and the SRRA. For instance, in Mapel, the local SRRA representative appeared keen to facilitate the humanitarian efforts and displayed his knowledge of the programs in a thorough briefing to the team. In Akot by contrast, NGOs cited the lack of an effective SRRA structure to help coordinate and direct NGO interventions as impacting the efficiency of the humanitarian effort. The SRRA representative in Narus appeared well informed and complimentary regarding NGO programs but the team detected tension between the SRRA and the SPLM commissioner, particularly when the commissioner stated his need for copies of all NGO programs and budgets in his area. (The SRRA already has an opportunity to review and comment on all OLS/NGO proposals.) Also in Narus, the SRRA Secretary was one of the managers of an OFDA/CRS-supported barter shop project that involved trading livestock for non-food goods. In Tambura, there was a very congenial relationship between CARE and the SRRA Secretary and the SRRA is responsible not only for providing security for barter shop operations, but also for management of the two satellite barter shops. (Note: The team shared with CARE its concern that the CARE barter program was encouraging the establishment of a parastatal and asked that the program shift emphasis to allow for increased involvement of cooperatives and/or private traders.) In Yambio (and probably elsewhere), the SRRA serves as the central bank for exchange of hard currency and collects "taxes". In Eastern Equatoria, the SRRA draws up the food distribution lists and actually distributes food while NGOs provide some supervision. The SRRA in this area is also under considerable pressure from the SPLA to divert food due to the presence of standing armies and ongoing fighting. Elsewhere, the SRRA does not manage the distribution, but rather serves as intermediary with village chiefs soliciting beneficiary lists from them.

The team believes that some of the SRRA's functions would more appropriately be handled by local traders (eg. management of the CARE barter shops) and by WFP/NGOs directly (eg. food distributions). Other functions should, in principle, be transferred to a civil authority once consolidated and stronger. For now, however, the SRRA is the only administrative body receiving direct donor support and therefore assumes many civil functions. Unfortunately, in so doing its effectiveness as a coordinator of humanitarian activities is diluted. Also, continued support to the SRRA in the absence of support to the civil administration could

result in tension between the two structures.

Along with debating whether support for the SRRA fosters or hinders the development of an effective civil administration in southern Sudan, the international community must grapple with an even tougher issue with regard to its support to the SRRA. On the one hand, OLS and the NGOs must work with the SRRA (and RASS) in their areas of operation and many provide transportation, in-kind materials and even pay technical staff salaries to help the SRRA do their job of coordinating relief/rehabilitation efforts. Arguments are powerful and convincing that forming Sudanese partners that understand the groundrules of humanitarian assistance and are prepared to defend assistance against abuse by the military results in better accountability for relief efforts. Such support also fosters good relations which permit the smooth functioning of NGO programs. However, the international community is cognizant that it is financially supporting a quasi-government body in a rebel held area at a time when such support is withheld to similar structures within the Khartoum government. To address this dilemma, OLS (and donor governments) has placed restrictions on the direct provision of hard currency to the SRRA. Instead, stationery is provided, rents are paid directly to landlords and equipment is donated. Such measures serve to avoid addressing the tougher policy issues: Should the UN be supporting the humanitarian wing of a rebel movement? In so doing, are we violating the sovereignty of Sudan?

USAID (through OFDA) played a leading role in encouraging the establishment of the SRRA and, through OLS, supporting capacity building efforts until 1994. Then, following increased pilferage of relief goods by the SPLM, USAID funding was stopped. Without the USAID leadership, some donors also denied funding while others, like CIDA, became quietly supportive. The SRRA has since taken significant steps towards improving accountability and officials have recently committed to transparent registration of beneficiaries in Eastern Equatoria.

**RECOMMENDATION:** The United States Government must make a policy decision related to U.S. funding for the SRRA and RASS. A policy decision is necessary in order to avoid ad hoc treatment of this issue which is obviously tied to U.S. longer term political aims in Sudan. The team recommends that any support to SRRA/RASS be provided through UNICEF and the NGOs--UNICEF to support specific capacity building of SRRA as an organization and through NGOs who might use SRRA seconded staff as technicians in their programs. U.S. support to build this capacity would also permit greater weight in a dialogue that could help shape a more responsive and effective SRRA/RASS.

**FINDING 3:** While the priority of health interventions is to provide emergency health care and vaccination services to the most vulnerable in displaced camps and/or insecure areas, most NGOs are implementing programs in more secure areas and most health programs are addressing chronic health problems.

**DISCUSSION:** The OLS health strategy is to increase coverage and utilization of preventive and basic curative services while empowering communities with the skills and means to protect and promote community and individual health. The main program interventions include primary health care, Expanded Program on Immunization (EPI) and guinea worm. Geographic priority is given to Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile but access has consistently hampered implementation in these areas. The past two years have thus seen a significant increase in the amount of health programs in the more secure Western Equatoria and a continuation of health programs in Eastern Equatoria where the majority of the displaced camps are located.

OFDA-funded health programs visited by the BHR team included IMC in Tambura, SMC in Narus, ARC in Manglalore and MSF/B in Mapel. Also visited were the NPA hospital in Chukudum, Diocese of Torit activities in Torit and the World Vision health program in Yambio. These visits do not present a comprehensive review of health programs in the south (for example, no sites in RASS areas were visited), but permit the team to make a few comments on health interventions in southern Sudan.

Most NGOs are adhering to the OLS health strategy. All health programs visited focus on the provision of primary health care through primary health care centers (PHCCs) and primary health care units (PHCUs). The PHCC/PHCUs provide out-patient services including consultations, EPI and guinea worm treatment. Several NGOs have added onchocerciasis treatment to their services, using drugs provided by the Carter Center. Utilizing an OLS/SRRA-approved nine month training program, NGOs train community health workers to work in the centers/units and regular refresher training is provided to previously trained workers. Communities are usually called upon to construct the units and, eventually, to support the community health workers with incentives of food. For the moment, however, most NGOs are either supplementing or replacing this community input with cash and/or incentives (eg. salt, soap).

OLS and NGOs have not been able to meet the geographical priorities of the health sector due to insecurity. As a result, many NGOs have focused their health activities in

areas that are easily accessible and secure, rather than on areas of greatest need. Advances in more secure areas are reflected by UNICEF statistics reporting 100 percent vaccination coverage in Western Equatoria as compared to only four percent coverage in northern Bahr el Ghazal.

NGOs face a number of other challenges in implementing health programs in southern Sudan. Identifying qualified community health workers is difficult given the low educational levels in the south. Of even more concern is the gap in higher level medical expertise at the medical assistant level. Also, primary health care programs are reliant on appropriate referral systems and donors are reluctant to invest in hospital services. Currently, OLS/NGOs are supporting hospitals in Tambura, Billing, Adior, Maridi and Akobo while NPA supports an additional three hospitals in Eastern Equatoria. Distances that must be covered from PHCCs to hospitals often make referral impossible and often there are no qualified doctors to handle the patients; at the hospital in Yambio, which lost I/NGO support following the forced withdrawal of MSF/France, nurses are providing surgery in the absence of trained surgeons. Although the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) tries to provide medical evacuation flights whenever possible, emergency surgical needs remain a second priority to ICRC's primary mandate to provide health care for war wounded.

Availability of health kits from UNICEF is also problematic. The growth in the number of NGOs (nearly 80 percent of all NGOs working in Sudan work in the health sector) has also increased the requirements for UNICEF to provide medical kits and cold chain supplies. UNICEF-supported programs require 150 medical kits each month and over \$200,000 worth of oral rehydration salts (ORS) each year. Vaccinations, cold chain supplies, including refrigerators, coolers, and smaller portable vaccine holders, are all supplied by UNICEF. According to UNICEF, nearly a six month lead time is needed to insure timely arrival of the inputs from Copenhagen yet UNICEF is unable to order so far in advance given donor funding cycles. NGOs have complained that they are inadequately served by UNICEF and often use their own resources to both supplement kits and purchase basic medicines. ECHO also recently instituted a grant with Pharmaciens sans Frontieres to procure drugs in the region for provision to all ECHO-funded NGOs.

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS:**

1. OFDA should prioritize its funding for health care programs addressing the needs of displaced populations, malnourished populations and/or populations in areas

where immunization coverage is comparatively low. OFDA should defer funding for any new programs that do not address the needs of the above groups until the OLS health sector develops--in concert with NGOs, SRRA and RASS--standards for basic levels of health care coverage to mitigate crisis. For example, what is the minimal level of PHCCs/PHCUs necessary per payam/county/population to help mitigate crisis? For the moment, OFDA should phase out funding for health care programs in Western Equatoria and other areas that do not meet the above criterion.

2. To support emergency health programs in insecure areas, OFDA should be prepared to fund mobile health operations. NGOs implementing such activities should focus on measles vaccinations and curative care rather than attempting to establish centers/units or conduct an EPI program.
3. USAID's drug procurement restrictions give OFDA a comparative disadvantage in the health sector. While continuing to support the above emergency health programs, OFDA and SFO should consult with other donors regarding the possibility of one donor (eg. ECHO) taking the lead on more rehabilitation-oriented (non priority areas/ non priority populations) health care activities while OFDA takes the lead in rehabilitative aspects in another sector.
4. OFDA should continue to support the training of CHWs utilizing the nine month training curriculum as part of priority health care programs. Additionally the IRC regional training centers, which were set up with OFDA support in 1989, have been an important component of capacity building in the south. Now, in areas where NGOs often have little or no access, trained CHWs carry on the work. OFDA's continued support for this activity is advised given the need to reach the most vulnerable.

**FINDING 4:** The WFP food economy model has gained widespread acceptance as an assessment tool in southern Sudan among NGOs, the UN and the SRRA/RASS but its effectiveness is limited by timeliness and accuracy.

**DISCUSSION:** The widely accepted SCF/UK food economy model represents a concerted attempt by UN/OLS to standardize and professionalize the manner in which food needs are assessed in southern Sudan. The model, which is used by WFP field monitors and NGO staff alike, strives to take into account all the various sources of food (eg. cattle, wild fruits)

available to populations in order to determine food security. Use of the model involves the collection and analysis of a number of socio-economic indicators gleaned from interviews with key informants and random inhabitants of the area under assessment. The 1995 OLS Assessment Report represents the results of this technique and provides a surprising amount of detail regarding food security at the household level in many areas.

The use of the food economy model has definitely provided a better understanding of the various coping mechanisms in place and relief programs should now be able to take these into account so that traditional coping mechanisms are supported and not destroyed. However, the usefulness of the model as a planning tool depends very much on the error factors and timeliness of the data collection, analysis and dissemination. The BHR team was concerned by reports that the model generated errors such that areas that needed food were denied food while the opposite also occurred and food was delivered where it was not needed. The team also questions the impact of conducting a food economy model assessment in the wake of an emergency event, such as the destruction of a village, when previous assessments should provide an initial baseline against which a rapid follow-up assessment should result in sufficient information to respond. One shortcoming of the program may be that it does not adequately capture local coping mechanisms that may surface in times of extreme stress. In this way the model could actually help to destroy self-reliance of populations who cannot be guaranteed of international support forever.

Related to concerns about the model, the BHR team has been disturbed by the low quality of WFP field monitors in the past. WFP has admitted that they have had difficulty attracting experienced officers and have often ended up hiring very young, inexperienced (both in Africa and in technical matters) staff. With the introduction of the food economy model there is an urgent need to upgrade the quality of staff to ensure that the analysis conducted is informed and sensible. WFP assured the team that recruitment of experienced personnel was underway.

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS:**

1. OLS should not overly rely on the food economy model for food aid decision making. While providing a good analytical tool to examine past and current food security in communities, the model's limitations mean that it is essential in the context of the Sudan emergency to couple food economy assessments with common sense and objective expertise from the area in

order to develop an appropriate response to a particular situation.

2. BHR and REDSO/SFO should follow up with WFP to ensure that qualified staff are being recruited.

**FINDING 5:** Overall progress has been made in strengthening management and monitoring aspects of food aid programs and achieving more reliable population estimates, however, displaced persons and war-affected residents need to make greater efforts at producing at least some of their own food requirements. CRS and NPA need to establish greater linkages between their agricultural rehabilitation programs and emergency food programs. Greater efforts are also needed to reduce general feeding programs and increase targeted feeding programs.

**DISCUSSION:** Working through NPA, CRS and WFP in southern Sudan, BHR/FFP provided over 42,000 MT of Title II emergency food commodities (cereals, pulses and vegetable oil), valued at \$23.7 million, to vulnerable groups in displaced camps and war-affected rural communities in 1995. Progress has been made in strengthening management and monitoring aspects of food aid programs and achieving more reliable population estimates. In addition, the distribution of seeds and tools to many of the target populations also receiving food aid should improve overall household food security levels. In assessing needs and distributing relief rations, as well as seeds and tools, the donor assistance should reflect the fact that actual and traditional sources of nutrition are, in many places, largely derived from animal protein and fish. Overall requirements for emergency food aid should continue to drop if rains are adequate and no large scale displacements of civilians occur because of the civil conflict.

NPA and CRS are mainly targeting displaced populations, although both are also targeting some war and/or drought-affected residents for short periods of time at reduced ration levels. In most areas, CRS and NPA are also implementing agricultural rehabilitation programs for their target populations receiving food aid (including displaced persons). The team noted a disdain for agricultural labor among pastoralists, wherein cultivation is deemed as work for the aged and for the very young. Agricultural rehabilitation programs must include a greater cross-section of the targeted society to be effective.

In many of the areas of Eastern and Western Equatoria in which USAID commodities are distributed, a local species of oil seed tree (lulu) is found. Camp residents are

knowledgeable about the use of the lulu seed for oil, however they say they lack the presses with which to efficiently make use of the oil seeds. The team's impression was that the presence of the U.S. vegetable oil in the ration may also be discouraging use of the local oil seed. NPA indicated their interest in encouraging the exploitation of this oil seed resource as a substitute for imported oil in the food ration and as a possible cash or barter resource.

It was also observed that throughout the areas visited, sorghum beer was being brewed from commodities supplied as relief food, giving the team the impression that the quantities of sorghum in the ration may be higher than the current food needs of the beneficiaries.

The team believes there should be a greater linkage between our emergency food aid and agricultural rehabilitation programs and both NPA and CRS have a strategy to halt distributions for a few months after the harvest. The perceived overdependence on food aid in many parts of Eastern and some parts of Western Equatoria was of particular concern. The team provided a strong message to SRRA officials that it is their responsibility to get the people (displaced persons and residents) mobilized and get the message across that they will be required to make greater efforts at producing at least some of their own food requirements because food aid distributions will be halted after the harvest for a certain length of time depending on growing conditions. NPA and CRS have been encouraged to more directly link their food distributions to agricultural activities by delaying their next food distributions until targeted populations have begun to prepare their fields. The team also believes that CRS and NPA should look at ways to do increased targeting of food aid and reduce the overall level of general distributions.

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS:**

1. The team recommends that the oil and sorghum ration components in the Eastern and Western Equatoria feeding programs be re-examined by the implementing NGOs and FFP with a view to more appropriately address the current food intake requirements and maximize use of local food resources.
2. Populations in Eastern Equatoria need to be mobilized to prepare the land for planting. The team urges that linkages be reinforced between food distributions and agricultural land preparation. To force this issue the team has recommended that the next food distribution in the camps be withheld pending land preparation by the

displaced. The team also supports CRS efforts to carry out a valid tukul (hut) count, to rationalize beneficiary numbers in camps around New Cush.

**FINDING 6:** Food production, and hence a measure of food security, has been attained in some areas of the south visited by the team due to better security, timely inputs and good rains. Some agricultural programs have thus moved beyond relief and into longer term rehabilitation activities requiring increased coordination efforts in approaches to training technology and extension work.

**DISCUSSION:** According to UNICEF statistics, OLS has distributed 2,000 MT of seeds and over 1 million tools to southern Sudanese farmers in the last two years. The results have been dramatic in some areas, closing the hunger gap and reducing, if not eliminating, the need for further large scale distributions of seed or food in 1996, except for cases of newly displaced, flood victims, and other vulnerable groups identified through field assessments. This change away from the need for large-scale emergency distributions to address widespread malnutrition has necessitated an adjustment in the OLS agricultural sector approach towards sustaining food security and promoting self reliance. Agricultural programs now address longer term rehabilitation needs of rural populations.

Western Equatoria, traditionally a surplus producing area, produced a dramatic surplus in 1995, stimulated by barter shop commodities available for trade and due to improved security as well as distribution of seeds and tools in the last few years. By some estimates, farmers have produced as much as 20,000 MT beyond their consumption needs. Through the OFDA-funded World Vision and CARE barter shop programs in Yambio and Tambura, part of this surplus can be purchased and redistributed in needy areas of the south reachable from the two sites. In so doing, transportation costs of costly airlift from Lokki can be reduced, and OLS can begin to move away, in some areas, from reliance on flight clearances from Khartoum for access to needy populations. Should this system be continued, improved storage for cereals and seeds will be needed so that NGOs will not feel pressured to distribute commodities where they are not immediately needed. Beyond meeting emergency needs in the south, production in Western Equatoria will have to be sustained by eventually helping farmers find other market opportunities, including support to agricultural activities that transform basic products into higher valued commodities (eg. oil pressing).

Other activities are underway to promote better nutrition

and varied food options in Western Equatoria. The CRS umbrella grant is working with community groups in rabbit raising and fish farming, while World Vision's Agricultural Recovery Program (ARP) is focussing on testing local and improved seed varieties for highest performance. The team looks forward to a closer examination of such activities as rabbit raising to see whether poultry or ducks might not be a more appropriate intervention in the area. Also, while these activities are not funded by OFDA, the team questions whether World Vision's ARP should be testing imported exotic seed varieties that depend on ideal production conditions when local varieties already produce surpluses.

Areas of Bahr el Ghazal visited by the team have also recorded increased food production due to a variety of interventions including distribution of seeds and tools, extension work and good rains. Overall food security for resident populations has consequently improved. According to farmers in Akot, the introduction of the ox plow in their area by Association of Napata Volunteers (ANV) has permitted them to increase areas under production as much as four-fold in one year. Farmers reported they had cultivated enough food to last through the hunger gap and to hire labor to help with the extra weeding that was now required. NPA working in the Akot area has now turned its attention towards refining farming techniques by improving tool designs, testing local seed varieties under different farming conditions to determine best efficiency and training progressive farmers to disseminate the new technologies.

Similar work is being done by World Vision in Tonj County. Their program which began as a relief program in 1993 has now shifted virtually entirely to a rehabilitation program encompassing the propagation and dissemination of fruit trees and other horticultural crops as well as multiplication of maize and sorghum varieties that help fill the hunger gap. Focus on root crops as a hunger season crop is also being looked at and tried. World Vision is also engaged in ox plow training. Nearby, SUPRAID is embarked on a community development training program that includes on-site training of community development workers (CDW) ("change agents") and progressive farmers as well as the establishment of seed banks for horticultural crops.

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS:**

1. OLS, working with the SRRA/RASS, should strengthen coordination between NGOs working in the food/agricultural sector by facilitating meetings in the field, sponsoring topical seminars in Lokki or Nairobi to foster consistency in approach where practical and, by taking a critical look at project

components, to determine their appropriateness for the southern Sudan context.

2. Although OFDA must give priority to emergency seeds and tools distributions to vulnerable populations, support should also be provided to agricultural rehabilitation initiatives that promote food security that will reduce dependence on relief food and vulnerability of populations to stress in the future.

**FINDING 7: Barter programs in Western Equatoria have been successful in generating surplus agricultural production for redistribution within southern Sudan and, despite changing food needs, opportunities to deliver the surplus in areas of the south still exist.**

**DISCUSSION:** OFDA is funding World Vision and CARE in Western Equatoria to implement barter programs to encourage sufficient surplus agricultural production to meet food/seed needs in deficit areas while meeting the communities need for non-food goods. At the time the programs were designed two years ago, several factors made this program an interesting prospect for southern Sudan. First, the border with Uganda was open suggesting that some surplus might be moved into northern Uganda to feed Sudanese refugee populations that were then relying on imported food aid commodities. Second, a large and needy displaced population numbering tens of thousands was residing in Maridi quite close to Yambio. Also, relief planners believed that moving surpluses from Western Equatoria to Eastern Equatoria would be more cost effective than transporting donor food from the Mombasa port to Eastern Equatoria. Based on a study by WFP, this latter option has been deemed cost ineffective.

The shops have been tremendously successful in encouraging surplus production. Scarce non-food commodities (eg. soap, salt, jerry cans, bicycles and spare parts, etc.) imported by World Vision/CARE to trade for food/seed in the barter shop are much coveted by farmers who have difficulty accessing these goods on their own. According to WFP, maize and sorghum surpluses this year could amount to over 16,000 MT and groundnuts to almost 18,000 MT. NGOs have only committed to buying sufficient food/seed to meet the target purchase goals of 1,000 MT maize (World Vision) and 100 MT food and almost 400 MT seed (CARE). The challenge in such programs is that the NGOs must project at the time of project design exactly how much grain or seed they will purchase. CARE based its target on letters of intent from other NGOs, while World Vision estimated food needs based on projected needs of WFP/NGOs. This forward planning is highly subject to the vagaries of relief needs in a war

situation and to the availability of hard currency by WFP/NGOs to actually purchase the food or seed.

A selling price (translated into barter goods) must also be negotiated by NGOs engaging in barter shop operations and the farming community. In 1993/94, NGOs highly subsidized the barter operations by paying high prices for the food/seed and not reflecting the cost of transport in the pricing of barter items. NGO attempts to lower the price to move closer to regional food/seed prices met with staunch resistance from the SRRA at first although significant process has been achieved for the 1996 harvest. Though improved, World Vision continues to significantly subsidize barter operations while CARE's prices are now based on cost recovery, including transport.

At the time of the team's visit, CARE was still meeting its seed contracts and hoped to have buyers for all seed purchased. World Vision on the other hand, with a 1,000 MT target purchase, was facing a situation of dramatically reduced relief needs in the previously targeted areas, improved food security in other areas and no buyers for the 1,000 MT. However, new relief needs have been identified in Bahr el Ghazal targeting displaced people from Gogrial and flood-affected populations in Tonj. A proposal is under review to support World Vision to move 500 MT to Tonj county for flood-affected. Additional tonnages are needed by WFP/World Vision to feed the Gogrial displaced. Also, 450 MT is required by NPA in Akot for displaced from Wau. Donor efforts to purchase/transport these commodities need to occur within the next few weeks to allow food movement overland prior to the rains.

An issue that must be addressed in the context of food procurement under barter programs is the timing of redistribution. The presence of food intended for relief distribution may end up driving the program rather than needs driving the distribution. In this context, if NGOs continue to encourage surplus production in 1996/97, improved storage for bartered food should be looked into so that NGOs are not pressured into distributing food where and when it is not needed.

Another issue is the need for hard currency to fund purchase and transportation of the locally produced food. WFP/NGOs wishing to purchase food from World Vision or CARE must pay cash to cover the costs of barter good purchases. Yet the major donors in Sudan tend to contribute food in kind while cash is reserved to support health and other non-food interventions. Seed purchases prove less difficult to finance given that funds are usually included in NGO grants for such purposes. The local purchase of food, however,

presents a special challenge and will require creative sourcing of funds, such as the regional monetization concept proposed by REDSO/FFP.

The closure of the border with Zaire has also left barter shops completely dependent on OLS air assets to move barter goods into Western Equatoria. Without a change in ground access to Western Equatoria from Uganda or an easing of the border closure with Zaire, this problem will continue. NGOs could, however, reduce the dependency of the barter shops on air assets by increasing local capacity to produce some of the goods sold in the barter shops. Possible linkages between the barter shops and local cottage industries (soap making, tailoring, tools production) should be examined.

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS:**

1. OFDA should fund a pilot food security effort to purchase and move up to 500 MT from Yambio to Tonj. If possible, the funding should be provided through WFP to serve as a catalyst for future local purchase efforts. Funding through NPA to purchase and move food from Yambio to Akot should also be seriously considered. The timing of these responses is urgent as the rainy season is approaching.
2. As a next step, the potential for offshore monetization should be explored by BHR/FFP and REDSO/FFP to support local purchases and other food security interventions. For example, the CIF cost of Title II emergency food to the Yirol area costs between \$1,000 to \$1,100/MT for sorghum. Assuming security is adequate on key routes, surplus sorghum or maize from Western Equatoria could be purchased and transported to the Yirol area for a CIF cost of between \$550 and \$650/MT, a significant savings over transporting Title II food. Monetization funds should be considered to support such local purchase efforts and also to fund seed multiplication efforts, improved storage programs and other food security interventions.
3. WFP should be encouraged to be more aggressive in identifying new cash funding from donors for local (internal Sudan) purchases and to attempt to do more road transport of food wherever security and weather permit to reduce their heavy reliance on expensive airlifts.
4. Further funding for barter programs should be dependent on the identification of food aid or seed needs or marketing opportunities for surpluses in the next year.

5. NGOs should look for marketing linkages between cottage industries and the barter shops.
6. Juba remains an obvious and ongoing relief food target for surplus production in western Equatoria. While both sides in the conflict do not support this option, OLS and other actors should continue to raise this issue for consideration whenever possible.

**FINDING 8:** Building the capacity of Sudanese indigenous NGOs (SINGOs) and supporting local groups to implement projects are ways of reducing costs of assistance and building local capacity and self reliance, however capacity building takes time and results are difficult to measure during the grant period normally allotted for OFDA programs.

**DISCUSSION:** The Nairobi Joint Statement of June 30, 1995 proclaims a commitment by international NGOs, donors and the UN that "the future of civil society in south Sudan lies in the establishment and development of indigenous organizations which can enable its people to become as self reliant as possible." The statement goes on to urge international NGOs to commit resources to developing indigenous capacity, whether NGOs or community organizations, to improve effectiveness and thus sustainability of interventions in the field. UNICEF/OLS has focussed on capacity building by supporting the development of SINGOs and by encouraging capacity building as a part of regular sector programs of NGOs.

In keeping with this vision, OFDA has funded SINGOs partnering with international NGOs, notably SMC with NPA and SUPRAID with World Vision, but also has supported through the CRS Umbrella Grant local community groups and other Sudanese NGOs engaged in self-reliance activities ranging from ox plows to soap making to fish farming. The view of OFDA and SFO, and indeed probably of many who are committed to this ideal, has been that local organizations have strong comparative advantages over international structures. First, they are Sudanese and thus committed for a longer time to the future. Second, they have better reach into local communities, thus having the possibility of anchoring programs within the community very early on, and they are less expensive and capital input dependent than international NGOs. However, such NGOs require some guidance from international NGOs who are more familiar with accessing donor resources, record keeping and financial management. OFDA's intention in funding SUPRAID and SMC in particular was to encourage the development of these skills through a close association with World Vision and Norwegian People's Aid. At the same time there was an expectation

that these NGOs would meet the outputs of their programs on schedule as described in their proposals. On another level, SINGOs, because many of their leaders are personalities in the Sudanese community, are finding they have an advocacy role to play in the area of human rights and humanitarian principles.

During the OFDA review it became clear that the primary objective of the partnership, the strengthening of the local NGO itself, has not been achieved. Both NPA and World Vision have admitted that sufficient time has not been committed to SMC and SUPRAID to foster such growth. For instance, the OFDA team found that, while SMC had met the output goals of the health program in Narus -- the establishment of PHCCs and PHCUs -- they had failed to work with the local communities and thus did not enjoy grass roots support that would promote sustainability. On the other hand, SUPRAID had invested heavily in community mobilization during their first year and thus had not met the objectives set out in their program proposal to OFDA. Both NGOs may have tried to take on more activities than reasonable given their lack of institutional capacity, SMC launching a comprehensive primary health care system and SUPRAID wanting to train community development workers, progressive farmers AND set up a seed bank all in one year. This diffusion of activities extends to extracurricular advocacy activities that also consume an enormous amount of SINGO leadership time.

AN, a Sudanese NGO funded under the CRS umbrella grant, has been more of a success. The NGO, in its first year, has been able to mobilize communities, train their own staff and train farmers, all without a large Nairobi office and the usual accoutrements of an NGO operation. An success may rest in its narrow focus on one activity, the technical skills of its field director and the project location (origin of both the NGO director and field director).

Besides the AN program, many of the CRS umbrella grants have been provided to small community groups engaged in soap making, fish farming, rabbit raising, etc. Of concern to the team is how these activities that benefit a relatively small group of people can be broadened to impact the larger community. One way would be to link them to other programs such as the barter shops. CRS is presently undertaking an internal evaluation of the project and hopefully this question will be addressed in their findings.

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS:**

1. OFDA should continue support for Sudanese NGOs and community organizations but must recognize that success

in these programs can only be achieved if time is allowed for the institutional capacity building of the NGO itself and in exploring linkages with other programs in the area.

2. CRS should make an effort to link the small grants into larger activities of other NGOs to build sustainability and have wider impact.
3. OFDA should support UNICEF's efforts to encourage all NGOs to make capacity building a part of all their program interventions. This can be achieved by on-the-job training, as is often the case in the health sector, or through working with local groups who might be participants in the program implementation.

**FINDING 9:** OLS Lokki operations are stretched to the limit attempting to meet demands of NGOs and UN agencies in the field and hampered in coverage by flight denials from Khartoum.

**DISCUSSION:** Lökkichokkio as the base for southern Sudan field operations has grown from a temporary tented camp constructed in 1989 accommodating about 40 people to a permanent installation catering to 150 or more people each night in tukuls equipped with electricity. NGOs are provided with accommodations free of charge and sign in for meals in logs sorted by NGO. Food catering is contracted to Africa Expeditions and includes meals and light snacks. Laundry service is provided on a daily basis, and showers/latrines are located throughout the camp to serve the burgeoning population. The OLS camp manager told the OFDA team that water consumption in the camp has soared to an astronomical 200 liters/per person/per day, nearly twice that of a modern city in the West. Although some loss is due to illicit sale of water by some camp employees (and OLS is addressing this problem), the fact remains that the water table in Lokki is threatened as is the long term sustainability of the camp. Camp residents and staff are constantly reminded of the need to conserve water. Power operates 24 hours a day using 200 KVA generators, a resource center has been established to provide study/working space for research or report writing and an open air bar offers a place for workers to relax.

Logistics operations in the camp are likewise daunting. Lokki supports some 40 NGOs and UN agencies in the field, and moves about 1,000 persons per month using various combinations of Twin Otters, Caravans and a Buffalo aircraft. At the time of the team's visit, OLS was operating with one Buffalo and three small aircraft, grossly

insufficient to meet the demands of the programs (the aircraft must also accommodate food rations, medical supplies, barter and incentive commodities for staff payments and projects, as well as construction materials, office supplies, etc. to support field operations). NGOs submit their cargo priorities to UNICEF which then consolidates an overall prioritization and submits the list to WFP logistics for flight scheduling. NGOs located in one flight destination must share cargo space, thus reducing what is available to each on every flight. For example a Caravan that can handle 700 kg to a location may divide that weight between passengers, food and project supplies for three or four NGOs. The further the destination the less the cargo, because fuel must be carried. In some cases, WFP has pre-positioned fuel to improve the efficiency of flights, but the fact remains that there is always a back log waiting to move. Some OLS staff believe the back log is a positive aspect -- that the back log will drive the program. But on the other hand, NGOs waiting for urgently needed project supplies see grant time slipping away and no results to show their donors. Despite all the problems, the consolidated Lokki logistical operations are a cost savings to donors overall and do foster coordination between NGOs working in southern Sudan.

That said, many NGOs are asking their donors for additional flights for their programs. One example serves to illustrate this need. Mobile health programs such as those being implemented by MSF/Belgium in Bahr el Ghazal (with OFDA funding) can only operate if they have regular and confirmed deliveries of ice packs and vaccines by air. Failure to deliver the supplies on time will result in substantial program delays and a waste of scarce donor resources. The OFDA team visited MSF/B on February 23-24. The nurse on site had been waiting for a delivery of ice packs so that he could carry out a second phase of EPI vaccination. To organize the EPI he also needed to give advance notice to the target village and thus needed a definite time of arrival for the ice pack flight. Unable to secure that information, he has until now been unable to undertake round 2 of the vaccinations. With rains approaching, his movements will be ever more difficult, jeopardizing project goals and objectives.

In other discussions the team learned that some NGOs, frustrated by lack of flight clearances to some destinations, are considering alternative structures to OLS as a way to meet these urgent needs. Unless NGOs are organized, however, it will be difficult for them to each raise sufficient money to support the logistics required by Sudan field operations. Only NPA, which has years of Sudan experience, good relations with the SPLA/M and generous

levels of untied funding, is able to run an effective operation outside of OLS.

Other issues surrounding Lokki operations are related to personnel -- specifically, whether individual NGOs need to base staff in Lokki, whether staff should have logistics or program expertise and whether they should be expatriates or Kenyans. At least 20 OLS/NGOs now base staff in Lokki, often to "lobby" with OLS managers to insure that their cargo gets on relief planes. There is the general sense that, despite objective priority lists, cargo decisions are often made on a more personal basis. In this regard, some NGOs report that expatriate staff are more effective in negotiating for cargo space with OLS managers than Kenyan staff. The OFDA team raised this issue with WFP in Lokki who was already aware of this perception. According to the WFP representative, cargo priorities are set objectively, according to the priority list and the NGOs own programmatic priorities. Problems arise, however, when the flight schedule changes due to emergency needs and/or flight restrictions and NGOs are forced to make on the spot programmatic decisions regarding program priorities. The ability and comfort level of the NGO's Lokki representative to make such decisions without the ability to consult with Nairobi and the field is dependent on the amount of information that representative has on its program goals and objectives. To address this problem, the WFP representative informed that efforts are underway to insure that Nairobi-based NGO managers prioritize their cargo lists more specifically on a weekly basis.

At the same time, however, OLS chief Philip O'Brien informed the BHR team of OLS's plans to shift the base of its resident program officers from the field to Lokki and to change the management of Lokki from a Senior Logistics Officer to a Senior Field Program Coordinator. Such a move could have the positive effect of moving program coordination closer to the field but could also lead to the establishment of parallel programmatic structures in Nairobi, Lokki and the field. The role of the field, Lokki and Nairobi (where NGO country directors, OLS sectoral heads, donors and the SRRA Chairman are based) must be sorted out to insure maximum coordination in a cost effective manner.

A final aspect of Lokki operations includes the road and airstrip maintenance. Roads from Lokki to Narus and displaced camps in Natinga are heavily traveled by humanitarian workers and require continual maintenance to avoid serious accidents and wear and tear on vehicles.

## RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. OFDA should continue its support for Lokki base operations, including WFP flight operations, UNICEF aircraft and WFP road maintenance. At the same time, OFDA should be flexible to provide funding to NGOs who require supplemental funding for air or other logistics operations to ensure success of their programs within OLS. Support for NGOs outside OLS as a way of meeting otherwise unmet needs due to denial of flights should also continue on a case-by-case basis.
2. OFDA and SFO should avoid support for the establishment of parallel structures in Nairobi, Lokki and the field. The issue of whether Lokki should serve as a logistics or programmatic base and general concern about OLS base management structures and relationships, should be addressed in the ongoing DHA OLS review.
3. OFDA should provide fiscal year (FY) 96 funding, at levels similar to FY 95, to support OLS operations. Funding disbursement cannot await the results of the OLS assessment, however the levels of FY 97 funding should take into account the results of the OLS review and subsequent donor consultations.

# APPENDIX I

## Team Itinerary

**TRAVEL SCHEDULE: FEBRUARY 12 - MARCH 1, 1996**

KF: Kate Farnsworth, OFDA Regional Advisor for Africa  
CM: Carolyn Mutamba, FFP Emergency Resources Officer for Sudan  
LM: Larry Meserve, Head of Sudan Field Office, Nairobi  
VN: Valerie Newsom, OFDA Horn of Africa Regional Team Leader

Monday, February 12:

09:55 am KF/CM/LM/VN arrive in Nairobi  
11:30 am KF/CM/LM/VN meet with REDSO/FFP  
12:30 pm KF/CM/LM/VN lunch with Paul Filler, Sue Hogwood of UK Embassy, Mel Middleton and CIDA officials  
02:00 pm KF/CM/LM/VN meet with Philip O'Brien of OLS/UNICEF  
03:00 pm KF/CM/LM/VN meet with representatives of OLS/WFP  
06:00 pm KF/CM/LM/VN attend reception at Gettier residence

Tuesday, February 13:

06:00 am KF/VN depart for JK International Airport  
08:00 am KF/VN depart Nairobi for Lokki  
08:00 am CM/LM meet with REDSO/FFP staff  
09:00 am CM/LM meet with USAID/Somalia staff  
10:00 am KF/VN arrive in Lokki and, over the course of the day, meet with CRS, MSF/B, NPA, UNICEF and WFP representatives  
10:00 am CM/LM meet with CRS representatives  
11:00 am CM/LM meet with NPA representatives  
12:30 pm CM/LM, along with CRS, NPA and WFP representatives, attend donors meeting at OLS in Nairobi  
02:30 pm CM/LM attend OLS/NGO/donor meeting at Gigiri

Wednesday, February 14:

- KF/VN spend day and night with World Vision in Yambio meeting with civil administrator, Governor of Equatoria and SRRA authorities
- CM/LM fly from Nairobi to Lokki in am, meet with CRS/NPA officials, travel overland to New Cush, meet with SRRA and CRS officials, visit DP camp and warehouse, then overnight in New Cush

Thursday, February 15:

- KF/VN visit World Vision barter program and CRS umbrella grant programs in Yambio
- VN travels overland to Tambura to visit IMC and CARE programs and overnights at CARE compound
- KF overnights in Yambio with World Vision staff
- CM/LM visit agricultural fields in and around New Cush as well as DP camp then travel overland to Ikotos and overnight at CRS compound

Friday, February 16:

- VN visits CARE barter program, IMC hospital and IMC health post in Tambura and overnights in Tambura
- KF attends meetings in Yambio and overnights in Yambio with World Vision staff
- CM/LM meet with SRRA officials in Ikotos then visit DP camps in Ngaluma and Ikotos town and CRS umbrella grant project

Saturday, February 17:

- KF/VN return to Lokki and overnight in Lokki
- CM/LM travel overland to Chukudum, meet with NPA officials and CRS umbrella grant manager for Eastern Equatoria then overnight at NPA compound

Sunday, February 18:

- KF/VN travel overland to Narus with NPA to visit SMC program and CRS umbrella grant projects, meet with SRRA and Civil Administrator, then overnight in Lokki
- CM/LM meet with SRRA officials in Chukudum, meet with ADRA officials, visit NPA hospital, NPA barter shop, CRS barter shop (umbrella grant) and agricultural sites between Chukudum and New Cush, then return overland to New Cush

Monday, February 19:

- KF/VN travel to Akot to visit NPA agricultural activities in Yirol County, then overnight in Akot with NPA
- CM/LM travel overland to Natinga with NPA officials, meet with SRRA officials, visit DP camps and return to Lokki to meet with WFP officials

Tuesday, February 20:

- VN/KF visit NPA and CRS program sites in Rumbek, meet Civil Administrator/SRRA authorities, discuss project proposal on site with ACROSS, then overnight in Akot with NPA
- CM/LM return to Nairobi on ECHO flight
- CM travels to Entebbe, Uganda on commercial flight, then overnights in hotel.

Wednesday, February 21:

- KF/VN return to Lokki and take connecting flight to Nyabagok to visit World Vision project site, then overnight in Nyabagok
- CM travels on ECHO aircraft to Arua, Uganda, then overland with NPA to Koboko, Uganda and on to Bomurye displaced camp. Overnights in displaced

camp with SRRA.

Thursday, February 22:

- KF/VN travel to Thiet to meet with Governor of Bahr el Ghazal and SRRA authorities and to visit SUPRAID project sites, then overnight at Nyabagok
- CM meets with Bomurye camp officials and Kajo Keji County Commissioner. Travels overland to Manglalore displaced camp. Meets with SRRA and camp officials and ARC medical coordinator, then overnights in ARC compound.

Friday, February 23:

- KF/VN visit World Vision agricultural activities in Nyabagok, drive to Mariel for pick-up by OLS flight to Mapel, visit MSF/B project site, meet with SRRA officials then overnight in Mapel with MSF/B staff
- CM meets with NPA agricultural extension team and visits proposed agricultural fields. Travels overland to Manglalore town for discussion with SRRA Secretary for Kajo Keji County, then on to Kerwa displaced camp. Meets with SRRA and camp officials in Kerwa, visits camp, proposed fields and water source. Returns overland to Koboki and overnights in NPA compound.

Saturday, February 24:

- KF/VN travel by SCF/UK plane to Lokki, attend debrief with WFP officials and continue to Nairobi on ECHO flight
- CM visits NPA warehouse in Koboko. Travels overland to Arua and then via MAF charter flight to Entebbe. Returns to Nairobi aboard commercial flight.

Sunday, February 25:

- No meetings scheduled.

Monday, February 26 and Tuesday, February 27:

- CM/VN attend Somalia strategy meetings
- 12:00 pm KF/VN meet with Katie Scherrer of IRC

Wednesday, February 28:

- 09:00 am KF/VN/LM meet with David Hughes, OLS Agriculture Coordinator
- 10:30 am KF/VN/LM meet with Ian Lavine, OLS Capacity Building Coordinator
- 11:15 am KF/VN/LM/CM meet with Burke Oberle, WFP D/Director
- 12:30 pm VN meets with Robin Marcos of ARC
- 02:00 pm KF/VN/LM meet with Arthur Chol and David Deng of

SRRA

03:30 pm KF/VN/LM/CM meet with Ted Chaiban of CRS  
04:40 pm KF/VN/LM meet with Steve Payne of IRC

Thursday, February 29:

09:00 am KF/VN/LM meet with Dr. Riak Gai of RASS  
10:00 am KF/VN/LM/CM meet with Keith Brown, USAID REDSO  
Director  
11:45 am VN/LM/CM meet with Helge Rohn and Adele Sowinska  
of NPA  
12:30 pm VN/LM meet with Bruce Mensor of World Vision  
02:00 pm KF/LM meet with Kitchel of CMA  
02:00 pm CM/VN attend Somalia strategy meetings  
10:55 pm KF/CM depart for CONUS

Friday, March 1:

08:00 am VN meets with Bob Sutton of SCF/US, Khartoum  
09:00 am VN meets with Joe Kessler of CARE, Khartoum  
10:00 am VN meets with Dabrovka Pem of ADRA, Khartoum  
01:00 pm VN/LM meet with Paul Filler/Tom Dodd of ECHO  
02:00 pm VN/LM meet with Stephanie Depriere of AICF  
03:30 pm VN/LM meet with Howard Berry and Michael Newton  
Brown of MCI/ACROSS  
11:55 pm VN departs for CONUS

**APPENDIX II**  
**OFDA Project Visits**

**CARE**

Activity: Emergency Recovery Program (#5067)

Area of Activity: Tambura (south)

Period of Activity: 8/13/95 - 12/25/96

FY 96 OFDA Funding: \$497,594

FY 95 OFDA Funding: \$602,161

Total OFDA Funding: \$1,099,755

Description: Promotion of household food security and the economic self-sufficiency of the population of Tambura county.

OFDA staff visited the CARE Emergency Recovery Program in Tambura from February 15 - 17, 1996.

CARE's barter shop operations involves encouraging surplus production in Tambura county by allowing farmers to trade various seeds and food quality maize/sorghum for various household goods. The purchased seeds/food are sold to NGOs/IOs for distribution in deficit areas of Southern Sudan. Barter shop commodities are sold at a price to include transport from Nairobi to Tambura and profits are held in a revolving fund to finance future barter shop commodities. Preferred commodities include salt, soap, bicycles, spare parts, trouser cloth, jerry cans, agricultural tools and other items.

Under the CARE system, farmers bring in seeds in 20 kg bags and food in 50 kg bags to a station where the commodities are checked for quality. Up to 5 MT are collected each day. The farmer is provided with a receipt that indicates the value of his commodities. The receipt is taken to an accountant who determines the monetary value and works out with the farmer how much of the commodities that he wishes to purchase he can afford. A copy of the receipt with the items that the farmer will purchase is provided to the barter shop and farmers are called in turn to receive their purchased goods. On a separate track, the seed/food purchased from the farmer is fumigated, the seed is treated and all are stored until shipment to the designated NGO/IO recipient. CARE only purchases sufficient seed/food to satisfy letters of intent/contracts with NGO/IOs.

CARE manages the barter shop process in Tambura town, but relies on the SRRA to manage the process from the (3) satellite stations. The SRRA is provided with commodities valued at a certain amount of seed/food and is responsible for returning that amount to CARE. The SRRA is responsible for insuring the security of the satellite stores and the store in Tambura town. To support this implementation role, 1.5% of the value of the collected food in barter shop commodities is provided to the SRRA. (As an aside, the SPLM collects an additional 15 kg tin of food from farmers in

"taxes".) From its profit, the SRRA is responsible for paying 50% of the staff salaries in the satellite operations, while CARE pays the remaining 50%. Since the SRRA assumed this implementation role, previous losses have been eliminated.

Utilizing other donor funds, CARE also implements seed multiplication/research/extension activities designed to improve the quality of seed produced by local farmers. CARE also supports 1/3 of the PHCUs in the county (with IMC supporting the other 2/3). CARE is also working with the local community to rehabilitate secondary roads to improve access to health care services. Food for work is sometimes provides to support these initiatives.

Future Plan: In 1996, CARE hopes to eliminate the need for donors to subsidize the cost of transporting barter commodities by strengthening the revolving fund. Over the following year they will also work to incorporate the overhead costs too, soon eliminating the need for other donor funding. CARE will work towards the ultimate goal of handing the entire operation over to a local cooperative or trader but asserts that this will be difficult until road routes to neighboring countries are open and a local entity is able to forge connections with purchases of the seed/food. CARE also hopes to incorporate support for cottage industries (eg. local soap production, tailoring) into its program. Also, rehabilitation and maintenance of primary roads is urgently needed in the county to facilitate the movement of the surpluses to deficit areas and CARE hopes to support labor intensive efforts of this kind. Increased seed multiplication/extension activities are also planned.

Water activities are also a serious need in the county. The current coverage is 1,500 people per water source (compared to the WHO standard of 500). CARE has submitted a proposal to CARE/USA for funding to rehabilitate wells, rehabilitated several years ago by UNICEF, in order to reach a target of 800 people per water source. CARE believes that agriculture, health, water and roads must be looked at as part of a total rehabilitation package. CARE is holding a strategy planning meeting in Nairobi the week of Feb. 17.

#### ISSUES

1. Transport costs of moving surplus food/seed as compared to purchasing/moving seed from Nairobi and/or Uganda.
2. Quality of seed as compared to Nairobi/Uganda. Additional tests are required.

3. Role of SRRA in implementation versus coordination: With the SRRA as a main implementor, CARE may be moving towards establishing "parastatals" in Tambura county.
4. Surplus surplus and unfulfilled letters of intent: WFP had submitted a requirement for 100,000 MT of maize/sorghum and 100,000 MT of ground nuts but has not yet committed to taking this amount. What is WFP's plan? WFP has not shown commitment to the surplus projects.
5. Lack of coordination: WVRD recently purchased maize and ground nut seeds from Kenya for distribution in Tonj county. Apparently, they did not realize until it was too late that CARE had this seed available locally.

### **Catholic Relief Services**

Activity: Umbrella Grant Management (#4186)

Area of Activity: Eastern/Western Equatoria (south)

Period of Activity: 9/1/94-6/30/96

FY 94 OFDA Funding: \$1,062,060

FY 95 OFDA Funding: \$480,422

Total OFDA Funding: \$1,542,482

Description: Support of local relief and rehabilitation initiatives in food security/agriculture, income generation, primary health care and wat/san.

The CRS Umbrella Grant is an experimental program focused on improving food security, encouraging self-reliance and reducing vulnerability in populations in southern Sudan. Community initiated activities in the health, agriculture and income generation sectors are supported with sub-grants of up to \$50,000. Approved projects must include tangible outputs and appear sustainable. Eight projects are currently operating with umbrella grant funding. OFDA visited several of the projects during the course of a two week visit to southern Sudan February 13 - 25, 1996.

CRS finances projects implemented by community groups and indigenous NGOs. With regard to community groups, CRS identifies groups that are willing to organize themselves, handle finances, and pay back on a loan basis, the inputs that CRS provides. The loan is usually paid to a third party in the form of charity, or program expanding actions. Individual SRRRA officials are sometimes involved in coordinating or benefitting from a community group project. For those indigenous NGOs that the umbrella grant supports, small grants are provided to support community level activities. Currently no capital asset purchases are financed under the umbrella grant.

Umbrella grant programs visited included a woman's group engaged in soap making and tie dying in Yambio; a rabbit breeding cooperative in Yambio; a barter shop cooperative in Narus; and ANV's (a Sudanese NGO) ox plough training project in Yirol and Rumbek counties.

#### Soap Making, Yambio

The Yambio soap making project is successful in engaging women in an income generation activity with self-sustaining potential. With Umbrella Grant support, five women groups in Yambio are learning to make soap utilizing inputs (caustic soda and borex) provided by CRS along with local palm oil. Soap is a commodity in much demand in Yambio (and throughout Southern Sudan) and local production, sold through the market, will allow NGOs to reduce soap imports. The Governor's wife, experienced in community group activities in Khartoum, is a key leader in the effort. The

women were in the process of completing their first batch of soap during the OFDA visit. The women will pay CRS back for the inputs it provides by donating a defined quantity of soap to the local hospital. The CRS rep advised that she plans to move the women's cooperative away from their dependence on borex and caustic soda to make the project sustainable without the need for purchases from Nairobi Downstream, the women plan to open a joint bank account and begin to manage their cooperative money to expand their financial security.

The women's cooperatives were also engaging in tie-dyeing of cloth during the OFDA teams visit. Given the continued need to import white cloth and all the dyes from Nairobi, CRS does not believe this project is sustainable and plans to cease support for this activity. This aspect of the project has helped to generate keen interest in collective women's work and thus one might anticipate that the opening of routes to Uganda might assist them in the future to make their own cloth purchases.

#### Rabbit Raising, Yambio

The primary purpose of this activity is to introduce an alternative source of protein to enhance food security. CRS provided 13 pairs of rabbits to a cooperative in Yambio for distribution to 13 households. Rabbit recipients were selected by the cooperative manager based on each individual's previous livestock experience and willingness to raise rabbits. A local farmer familiar with rabbit raising was used as a trainer to demonstrate to the new rabbit owners how to care for and properly breed the rabbits. The "loan" of the rabbit pair must be repaid by each recipient by providing a pair of the offspring to another family. (Unfortunately, CRS had problems transporting the rabbits to Yambio and about 50 percent perished before arriving in Yambio.)

#### Barter Shop, Narus.

This activity supports an income generation activity by providing coveted commodities, in exchange for livestock, to the population in 22 villages surrounding Narus. The barter shop cooperative (which includes an SRRA official) works with a Kenyan trader to swap livestock from within Southern Sudan with commodities that are only available outside of Southern Sudan.

The cooperative received an initial loan from CRS to purchase the first stock of commodities from the Kenyan trader. The loan was deposited into a bank account that the cooperative established in Lodwar. The trader purchased commodities and brought an invoice to the cooperative accounting for the purchases. The cooperative then allowed local Sudanese traders to use goats, bulls and other

livestock from about 22 surrounding villages to purchase these commodities wholesale from a container shop they have set up in Narus town. The Sudanese traders then bring the commodities back to their villages for retail sale. The retail traders bring the animals they have obtained back to the wholesale point and provide the cooperative with the value in animals equivalent to that which they purchased (they keep a profit for themselves).

Now with animals in the paddock, the cooperative arranges with the Kenyan trader to collect the livestock in Narus on a specified date. A value for the livestock is agreed upon by the cooperative and the Kenyan trader. The Kenyan trader then transports the livestock to Kenya where they are sold at a profit. Following this transaction he buys a pre determined amount/type of commodities and depositing the remainder (minus his profit) in the cooperative bank account. The profit earned by the cooperative will be used to reimburse CRS for the loan. At the time of the OFDA teams visit, only one round of buying and selling had occurred so it is difficult to measure the success and sustainability of this program.

#### ANV - Ox Plough Training

ANV is a Sudanese NGO based in Rumbek Country not far from Akot. They are the only Sudanese NGO receiving funds under the Umbrella Grant (most other recipients are community groups). OFDA staff spent an afternoon with project personnel on site on February 20, 1996.

The use of ox ploughs has been identified by experts in Sudan as a key technique to increase crop production. Farmers using this technology can expand area under production seven-fold in one year alone. Yirol and Rumbek counties, where ANV works, are areas where the potential for harvests to sustain the population through the year are hindered by poor farming methods.

Prior to implementation of this program, ANV had to work with the farmers to overcome strong and deeply ingrained social attitudes towards bulls. The relationship between a Dinka and his bulls is precious as cattle are an indication of wealth, are used as bride price and are rarely eaten for meat. Consequently, Dinkas are reluctant to work their cattle to increase cultivation. Through the hard work of its Sudanese project manager, ANV succeeded in convincing farmers to bring their bulls for training. The OFDA team also later learned that an ox plow project had been introduced to the area before the war but had never fulfilled its objectives.

The project carried out a phase one training in 1995.

Response was overwhelming, ANV had planned for 60 pair of oxen and received 150 for training. Each pair of oxen requires three person to accompany them. Women also participated although in small numbers. Because of the large response, the normal 14 day training period for animals at the training site was thus reduced to 7 days only with ANV staff providing follow up for each pair at their farms. With only 60 plows, 90 farmers are still waiting for their plows to begin preparing land for this season's planting. The plows are in Lokki waiting airlift by OLS.

The OFDA team had the opportunity to meet farmers who had benefited from the ox plow training in 1995. Overwhelmingly the farmers interviewed by the OFDA team reported that they increased their production over four-fold and now plan to again increase land under cultivation in the upcoming planting season. Upon harvest, they must provide ANV with 90 kg. of their harvest for distribution to needy farmers for seed and for use as food for farmers in the subsequent training program.

The team believes their Sudan-based and focussed presence is an important factor in their success to date, in addition to the dynamic work of the principal trainer.

#### Other programs

Other umbrella programs not visited include fish farming in Western Equatoria where CRS provided training to groups of farmers who are digging and stocking their own fish ponds. Since fish farming was previously an activity in Western Equatoria, this activity can be expected to be self-sustaining fairly quickly. Moreover, dried fish is tradable for barter or cash in the markets in the area. Eventually large fish production will require some external marketing source however.

#### ISSUES

1. Identification of groups: should Umbrella grant projects attempt to target vulnerable populations or should they seek out progressive community members who can "lead" the rest?
2. Sustainability of projects: are projects that rely on inputs from Nairobi sustainable? In the short/medium term is this a basic element that must be accepted in s. Sudan programming and Umbrella Grant specifically?
3. Recipients of Umbrella grants: is capacity building for local NGOs a component of this grant or should it focus on community level efforts?

4. Assets: should purchase of capital assets be permitted under this grant?

**International Medical Corps (IMC)**

Activity: Primary Health Care and Hospital

Area: Tambura County

Period of Activity: 4/1/94 - 5/31/96

FY 96 OFDA Funding: \$299,303

FY 95 OFDA Funding: \$239,400

FY 94 OFDA Funding: \$1,775,045

Total OFDA Funding: \$2,313,748

Description: Reduction of morbidity and mortality through the provision of medical services, the reactivation of Tambura Hospital and EPI.

OFDA visited IMC operations in Tambura from February 15 - 17, 1996. OFDA funding for the Tambura hospital ceased in October 1995, but operations continue with partial funding from ECHO (drugs) and private sources. The hospital has an in patient capacity and includes an operating theater, adult male, female and children wards, an out patient department, a pharmacy and a CHW training center. A MCH clinic and a TB center are currently under construction. Primary surgical needs in the hospital is for those suffering from hernias, complicated births and some animal (ie. hyena) bites. Primary diseases treated in the hospital are goiter, malaria and diarrheal and respiratory infections. IMC has trained CHWs in its center and will work with other I/NGOs (including AmRef, AAIN and WVRD) to train Medical Assistants in Western Equatoria.

Utilizing OFDA funding, IMC also supports five primary health care centers (PHCCs) and 18 primary health care units (PHCUs). This represents 2/3 of the PHCC/PHCUs in Tambura county, with CARE supporting the remaining 1/3. Primary ailments treated by the PHCUs/PHCCs are the same as those treated by the hospital, with complicated cases referred to the hospital. While the PHCC will eventually be staffed by a Medical Assistant and three CHWs thus providing a higher level of health care than the PHCUs, for the moment there is not much difference between the two. Mectizin, the treatment for onchocerciasis is also dispensed by the CHWs, who have received training in how to identify oncho and appropriate dosage sizes.

The level of health care in Tambura far surpasses that of most other areas in southern Sudan principally because the area is secure and the level of education of health staff is higher. According to UNICEF statistics EPI coverage has exceeded 100 percent in this area.

ISSUES

1. Future of Program: The health needs in Tambura county have passed the emergency stage and are becoming more

focussed on treating endemic diseases. That said, the Tambura Hospital serves as a critical referral center for the county. OFDA has already decided to cease funding hospital operations. Hopefully IMC will be able to continue with other donor support. With regard to the PHC program, OFDA's grant currently expires March 31. IMC pressed for continued support at least for planned research on the relationship between goiter and nutrition and on sleeping sickness. These activities move beyond OFDA's priorities in southern Sudan.

**Medecins Sans Frontieres/Belgium (MSF/B)**

Activity: Emergency Medical and Nutritional Assistance Program

Area: Bahr el Ghazal (south)

Period of Activity: 1/26/96-1/25/97

FY 96 OFDA Funding: \$379,560

Description: provision of primary health care

OFDA team visited MSF/Belgium's project in Mapel on Feb. 23. Staffing in Mapel consists of one Italian nurse (Susan), one Kenyan nurse (George) and one logistician (Lucas). Both nurses conduct consultations in the PHCC. George is also responsible for facilitating and supervising the EPI outreach while Susan conducts TBA training.

Mapel is located in Kuajina payam. The payam hosts one PHCC and four PHCUs supported by MSF. Local staff at the PHCC consist of a Medical Assistant and several CHWs who provide, Monday through Saturday, out patient services including consultations, prescriptions, EPI, oral rehydration therapy, onchocerciasis and guinea worm treatment and an observation room. From 80-100 people are seen each day at the PHCC. The PHCUs are staffed by one CHW and, eventually, an assistant. Consultations are conducted and drugs provided to treat minor ailments and oncho/guinea worm. More serious cases are referred to the PHCC. The PHCUs are also the site of MSF's EPI outreach programs. No surgical capacity is available so MSF refers serious cases to the ICRC hospital in Lokichokkio. Refresher training for CHWs and TBAs is also provided. The primary illnesses seen at the PHCCs and the PHCUs are malaria and upper respiratory tract infections, consistent with morbidity patterns elsewhere in the south.

Drugs for EPI are provided by UNICEF. UNICEF has provided a solar refrigerator which is located at the PHCC. For the outreach programs, UNICEF provides ice packs via plane from Lokichokkio and MSF staff bicycle out to the PHCUs where communities have been notified in advance to immunize the children. The outreach EPI program has only recently commenced and a full cycle has not been completed in any of the PHCUs. MSF/B staff in Mapel believe that procurement of a freezer for their program, which would allow them to store ice packs in Mapel and thus conduct EPI on their own schedule, would facilitate the vaccination process.

While not visited by the team, Bararud has a similar set up to the Mapel program. In Panthau, MSF/B has launched a mobile team as insecurity has prevented establishment of a PHCC and/or PHCUs.

ISSUES

1. While Mapel is relatively secure, the insecurity in other parts of Bahr el Ghazal has prevented MSF/B from bringing a vehicle in to Mapel. The effectiveness of an EPI program without a vehicle and given the general security environment is questionable. Should EPI be conducted, or should we focus on measles immunizations?
2. The ailments treated by MSF in Kuajina payam are no more of an emergency nature than those treated by NGOs operating in secure areas. However, EPI coverage throughout Bahr el Ghazal, is comparatively very low.
3. EPI is a stated priority in PHC for OLS, yet MSF/B has huge problems in organizing campaigns due to the vagaries of ice pack deliveries. UNICEF needs to find ways to support NGOs who are working with the most vulnerable. At a minimum UNICEF should be urged to provide the necessary refrigeration facilities to allow MSF more flexibility to carry out the EPI.

**Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)**

Emergency Food Relief, Agricultural Rehabilitation (#6019)

Areas: Kongor, Chukudum, Kapoeta, Yirol, Kajo Keji (south)

Period of Activity: 12/15/95 - 12/14/96

FY 96 OFDA Funding: \$1,743,050

Description: Food relief, seeds and tools

NPA is one of OFDA's largest grantees in southern Sudan and is the only grantee which is not a member of Operation Lifeline Sudan. NPA's ability to operate outside of the tripartite arrangement is due to its long relationship with the SPLM and its untied funding sources which permit high flexibility and creativity in responding to emergency situations. Along with the OFDA funding, the U.S. Government provides Title II commodities in support of NPA food distribution programs around Kajo Keji.

OFDA staff visited NPA's program in Yirol from February 19 - 21, 1996.

Yirol County in Lakes (Bahr el Ghazal) is one of the most remote areas of southern Sudan. The town of Yirol is held by the government, as is the neighboring major town of Rumbek. Akot, situated roughly in between, hosts the airstrip which services NGOs working in both counties. Adior near the Nile in Yirol Country also has an airstrip which services the hospital that is run by a non-OLS Italian NGO, CCM. CCM also works in the hospital at Billing and supports the hospital in Akot.

NPA is currently working principally in the West Payam of the county. The East Payam on the other side of the Paiyei River is just now being explored by the Akot-based team. NPA estimates that 75 percent of the population of the county actually live on the East side but are inaccessible from the west side (i.e. Akot) during eight months of the year. NPA's plans for expansion include the establishment of a base camp on the east side of the river at Abuyang, approximately 3 hours from Ngop on the west and 35 km from the Nile in order to stage relief and rehabilitation actions.

The NPA program funded by OFDA consists of food distribution and seeds/tools distribution. Ten thousand households in West Payam benefitted from the program in 1995, including 2,906 returnees from Khartoum. The program was initiated after an OLS harvest assessment in 1994 identified Yirol county as a marginal area in terms of food production and availability. According to NPA, production constraints (improper tools, poor quality of seeds) along with labor force difficulties (departure of productive members of the community to cattle camps) are the primary constraints to agricultural production. During deficit times, populations

in the East can rely on livestock as an additional food source, but those in the East can only resort to eating wild foods which are not available in the initial months (March-May) of hunger. Also, collection of wild foods reduced productivity in the population.

While seed distributions in 1995 resulted in a successful, surplus ground nut crop in East Payam, drought conditions caused an almost total loss of the sorghum/millet crop. At the same time, recent surveys indicate that the East payam actually enjoyed a surplus of cereals and a deficit of groundnuts in the same year. NPA is now looking at ways to barter soap, salt and other items such as fishing net material for cereal seeds in the east for redistribution in the west. Barter exchange rates are 18 kg cereals= 1-1,500 Sudanese pounds; 1 kg salt = 500 sudanese pounds. NPA also plans to purchase seeds from the CARE barter program. Seeds and tools must be distributed in the next month or so to meet April planting deadlines.

Beneficiaries of the 1996 program have not yet been finalized. NPA correctly points out that during the project design stage of a seeds and tools project the final harvest results are often not tabulated hence preventing accurate estimations of crop production. The staff is presently working with local leadership and the SRRA and with their own knowledge of the area, identifying those who will receive distributions.

At present NPA does not think there will be a need for large food distributions to the current population. Using the WFP food economy model, the NPA staff have surveyed the area and concluded that needs are minimal. The WFP food economy survey team reached similar conclusions. However, NPA is concerned that there will be a flood of displaced emerging from Wau with the next GOS convoy set to depart in the next weeks. According to NPA thousands of southerners will move out of Wau with this convoy and into the Yirol area. The added pressure of these new arrivals will create some food stress in the area and NPA wants to be prepared for this eventuality. Identification of needy people, including those who receive the displaced will be done in collaboration with SRRA and local leadership.

In the WFP request to donors, it is noted that NPA requires 450 MT of food aid for the Yirol area. According to NPA it is still unclear from where this food aid will come and who will transport it as they have heard no word from WFP. In team discussions with WFP in Lökkichokkio it was learned that WFP has made no move to make this purchase for NPA. Possible alternative sources thus may be World Vision surplus currently available in Yambio.

Strictly speaking the NPA program is not a relief program, although there may be relief programs that arise based on population movements, i.e. the Wau train. Over the medium/longer term, NPA wishes to fashion an integrated agricultural recovery project, some elements of which are already being put in place. With the energetic assistance of an Ethiopian agriculturalist, NPA is carrying out field trials of local seed varieties using improved tools designed based on customer preferences (the traditional "maloda" allows a farmer to barely scratch the surface of the soil thus not benefitting from the richer material underneath), and eventually introducing ox plow training to the portfolio. NPA's approach is to focus on local rather than imported seed varieties on the basis that imported seeds must be produced under maximum conditions. Nevertheless in this first stage they are testing both varieties for comparison purposes and remain open to the adoption of varieties such as Katumani maize and Serena sorghum.

NPA firmly believes that agricultural inputs are useless unless coupled with community development ideas and extension. Consequently, OFDA funding for seeds and tools purchases are combined with other untied donor money to fund the extension components of the program. NPA is well-grounded in the area and can be expected to expand their agricultural program over the next year.

### ISSUES

1. Food Aid: The most urgent issue requiring resolution is the procurement/sourcing of up to 450 MT of food aid for displaced persons in Yirol County. Possibilities include immediate purchase of this tonnage from World Vision surpluses in Yambio, from CARE surpluses in Tambura, or through call forwards of imported food. NPA states it is prepared to move the food overland from Yambio once the food is made available to them. The window for moving food into Yirol will remain open until about April/May. After that the options become more limited, more complex, more costly.

2. Coordination: As in other areas, discussions in Akot with NPA, included a visit with local authorities. During the meeting the question of coordination and planning between NGOs arose as a fairly serious concern of NPA and some Sudanese counterparts. At issue was coordination of programs related to water, ox plows and agriculture. According to NPA, there was no effort to coordinate NGOs in the Akot area and as NGOs were spread out it was difficult to know what each was doing, learning, etc. from various interventions. Although it was noted that the SRRA or the civil administration rightly had a role in providing such coordination, neither of the reps from those structures

seemed anxious to take on the task in an active way. NPA pointed out that it is the people of Sudan who suffer from lack of coordinated strategies.

3. Roads: Although not visited on the trip, the work of Terra Firma was in evidence in Yirol. NPA stressed the usefulness of this activity (funded by OFDA at a level of \$2.0 million in FY 95) to facilitate use of roads within Western Equatoria to move food and relief supplies. The road to Akot was not yet completed by Terra Firma and there was some confusion as to whether the organization would return to complete the task. Reconsideration of OFDA funding for road improvements (and maintenance) may be necessary in conjunction with OFDA's continued interest in local purchase/redistribution activities in this area (see also World Vision and CARE, W. Equatoria).

**NPA/Sudan Medical Care (SMC)**

Activity: Medical Program (#4099)

Area of Activity: Kapoeta District

Period of Activity: 6/1/94-5/31/96 (current estimated)

FY 95 OFDA Funding: \$184,081

FY 94 OFDA Funding: \$182,290

Total OFDA Funding: \$371,881

Description: Provision of basic medical supplies and treatment to 10 Primary Health Care Centers and implementation of EPI.

OFDA visited SMC at Narus on Sunday February 18, 1996 to review progress to date in the joint NPA-SMC effort aimed at providing urgently needed health services in Toposaland while building the capacity of a new Sudanese NGO.

Project operations began in May 1994. SMC staff explained that it took two months to build the living compound and training huts for the staff and trainees and thus actual work began in August with a two week refresher training for about 24 CHWs. The training candidates had a varied background including first aid, nursing, while some had had the 9 month CHW course previously run by IRC in Kapoeta. Training candidates were selected through the Toposa community using SRRA links, at Kakuma refugee camp in northern Uganda, and some were "tumbled upon" during the general search for candidates.

One PHCC and nine PHCUs were set up in the first year of the project. Two EPI teams operate out of the PHCC. SMC has asked that OFDA fund an expansion of their work into an agricultural zone nearby citing needs along with difficulties in working with Toposa as a reason for their inability to fully meet project expectations to date. Some of the issues to address include:

ISSUES:

1. Community Participation: While meeting target "outputs" for the OFDA grant, i.e. creation of PHCUs, SMC confessed that actual support for the CHWs by the community has not been forthcoming. In retrospect the team acknowledged that community support for the CHWs would perhaps have been better mobilized had the community been more involved in CHW selection, and in general sensitized about the value of health care, the purpose of CHWs and the role of communities in supporting CHWs. At the same time, however, SMC noted that the lack of previous community participation in health in Toposaland was a constraint to community involvement necessitating a longer term intervention to address social perceptions. SMC thus felt caught

between the output demands of the grant and the time needed to do the necessary groundwork to develop community support. The challenge now that a successful level of implementation has been achieved is to stimulate this support so that CHWs can become self-sustaining and SMC can eventually expand into other areas.

2. Village Health Committee: Directly related to the above point is the issue of village health committees. Based on Alma Ata principles, the project aims not only to identify and train CHWs, but also to create village health committees to support the trained CHWs. According to SMC, the SRRA specifically instructed them not to undertake the formation of such committees as the Movement was in the process of discussing a generalized approach to community based development ("the Way Forward" , see also Akot). As such SMC had been unable to form any formal or semi-formal village structures in support of the program. It turns out that the Movement has in the last days decided on a holistic approach to community development at the village level using village development committees and SMC has been given the go ahead to form embryonic health groups that might then form the basis for the village development committee.
3. Comparative Advantage of Indigenous NGO: SMC as an indigenous NGO has special challenges but also many advantages. Admittedly the challenge is to develop the capacity within its own organization, attract talented members who will settle for lower salaries than those offered by international NGOs, and respond to the higher expectations placed on them by their partners and donors who recognize their comparative advantage. Their comparative advantage is that they are from southern Sudan, are committed to the future of the south, and have a special understanding of the people. They also agree to perform perhaps under more difficult conditions than international counterparts.

SMC has a special challenge however in Toposaland which is known for being the most difficult area to work in southern Sudan - most of their management staff is not from the area, and thus they must also build relationships locally as much as any outsider. Nevertheless, they are best placed, this team believes, to have long term success in the area. As with other projects in southern Sudan which are addressing longer term health/ag needs, the time spent in the project building the community structures and sensitizing the population is well spent.

4. Expansion: Given continuing concerns about the sustainability of current SMC actions, and the real need for medical coverage in this area that is prone to flare ups of violence related to cattle rustling, etc. the OFDA team suggests that SMC continue their focus in the Narus area with the Toposa before expanding to other areas.
5. Role of NPA: NPA has recently become more involved in working with SMC to develop a more community based program. These efforts should continue.

**WVRD/Sudan Production Aid (WVRD/SUPRAID)**

Activity: Food Security and Agriculture Program

Area: Tonj Country, Bahr El Ghazal (south)

Period of Activity: 2/15/96 - 1/14/97 (pending)

FY 96 OFDA Funding: \$155,433, pending

Description: Agricultural rehabilitation activities designed to enhance community awareness and assist farmers in obtaining reliable household food security and sustainable traditional coping mechanisms.

OFDA team visited SUPRAID's program on Feb. 22. Along with building capacity of an indigenous Sudanese NGO (SINGO), the project also focuses on encouraging increased agricultural production through training in improved farming methods, introduction of new crops, including fruit trees, and establishment of a seed bank.

The primary thrust of the project consists of training community development workers (CDWs) in cooperative management, and improved production techniques (eg. oxploughs and improved tools.) The CDWs, once trained, will work alongside SUPRAID training staff as change agents in training 50 progressive farmers in improved crop methods. The CDWs will also return to their communities to impart the knowledge they have received. The progressive farmers serve to demonstrate to their respective communities the benefits of the improved methods.

Demonstration plots are also established at the SUPRAID training site. Tuber crops and fruit trees are cultivated, along with traditional crops using improved seeds. A Sudanese agriculturalist with long experience in the area, Dr. Christopher Bennett is a primary trainer for the CDWs.

The first year of the project started slow, with most time spent on organizing and developing institutional structures. The training center built using OFDA funds is now being reconstructed in a preferred river side location that was not available at the initiation of the grant. The CDW recruitment process was slow and training was not completed. Thus in the second year of the project the training will be completed along with the training of some new volunteers.

There have been successes as well. Of the 23 CDWs recruited last year, about 18 were repatriated from Kakuma camp and plan to now remain in Southern Sudan. The dynamism of the NGO director Acueil Baqaal also will ensure some success in the project.

ISSUES

1. Training/Capacity Building. OFDA's commitment to this

project is contingent on our commitment to capacity building, both of SINGOs and of local communities. Although there are technical offshoots, such as use of improved farming techniques and the development of the seed bank, SUPRAIDs main activity is training of community development workers and progressive farmers.

2. Other NGOs engaged in agricultural rehabilitation programs have focussed efforts on progressive farmers rather than CDWs as change agents. It is unclear how the addition of CDWs to the Change equation will work given the need to sustain CDWs in some way to ensure their motivation. This is a project that will require careful monitoring and evaluation. The team suggests that a evaluation of the activity take place after the second year of activity and that the evaluation include an individual experienced in training programs for community development specifically.

**World Vision Relief and Development (WVRD)**

Activity: Emergency Response Program (#3193)

Activity: Tonj, Yambio (for Tonj see separate review)

Period of Activity: 9/30/93 - 5/31/96

FY 95 OFDA Funding: \$865,927

FY 94 OFDA Funding: \$1,531,225

FY 93 OFDA Funding: \$2,386,267

Total OFDA Funding: \$4,783,419

Description: EPI, distribution of seeds and tools, vaccination of cattle, household income generation programs, distribution of food.

OFDA visited the World Vision project in Yambio from February 14 - 16, 1996 with the purpose of focussing specifically on the barter program component of the WVRD program.. The OFDA team visited a barter site, interviewed participating farmers, cooperative directors, as well as World Vision local staff. A meeting with the Governor of the province also provided the official SPLM opinion of the project and its impact on the community and local economy.

The World Vision local purchase grain/barter program is in its second year of activity. The purpose of the program is to generate surpluses in the agriculturally rich Western Equatoria region in order to supply relief programs in deficit areas in the south. Purchase of the grain is with commodities highly desired by the community but unavailable due to lack of access to external markets and the limited cash economy. The product of exchange is maize, grown largely as a cash crop in the area as a complement to other food crops which include groundnuts, simsim, and sorghum.

Under the program, WVRD imports from Kenya commodities such as cooking pots, shoes, bicycles, cloth. At the farm level, cooperatives (42 in total) survey potential farmer traders to find out which of the commodities they wish to purchase. This list is conveyed to World Vision. Thus, on the designated barter day for a particular cooperative (and each cooperative has several chances to barter), a World Vision rented truck (from Terra Firma) arrives at the cooperative with the items "ordered" by the farmers. In principle farmers who have placed orders show up at that time with their grain which is measured and set aside for transport by WVRD to central treatment stores in Yambio. Of course farmers might change their mind as to the commodities they wish to purchase, and this is generally not a problem. Also a farmer who has not declared his intention to buy can show up and purchase. Usually there are extra commodities in the store and when supplies run out, trading resumes on another day with farmers storing the grain they have brought to trade at nearby farms.

Besides the barter shop program funded by OFDA, WVRD is implementing an agricultural recovery program that includes seed trials at demonstration sites with eventual expansion to progressive farmers. The program is under-funded and has been implemented in small stages. In addition, WVRD manages a PHC program modeled after the standard system accepted in south Sudan which includes outreach using CHWs and Traditional Birth Attendants. Important aspects of the program include the EPI component which last year reached only 60 percent of the target population due to problems capturing children for second and third rounds. Also, World Vision pays the CHWs in cash and kind due the lack of full community support for these health workers. Cash payment is done by changing hard currency with SRRA officials in Yambio.

### ISSUES

1. Surplus: Under the 1996 LPG program, World Vision has been funded to trade for 1,000 MT, being, at the time of project design, their best estimate of potential food needs in neighboring areas. According to WFP and local authorities, surplus production might be as much as 20-30,000 MT in the area. Local authorities are concerned that the surplus will not be bought up, thus, as they reason, impacting (i.e. reducing) potential farmer production the next year. During OFDA's meeting with the Governor of Equatoria he emphasized his concern that all farmers would not be able to "sell" their surplus to WV and obtain the goods they desired. OFDA explained that the intention of the program was not to buy all the surplus but to purchase an amount estimated by World Vision to be what would be needed in other programs in southern Sudan. The Governor expressed his concern that the surplus would rot since Sudanese do not eat maize and that World Vision could be in a difficult situation with the people.

It does appear that the barter program has resulted in a classic farmer production response. In interviews at the barter point, OFDA staff were told by farmers that they had expanded their area under production of maize specifically to obtain the barter goods offered by WVRD. Many cleared new areas and planted up to 3-4 feddans of maize, each yielding about 8 sacks or 400 kgs of maize grain. Others simply switched land that would otherwise have produced other food crops. However, in no conversation did OFDA have the impression that farmers had jeopardized their food security in selecting the size of maize-planted area or that they would let the food rot if they are unable to barter it for goods in the World Vision stores.

3. World Vision's 1,000 MT: The original assumptions underlying the barter program included the possibility of moving surplus to deficit areas. It is generally agreed that it would not be cost effective to move surplus from Western Equatoria to Lokki and thence to programs in Eastern Equatoria or onto the airlift/drop to more northern destinations, but it is well known that surplus in Yambio could move to parts of Bahr el Ghazal before the rains, obviating, in principle, the need for airdrop/lift. At the time of the project's inception, displaced camps in Maridi, as well as access to refugee camps in northern Uganda were seen as potential beneficiaries of the project. Now, the situation has changed. The fall of Morobo to the GOS forces has cut access to Uganda, leaving only the Zaire route available for road access to Uganda from Sudan. Taxes and delays at the Zaire border make transport in that direction unwise and certainly uneconomical. Moreover, the SPLM has stated its opposition to the export of Sudan production, and if some studies such as the recent WFP review of local purchase options are valid, the efficiency of purchasing in Sudan for northern Uganda refugee camps is also questionable. Additionally, improved food security for the displaced in Maridi, as well as the intention of AAIN, an NGO working in that area to also introduce a barter program, means that demand for World Vision generated surpluses are not needed there. (NOTE: The OFDA team heard otherwise from the Governor and other officials and will explore the situation with WFP and AAIN during the course of the review). This leaves local distribution within Bahr el Ghazal as the most attractive option for the World Vision 1,000 MT.

World Vision, Nyabagok (see section on Tonj County) will absorb up to 500 MT of the 1,000 MT in a food distribution program for flood affected. Another 500 MT is also needed for anywhere from 10,000 to 30,000 people who have fled Gogrial as a result of Kerubino raiding.

The team believes that relief needs within areas reachable from productive areas in Western Equatoria should be addressed using local surpluses whenever possible. Even though this will require additional OFDA funding, the spin off benefits of using production from within Sudan outweigh the costs of implementing such a program. The team recommends that OFDA fund a pilot project to move some of the 1,000 MT from Yambio to Tonj. If possible, funding should be provided through WFP, perhaps serving as a catalyst for more aggressive efforts on WFPs part to purchase locally.

4. Pricing: When the barter program, began World Vision priced the barter goods based on their actual cost excluding transport to Yambio, effectively offering farmers an inflated price for their grain (\$250). In the second year, prices of grain were lowered to begin eliminating the subsidy. The local administration resisted, calling upon farmers to strike, but eventually allowing the new prices to prevail (need to check this detail).

In the next project cycle World Vision intends to fully eliminate the subsidy (bringing maize prices down to \$125 per MT), an action that is critical for the sustainability of the program and for ensuring that the program does not interfere with any natural market forces/trading that is going on. The fact that the border with Uganda has been closed has perhaps lessened the impact that the subsidies otherwise would have had on a healthy market.

5. Taxes: Although a much wider issue that will be addressed in the main body of the report attached to this mission visit, it is important to note that farmers are taxed one tin, or approximately 15 kg, on their barter shop transactions. It was not easy to obtain details as to whether this was a "flat tax" or a "progressive tax" depending on the price of the good. The tax is collected by the SRRA.
6. Although studies would need to be done before implementation, the team discussed with WV their idea to purchase grain next year with a mixture of cash and barter goods. Depending on the border situation, this may be a viable option and deserves some reflection. The implications of providing hard currency, however, should be taken into serious consideration before embarking on such activities.

**World Vision Relief and Development (WVRD)**

Activity: Emergency Response Program (#3193)

Area of Activity: Tonj, Yambio (for Yambio see separate review)

Period of Activity 9/30/93 - 5/31/96

FY 95 OFDA Funding: \$865,927

FY 94 OFDA Funding: \$1,531,225

FY (# OFDA Funding: \$2,386,267

Total OFDA Funding: \$4,783,419

Description: EPI, distribution of seeds and tools, cattle vaccination, household income generation, distribution of food

OFDA team visited the World Vision program in Nyabagok, Tonj County from February 21 - 23, 1996. The program, which began as a relief intervention in 1993 is now three years old and has moved from distribution of relief supplies to building local capacity and increasing agricultural production through improved techniques.

In the last two years the area has been blanketed with seeds and tools. Thus, under normal circumstances emergency interventions will no longer be needed. However, the area of Tonj has been the scene of disruptions due to war and flooding in 1995, necessitating World Vision to plan an emergency intervention of food, seeds and tools in 1996. World Vision will have to increase its staff in order to meet the demands of the upcoming emergency intervention. Current plans under development include a food distribution of up to 500 MT of cereals and seeds.

Identification of beneficiaries will be with the assistance of the SRRA working with executive and sub chiefs of the area. Generally the World Vision philosophy is to provide a general distribution, leaving the community to sort out who are the most vulnerable and thereby more needy. In practice it is not clear that the needy receive more than those who were not as vulnerable.

The main thrust of the World Vision program now is agricultural extension focussing on the adoption of new seed varieties and ag techniques. A Kenyan agricultural agent has worked with the program for three years and notes a genuine increase in interest in both improved seeds and in the adoption of ox plow technology, specifically the adoption of Katumani maize and short season sorghum varieties. Introduction of the species was initially, and continues to be, through demonstration gardens as various locations in the county. Interested farmers make themselves known to World Vision which then supplies seeds. World Vision is also working to expand root crop production to help fill the hunger gap, introducing sweet potato and

expanding cassava which can be harvested in June/July when cereals are scarce.

Like other NGOs in the area WVRD is introducing ox plow technology. The Kenyan agriculturalist trained an initial group of farmers and subsequently has set up a number of training centers. The demonstrators train farmers on site at the centers - the OFDA team observed 4 pair being trained at the site near the World Vision camp. According to World Vision ox plows have taken off more slowly in their area due to cultural resistance from farmers. To date they have distributed about 60 ox plows. A Sudanese extension worker/demonstrator was enthusiastic about the program and said in his view the ox plow system was widely admired by farmers. He himself had expanded area under production 7 fold and was able to hire friends to help with the additional weeding required. Most difficult he reported was harvesting the vast areas he had planted but his enthusiasm to continue expanding overwhelmed his concerns about harvesting - there would always be labor for hire.

#### ISSUES

1. Ox Plows: World Vision distributes ox plows for free, while other NGOs in the same type of program are requiring cost sharing/pay back with the farmers. In the team's view there is room for more coordination on the methods of introducing ox plow in the south. Another small example; WVRD is using english as the language of bull training, while others are using Dinka. SUPRAID is also undertaking ox plow and at a minimum there should be standardization of their approach given that World Vision is the sponsor of SUPRAID.
2. Outreach: World Vision outreach works on a word of mouth system from farmer to farmer, although they do organize farm fairs to advertise the work they are doing. SUPRAID is training community development workers and progressive farmers, who presumably could be used to heighten the strength of outreach generally in this county.

## APPENDIX III

### FFP Project Visits

## New Cush (Feb. 14/15)

A. Logistics: The travel time between Loki and New Cush has been significantly reduced because of several factors: the USAID/ECHO-funded road improvement between Loki and Natinga, the SRRA/NGO effort to improve the road between Natinga and New Cush using the SRRA road equipment, and the FFW support and fuel contributions from CRS, NPA and ADRA. Travel time is now between two and two and a half hours in the dry season. Additional work in some of the low lying spots on the Natinga-New Cush road are scheduled, but will not be completed before the upcoming rainy season.

B. Overview of New Cush: This is the new location for the SRRA headquarters since September 1994. The previous headquarters for SRRA was in Nimule, but insecurity in/around Nimule and Mogale forced the SRRA to identify a new location. SRRA said they selected New Cush because of good security and its accessibility by road from Lokichokio. SRRA staff number about 200, but when their families are included the total number is about 1,500. Many displaced persons re-located from Nimule and Mogale DP camps to New Cush because of the anticipated better security as well as a continuation of relief efforts by OLS/NGOs. Most of the displaced persons are Dinka who have been displaced several times during the last few years and were looking for a more stable environment. War-wounded and handicapped persons were some of the first to arrive (many of these have since been transferred to Natinga). The SRRA says they permitted displaced persons to come for administrative reasons, but did not encourage them to come. The SRRA believes the maximum number of people which New Cush can accommodate is 10,000 but up to 10,904 had been registered before CRS stopped registration in October 1995. The availability of water is a serious problem and is the real limiting factor in the number of people which can be supported. The camp seemed well organized. A small market and shade-tree butchery were operating. Small livestock (goats, chickens) were numerous and a few cattle were also visible.

C. NGO Presence: Although numerous IOs (UNICEF, WFP) and NGOs (NPA, NCA, IAS) have provided various inputs, The only NGO currently operating full time in New Cush is CRS. CRS is providing emergency food distributions to an estimated 10,000 displaced persons as well as supporting various food for work programs. In addition, CRS is implementing an agricultural rehabilitation program which initially provided seeds and tools to 665 households during their first year and are to target an additional 1,153 families for this next growing season. Households are to be provided with at least 2,500 sq. meters and sorghum, ground nut and vegetable

seeds. CRS believes that families should be able to produce approximately 2 months supply of grain. The CRS strategy is to halt distribution for up to two months after the harvest, but they have had a difficult time in getting the displaced persons mobilized to begin preparing their fields. CRS also is implementing a umbrella grant in New Cush for latrine construction through the SRRA. CRS has a rubhall in New Cush, but security needs to be strengthened. CRS however does not maintain a large food stock there and normally distributes food commodities as soon as they are received.

The Diocese of Torit (DOT) established a full time presence in New Cush in July 1995. They have opened a kindergarten and primary school as well as a clinic within the DP camp which is open 5 days a week. They consider the medical services inadequate for the scope of the need and are only providing essential medical care, sending referral cases to the NPA hospital in Chukudum or the ICRC hospital in Loki. There has been no recent EPI campaign in New Cush.

A UNICEF/MEDIC well drilling team was present during the visit and was hoping to complete the drilling of three new wells.

Water is definitely a problem in New Cush and even if MEDIC is successful in drilling three new wells, water will continue to be a problem. SRRA has stated that no new displaced persons will be permitted to settle because of this problem.

D. Discussions with SRRA Officials: This was the first formal visit by USAID officials to New Cush since the SRRA Headquarters were established (a few previous trips were cancelled due to logistics or security constraints), and SRRA officials were pleased with the visit. We acknowledged and praised the many positive changes which have occurred within the SPLM\SRRA during the last 9 months, including the signing of the humanitarian principles and ground rules with OLS, good collaboration and dialogue with OLS, NGOs and donors on strategic planning and coordination, capacity building efforts within the SRRA, and a push toward a more open, transparent civil society and encouraged them to continue with this process. We did, however, state that the SRRA and SPLM still need to demonstrate that these changes are substantive and that issues dealing with accountability, transparency, accurate population estimates, etc. need to be further demonstrated with concrete actions. We also praised their efforts to rehabilitate the Natinga - New Cush - Chukudum road in collaboration with NGOs, noting that significant improvements in the road will reduce the wear and tear on vehicles and ultimately reduce transport costs. Such activities need to continue, using low tech, labor intensive methods, supplemented by NGO inputs of fuel and

food for work resources and possibly some limited technical assistance from NGOs or WFP.

We then discussed our concern about the lack of initiative by the displaced persons in New Cush and in general in many parts of southern Sudan, including residents, to mobilize and do community self-help type activities without having to be paid for everything. For example, the displaced persons or residents should be able to collect local materials and construct a warehouse, clinic or tukels (huts) for community health workers without having to be paid in food or non-food items. The general welfare mentality or entitlement attitude is counterproductive to the overall relief effort and will neither permit any kind of sustainability nor foster the move towards rehabilitation and development for which the SRRA is striving. In addition, displaced persons and residents need to make a greater effort in meeting a larger share of their food needs through local production efforts. Many displaced persons are being provided with access to land along with seeds and tools, but show little effort to actively cultivate.

We informed the SRRA that in the future, there will be linkages between our food aid and agricultural rehabilitation programs and that distributions will be halted after the harvest for an appropriate duration, depending on local conditions. The displaced should be given a goal to produce two months or more of their family's food needs and, if suitable weather conditions occur, distributions will be halted for two or more months after the harvest. In addition, CRS has complained that displaced persons who have been provided with seeds and tools recently have not yet begun preparing their fields and it was difficult for CRS to get the people mobilized. We pointed out to the SRRA that we believe it is their responsibility to get the people mobilized and get the message across that they will be required to make greater efforts at producing at least some of their own food requirements because food aid distributions will be halted after the harvest for a certain length of time.

SRRA officials recognized the problem of mobilizing the people for a number of reasons, including the notion that people here still don't see themselves as being settled here for a long period of time and are likely to want to return to their home areas as the opportunity arises. In addition, most of the people are pastoralists and are not used to sedentary life. They did however acknowledge the need to do a better job at mobilizing the people and after our departure we understand that a number of people actually began preparing their fields.

In New Cush and elsewhere, village relief/development committees are supposed to be formed, however, in reality few are actually in operation. We stressed the importance of getting the committees operation as well as the need to have the committees more involved in the distribution of relief items and in planning and managing various programs. Womens' participation on village relief/development committees should be a priority and we hope that women would make up at least 50% of such committees.

The SRRA infrastructure for holding workshops and seminars is quite good and they are completing construction of 10 tukel guest houses. A recent meeting was held for SRRA officials to discuss the 5 year strategic plan ("The Way Forward"). This meeting was also attended by invited NGO and OLS officials. Because of the infrastructure, the upcoming SPLM conference/workshop on civil society will likely be held here.

#### **Ikotos (Feb 15/16)**

A. Overview of Ikotos: We left New Cush in the early afternoon of Feb. 15 by road with CRS officials and arrived in Ikotos in just under four hours. Upon arrival, we learned that Ikotos had been bombed (twelve hits) by the GOS Anotov aircraft about five days earlier, with four people injured.

Ikotos is an old town currently occupied by a mix of residents and an estimated 3,000 displaced, with another 500 displaced living in a camp at Ngaluma, about 15 km away. Out of five boreholes in Ikotos town, four are operational. A small market was operational with a few manufactured goods (matches, soap, used clothing, etc) and cooking items (onions, salt, tomatos, etc) from Uganda. The currency used is the Ugandan shilling. Several compounds were brewing local beer. Small livestock (chicken, goats) were visible in numerous compounds.

Food commodities come by road through northern Uganda, but the road is in very poor condition and insecurity in northern Uganda east of the Nile is on the upswing due to the LRA rebel activity.

B. Overview of CRS Activities: CRS came to Ikotos in March 1994 after hearing of reports of a serious drought and high levels of food insecurity. At that time, the area was still somewhat contested. A target population of 42,900 residents were identified as requiring some outside food aid and CRS provided half rations from March - May and from October '94 to February 1995. CRS performed an assessment of the

residents in March 1995 and returned in July to determine the status of the harvest. As a result of very poor harvest conditions, CRS provided residents with half rations from July to October 1995. The displaced persons in Ikotos town have been provided with full rations since February 1995. New arrivals came during 1995 because of the fighting in/around Torit and Lafon. These new arrivals were put in a displaced camp 15 km from Ikotos, and a total of 500 displaced have been receiving full rations since August 1995.

CRS is also implementing an agricultural rehabilitation program in Ikotos for residents and displaced. They have 4 extension agents and 1 agricultural manager. More than half of the population are considered pastoralists. Growing conditions have been poor during the last two harvests, but with sufficient rains the potential is there for the residents to meet most of their food needs. CRS provides food for inpatients and incentive payments (FFW) to health workers/trainees.

CRS has two umbrella grant activities in Ikotos - an extension of a health center/staff houses and an appropriate technology (carpentry/metal work) project - which are discussed below in section F.

As in New Cush, CRS is experiencing difficulty in Ikotos getting the people (especially the displaced) motivated to prepare their fields and welcomed our comments to the SRRRA secretary regarding the linkage between food aid and agricultural production activities.

C. Discussions with SRRRA: Our discussions with SRRRA officials centered on the same message we provided to SRRRA officials in New Cush. These included: (a) our support for the continuation of SRRRA's move to become more accountable/transparent, (b) the need to have the SRRRA get involved in mobilizing the communities (displaced and residents) so that they make a greater effort in supporting relief interventions and in producing their own food requirements, (c) the need to have a greater linkage between the food aid programs and agricultural rehabilitation programs, (d) the need to obtain accurate population estimates (e) a greater role for women in the planning and allocation of relief program goods and services, and (f) support for the development of village relief/development committees and the joint relief and rehabilitation committees with at least 50% of the members being women.

D. Other NGO Activities: NCA is operating a training facility for CHWs/TBAs and operates 32 Public Health Centers/Units in the Ikotos area. EPI campaigns are also

done on a regular basis. NCA is also working in the education sector as well as water supply (they plan to drill 18 new bore holes in the area).

DOT also has a small program in Ikotos, but we were unable to meet with anyone from the DOT so cannot comment on their activities.

E. Visit to Ngaluma Displaced Camp: This camp for displaced persons was started in August 1995, for people displaced from the fighting in Lafon and Torit. About 500 displaced are presently in Ngaluma. A nearby river provides an ample permanent water source. NCA provided plastic sheeting, blankets, utensils and jerrycans to the new arrivals. NCA also provides primary health care and a monthly EPI program. CRS provides food aid and will be distributing seeds/tools to the 159 households. NCA also has a therapeutic feeding program (at present 11 malnourished children are targetted). The camp is reasonably well organized and has ample water and land to support the population, including agricultural activities.

F. CRS Umbrella Grant Activities: The clinic is housed in an old stone building built as a clinic by NCA in the 1970s. The clinic has one trained nurse, one trained and two untrained medical assistants, one trained lab technician and two lab assistants. The lab is supplied with a microscope and basic materials from UNICEF and NCA, who also provide the cold chain and supplies for EPI. Under the Umbrella Grant, materials are supplied for 5 tukels to be built for staff housing. Two were underway at the time of our visit. FFW in the form of soap and salt is provided to the construction workers.

A small group (6) called the Appropriate Tech Practitioners are also receiving support from the CRS Umbrella Grant. They are using scrap metal to make acceptable quality cooking pots (four sizes costing \$4 - 12) and household items, and are building basic wooden furniture (chairs). The compound was well organized, the smelting was underway, and they had a substantial stock of both pots and chairs. A few cooking pots were visible for sale in the market and in the CRS Chukudum barter shop, however, the sustainability of this unit is questionable unless they develop adequate markets for their products.

#### **Chukudum (Feb. 17/18)**

A. Overview of Chukudum: We left Ikotos in the early afternoon on Feb. 17 and travelled to Chukudum by road in

about 3 hours. Travel will take substantially longer however, once the rains arrive. Chukudum is a well established farm town on the western slope of the Didinga hills. Many of the homes are in substantial compounds, and some of the roads are lined with large mango trees. Livestock (goats, sheep, a few cattle, chickens and ducks) were all visible. There is a town market, however, it was not operating the day we visited.

Chukudum is considered the headquarters of the SPLM and a number of soldiers were casually walking the streets. We briefly stopped by the CRS compound to meet the CRS E/Equatoria Umbrella Grant manager, Reignier Sheele. We then were dropped off at the NPA compound, located opposite the Chukudum hospital run by NPA.

B. NGO presence in Chukudum: The only international NGOs which maintain a full time presence in Chukudum are NPA, ADRA and CRS. The DOT also maintains a presence and is running a clinic. NCA also maintains a small compound, but does not currently have any projects in Chukudum.

B.1. ADRA only uses Chukudum as a base for their primary health care and veterinary programs in the surrounding areas. ADRA is implementing their primary health care programs for an estimated 140,000 beneficiaries and operates 3 PHCCs (Kimatong, Nagashot and Lorema) and 11 PHCUs (with 3 more PHCUs under construction). ADRA also has an EPI program, and trains CHWs and TBAs. ADRA is presently undertaking a health survey so that they will be able to determine the impact of their program as measured against their benchmarks for various programs. A livestock census is also to take place shortly. During the past year, the provision of drugs has been a major problem for ADRA, as UNICEF was unable to provide a sufficient number of PHCC and PHCU kits for their program. ADRA has had to use some private funds and also received some drugs from ACROSS. In 1996, ADRA has broadened the support base for their programs and is receiving funds from ECHO for procurement of drugs. ADRA has been able to assist the formation of 18 village development committees who meet monthly to discuss primary health care and livestock programs. The SRRA Medical COordinator also helps supervise the ADRA programs and assists in training.

B.2. CRS maintains a small compound in Chukudum for use by the Eastern Equatoria Umbrella grant project manager, Reinier Scheele. At present, CRS has 13 active grants in Eastern Equatoria. The following types of activities are being funded:

a. Bartershops, retail/wholesale shops: We observed the

bartershop in Chukudum known as the Tilao Bartershop. Nearby residents or displaced persons can exchange certain cash crops (mainly tobacco), goats or gold for various consumer goods (such as sugar, salt, soap, matches, batteries, clothes, etc.). This is run through a small cooperative association and is run on a complete cost recovery basis with no subsidy (as most of the retail items are procured in Loki and transport charges are included in determining the exchange rates). At present, the average sales are \$4,000 per month. With the opening of this bartershop, residents and displaced persons no longer have to pay the exorbitant prices which petty traders had been charging: sugar sold for the equivalent of 80 to 90 Kenya Shillings per kg before the barter shop began operations is now selling at 50 KSh/kg.

- b. Latrine construction/sanitation;
- c. Ox-plow training/seeds;
- d. Donkey transport;
- e. Protection of a critical water sources/springs;
- f. Expansion of health facilities;
- g. Drilling of boreholes;
- h. Chicken project;
- i. Tea shop.
- j. Pot and chair production
- k. Sandle-making

CRS was expecting an evaluation team out the following week to evaluate the umbrella grants.

B.3. NPA operates a hospital in Chukudum which is mainly funded by the Government of Norway, as well as by private funds. ECHO also supports the hospital with drugs and NPA recently received a large amount of medical supplies from AMERICARES. NPA has a full field hospital, with 2 operating theaters, a laboratory, maternity ward, pediatric ward, general ward, x-ray facilities, etc. The hospital staff includes a trained Sudanese doctor, and trained Sudanese and Kenyan nurses, lab technician, and x-ray technician. NPA runs training programs for nurses, CHWs and lab technicians. Patients are provided with meals (from Title II commodities under the NPA program) and provides FFW incentives for the trainees and medical staff. The most common problem seen for inpatients is gun-shot wounds, not from the civil conflict, but from cattle raiding among the local tribes.

NPA operates an emergency food distribution program for displaced persons as well as an agricultural rehabilitation program. The emergency food distribution program is targeting 6,000 displaced persons in the Chukudum area and provides rations at 75% levels for 7 months of the year and at 50% rations for 5 months of the year (after the harvest).

However, these displaced persons will also be provided with seeds/tools this year (as well as some residents) and will be required to produce some of their own needs at the household level so that NPA intends to halt distributions for approximately 2 months after the harvest (depending on growing conditions). NPA is also providing FFW incentives to hospital workers and trainees and for road rehabilitation efforts being coordinated by the SRRA.

NPA is also managing an agricultural rehabilitation program out of Chukudum which is targeting 11,800 households in Kapoeta County. NPA is targeting 9,400 households in the Boya, Dadinga and Toposa areas which have been affected during the last two years by poor growing conditions. NPA is to provide enough seed for cultivating an average minimum of 2 feddans of cereals, 2 feddans of pulses and 330 sq. meters of vegetables. A total of 2,400 displaced households in the Dadinga and Toposa areas will be provided seeds to cultivate 1 feddan of cereals, 1 feddan of pulses and 200 sq. meters of vegetables.

NPA is procuring almost all of their seeds locally through a barter shop program in which farmers can exchange sorghum and maize seed as well as simsim and groundnuts for consumer goods, such as clothes, sandals, pots, salt, etc. At the time of our visit, NPA has already procured 120 bags of sorghum seed and 50 bags of maize seed. NPA had done a good job at procuring local seed varieties within southern Sudan rather than in procuring them in outside. This supports the use of local varieties and encourages farmers to produce additional seed for exchange. On our return trip towards Loki, we were able to observe many of the fields in which the displaced persons and residents were to cultivate. The NPA believes that residents will not require any food aid in 1996 unless the growing conditions are extremely poor and therefore are not presently targeting any residents for food aid.

NPA is also in the process of constructing a vocational training center which is funded from non-USAID sources, and will include carpentry, blacksmithing, agro-forestry, vegetable gardening, mud brick making and agricultural activities.

C. Discussions with SRRA Officials: Our discussions with the SRRA Secretary and other SRRA officials were along similar lines to our discussions with SRRA officials in New Cush and Ikotos. The SRRA officials complained about the insufficient quantity of relief food compared to last year and argued that the displaced are mainly pastoralists and therefore should not be expected to undertake significant farming activities. They did however agree that the

overall food security situation had improved recently and acknowledged their need to get the displaced person mobilized in more involved in meet some of their household food needs. They also did not react negatively to our discussions regarding a delay in the next distribution until people begin preparing their fields and a halting of distributions after the harvest for a period of time.

#### **Natinga (Feb. 19)**

We departed Chukudum in the early afternoon on Feb. 18 and passed several agricultural fields enroute, as well as stopping by the see the ADRA PHCC at Lorema. We spent the night at the CRS compound in New Cush and left for Natinga early Feb. 19.

A. Overview of Natinga: Natinga is a rocky, semi-arid area with unreliable rainfall patterns on the northeast side of the Didinga Hills. Meaningful agricultural activities are not possible in this area. It is usually inhabited by Toposa, who use the one all-season well for their livestock in the dry season. Natinga is the site of a displaced persons camp populated primarily with Dinka from the Triple A camps. Although the area is secure and provides a safe haven, limited agricultural potential and very limited water supply make life extremely difficult for the displaced. They will require external assistance for as long as they remain at this site. Natinga is also the location of about 2,800 minors who have been on the move for a number of years. A primary school is being run by NPA and UNICEF for the minor's camp. A number of war-wounded (415, mainly amputees) are also located here and a small program with the handicapped to produce sandals under the CRS umbrella grant is to be implemented shortly. Many of the amputees have received artificial limbs from the ICRC hospital near Loki. The camp is organized into upper and lower sections, plus the minors' school/camp. There is a market in which there is a lively trade between the Toposa and the camp occupants, including shoats for grain. Kenyan manufactured goods, used clothes, tobacco and vegetables from Chukudum and livestock were on sale. The old Sudanese pound is the currency used in this area.

B. NGO Presence: No NGO maintains a full-time presence in Natinga, but NPA is providing emergency food aid rations to an estimated 8,000 displaced (100% rations for 7 months and 50% rations for 5 months). NPA also provides 100% rations to the minors for 12 months as they are in school and are unable to provide any of their own food requirements. At present, no NGO or religious organization is providing any primary health care, although SMC has occasionally been providing 1 PHCU kit per month and has selected one local

person to train as a CHW.

C. Meeting with SRRA: A brief discussion was held with the SRRA, during which the same messages as given in our prior stops were delivered, particularly focusing on transparency and self-help. When challenged about the suitability of maintaining a camp in such an inhospitable area, the SRRA aid the during the April SPLA civil society meeting, the relocation/repatriation of the Natinga displaced will be discussed.

**KAJO KEJI COUNTY**  
**Western Equatoria**  
**February 21 - 24, 1996**

BHR/FFP Emergency Programs Officer, Carolyn Mutamba, travelled with Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) staff to their field offices in Koboko, northern Uganda and into Kajo Keji County of Western Equatoria, Sudan, as part of the OFDA/FFP portfolio review.

A. LOGISTICS: NPA operates a base camp in Koboko, Uganda, which includes an office with radio setup. Storage for food commodities is rented nearby. Commodities are trucked each month over 30-50 kms of extremely poor roads into the displaced camps of Kajo Keji County, southern Sudan. NPA is implementing a FFP-supported food distribution program targeting 32,500 displaced people, as well as an OFDA-funded agriculture program, and some small health inputs and training activities using other sources.

Three camps for the displaced were visited. Bamuruye (estimated population 13,500) comprises primarily displaced from Kajo Keji town and surrounding rural farming villages. Mongalatore (est. pop. 9,000) caters primarily for the pastoralist Dinka tribe from the Bor and Kongor areas. The Kerwa camp (est. pop. 10,000) is mostly agriculturalists from the Kaya area of Western Equatoria. Meetings were held with camp officials, the SPLA County Commissioner, SRRA Secretary for the county, and staff of the American Refugee Committee (ARC).

B. FOOD DISTRIBUTIONS: At present, NPA distributes 75% rations only to those displaced who are in the three camps: Bomuruye (13,500), Mongalatore (9,000) and Kerwa (10,000). All three camps' leaders claim the numbers are higher, however the most glaring difference was in Mongalatore, where the camp leaders claim a population of 15,400. Evidence of new arrivals, however, was most visible in Kerwa, with a new section of the camp just opened and people still trying to build their straw huts. This issue of

numbers continues to plague the food program and for these three camps will hopefully be addressed in a modified hut and head count to be jointly undertaken by NPA and the SRRA in March. A second issue - raised by both the County Commissioner and the SRRA County Secretary - was whether or not those displaced but not living in camps should be provided assistance. They claim there are many who have been displaced by insecurity who have had to relocate elsewhere in the county. Another agency had been providing assistance (food and non-food) prior to NPA's arrival. NPA has agreed to expand the March hut/head count to include an assessment of the county's displaced populations and potential assistance needs, however no commitment has been made to provide either food or non-food assistance outside the camps.

Based on information gathered through the Food Economy model, NPA and the SRRA have agreed that 75% of the complete (cereal, pulse, oil and salt) ration is sufficient to meet current needs in the camps. Livestock (mostly goats and chickens but also a few cattle and pigs), fruits (papaya, bananas and mangos), and local vegetables augment the rations. There were small markets active in all three camps, which had local produce (cassava roots, tomatoes, onions, greens, tobacco,), household items (soap, matches, plastic containers), and clothes. Some households have members who do casual labor across the border in Uganda to earn money for such purchases. Other families cultivate and sell tobacco and/or simsim (sesame seeds) for income. NPA was urged to continue monitoring household food inputs and consider lowering the rations further if/when appropriate. The officials in all three camps were given the same messages as those in Eastern Equatoria concerning transparency, accountability, self help, the linkage of the agriculture program and the relief food, and that the food distributions will cease for a specified number of months after the harvests.

A distribution underway in Mongalatore was not using a well organized system, resulting in the recipients spending most of the day at the distribution center in order to receive all four commodities. NPA food monitors were in the process of reorganizing the distribution premises and system to reduce the length of time large numbers of people are milling around the distribution site. Similar changes are underway in the other two camps.

C. AGRICULTURE PROGRAM: This is an OFDA-funded activity to provide seeds, tools and agricultural extension support to the camps. NPA has had difficulty getting the necessary staff, however their ag. coordinator and the extension staff are now in place. The seeds (sorghum, ground nuts, and vegetables) and tools distributions will be starting in

early March. UNICEF had distributed some seeds and tools last season, however, they were insufficient for the need, came late, and in the case of some tools, broke easily. NPA will not have sufficient inputs to supply everyone, however grain seed from the last season was being stored by numerous households visited. In Bomurye and Kerwa camps, sites had already been designated near water points as nurseries for the vegetable seeds; once sprouted, the plants will be distributed rather than seed. All three camps had sites designated and under preparation by the NPA and SRRA ag extensionists as demonstration plots. The traditional planting and growing methods and new techniques will both be used to demonstrate which methods produce the higher yield. The extensionists have also identified lead farmers who will serve as contract farmers to plant extra crops which will provide seeds for future seasons.

The camps have an abundance of mango trees, as well as the potential for more bananas and papaya which will augment the diets. In addition, there is an indigenous tree, the Lulu, which produces an oil seed many of the local population know how to use. NPA has begun discussions with the ag extensionists and camp officials about methods of drying and preserving the fruits, and methods for exploiting the lulu oil seed. NPA was encouraged to look into the latter as a means for reducing or eliminating the vegoil in the ration.

D. HEALTH AND WATER: Both Bomurye and Mongalatore camps have adequate protected wells/boreholes with pumps. In Bomurye camp, the community has organized themselves on a self-help basis to build an impressive complex of well-built huts to serve as a clinic. According to the camp secretary, a trained medical assistant, a lab technician, nurses, a pharmacist and TBAs are all available within the community. They have received 2 health kits and medical kits from the American Refugee Committee (ARC) and UNICEF. In contrast, the Mongalatore camp has a few run-down huts which are incomplete, and the camp secretary was rather unsure of what personnel are available in the camp.

In discussions with the Medical Coordinator of ARC, it was learned that Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF)/Holland had provided out-patient services (OPD), EPI, CHW and TBA training, as well as medical supplies to both camps. MSF has withdrawn and ARC is now taking over. ARC will provide OPD, IPD, EPI, CHW training, and will organize PHC units and MCH centers. They are also establishing a laboratory in Mongalatore town. The ARC Program Coordinator was travelling and the Medical Coordinator was too new to discuss the progress of the program with us.

Kerwa Camp had also received services from a mobile unit of

MSF/Holland. After the MSF withdrawal, a British woman (Anna McClintock) has been providing sporadic basic OPD services with a mobile team funded by CAFOD. ARC has not as yet established itself in this camp. The water situation in this camp is very precarious, with only two water sources currently operational. MSF had begun improving and protecting the well sites, however the water table dropped too low for the MSF work to be functional. The camp currently scoops milky water from unprotected holes next to the protected well sites. Kerwa camp has an urgent need for additional boreholes to be drilled. The camp officials were urged to communicate immediately and forcefully with the SRRA their need for the IAS (International Aid Sweden) drilling rig, funded by OFDA and currently sitting idle due to problems between IAS and the SRRA, to be sent into Kerwa.


In a discussion in Koboko, Ann McClintock spoke at length of the threat of guinea worm in the area. She claims the guinea worm patients she was treating in a Kaya hospital before Kaya fell have settled into the camps and county. The gestation period for this water-borne disease is approximately 12 months. She predicts that Kajo Keji County and the bordering areas in northern Uganda are at risk of a major outbreak of the disease around June 1996. She has submitted a small proposal to Global 2000 in Kampala for community education materials and basic supplies for a mobile team. Kerwa camp, with its unprotected water sites is particularly vulnerable. NPA's Program Coordinator (who is also a health specialist) is aware of this potential threat, but believes the outbreak will not be so wide spread as Ms McClintock predicts. OFDA should encourage NPA and ARC to monitor this carefully for the next several months.

E. DISCUSSIONS WITH OFFICIALS: On February 22, we met with Kajo Keji Commissioner Jame Duku near Mongalatore. He has recently been appointed and charged with the task of establishing a civil administration in the county. Mr. Duku has previously served as SRRA representative in Addis Ababa, Nairobi and Kapoeta. Duku, the chiefs and elders provided a comprehensive briefing on Kajo Keji County and outlined an ambitious plan for the area, including the establishment of schools, brick-making, drug store cooperative and various other civil and social structures. The Commissioner pressed his case for assistance to county residents, stating there are many displaced among the residents and more returning from Uganda. He stated the SPLA/SRRA policy is to not build any further camps but rather "dot" the returnees and displaced in communities along the border. NPA has agreed to work with the commissioner in doing a food economy survey/needs assessment in March, but made no commitments to provide assistance.

On February 23 at his request, we paid a visit to Oliver Muli, the SRRA Secretary located in Mongalatore town. Mr. Muli also provided a succinct briefing of the county in which he stated the county population is believed to be approximately 65,000 plus the camps. He mentioned that the county residents had received relief food in prior years, but that the food was cut off last year. He readily acknowledged that people survived without the relief food and stated his belief there is no food problem for the moment. He requested that any future relief assistance be linked to agriculture activities to assure dependency does not take root.

It was clear from the discussions held with both the Commissioner and the SRRA Secretary that there is a lack of clarity and apparent duplication of roles and activities between the civil administration and the SRRA. The OLS should press the SPLM to address this issue to avoid wasteful competition among the two entities for the same scarce donor resources.

SOUTHERN  
SUDAN



400 Km