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*Evaluation Report*

**PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION PROJECT US/AID  
and  
NATIONAL POLICE, GOVERNMENT  
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC CONGO**

\*

DECEMBER 1967

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REVIEWED AND DOWNGRADED by Lauren J.  
Goin, Director, OES, January, 1975

Office of Public Safety

Agency for International Development  
Department of State  
Washington, D.C.

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## INTRODUCTION

At the request of the United States Ambassador in Kinshasa, Congo, the Evaluation Team composed of Mitchell A. Mabardy and Elmer H. Adkins, during 20 November 1967 to 21 December 1967, visited the Congo and conducted a study and evaluation of the Public Safety Program and the National Police (NP) of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (GDRC). The Evaluation Team was materially assisted in accomplishing the study by the Public Safety Division and other members of the Country Team. A preliminary draft report was submitted to the Ambassador on 21 December 1967.

The terms of reference of the study were embodied in AIDTO-60 of 25 October 1967, and were as follows:

A. To evaluate National Police strength and abilities to carry out its assigned mission in the face of current and anticipated threats to internal security.

B. To examine the objectives of the USAID Public Safety project and measure achievements with respect to them.

C. To make recommendations to the Country Team and to Washington on what actions might be considered by the United States and the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (GDRC) for changes in both the police and the Public Safety program arising from findings in (A) and (B).

The study was to include the nature of the threat to internal security and the capabilities of respective police elements to maintain order, enforce the law, investigate and prevent civil crimes, and provide urban and rural police services consistent with the dimensions of the threat. It was to include but not necessarily be limited to: (a) the National Police force mission, organization, budget, personnel strength and deployment, operational effectiveness, training abilities, records, communications, mobility, and equipment maintenance ability; (b) training needs in light of a potential United Nations (UN) role and advisory assistance and other aid that possibly could fall within Belgian capabilities; (c) the relationship of the National Police to the Congolese National Army (ANC) in light of the respective roles of each for countering internal security threats; and (d) the nature and degree of GDRC political and budgetary support for the National Police.

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In the course of the study visits were paid to the Vice Minister and Secretary of the Interior, the Inspector General (IG) who commands the National Police and the executive members of the latter's entire staff. Executives of the Belgian and UN missions were interviewed. Field inspections were made to police units of three principal cities and three police schools located in those cities (Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, Mbandaka), examining their operations in considerable depth. Information concerning intelligence, military, and political matters was obtained from the Ambassador, the USAID Director and the respective members of their staffs. Research was performed by the Team both in Washington and Kinshasa in the considerable documentation available. This included the Public Safety Survey of 1963 upon which the current program was based.

Particular attention was paid to communications operations and maintenance, school curriculum and school physical plant facilities and the motor vehicle shop and local maintenance and driving practices. Likewise, Belgian and UN donor efforts and their impact on the Congolese, as well as future potential were probed and assessed.

The in-country efforts of the team were concluded with an informal presentation to senior personnel of the Mission, with whom draft copies of the report were left. It was carefully pointed out that the draft report expressed the observations, conclusions and recommendations of the Team which are subject to AID/W and Department of State review and finalization.

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## SUMMARY

### 1. Threat

With the termination of the Mercenary action, the internal security situation has achieved some degree of improvement. There continues to exist active and latent threats in the form of subversive and bloc country elements in the neighboring countries and the Congo. Lawless elements and serious crime are growing in urban areas having an adverse impact on the security situation.

### 2. Roles of Security Forces

The role and authority of the National Police (NP) are spelled out by law and are considered as being fundamentally sound. The Police are charged by law with protecting the interests of the State, enforcing laws and regulations, and maintaining peace and order. Their enforcement duties cover felony and misdemeanor types of crime and include the collection of information and evidence, patrol and surveillance, traffic regulation, civil disturbance control and guarding of government buildings.

Other governmental agencies who perform law enforcement duties are: the Surete Nationale which reports directly to the President, and is primarily responsible for countersubversion, counterespionage, immigration control and political matters; the Mine Police under the Ministry of Lands and Mines; and the Customs Police, a part of the Ministry of Finance; and during emergencies the Army which includes the Gendarmerie. It is important to note that as a matter of practice local Army unit commanders have been known to unilaterally and without proper authority set up road blocks and ostensibly perform police tasks during non-emergency periods. These unauthorized Army actions have served as the basis for criminal acts by Army personnel and constitute a difficult problem for the government.

### 3. Police Functions and Strength

The National Police are under the Minister of Interior (MOI). The organization and functions of the headquarters staff and field operational elements are basically sound. The police carry out traditional duties of law enforcement agencies in urban and rural areas. Since legislation was adopted on July 20, 1966, nationalizing the police, action has been in process to sever personnel local ties and loyalties growing out of their former autonomous provincial status and reorient the force toward the national government. Present strength is 24,368 and action is in progress to reduce it to the authorized level of 20,000.

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4. Magnitude of Public Safety Project since 1963

a. The Public Safety project was initiated in September 1963 when one advisor was assigned in-country. At present the staff is authorized six advisors in the following categories: Chief; Generalist; Communications; Logistics/Supply; Municipal, and Training. Since inception the size of the project has been predicated on a desire to maintain a minimum U.S. presence with the understanding that the Belgian and United Nations technician effort should serve as the primary support action.

b. For FY 1967 the Public Safety project was funded at:

Technicians	\$141,000
Participants	44,000
Commodities	200,000
Other Costs	<u>28,000</u>
Total	413,000

For FY 1968 the field submission was for \$632,000, however, pending the outcome of this evaluation only \$183,000 was allocated, broken down as follows:

Technicians	\$129,000
Participants	44,000
Other Costs	10,000

The total program funding since inception is:

Technicians	\$ 497,000
Participants	134,000
Commodities	1,641,000
Other Costs	<u>74,000</u>
Total	\$2,346,000

c. The primary objective of the Public Safety project is to improve the ability of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (GDRC) to maintain internal security through: increasing the effectiveness of the police organization; strengthening considerably the capabilities of the police school system; improving certain police facilities and the operational and maintenance capability of the communications and transportation elements; close coordination with other primary donors; and, providing advisory assistance, training in the U.S., and a minimum amount of commodities.

d. Summary of Project Achievements

(1) In 1965 a central coordination capability was created in the Ministry of Interior for dealing with the many autonomous provincial police forces.

After considerable effort legislation was passed in 1966 nationalizing the police and guidance furnished for consolidation of these provincial police forces.

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(2) A coordination committee, consisting of police representation from the United Nations (U.N.), the Belgians, the Nigerians (participating under the auspices of the U.N.) and chaired by the U.S. Chief Public Safety Advisor, identified common goals and courses of mutually beneficial action. Excellent relations were maintained among all donors, and multidonor support for the GDRC police was facilitated with increased success.

(3) A countrywide point-to-point communications network has been established at 22 locations, with plans for increasing it to 32 locations. Local communications systems have been installed in the major cities. Sixty-two operators and six maintenance personnel have been trained. Commodities essential for establishing and maintaining the system have been furnished.

(4) As a remedial measure to meet the transport problem, 264 motor vehicles, 3,200 bicycles, spare parts for all transportation and a small amount of repair tools have been furnished. The motor vehicle program, when initiated, contemplated that some Belgian police technicians assigned to the various police units would afford a degree of supervision in the use and care of the vehicles furnished. However, with their unexpected withdrawal from the Congo, this task fell entirely to the Congolese.

(5) The five police schools have been refurbished and repaired and training aids provided. Twenty-two police officers have graduated from the International Police Academy (IPA), Washington, D. C., and are assigned to various staff and operational duties. Four policemen have completed communications training at Delgado Institute, New Orleans, Louisiana, and all are assigned to communications duties, with some projected to move into communications maintenance positions in the Detachments (Provincial Police Forces).

(6) Since 1964, 20,000 uniforms consisting of caps, shirts, trousers, belts, socks, shoes and raincoats have been furnished. The majority of the police are now reasonably well attired presenting a standardized and improved appearance.

(7) Civil disturbance control familiarization training was provided at the schools and at units in urban locations. Commodities provided by the project amounted to: 1,040 gas masks, 65 tear gas guns, 1,950 chemical grenades and 1,475 chemical projectiles.

(8) At Kinshasa, a garage work area and spare parts storage and maintenance building were constructed. Plans have been approved for construction of a communications maintenance and repair facility. Also in Kinshasa, housing is under construction to accommodate 480 families and 320 bachelors. By December 1967 half of these units were completed and occupied.

##### 5. Belgian Police Support

The Belgians have provided police assistance ever since Congo independence in 1960. Their effort has been applied in command and staff

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positions and in planning, administrative and operational roles. A significant number of Belgian technicians were assigned in the school system as administrators and instructors. The Belgian effort has contributed toward enhancing discipline, operations and training in units where it was applied and its impact was particularly noticeable in the staff and operation in Lubumbashi, Katanga province. At the time this report was being written the Belgian and Congolese governments had not reached any agreement on the police support effort and it is not known if any Belgian support will be forthcoming. Basic differences stem from the Congolese anti-Belgian attitude growing out of the Mercenary rebellion and GDRC resistance to a Belgian desire to (a) control assignments of its technicians and (b) have them function entirely as advisors.

#### 6. United Nations (UN) Police Support

The United Nations police assignment program consisted of instructors for the school system recruited from various nations and a contingent of Nigerian police. The policemen from Nigeria arrived in 1960 and terminated their service in December 1966. They performed training tasks and general law enforcement duties in a number of locations in the Congo. The UN initiated its multi-nation instructor staff effort in early 1964 and is scheduled to terminate the operation at the close of 1967. The overall UN effort has provided a valuable training service during a critical period in the Congo.

#### 7. Police Deficiencies

Significant deficiencies were identified in the National Police organization. These, with proposed remedial measures, are as follows:

##### a. Command and Administration

Administration, planning and management skills, and general know-how at all levels of organization from the national headquarters to the operational police stations are generally of a poor and rudimentary nature resulting in an inadequate level of effectiveness. This situation should be corrected through counselling of personnel at police National and Detachment (province police force) headquarters and the headquarters of the principal urban and rural operational elements. This may be accomplished by frequent short term seminars, inspections, on the job training and appropriate orientation publications.

##### b. Police Education and Training

With the termination on December 31, 1967, of the UN teacher staff effort, the National Police will be unable to provide sufficient trained replacements to staff the faculties at all five schools except on a gradual basis requiring about one years time. Additionally, existing Congolese school faculty members have not acquired sufficient knowledge to identify objectively and correct weaknesses in the system. The school system faculty and other members of the NP should receive counselling and training in country, and as appropriate in the U. S. at the International Police Academy, and possibly in third countries.

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There is a need to reorient the curricula by de-emphasizing academic, legal and other sophisticated subjects. Emphasis should be on knowledge essential to everyday police operation and law enforcement matters. Demonstration and class exercise teaching techniques need to be increased in contrast to the existing method which is mainly by rote.

The normal total school capacity is 770 students, with courses running nine months for recruits, six months for NCO's and eighteen months for officers. About 2,000 personnel have received formal training over the past four years. In order that an acceptable formal training impact may be attained it is believed at least 2,000 police should be trained annually. This could be accomplished through modification of the curricula and condensation to cut down the length of each course. Ways to expand plant capacity may be feasible and should be examined. For example at the Lubumbashi school through some doubling up and expanded scheduling in use of facilities the normal student body of 250 was being exceeded by 200 during December 1967 without any apparent loss of effectiveness. Additionally, the formal school education program should be supplemented by a mobile training capability in the Detachments having as a target the training of 2,000 men annually.

c. Motor Vehicle Transportation

In the motor vehicle administration and maintenance field there are inadequacies in supervision, record keeping, driver maintenance, repair expertise and budgetary support. Vehicles are deadlined due to lack of drivers and periodic shop maintenance and insufficiency of funds for commercial repair or for purchase of parts for repair in police garages.

The problem stems in varying degree from the unexpected loss of Belgian supervisory and administrative personnel throughout the National Police, insufficient budgetary support and the fact that a qualified motor vehicle maintenance technician was never assigned to the project.

About 200 of the 264 vehicles provided since 1964 are deadlined. It is estimated 100 may be repairable. A TDY maintenance technician should assess the situation and for the long range effort a qualified full-time technician is necessary to advise the police in training, administration and maintenance.

d. Civil Disturbance Control

Although the Public Safety Division (PSD) has assisted in the formation and training of civil disturbance control units, field trips revealed that most units are no longer organized and the equipment is neglected. Chemicals are over three years old and should be considered obsolete and for training use only.

e. Criminal Investigations

Criminal investigation capability is at a very low level, with personnel inadequately trained. Equipment and procedures for proper filing and record keeping are inadequate. There is no national repository for fingerprints.

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## 8. Inhibiting Conditions

Certain conditions, some of which are beyond the control of the National Police have, in addition to other significant matters, served to impinge on and inhibit police ability to overcome deficiencies. These are: lack of political and budgetary support; low level capability of police trainees, administrators and commanders; frequent reliance by the Government on the ANC for law enforcement and the tolerance of the ANC encroachment onto police role; and, inability of the Public Safety Division staff to exert influence on Police and MOI leaders.

## 9. Preconditions for a Support Program

Certain preconditions should prevail before any United States assistance effort can be expected to be successful. These preconditions should be based on a positive commitment from President Mobutu that:

- a. Adequate financial and political support will be provided the police.
- b. Until such time as the National Police law is implemented effectively and the Inspector General is vested with appropriate authority, a direct contact for implementation of the Public Safety Program will be established at the Minister of Interior level.
- c. The ANC will not encroach on the police role and will be used only to an essential minimum for law enforcement duties during emergencies.

Without the clear acceptance of these preconditions a program cannot be accomplished with any worthwhile degree of success and should not be undertaken.

## 10. Program Objectives

The evaluation study has led to the conclusion that the National Police are in great need of further support and given the acceptance of the above-mentioned preconditions, a Public Safety program in consonance with the recommendations of the evaluation study should be considered. The recommendations in essence provide the basis for a feasible program taking into consideration the low levels of capability of the National Police. The recommended Public Safety Program objectives are:

- a. Develop an acceptable level of capability in police leaders for the management of human and material resources, planning, administration of police functions and the supervision of police operations for a force of 20,000 men, having countrywide law enforcement responsibilities.
- b. Establish urban and rural mobile and foot patrols encompassing Kinshasa, all Provincial capitals and other urban communities, and selected rural areas.

c. Establish a decentralized automotive maintenance and repair capability for up to 500 vehicles, embracing five 4th echelon garages, spare parts distribution centers, equipment retirement and procurement schedules, driver training and maintenance programs.

d. Establish a nationwide police communications system, integrated with mobile and tactical communications facilities for urban and rural patrol. The equipment inventory for these networks will include SSB radios, VHF FM base stations, and VHF FM and SSB tactical radios.

e. Establish a modernized police training facility sufficient to train 2,000 police officers per year in recruit, in-service, specialty and senior management courses; develop a mobile police training capability for training in the field of an additional 2,000 men per year.

f. Establish a police records and fingerprint file sufficient to provide for provincial operational files and a central fingerprint repository in Kinshasa for one million fingerprints.

g. Establish riot control detachments of an appropriate size in each of the Provincial capitals and Kinshasa.

#### 11. Project Implementation

In order for assistance to be provided with the greatest effectiveness, the Belgian Government should provide the 22 advisors presently being considered and the USAID should hire six of the former United Nations trainers.

The Belgian technicians should be assigned as staff advisors in the National Headquarters, the Detachment Headquarters, major urban police headquarters, and as instructors at the police schools. The former UN trainers should be assigned as resident advisors, one at each of the five schools and the sixth with the Public Safety Division staff.

The U.S. Public Safety Division staff should consist of nine advisors:

a. A Chief and one Generalist who would also act as Deputy Chief, and with the Chief coordinate the efforts of all donor personnel, supervise the implementation of all project plans and be concerned with the development of police leader capabilities generally.

b. Two Generalist advisors to work with police supervisors and their staffs in nine detachments to develop leader capabilities, to establish urban and rural police patrols, and the establishment of riot control capabilities.

c. Two Training advisors to work with Headquarters planning elements, to plan implementation at each of the schools, and to advise with respect to the use of mobile training methods.

d. One Communications advisor.

- e. One Motor Vehicle Maintenance advisor.  
 f. One Records and Identifications advisor.

## 12. SUMMARY OF RESOURCES

Estimated costs for the U.S. participation in a five-year program are given below:

(Funding is shown in \$1,000's)

	<u>FY 69</u>	<u>FY 70</u>	<u>FY 71</u>	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>
<u>Technicians</u>					
U.S. - 10 (1 Chief, 3 Generalists, 1 Motor Maintenance, 1 Commo, 2 Training, 1 Records & Identification, 1 Secretary)	270	225	270	225	270
Contract 3rd Country - 6	<u>90</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>90</u>
Total	360	315	360	315	360
<u>Participants (training)</u>	79 (34)	70 (32)	30 (12)	30 (12)	30 (12)
<u>Commodities</u>					
Transportation	125	39.5	19.5	17.5	17.5
Communications	18	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5
Investigations & R&I	18.8	17.9	2.2	2.2	2.2
Civil Disturbance Control	46.3	.5	.5	43.5	.5
Schools/Training	24.2	5.0	5.0	5.0	3.0
Miscellaneous Police Equipment	<u>12.0</u>	<u>10.0</u>	<u>10.0</u>	<u>10.0</u>	<u>10.0</u>
Total	244.3	79.4	43.7	84.7	39.7
<u>Shipping Cost</u>	61.0	19.8	10.9	21.2	9.9
<u>Other Costs (local hire - 2 Secretaries)</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>35</u>
GRAND TOTALS	779.3	519.2	479.6	485.9	474.6

TOTAL COST ALL YEARS 2,738.6

### 13. Feasibility of Attainment of Objectives

It must be noted that the inadequate effectiveness and underdeveloped capability of the National Police, the reported general corruption in government and the police; and the Congolese indifference to discipline are all factors which will exert a potent inhibiting impact on the achievement of the proposed project objectives.

In any event, significant improvement of police effectiveness could be achieved only in the long term. Consequently, the police will require continuing aid over this period of time—perhaps as long as ten years.

If Other donor aid provided. If Belgian and UN advisors are available at the level proposed, it is likely that a perceptible level of improvement could be realized in the training and general police operations areas within five years.

If Only U.S. aid provided. Should other donor aid not be available it is not proposed that the U.S. contribution be increased. This should remain at the same level proposed, in the recommendations, but the attainment of the specific objectives would therefore be delayed. It is expected that an overall acceptable level of effectiveness in all aspects of the project effort may be attained after a ten-year period, although some objectives might be reached earlier (e.g. communications).

## CHAPTER I

## THE THREAT TO INTERNAL SECURITY\*

With the mercenaries now out of the Congo, the major threat which they posed to the internal security appears to be resolved. The reported Portuguese effort of allowing or supporting the infiltration of mercenaries from Angola into the southeastern Congo was a failure. It is questionable if it would be tried again soon without major provocation from the Congo. In the event Portugal should again support such a threat, it is believed the Congo would be unlikely to take major counter-action against Angola beyond its present support of Angolan rebels. A major rail line essential to the Congolese copper economy runs from the Katanga, a large copper producing area, down into Angola and out to the coast at a Portuguese port. Zambia also has interests in this large copper field which extends many miles south of the Congo's borders into Zambia and needs the same railroad for its commerce. For these reasons, the economics of the situation would appear to serve as a discouraging influence for any increased hostility between the Congo and Portugal. At this time and under the present circumstances it is believed that both countries will seek to develop a 'modus vivendi'.

Another possible threat exists in contiguous Congo-Brazzaville to the north, which has a very obvious Communist infiltration potential. Likewise, in this situation a 'modus vivendi' seems to have been reached with the Congo-Brazzaville. The latter has a great many internal problems and the Soviet, Chinese Communist, and Cuban Missions with an estimated three to five hundred in the latter mission, are apparently engaging as yet in only limited subversive activity against the Congo-Kinshasa. Should the internal problems in Congo-Brazzaville be resolved, it may well be that Communist infiltration may become more serious than it is currently assessed to be.

The major threats to the Congo at this point appear to be internal and principally involve the activities and composition of the ANC. President Mobutu realizes he must do something to bring the ANC under control. This is a difficult matter to resolve since the Army is Mobutu's power base and his administration is fundamentally a military dictatorship ruling, to a degree, by fear and force. His 'modus operandi' according to contemporary history, has been to ease difficult army leaders out of the sensitive posts by foreign assignments; by "kicking them upstairs" away from troop commands, by transfer and by retirement. He usually does these things cautiously, one at a time, balancing opposing factors in the meantime, and playing the various army leaders off against each other. Nonetheless, his control of the ANC is not truly complete.

\*All information contained in this chapter was developed from briefings by various elements of the Country Team.

A difficult economic situation and the vacuum left by departing European merchants and technicians has created some discontent, particularly for the ordinary worker. The monetary reform, however, seems to be working well and this will have an ameliorative affect on the little man's situation, although as yet there has been only a slight improvement.

National divisions of thought and feeling create another threat. For example Katanga—a source of much of the nation's natural resources—needs to be brought back into the fold and not left in its black-sheep position with the Central Government still regarding it as traitorous. The new Katanga Governor is reported as doing a good job; however, in some areas of the province he is unable to keep the ANC under control. Hopefully, future relations between the Central Government and Katanga will improve. The northeastern sector of the country has, in large measure, nearly returned to bush as it has been wrought by unrest and insurrection in the past two or more years. The Simba rebellion centered in the northeastern section of the country, while serious at the time, is not now a major threat. Only small pockets of disorganized resistance remain and external support is gone.

Legally, no communist party exists in the Republic and reliably informed sources are unaware of any party organization or activity at this time.

President Joseph Mobutu allows only one political party of which he is the head, the Mouvement Populaire Revolutionaire (MPR), and in the provinces he has designated each of the governors as the Provincial Party Chief.

The Jeunesse, or Youth Movement of the government political party has been successfully eliminated as a threat and is now under the control of the Minister of Youth and Sports. They have very little power and no arms.

In general, while ethnic and tribal differences still cause clashes in various areas, they at the moment seem to offer little possibility of open tribal warfare since the Central Government controls the power mechanism and repressive organisms in the country. Were real rebel activity to again emerge, tribalism might be a factor in supporting it as in the past.

The Bakongo tribe which occupies the area from Kinshasa to the ocean is not now considered to be a major threat. Although they are unhappy with Mobutu, they are not normally a violent tribe and are probably unlikely to rebel.

The Rhodesians do not appear to be an important threat at this time with the mercenaries gone and not having a contiguous border with the Congo.

The Czechs, the Poles, Bulgarians, and Rumanians, while maintaining diplomatic missions here are small in numbers and are being very cautious. Little subversive activity is believed being carried out by these Communist-Bloc establishments and they appear to be just maintaining a presence in the Congo.

During the writing of this report it was learned that the Government had just resumed relations with the USSR and it remains to be determined what subversive impact may be brought to bear in the future.

In general, crime and lawlessness, while periodically severe in many areas do not pose, at this time, a major threat to the government. However, the increase in breaking and entering, armed robbery and other serious and minor crime in the cities is a cause for much concern and potentially poses a very difficult situation. In Kinshasa, as elsewhere, the ANC and the Gendarmerie are being sporadically used to maintain law and order along with police. Neither is capable of doing the job effectively and, additionally, members of the ANC commit serious crimes, such as murder, rape and robbery, against the public with impunity. The police everywhere appear to have a poor patrol capability for handling crime during daylight hours and virtually no capability at night.

The situation does contribute to instability which threatens the law abiding citizen, hinders his daily peaceful and secure home life and work effort and has an adverse impact inhibiting the social and economic development of the nation.

The potential is such that further increase in crime and lawlessness in general could cripple community life reversing its development and growth. The reduction in size of the foreign community has had an unfavorable impact on the economy and any further loss because of the lack of security constitutes a major threat to the economy.

CHAPTER II  
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. SUPPORT FOR NATIONAL POLICE

Conclusion:

The Evaluation Team was unable to find positive evidence reflecting that the GDRC leaders are prepared to provide the political and monetary support essential to develop the police into a viable national law enforcement force.

Recommendation:

The initiation of a Public Safety support program should be contingent on the U.S. Ambassador obtaining a commitment from the President of the GDRC that:

1. The police will receive adequate political and budgetary backing to permit development for performance of their tasks on a national scale.
2. Until such time as the National Police law is implemented effectively and the Inspector General vested with appropriate authority, a direct contact for implementation of the Public Safety program will be established at the Minister of Interior level.
3. The ANC will not encroach on the police role and will be used only to an essential minimum for law enforcement duties during emergencies.

B. PROFESSIONALIZATION OF COMMAND AND STAFF OFFICERS

Conclusions:

1. The key officers in command and staff positions at various echelons of command, both urban and rural, possess a fair grasp of their responsibilities. However, the know-how for implementation is significantly deficient.
2. At the National Headquarters and the Detachment (province police force) Headquarters visited, as well as urban precinct stations most personnel appeared alert and interested. However, the policies, procedures and the administrative systems for planning and operational direction and control varied from rudimentary to virtually non-existent.
3. The National and Detachment headquarters and the urban and rural stations require the development of an integrated system for discharging their

police staff and operational functions including both urban and rural law enforcement patrol operations, gathering police intelligence and performing criminal investigation operations, to mention but a few.

Recommendations:

1. Under the supervision of the Chief Public Safety Advisor (CPSA) and his staff, indoctrination programs be developed to educate key command and staff officers in the fundamental principles of management. Essential orientation programs for the education of senior commanders and their key staff officers are required in such important areas as programming, budget and finance, logistics, public relations and planning.
2. Advice be provided on techniques and procedures for assessment of the quality of performance and compliance with standards and policy. Guidance be provided on the establishment of a command inspection system.
3. Orientation and Education programs be carried out through periodic and frequent conferences and seminars of brief duration.
4. The essential elements of indoctrination of counterparts by Advisors should encompass imparting know-how in the formulation of standards, regulations, policy and operating procedure. This aspect should be aimed at providing familiarization for the national headquarters and detachments headquarters staffs with certain tools that would foster their command and establish proper administration and direction for: discipline; maintenance of equipment; operational assignment and deployment of police; crime prevention patrols; standardization; improvement of knowledge and skill; and, increased effectiveness of mission performance in general.

C. ROLES, INTERNAL SECURITY FORCE

Conclusions:

1. The police role is legally established by law. The law is adequate and charges the police with the classical and traditional duties and missions of law enforcement agencies. The police overall role legally encompasses all the traditional law enforcement functions performed by the Surete Nationale, the Customs Service, the Mine Police, the ANC and Gendarmerie during emergencies.

The National Police has complete responsibility for the police of rural areas throughout the country and has continually provided coverage with elements of the force assigned to districts and territories and miscellaneous police posts in smaller communities. In view of the fact that police coverage of rural areas has always been a normal aspect of police operation, it is believed that rural operations will benefit proportionately with urban operations as progress and development of the police as a whole takes place.

2. The roles of the ANC, Gendarmerie, Surete Nationale, Customs Service and Mine Police are not in some cases fully defined by law. However, in the case of the Surete Nationale, Customs Service and Mine Police the roles are reasonably well defined by practice and the carried over legislation from the colonial era. Problems with respect to roles seem to stem from the frequent and what seems to be over-use of the ANC in law enforcement operations.

3. Although during periods of martial law the ANC is used as a law enforcement tool of the Government its members seriously lack qualification for the performance of a law enforcement role and additionally when acting in such a role they have been prone to commit serious crimes against the public. Although the use of the ANC has resulted in neutralization of active anti-government and lawless elements, in essence it amounts to providing a substitute in the form of control by force of arms and an atmosphere of fear which pervades and inhibits the social and economic progress of the community.

4. The attainment of internal security through employment of police elements is indispensable for creation and the maintenance of an atmosphere conducive to social and economic growth. The alternative to the maintenance of law and order by the police could possibly mean a continued increase in lawlessness and insecurity, a totalitarian rule through fear and a serious deterioration of the economy.

#### Recommendations:

1. The use of the ANC in a police mission should be only as a last resort during emergencies with the police resuming the sole and full burden for law enforcement as soon as possible. ANC elements should be gradually established in garrison life as political circumstances and the security situation permit.

2. The police should be adequately trained and developed in order that they may be able to perform on a full scale their role as the law enforcement arm of the Government thereby diminishing the frequent employment of other security elements.

#### D. POLICE BUDGET AND FISCAL MANAGEMENT

##### Conclusions:

1. The National Police Budget and Accounting section lacks the capability to adequately perform its functions in terms of knowledge, skills and resources, both human and material. The system itself is archaic and not geared to servicing a modern, professional, national police organization. The system follows the classical colonial practice of including all purchasing for the force, thus eliminating the checks and balances between the comptroller's and the logistics functions to reduce the possibility of kick-back or embezzlement.

2. There appears to be no programming effort nor any well-planned justification for funding or subsequent expenditures. Budgetary planning and

preparation obviously has been limited to taking the previous year's figures and doubling them in the vague hope of getting enough money to operate. No financial training was in evidence.

3. Lack of modern equipment is another limiting factor. While certainly this should be approached carefully to avoid expensive and over-sophisticated acquisitions of machinery, modernization of the system appears logical. Likewise, an examination in depth should be made of the records themselves to relate them to the limited mechanization proposed.

4. Additional personnel will probably be required if the Budget and Accounting section is to meet its stated goals in a national organization. Increased coordination and planning for the budget with all elements of the force is required. All current and future staff will require financial and system training once the latter has been determined.

5. In summary, the Budget and Accounting section needs development in depth, a thorough overhaul of all its systems, employment of limited mechanization consistent with economy and missions, and additional, well-trained personnel.

#### Recommendations:

1. A complete methods study be made of all the NP budget and fiscal practices. This could possibly be accomplished through the available USAID staff resources in Kinshasa. Based on such findings and the demonstrated Congolese capability to support and absorb such refinements, cautious commodity inputs would be in order with due regard to the danger of over-capacity and over-sophistication.

2. Indoctrination should be provided in basic principles of budget planning and preparation.

#### E. COMMUNICATIONS

##### Conclusion:

The goals that have been established for the communications system are being attained. Namely: To provide the Police with an efficient communications system, to train radio operators to operate the equipment and to train maintenance men to perform all necessary maintenance on the equipment and to establish an adequate records system. There have been many delays and problems but none that were insurmountable. Time, patience and supervision have resulted in the progress made at the present time. However, more radio operators must be trained, more maintenance men must be trained and the communications system must be supervised until such time as the U.S. Government can be assured that the communications system is adequately developed and can be properly utilized and maintained without outside help.

Recommendations:

1. A modest supply of spare parts should be procured through FY-70 to allow the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (GDRC) to upgrade their logistics and financial capabilities. Additional test equipment and electrical tools are needed to bring shop capabilities to required levels and should be USAID procured. No Single Sideband (SSB) radio network expansion is contemplated at this time pending completion of the final phase, after which the overall point to point and tactical communication requirement should be studied for possible expansion. Minor VHF radio system expansion—about five base stations—is recommended in Kinshasa to meet the expanding commissariat situation. Sixty, mobile, VHF radios now in storage be installed as motor vehicles become available.

2. Through an in-country training program 30 operators and five maintenance technicians be trained each year.

3. Two maintenance technicians be trained each year in the U.S.

F. TRANSPORTATION

Conclusions:

1. The USAID has performed adequately in fulfilling its role of furnishing transportation; on the other hand, the Congolese have failed to fulfill their commitment adequately for maintenance and repair of transportation provided. The unexpected departure of the Belgians, whom it was hoped would provide the technical operational supervision for management of the transportation input, left a serious gap that could not be filled by the Congolese.

2. Deficiencies are primarily in the area of poor administration, inadequate driver first echelon and periodic shop maintenance, poor driver skill, inadequate mechanical expertise, and inadequate tooling and equipment. It is pointed out that although driver maintenance as a whole was poor, the Team noted that some drivers were highly conscientious and it must be assumed that with proper and sufficient training, they would be expected to do an excellent job of first echelon maintenance. The same is true in the situation of the mechanics.

3. Approximately 100 of nearly 200 deadlined vehicles could be returned to service at a reasonable expense, and the Congolese should be encouraged to do this. The idea has merit in that it should provide a valuable training exercise in solving certain transportation problems.

4. Delivery of 21 vehicles is being withheld by the USAID until such time as it is believed the Congolese are prepared to employ the transportation in keeping with terms of the ProAg. It is believed the Congolese may become amenable to guidance and counselling which is required on a patient yet persevering basis.

Recommendations:

1. The U.S. should provide a fulltime advisor who is an expert in shop management and motor vehicle repair, to furnish advisory support in motor vehicle administration and management functions and responsibilities for all echelons of the NP.

2. The PSD should provide for several Congolese to attend schools in motor vehicle management and mechanics each year in a French speaking country.

3. The Congolese should be encouraged to arrange for repair at their own expense as many of the deadlined vehicles as possible. The TDY services of a US motor vehicle repair technician to make an educated assessment of the vehicles which may feasibly be repaired, parts required and costs and shop facility layout, would be of great value to the Mission and the Congolese government. If in the judgement of the Mission some stimulation may be of value, consideration could be given to paying all costs or offering to share costs with the Congolese for parts needed for repair, providing the TDY technician assessment reflects that such a course of action has feasibility.

4. The 21 vehicles withheld be released gradually based on an understanding by the Congolese regarding proper employment and maintenance. The PSD should be prepared to monitor the use and actively note deficiencies and counsel the NP in proper administration and utilization procedures. The effort should be in essence a demonstration type of action which in the past appears to have been seriously lacking.

5. For the future, the Congolese should be expected to buy most of their transportation needs except for the 21 vehicles being withheld.

G. POLICE EDUCATION AND TRAINING

Conclusions:

1. The Congolese capability to perform the training mission without advisory assistance has not yet developed to an adequate degree. They have very little knowledge or experience in performing the essential incisive professional analytical self-examination which is necessary for identification of the hard core defects in police skills, professionalism and the training system; moreover, they are not sufficiently sophisticated to be able to formulate the disciplines of an objective remedial program with its courses of action and criteria.

2. The school curricula is faulty in that it over-emphasizes academic, legal and liberal arts subjects and devotes insufficient time toward the basics of police training in such fundamental matters as patrol work, civil disturbance control, relationships with the public, collection and preservation of evidence, techniques and mechanics of arrest, and other daily duty procedures and techniques of the policeman on patrol. Instruction methodology is

mostly rote in nature. Modern techniques of demonstration and class participation and exercise are underdeveloped.

3. A tour of training for possibly two senior officers of certain U.S. police departments and training of selected officers at the International Police Academy would serve to enhance professionalism within the force. Also, such training should be an asset in creating an awareness of the importance of management, administration, discipline and equipment maintenance requirement.

4. There is a paucity of trained personnel, the schools having produced about 2,000 graduates during the past several years, in a force having a strength of approximately 24,000 personnel.

5. All five schools require minor amounts of plant repair and rehabilitation, with the schools at Kisangani and Bukavu in need of refurbishing to replace furnishings and equipment looted during the rebellion.

6. Modest amounts of training aids are required. These essentials run from still and motion picture projectors, films, film strips and slides, to locally prepared charts, crime scene mock-ups, simulated vehicular accident scenes, model control center operations, and hypothetical riot and civil disturbance control situations.

7. The local hire by USAID of a minimum of six of the former U.N. training advisors for use in the training system along with those advisors which may materialize through Belgian and Congolese negotiation would permit overall training assistance to be provided with increased effectiveness.

Recommendations:

1. The U.S. role in support of the Congolese school system be primarily in the nature of advisory assistance with modest commodity inputs.

2. The PSD should provide the Congolese with guidance and plans for gradual: recasting of the curricula to make it more appropriate, eliminating over-emphasis on legal and liberal arts subjects and bringing fundamental police subjects into proper perspective; reorientation of instruction methodology to encompass modern techniques of teaching to include demonstration, class participation and class exercises; reorganization of school schedules to increase annual student production; and, development of measures to qualify more personnel for participant training at the IPA.

3. To achieve the necessary impact in training personnel:

a. About 30 participants should receive training at the International Police Academy each year for two years and then the number may be scaled down to 10 each year for three years.

b. The Mission should use its influence in extending invitations to especially the new Vice MOI and a senior police official to come to the U.S. for Police Executive Training.

c. Two students should attend communications maintenance training at Delgado Institute in New Orleans, Louisiana, each year.

d. The NP school system schedules should be modified to increase the annual number of students graduated from 1,000 to 2,000.

e. The effort of the five schools should be supplemented by establishing a mobile training team capability. The objective of the effort should be to train 2,000 men annually who otherwise would not have the opportunity to participate as resident students at the schools.

4. The USAID should provide Public Law 480 funds as necessary for essential books and other training aids in the amounts mentioned below under commodity support funding.

5. The USAID should provide Public Law 480 funds essential for the physical plant repair and modification at all five schools, the refurbishing of the Kisangani and Bukavu schools and modest amounts of physical plant and grounds maintenance tools.

6. Based on the fact that the U.N. will definitely phase out its program at the close of CY 1967, the USAID should hire six advisors from former members of the U.N. police advisory staff and other qualified personnel as appropriate. One advisor to be in residence at each of the five schools and the sixth working in the PSD to assure standardization and an adequacy of French language books, visual aids and other educational matter and course material.

#### H. CIVIL DISTURBANCE CONTROL (CDC)

##### Conclusion:

The Congolese are capable of rioting as demonstrated by the violence in Kinshasa in the summer of 1967, largely directed against the white community. The high cost of living and substantial unemployment provide a potential for civil disturbance which must be recognized. The existing police capability is minimal except for a few relatively well managed police organizations such as that in Lubumbashi. Stocks of chemical grenades and projectiles total 3,425 which is substantially below the 8,000 required for the operational and training needs of the nine, 30-man CDC teams.

##### Recommendation:

A program of specialized training in CDC should be planned and implemented for the humane control of civil disturbances. Police elements who normally perform patrol duties should receive basic and periodic training

in CDC operations and have a dual mission of patrol and riot control response. Stocks of chemical grenades and projectiles which become obsolete due to age should be used for training, and amounts of equipment to meet minimal requirements be provided as indicated in the commodity listing below.

## I. POLICE FIREARMS AND MARKSMANSHIP TRAINING

### Conclusions:

1. It remains General Mobutu's policy that the police will not be armed with or possess firearms; although, it is reported they have the following in their stocks: 2,875 rifles, 489 submachine guns, 109 pistols, 20 automatic rifles and one 37 mm cannon, all manufactured prior to W. W. II and mostly European makes.

2. A minimal amount of marksmanship familiarization training is provided students at the five schools and the ANC makes its ranges available.

### Recommendation:

Until there is a change in the policy, the Public Safety assistance program should not provide developmental support.

## J. CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION (CID)

### Conclusions:

1. The Criminal Investigations Division (CID) has the framework for developing into a good organization through some refinement. There was evidence among the personnel of dedication and an earnest desire for help and a willingness to learn. The Records and Identification Bureau should be separated from the Division. Consideration should be given to dividing the CID into specialized Bureaus dealing with the various types of crimes such as Homicide, Robbery and Auto Theft. Professional training and upgrading of personnel are urgently required.

2. The Public Prosecutor's Office based on its assigned role and mission is involved in large measure in the investigative function. This situation creates the basis for a gray area in an overlap of functions with the CID and prevents the CID from developing its criminal investigation capability. Overall, the divided role makes for an undesirable situation and it is essential that the police be assigned the full role and mission.

### Recommendations:

1. Plans should be made for specialized investigative training. Commodity needs appear to be modest and these should be determined by the PSD in the future in accordance with the ability of the Congolese to absorb them. Necessary changes should be made in administrative or legislative

provisions as appropriate to give the Criminal Investigations Division its proper role and mission. Additionally, the CID should be studied by the PSD to determine the feasibility of dividing it into Bureaus handling various criminal law violations. The Records and Identification Bureau should be removed from the Criminal Investigations Division, and established as a separate Division, reporting to the Director for Administration at the national level, and to the Chief of Technical Services in the Detachments.

2. A National Uniform Crime Reporting system should be installed, tailored to meet the requirements of the Napoleonic legal system rather than the Common Law.

3. Procedures for handling and filing of fingerprint records and criminal files should be refined and personnel provided appropriate training. Consideration should be given to establishing a nationalized central repository at the seat of government. Modest commodity requirements are being recommended in the form of specialized filing cabinets and other easily predictable requirements essential to the proper administration of fingerprint records and files.

#### K. TRAFFIC DIVISION

##### Conclusion:

The Kinshasa Traffic Division is reasonably well led by an enthusiastic and knowledgeable officer. He provided an outstanding briefing making full use of his situation map and profile data, giving evidence that he does have a grasp for the salient points of operating a traffic program. The Division has better esprit de corps, discipline and direction than other units in Kinshasa. It is the most all around proficient police element both operationally and in maintenance of equipment in Kinshasa and probably the Congo. It appears that this unit is ideally suited for further development for use as a model for the rest of the force.

##### Recommendation:

The Traffic Division should be developed as an exemplar of a well-administered and operated police unit whose men reflect good standards of discipline, with the hope of stimulating and motivating the rest of the force toward improvement. Attention should be concentrated on the Division to further upgrade its training and capability. Its administrative and operational system should be refined and upgraded. Commodity inputs should include ten motorcycles with radios for the first year to broaden patrol coverage, and five a year thereafter for four years. Other support items should include crash helmets, white belts, and holsters, and accident investigation kits.

## L. POLICE HOUSING, BUILDINGS AND CAMPS

### Conclusions:

1. Some of the police operational headquarters and stations are generally inadequate in design and space with much overcrowding. It is expected that the situation with respect to National and Detachment headquarters and urban area police stations will continue to deteriorate. Planning and administration by the police in the area of housing management is inadequate.

2. NP facilities used by the PSD in support of the communications and logistics activities are overcrowded, unsuitable in layout, and deteriorating. An approved add-on for the communication activity should be held up until the overall matter is studied and a decision made as to the feasibility of a new larger building to accommodate both the communications and storage needs. The motor vehicle repair shop needs revision and probably expansion.

### Recommendations:

1. Provide the police with advisory assistance to develop their competency in the planning and management of police housing, for the effective administration of current and on-going requirements and also develop their capability to staff long range requirements in order to gradually correct the situation of certain old poorly designed and overcrowded buildings.

2. Study the feasibility of what appears to be an urgent need for a building at Camp Lufungula, Kinshasa to house the communications and logistics support effort. If appropriate, cancel the approved plan for the communications building add-on and provide from available PL-480 funds for a suitable multi-level building. The motor vehicle repair shop requires study to determine appropriate additional garage space which should be build from available PL-480 funds.

## M. PUBLIC RELATIONS

### Conclusion:

A Public Relations (PR) Bureau of the National Police is authorized by the Police Statute and has the responsibility for all PR activities. The PR Bureau also has the responsibility for running police dispensaries and canteens and mainly concerns itself with these activities to the detriment of Public Relations. There are no organized PR programs.

### Recommendations:

1. That PR Bureau should be raised to the level of a section of the Administration Directorate and given increased responsibilities and authority.

2. Dispensaries, canteens and other non-related functions should be assigned as administrative responsibilities in the Police Strength and Personnel section of the Directorate of Administration.

3. Personnel of the Public Relations Bureau should be made aware of proven PR techniques for conditioning the Public to understand the true role of the police and the purpose of new enforcement programs.

#### N. PUBLIC SAFETY ADVISORS

##### Conclusions:

1. The current staffing pattern of the USAID Public Safety Division-Kinshasa consists of the following:

1 Chief	1 Logistics Advisor
1 Generalist	1 Municipal Advisor
1 Communications Technician	1 Secretary
1 Training Advisor	

2. During the life of the Public Safety mission which began in 1963, it has been operating within relatively narrow parameters. It has had, and still does have the primary police advisory responsibility in communications, logistics, commodity support for motor vehicles and training aids as well as a few other incidentals. It has also had the responsibility for commodity support in police communications. Another major area of responsibility has been the construction and repair of schools and other facilities USAID-financed with PL 480 funds.

3. A major effort in an integrated police program usually involves technical advice for education and training, and for management and police operations at all levels. It also deals in depth with support functions such as motor vehicle maintenance, records and police administration. During the life of the program, most of this kind of technical assistance was afforded by an average of some 40-odd Belgians, 9 UN advisors, and marginal effort by other third country nationals.

4. In the Congo National Police, the Public Safety management effort should be at a high level to establish a personal rapport with the Vice Minister and his staff, as well as the Inspector General National Police. This must exist if the present difficulties and deficiencies centering around multiple and unsound efforts to manage the police force are to be remedied. The Chief, Public Safety, must maintain constant contact and give guidance to these top officials. He will also be required to give personal direction and personally participate in such educational devices as management seminars. He must do considerable travel to monitor nation-wide operations.

5. Kinshasa is a city of 1.5 million people and the rest of the country, with its 12 major urban centers has a population totalling about 14, 500, 000.

Geographically the Congo is about as large as the United States east of the Mississippi. Generalists are required to advise and monitor the Public Safety program across the board. This will include all of the professional police disciplines ranging from police administration to criminal investigation, to patrol and traffic. The Generalists must travel considerably to inspect and monitor the resource inputs and to insure that police administration is effective. They will serve as day-to-day counsellors to the 9 Detachment Commanders and the Commander of the capital city police.

6. The Motor Vehicle Maintenance Technician appears to be an obvious requirement to achieve and maintain the necessary police mobility and to protect the substantial USAID commodities investment.

7. The Communications picture is one of the brightest spots in the current program mainly because of the fact it has had close supervision in the form of a qualified technical advisor from the beginning. However, the Congolese, even though progress has been recorded, still have a long way to go to become self-sufficient. To achieve this end and to further protect the more than \$335,000 investment made to date, continuation of a Communications Technician appears advisable.

8. Leadership Education is one of the key factors in developing a real police capability in the Congolese. If the leaders are not trained in management practices and in the fundamentals of police administration, tactics and disciplines, the program cannot expect to succeed. This will encompass several management seminars annually, as well as continuous in-service training for the junior officer corps. Training advisory assistance to educate leaders is an obvious necessity.

9. There are five major police training schools in the Congo with a capacity of 1,000 students, which probably should be doubled in the near future. The training problem in terms of student body is in the order and magnitude of 20,000 individuals who should receive supervised training within a reasonable time frame; hopefully, 2,000 per year at the five schools and 2,000 per year by the use of a field mobile training effort in the Detachments. USAID has commodity investments in training aids and also has substantial investments in plant and other facilities. Accordingly, two Training Advisors to supervise and monitor the education and training effort will be necessary.

10. Records and Identification, and the Criminalistics Laboratory are national problems which have scarcely been probed. To satisfy these essential police support requirements, a Records Technician will be required for the life of the program.

11. One US Secretary and 2 local hire Secretaries will be required for administrative support.

Recommendation:

The following staffing pattern is being recommended for the life of the program:

- 1 Chief, Public Safety Advisor
- 3 Generalists
- 1 Motor Vehicle Maintenance Technician
- 1 Communications Technician
- 2 Training Advisors
- 1 Records and Identification Advisor
- 1 US Secretary
- 2 Local Hire Secretaries

O. PROGRAM ESTIMATED COSTS

Comments:

The time spread for planning purposes is for a Five Year Plan to extend from FY 1969 through FY 1973. The GDRC budgetary year is the same as the calendar year and the CY 1968 Budget has been submitted to the MOI for consideration.

GDRC Costs

The requested NP CY-68 budget is 12 million Z (\$24 million US), but there is no indication that the NP will receive more than enough to pay for salaries and allowances, as was the case in CY-67. It will require some time, and considerable training in budgeting and financial management before meaningful ancillary funds may realistically be expected from the GDRC. It should, however, be a direction for the police program to take, to guide them into greater financial self-sufficiency.

U.S. Costs

Local currency support requirements, from funds generated by PL-480 arrangements, will require a great deal of mutual study and negotiation before the parameters of such funding can be logically determined. However, some minimum allocations of local currency should be made for school facility maintenance and similar purposes because of the immediate need.

US dollar inputs as reflected below for the proposed program are modest considering the size of the police force and the magnitude of what is to be accomplished. Both human and material resources as proposed should be provided the project if there is to be any chance at all to succeed.

Recommendations:

The following estimated U.S. dollar expenditures are recommended. These will, of course, be subject to refinement to meet changing conditions.

	(\$1,000's)				
	<u>FY 69</u>	<u>FY 70</u>	<u>FY 71</u>	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>
<u>Technicians (&amp; 1 U.S. Sec.)</u>					
U.S. - 10	270	225	270	225	270
(1 Chief, 3 Generalists, 1 Motor Maintenance, 1 Commo, 2 Training, 1 Records & Identification, 1 Secretary)					
Contract 3rd Country - 6	<u>90</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>90</u>
Total	360	315	360	315	360
<u>Participants (training)</u>					
FY-69, 2 VIP, 30 IPA, 2 Commo					
FY-70, 30 IPA, 2 Commo					
FY-71-72-73, 10 IPA, 2 Commo					
<u>Commodities</u>					
<u>Transportation</u>					
FY-69, 10 Motor Cycles (MC) with					
spec. police equipment . . . . .	25				
Spare parts repair 100 vehicles .	55				
M. V. repair tools & equipment . .	45				
FY-70, 5 MC w/spec. police equip. . . . .	12.5				
Spare parts for 50 vehicles . . . . .	25				
M. V. repair tools . . . . .	2				
FY-71, 5 MC w/spec. equip. . . . .	12.5				
M. V. spare parts . . . . .	5				
Tools . . . . .	2				
FY's-72-73, 5 MC w/spec. equip. . . . .				12.5	12.5
M. V. spare parts . . . . .				5	5
<u>Communications</u>					
Motor Cycle radios	10	5	5	5	5
Test equip. & tools	3	.5	.5	.5	.5
Spares (incl. generators)	5	1	1	1	1
<u>Investigation, Records &amp; Identification</u>					
Fingerprint & Records Filing Cabinets	8.2	8.4	1.2	1.2	1.2
Crime Kit	5	4	.5	.5	.5
Photo Laboratory	5.6	5.5	.5	.5	.5
<u>Civil Disturbance Control</u>					
Chemical Hand Grenades	21.6			21.75	
Chemical Projectile Grenades	21.6	.5	.5	21.75	.5
Gas Masks	3.1				
Schools/Training	24.2	5	5	5	3
Miscellaneous Police Equipment	<u>12</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>10</u>
Total	244.3	79.4	43.7	84.7	39.7
<u>Shipping Cost</u>	61.0	19.8	10.9	21.2	9.9
<u>Other Costs (local hire - 2 Secretaries)</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>35</u>
GRAND TOTALS	779.3	519.2	479.6	485.9	474.6
<u>TOTAL COSTS ALL YEARS</u>	2,738.6				

## CHAPTER III

### ROLES, INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

#### A. THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL POLICE

The police law requires the police to protect the interests of the State and to carry out the functions required by laws and regulations in force.

Essentially, the police perform a general civil police function, enforcing criminal laws and certain non-criminal administrative regulations in the normal European method. The statute requires that they carry out the following duties:

1. Continuous observation of public streets and markets and patrol.
2. Report violations of laws and regulations to competent authority as well as dangers to public order.
3. Watch over public tranquillity and re-establish order when necessary.
4. Collect information concerning violations, inform competent authority, search for and arrest criminals.
5. Arrest criminals caught in the act or the subject of hue and cry, as well as those found with compromising property in their possession.
6. Prevent the destruction of evidence.
7. Arrest drunks and insane persons, detain them, and inform competent authority.
8. Arrest deserters, escaped prisoners, vagabonds, beggars, persons attacking persons or property, and disorderly persons.
9. Investigate or report accidents and assist victims, and report cadavers discovered.
10. Check persons residing in their areas, seek unregistered persons and aid in censuses and checks.
11. Guard government buildings or personnel as ordered by the MOI.
12. Police assistance at private gatherings will be charged for by the government, according to an established scale.

In major cities, the police perform traffic enforcement and control and exercise general criminal investigative functions. Riot squads are also mentioned incidentally without definition in the statute and exist in various forms in some major cities.

### Urban and Rural Operations

The current police strength of 24,368 in a country of about 16,000,000 population provides 1 policeman to each 657 persons. The N.P. objective for reduced strength would place the police at a total of 20,000. This amounts to 1 policeman to each 800 persons. It is believed the reduced strength would be sufficient to accomplish the total mission. During the colonial period the police strength was less than 10,000 however their tasks were not as great.

The National Police is presently charged with providing law enforcement activity throughout the country in both rural and urban areas. No other agency has this responsibility. In various cases, the ANC and the Gendarmerie have performed a variety of rural law enforcement in recovered and other areas under both martial and non-martial law authority. The Gendarmerie has functioned on a spotty basis in semi-rural areas. Generally its operation has been conducted on the outskirts of urban centers.

Under the Belgian administration, the police was primarily oriented toward urban areas. Small units, however, were assigned to posts in rural areas. Sometimes these units were under the command of a police commissaire; at other times they were placed at the disposition of the local territorial administrator. Essentially they served mainly as a means of taking repressive rather than preventive (such as patrol) action.

After independence, the same pattern has prevailed. Nonetheless, in most sectors of the country the pattern of having small police units (now normally under the command of a commissaire due to the augmented number of commissaires since independence) assigned to districts and territories and miscellaneous police posts in smaller towns remains unchanged.

The method of performing the job in rural areas is similar in nature to that of some of the other countries in Africa. The police is established at a post in a village and may move out on occasion to patrol or respond to a specific situation.

In some areas where tribes continue to conduct their own civic administration the tribal chief under customary law may establish his own police. Tribal police elements do not come under the N.P.

### B. ARMEE NATIONALE CONGOLAISE (ANC).

The Congolese army was created in 1960 shortly after the Congo gained its independence. Its ancestor was the Force Publique of the Belgian Congo, which was essentially a repressive organization. All officers and many

adjutants (more or less warrant officers) in the Force Publique were Belgian officers, who continued to occupy their command positions. They were replaced by Congolese officers, who generally had been sergeants prior to independence. Many of these same former sergeants are the present colonels and generals of the ANC.

When the ANC was created from the Force Publique, a Gendarmerie was also established. In theory, the Gendarmerie received the best men from the Force Publique to create a para-military constabulary separate from the ANC but still a part of the Ministry of Defense. In practice, the personnel qualifications of the two organizations were virtually identical and the Gendarmerie has functioned in an essentially army rather than law enforcement role.

The official strength of the ANC is reported at approximately 29,485. Qualified observers feel that its actual strength is probably in the vicinity of 27,000 or perhaps less. The strength of the Gendarmerie is reported at 3,500. The Congolese Navy has 15 men, while the Air Force has approximately 500.

No official role for the ANC has been legally established. Its present de facto role includes the defense of the country's borders, defense against internal and external aggression and serving as an enforcement arm of the Central Government. The ANC and Gendarmerie both exercise police powers (partially on a basis of martial law and partially as an assumed power.) The Gendarmerie may be requested by a Provincial Governor for the performance of law enforcement duties during an emergency. As of the time of this reporting none of the Governors is known to have ever requested assistance by the Gendarmerie.

A number of countries are aiding the ANC in various ways. The Italians have provided pilot training for the air force in Italy and have a mission in the Congo providing advice and further training. The Israelis have trained paratroops in Israel and have a mission in the Congo training additional personnel and providing advice. The Belgians have historically been the major source of military assistance personnel. The US Military Mission (COMISH) has functioned primarily in a support role, providing vehicles, signal equipment, and allied items, and advice and local training in these fields. A number of Congolese have been trained in various military fields in the US and in Belgium, in addition to the specialized training given in Italy and in Israel. The air operations capability has diminished with the reduction in the activities of World International Ground Maintenance Organization (WIGMO), a special aircraft operations and maintenance organization which previously flew and maintained fighter, fighter-bomber, and transport aircraft for the GDRC but now is primarily in the maintenance and transport field.

### C. THE SURETE NATIONALE

The Surete is responsible for a diversity of functions but its primary fields of activity can be described as counter-subversion, counter-espionage, immigration control and supervision of resident foreigners, and acting as the political police of the regime. Formerly under the Ministry of Interior, it always functioned as a virtually autonomous unit. After the ascent to power of Mobutu, the Surete was officially detached from the Ministry of Interior and assigned directly to the Presidency. The strength of the Surete is only several hundred actual members and in addition it has assorted informants and other persons working for it in various ways. Its personnel are assigned to various ports of entry to process passports. A blacklist of persons forbidden to enter or leave the country is maintained. The Surete also maintains files on and conducts surveillance over all resident foreigners. It has field offices in all provinces. Its counter-espionage and counter-subversive capabilities are professionally assessed as not very great, many of its personnel lack training or ability.

A handful of Belgian advisors were formerly assigned to the Surete, but they were all imprisoned and later released during the anti-white activities of the Government in July-August 1967. One Belgian advisor is known to be working with the Surete handling their fingerprint files. There are also a few Israeli advisors working with the Surete.

### D. CUSTOMS

The Congolese Customs activity is part of the Ministry of Finance and handles normal customs activities at ports of entry. It enforces customs laws and therefore has police powers in that respect. It also has offices in the provinces. Reports indicate that it is thoroughly corrupt and incompetent. A few UN advisors have been assigned to the customs but have made little headway. The Customs is not an armed organization. A Financial Brigade, which was a uniformed, armed investigative branch of the Finance Ministry, formerly existed but has been disbanded.

### E. MINE POLICE

A governmental Mine Police under the Ministry of Lands, Mines, and Energy has existed sporadically since 1964. Its responsibility is to control the smuggling of diamonds and other precious materials from the Congo (it has been estimated by a reliable source that more diamonds are smuggled out than are legally exported) and it is vested with police powers for discharge of its assigned role. Its personnel are appointed on a basis of politics, are untrained, and appear mainly to be concerned with personal gain. The Mine Police has been periodically dissolved and reconstituted. At present it is believed to be operating only on a restricted basis in a few areas. As a National internal security organization it is virtually valueless.

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COMMENT

The roles of certain security organizations, especially the ANC and Gendarmerie, are not specifically defined by any known legislation, nor are they mentioned in the current constitution. Furthermore the role they play as the military arm of the GDRC is far different from any role that the old Force Publique played under the Belgians. Roles of others, such as the Customs and the Surete, whose roots stem from the period prior to independence are continuations of organizations established during the colonial era. Since all legislation of the Belgian Congo remains in effect until specifically abrogated, these latter organizations have simply kept the role basically established for their colonial predecessors.

The official role of the National Police as described in the legislation creating and organizing it, is so broad that it could in theory carry out all law enforcement functions of any sort, even carrying out the counter-espionage responsibilities of the Surete or the enforcement activities of the Customs. Similarly it could (and does in certain cases) enforce the internal mining and anti-smuggling regulations that are normally the province of the mine police.

In times of martial law, as a matter of practice the police becomes subordinate to the military authorities which direct all enforcement activities, whether by the army or the police. It was reported to the team that, even during non-martial law periods, whenever periods of stress occur, or even for personal advantage, members of the ANC are known to establish road blocks to control civilians and to otherwise maltreat them under the guise of maintaining order.

Members of the ANC have not been trained for the performance of conventional police duties and on occasions when they practice law enforcement with or without authority they have been prone to inflict depredations and serious crimes against the public creating an atmosphere of fear and seriously inhibiting any social and economic activity. The ANC, as the political situation permits, should be gradually moved into garrison life and then allowed to perform police duties only in extreme emergencies, for an absolute minimum of time. Likewise the use of the Gendarmerie which may be requested by the Provincial Governors for performance of law enforcement should be kept at an absolute minimum.

While in theory under its legislation the National Police could perform the functions of the Surete, this is not done in practice. The role of the Surete Nationale and its elements (except political) would be more logically grouped if they were relegated to the NP. Because of the present limited levels of capability in the NP it would serve no useful purpose and be unwise to recommend a move at this time. Additionally the President places great stress on the Surete and has seen fit to have it directly reporting to him instead of the MOI.

## F. NATIONAL IDENTIFY CARD PROGRAM

During the Belgian administration of the Congo prior to independence, a National Identity Card program was established which required all adults to register. The primary purpose of this program was not only to identify the persons concerned but also to control their movements. Moving to a city from a rural area was normally permitted consistent with labor force requirements. The Identity Card indicated whether or not a person was authorized to live and work in a given area. The program was administered by the provincial and municipal governments, not by the police, and appears to have been concentrated in major centers more than in undeveloped areas.

Persons applying for identity cards were fingerprinted, and the fingerprint classification was usually carried on the card. Cards in some areas and in the latter years of the Belgian administration were laminated in plastic. The cards reflected the person's name, date and place of birth, tribe, parents' names, and residence as well as his photo and one fingerprint. Each bore a serial number, prefaced by the letters "S. D." for "Service Dactyloscopique" (Fingerprint Bureau). Thus the cards are often referred to as SD cards.

The Basic system was continued when the Congo became independent. No plasticized cards have been issued after the Belgian departure. Instead, a paper folder or in some cases a booklet is issued, containing the same information as the Belgian cards. Successive changes of address are normally noted on the card. Since the paper is of poor quality, exposure to the tropical climate causes deterioration and it is easily counterfeited.

The local governmental units responsible for administration of the system in theory maintain a register of persons by SD number, name, and residence. Reports indicate that this is frequently poorly maintained. Fingerprints are normally kept in a central location for each major city, but it has been reported that there are few qualified classifiers. The system of classification is archaic and unsuitable for accurate storage and retrieval of the large stocks of fingerprint cards. Because of the change in the card format and the deterioration in the administration of the program, it appears less effective than under the Belgian administration. It is not unusual to discover when a criminal is arrested that he possesses several identity cards under different names.

As it presently stands, the identity card program is within the framework of the local governmental units. The program is poorly conducted, administered and has little value from a security standpoint. Additionally, it appears that the country has no real need of an identity card program at this time. Therefore, it is felt that the police should remain uninvolved until such time that security problems necessitate a true national identity program.

## CHAPTER IV

### OBSERVATIONS AND FINDINGS NATIONAL POLICE

#### A. FUNCTIONS AND ORGANIZATION

1. Historical Background. Since inception of the USAID/PSD program in 1964, information has continually been gathered increasing the PSD store of knowledge regarding the history and development of the National Police. Significant elements of this valuable information have been selected and are provided below.

##### Before Independence

The civil police activity of the Congo prior to Independence was established under authority of the Colonial Charter of 1908. The police were organized on a provincial basis, coordinated by overall Belgian Colonial administration. Police detachments were located in the major cities, towns and villages with Belgians virtually filling all officer positions and many non-commissioned positions as well. The Belgian Parliament on May 18, 1960 voted a "Fundamental Law Relative to the Structure of the Congo," referred to as "la Loi Fondamentale," to serve as interim legislation until the Congo adopted its own definitive constitution. Based on this interim legislation, the police remained under provincial authority from 1960 until July 20, 1966, when they were nationalized by Law #423 and Law #424.

The role of the police during the pre-independence period was essentially urban, with some repressive activities being carried on out-side the cities as necessary but with little preventive activity in such areas. General law enforcement activities were carried on by the police, including all the normal police operations such as patrol, traffic control, and investigations. When major repressive actions were required, the Force Publique later to become the Armee Nationale du Congo (ANC) was employed, not the police.

The Police weapons consisted of rifles and submachine guns, but the arms were issued to Congolese police personnel only in emergencies. Riot squads were maintained in major cities, and tear gas was stocked. It is believed that the use of rifle fire was considered the normal progression in riot control.

A police school was maintained in each of the six provinces to teach recruits and non-commissioned officers (NCO's). Almost all instructors were Belgian officers. As Congolese were trained and qualified, Belgian NCO's were eliminated. The first Congolese officers were appointed in Kinshasa (Leopoldville) in 1956. This was a group of approximately 10 officers, of whom several are still in the police. Another small group was trained in

1958 and another in 1959 but by 1960 there were only a few dozen Congolese Officers. Belgian Officers came from two sources; the Belgian Gendarmerie and the various Belgian civil police forces. A few gendarmerie officers were assigned, but most of those assigned from the Gendarmerie were actually NCO's in Belgium. Officers from the civil police forces were generally better qualified.

According to reports, the various police forces were adequately equipped. Leopoldville, now Kinshasa, with a population of some 300,000 in 1960 had over 150 police vehicles. VHF-FM and UHF-FM radio nets were installed in the major cities and throughout the Katanga. No long distance police radio facilities were provided; the wide-spread post office radio-teletype network being used instead.

The Belgian Government made serious efforts to improve the Congolese police forces during the three or four years immediately prior to Independence. Strengths were increased, additional police advisors were sent to the Congo, modern police schools and barracks were built, and considerable equipment was provided. Unfortunately, attempts to train police command officers in sufficient numbers came too late.

#### After Independence

When Independence came in 1960, the Congolese assumed most officer posts. The bulk of the Belgian officers, with the exception of those in the Katanga, left during the immediate post Independence disturbances. Those in the Katanga remained almost en masse and a large part retained their former positions, except for the top command posts. Because of this continuity of leadership and training, the Katanga Police has always remained the best in the Congo. Just prior to and during 1963 Belgians started trickling back to other areas of the Congo, with over 50 being in service by the close of 1963. During the immediate post-Independence period (again with the exception of the Katanga), most police vehicles, radios, and other equipment were stolen or destroyed. When the public safety project began in September 1963, there was not one operating police radio or police vehicle in Leopoldville—now Kinshasa.

After Independence, forces grew to several times their previous size, mainly for political reasons. All training schools except the one in Elizabethville—now Lumbumbashi—serving the Katanga were unable to sustain themselves and gradually closed operations by 1962. Most recruitment was done on a tribal or political basis and this, coupled with the lack of trained leaders, resulted in an undisciplined force employed mainly to serve the whims of the provincial politicians. Here again an exception was the Katanga, where capable Congolese had been trained by the Belgians in 1960 to assume the top command positions.

The situation was further aggravated when on 1 January 1963, the country was split into 21 provinces. Each had its autonomous police force which again expanded. The paucity of competent command personnel became a greater problem, and political influence increased. Discipline, operations and equipment of the forces suffered.

~~SECRET~~

In 1964, the Minister of Interior realized the need for improving the police and attempted to insure their being paid and provided with proper equipment, as well as being made more efficient.

By 1964, the Leopoldville—now Kinshasa police training facility was reopened as a national training school, and by 1965, the Bukavu, Stanleyville, now Kisangani and Coquilhatville—now Mbandaka schools were reopened. These, along with the Elizabethville—now Lubumbashi school which had remained in continuous operation, provided the first sizable amount of trained police since Independence.

In 1964 the Congolese rebellion caused a significant loss in the police strength of the eastern Congo. To rebuild the police of the eastern provinces several hundred recruits were put through a crash course of training given at the Stanleyville school. Belgian officers attached to Belgian Administrative Teams in the major towns (the teams being sent in by the GDRC to re-establish civil administration in those areas where the rebels had destroyed the local government) assumed command positions in most cases and began to rebuild the police forces.

In November, 1965, the President showed interest in the police and ordered that a National Police be created. A group to write the necessary legislation was organized, with a Congolese as titular head. The actual work was done by a UN representative (a senior French commissaire assigned to the Kinshasa school), a senior Belgian officer, the Congolese commandant of the Kinshasa school, a Belgian administrator in the Ministry of Interior, and the Chief or Acting Chief, Public Safety Division (PSD). This group produced what became on July 20, 1966, the organic police law and statutes.

Whatever semblance of police effectiveness which may have existed in the Congo in the two to three year period immediately following Independence was the result of the efforts of a few enlightened Congolese administrators, assistance rendered by 32 Belgian police technicians, advice offered by interested United Nations (UN) civilian operations personnel, and the limited guidance and on-the-job training being given by the UN Nigerian Police Detachments located in Kinshasa, Kisangani, Bukavu, Kindu, and Luluabourg.

2. National Police Law. On July 20, 1966, Laws #423 and #424 were enacted establishing the National Police (NP) as an agency of the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) and placing it under the direction of the Minister. This legislation—hereafter called the Statutes—established the position of Inspector General (IG) as the Commanding Officer of the national force, and authorized the MOI to delegate all or any part of the required management powers to the Inspector General. The Statute prescribed the framework of the organization of the NP. It further delineated functional descriptions for administration, logistics, training, legislation and special problems. Likewise included were the personnel administration system and career program, staffing patterns for Officers and Enlisted Men, operational activities and unit structure, as well as rules and regulations for conduct.

~~SECRET~~

Conditions and actions leading to the enactment of the NP Statutes are interesting and worthy of brief mention. Beginning around 1964, the PSD, UN and Belgian police advisors initiated action urging the Government Democratic Republic Congo (GDRC) to nationalize the police. The basic aims of nationalization were to centralize control, removing it from local politicians, reduce swollen forces to realistic levels, create uniformity, to screen out unqualified personnel and improve the operation, organization and training of the police. Some of the difficulties stemming from non-centralized control were: varied degrees of standards in management; indifference in some instances; problems in the allocation of limited resources to the training, transportation, communications and other operational activities; nepotism; poor discipline; inefficiency; political interference; graft and corruption. It was believed that donor provided assistance and Congolese administration and direction would be enhanced considerably in dealing with a national structure, rather than the 21 autonomous forces under the provincial governors. The 1967 Constitution recognized the legal existence of the National Police and the essence of what is provided by the National Police Law is mentioned below:

Annex I established the different ranks and prescribes the grade distribution of the police. The following manning tables are described by this portion of the legislation, as well as delimiting the percentages of personnel permitted in the structure, in descending order, from roughly Colonel to Second Lieutenant, and Sergeant to Private. The Inspector General ranks as a Brigadier General.

<u>Officers</u>	
<u>Rank</u>	<u>Percentages</u>
<u>Commissaire &amp; Inspector Corps</u>	2 %
Inspectors & Principal Commissaires	20 %
Commissaires	30 %
Assistant Commissaires	50 %
<u>Sub-Commissaire Corps</u>	3 %
Principal Sub-Commissaires	20 %
Sub-Commissaires	30 %
Assistant Sub-Commissaires	50 %
<u>Non-Commissioned Officers</u>	
<u>Brigadier Corps</u>	20 %
Chief Brigadiers	10 %
Brigadiers	30 %
Assistant Brigadiers	60 %
<u>Private First Class and Private</u>	
Police Agents Corps	75 %
Principal Police Agents	40 %
Police Agents and Assistant Police Agents	60 %

Annex II prescribes the organization and functions of the Inspectorate General.

Annex III to the Law provides service and dress uniform regulations, as well as those for various specialized uniforms. Insignias are specified for each rank.

Annex IV provides for categories of vehicles and communications equipment.

Annex V provides for categories of weapons and for their assignment to units.

Annex VI determines the requirements for admission to the police schools. To become a recruit policeman, the applicant must be a Congolese citizen of irreproachable conduct, pass a physical examination, have at least six years of elementary school, meet the minimum height, be between 18 and 30 for men and 18 and 25 for women, and pass an entrance examination. To enter the NCO class, the applicant must be at least an Agent, have above average efficiency reports, and pass the entrance examination.

For the Sub-Commissaire class, different standards are prescribed allowing for direct entry from civilian life and for personnel already in the police. The basic requirements for civilians are the same as for recruit applicants except that 4 years of secondary school is required, (roughly sophomore standing in the US high school system), and a more difficult entrance examination is given. For candidates coming from within the police, two years of service in the grade of Brigadier or higher is required, as are above average efficiency reports and passage of the entrance examination. Twenty-five (25) percent of the places in the sous-commissaire course are for civilian candidates, while seventy-five (75) percent are for police personnel.

Annex VII establishes the new ranks and provides for transition from and a listing of equivalent ranks. It also establishes dates of rank. Officer personnel, as opposed to enlisted men, are reclassified only by their permanent ranks and are required to take an examination. If successful, they receive the permanent rank of Sub-Commissaire. If unsuccessful, they will have the rank of Chief Brigadier.

Additionally, the Statutes provide that:

a. Personnel and units may be assigned to any portion of the country by the MOI upon recommendation of the Inspector General or the power may be delegated by the MOI.

b. Police training will be carried out in police schools established by the MOI. Uniformity will be assured by the Inspectorate-General.

c. In general personnel serving in the various police forces existing prior to the creation of the National Police, with certain minor exceptions would be incorporated into the National Police.

d. Personnel engaged by the police after the creation of the National Police must be graduates of one of the authorized police schools.

e. A reclassification of the grades of the various former forces into the grades of the National Police was authorized.

f. Prior laws concerning the police were abrogated.

g. An annex established standard police salaries.

Authority. Authority to make arrests, serve warrants, and investigative methods are prescribed to a certain degree by the criminal code. Brigadiers and Agents have much less legal authority than their American police counterparts in the lowest grades, not being authorized to make certain types of reports, arrests and seizures. In essence, Brigadiers and Agents can arrest only for a violation of a serious nature committed in their presence. Officer personnel can issue summonses, execute warrants issued by magistrates, make arrests, detain prisoners and take official statements.

### 3. Organization and Force Levels

Functions of Inspector General and Staff. The organization of the Inspectorate General of the National police consists of an Intelligence Exploitation Service and four Directorates. Personnel authorizations and functions are as follows:

The Intelligence Exploitation Service Section is authorized 1 principal Inspector, 1 Principal Commissaire, 1 Sub-Commissaire, 3 clerks and 2 typists. Its functions are to collect, evaluate, and exploit all intelligence concerning law enforcement matters coming from police units. It also maintains liaison with the various police units and with other enforcement and security services.

The First Directorate, ADMINISTRATION, contains three sections:

The First Section, Police Strength and Personnel, is authorized 1 Inspector, 4 Principal Commissaires, 5 Sub-Commissaires and 5 clerks. It consists of four Bureaus whose functions are: Study the personnel requests made by the detachment commanders and by provincial governors and make suggestions concerning appropriate police strengths for the areas concerned. Maintain records concerning the strength of each unit. Handle the personnel records of Sub-Commissaires, Commissaires, and Inspectors. Provide instructions for the detachments, which are responsible for maintaining the records of the Brigadiers and Agents assigned to them. Handle pension matters. Handle efficiency reports and promotion matters for Sub-Commissaires, and Inspectors. Handle complaints concerning these officers and

receive promotion actions proposed for Brigadiers and Agents by their Detachment Commanders. Process matters dealing with the Superior Disciplinary Council and prepare dossiers concerning honorary awards for police personnel. Handle all officer assignment and transfer matters and receive notification of all transfers concerning non-officer personnel. Study assignments of foreign technicians.

The Second Section, Budget and Accounting, is authorized 1 Inspector, 3 Principal Commissaires, 4 Sub-Commissaires, and 4 clerks. It consists of three Bureaus whose functions are: Prepare the annual budget request for salaries, operating costs, and all other items required for the police; administer the funds provided for the police; handle bookkeeping and accounting matters, including salary payments, assignments of vehicles, inventories, and official travel; perform the duties of a central purchasing office.

The Third Section, Secretariat, is authorized 1 Principal Commissaire, 1 Commissaire, 1 Sub-Commissaire, 4 typists, 5 clerks and 6 policemen-clerks. It consists of three Bureaus whose functions are: Provide a Message center and process all coded messages; handles public relations and protocol; perform typing, reproduction, and filing.

The Second Directorate, LEGISLATION AND SPECIAL PROBLEMS, contains two Sections and Secretariat.

The First Section, Legislation, is authorized 1 Inspector, 2 Principal Commissaires and 3 Sub-Commissaires. It consists of two Bureaus whose functions are: Study all laws relating to the police, collect and study documentation concerning police and judicial matters; prepare and revise police instructions and circulars as necessary.

The Second Section, Special Problems, is authorized 1 Inspector, 2 Principal Commissaires, 2 Sub-Commissaires, and 2 clerks. It consists of two Bureaus whose functions are: Handle firearms registration; study special problems concerning tribalism, strikes, bars, demonstrations, and similar matters.

The Third Section, Secretariat, is authorized 1 Sub-Commissaire, 1 clerk, 3 typists and 2 policemen-clerks. Its functions consist of support for the Directorate.

The Third Directorate, TRAINING, contains three Sections. The First Section, Organization, is authorized 1 Inspector, 2 Principal Commissaires and 4 Sub-Commissaires. It consists of 2 Bureaus whose functions are: Handle organization and operations of police schools, including assignment of instructors to schools; handle training equipment.

The Second Section, Instruction, is authorized 1 Inspector, 2 Principal Commissaires and 1 Sub-Commissaire. It consists of 2 Bureaus whose functions are: Prepare training programs; determine school admission requirements; handle studies abroad.

The Third Section, Secretariat, is authorized 1 Commissaire, 1 clerk, 3 typists and 2 policemen clerks and provides support for the Directorate.

The Fourth Directorate, LOGISTICS, contains three Sections.

The First Section, Equipment, is authorized 1 Inspector, 4 Principal Commissaires, 2 Sub-Commissaires, 1 armorer, 1 identification specialist, 1 laboratory specialist, 1 Chief Brigadier, 2 Brigadiers, 2 policemen-drivers, and 1 clerk-typist. It consists of four Bureaus whose functions are: Handle matters relating to uniforms, equipment and arms; handle matters concerning vehicles and transport; handle technical equipment matters; handle the central police warehouse and the shipment of items to detachments.

The Second Section, Radio and Telecommunications, is authorized 1 Inspector, 1 Principal Commissaire, 1 Commissaire, 1 radio engineer, 4 radio repairmen and additional repairmen may be added as necessary. It consists of 2 Bureaus whose functions are: Supervise operating standards of the police radio network, personnel training, and repair; operate the Kinshasa headquarters station of the Inspectorate-General; supervise the other stations.

The Third Section, Secretariat, is authorized 1 Sub-Commissaire, 1 Commissaire, 3 typists and 2 policemen clerks. It furnishes support for the Directorate.

#### GDRC Geographic Subdivisions

The Democratic Republic of the Congo is divided into several political subdivisions. These consist of eight Provinces which are divided into Districts, and the Districts are subdivided into Territories. In a U.S. frame of reference, this would approximate States, Counties, and Townships. Likewise, the national capital at Kinshasa carries the same political status as a Province. In each Province a capital city is designated as the local, administrative authority, and has a police Detachment for the provincial force. Reference is made to the "Typical Detachment (Provincial), Organization Chart," Figure 1.

Platoons, Brigades and Companies. The units below Detachment level are organized along the following lines:

- a. The Section consists of 12 men including an Assistant Brigadier as leader.
- b. The Platoon consists of three sections commanded by a Chief Brigadier who has a Brigadier as an assistant.
- c. The Brigade is composed of three platoons commanded by a Commissaire or a Principal Sub-Commissaire with a Sub-Commissaire as an assistant.
- d. The Company consists of three Brigades commanded by a Principal Commissaire with an Assistant Commissaire or a Principal Sub-Commissaire as an assistant.

# TYPICAL DETACHMENT (PROVINCIAL) ORGANIZATION CHART NATIONAL POLICE




Figure 1

Strength. Prior to independence in 1960, the NP consisted of 272 Belgian officers and 8,927 Congolese NCO's and EM. Currently, the authorized force level of the NP is 20,000 according to the Budget and Accounting Section (BA). The following table shows the force by rank, as furnished to the Evaluation Team by the Budget and Accounting Section and reflects a grand total of 19,966 officers and men. There is a discrepancy of 34 in the totals furnished, which the Budget and Accounting Section was unable to explain.

STAFFING PATTERN

<u>RANK</u>	<u>FORCE LEVEL</u>
<u>Officer Personnel</u>	
Inspector General	1
Inspector Principal	24
Inspector	32
Principal Commissaire	58
Commissaire	125
Assistant Commissaire	200
Principal Sub-Commissaire	205
Sub-Commissaire	300
Assistant Sub-Commissaire	<u>401</u>
	1,346

<u>GRADE</u>	<u>FORCE LEVEL</u>
<u>Enlisted Personnel</u>	
Chief Brigadier	1,206
Assistant Brigadier	2,400
Principal Police Agent	3,000
Police Agent	3,014
Assistant Police Agent	<u>9,000</u>

Total Authorized Strength - 19,966

In fact, the force level increased in 1966 until, according to a GDRC survey, it reached about 27,000. There has been some reduction, according to the NP, who now report about 24,000 on the force, mainly as a result of discharging personnel who failed to pass a physical examination. This is not a static figure since recruiting is forbidden and normal attrition will result in some losses. With a population of approximately 16,000,000 this amounts to a police ratio of 1.50 per thousand population.

Deployment. The table below provides the latest information available about the deployment of the NP force.

DEPLOYMENT

<u>LOCALITY</u>	<u>FORCE LEVEL</u>	<u>LOCALITY</u>	<u>FORCE LEVEL</u>
Kinshasa	3,504	Katanga	7,360
Congo Central	2,042	Kivu	2,026
Bandunda	2,057	Orientale	1,745
Kasai Occidental	1,617	Equateur	<u>1,784</u>
Kasai Oriental	2,225	TOTAL	24,368

COMMENT

The chain of command is direct and clearly indicated with the classical authorities of staff officers to plan, develop policy, furnish administrative and technical support, and inspect. The Detachment Organizations (Provincial Police Forces) fall under the direct control of the Inspector General in a clearly defined chain of command. Staff and operational activities of the Detachments are divided into major subdivisions of (1) Technical Services, including Investigations, Traffic, Sub-Detachments and the provincial capital policing effort, and (2) the Administrative Service, or support functions of Public Relations, Finance, Personnel and Secretariat.

This fundamentally sound, but somewhat limited functional organization, is to a degree inhibited by the practical exigencies of the GDRC management, with their own limitations of experience, training and patriotism aggravated by power consciousness and nepotism. None of these things is peculiar to the Congo or the NP, but is quite common in a newly emerging nation with only seven, hectic years of self government.

A few examples will highlight the problem. The Minister of Interior (MOI), a former law school director in his late twenties, is considered by some to be the second or third most powerful political figure in the Congo. The office of Vice Minister has been recently created, and the MOI has delegated NP supervision to the Vice Minister who is new and has not had sufficient opportunity to demonstrate his capacities and attitudes.

The Secretary General of the Ministry of Interior, is reported to exercise undue operational control of the NP, effectively limiting the authority of the Inspector General. The Secretary General and frequently the MOI initiate and approve all personnel actions including recruitment, transfers and discipline. They, as well as other MOI staff members often give direct orders to police at all levels. The MOI has placed a number of young law school graduates - former students of his - in key positions in the NP. Also, even though the Statutes do not provide for a Deputy Inspector General, the Principal Inspector in Charge of the Intelligence Service in practice performs in such role and all orders and communications between the Inspector General and his force must pass through this Deputy. The latter is reported to be personally beholden to the Secretary General, and the President.

Although the police have been nationalized since July 1966, it appears that the Inspectorate General of the National Police headquarters has failed to develop sufficiently as a viable element. The proliferated command situation, political interference, and feeble authority of the Inspector General has, to a degree, contributed to inhibition of the general development of the police and to the low levels of administrative control, direction and discipline.

In a meeting with the evaluation team, the Vice Minister of Interior expressed his recognition of defects in police efficiency, and his belief that these had to be corrected. He hoped the United States would not turn its back on the GDRC now that the GDRC is no longer preoccupied with internal dissidence and hostilities and can devote necessary attention to problem matters.

At no time during its in-country study was the team able to gain knowledge of any specific thinking or planning that would lead to believe Mobutu and the MOI are prepared to support the police as a National Police force free of political interference or provide the necessary budgetary support for its effective operation. The proposed police budget for CY 1968 is for approximately \$24,000,000 U.S. which, it is believed, would be about sufficient to fully support the financial needs of the police. However, based on last year's budgeting experience, it is doubtful if the police would receive much more than the funds needed to cover pay and minimal levels of operation.

The team also noted that the U.S. Ambassador and USAID Mission Director are of the opinion that President Mobutu would be willing to support a national police force adequately.

There are some developments which indicate certain conditions existing in the past, which have served as a basis for not strengthening the position and authority of the police, no longer prevail. Provincial Governors no longer have autonomous police forces under their authority. All Governors are appointed by President Mobutu and designated by him as the Provincial Political Party chiefs. President Mobutu heads up the national political party which is the only legal political party.

With the cessation of hostilities and the lifting of martial law, the role of the ANC and its employment as a law enforcement element could eventually fade into the background. However, it is believed that the nation has not developed sufficiently its defense structure to feel secure against externally generated threats. Additionally, it is believed that at this time President Mobutu has not consolidated sufficiently his position and his government. Based on these circumstances it may be premature to expect any precipitous action at this time for diminution of reliance on the ANC and greatly increased support for the National Police.

The time factor necessary to orient the structure, system and roots of the Police from autonomous provincial forces to a National system must be considered and it appears that sufficient time has not elapsed to permit adequate orientation. During the past 18 months since legislation was approved, some consolidation measures in the form of reclassification and mass redeployment of personnel have been taken.

The conventional administrative tools, i. e., manuals of Rules and Regulations, Police and Operating Procedure, do not exist in the NP. However, much of this does exist in the Statutes and if the use of this legislation could be maximized, efficiencies undoubtedly would result. Such orders as are issued, originate in the Legislative Directorate of the headquarters staff. This Directorate is headed by a competent individual who incidentally in 1956 was one of the first Congolese to attain officer status. This activity is reasonably well managed and is concerned principally with the interpretation of legislation pertaining to police regulations, appointments of personnel in the police, policy matters, and questions on organization and manning. The other 3 Directorates are staffed with chiefs who seemed to be competent; however, the administration of their responsibilities and functions appeared to be of a rudimentary nature.

At the provincial level, prior to 1966, the police were under the jurisdiction of the provincial administration. With the advent of the NP this theoretically was changed to centralized administration and control. However, it is reported that by order of the MOI the Provincial Government have been given operational control, but look to the Inspector General only for administrative support including finance and logistics. This provincial situation reportedly varies and is further complicated by the strengths and weaknesses of local personalities, politics, tribal customs and relationships.

For a new nation just seven years in business, the NP has come up with a remarkably sound functional organization, which if fully implemented would take the NP a long way toward the triple goals of efficiency, economy and professionalism.

The organization could be improved by including in the tables of organization the positions for a Deputy Inspector General, and a Director for Police Operations. As it now stands, the Inspector General has 14 component units theoretically reporting directly to him, which constitutes a rather extensive span of control. Likewise, there should be a reshuffling of the functions, to place the NP roles and missions in the classical functional trilogy of Administration and Technical Support, Police Operations, and Intelligence. Some current anomalies could be corrected such as removing the headquarters Public Relations Bureau from its hiding place under the Secretariat Section of the Administration Directorate, and elevating it to a Staff Section reporting directly to the Director of Administration.

A fundamental weakness in the Statutes, is the inclusion of a great mass of administrative material in this enabling legislation. This common error of colonial origin makes it extremely difficult to make changes since any such modification requires a long and tedious legislative process. It also has the effect of limiting decision making on the part of NP managers. As an example, the Statutes describe the character of buttons to be worn on police uniforms. Other matters such as official travel, discipline, efficiency reports, and use of equipment and armament would be more properly dealt with in an administrative manual.

However, there is little likelihood, nor would it appear practical or politic to attempt any changes soon. More productive and immediate results could be gained by efforts to implement the existing organization and teach police executives how to manage what they now have at their disposal.

There is a great need for training the National Police headquarters officers in the proper performance of command and staff functions in order to properly establish command jurisdictional authority and permit the headquarters to attain an adequate level of skill for the management of the force.

Professional advice should be provided and guidance directed at the NP headquarters command and staff through regular periodic seminars, orientation and conferences based on pertinent assessments to develop skills in administration, direction, control and overall management of the force. This effort should include guidance, in the formulation of standards, regulations and

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policy in order to provide the headquarters with a feel for certain tools that would foster the command of the National headquarters over the police and improve its stature, thereby giving real impetus to the legislation which resulted in police nationalization. Also, this action would tend to diminish the overly active police administration and direction by the MOI, the Vice MOI and Secretary-General, hopefully bringing the Inspector General into his proper role. Additionally, the Inspector General and his staff should be advised on techniques and procedures for assessment of the quality of performance and compliance with standards and policy through a program of frequent Congolese officer inspections aimed at all levels of the field units and requiring response and follow-up actions. Advice should be furnished which would result in frequent visits being made by NP Headquarters and Detachment Headquarters to the police stations in order to furnish guidance and orientation on administration and daylight and nighttime patrol operations, all of which are minimal in nature or non-existent at this time. The National Headquarters needs to be stimulated into conducting periodic conferences for field commanders and guided in the formulation of appropriate agenda material and the mechanics of delivering the material and carrying out a conference of a workshop nature, designed to highlight problems and develop solutions.

The same requirement applies to the lower echelons of command and staff and remedial training and counselling should be tailored to suit their situation.

Great amounts of patience and perseverance will be essential for performance of the task and it may be expected that the development and improvement will be slow at best.

## B. ADMINISTRATION & TECHNICAL SUPPORT

### 1. Personnel

Personnel actions including recruiting requirements, assignments, pay and allowances, travel, efficiency reports, promotion, discipline, equipment and uniforms, and many other personnel matters—normally covered in an administrative manual—are spelled out in detail in the Statutes.

Recruitment. Recruiting criteria are statutory and generally require that male or female candidates for police positions be of good character and physical condition, a minimum height and between the ages of 18 and 30 for males and 18 and 25 for females. A minimum of a sixth grade level of education is required. (Not the equivalent to 6th grade by U.S. standards, just six years.) Officer candidates have like requirements except that they must have four years of secondary school. Provisions are also made for the recruiting of skilled workers such as tailors, carpenters, and painters into the EM ranks. A maximum of 25% of the officer candidates may be selected from outside the force, and the balance must be promoted from within the ranks.

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Rights and Duties of Policemen. All police are required to take a conventional oath of office. Proper performance of duty, politeness, integrity, and professional secrecy are prescribed. Conflicts of interest, outside business activity, political and union activity are forbidden. The government is required to care for the policeman in the case of injuries and other damages resulting from the performance of duty and to defend the individual policemen in litigation arising from official duties.

Assignments. Assignments are made independent of personal rank, but are generally limited to a grade above or a grade below the requirement of the position. The NP is designated as a career service.

Conditions of Service. Annual leave is granted at the rate of 30 days each year, and a compensatory is granted as a right if a policeman is required to work on a legal holiday. Special leave is granted as follows: marriage, 4 days; wife's child delivery, 4 days; death in the immediate family, 6 days. Sick leave may be granted for up to six months. Police may be assigned on detached duty to a Congolese embassy, an international organization or a foreign government, but continue to benefit from all career conditions of service.

Pay and Allowances. Pay for all ranks is calculated by a formula based on an arbitrary index fixed by the President. The IG currently gets a base pay of about \$80 US per month, paid in advance. A beginning Agent receives about \$14 US per month. In addition the police get quarters allowances, special risk pay, medical care, family allowances which are increased with each child. Other allowances at certain levels are for personal vehicles, uniforms, typewriters, travel incidentals and transfer allowance.

Efficiency Reports and Promotions. Annual efficiency reports are required. Step increases are given automatically except to personnel with marginal efficiency reports. Grade promotions from one category to another such as Agent to Brigadier, sub-Commissaire to Commissaire, require either an examination or the successful completion of the police school course for the new rank. Promotions to the Inspector category are made by choice of the government, not by examination. Promotions to the Inspector and Commissaire categories are made by the President, to the Sub-Commissaire category by the MOI, to the Agent and Brigadier categories by the Minister or by the Inspector General (if delegated). Three years between promotions are normally required.

Discipline. Officer personnel may be punished by reprimand, a fine of 1/3 of one month's pay, transfer, suspension for not more than three months, demotion of one grade (except for Assistant Sub-Commissaires where demotion would take them out of the officer class) and discharge. Enlisted personnel may be punished in the same way and confined not more than 21 days. Discharge or demotion may be directed by the President for Inspectors and Commissaires, by the Minister for Sub-Commissaires, and by the Inspector General for Agents and Brigadiers. Suspensions and transfers for Inspectors and Commissaires may be directed by the Minister, and for the remaining categories by the Inspector General. A Disciplinary Council is established

for each Province and the city of Kinshasa to handle matters concerning Agents, Brigadiers, and Sub-Commissaires. A Superior Disciplinary Council is created at the Inspectorate-General to handle cases involving Commissaires and Inspectors. The Disciplinary Council is presided over by the Inspector in charge of the Detachment, and there are four regular members and four alternates. The MOI or a designee presides over the Superior Disciplinary Council, assisted by two regular members and two alternates. A quasi-judicial procedure is established by the Statutes.

Termination and Retirement. Service is on a tenure of office basis and may be terminated by resignation, discharge or retirement. Discharge may be for misconduct or physical incapacity. Retirement may be requested after 30 years service and is mandatory at the age of 55. Rather broad regulations are established for the administration of retirements and pensions.

Miscellaneous. Several other titles in the Statutes deal with character and use of uniforms, equipment and armament, grade reclassification and other detailed personnel administrative matters.

#### COMMENT

Most of the personnel material contained in the Statutes should be contained in an Administrative Manual rather than in legislation. Likewise, these articles, while fundamentally sound, need to be expanded into more workable detail. As an example, the procedures and powers of the Disciplinary Councils—an effective internal affairs device—should be amplified for greater usefulness.

However, if the personnel provisions of the Statute were to be strictly followed, much good would result. Unfortunately, this is reported not to be the case. Career development, though provided for, is said to be short circuited by political and tribal favoritism. Transfers have been misused to meet political ends, such as the mass transfers of Commissaires in 1967. Nevertheless, some of this may have been necessary in the big picture of isolating individuals from their provincial and tribal power bases.

Discipline appears to have suffered from, among other things, lack of utilization of statutory provisions. For example, no known meetings of the Superior Disciplinary Council have taken place since the Statutes became effective. This delinquency exists in spite of reported instances of armed robbery, rape and extortion by Commissaires.

In general, orders issued are reported to be ignored, and little true inspection exists, although occasional trouble-shooting missions are sent out from the seat of government.

The Team is making no recommendations at this juncture concerning personnel since the necessary improvements in personnel practices would naturally occur as an extension of the broad recommendations for administrative improvement.

## 2. Police Budget and Fiscal Management

The budget and financial planning activity located in the National Police Budget and Accounting Section (BA) of the Directorate for Administration, is headed by an Inspector of Police and sub-divided into three bureaus. Legal authority for responsibilities of this office and its authorized strength is contained in the National Police Statute.

Bureau #1, Budget Planning and Execution. This bureau has the responsibility of planning the annual NP budget and soliciting funding requirements from the Inspector General, his Staff, and all of the operating detachments and schools. It organizes the annual budget which is forwarded by the Inspector General to the Minister of Interior (MOI) for review and approval action. Once government approval of the budget is obtained, this Bureau administers the allotment of funds to the ultimate user in accord with standard accounting practices. It also monitors the funds allotted, prepares monthly reports of progress and budgetary modifications and maintains current budget records.

The authorized strength of Bureau #1 is: one Principal Commissaire, two Sub-Commissaires/Accountants and one clerk. However, in practice it is augmented by two additional clerks.

Bureau #2, Accounting. This Bureau is charged with the paying of salaries and allowances, payment of all operating expenses and purchases. It likewise has the role of supervising all Detachment accounts. In practice payroll checks are prepared by a central GDRC accounting office and distributed to the field. NP officers are paid by check and enlisted men in cash by the individual detachment accounting offices.

The authorized strength of this Bureau is: one Principal Commissaire, two Sub-Commissaires/Accountants, and three clerks. The staff is short one clerk.

Bureau #3, Central Purchasing. This Bureau has the responsibility for issuance of, in conjunction with other government agencies which might be concerned, all invitations to bid for the purchase of NP equipment.

This Bureau is authorized a staff of one Principal Commissaire. However, it is augmented by two sub-Commissaires and three clerks.

Budget. The budget for 1967 is shown in Table I. GDRC operates and budgets on a Calendar Year financial basis. In examining the Budget it should be noted that the national currency reforms took place in June, 1967, converting from Congolese Francs (CF) to Zaires (Z). Current evaluations are, 1,000 CF = 1 Z. = \$2.00 U.S. All figures below are in Zaires.

**TABLE I**  
**NP BUDGET SUMMARY, CY-1967**

CATEGORY	ORIGINAL CREDIT	SUPPLEMENTARY CREDIT
002 – Salaries	1,000,000 Z	2,574,549 Z
003 – Salaries of Foreign Technicians	4,736	0
005 – Travel Expenses	200,000	285,594
006 – Privately Owned Vehicle Mileage	5,886	0
007 – Foreign Travel Expenses	4,000	413
008 – Travel of Foreign Technicians (Non-US)	2,118	0
009.01 – Non-Durable Items & Expenses (P.O.L., Electricity, Paper, MV & Como Spares, etc.)	150,000	292,765
009.02 – Durable Equipment (Vehicles, Weapons, etc.)	300,000	0
010.01 – Rents of Offices and Quarters	5,538	0
010.02 – Foreign Training Costs and Local Student Maintenance Allowances	3,000	0
010.07 – Confidential Investigative Funds	6,000	19,000
010.14 – Miscellaneous Expenses	3,351	0
033.01 – Pensions	10,000	27,600
<b>Totals</b>	<b>1,694,629</b>	<b>3,199,921</b>

**Grand Total: 4,894,550 Z**

On November 1967, the NP sent its CY 1968 budget (Table II) request to the MOI for inclusion in the latter's overall budget as follows:

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**TABLE II**  
**REQUEST**  
**NP BUDGET/SUMMARY, CY-1968**

CATEGORY	ORIGINAL CREDIT
002 - Salaries	6,494,661 Z.
003 - Salaries of Foreign technicians	13,133
005 - Travel Expenses	1,371,859
006 - Privately Owned Vehicle Mileage	23,736
007 - Foreign Travel Expenses	5,365
008 - Travel of Foreign Technicians (Non-US)	3,320
009.01 - Non-Durable Items & Expenses (P.O.L., Electricity, Paper, MV & Como Spares, etc.)	756,116
009.02 - Durable Equipment (Vehicles, Weapons, etc.)	2,696,844
010.01 - Rent of Offices and Quarters	20,000
010.02 - Foreign Training Costs & Local Student Maintenance Allowances	36,000
010.07 - Confidential Investigative Funds	100,000
010.014 - Miscellaneous Expenses	393,620
033. - Pensions	24,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>11,938,654 Z.</b>

(Motor vehicle spare parts are included in the 009.02 --- "Durable Equipment" account total, and are not detailed. POL amounts to 190,626 Z.)

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COMMENT

It is observed that this new CY 1968 budget request of 12 million Z. is more than double the 5 million Z actually disbursed in CY 67. Part of this may be due to the fact that NP budget requests have in the past been cut 50%. The fate of the CY-68 Budget has not as yet been reported.

The Inspector in charge of the Budget Section said he calculated budgetary requirements several ways. For personnel he used a base figure of 20,000 employees which, incidentally, does not match the approved staffing pattern which reflects a total figure of 19,966 employees.

A critical factor of the NP is the appropriation of insufficient operational funds by the GDRC. This was further complicated by the changing of the forces from provincial autonomy to a national organization. Additionally, budget plans for the police as a national force has never been required prior to CY 1967. Unfortunately, at that time they were made up after the normal national planning cycle and consequently were late in being submitted. As a result, early in the calendar year and for a rather extended period of time, the NP had difficulty in meeting operating expenses.

This situation was relieved to a degree by supplemental appropriations. However, with an actual force level of about 24,000, funds were allotted for only 20,000 police. Another shortfall directly affecting the AID investment concerned funding for motor vehicle, communications and other equipment spares and consumables. To meet payroll realities the already inadequate support funds for maintenance and operations were raided creating serious problems in communications and transportation.

Other shortfalls in support items not directly affecting the PSD/AID program are obvious in the CY-67 Budget resume, keeping in mind that the Original Credits shown in the resume were for Kinshasa only, and also the raiding of the various accounts to meet payrolls.

Budgeting procedures are sub-standard, involving a lot of guesswork. For example, salaries and allowances estimates involving more than 50% of the total budget are based on inaccurate or vague figures. As of 1 November 1967, when the Belgian budget specialist departed, he had been unable to get a force level figure from the Personnel Office. His replacement stated he used the figure of 20,000. However, using an order of magnitude force level of 20,000, the average direct annual personnel cost per policeman, including allowances and pensions is 325 Z. or \$650 U.S. per annum.

In general, the budget Inspector stated that in reaching his budgetary estimates, in some non-personnel categories, he used CY-67 Kinsahsa figures and applied a factor of the eight provinces now under NP jurisdiction. This seems to be substantially true in the 009.02 - Durable Equipment (Vehicles, Weapons, etc.) account. Several other categories were reviewed with him, but no more specific information could be elicited as to his methods of calculations in other budgetary units.

The BA Inspector stated that, prior to the establishment of the police as a national force, the BA's responsibility was limited to providing these services for the police of Kinshasa only. As of 1 January 1967, the Section responsibilities were expanded to encompass the entire NP force operation and a total staff of 19 people was authorized. Little planning was evidenced for this operational expansion. However, the Inspector expressed legitimate concern about having sufficient resources to meet this new situation.

The Inspector is reported to have little if any formal budget and accounting training, having relied almost wholly upon a Belgian, who has permanently left the Congo. A foreign replacement is problematical. The BA Section's office space is small and overcrowded. Only a few typewriters and adding machines were observed in operation.

The current payroll practices are subject to failure, probably due to inexperience in national coordination. For two months in several provinces, officer personnel received double salary, a pay check from the central payroll office and a similar amount from the local detachment. An audit corrected this failure.

### 3. Communications

Communications Network and Transceiver Units. The Police communications network consists of the country-wide point to point SSB system between Kinshasa and Detachment headquarters (headquarters for the provincial police force) and cities within each Province. Also each Detachment headquarters has a VHF mobile and base station system. The SSB system consists of 22 stations installed to date in the following cities: Kinshasa, Thysville, Matadi, Kikwit, Kenge, Mbandaka, Lisala, Gemena. Kisangani, Isiro, Bunia. Bukavu, Goma, Kindu. Lubumbashi, Kolwezi, Kamina. Luluabourg, Luebo. Mbuji Mayi, Kabinda, Lusambo. (Cities underlined are Detachment headquarters and others are stations within the Detachment.) Radio equipment has been shipped to the cities of Buta, Kalemi, Manono, Sandoa and Sakania. These stations will be installed in the near future. (See Tab A, for exact location of the radio stations. Solid lines indicate stations installed and broken lines indicate future installations.) The project has provided 35 SSB transceivers. In addition to the above stations, 5 transceivers remain to be installed at locations to be determined at a later date. An additional 3 units will be kept in Kinshasa as spares. (See Tab B, for list of frequencies in use.)

Communications Operators and Message Load. The above stations are operated by 23 students who graduated from the Post Telephone and Telegraph (PTT) school located in Kinshasa. Length of course was 9 months. Subject material including sending and receiving the morse code, message composition, the "Q" code, phonetic alphabet, organization of the communications system and on the air type training in Kinshasa sending and receiving messages to and from various parts of the country. Most of the operators attained the speed of 15 to 18 words per minute. The communications system has an additional 10 operators who were former military radio operators

bringing the total of operator personnel to 33. A class of 29 students graduated from the PTT school in October of 1967 and will be sent to various parts of the country to operate the Police radios. A former student in the first class of 23 students which graduated in 1965 carried out the entire training of the second class. An additional 30 students will be selected in the near future to attend the next course using PTT facilities. The SSB system is operated efficiently and it has proven to be of great value during various crises throughout the country. When Government and Military radio facilities failed, the Police SSB system was the only means of communications to and from troubled areas which enabled the Police to have first hand knowledge of the situation. (See Tab A for the exact location of the above radio stations.) (See Tab F for deployment of Personnel.)

Tab C indicates messages sent and received from Kinshasa and the various detachment headquarters. Most of the messages are transmitted and received during daylight hours due to the present lack of operating personnel to adequately man the radio stations on a 24-hour basis. This problem will be overcome in the near future when the present class of 29 students are assigned to various stations within the country. Also an additional 30 students will be selected for the next code course.

Communications Maintenance. Until late 1966, the National Police did not have the capability to install and maintain AID financed radio equipment. Most of the installations and repair work was either contracted out or in the case of equipment in Kinshasa, the local Radio Corporation of America Representative performed the necessary maintenance. In late 1966, Mr. Jean Pierre Mulenda was recruited as a commissaire (recently promoted to Inspector and has complete supervision of the system) of Police to supervise and maintenance of the Police radio system. Since that time, the Communications advisor and Inspector Mulenda have performed the necessary maintenance on Police radio equipment in Kinshasa and other cities in the country. Inspector Mulenda is now in the process of installing SSB equipment throughout the country in the last and final phase of the installation work. It is anticipated that by the end of CY 1968, all SSB equipment will be installed. Inspector Mulenda spent 3 years in Paris, France, studying basic and advanced radio and he has an excellent background in all phases of radio communications. Upon returning to the Congo he was employed by the Post Telephone and Telegraph (PTT) in Lubumbashi and Kinshasa installing and maintaining PTT radio equipment before entering the National Police.

Four participants recently returned from a 6-month U.S. radio maintenance course located at the Delgado Institute in New Orleans, La., and are now receiving on-the-job training at the Police camp in Kinshasa before being assigned to various parts of the country to maintain the radio equipment. An additional radio technician has been recruited and is now assigned to the maintenance section and is qualified to perform installation and radio maintenance work. The police radio maintenance section now has a total of six maintenance men. Three of the returned participants will remain in Kinshasa for some time until their ability to repair all Police radio equipment improves. Recruitment will continue for qualified maintenance men and additional students will be sent to the U.S. to study radio maintenance

to increase the National Police capability to maintain all AID financed equipment. Repair facilities in Kinshasa are not adequate, because there is little space for repair work or the storage of spare parts and equipment. Plans are in progress for the construction of adequate repair facilities at Camp Lufungula in Kinshasa and construction will begin in the near future.

The VHF mobile system in Kinshasa and other cities in the country has presented many problems. Out of a total of 53 mobile units installed in Jeeps and other vehicles in Kinshasa only 8 are operating due to the Jeeps being deadlined for various reasons. (Explained in detail under the heading of Transportation.) As Jeeps become deadlined in Kinshasa the radios are removed and stored in the maintenance shop at Camp Lufungula until such time that the Jeep has been repaired. To date, very few Jeeps have been repaired because of lack of funds, spare parts, and the inability of the Congolese to perform the necessary repairs. Through field trips by the communications advisor and Inspector Mulenda, (chief of the police communications system) all VHF equipment that is found to be inoperative is repaired and restored to normal operation and in the case of a deadlined vehicle the equipment is returned to Kinshasa for storage until such time as the vehicle is repaired. A total of 60 mobile units are now in storage at Camp Lufungula. It is impossible to determine the exact number of mobile radios that are out of operation in the country at any given time. Their service situation will improve in the near future with the assignment of the four returned maintenance participants to various Detachment headquarters.

System and Commodity Input. The communications system consists primarily of two divisions under the inspector general: Operations and Maintenance. Operations consists of the communications center in Kinshasa, detachment headquarters radio stations and radio stations within the detachment. At the present time, the maintenance section consists of the maintenance center located in Kinshasa. Other maintenance centers will be established in the eight detachment headquarters as maintenance men are trained. (See Tab D, for the organization chart.)

The VHF base station equipment in Kinshasa consists of thirteen base stations located in the various Commissariats and through constant supervision the system operates efficiently. (See Tab B, for VHF frequencies in use throughout the country.)

The U. S. Government has provided the National Police with the following radio equipment and spares: 35 SSB transceivers, 123 RCA VHF mobile units, 14 walkie talkie, 47 RCA base stations, 47 generators, 4 Aerocon 1000 watt amplifier for SSB transceivers, tools and test equipment to maintain the radio equipment and generators, constant voltage transformers for the above radios and a 10% spare parts for all equipment. All spares are stored in the maintenance shop in Kinshasa. Total dollar value for the above material and equipment is \$332,749.71. (See Tab E, for a complete list and disposition of the communications equipment.)

## COMMENT

At the present time, the Police do not have the capability to plan or supervise for the present or future needs concerning the communications system. Radio personnel must be supervised by the communications advisor on a daily basis in all phases of the communications system to produce results. However, since Inspector Mulenda has been recruited it is hoped that this situation will improve. Mr. Mulenda has a great deal of potential, is well qualified but he does at this time require fairly close supervision. If led in the right direction the Police will have an efficient communications system to enable them to carry out their assigned duties in an effective manner on a country wide basis.

The first Police SSB radio station was installed in Kinshasa during September of 1965 and other stations were installed as equipment arrived at the various locations. A great deal of progress has been made and should be expected to continue. In the past the Police had no means of communicating with other police posts in the country. They had to rely on mail or Government radio facilities which were often out of commission due to lack of maintenance. Messages would take weeks to reach their destinations. The Police now have the capability to send messages to all parts of the country almost within a matter of minutes. Radio operators have been trained and can be trained with little difficulty. Radio maintenance men are in the process of being trained to enable the Police to maintain all radio equipment without outside help.

#### 4. Transportation

Prior to Congolese Independence in 1960, the police motor vehicle fleet totalled about 500 vehicles. All administration, supervision, management and repair activities (performed by Public Works during colonial and early post colonial era and not attempted by police units until about 1962) were manned and provided by Belgians. Therefore, none of these important basic and essential capabilities were developed in Congolese nationals. In the period immediately following Independence, virtually all 500 vehicles were either stolen, requisitioned by various military units, converted locally to personal use, destroyed in the fighting that followed, or were ruined by improper use or lack of maintenance.

In 1963, it became obvious that in order to properly prepare the police to assume their normal tasks of maintaining law and order and establishing internal security, action was essential to restore a minimal acceptable degree of mobility.

PSD Project Objectives. In 1964, the USAID concluded a Public Safety Assistance Agreement with the Congolese Government which, along with other types of police assistance, provided for a program in the area of transportation. The U.S. effort was one of assisting the police in carrying out their essential duties in patrol and transportation functions through the provision of appropriate equipment. The agreement also provided that the Congolese

Government would furnish sufficient funds for operation, maintenance and repair of all U.S. furnished equipment.

The U.S. effort was originally contemplated as being one of providing material needs with the Belgians furnishing the technical and operational supervisory and management support. This combined effort which appeared feasible and proper at the outset of the program soon suffered some serious reverses. About the time that the PSD support effort was being initiated Belgian presence in the Congo increased. However, this was short lived and by early 1967 the Belgian presence was significantly reduced and it became apparent that the U.S. effort would have to become more demonstrable and active in order to fill the gap and try to keep the transportation activity operating with some degree of success. Although the U.S. survey, upon which the initial assistance program to the Congolese was based, fully recognized the significance of transportation administration, management, operational skill and the essentiality of driver first echelon and periodic shop maintenance, it was considered that the Belgians in their overall police administration effort would be able to provide some support to the development of these capabilities. Motor vehicle transportation and equipment initially was concentrated in units to which Belgians were assigned. However, in most cases Belgians were not assigned to positions directly in charge of the motor vehicle activity. Nevertheless, their unexpected loss resulted in a major adverse impact on the transportation activity.

Although the U.S. Advisor staff did not have a full time transportation specialist, was minimal in size and by design a token effort intended to remain the the background, nevertheless the members who were already spread extremely thin took it upon themselves to enlarge the scope of their interest in the transportation activity. During all scheduled periodic and special field visits, they made a major point of providing advisory assistance on such matters as shop management and administration, supervision of operations, and first echelon driver maintenance responsibilities.

Transportation and Related Equipment. The project provides for a total of 285 vehicles and 10% spare parts which have been received in country. Only 264 have been delivered to the police, while 21 vehicles are presently being withheld because of Congolese failure to honor certain terms set forth in the Project Agreement which provided for allocation of sufficient funds for operation, maintenance and repair. Additionally, the Congolese are misusing vehicles, placing them to their private and personal needs. Also, maintenance is seriously inadequate. The number and types of vehicles provided in the project are: 20 light trucks; 167 jeeps, both 2 and 4-wheel drive; 40, 2-1/2 ton trucks; 32 pick-up and/or panel trucks; 13 carryalls; 6 ambulances; one wrecker; and six motorcycles. In addition, 3200 bicycles were provided.

Operational Examples and Problems - Kinshasa. Generally, circumstances and experience in Kinshasa are reported as being similar to conditions that prevail at most locations where transportation has been provided in the Cogo. In order to provide an appreciation of the nature of the transportation situation in the Congo, information concerning Kinshasa is described below.

Eighty-three vehicles have been provided the police in Kinshasa since 1964. (See Tab G, for distribution of vehicles throughout the Congo.) Of this number only 8 jeeps, 3 heavy trucks, 3 motorcycles and 4 light trucks were in operating condition at the time this report was being prepared. Included in this number are 6 jeeps which have undergone major overhaul in the local commercial jeep garage. The remainder of the vehicles have either been damaged beyond feasible repair by accidents or deadlines because of a lack of replacement parts. It has been estimated that approximately 28 of these vehicles could be restored to operation were the spare parts and expertise available. The chronic shortage of funds often prevents the use of commercial repair facilities. Police in other parts of the country have fewer repair facilities available to them and suffer from the same general shortages as the police in Kinshasa. On occasion, because of the non-availability of funds, police utilize the local facilities of the Travaux Publique - a government agency for motor vehicle repair and maintenance. For the most part the Travaux Publique seriously lacks equipment, tooling and qualified personnel. Vehicles placed in their hands are generally out of service for many months. The Congo as a whole is short of qualified mechanics and various types of spare parts.

Some of the problems in Kinshasa stem from inadequacies of control and management. Vehicles are not dispatched by a trip ticket system; drivers are not permanently assigned, transportation on a large scale is placed to personal use, driver first echelon maintenance and periodic shop maintenance is inadequate. Mechanical expertise is inadequate. Drivers responsible for causing accidents and mechanical damage due to gross negligence are not punished. Motor transportation officers are inexperienced, incompetent and do not receive any degree of responsible supervision. Records are not kept. Shop facilities and layout are poor, tools are inadequate and of significance is the fact that adequate advisory expertise in numbers and skill has never been furnished by any of the donors.

#### COMMENT

Principle Problems. It appears that at least some of the principal problem areas in the transportation activity have been created because of the absence of sufficient qualified resident technical advisors. Professional advisory assistance is necessary for effective resolution of the serious transportation difficulties. The Congolese do not have the capability to adequately correct the situation on their own. The deficiencies are mainly in the areas of supervision and direction, the virtual absence of administration, the poor to non-existent driver first echelon and periodic shop maintenance, and the lack of driver training. Maintenance facilities, tools and sufficiently competent mechanics are simply inadequate. The capability to perform repairs is limited mainly to simple adjustments and parts replacement. Mechanics who have a capability to perform engine overhaul are a rare exception.

There is no punitive action or levying of costs for damage caused by accidents or inadequate maintenance due to driver gross negligence, although regulations do provide for this.

A carefully planned effort designed to provide fundamental know-how pitched at their seriously limited capability would be the first step. The development plan should be based on phased advancement, assuring that each step of training and each segment of the operation from its most elemental level is properly assimilated before moving on to the next level.

Assessment by Motor Vehicle Specialist. It appears that a specialist in the field of motor vehicle maintenance could make a valuable contribution through the performance of a survey which would probably require 60 days to be properly accomplished. The survey should assess the deadlined vehicles to determine those which may be returned to service, the status of spare parts, shops and mechanics, and the requirements for the short range and long range effort.

Disposition of Withheld Vehicles. To resolve the disposition of the 21 vehicles that have been held back will be a difficult matter. Although several of the senior officers and some junior officers interviewed indicated they needed transportation, it was not possible to detect any evidence reflecting Congolese concern to such a degree that they would be willing to curtail personal use in order to conserve available vehicles for patrol and official purposes. Under such circumstances, it may be quite some time before the necessary conditions may prevail under which the USAID would be willing to release any of the 21 vehicles.

Consideration may be given to having the Congolese specifically identify the patrol area for which there is a vehicle requirement. If unable to do that, the USAID could suggest assistance by having the PSD work jointly with the Congolese to assess the need and help in making a specific identification of the patrol area which would serve as the basis for the requirement. If such an action is accomplished, then a single vehicle may be issued, with the understanding that the PSD/USAID will monitor the use of the US-provided equipment. If we are satisfied that the vehicle is being continually applied to official patrol purposes and that driver first echelon and shop periodic inspection and maintenance are being accomplished under proper supervision and according to our advice, we would then be prepared to gradually expand our effort as appropriate.

Estimate of Repairable Motor Vehicles. Of the 264 vehicles provided the NP about 60 are still operational and possibly 100 or more could be repaired and returned to service. (Accurate figures are not available as the National Police do not have such information from the field. Vehicles have gone to 33 different units all over the Congo and a system of administration and direction is not established to permit gathering such data within any reasonable time period.)

Budget for Vehicle/Equipment Purchase and Possible Congolese Action. The proposed budget for 1968 is \$23,800,000.00, of which \$5.3 million is planned for all kinds of equipment including vehicles and spare parts. If the entire amount is approved, which is highly problematical since virtually only funds for salaries were approved in CY 67, GDRC could procure a part of their vehicular requirements, spares and consumables, but probably not all.

Recently the NP procured 9 Fiats and 42 Volkswagen automobiles for delivery in January 1968. This poses a USAID support problem in terms of communication gear adaptability and tooling for repair. If the proposed budget is approved, it is believed the Congolese should move ahead at their own expense in developing their logistics to purchase additional spare parts and make necessary repairs. The PSD/USAID should endeavor to move them in that direction.

Possible US Action. Should the budget not materialize with sufficient funds, then some form of inducement would be appropriate. The possible use of local repair facilities should be considered. As an alternate, spare parts could be furnished and under the advisory supervision of a USAID motor vehicle maintenance technician, police mechanics in a major city could be mobilized as a task force to get the repair work moving. In succession, the technician could likewise mobilize the efforts of police mechanics in other major cities. Augmentation of the task force by local hire as available and appropriate should be considered. This would furnish a partial and quick short-range solution to the problem of returning vehicles to service which do not require complete overhaul.

## 5. Police Education and Training

The USAID/PSD mission, in conjunction with efforts of other donor countries, is to improve the educational and training facilities and develop the curricula of the national and regional police schools. The project is to provide technical advice, construction and repair of installations, and essential equipment and supplies.

### a. Training Systems

The Third Directorate, Training, reports to the IG/NP. The Commandant of each training school receives technical guidance from and is under the operational control of the Directorate Chief. It is reported that in practice, this is not followed, i. e., the Third Directorate and the IG both are sometimes by-passed, and training matters taken up directly with the Secretary General of the MOI.

The chart seen as Tab H, depicts the organization of the police training schools. See Tab I, for detailed descriptions of each position.

Prior to independence in 1960, the Belgian administration established police schools in Lubumbashi, Kinshasa, Kisangani, Bukavu and Luluabourg. By 1962 all were closed except Lubumbashi, which has never ceased to operate. The Kinshasa school reopened in 1964. The school physical plant at Luluabourg is no longer in existence. The NP statutes of July 1966 authorize six schools, the above-mentioned five schools and one more at Mbandaka. Additionally, it designated the schools at Kinshasa and Lubumbashi as national schools and the others as regional schools.

Both the Kisangani and Bukavu schools have been thoroughly looted and will require some repair and new equipment to go back into operation. Some improvement particularly in sanitary facilities, storage space and kitchens, will be needed at schools in Kinshasa, Mbandaka and Lubumbashi. Tools for plant maintenance such as carpenter and plumbing kits and grounds maintenance equipment are virtually non-existent.

Total classroom capacity for all schools is 770. The National Police School at Kinshasa has eight classrooms, a student capacity of 250, and 19 faculty members. The National School at Lubumbashi has 5 classrooms, a normal student capacity of 200, (presently there are approximately 400 in training utilizing other facilities), and 9 faculty members.

The facilities of the existing Regional Schools are as follows:  
(1) Mbandaka, three classrooms, student capacity 120 and at present no instructors; (2) Kisangani, two classrooms, student capacity 80, and no assigned instructors; and (2) Bukavu, three classrooms, student capacity 120, and no instructors.

Libraries. The libraries of the schools, as they stand now, are quite inadequate. Even though USAID/PSD has provided some books to all schools, in French and English, more books in French are needed as well as some expansion of the library facilities.

Training Commodities. USAID provided certain necessary commodities for the school operations. These commodities included: office equipment, such as typewriters, duplicating and mimeograph machines; sports equipment; audio-visual aids such as moving pictures and projectors, slide and opaque projectors; demonstration type civil disturbance control equipment; course outlines and other limited printed materials. Additionally, uniforms were furnished the trainees. There remains a shortage of training aids in such items as visual aids, mock-ups, models of various scenes and settings and French language materials.

Programs of Instruction. Tab J, describes in detail the various courses, the hours and contents. The National Police Law of 1966, permitted standardization of police courses, but did not limit programs of instruction (POI). It was learned that in practice only the Commissaire course has been standardized. Other courses vary considerably in course content and hours.

Courses of education place heavy emphasis on academic legal and liberal arts and insufficient time on Police fundamentals and pragmatics. For example, in the recruit training course which consists of a total of 1,088 hours of instruction, 476 hours are devoted to legal codes, government organization and French language instruction. Likewise, 306 hours are devoted to physical training, self defense, sports and drill constituting another imbalance in the program. Only 306 hours, which is less than 30% of the total, are devoted to such police fundamentals as maintenance of order, firearms, police mission, first aid, and radio operations.

The technique and method of instruction is mostly rote in nature. Demonstration types of exercise and practical application are below minimal levels as found in modern police systems.

Categories of Training and Entrance Qualifications. The national training program is organized in three broad categories consisting of three sections as listed below. Candidates for recruit training come directly from qualified applicants in civilian life, candidates for NCO training come from qualified members of the police and candidates for officer training are selected from qualified applicants from both the police and civilian life.

Major categories of training and duration of each are as follows:

- (1) Section of Recruits, 9 months course.
- (2) Section of NCO's, 6 months course.
- (3) Section of Officers, 15 months plus 3 months of practical training.

Entrance qualifications are shown in Tab K.

Students Trained and Trainees. Countrywide, the various National and Regional police schools during a period of nearly 5 years have trained 1,039 recruits, 102 non-commissioned officers, and 278 commissioned officers. As of 5 December 1967, at Kinshasa, 158 men were being trained in the 12-month commissaire course. At Lubumbashi 120 men were attending the Commissaire course and 291 recruits were in training. Total trained and in training is 1,978.

Communications courses for operators have been established in-country with success. Twenty-four communications operators have been trained and 20 are presently in training.

Short term civil disturbance control training was provided for 1,107 policemen.

Limited in-service training has been given in Kinshasa in various fields, such as driver training, motor vehicle maintenance and repair, and other types of training without too much success.

An attempt was made to provide instructor training to bright young graduates of the commissaire course at the Kinshasa School but it did not succeed. Most instructors, graduates of instructor courses and trainees are interested in moving to operational police duties because of opportunities to supplement income and some are successful in arranging transfers. Incidentally, no returned U.S. participants are now being utilized in teaching positions although four were trained for that purpose.

Participant Training. Participant training has moved slowly mainly because qualified candidates could not be found or spared from their positions.

To date, 26 Congolese police have received US participant training, as follows:

<u>Qty</u>	<u>Course</u>	<u>Dates</u>
6	IPA French Special Actions (Civil Disturbance Control)	20 Sep - 12 Nov 65
10	IPA French Special Actions (Civil Disturbance Control)	5 Jul - 2 Sep 66
6	IPA French General Course	13 Feb - 12 May 67
4	Radio Repair & Maintenance, Delgado Institute, New Orleans	1 Oct - 1 Apr 67

For FY-67, one technician is awaiting call forward for the Radio Repair and Maintenance Course, Delgado Institute.

b. United Nations Instructors

The United Nations entered the police training program in 1963 when they agreed to provide an instructor program for the Congolese police training establishment. By the end of that year, only one instructor had been hired and was on board. In mid-1964, the first group of UN instructors began to arrive and by the end of the year there were five in country. The program continued into 1965-66 with rarely more than nine instructors out of an authorized total of 20 on board at any one time. This authorized total was cut by the UN to 15 for 1967, and at the same time the UN announced its intention to leave the police training field at the end of CY 1967.

c. Belgian Instructors

The future of the Belgian police assistance is vague. It is estimated that as many as 22 advisors may be placed in the Congo and possibly 15 of the group would be instructors. However, discussions are continuing intermittently with no concrete results to date. Based on PSD experience, Belgian and US efforts in the school systems have always been successfully coordinated.

d. Nigerian Police Assistance

The Nigerian Instructor Program was started in 1964 and ran through 1966. Additionally, several groups of Congolese Commissaires were trained in Nigeria. Nigerian police units were attached to the Congolese Police for operational duties in the city of Kinshasa and other major cities. However, the differences in system and procedures were great and the language barrier was not fully surmounted. As a result, the full benefit of their impact was never realized.

e. Public Safety Advisors

The PSD activity started in 1964 as a partial effort and reached its greatest potential in 1965 with the establishment of a position for a Training

Advisor. However, the effectiveness of this endeavor was severely limited by the parameters of the mission, which required working through the Belgians and the UN advisor instructors. The efforts of a single U.S. advisor were stretched too thin to effectively cover the extensive training problems and school system. Nevertheless, the collective effort of the PSD Staff though limited, was productive, creating some capability in terms of training aids and reformation of the program of instruction, as well as making substantial gains in USAID funding for the construction and repair of the very much needed training plants.

### COMMENT

Rehabilitation of Schools. In order to move forward with the training effort at a reasonable level considering the size of the force and the numbers who are untrained, it will be necessary to rehabilitate the Kisangani and Bukavu schools and perform some minor plant repairs at the others. Although the Kisangani and Bukavu schools have been thoroughly looted of all removable items and equipment the buildings themselves are reported not to be heavily damaged. This raises some hope that rehabilitation costs will not be excessive.

Courses of Education. The program of instruction requires study, analysis and reorientation. This is essential to correct inadequate and inappropriate teaching methods and courses of education and training. There is a marked over emphasis on legal and liberal arts subjects which, while meritorius in themselves are related only peripherally to basic police training and the realities of the situation in the Congo. Education and training in police fundamentals is not afforded the emphasis and broad coverage which is required, leaving substantial gaps in the basic curriculum.

Faculty. The loss of the UN and Belgian instructors is something that the Congolese cannot afford and it will have a significant adverse impact on the entire training effort.

The professional capability of the Congolese school system faculty members has not sufficiently developed. It is believed that alone they would be unable to objectively identify deficiencies in the Training system and formulate and conduct the required programs to properly correct courses of education and the systems as a whole.

School Production Capability. During a period of nearly five years, the schools have graduated 1,419 students with an additional 569 in attendance at the present. At such a level of production, a large portion of the force will remain without formal training. At present, course duration is nine months for recruits, six months for NCO's and 18 months for officers. The maximum capacity of the schools is close to 1,000 students. In order to permit the bulk of the force to receive schooling, the NP needs to revise courses of education and training schedules, and step up production. To achieve the necessary impact in training it is believed the schools should train 2,000 personnel annually.

The effort of the five schools should be supplemented through the use of mobile training teams, providing refresher and basic training as appropriate to personnel of the NP. The training should be planned for personnel who would not within a reasonable period of time be given the opportunity to participate in the school program as resident student trainees. Four mobile training teams should be established and their effort applied in the units of the Detachments. The mobile training team capability should be phased to be fully developed in a year's time to produce at the level of 2,000 graduates annually.

Third Country Advisors. It appears that third country contract training advisors resident at each of the five schools would serve to enhance the training program and the quality of the school effort greatly. Additionally, a third country contract training advisor would be of immense value in the performance of major tasks in developing courses in the French language and preparing French language police textbooks and other training aids to assure adequacy and program standardization. Some qualified individuals will become available as the UN phases out its training assistance program at the close of 1967. The better ones of the group would be basically well suited for the task in many respects. It is understood that it is feasible for the USAID to contract hire individuals of this category locally. These advisors would work under the direct supervision of the PSD. As the Congolese demonstrate their professional capability to take over tasks being performed by third country advisors this type of support effort may be gradually phased down.

U.S. Role Considering UN and Belgian Future Advisor and Training Status. The Team has been proceeding on the assumption that there will not be any UN and Belgian training support. Should UN and Belgian support be forthcoming, the contemplated US effort would readily accommodate itself to such a contingency. This is based on the fact that the team's recommendation for US training support provides for advisory assistance only with a local hire advisor (former UN advisor) in residence at each school with Congolese administering the school system and instructing. There is a modest commodity input contemplated, however, this will not be affected by any other donor effort.

The local hire advisor idea and school system administration and teaching by Congolese may be scaled down as appropriate to accommodate any UN and Belgian inputs. If the local hire idea does not materialize and the UN and Belgians fail to provide advisor or trainer support then the US PSD support effort would be maintained as an advisory service working out of Kinshasa. The Congolese would then be administering, operating and providing the teaching staff entirely on their own being counseled by the PSD.

Experience indicates good working relations have existed in the past with the Belgians. Any Belgians which may be provided as trainers or as advisors could fill any number of positions in the school system and their effort harmoniously coordinated with the US support operation.

## 6. Civil Disturbance Control

Prior to 1960, Civil Disturbance Control (CDC) existed in the major cities of the Congo under the Belgian administration in the classical European police tradition. This police discipline, like others in the force, deteriorated with the phasing out of foreign leadership.

In theory in each urban center some police act as a standby group prepared to provide a CDC response capability on call. It was reported that on the few recent occasions when the Kinshasa police commander attempted to turn out his unit, not more than a few men appeared, usually straight from their personal quarters, half dress and unequipped. Also, during a Team field trip to Mbandaka the Commander said that the CDC unit consisted of 30 people. However, when an alert was sounded, six police turned out. It appears that some residual capability remains in the force, particularly in better establishments such as Lubumbashi.

The Congolese public has demonstrated a capability to riot, loot, burn, and commit violent acts against the members of the white community as well as against each other. As recently as last August, the presence of a handful of mercenaries more than 1,000 miles away from the capital city served as the cause for a wave of violence that resulted in much destruction. At the same time the government appeared to stand by allowing this violence to run its course without taking positive police action to protect the public against the rioting mobs. Obviously, this could happen again.

Chemical Equipment and Training. Tear gas guns, projectiles, grenades and gas masks have been supplied to all operating schools by USAID, together with practice refills, and students in 1966 and 1967 received instruction in this equipment. All training has been limited to demonstration and familiarization. See Tab L, for the equipment and munitions inventory.

Rudimentary Civil Disturbance Control (CDC) units were formed in the twelve urban centers of the eight provinces and the capital city. PSD advisors gave familiarization training at some localities. IPA Special Actions course (CDC) and Kinshasa school graduates are found in a number of cities. Nonetheless, field trips have shown most units disorganized, the equipment neglected and improperly stored.

### COMMENT

The Congo suffers from inflation and a high cost of living, with extensive unemployment. Additionally, bloc country elements are in the Congo and nearby in Brazzaville, Congo. The potential does exist for subversion, rioting and civil disturbance. Failure to recognize such a latent threat and make provisions for it could lead to serious consequences.

Steps should be taken to upgrade the capability of personnel and organizations through furnishing specialized training and small amounts of essential equipment.

The situation in the Congo does not require a stand-by CDC force. It is believed that police elements who would normally perform patrol duties are sufficient providing they are trained and given periodic drills to keep them proficient.

Modest commodity inputs are required. This would consist of materials for training and stocks of chemical equipment and munitions.

#### 7. Police Firearms and Markesmanship Training

Congolese Arms Policy. The various provincial police forces and the present NP have always been lightly armed but only authorized to carry weapons under exceptional circumstances and emergencies. During the Colonial days, however, Belgian officers were regularly armed.

Under colonialism Belgium was the sole source of arms which were procured for the Force Publique, who in turn sold them to the police. This practice was continued after the Force was converted to the ANC. The principal weapons currently in police stocks are:

- a. Model 1889 or 1936 Mauser bolt action rifles, caliber 7.65mm.
- b. Several makes of sub-machine guns (SMG), all caliber 9mm. parabellum.
- c. The NATO Browing Hi-Power pistol, caliber 9mm.

A few Italian and Spanish weapons are on hand, which were purchased by Katanga during its secession, as well as battlefield pickups and odds and ends left behind by the UN forces. (See Tab M for the weapons inventory.)

On only two occasions in recent years have police requests for additional weapons been granted. In 1964 the ANC issued weapons to the Bukavu police to fight against Simba rebels. Again, in 1967, during the mercenary rebellion, the ANC provided the police with some 500 rifles and ammunition. It is reported that the ANC later asked for their return, which the police refused. The matter is still unresolved.

In 1966, US sources reported that a British ship with approximately one billion CF (\$2 million US) in arms and ammunition for the police appeared at the port of Matadi. These weapons had been ordered by a former MOI for the police. President Mobutu refused delivery and the arms were returned, his policy is the NP will not be armed.

While the police were under the autonomous provincial governors, reportedly, the central government refused to furnish them arms as it was feared that this would constitute an armed force with primary loyalties to the provincial authority. It is reported that President Mobutu's policy has served as a further deterrent to weapons supply. No indications of any change in his thinking have surfaced to date. Accordingly, most police continue to be armed only with a baton except in emergencies.

Firearms Training. Marksmanship training has been limited. None of the police schools has a range of its own as yet, but one is under construction in Kinshasa. ANC ranges are reported to be available at times. All students attending the Kinshasa school from 1965 forward have been given classroom instruction including dry firing and a limited amount of range firing with rifle, pistol, and SMG. Other schools have been limited to classroom instruction and dry firing. No regular firearms training is conducted in the Detachments.

### COMMENT

In the Congo limitations have been placed on police arms for political reasons which stem from the past when the administration considered the police in their former autonomous status as a potential source of danger.

In view of President Mobutu's policy it does not seem wise for the PSD to involve itself in a program beyond that presently being conducted in the school system.

8. The Criminal Investigations Division (CID). Field inspections by the Team disclosed that the operations of the various Criminal Investigations Divisions at Kinshasa, Mbandaka and Lubumbashi were essentially the same in organization and operational capability.

Organization and Functions. All Criminal Investigations Divisions report to the Detachment Commander. They are staffed with officers and enlisted men, and the Commanders all state they have inadequate forces for the tasks they must perform.

They have two broad functions:

- a. To receive complaints of crimes committed where the subject is known. These cases are sent to the Public Prosecutor for case preparation to the courts.
- b. To investigate cases where the subject is unknown and such other matters as requested by the Public Prosecutor.

Another major function of the Criminal Investigation Division is to maintain the records and identification system of the division. The Divisions are composed of two Bureaus as follows:

Investigations Bureau. The Investigations Bureau investigates the conventional urban crimes. All criminal statutes are federal and are codified under a national Penal Code based on the Napoleonic Code. In practice, because of staff limitations, the Bureaus reportedly investigate only major crimes. They sometimes conduct investigations based on information from confidential informants.

**SECRET**

Complaints are received and recorded in a bound-ledger-type log-book containing simply the name and address of the complainants.

As to equipment, a little latent fingerprint powder and a small supply of plastic lifting tape is on hand. 35mm cameras are in stock but no film. In Lubumbashi it is impossible to purchase film as there is none in the stores.

No spot maps are used for recording crimes except in the Criminal Investigations Division Kinshasa. Typewriters and transportation are in short supply in all areas. At Mbandaka the investigators are using a 2-1/2 ton truck for their mission.

The few people and incomplete training afforded in the national and regional schools have served to keep the effectiveness of the Division at a low level. However, there did appear to be a great interest on the part of the Division personnel in all localities to learn, and a desire for advice and guidance in their chosen profession.

Records and Identification Bureau. A fingerprint system is uniformly installed in the three detachments inspected by the Team. The system is not considered suitable for modern police record-keeping. Fingerprint technicians are in place in all three Detachments, and obviously had received some training. The fingerprints taken are excellent. All ten fingers are recorded on a fingerprint form which contains a limited criminal history on the reverse side. These forms are filed in cardboard book-type vertical files. There is no national central storage center nor national or international exchange of fingerprints. A limited local distribution is made to the Surete and the ANC.

Another record form is the "Fiche d'Antecedents" (past record), which contains a listing of the criminal history. It is supported by an index card. These cards are filed in open wooden trays and metal files. Lubumbashi, in addition, has a standard visible index file of photographs of known criminals divided by types of crime. All Bureaus have an inadequate supply of legal sized metal filing cabinets, but inspection showed that often the file drawers contained a jumbled mass of unfiled papers. Where filing is being done, it usually is in simple chronological serialization.

Kinshasa publishes a daily criminal bulletin reporting stolen property and fugitives for local distribution only. All units have rudimentary stolen property records. The Bureaus have the beginnings of a Uniform Crime reporting system. This is a simple listing of the various types of crimes as they occur. Only two detachments are furnishing these monthly reports to the National Headquarters. All other statistical and reporting materials are non-existent.

**SECRET**

9. Traffic Police Division - Kinshasa

Organization. The Traffic Division of the Kinshasa City Police is divided into three units: The Accident Investigation Unit, the Motorcycle Unit and the Traffic Control Unit. (See Figure 2.)

The manning table consists of 22 Officers, 137 Non-Commissioned Officers and 108 Police Agents. Their workday differs depending upon the type of assignment. The office staff works from 0730 hours until 1200 hours, and from 1400 hours until 1630 hours. The Traffic Control Unit operates in two shifts from 0600 hours to 1400 hours, 1400 hours to 2200 hours. The Accident Investigation Unit and the Enforcement Patrol Sections work three shifts, 0600-1400, 1400-2200 and 2200-0600. The men work six days a week.

With the exception of some officers, the educational level of the personnel of the Traffic Police is below par. The Traffic Police, however, take pride in their appearance and work and appear to be superior to the rest of the police in Kinshasa.

Accident Investigation Unit. This Unit has the responsibility for the investigation of all traffic accidents in the city of Kinshasa and its environs. The Unit is divided into four elements, each of which corresponds to a geographic section of the city.

Motorcycle Unit. This Unit is under the command of a Belgian officer and is divided into four operational sections.

a. The Enforcement and Patrol Section is motorcycle mounted and is responsible for traffic enforcement and patrol in eleven, preplanned sections of the area. This Section is the only police element performing any regular type of patrol activity in the city of Kinshasa. Each USAID-provided motorcycle is equipped with a mobile radio which is linked to a base station in Traffic Police headquarters and to all 13 Commissariats in the city.


b. The Taxi Control Section issues special driver's licenses and enforces compliance with insurance requirements. Vehicle inspections are conducted every six months.

c. The Traffic Safety Section performs signalization inspections and reports malfunctions or damage, dangerous road conditions, abandoned cars or other types of traffic hazards to the Ministry of Public Works for removal or remedial action. They may also recommend the installation of traffic signals where, in their opinion, it is deemed necessary. In the case of abandoned cars, the Section can tow away such vehicles if they constitute a traffic hazard.

d. The Driver's License Section gives candidates a three-part examination:

- (1) A written test of the applicant's knowledge of the Traffic Code;

# ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OF THE KINSHASA TRAFFIC POLICE



- (2) A practical test utilizing a mock-up of a city to test the applicant's knowledge of the Code;
- (3) A road test to determine the applicant's driving ability.

The issuance of the licenses is the responsibility of the City Police Commander.

Traffic Control Unit. This Unit is responsible solely for the point control of vehicular and pedestrian traffic for the city of Kinshasa.

Transportation. The Traffic Police Division has six motorcycles (three of them AID supplied) and one AID supplied Jeep in operation. Their record for keeping their transportation maintained and operating is better than that of the balance of the Kinshasa city police. The men of the motorcycle unit perform their own first and second echelon maintenance.

Administration. The filing methods are inadequate in the Division and it would be difficult to compile operational statistics. The Commander maintains an apparently well-kept spot map of Kinshasa with colored pins showing the location of property damage, personal injury and fatal accidents. He also keeps a large chart illustrating the accident profile as to type, time of day, day of week, monthly and yearly figures.

The Chief, the Deputy and the heads of all three Units, meet weekly for planning, formation of policy and dissemination of information regarding problems encountered. The operation of the Traffic Police is budgeted within the framework of the Kinshasa City Police. The Commander has requested a separate budget for his operation because of the importance and magnitude of tasks they perform.

#### 10. Police Housing, Buildings and Camps

The National Police has nearly all its facilities in urban areas. Most of these were either built or acquired by the Belgians to accommodate a force of about 10,000, which is about half the size of the current organization; as a result there is much overcrowding. To further aggravate the serious shortage of buildings and other real estate many former police facilities have been taken over by the army, and the police forced to seek accommodations on the economy.

Most major cities provide housing and facilities for bachelors and families and other police operational needs in one or more police camps. No city has sufficient quarters for all its policemen.

#### Counterpart Funds Building Repair and Construction Kinshasa

In Kinshasa, the police formerly had three camps for a force of less than 1,500 men. After the 1963 police mutiny two of these camps were taken over by the ANC and have never been returned. As a result, some 900 people are now residing in Camp Lufungula, Kinshasa, a major police camp which was designed for a maximum of 500. In addition to police bachelor and family housing the camp contains administration buildings and storage areas, a

parade ground, and the Kinshasa garage. PSD storage and radio maintenance facilities are also located in this camp. Two garage working areas were re-roofed and a storage building and parts storeroom were built with counterpart funds. In addition, work was begun in 1966 on an additional police camp in Kinshasa, since the force has grown to nearly 3,000. This camp, in the Lemba section of Kinshasa is also being built with counterpart funds. The camp was designed to hold 480 families and 320 bachelors and construction was to be phases over a four-year period at a cost of 1,000,000,000 francs (\$2,000,000 US). The first segment was started in early 1966 and completed in early 1967 and is now occupied. The second segment was begun in late 1966 and is not yet finished. Due to the monetary reform, it is expected to cost twice the amount originally anticipated. A decision in the Mission on continuing the remaining portions with US funds has not yet been made and the matter is under study by the USAID. Even when this camp is completed, only half of the Kinshasa police will be quartered in government housing. The remainder of the police is given a housing allowance to defray costs on the open market. Since the tradition in the Congo is that Government employees will be given government housing, and rents and housing costs have been steadily rising without commensurate increases in the allowance, this creates problems. Officers are normally provided with individual government houses.

The Inspectorate-General is quartered in three floors of a large Kinshasa Office building owned by a government corporation. The space available is inadequate. At PSD urging, the Inspectorate-General has sought other quarters, but the financial problem involved has not been resolved.

#### Counterpart Fund Building Repair and Construction National Schools

During the years 1964-67, various construction activities other than the Lemba police camp were undertaken with counterpart funds, principally at training schools.

A total of 41 million francs (\$82,000 US) was spent at the Kinshasa school. This included the complete renovation of 41 sets of 4 unit student quarters, a classroom building, an office building, a messhall, and a canteen. In addition, four new sets of student quarters of the same type were built, an office building was enlarged, an obstacle course was built, and a firearms range was begun which is still under construction. Miscellaneous repairs and connection of the school to the city electrical system were also carried out.

At the Lubumbashi school some 800,000 francs (\$1,600.00 US) were spent for minor repairs and for bringing in city water and electricity, since the major repairs to the school had been done after the rebellion of 1964 with emergency funds of the GDRC.

Nearly 2,000,000 francs (\$4,000.00 US) were spent on the Bukavu school for miscellaneous repairs and also for the provision of materials for repairs to be done with government labor at the school.

At Mbandaka, approximately 12 million francs (\$24,000.00) were devoted to the construction of a classroom building and a 45 student dormitory, in addition to miscellaneous repairs.

#### NP Housing Administration

In 1967, 5,938,000 francs (\$11,876.00 US) were allocated in the police budget for rents while 20,000,000 francs (\$40,000.00) were requested for 1968. The police do not have any records which provide an inventory of their facilities.

#### COMMENT

The administration of the police facility program requires considerable attention particularly at the National and Detachment (province) levels to develop the necessary capabilities for planning and day to day management.

If the government continues its efforts at police reclassification and reduction of the force strength some relief will be felt in the area of bachelor and family housing. However, there still would not be sufficient facilities to accommodate all the police because of the large facility losses to the ANC.

With regard to operational headquarters and support facilities and the commissariats in the major cities and towns it is believed that police operations will continue and possibly increase from present levels further aggravating the overcrowding and poor plant facilities.

At Camp Lufungula, Kinshasa consideration should be given to replacing the dilapidated and seriously overcrowded PSD communications maintenance shop and logistics support building with a more adequate facility. Additionally the motor vehicle repair shop is in need of increased and improved garage facilities.

In the area of facility support it is believed that some counterpart funds may be needed in the future to take care of schools and other facilities of significance to the USAID/PSD effort such as projects mentioned above at Camp Lufungula.

#### 11. Public Relations

A Public Relations Bureau exists in the Secretariat of the First Directorate--Administration--of the Inspectorate-General. The statute makes it responsible for relations with the press, radio, and protocol activities.

In practice, it from time to time publishes a house organ named "Gazette de Police." This is mainly devoted to departmental news items and praise for police and government leaders. It also sometimes prepares articles for the local press. Unfortunately such coverage is limited and press criticism of the police often passes unchallenged. The Bureau also manages the police canteen and functions as an odd jobs office.

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A public relations office is also provided in the administrative service of each Detachment. However, no planned public relations activity has been noted in the Detachments. The public relations staff appears to concern itself mainly with its other responsibilities, such as running police dispensaries and canteens.

It was reported to the Evaluation Team that many citizens have lost respect for the police as a result of the shakedowns, extortion, and other crimes attributed to police personnel as well as their general lack of efficiency. It was also reported that the police is, to a degree, still the repressive organism created by the Belgians, and that the average citizen does not regard it as his protector. He hesitates to make a complaint to the police except in dire need.

There was little indication that the average policemen had any real notion or understanding of the role of the police as a public servant or the need to have public support to ensure successful operations.

#### COMMENT

The Team believes press relations could be measurably improved by utilizing proven techniques. This would include making available to the press, radio and TV truthful and complete information concerning newsworthy police matters, in a central easy-to-approach office. Likewise, this would give the force a chance to present the police side of the news as well. Additionally, the public may be conditioned in advance to new and changing selective enforcement programs.

The Public Relations Bureau is hidden away under the Secretariat of the Administration Directorate, symptomatic of the lack of emphasis given this problem. It should be raised at least to a Section of Administration, stripped of its non-public relations functions and have frequent and daily access to the IG and all Division heads. Similar structural changes should take place in the Detachments.

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## CHAPTER V

### THIRD COUNTRY AND UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE

#### A. BELGIANS

For the entire period since Independence, the Belgians have been the primary group in the police assistance field. Through this period their role has gradually changed, but in essence they have filled jobs the Congolese have either been unwilling or unable to assume. These have ranged from paymaster, purchasing officer, and instructor to various staff and command positions. At the present, there are very few Belgians in line command positions, mainly as a result of two factors. One has been the anti-foreign advisor attitude; the other has been the realization by the Belgian Mission that operational posts in which Belgians direct, administer and enforce discipline are the ones that cause the friction.

The level of Belgian police personnel in the Congo has varied from a maximum of 63 by late 1966 to an expected minimum of 9 in December, 1967.

After the 1967 mercenary rebellion and the Congolese attacks on the Belgian Embassy and other incidents, the GOB held in Belgium all commissaires returning to Belgium on home leave. In addition, the Belgian Gendarmerie instructed all its personnel assigned to civil police duties in the Congo (some 22) to terminate their duties by 31 December 1967 and return to the Gendarmerie in Belgium. Moreover, the 14 Belgian Administrative Teams, most of which included one or more police commissaires, were terminated in 1967.

As a result of all these factors, the GOB planned on a police strength of 22 Belgian commissaires when and if its police assistance program resumed normal operation. It hoped to place most of these commissaires (15) in the two major police schools, with the remainder being at the Inspectorate-General and at one or two major field inspectorates. The GDRC refused to agree with these proposals, and the police program remains moribund along with most Belgian assistance activity.

The difficulty seems to stem from a Belgian desire to normalize its assistance in the form of advisors rather than having its nationals function as augmentees to the Congolese police. The GDRC wants to have complete control with respect to assignments and the type of duties that Belgians will perform.

In early 1967, the Belgian group was distributed in essentially the following manner: 5 at the Kinshasa school, 4 at the Lubumbashi school, 4 at the Lubumbashi inspectorate, 10 in various Katanga cities, 4 in the city of

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Kinshasa, 5 at the Inspectorate-General, and approximately 20 scattered throughout other cities and administrative teams in former rebel-held areas. At any one time, probably 15-20% of these men were on home leave.

The capabilities of the Belgian commissaires vary. The gendarmerie group is probably overall the lowest qualified. Most are gendarmerie sergeants holding officer rank only while in Congo service. The remainder are Belgian civil police personnel and generally have more formal education, higher previous rank, and better qualifications. Several are university graduates. One of these men, formerly the Inspector of the Katanga Police prior to Independence and subsequently the Chief Instructor of the Lubumbashi School, was a professor of languages prior to entering the police 20 years ago and is reported to be an extremely well-qualified and most capable police instructor.

Administrative team commissaires functioned either as the chief of police in the area concerned or as the advisor to the chief, with considerable command powers nonetheless. Commissaires assigned to commissariats were either commanders or advisors, often functioning as commanders in the absence of the commander. At NP headquarters the Belgians filled key staff positions in the personnel, training, and logistics area of the Inspectorate-General. In the school system, the Belgians along with the UN instructors did the bulk of all training at all levels and much of the administration.

The team was informed that as Belgian commissaires vacated the many important posts proficiency in budget planning, logistics, training, commissariat operation, general administration and discipline started to drop. This situation was due primarily to the fact that Congolese replacements were not sufficiently and adequately prepared to take over the duties.

Almost all the salary of Belgian commissaires is paid by Belgium, with the Congolese paying only a small portion and supplying quarters.

The team was informed by Belgian sources that if a Belgian commissaire program is resumed by the GOB, most personnel will be in training and administrative posts as proposed by the GOB. Although the police would in all probability not have the higher level of efficiency that would result from Belgians in command and operational positions, the proposed relationship would have some worthwhile advantages in that it forces the Congolese to run their own organization. This is an essential step if they are ever to end their need for foreign personnel.

#### COMMENT

Were all the foreign advisors to depart (which is virtually the case, since all UN instructors and virtually all Belgians will probably soon be gone) the Congolese could not effectively take over most of their jobs. The slots could be filled but in most cases at a much lower level of efficiency. This is especially true in technical jobs, such as the budget, in positions of command where Congolese discipline is almost invariably more lax and in teaching posts.

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## B. UNITED NATIONS

The Deputy Resident Representative of the U.N. (DRRUN), advised that the UN moved into the Congo right after Independence in 1960 with a massive public administration effort. If that had not been the case, there would have been no government and, in effect, up until 1964, the UN for all practical purposes constituted the Congolese administrative government outside the political sphere. At that time and as an outgrowth to a degree of the military and political programs, the UN developed a police program, the first and only one of its kind in the world as far as the UN was concerned. Their Program Agreement (ProAg) limited the participation of the advisors to training of the national police. Some 20 positions were established in 1964 and subsequently reduced to 15 in 1967. On very few occasions were there more than 9 advisors assigned at any one time.

The police program of the UN officially ends on 31 December 67. There will be some carry over until February of 1968 required to fulfill existing contracts.

The UN's decision to discontinue the program was based on two factors: #1 - that there is nothing in any of the resolutions passed by the UN for their programs that would authorize such projects; #2 - there is no New York back-stopping of a police program at UN Headquarters. Accordingly, the recruiting effort for the police program was not totally successful. Likewise, there are no policies concerning this type of program.

Early this calendar year, DRRUN said he advised the MOI that the UN was phasing out its police assistance effort and suggested that the Congolese might hire some of the advisors directly. The MOI made at least one offer which was completely unacceptable, amounting to pay of \$80.00 in hard currency plus \$20.00 in local money per month. There is no indication that the MOI is pursuing this matter any further.

The UN police advisors receive about \$1000 per month. The DRRUN pointed out that there are some good men on the staff and he believes that they would be interested in a reasonable offer to return on a contract basis.

Also pertinent historically is the fact that the UN brought in 400 Nigerian police troops in 1960 and they remained here until 3 January 1966. At first, about 50% of the police were located in Kinshasa with others scattered in detachments throughout the country. By 1965, all were in Kinshasa. These people did a very good job, in general, and most of the UN staff felt that they were the UN police force with a particular interest in the staff's personal security, creating a secure feeling which does not exist today.

Likewise pertinent to the police program is the phasing out by the close of CY 1967 of UN technicians for the central garage of the Travaux Publique. The idea of having UN technicians teach motor vehicle maintenance was good and served to satisfy an important need, but the Congolese government has failed to support the project adequately as promised. The efficiency of the

garage is deteriorating and probably will continue its downward trend at least for the time being.

Of collateral interest are the roles and missions of the UN here and worldwide. In general terms, the UN restricts itself in most instances to long-term development projects in the areas of economics, social welfare and public administration. In the Congo, agriculture, with 14 advisors has the greatest immediate prospect for further development with probable expansion in the very near future.

The Public Health function has trained over 200 local doctors but this has not been successful because those trained will not remain in the provinces. They come to the capital city and work two hours a day at a government desk and then go ahead with their private practice. There are 90 foreign doctors now in the project, being scaled down to 65 next year.

Public works is now limiting itself to roads and canals and has 35 engineers and technicians.

Telecommunications was quite large but, having trained the Congolese, this program is being phased out and the host country is taking over.

Civil Aviation has 53 technicians now and will be ready to phase out in two more years. Related to this is meteorology, likewise phasing down and leaving the Congolese to take over.

The education program deals with the formal education in secondary schools and technical institutes. This is building up somewhat with an advisory staff of 18.

The UN direct fund amounted to \$11,000,000.00 in CY 66; \$8,000,000.00 in CY 67, and is set at \$6,000,000.00 for CY 68.

In conclusion the DRRUN stated that he believed there was a serious need for a good police program in the GDRC, and that he was hopeful that AID would take over the development and further expansion of this program to meet the requirements of the nation whose development would be seriously hampered if peace and security could not be guaranteed.

CHAPTER VI  
PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM OBJECTIVES,  
GOALS AND IMPLEMENTATION ACTION

Public Safety program objectives in support of the Congolese police were planned for selected police activities which were deemed essential and for which the requirement was not being fulfilled or fully met by some other donor nation or the U.N. This portion of the report summarizes program objectives, goals and implementation action. Objectives reported all fall in the following categories of police activities and interest:

- A. National Police Organization
- B. Communications
- C. Transportation
- D. Training
- E. Coordinate Donor Police Assistance
- F. Office Equipment
- G. Police Uniforms
- H. Police Activity Belgian Public Administrative Team
- I. Civil Disturbance Control
- J. Logistic Supply
- K. Increase in GDRC Financing
- L. Police Housing
- M. Police Advisors

Figure 3, repeats the actual PSD Staffing Fulfillment since the inception of the program.

A. NATIONAL POLICE ORGANIZATION

OBJECTIVE

Improve the overall organization of the National Police through increased coordination and central control.

Goal A

Increase the authority of the Third Directorate of the Ministry of Interior as a national coordinating office for the autonomous provincial police.

Action

Prior to 1965 the PSD focused attention on what was the Third Directorate in the Ministry of Interior in order to improve its capability. This Directorate had a vague responsibility for maintaining liaison and coordination on the national level with the autonomous provincial police forces. Its staff was increased and its capability improved permitting it to serve as the official distribution and coordination point for all PSD equipment and requests from the provinces. Efforts to further augment the role of this organization were dropped in late 1965 when President Mobutu ordered the creation of the National Police.

Goal B

Create and support a National Police, in accordance with the modification of the constitutional provisions.

Action

PSD participated in the drafting of the laws which were signed into law in July, 1966, creating and implementing the National Police. Subsequently, it has advised on methods and actions for consolidation of the various provincial forces into a true National Police, such as the officer reclassification and standardization action. Also, PSD has tried to make the Inspectorate General of the National Police more operational, an effort that has failed to produce the desired results. The Inspector General is seriously hampered by the failure of the Minister of Interior to delegate necessary command authority and by internal police politics.

B. COMMUNICATIONS

OBJECTIVE

Strengthen police communications both in urban areas and country wide to facilitate the transmission of information and instructions and to tie police units closer to the capital.

Goal A

Install FM base and mobile units in selected urban areas.

Action

In 1964, FM nets were installed in the six most important cities and in 1965 in the six secondary cities. It soon became apparent that the use of these sets in all but the most important cities was marginal. Communications traffic was insufficient to justify the extension of such nets to smaller cities, as had been originally contemplated. Consequently, no further nets were installed. Efforts have been made both through the police schools and visits by PSD personnel to improve use of FM nets. Sets not being properly used or maintained and those in deadlined vehicles were returned to the supply warehouse in Kinshasa.

Goal B

Install SSB stations in cities having major or secondary police headquarters or which are important for strategic reasons.

Action

SSB long distance stations were installed or scheduled to be installed in all present and former provincial capitals and several other selected cities. This network, the only one of its type in the Congo, has proved to be very useful. It has provided much information and data that would otherwise have been unobtainable during difficult security situations, such as the various rebellions. Maintenance requirements have been very low. By providing a rapid channel for the transmission of instructions, it has tied the detachments more closely to the Inspectorate-General.

Goal C

Train SSB operators.

Action

Two classes of SSB operators have been trained by the PTT under the supervision of the Communications Advisor. An additional class is in preparation.

Goal D

Provide an internal police maintenance capability.

Action

Four maintenance participants were trained in the US and are now working under the supervision of the Communications Advisor prior to being sent to various areas of the country. One participant is scheduled to depart for the US whenever the FY 68 course is scheduled. Additional candidates are being screened for FY 68 training. Through PSD efforts, two competent maintenance men have been brought into the police and one is in command of the Radio Bureau of the Inspectorate-General.

C. TRANSPORTATION

OBJECTIVE

Provide vehicles to meet the patrol and transportation needs of the police.

Goal

Provide quantities of vehicles in accordance with available funds each year, first to the police forces of major cities and schools, and subsequently to other areas. (Areas of concentration were first to be those localities where Belgian police personnel were assigned, to attempt to obtain more effective use of the vehicles).

Action

Jeeps, ambulances, light and heavy trucks, and motorcycles have been provided totalling 90 in 1964, 100 in 1965 and 74 in 1966. 21 are currently being held by PSD due to the suspension of vehicle deliveries in 1967. Additionally the procurement of 48 vehicles planned for in 1967 was cancelled.

These suspension and cancellation actions were the result of diversion of vehicles from ProAg assigned organizations, misuse of vehicles, lack of maintenance, and failure by the GDRC to fulfill other ProAg obligations, such as adequate budgetary support. The suspension continues at this time. The problems are more fully discussed in the Transportation Section. Three thousand bicycles were furnished to the various police forces in 1965 and 1966.

Although many vehicles of various types were provided, patrol activity remained minimal, despite efforts by operational Belgian commissaires to vitalize the operation. Most vehicles are used for material transport, personnel transport, or personal business.

While the PSD Logistics/Supply Advisor SPAR calls for vehicle maintenance qualifications, no such qualified person has ever been assigned. For a period of time the position was filled by an individual specialized in Logistics and Supply. Advisors possessing other skills have also been filling the position as an additional duty to provide some degree of coverage.

D. TRAINING

OBJECTIVE

Improve training and training capabilities in the National Police.

Goal A

Reactivate closed training schools.

Action

Primarily as a result of PSD pressure, the Kinshasa training school was reopened in 1964 and the Mbandaka, Kisangani, and Bukavu schools were reopened in 1965. Kisangani closed in 1966 as the result of the Katangese rebellion, while the remaining schools and the Lubumbashi school (the only police school to remain in continuous operation after 1960) were closed in April 1967 by order of the Minister of Interior to permit reclassification of all police personnel before training. The Kinshasa and Lubumbashi schools reopened for Officer and recruit training in August, 1967. The Luluabourg school, which closed in 1962, no longer has a physical plant and has never reopened.

Goal B

Provide necessary training equipment for these schools.

Action

Some 46 items of training equipment (projectors, amplifiers, cameras, etc.) have been provided to the various training schools. In addition, surplus US desks and cabinets as well as locally manufactured furniture has been provided to the schools.

Goal C

Repair, refurbish and add on to these schools as necessary.

Action

As discussed in detail under buildings, extensive repairs, renovations, and some additional construction were provided to the schools through the use of local currency funds. 155 million francs (\$310,000 US) were allocated in the 1964-67 period. All operating schools were restored to good condition by the beginning of 1967.

Goal D

Support foreign instructor staffs.

Action

Through pressure on the UN and funding through the US/UN ProAg (not a part of the PSD project) 20 foreign instructor positions were authorized from 1964 through 1966 and 15 in 1967. Recruitment difficulties prevent the maximum number of instructors assigned from ever exceeding 14. This high was attained only for a period of a few months, and at most times the instructor strength averaged 8 or 9. The UN decided to terminate its police instructor program at the end of 1967. Most of its strength had been concentrated in Kinsahsa, with 2 or 3 instructors each in Bukavu and Mbandaka for only a few months in early 1967. Belgian instructors carried all the Officer teaching load at Lubumbashi during all years, and Belgian instructors carried at least half of the teaching load (and often more) at Kinshasa. With the current blocking of all personnel on leave in Belgium as a result of the

Belgian-Congolese political situation, only 3 Belgian instructors will actually be in the training schools by the end of 1967, and no UN instructors will be present.

Goal E

Start a corps of Congolese instructors.

Action

Repeated efforts have been made with minimal success to create a group of Congolese instructors. (While Congolese have instructed in-recruit training at Lubumbashi school for years, these men were chosen, assigned, and trained by Belgian instructors long before the PSD program started. No Congolese instructors have been trained for the other schools). Efforts to get competent Commissaires assigned to the Kinshasa school to start learning instructor techniques failed in 1965, since most of these men preferred to work in Commissariats where income could be more easily supplemented. A group of 20 Commissaires was assigned to the Kinshasa school in 1967 for instructor training. After a few weeks almost all had obtained transfers, and the course collapsed. In late 1967, nearly a dozen university graduates received direct appointments as Inspectors and were assigned to the Lubumbashi and Kinshasa schools. Since none of these men had any police or teaching experience, their performance was not outstanding. Efforts to have the Minister of Interior assign returned participants as instructors have met with no results.

Goal F

Provide US participant training for selected police.

Action

A total of 26 participants has been trained in the US during the years 1965-67. 16 of these men attended the French language Special Actions Course. Six attended the IPA General Course, four of whom received instructor training. Four men attended the Communications Maintenance Course. All are now assigned to Communications Maintenance duties. One new candidate is presently awaiting the beginning of the 1968 maintenance course. Problems were encountered in obtaining qualified candidates for the various courses due to low educational levels and political interference to push favored persons.

E. COORDINATE DONOR POLICE ASSISTANCE

OBJECTIVE

Coordinate police assistance activities of all donor countries.

Goal

Obtain an exchange of information and division of tasks to avoid duplication among donors.

Action

In 1963, the Government of Belgium (GOB), the United Nations (UN) and the Nigerian Government were the principal donors, along with the US, with the Nigerians withdrawing in 1966 and the UN in 1967. Originally a coordinating committee was established with the various donors and the GDRC in 1963. This ended in 1965. During the life of the committee and subsequently, the Chief or Acting Chief PSD has always served as the informal coordinator. Since the US was the only equipment donor, and since neither Belgians in Brussels (until 1967) nor the UN in New York furnished any particular back stopping for its police program personnel in the Congo, this task was facilitated and carried out with success. In addition, excellent relations have always been maintained with senior GOB and UN personnel, and frequent discussions and formulation of common tactics have been successfully accomplished. Activity by other nations in the police field has been limited to the provision of an occasional participant training slot by the Germans and the French.

F. OFFICE EQUIPMENT

OBJECTIVE

Improve police operations and records through the procurement of office equipment.

Goal

Supply typewriters, duplicators and other small office machines to selected police units and schools.

Action

All operating schools, major cities, and all provinces have been supplied with such items, to make a total of 195 pieces of office equipment through 1967. Most items have been well used, but problems sometimes developed when funds were not available for paper and maintenance or in rural areas far from supply sources and repair shops.

G. POLICE UNIFORMS

OBJECTIVE

Improve police appearance and morale through the procurement of police uniforms.

Goal

Provide quantities of complete uniforms each year to the various police units.

Action

While the original survey conceived the idea of furnishing police uniforms only to personnel graduating from police schools, with all but one of the schools closed at the beginning of the project this idea was abandoned as impractical. Instead uniforms were provided to the major cities, schools (as they reopened) and provinces. Whereas most policemen were in rags when the project started, the majority are now reasonably well attired. Appearance, while improved, is still not all that it might be, since smartness in the wearing of the uniform, even among police school students and graduates, is not common. Nonetheless, both Congolese and Europeans have commented on the improved appearance of the police since uniforms were provided by the program. 4,000 sets were provided in 1964, 4,000 in 1965, 8,000 in 1966 and 4,000 in 1967.

H. POLICE ACTIVITY BELGIAN ADMINISTRATIVE TEAM

OBJECTIVE

Support Belgian Administrative Teams

Goal

Provide funds and equipment for Belgian Administrative Teams

Action

The Belgian Administrative Teams were a device designed to restore public administration to selected formerly rebel held areas. Functioning from late 1964 to late 1967, their operational funding was provided through the inclusion of additional local currency in the Public Safety project. In addition, since most teams included a Belgian police Commissaire, vehicles and other police equipment were programmed for the police forces of these localities to allow the team Commissaire more capability to rebuild these forces. Initially the program worked quite well but encountered increasing resistance from Congolese government personnel and was terminated by the GOB in late 1967.

I. CIVIL DISTURBANCE CONTROL

OBJECTIVE

Augment police civil disturbance control capability.

Goal

Provide Civil Disturbance Control (CDC) equipment to selected police forces and schools and to support CDC training.

Action

During 1964 and 1965, CDC packages were provided to 12 major cities. These packages included tear gas guns, projectiles, grenades,

masks, first aid equipment, lights, and walkie-talkies. Demonstration training was provided by PSD or other foreign advisors. Supplemental quantities of projectiles and grenades were provided in 1966, as was gas training and equipment for the various police schools. Experience showed that most of the cities concerned were not storing or maintaining the equipment properly, that Belgian commissaires formerly assigned to command or advisory CDC squad duties were being transferred to other duties by the GDRC, and that in many cases the CDC squads were no longer functional. Consequently provision of such equipment was discontinued. All personnel passing through the police schools were given CDC training and familiarized with the USAID provided equipment.

**J. LOGISTIC SUPPLY**

OBJECTIVE

Develop an internal police capability in logistics and supply.

Goal

Train police personnel through on-the-job training in customs, inventory, stocking, and shipping procedures.

Action

From 1964 to the present the former PSD Logistics-Supply Advisor and the subsequent acting advisors attempted to provide training to Congolese personnel in this field. An attempt to train Kinshasa motor pool personnel in parts inventory and stocking procedures worked only when constant advisory attention could be given to it, because of disinterest of Congolese supervisory personnel. All customs clearances and subsequent reshipment of USAID commodities and local purchase items have been performed or supervised by PSD. Police personnel assigned to PSD have learned to carry out these duties but still require PSD supervision. Attempts to get competent police supervisory personnel assigned to learn the logistics supervisory role have not been very successful. Efforts continue to locate proper NP personnel.

**K. GDRC INCREASE ITS ASSUMPTION OF COSTS OF EQUIPMENT**

OBJECTIVE

Have GDRC assume a larger portion of the costs of equipping its police properly and maintaining USAID provided equipment.

Goal

The FY 64 ProAg stated "the GDRC shall...provide funds for maintenance and repair contracts for communications equipment...and shall furnish adequate repair and maintenance facilities and garaging for all motor vehicles..."

The FY 65 ProAg stated that "the provincial governments prior to the receipt of USAID furnished equipment provide proof that sufficient funds have been allocated for salaries to their police personnel, for maintenance and repair contracts for communications equipment, necessary gasoline and oil. . .adequate repair and maintenance facilities, garaging and/or housing for all motor vehicles and radio stations."

An almost identical provision was in the FY 66 ProAg.

The FY 67 provision was made considerably more stringent. It stated, "Prior to any of the equipment covered by the Project Agreement, whether financed in dollars or local currency being officially authorized by the United States Government for delivery in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Minister of Interior of the GDRC shall effectively commence the implementation of the National Police Law and Statute. Such implementation shall include: the appointment of the Inspector-General of the National Police and the Directors of the Inspectorate-General; the preparation of a budget for the National Police including provision for salaries of all members of the National Police, operating funds, necessary funds for the operation of all recognized police training schools, sufficient funds for the maintenance, operation (including gasoline and oil) and repair of all USAID equipment provided in the past and to be provided under this agreement, and shall commence repairs on such equipment presently out of service, funding the inland transportation of all USAID provided equipment covered by this agreement, and fund for the purchase of at least a minimum amount of police equipment by the National Police itself; the actual official allocation of funds to the National Police to cover the expenditures proposed in the budget."

#### Action

With a few exceptions the GDRC role in providing equipment and funds for maintenance has been poor. Part of this has been due to the past chaotic financial condition of the country and to the reported embezzlement of funds. Prior to the creation of the National Police, provincial police frequently went unpaid for long periods. Some of this was because of the swollen size of local forces but more frequently this condition resulted from the reported embezzlement of GDRC payroll funds by provincial politicians. The provinces did not tax directly and all taxes were collected by the Central Government and, in turn, allocated for provincial operations. In some areas, such as the Katanga, adequate funds were available, and maintenance and operation were satisfactory. Indeed in 1965 the Katanga Police even attempted to purchase Jeeps with its own funds, only to be thwarted by AID regulations preventing Jeeps brought in through the import support program from being sold to the government. Nonetheless, the Katanga Police bought 10 Renault sedans and 6 Mercedes trucks for its own use. In Mbandaka and in Matadi vehicles were maintained and repaired. In Katanga and in Kinshasa radio maintenance contracts were obtained. In most of the rest of the country, the ProAg conditions were not fulfilled. In the Northeast, the effects of the 1964 rebellion hampered police efforts in this field.

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Full application of the ProAg provisions was not deemed advisable by the Mission prior to FY 67, although individual applications were made in certain areas where intolerable conditions prevailed. All vehicles and communications shipments to Luluabourg were suspended in 1965. A suspension for the same commodities was imposed on Bukavu for a period in late 1965 until it improved its practices.

With the creation of the National Police and as the project began its fourth year, it was felt that sterner action was required. This resulted in the more stringent provisions of the FY 67 ProAg. When in January 1967 it became apparent that inadequate budget funding was being provided for the National Police, that lack of maintenance and misuse of equipment was increasing, and that vehicles had been diverted from their authorized ProAg destinations for non-police units, the bulk of all procurement and shipment was suspended. In addition to stopping such activities for FY 67 commodities, vehicles from the FY 66 program that had not been shipped were kept in PSD USAID custody and still remain there.

The only correction to this situation, despite many promises by the Minister of Interior and subordinate Ministry officials, has been to provide funds for the National Police salaries and to do little else. The National Police has managed to purchase some uniforms and a few vehicles (non-operational types intended for command personnel) on its own during 1967.

## L. POLICE HOUSING

### OBJECTIVE

Improve police housing in Kinshasa, thus improving morale and making a police reserve force more readily available.

### Goal

Construct an additional police camp in Kinshasa.

### Action

In 1965, as the Kinshasa police force expanded due to the continued growth of the city, its housing facilities (already inadequate for the existing force) became even more strained. Traditionally under the Belgian administration, housing had been provided for police and other government employees, and this policy was continued by the GDRC. Consequently, USAID started the construction of an additional police camp in Kinshasa. As discussed under "Building," approximately 1/4th of the camp was completed with FY 66 funds, and an additional 1/4th is under way with FY 67 funds. The FY 66 segment is already occupied and has improved the morale of the police families occupying it, as well as improving living conditions and concentrating off-duty policing for emergency use.

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M. PSD ADVISORS

OBJECTIVE

Provide American police advisors to assist the Congolese police.

Goal

Provide a minimum number of US advisors for specialized tasks to supplement Belgian and UN advisors and to carry out operations of specific US responsibility.

Action

When the program was first implemented in 1963, the only authorized advisor slot was that of the Chief. This was soon supplemented by slots for a Generalist, a Communications Advisor, and a Logistics/Supply Advisor, as well as a Secretary. In 1965, slots for a Municipal Advisor and a Training Advisor were added.

The basic philosophy applying both to the Mission and to the PSD program at the time of inception of the latter was to minimize direct American participation and to depend as far as possible on UN and Belgian technicians. This concept was slightly altered in 1965 when the Municipal and Training slots were added but the function of these men was still seen essentially as a support and coordination operation. With the gradual removal of Belgian personnel from operational roles and the fact that the UN never fully staffed its program, it soon became obvious that there was no one doing a number of the vital functions in the police, nor were there US personnel available to fill the gap. The problem was even more aggravated in 1967 when a large portion of the Belgian personnel were withdrawn and others who were on home leave were prevented from returning to the Congo until political questions (which are still unresolved) were settled.

Even the minimum number of US advisors authorized has never been entirely provided, except in 1964. As shown on the chart in Figure 3, the Chief's spot was vacant for four months in 1966, and has subsequently been vacant since December, 1966. The Generalist has been Acting Chief during this time in addition to his other duties. The Communications slot has normally been filled, with the exception of a two months' gap in mid-1966 and the Advisor's home leave in 1967. The Logistics/Supply slot was filled until November, 1966, but subsequently has been vacant. Both the Municipal Advisor who departed in September 1967, and the Training Advisor have had to fill this slot in addition to their regular duties. The Municipal Advisor slot was not filled until six months after its creation and subsequently has not been filled since the departure of the former incumbent in September, 1967. The Training Advisor slot was not filled until two years after its creation. The Secretarial slot was not filled for several months after it was established but has been continuously occupied since then.

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Another major personnel problem has been language and other qualifications. The Logistics/Supply officer, while an outstandingly capable advisor, was not a qualified mechanic/maintenance expert as required by the SPAR. More important, however, has been the matter of language qualification. All advisor slots require a 3 level French language proficiency. Only the first Chief, the Generalist, and the two Communications Advisors have had this proficiency. All other personnel provided have had at best a 2 level and often a 1 level French language, with a 5 level being native fluency. This has proven somewhat of a hindrance to effective advisory effort.

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## PSD STAFFING FULFILLMENT Program Began in Sept. 1963




Figure 3

## CHAPTER VII

### CONGOLESE POLITICAL ASSESSMENT, SOCIETY AND ECONOMY

#### A. POLITICAL ASSESSMENT

When the Congo became independent in 1960, an organic law prepared by the Belgian government was established in lieu of a constitution. Elections were carried out, and the nation was organized on general democratic principles. A constitution was approved by a referendum in 1964, creating a federal system. Elections for a new parliament were subsequently held. This government was not particularly effective. Both the central government and the various provincial governments tended to be chaotic, corrupt, politically dominated, which resulted in a lack of effective control. A large part of these difficulties were caused by the 1964 Simba rebellion. In mid-1965, President Kasavubu dismissed former Premier Tshombe. The replacement cabinet was even less efficient and showed leftist tendencies. Consequently, ANC Commander Mobutu and the ANC high command assumed power in November, 1965, for the avowed purpose of improving the government. Kasavubu was deposed and Mobutu became president.

Various measures have been taken to improve the economic situation of the country, including a monetary reform, and progress had begun when the 1967 mercenary rebellion broke out. Now that the rebellion has been resolved, it is estimated that at least a year of peace will be required in order for the situation to settle and progress resumed at the pre-rebellion rate. Additional incentives for foreign investment are reportedly being prepared. Mobutu apparently now realizes that the Congo has great need of the European community and is acting accordingly. Should the current period of peace continue, both the government and the economy should become stronger.

In 1966 and 1967, the central government took measures to establish strong central control of the entire country. The 1967 constitution virtually abolished the federal system and made the provinces mere Administrative units with virtually no powers of their own. President Mobutu himself is a generally capable man who sometimes readily accepts foreign advice, often has good ideas, and is becoming a more capable political leader. He is hampered, as all previous Congolese leaders have been, by the lack of trained administrators in the government. Mobutu has stated that presidential elections will be held in 1970, interestingly in 1970 he will be 40 years old. This, coincidentally, is the minimum age required by the Constitution for Presidential candidates. It is likely that Mobutu will resign his military commission and run for office as a civilian. It should be noted that he is also head of the MPR political party, which is government-sponsored and the only party permitted in the country at this time.

## B. SOCIETY AND CULTURE

The Congo, in common with many African countries, is a created rather than a natural unit. Its borders were created during the colonial carving up of Africa during the latter part of the 19th century and do not reflect natural units. Persons in the far western areas of the Congo belong to the same tribes as persons in adjacent portions of the Congo-Brazzaville and Angola. Similarly many inhabitants of the Katanga belong to the tribes found in bordering areas of Zambia and Angola.

Prior to Belgian colonization, Congolese society was tribal. It remains still very much so, despite the passage of time. As a result, there is not much national spirit, for the average citizen feels himself a member of a tribe, a village, or a region, rather than a Congolese. Moreover, tribal differences still are rather important. Members of various tribes still distrust and discriminate against each other. While the Mobutu government is attempting to downgrade tribalism, a great deal of time will be required to eradicate the habits of centuries. This is especially true in rural areas, where the Belgians concentrated primarily on maintaining control.

With the large size of the Congo (it is slightly smaller than approximately that part of the US East of the Mississippi) and the diverse origins of the people, social organization tends to vary from tribe to tribe. Some forms have been imposed by law, however, such as the prohibition of polygamy. The status of women is generally inferior, and they do much of the work, especially in agriculture. Women do most of the selling in markets, often control the finances and in fact, occupy an important position. Families are usually large.

The educational level is low, but some education is wider spread than in many underdeveloped countries. The Belgian aim was to provide two years of elementary education to as many as possible, so literacy and a knowledge of simple arithmetic are widespread. Their intention was to gradually expand higher education, but independence arrived sooner than planned. Secondary education was very limited at the time of independence, and there were only a handful of university graduates. Subsequently secondary education was expanded, and three universities are operating in the Congo. Nonetheless, it still suffers from a lack of adequately educated citizens.

## C. JUDGES AND LEGAL CODE

The judicial system remains essentially that of the Belgian Congo. This is a modification of the usual European Napoleonic Code system. All former laws still remain active unless specifically repealed, and no Congolese criminal or civil code has yet been promulgated. A large portion of judges are still foreigners, (Belgians). The Belgian government is eager to have its nationals removed from this role, but, peculiarly the GDRC is not desirous of losing their services at this time. There is a shortage of Congolese lawyers and many prefer to engage in politics, as do many university graduates. In addition to codified law, the Belgians permitted certain truly rural areas to

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operate under their own customary law, and this practice still continues to some extent. Extensive corruption is reported in the prosecutor's office and in the courts.

#### D. ECONOMY

The Congo is potentially a rich country. Its mineral resources include copper (its primary source of foreign exchange), gold, zinc, cobalt, diamonds, and tin. Agriculturally it could be virtually self-sufficient in food-stuffs and has a number of export crops, including palm oil, rubber, coffee, and lumber products. Both sectors have been upset by the various post-independence problems in the country. Much of the mineral and agricultural wealth (other than copper) is in areas of the country hit by the various rebellions. Copper production was threatened by the nationalization of the mines in January, 1967, but no truly serious difficulties have resulted. The anti-white activities resulting from the July, 1967, mercenary rebellion caused a number of European technicians to leave. Presently the remaining number of technicians is just sufficient to operate the copper industry effectively.


A factor hampering the economy is the poor transport system. This has deteriorated badly since independence. Surface transport is frequently slow and unreliable. Air transportation is almost entirely dependent on foreign crews and maintenance personnel. Much of the mineral production is exported through Angola, since this rail route is faster and shorter than the one through the Congo. Political factors have often caused complications in the use of this rail line.

Government fiscal management is not particularly good, but a budget surplus was shown for a few months in mid-1967. This was wiped out by the expenses of the mercenary rebellion. In addition, direct budget support by the US Government has been provided in the past.

Given continued stability so that foreign exchange earnings continue and if funds are not wasted on unwise expenditures, the Congo can probably have a balanced budget and devote certain sums to its own development, becoming less dependent of foreign aid in the future.

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### NATIONAL POLICE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM



### NATIONAL POLICE COMMUNICATION FREQUENCIES

CITY	HIGH FREQUENCY	VERY HIGH FREQUENCY
All SSB stations use:	3,721.5 Mhz	
	8,064 "	
	10,193 "	
	10,775 "	
Kinshasa		Transmit 37.00 Mhz Receive 37.90 Mhz
Kisangani		Transmit/Receive 37.75 "
Lubumbashi		Receive 38.00 " Transmit/Receive 37.94 "
Bukavu		Transmit/Receive 37.70 "
Mbandaka		Transmit/Receive 37.55 "
Luluabourg		Transmit/Receive 37.50 "
Matadi		Transmit/Receive 37.10 "
Albertville		Transmit/Receive 37.20 "
Goma		Transmit/Receive 37.30 "
Kolwezi		Transmit/Receive 38.00 " (Channel 1) Transmit/Receive 37.94 " (Channel 2)


**MESSAGES SENT AND RECEIVED  
THROUGH THE NATIONAL POLICE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM  
JANUARY 1, 1967 THROUGH NOVEMBER 30, 1967**

MONTH	TRANSMITTED	RECEIVED
January	124	177
February	129	178
March	155	226
April	203	242
May	141	201
June	141	321
July	98	342
August	100	270
September	80	222
October	135	240
November	148	250
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,454</b>	<b>2,669</b>

# SECRET ORGANIZATION CHART

TAB D

## NATIONAL POLICE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM



## LOCATION OF COMMUNICATION COMMODITIES

CITY	SSB	VHF BASE	VHF MOBILE	WALKIE-TALKIE	MOTORCYCLE
Kinshasa	1	14	57	2	6
Lubumbashi	1	3	12	2	
Kisangani	1	6	7	1	
Bukavu	1	5	7	1	
Mbandaka	1	3	6	1	
Luluabourg	1	6	5	1	
Matadi	1	2	6	1	
Albertville	1	2	3	1	
Goma	1	2	5	1	
Kolwezi	1	2	5	1	
Mbuji Mayi	1	2	5	1	
Kikwit	1	2	5	1	
Thysville	1				
Kengw	1				
Lisala	1				
Gemena	1				
Isiro	1				
Bunia	1				
Kindu	1				
Kamina	1				
Luebo	1				
Kabinda	1				
Lusambo	1				
<b>Total</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>123</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>6</b>

The cities of Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, Kisangani and Bukavu each have one 1000 watt Aercom Amplifier.

TAB F

**DEPLOYMENT OF RADIO PERSONNEL**


CITY	MAINTENANCE MEN	RADIO OPERATORS
Kinshasa	6	4
Thysville		1
Matadi		2
Kenge		1
Kikwit		1
Mbandaka		2
Lisala		1
Gemena		1
Kisangani		2
Isiro		1
Bunia		2
Bukavu		4
Goma		1
Kindu		1
Luluabourg		2
Luebo		0
Lusambo		1
Kabinda		1
Mbuji Mayi		2
Kolwezi		0
Lubumbashi		2
Kamina		1
Total	6	33

## LOCATION OF TRANSPORTATION COMMODITIES

CITIES	LIGHT TRUCKS	WRECKERS	MOTOR-CYCLES	TRUCKS Pick-ups & Panels	JEEPS CJ-6 & CJ-5 Both 2 and 4-Wheel Drive	CARRY-ALL	TRUCKS 2½ Ton	AMBU-LANCES	TOTAL
Min. of Interior or Hq Nat. Police	1	-	-	-	-	3	1	-	5
Kinshasa	3	1	6	2	58	2	8	1	81
Kinshasa School	-	-	-	1	2	4	2	-	9
Mbandaka	1	-	-	1	6	-	1	1	10
Mbandaka School	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	2
Luluabourg	-	-	-	1	7	-	1	1	10
Luluabourg School	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	2
Lubumbashi	1	-	-	2	16	1	4	1	25
Lubumbashi School	-	-	-	1	-	2	2	-	5
Bukavu	1	-	-	1	7	-	1	1	11
Bukavu School	1	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	3
Kisangani	-	-	-	2	12	-	3	1	18
Kisangani School	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	2
Matadi	-	-	-	2	6	-	2	-	10
Mbuji-Mayi	-	-	-	1	5	-	1	-	7
Kolwezi	-	-	-	1	5	-	1	-	7
Goma	-	-	-	1	5	-	1	-	7
Kamina	-	-	-	2	6	-	2	-	10
Boendi	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	2
Manona	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	2
Albertville	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	2
Lisola	1	-	-	1	3	-	1	-	6
Bumba	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	2
Gemena	1	-	-	1	2	-	1	-	5
Isiro	1	-	-	1	3	-	1	-	6
Bunia	1	-	-	1	3	-	1	-	6
Watsa	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	2
Lodja	1	-	-	-	2	-	1	-	4
Tchikapa	1	-	-	-	2	-	1	-	4
Kenge	1	-	-	-	2	-	1	-	4
Inongo	1	-	-	-	2	-	1	-	4
Kabinda	1	-	-	-	3	-	1	-	5
Kikwit	-	-	-	1	5	-	1	-	7
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>167</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>285</b>

\* These numbers reflect the twenty-one vehicles presently being withheld. They are shown under the cities where originally scheduled.

# ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE NATIONAL POLICE SCHOOL



## FUNCTIONS OF THE SCHOOL STAFF

In accordance with the regulations, the Ecole Nationale Superieure de Police at Matete (National Advanced Training School for Police), a residence school, shall be placed under the authority of a "Commissaire Controleur Principal (Chief Superintendent-Inspector), who shall be the Commandant of the school. He shall be directly responsible to the higher authorities to which he shall send periodic or other reports concerning the operation of the establishment.

\* \* \*

The Commandant of the School shall be assisted by an Assistant Commandant who, in addition to his duties as defined in the regulations shall substitute for the Commandant in case he is absent or cannot perform his duties.

The Commandant of the School shall direct or supervise:

- (1) the administration of the establishment;
- (2) the technical and pedagogical functions.

## ADMINISTRATION

SECRETARIAT: Directed by a police superintendent (or in the absence of the latter by an assistant superintendent. The Secretariat shall take care of:

- (a) all the usual functions of a secretariat, mainly the mail, the classification and maintenance of records;
- (b) any typing and mimeograph work relating to the syllabus and courses used in teaching at the school;
- (c) setting up the school library and obtaining material for it;
- (d) receiving visitors and sending them either to the Commandant or Assistant Commandant.

BUREAU OF FINANCE AND ACCOUNTS: Directed by a police superintendent (or in the absence of the latter by a police officer under the supervision of the Commandant) who shall be the Assistant Manager of Funds.

- (a) The Bureau of Finance and Accounts shall draw up all annual budget provisions (wages and expenses for the staff and the students - clothing and equipment - working expenses - technical, pedagogical, sports and office

equipment - furnishings - maintenance and repairs to the school buildings and the barracks - bedding - food expenses, etc.)

(b) It shall administer the budget and the appropriations for various purposes, keep the budgetary records up to date, etc.

(c) It shall administer the payment of wages and allowances to the staff and to the students.

(d) It shall be responsible for keeping the stock accounts, equipment management, drawing up, keeping up to date, and checking inventories.

STAFF ADMINISTRATION: This shall come under the duties of the Assistant Commandant, who shall refer matters to the Commandant for a decision, should the need arise.

(a) The Assistant Commandant shall see to the strict application of the rules of the School and to the maintenance of discipline with the help of the director of the camp.

(b) He shall handle all questions concerning the administrative position of staff and students, files and the corresponding forms, etc.

(c) He shall be available to students and staff members for discussion of any personal problems and, should the occasion arise, shall pass on to the Commandant any justified requests for interviews.

(d) He shall handle all questions concerning assignment of living quarters and submit them to the Commandant for decision.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE CAMP: This shall be placed under the authority of a commissioned police officer (or in the absence of the latter, a noncommissioned officer) who shall have the title of director of the camp.

(a) He shall be directly responsible for the internal regulations and discipline, guard duty and weekly duty.

(b) He shall be responsible for the good order, hygiene and cleanliness of the camp and of the teaching and residence buildings (general work, clean-up details, etc.)

(c) He shall draw up a weekly report on the total strength, including all changes (transfers, exchanges of posts, dismissals, etc.)

(d) He shall maintain the register of the Infirmary for staff members and students who are sick or who go there for consultation.

(e) He shall be responsible for access to the camp and for visitors to the school.

The director of the camp shall be assisted by an assistant director of the camp and by an officer of the week, both of whom shall be chosen from the administrative staff of the school.

INFIRMARY - DISPENSARY: shall be directed by a medical orderly under the authority of the Assistant Commandant.

(a) The medical orderly shall hold a daily sick inspection, according to a schedule, for the staff members or students who are entered in the Infirmary register by the director of the camp. He shall submit this register after each visit to the Assistant Commandant for all decisions concerning justified exemption from exercise or rest or for penalty in case of unnecessary consultation.

(b) He shall give first aid in case of sudden illness or accident.

(c) He shall make proposals to the Assistant Commandant for the transportation of the sick, either for medical examinations or for hospitalization.

MANAGEMENT OF RESIDENCE HALL AND CAFETERIA: This shall be placed under a police superintendent (or in the absence of the latter, of a commissioned police officer) and under the jurisdiction of the Commandant of the school.

(a) The superintendent shall be responsible for supplying food for the resident students, for maintaining and renewing supplies at the proper time; he shall make all necessary purchases and shall submit the bills to the Accounting Office for payment.

(b) He shall manage the school cafeteria: food, financial management, fixing the prices; he shall regularly submit his accounts to the Commandant for approval; he shall make suggestions for any change in the food or articles sold in the cafeteria, etc.

(c) He shall be responsible for the kitchen and service staff, for their competence and for their service; he shall make all suggestions for hiring and firing.

ASSISTANT COMMANDANT: Chief police superintendent (or, in the absence of the latter, a police superintendent). He shall have the following personal duties:

- (1) Personnel administration
- (2) Supervision of the administration of the camp
- (3) Supervision of the Infirmary and its operation

(4) Supervision of trucks and means of transportation. His prior authorization must be received before any vehicle can be used outside the camp. He shall supervise the maintenance of the vehicles, together with the Garage Supervisor of the Central Government Police and shall discuss all questions of repair with him.

(5) He shall supervise the different storage facilities for clothing, equipment and various supplies, for which he must sign all requisitions.

(6) He shall organize and direct the recruitment of men and women (notices in newspapers and radio announcements, through the Public Relations Bureau of the Inspector General's office, develop material for recruiting operations, etc.).

He shall prepare all proposals for recruiting students for the advanced courses.

(7) In cooperation with the Public Relations Bureau, he shall be responsible for distributing all press releases or information about the school, organizing all ceremonies (end of term, official inspections of the establishment) and all questions of protocol concerning the school.

TECHNICAL AND TEACHING OPERATIONS: The Commandant of the School shall supervise the orientation of the teaching with the permanent assistance of the Technical Director of Studies, the Faculty Council and the Technical Adviser.

His role in this respect shall be as follows:

(1) Selecting the subjects to be taught:

Beginning with the basic subjects inherent to any police school, he shall direct the program of studies so as to include in the program for each category of students those subjects considered appropriate, either on the basis of past experience or the presence of specialized instructors, in order to improve the level of teaching at the Police School.

(2) The relative importance of the subjects: Keeping in mind the practical tasks to be performed by the students when they leave the school, the Commandant shall determine the number of hours to be devoted to the different theoretical and practical courses, according to the categories of students for which they are given.

(3) Assignment of courses to the professors: After consultation with the Technical Director and with the Faculty Council, the Commandant shall assign the courses to the various professors, taking into account the fields of specialization and the personal preferences of each one.

After consulting with the Technical Director of Studies, the Commandant shall distribute the courses equitably so that the professors have

approximately the same weekly schedule, taking into account any additional duties which may be assigned to them.

(4) **Supervision of Studies:** The Commandant shall have complete freedom to attend the different classes in order to judge the teaching methods.

After consulting with his colleagues, he shall draw up a schedule for tests to check on the studies and progress of the students; various compositions, monthly or quarterly examinations, final or end-of-term examinations. He shall also determine the coefficients of value which may be attributed to the various subjects according to their practical importance for the vocational training of policemen, noncommissioned and commissioned officers.

Based on these tests, he shall establish the criteria for dismissal from the school of students whose work has been judged to be insufficient.

The Commandant of the School shall also be entitled to ask, and to initiate the necessary steps with the competent national and international authorities, for the assignment of qualified instructors needed on the teaching staff for subjects such as:

- General education (Education Division)
- First Aid (Health Division)
- Technical or specialized courses, radio-transmission, technical police, etc.

Lastly, he shall evaluate the members of the teaching staff, their assignments, etc.

\* \* \*

THE TECHNICAL DIRECTOR: Under the authority of the Commandant of the School, the Technical Director shall be responsible for:

- (a) the coordination of the programs and the various courses;
- (b) the organization of training periods or sessions, the distribution of the various courses according to the number of hours they are taught (this should be determined in collaboration with the Faculty Council). The Technical Director shall establish the weekly schedule in a rational manner, on the basis of the general program;
- (c) setting the dates and schedules for the various tests;
- (d) all questions concerning students with regard to their studies.

He shall receive any reports from professors concerning unexplained absences from class, deficiencies in the work, infractions of discipline, etc. and shall refer them to the Commandant for a decision, giving his detailed opinion.

He shall be available to any student who so desires to discuss all questions relating to his studies and shall give a report on these meetings to the Commandant of the School.

\* \* \*

FACULTY COUNCIL: The Faculty Council shall be composed of all the members of the teaching staff; it shall meet periodically, with the Commandant of the School presiding, to consider any of the subjects listed above. It shall study all suggestions concerning the smooth operation of the school and the improvement of the teaching, and shall make whatever proposals it deems advisable.

The Faculty Council shall meet, with the Commandant presiding, to discuss any cases concerning students who have not passed the periodic or final examinations, and shall decide on the dismissal or second chance of the students in question.

\* \* \*

TECHNICAL ADVISOR: The Technical Advisor shall participate in teaching, to the extent of the time he has available after performing the duties described above.

\* \* \*

FACULTY: The members of the Faculty shall teach the courses that have been assigned to them, according to the established schedules, and are required to complete their courses within the time limits of the training periods or sessions.

They shall use for that purpose the already existing syllabuses and textbooks and may make any suggestions for improving and supplementing them, or, on the contrary, for simplifying them, according to the experience of the professors and the level of the students for whom they are intended.

With regard to the textbooks to be created, they shall prepare them, on the basis of the legislation and regulations currently in force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the materials that the professors collect for that purpose, pending the establishment of the school's library.

The Secretariat shall take care of the typing and mimeographing work.

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The professors shall be free to make suggestions for the collection of the materials needed for the syllabuses and basic textbooks, as well as for bringing them up to date as (legislative) amendments are promulgated. They shall also be free to make suggestions concerning the establishment of the school's technical library.

**SECRET**

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO  
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
POLICE SCHOOL OF THE  
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT  
LEOPOLDVILLE -- MATETE

## SCHEDULE OF CLASSES

### Advanced and Accelerated Sections

DAYS	8 - 8:50 A.M.	9 - 9:50 A.M.	10 - 10:50 A.M.	11 - 11:50 A.M.	2:30 - 3:15 P.M.	3:15 - 4 P.M.	4:30 - 5:30 P.M.
<b>MONDAY</b>							
Section A	Drill	Admin. Organization	Criminal Procedure	French	Patrol	Information	Sports
Section B	Drill	French	Admin. Organization	Criminal Law, Gen.	Law (1)	Criminal Investigation	Sports
Accelerated	Phys. Education	Criminal Procedure	Criminal Law, Gen.	Admin. Organization	Criminal Investigation	Patrol	
<b>TUESDAY</b>					LECTURES, TOURS, TARGET PRACTICE		
Section A	Phys. Education	Criminal Law, Spec.	Law (1)	Technical Police			
Section B	Phys. Education	Technical Police	Criminal Law, Spec.	English			
Accelerated	Drill	Law (1)	Technical Police	Criminal Law, Spec.			
<b>WEDNESDAY</b>					FREE TIME		
Section A	Weapons	Identification	Maint. of Law and Order	Traffic Regulations			
Section B	Phys. Education	Maint. of Law and Order	Traffic Regulations	Law (1)			
Accelerated	Phys. Education	Traffic Regulations	Law (1)	Maint. of Law and Order			
<b>THURSDAY</b>							
Section A	Phys. Education	Criminal Law, Spec.	Technical Police	Maint. of Law and Order	Criminal Procedure	Criminal Law, Gen.	Sports
Section B	Weapons	Identification	Criminal Law, Spec.	Technical Police	Information	Criminal Procedure	Sports
Accelerated	Drill	Technical Police	French	Criminal Law, Spec.	Criminal Law, Gen.	Information	
<b>FRIDAY</b>							
Section A	Drill	Admin. Organization	Traffic Regulations	English	Information	Criminal Investigation	Sports
Section B	Drill	Criminal Procedure	Admin. Organization	Traffic Regulations	Patrol	Information	Sports
Accelerated	Phys. Education	Traffic Regulations		Admin. Organization	Criminal Investigation	Patrol	
<b>SATURDAY</b>					1) Civil, Commercial and Administrative Law 2) 3 weeks out of 4: Forensic Medicine; 1 week out of 4: First Aid.		
Section A	Phys. Education	Patrol or Constitutional Law	Law (1)	Forensic Medicine			
Section B	Phys. Education	Forensic Medicine (2)	Patrol or Constitutional Law	Maint. of Law and Order			
Accelerated	Weapons	Identification	Forensic Medicine (2)	Constitutional Law			

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO  
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
POLICE SCHOOL OF THE  
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT  
LEOPOLDVILLE -- MATETE

## SCHEDULE OF CLASSES

## Recruit Sections A, B, C, D, E

DAYS		8 - 8:50 A.M.	9 - 9:50 A.M.	10 - 10:50 A.M.	11 - 11:50 A.M.	1:30 - 3:15 P.M.	3:15 - 4 P.M.	4:30 - 5:30 P.M.
MONDAY	A	Weapons	Target practice	Legal Identification	Legal Identification	French	Patrol	Drill
	B	Weapons	Target practice	Legal Identification	Legal Identification	Maint. of Law & Order	French	Sports
	C	Detail	Detail	Detail	Detail	Criminal Law	Field Trips	Sports
	D	French	Phys. Education	Organ. of the DRC	Criminal Law	Patrol	Maint. of Law & Order	Sports
	Women	French	Drill	French	Field Trips	Field Trips	Criminal Law	--
TUESDAY	A	Detail	Detail	Detail	Detail	Criminal Procedure	First Aid	Sports
	B	French	Organ. of the DRC	Criminal Law	Phys. Education	Patrol	Criminal Procedure	Drill
	C	Weapons	Target practice	Legal Identification	Legal Identification	French	Traffic Regulations	Sports
	D	Weapons	Target practice	Legal Identification	Legal Identification	Traffic Regulations	French	Sports
	Women	--	French	Child Welfare	Drill	First Aid	Patrol	--
WEDNESDAY	A	Patrol	Drill	French	Criminal Law	FREE TIME	FREE TIME	FREE TIME
	B	French	Patrol	Drill	Field Trips			
	C	Traffic Regs.	French	Patrol	Drill			
	D	Drill	--	Field Trips	Patrol			
	Women	--	Phys. Education	Criminal Procedure	Child Welfare			
THURSDAY	A	French	Field Trips	Phys. Education	--	Maint. of Law & Order	Traffic Regulations	Sports
	B	Detail	Detail	Detail	Detail	French	Field Trips	Sports
	C	Org. of the DRC	French	First Aid	Phys. Education	Field Trips	Maint. of Law & Order	Drill
	D	Traffic Regs.	Phys. Education	French	First Aid	Criminal Law	French	Sports
	Women	--	Drill	Organ. of the DRC	French	Traffic Regulations	Criminal Law	--
FRIDAY	A	French	Phys. Education	Maint. of Law & Order	Field Trips	Criminal Law	Field Trips	Sports
	B	Traffic Regs	French	Phys. Education	Maint. of Law & Order	First Aid	Criminal Law	Sports
	C	Field Trips	Maint. of Law & Order	French	Phys. Education	Criminal Procedure	Patrol	Sports
	D	Detail	Detail	Detail	Detail	Field Trips	Criminal Procedure	Drill
	Women	--	Drill	--	French	Patrol	First Aid	--
SATURDAY	A	French	Traffic Regulations	Organ. of the DRC	Drill	FREE TIME	FREE TIME	FREE TIME
	B	Traffic Regs	--	Drill	Field Trips			
	C	--	Drill	French	Criminal Law			
	D	Drill	Field Trips	Maint. of Law & Order	French			
	Women	--	Phys. Education	Field Trips	--			

## CURRICULUM

As shown in the Foreword, the Ecole Nationale Superieure de Police is designed to provide complete vocational training for police officers.

The following pages give a breakdown of the weekly schedule for both advanced students and recruits.

Advanced Section: Police-officer students in the 15-month course and those in the accelerated training sections are given the same level of training by the same professors.

The standard daily schedule includes one hour of physical education or practice sessions, followed by five hours of class-room instruction.

Team-sport training sessions are held three times a week and Tuesday afternoons are set aside for lectures, educational field trips or target practice.

Therefore, the weekly schedule consists of 30 hours of courses. As a result, for a 15-month or 60-week course, the various subjects are taught the following number of hours:

General Criminal Law	60 hrs.
Special Criminal Law	120 hrs.
Criminal Procedure	120 hrs.
Criminal Investigation	60 hrs.
Patrol - Special Laws - Constitutional Law	120 hrs.
Technical Police	120 hrs.
Administrative Law	} 120 hrs.
Civil Law	
Commercial Law	
General information - Border Police and Immigration Service - Introduction to labor and political organizing	} 120 hrs.
Organization of police forces, police stations, administrative and clerical personnel - Files and Records	} 120 hrs.
Public Finances and administrative accounting - Maintenance of Law and Order	} 120 hrs.
Traffic Regulations - Drafting police reports and writing summonses	} 120 hrs.

Forensic medicine - First Aid	60 hrs.
Legal identification - Telecommunications	60 hrs.
French and the Humanities	60 hrs.
English	60 hrs.
Weapons and target practice	60 hrs.
Drill	120 hrs.
Physical Education - Self-defense, Judo and similar sports	} 180 hrs.
Total	1,800 hrs.

In the accelerated Training Section which includes Provincial Police Officers with some professional experience and lasts only six months (or a grand total of 720 hours), particular emphasis is placed on two basic subjects and the schedule is slightly modified as follows:

- 2 hours per week of General Criminal Law instead of 1
- 2 hours per week of Criminal Investigation instead of 1
- 1 hour per week of General Information instead of 2
- 1 hour per week of Maintenance of Law and Order instead of 2

This pattern clearly reveals that the school's curriculum--in addition to those subjects required for any Judicial Police Officer--provides students with as extensive as possible vocational training so that on graduating and upon assuming their duties in the Provincial Police forces they may be properly considered as "full-fledged" officers, adequately trained in all police fields.

As soon as the application presently being made to UNESCO is successful, the program will include for all advanced sections 2 hours a week of courses in French and the Humanities.

Outlines of the main courses follow the table showing the weekly schedule.

The courses in Drill, Physical Education and Self-defense sports are in accordance with the general standards in those fields.

GENERAL CRIMINAL LAW COURSE

I. OFFENSES AND PUNISHMENT IN GENERAL:

- Definition of offenses
- Classification of offenses
- Elements of a criminal act or offense
- Attempts, punishable by law
- Justification of act - Self-defense
- Aggravating circumstances
- Extenuating circumstances
- Plurality of offenses
- Participation of several persons in one offense
- Aiding and abetting.

II. PUNISHMENT - SELF-DEFENSE - ENFORCEMENT:

- Reduction of sentence
- Parole
- Conditional sentencing
- Recidivism

SPECIAL CRIMINAL LAW COURSE

PREAMBLE:

Definition of Special Criminal Law, its place in the body of Law, its scope and interest for police officers.

CHAPTER I: OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON OF INDIVIDUALS:

- (1) Intentional homicide and bodily injury
- (2) Unintentional homicide and bodily injury
- (3) Superstitious tests and barbarian practices
- (4) Dueling
- (5) Offenses against individual liberty and violation of domiciliary privacy
- (6) Offense against the inviolability of the mails
- (7) Disclosure of privileged information
- (8) Libel and slander.

CHAPTER II: OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY:

- (1) Theft and blackmail
- (2) Fraud
- (3) Malicious injury to property, dilapidation, damage.

CHAPTER III: OFFENSES AFFECTING THE ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS:

- (1) Counterfeiting, falsifying, and imitating money
- (2) Counterfeiting or falsifying seals, stamps, punching devices, etc. . . .
- (3) Usurping public office
- (4) Unlawful wearing of decorations
- (5) Forgery
- (6) False evidence and perjury.

CHAPTER IV: OFFENSES AGAINST THE PUBLIC PEACE

- (1) Rebellion
- (2) Outrage and violence against public officials
- (3) Breaking of (official) seals
- (4) Impeding the execution of public works
- (5) Restraint of trade or navigation
- (6) Embezzlement and misappropriation of funds by public officials
- (7) Bribery of public officials, court-designated experts or arbitrators
- (8) Publication and distribution of handbills
- (9) Offenses against postal service
- (10) Offenses in matters of Vital Statistics Records.

CHAPTER V: OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC SAFETY:

- (1) Associations formed for the purpose of criminal attempts against individuals and property of individuals
- (2) Threat of criminal attempt against persons or property
- (3) Escape of prisoners
- (4) Prison breach.

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## CHAPTER VI: OFFENSES AGAINST MORALITY AND DECENCY:

- (1) Abortion
- (2) Indecent assault and Rape
- (3) Indecent exhibition
- (4) Indecent exposure
- (5) Desertion of family
- (6) Adultery and bigamy.

## CHAPTER VII: CRIMES AGAINST THE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS:

- (1) Infringement of the freedom of religion
- (2) Infringement by public officials of rights guaranteed to individuals.

## CHAPTER VIII: CRIMES AGAINST THE SECURITY OF THE STATE:

- (1) Crimes against the external security of the State
- (2) Crimes against the internal security of the State
- (3) Inciting draft dodging and similar crimes.

Note: This course will be supplemented as required by any new laws, decrees and ordinances amending certain articles of the Congolese Penal Code.

## COURSE ON JUDICIAL ORGANIZATION AND APPLIED CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

### JUDICIAL ORGANIZATION

The judicial power

Court officials

- Magistrates - Judicial Police officers and men.

Office of the Public Prosecutor

- Characteristics - Functions

Criminal courts

- Organization and jurisdiction of the courts

Unwritten law courts

- Jurisdiction - Grounds for appeal

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Written law courts

- Composition - Jurisdiction - Grounds for appeal

Institutions established by the Constitution of August 1, 1964

## CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Organization of the Judicial Police

- General outline
- Appointment of JP officers - Categories - Hierarchy - Functions

Regulations relating to all JP officers

- Powers and duties
- Reports: drafting - form - processing
- Right of seizure
- Right of arrest
- Right to ask for payment of fines (Fines collected on the spot)

Provisions relating to Judicial Police Officers with general competence

- Special power
- Official visits to, and findings on, the scene of the crime
- Preliminary investigation by examining witnesses
- Right to administer an oath
- Right to forbid all persons to leave the area
- Right to request interpreters, translators, experts, and physicians
- Right to issue a warrant
- Right of house search

Executing requisitions for investigation

- Definition
- Form - Execution

Judicial inquiry

- Preliminary inquiry
- Procedure
- Summonses and warrants
- House search
- Searching of suspects

Detention pending trial and conditional release

- Methods of implementation
- Warrant of provisional arrest
- Detainer
- Conditional release - Conditions

Procedure before trial courts

- Final judicial inquiry
- Bringing a case before a court and subpoenas
- Prosecution
- Bringing civil action
- Hearings
- Procedure - Form
- Judgments
- Terms of the decision
- Authority of res judicata

Stay of execution and appeal

- Effects - Time allowed - Forms

Execution of Judgments

Legal costs and pro rated fees

**COURSE ON CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION AND  
DRAFTING OF REPORTS**

**I. THEORETICAL ASPECTS**

Proceedings

Writing proceeding - Statement of facts

Drafting of reports: form, style, substance

Proceeding report

Material form: preliminary inquiry  
                  flagrant crime  
                  court order

Evidence: burden of proof  
intimate conviction  
legality of evidence  
oral, material evidence - expert opinions

Warrants

Investigation by the Police: secrecy  
facts in evidence: the Law  
rights of the defendant  
privileged information

Statutory hours

The calling of experts

Restitution of seized property

Serving of warrants.

## II. PRACTICAL ASPECTS

The discovery of the offense: rumors, anonymous denunciations and  
complaints, flagrant crime

Investigation: seizure, placing of seals

Testimony: main sources of errors, false witness, the preparation of  
witnesses

Physical clues (fingerprints - biological clues - disorders)

The search for and identification of the author of the offense

Arrest

The interrogation

The confession

The informants

Police records

Psychological factors: propaganda, aggressivity, fear

Juvenile delinquency

The fight against banditry

Adultery

Prostitution

Financial, economic, and customs investigations and frauds (food and tax frauds, gold and foreign currency trafficking, etc.)

Narcotics

International investigations - Interpol.

### III. PRACTICAL STUDIES

Writing of reports, critique of procedures and investigations

Field trips, films if possible.

## COURSE ON PATROLLING PUBLIC THOROUGHFARES AND PUBLIC PLACES

### PREAMBLE:

General observations on public safety and the role of the policeman.

### I. OFFENSE ON PUBLIC THOROUGHFARES

#### Chapter 1. Offenses against Public Safety and Order

- (1) Unlawful assemblies
- (2) Demonstrations, processions, parades, gatherings and meetings
- (3) Arms and ammunition
- (4) Aliens
- (5) The exercise of certain trades: peddling, displays, use of terraces, kiosks
- (6) Gambling and lotteries
- (7) Sales by itinerant merchants
- (8) Posting bills, inscriptions on public streets and buildings
- (9) Begging, vagrancy.

## Chapter 2. Threats to Safety

- (1) Lunatics
- (2) Attacks on persons: brawls, minor violence
- (3) Animals: mistreatment, in traffic, straying cattle
- (4) Traffic (an indication of the place taken by traffic in the problems of the Police. For details cf. Traffic Regulations)
- (5) Depositing objects or materials: Illumination of excavations and equipment, obstruction of public thoroughfares, construction work on public thoroughfares.
- (6) Street thefts: purse snatchings, pocket picking, theft from displays, theft of bicycles.

## Chapter 3. Sanitation

- (1) Contagious diseases: preventative measures by the Police, compulsory vaccinations
- (2) Hashish
- (3) Street cleanliness and hygiene: sweeping the streets, removal of refuse
- (4) Cleanliness of goods: fruits, vegetables, meats, miscellaneous Funerals.

## Chapter 4. Quiet

- (1) Traffic noises
- (2) Noises caused by a business or industry
- (3) Noises caused by man: public insults, rowdiness, fireworks, fire crackers.

## II. OFFENSES IN PUBLIC PLACES

### Chapter 1. Leisure Activities

- (1) Race tracks and stadiums
- (2) Public squares and parks.

Chapter 2. Activities Subject to Regulations

- (1) Businesses, shops and markets
- (2) Places selling beverages, drunkenness
- (3) Hotels and restaurants
- (4) Public transportation.

Chapter 3. The Protection of Morality

- (1) Schools
- (2) Gaming houses
- (3) Bawdy houses
- (4) Cinemas, theaters, dance halls.

COURSE IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

I. INTRODUCTION TO:

- Great principles of Constitutional Law
- Political power
- The State
- Forms of State
- Different forms of constitutions
- Political regimes
- Separation of powers.

II. DETAILED STUDY OF THE CONGOLESE CONSTITUTION (and comparison, on essential points, with the institutions of other countries.)

- General provisions
- Fundamental rights
- Distribution of jurisdictions among the Republics and the Provinces
- National institutions
- Provincial institutions
- Judicial power
- Auxiliary bodies
- Public finances
- Administration
- Forces of law and order
- The Constitutional Court
- Incompatibilities
- Constitutional revision
- Temporary provisions

COURSE IN TECHNICAL POLICE WORK

I. THEORY COURSE

- Discovery of the offense
- Evidence in criminal matters
- Material clues
- Services of technicians and experts
- Sources of information
- Seizure
- Conducting a criminal investigation
- Proceeding to the scene of the crime
- Operations to be carried out on the scene of the crime
- The official investigation report
- Direction of the investigation
- Examination of witnesses
- Surveillance and shadowing
- Searches
- Arrest
- Reconstruction of the crime
- Character investigation
- Traffic, railway, air and maritime accidents.

II. CRIMINOLOGY

- Field and techniques of police photography
- Firearms expert's report
- Fires
- Explosions
- Handwriting expert's report
- Typewritten texts
- Counterfeit money
- Breaking in (walls, ceilings, windows and doors)
- Traces of tools
- Breaking into safes.

III. IF POSSIBLE:

- Practical exercises
- Field trips
- Films

COURSE ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW IN GENERAL AND ITS MAJOR DIVISIONS

- Law
- Public freedom
- Freedom of assembly
- Freedom of association

- Public utilities
- Fundamentals of Public Finance and the Ministry of Finance
- Auxiliary bodies of the State
- Economic and Social Councils
- State of siege
- State of emergency
- Administrative jurisdiction

### COURSE ON CIVIL LAW

#### INTRODUCTION TO:

- The field of Civil Law
- Persons and classification thereof
- Property and classification thereof
- Nationality
- Aliens
- Certificates
- Domicile and residence
- Marriage
- The dissolution of marriage
- Divorce and separation from bed and board
- Contracts in general
- Sales
- Loans
- Warrants.

### COURSE ON COMMERCIAL LAW

#### FUNDAMENTALS:

- Merchants
- Account books
- Forfeitures
- Business Register
- Negotiable instruments.

### COURSE OF GENERAL INFORMATION FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER POLICE

#### I. GENERAL INFORMATION

- Information, essential to society and the State
- The field of general police information
- Forms, presentation and transmission of information.

## II. FUNDAMENTALS OF POLITICAL-SOCIAL TRAINING for the Police Official

- The political party, expressing ideas or representing groups
- The practical forms of a political party's constitution and activity
- The various uses of the political party with regard to the life of the nation; threats to law and order which may result therefrom
- Knowledge and possible surveillance of political parties
- General outline of the social problems inherent in any nation in the process of formation and development, the social classes, and ethnic problems
- Knowledge of the main ethnic groups in the field of action of a Police official
- An appreciation of the social circles which fall within his jurisdiction, of the various crimes or conflicts which may result therefrom
- The union movement and its possible use against law and order
- Knowledge and possible surveillance of unions.

## III. IMMIGRATION AND BORDER POLICE

- Fundamentals of immigration
- The immigration system in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
- Travel documents: passports and visas
- Temporary or indefinite residence
- Residence documents
- Fundamentals of the organization of the immigration police under the Surete Nationale
- Possibilities for cooperation of the general police services with the specialized services.

## IV. EXERCISES, as the course goes on.

COURSE RELATING TO PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATION  
APPLIED TO POLICE FORCES, SERVICES, AND STATIONS

- I. INTRODUCTION TO the concepts and principles of organization in national, administrative, industrial, commercial, and private bodies.
  
- II. THE PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE of such concepts and principles with regard to the police services at all levels of action and administration.
  
- III. THE ORGANIZATION OF POLICE FORCES: Services and Stations with respect to the distribution of functions and jurisdictions, with respect to action and responsibility, and with respect to personnel.
  - Organizational charts: Police forces  
Various services  
Police stations.
  
- IV. PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION
  - General rules
  - Making up files
  - Classification of files and keeping them up to date
  - Card indexes and all types of identification cards
  - Planning, etc.
  
- V. MANAGEMENT RULES FOR POLICE SERVICES OR STATIONS
  - Organization of the secretariat
  - Rules for correspondence
  - Transmittal of mail
  - Regulation registers and their maintenance, etc.
  
- VI. DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS, essential base for continued police activity
  - General rules
  - Practical methods.

- VII. All subjects related to those listed above.
- VIII. Rational utilization of personnel, taking into account training, personality and aptitude, with a view to obtaining maximum efficiency.
- IX. PRACTICAL EXERCISES, as the course goes on.

## COURSE IN PUBLIC FINANCES AND PRACTICAL ACCOUNTING

### I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES


- Need for organizing finances and public accounting
- General budgetary principles.

### II. PUBLIC FINANCES AND THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE

- Organization of the Ministry of Finance
- The budget and taxes
- The Customs administration
- Public credit
- Loans and the public debt.

### III. BASIC RULES FOR CASH AND STOCK ACCOUNTING

- Definition of cash and stock accounting
- Rules of management
- Budgetary charges
- Accountable securities
- Account books
- Inventories.



IV. THE BUDGET AND ITS PREPARATION

- Budgetary estimates in general and at the level of a Police Force, Service or Station.
- The different budget headings with regard to the operational needs concerning personnel, equipment, maintenance of buildings, etc.

V. IMPLEMENTING THE BUDGET

- Assigned and sub-assigned budget credits
- Keeping vouchers up to date; the status of credits
- Responsibilities of persons authorized to pass on accounts and of the cash and stock manager-accountants.

VII. CASH ACCOUNTING PER SE

- Managing funds which come from fines, etc.
- Drawing up documents to show receipts or disbursements
- Accounting books and records
- Nomenclature.

VII. STOCK ACCOUNTING

- Inventory registers to be maintained at the Police division or station level.

VIII. FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE ACCOUNTING

- General observation on commercial or private accounting from the standpoint of crime investigation.

IX. PRACTICAL EXERCISES in the subjects covered.

COURSE ON THE MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER

- (1) Aims in maintaining law and order
- (2) Duties and qualities of the head of a detail. Duties of the personnel put into action
- (3) Techniques of maintaining law and order
- (4) Study of cases and practice
- (5) Surveillance
- (6) Study of a master-plan
- (7) Shifting of personnel (Theory and practice)
- (8) Equipment - practical exercises
- (9) Methods of loading and unloading vehicles and other means of transportation.

COURSE IN TRAFFIC REGULATIONS AND DRAFTING  
REPORTS ON TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS

I. TRAFFIC REGULATIONS

- Ordinance of January 17, 1957, No. 62/12, regulating traffic and traffic police
- An in-depth study of all the articles (of the Traffic Regulations) and comments thereon.

II. Inspection of the scene of traffic accidents

- Equipment
- Documents to be filled out
- Conduct at the scene
- Collection and classification of the wreckage
- Inspection of the scene, position of vehicles, and any marks

- Drawing up a diagram
- Description of conditions at the scene.

### III. WRITING REPORTS

- Naming the offense
- Report with fine collected on the scene
- Report transmitted to the Police Court
- Report of an accident with property damage
- Report of an accident with property damage and slight injuries
- Report of an accident with property damage and serious injuries
- Report of an accident with property damage and manslaughter.

## COURSE IN FORENSIC MEDICINE

### I. HUMAN ANATOMY

- Life, cells, man, his creation, his formation up to intrauterine life
- The human body, tissues, organs
- The locomotive parts: skeleton, muscles, joints
- Respiration and blood circulation
- Digestion
- The elimination of toxic substances: the skin, the kidneys
- The central and peripheral nervous system, the sympathetic system
- The reproductive organs
- The sensory organs

### II. CLINICAL CRIMINOLOGY

- The role of forensic medicine and criminology in police investigation work

- The signs of death
- Assault and battery
- Injuries caused by firearms and explosives
- Criminal abortions
- Sexual offenses, sexual pathology, prostitution
- Asphyxiation by mechanical means
- Drowning
- Toxic asphyxiations
- Burns
- Poisoning: food, respiratory, alcoholic
- Analysis of biological products and strains
- Autopsies and toxicological tests

### III. CRIMINAL PSYCHOLOGY

- Criminological examinations
- The study of tests
- Character analysis
- Emotional states
- Kleptomania
- Suicide, homicide, infanticide
- Juvenile delinquency, minors running away from home
- Delinquent driving
- Pyromania
- Financial fraud, swindling
- Anthropology
- Pandering
- Poisonings.

FIRST AID COURSE

I. THEORETICAL COURSE

- Introduction, general advice
- Procedure in dealing with accident victims
- Transporting the injured
- Evacuating victims
- Syncope, state of shock, nervous collapse, epilepsy, hysteria, drunkenness
- Wounds, medical attention, hemorrhages, hemostasis
- Injuries to the locomotive system: bones, joints
- Disturbances of the digestive system
- Asphyxias
- Atomic problems in peace and war.

II. PRACTICAL COURSE

- Lifting the injured
- Immobilizing dislocated or fractured limbs (slings, splints)
- Pressure points, compression bandages, tourniquets
- Manual methods of artificial respiration: Nielsen-Schafer, Silvester, Guigoz
- Combined methods of artificial respiration
- Mouth-to-mouth resuscitation
- Gases
- Burns
- Injuries caused by automobile accidents
- Principles of physical and moral hygiene.

## COURSE IN LEGAL IDENTIFICATION

## I. GENERAL

- Memory and observation
- Description, spoken picture
- Protecting the scene
- Modus operandi, information to be gathered in order to establish a suspect's identity on the basis of the modus operandi.
- Visual identification of suspects (line-up).

## II. THE SCIENCE OF FINGERPRINTING

- History of fingerprinting
- Visible and invisible fingerprints
- Examining the scene
- Objects likely to show fingerprints
- Methods of taking fingerprints
- The technique of recording fingerprints for fingerprint classification.

## III. THE REPRODUCTION OF FINGERPRINTS

- Reproduction of fingerprints with three dimensions and two dimensions
- Footprints, shoeprints, tire prints, tool prints, etc.

## IV. PHOTOGRAPHY

- General information on photography
- Equipment
- Uses and techniques

Sketches and layout drawings of the scene as a supplement to photographs.

## V. OTHER SCIENCES

- Identification of handwriting
- Forgery
- Identification of forced or broken locks.

## ENGLISH COURSE

The English course is divided into two parts. The first is theoretical and is given during the first part of the training period; it is twofold:

### I. INTRODUCTION

- The importance of languages
- The importance of English to a police officer
- Various methods of language teaching.

### II. INTRODUCTION TO THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

- The English alphabet
- The various rules of grammar
- Irregular verbs.

The second part of the course is essentially practical, and deals with vocabulary, idioms, and conversations. It is given during the remainder of the training course.

## WEAPONS COURSE

### 1. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

- General information on the various weapons
- Legal definition of a weapon.

## II. 7.65 MM RIFLE

- Nomenclature
- Use
- Safety, maintenance, disassembling and assembling, correcting defects
- Firing practice.

## III. 9 MM SUBMACHINE GUN

- Nomenclature
- Safety measures
- Use, single-shot fire, automatic fire
- Maintenance, disassembling and assembling, correcting defects
- Practice firing from the hip and from the shoulder.

## IV. AUTOMATIC PISTOLS (VARIOUS CALIBERS)

- Nomenclature
- Safety measures
- Use
- Maintenance, disassembling and assembling, correcting defects
- Firing practice.

## V. TEAR GAS EQUIPMENT

- Nomenclature
- Use
- Methods of firing: by hand, by gas gun
- Types of projectiles: grenades and shells
- Types of tear gas
- Detonating and dispersion grenades
- Precautions to take
- Firing practice.

## RECRUIT SECTIONS

### MEN'S SECTION

Police cadets receive instruction suited to their future duties. Therefore, physical training and practical subjects are emphasized. This can be seen from the following schedule which covers a 32-hour week computed over a nine-month session, or more precisely 34 weeks including monthly and quarterly examinations.

Physical education and self-defense	102 hrs.
Group sports	102 hrs.
Drill	102 hrs.
Practice in maintaining law and order	68 hrs.
Traffic regulations (with practical exercises in directing traffic)	68 hrs.
A policeman's routine and special assignments	68 hrs.
Fundamentals of criminal law (Books I and II)	68 hrs.
Fundamentals of the judicial structure and criminal procedure	34 hrs.
Patrol and special laws	68 hrs.
Administrative Organization of the DRC	34 hrs.
Organization of the police of the Congo; various police bodies; organization and status of the Central Government Police Force; organization of police stations	34 hrs.
French; general education	170 hrs.
Hygiene and first aid	34 hrs.
Practical training in legal identification and in the use of the radio (one hour per subject every two weeks)	34 hrs.
	<hr/>
TOTAL	1,088 hrs.

It is worth explaining this breakdown of the course. In the case of advanced training, practical subjects and physical training occupy only 25 percent of the total schedule, whereas they take up almost 60 percent of the recruit course.

Because of the nature of his activities, a policeman must:

- (a) be in good physical condition: 6 hours a week of physical education and sports;
- (b) be given training in paramilitary discipline: 5 hours a week of drill and practical exercises in maintaining law and order;
- (c) not only be familiar with the weapons he is issued, but also know how to use them with precision: 3 hours a week of weapons and firing practice which has been made more effective by the construction at the School proper of a small firing range which will make it possible, during the training period, to pick out the most promising marksmen who could become "sharpshooters" and weapons training officers;
- (d) not only know the traffic regulations but also know how to direct traffic, especially in a city like the capital. That is why the course provides for a substantial number of practical exercises during which trainees put their training into practice in the city itself;
- (e) lastly, be familiar from the outset with his daily duties in a city police station, hence the course on routine and special assignment: 2 hours a week.

The theoretical courses are justifiable per se:

- (a) every police officer should be familiar with his country's structure and that of the police service to which he belongs; hence the courses on the administrative organization of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and that of the various police bodies;
- (b) even if he himself does not draw up reports of proceedings, it is essential that he know the fundamentals of the law and the regulations he is responsible for defending or enforcing; he must know the organization of the Judicial Branch which will mete out the sentences that result from police action; hence, the courses on criminal law, patrol, and the organization of the judiciary;
- (c) every policeman is required to draft reports to his superiors.

Logically, a policeman is destined to become an officer, and it is from among the "ranks" that a large number of higher-ranking officers will be selected in the near future. That is why the schedule provides for the relatively heavy emphasis on French (5 hours a week) because the time is past when a policeman simply carried out orders and was not required to have much general education.

Lastly, it should be noted that police cadets are given instruction in the fundamentals of legal identification and radio-telecommunications.

Indeed, it was thought that a modern police force should have technicians at every level. About twenty radio operators have already been trained during previous training sessions. The techniques of radio-telecommunications and legal identification obviously will require more and more specialists, and therefore the more gifted students can be selected to take specialized training later.

In short, the Recruit Section curriculum, as presently conceived, should make it possible to train policemen equipped to perform their duties and it would appear that, with a few changes, it could serve as a basis for training courses for officers which will be started as soon as conditions permit.

### WOMEN'S SECTION

The curriculum for this section was drawn up on the basis of the students' needs. The course takes six months, i. e. in practice 24 weeks. There are 24 hours of courses a week, broken down over the entire period as follows:

Physical education	48 hrs.
Unarmed drill	96 hrs.
Hygiene and first aid	48 hrs.
Child welfare	48 hrs.
French	96 hrs.
Fundamentals of criminal law	48 hrs.
Fundamentals of the organization of the judiciary	24 hrs.
Patrol; special laws	48 hrs.
Routine and special assignments	48 hrs.
Traffic regulations	24 hrs.
Administrative organization of the DRC	24 hrs.
Organization of the civil instruction police service	24 hrs.
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TOTAL	576 hrs

This curriculum is similar to the one for the Recruit Sections as regards the theoretical subjects because the Women's Police Auxiliary must have an adequate general education and the fundamental knowledge essential to anyone wearing a police uniform.

The same concern underlies the six hours a week devoted to physical education and drill, so that the students' bearing will be in keeping with the service they represent.

Lastly, owing to the duties to which they will be assigned from the outset, and their role which is similar to that of welfare workers, there are 2 hours a week of hygiene and first aid and 2 hours a week of theory on the problems of child welfare.

Mention should be made of the fact that future courses will include training in secretarial work, typing, and fundamentals of bookkeeping so that gradually the women's auxiliary will be able to play a larger role in the administrative work of the police, thus freeing a corresponding number of policemen for active duty.

TRAINING ENTRANCE QUALIFICATIONS

(1) Section of recruits

- (a) Be a national of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
- (b) Be of good morale background with no police record.
- (c) Family may not accompany students during training period.
- (d) Considered physically fit by a physician of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, appointed by the police.
- (e) Holder of a certificate stating that the candidate has completed at least 6 years of primary studies.
- (f) Height minimum of 1 meter 65 cm for males and minimum of 1 meter 60 cm for females.
- (g) Age 18 to 30 years for males and 16 to 25 for females.
- (h) Be classified within the limits of the position available established by the entrance examination consisting of general cultural and physical tests.
- (i) As it relates to female recruits, not be pregnant nor have children less than one year old. Recruits becoming pregnant during training period will be dismissed from the school.

(2) Section of NCO's

- (a) Be an agent of the police cadre and have the rank of agent principal of police.
- (b) Have favorable recommendation from his Chief or Service concerning his behavior, aptitudes and status of past performance.
- (c) Be classified within the limits of the positions available, established by an entrance examination consisting of tests of general culture and tests of a professional nature.

(3) Section of Officers

- (a) Be a national of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

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- (b) Have a good moral background and be free from criminal record. Have a favorable recommendation from his chief of service concerning his behavior and aptitudes and status of past performance for candidates presently in the police cadres.
- (c) Family not authorized to accompany married student during training period.
- (d) Considered physically fit by a physician appointed for the police.
- (e) 21 to 30 years old. Latter limit not applicable to the personnel presently in service.
- (f) Height at least 1 meter 65.
- (g) Be classified within the limits of the positions available established by an entrance examination consisting of an essay on a subject of general culture, a test in arithmetic, a test in history and geography and physical tests.

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INVENTORY OF CHEMICAL EQUIPMENT AND MUNITIONS  
 PROVIDED THE NP BY U.S.A.I.D.

The gas provided is past its normal three-year maximum life expectancy. Most of it has also vanished during the various rebellions.

<u>Location:</u> <u>Province</u>	<u>Tear Gas</u> <u>Guns</u>	<u>Grenades</u>	<u>Projectiles</u>	<u>Masks</u>
Kinshasa	10	200	150	160
Katanga	15	500	375	240
Equateur	5	100	75	80
Kivu	10	300	225	160
East Kasai	5	200	150	80
West Kasai	5	100	75	80
Kongo Central	5	200	150	80
Bandundu	5	200	150	80
Orientale	5	150	125	80
	<u>65</u>	<u>1,950</u>	<u>1,475</u>	<u>1,040</u>

## INVENTORY OF NP WEAPONS

In response to an NP questionnaire the following weapons inventory was assembled in November, 1967. Only 60% of the NP units queried responded.

<u>Distribution Province</u>	<u>Rifles</u>	<u>SMG's</u>	<u>Pistols</u>	<u>Auto Rifles</u>	<u>Cannon, 37MM</u>
Kinshasa	674	67	39		
Katanga (Incomplete report)	424	86		15	1
Orientale (Incomplete report)	7				
West Kasai	4				
Equatuer	406	200	50		
Bandundu	66				
East Kasai	139	51			
Kongo Central	609	39	20		
Kivu (Incomplete)	143	2		1	
Lubumbashi School	313	64		4	
Kinshasa School	90				
TOTAL	2,875	489	109	20	1

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DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY  
No. 120, dated 1/24/77

Assistant Administrator,  
Bureau for Program and  
Management Services

1/24/77

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