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# USAID's Role in Civil/Military Cooperation in Asia and the Middle East

*An Assessment of Programmatic Implications and Lessons  
Learned  
Report on Phase I*



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# ***USAID's Role in Civil Military Relations in Asia and the Middle East***

## ***Programmatic Implications and Lessons Learned Report on Assessment Phase 1***

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## Executive Summary

Implementation guidelines for USAID's current Civil/Military Cooperation Policy require that Regional Bureaus work with COCOM representatives to develop strategies to work in areas where there are security issues; explore options for securing DOD funding for USAID development activities; and work with other agencies and offices to:

- Develop, test and subsequently improve common metrics and assessment techniques;
- Improve the monitoring and assessment of joint USAID-DOD efforts;
- Develop general guidelines for determining what programs and projects should receive the highest priority for monitoring and assessment.

This report details the findings of Phase 1 of the corporate level meta-assessment of Civil Military Cooperation in the Asia and Middle East Missions. This ongoing assessment has three main objectives: 1) To contribute to a better understanding of how Civil/Military Cooperation contributes to the achievement of USAID's development objectives and strategic operations; 2) To evaluate both the advantages and disadvantages of the relationship; and 3) To provide building blocks and a framework for developing a more advanced Civil/Military Cooperation strategy to promote effective cooperation, access and share knowledge and resources, and establish a fully participatory process for future cooperation.

Phase 1 of the Civil Military Cooperation assessment addresses, in part, four questions. On-site visits and an in-depth examination of projects involving Civil/Military Cooperation will address these questions further in Phase 2 of the assessment. The questions are:

- Does USAID's organizational culture enable or support effective Civil/Military Cooperation?
- Does the Military's organizational culture enable or support effective Civil/Military Cooperation?
- Has communication between USAID and the Military on development projects been optimal?
- Is the premise correct that USAID has been effectively supported in its development efforts by Civil/Military Cooperation?

Phase 1 consisted of interviews with Washington and Mission staff who have had extensive experience with Civil/Military cooperation in development and a survey sent to both civilian and military personnel in the Asia and Middle East Missions on knowledge, perceptions and attitudes toward Civil/Military cooperation.

The following findings, conclusions and (interim) recommendations measure the knowledge, perceptions and opinions of the interviewees and respondents and should be taken only as evidence of those rather than findings of fact. Also, the data obtained

from military interviewees and respondents is limited and not a sample, representative or otherwise, of that population.

**Key Findings** with respect to the assessment questions as detailed in this report are:

- The majority of interviewees and survey respondents (both civilian and military) believe that Civil Military cooperation has had a positive impact on development.
- A greater percentage of Asia respondents (70%) than Middle East respondents (52%) believe that that Civil Military cooperation has had a positive impact on development.
- Both military and civilian interviewees and respondents emphasize funding and security issues as being of high priority in the relationship.
- Civil Military Cooperation is perceived by respondents as being more significant in mitigating the constraints imposed on development by High Threat Environments than in leveraging resources.
- Identity issues (that is, perceptions of USAID by the populace when they operated in conjunction with the military) were cited by both Washington officials and mission respondents (civilians) as a primary concern in partnering with the military.
- Sixty percent of all survey respondents are aware of Civil/Military cooperative activities.
- Seventy percent of all survey respondents stated their willingness to engage in joint planning for humanitarian relief efforts.
- While over half of the civilian survey respondents knew something about civil military cooperative activities presently taking place in their region or country, less than half were aware of any specific past or present programs involving such cooperation.
- The understanding of agency assigned roles by civilian and military actors in development differs from those outlined in the agency policies.
- When communication was brought up by survey and interview respondents, it was primarily as an aspect of cooperation that needed improvement
- Civil Military Cooperation is perceived as a short term phenomenon by both military and civilian interviewees and respondents despite the existence of long term steady state programming.
- Both civilian and military interviewees and respondents emphasize the humanitarian relief aspects of Civil Military Cooperation.

**Key Conclusions** that result from these findings, based on 20 interviews and 232 separate comments from 124 survey respondents, are that:

- Missions have, for the most part, evolved a normalized humanitarian relief model for Civil/Military Cooperation and appear to be developing a different joint or collaborative model for Civil Military Cooperation in other areas.
- While willing to engage in joint planning activities (over seventy percent of respondents), civilian staff in Missions are largely unaware of what those activities are.
- In the Civil Military Relationship, USAID tends to assume the role of expert consultant rather than lead agency or primary advisor on development projects shared with the military.

- Missions are flexible in terms of policy interpretations, objectives and organizational structure but not flexible in terms of resources and response in high threat environments.
- The Military is positive about Civil/Military cooperation and recognizes the necessity for and the benefits of continuing it.
- The Military values USAID's development expertise but does not accord it the status of leader in the relationship.
- USAID staff does not accept the status of leaders in the relationship.
- The Military is not flexible in terms of objectives, policies and organizational structure.
- The Military would be more comfortable with "regularized" contacts and meetings on development work with USAID.
- USAID Mission staff is more comfortable with less formal contacts and meetings.
- The military is viewed by USAID—and to some degree accepts—the role of donor, provider of security and decision-maker; while USAID is viewed by the military—and to some degree accepts—the role of expert contractor or consultant providing technical assistance but not direction.

**Interim Recommendations** based upon Phase 1 Key Findings and Conclusions:

- Civil/Military Cooperation would be furthered by regularly scheduled joint meetings (depending upon the extent of cooperation) from as frequently as once a month to every quarter.
- To the extent possible, USAID officials should schedule most regular meetings, hold them at Mission offices, set the agenda, restrict attendance to a specific number from each side and lead the discussion.
- Where relevant, coordination sections should be included in Performance Management Plans with defined steps to be taken to ensure effective collaboration on activities toward common goals.
- Where relevant, Civilian and Military personnel engaged in cooperative activities should develop joint metrics for measuring performance.
- Short-term cooperative Civil/Military programs should be examined as possible phase-in programs for future cooperation on longer-term projects where appropriate.

**Program Recommendations** for Continuing Assessment:

- The very limited number of military survey respondents for phase 1 of the assessment suggests the need for outreach efforts in order to more thoroughly examine attitudes in this sector—Phase 2 of the Assessment should include at least four on-site visits to interview and survey military personnel who may have been reluctant to respond to an online survey.
- The following Missions typify the cooperative programming models and the regions represented by the Asia and Middle East Bureaus and should be selected for case studies in Phase 2 of this assessment:
  - The Philippines which has active long-term and disaster relief Civil/Military Cooperation programs (the "steady-state model"). Staff from the Philippines submitted the largest number of single mission responses to the survey.

- Afghanistan which represents the PRT Model for Civil/Military Cooperation and submitted the second largest number of single mission responses to the survey;
- Indonesia which submitted the fourth largest number of single mission responses and has had considerable experience with the humanitarian relief model of cooperation.
- In addition to these three, Phase 2 should include one longitudinal case study of Civil/Military cooperation in a dynamic but non-conflict context. As the Yemen Whole of Government initiative is in its beginning stages, Yemen provides the ideal case study subject for an examination of the evolving Civil/Military relationship there.



*Figure 1. USAID, the Philippine government, the USS Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier, and the Philippine National Red Cross combine forces in response to the extensive flooding and casualties caused by Typhoon Fengshen in June 2008.*

## ***Acronyms***

**AFRICOM** U.S. African Command  
**CENTCOM** U.S. Central Command  
**CERP** Commander's Emergency Response Program  
**COCOM** Combatant Command  
**COIN** Counterinsurgency  
**CSP** Community Stabilization Program  
**CSTC-A** Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan  
**DCHA** Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance  
**DFID** Department for International Development (UK)  
**DG** Democracy and Governance  
**DOD** Department of Defense  
**DR** Disaster Response  
**EGAT** Bureau for Economic Growth, Agriculture and Trade  
**FATA** Federally Administered Tribal Areas  
**HA** Humanitarian Assistance  
**ICMAG** Interagency Civil-Military Action Group  
**ISAF** International Security Assistance Force  
**JUSMAG** Joint United States Military Assistance Group  
**JSOTF** Joint Special Operations Task Force  
**MIST** Military Information Support Team  
**MNF** Multi-National Force  
**MNSTC-I** Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq  
**NGO** Non-governmental Organization  
**OCR** Office of Civilian Response  
**ODC** Office of Defense Cooperation  
**OFDA** Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance  
**OHDACA** Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid  
**OMA** Office of Military Affairs  
**OSD** Office of the Secretary of Defense  
**OTI** Office of Transition Initiatives  
**PACOM** U.S. Pacific Command

**PCC** Policy Coordinating Committee  
**PNSR** Project on National Security Reform  
**PRT** Provincial Reconstruction Teams  
**S/CRS** State Department's Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization  
**SAO** Security Assistance Office  
**SDA** Senior Development Advisor  
**SFRC** Senate Foreign Relations Committee  
**SOCCENT** Special Operations Command Central  
**SSR** Security Sector Reform  
**TSC** Theater Security Cooperation  
**TSCTP** Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership  
**UN OCHA** U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs  
**USAID** United States Agency for International Development  
**USG** United States Government  
**USIP** U.S. Institute of Peace  
**WOG** Whole of Government

## **Glossary**

**antiterrorism.** Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military and civilian forces.

**civil administration.** An administration established by a foreign government in (1) friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government; or (2) hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercise executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established.

**civil affairs operations.** Those military operations conducted by civil affairs forces that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in localities where military forces are present; (2) require coordination with other interagency organizations, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector; and (3) involve application of functional specialty skills that normally are the responsibility of civil government to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations.

**civil affairs.** Designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support civil-military operations.

**civilian actor.** Non-military personnel representing USAID, international organizations or non-governmental organizations involved in humanitarian assistance and development activities.

**civil/military cooperation.** The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors that is necessary to avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate, pursue common goals. Cooperation is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training.

**civil-military operations center.** An organization normally comprised of civil affairs, established to plan and facilitate coordination of activities of the Armed Forces of the United States with indigenous populations and institutions, the private sector, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational forces, and other governmental agencies in support of the joint force commander. Also called combatant command. A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities.

**civil-military operations.** Activities that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile

operational area to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces.

**combatant command (command authority).** Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 (.Armed Forces.), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command.

**combatant commander.** A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President.

**commander's emergency response funds (CERP Funds).** CERP funds provide tactical commanders with a means to conduct multiple stability tasks that have traditionally been performed by U.S., foreign, or indigenous professional civilian personnel or agencies. These tasks include but are not limited to the reconstruction of infrastructure, support to governance, restoration of public services, and support to economic development.

**community stabilization program.** Launched in May 2006, CSP is a 3-year, \$544 million program implemented by a U.S. based nonprofit organization that receives funding through a cooperative agreement with Baghdad. The program is intended to complement military security efforts, and civilian local government development, with economic and social stabilization efforts. These efforts to rapidly stabilize strategic cities are comprised, in part, of short- and medium-term public works projects which provide employment for those groups in Iraqi society most susceptible to insurgent appeals.

**complex contingency operations.** Large-scale peace operations (or elements thereof) conducted by a combination of military forces and nonmilitary organizations that are assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions.

**complex emergency.** A complex emergency is a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single and/or ongoing UN country program.

**content analysis.** Content analysis is an in-depth analysis, using quantitative or qualitative techniques, of messages using a scientific method (including attention to objectivity-intersubjectivity, a priori design, reliability, validity, generalizability, replicability, and hypothesis testing) and is not limited as to the types of variables that may be measured or the context in which the messages are created or presented.

**counter-insurgency.** In the context of an occupation or an armed rebellion, counter-insurgency (abbreviated COIN) is a military term for combat against an insurgency, by forces aligned with the recognized government of the territory in which the armed conflict takes place. Counter-insurgency is normally conducted as a combination of conventional military operations and other means.

**country team.** The senior, in-country, US coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the US diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented US department or agency, as desired by the chief of the US diplomatic mission.

**discourse.** Discourse means either "written or spoken communication or debate" or "a formal discussion or debate." The term is often used in semantics and discourse analysis. Discourse can be observed in the use of spoken, written and signed language and multimodal/multimedia forms of communication and is not found only in "non-fictional" or verbal materials.

**discourse analysis.** Discourse Analysis can be characterized as a way of approaching and thinking about a problem. In this sense, Discourse Analysis is neither a qualitative nor a quantitative research method, but a manner of questioning the basic assumptions of quantitative and qualitative research methods. Discourse Analysis does not provide a tangible answer to problems based on scientific research, but it enables access to the ontological and epistemological assumptions behind a project, a statement, a method of research, or a system of classification. In other words, Discourse Analysis will enable to reveal the hidden motivations behind a text or behind the choice of a particular method of research to interpret that text.

**goal language.** Goal language incorporates both explicit and implicit expressions in spoken and written discourse that relate to the purpose toward which the endeavor that is the object of the discourse is directed.

**heterarchy.** Self-organizing non-hierarchical systems that are characterized by lateral accountability and by organizational heterogeneity. Heterarchies encompass multiple communities of knowledge and practice that subscribe to diverse evaluative and performance criteria and answer to different constituencies and different principles of accountability.

**hierarchy.** The vertical layers of ranks within an organization, each layer subordinate to the one above it. Organization hierarchy is often shown in the form of an organization chart. A hierarchy can link entities either directly or indirectly, and either vertically or horizontally. The only direct links in a hierarchy, insofar as they are hierarchical, are to one's immediate superior or to one of one's subordinates, although a system that is largely hierarchical can also incorporate other organizational patterns.

**host nation.** A host nation receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory.

**host-nation support.** Support by the host nation is civil and/or military assistance rendered to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crisis or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations

**humanitarian assistance coordination center.** A humanitarian assistance coordination center operates during the early planning and coordination stages of foreign humanitarian assistance operations by providing the link between the geographic combatant commander and other United States Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and international and regional organizations at the strategic level.

**humanitarian assistance.** Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. As a model of Civil/Military cooperation, humanitarian assistance is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance.

**humanitarian operations center.** An interagency policymaking body that coordinates the overall relief strategy and unity of effort among all participants in a large foreign humanitarian assistance operation, the humanitarian operations center is normally established under the direction of the government of the affected country or the United Nations, or a United States Government agency during a United States unilateral operation. The humanitarian operations center should consist of representatives from the affected country, the United States Embassy or Consulate, the joint force, the United Nations, nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations, and other major players in the operation.

**interagency.** United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense.

**intergovernmental organization.** An organization created by a formal agreement (e.g. a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the African Union.

**joint civil-military operations task force.** A joint task force composed of civil-military operations units from more than one Service. It provides support to the joint force commander in humanitarian or nation assistance operations, theater campaigns, or civilmilitary operations concurrent with or subsequent to regional conflict. It can organize military interaction among many governmental and nongovernmental humanitarian agencies within the theater.

**joint special operations task force.** A joint task force composed of special operations units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The joint special operations task force may have conventional non-special operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions.

**joint task force.** A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander.

**longitudinal case study.** Case studies explore and investigate contemporary real-life phenomena through detailed contextual analysis of a limited number of events or conditions, and their relationships. In some case studies, an in-depth longitudinal examination of a single case or event is used. The longitudinal examination provides a systematic way of observing the events, collecting data, analyzing information, and reporting the results over a long period of time.

**military actor.** Members of the United States Armed Forces who are subject to its hierarchical chain of command which may include peacekeeping troops, observers and other non-armed personnel as well as combatants.

**military civic action.** The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population.

**military information support.** MIST is the acronym now being used for psychological operations. PSYOPS, a term which is gradually being phased out, are defined as operations planned and executed to convey selected information and indicator to foreign audiences to influence their ambitions, motives, objectives, and reasoning.

**multinational force.** A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed an alliance or coalition for some specific purpose.

**nongovernmental organization.** A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society.

**organizational culture.** Organizational culture refers to the set of the set of beliefs, values, and norms, together with symbols like dramatized events and personalities, that represents the unique character of an organization, and provides the context for action in it and by it. It represents a pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its problems that has worked well enough to be considered valid and is passed on to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.

**peace operations.** A broad term that encompasses multiagency and multinational crisis response and limited contingency operations involving all instruments of national power with military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. Peace operations include peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacemaking, peace building, and conflict prevention efforts.

**private sector.** An umbrella term that may be applied in the United States and in foreign countries to any or all of the nonpublic or commercial individuals and businesses, specified nonprofit organizations, most of academia and other scholastic institutions, and selected nongovernmental organizations.

**provincial reconstruction team.** An interim interagency organization designed to improve stability in a given area by helping build the legitimacy and effectiveness of a host nation local or provincial government in providing security to its citizens and delivering essential government services.

**section 1207 funding.** Section 1207 of the FY 2006 National Defense Authorization Act authorized the Secretary of Defense to transfer of up to \$100 million per year for two years to the Department of State for programs that support security, reconstruction or stabilization. In passing section 1207, the Congress recognized the pressing need previously expressed by the Administration for a civilian response capability for stabilization and reconstruction activities in countries that are prone to conflict. The 1207 authority is intended to improve U.S. capacity and interagency coordination for immediate reconstruction, security or stabilization assistance to maintain peace and security in countries that are unstable. Section 1207 has a strong civil-military coordination and cooperation component, which means that it focuses on reconstruction and stabilization via civilian coordination with the security sector and civil society.

**security transition command.** A military formation whose primary role is the training and development of security forces like the Afghan or Iraqi National Armies.

**security assistance.** Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.

**special operations command central.** Special Operations Command Central is a subordinate unified command of US Central Command (USCENTCOM). It is responsible for planning special operations throughout the USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR); planning and conducting peacetime joint/combined special operations training exercises; and orchestrating command and control of peacetime and wartime special operations as directed.

**special operations forces.** Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations.

**special operations.** Operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These operations require covert, clandestine, or low visibility capabilities. Special operations are applicable across the range of military operations. They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces or other government agencies and may include operations through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces.

**stability operations.** An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment,

**status-of-forces agreement.** An agreement which defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating the status of visiting military forces may be bilateral or multilateral. Provisions pertaining to the status of visiting forces may be set forth in a separate agreement, or they may form a part of a more comprehensive agreement. These provisions describe how the authorities of a visiting force may control members of that force and the amenability of the force or its members to the local law or to the authority of local officials.

**steady state.** Steady state Civil/Military cooperation presupposes a long term history and a future commitment suggesting that processes and programs will continue to resemble the way they appeared in the past.

**strategic communication.** Focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.

**terrorism.** The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.

**theater special operations command.** A subordinate unified or other joint command established by a joint force commander to plan, coordinate, conduct, and support joint special operations within the joint force commander's assigned operational area. Also called TSOC.

**unified action.** The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort.

**whole of government.** A term usually used in connection with COIN planning, a whole of government approach integrates civilian and military capabilities across each of the four COIN strategy functions of security, politics, economics and information. This requires 'whole-of-government' planning to synchronize and sequence each department's activities towards achieving the objectives of the COIN strategy.



*Figure 2. Army medical technician examining children in a local medical clinic in Afghanistan*

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## I. Background

It is a commonplace that security and development need to reinforce each other. However, many studies of the planning and management of projects have pointed out that parallel efforts or clear dominance of one side of civilian/military partnership may occur for various reasons. More flexibility on one side in accessing personnel and funds is often articulated as one of those reasons. Also, according to much of the literature on the subject, a more important aspect is the difference in organizational cultures. In contrast to development professionals, who tend to be deliberative, seek consensus and want to pursue activities that have a long term impact, the military tends to be decisive, mobilizes both personnel and funds quickly and, due to its hierarchical nature, does not support consensus-building or seek to achieve long-term assistance objectives. Cooperation between civilian and military actors on development projects that are a part of counterinsurgency programs may be more subject to an imbalance in control than other projects because counterinsurgency primarily has a military objective for which civilian means, i.e., development assistance, are used.

Analysts agree that cooperation should be based on professional competence i.e. development activities should principally be done by development experts, not armed forces and if plans or activities are conflicting, mechanisms for negotiation and compromise which respect professional expertise as well as differing interests must be instituted. Sometimes even mutuality of interests can create concerns. For instance, while development workers may be wary of having too close a relationship with the military in order to protect their relations with the local population, soldiers may be encouraged to do development projects themselves in order to improve their standing with the local population.

When USAID first considered the role of Civil/Military Cooperation in development there were several reasons articulated for adopting a Civil/Military Cooperation policy. It was explicitly recognized that, especially in post-conflict situations, there are stabilization and reconstruction tasks for which the military has specific skills, assets and capabilities. Further, it has been stated that, in those situations when there is a gap which cannot be filled by another actor; where value is added for the recipient community; when it is acceptable to the local population and culture; when it is planned in such a way to support other assistance efforts; and where the military has a specific comparative advantage, Civil/Military Cooperation can be of benefit to both sides.

More recently USAID, in its Civil Military Cooperation Policy (Appendix A), has made the following declaration in favor of advancing civilian-military relations: "It is USAID's policy for all operating units to cooperate with DoD in joint planning, assessment and evaluation, training, implementation, and communication in all aspects of foreign assistance activities where both organizations are operating, and where civilian-military cooperation will advance USG foreign policy. Cooperation by all relevant operating units, whether in Washington or in the field, will strengthen coordination, planning, and implementation of assistance to states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from violent conflict or civil strife. USAID is committed to a comprehensive, coherent whole-

of-government approach and will partner with other USG entities to strengthen efforts to prepare, plan for, and conduct conflict mitigation, management, and stabilization assistance.“

Despite this very clear statement of purpose, a recently published report commissioned by USAID/DCHA, *The Civilian-Military Relations Study Group: Consensus Report* (2009), states that USAID’s objectives for what it wants to get out of its potential relationship with the Military are not clear. USAID convened the Study Group as “a panel of subject-matter consultants tasked to provide expert advice on civilian-military relations and related issues that USAID should consider when implementing its Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy.”

The Study Group Report, among other things, suggests that, specific to the regional bureaus’ role in Civil/Military Relations, USAID should: 1) Clarify the roles and responsibilities of pillar bureaus, regional bureaus, and bilateral and regional missions in Civil/Military relations; and 2) Decide what office and bureau within USAID takes the lead and determine the role and responsibilities of other parts of the Agency in carrying out these priority work efforts--among pillar bureaus, regional bureaus and key USAID missions in selected countries that must take on the challenge of carrying out the above analysis and work in coordinating with in-country.

The report did not specify any methodology for collecting data but, as an “advice” paper, it is assumed that the study group conducted some high level interviews with key officials and conducted a review of the literature. There is no indication in the report that the study group canvassed Missions or bureau staff with respect to any of these questions.

In the final section, the report raises a number of pertinent issues: “Does USAID want to influence DOD’s humanitarian activities? Or do they just want awareness of the activities, to de-conflict with the activities of their implementing partners (i.e., ensure that DOD doesn’t drill wells in a village where USAID is installing a separate piped water system?) Do they want to convince DOD NOT to do certain activities? Do they want DOD to limit itself to direct security activities, or focus on building capacity for disaster response? Unless USAID broadly creates an internal consensus for what its objectives are, then USAID will have no influence on what DOD does or have a legitimate complaint when DOD does the wrong thing!”

Stating that: “USAID’s main objective in working more closely with DoD should be to help achieve USG and USAID foreign policy, foreign assistance, and international objectives,” the Study Group came up with certain broad “corporate decisions” that would facilitate Civil/Military Cooperation within USAID including:

- Coming to terms internally in regional bureaus, pillar bureaus and the field and building an agency consensus on the objectives and nature of USAID’s relationship with DOD.
- Conducting an internal discussion that involves both USAID/Washington and

- the field in regards to the USAID/DOD relationship.
- Having senior officials; a) explicate USAID's goals and objectives; b) openly discuss major challenges; c) recommend how to address those challenges; d) discuss constraints to a closer relationship with DOD; and e) indicate to USAID staff how to mitigate or remove those constraints.

These questions and recommendations strike at the heart of USAID's and DOD's organizational cultures, implicating also the communication mechanisms between the two agencies and the kind of support for development activities that each perceives it supplies.

## **II. Objectives of Civil/Military Cooperation**

According to the DCHA Study Group, USAID's objective in forming civilian-military relationships with DoD should be to: 1) help achieve USAID's foreign policy and development objectives as part of overall USG foreign policy and national security goals; and 2) link to DoD's resources, field assets, and capabilities to be more effective in conflict and crisis situations, post-conflict efforts, reconstruction and stabilization, long-term efforts in strengthening weak and fragile states, and in conflict-crisis prevention.

The Office of Military Affairs in DCHA, emphasizes the implementation aspect of Civil/Military Relations. They state that there are basically three models for Civil/Military cooperation in foreign assistance. These are: 1) relief coordinated through OFDA for humanitarian purposes; 2) the work of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan to achieve stabilization; and 3) steady state (long term) programming designed to provide on-going assistance to certain countries in accordance with U.S. Foreign Policy goals.

According to other reports (see References at Appendix F), however, Missions and regional bureaus are more concerned with the Civil/Military Cooperation Development Hypothesis, as articulated in USAID policy statements and in other relevant materials. This states that development efforts in regions where there is a substantial U.S. Military presence can be augmented by such cooperation. By enabling access to populations in high threat areas that otherwise would be inaccessible for development efforts; utilization of DOD resources for development activities; and providing a demonstration, through successful Civil/Military Relations dialogue, of a model of good governance for states undergoing a transition from authoritarian forms of government to more open, transparent ones, development programming will more efficiently and effectively achieve its strategic objectives.

The DOD's fairly clear statement of the objectives in Civil/Military Relations is to: implement much more robustly the development of host country capacity to achieve a sustainable security and to improve DoD access to strategically important areas, influence strategically important populations, especially those vulnerable to extremist

influence, support USG efforts to build the capacity of partner nations to deliver essential services to civilian populations and better prepare for disasters and have a demonstrable positive impact on the civilian population.

Gaining the cooperation of the civilian population is part of this strategy because the military cannot just impose security on an unwilling population so they do the so-called “winning hearts and minds” activities. Other motivations for the military to engage in Civil/Military cooperation are to tap into the development expertise, monitoring and evaluation expertise, local knowledge and experience, and the long-term focus of the development community (which includes USAID and its implementing partners such as NGOs) to better achieve the military’s objectives. As stated by the DOD’s OHDACA, “The DOD recognizes that its viewpoint is very short-term, and wishes to improve continuity and sustainability of their activities.” As one representative of PACOM said during an interview: “USAID is our exit strategy.”

Without coordination with the development experts from USAID, World Bank, European Community Humanitarian Organization and others military activities may amount to little more than “random acts of kindness” rather fitting into an overall strategic development plan for a region. As an international phenomenon, Civil/Military Cooperation’s objectives have been addressed by other Foreign Assistance organizations. In particular, DFID has specified four basic principles applicable to these cooperative projects. These are: 1) clarity of mission and objectives; 2) unity of authority and integration of effort; 3) timely and effective interventions; and 4) commitment to the process at high levels for both organizations. All of these principles are highly dependent upon the degree to which both civilian and military actors understand, accept and fulfill their roles in the partnership—factors which are, in turn, dependent upon perceptions, communication and support at all operational levels.

To summarize the literature on objectives, it appears that few development professionals or military decision makers believe that very close integration should be the goal of cooperation. Instead, it has been suggested that the different professional cultures are each ideally suited to their main operational goals. Most analysts agree, however, that while the intensity of cooperation may logically vary from case to case. Thus, information and coordination of activities are essential to the success of the partnership.

### **III. Purpose of the Assessment**

This document reports the findings and conclusions from Phase 1 of the Asia and Middle East Bureau’s Civil/Military Cooperation Assessment. The information obtained from this both phases of this assessment will be used in the effort to develop better methods of evaluating Civil/Military activities in the future and improve monitoring and evaluation of joint efforts by delineating both the successes and challenges of the Civil/Military Cooperative partnership.

Implementation guidelines for USAID's current Civil/Military Cooperation Policy require that Regional Bureaus work with COCOM representatives to develop strategies to work in areas where there are security issues; explore options for securing DOD funding for USAID development activities; and work with other agencies and offices to:

- Develop, test and subsequently improve common metrics and assessment techniques;
- Improve the monitoring and assessment of joint USAID-DOD efforts;
- Develop general guidelines for determining what programs and projects should receive the highest priority for monitoring and assessment.

Toward these ends, this assessment of the structure and operation of Civil/Military Cooperation in Asia and Middle East Missions is based on the hypothesis that communication and views about the effectiveness of cooperative activities are major factors in facilitating the success of those activities. With bulk of resources and personnel for Civil/Military Cooperation focused on Asia and the Middle East, the bureaus representing these regions are uniquely positioned to assess the progress of Civil/Military Cooperation.

This assessment was designed to address specific issues that have been raised with respect to the efficacy of Civil/Military Cooperation. In this regard, five assessment questions will be addressed:

- Does USAID's organizational culture enable or support effective Civil/Military Cooperation?
- Does the Military's organizational culture enable or support effective Civil/Military Cooperation?
- Has communication between USAID and the Military on development projects been optimal?
- Is the premise correct that USAID has been effectively supported in its development efforts by Civil/Military Cooperation?

The objectives for both phases of the assessment are: 1) To provide a better understanding of how Civil/Military Cooperation contributes to the achievement of USAID's development objectives and strategic operations; 2) To assess both the advantages and disadvantages of the relationship; and 3) To provide building blocks and a framework for developing a more advanced Civil/Military Cooperation strategy to promote effective cooperation, access and share knowledge and resources, and establish a fully participatory process for future cooperation (Statement of Work is at Appendix B).

## IV. Research Design

Organizational culture has been described as both deeply embedded patterns of behavior and shared values, assumptions, beliefs, or ideologies that members have about their organization or its work. An organization's culture can be conceptualized as three interrelated levels. At its deepest level, culture consists of the underlying assumptions (often implicit and unstated) that guide behaviors. Culture becomes discernible in part through espoused values—the beliefs and priorities of people in a particular institutional context. Finally, and most evident, are the artifacts of culture—policy documents, mission statements, etc.

Effective alliances between differing organizational cultures not only depend upon partners' abilities to regularize processes and procedures but also to understand and reconcile multiple sets of norms and expectations. Some analysts of the interaction between the organizational cultures of the Military and USAID have suggested that the recognized inequality in personnel and funds is most instrumental in creating an imbalance of control over specific activities on the ground. From the aspect of this research design, however, and based upon a survey of the literature, the approach taken here is to examine the imbalance, whether real or perceived, in the context of organizational cultures. Thus, DOD's significantly greater access to funds and personnel is not viewed as, in itself, either a challenge to effective cooperation or a stimulator of it.

Deeply embedded organization cultural assumptions are generally not explicitly stated but often expressed in survey or interview comments through the choice of certain key words and phrases. Examining institutional context and the artifacts of organizational culture, however, requires an understanding of its different structures. While it almost goes without saying that the Military is hierarchically organized, USAID's organization most closely resembles the lesser known organizational structure of heterarchy (see glossary for both terms). The terms are looked upon by organizational culture researchers as polar opposites. The only recognized significant direct linkages in a hierarchy are to one's immediate superior or to one's subordinates. Heterarchies on the other hand recognize a diversity of linkages and answer to a diversity of different communities. These structural differences are often what is explicitly stated about organizational cultures.

In order to examine the three conceptual levels of USAID and military organizational cultures and their interactions, the research design for this assessment encompasses two phases. Phase I included a survey of the literature, background interviews with informants who had general information on Civil/Military cooperation and interviews with officials (key informants) involved in Civil/Military policy and implementation roles and a survey of staff in the Asia and Middle East Missions, to assess perceptions about organizational cultures and communication and support issues among officials in USAID working specifically on Civil/Military Cooperation and a broad cross-section of Mission staff. Phase 2 will integrate a closer analysis, including interviews and reviews of reports on specific projects, of five Missions and their modes of cooperation.

## V. Methodology

Phase 1 involved two related tasks: examining the role of Civil/Military Cooperation in development and defining Civil/Military Cooperation as it is conceptualized and understood by Missions. During Phase 1, a review of external sources of information including articles, policy documents and assessments and key informant interviews were undertaken.

This research integrates interviews and surveys. The approach taken in Phase 1 was to use initial Interview data as a source of information about organizational cultures and subcultures and modes of cooperation from the perspectives of senior officials. Interviews were analyzed for two purposes: 1) to provide preliminary findings and recommendations, and 2) serve as a basis for the content of a survey. The survey, was developed concurrently with the analysis of the interview data to provide a more systematic, quantifiable means of gathering perceptions from more people. Initial survey data provides baseline measures of the state of cooperation. During Phase 1, case studies for Phase 2 were selected on the basis of: regional representation; potential for learning from experience; and the availability of information (preferably based on assessments) on the history and process of Civil/Military Cooperation (see Recommendations Section).

Interview participants were selected with the intent of exposing the interviewers to people associated with or supporting a variety of different Civil Military Cooperation activities based in Washington, DC. Phase 2 of the study will involve more in-depth interviews with Mission personnel. Individual interviews were conducted with 20 people in senior leadership positions.

Individual interviews were conducted in the offices of the interviewees. The interviews usually lasted between 30 minutes to one hour. Cate Conley and Amani Selim assisted in the interview and data collection process. The interviewers explained the purpose of the interview and discussed the reasons for undertaking the research. During the introduction the confidentiality of the interview was stressed. The concept of "not for attribution" (i.e., individual comments will never be attributed back to their individual sources) was discussed. Confidentiality was reaffirmed by the interviewers when they began the interviews. Also in the interests of confidentiality, interviews were not taped. Rather, informal notes were taken but not to the extent that eye contact and rapport was lost. The two person interview team helped in this regard. Prior to conducting individual and group interviews, the interviewers developed a number of possible questions (Appendix C). However, in practice, the interviewers facilitated the answers to specific questions by asking general ones and following up with requests for examples.

The survey questions were formulated after a review of the interview notes identified themes and sub-themes for specific yes/no/don't know questions. In automated format, respondents were also able to comment on each item. The survey was sent to all relevant personnel in Missions to complete. 124 people responded to survey—all but 3 of them civilians.

The survey contained three parts: a background section, a knowledge section and a perceptions section with comments boxes interspersed throughout (Survey Questionnaire at Appendix D). The survey questions were later grouped according to their relevance to the research questions as illustrated in the following table:

<b>Survey Questions</b>	<b>Survey Group</b>
<b>Research Question: Organizational Culture</b>	
1) Do you know of any Civil/Military Cooperative activities presently taking place in your region or country?	Knowledge
2) Do you know of any US Military development assistance activities presently taking place in your region or country that overlap with USAID programming?	Knowledge
3) Do you know of any humanitarian relief efforts requiring Civil/Military Cooperation that your office has worked on in the last five years?	Knowledge
4) Would you be willing to participate in cooperative Civil/Military humanitarian response planning?	Perception
5) In your view, should USAID and the Military be more or less engaged in your country or region?	Perception
<b>Survey Questions</b>	<b>Survey Group</b>
<b>Research Question: Communication</b>	
1) Are you familiar with how Section 1207 funding works?	Knowledge
2) Is your office implementing or planning to implement a Section 1207 Program?	Knowledge
3) Is Civil/Military Cooperation in your country/region implemented through a formal mechanism?	Knowledge
4) Do you believe that Civil/Military cooperation has increased where you are working (become more visible) in the last three years?	Perception
<b>Survey Questions</b>	<b>Survey Group</b>
<b>Research Question: Support</b>	
1) In your view, do High Threat Environments pose constraints on the ability to carry out development programs?	Perception
2) In your view, can Civil/Military Cooperation help to mitigate this problem?	Perception
3) In your view, has USAID, through Civil/Military Cooperation, been able to leverage significantly more resources for programs?	Perception
4) In your view, has Civil/Military Cooperation positively impacted	

development assistance	Perception
<b>Question</b>	<b>Survey Group</b>
1) You are—in the Military or A Civilian?	Background
2) What is your country/region?	Background

*Table 1. Survey Question Groups and Research Question Groups*

The findings described below are based upon three types of analyses: 1) descriptive and statistical analysis of survey responses; 2) content analysis of interviews and written survey comments documenting the frequency of key words; and 3) discourse analysis of interview and survey comments in conjunction with written policy and guidance statements.

Most of the statistical analyses contained in this report are descriptive. The survey and interview samples are not large enough to do too many inferential statistical analyses. Simple correlation coefficients, however, can be calculated on the basis of the yes, no and don't know/no response answers by assigning values to them and constructing a correlation matrix quantifying the strength of the relationship between answers.

Content analysis is a research tool used to determine the presence of certain words or concepts within texts or sets of texts (see glossary). Researchers quantify and analyze the presence, meanings and relationships of such words and concepts, then make inferences about the messages within the texts, the writer(s), the audience, and even the culture and time of which these are a part. Texts can be defined broadly as books, book chapters, essays, interviews, discussions, newspaper headlines and articles, historical documents, speeches, conversations, advertising, theater, informal conversation, or really any occurrence of communicative language.

Based upon interviews and a review of the pertinent literature, key words that occur with different frequencies in interviews and comments were selected on the basis of their implications for assessing organizational culture, communication and support.

<b>Group</b>	<b>Sub-Group</b>	<b>Key Word</b>
<b><u>Organizational Culture</u></b>	<b>Cooperation</b>	Joint Sharing Culture Personality
	<b>Objectives</b>	Collaboration Development Expertise
	<b>Activities</b>	Humanitarian Flexible Inflexible
<b><u>Communication</u></b>	<b>Cooperation</b>	Communication Non-Communication
	<b>Objectives</b>	Short-Term Long-Term

	<b>Activities</b>	Infrastructure
<b><u>Support</u></b>	<b>Cooperation</b>	Support Enabling Not Enabling
	<b>Objectives</b>	Counter-Terrorism/Insurgency Security
	<b>Activities</b>	Resources Effective Ineffective

*Table 2. Content Analysis Key Words, Groups and Sub-Groups.*

Groups and sub-groups were selected not on the basis of the common meanings of these terms but, rather, on the basis of their typical contexts within the communication of the interviewees and commenters. For example, “humanitarian,” which might reasonably appear in the “support” group is placed in the “Organizational Culture” one because it has a variety of different meanings for both Military and Civilian respondents depending upon perspectives. The Military typically refers to all of its in-country non-military activities as “humanitarian” while USAID is far more restrictive. The use of the term “humanitarian,” thus, can be as symptomatic of these cultural differences as much as “development” is.

Words did not appear exactly as noted in the table and were counted if they were in any form of the key word. In addition, certain words appeared frequently in both positive and negative contexts, particularly those relating to communication and support. Therefore, these contexts were counted as separate occurrences as noted in the table. Given that all conversations and comments focused on the same subject, the frequency of key word use in comments and interviews provides some indication of the associations that respondents have with those terms and their inferences within the context of Civil/Military Cooperation.

The strength of content analysis lies in its ability to quantify themes in communication that might otherwise escape the notice of the researcher. Ultimately, however, it is not an objective form of data collection as it is within the province of the analyst to select the words, phrases or themes that will be examined and also to select the questions they will be used to answer.

The third type of analysis, discourse analysis, does not provide a tangible answer to problems based on scientific research, but it enables access to the assumptions that define organizational cultures and roles. Discourse analysis can reveal the hidden motivations behind a written or spoken text. Discourse analysis is neither qualitative nor quantitative but critical—that is, a deconstructive reading and interpretation. It will, thus, not provide absolute answers to a specific question, but enable us to understand the conditions behind the question and make us realize that the essence of the question, and its resolution, lie in its assumptions. This application of critical thought to social situations and the unveiling of subtexts can be applied to any text. The essential purpose of discourse analysis is not to provide definite answers, but isolate unacknowledged agendas and motivations.

## VI. Findings, Conclusions and Interim Recommendations

As stated above, successful collaboration between two organizational cultures depends upon the partners' abilities to regularize processes and procedures and understand and reconcile multiple sets of norms and expectations. The interviews and surveys that form the basis for the following analyses measure the degree of understanding that exists among civilian and military actors in development as to what their own expectations are as well as those of their partners from other parts of the U.S. Government.

Even though an interview guide was used (Appendix C), the 20 interviews were largely unstructured. Form the survey, 124 responses were obtained representing a majority of the Missions served by the Asia and Middle East Bureaus as shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Missions Represented by Survey Respondents.

## Evaluation Question 1: Does USAID’s organizational culture enable or support effective Civil/Military Cooperation?

### **Findings Statistical and Content Analysis:**

All civilian interviewees stressed the necessity for better training for staff in negotiating the differences between military and civilian actors in development with respect to goals and reporting mechanisms. Five out of twenty of the interviewees were of the view that all USAID personnel should be more aware of Civil/Military cooperative activities and that those individuals specifically working with the military should be better informed as to the differences in approaches and objectives. Content analysis of both interviews and survey comments to map references to specific key words in terms of their frequency is illustrated by the following chart:




Figure 2. Civilian Interviews and Survey Comments-- Content Analysis/Organizational Culture

Purpose terms referencing to the objectives of Civil/Military Cooperation were mentioned with highly diverse frequencies. Development was mentioned with greatest frequency, with resources and security coming second. Words relating to cooperative activities were mentioned with slightly above average (civilian comments for all terms) frequency (10). These include “joint,” mentioned with above average frequency, and “collaboration” mentioned with significantly below average frequency. “Inter-agency,” the more formalized version of “joint” and “collaboration” was mentioned with less than average frequency. “Expertise,” “culture” and “personality” are terms relating to norms and expectations. “Culture” was mentioned with the least frequency of any of the organizational culture terms. “Expertise” was mentioned with slightly above average frequency and “personality” with significantly below average frequency. “Flexibility” and “inflexibility” were mentioned with equal frequency.

During interviews and in comments, identity issues (that is, perceptions of USAID by the populace when they operated in conjunction with the military) were cited by both Washington officials and mission respondents as a primary concern in partnering with the military. As one commenter expressed it, “Confusion between USAID and military assistance [means that] people are often suspicious of US foreign assistance.” Others expressed even greater concern about identity issues, viz. “Our security is now in greater danger than at times where USAID worked independently for the sake of international development.” Identity issues were not included in the content analysis as this concept was too complex for key word expression.

One senior Mission official stated his belief that coordination should be “embedded” in the planning process in order to be really effective. Close cooperation was deemed by twelve civilian survey commenters to have had a beneficial effect for their programs. As one of them said: “We are working very closely with our Civil Affairs units to strengthen both of our missions in the areas of health and education. This is a continued work in progress but we have established excellent relationships with our Military units here at post and expect true synergistic effects in our health and education programs.” Others, while supportive of cooperation, expressed skepticism about how cultural differences could be negotiated. As one commenter said, “It is a good thing but strong resistance on both sides contributes to less than optimum performance.”

Responses to Survey multiple choice questions from Asia and Middle East Missions on organizational culture were almost entirely from civilians as noted above. Analyzing civilian only responses for the purposes of this section, sixty percent of respondents are aware of Civil/Military cooperative activities. Less than that percentage (43%) were aware of humanitarian relief activities but seventy percent of the respondents stated their willingness to engage in joint planning for humanitarian relief efforts. Forty-two percent of the respondents stated that they knew of activities being performed solely by the military that overlapped with USAID activities (Figure 3). Thus, while over half of mission survey respondents knew something about civil military cooperative activities presently taking place in their region or country, less than half were aware of any specific past or present programs involving such cooperation.




Figure 3. Civilian Survey Responses to Organizational Culture Questions

**Evaluation Question 2: Does the Military’s organizational culture enable or support effective Civil/Military Cooperation?**

**Findings—Statistical and Content Analysis:**

Ten out of twenty interviewees were in the military but only three of the survey respondents (out of 124). Given this small sample, it is difficult to make a judgment as to what military perceptions contribute to the reconciling of organizational cultures. Content Analysis of comments and interviews are illustrated below but it should be made clear that given the small numbers of respondents these cannot be effectively compared to civilian responses.




Figure 4. Military Interviews and Survey Comments—Content Analysis/Organizational Culture

Military interviewees emphasized both the informal (that is, “joint”) and formal (that is, “inter-agency”) nature of their activities with USAID. Exemplary of some of the individual positive comments from military personnel is the following: “Since 2009, [the Mission] and the DoD’s primary unit has created a unique collaborative relationship, allowing [the Civil Affairs team] to better implement its own humanitarian relief and development programs.” Another military interviewee suggested that Missions should “regularize meetings with DOD counterparts” in order to increase the collaborative nature of the partnership.

Other military respondents praised recent efforts to improve Civil/Military Cooperation. For example, one respondent stated that “there has been a significant streamlining of efforts. Each interagency team has found mutually benefiting aspects from this cooperation,” and another opined that “[M]ilitary cultural misconceptions are slowly dissolving to facilitate a whole of government Interagency approach.” Only one of the thirteen military respondents made a slightly negative comment that the relationship would be greatly facilitated if “the National Security Council would get its act together.”

“Expertise,” “humanitarian” and “collaboration” had equal frequencies in their discussions of Civil/Military Cooperation. “Development” was mentioned with less frequency than “humanitarian” but not significantly less. “Culture” and “personality” were emphasized with slightly greater than average frequency (over 5—for military comments on all terms) with at least four respondents emphasizing the importance of the office culture and the personality of senior officials in “making this work.” [It should be noted that 9 of the 13 military respondents were special operations forces who are specifically trained to deal with cultural, social and psychological concerns in politically sensitive environments (see glossary)].

“Sharing” was the only organizational culture term mentioned with less than average frequency. Where “flexible” was mentioned it was only in a positive context. The term did not appear in negative contexts in military interviews or comments.

The three survey responses to multiple choice questions were all “yes” with respect to the questions: 1) Do you know of any Civ/Mil Cooperative activities presently taking place in your region or country? 2) Do you know of any US Military development assistance activities presently taking place in your region or country that overlap with USAID programming? 3) Do you know of any humanitarian relief efforts requiring Civil/Military Cooperation that your office has worked on in the last five years? 4) Would you be willing to participate in cooperative Civil/Military humanitarian response planning?

**Findings: Discourse Analysis—Organizational Cultures and Agency Roles:**

As noted in Section V, discourse analysis is neither a quantitative nor qualitative method but, rather, an approach to assessing those assumptions that underlie organizational cultures and either enable or impede reconciliation with other organizational cultures. The following table is a comparison of the policies of Civil Military Cooperation as compared to civilian and military quotes and comments on the roles that individuals have played in inter-agency interactions.

Policies Reflecting Roles and Organizational Culture	Civilian Interviews and Comments	Military Interviews and Comments
<p><b>USAID</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <i>Operating units cooperate with the Department of Defense (DOD) in joint planning, assessment and evaluation, training, implementation, and communication in all aspects of foreign assistance activities.</i></li> <li>2. <i>USAID will continue to lead and serve as principal advisor on development issues.</i></li> <li>3. <i>As the USG's primary resource for expertise in international development, USAID seeks to influence the development dimensions of DOD strategic plans and implementation activities.</i></li> <li>4. <i>USAID will strengthen its planning, training, and implementation capacity to contribute to interagency security, stability, transition and reconstruction operations.</i></li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Perception is that the civilian side will pick up the gap as the military pulls out.</li> <li>2. Their approaches are intimidating</li> <li>3. Problems with the military not understanding laws—no oversight over contractors</li> <li>4. Rigid restrictions on contracting and inter-agency relations</li> <li>5. Number one strength—they have money, number two, they get people in and out quickly</li> <li>6. [Country name] is an example of everything gone wrong and we correct it</li> <li>7. Civ/Mil cooperation is seen by rank and file as sapping strength of the military</li> <li>8. Ambassador has control over all departments except ongoing operations</li> <li>9. Grossly overestimated status of infrastructure</li> <li>10. PRT's are not a good development</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. USAID is the military's exit strategy</li> <li>2. USAID is looking for ways to reassert itself</li> <li>3. Civ/Mil Cooperation is an ad hoc response to changing needs</li> <li>4. Motto--Create, strengthen, preserve</li> <li>5. Motto--Clear, hold, build</li> <li>6. Top down integration—NSC, DOD, DOS--whole of government history on the ground is more ad hoc</li> <li>7. Special forces were taken by surprise that USAID was doing the same thing</li> <li>8. Special Operations don't have skills to reach out to society</li> <li>9. Strategy—enable local hosts to solve their own problems</li> <li>10. We recognize that USAID has the knowledge</li> <li>11. Cooperation with USAID has dramatically increased the</li> </ol>

<p>5. <i>At the regional level, USAID will exchange officers with all appropriate Combatant Commands (COCOMs) and place Senior Development Advisors (SDAs) within the Combatant Commands to improve coordination, and communication and to promote program synchronization and effectiveness.</i></p> <p>6. <i>In the field, USAID staff will collaborate with US military officials at post to develop integrated approaches to country-specific security and development challenges.</i></p> <p>7. <i>USAID will seek to improve the preparedness of its personnel to operate in coordination with DOD through: training, recruitment and retention of qualified personnel, exchange and fellowship programs, synchronization training and tour schedules with those of counterpart military units.</i></p> <p>8. <i>USAID will look to DOD, to lead, coordinate, and communicate the in-theater DOD response for security cooperation, but reiterates that DOD should not substitute for civilian capabilities.</i></p> <p><b>DOD</b></p> <p>9. <i>The Department of Defense shall maintain a capability to conduct a broad range of civil affairs activities.... to meet DoD Component responsibilities to the civilian sector in foreign areas.</i></p> <p>10. <i>DOD shall: 1) coordinate military operations with civilian agencies of the U.S. Government, with civilian agencies of other governments, and with non-governmental organizations; 2) provide assistance to meet the life-sustaining needs of the civilian population; 3) provide expertise in civilian sector</i></p>	<p>11. Stability, peace and security are different goals—short-term</p> <p>12. DOD does infrastructure spending</p> <p>13. DOD focuses on the immediate</p> <p>14. They (DOD) would show up for meetings with a roomful representatives to our one—we were overwhelmed</p> <p>15. They were anxious to build and didn't seem to think much about what the long-term results would be</p> <p>16. Made us dependent on the military efforts. Our security is now in greater danger than at times where USAID worked independently.</p> <p>17. USAID has been carrying out programs in high threat environment for many years, and has substantial expertise in how to do this.</p> <p>18. Helped increase our outreach significantly through logistics support. We have also provided advice and guidance to civilian affairs programs</p> <p>19. DOD can provide information and resources that is not available to USAID, USAID provides expertise that is beneficial for DOD.</p> <p>20. Military can provide security and access</p> <p>21. Military resources can be used to complement AID programs.</p> <p>22. Military effective in controlling armed and criminal groups</p> <p>23. Just throwing money at people should not be confused with "development." such actions are rarely sustainable</p> <p>24. Humanitarian Relief is not Development.</p> <p>25. Mil has the resources but needs technical assistance by USAID</p> <p>26. Military should stick to providing quick handouts for those injured in the way, and trash pick up to clear the way of IEDs-- USAID should take over development projects from there</p> <p>27. Has allowed USAID to influence</p>	<p>relevancy and impact of our Civil Affairs operations.</p> <p>12. USAID's technical expertise, institutional knowledge and long-established government and non-government contacts have proven invaluable.</p> <p>13. Combining the intelligence and security capabilities of the military with civilian aid organizational work planned and already in progress help both entities to more effectively implement development programs.</p> <p>14. USAID/Yemen was awarded funds through the NDAA 1207 in the past, and will reapply for further funding in 2010.</p> <p>15. In response to a particular DoD initiative, USAID was provided \$10 million in supplemental funding in 2009 to support this initiative.</p> <p>16. Partnered with DoD civil affairs (CA) teams, CA submitted proposals for some \$350,000 to support a joint USAID/DoD health and education initiative to be carried out 2009-2010.</p> <p>17. There has been a significant streamlining and efforts.</p> <p>18. Each interagency has found mutually benefiting aspects from this cooperation.</p> <p>19. Civil Affairs Teams continue to operate in these high threat environments and the development agencies will need to follow suit in order to build upon the very small victories accomplished by CERP/ MINCOST CAT projects.</p> <p>20. 1207 funding is managed by the AID office with input from the JUSMAG and JSOTF operating in theater.</p> <p>21. The military has provided security and access to USAID in a way that would have been impossible given the threat posture.</p> <p>22. Working with a standing JUSMAG/ JSOTF and the host countries military cultural misconceptions are slowly dissolving to facilitate a</p>
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<p><i>functions that normally are the responsibility of civilian authorities. That expertise is applied to implement DoD policies to advise or assist in rehabilitating or restoring civilian sector functions.</i></p>	<p>use of DOD resources</p> <p>28. Military sometimes it can hinder if they don't understand development or USAID's long-term goals that we would like to achieve.</p> <p>29. The Mil component has allowed development work to continue</p> <p>30. Brigade Commanders need to be cognizant that USAID does not answer to them, that they do not have authority over our contractors/grantees, and that they cannot direct them</p> <p>31. If we all stay within our lanes we can complement one another, work together, and mutually achieve our objectives.</p>	<p>whole of government Interagency approach.</p> <p>23. Military entities are capable of performing in these (high threat) environments.</p> <p>24. For example the MIL uses the medical profiles/information provided by USAID to plan medical/dental missions</p>
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*Table 3. Discourse analysis comparisons of Civilian and Military policies and comments.*

On the military side role functions are: 1) *conducting a broad range of activities*; 2) *meeting responsibilities to the civilian sector*; 3) *coordinating with civilian agencies*; 4) *providing life-sustaining (humanitarian) assistance*; and 5) *applying expertise to rehabilitate and restore*. Military interviewees and commenters perceive that they are performing four out of five of these defined role functions. The concept of meeting responsibilities to the civilian sector does not appear in military discourse from this small sample. Conducting a broad range of activities is not alluded to as frequently in comments as the other role functions.

On the USAID side, role functions are to: 1) *cooperate on joint planning, assessment and evaluation, training, implementation, communication and personnel matters*; 2) *contribute to interagency security, stability, transition and reconstruction operations*; 3) *let the Military lead on security matters*; 4) *continue to lead on development matters*; 5) *serve as principal advisor*; 6) *collaborate to develop inter-agency approaches*; and 7) *serve as a primary resource*. Of these seven role functions, USAID interviewees and commenters perceive that they are performing three fully and one partially. These are: cooperating on implementation and communication, serving as principal advisor, serving as a primary resource and letting the Military lead on security matters.

USAID and Military interviewees and commenters see *each other* as performing two out of five role functions, in the case of USAID's view of the Military, and two out of seven in the case of the Military's view of USAID. USAID informants see the military as fulfilling its humanitarian and rehabilitation and restoration functions. Military informants see USAID as performing its primary resource and advisor functions. Only USAID commenters brought up the issue of the military performing functions not within policy guidelines with references to "sticking to" certain things or "staying in our lanes."

Four USAID commenters reference a role for the agency as resolving problems that are either unresolved by the military or created by them. “[Country name] is an example of everything gone wrong and we correct it” and “Perception is that the civilian side will pick up the gap as the military pulls out” are typical of these comments. One commenter on the military side referred to USAID as an “exit strategy,” which to some extent supports the view of USAID as taking charge *after* the military has gone.

With respect to two role functions, USAID and military responses are symmetrical. These two notable symmetries, however, are not described in the policies of either agency except under the broad rubric of “coordination and assistance.” Both USAID and the Military define the provision of security and resources for development activities by the Military as the most significant role functions in Civil Military Cooperation.

### ***Evaluation Questions 1 and 2: Organizational Culture Conclusions:***

**Statistical and content analyses** of interviews and surveys indicate that USAID’s organizational culture:

- Emphasizes development expertise and the ability to work somewhat “behind the scenes.”
- Tends to be ad hoc in its approach to problems and is limited in its strategic planning capabilities.
- Has, for the most part, evolved a normalized humanitarian relief model, with which it is comfortable, in reference to Civil/Military Cooperation.
- Appears to be developing a different joint or collaborative model for Civil Military Cooperation in other cooperative activities.
- Encourages willingness to engage in joint planning activities (over seventy percent of respondents).
- Tends to assume the role of expert consultant rather than lead agency or primary advisor on development projects shared with the military.
- Does not fully recognize differences in culture and personality between civilian and military actors as a major concern.
- Is concerned about identity issues in Civil Military Cooperation.
- Is flexible in terms of policy interpretations, objectives and organizational structure.
- Is not flexible in terms of resources and response in high threat environments.
- Emphasizes the humanitarian relief aspects of Civil Military Cooperation.

With respect to military organizational culture, conclusions drawn from such a small sample can only be descriptive of the sample itself rather than the population. Statistical and content analyses interviews and surveys, however, suggest that the Military:

- Is positive about Civil/Military cooperation and recognize the necessity for and the benefits of continuing it.
- Values USAID’s development expertise.

- Values and commits resources to strategic planning.
- Is flexible in terms of resources and response in high threat environments.
- Is not flexible in terms of objectives, policies and organizational structure.
- Supports collaborative, inter-agency work as vital to achieving both USAID and DOD objectives.
- Is primarily concerned with the humanitarian nature of development work.
- Would be more comfortable with “regularized” contacts and meetings on development work with USAID.
- Recognizes that cultural and personality distinctions can contribute or detract from the success of Civil/Military Cooperation.
- Emphasizes the humanitarian relief aspects of Civil Military Cooperation.

**Discourse analysis** of the Civil Military Cooperation “conversation,” as evidenced by policy guidelines and comments on roles, indicate that, while USAID and DOD policies are clearly based upon the official organizational cultures of each agency, the roles that have been assumed by civilian and military actors in development differ substantially from those official pronouncements.

USAID policy emphasizes joint activities and a role in which it will continue to lead on development. The latter statements are slightly undermined, however, with the addition of phrases such as “and serve as principal advisor.” Further, USAID’s references to itself as a “primary recourse” for development expertise clearly suggests a consensus seeking rather than decision making model of cooperation. Primary does not translate as “sole” and, in this case, it is clear that the Agency does not see itself in that light since USAID seeks only to “influence the development dimensions” of DOD activities. On the other hand, the DOD’s main involvement in civilian projects is to “maintain capability,” “engage in a broad range of activities,” “meet its responsibilities” to the civilian sector and “provide assistance to meet the life-sustaining needs of the civilian population.”

The language used by each agency in its policies indicates that, in the relationship, the DOD clearly grants itself more latitude and decision-making authority by using terms that refer to responsibilities to foreign governments, necessity, life and death situations, and, most importantly, the strategic use of the command term “shall,” which is notably absent from USAID policy discourse. USAID, on the other hand, grants to itself the role of advisor, expert and consultant and, even though it is also clear that it views itself as a leader on development projects, it does not assert that this is the way in which others should view it.

The comments from civilian and military actors suggest that a gap has developed between policy and the practice with respect to a mutual recognition of all role functions that policies suggest should be fulfilled by each agency. Instead, the military is viewed by USAID—and to some degree accepts—the role of donor, provider of security and decision-maker; while USAID is viewed by the military—and to some degree accepts—

the role of expert contractor or consultant providing technical assistance but not direction.

### ***Organizational Culture Interim Recommendations:***

- Where relevant, coordination sections should be included in Performance Management Plans with defined steps to be taken to ensure effective collaboration on activities toward common goals.
- Where relevant, Civilian and Military personnel engaged in cooperative activities should develop joint metrics for measuring performance.
- To the extent possible, USAID officials should schedule most regular meetings, hold them at Mission offices, set the agenda, restrict attendance to a specific number from each side and lead the discussion.
- Future assessment should include at least four on-site visits to interview and survey military personnel who may have been reluctant to respond to an online survey.
- Civil/Military Cooperation would be furthered by regularly scheduled joint meetings (depending upon the extent of cooperation) from as frequently as once a month to every quarter.
- USAID employees should be made more cognizant of the funding opportunities and security benefits of Civil/military cooperation.
- USAID employees should be encouraged to thoroughly assess what *real* contributions added security and funding have made and potentially can make toward achievement of USAID goals.

### **Evaluation Question 3: Has communication between USAID and the Military on development projects been optimal?**

#### ***Findings:***

“Communication” in this instance encompasses more than just the give and take of people working together on projects. The culture of communication for civilian and military actors engaged in development includes: the extent to which development professionals are informed about military activities and vice versa; how they understand the nature of those activities; and how they understand the results of those activities. Thus, the two components of communication for the purposes of this assessment are: mutual understanding (as measured by interviews and comments) and knowledge (as measured by the survey). For the purposes of the content analysis short-term, long-term and infrastructure were selected as communication terms because survey comments and interviews highlighted these concepts as focal points for misunderstanding.

When communication itself was brought up by survey and interview respondents, it was primarily as an aspect of cooperation that needed improvement (five out of eight) and only one respondent reported that his experience with Civil/Military communication was good. Other communication comments were basically neutral.




Figure 5. Military/Civilian Interviews and Survey Comments—Communication/Content Analysis

As shown in Figure 5, content analysis indicates that infrastructure was the most frequently mentioned communication related term and was the subject of more civil/military communication than terms relating to project timelines (short-term and long-term). Communication in both positive and negative forms was mentioned directly only eight times—more than long-term but less than long-term/short-term combined.

In general, comments indicate that Civil Military Cooperation is perceived as a short term phenomenon despite the existence of long term steady state programming in certain regions. Respondents referred to the long term when discussing the Civil/Military relationship primarily as a missing component. “Stability, peace and security are different goals from development—short-term rather than long-term” is typical of these comments.




Figure 6. Survey Communication Questions

Survey questions referencing communication were primarily concerned with the degree of knowledge about Civil/Military Cooperation in the missions. Seventy-two percent of mission respondents were familiar with 1207 funding. Over fifty percent did not know whether or not their missions had any plans to implement 120 programs. Almost sixty percent did not know what type of mechanism was implemented for Civil/Military cooperation. Seventy-two percent of mission respondents, however, were able to state an opinion as to whether or not Civil Military activities had increased in their countries/regions.

**Conclusions:**

Statistical and content analyses of interviews and surveys indicate that communication as an aspect of Civil Military Cooperation is significant in theory but not put into practice as witnessed by the facts that:

- Knowledge about civil military cooperation is very limited among mission staff and only a minority have specific information about it.
- To the extent that challenges to the partnership were recognized they were generally attributed to a lack of understanding of differences in organizational culture and lack of communication.


**Communication Interim Recommendations:**

- Civil/Military Cooperation would be furthered by regularly scheduled joint meetings (depending upon the extent of cooperation) from as frequently as once a month to every quarter.
- Communication would be facilitated joint training exercises on project objectives for civilian and military actors and the extent to which they complement or, in some cases, contradict each other.
- Each side should make a concerted effort to include each other in every communication impacting on or potentially impacting on the other agency's activities.

#### Evaluation Question 4: Is the premise correct that USAID has been effectively supported in its development efforts by Civil/Military Cooperation?

##### *Findings:*

As shown in Figure 6, the terms supportive, enabling and effective, were used more frequently in comments and interviews than negative terms. Most such communications, predictably, emphasized the security and resource aspects of Civil/Military cooperation but others suggested that the benefits of Civil/Military cooperation extended beyond this. Notably, Mission respondents used the words “supportive” and “effective” in a variety of contexts including those relating to implementation as well as the funding and security. “Helped increase our outreach significantly through logistics support” and “help both entities to more effectively implement development programs” are typical examples.



*Figure 7. Military and Civilian Interviews and Survey Comments on Support—Content Analysis.*

Survey results indicated that Mission respondents believe that the leveraging of DOD resources was somewhat less significant than the usefulness of Civil/Military cooperation in high threat environments. Sixty-three percent of the respondents believe that Civil Military Cooperation could mitigate High Threat environment constraints while sixty-two percent believe that it has had a positive impact on development. This question, because it is a pivotal one in the survey, is discussed in greater detail in the following section.




Figure 8. Survey Support Questions

The survey question concerning whether or not the military should be more engaged in development work was intended to elicit provide a final measurement as to how useful Mission respondents considered Civil Military Cooperation as a model for the future. Fifty-two percent of the respondents, as illustrated in Figure 9 believe the military should be more engaged. Only thirteen percent wished to see less engagement. Twenty-nine percent of the respondents, however, did not indicate whether they wanted to see more or less engagement and six percent skipped the question suggesting that over a third of the respondents were fairly neutral on this subject.




Figure 9. Engagement Survey Responses

**Conclusions:**

Statistical and content analyses of interviews and surveys indicate that a majority of Mission respondents believed that Civil Military Cooperation was useful in development in the following ways:

- Providing resources and personnel for development work through DOD funds;
- Mitigating the constraints on development work imposed by High Threat Environments;
- Supporting development work in a variety of contexts;
- Enabling the accomplishment of more development projects through the sharing of expertise and resources;
- Perceptions of Civil Military Cooperation by one fifth of Mission respondents are not positive:
- Mitigating High Threat constraints is more important to Mission respondents in accomplishing development work than leverage more resources.

***Interim Recommendations:***

- The Asia and Middle East Bureaus should provide training for Mission staff on issues in Civil/Military Cooperation enlisting the expertise of the Office of Military Affairs.
- Missions which have had success stories attributable to Civil Military Cooperation should disseminate them through USAID channels emphasizing USAID participation.
- A greater emphasis should be placed upon joint planning and training exercises in support of Civil Military cooperation on projects.

**Other Evaluation Issues—Differences in Survey Responses by Country and Region:**

Almost three times as many survey responses came from Asia Missions in comparison to Middle East Missions. The contrast between the characteristics of those responses, in percentage terms, is shown in Figures 10 and 11. Asia Missions reported a greater percentage of “yes” responses to questions than Middle East Missions in every category except that relating to the constraints of high threat environments. Interestingly only three of the Middle East responders were from the Iraq Mission, as opposed to 14 from Afghanistan reported in the Asia section. Nevertheless, the perception of being in a high threat environment seems to be more marked in the Middle East Missions. Despite this the Middle East Missions were somewhat less (-8%) convinced that Civil/Military Cooperation could aid them in this regard. This may be a function of the larger and more diverse sample from Asia Missions (including South and Central Asia) but it is difficult to say whether the sample from Middle East Missions is as representative.

In the “Don’t Know” category of responses, Middle East Mission Respondents had less knowledge than Asia Mission Respondents about 1207 Plans in their Missions, cooperation mechanisms, mitigating high threat environments, leveraging resources and, most significantly, whether or not Civil/Military cooperation had a positive impact upon development.




Figure 10. Middle East Mission Survey Responses.




Figure 11. Asia Mission Survey Responses.

The greatest difference between the two regions was in the awareness of humanitarian relief activities employing Civil/Military Cooperation. Twenty-five percent of Middle East respondents as opposed to fifty-one in the Asia Missions knew of such activities. This is less surprising, however, when one considers that more Civil/Military Humanitarian Relief efforts have taken place in Asia in recent years.

Asia Mission respondents were, in general, more aware of and involved with Civil/Military Cooperative activities and programs as indicated by responses to questions concerning 1207 funding, joint planning and cooperative activities. Mission respondents in both regions, however, seemed equally unaware of what mechanisms existed for facilitating Civil/Military Cooperation. Finally, Asia Missions were disposed to seek *more* military engagement than Middle East Missions as shown in Figure 12 which indicates that 57% of Asia respondents thought that the Military should be more engaged as opposed to 50% of the Middle East respondents.




Figure 12. Asia and Middle East Survey Responses to the question of whether the Military should be more or less engaged in development activities.

**Interim Program Recommendations:**

Both Asia and Middle East Missions report some deficits in knowledge about Civil/Military Cooperation but the differences between the two regions suggest that more outreach activities should be scheduled in Middle East Missions, particularly those which, it is anticipated, will be venues for increased Civil/Military activities. Such outreach should be targeted towards making Middle East Missions more aware of Civil/Military Cooperation and, also, more accustomed to working with military actors in development.




Figure 13: Individual Mission Responses to Question About Military Engagement

Analysis of the survey answers by country can provide an overview of attitudes from missions with experience in different models of Civil Military Cooperation. Respondents from Afghanistan reference the PRT model (too few responses were obtained from Iraq to contribute to this analysis). Afghanistan respondents indicate that they would like much more engagement by the military, believe that Civil Military Cooperation has had a positive impact and are most concerned about mitigating High Threat Environment constraints.

Respondents from the Philippines, with experience in both the Steady-State and Humanitarian relief models, also would seek more engagement, though somewhat less than Afghanistan. More respondents in the Philippines indicated knowledge of 1207 funding than in any other country and there were a greater number of “yes” responses on questions relating to joint and cooperative plans and activities than with respect to the other countries that submitted ten or more responses.

Indonesia’s experience with Civil Military Cooperation is primarily with the humanitarian relief model and, like Afghanistan and the Philippines, respondents there indicated that they would

like to see more military engagement. Surprisingly, less than half of the respondents from Indonesia were aware of humanitarian relief efforts.

Jordan respondents were far less willing to see more military engagement than other countries submitting ten or more responses. Jordan respondents, also, had the least knowledge of Civil Military programming than the other three countries. Since the military is not actively engaged in development work in Jordan either on a regular or humanitarian basis these findings are not surprising. Jordan respondents were also less positive about the impact of Civil Military Cooperation, although the number of “don’t know” answers exceeded those in the “yes” or “no” category.




Figure 14. Country Survey Responses



Figure 15. Bridge in Mindinao constructed by USAID and the military.

### **Other Evaluation Issues—Correlation Between “Positive Impact” and Other Survey Answers**

Correlation coefficients measure the extent to which two or more sets of variables move together either positively or negatively. When two attributes have a positive correlation coefficient, an increase in the value of one attribute indicates a likely increase in the value of the second attribute. A correlation coefficient of less than 0 indicates a negative correlation. That is, when one attribute shows an increase in value, the other attribute tends to show a decrease. Essentially correlation statistics in this case merely quantify the relationship between answers that can be seen visually on charts and histograms. The strength of any positive relationship as seen in the matrix shown in Tabel 3 can vary between .01 and 1 with 1 demonstrating a one to one correspondence. Any coefficient larger than .35 is considered to be statistically significant, however, where sample sizes are small as in this case.

The matrix illustrates that the strongest positive relationship exists between the number of individuals who believe that Civil Military cooperation has had a positive impact on development and those who believe that it leverages resources and mitigates high threat environments. The third strongest relationship is between the number who believe cooperative activities have increased in their countries and the number who believe it has had a positive impact on development. Interestingly the positive impact question is not a predictor of a “more engaged” answer on the engagement question.

As the matrix indicates the correlations between responses to other questions are much higher than the correlation between positive impact and other questions. In particular, the number of yes responses to the humanitarian relief question had a high correlation

to the Civil Military activities increase question and the latter had a high correlation to the leveraging of resources question.

	<i>Impact</i>	<i>1207</i>	<i>Relief</i>	<i>Overlap</i>	<i>Increase</i>	<i>Engaged</i>	<i>Resources</i>	<i>H.T.E.</i>	<i>Mitigate</i>
Positive Impact	1								
Familiar with 1207	0.246744	1							
Humanitarian Relief	0.049357	0.606298	1						
Overlapping Activities	0.225501	0.710186	0.729242	1					
Civ/Mil Increased	0.362974	0.665111	0.805619	0.76708	1				
More Engaged	0.153238	0.551345	0.707811	0.597671	0.702845	1			
Leverage Resources	0.542588	0.566762	0.539777	0.635224	0.832145	0.717061	1		
High Threat Environment	0.237082	0.339548	0.560206	0.519656	0.677361	0.488136	0.660233	1	
Mitigate High Threat	0.539168	0.436763	0.46816	0.58446	0.766965	0.585332	0.85498	0.74288	1

*Table 4. Correlations between survey responses.*

## VII. Phase 2 Research

The very limited number of military respondents in phase 1 of the assessment suggests the need for outreach efforts in order to more thoroughly examine attitudes in this sector. Phase 2 of the Assessment should include at least four on-site visits to interview and survey military personnel who may have been reluctant to respond to an online survey (see Appendix E, Phase 2 Statement of Work).

Although the number of responses is a less than rigorous decision making tool, it nevertheless provides some indication of Mission knowledge of and interest in Civil/Military programming. For lack of other more specific data, however, it is assumed for the purposes of this Phase of the Assessment that Missions submitting larger numbers of responses had potential for learning from experience of the case study and the availability of information on the history and process of Civil/Military Cooperation. Additional facts that were included in the selection process as detailed below were whether the Missions typify the cooperative programming models and the regions represented by the Asia and Middle East Bureaus.

The following Missions were selected in Phase 1 for Phase 2 case studies:

- 1) The Philippines has an active long-term Civil/Military Cooperation program (the “steady-state model”). The Philippines submitted the largest number of single mission responses to the survey.
- 2) Afghanistan submitted the second largest number of single mission responses to the survey and represents the PRT Model for Civil/Military Cooperation.

- 3) Indonesia submitted the fourth largest number of single mission responses (after Jordan which essentially has no Civil/Military cooperative programming). Indonesia as had considerable experience with the humanitarian assistance model of cooperation.
- 4) Phase 2 should include one longitudinal case study of Civil/Military cooperation in a dynamic but non-conflict context. As the Yemen Whole of Government initiative is in its beginning stages, Yemen provides the ideal case study subject for an examination of the evolving Civil/Military relationship there.

**Appendix A**  
**Ciov/Mil Pollicy and Guidelines**

## **Q&As for Field Mission Staff Regarding the Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy (PD-ACL-777)**

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**Q. What is the new USAID Policy on civilian and military cooperation?**

**A.** It is USAID's policy that all operating units cooperate with the Department of Defense (DOD) in joint planning, assessment and evaluation, training, implementation, and communication in all aspects of foreign assistance activities where both organizations are operating, and where civilian-military cooperation will advance United States Government (USG) foreign policy.

**Q. What is the purpose of the Policy?**

**A.** The Policy is designed to facilitate a whole-of-government approach in which USG agencies work within their mandated areas of responsibility in a more coherent way to provide a coordinated, consistent response in pursuit of shared policy goals to include humanitarian relief efforts, counter-terrorism initiatives, civil affairs programs, and reconstruction and stabilization efforts.

USAID developed this Policy to ensure that development, diplomacy and defense agencies work effectively together. Instability constitutes the greatest threat to our development investments and human progress in developing countries. Our strengthened partnership in stabilization will benefit governments, institutions, civil society and individuals, who struggle to build their own futures amidst conflict and precarious security situations. USAID's leadership in international development and humanitarian assistance will be strengthened by a coherent approach to USAID-DOD planning and implementation across countries and regions.

**Q. Why is the Policy needed?**

**A.** Development has been recognized as both a cornerstone of national security and a key element of any successful counterterrorism and

counterinsurgency effort. The Departments of State and Defense have issued policy guidance and directions to guide their organizations in support of the National Security Strategy. This Policy complements those efforts, clarifies the role of USAID as a key part of the interagency process, and places stabilization efforts as a key element of USAID's development mission.

For example, [Department of Defense Directive \(DODD\) 3000.05](#) elevates stability operations to a level comparable to combat operations and mandates that they be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities. The Directive acknowledges that many tasks and responsibilities associated with reconstruction and stabilization operations are not ones for which the military is best suited. In the absence of civilian capacity to carry out these tasks, the capabilities will be developed within the military. DOD has acknowledged that USAID's expertise in building the capacity of local institutions is key to stability and reconstruction. Based on this, close civilian and military cooperation and coordination will enhance the likelihood that Defense-funded programs are consistent with development principles, while ensuring the achievement of overall national security objectives.

**Q. What are the Policy's guiding principles?**

**A.** There are four:

1. USAID will continue to lead and serve as principal advisor on development issues.
2. Cooperation with the DOD will not divert USAID resources away from its development mission or the principles of effective development assistance.
3. USAID will strive to ensure that short-term objectives be consistent with long-term goals.
4. USAID will continue to maintain its long-standing relationships and work with a variety of partners.

**Q. What are USAID's roles and responsibility under the Policy?**

**A.** There are six:

1. As the USG's primary resource for expertise in international development, USAID seeks to influence the development dimensions of DOD strategic plans and implementation activities.
2. USAID will strengthen its planning, training, and implementation capacity to contribute to interagency security, stability, transition and reconstruction operations.
3. At the regional level, USAID will exchange officers with all appropriate Combatant Commands (COCOMs) and place Senior Development Advisors (SDAs) within the Combatant Commands to improve coordination, and communication and to promote program synchronization and effectiveness.
4. In the field, USAID staff will collaborate with US military officials at post to develop integrated approaches to country-specific security and development challenges.
5. USAID will seek to improve the preparedness of its personnel to operate in coordination with DOD through: training, recruitment and retention of qualified personnel, exchange and fellowship programs, synchronization training and tour schedules with those of counterpart military units.
6. USAID will look to DOD, to lead, coordinate, and communicate the in-theater DOD response for security cooperation, but reiterates that DOD should not substitute for civilian capabilities.

**Q. How and when were the Policy and Implementation Guidelines developed?**

**A.** The Policy and the Implementation Guidelines were developed as an Agency-wide effort, with experts from all bureaus and Missions contributing their experience and concerns. The documents were developed using the new coordinated process for making policy and strategic decisions. The Agency Policy Coordinating Committee (APCC) includes technical and program staff, Deputy Assistant

Administrators, Assistant Administrators, and the Deputy Administrator. Each level of the APCC contributed through an effective consultative process. This effort resulted in a product that is timely for USAID's efforts in rebuilding its leadership. This is exemplary of what USAID can achieve if we draw together our collective expertise and experience. The work started on November 5, 2007, and concluded with the approval by Assistant Administrators and the Deputy Administrator on March 11, 2008. The Administrator approved the documents on March 25, 2008.

**Q. Why did it take so long to get this out to the field?**

**A.** With the elimination of PPC as part of foreign assistance restructuring and the loss of institutional support for publication of policy papers, we had to find alternative ways to get the documents published. In addition, we were considering several approaches for launching the Policy in collaboration with other USG agencies that, unfortunately, has taken extra time.

**Q. Was field input taken into consideration?**

**A.** Through the regional bureau representatives at the APCC, field missions provided input as draft documents were being developed. Field missions also raised questions, issues and concerns. These concerns / issues were compiled and were the basis for developing the Implementation Guidelines, intended to be practical guidance for field implementation. In particular, the section on Legal Considerations was prepared to address issues that frequently arise in USAID programs in conflict-prone countries. As we implement the Policy and gain more experience, we will come across more questions and issues. It is our intention to review these issues regularly as an Agency-wide effort, and revise the Implementation Guidelines as needed.

**Q. What documents can be shared with our partners?**

**A.** The Policy document and Implementation Guidelines can be shared with our partners. However, we are in the final phases of the external launch of the Policy paper and the Implementation Guidelines. By

the conclusion of the launch we will have provided full explanation of the Policy and how it will or will not affect our partners.

**Q. What can you tell us about the external launch?**

Q. The external launch has been taking place over the past three months and is scheduled to be completed in January 2009. OMA and senior officials from the DCHA Bureau and Chief Operating Officer have presented briefings to InterAction as part of the external roll out to get buy in from our partners, participated in civil-military related activities at the United States Institute for Peace, and presented information to various Congressional oversight committees. Additionally, we have met with interagency officials, including DOD, State Department, and National Security Council. Also, all Missions should have received a hard copy of the [Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy \(PD-ACL-777\)](#) and a hard copy of the [Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy Implementation Guidelines](#), both dated July 2008, through official mail. The Policy has also been mailed to 1,700 recipients, including U.S. Embassies, State Department, DOD, National Security Council, Congressional oversight committees, American Committee for Voluntary Foreign Assistance, private and nongovernmental organizations, and think tanks. The July 2008 release of the agency announcement to all Mission Directors, along with the Administrator's Policy guidance video, and the January 2009 conference call with Mission Directors on our progress in implementation, will conclude the internal and external launch.

**Appendix B**  
**Civil/Military Cooperation Study Statement of**  
**Work**

**Statement of Work**  
***USAID's Role in Civil Military Relations in Asia and the  
Middle East***  
***Programmatic Implications and Lessons Learned***

**Background**

When USAID first considered the role of Civil/Military Cooperation in development there were several reasons articulated for adopting a Civil/Military Cooperation policy. It was explicitly recognized that, especially in post-conflict situations, there are stabilization and reconstruction tasks for which the military has specific skills, assets and capabilities. Further, it has been stated that, in those situations when there is a gap which cannot be filled by another actor; where value is added for the recipient community; when it is acceptable to the local population and culture; when it is planned in such a way to support other assistance efforts; and where the military has a specific comparative advantage, Civil/Military Cooperation has been of benefit to both sides.

Three models for Civil/Military cooperation in foreign assistance have been developed. These are: 1) humanitarian relief coordinated through OFDA; 2) the work of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan; and 3) steady state (long term) programming like NAMRU in Egypt and elsewhere.

Implementation guidelines for USAID's current Civil/Military Cooperation Policy require that Regional Bureaus work with COCOM representatives to develop strategies to work in areas where there are security issues; explore options for securing DOD funding for USAID development activities; and work with other agencies and offices to:

- Develop, test and subsequently improve common metrics and assessment techniques;
- Improve the monitoring and evaluation of joint USAID-DOD efforts;
- Develop general guidelines for determining what programs and projects should receive the highest priority for monitoring and evaluation.

**Program Theory of Civil/Military Cooperation**

The Civil/Military Cooperation Development Hypothesis, as articulated in USAID policy statements and in other relevant materials, is that development efforts in regions where there is a substantial U.S. Military presence can be augmented by such cooperation. By enabling access to populations in high threat areas that otherwise would be inaccessible for development efforts; utilization of DOD resources for development activities; and providing a demonstration, through successful Civil/Military Relations dialogue, of a model of good governance for states undergoing a transition from authoritarian forms of government to more open, transparent ones, development programming will more efficiently and effectively achieve its strategic objectives.

Four basic principles applicable to these cooperative projects have been articulated in the literature. These are: 1) clarity of mission and objectives; 2) unity of authority and

integration of effort; 3) timely and effective interventions; and 4) commitment to the process at high levels for both organizations.

### **Evaluation Questions and Objectives**

The proposed assessment is a corporate level meta-evaluation designed to address specific issues that have been raised with respect to the efficacy of Civil/Military Cooperation. In this regard, five evaluation questions will be addressed:

- Does USAID's organizational culture enable or support effective Civil/Military Cooperation?
- Does the Military's organizational culture enable or support effective Civil/Military Cooperation?
- Has communication between USAID and the Military on development projects been optimal?
- Is the premise correct that USAID has been effectively supported in its development efforts by Civil/Military Cooperation?

The evaluation has three main objectives: 1) To provide a better understanding of how Civil/Military Cooperation contributes to the achievement of USAID's development objectives and strategic operations; 2) To assess both the advantages and disadvantages of the relationship; and 3) To provide building blocks and a framework for developing a more advanced Civil/Military Cooperation strategy to promote effective cooperation, access and share knowledge and resources, and establish a fully participatory process for future cooperation.

### **Evaluation Methods**

The evaluation will be conducted in two phases. Phase I involves two related tasks: examining the role of Civil/Military Cooperation, including its strengths, weaknesses and future potential and identifying and reviewing programs implemented by Civil/Military Cooperation. The second task will be used to define Civil/Military Cooperation as it is understood and practiced by Missions.

During Phase I, a review of external sources of information including articles, policy documents, evaluations and assessments and key informant interviews will be undertaken.

Also during this phase, a survey instrument will be formulated and sent to relevant personnel in Missions to complete. During Phase I, case studies for Phase II will be selected on the basis of: regional and sectoral representation; potential for learning from experience; and the availability of information (preferably based on evaluations) on the history and process of Civil/Military Cooperation.

During Phase II, the evaluation team will conduct the five case studies. Projects that were completed, evaluated and assessed at the field level will be reviewed and further interviews and surveys implemented. These case studies will be the primary basis for evaluating Civil/Military Cooperation in development and allow the evaluation team to derive lessons and recommendations. Thus the questions to be asked on the project level with respect to Civil/Military Cooperation will be:

1. Relevance: Was Civil/Military Cooperation on the project appropriate in addressing the situation needing improvement? Why or why not?
2. Effectiveness: Has Civil/Military Cooperation on the project supported the achievement of the goal, objectives, outputs, and activities? Why or why not?
3. Efficiency: Were Civil/Military Cooperation inputs (resources and time) used in the most appropriate way to achieve the objectives (outcomes)? Why or why not? What could be done to improve implementation?
4. Impact: Has Civil/Military Cooperation on the project contributed to the long-term goal? What unanticipated positive or negative consequences did the project have?
5. Sustainability: Has Civil/Military Cooperation on the project contributed to continued positive impacts as a result of the project? Why or why not?

### **Deliverables**

- Evaluation Report for Phase I—August 31
- Final evaluation report—November 30
- 

### **Schedule and Logistics**

#### Phase I Tasks:

- Finalize statement of work and review of documents by March 31
- Revise statement of work by April 20
- Complete survey instrument by April 20
- Send survey instrument to Missions by April 30
- Collect all survey responses by May 20
- Conduct auxiliary interviews with State Department and DCHA officials by April 30
- Draft findings from interview notes and surveys by May 31
- Select five case studies for Phase II
- Prepare draft report on Phase I by June 30
- Review and discuss draft report internally and externally July 1-15
- Prepare final report on Phase I-August 31st

#### Phase II Tasks:

- Follow-up interviews based upon survey responses-Sept 1 through 30
- Mission visits -Sept 1 through August 15
- Review of case study materials and additional interviews—August 30
- Final report on evaluation Phases I and II by September 15

### **Team Composition**

- Sandra Scham
- Amani Selim
- Cathleen Conley

**Evaluation Budget**

<u>Task/Sub-Task</u>	<u>Person.</u>	<u>Hours x Rate</u>	<u>Travel</u>	<u>Per Diem</u>	<u>Total</u>
Task 1: Finalize Work plan and Initial Interviews	3	300x50=15000	1200	150 x 14=2100	\$18,300.00
Task 2: Develop Survey	2	30 x 50=1500	0	150 x 5=750	\$2,250.00
Task 3: Second Stage Interviews	2	80 x 50=4000	0	0	\$4,000.00
Task 4: Implement Survey	3	100 x 50=5000	0	0	\$5000.00
Sub 4.1: Choose sample	3	40 x 50=2000	0	0	\$0.00
Sub 4.2: Implement survey	3	40 x 50=2000	0	0	\$0.00
Sub 4.3: Follow up	3	20 x 50=1000	0	0	\$0.00
Task 5: On-Site Visits	3	80 x 50=4000	2000	150 x 14=2100	\$8,100.00
Sub 5.1: Schedule & Plan	3	40 x 50=2000	0	0	\$0.00
Sub 5.2: Interviews	3	40 x 50=2000	0	0	\$0.00
Task 6: Data Analysis	3	80 x 50=4000	0	0	\$4,000.00
Task 7: Write Final Report	1	80 x 50=4000	0	0	\$4,000.00
Sub 7.1: Write draft	1	40 x 50=2000	0	0	\$0.00
Sub 7.2: Gather comments	1	20 x 50=1000	0	0	\$0.00
Sub 7.3: Write final report	1	20 x 50=1000	0	0	\$0.00
<b>Total</b>					<b>\$45,600</b>

**Appendix C**  
**Interview Guide**

- 1) What has your experience been with Civil/Military Cooperation on development projects? (Describe)
- 2) Do you believe that Civil/Military Relations in USAID have improved or gotten worse over the past five years?
- 3) If improved, what do you think are the most important steps that have been taken to improve relationships?
- 4) If not improved, why do you think that has occurred?
- 5) What are the most important qualities in the relationship between the military and the civilians in development work? [E.g., is it built on trust, confidence, and communications?]
- 6) What are some examples (either good or bad) from your experience of Civil/Military cooperation in development?
- 7) Do you think that high threat environments in the Asia and Middle East regions make Civil/Military cooperation more important? Why or why not?
- 8) How would you describe the ways in which Civil/Military cooperation functions in the field?
- 9) What kinds of issues have arisen in moving from the policy stage to implementation of new ways of facilitating the Civil/Military relationship? (Describe)
- 10) What steps have been or are being taken to train military actors in best practices in development?
- 11) What steps have been or are being taken to train civilian actors on working with the military on development?
- 12) What do you believe are the major issues to address in assuring that the Civil/Military relationship in development works?
- 13) Do you believe that these issues are being addressed?
- 14) What do you think has been the primary impact of Civil/Military cooperation on development ?

**Appendix D**  
**Survey Questionnaire**

# Box Responses/Survey

## Responses to Formal Mechanism Question:

1. Civilian-Military working group, chaired by USAID and DOD/ODC
2. There is an interagency civil-military working group that meets on a monthly basis to discuss issues, projects, and upcoming events.
3. Through our "Country Team" meetings run by the Ambassador; heads of agency at Post attend, including DOD and USAID.
4. The Embassy has a bi-weekly DOD Coordination group where USAID, various DOD elements at post, PAO, and State meet to discuss ongoing activities and collaboration.
5. 1207 and 1206 funding.
6. A Civil Military liaison officer is assigned to the USAID office on a permanent basis.
7. I am not in a position to know exactly.
8. there is a military personnel assigned to liase with USAID
9. I understand from my colleague that a formal Military USAID cooperative effort exists in Yemen.
10. Through a bilateral agreement between USAID and the Government of Bangladesh
11. The money is transferred to the Mission and I as a CO procure via the proper instrument the work product the Mission and Military have agreed upon. As a CO this happens often depending on the location I am assigned.
12. IRRF, ESP, CERP, Data Sharing Joint Working Group for which I am USAID/Iraq Representative.
13. There is an MOA between USAID and the JUSMAG office which defines respective responsibilities and areas of cooperation. There is also a small amount of joint programming between USAID and the Joint Special Operations Task Force (runs out of DOD's Special Operations Combatant Command).
14. The needs are identified by government of Afghanistan and then each individual implementing partner backup part of the needs/plan. By this way the activities are implemented through formal mechanism.
15. We are currently implementing a 1207 program as well as synchronizing efforts with our MIST and SOCCENT teams and designing matrices that outline and layout defined efforts between USAID and the Civil Affairs units here at post.
16. There is no one formal mechanism in Iraq although there is extensive civil-military cooperation. I'm not sure of its current fate but there was the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF). In addition to the PRT structures involving State, USAID, and DoD, we also have had U.S. Military Liaison Officers (LNOs) embedded within USAID and

USAID LNOs embedded with the Military Civil Affairs units at the Multi-National Force (MNF) and Multi-National Corps (MNC) levels.

17. There is an interagency working group called ICMAG (Interagency Civ-Mil Action Group) that works under the authority of chief of mission and is responsible for all civ-mil cooperation activities.

18. Formal in the sense that USAID Philippines has signed a memo of cooperation which lays out a general framework to ensure working together and sharing information.

19. I don't know what is the definition of formal mechanism.

20. ICMAG

21. Inter-Agency Civ-Mil Action Group

22. Via general Dayton's office via Consulate General in Jerusalem

23. USAID has a contract with ARD Inc., to implement civilian side of activities, while the INL has agreements with the government and USIP to implement its activities

24. Not very familiar about the mechanism. However I am aware there is a mechanism in place

25. Joint committee

26. This has to go through the highest ranking (national) official in order to get a permission to implement.

27. We have a Civ-Mil point person imbedded in our office and coordinates with projects on education, health, etc.

28. Government to Government Memorandum of Understanding

29. MOU between DOS and DOD

30. Working Groups at the Embassy level, good interaction with PACOM at the regional level.

31. administrative procedural agreement (APA)

32. USAID occasionally enters into formal MOUs with US Military forces in this country, but usually these MOU deal with very specific matters - rather than dealing with the overall relationship.

33. USAID/Philippines and JSOTF have a memorandum of understanding.

## **Responses to Civ/Mil Increase Question:**

1. Directed DOD humanitarian assistance into on-going USAID development assistance programs for greater impact.

2. It ensures that there is no duplication of effort. It's mutually beneficial: DOD has done engineering surveys for USAID; USAID has assisted in DOD assessments, including the use of translators and "interpreters" of cultural context.

3. DOD assisted in providing humanitarian assistance, along with USAID, following a natural disaster. Since that point we have worked to coordinate continuing recovery activities as USAID has tended to focus more on livelihoods whereas DOD is focusing on infrastructure. However, USAID may conduct some of the types of infrastructure activities as DOD and so we are coordinating to ensure that we complement each other's efforts. USAID and DOD also have assisted each other with FSN staff and DOD engineering expertise to conduct field assessments to plan future programming.
4. Building health faculty and school will complement to health and education program in the country
5. Rehabilitated schools provides better environment for teaching/learning process. The complementary rehabilitation activity ensures the quality of outcomes for trained teachers(better performance) and students (learning well)
6. It start has new project and enriched the HA program
7. don't know yet
8. better coordination between AID and the military
9. Received much needed funds for critical infrastructure needs.
10. There has been a significant streamlining and efforts. Each interagency has found mutually benefiting aspects from this cooperation.
11. Mil cooperation is not reinventing anything; they are mostly doing something that will help existing or future development assistance programming. For instance, USAID has pre-school program and uses Government facilities to run schools; therefore, Mil is constructing schools that can be used by USAID.
12. Much needed increased funding.
13. IMHO it is a good thing but strong resistance on both sides contributes to less than optimum performance
14. We are working very closely with our Civil Affairs units to strengthen both of our missions in the areas of health and education. This is a continued work in progress but we have established excellent relationships with our Military units here at post and expect true synergistic effects in our health and education programs.
15. I have been asked by the Ambassador to coordinate both military and civilian programming to ensure both are synergistic here at post. programming.
16. To change the ideas regarding it for better communication for finding a result based solution.
17. We have many TDY personnel whom use our mission as a launching area for their work in Iraq
18. It has positive and successful impact.
19. My sense is that it has become less visible as the U.S. Military withdraws from Iraq. The perception is that the civilian side will pick up the gap as the military pulls out; however, the reality is that resources are decreasing on the civilian side as well.

20. It completely made us dependent on the military efforts. Our security is now in greater danger than at times when USAID worked independently for the sake of international development.

21. Better collaboration between DoD short-term programs with USAID longer-term efforts. One example is the use of special operation task forces to deliver books to USAID-sponsored schools that are located in conflict areas.

22. Confusion between USAID and military assistance. People are often suspicious of US foreign assistance when the military is involved.

23. Has shown the need for full-time staff in Mission technical offices to take on coordination with FPOs on PRTs.

24. Joint planning and implementation; CERP to USAID-funded projects

25. Strengthening security, search and rescue.

26. This covers more areas: cultural, humanitarian assistance, provision of medical help and social services, music. So, it is more friendly and well received by the public in general.

27. The US military recently built a hospital which was supposed to benefit poor mothers and children. However, my office did not even know anything about this. Had there been better coordination between our office and the US military, we could have pinpointed places or particular areas where it is more strategic to build a hospital.

28. No impact at all

29. Not sure

30. Security cover.

31. Added focus and increased cooperation/synchronization

32. Cooperation has definitely increased but internally, not publically advertised. That is a deliberate, situational decision.

33. More complementation; shared information

34. It did not have substantial impact. USAID has been carrying out programs in high threat environments for many years, and has substantial expertise in how to do this. Similar activities carried out by US Military forces are a welcome supplement to USAID activities.

35. It has helped increase our outreach significantly through logistics support. We have also provided advice and guidance to civilian affairs programs in terms of focus and contributions to longer-term efforts.

### **Responses to High Threat Mitigation question:**

1. Can't carry out development without at least a minimum of security.
2. Don't know

3. In some serious situations like flooding or earthquake. More cooperation from military side will help to resolve the emergency issues.
4. DOD can provide information and resources that is not available to USAID, whereas USAID provides expertise that is beneficial for DOD.
5. Military can provide security and access to carry out development programs.
6. I don't understand the questions.
7. Additional resources to infrastructure are needed to development programs in education sector where rehabilitation of schools is not considered.
8. People's economy will grow up, people will have job...etc.
9. Since after a arms conflict the Civilian populations need resources to start there livelihood and get back with life.
10. Joint cooperation with local civ/mil
11. As long as Military focuses on security and not development.
12. development work could be assisted by military support in high risk threat environments.
13. closer relationship with local people would bring better/clearer understanding of one another, and maybe would reduces chances for conflict
14. Helps to work in areas and sectors where USAID cannot undertake activities. However, the structures and processes for undertaking such programs need to be streamlined.
15. In some cases, yes. In Yemen the military was sometimes able to travel to places where USAID was not able to work. In other cases, I can imagine the US military would be more of a target and exacerbate the problem than if it was just USAID.
16. Yes. Military resources can be used to complement AID programs, for examples construction of schools or roads in areas where AID is working on complementary programs.
17. Civil Affairs Teams continue to operate in these high threat environments and the development agencies will need to follow suite in order to build upon the very small victories accomplished by CERP/ MINCOST CAT projects.
18. I think if two sections work together then that's some thing good
19. I often feel that the Military can provide better development assistance in areas where security is an issue.
20. There is no "yes" or "no" type answer to this question. Each case is different as the regions, countries, and nations.
21. I have been assigned to most of these high threat locations during the last 6 years and the Military is very needed element to our successful implementation of all our programs. Yes, we have different view points but it is in our best interest these days to find common ground for both entities.

22. Military protection is necessary to facilitate Development workers to carry-out their mission but this shouldn't results in Military people taking over the development role/task for which they are not ideally suited or trained. If they were primarily "development" personalities they would have gone into development in the majority of cases.

23. it needs to be done internally

24. Civ/Mil cooperation enables activities to occur in areas where USAID would otherwise have difficulty operating. It also enables USAID to teach our military colleagues about long-term and holistic thinking in conducting activities (even seemingly simple ones like constructing latrines or school classrooms). Lastly, it mitigates duplication of efforts and fosters more coordinated activities that have a greater impact (e.g., military builds a road which enables USAID-supported farmers to move their products to market more easily).

25. The Civ/Mil cooperation here at post is excellent and allows us to have greater visibility of the current conditions in theater, the security situation and the needs of communities where we are targeting to work together. Collectively, our US Mil elements and we at USAID can work better to define our missions and to ensure that programs do in fact address the needs of the targeted communities where we are working and/or trying to kick start joint programs.

26. possibly. but this is a complex question that cannot be answered in this survey on the unclass side.

27. not sure; I don't know a whole lot about it but from what I do know, think there are pros and cons. I personally think USAID should manage development funds, not the military. that being said though, if the military has funds for development, then we need to get on board with cooperating with them because most of them need our help.

28. Civ / Mil cooperation is the experience toward decreasing the violence and building trust between each other.

29. Civ/Mil cooperation is an effective tool to allow development work to progress in areas in which normally the USG would option to evacuate post

30. Because Afghanistan is the situation that needs CIV/Mil Cooperation. Mil cooperation is needed in many cases

31. Civil-military cooperation is essential to monitoring our projects and movements of personnel in high threat environments. While RSO provides some services, personnel in PRTs generally rely on the military to monitor our programs. Without the U.S. Military, USAID cannot monitor its programs properly in light of current Chief of Mission policy for security. One downside worth mentioning is that while many beneficiaries may be happy to cooperate with USAID, they do not want their premises visited by MRAPs and military personnel due to the public attention it draws to them for associating with the U.S. Government, thereby putting themselves at risk by insurgents.

32. In my country military is not the traditional peace-keeping mission. The military here need to do offensive operations in different parts. If we marry development efforts with a military that is here to defeat the enemy, is not a good idea. Once the military is in war,

there is a lot of room for error and a small mistake in war is can cause death. One death can be big blow to the entire development effort if it is seen with the military that is in fighting mood.

33. transportation of staff and goods is one example. Another is opening up areas that allow development to take place.

34. Maybe. What is to be avoided is the perception that the military is giving bread and butter with one hand and dropping bombs and bullets with the other.

35. By reducing terrorist threats in local communities, impeding the local economy and forcing them to support political agendas or terrorists, human rights violations enforced on women, gender discrimination at schools and no religious or cultural freedoms. Assistance through development work makes people living in a better life by having job, thinking rightful, thus no need to fight for.

36. I'm not sure exactly

37. Military is viewed negatively.

38. We can't do site visits without military security.

39. I have no idea

40. not sure

41. Civ/Mil programs make civilians targets and blur the lines between development and military action.

42. Military will be effective in controlling armed and criminal groups which makes civilian development difficult to implement.

43. The attitude of the local government is not conducive for this kind of exercise

44. yes and no. While the military has the might and the protection to deliver assistance in places more difficult for humanitarian assistance groups to reach, the military's increased participation in humanitarian assistance does blur the line between the 'white van' civilian assistance groups and the men with guns.

45. military is better trained, more teamwork

46. If we use more friendly and culturally acceptable approaches, there should not be any problem.

47. Civ/Mil cooperation could help since we could exchange information on where it would be safe to go or not. However, as a development worker, I also feel that we should also be careful in having "uniformed" men carrying firearms as we go to provinces and communities. The more military men (usually with long firearms -- since I've seen a US mil carrying these during the Mercy Mission), the people see, the more it is perceived that an area/place is being "militarized" -- which could mean that something is afoot or something bad is happening/about to happen.

48. high threat environments are not one country problem, cooperation will certainly help.

49. as long as each is clear on their role .... the recent encroachment of the military into development is worrisome. the military does not understand or carry out development programs. Well

50. Thu, Jul 30, 2009 1:21 AM

51. The constraints would be external not directly tied to the cooperation-

52. Actually, the answer is Don't know (but you don't have that choice). Considering the perception that pervades in some parts of the country that having military personnel around is more dangerous than helpful, I don't know if a civ/mil cooperation is a method of choice for doing development work. But that's almost moot and academic. The norm these days is really to work with the military, period. We just need to focus on the HOW, rather than the why.

53. Security cover

54. Military entities are capable of performing in these environments.

55. It is highly dependent on the country context. Clear leadership and guidance from the top helps too.

56. helps diffuse tension. civil/military cooperations creates an environment for pursuing peace.

57. Mil. personnel can go to areas that civilian contract workers cannot.

58. The constraints posed by high threat environments do limit USAID ability to carry out development programs, but they do not limit them very much. Presence of US Military can be a two-edged sword. While US Military presence can result in a reduction in threat over the long term, in the short term, the presence of US Military forces can alarm people and prompt a hostile reaction by some people who hitherto had not threatened USAID activities.

59. Have not done so to date, see no breakthroughs in thinking of how to mitigate

60. It increases the sense of inclusion, and that there is something to lose if peace and order is not maintained.

61. Looking at both sides of the coin would provide a more complete development intervention

## **Responses to Leveraging Question:**

1. At least in our country context, the amounts of DOD funding are quite small and the coordination efforts are very time consuming.

2. I would say the impact is nominal in terms of leveraging resources. I'm not sure why that is, but I will say there's more benefit involved than simply leveraging resources

3. At post we have successfully received an additional \$15 million in 2009 1207 resources, in part through our successful interagency cooperation as post.

4. Military resources are not necessarily large, but they can be timely and flexible.
5. Tajikistan receives assistance through the US Embassy Civil Affairs Team thus it's involvement through AID ids needed
6. I think yes but since I'm not involved with this Program, I do not know the extend.
7. Currently I am not aware of any resources put in the programs with civ/mil involved
8. Lack of mechanisms for either money to come to USAID or procure services from implementing organizations.
9. joint civil and military funding provided
10. More funds have been received through Civ/Mil partnerships, but that's not to say that more funds have been leveraged from other sources as a result of this partnership.
11. In Yemen, military resources were somewhat helpful for USAID since they provided funds for infrastructure and supplies. They also provided labor. This enabled USAID to focus on technical assistance while providing needed infrastructure support. It was difficult at times to work with the military (see comment below).
12. For example, through 1207 funded activities that are funded by DoD and executed in cooperation with DoD and other USG agencies.
13. 1207 funding is managed by the AID office with input from the JUSMAG and JSOTF operating in theater.
14. I am not in a position to know about resources.
15. It could be a very strong cooperative strategy
16. Money is coming from different sources to achieve one common goal; therefore, more resources are coming to my Mission
17. Especially in Iraq where because of the close proximity I find better working relations than in Afghanistan where you have the classic separated camps, i.e., Embassy compound vs military installation.
18. It is clear that more was done thru Mil/Civ cooperation than would have been possible without such cooperation however such cooperation should be done with more clearly defined roles, making clear who are the development experts and how successful development is done. The idea of just throwing money at people should not be confused with "development". It may sometimes be desired to throw large amounts of money at people/communities in the hope of buying a temporary peace but such actions are rarely sustainable and can only be seen as temporary relief/avoidance of worsening conditions in the same way that Humanitarian Relief is not Development.
19. 1207 and 1210 funds are a good example of the resources leveraged. USAID-led Humanitarian assistance would not be nearly as effective without DOD assets. And in a less tangible way, the connections that have developed between USAID and DOD through entities like the USAID Office of Military Affairs have important positive aspects.
20. Absolutely. Our SOCCENT and MIST teams come to the table with resources and we jointly plan efforts. We are still a work in progress but are all confident we can continue joint programming/funding.

21. depending on the country

22. It appears that much of the early funding in Iraq was implemented without much oversight such as USAID normally uses. Considering that the USG has a finite budget, some of these funds could have been administered under USAID's development umbrella.

23. In some cases Mil has the resources but needs technical assistance by USAID.

24. Never heard of it.

25. I am ambivalent in answering this question, agree that we have leveraged our resources, but have a problem with the term "significantly." In some instances, with CERP or JTERP, USAID has been able to coordinate our efforts with hiccups along the way. USAID generally does development better than the military, although we have significantly less resources. However, the military is flush with funds and interested in quickly pumping money out there. Perhaps the military should stick to the "clear" phase through military efforts, providing quick handouts for those injured in the way, and trash pick up to clear the way of IEDs. USAID should take over development projects from there (with the military focused on security and assisting movements for project monitoring). In addition, we should have greater Congressional authority and flexibility to accept DoD funds. There have been cases where DoD wanted to provide funds to USAID, and where we found ourselves restricted.

26. experienced AID officers do not understand civ-mil at all. To mitigate this problem, AID started hiring ex-military officers who then do not understand the principles of AID.

27. 1210 and 1207 funds

28. Probably-The military has access to more monies.

29. Not very active in this country and it may not be the right move at this time.....

30. Civ/Mil does very little to and in very slow mode compare to AID.

31. not sure again as I did not see any example of it in Turkmenistan.

32. USG Policies support coordinated assistance.

33. CERP funds are substantial. We could do a better job at leveraging those funds. Being proactive with the military on what they can do based on their comparative advantage. Again, need full-time USAID staff in Kabul dedicated to managing the relationships--Central ministry, provincial ministry, CTOs, IP staff, DOD counterparts and USAID FPOs.

34. i.e. for roads, etc.

35. Due to terrorism

36. don't know

37. Yes; however, this is not necessarily a positive development.

38. Military has been able to assist where USAID is constrained due to regulations.

39. By way of funding

40. 1207 funding gives USAID additional resources to put toward strictly humanitarian assistance programs.

41. I have no idea.

42. During the Mercy Mission, the local governments we work with have been able to provide health services to areas which we would not have been able to cover.

43. because AID has clear distinction between assistance to military and non-military and we can't cross it

44. I haven't worked on any of these programs, but have heard anecdotally that we have leveraged funds

45. some, but not that significant. for one, there is no continuity in terms of who in the military we are talking with. Military planning officers get changed on a 6-month basis. Then, for specific schedules, there will be different commanders and military health officials that we work with. The military chain of command is too sacred to allow for flexibility even for non-military operations

46. Planning resources, security, etc.

47. For example the MIL uses the medical profiles/information provided by USAID to plan medical/dental missions.

48. 1207 - however need to streamline process; would be lovely if DOD could just give money to USAID Washington for them to distribute as needed.....

49. makes available more resources for critical activities.

50. Logistics and transportation are expensive. Military expertise in this areas frees up resources for other activities.

51. Iraq and Afghanistan soak up any extra funds.

52. We have been able to access 1207/1210 funding, we have worked on complementary programs, and obtained logistics support for our activities, especially in hard-to-reach conflict affected areas.

53. USAID has successfully competed for and received a total of about \$20 million of 1207 funds over two years. These funds have allowed USAID to mount important and necessary infrastructure development programs in conflict areas.

## **Responses to Positive Impact on Development Question:**

1. minimal impact given the short-term objectives of military assistance.
2. DOD is increasingly engaging here and so the USG can maximize its positive impact in country through coordination and ensuring that our efforts are integrated.

3. Has allowed USAID to influence use of DOD resources for civil affairs and link them to USAID long-term development activities.
4. The additional input affects the outcomes of the project as each component of the project links to each other. Trained teachers are motivated to disseminate knowledge in rehabilitated schools and kids have fun from improved facilities and interactive learning practices.
5. Our people may have the idea that military is here to help the people. they are not here just to fight.
6. I think so and for the same reason as 11 above.
7. Confusion between security and development.
8. The two sides do not understand each other.
9. In theory the military can help and have a positive impact - but sometimes it can hinder, especially if military personnel don't understand development or USAID's long-term goals that we would like to achieve. In my experience in Yemen, the military's objective was to spend money, but the implementation and underlying development objectives were not necessarily considered. In addition, the military personnel tasked to do this work were mostly young and inexperienced. It made it difficult to work with them. There were complaints from several health departments that the health facilities constructed by the military did not meet Yemen's standards or needs. As a result, some of the facilities were not being used. The military needs to change the incentives for their development programs and ensure that they are utilizing and tapping into appropriate technical expertise to implement their programs.
10. Overall, programs need to be coordinated better to avoid the perception that civilian agencies are supporting military goals. In cases where the military and AID do work together, roles and responsibilities need to be carefully defined. For example, in areas where DoD is maintaining peace or training a foreign military to operate against a destabilizing group (Taliban, Abu Sayyaf, etc) USAID programs can help provide "peace dividends" or, to an extent, counter insurgencies by providing economic and educational opportunities. In these cases, AID's work should be sharply delineated from that of the military to ensure that AID continues to be accepted and trusted and our overall work in the country is not jeopardized.
11. The military has provided security and access to USAID in a way that would have been impossible given the threat posture. Working with a standing JUSMAG/ JSOTF and the host countries military cultural misconceptions are slowly dissolving to facilitate a whole of government Interagency approach.
12. Don't know
13. It could if managed correctly.
14. Please see the answer of question no. 8
15. Yes, as long as the particular Military commander recognizes our expertise.
16. It would not have been possible for USAID/Iraq to continue to be active in Iraq during the past few years without military protection however the impact would have

been greatly improved if the Military would have done what they do best and facilitate the Humanitarian Assistance and Development experts do what they do best. Just throwing money at people isn't always beneficial. If nothing sustainable is developed which the money is withdrawn there is a negative backlash from people who have become dependent on it. They will look to others who will "pay" them.

17. It does not affect the people

18. Civ/Mil cooperation is an example of team work, the team work result always positive and reduces duplications.

19. they don't seem to know how to do health related development assistance; but if they were to provide support for reproductive health/family planning service delivery programs to the military and their families, it would complement USAID assistance

20. Our Military counterparts here at post are committed, passionate, strategic visionaries who wish to engage with us to jointly implement development assistance and development programs in the most efficacious manner possible. The Special Operations Forces here at post are a great group of dedicated professionals and working with them to jointly implement our missions is a strong move in improving overall development assistance in this country.

21. we have not reached this level yet

22. not sure but I'll tend toward the positive.

23. Not aware of any

24. if it is in a coordination it has positive impact, but if it is not in a coordination it has negative and full of challenge impact.

25. The Mil component has allowed development work to continue in areas where it would be impossible without Mil assistance. USAID's development expertise has provided the military with insight into other methods of intervening and a significantly more robust monitoring and evaluation than the Mil normally uses.

26. in the environment where I work need more military interaction because of security.

27. Without the U.S. Military, USAID could not have monitored its projects and provided oversight, never mind clearing the area to be secure. However, Brigade Commanders need to be cognizant that USAID does not answer to them, that they do not have authority over our contractors/grantees, and that they cannot direct them (could be personally liable for unauthorized commitments if they do so), even if these projects occur in their Area of Operations. If we all stay within our lanes (DoD=security, State=diplomacy, and USAID=development), we can complement one another, work together, and mutually achieve our objectives.

28. A lot of focus on Civ-Mil efforts made it very difficult for AID officers to even operate in this environment. They have become completely dependent of military. This does not have any positive impact.

29. Only in conflict and high threat area. Also for disaster relief

30. Probably- see comment in item 10.
31. Only cooperating that I am familiar with is the training by military for border guards.
32. But in a very small account.
33. Don't know
34. military almost always is viewed negatively.
35. I do not know
36. Beneficiaries cannot distinguish between development activities and military activities.
37. Working with both civil and military is important to improve understanding of each other's role in maintaining security and development
38. By making a positive impact on the rehabilitation of the ex-combatants
39. At least we can help inform one another of best practices.
40. The staff from DOD, although well-intentioned and well-resourced, use a very expat-heavy model of delivering assistance that runs counter to the programs USAID is supporting.
41. Civ/Mil cooperation is badly needed. Mil has the infrastructure to mobilize the logistics and Civ has the talents and capacity to drive the force. They need to work together.
42. I'm really not sure. I have no evidence to say if there is positive impact or not. However, I believe that there should be more coordination and sharing of information.
43. we are now undoing and fixing a lot of the interventions the military started in the name of "development"
44. Don't have direct knowledge, but have heard very good examples of effective cooperation
45. not sure, but we have certainly tried to make the most of it. a health center being refurbished here and there, some classrooms painted here and there, some hospital generator sets repaired here and there... only if the military will consider a real development plan for a specific site, perhaps, will the impact be more evident and tangible
46. Geographic expansion.
47. There is a blurring of roles. This country/region is not a high threat area that needs the military involvement actually. For other geographic areas, the need is there.
48. they reinforce each other. USAID offers a development perspective while the Military ensures security.
49. The resources made available to USAID through the 1207 program have been very useful as USAID carries out its "peace and development" program.
50. Hasn't had many concrete successes

**Appendix E**  
**Phase 2 Statement of Work**

# ***USAID's Role in Civil Military Relations in Asia and the Middle East***

## ***Programmatic Implications and Lessons Learned***

### ***Phase II Evaluation***

#### ***I. Introduction***

When USAID first considered the role of Civil/Military Cooperation in development there were several reasons articulated for adopting a Civil/Military Cooperation policy. It was explicitly recognized that, especially in post-conflict situations, there are stabilization and reconstruction tasks for which the military has specific skills, assets and capabilities. Further, it has been stated that, in those situations when there is a gap which cannot be filled by another actor; where value is added for the recipient community; when it is acceptable to the local population and culture; when it is planned in such a way to support other assistance efforts; and where the military has a specific comparative advantage, Civil/Military Cooperation has been of benefit to both sides.

Three models for Civil/Military cooperation in foreign assistance have been developed. These are: 1) humanitarian relief coordinated through OFDA; 2) the work of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan; and 3) steady state (long term) programming like NAMRU in Egypt and elsewhere.

Implementation guidelines for USAID's current Civil/Military Cooperation Policy require that Regional Bureaus work with COCOM representatives to develop strategies to work in areas where there are security issues; explore options for securing DOD funding for USAID development activities; and work with other agencies and offices to:

- Develop, test and subsequently improve common metrics and assessment techniques;
- Improve the monitoring and evaluation of joint USAID-DOD efforts;
- Develop general guidelines for determining what programs and projects should receive the highest priority for monitoring and evaluation.

#### ***II. Program Theory of Civil/Military Cooperation***

The Civil/Military Cooperation Development Hypothesis, as articulated in USAID policy statements and in other relevant materials, is that development efforts in regions where there is a substantial U.S. Military presence can be augmented by such cooperation. By enabling access to populations in high threat areas that otherwise would be inaccessible for development efforts; utilization of DOD resources for development activities; and providing a demonstration, through successful Civil/Military Relations dialogue, of a model of good governance for states undergoing a transition from authoritarian forms of government to more open, transparent ones, development programming will more efficiently and effectively achieve its strategic objectives.

Four basic principles applicable to these cooperative projects have been articulated in the literature. These are: 1) clarity of mission and objectives; 2) unity of authority and integration of effort; 3) timely and effective interventions; and 4) commitment to the process at high levels for both organizations.

### ***III. Evaluation Questions and Objectives***

The evaluation shall document accomplishments and lessons learned for the use of both USAID staff and the general public. Specifically, the Phase II evaluation report shall assist and inform the Asia and Middle East Missions and guide other current and future country programs.

The Asia and Middle East Bureaus would like specific examples of impact, both in quantitative and qualitative form. The evaluation questions are structured around the addressing the overall issue of Civil/Military Cooperation (Phase I—Evaluation Report Attached) and thereafter detailing the impact of specific activities and series of interventions.

The proposed assessment is a corporate level meta-evaluation designed to address specific issues that have been raised with respect to the efficacy of Civil/Military Cooperation. In this regard, five evaluation questions will be addressed:

- Does USAID's organizational culture enable or support effective Civil/Military Cooperation?
- Does the Military's organizational culture enable or support effective Civil/Military Cooperation?
- Has communication between USAID and the Military on development projects been optimal?
- Is the premise correct that USAID has been effectively supported in its development efforts by Civil/Military Cooperation?

The evaluation has three main objectives: 1) To provide a better understanding of how Civil/Military Cooperation contributes to the achievement of USAID's development objectives and strategic operations; 2) To assess both the advantages and disadvantages of the relationship; and 3) To provide building blocks and a framework for developing a more advanced Civil/Military Cooperation strategy to promote effective cooperation, access and share knowledge and resources, and establish a fully participatory process for future cooperation.

### ***IV. Evaluation Methods***

The evaluation will be conducted in two phases. Phase I involved two related tasks: examining the role of Civil/Military Cooperation, including its strengths, weaknesses and

future potential and identifying and reviewing programs implemented by Civil/Military Cooperation.

During Phase I (report attached) a review of external sources of information including articles, policy documents, evaluations and assessments and key informant interviews was undertaken. Also during this phase, a survey instrument will be formulated and sent to relevant personnel in Missions to complete. Also, during Phase I, case studies for Phase II were selected on the basis of: regional and sectoral representation; potential for learning from experience; and the availability of information (preferably based on evaluations) on the history and process of Civil/Military Cooperation.

During Phase II, the evaluation team will conduct the four case studies. Projects that were completed, evaluated and assessed at the field level will be reviewed and further interviews and surveys implemented. These case studies will be the primary basis for evaluating Civil/Military Cooperation in development and allow the evaluation team to derive lessons and recommendations.

The following Missions were selected in Phase 1 for Phase 2 case studies:

1. The Philippines, which has an active long-term Civil/Military Cooperation program;
2. Afghanistan, which represents the PRT model for Civil/Military Cooperation;
3. Indonesia which has had considerable experience with the humanitarian assistance model of cooperation; and
4. Yemen which has just launched its Whole of Government initiative which will form the basis for a longitudinal case study.

The questions to be asked on the project level with respect to Civil/Military Cooperation will be:

1. Was Civil/Military Cooperation on the project appropriate in addressing the situation needing improvement? Why or why not?
2. Has Civil/Military Cooperation on the project supported the achievement of the goal, objectives, outputs, and activities? Why or why not?
3. Were Civil/Military Cooperation inputs (resources and time) used in the most appropriate way to achieve the objectives (outcomes)? Why or why not? What could be done to improve implementation?
4. Has Civil/Military Cooperation on the project contributed to the long-term goal? What unanticipated positive or negative consequences did the project have?
5. Has Civil/Military Cooperation on the project contributed to continued positive impacts as a result of the project? Why or why not?

#### ***V. Deliverables***

The contractor shall provide the following deliverables:

1. Brief outline of methodological approach for evaluation.
2. A proposed itinerary, schedule for interviews, and list of all logistical support needs for the field visit based on desk review of documents and grants database, interview lists, and initial conversation with the Bureaus. This deliverable shall be submitted to the CTO prior to departure; however, it can be adjusted within the first few days.

3. Draft of the evaluation report, not to exceed 30 pages single-sided with Times New Roman 12 point (or equivalent) font, plus additional annexes (report and annexes to be submitted electronically). The format of the report is flexible, but should be discussed with the country team. The report shall include photographs (to be taken by the evaluators).
4. The following sections are recommended for the final report: Table of Contents, Acronyms, Executive Summary, Background (mission and general approach to programming, country context, evaluation objectives and methodology, overall observations, findings (answers to questions in scope), conclusions, recommendations.
5. Final evaluation report in English, deliverable no later than two weeks after receipt of all comments from USAID on first draft. A total of 20 bound copies should be delivered in addition to an electronic copy in Microsoft Word format.
6. Final PowerPoint presentation summarizing conclusions and recommendations to be submitted electronically at the same time as the final report. The PowerPoint presentation and Final Evaluation Report should adhere to the USAID graphic standards identified at <http://www.usaid.gov/branding/acquisition.html>.

#### ***VII. Phase II Tasks***

1. Recruit and hire three-person final evaluation team (final team will include one Bureau staff member)
2. Develop, in coordination with the Asia and Middle East Bureaus, an appropriate methodology for the evaluation.
4. Evaluate the performance and impact of Civil/Military Cooperation in the Asia and Middle East Missions including:
  - a. A literature review of documentation on Civil/Military Cooperation. All necessary documentation and database access will be provided by USAID, the majority electronically.
  - b. Interviews in the Philippines, Indonesia, Afghanistan and Yemen.
  - c. Field surveys if possible.
  - d. A field review, including interviews with Mission and Civil Affairs staff Embassy and other USG personnel as needed; implementing partners; and program beneficiaries at project sites where feasible.
5. Provide an out-briefing to in-country before departure.
6. Provide a briefing in Washington upon completion of the field visits, but prior to finishing the draft report.
7. Document, in a draft evaluation report for USAID comment, findings, conclusions, and lessons learned from the program, as well as recommendations for the future (details on the report are presented below);
8. Provide a final evaluation report for public distribution, incorporating feedback from USAID on the draft, to include a Power Point presentation; and
9. Provide an official public presentation in Washington on the final report.

### ***VIII. Schedule and Logistics***

The Task Order period will begin immediately after signing and extend until April 30, 2010. The field visit portion of the evaluation should take place Between December 2009 and February 2010. Work under the Final Evaluation portion of the Task Order will take place in Washington, DC, Afghanistan, Indonesia, the Philippines and Yemen.

### ***IX. Team Composition***

1. One senior-level evaluator with extensive experience (at least 10 years) designing and conducting corporate-level evaluations. The senior level evaluator will serve as team leader and be responsible for the field review, interviews, the draft and final evaluation reports, and the debriefs in the field and in Washington, DC.
2. One mid-level evaluator with experience (at least 6 years) conducting evaluations of programs in Asia and the Middle East.
3. One mid-level evaluation with experience with Civil/Military Cooperation projects.

**Appendix F**  
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**APPENDIX G**  
**BACKGROUND AND KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS**

<b><u>OFFICE OR ORGANIZATION</u></b>	<b><u>NUMBER INTERVIEWED</u></b>	<b><u>TYPE OF INTERVIEW</u></b>	<b><u>DATE (MONTH/YEAR)</u></b>
USAID/OMA	1	KEY INFORMANT	2/09
USAID/ASIA/TS	2	KEY INFORMANT	2/09
USAID/ME/TS	2	KEY INFORMANT	3/09
USAID/CAIRO	2	KEY INFORMANT	6/09
USAID/OMEP	1	KEY INFORMANT	6/09
USAID/YEMEN	1	KEY INFORMANT	9/09
USAID/IRAQ	1	KEY INFORMANT	2/09
DOD/CMSE	3	KEY INFORMANT	3/09
DOD/CENTCOM	3	KEY INFORMANT	3/09
DOD/PACOM	1	KEY INFORMANT	3/09
DOD/SOCCENT	3	KEY INFORMANT	9/09
CIVIL-MILITARY INITIATIVE	1	BACKGROUND	5/09
OFFICE OF TRANSITION INITIATIVES	1	BACKGROUND	6/09
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY	2	BACKGROUND	6/09
USDA PRT MEMBERS	5	BACKGROUND	6/09
CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY	1	BACKGROUND	5/09
THE CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS	1	BACKGROUND	5/09
INTERACTION	1	BACKGROUND	5/09