



**USAID** | **NIGERIA**  
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

# MID-TERM EVALUATION OF THE CONFLICT ABATEMENT THROUGH LOCAL MITIGATION (CALM) PROJECT

IMPLEMENTED BY IFESH UNDER COOPERATIVE  
AGREEMENT NO. 620-A-00-05-000099-00

JUNE 2009

This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development.  
It was prepared by ARD, Inc.

# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The CALM Mid-term Evaluation team extends deep thanks to the some 200 project beneficiaries and partners of CALM in Delta, Kaduna, Kano, Plateau, and Rivers states who generously shared their time and thoughts during our interviews and discussions. We are also grateful to the IFESH/CALM staff for generously providing detailed information on their field activities and contacts, and for arranging a number of key interviews. IFESH headquarters in Phoenix kindly supplemented our documentation on the history and evolution of the project.

We are grateful to a number of senior staff from government and donor organizations who expanded our understanding of present and future conflict mitigation and management initiatives in Nigeria. Special thanks goes to USAID Mission Director Sharon Cromer in Abuja for her warm welcome and interest in the evaluation; to the Peace, Democracy and Governance Team for their hands-on support; to staff and team leaders who shared their insights; and to MEMS for review of the project monitoring and evaluation plan.

Finally, we gratefully acknowledge the constant and conscientious support of our field research associates: Ali Garba, Institute of Governance and Social Research (IGSR), Jos; Rosemary Osikoya, Jos; Dr. Christy George, Kate Bee Foundation, Port Harcourt; and Kingsley Akeni, AFSTRAG Consults Limited, Warri.

This report has been prepared for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), under Contract No. DFD-I-00-05-00248-00, Task Order No. 8, Mid-Term Evaluation of the Nigeria CALM Program, under the Instability, Crisis, and Recovery Programs (ICRP) Indefinite Quantity Contract.

Authors: Deirdre LaPin, Sam Amadi, Victor Adetula

ARD Primary Contacts:

Lewis Rasmussen, Senior Technical Advisor/Manager ([lras mussen@ardinc.com](mailto:lras mussen@ardinc.com))  
Edwin Harvey, Project Manager ([eharvey@ardinc.com](mailto:eharvey@ardinc.com))

ARD, Inc.  
159 Bank Street, Suite 300  
Burlington, VT 05401  
Tel: (802) 658-3890  
Fax: (802) 6584247

# MID-TERM EVALUATION OF THE CONFLICT ABATEMENT THROUGH LOCAL MITIGATION (CALM) PROJECT

IMPLEMENTED BY IFESH UNDER COOPERATIVE  
AGREEMENT NO. 620-A-00-05-000099-00

JUNE 2009

## **DISCLAIMER**

The author's views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.



# CONTENTS

- ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ..... iii**
- EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..... v**
- 1.0 BACKGROUND TO THE CALM PROGRAM ..... 1**
- 2.0 CALM OBJECTIVES, ASSUMPTIONS AND OVERARCHING ORIENTATION..... 3**
  - 2.1 GOAL AND OBJECTIVES AS STATED IN THE COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT 3
  - 2.2 PROGRAM ORIENTATION..... 4
  - 2.3 RELIABILITY OF PROGRAM ASSUMPTIONS..... 5
- 3.0 RESEARCH TEAM, PURPOSE, AND METHODOLOGY ..... 7**
- 4.0 DESIGN VERSUS ACTUAL APPROACH TO PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION ..... 9**
  - 4.1 PROVIDING AT-RISK YOUTHS WITH CONSTRUCTIVE FORMS OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT ..... 10
  - 4.2 DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM..... 13
  - 4.3 MAINSTREAMING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT INTO TARGETED ORGANIZATIONS ..... 15
  - 4.4 TARGETED MITIGATION INTERVENTION IN NON-FOCAL STATES ..... 16
  - 4.5 CIVIC EDUCATION FOR ELECTION OBSERVERS AND YOUTH ADVOCACY ..... 16
  - 4.6 PROGRAM INTERVENTIONS AND THEORIES OF CHANGE ..... 16
- 5.0 FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS ..... 19**
  - 5.1 PROGRAM MANAGEMENT ..... 19
    - 5.1.1 Performance Management Plan ..... 19
    - 5.1.2 USAID Oversight, Guidance and Support..... 20
    - 5.1.3 IFESH Management: Administration and Reporting, Partnering, and Technical Oversight..... 21
  - 5.2 ILLUSTRATIVE FINDINGS FROM CALM FIELD ACTIVITIES ..... 22
    - 5.2.1 Rivers State Youth Groups ..... 23
    - 5.2.2 Delta State Computer Skills Training ..... 24
    - 5.2.3 Kano State CMMRC..... 24
    - 5.2.4 Plateau State EWS ..... 24
    - 5.2.5 Kaduna State Basketball for Peace ..... 25
- 6.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ..... 28**
  - 6.1 STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, OPPORTUNITIES, AND THREATS ANALYSIS ..... 28
    - 6.1.1 Strengths..... 28
    - 6.1.2 Weaknesses..... 29
    - 6.1.3 Opportunities..... 30
    - 6.1.4 Threats ..... 31
  - 6.2 STRENGTHENING CALM IMPACT IN THE NEXT 15 MONTHS ..... 32
    - 6.2.1 Key Managerial Steps..... 32
    - 6.2.2 Key Programmatic Contributions to Peaceful Elections and Future Conflict Abatement ..... 34
  - 6.3 ADDITIONAL LESSONS ABOUT CONFLICT ABATEMENT IN NIGERIA..... 35

<b>ANNEXES.....</b>	<b>38</b>
<b>ANNEX A. SCOPE OF WORK.....</b>	<b>39</b>
<b>ANNEX B. APPROACH TO THE STUDY.....</b>	<b>43</b>
<b>ANNEX C. SCHEDULE OF ACTIVITIES.....</b>	<b>47</b>
<b>ANNEX D. DETAILED FINDINGS BY STATE.....</b>	<b>53</b>
<b>ANNEX E. PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS INTERVIEWED.....</b>	<b>64</b>
<b>ANNEX F. DOCUMENTS REVIEWED.....</b>	<b>74</b>

# ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

BB4P	Basketball for Peace
CA	Cooperative Agreement
CALM	Conflict Abatement through Local Mitigation, USAID-funded program implemented under a Cooperative Agreement with IFESH
C-NGO	Coordinating NGO (for the CMMRCs)
CBO	Community-Based Organization
CBIO	Community Based Implementing Organization
CDRT	Centre for Democratic Research and Training (Kano)
CFSJA	Christian Foundation for Social Justice and Equity (Jos)
CITAR	Coalition of Northern based Non-Governmental Organizations
CMM	Conflict Mitigation and Management
CMMRC	Conflict Mitigation and Management Regional Council (CALM)
COP	Chief of Party (IFESH/CALM)
COTR	Contracting Officer's Technical Representative (USAID program supervisor)
CPP	Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding
CRESNET	Conflict Resolution Stakeholders Network (2001)
CYA	Community Youth Association
DCHA	Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (USAID)
DfID	Department for International Development (UK)
EMOLGA	Emohua Local Government Area (Rivers State)
EPI	Emolga Peace Initiative
EU	European Union
EWS	Early Warning System
FY	Fiscal Year
GSSS	Government Standard Secondary School
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
IEC	Information/Education/Communication
IFESH	International Foundation for Education and Self-Help
IITA	International Institute for Tropical Agriculture
IMC	Interfaith Mediation Center (Kaduna)
IP	Implementing Partner
IPCR	Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (President's Office, Abuja)
IR	Intermediate Result
IT	Information Technology
ITC	Information Technology Consulting
LGA	Local Government Area
m	million (currency)
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MEMS	Monitoring and Evaluation Management System
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding

N	Naira (Nigerian currency, now at \$1 = 150; 2008: \$1 = 120)
NDDC	Niger Delta Development Commission
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NISER	Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research (Ibadan)
NOIC	Nigeria Opportunity Industrialization Center
OECD/DAC	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/Development Assistance Committee
OPDAM	Organization for Peace, Development and Management (a splinter group from BB4P in the Port Harcourt Area)
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives
OWA	Ogoni-Wakirike-Andoni Youth Initiative (created in 2007 by WUPG)
PC	Peace Club
PHCN	Power Holding Company of Nigeria
PMP	Performance Management Plan
PPP	Prime Peace Project (Kano)
PZ	Peace Zone
RFTA	Revised Financial Technical Application (IFESH 2005)
SEMA	Strategic Empowerment and Mediation Agency (Kaduna)
SO	Strategic Objective (USAID)
SWIFT	Support Which Implements Fast Transition (USAID Indefinite Quantity Contract managed by USAID/DCHA/OTI)
SWOT	Strengths/Weaknesses/Opportunities/Threats
TOT	Training of Trainers
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
USAID	US Agency for International Development
YOU-PEG	Youth Peace and Empowerment Group (Jos, Co-coordinating NGO for the Plateau State CMMRC)
WAO	Women's Action Organization (Coordinating NGO for Rivers CMMRC)
WUPG	Wakirike United Peace Group

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The USAID Conflict Abatement through Local Mitigation (CALM) program seeks to prevent and reduce conflict by strengthening the capacity of Nigerian society to address the factors responsible for violent conflicts, especially in the Rivers, Delta, Kano, Kaduna and Plateau states of Nigeria. In 2005, USAID/Nigeria awarded a five-year, competitively bid grant to the International Foundation for Education and Self-Help (IFESH) to implement the program in the five states of Nigeria from June 2005-June 2010 under Cooperative Agreement (CA) No. 620-A-00-05-00099-00. The program has four component objectives: (1) increased opportunity for engaging youth; (2) development of Early Warning Systems (EWSs) and response mechanisms; (3) mainstreaming of conflict management in targeted organizations; (4) and targeted conflict mitigation interventions in non-focal states. An additional short-term objective was added to support the local, state, and federal elections in April 2007 through civic education for election observers and post-election youth advocacy.<sup>1</sup>

The CALM program is geographically broad and diverse in scope, with six very different components executed in five states. It stresses community-based interventions, a focus on youth aged 15-29 years, conflict mitigation and management (CMM) and economic skills training, public education, and upper-level stakeholder engagement. Therefore, it assumes staff expertise in training, early warning and response, youth skills acquisition, community program planning, high-level advocacy, information/education/communication (IEC), and coordination with USAID program staff and—by implication—donors. Focal states are located in the Niger Delta, which furnishes over 85% of national revenue but suffers from conflict over distribution of oil resources; and the northern and central region, in which conflict is linked to religion and migration of peoples into other ethnic strongholds. Furthermore, the program is modestly funded at \$8,656,874 over five years, of which 7.8% or \$656,874 was foreseen in counterpart, private sector funding from the recipient.

**Purpose and Methodology.** CALM is the first program of its kind for the USAID/Nigeria mission and is in many ways experimental. Although well past the mid-mark of the program, this “mid-term” evaluation offers an opportunity to assess program design and impact, and to make suggestions for both strengthening and strategically focusing conflict abatement efforts for the remaining 15 months of the program. The multiple objectives of the evaluation were to (1) assess progress of CALM from its start in June 2005 to end in fiscal year (FY) 2008 in achieving the program results expected; (2) specifically recommend ways to strengthen performance for the remaining 15 months of program; (3) explore, at the request of USAID/DCHA/CMM, the utility of the 2008 draft Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)’s “Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding (CPP) Activities”; and 4) specifically apply an USAID/DCHA/CMM analytic tool designed to identify seven broad theoretical levels of “change” and 17 individual drivers of conflict change. The mid-term review of the CALM program was undertaken in two phases: a desk study of documents, and nearly three weeks of intensive field research in Abuja and all focal states by a nine-person team. Seventy-five qualitative field interviews were undertaken.

**Findings.** The evaluation team found that CALM has made an important contribution to raising awareness of creating and maintaining a culture of peace in selected regions of the focal states by

---

<sup>1</sup> While quite lengthy, the report of a 2006 baseline survey of the five states conducted by Drs. Albert and Pam-Sha on behalf of IFESH is highly detailed and informative, and accordingly, provides useful insight into CALM impact. USAID should consider replicating the survey as a final evaluation of CALM and to help inform future conflict programming by the mission.

mobilizing the interest and support of civil society groups at all levels. It has laid a foundation for broad stakeholder engagement in conflict prevention and early warning and response. It has reached out to youth through sports activities, educational institutions, and informal associations and networks. It has opened dialogue and occasionally partnered with government on CMM, and has tested and selected a number of reliable implementing partners. In its effort to fulfill program goals, CALM has also been too ambitious, and has suffered from management deficiencies. The scope and complex design of its work plan have not always been matched by the requisite technical skills of its staff or by the adequate and timely application of funding a range of activities. These conditions affected the tone and morale of the program as it struggled to meet expectations of partners and beneficiaries in a worsening program environment owing to insecurity. Specifically, the evaluation team noted:

- Program management by USAID and IFESH was hampered by a Results Framework and indicators that focused on numerical outputs rather than higher-level results.
- Field supervision by USAID and IFESH was rare, owing in part to increasing security restrictions.
- Conflict early warning has not evolved through the CALM program into a fully designed “system” with clear policies, processes, and protocols for information gathering, analysis, reporting, and rapid response.
- By creating Conflict Management and Mitigation Regional Councils (CMMRCs) in all focal states, CALM pioneered the concept of institutionalizing a critical mass of citizens concerned with CMM from a broad cross-section of civic, youth, and governmental organizations; however, the mentoring, oversight and support to the CMMRCs needs strengthening, including the basic relationship between the CMMRCs and the corresponding coordinating nongovernmental organization (NGO), as well as between IFESH and the CMMRCs.
- The program has pursued a well-planned program of training at the higher tiers of program organization, but its cascade approach was less effective; youth training was insufficient including in respect to follow-on efforts and effective empowerment strategies necessary for sustainable impact.
- CALM management systems for planning, supervision, and institution building of partners and beneficiaries are weak.

**Conclusions and Recommendations.** The evaluation team believes program impact can be enhanced in the remaining 15 months of the program. The first step is to review and adjust the IFESH management strategy and USAID oversight role in order to gain maximum value from program implementation. Strengthening CALM’s impact will require addressing pending programmatic and administrative matters, including a timely review and approval of CALM’s work plan for 2009 and 2010. In addition, the upcoming 2011 elections and the possibility of political violence offer an incentive to immediately strengthen the core program components for early warning and civic education. Specific management steps would include:

- Systematically addressing pending issues and concerns, especially those affecting and/or noted by partners and beneficiaries;
- Clarifying processes and timing for disbursement of program funds;
- Tightening program focus on key components, with special attention to strengthening the EWS;
- Reviewing—and changing as needed—current program partners and strengthening partnering management;
- Enhancing support to program institutions;

- Revising the current program monitoring and evaluation (M&E) Results Framework to include a limited number of custom indicators focused on program *outcomes and impacts*;
- Increasing program supervision by IFESH and USAID; and
- Providing technical support as needed to guide short-term program planning for early warning, including designing reporting, analysis, warning, and response protocols as well as strengthening institution building.

**Key Lessons and Future Considerations for CMM in Nigeria.** Creating a culture of peace is critical for political, social, and religious stability in Nigeria, especially in so far as building and enabling capacity for rapid response to emerging conflict dynamics. A complex web of causes and incentives underlie violent conflict in Nigeria. The key trigger for unleashing these smoldering tensions is electoral politics, as seen recently in the Jos (November 2008) and Ekiti (April 2009) elections. USAID can make a notable contribution to the country’s fledgling democracy by building widespread vigilance to safeguard a peaceful political process, especially through a strong EWS. A dual strategy should focus on top-down engagement and close monitoring of politicians combined with expanded, bottom-up CMM education of youth, women, and other members of civil society in peace, civic action, and conflict prevention measures.

Continuing support to conflict abatement in Nigeria may also consider key “lessons” emerging from the review: (1) ensure that program assumptions and interventions match actual conflict patterns, underlying causes, and behaviors of political actors in the areas of planned intervention; (2) apply broad communication and educational programs at all levels of formal and informal education, especially primary school, which is the largest and most powerful forum for introducing Nigerian society to a culture of peace; (3) enhance the role of the press to build an intense public awareness campaign for creating a broad culture of peace; (4) coordinate more effectively with other USAID, government, and donor programs; and (5) provide adequate and timely technical and financial resources against a realistic plan of activities.



# 1.0 BACKGROUND TO THE CALM PROGRAM

The 2005 USAID Conflict Abatement through Local Mitigation (CALM) program is designed to nurture a tolerant young citizenry and a stable social environment that together support a peaceful democratic process. This objective was born from socio-political events that unfolded in Nigeria during the preceding decade, including USAID response programming.

Following the sudden death of Dictator General Sani Abacha, Nigeria began a fragile democratic transition in June 1998 under the caretaker government of General Abdulsalami Abubakar. In May 1999, the first democratic government in 15 years assumed office. Planned elections also ended a period of economic sanctions imposed in 1995 by the US, the European Union (EU), and allied donor countries in response to the military hanging of the Ogoni Nine. Although humanitarian support was nominally excluded from these restrictions, assistance for most basic social needs was nevertheless severely curtailed, adding to unrest among the poorest Nigerians.

In March 1999, a rapid mechanism for channeling fresh support to the new democracy was provided through the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI). Programs were designed to address residual ethnic tensions, economic competition, and corruption that might threaten the fledgling Fourth Republic. Training was the centerpiece of the approach to build capacity for good governance for citizens and elected officials, complemented by advocacy for policy reform and improved civilian-military engagement. Pilot economic and social development projects were initiated in the volatile Niger Delta region. Popular media were enlisted to extend program reach into the civil society through good governance and peace messages.

OTI added a new training component on conflict mitigation and management (CMM) in the second year of the program. By February 2000, a professional civil society network devoted to peace building and conflict resolution was created; Conflict Resolution Stakeholders' Network (CRESNET) was registered one year later. A training manual was developed and over 1,200 trainers from civil society organizations were instructed in community-based methods for anticipating, avoiding, mitigating, and resolving disputes.

An evaluation of the program followed the close of OTI/Nigeria in September 2001. It recommended that incorporation of activities into the USAID country program be considered. "OTI's activities are often short-term or one-time events that need to be replicated or extended to achieve lasting results," they wrote (Dewey and Slocum, 2002). They concluded that sustainability had been weakened by a parallel management structure not adequately coordinated with other USAID program activities. Furthermore, they pointed out that, owing to the programs' intrinsic short-term horizon, its initial strong planning and motivation were not sustained over the program life. Consequently, from 2002, selected OTI initiatives continued under the quick-disbursing contracting mechanism, Support Which Implements Fast Transitions (SWIFT). Through SWIFT, conflict management and civil education training was advanced through CRESNET. USAID also extended support to a small, Zaria-based private voluntary organization called Basketball for Peace (BB4P). This program offered youth groups opportunities to bridge differences with others and to practice self-discipline during basketball training and competitions. "Peace zones" were created in selected hotspots throughout the country, each having three secondary school "peace clubs" in addition to teams. CMM had become a regular feature of USAID program support to

Nigerian civil society, but in time, the SWIFT mechanism was found to be both management intensive and piecemeal in approach.

Meanwhile, a history of ethnic, economic, and political disputes continued to play out sporadically in different areas of the country. A long surge of ethnic and resource-related tensions wracked the Niger Delta, beginning with the Ogoni Crisis (Rivers State) in 1993 and the Warri “Wars” (Delta State) between 1997 and 2005. Successive religious clashes erupted in Kaduna in 1992, 2000, and 2002. Religious and resource tensions gained intensity in Kano from 1953 to 1980, and more recently in 1991, 2001, and 2004. Similar outbreaks of violence were seen in Jos and other parts of Plateau State in 2004 (and again in November 2008 after the CALM program began).

The violence which broke out in several Nigerian communities became a major threat to Nigeria’s new democracy, assuming regional dimensions characterized by resource-based conflicts in the Niger Delta and ethno-religious violence in the north. In the Niger Delta, the youth are still restive, and the struggle for political power and access to resources is gradually assuming the form of low key guerrilla warfare; while in the north, spontaneous ethno-religious violence fueled by religious extremism continues.

Evidence of persistent conflict throughout the 1990s and early 2000s suggested that violence—its underlying causes, prevention, and management—should figure as a strategic objective in the new USAID country program strategy for the 2005-2009 period. The country analysis stressed two key issues, first, the high rate of unemployment and underemployment of youth in a mono economy almost wholly dependent on oil rents; and second, the continuing fragility of the nation’s democracy and its vulnerability to electoral manipulation and violence. Youth were actor-victims in both cases. To consolidate and sustain conflict management gains already made, a unified program with a focus on youth and community was proposed to encourage programmatic consistency, durability, and synergy among existing conflict management components.

On 10 June 2005, USAID/Nigeria awarded a five-year, competitively bid grant to the International Foundation for Education and Self-Help (IFESH) to implement a conflict prevention, mitigation, and reconciliation program in five states of Nigeria from June 2005-June 2010. The Conflict Abatement through Local Mitigation (CALM) program is aimed at strengthening capacity for conflict management in Rivers, Delta, Kano, Kaduna and Plateau states. The Cooperative Agreement (CA) between USAID and IFESH (No. 620-A-00-05-00099-00) serves as the primary governing document for the program.

# 2.0 CALM OBJECTIVES, ASSUMPTIONS AND OVERARCHING ORIENTATION

## 2.1 GOAL AND OBJECTIVES AS STATED IN THE COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT

The CALM program is aimed at preventing and reducing conflict by strengthening the capacity of Nigerian society to address the factors responsible for violent conflicts in Rivers, Delta, Kano, Kaduna and Plateau states. The goal was further detailed in an extensive discussion of the rationale, approach, and expectations underpinning the program design as the CA was developed and finalized. For example, the program had an **Expanded Goal**, which was to:

*increase both at regional and community level the capacity of government institutions, civil society, political parties, youth groups, women's groups and other stakeholders to reduce episodes of violent conflicts in key targeted states and to better manage and mitigate the impacts of conflict when it does occur (USAID, 2005:B-2).*

The program seeks to achieve this through four-component objectives: (1) increased opportunity for youth engagement; (2) development of Early Warning Systems (EWSs) and response mechanisms; (3) mainstreaming of conflict management in targeted organizations; and (4) targeted conflict mitigation interventions in non-focal states.<sup>2</sup> Finally, an additional objective was specified by USAID during the course of the program to support the local, state, and federal elections in April 2007, reading *Civic Education for Election Observers and Post-election Youth Advocacy (2007 only)*. In addition to putting forward the four original objectives along with the fifth situational objective for election support, the CA presented a series of further specific program expectations, namely to:

- Work to reduce violent conflict with donors, government institutions, and political parties as well as civil society, youth groups, and women's groups (B-2, B-20).
- Develop, with USAID, a fit-for-purpose monitoring and evaluation plan and Results Framework that focuses on appropriate "conflict indicators" (A-3, B-24).
- Provide grants to local institutions, including community and cluster-community involvement (B-2).
- Develop public-private sector partnerships. (B-2).

---

<sup>2</sup> It should be noted that the non-focal states' objective was more implied in the CA, as this objective required setting aside "reserve funds to respond to unintended conflict in areas outside of the five states" (B-1).

- Mainstream activities identified for CMM “(SO11) **and** [emphasis in original] programs/activities that will also impact directly or indirectly on other strategic objectives such as improved livelihoods (SO12), improved social services (SO12), and HIV/AIDS (SO14)” (B-6).<sup>3</sup>
- Build CMM into other institutions, e.g., [International Institute for Tropical Agriculture] IITA or oil companies.
- Draw on prior community development knowledge of the Niger Delta.
- Emphasize training as a primary strategy. Create a disincentive for youth violence and destruction through integrated capacity-building training (B-12) and removing participants from the loci of conflict (B-3).
- Link senior EWS stakeholders with youth for CMM information gathering and promote mentoring, employment, and skills training opportunities.

## 2.2 PROGRAM ORIENTATION

The CALM program is complex—geographically broad and diverse in scope. CALM stresses community-based interventions, a focus on youth aged 15-29 years, CMM and economic skills training, public education, and upper-level stakeholder engagement. It assumes staff expertise in training, early warning and response, youth skills acquisition, community program planning, high-level advocacy, information/education/communication (IEC), coordination with USAID program staff and—by implication—donors. Furthermore, the program is modestly funded at \$8 million over five years. Private sector complementary funding of over \$656,874 was also expected from the recipient.

Program activities unfold in two distinct areas of Nigeria: (a) the Niger Delta (Rivers and Delta states), which suffers from an expanding low-intensity conflict over distribution of oil resources accounting for 90% of federal revenue; and (b) the northern and central region (Kaduna, Kano, and Plateau states), where conflict is more often linked to religion and migration of peoples into other ethnic strongholds.

The hallmark of the program is to mainstream CMM into civil society organizations through a cascade approach, training implementing partners (local NGOs/community-based implementing organizations [CBIOS]), who in turn train other local groups. To support multi-stakeholder EWS and response, Conflict Mitigation and Management Regional Committees (CMMRCs) were created by CALM in each state. In principle, these groups work in combination with youth components to foster CMM information gathering; and promote mentoring, employment, and skills training opportunities.

By design, youth components include BB4P and secondary school peace clubs situated in designated Peace Zones (PZs), where they are expected to create synergy of effort. Community Youth Associations (CYAs)—some loosely connected with the PZs—mobilize youth for civic education workshops. Youth skills training to build opportunities for youth employment was a key feature of the original design; skills fairs were held in each state, and these activities gained momentum in FY 2008. Also, to support the 2007 election, a specific-purpose component provided non-violent election training and election monitoring.

---

<sup>3</sup> It should be noted that this objective was originally framed as Integrating Conflict Management into Traditional Development Programs, and was later clarified in the Performance Management Plan (PMP) and subsequent project documents as “Mainstreaming CMM into Targeted Organizations.” The original intention of the CA was stated as: “Collaborating with partners and stakeholders to integrate conflict issues into education, health, governance and economic development programs” (USAID, 2005: B-2). **The abbreviated interpretation of this objective may have reduced the potential for cross-fertilization among sectors and for mainstreaming CMM information.**

Finally, CALM disseminates awareness of peace through public media, typically through public education announcements initiated by the CMMRCs.

CALM inherited many features from its USAID/OTI antecedent, including a grassroots, bottom-up style; a tradition of small grant awards; an array of over 14 existing local NGOs, many of them members of CRESNET; established community and professional links in the program states; a strong emphasis on training and use of training materials developed by OTI, CRESNET, and BB4P; use of media for public civic education; and a number of former OTI and partner program staff. While much of the residual influence was positive, the evaluation team surmised that the OTI legacy may have had an early deleterious effect, as CALM tended, overall, to have a shorter-term program event orientation rather than a longer-term orientation to programming. The longer-term orientation was particularly needed to make the EWS and youth skills/jobs training effective. Consequently, partners often lacked a multi-activity work plan, and projects were more diffuse, only partially coordinated, and inconsistently implemented. The community-oriented staff had limited experience with government policy engagement and high-level advocacy. Its reliance on community and (often weak) civil society institutions increased its management burden for implementation and sustainability.

## 2.3 RELIABILITY OF PROGRAM ASSUMPTIONS

The Program Results Framework approved in July 2006 and revised in October 2007 showed the following critical **assumptions** underpinning the success of the CALM program (IFESH/CALM, 2007) in order to achieve the Nigeria mission's Intermediate Result 11.4: "Strengthened Conflict Management."

1. Political climate in the five states of program implementation remains stable and no radical changes occur.
2. The ongoing transition process is sustained and the Federal Government of Nigeria remains supportive of US foreign assistance.
3. The private sector is predisposed to provide additional resources to the program and the economic situation does not deteriorate.
4. CMM Regional Councils (CMMRC) perform diligently and continue operating in an enabling environment.
5. Key stakeholders and implementing partners collaborate and cooperate constructively and are supportive of the program.

Nearly all respondents questioned asserted that most assumptions did not hold in all states during the period of program implementation. Electoral or resource violence (Assumption 1) significantly altered the program context in three states, destabilizing the Niger Delta during most of 2007 and the Jos area in November 2008. The program closed its home office in Port Harcourt for four months in August 2007. USAID staff were barred from travel to the Niger Delta beginning in 2007 and to Jos from November 2008. A counterpart funding contribution (Assumption 3) expected from Chevron Nigeria, Ltd. was not forthcoming. Other private sector sources were not successfully identified by CALM, although some implementing partners, peace clubs, and basketball teams raised small individual contributions. In addition, a sharp increase in food prices beginning in 2007 was followed by the global recession of 2008, which significantly slowed all economic sectors in Nigeria, depreciated the Naira, and encouraged capital flight. The strength and sustainability of the CMMRCs (Assumption 4) varied among states, chiefly for reasons of internal management. Their functioning was also affected by the variable collaboration and cooperation among stakeholders (Assumption 5), especially the low performance of three "coordinating NGOs" (C-NGOs) supporting the CMMRCs. In two states, these C-NGOs performed poorly and were

removed; in one state, the NGO essentially lost interest and implicitly withdrew its services; in another state, the organization expressed dissatisfaction and a desire to withdraw.

These conditions, with the exception of the second assumption, should be considered logically when considering the partial outcome or impact of the CALM program goal “to prevent and reduce conflicts by strengthening the capacity of Nigerian society to address the factors responsible for violent conflicts.” While a program of limited scope and funding cannot be held fully responsible for these social, economic, and political conditions, management of the program can contribute in positive or negative ways to outcomes described in Assumptions 3-5.

An additional, overarching, but implicit, program assumption—and a key to its design—is that *youth are at the root of most violent conflict*. Though not listed in the Results Framework, this rationale for the program’s primary focus on community and youth was discussed extensively in the CA. Here, the cause of youth unrest is understood as inactivity and unemployment; therefore, the program design assumes that removing young people from sites of conflict through social, political, and economic engagement will curb youth violence by creating a safe environment for democratic practice.

The program baseline studies (Albert, 2006; NISER, 2006), the “Strategic Conflict Assessment” (IPCR, 2007), and the majority of respondents disagreed with this overriding design assumption. Rather, they stressed the political and financial manipulation of youth—which often sparks underlying religious and ethnic tensions—as the main cause of youth violence. This conclusion is empirically supported by the heightening of violence before and during elections. These studies support the view that *accountability of politicians, security agencies, and government in general is therefore key to maintaining peace*. In this light, CALM’s limited engagement with government in its training activities and the EWS may have diminished its potential for achieving the program’s overarching goal.

# 3.0 RESEARCH TEAM, PURPOSE, AND METHODOLOGY

The evaluation team was led by Dr. Deirdre LaPin (an independent consultant), and was supported by Dr. Victor Adetula (Political Science, University of Jos) who served as the Head of North Sub-Team A, and by Dr. Sam Amadi (Ken Nnamani Center for Leadership and Development, Abuja), who served as the Head of South Sub-Team B. Ali Garba and Rosemary Osikoya (both from Jos) joined the northern team, while Dr. Christy George (Port Harcourt) and Kingsley Akeni (Warri) joined the southern team. In addition, the ARD consultants were accompanied in Kaduna by USAID staff in the form of Mr. Chom Bagu of USAID/Abuja, who served as the Contracting Officer's Technical Representative (COTR) for the program, and Ms. Rachel Locke of DCHA/CMM. Additionally, Ms. Minnie Wright from the mission in Abjua provided counsel and program support, as did Ms. Locke and Mr. Bagu throughout the entire undertaking.

The Team Leader conducted two initial telephone interviews with two senior staff at IFESH headquarters and all core team members reviewed numerous primary documents as a precursor to conducting the field research, including the 2008 draft OECD/DAC "Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities."

A field research methodology was developed, revised, and approved by USAID. Protocols were agreed to and a field research plan was developed with the IFESH CALM leadership. Eight field research tools corresponded to focus groups, key informant interviews, and small group discussions. Research questions considered: (1) the program assumptions and objectives in context, (2) the program design and feasibility *as implemented* in relation to the original plan, and (3) the appropriateness of the Monitoring and Evaluation Plan with respect to expected outcomes and impacts. Seventy-five interviews were conducted. See Annex B, Approach to the Study, for more details.

Though named "mid-term," the evaluation is being conducted in the fourth year of a five-year program. CALM is the first program of its kind for the USAID/Nigeria mission and is in many ways experimental. The brief program life remaining offers limited space for major course correction; however, the review offers an opportunity to assess the program design and to make suggestions about an approach to future conflict abatement programs in Nigeria. Furthermore, the evaluation has come at a time of increased interest in CMM programming and evaluation in the donor community. The multiple objectives of the USAID evaluation are therefore summarized as follows.<sup>4</sup>

1. Assess CALM progress from its start in June 2005 to the end of FY 2008 in achieving "Strengthened Conflict Management," the Intermediate Result set out in the program Results Framework of the program PMP.

---

<sup>4</sup> USAID/Abuja also initially requested an additional, but integrated, management assessment dimension. However, it was determined that adequate information could be gleaned by applying a management lens as an overlay to a number of the instruments and research protocols.

2. Develop recommendations to strengthen CALM performance for the remaining 15 months of program life based on conclusions from the progress assessment. Owing to its timing, the report will offer considerations for future conflict abatement interventions in Nigeria by reviewing the relative appropriateness, feasibility, and efficacy of the different components of the present program in their current context.
3. At the request of USAID/DCHA/CMM, examine the usefulness of draft OECD “Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding (CPP) Activities” directly in interview questions and indirectly through analysis of findings.
4. At the request of USAID/DCHA/CMM, specifically consider underlying (and usually unstated) theories of change by applying a USAID/CMM analytical tool which identifies seven broad levels of “change” and 17 individual drivers of conflict change (see Table 1 below).

The following considerations, assumptions, caveats and limitations factored significantly into the field work, and thus influenced the subsequent report.

- To meet mission strategic country program objectives, it was assumed that a pragmatic assessment of the CALM program and its past, current and future influence on CMM in Nigeria was the primary focus of the evaluation. Otherwise the multipurpose nature of the evaluation could not only confuse or dilute careful attention to the main task at hand, but also to any of the other evaluation objectives.
- As agreed by the Monitoring and Evaluation Management System (MEMS), the Monitoring and Evaluation Plan for the program was not fit-for-purpose, stressing aggregated numerical outputs that cut across all program components. Moreover, the plan was changed three times during the life of the program, making a detailed analysis of the Results Framework and quarterly reports of questionable utility. The plan was adjusted in January 2007 after the USAID reorganization, and the CALM program was shifted to the mission’s new Peace and Security Program. Six original indicators were increased to 23, nearly all stressing numerical *outputs*. (These indicators were trimmed to 14 for FY 2009.) Qualitative data through the research instruments can yield insights into program *outcomes*. However, given the small size of the program and the weight of intervening variables, an assessment of *impact* would be ambitious for the program overall.
- Neither the Team Leader nor the USAID representatives were granted permission by the US Regional Security Officer in the US Embassy to travel to two of the five program states (Rivers and Delta) or to Jos Town (Plateau State) on grounds of security concerns. Consequently, full program information housed in the main program office in Port Harcourt was not accessible, although IFESH made efforts to provide information by courier or from the Kaduna regional office.
- Frequent changes of CALM staff over the life of the program, especially the COP, curtailed “institutional memory” and insight available to the evaluation team.
- A small, purposeful cluster sample approach was applied to the selection of interview subjects. Consistency of findings could encourage confidence, but not eliminate error in results.
- For practical reasons, election observers, CMMRC members, and BB4P team players were often interviewed in the presence of their supporting NGOs.
- IFESH/CALM was helpful in identifying potential respondents for the field research plan; however, not all interviewees were contacted in a timely manner, resulting in substitutions or cancellations by the research team. Misunderstandings on expectations of ARD financial support to focus group members or others respondents were resolved, but consumed valuable time.

# 4.0 DESIGN VERSUS ACTUAL APPROACH TO PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

CALM seeks to create an enabling environment for Nigeria’s democracy by expanding knowledge, will, and processes for conflict prevention and management in Nigerian society. Primary actors identified by the program are youth aged 15-29, communities with a history of violence, and school- and community-based groups and associations that support peace. Funded civic organizations are provided grants to build the capacity of these actors to promote the three program objectives, which are mutually reinforcing: (a) engaging young people constructively through sports, skills development, and peaceful association; (b) creation of an EWS to prevent conflict; (c) mainstreaming conflict mitigation and management into other development programs and organizations. Capability for conflict prevention, management, and response is focused on Rivers, Delta, Plateau, Kano, and Kaduna states, together with as-needed conflict response to events in non-focal states.

This section examines the relationship between the basic program design, briefly presented above, and the IFESH approach to its practical implementation. Two initial documents—the IFESH Revised Final Technical Application (IFESH, 2005) that responded to the USAID Request for Applications, and the USAID Cooperative Agreement (USAID, 2005)—governed the program approach at the outset. In addition, the IFESH Revised Performance Management Plan (USAID, 2007) reflects agreed design changes following a restructuring of USAID in 2006.

Overall, the IFESH approach *as planned* broadly matches the spirit and expectations of the initial program design. Over time, however, practical application began to lose sight of the program’s primary aims and eventual results. Owing in part to a deteriorating internal and external program environment, implementation became increasingly *process* focused. Events undermined the initial program assumptions, e.g., post-2007 election violence, a 2008 economic downturn, USAID restructuring, frequent personnel changes and unreliable funding flows. It was a great practical challenge to adjust program execution to an ever-changing context while preserving expected outcomes, or in some instances even realizing lower-level outputs. A further program component that expanded civic education to election observation and youth advocacy was added to the program for 2007. These election-related activities were broadly appreciated by implementing partners (IPs) and their trainees, but the increased burden on time and financial resources slowed or delayed implementation of some planned program components.

The overarching framework which IFESH built to fulfill the CALM program objectives comprised six major sets of activities, all intended in practice to be interlocking or at a minimum overlapping. Each is discussed in more detail below. The six activities included (1) sports teams, and (2) related peace clubs in schools, which were two principal activities incorporated from the BB4P program and its “Peace Zone” concept. As an extension of the PZ and as a third activity area, IFESH/CALM also identified or fostered CYAs whose members would serve as peace advocates in known “hot spots.”

IFESH pressed the “zone” concept to a higher and more sophisticated level with the adoption of a regional approach. By 2005, this idea had gained currency with social programs supported by oil companies, and its purpose was to combine the efforts of multiple communities in the pursuit of development and peace. (IFESH, 2005: 1-2). IFESH/CALM placed what they called the Conflict Mitigation and Management Regional Council at the apex of the “region.” The councils, which represented the fourth activity area and whose members were to be elected by stakeholder communities and groups, were intended to reduce conflict by encouraging greater communication and transparency between leaders and underserved groups in their catchment areas and to foster sustainable development and youth employment. Through these communication channels, the CMMRC would serve as the focal point of an EWS to prevent conflict.

At the heart of the IFESH/CALM approach was the fifth activity, a cascade training and information strategy able to draw all of the preceding actors into a community of peace that would foster Nigeria’s democratic process. Creating and harnessing groups and associations was critical to the success of this strategy. Training and information workshops and materials would mainstream CMM information through Nigerian society and enable leaders of selected groups to train their members and the community on CMM principles. In 2006, USAID requested IFESH/CALM to draw on its civic education training and communications as an entry point for a special 2007 national election preparation initiative. As the sixth activity stream, CALM IPs trained hundreds of election observers and offered practical experience in preventing and reporting on electoral malfeasance, which is the primary cause of violent conflict in Nigeria today.

The IFESH philosophy, rooted in a longstanding knowledge of the Niger Delta and other regions, was in some ways more ambitious than the CMM approach of its donor. The NGO clearly recognized the multiple underlying causes of violent conflict in Nigeria, ranging from youth unemployment to underdevelopment to lack of political participation and government indifference. It commissioned two excellent baseline studies on youth employment needs, and conflict triggers and management in the focal states. It understood the central role of local empowerment in mitigation and management of conflict and therefore stressed grant making and capacity building for NGOs, CBOs, and local youth associations. An IFESH/CALM achievement was building a remarkably broad constituency in each of the five focal states for peace education and intervention, even though it did not succeed in all contexts in transforming this constituency into a functional and sustainable network for early warning or conflict response.

Ultimately, the discussion of “design and implementation” turns on the gap between a strong conceptual grasp of conflict drivers and achieving a practical impact on their effects. The operative challenge to IFESH/CALM was to adjust its approach to changing circumstances, while concurrently limiting its field of action to the bounds of its modest resources. In practice, the program design became an unending “work in progress” as the program context became increasingly precarious. Unfortunately, under these conditions, the complexity of the program seemed to expand rather than contract. IFESH knowledge and ambition, combined with the growing USAID awareness of the threat conflict posed to democracy in Nigeria, resulted in program overreach by both parties, and inevitably some disappointment.

#### **4.1 PROVIDING AT-RISK YOUTHS WITH CONSTRUCTIVE FORMS OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT**

The assumption of both the design and the implementation approach adopted by IFESH/CALM is that youths, as key actors and affected victims of violence, are also central to managing and mitigating conflicts. The program recognizes that the vulnerability of youths in conflict derives from their lack of meaningful economic and social activities to engage their energy and provide them with income. The program baseline conflict study further noted that youth are open to ready manipulation by political actors seeking electoral office. Adjustment to this information should have increased program engagement of

government and the political class. Nevertheless, emphasis on diverting youth from violent practice stood as the program guiding principle.

A step-by-step process for youth engagement is described as an approach to this objective in the IFESH RFA, beginning with identification of at-risk youth in each of the “hot spots” (PZs) in the five targeted states; a needs assessment to determine appropriate forms of constructive engagements, e.g., income-generating skills training, sporting activities, and adult literacy; a design process with local partners of training modules for the identified “engagement activities”; integrated pilot programs funded by the small grants component of the program; and monitoring and evaluation of engagement activities (IFESH, 2005: 26).

**Peace Zones.** PZ operation was taken as a key entry point for youth engagement by IFESH/CALM. The PZ concept was initiated by the Zaria-based BB4P project, first funded directly by USAID through the SWIFT IQC mechanism and later incorporated as a sub-grantee into CALM. The original idea sought to introduce the culture of peace to youths in “hot spot” communities that have either previously experienced or have potential for violent conflicts. The CA called for the BB4P sub-project to actively engage in mobilizing at-risk youths in basketball teams and competitions, establish PZs for the prevention and mitigation of conflicts, create three public service peace clubs in secondary schools within each zone, and build a network of ‘peace ambassadors’ who would be used to model CMM among youths. BB4P relies heavily on volunteer mentors, namely PZ coordinators (to oversee training and competitions), coaches, “peace managers” or educators, and a peace club coordinator (often a school master). Frequent personnel shifts among these volunteers can lead to loss of momentum.

While the intense interpersonal contact of basketball makes the sport itself a good teacher of self-discipline under stress, IFESH/CALM enhanced CMM training among team members with the appointment of the “peace manager” for each zone. The manager often used a very good existing BB4P CMM training manual, and many teams incorporated a peace training period—some teams for one hour per day during trainings, or once a week, and/or during sports competitions.

Under CALM, BB4P continued as a sub-grantee to implement the PZ component, especially the sporting activities. Typical support from BB4P would include a 10-week program to initiate the teams and provision of basic equipment, modest stipends for the volunteer mentors, and organization of competitions between teams with small payments to both winners and losers. The program seeks complementary private sector funding to build courts, backboards, hoops, shoes, and other equipment; and trains some teams in fundraising from the community.

BB4P actively supported the peace clubs in organizing an annual “peace week” in each zone. Under CALM management, peace clubs began to receive relatively less direct support from BB4P, and this responsibility in practice shifted in the direction of CALM staff. These structures could be the most promising youth groups for creating a long-term culture of peace in communities because outreach is a key function. Two types of clubs are typical: those once created and mentored by the BB4P and those formed spontaneously after a CALM workshop or grafted onto an existing school club. Currently, some clubs exist only in name. Overall, a minimal functional linkage exists between the peace clubs and the BB4P in the PZs.

The responsibility of IFESH/CALM as a “parent” to BB4P has not been wholly clear or satisfactory, and the sub-grantee has lacked a work plan or predictable funding stream since 2007. These constraints have been compounded by a struggle for greater independence by BB4P and a general decline in team interest and activity among all states. Dissatisfaction among team members is widespread and detrimental to a once-successful youth engagement activity. This trend could be quickly reversed through negotiation and a restructuring of the relationship between the two parties.

**Community youth associations.** In CALM, the definition of the “Peace Zone” was to also embrace CYAs as well as community members. Although CYAs were not specifically mentioned in the governing documents, these grassroots organizations are potentially one of the most powerful tools for building a culture of peace and for gathering and acting on conflict-related information. Members have not yet been recognized as full structures and partners, but their members are occasionally invited to trainings for community groups which also include associations of women and girls.

In practice, there is limited interaction thus far between the CYAs, community leaders, and even the school peace clubs with the basketball teams—who remain focused chiefly on their sport. The “zone” has expanded little beyond its original BB4P concept and continues to have greatest resonance in the teams. A strong cadre of “ambassadors” as peace advocates, drawn from local community organizations, is yet to emerge; although some members of sports teams or youth groups speak of a personal peace transformation or engaging in CMM interventions in the community or in schools.

**Skills training.** Skills training for at-risk youth was proposed in the CA as a major approach to increase the access of at-risk youth to meaningful economic and social engagement and entrench values of self-worth and dignity. Youth unemployment exceeds 75% in some states. In 2007, the CALM program launched skills education for at-risk youths. The CA envisaged a planned approach to skills development—e.g., auto mechanics, electronics, fashion design, computer, secretarial skills—to encourage conflict prevention through economic training and transformation. As specified in the CA, IFESH/CALM undertook a baseline study of the training needs of the communities. It also evaluated the capacity of credible NGOs and CBOs to deliver training and other services.

At the same time, the CA and the RFTA did not foresee IFESH/CALM as manager of a hands-on training program. Rather, livelihood activities were originally designed to be “mainstreamed” into other “economic growth opportunities” implemented by USAID/Nigeria and its partners (IFESH, 2005: 19). Collaboration was envisaged with such organizations as the IITA for encouraging agricultural production and job placement, or self-employment through workforce or microenterprise development programs. IFESH proposed that CALM and its partners would provide business development training or loan funds to trained youth, supported in part by complementary private sector funding. In addition, CALM would seek collaboration with businesses and private sector commitments to engage youth through mentoring, internships, and apprenticeships. Partnerships with the Nigerian Chamber of Commerce, Rotary Club, and Nigeria Opportunity Industrialization Centers (NOIC) were envisaged.

The partnership approach for enhancing youth livelihoods was in time supplanted by a skills training program managed solely by IFESH/CALM through its selected IPs. Following completion of the youth employment baseline study, the program organized skills fairs in 2007-2008 in each state and invited youth from local community organizations and NGOs to sample income-generating opportunities displayed by local entrepreneurs and business organizations. Local IPs were then contracted to provide skills, which were to be selected in principle through consultation with youth stakeholders. Final offerings included catfish farming, video production, IT training, and so on. Trainees were encouraged to form business cooperatives to pursue self-employment opportunities.

The design of the revised CALM skills training program revealed some weaknesses. The training approach was resource intensive for a modestly funded project; some applications required large capital investments for trainees in infrastructure and equipment; business skills training was not built into the initial training modules; the quality of training organizations was variable and some of the best were required to shorten the training period to economize on cost; the choice of skills did not match the interests of many youth; the selection of trainees was not always transparent; owing to the high cost, a small number of youth benefitted; CALM or IPs did not provide for follow-up mentoring and few youths were employed or self-employed after the training; or no organizational support was envisioned for forming cooperatives.

While few projects became income generating, the appetite for them remains high. From self-reports, they did in some cases build confidence and expand the trainees' horizons. In addition, the skills training was in many cases combined with training in conflict management and HIV/AIDS awareness, and for this purpose, IFESH built the capacity of service providers in these subjects. Trainees would thereafter be empowered to enhance the life of their community through CMM and health education in addition to gaining a remunerative skill.

## **4.2 DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM**

The development of a comprehensive early warning and rapid response system in the five focal states is a core objective of CALM. According to the governing documents, the EWS was to rely on a multi-stakeholder mechanism by which conflict early warning signals are identified and reported from youth and other community groups about potential or ongoing outbreaks. The initial design of the CALM program was predicated on the integration of various community stakeholders and peace structures into the EWS, where the various structures would reinforce their mutual capacities to mitigate and manage conflicts in the focal states. In theory, the youth and community structures (BB4P, community associations, peace clubs) were to be an effective part of EWS implementation.

In its RFTA, IFESH described its process for building its EWS approach. These steps included a review of existing literature on conflicts in each of the five states; identification of key conflict actors; a baseline survey of key conflict participants to solicit their views on the causes, prevention, and early warning signals of the conflicts; development of a conflict analysis framework/model to analyze the causes of conflicts; and finally, development of a comprehensive crisis response strategy and EWS for each state, based on the analysis.

From the baseline study it emerged that most respondents perceived government as a more critical actor than civil society in fostering and managing conflict. Less than 10% believed that civil society possessed adequate power and influence. This information might have strengthened the EWS approach by enhancing program engagement with senior government officials and the political class. In addition, professional support to the EWS design may have been considered.

The chosen approach created a centerpiece for the EWS in the form of an elected Conflict Mitigation and Management Regional Council. This apex body became responsible for receiving, analyzing, and responding to conflict-related information. In addition, the CMMRC was to reinforce the IFESH "regional approach" by building operative communication links with PZs and community organizations within its catchment area. The concept of "region" was weakened, however, when a single CMMRC was eventually established for each focal state. Up-down links with the community became difficult to maintain over such a wide area, and the councils tended to form the strongest links with traditional rulers, and in some instances the police, rather than the community. CMMRC members have since concluded that establishing bodies similar to the councils at the level of local government could enhance future EWS effectiveness.

Membership of the state-level CMMRCs was not determined by election but by CALM appointments from key professional stakeholder groups in civil society and government. Representation included labor, women's, religious, and student organizations as well as influential NGOs and relevant mid-level government officers. Business, which has a strong economic interest in maintaining peace, was only marginally represented, and chiefly by oil companies in the southern states. Typically, the CMMRC is headed by a traditional leader in the state. The membership structure was intended to support not only EWS but to enhance other program objectives such as youth mentoring, empowerment of women, and mainstreaming of CMM into Nigerian society; hence the presence of labor and women's organizations. It was further expected that CMMRC members would also take responsibility for training other groups within the EWS regional information network.

In essence, the CMMRC is a valuable volunteer stakeholder structure, but it cannot in its present form assume primary responsibility for a critical life-and-death function such as EWS, which requires professional input and design. As volunteers, commitment of members varies. Issues intrinsic to the membership emerge. For example, institutional, rather than personal representation reduces the commitment and profile of participants and encourages some representation by proxy. Government representation lacks sufficient seniority to take authorized decisions. As a volunteer organization with minimal support, the CMMRC lacks strong incentives to hold regular meetings, and its effectiveness relies on the commitment of one or two key champions.

Recognizing the doubtful stability and sustainability of the CMMRC structures, IFESH/CALM assigned a Coordinating NGO (C-NGO) to provide the “secretariat” and oversight to each council. C-NGO responsibilities include technical guidance to CMM activities, support to “advocacy visits” to government and other officials, logistics preparation for CMMRC meetings, a “conflict information hub” that makes monthly reports to the CMMRC and IFESH, and management of all CMMRC funds except those intended for direct conflict response by the CMMRC itself. In principle, C-NGO support is temporary for up to three years until the CMMRC can be established as a solid institution. (Sustainability appears unlikely for most CMMRCs.)

The relationship between IFESH and the NGOs coordinating the CMMRCs is formally defined by Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs), but the memoranda are signed between IFESH and the CMMRC, with the C-NGOs merely cited as responsible for reporting on budget and activities. This approach requires the C-NGOs to report on activities which they do not have the legal capacity to initiate or control. In Plateau State, the C-NGO has been replaced *de facto* by a second NGO but remains responsible for submitting reports. Sensitivities surrounding these arrangements have generated some tension. Three of the five councils are currently not satisfied with their C-NGOs, owing either to their lack of commitment and/or capacity, or to the administrative regime which gives them financial control in fact but not in name. Some CMMRC members sense they are being dealt with as “small boys” by the CALM program.

A greater concern for the EWS is that it has not evolved into a functioning “system” with clear policies, processes, and protocols supported by an EWS handbook or adequate training and management tools. Without these essential elements, training on the EWS “process” becomes ad hoc; reporting from the information “hub” suffers from lack of standard guidelines; and communication with the critical information network of youth and community organizations is intermittent and unreliable. While all CMMRCs have received training by IFESH/CALM on CMM and EWS, the expected “cascade” training to be undertaken by CMMRCs for organizations within their catchment area has not materialized.

Finally, the EWS is not yet a network. CMMRCs were initially conceived to be representatives of CBOs, NGOs, and other existing peace structures as indicated by the baseline study and analysis. These targeted and existing peace structures ought to have been identified and formally integrated into the EWS before the election of their representatives to the CMMRCs. Although the councils do represent diverse interests and constituencies, their formation at state level, their functional roles, and a lack of well-developed reporting and analysis system prevents them from taking root in an effective community of information sources.

Regrettably, therefore, the CMMRC is not visible or known to most communities or youth groups, even within the state capitals where they are based. The original CALM approach assumed that CMMRC would receive information from youth groups and other structures for analysis and appropriate response. This approach further assumed that the CMMRC would be rooted in the community and would have sufficient influence to act powerfully and effectively on information received. In practice, IFESH/CALM elevated the CMMRCs as the exclusive custodian of the EWS framework and marginalized the contributions of youth groups to the detriment of an efficient EWS. Program implementation has elevated the CMMRC above the other components, alienated the CMMRCs from other community groups, and

thereby weakened synergy among the program components. Ultimately, this approach weakened the capacity to prevent and mitigate conflicts in the focal states, as did the lack of well-developed protocols and capacity building for an integrated warning and response system.

### **4.3 MAINSTREAMING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT INTO TARGETED ORGANIZATIONS**

As noted in Section 2, this objective was originally framed as “Integrating CALM into Traditional Development Programming.” However stated, the focus of the objective from the outset was to build the capacity of selected development actors to mainstream CMM into institutions that serve vulnerable communities. The RFTA noted the following steps for realizing this objective: facilitate establishment of appropriate Conflict Management and Mitigation regional structures [ultimately, the CMMRCs]; identify key stakeholder groups to be trained in CMM; carry out training needs assessment of the stakeholder groups; design appropriate CMM training modules targeted at the stakeholder groups as well as across the five states, the zones and the country; and train local partners on integrating CMM into USAID partner programs in agriculture, education, health, HIV/AIDS awareness, enterprise development, etc.

Training is the principal thrust of this program objective. It begins with selecting IPs with demonstrated abilities; and building their capacity in CMM, EWS, and conflict mediation skills through a training of trainers (TOT) program. Targeted NGOs and CBOs are then selected for training, either by IFESH/CALM or the IPs. In collaboration with the IP organizations, the RFTA notes that IFESH “will also develop, field-test, and implement conflict training modules that can be integrated into the existing programs of USAID partners and other organizations working to improve health and education, provide financial services, increase agricultural production and employment, and mitigate the impact of HIV/AIDS” (IFESH, 2005: 3).

The scope of institutions targeted for training was ultimately narrower than originally planned, and focused on population segments in vulnerable communities such as girls, women, youth, rather than on a broad range of development programs. At the same time, both the RFTA and CA foresaw the engagement of local community organizations as a key part of entrenching a culture of peace in schools, communities, or so-called “regions.” IFESH/CALM would identify existing youth associations (peace structures) in the states and network them into the conflict mitigation and management process. It would further organize and empower new or existing groups with knowledge of the EWS and CMM education. Members of these groups would also be the beneficiaries of skills training and civic education. In turn, they would be empowered to build the capacity of other members of their communities.

In practice, identification of local community groups and their integration into the EWS and CMM processes was not wholly systematic, and a number of potentially useful groups, such as community youth vigilante organizations, were left out. However, many members—especially senior members—were trained by CALM at workshops once or twice a year, and this training was widely appreciated.

A strength of the CALM approach was to build CMM and EWS into all training activities, including skills training and civic education. While generally successful, three key weaknesses emerged from the CALM training approach. First, the cascade or “step-down” training was rarely carried out for the general membership by trained officers of community organizations, and there was no monitoring or follow-up to ensure that this was done. In some states, members of the CYAs were selected for the skills development and civic education, but were not further empowered to build capacity for peace in their communities. This one-off approach missed out an opportunity to leverage many influential community youth organizations in the focal states, especially in the Niger Delta. Similarly, while the program design recognized the vulnerability of women and the value of their contribution to the CALM process, the implementation approach failed to integrate girls, women, and women’s groups into all the program components. Second, few adequate training manuals or tools were created by the program to assist

trainees to conduct further trainings independently. This key opportunity for mainstreaming through a solid educational approach was missed. Third, the vast constituency which IFESH/CALM created among youth and other vulnerable groups was not actively formed into a “network” that might fully participate in future CMM activities or—most important—the EWS.

The recruitment of partner NGOS for the implementation of CALM was designed to be rigorous and predicated on a study to show the strengths and weaknesses of potential partners. Competitive bidding was employed in many cases. In some, the recruitment of partners for program implementation was done on ad hoc basis without serious regard for the selection criteria provided in the CA. Oftentimes, IFESH fell back on residual knowledge and solicited groups to handle some component of the program without due diligence or competitive bidding.

#### **4.4 TARGETED MITIGATION INTERVENTION IN NON-FOCAL STATES**

The CA and RFTA required that funds be set aside for emergency response to conflicts in non-focal states. The CALM program recognized that copycat conflicts can often undermine peace in the focal states. Thus far, one such intervention concerning a conflict between Shiite and Sunni has been undertaken in Sokoto through the Interfaith Mediation Center (IMC) based in Kaduna. A report written on the meeting indicated that the members of the Sunni sect did not participate but requested a separate engagement at a later date. Thus far, an emergency intervention protocol has not been defined to identify potential links between an outbreak of conflict in non-focal state and risk conditions in the focal states. The result is that the program response for non-focal states is typically an improvised and one-off effort, with negligible prospect of sustainable programmatic success.

#### **4.5 CIVIC EDUCATION FOR ELECTION OBSERVERS AND YOUTH ADVOCACY**

CALM’s ongoing civic education activities are designed to create awareness in the youth population of their civic responsibility toward democracy and good governance. Elections are the most consistent triggers of violence today in Nigeria. In the PZs, the BB4P teams and peace clubs offer strong platforms for the promotion of peace education for youth.

The CA and RFTA proposed a CALM intervention in the run up to the 2007 national elections. Consequently, IFESH implementing partners were asked to train and prepare youths for election observation activities, as well as youth advocacy with government after the election. IFESH/CALM figured among a number of USAID partners who engaged in election-related training. However, the advantage of CALM was its broad youth constituency and its ongoing program of civic education. Response to this training was very positive, and many youth requested more extensive training in future.

#### **4.6 PROGRAM INTERVENTIONS AND THEORIES OF CHANGE**

The CALM program unfolded concurrently with a period of interagency reflection on the planning, management and evaluation of conflict related programs. Because the program predated most of this collective work, it was not calculated into the program design. Nevertheless, the evaluation examined the usefulness of draft OECD “Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding (CPP) Activities.” This high-level manual is intended to encourage greater attention to the relevance, effectiveness, impact, sustainability, and efficiency of CPP interventions, with special emphasis on a multi-donor approach to such interventions and their assessments. An Evaluation Framework created for this evaluation (by John Mason, see Table 1) incorporated key criteria from the “Guidance” sections 3.2 and 3.3, which relate to planning and conducting evaluations. It should be noted, however, that *post-hoc application of the OECD criteria to the evaluation of a program conceived without benefit of the OECD*

*guidance is less useful than its application to future program concept and design.* For example, the OECD stresses a multi-lateral approach to planning and evaluation. While this mid-term assessment will not involve direct participation of other key actors (e.g., government or donors), such an approach could be very useful to an initial program concept, the iterative and summative evaluations, and to follow-on program design. Combined donor budgets and synergy of effort could also mobilize sufficient funds and the political will for a future conflict mitigation and management effort to have a genuine impact.

Section 3.3.1 in the OECD “Guidance” refers to the logic of a theory of change that underlies the implementation of a CPP (or CMM) activity. A corresponding analytical tool developed by USAID/CMM presents seven broad levels of “change” and 17 individual drivers attached to these levels. However, CALM was not designed with an explicit theory of change framework in mind, and any assessment of the theories of change framework underlining the design (and implementation) of the program will be retrospective and thus reflective. Accordingly, it would be inappropriate to assume the presence or absence of an implicit theory as a criterion for judging program success. At the same time, an examination of the documents, conversations with program management, and—above all—beneficiary responses would indicate that some theories are at play in the various existing program components, as shown in the table below. For example, the design of the BB4P, the peace clubs, and the PZs is underlined by such theories as inner transformation, key actors’ attitude, community reconciliation, bridge building, and the culture of peace. While the theory of inner transformation runs through all CALM program components, CALM did not intentionally accord importance to theories of change that relate more to the contribution of elite manipulation as a real factor for violent conflict.

The current CALM approach—which stresses training in the causes, prevention, signaling, and management of conflict—most appropriately reflects the personal or communal rather than institutional levels of change (i.e., 1: Individual Enlightenment, 2: Attitudes toward Peace, 3: Healthy Relationships, 4: Peace Process). Higher levels which include 5: Functioning Institutions, 6: Reforming the Elite, and 7: Transitional Justice, lie generally beyond the scope of the present program design. A key exception is the CMMRC, which draws together mid- to senior-level stakeholders from a range of traditional, government and civil society institutions. This attempt to institutionalize a supportive coalition for peace holds the potential to tap into higher levels of government decision making and to influence elites through institutional or personal networks.

As has been previously noted, the CALM baseline and other studies document the widely held view among the Nigerian public that violent conflict is politically motivated and generated by elites. A program that addresses this conclusion would properly stress change in institutions, among the political elite, and at the highest moral and legal sphere. Such an approach would be quite different from that of the present day CALM.

**TABLE 1. CALM: THEORIES OF CHANGE**

<b>CMM Theories of Change:</b>	<b>CMM Theories of Change:</b>	BB4P	Peace Clubs In Schools	Community Youth Associations	CMMRCs EWS	Workshops & Events Publicity	Election Monitoring (2007)	
<b>Theoretical Family</b>	<b>Specific Theoretical Focus</b>	<b>Zones of Peace</b>						
Individual Enlightenment	1 - Inner Transformation	X	x	x	x	x	x	
Attitudes Toward Peace	2.1 - Key actor attitudes		X	X	x	x	x	
	2.2 - Mass Attitudes	Within the Zones of Peace X			x	X	X	x
	2.3 - Culture of Peace	Within the Zones of Peace X			X	X	x	
Healthy Relationships	3.1 - Community Reconciliation	X	x	X	x			
	3.2 - Building Bridges	X	x	x	x			
Peace Process	4 - Negotiated Settlement		X		x			
Functioning Institutions	5.1 - Economic			x				
	5.2 - Political				?		x	
	5.3 - Security/Juridical				x			
	5.4 - Social Services							
Elite Reform	6.1 - Elite Motivations				x			
	6.2 - Elite Means				x			
Coming to Terms with the Past	7 - Transitional Justice							

**Notes:**

1. x = Based on discussion/interviews with IFESH-USA, IFESH-CALM; no strong evidence in written documentation but evidence from field interviews
2. Theories 1.1 – 4 could yield achievable outcomes within the boundaries of the CALM program objectives.
3. Theories 5.1 - 5.4 would overlap with other Strategic Objectives of the USAID program, which support national government programs. The CALM program may contribute to desired outcomes, but cannot be accountable for them alone.
4. Theories 6.1-6.2 depend broadly on the policies and processes of government performance. They would apply marginally to the verifiable outputs in the CALM program.
5. Theory 7 on Transitional Justice can be supported in limited ways by CALM program activities, but cannot serve as the intellectual basis of a small capacity-building project. This theory must be linked to a broader Legal Framework managed by the State (such as the Oputa Commission or the more recent Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Rivers State).

# 5.0 FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

This section offers an analysis of selected key findings gleaned from materials and activities covering program inception in 2005 until the review in March 2009. Main sources include reports, training manuals, and media materials, as well as data from all 75 qualitative field interviews. (These data are preserved in electronic format.) Findings from the Mid-term Review reflect the challenges of complex program design and management in a challenging environment. They also bear witness to the commitment, enthusiasm, and belief of program staff, partners, and beneficiaries in the value of reducing and managing conflict for ensuring a peaceful, prosperous, and democratic future in Nigeria. Toward such an end, training is the primary program focus and chief strength. At the top tiers, CMM training is carried out directly by IFESH/CALM staff and is well received by trainees. Civil society and job skills training are executed through its IPs and are broadly appreciated, though they do not go far enough. The “step-down” training, which is central to mainstreaming CMM inside civil society and community organizations, has not been taken up by most organizations and has been marginally supervised and supported by CALM.

Overall, the general picture that emerges in the fourth year of program execution, is one of an ambitious set of components which are still a work in progress. They are partially coordinated and successful, carried out by implementing partners who are, in majority, capable and committed to program goals. At the same time, execution suffers from inadequate planning, insufficient partner engagement, an uncertain funding stream, and a tendency toward short-term action. Finally, CALM management has been hampered by its inappropriate M&E system, which emphasizes quarterly reports on low-level outputs that often bear little relation to expected program results.

In this regard, highlights of performance and a general table of findings are presented below, whereas a supplement in Annex D provides detailed findings from representative program activities in the five focus states.

## 5.1 PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

### 5.1.1 Performance Management Plan

USAID held high expectations for the CALM program. Its innovative, program-based approach to CMM was in many ways an experiment for USAID/Nigeria. For six years, the mission’s conflict prevention portfolio comprised discrete and loosely coordinated *activities* executed through a rapid disbursing mechanism known as SWIFT. A *programmatic* approach stressing synergies between program components was a new concept and a work in progress from the start. In fact, the CA governing the program deferred the detailed program design and evaluation framework until after the program award (USAID, 2005: B-23- B-24) “since conflict management and mitigation is still a relatively new field and indicators are still being developed” (A-3). The guidance offered in the CA was a table of proposed program components and potential related activities. Ultimately, the CALM Performance Management Plan (PMP) expanded this outline into six very different and ambitious components. All were implemented in five focal states. Consequently, the program drew on a variety of technical skills and a range of IPs. To support the IPs, IFESH also developed systems for grant making and institution building. The result was a complex, multi-layered approach to implementation that made important demands on management teams in both IFESH and USAID.

An evolving program environment presented further challenges. Turnover of personnel included USAID supervisors (2), the IFESH Chief of Party (4), M&E officers (2), finance administrators (2), and grants officers (2). The global reorganization of USAID begun in 2006 prompted two major revisions in the program Results Framework. The original four high-level indicators were expanded to 23, then to 29, and then reduced to 14 in 2009. Localized insecurity in the Niger Delta from August 2007 and in Jos from November 2008 restricted travel and diminished supervision and knowledge about program activities in both USAID and IFESH. The CALM program headquarters in Port Harcourt was temporarily closed, and direct visits of USAID staff ended. Senior staff from IFESH headquarters continued to make annual visits to support the program, but they could not prevent some loss of program momentum and direction that began with the office closure.

The PMP and Results Framework offer the principal basis for analysis of findings with respect to *outputs*. Nearly all of the PMP indicators for CALM are expressed as numerical outputs across the program as a whole, e.g., numbers of persons attending training activities or numbers of reports submitted. These combined numerical results give little insight into the relative success of each program component. For this reason, the review focused on the *outcomes* and—to less extent—*impacts* expected for each component as described in the PMP and CA. For example, does evidence suggest that the EWS prevented or mitigated conflict? Are the CMMRCs viable and efficient structures for managing and responding to EWS information? Did skills training lead to business development or employment for youth? Did the Peace Zones contribute to creating a culture of peace in their communities? Did civic education and election observation promote understanding and participation in the electoral process? These broader questions were highlighted in the field interviews.

As a management tool, the PMP has therefore not always helped USAID or IFESH to focus on high-value program results. During interviews, concern was expressed by nearly all parties about the CALM design of the performance management system, especially the Results Framework, the indicators selected, and the quality and burden of reporting. The consensus view of IFESH, USAID, and MEMS is that the existing Results Framework is not fit-for-purpose. Findings from state-level interviews also indicate a perception among some staff and IPs that many CALM activities are driven by an indicator checklist rather than a concern for higher-level results.

### **5.1.2 USAID Oversight, Guidance and Support**

Throughout the program, USAID provided conscientious oversight to the central administrative processes of CALM. The contractor for monitoring and evaluation (MEMS) regularly offered good advice and assurance on the quality of IFESH-reported data, often making visits to the field. USAID has also worked to realign the CALM PMP with requirements associated with the USAID global reorganization. These requirements complicated program management, though, and added burdens for reporting to both USAID and IFESH. Along this line, MEMS is cognizant of deficiencies in the current Results Framework and is willing to work with USAID and the recently reported CALM M&E Officer to adopt a more suitable set of program indicators. Findings from state-level interviews indicate that a perception exists that many CALM activities are undertaken in order to meet an indicator checklist requirement; members of the evaluation team further felt that USAID should more strongly require outcome and impact narratives.

Typically, USAID “substantive involvement” with grantees under a CA is a negotiated partnership in which both parties share responsibility for broad program decisions. Timely and substantive discussion of program work plans would have helped to clarify program direction and encourage deeper analysis of program strategies. This type of relationship is critical in general, but especially when USAID management needed to introduce add-ons, such as election training and non-focal states—which may have overburdened CALM’s already complex structure.

Unfortunately, a worsening security environment hampered USAID direct field supervision after mid-2007, at a time when key changes were also taking place in CALM management. A CA typically requires

USAID “substantive involvement” in program implementation and shared responsibility for analysis of program strategies and discussion of program work plans. A rapidly changing program environment would therefore call for enhanced, and sometimes creative, efforts at engagement and communication (if necessary by proxy, as in the case of MEMS). However, shifting Agency directives on security, stakeholder engagement, and personnel generated occasional management inconsistencies and ambiguities. For example, some IFESH staff report that, contrary to the CA, they were at times discouraged from partnering with government, even on key cooperative efforts such as the EWS. Additionally, at the time of the mid-term review, near the end of Q2, the CALM FY 2009 Work Plan was not yet approved. More discussion of program work plans would have helped to clarify program direction and encourage deeper analysis of program strategies, and should be an area of emphasis over the final 15 months of the program.

Overall, USAID held high expectations for the CALM program as an innovative programmatic approach to CMM in Nigeria. The program was in many ways an experiment which required maximum synergy among its components and close team orientation between USAID and IFESH. At the same time, both USAID and some CALM staff shared a history with the prior, short-term, project-driven orientation of the former OTI/SWIFT approach, and this experience may have influenced CALM’s operation as a set of component parts rather than an integrated program.

### **5.1.3 IFESH Management: Administration and Reporting, Partnering, and Technical Oversight**

From the outset, the IFESH/CALM staff have faithfully reported program results and carefully adjusted their submissions to the changing PMPs and program indicators. They also carefully trained their IPs on performance reporting, although templates used by the NGOs sometimes vary. This administrative strength has been sustained throughout the program period despite shifts in personnel, although frequent turnover of key personnel has adversely impacted staff morale as well as management and programming effectiveness.

Beyond administration, the variety of technical activities, combined with multiple partners in a tiered chain of execution, magnifies the demands on staff time, decision making, oversight, and training. The *cascade* implementation design requires that program staff ensure primary oversight of IPs, who in turn support institutions such as the CMMRCs, BB4P teams, and peace clubs (in many cases built from scratch). Under this model, the program has relied on the civil society, a sector having the weakest formal institutional base. It therefore bears the burden of broad institution building and primary financing for many of its partners.

Processes for managing these partnerships are not well defined. A competitive process was established for initial IP selection, and many NGO partners have been dedicated assets to the program. The most complex partnering relationships centered on the C-NGOs, who were designated to serve a secretariats, advisers, trainers, and information hubs for the higher-level CMMRCs. Their selection was not always appropriate in terms of capacity or shared vision. Relations between the C-NGOs and CMMRCs have at times been tense and ultimately dysfunctional (Kaduna, Plateau, Rivers). Likewise, BB4P reported that its relationship with IFESH has been strained due to irregular support and an absence of a work plan since 2006, and suggested it is not treated as a partner but instead is used as a grantee to “deliver indicators.”

Most partners do not have an overarching framework to guide their activities. Beyond its first year, CALM did not require or encourage IPs to submit annual work plans, frequently suggesting instead short-term plans based on smaller budgets. Routine IP activities are rarely supervised in the field. Institutional capacity building for the IP/NGOs or the new beneficiary organizations is not a designated program activity. Peace club officers are not provided with tools or coached on “step-down” CMM training for their club members, nor are the CMMRC members helped to “mentor” youth in PZs or CYAs as planned.

For these reasons, the potential for “multiplying value” implicit in the cascade style design was not fully realized.

Of greater concern is the program’s irregular funding stream through IFESH headquarters. A chain of perceived inadequate funding starts with a program work plan which was too ambitious for the available resources, late and inadequate disbursements from IFESH headquarters to the field, slow disbursement to the satellite office in Kaduna and then on to grantees and their beneficiaries. Funding delays conditions demoralize staff and grantees equally and in some instances create resentment, diversion of funds, and conflict with partners. One IP noted the program does not appear to run on a “budget” but on a replenished “imprest account.” MEMS confirms that IFESH headquarters quarterly reporting on the USAID 269 forms is irregular. The last USAID portfolio review in August 2008 noted a discrepancy between program claims of underfunding and the documented size of the available pipeline.

Financial flexibility in the field offices is constrained. For example, the CA requires a set-aside fund for rapid response in non-focal states, but this fund has not been established. Additionally, according to program staff, funds were not available to forestall the November 2008 election conflict in Jos North Local Government Area (LGA), although likely violence was said to have been anticipated by the CMMRC the previous May. This notwithstanding, IFESH acknowledges having been made aware of an increased risk of violence during a training program two months prior to the elections.

Other financing issues include IFESH’s cost-sharing contribution from Chevron in the amount of \$656,874.00. (IFESH, 2005:3), or 7.8% of the total program the total program value planned at \$8,460,444.00. This contribution reflected a planned extension of the Western Niger Delta Development program which IFESH was implementing in 21 Chevron host communities prior to 2005. Ultimately, the extension was not approved, and IFESH continues to seek complementary funding from other private-sector sources.

The expanded breadth and variety of CALM program components requires a strategic vision and strong coordination skills at the top. Despite a dedicated and willing staff, the CALM skill mix does not meet the challenges of its complex technical design. Skills are weighted toward general development, training, or administrative processes rather than to technical strengths in key program areas such as early warning and response, youth livelihoods, IEC, institution building, and so on. Although staff numbers have increased from 20 on the PMP organigram to 31 on a recent organization chart (some for added security staff), skill gaps have not been met through recruitment or outsourcing.

## **5.2 ILLUSTRATIVE FINDINGS FROM CALM FIELD ACTIVITIES**

Findings from the field should be understood as learning points for continuing, strengthening and improving an important effort that has laid a foundation for long-term US engagement in preventing conflict and building peace in Nigeria. The next paragraphs offer an overview of some program successes, several brief case examples of field findings, and a table summarizing assessment data by state. Details for the summary may be found in Annex D.

A number of notable successes have been recorded by the evaluation team, including:

- Interventions by the CMMRCs in all focal states;
- The meaningful contribution made by hundreds of young election observers to a fair and sound national polling process in 2007;
- BB4P mobilization to support a child immunization campaign in Zaria;
- Building of CMM into health and education training in Kaduna;

- Helping the formation of the Wakirika United Peace Group (WUPG) in Rivers State, which in turn helped form the Ogoni, Wakirika and Andoni Youth Association (OWA), a multi-communal peace group;
- Intervention of a school peace club in strife-ridden Okrika to resolve community disputes;
- Willingness of grassroots youth organizations in Kaduna to participate in EWS;
- Setting up peace clubs in every Plateau State secondary school, by order of the Deputy Governor;
- Expansion of peace clubs from senior to junior secondary schools in parts of Rivers State;
- The enhanced sense of personal worth reported by youth after skills training;
- The new basketball court built in Kaduna entirely through a team's own fundraising and labor; and
- Seventy-one youth associations who met their state assemblies to lobby for a draft National Youth Policy.

Additionally, the selected case examples below will serve to illustrate characteristic findings from the program focus states.

### **5.2.1 Rivers State Youth Groups**

Peace Clubs hold much promise. The evaluation team's findings suggest they could become the driving force for personal transformation, bridge building a sustainable peace culture in the state. The coordinating teacher and officers at Girls' Secondary School, Okirika narrated instances where disputes amongst students were resolved through the mediation of student members of the club. The State Coordinator also related that early warnings relayed by members of the club to their teacher saved a school from violent attack by militant youths. Members of the club have become peace ambassadors in their homes in Okirika, a town recovering from a devastating communal conflict. Community outreach in local sanitation exercises and peace rallies by this club have helped in the social and psychological recovery of the community. The members of the club see themselves in a new light as change-agents. Schools around the neighborhood are requesting members to come and help establish Peace Clubs in their own institutions. Unfortunately, clubs are not closely monitored and nurtured apart from their inauguration, initial training, and occasional notification of special events or competitions. The Peace Clubs also have not received dedicated training on EWS and CMM, apart from the coordinating school teacher and one or two members. Club members consequently can define EWS and CMM but have little knowledge about their own role in conflict mitigation and management. This is a lost opportunity.

The CYA is another CALM youth component having strong potential. One positive example is the Wakirika United Peace Group, which was organized with the help of IFESH/CALM in 2006. Membership is open to all youths in Okirika. It has played an important role by mobilizing the youths of the community through peace rallies. Its biggest success is the formation of Ogoni, Wakirika and Andoni Youth Association, which came into being when youths from Ogoni and Andoni, two communities always at war with each other, observed how WUPG worked with the elders to demobilize militant youths. They requested that an association be formed that included their communities. Today, both OWA and WUPG are led by elected officials. The two organizations collaborate on conflict mitigation and management. Some of the members of the association were former militants who are now peace ambassadors. A coalition of youths from these ethnic groups to promote peace is a huge boost to the CMM process in the state.

### **5.2.2 Delta State Computer Skills Training**

A vocational training activity on computer appreciation was organized for youths in Delta State. Information Technology Consulting (ITC), a reputable computer firm with branches across the country, offered an abbreviated version of its six-month course in Warri for two months. The training, which included CMM and EWS, drew about 65 youths associated with the CALM program. Although ITC believed the training was insufficient to help the trainees secure a job or become self-employed, it was able to place four of the graduates. Beyond this limited tangible result, the conflict mitigation and peace building instruction appeared to generate a huge change in the behavior of students midway through the course, in contrast to their unruly and violent conduct at the outset. It was also reported that some trainees who had no knowledge of computing before the training now own laptops and are usually seen in cybercafés. Some trainees suggested a follow-on training with financial support to start up a business.

### **5.2.3 Kano State CMMRC**

The CMMRC is a valuable volunteer stakeholder structure, but it cannot in its present form assume primary responsibility for a critical life-and-death function such as EWS, which requires professional input and design. As volunteers, commitment of members varies. Institutional, rather than personal representation reduces the commitment and profile of participants and encourages some representation by proxy. Government representatives often lack sufficient seniority to take authorized decisions. As a volunteer organization with minimal support, the CMMRC lacks strong incentives to hold regular meetings, and its effectiveness relies on the commitment of one or two key champions. Four out of five CMMRCs have stopped holding monthly meetings, in part for lack of focus or funds.

Recognizing the doubtful stability and sustainability of the CMMRC structures, IFESH/CALM assigned a C-NGO to provide the “secretariat” and oversight to each Council. C-NGO responsibilities include technical guidance to CMM activities, support to “advocacy visits” to government and other officials, preparing logistics for CMMRC meetings, establishing a “conflict information hub” that makes monthly reports to the CMMRC and IFESH, and managing all CMMRC funds except those intended for direct conflict response by the CMMRC itself. C-NGO support is temporary for up to three years until the CMMRC can be established as a solid institution.

The Kano State CMMRC has been fortunate in its C-NGO, the Centre for Democratic Research and Training (CDRT), based in Mambayya House at Bayero University. With noticeable enthusiasm and institutional commitment, CDRT has guided the CMMRC to achieve notable successes in conflict prevention and mediation interventions. The Mambayya House has performed the functions of the information hub only on demand, when a crisis is imminent or underway. Notwithstanding, the CMMRC enjoys wide public confidence from even the most vulnerable populations, e.g., the Igbo Christian community. This has resulted in the recent call by this community for the intervention of the Council in an intra-ethnic conflict among Igbo leaders in Kano. The Council has successfully intervened in seven religious conflicts. They included a fact finding mission to Sumaila LGA during the sectarian clash of 9 February 2008, between students of a secondary school and the police in the area. The Mambayya House—the C-NGO for the CMMRC—complained of inadequate funding for the CMMRC to hold its regular monthly meetings.

### **5.2.4 Plateau State EWS**

The EWS managed by the CMMRC has not yet evolved in any state into a functioning “system” with clear policies, processes, and protocols supported by an EWS handbook, adequate training, and appropriate management tools. Without these essential elements, training on the EWS “process” becomes ad-hoc. Reporting from the information “hub” in the C-NGO suffers from lack of standard guidelines. Communication with the critical information network of youth and community organizations is intermittent and unreliable. And, perhaps most important, the analysis, warning and response mechanisms

seemingly failed, as the November 2008 election-related riots in Jos amply illustrate the pressing need for an effective early warning and response system.

As previously mentioned, the CMMRC had determined in May 2008 that future violence was likely, and an IFESH review of the political violence in Jos noted that IFESH was alerted to potential trouble two months prior during a training seminar. However, CALM did not act strategically upon this information, including not reporting the previously received early warning information to USAID or the US Embassy. CALM did react to the last moment CMMRC request to place radio jingles (public service announcements) only days before violence broke out. (It should be noted that interviews suggested the Deputy Chair of the CMMRC and some officials from the council secretariat met on an ad hoc basis and personally paid to cover the costs of radio jingles to counter potential violence.)

As the crisis in Plateau State shows, the reception of early warning signals must be subjected to well-trained analysis for strategic action to be taken in a timely and appropriate manner. In this instance, mitigative action was too late and too little for it to have been effective. It seemed that the CMMRC lacked the capacity and perhaps the basic structure and mandate to intervene effectively in such instances of instability or to work with actual security institutions. It is also possible that the government institution responsible for security intervention lacked the incentive to take action or was held back by other political considerations. For this reason, engagement and commitment of government is quite likely to enhance the success of the EWS, as is the establishment of well developed reporting, analysis, warning and response protocols, and capacity.

### 5.2.5 Kaduna State Basketball for Peace

In its earliest days, CALM took as its entry point the existing Basketball for Peace project, previously funded by OTI. This activity remains the focus topic on the IFESH/CALM website. BB4P creates youth basketball coalitions called peace zones in vulnerable “hot spot” communities. Using a networking concept, BB4P extends its peacemaking activities to peace clubs in secondary schools within the PZs. As a small but successful “project” in its own right, BB4P expected to sustain its relative autonomy under CALM, Its status as a grantee has created ambiguity and tension with its new parent, especially in Kaduna, located only a few miles from the BB4P head office in Zaria.

Despite concerns about limited freedom and funds to chart its own direction, BB4P has maintained more than six highly active BB4P clubs in the Kaduna area. The club at the Kaduna Police College pursues a regular program of training, peace talks, and inter-mural competitions. It has also built a second basketball court through its own efforts in fundraising and construction. It also serves as a bridge between the police and the surrounding community. The Coordinator identifies mentors for career development, and a number of team members have joined the police force as well as other occupations.

**TABLE 2. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS BY STATE**

Component	Rivers	Delta	Plateau	Kaduna	Kano
<b>Early Warning System</b>	Undeveloped system, no protocols  EWS “hub” not functional; no regular reporting to IFESH or government.  Up/down links with CMMRC need strengthening	C-NGO created own partial system of protocols using official telephone numbers and member networks  EWS “hub” not functional; no regular reporting to IFESH or government.	No functional system in place, as illustrated by slow response to potential election violence in Nov. 2008.  CMM roles and responsibilities unclear and no functional up/down links	No defined EWS system; CMMRC relies on informal networks  Up/down links weak  EWS “hub” not functional; no regular reporting to IFESH or government.	Not yet a full-fledged system; relies chiefly on personal or institutional networks  EWS “hub” established, but only marginally functional  Good links with government.

Component	Rivers	Delta	Plateau	Kaduna	Kano
	EWS training for CMMRC	Up/down links with CMMRC still weak	EWS “hub” not functional; no regular reporting to IFESH or government  Existing EWS knowledge up/down has not been tapped		Offices and police, but youth links weak
<b>CMMRC</b>	<p>Training well received</p> <p>Membership broad</p> <p>Minimal gvt. Engagement</p> <p>Ambiguity between “personal” and “functional” representation</p> <p>C-NGO inactive; CMMRC self-managing and created own work plan</p> <p>Strong advocacy, mediation, engagements</p> <p>Organized radio jingles for peace</p> <p>Trained some Peace Clubs on EWS</p>	<p>Training well received</p> <p>Balanced membership by stakeholder group and ethnicity; includes IOC representative</p> <p>“Lacks pedigree” overall</p> <p>Little interaction with youth groups</p> <p>Some government engagement, but minimally active</p> <p>Original C-NGO replaced by civic education IP NIPRODEV</p> <p>Limited advocacy and public engagement thus far, but good potential</p>	<p>Competent training by IPs</p> <p>Helped prevent violence during Jos elections March 2009 through timely warning and response.</p> <p>Broad peace constituency, but modest commitment to CALM objectives</p> <p>Conflict between two C-NGOs: registered CFSJA “fronts” for You-Peg, which does the coordination</p> <p>No CMMRC work plan or regular meetings</p> <p>No step-down trainings for youth groups</p>	<p>CMM and EWS training took place but not acknowledged as useful or adequate</p> <p>Membership does not include civil society groups (e.g. BB4P); government stakeholders marginally active</p> <p>C-NGO IMC, focused on religious conflict, not committed to multi-stakeholder CALM approach</p> <p>Using informal networks successfully mediated simmering religious crisis and local revolt against power company</p>	<p>Broadly representative and committed; known and respected by peace constituencies</p> <p>CMM trainings provided, but did not equip members to train youth groups in EWS</p> <p>Strong and conscientious C-NGO CDRT has guided 7 conflict prevention and mediation interventions</p>
<b>Peace Zones</b>	<p>6 zones created in the State</p> <p>BB Teams split from BB4P; new org. OPDM created with IFESH consent</p> <p>Key hot spots not served for lack of funds</p> <p>Peace Clubs: many active, strong potential, extended to</p>	<p>New Peace Zones created</p> <p>BB4P reportedly in decline, but some teams still active; peace messages to teams have fallen off</p> <p>EWS and CMM training given by IFESH or IPs to club and team officers</p>	<p>In some zones, BB4P and Peace Clubs have been inactive since 2007</p> <p>No new Peace Zones created by CALM program</p> <p>Momentum for BB4P maintained through personal efforts of State Coordinator</p>	<p>Competition between CALM and Zaria-based BB4P in this, their “home” area; IP seeks more autonomy and funding from CALM</p> <p>Some very active BB4P teams, receiving direct BB4P training on fundraising, etc.</p> <p>Some active</p>	<p>2 of 3 planned new Peace Zones created; however, State BB4P Coordinator has lost interest in the CALM umbrella for BB activities</p> <p>Peace talks to BB4P teams are rare</p> <p>Links between BB4P and Peace</p>

Component	Rivers	Delta	Plateau	Kaduna	Kano
	<p>junior schools, but not well supported by CALM</p> <p>Some very strong CYAs with great potential</p> <p>Some peace clubs and CYAs have engaged in mediation</p> <p>Peace clubs, BB teams and CYAs have received CMM training, but limited to key personnel</p> <p>Step-down training by youth org. heads not effective or well supported by CALM</p>	<p>Little step down training for members</p> <p>Members say strategy to “divert youth energies” has shown results</p> <p>No Peace Clubs visited, as school teaches on strike</p> <p>CYAs have not been created</p>	<p>through position on State Sports Council</p> <p>CALM BB4P approach with peace education not being implemented in existing Zones</p> <p>Deputy governor ordered Peace Clubs in all secondary schools, but so far performance is low</p> <p>IP training of Peace Clubs, CYAs, BB4P on EWS and CMM did not lead to step-down training</p>	<p>Peace Clubs, and formation encouraged by peace workshops, but little CALM support.</p>	<p>Clubs are weakening</p> <p>New Youth Clubs are encouraged, but little follow-up institution building by CALM</p>
<b>Skills Training</b>	<p>Skills Fair held; raised positive expectations</p> <p>Well drilling: poor choice, duration was too short</p> <p>Should be some follow-up. There should have been some females participants also</p>	<p>Skills Fair held</p> <p>Computer skills: desirable, and qualified IP, but too short for sustainable outcome for most trainees</p> <p>EWS training built into the course</p> <p>4 of 65 trainees placed in jobs</p> <p>Expectations for follow-on support: jobs, business training, or credit</p> <p>Reportedly raised confidence of some trainees</p>	<p>Skills Fair held</p> <p>Fish farming: training in one demonstration program, but activity not sustained.</p> <p>Video production: popular but equipment handover delayed by CALM until further business training</p>	<p>Fish Farming Training</p>	<p>Skills Fair held</p> <p>Fish Farming training and pilot project involving the BB4P Coordinator and youth from BB4P was not well designed or sustained. Other trainees disappointed by lack of follow-up.</p>
<b>Election Observation</b>	<p>Training and election observation experience very satisfactory</p>	<p>Training and observation satisfactory</p>	<p>No information available</p>	<p>Civic education training by IP well received; election observation a positive experience</p>	

# 6.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CALM has made an important contribution to raising awareness of creating and maintaining a culture of peace in selected regions of the focal states by mobilizing the interest and support of civil society groups at all levels. It has laid the foundation for broad stakeholder engagement in conflict prevention and early warning and response. It has reached out to youth through sports activities, educational institutions, and informal associations and networks. It has opened dialogue and occasionally partnered with government on CMM. It has tested and selected a number of reliable implementing partners. In its effort to fulfill program goals, CALM has also been ambitious. The scope and complex design of its work plan have not always been matched by the requisite technical skills or by adequate and timely funding. These conditions affected the tone and morale of the program as it struggled to meet expectations of partners and beneficiaries in a worsening program environment.

This notwithstanding, the evaluation team clearly believes program impact can be enhanced in the remaining 15 months of the program. The first step is to review and adjust the IFESH management strategy and USAID oversight role in order to gain maximum value from program implementation. Strengthening CALM's impact will require addressing pending programmatic and administrative matters, including a timely review and approval of CALM work plan for 2009 and 2010. To realize the greatest impact the approved work plan should detail both programmatic and managerial contributions toward achieving program objectives. In this light, the following section presents the results of a strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) analysis the field team undertook; articulates specific recommendations for maximizing program impact; and concludes with suggestions to USAID as it considers continuing support to conflict abatement in Nigeria.

## 6.1 STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, OPPORTUNITIES, AND THREATS ANALYSIS

This section draws conclusions from research findings. It follows the basic orientation of a SWOT analysis, summarizing strengths and weaknesses internal to the program and identifies both opportunities and threats in an institutional or external context. The SWOT also serves as a foundation for discussion of future actions to be taken by the program in the next 15 months and may offer useful considerations for future USAID support to CMM activities. As in any SWOT analysis, it should be noted that in some instances, a given issue may have elements of strength as well weakness, or be perceived as opportunity as well as a threat.

### 6.1.1 Strengths

- **Program of training.** The program has provided, either directly or through its implementing partners, a planned program of workshops to train CMMRCs and their coordinating NGO partners in CMM, EWS and mediation skills. It has also trained its grantee organizations in management and reporting for sub-grants and projects. In late 2007 it initiated an ambitious program of youth skills training, including exposure to a broad range of income-generating activities through skills fairs following up by selected IP-led training events.

- **Mobilization for awareness building and education.** The program has demonstrated the power to convene large constituency of youth in all five states for CMM-related activities by drawing on its longstanding contacts in IP, NGO, and CYA groups. For example, in 2007 it easily added to its regular program the training of hundreds of youth observers and youth advocates for the national elections. This was universally judged a useful and successful civic education initiative. CALM has also mobilized leaders in the majority of peace clubs, basketball for peace teams, and community youth organizations to participate in CMM workshops, with the expectation that trainees on their own volition would create peace clubs in schools and/or provide step-down training to their group members.
- **Creation of CMMRCs.** By creating Conflict Management and Mitigation Regional Councils, CALM pioneered the concept of institutionalizing a critical mass of citizens concerned with CMM from a broad cross-section of civic, youth, and governmental organizations. Council members have embraced the utility of their groups and most have suggested extending them to local governments in their states.
- **Peace Zones.** The Basketball for Peace project, begun in 2001 as a private voluntary organization, was incorporated as a flagship component into the CALM program, together with its concept of creating “peace zones” in violence-prone areas of the focal states. Historically, the BB4P has enjoyed strong, often enthusiastic, support by players, referees, and coaches. Under CALM, “peace messages” were incorporated into BB4P training and competition.
- **Niger Delta focus.** IFESH has established a history of working in Niger Delta communities, an oil-rich region marked by escalating low-intensity violence. The government of Nigeria relies on this region for nearly 90% of its income, as do many countries for a reliable energy supply. CALM presence is a rare distinction among international donor organizations. By drawing on this strength, the program makes an important contribution to the future of Nigeria and the world economy.
- **Analysis and addressing of multiple underlying causes.** The complexity of the CALM program, with its six components, reflects a good conceptual grasp of the multiple and interlinked causes underlying violent conflict and the channels available for their prevention and management. CALM must be given credit for its sincere effort to address diverse economic, social and informational, issues surrounding conflict and peace-building. As a small program, it lacks the capacity to address all causes fully, but it can foster coordination among inputs from other, more specialized, actors (e.g. youth economic development). In addition, the program can enhance its impact by focusing on the most common trigger of violent conflict in Nigeria today, which is electoral politics.
- **Faithful reporting.** CALM has regularly submitted quarterly reports that make strong efforts to assess progress according to an evolving Results Framework.

### 6.1.2 Weaknesses

- **Staff skill mix.** Most CALM staff are deployed as generalists, and nearly all take responsibility for training, which is the program strength. However, the diversity of CALM components also requires specialized technical expertise in early warning and response systems design and management, CMM training, information/education/communication, youth livelihoods, and M&E. The program also requires a Chief of Party with demonstrated skills in strategic planning and coordination of disparate components. Where these skills were absent in-house, few opportunities were exercised for recruiting or outsourcing needed expertise.
- **Training materials.** Effective training depends on expert materials development. CALM often creates derivative materials that are unclear and incomplete. They lead to an opportunistic, non-standard approach by various IP trainers. Many CALM CMM training materials were produced

before the program inception by CRESNET or BB4P. Only two IFESH/CALM training tools are of standard quality. Many are set at the wrong level, poorly produced, and not designed for training of trainers, despite the central role of “step-down” training in the CALM strategy for CMM capacity building.

- **Partner relations.** CALM needs to enhance its culture of partnering, stakeholder engagement, collaboration, and communication. Beneficiaries and IPs report that staff rarely undertake field visits or engage in direct interaction outside of formal workshops or events. Annual work plans, mutually agreed, would empower grantees to plan and implement activities with confidence and autonomy. Reportedly, IP planning proposals are at times submitted without response or without adequate discussion and negotiation. In the place of work plans, CALM tends to manage its grantees on an ad hoc, opportunistic basis driven by the availability of funds. And in the place of collaboration, some CALM staff are perceived to compete with strong IPs, such as BB4P, who say they are given little autonomy, meager resources and low “profile” in the program.
- **Institution- and network-building.** The CALM program model stresses a “cascade” strategy. It relies on competent and reliable implementing partners for training and capacity building. It depends on strong and committed networks for successful EWS. It has also strived to create specific-purpose institutions such as Peace Clubs, BB4P teams, and CMMRCs. Strong tools, processes, and supervision for institution- and capacity building are therefore central to program success. Findings suggest that these tools and processes were not sufficient
- **Program overreach.** IFESH/CALM over estimated its capacity to tackle some of the most difficult program components, such as youth skills training. This weakness diluted attention from its strengths such as training. It is trying to navigate through waters that are increasingly agitated by missed promises to beneficiaries and targets expected by USAID.
- **Management issues.** CALM management has been weakened by frequent staff turnover, poor program processes (work plans, supervision) and an unreliable IFESH funding stream. All of these have threatened the quality of program leadership and discipline, program consistency, early warning response, and staff morale. Disbursements of routine or special event funds by IFESH to beneficiary groups are often delayed and fall below expectations or requirements. In some cases program activities have stopped.
- **Weak M&E.** The present Results Framework and indicators do not yield information appropriate to management decision making. It stresses aggregated numerical outputs that cut across program components. The performance reporting system drives the program to produce “numbers” and deflects attention from managing components for results. A newly assigned M&E officer in the program has suggested revisions to focus attention on outcomes and impacts, combined with better field monitoring.
- **Collaboration with government.** The CA expects that CALM will engage government on CMM. In practice interaction with public sector officials has been limited to government representatives on the CMMRC. Key activities such as EWS require an overarching institutional “champion” to ensure program sustainability, and government is best placed to provide this institutional home.

### 6.1.3 Opportunities

- **Elections.** The 2010-2011 electoral period provides an incentive to strengthen early warning and response system and for renewed civic education. The first of these two activities builds on an existing CALM institution and the second on a past success and strength.

- **Existing CMMRC stakeholder groups.** The CALM program has created committed stakeholder groups in the fledgling CMMRCs, which include some security representatives, traditional rulers, labor, government and civil society groups. The CMMRCs could be strengthened and replicated at local (LGA) level.
- **Youth constituency.** The program has a valuable youth constituency in existing youth groups. In addition, myriad untapped informal youth associations and networks exist everywhere at community level. They offer an additional source of further EWS information and peace advocacy. Some informal community youth protection associations have already developed links with the police.
- **Niger Delta.** CALM can build on its current activities in the Niger Delta to support a much-neglected region which is absolutely vital to the future and security of Nigeria. It has already established strong community youth associations in Rivers State, Peace Zones, and peace clubs in secondary and some junior schools.
- **Government and donor CMM initiatives.** Opportunities for USAID collaboration with partners on conflict abatement include new government and donor CMM initiatives, e.g. a new government strategy for community policing, EWS pilot project by the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) structures in six geo-political zones (Jos as an entry point), and the joint UNDP/EU/DfID/CIDA \$75M “Deepening Democracy in Nigeria” project is expected to be launched in June 2009 to begin support over five years to the Nigerian democratic process, including the 2011 elections. The new Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs may offer another platform for engagement on peace and security.
- **Primary school peace education.** There is evidence of a strong appetite for extending peace clubs and CMM training to greater numbers of youth in schools. In some states, peace clubs have been created in junior secondary schools. Many interviewees recommended engaging younger students at primary level.
- **Employment opportunities.** Nigerian agriculture has a potential competitive advantage in the world market. Food shortages and the present economic downturn has raised awareness of new livelihoods opportunities for larger numbers of youth in agriculture.
- **Mainstreaming.** A potential for synergy exists between youth groups – BB4P, peace clubs and the CYAs – and the USAID HIV/AIDS and health program; this potential has already been tapped by the Kaduna State Governor. EWS constituencies can be further expanded through mainstreaming beyond youth to include women’s civil society organizations and youth ethnic interest groups,

#### 6.1.4 Threats

- **Politically motivated electoral violence** is expected by some analysis in the period mid-2010 through 2011. Recent election violence in Ekiti State has deepened this concern. CALM ends 10 months before the next scheduled elections, but can nevertheless strengthen its EWS and civic education.
- **Distrust between communities and security services** can undermine EWS.
- **Continued unemployment and economic downturn** can heighten youth unrest.
- **Evidence of discontent** among a few IPs, grantees, and other beneficiary groups could threaten program effectiveness and, at the most extreme, IFESH and USAID reputations. Program management needs to address these issues, many predating the tenure of the present COP.

- **Funding through end-of-program may be inadequate** to resolve all outstanding obligations, claims, expectations, together with routine program requirements. IFESH may be unable to contribute the counterpart funding amount required under the CA.
- **Limited field supervision** by IFESH staff and USAID hampers consistent monitoring of CALM activities and opportunities for prevention and resolution of internal program conflicts.

## 6.2 STRENGTHENING CALM IMPACT IN THE NEXT 15 MONTHS

### 6.2.1 Key Managerial Steps

1. **Issues management.** Over 80% of IPs and beneficiaries indicate that they have benefited from their engagement with CALM and would be willing to continue their association with the program. At the same time, more than half of the IPs, CYAs, BB4P teams and skills trainees, together with one-third of peace clubs, expressed dissatisfaction for one or more of the following reasons: (a) failure to follow through on plans or promises; (b) non-payment of certain administrative fees—usually 10%; (c) slow or late disbursement of other expected funds; (d) delayed approval of proposals or work plans; and (e) poor communication, lack of contact, and behaviors perceived as disrespect.

*It is recommended that* the CALM COP and team make a systematic tour of program activities and submit a complete list of pending issues and concerns, especially those affecting and/or noted by partners and beneficiaries. Following discussions with program stakeholders, the team should propose as early as possible mutually acceptable options for their resolution. With the cooperation of IFESH HQ, and if necessary with USAID, he and his staff should develop a time-and-targets plan for fulfilling the options selected.

2. **Planning.** While the “issues” analysis above is underway, the COP could meet with USAID to review the remaining CALM the CALM Work Plan for 2009 and agree on feasible targets and budget allocation for the entire program up to its scheduled completion date in June 2010.

*It is recommended that* USAID review, amend as needed, and approve the CALM work plan for 2009. A work plan for 2010 could also be drafted as a complement to this process. Both plans should include activities related to the “issues” analysis above.

3. **Funds disbursement.** Funding from IFESH HQ has been reportedly irregular and often delayed. The CALM team therefore lacks the confidence to develop work plans with its partners against predictable budgets.

*It is recommended that* USAID Nigeria at its earliest convenience clarify with IFESH HQ senior management the apparent disparity between disbursements and funds shown in the program pipeline according to available financial records. USAID should seek assurance from IFESH that it will urgently adjust financial planning, timing, and flows to become more responsive to planned program needs. The proposal of USAID Nigeria to request a financial audit of the program is supported.

4. **Tightened program focus.** Overreach and underperformance of some activities, such as skills training, has raised expectations and exacted high opportunity and resource costs, but yielded few results.

*It is recommended that* CALM refocus attention on program components that have strong prospects for success and sustainability. These include a more systematic and professional early warning system, re-energized CMMRCs in their present form, and stronger engagement with youth groups, on an individual basis, to lay a foundation for peace education prior to the 2011 elections. As part of its

“issues” review, it should close out training activities with a feasible, efficient, low-cost strategy for meeting valid expectations still pending.

5. **Partnering.** CALM has many strong and dedicated NGO partners. Some, however, have performed below expectations because of low capacity, unsuitability, or loss of interest.

*It is recommended that* IFESH/CALM review the status of its IPs and change or drop those who have not been delivering on their mandate to support vital components such as CMMRCs (Kaduna, Plateau, Rivers). Direct funding to CMMRCs could be considered where its Coordinating NGO does not add value. Meanwhile, budgets for IP activities should be reviewed to enhance the sustainability of important program activities through adequate support.

*It is further recommended that* CALM meet in the next month with all retained IPs and jointly develop work plans and budgets that consolidate and complete ongoing activities for the remaining program period. The only new initiatives accepted should be those that resolve pending issues (e.g. promised and expected skills training) or activities that offer foundation support to 2011 elections. “New ideas” should be firmly discouraged. Funding levels for activities should be negotiated with IPs to reasonably cover the outputs expected.

*It is also recommended that* ambiguous, inappropriate or irregular financing mechanisms for the IPs and associated groups (e.g. Plateau State) be modified or regularized.

*It is finally recommended that* CALM explore options for granting more “space” and financial security to its flagship Basketball for Peace component so that it may refurbish and equip existing clubs, encourage more competitions promoting peace, and attract complementary private-sector funding. At a minimum, attention is needed to refurbish the relationship between IFESH and BB4P, especially in Rivers and Delta states. It would be advised to resist donor demands for expansion into other sports (suggested from a number of sources) until it has been solidly re-established as a functioning organization

6. **Institution building.** Solid institutions such as CMMRCs, Peace Clubs, BB4P Teams, and CYAs will ensure sustainability and a strong foundation for CMM in future years.

*It is recommended that* guided institutional independence for the CMMRCs be encouraged through a clear program of action in early warning and pre-election activities. Information “hubs” should be re-activated in the Coordinating NGOs or established inside the CMMRCs and required to submit monthly reports to government as well as to IFESH. A national meeting of CMMRCs to exchange experiences and lessons learned would be an excellent opportunity to kick off this initiative.

*It is recommended that* more attention be given to better integrating the CYAs into the overall CALM framework and into the EWS in particular.

*It is also recommended* a general program to activate existing Peace Clubs and CYAs be designed around the upcoming 2011 elections with appropriate materials *distributed directly with training to each group*, rather than through a loosely supervised “step-down” approach.

**M&E Plan Revision.** A consensus view among program stakeholders is that the current Results Framework and indicators do not adequately “tell the story” about program results for management purposes.

*It is recommended that* the newly appointed M&E officer in CALM be encouraged to work with MEMS to revise the framework to include a limited number of custom indicators focused on program *outcomes and impacts*.

7. **Coordination with Government and Donors on CMM.** New government and donor initiatives underway in early warning and response offer opportunities for synergy, especially in the run-up to the 2011 elections. In the short term CALM should expand its strengths in civic education, early warning, and its unique broad youth network. Many younger program beneficiaries in clubs and CYAs have requested more training on electoral reform and participation in election observation.

*It is recommended that, in the spirit of the new DAC philosophy of CMM multilateral coordination, USAID provide early guidance to IFESH/CALM on opening dialogue and aligning its activities with complementary government or donor initiatives.*

8. **Supervision.** CALM has been deprived of adequate field supervision by both IFESH and USAID staff. Security restrictions on travel to the Niger Delta begun in 2007 cannot wholly explain this weakness.

*It is recommended that IFESH staff sharply increase their interaction with CALM activities and program participants on ground.*

*It is further recommended that the level of USAID supervision be stepped up and that regularly scheduled program review meetings with senior staff be held in IFESH/CALM offices, at a minimum on a monthly basis. USAID visits with the COP in the CALM program headquarters in Port Harcourt may be replaced by monthly meetings in a nearby city or at the Kaduna Regional Office. Field monitoring visits can be made in restricted areas by proxy, if necessary. (This proxy approach has been adopted by DfID in the Niger Delta region.) Additionally, USAID should enhance its internal control and monitoring of CALM to help maximize and target the impact of remaining fiscal resources.*

9. **Technical support to CALM.** Technical weaknesses are evident in EWS, training materials development, and institution-building.

*It is recommended that one or more short-term consultants be resourced as needed to support short-term program planning, designing protocols and processes for early warning, and strengthening institution building.*

## **6.2.2 Key Programmatic Contributions to Peaceful Elections and Future Conflict Abatement**

A complex web of causes and incentives underlie violent conflict in Nigeria. The key trigger for unleashing these smoldering tensions, however, is electoral politics, as seen recently the in Jos (November 2008) and Ekiti (April 2009) elections. Preventing violent conflict can therefore center in the first instance on electoral behaviors during the typically long political season. USAID can make a notable contribution to the country's fledgling democracy by building widespread vigilance to safeguard a peaceful political process. A dual strategy should focus on top-down engagement and close monitoring of politicians combined with expanded, bottom-up CMM education of youth, women, and other members of civil society in peace, civic action and conflict prevention measures. High level advocacy will be needed to enlist the cooperation of appropriate government institutions and political parties to encourage public sector accountability and to formulate collaborative conflict prevention strategies. The top-down, bottom-up approach suggested above can be addressed through enhancing the EWS and network and a grassroots education program that builds a culture of peace, two core components in the current CALM program.

At present, EWS has not evolved through the CALM program into a fully designed "system" with clear policies, processes, and protocols for information gathering, data management, or rapid response. A professional, coordinated and institutionalized EWS will require committed and accountable action by government (a dimension that is beyond the current CALM scope). USAID may want to think through how relevant projects can be better structured to both receive support and endorsement from and provide

support to the traditional and governmental power structures in a given state. Features of an enhanced CMM and EWS effort could include:

- Maintain the regional councils as vital stakeholder support groups. Review and adjust their composition as needed, incorporating the business sector. A two-tiered CMM structure can be considered, one senior group with decision-making authority at state level, and similar groups in local governments. The “coordinating NGO” support to the CMMRCs should be replaced by building the CMMRC institutional and technical capacity.
- Link the CMMRC/EWS data collection structures to highest government levels, to ensure adequate muscle. It has been noted that a volunteer CMMRC organization, minimally funded, lacks strong incentives to hold regular monthly meetings and most activities are reactive and mobilized by strong individual “champions” in the group (Delta, Rivers, Kano); sustainability in some states is currently doubtful (Plateau, Kaduna).
- The EWS should be focused on spotlighting likely hotspots for electoral violence in the focal states so that rapid response can help prevent and mitigate possible violent conflict.
- The strengthened EWS should start small and expand, possibly on the basis of geo-political regions. As pilots, Plateau and Rivers states are suggested pilot options, the first because of a planned IPRC EWS initiative based in Jos and the second because of historically high levels of violence. (Though the need is great, working in Rivers State will be difficult at best due to the security constraints applied to USAID and expatriate personnel.)
- The valuable youth groups (peace clubs, BB4P teams, and CYAs) currently associated with CALM should be strategically *linked into a functional network* that channels EWS information to a central collection source.
- A salaried professional in each pilot state should work in close coordination with the CMMRC to ensure the collection, recording and response to EWS data. This professional should work with a CMM program-based EWS officer and any appropriate networks and projects in government, civil society and community.
- Any future project on EWS must be more technically advanced and should offer specialized training on effective identification and response to early warning to members of the regional councils, NGOs and other relevant actors in the Peace Zones, including government representatives. Part of this capacity building should include designing and disseminating clear integrated protocols and procedures guiding reporting, analysis, warning, *and* strategic response to early warning; capacity building should also include strategic planning and skill building seminars for both public and private sector representatives as linking broad civil society networks to local, state and federal government will be critical for effective early warning and rapid response.

### **6.3 ADDITIONAL LESSONS ABOUT CONFLICT ABATEMENT IN NIGERIA**

Creating a culture of peace is critical for political, social and religious stability in Nigeria, especially in so far as building and enabling capacity for rapid response to emerging conflict dynamics. Toward this end, CMM impact can be enhanced by leveraging strong, existing institutions—including government—as well as by also creating new institutions through a well designed process of organizational strengthening and sustainability planning. Future activities in conflict prevention and management through CALM as well as other current and potential USAID programs should continue and deepen the community focus, expanding the reach to include neighborhood grass roots youth and women’s groups, and an emphasis on civic and peace education. Such efforts should also consider the following general “lessons.”

**Assumptions about causes of violent conflict.** Any future approach to conflict prevention and management should match current conflict patterns, underlying causes, and behaviors of political actors in the areas of planned intervention. A growing tendency toward “do or die” electoral politics has added to the palpable culture of discontent among young people and at the same time encouraged politicians to manipulate unemployed youth to disrupt or distort the democratic process. Albert’s study (2006) commissioned by CALM indicates that a vast majority of the Nigerian public in the CALM focal states believes that only government holds the power and authority to address violent conflict. Less than 10% regard the weaker and less organized civil society as a primary effective actor. Along this line, a common prior assumption is that democracy will help to both mitigate conflict and resolve some of the issues that engender conflict. Experience over the past decade, however, has suggested that democratic politics may actually create new varieties of conflicts or strengthen the causes of conflict. USAID should bear in mind the role, dynamics, and impact of “democratic” politics in Nigeria when undertaking additional conflict prevention, abatement and mitigation efforts.

**Education in conflict prevention and peace-building.** A culture of peace can be promoted in at-risk communities through broad communication and educational programs all levels of formal and informal education. The primary school is the largest and most powerful forum for introducing Nigerian society to a culture of peace. Current Peace Clubs and peace education in secondary schools should be extended to primary schools. It should also engage a broad spectrum of civil society, trade, religious, and women’s organizations in CMM education programs. Communication and training materials and modules which are fit-for-purpose and culturally appropriate should be developed and provided to schools and other civic organizations to credibly mainstream CMM into general society. Sesame Street materials on peace and CMM could be developed for the primary school level, as has been done for other program sectors in Nigeria. Concurrently, high-level peace advocacy of and targeted training for elected officials will also lend support as deterrents to political violence. In the end, a civil society based approach to conflict early warning and rapid response will have to be linked to local and state-level government participation in developing and following warning response and protocols for peace and security.

**Role of the press.** It is important to undertake intense public awareness campaign around conflict mitigation in order to build a supportive environment for effective early warning and response. This will require engaging a broad spectrum of civil society, trade, religious, and women’s organizations in conflict mitigation and management. Training for media practitioners on conflict management and mitigation, including specific understanding of early warning and rapid response, will be important.

**Linkage and integration with related USAID programs.** Strategies to address underlying social and economic causes of conflict are more likely to succeed through fruitful coordination with other USAID/donor projects that support primary education, democracy and governance, and economic development. The conflict abatement effort can offer linkages (e.g. with youth groups) and inputs (CMM education materials) with specialized economic development programs. For example, income generation and employment for unemployed youth can be linked to youth skills and enterprise development components in other USAID programs such as MARKETS, Cassava Enterprise Development Program, business support programs, etc. Likewise, program impact will be strengthened by mainstreaming conflict abatement into appropriate local and institutional structures in traditional program areas, especially HIV/AIDS, health, education, agriculture, and skills development.

**Inter-agency and cross-donor coordination.** As previously mentioned, any USAID future initiative in CMM could benefit from collaboration and synergy with similar efforts of donors and government. This objective has recently been strongly endorsed by the OECD/DAC. At present, routine meetings or mechanisms for CMM donor coordination in Nigeria have lost momentum, but discussion is underway about their revival in anticipation of the elections scheduled for 2011.

**Program management and financing.** CALM lacked the requisite technical skills to carry out its diverse program. In addition, its funding was insufficient to meet the demands of its work plan; projects should

have a realistically aligned scope and budget, including a set-aside fund for unexpected contingencies. The PMP and Results Framework should reflect the true structures and processes of implementation and ultimately demonstrate outcomes and (perhaps) impacts of each program component.

---

# ANNEXES

---

# ANNEX A. SCOPE OF WORK

## TECHNICAL UNDERSTANDING AND APPROACH

### EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

The objective of this mid-term evaluation is to assess the programming, management, and implementation approaches of the IFESH CALM activities undertaken in Nigeria from June 2005 until June 2008. Project activities are scheduled to end in June 2010. As part of its assessment, ARD will identify best practices and key lessons from IFESH CALM from this first phase of implementation, and provide recommendations to USAID/Nigeria on how program activities can be improved to achieve conflict management goals over the remaining life of the project. ARD will also assess how activities to date have contributed to the Mission's broader conflict mitigation activities and strategic approaches.

The evaluation team will make specific recommendations to USAID that will assist USAID/Nigeria in leveraging and increasing the impact of IFESH CALM activities in a way that strategically enhances USAID conflict mitigation objectives. Recommendations will be framed based on IFESH CALM's four component areas but will also be aligned with specific USAID Mission program areas to ensure the report is effective for USAID program approaches in Nigeria—with special attention on previous USAID programs in conflict mitigation such as OTI, PACE and others. The field team will look for specific program- and activity-level opportunities for USAID/Nigeria and for IFESH CALM staff to ensure this mid-term evaluation can be used as a program management tool for USAID.

ARD proposes an ex-post and ex-ante assessment that considers CALM's achievements to date and the challenges it has faced, as well as future conditions that may arise over the next two years. Of particular importance for this assessment will be:

- **Response:** What impact have CALM and its partner groups had in responding to immediate flare-ups of violence, or early warnings of such, within the five target states, and outside the focal states (with the Rapid Response Instrument) since 2005?
- **Behavior:** What has been CALM's longer-term impact on fostering greater political cultures of peace (social capital)?
- **Systems:** What sort of social and institutional architecture has CALM promoted that is intended to undertake early warning and conflict management activities, and how sustainable is CALM's Conflict Early Warning System (CEWS)?
- **Adaptability:** Given Nigeria's fluid political climate, how can CALM best adapt its current programming in order to respond to changing circumstances on the ground in its last two years of operation?

ARD's methodology is designed to achieve the specific objectives described in the scope of work (SOW) within the allotted time frame and the specified level of effort. The methodology consists of:

- Conducting preliminary desk research of relevant documents;
- Interviewing project implementers, stakeholders and political analysts, utilizing survey instruments such as questionnaires with standard and customized questions; and

- Visiting sites in Abuja and in the five states where IFESH CALM has been implementing programs.

The ARD evaluation team is well versed in the issues, politics and complexities of Nigeria, but also has the practical experience of USAID programming, conflict mitigation methods and specific local level experience with program management and implementation. ARD's approach will be to look at the impact, management, and design of the IFESH CALM project and ascertain how this project's activities are impacting beneficiary groups as well as influencing and contributing to USAID/Nigeria's overall goals toward mitigating conflict.

### **Stage 1: Document Review**

During Stage I, the evaluation team and ARD subject matter staff will review all necessary documentation for IFESH CALM as well as other strategic documentation identified by USAID/Nigeria. This document review will help to inform and refine the evaluation approach, impact questions for the field, and refine the survey instruments. Depending on field conditions, it may be necessary to survey key informants and target groups through means other than face-to-face interviews. The field team will consult with USAID, and be involved in the methods review along with ARD support staff and an M&E Specialist who will be assisting with the review and refinement of survey tools and instruments. This stage will provide a current and practical background for the field team as well as updated program management and staffing information about IFESH CALM to ensure that the mid-term evaluation can be used as a management and strategic tool for USAID/Nigeria.

### **Stage II: Beneficiary Impact Assessment**

Nigeria's fast-changing political environment poses a uniquely challenging environment for conflict resolution work. In the ex-ante dimension of the assessment, ARD proposes to engage IFESH in a constructive discussion over how CALM can best respond to what appears to be a worsening political climate across much of the country. The Niger Delta in particular continues to spiral downward, as the Yar'Adua administration's latest peace initiative—a region-wide conference chaired by former Foreign Minister Ibrahim Gambari—has floundered. Leading militias in the region, some under the loose coalition known as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), undertook extensive operations against oil companies in the region in September 2008, prompting the Nigerian military to counterattack.

In spite of these troubling developments, the Yar'Adua administration's establishing a Niger Delta Ministry may open new collaboration opportunities for CALM partners. It might also help restart the peace process from the presidency. Additionally, two promising local initiatives led by the governors of Bayelsa and Delta states deserve attention. Preparations on the part of IFESH and its partners to address escalating violence and opportunities to contain it will be considered in ARD's evaluation.

The rest of the country, meanwhile, faces increasing speculation over President Yar'Adua's health and rumors of a succession crisis in the making. Even if the president successfully quashes such challenges, the intense jockeying among the nation's most powerful politicians for control of the ruling PDP and the various arms of government will likely continue apace, and will be aggravated by ongoing disputes between northern and Niger Delta leaders over the percentage of oil wealth to be given to the Niger Delta. These disputes among the politicians have combined with growing Christian and Muslim extremism to exacerbate the great religious rift in the nation, at the expense of the communities living along the divide. Against the backdrop of these contextual constraints and opportunities, the ARD team will assess the potentialities of CALM programming for Kaduna, Plateau and Kano states, and make recommendations based on our analysis how CALM might best respond to an increasingly unstable political and religious climate.

ARD will conduct interviews with key informants as identified such as program managers, implementing partners, civil society organizations (CSOs), other donors, Government of Nigeria (GON) officials, program participants, and program beneficiaries. The ARD Team Leader will also consult with USAID and US Embassy staff to ensure the key informants are adequate and effective for primary data sources. Several site visits will enable the team to probe more deeply into the impact of past project activities and the perceptions of implementers, stakeholders, and beneficiaries. ARD will construct a key informant survey to be administered prior to departure to the field that will provide a basis for some of the initial program management information. This survey will act as an initial tool for the identification of specific program information from IFESH CALM participants and partners.

This survey will be administered to targeted sub-grant partners of IFESH and will serve to initially identify key issues and areas that will enhance field methods and streamline field interviews. Focus group interviews will also be used with key sub-grant partners or stakeholder groups to maximize field time and to ensure rapid access to information from beneficiary groups. These survey tools could be administered to participants outside of the selected state field areas to consolidate and coordinate information and to leverage greater access to program- and activity-level impact. The results, outcomes, and impacts of the interventions will be identified and contrasted with what might have been realistically achieved in the prevailing context.

**TABLE A-1. WORK PLAN FOR THE MID-TERM EVALUATION OF IFESH CALM PROJECT**

<b>Stage I: Document Review and Evaluation Design</b>	
<b>Step 1: Relevant Document Review and Work Plan Development (LOE TBD)</b>	<b>Activities:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Review and analyze IFESH CALM project documents</li> <li>▪ Review USAID documentation relevant to IFESH CALM</li> <li>▪ Administer initial survey to field</li> <li>▪ Prepare meeting schedule for field work</li> <li>▪ Develop work plan and get USAID approval</li> </ul>
<b>Detail:</b> ARD will begin this portion of the assignment upon receipt of the task order contract. The first phase of the evaluation will consist of a review and analysis of IFESH CALM project documents covering the period of June 2005 to June 2008. This review period will also involve a review of other relevant documentation as requested by USAID/Nigeria. This review will allow the ARD team to prepare the final evaluation tools and also provide an opportunity to refine the evaluation methodology. The ARD team leader will conduct this work from ARD's Washington office, conferring by phone and email with USAID/Washington or USAID/Nigeria staff as needed. This preparatory work will overlap with the development and the preliminary drafting of a work plan for the field portion of the study. Local staff in Nigeria (TBD) will arrange for preliminary meetings while the work plan is being finalized and will also administer the initial survey tool referred to in the methodology section (1.2). Also during this period, all administrative arrangements (contracting, travel, etc.) will be made by ARD's Project Manager.	
<b>Stage II: Field Mobilization and Beneficiary Impact Assessment</b>	
<b>Step 2: Meeting with USAID and Travel to Abuja (4 days total)</b>	<b>Activities:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Participate in Abuja briefing session</li> <li>▪ Finalize work plan</li> <li>▪ Mobilize two field teams</li> </ul>
<b>Detail:</b> The second phase of this assignment will follow Mission approval of the draft methodology and work plan. The ARD Team Leader and designated team members will participate in a one-day briefing session with USAID/Nigeria personnel. This briefing session will allow the team to refine the SOW and confirm that the work plan for the field work portion of this mid-term evaluation is comprehensive for all field approaches and needs. This will also allow initial security considerations to be considered to inform mobilization of the two field teams (one for the northern states and one for Rivers and Delta states).	
<b>Step 3: Field Work (12 days) and USAID/Nigeria Mission Brief (1 day)</b>	<b>Activities:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Conduct field work</li> <li>▪ Debrief Mission</li> <li>▪ Draft executive summary/preliminary findings</li> </ul>
<b>Detail:</b> The team will conduct two weeks of field work. This will involve interviews and focus groups with beneficiaries, project implementers, USAID and other donors, and other stakeholders. The team will provide a final debriefing to Mission staff prior to departure from Nigeria. This debrief for USAID/Nigeria will create an opportunity to obtain initial Mission reaction to the preliminary findings, recommendations, and structure of the evaluation report as well as allow	

the team to discuss ways to strengthen the IFESH CALM project with the Mission and leverage this work in other Mission program areas. This debrief will also provide the team with valuable input from the Mission to strengthen the utility of the final report and to identify ways to make the report useful to the Mission programming staff.

**Final Report Preparation**

<b>Step 4:</b>	<b>Activities:</b>
<b>Final Document Preparation and Submission</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Submit draft report to USAID/Nigeria</li> </ul>
<p><b>Detail:</b> Within two weeks of the ARD Team Leader's departure from country, a draft report will be submitted to USAID/Nigeria. This report will be structured to address the evaluation questions as outlined in the SOW for this RFTOP and may also include additional or refined queries based on an analysis of implementation methods and strategic approaches that allow USAID/Nigeria to maximize the impact of IFESH CALM and identify methods for the Mission to improve program management and project impact of CALM in Nigeria.</p>	
<b>Step 5:</b>	<b>Activities:</b>
<b>Finalization of Final IFESH CALM Report</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Submit final report to USAID/Nigeria</li> </ul>
<p><b>Detail:</b> USAID/Nigeria will provide comments and review the report content. Following receipt of Mission comments on the assessment draft, the team will revise and finalize the report.</p>	

# ANNEX B. APPROACH TO THE STUDY

**Team Composition.** The Field Team was led by Dr. Deirdre LaPin (an independent consultant and Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center), and was supported by Dr. Victor Adetula (Political Science, University of Jos) who served as the Head of North Sub-Team A, and by Dr. Sam Amadi (Ken Nnamani Center for Leadership and Development, Abuja), who served as the Head of South Sub-Team B. In addition, the ARD consultants were accompanied in Kaduna by USAID staff in the form of Ms. Rachel Locke of DCHA/CMM, and Mr. Chom Bagu of USAID/Abuja; Mr. Bagu served as the Contracting Officer's Technical Representative for the project as well. Additionally, Ms. Minnie Wright from the Mission in Abjua also provided counsel and project support, as did Ms. Locke and Mr. Bagu throughout the entire undertaking.

**Phase 1 Activities and Outputs.** The Mid-term Review of the CALM Project was undertaken in two phases, a desk study and field research. For Phase 1, the Team Lead conducted two initial telephone interviews were conducted with two senior staff at IFESH HQ and all team members reviewed the following primary documents as part of the Phase 1 desk study:

- Review of CALM project documents provided by USAID, including the Revised Technical Application (24 May 2005), the revised PMP (October 2007), Quarterly Reports Q1 FY-2006 to Q4 FY-2008, and Project Performance Reviews for August 2007.
- Review of two “baseline” studies commissioned by the CALM project assessing needs for youth employment (NISER) and a field survey aimed at identifying the factors underlying conflict and existing conflict management strategies in the five project states.
- Request and review of additional CALM project documents provided by IFESH, including initial project concept papers, an original Monitoring and Evaluation Plan, a Quarterly Report for Q4 FY 08 and a draft Work plan for FY09, showing some new directions for the project in its final year.
- Review of the “USAID/Nigeria Country Strategy” (January 2006).
- Review of a multi-donor supported “Strategic Conflict Assessment” undertaken in 2007 by the International Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution and the World Bank’s recent Country Partnership Strategy Progress Report for Nigeria.
- Collection and review of studies, press articles and reports on recent and ongoing conflicts, especially in Jos and the Niger Delta.
- The draft OECD/DAC “Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities” (2008) and
- USAID/CMM “Theories of Change” framework.

As a result of the initial review work, the following reflect the primary Phase 1 outputs:

- John P. Mason prepared a draft “Evaluation Analytic Framework” to guide the development of the assessment instruments and protocols; this paid specific attention to incorporating the OECD/DAC

“Guidance on Evaluation Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities” and the USAID/CMM “Theories of Change.”

- Research questions were developed to consider (1) the project assumptions and objectives in context, (2) the project design and feasibility *as implemented* in relation to the original plan, (3) the appropriateness of the M&E management plan, with respect to expected outcomes and impacts. Specific questions for research included the following:
  - Does the CALM project have a strong Monitoring and Evaluation Plan against which its success can be fairly measured?
  - Is the Results Framework truly relevant to the project as designed? The project is implemented via components. However, the indicators cut across the project often without specifying what components they relate to. Should different indicators, pointing to higher level results, also be considered?
  - Have the project inputs—especially the budget—been adequate for a project which has a very wide geographic spread and a diverse scope of activities?
  - Has the “substantial involvement” of USAID, a feature of Cooperative Agreements, worked to the best advantage of the project?
  - Given the very different challenges to peace that obtain in the North vs. the Niger Delta, should a future project adopt a more regional focus that permits specific threats to peace to be addressed more effectively?
  - Should the project limit its components?
  - Is there evidence that the Early Warning and Response System has been effective?
  - Have the possibilities within the USAID/Nigeria Country Program been harnessed to support CMM?
- A field research methodology was developed, as seen in the Table below, “Planned Research Activities per Each of Five States”
- Eight field research tools were designed and included the following:

#### Focus Groups

- CMMRC Topic Guide
- Youth General Topic Guide, with sections adapted for School Peace Clubs, Community Youth Associations and Basketball for Peace Teams.

#### Key Informant Interviews or Small Group Discussions

- Introduction for Key Informant Interviews
- USAID or Senior Stakeholder Question Schedule
- Community or Civic Leader Question Schedule
- IFESH Question Schedule
- Implementing Partners Question Schedule
- Election Trainees Question Schedule

- Local personnel for the Field Evaluation Team in Nigeria were identified, recruited, and given preliminary guidance.
- A CALM Mid-Term Evaluation Phase 1 Report was submitted.

**Phase 2 Activities and Outputs.** Upon arrival in Abuja, meetings were held with USAID and donor partners in Abuja, field research tools were refined and reproduced, protocols were agreed to and a field research plan was developed with the IFESH CALM leadership. Additional recruitment of the field research team was completed as the Northern and Southern Sub-Teams, headed by Drs. Victor Adetula and Sam Amadi respectively, were each staffed with two experienced field researchers with appropriate

evaluation and language skills. Ali Garba and Rosemary Osikoya (both from Jos) joined the Northern team, while Dr. Christy George (Port Harcourt) and Kingsley Akeni (Warri) joined the Southern team.

The research schedule whilst in country was as follows:

March 8 – 11: Abuja

March 12 – 15: Kaduna – Teams A and B, field testing

March 16-18: Kano (A) and Port Harcourt (B)

March 18- 21: Jos (A), Warri (B), and Abuja (Leader)

March 23- 26: Abuja

Data collection was a result of site visits, individual interviews and focus group discussions. All together 75 interviews were conducted along the following breakdown:

- Office-based interviews:
  - Management interviews: USAID (2), IFESH HQ (2), IFESH/CALM (2)
  - Staff interviews: USAID (4), IFESH (6)
  - Senior partner interviews: Donors (2)
  - Government (2 individual); in CMMRCs (5)
- Field Visits and Interviews: Where possible two Peace Zones were visited in each state, and IFESH was asked to identify a “strong” and “less strong” example from either zone. In each, the researchers met with a basketball for peace team, one peace club, and one community youth association, resulting the following interviews:
  - Available members of the CMMRC (5)
  - Coordinating NGO (for CMMRC) (5)
  - Community/Government Leaders (3)
  - Peace Clubs (8)
  - Basketball for Peace Coordinator (7)
  - Basketball for Peace Players (5)
  - (Where possible) community residents in the Peace Zones (1)
  - Community Youth Associations (4)
  - Skills training implementing partner (4)
  - Skills trainees (4)
  - Civic education implementing partner (5)
  - Election Observer trainees (4)

**TABLE A-2. PLANNED RESEARCH ACTIVITIES PER EACH OF FIVE STATES**

1-2 Key Informant Interviews	1-2 Focus Groups or Key Informant or Small Group Interviews with participants	1-2 Focus Groups <i>Possible:</i> 1 Key informant interviews with teachers <i>Possible:</i> 1 Key informant interview with parents	1-2 Focus Groups or Key Informant or Small Group Interviews with participants	1 Focus Group <i>Possible:</i> 1 Key informant interview with chair	1-2 Key Informant or Small Group Interviews with participants	1-2 Key Informant or Small Group Interviews
<b>Implementing Partners, e.g.</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ NGOs</li> <li>▪ CBOs</li> <li>▪ Trainers</li> <li>▪ Journalists</li> </ul>	BB4P	Peace Clubs In Schools	Comm. Youth Assns	CMMRCs EWS	Workshops Events Publicity	Election Training and Monit. (2007)
	<b>Z o n e s o f P e a c e X 2 Per State</b>					

# ANNEX C. SCHEDULE OF ACTIVITIES

## Phase I: Washington

February 12, 2009	Kickoff meeting: USAID and ARD
February 13-March 5	Review of CALM and related documents; development of research tools
February 19	First Conference Call: USAID/Abuja-USAID/Washington-ARD
February 24	LaPin Telephone Interview with CL Mannings, Vice President, IFESH HQ
February 26	LaPin Telephone Interview with Emmanuel Ojameruaye, Head of Planning, IFESH HQ : Part 1
February 27	Meeting of Team Leader Deirdre LaPin with ARD M&E specialist John Mason
March 1	LaPin Telephone Interview with Emmanuel Ojameruaye, Head of Planning, IFESH HQ : Part 2
March 2	Second Conference Call: USAID/Abuja-USAID/Washington-ARD
March 5	LaPin Submission of Phase 1 Report, Research Instruments, and Proposed Research Schedule

## Phase II: Nigeria

### *Abuja, March 7-13*

March 7 PM	Team Leader LaPin arrives in Abuja
March 8 PM	Team A Leader, Victor Adetula, arrives in Abuja
March 8 PM	Rachel Locke, USAID/CMM arrives in Abuja
March 8	Team B Leader, Sam Amadi, resident in Abuja
March 8 PM	Team Planning Meeting: LaPin-Adetula-Amadi
March 9 All Day	ARD-IFESH/CALM-USAID planning meeting, including Locke, Bagu (part-time), LaPin, Adetula, Amadi, Tyrone Gaston (COP IFESH/CALM), Samie Ihejirika (Deputy COP)
March 10 AM	ARD/USAID Team Meets USAID staff: Sharon L. Cromer (Mission Director), Anne Fleury (Strategy Adviser ), Minnie Wright (Peace/D&G Team Leader), Chom Bagu (Sr. Conflict Program Manager)
March 10 PM	Review and Redraft of Research Instruments
March 11	LaPin Interview with Minnie Wright, USAID

March 11	Research Associates for Team A arrive in Abuja
March 11	Team finalizes and reproduces research instruments
March 11	Team A and Sam Amadi (Team B Leader) depart for Kaduna
March 12	Data analysis, planning and interviews by telephone (LaPin)
March 13	LaPin, Locke, Bagu depart for Kaduna
<b><i>Kaduna March 11-14</i></b>	
March 11 PM	Preliminary Interaction with IFESH/CALM Kaduna Staff
March 12 AM	Meeting with Basketball for Peace (BB4P) Management and National Volunteer Staff in Zaria
March 12 AM	Courtesy Visit to Alhaji R. Shehu Idris CFR (Emir of Zazzau and Chairman of the Kaduna State CMMRC) Zaria, Kaduna State
March 12 AM	Interview with Suleiman Abdulatif (Senior program Officer) Strategic Empowerment and Mediation Agency (SEMA, an IP)
March 12 PM	Small Group Discussion with the Ahmadu Bayero University (ABU) Peace Club
March 12 PM	Focus Group with Election Monitors (and SEMA, their trainer)
March 12 PM	Focus Group with Community Youth Association Members
March 12 PM	Focus Group Meeting with the Conflict Monitoring and Management Regional Council (CMMRC), Kaduna (7 of 30 members)
March 13 AM	Brief Interview Meeting with Alhaji Salisu Ahmed, Local Government Chairman, Kaduna North LGA
March 13 AM	Interview with Elisha Dodo Dabo, Patron of Dabo Secondary School Peace Club, “Television,” Kaduna
March 13 noon	LaPin, Locke, Bagu arrive in Kaduna by road
March 13 PM	Focus Group with Peace Club at Government Girls’ Secondary School, Barnawa
March 13 PM	Meeting between Locke, Bagu, LaPin, Adetula and the Inter-Faith Mediation Centre: Pastor John Movel Wuye and Imam Nuryan (James) Ashafa
March 13 PM	Discussion of logistics with Sammy Ihejirika, IFESH/CALM
March 13 PM	Team Planning Meeting: ARD/USAID Review of field results
March 14 AM	Small Group Discussion, Peace Zone Coordinator and others, Kaduna Police College
March 14 AM	Interview with BB4P Team Member from Kakuri, Kaduna South
March 14 PM	Interview with BB4P Patron at Ungwan Maichibi (“Television”)
March 14 PM	Spontaneous Community Interview in Ungwan Maichibi neighborhood with two women and, a member of the Yelwa Youth Association, and half a dozen male and female friends.

March 14 PM Interview with Community Leader in Ungwan Maichibi (“Television”)

March 14 PM Meeting of ARD/USAID Team with Mohammed Salisu and Boniface Igomu, IFESH Kaduna Team

Interview Adetula/Garba with Salisu on Program in Northern Region

Interview LaPin/Amadi/Locke/Bagu with Igomu on Monitoring and Evaluation

March 14 PM Team Planning Meeting: LaPin, Adetula, Amadi

March 15 AM Locke and Bagu return to Abuja

Team A: Travel by road to Kano

Team B (Sam Amadi): Travel to Abuja by road and Port Harcourt by air to meet Team B members Christy George and Kingsley Akeni

***Kano March 16-18***

March 16 AM Small Group Interview with the Centre for Democratic Research and Training (CDRT, Coordinating NGO for the Kano CMMRC)

March 16 AM Focus Group Discussion with the Kano CMMRC

March 16 PM Small Group Interview, “Peace Club,” Musa Iliyasu College [Peace Club exists only on paper; interviewed headmistress, sports master, and several teachers]

March 16 PM Team Planning Meeting: LaPin and Team A

March 17 AM Visit to Project Site: Fish Farming Skills Training

March 17 AM Interview with Muhammad Mustapha Yahaya, Executive Director, Democratic Action Group

March 17 PM Small Group Interview with “Peace Club,” King’s College

March 17 PM Interview with Umar Ibrahim Bala, Kano State BB4P Coordinator, at Farm Road BB4P Zone

March 17 PM Visit to Peace Zone, Zoo Road

March 18 AM Interview with Mohammed Kabir Abubakar, Head Referee, Farm Center Peace Zone

March 18 PM Team A proceeds to Jos by road

Team B proceeds to Warri by road

March 18 PM LaPin returns to Abuja via Kaduna

March 18 PM LaPin meets with Boniface Igomu at IFESH Regional Office, Kaduna

***Port Harcourt March 15-18***

March 15 PM Sam Amadi, Team B Leader, holds a Team Planning Meeting

March 16 AM Interview with IFESH Staff including the grant officer and program manager

March 16 AM Interview with members of the Conflict Mitigation and Management Regional Council (CMMRC's) in Rivers State

March 16 PM Interview with Moses Johnson, the Coordinator for Peace Clubs in Rivers State

March 16 PM Interview with Mr. Boma Idoniboye-Obu, BB4P State Coordinator re: Elekahia Peace Zone and Borikiri Basketball for Peace

March 17 AM Travel to Okrika

March 17 AM Focus Group Discussion with Ogoni, Wakirika and Andoni (OWA) Youth Initiatives, a multi-ethnic CYA, with the Wakirike United Peace Guide, CYA

March 17 AM Interview with executive members of the Ogoni, Wakirika and Andoni (OWA) Youth Initiatives

March 17 AM Small Group Discussion with executive members of the Girls' Secondary School Peace Club, Okumgba-Ama, Okrika LGA

March 17 PM Return to Port Harcourt Area

March 17 PM Small Group Discussion with leaders of Emolga Peace Initiative, Emohua LGA, a CYA

March 17 PM Interview with the program officer of Women's Action Organization (WAO), an NGO coordinating the CMMRC in Rivers State

March 18 AM Interview with coordinator and a member of the Stella Maris College Peace Zones

March 18 PM Team B proceeds to Warri by road

**Warri, March 18-20**

March 18 PM Team B arrives Warri early evening

Interview with Mr. Collins Nawuwumi, Peace Coordinator, BB4P, Delta State

Interview with members of the Dom Domingo's College BB4P and the Peace Zones

March 19 AM Interview with members of the CMMRC in Delta State.

Interview with the Executive Director and Program Officer of the Niger Delta Professionals for Development (NIPRODEV), coordinating NGO for the Delta State CMMRC

Small Group Discussion with the Managing Director and top executives of ITC Systems Global, Nigeria, Ltd., the IP providing information technology skills training for the youth

March 19 PM Focus Group with members of the Daudu Peace Zone on BB4P and Focus Group with Election Observation training.

[There was no interview for the school Peace Club because public schools were on closed in Warri during the interview. But, the team talked to people in the PZs who belong to Peace Clubs and the Coordinator of the Peace Zones.]

- March 20 AM Interview with the Executive Director of Global Peace Development, an NGO coordinating civic education for CALM (Ughelli)
- March 20 PM Sam Amadi and Christy George, two members of Team B, return by road to Port Harcourt.
- March 20 PM Interview with Head of Training, Fate Foundation, an NGO providing skills training in Rivers State

***Jos, March 18-21***

- March 18 PM Informal meeting at Jos Business School to plan interviews
- March 19 AM Attempted interview with Christian Foundation for Social Justice and Equity (CFSJE). This co-coordinating NGO for the CMMRC was unavailable. [Note: this NGO has ceded practical coordination to its partner NGO YOU-PEG]
- March 19 AM Interview with Christopher Isha Isha, Vice-Chairman, Jos North Local Government, standing in for the Chairman Mr. David Buba
- March 19 PM Interviews with Units in Agwan Rogo Peace Zone (Peace Zone coordinator, Peace Club - GSSS members and some beneficiaries of the skill acquisition component of the project)
- March 20 AM Interview with video skills provider, Mr. Patrick Jude Oteh, Artistic Director, Jos Repertory Theatre
- March 20 AM Interview with YOU-PEG, Co-Coordinating NGO for the CMMRC, Plateau State
- March 20 AM Interview with Mr. Ezekiel Gomos, Vice-Chairman, CMMRC, Plateau State
- March 20 PM Fatima Suleiman Ahmed, Islamic Counseling Initiative (NGO in Jos)
- March 20 PM Attempted interview with Peace Club (St Louis College), but the Principal of the School was not informed and was not available.
- March 20 PM Interview with members of National Council of Women's Societies (NCWS). Plateau State
- March 21 PM Interaction with members of the BB4P from Alheri Peace Zone and Jenta Peace Zone (with Christopher Wesley, BB4P Coordinator for Plateau State)
- March 21 PM Watched a friendly match between from Alheri Peace Zone and Jenta Peace Zone
- Interview with selected members of Alheri Peace Zone and Jenta Peace Zone
- March 21 Dadin Kowa Peace Zone – on schedule but no functioning BB4P or Peace Club

***Abuja, March 19-26***

- March 19 PM LaPin Interview with Mark White (Regional Development Advisor), DfID, Abuja
- March 20 AM LaPin Interviews in USAID: Chom Bagu (Sr. Conflict Program Manager), Sandy Ojikutu (Education Team Lead), and Linda Crawford (HIV/AIDS Team)

LaPin Interview with Mal. Zakaraiya Zakaria (Sr. M&E Specialist) Nigeria MEMS

March 21 PM LaPin Interview with William L. Pflaumer, Political Officer, US Embassy

March 23 AM LaPin telephone interview: Mr. Oliver .B. Johnson, Director Basketball for Peace, Zaria

March 23 AM Team Review Meeting: LaPin/Adetula/Amadi

March 23 PM LaPin interview with Karla Fossand (Health Team Leader, USAID)

LaPin interview with Abiodun Onadipe (Peace Development Advisor, UNDP)

March 24 AM Team Data Analysis

March 24 PM Team: USAID Briefing Planning Meeting

March 25 AM LaPin Interview with Dr. Joseph Golwa (Director) Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Office of the Presidency, Abuja

March 25 PM Team: USAID Data Analysis and Briefing Drafting Meeting

March 26 AM Team Briefing Preparation Meeting

**March 26 PM USAID Debriefing conducted by ARD Team**

LaPin/Adetula/Amadi for Sharon Cromer (USIAD Mission Director), Mikaela Meredith (Deputy Mission Director), Sandy Ojikutu (Education Team Lead) Bosede Eitokpah (Senior Civil Society Program Manager) Chom Bagu (Sr. Conflict Program Manager, Peace/D&G)

March 26 PM LaPin departs Abuja, arrives Washington March 27 PM

March 27 AM Adetula departs Abuja

# ANNEX D. DETAILED FINDINGS BY STATE

## RIVERS STATE

The implementation of Conflict Abatement through Local Mitigation (CALM) project in Rivers State posts mixed results. On one hand, there is evident enthusiasm for conflict mitigation and EWS among members of the CMMRC, of whom the majority are civil society activists and religious leaders engaged in peace-building activities in their different organizations. They believe in the potential of the Council and CALM to establish a culture of peace in Rivers State, but think that its effectiveness will be enhanced if the membership includes more statesmen and women who have access to high levels of government and more influential citizens. On the other hand, the Peace Zone concept has deteriorated in the State because of an internal conflict with the implementing partner. Nevertheless, some functioning peace clubs in secondary schools have had considerable impact on the lives of students and their communities. In the same way, youth associations are also seen to be powerful institutions for peace making and, potentially, EWS.

**EWS and CMMRC.** Capacity for early warning, a key component of CALM, is still low in Rivers State. A clear “system” for gathering and responding to information does not yet exist. At present successful conflict prevention relies on the personal initiative of members of the state Conflict Mitigation and Management Regional Council (CMMRC). Inaugurated on October 19, 2006, the Council is well organized with an elected Chairman, Secretary and other key officers. It holds meetings monthly or whenever an emergency requires intervention. For example, a meeting held on March 12, 2009, reviewed peace initiatives in Emohua and prepared for a proposed CMM and EWS training for youth in that community.

Membership in the Council is functional, not personal. Designated bodies include the representative of the Governor, organized private sector, labor, women’s organizations, the NGOs, religious and traditional institutions, youth representatives, and the academic community. The oil industry, the state assembly, and the local government councils are also stipulated, but so far these groups have not appointed representatives. Current members are not persons of authority who can commit the groups they represent to a stake in the CALM process. For example, the representative of the Governor on the Council is not a senior and ranking official and thus does not have the status to connect the Council directly to the highest level of government; moreover, he does not attend Council meetings.

To work effectively in Rivers State, the EWS needs to engage the peace and security architecture of the state at the upper levels. The Council has little influence with the Governor, government structures, or any leverage on security policies. One member of the Council with considerable public profile has used his community influence to assist the CMMRC intervene in some low-level conflicts. Similarly, another notable politician -- and respected traditional ruler -- was asked to serve in his individual capacity by members of the Council. Although he is also a member of the Traditional Rulers Council (TRC), he does not officially represent or commit this body to the decisions of the CMMRC, and in so far as he was not officially appointed by the TRC, the CMMRC does not receive support from the TRC. In essence, the process of constituting and running the CMMRC does not commit the represented groups to the Council in a way that promotes ownership as stakeholders in the CALM activities and objectives.

Just as the CMMRC has not been able to link “up” to the highest government levels, it has had very limited success in mainstreaming EWS “down” through formal and informal peace structures in the state. The Council concedes that it does not have a formal protocol for responding to early warning system and receives little early warning from the Peace Zones. Channels of information spring more often from autonomous youth structures established as CYAs under the former OTI interventions or from spontaneous associations that have grown up around the renewed consciousness for peace among Niger Delta youth.

Members of the Council received EWS and CMM training in February and March 2007, and on Peace Mediation in October 2008. Training was delivered by IFESH and its Rivers State implementing partner, the Women’s Action Organization (WAO), which initially served as the CMMRC C-NGO. The members of the Council consider the trainings useful in that they were exposed to critical aspects of the EWS and the CMM, but they deem the training insufficient in quality and quantity to make them effective in mitigating and managing conflicts in the state. Members of the Council showed some understanding of the workings of the Early Warning System but have not learned clearly what steps and processes to activate in responding to early warning signals. Our team sighted training manuals prepared by IFESH for these trainings. The manuals are not of high quality and are not the kinds of tools needed to effectively guide Council members in responding appropriately to early warnings of conflict.

IFESH selected WAO to coordinate the CMMRC in River State. (No WAO officer was available for interview.) The NGO does not have established reputation or expertise on conflict mitigation and management and lacks the quality of staff to support and help coordinate the activities of the Council. In fact, WAO is based in Calabar, Cross Rivers State with a two-person field office in Port Harcourt. The CMMRC alleges that the NGO mismanaged its funds, though the Review Team could not substantiate the claim. This notwithstanding, funding for the CMMRC overly ad hoc and allegedly is more tied to meeting a quarterly reporting obligation. Ordinarily, IFESH releases monthly allocation to the coordinating NGO to organize meetings, sending just enough to pay travelling allowance of N1500.00 for each member. Apart from the organizational grant to the WAO at the beginning, IFESH did not provide funding to manage the monthly meeting, cover other logistical expenses as well as to support other Council activities. Consequently, coordinating-NGOs may not be as dedicated to providing effective management and coordination support as the CMMRC may need. In late 2008 the coordinating NGO was discharged and the council wrote a workplan and started to manage itself. However, IFESH has not yet granted the Council the independence to organize its own activities, nor has it effectively coached and monitored them. Meanwhile, IFESH continues to release the monthly travel stipends.

The CMMRC has produced a Report of Activities from October 2006 to March 2009 which shows various interventions of the Council on public enlightenment, stakeholder engagement, and solidarity visits to strategic agencies like the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and the Oil Producing Trade Section of the Lagos Chamber of Commerce (OPTS). In March 2007, the Council organized CMM and EWS training for 30 Journalists. In April of the same year the Council trained the Peace Clubs on EWS. On September 15, 2008, the Chairman and two other members featured in a television talk-show on conflict resolution in the Niger Delta. As part of its EWS activities the Council sponsored radio and television jingles for peace in the state. The Council has engaged in mediation in a few low-intensity conflicts. It has intervened in the communal conflict in Emohua Local Government. The Council also organized a peace forum with youths from Obio/Akpor Local Government Area on January 20, 2009. Members of the Wakirika Youth Organization acknowledged the positive role played by the CMMRC in the conflict between Ogan-ama and Dumo-ama families in Okirika.

In spite of these interventions, there is no evidence of a successful mitigation of a full-fledged conflict based on early warning signals picked from components of the Peace Zones. This may be because most of the conflicts in the state center around resource control with the federal government. Also, it may partly

be due to the weakness of the EWS mechanism and the lack of support for CALM amongst traditional structures of peace in the state

**Peace Zones.** Rivers State has six Peace Zones with about thirty basketball team members in each. In the early days of CALM there was great expectation and interest in the project. Creation of new Peace Zones has been nearly paralyzed in the State, reportedly because of a conflict between IFESH and the National Coordinator of the BB4P. The original Peace Zone concept, defined as a place to nurture the culture of peace, is now marginally functional, and Basketball for Peace (BB4P) organizations, originally the lead component in the Peace Zone have become highly disorganized and disenfranchised from CALM. In some locations the BB4P has completely split from CALM, changing their name to OPDAM (Organization for Peace, Development and Management). The breakaway is a result of IFESH diffidence in funding BB4P to manage its activities in Rivers State. IFESH encouraged the Rivers State BB4P to register a new organization in August 2007. The State Basketball Coordinator seeks to use the new platform to raise private sector funding for sports activities, but without the restrictions IFESH has imposed on BB4P.

Other issues surround this project component. The quality of training on EWS and CMM for team members is shallow and inadequate to build their capacity as Ambassadors of Peace. Furthermore, there are reportedly no basketball teams in the real hotspots because of lack of funds, and in other instances securing land permits to construct new courts has also been an obstacle. Consequently, teams are established where courts already exist, somewhat defeating the objective of the BB4P to use basketball to draw at-risk youths away from conflict situations. The Coordinator noted that football (soccer) is a less costly peace platform than basketball and will likely be more effective in diverting youth from conflict situations; this conclusion is perhaps partially held as so many youth have become significantly less enthusiastic about and less engaged with CALM.

**Peace Clubs** hold much promise for personal transformation and for bridge building. Our finding on the Peace Clubs in Rivers State is that they could become the driving force for a sustainable peace culture in the state, but they receive insufficient attention from the CALM project. We visited two functional Peace Clubs at the Girls' Secondary School, Okirika and Stella Maris College, Port Harcourt and also spoke with the State Coordinator of Peace Clubs. At GSS Okirika we interviewed the coordinating teacher and officers of the club. All spoke positively about the potential of their Peace Club and it has enabled them to understand causes and mitigation of conflicts. They narrated instances where disputes amongst students that could have escalated into open conflicts were resolved through the mediation of student members of the club. The coordinating teacher informed us that he has observed tremendous changes in the life of the student members of the club. The same sentiment was expressed by the State Coordinator who shared stories about how early warnings relayed by members of the club to their teacher saved a school from violent attack by militant youths. Members of the club in the Girls Secondary School Okirika have become peace ambassadors in their homes in Okirika, a town recovering from a devastating communal conflict. Community outreach in local sanitation exercises and peace rallies by this club have helped in the social and psychological recovery of the community. The members of the club feel empowered by their activities and now see themselves in a new light as change-agents. The impact of the outreach is such that schools around the neighborhood without Peace Clubs are requesting members of the GSS Peace Club to come and help establish Peace Clubs in their own institutions.

Unfortunately, management of the Peace Clubs in the state shows weaknesses. Clubs are not closely monitored and nurtured. The Peace Club members we interviewed could not recall when an IFESH staff visited their school to observe activities and instruct apart from their inauguration, initial training, and occasional notification of special events or competitions. Students also report that their commitment for the Peace Club has fallen from high levels in 2007, because student perception is that CALM has not fulfilled simple promises. For example, IFESH requested the clubs to send entries for art competition. The members used their meager resources to buy materials and executed drawings and other arts. Many

months after they sent their entries, IFESH has not announced the winners or communicated to them when it intends to announce winners.

The Peace Clubs also have not received dedicated training on EWS and CMM. The coordinating school teacher and one or two members of the club participate in IFESH training, and these representatives report about EWS and CMM without actually building the capacity of the students. Club members consequently can define EWS and CMM but have little knowledge about their own role in conflict mitigation and management. And yet, these school children are so enthusiastic about peace and conflict resolution that many of them have taken the message back to their parents and siblings.

It is distressing that such a component with a huge potential for self-transformation and bridge-building in the community could be left at the fringe due to managerial underperformance.

**The Community Youth Association (CYA)** is another CALM youth component having strong potential. The CYAs are designed to play important roles in detecting early warnings of conflict and entrenching peace and reconciliation in their communities. As in many states in the Niger Delta, Rivers State has many youth associations that have high visibility and capacity for peace building and conflict management. The crisis of oil and the politics of resource control have enhanced the advocacy and community mobilization expertise of these associations, so that they could become valuable stakeholders in an EWS framework.

One positive example is the Wakirika United Peace Group (WUPG). This association was organized with the help of IFESH/CALM in 2006. Membership is open to all youths in Okirika. It has played an important role by mobilizing the youths of the community through peace rallies. Its biggest success is the formation of Ogoni, Wakirika and Andoni Youth Association (OWA), which came into being when youths from Ogoni and Andoni, two communities always at war with each other, observed how WUPG worked with the elders to demobilize militant youths. They requested that an association be formed that included their communities. Today, both OWA and WUPG are led by elected officials. The two organizations collaborate on conflict mitigation and management. The formation of the Ogoni Wakirika and Andoni Coalition is a huge impetus for peace in Rivers State. The Andoni, Ogoni and Okirika (Wakirika) constitute a large segment of the state and has been the locus of many communal clashes. Some of the members of the association were former militants who are now peace ambassadors. A coalition of youths from these ethnic groups to promote peace is a huge boost to the CMM process in the state.

The leadership of OWA and WUPG informed us that they have received two trainings on CMM and EWS since inauguration, one conducted during the inauguration and the other in February 2009. They also suggested that CALM develop a more structured and high-value youth skills training program. It described the present training as “just symbolic” and are not sustained enough to truly equip the youths with any relevant skills. In addition, they commented on a two-year-old promise by IFESH to deliver a bus and a speed boat to facilitate mobilization in the creek. CALM staff attributed the failure to concerns on the part of USAID officials that the speed boat could be used for oil bunkering activities. Notwithstanding that this is a serious concern, but it should be noted that failure to honor its word seems to have injured the reputation of CALM and undermined WUPG’s commitment to the project.

Another Community Youth Association we interviewed is the Emolga Peace Initiative (EPI). The EPI is established in a community that is prone to violent conflict over access and ownership of oil resources. Emolga Peace Initiative has about 150 members and covers the communities in Emohua Local Government Area. The association has been successful intervening in communal conflicts since formation in 2006. Some of the conflicts it has mediated in the Emohua were conflicts over chieftaincy rights in the communities. It has received some general training on EWS and CMM like other components of CALM in the state but is not in any sense networked into the EWS as conceived under the CALM objectives. EPI

suggested that reinvigorating CALM activities will require adequate funding for activity components and more skills training, the latter being focused on self-employment and entrepreneurship.

**Election observation.** Youths in Rivers State were generally satisfied with their roles during the 2007 elections, where they were part of a large cadre of trainees on election observation. Most of the election observers were members of the CYAs. Their brief was to observe and report on the election process and not to settle or resolve any electoral disputes. *Civic education*, apart from the election observation training, is not extensive or elaborately designed, and is not considered a major component of the CALM project in Rivers State.

**Skills training** under CALM is somewhat appreciated but seems unlikely help youth become self-employed or self-reliant. It also competes with many similar and better funded programs offered by oil companies, states, or by the NDDC. The Head of Training of Fate Foundation, the Implementing Partner for skills training, confirmed that the length of the training was insufficient for real skills acquisition. The skills offered the youths are not relevant to the economy and market in the state. Financial or logistic support to the trainees would be necessary to enable them start their own business. A senior CALM officer concurred with these limitations and suggested a future CALM project may do well to remove the skills training component. For the present, skills training has unfortunately raised expectations which will not be met. Interlocutor comments indicate that the former Chief of Party often made unrealistic promises, and that current leadership has not communicated well why these promises could not be kept.

## DELTA STATE

The Team's assessment of the IFESH/CALM project in Delta State is similar to that of Rivers State with a few variations. It should be noted that field research was constrained. Only a few members of the CMMRC were interviewed. Peace Clubs were not visited in Warri because schools were on forced vacation owing to a teachers' strike. Nor did the Team interview any CYAs because IFESH has not established any CYAs and does not work directly with the Peace Clubs. In contrast to Rivers State, the Peace Zones are very active, and the Team interacted with the State Coordinator of BB4P and Peace Clubs.

**EWS and CMMRC.** With the end of the so-called "Warri Wars" in 2003, there have been very few instances of inter-communal conflict in Delta State, ~~and~~ **V**iolence is typically associated with continuing youth militancy over ownership of oil resources, as noted in the 13 May 2009 military offensive against militant camps in the western delta. The CALM Early Warning System (EWS) is still in formative stages. The CMMRC in Delta State is fairly balanced in terms of ethnic configuration and geopolitics. Membership is drawn from the four main ethnic groups in the state -- the Igbo, the Ijaw, the Itsekiri and the Urhobo -- and also covers the major stakeholder groups in the state, including labor, civil society, organized private sector, women, and the religious leaders. As in Rivers State, the representative of the Governor has not been active in CMMRC meetings or activities. Unlike Rivers State, representation includes the state legislature and an oil company (Chevron). Nevertheless, membership of the CMMRC does not guarantee effectiveness because of the inability of representatives of the key stakeholder groups to commit their groups to CALM. Secondly, it could be said of the CMMRC in Delta State that it lacks the institutional prestige and pedigree to connect effectively with the security and peace architecture in the state.

Relations between the CMMRC and IFESH its Coordinating NGO -- Niger Delta Professionals for Development (NIPRODEV) -- is very cordial. Six members of the CMMRC, including the Chairman and Secretary, attended the focus group interview. All expressed satisfaction with the C-NGO, but were less pleased with IFESH management of the project. NIPRODEV originally contracted to provide civic and voters education. Following the poor performance of original coordinating NGO for CMMRC, Center for Social and Corporate Responsibility, IFESH asked NIPRODEV to take over because it has built capacity

in conflict resolution, peace building and community empowerment over the years. Although members of CMMRC would want to be independent of any NGO coordination, they are content to be coordinated by NIPRODEV for a few more years.

NIPRODEV suggested that the IFESH approach to managing the CMMRC could be improved with the introduction of a CMMRC action-plan and a more reliable and consistent release of funds for Council activities. Reportedly, quarterly allocations are often released well into the quarter with the expectation that the NGO complete activities for the entire period. Such ad hoc funding does not allow for strategic planning. It was noted that a CMMRC unable to plan its activities in a strategic manner becomes just like a unit of IFESH, rather than an independent partner.

Although CMMRC has been able to intervene in some low-level conflicts in the state, its visibility is low. It is not known amongst policymakers and critical stakeholders in the state. Members attribute the undistinguished profile of the CMMRC to IFESH's propensity to grab the limelight and allege that it does not promote the CMMRC but takes on directly activities more appropriate to the CMMRC itself. However, the CMMRC recorded one notable achievement, which was to resolve a chieftaincy disputes in Uvwie Local Government Council with the assistance of the LGA Chairman. The CMMRC has also conducted peace rally and established a Peace Club at the Delta State University, Abraka. In 2008 it organized media training workshop on reporting of conflicts for media practitioners in Delta State.

The CMMRC was trained once on EWS and CMM in July 2007 and on peace mediation in September 2008. Although these trainings were judged generally useful, they were not sufficiently rigorous or advanced to empower the CMMRC to manage an effective early warning activity. As in other states, the CMMRC lacks a written protocol for collecting and responding to early warnings on conflict, and IFESH has not provided them with management guidelines. However, NIPRODEV has helped the CMMRC establish a rapid response protocol that contains the telephone numbers of important security agencies and public officials for passing on early warning. The informal protocol requires members to call one another and in cases of a real threat of violence to intervene at the level of critical security institutions. Members claim that this improvised protocol is useful but has not yet been successfully deployed to mitigate any conflict. The members also suggest that EWS and CMM will work better if CMMRCs are established at the local government level, where they can establish strong anchor with the people and create a structure for effective early warning and rapid response.

The CMMRC has not had meaningful interaction with other components of CALM or engaged with any BB4P or Peace Club except the one which it established in Delta State University. Members of the BB4P Clubs interviewed have no knowledge of the activities of the CMMRC. The CMMRC members have participated in youth skills training events, but only as observers. The CMMRC notes that IFESH has not fostered its interface with the Peace Zones, instead dealing directly with them. The Council believes it needs more financial and administrative independence to effectively serve as a custodian of the EWS and to mainstream CMM into other project components. The CMMRC has made efforts to generate supplementary funds from Chevron and believe the prospect for private sector funding is very bright. Components of CALM will need to look beyond IFESH for funding if they are to be sustainable.

**Peace Zones.** Two Basketball for Peace (BB4P) Teams were interviewed -- Don Domingo and Daudu. The Peace Zones seem to be in decline for lack of funding. Youths painted a picture of high enthusiasm and trust at the beginning of the project when they had high hopes that BB4P would offer an escape from the risks of conflict in Warri. Today in these zones, Peace Managers have stopped providing the peace education component because they receive no allowance. Youths are no longer paid small stipends for matches because BB4P no longer organizes regular competitions. Consequently, only those youth who still want to make a career from basketball or want to keep themselves busy continue to come for training. When we visited the two zones we meet 5-10 youths practicing.

It is clear that many of these youths have enthusiasm for the game of basketball, but it is difficult to know how much faith they still have on the concept of the basketball for peace and the Peace Zone. Members of the BB4P have received little “step down” training in CMM or EWS. When we asked if they knew anything about the EWS, only officials who had participated in one or two of EWS and CMM trainings answered in the affirmative. The only trainings members admitted receiving directly from IFESH are the skills’ training on computer appreciation and a civic education in late 2008.

Members still believe in the potential of the BB4P to divert the energies of at-risk youth to useful endeavors, and they readily acknowledge the transformation some of the members have undergone on account of BB4P activities, especially in the early days. With the program decline, they also feel a personal sense of loss. Activities have ground to a halt. They have used skills and concepts learned during peace talks at trainings to settle disputes amongst themselves. Yet members do not feel any obligation to contribute to conflict mitigation and peace building in their community, although they have an acute sense of the causes and dynamics of conflict in the state.

**Skills Training.** A single vocational training activity, on computer appreciation, was organized for youths in Delta State. ITC, a reputable computer firm with branches across the country, offered an abbreviated version of its 6-month course in Warri for two months. The training, which included CMM and EWS, drew about 65 youths associated with the CALM project. Although ITC believed the training was insufficient to help the trainees secure a job or become self-employed, it was able to place four of the graduates. Beyond this limited tangible result, the conflict mitigation and peace building instruction appeared to generate a huge change in the behavior of the students midway through the course, in contrast to their unruly and violent conduct at the outset. It was also reported that some trainees who had no knowledge of computing before the training now own laptops and are usually seen in cybercafés. Some trainees suggested a follow-on training with financial support to start up a business.

More efficient management of the program in Delta State may have overcome some problems, e.g. complaints of non-transparent selection of trainees for the computer course; more rigorous selection of the C-NGO for the CMMRC; a more regular and consistent funding stream; and granting more latitude to the CMMRC to exercise initiatives relevant to peace and security in the state. However, to have an effective EWS, CALM must build the reputation and pedigree of the CMMRC and other project components, empowering to have their own voice and endowing them with the capacity to react effectively as reputable and relevant agents for peace and security in the state.

## 5.5 PLATEAU STATE

**EWS and CMMRC.** Plateau State experienced a serious violent ethno-religious conflict in November 2008 associated with elections held in Jos North LGA after years of deferment. By its own analysis, CALM perceived the outbreak as a sign of weakness in its system of early warning and response. The evaluation team noted several lapses in the management of the crisis and its precipitating events. First was the lethargy of the CMMRC, which had signaled its concerns about potential violence during a CALM training in May; second, the lack of timely advice and resources offered to the CMMRC to encourage preventive action; third, the absence of a functional EWS structured to engage and mobilize informed and willing stakeholders.

A wide range of peace constituents – labor, media, youth organizations, women groups, security, LGA, state government etc. – are represented in the CMMRC. However, evidence suggests that the commitment of these constituent members to the goals and objectives of the CALM project is low. Attendance at meetings and follow-up activities are not impressive. The evaluation team observed that CMMRC members understood that they were participants in a structure essential for the development and operation of the EWS, but details of their expected roles and responsibilities within the EWS framework were not fully understood by members or the various organizations they represent. An equally poor understanding

of roles and responsibilities is observable in the relationship of the CMMRC and its two Coordinating NGOs, the Christian Foundation for Social Justice and Equity (CFSJA) and YOU-PEG.

In addition, the CMMRC has no comprehensive workplan for its activities. It operates on an ad hoc basis and with minimal linkage to other CALM project components, especially youth and women's organizations, which should serve as sources of early warning information. For instance, there is no clarity on expected outputs and outcomes, timelines, or budgets. In spite of these limitations the CMMRC may count a number of important achievements. It has undertaken advocacy visits to key stakeholders including the Plateau State Chamber of Commerce. A visit to Deputy Governor of the State resulted in the introduction of peace education in secondary schools. A timely early warning and response helped to prevent the occurrence of violence during the earlier Jos LGA elections held in March 2008 and later annulled amid some controversy. The CMMRC mediated a labor crisis in February 2008 which prevented the escalation of an industrial dispute by government workers.

A functional working relationship is lacking between the CMMRC and other project components such as BB4P, Peace Clubs, CYAs, or NGO skill providers. For example, the State Peace Zone Coordinator was asked to leave a CMMRC meeting by a coordinating NGO, despite CALM's philosophy of broad representation and inclusiveness. Awareness of EWS exists among many potential stakeholders. Government and civil society have in the past shown a capacity to address low-intensity conflicts in prior outbreaks of violence. Yet, there is no evidence that the CMMRC or CALM have tapped into this existing knowledge or even demonstrated desire to build on it. No collaboration or partnership has emerged out of EWS training programs with any civil society organizations such as COWAN or the League of Muslim Sisters, who participated in one IFESH-sponsored EWS training.

Furthermore, training is not always conducted in an organized way to benefit broad spectrum of the stakeholders. Training sessions in EWS for members of CMMRC, BB4P, Peace Clubs and other youth organizations seen often to be hastily arranged to meet M&E reporting requirements. Interviews with targeted beneficiaries in Jenta Adam, Alheri and Agwa-Rogo Peace Zones reveal only scanty knowledge of EWS and the expected roles of Peace Zone members.

**Peace Zones.** A number of Peace Zones exist throughout Plateau State. The evaluation team was able to visit three located in Jos (Alheri, Agwa-Rogo and Jenta-Adamu). In these Zones, both the Basketball for Peace and Peace Clubs have remained generally inactive since 2007, a situation which the BB4P State Coordinator attributed to poor logistical and financial support, for example, no basketball court has been built in Plateau State under CALM. The few tournaments held among Peace Zones since 2007 were made possible through his personal role as an employee of the Plateau State Sports Council. He has used his office to arrange tournaments to keep the youths together and to maintain the vision of the Peace Zones. In spite of these efforts, integration of the activities of the BB4P and Peace Clubs into the CALM project is minimal. The majority of young sportsmen interviewed did not demonstrate any understanding of the vision of the CALM project, even though they were proud of their membership of the Peace Zones and the opportunity to play basketball. The Peace Zones are still being managed along the lines of the pre-CALM program. Although youths in the BB4P are aware they should normally be given peace education talks during tournaments and trainings, they confessed that the designated peace managers have not been coming around to do so.

The situation of the Peace Clubs in Plateau state is even more disappointing. Two of the Peace Clubs scheduled for visits were not available for interview. The Peace Club at the St. Louis Girls' Secondary School has no coordinator in place, and the COCIN Secondary School could not be reached because the coordinator listed for the evaluation team by IFESH had reportedly not been in the area for about a year.

**Skills Training.** The evaluation team gathered that the CALM project undertook two skills acquisition activities for youths selected from the Peace Zones, one on fish farming and a second on video production. The primary skills training IP, the Christian Foundation for Social Justice and Equity

(CFSJA), was not available for interview, but the team spoke with two other organizations involved, YOU-PEG and the Jos Repertory Theatre. Criteria for choosing the skills, selecting the trainers, and managing the skill acquisition activity were not wholly transparent. At the Agwan-Rogo Peace Zone the evaluation team was told that some members of the Peace Zone benefited from skills training in fish farming which involved 600 hundred fingerlings, four bags of feed and a plastic basin to start a farm. Although there was a “harvest” of fish by the Peace Zone, the project suffered from poor supervision and monitoring. The farm project was not sustained and had little overall impact. In addition, allegations of financial impropriety by the IP were reported.

The video production training organized by Jos Repertory Theatre was well received by beneficiaries. However, the effort was reportedly interrupted suddenly when CALM staff removed learning equipment and materials from the premises; CALM plans to return the equipment after completion of further training on business skills for the prospective video entrepreneurs.

## 5.6 KADUNA STATE

IFESH/CALM has established a regional office in Kaduna, headed by the CALM Deputy Chief of Party. The office provides administrative, technical and supervisory support to project activities in the focal states of north/central Nigeria region. Despite proximity, monitoring and communication with CALM stakeholders and implementing partners in the region has been limited, even in Kaduna town itself. Interaction with IPs, NGOs, members of Peace Zones and Peace Clubs is reportedly rare outside of workshops, training programs, and other special events, such as occasional visits from IFESH officials from the US.

The evaluation team found that the relationship between IFESH and two key CALM partners in Kaduna State has seriously deteriorated, in part through poor communication. The formerly independent Basketball for Peace Project based in nearby Zaria has grown dissatisfied with its role as a sub-grantee of IFESH/CALM. Much as it would like to be part of the project, BB4P is frustrated by its lack of autonomy to chart its own direction, as well as by inadequate funding for sports competitions and other activities. Similarly the Kaduna-based Inter-faith Mediation Centre (IMC) has been disappointed by its diminished role within the project, where it now serves as a C-NGO for the Kaduna CMMRC. An initial MOU with CALM gave IMC responsibilities for forming and supervising all of the CMMRCs in the northern region, but that agreement was later revised. Interviews with IMC and the national coordinator of BB4P also suggest that IFESH and these sub-grantees also subscribe to different approaches to CMM, which have not yet been successfully reconciled within the CALM project.

**EWS and CMMRC.** Institutional structures, in the form of the CMMRC and CYAs, for the creation of an early warning network in Kaduna State exist, but are not adequately coordinated within a functioning system. At present the CMMRC is not well organized or administered, rather it is more of a loose forum of members who typically drive the early warning process through informal arrangements under the name of the CMMRC. Yet, by applying this approach, the CMMRC successfully prevented the escalation of a religious conflict initiated by complaints from Muslims praying in the mosque about noise from an adjacent church. The Imam of the mosque immediately called members of the CMMRC, who intervened and resolved the issue. The CMMRC also helped to settle a lingering crisis between the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) and some communities in the Sabon Tasha metropolitan area of Kaduna, who complained about the lack of transformers and electric supply. Early warning signs indicated that the communities had mobilized to attack the PHCN. The CMMRC visited the local government chairman and elders of the communities and urged them to take steps to avoid a violent clash.

Implementation of CALM in Kaduna State has not integrated critical stakeholders, notably civil society groups and government agencies, nor even adequately built their capacity for conflict management and mitigation. Little support to the CMMRC has been forthcoming from the Inter-Faith Mediation Center

(IMC), which has been named to serve as its Coordinating-NGO. CALM envisages the role of C-NGO as an experienced organization with a compatible outlook and philosophy. IMC is instead an organization which has built its success on mediation in *religious* conflict, and it has therefore not easily adapted to the CALM multi-stakeholder approach.

**Peace Zones.** CALM also suffers from the lack of synergy in the implementation of the various project components. For instance, it was noted that the activities of BB4P, both within and outside the framework of the Peace Zones, were better organized and purposeful than other project components, owing possibly to the fact that the BB4P organization is headquartered in nearby Zaria (Kaduna state). BB4P remains generally popular, but a general loss of momentum is reported since the pre-CALM era. Within the CALM project the BB4P barely interacts with any other components, and it is sometimes perceived by CALM staff as a competitor rather than a source of complimentary inputs to the project. In fact, not since 2006 have BB4P and IFESH agreed upon a common workplan. Additionally, the BB4P Coordinator noted that they are not represented on the CMMRC, and have in fact never been invited to any Council meetings. The evaluation team also interacted with members of the two strong peace clubs in Kaduna at Barnawa Government Girls' Secondary School and Dabo Secondary School. Transformation of school groups into "peace clubs" has at times been a slow process. Many youth groups from secondary schools are invited to CALM peace orientation workshops, but a trend observed in many was that the project does not follow up to consolidate them into effective Peace Clubs.

**Election observation.** Members of various youth organizations participated in civic education and election observer training offered by IFESH's implementing partner SEMA. Interviews confirmed SEMA's good coordination of governance-related training and youth advocacy activities. However, some youths reported dissatisfaction with the manner in which IFESH managed payment of allowances to election observers through their CYAs. Because the amount designated for each youth observer was not clearly stated in advance, some youth found the payment inadequate. The incident created tension in some CYAs whose members accused their leaders of impropriety.

## 5.7 KANO STATE

**EWS and the CMMRC.** Early warning activities were initiated with the setting up of the CMMRC, formed with representatives drawn from a wide spectrum of constituencies in the State, including women's groups, NGOs, religious bodies, traditional institutions, labor, students, the business community, and so on. Some CMM trainings and orientation sessions were conducted for Council members, but they were reportedly not designed to provide advanced knowledge of EWS. Training sessions were not reinforced by a written EWS management plan, nor was a handbook provided to enable CMMRCs to undertake step-down trainings for the youth groups who were to become part of their information network. The EWS in Kano as in other focal states of the CALM project has not evolved into a full fledged system.

The CMMRC has been fortunate in its C-NGO, the Centre for Democratic Research and Training (CDRT), based in Mambayya House at Bayero University. As the "the secretariat" to the CMMRC, it organizes and facilitates meetings, builds capacity on EWS, and supports response to conflicts. With noticeable enthusiasm and institutional commitment, CDRT has guided the CMMRC to achieve notable successes in conflict prevention and mediation interventions.

Although the coordinating NGO demonstrated a commitment to the documentation of CMMRC activities, it could offer no evidence of gathering and reporting EWS information through its "hub." Without guidelines, regular reports, clear information channels, adequate and regular funding, or website for sharing information, the Mambayya House has performed the functions of the information hub only on demand, when a crisis is imminent or underway. Notwithstanding, the CMMRC successfully intervened in seven religious conflicts. They included a fact finding mission to Sumaila LGA during the sectarian

clash of February 9, 2008, between students of a secondary school and the police in the area. The Mambayya House – the coordinating NGO for the CMMRC -- complained of inadequate funding for the CMMRC to hold its regular monthly meetings.

The relative success of the CMMRC is attributable to the availability of a strong and supportive secretariat with considerable intellectual and peace building potential. But the House is yet to demonstrate any appreciable effort to connect other CALM peace structures to CMMRC through operational linkages. This reduces the opportunities for synergy and strong project performance in the state. Nonetheless the CMMRC enjoys wide public confidence from even the most vulnerable populations, e.g. the Igbo Christian community. This has resulted in the recent call by this community for the intervention of the Council in an intra-ethnic conflict among Igbo leaders in Kano.

**Peace Zones.** CALM set out to build on an earlier USAID-supported CMM program in Kano State, with the object of expanding the Peace Zones in Kano into more vulnerable “hot spot” communities. Two of three additional Peace Zones planned by BB4P under the program were created in total, but there was no evidence that the new Peace Zones created remained active during the period under review. However, BB4P remained active in the promotion of youth basketball coalitions, and these are largely sustained through sporting activities with teams outside the framework of the CALM project. Also, it was found out in Kano that most members of BB4P in Kano nurture the dream of possible professional career in basketball and have little interest in peace and civic education offered through the CALM. Also, the intended linkages between BB4P and Peace Clubs in zone secondary schools has suffered from inactivity, due largely to lack of institutional support. The team found that in King Secondary School, Kano members of an already existing youth club were invited to participate in CALM CMM orientation seminars, but no follow-up was undertaken to rekindle and sustain their interest.

**Skills Training.** A fish farming training organized for selected youths from the Peace Zones in Kano is an example of one skills acquisition initiative that was not well planned and yielded few positive results. Six BB4P players, along with members of other NGOs, were selected to participate in a fish farming training and pilot project. The State BB4P Coordinator, an avid sportsman and entrepreneur, offered space for construction of two concrete fish tanks. Problems later developed. The water supply to the tank from a nearby well was insufficient to sustain a healthy tank environment for the fish. Two water pumps were installed, but the problem persisted. As the fish mortality rate rose, it was decided to harvest the fish. Around N100,000 was realized from the sale, less than expected, and contrary to plan, the sum was held by the Coordinator and not deposited in a revolving bank account that would pay for new fingerlings, feed, and running costs. A second small harvest netted around N17,000, also reportedly retained in the same way. Today, a number of catfish may be seen in the tank, swimming in the shallow, murky water. The BB4P players that had initially volunteered to take care of the fish tank no longer come to tend them, having seen little return for their labor. Moreover, the Coordinator has also lost his enthusiasm for the BB4P program, which seems to be winding down in Kano State.

# ANNEX E. PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS INTERVIEWED

## WASHINGTON, D.C.

*11 February – 6 March 2009*

S. Tjip Walker (Team Leader, Warning and Analysis) USAID/CMM

Rachel Locke (Conflict Specialist) USAID/CMM

## PHOENIX, ARIZONA

*24 February – 1 March (telephone interviews)*

CL Mannings (Vice President) IFESH HQ Phoenix, AZ

Emmanuel Ojameruaye (Planning) IFESH HQ Phoenix, AZ

## ABUJA, NIGERIA

*9 March*

Chom Bagu (Sr. Conflict Program Officer) USAID, Abuja

Tyrone Gaston (Chief of Party, Port Harcourt) IFESH/CALM

Samie Ihejeirika (Deputy Chief of Party, Kaduna) IFESH/CALM

*10 March*

Sharon L. Cromer (Mission Director) USAID, Abuja

Anne Fleuret (Sr. Strategic Analysis Advisor) USAID, Abuja

Minnie Wright (Peace, D&G Team Leader) USAID, Abuja

Chom Bagu (Sr. Conflict Program Manager) USAID, Abuja

## NORTHERN REGION

**KADUNA/Zaria (11-14 March)**

*11 March*

**IFESH/CALM Kaduna Regional Office**

Samie Ihejeirika (Deputy Chief of Party)

Mohammed Salisu (Program Manager, Kaduna)

Boniface Igomu (Monitoring and Evaluation Manager)

**12 March**

**Basketball for Peace (Ahmadu Bello University Basketball Foundation, Zaria)**

Oliver B Johnson (Program Manager)

Ibrahim Innocent Enesi (Operations Manager)

Ademola I. Adigun (Technical Manager)

Edward O. Tox (Asst. Program Manager)

Akuboh Michael (Kaduna State Coordinator)

**ABU Peace Club, Zaria**

Dr (Mrs.) Foluke Adeniyi (President of the PC), lecturer in Faculty of Education, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. Kaduna State

Mr. Olakunle Michael (Secretary-General of the PC), Lecturer Department of Chemical Engineering, ABU

**Traditional Ruler**

Alhaji R. Shehu Irdi CFR (Emir of Zazzau) Zaria, Kaduna State

**Strategic Empowerment and Mediation Agency (SEMA)**

Suleiman Abdulatif (Senior Program Officer)

**Election Monitors (trained by SEMA)**

Kabiru Yusuf, Youth Council

Hassan El-Adamu, Development Monitors

Sa'adu Ibrahim Nock, Badarawa Youth Community Dev. Assn.

Abayomi Muid Alabi, Rainbow for Peace, Ungwan Sarki

**Community Youth Association Members (some overlap with above)**

Abayomi Muid Alabi, Rainbow for Peace, Ungwan Sarki

Tanko Ibrahim Mohd, Northern Youths, Kaduna North

Ungwan Sarki, Integration 4 peace Movement, Tudun Wada

Sunday Oibe, Makera Youth for Peace and Dev., Makera

Ibrahim Suleiman, Northern Youth Progressive Movement, Doka

Murtala M. Abubakar, Arewa new Era, Dutsen Wai

Sa'adu Ibrahim Nock, Badarawa Youth Community Dev.

**CMMRC Members (7 of 30 members)**

Pastor Joshua K. Pyeng, Inter-faith Mediation Centre

Hassan A. Abubaka, Labor Representative

Alh. Yusuf Usman, Ex-Servicemen Association  
Abdullahi Mohammed, Inter-faith Mediation Centre  
Elder (Chief) P. Lawson, Christian Association of Nigeria  
Hon. Munir G. Waziri, Kaduna North Local Government Council  
Hon. Abdullahi Adamu, Special Assistant to Kaduna State Governor  
Eng. Tasiu M. Ringim, CITAR/NGO

***Kaduna, 13 March***

**Government**

Alhaji Salisu Ahmed Local Government Chairman, Kaduna North LGA

**Dabo Peace Club**

Elisha Dodo Dabo (Club Patron) Dabo Secondary School, “Television”

**Government Girls’ Secondary School, Barnawa**

Mr. Ndakson School Master and Peace Club Patron.

**Inter-Faith Mediation Centre (Coordinating NGO for CMMRC)**

Pastor James Movel Wuye Joint Executive Coordinator

Imam Mohammad Nuryan Ashafa Joint Executive Coordinator

***Kaduna, 14 March***

**BB4P – Police College**

Emmanuel Moses Deputy, Sports, Police College and CIB, Police Headquarters

Mailafias Yakubu (PZ Coord. -BB4P) DSP, Police Headquarters

Engr. Augustine Sunday Idoko Social Secretary for the Police School Squash Team and BB4P Community supporter

**Peace Zone Kakuri, Kaduna South**

Joseph Onuche Sule BB4P – Team member (interviewed at the Police College)

**Ungwan Maichibi (“Television”) Peace Zone**

John Audu (Peace Manager of the Television Peace Zone), Kaduna Government Secondary School, Television

**Community in “Television” Area (spontaneous interview)**

Sho Bakut, community member

Saratu Ad, community member

Prince Ibrahim, President Yelwa Youth Association

Celina James, Member Yelwa Youth Association

Jemima Zakari , area woman leader

**Interview with Community Leader, Ungwan Maichibi (“Television”)**

Emmanuel

**KANO (16-18 March)**

***Kano, 16 March***

**Centre for Democratic Research and Training (CDRT)**

Dr. Haruna Wakili (Director) Mambayya House, Bayero University

Habu Mohammed (Asst. Director) Mambayya House, Bayero University

Murtala A. Ringsim (Research Fellow and Desk Officer, IFESH/CALM Project)

**CMMRC Kano**

Zainab A. Suleiman (MFR, Kano State President) National Council of Women’s Societies

Bashir Abbah (Chairman) National Labor Congress, Kano State

Munir Mustapha, (representing Student Union Government President) Federal College of Education,

Lawan D Adamu, (representing Student Union Government President) Bayero University Kano

Rev. Dr. Ubah Andrew (former General Secretary) Christian Association of Nigeria. Kano Chapter

Muhammad Mustapha Yahaya (Executive Director) Democratic Action Group, Kano

**Musa Iliyasu College Peace Club (not active)**

Aminu Suleiman, Games Master [Attended an IFESH training, but has not started a Peace Club]

C. R. Adedoyin (Mrs) Principal

Ogwuche Jane (Mrs) Vice Principal

Haj. Zainab M. Iliasu H/M/ Vice Principal Admin.

Teachers:

- Ugwu Fabian Uche
- Chinyere Chioke
- Nkemdem Nkemdem
- Rueben I. Victory
- Larry T. David
- Chioma Charity Ogijiofor

***Kano, 17 March***

**Farm Center Peace Zone: Fish Farm Skills Training**

Umar Ibrahim Bala (Peace Zone Coordinator)

Muhammad Mustapha Yahaya (Trainer)

**Democratic Action Group**

Muhammad Mustapha Yahaya (Executive Director)

**Prime Peace Project and Election Monitor Trainees**

Mary Sjoyemi (Secretary)	Prime Peace Project (PPP)
Jacqueline Jackden (Accountant)	PPP
Ahamed Ideabejor (Manager)	PPP
Emadealu Jim Osumah (member)	Society for Youth Awareness and Health Development (SYA&HD)
Saheed Ogunmuyiwa (member)	SYA&HD
Kikelomo Saliu (member)	Women and Youth Development

**“Interactive Club” King’s College, Kano**

[Not fully transformed into a Peace Club, although some members were drawn into BB4P orbit by a former games master]

Student members:

- Harrison Godwin
- Emmanuel Basil
- Rashedi Oyeti
- Mary Clement
- Maryann Umeh
- Olawale Michale Kayode
- Emmanuel Onuh

**Farm Center Peace Zone**

Umar Ibrahim Bala (Kano State BB4P Coordinator)

***Kano, 18 March***

**Farm Center Peace Zone**

Mohammed Kabir Abubakar (Head Referee, Peace Zone)

**JOS (18 – 21 March)**

***Jos, 18 March***

Jos Business School: Informal Planning Meeting held at the to make contacts for interviews

***Jos, 19 March***

## **Government**

Christopher Isha Isha (Vice-Chairman)

Jos North Local Government

## **Youth Peace and Empowerment Group (YOU-PEG), Co-Coordinating NGO for the CMMRC**

Mrs. Martina Kure (Coordinator)

Mallam Sedeeq Hong (Program Manager)

## **Agwan Rogo Peace Zone, CALM Skills Acquisition: Fish Farming,**

[Executed by Christian Foundation for Social Justice and Equity, co-coordinating NGO for the CMMRC]

*Training was reviewed by:*

Mallam Garba Muhammed (Coordinator)

Agwan Rogo Peace Zone

Mallam Samai'la Gwadabe (Treasurer/Welfare Officer)

Jos North, Plateau State Agwan Rogo Peace Zone

Hamisu Abubakar (Public Relations Officer)

Jos North, Plateau State Agwan Rogo Peace Zone

## ***Jos, 20 March***

### **CMMRC, Plateau State**

Mr. Ezekiel Gomos (Vice-Chairman)

### **CALM Skills Acquisition Program: Video Production**

Mr Patrick Jude Oteh (Artistic Director)

Jos Repertory Theatre.

### **National Council of Women Societies (NCWS, Beneficiaries, Skills Training)**

Mrs Ruth Gokas

NCWS

Happy Danusa

NCWS

Naomi Fanto

NCWS

### **Islamic Counseling Initiative, Jos**

Fatima Suleiman Ahmed (Coordinator)

## ***Jos, 21 March***

### **Alheri Peace Zone and Jenta Peace Zone**

*Management Staff:*

Christopher Wesley (Coordinator, Alheri), BB4P, Plateau State

- .Dayo F. Adejumo (Tafawa Balewa/ Asst. Coordinator)
- Abraham Eli (Alheri/ Asst. Captain)
- Jatau Paull (UMCA Quarters/ asst. Captain)
- Chris. D. Wesley (Alheri/ Coordinator)
- Abraham Vincent (Jenta/ Coach)

*Interviews with selected members of Alheri Peace Zone and Jenta Peace Zone:*

- Al- amen Lawan Alheri PZ
- Paul Jatau Alheri PZ
- Matthew Amas Alheri PZ
- Henry Lawrence Alheri PZ
- Ehindero Owen Alheri PZ
- Ezenwokolo K. U. Osaz Alheri PZ
- Jude Anaekwe Alheri PZ
- Moses O. James Alheri PZ
- Henry Uzozike Alheri PZ
- Peter Abraham Jenta PZ
- Samuel Ibrahim Jenta PZ
- Pam'an Dakat Jenta PZ
- Harison Galadima Jenta PZ
- Abraham Eli Jenta PZ

**SOUTHERN REGION**

**PORT HARCOURT (15-18 March)**

***Port Harcourt, 16 March***

**IFESH/CALM HQ, Port Harcourt**

Tyron Gaston (Chief of Party)

IFESH, PHC

Ineba Bob-Manuel (Regional Program Manager)

IFESH, PHC Caroline Umagu (Grants Officer) IFESH, PHC Emeka Nwankwo (Deputy Admin. Manager) FESH, PHC Paul Avoaja (Grants Manager) IFESH, PHC

**CMMRC, Rivers State**

Dr.George Ogan (Chairman, CMMRC),

Community Stakeholder

Mrs. Emem Okon (Secretary, CMMRC),

KEBETKACHE

Doji Adeniji (for Mrs. Minna Ogbanga)

Center for Development Support Initiative

Alh.Ibrahim E. Woke

Muslim representative (Etche)

Jerry Ngiangia (member)

Christian Association of Nigeria

Phillip Kalio

Society for Participatory Development

**Peace Clubs in Rivers State**

Moses Johnson (Coordinator)

**Elekahia Peace Zone**

(Interview only)

Mr. Boma Idoniboye-Obu

BB4P State Coordinator

***Port Harcourt, 17 March***

**Ogoni, Wakirika and Andoni (OWA) Youth Initiatives, a multi-ethnic CYA**

**Wakirika United Peace Guide, CYA**

Sunny Bekameh (President)

Igbiks Kalio (Secretary, OWA/Wakirika, Okrika)

Sampson Adoki (Security Adviser, OWA/Wakirika, Okrika)

Elder Dike Igbiks (Coordinator, OWA/Wakirika, Okrika)

Tamun Obelema Idasimenuma (Member, OWA, Walga)

Charity Sekembo (OWA Women's Leader, Okrika)

George Aminadoki (Member OWA, Walga)

Prince George Ofori (Member, OWA, Walga)

Blessing George (Member, OWA, Walga)

Friday Igbikininiminbo (Member, OWA, Walga)

Gwunglbolge Jacob (Member, OWA, Andoni)

Eme Isotu (Member, OWA, Andoni)

Ngeri Sample (Member, OWA, Okrika)

**Girls' Secondary School Peace Club, Okumgba-Ama, Okrika LGA**

Emerue Hyacinth (Coordinator)

Gold Fiberosima (President)

Siyeofori Iyenemi (Secretary)

**Emolga Peace Initiative, Emohua LGA, a CYA**

Sensei Japheth Amadi (Chairman)

Tobin Rapheal (Secretary)

Ahmed Womum (P.R.O)

**Women's Action Organization (WAO), Coordinating NGO for Rivers CMMRC**

Geraldine Ihuoma Onyeke (Former Program Officer)

**Borikiri Peace Zone and the Borikiri Basketball for Peace**

(Interview only)

Mr. Boma Idoniboye-Obu

BB4P State Coordinator

***Port Harcourt, 18 March***

**Stella**

**Maris College Peace Club and Peace Zone**

Atu Baridapdoo (Coordinator, Stella Maris College Peace Club)

I. Obisike (President, Stella Maris College Peace Club)

**WARRI (18-19 March)**

***Warri, 18 March***

**Warri Basketball for Peace**

Mr. Collins Nawuwumi (State Coordinator)

**Dom Domingo's College BB4P and Peace Zone**

***Warri, 19 March***

**Niger Delta Professionals for Development (NIPRODEV), coordinating NGO for the Delta State CMMRC**

Joel Bisina (Regional Director, Warri)

Ifeoma Olisakwe (Program Manager, Warri)

**Delta State CMMRC**

Chief Imo Otite (Chairman)

Isiokolo

Mrs M.A Igbu (Treasurer)

Isoko

Frank Uromieyaghan (Asst Sec) Warri

Joel Bisina (Member) Warri

**ITC Systems Global, Nigeria, Ltd., an information technology company doing youth skills training**

Mathew Elusoji (Director)

Sade Elusakin (Operations Manager)

Austine Ashibuogwu (Technical Manager)

Tony Olurunfemi (Education Manager)

**Daudu Peace Zone and BB4P**

Nelson Teje (Referee, BB4P, Warri)

Emos Gbonwei (Coach, BB4P, Warri)

Several players

**Election Monitors, Warri**

(See Daudu Peace Zone)

***Ughelli, 20 March***

**Global Peace Development, Civic Education NGO**

Esike Onajite (Executive Director)

***Port Harcourt, 20 March***

**Fate Foundation, an NGO providing skills training in Rivers State**

Choice Nwajei (Head of Training, Port Harcourt)

**ABUJA (19-26 March)**

***19 March***

Mark White (Regional Conflict Advisor) DfID, Abuja

***20 March***

Sandy Ojikutu (Education Team Lead) USAID, Abuja

Chom Bagu (Sr. Conflict Program Manager) USAID, Abuja

Linda Crawford (HIV/AIDS) USAID, Abuja

Mal. Zakaraiya Zakaria MEMS, Abuja

***21 March***

William F. Pflaumer (Political Attaché) US Embassy, Abuja

Cheryl Fernandes (Deputy Political Attaché) US Embassy, Abuja

***23 March***

Telephone interview:

Mr. Oliver B. Johnson (Director) Basketball for Peace, Zaria

Karla Fossand (Health Team Lead) USAID, Abuja

Abiodun Onadipe (Peace Dev. Advisor) UNDP, Abuja

***25 March***

Dr. Joseph H.P. Golwa (Director General) Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Office of the Presidency

Gabriel Iya Director of Democracy and Development Studies, IPCR

***26 March***

Mikaela Meredith (Deputy Mission Director) USAID, Abuja

Bosede Eitokpah (Senior Civil Society Program Manager)

# ANNEX F. DOCUMENTS

## REVIEWED

- Albert, Isaac Olawole. 2006. Baseline Survey Report of Conflicts in Rivers, Delta, Kano, Kaduna and Plateau States of Nigeria. Presented to Conflict Abatement through Local Mitigation (CALM). Port Harcourt: IFESH.
- ARD, Inc. 2006. Democracy and Governance Assessment in Nigeria. Brattleboro, VT: ARD for USAID. Available online at [http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PNADI079.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADI079.pdf).
- Bruton, Bronwyn. 2002. The Conflict Resolution Stakeholders Network (CRESNET): An Independent Program Evaluation of the United States Agency for International Development Office of Transition Initiatives (March). Available online at <http://www.spa.ucla.edu/ps/research/bruton.pdf>
- Chevron. 2008. GMOU Participatory Shareholder Evaluation. A Joint Evaluation of the Global Memoranda of Understanding between Chevron, Community Organizations and State Governments in the Niger Delta (October).
- Dewey, Arthur E. and Glenn Slocum. 2002. The Role of Transition Assistance: The Case Of Nigeria. Center for Development Information and Evaluation Working Paper No. 325. Washington, D.C: USAID PN-ACN-770 (January). Available online at [http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PNACN770.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACN770.pdf).
- IFESH. 2005. Conflict Management and Mitigation Request for Application (RFA) # 620-04-005 (May 24).
- IFESH/CALM. 2007-2009. Quarterly Reports to USAID, various.
- IFESH/CALM. 2007. CALM Performance Management Plan, approved July 2006, revised October 2007.
- IFESH/CALM. FY 2008 Third Quarter Report, Performance Management Plan Data Sheets, 2007-2008
- IFESH/CALM. 2008. Intervention Report of Kano Road Mosque and St. Joseph Catholic Church Facilitated by Interfaith Mediation Centre and CMMRC Kaduna Held on the 24<sup>th</sup> June 2008 Supported by IFESH Northern Regional Office Kaduna. Kaduna, Nigeria.
- IFESH/CALM. 2008. Situation Report of Civil Disturbance in Jos, Regional Program Manager, CALM Project (December).
- IFESH/CALM. 2006-2009. Annual Workplans. Port Harcourt: IFESH/CALM
- IPCR. 2007. Nigeria: Strategic Conflict Assessment. Abuja: Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution.
- Mason, John et. al. 2000. Training for Good Governance & Civil-Military Relations Impact Assessment of the Office of Transition Initiatives/Nigeria Program. Arlington, VA: PriceWaterhouseCoopers for USAID, Washington, D.C.(April). Available online at [http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PNACH680.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACH680.pdf)
- MEMS. 2007-2008. DQA Forms for IFESH/CALM. Abuja: MEMS.
- NISER 2006. Needs Assessment of Youth Employment in Rivers, Delta, Kaduna, Kano and Plateau States of Nigeria. Ibadan, Nigeria: NISER (November).

- OECD/DAC. 2008. Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities: Working Draft. Paris: OECD.
- USAID. 1999. USAID/OTI Nigeria Program Description (May). Available online at [http://www.usaid.gov/our\\_work/cross-cutting\\_programs/transition\\_initiatives/country/nigeria/nigeria.html](http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/transition_initiatives/country/nigeria/nigeria.html)
- USAID. 2000. USAID/OTI Nigeria Program Description, November. Available online at [http://www.usaid.gov/our\\_work/cross-cutting\\_programs/transition\\_initiatives/country/nigeria/ngi2000.html](http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/transition_initiatives/country/nigeria/ngi2000.html)
- USAID. 2001. USAID/OTI Nigeria Program Description: Nigeria Program: FY2001 Budget - \$6,000,000. Available online at [http://www.usaid.gov/our\\_work/cross-cutting\\_programs/transition\\_initiatives/country/nigeria/progdesc.html](http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/transition_initiatives/country/nigeria/progdesc.html)
- USAID. n.d. The Role of Transition Assistance: The Case of Nigeria. Evaluation Brief No. 4. [A Summary or Dewey and Slocum]. Available online at [http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PNACN771.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACN771.pdf).
- USAID/Nigeria. 2005. IFESH Conflict Management and Mitigation: Cooperative Agreement No. 620-A-00-06-00099-00.
- USAID/Nigeria. 2006. Country Strategy Statement (31 January).
- USAID/Nigeria. 2007. Annual Portfolio Review for CMM [CALM Project]. Abuja: USAID (November).
- USAID/Nigeria. 2008. Annual Portfolio Review for CMM [CALM Project]. Abuja: USAID (August).
- Walker, Tjip. 2009. Theories of Change for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding. 2009. USAID/W: Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation.
- World Bank. Nigeria. 2008. Country Partnership Strategy Progress Report (February).

---

***Training Materials Used by IFESH, Designed by IFESH and Implementing Partners***

- Basketball for Peace. N.d. Peace Clubs: Training of Trainers (TOT) Workshop for Secondary Schools. Zaria, Nigeria.
- Basketball for Peace. N.d. Conflict Mitigation and Management Handbook for Peace Zones and Peace Clubs. Produced in Conjunction with CRESNET. Zaria, Nigeria.
- CAP. Good Governance and Anti-Corruption Processes (Training Manual). Jos, Nigeria. n.d. Adapted from the *Pillars of Corruption Series*, Vol. 4.
- CAP. N.d. Transparency and Budget Monitoring (Training Manual). Jos, Nigeria.
- CRESNET. 2008. Conflict Mitigation and Mangement (CMM) Training Manual. Conflict Resolution Stakeholders' Network: Abuja, Nigeria (2001, rev. November 2008).
- IFESH/CALM. N.d. Hand-out on Developing Capacity for Conflict Analysis and early Response. Port Harcourt, Nigeria.
- IFESH/CALM. N.d.. Early Warning Reporting/Communication. Workshop Handout. Port Harcourt, Nigeria.
- IFESH/CALM. N.d. Early Warning Toolkit for Peace Clubs and Peace Zones.

IFESH/CALM. 2006. Training Manual on Early Warning Response and Conflict Management. Port Harcourt: IFESH-Nigeria (December).

IFESH/CALM. 2008. Mediation Training Reader for Conflict Mitigation and Management Regional Council. Port Harcourt: IFESH-Nigeria (September)

Soaltech. N.d.. On Fish Farming Skills for Youth in Kaduna State. USAID/IFESH-CALM Project. Trainees Handout. Kaduna.

---

***IEC Materials Developed for CALM (CDs)***

CALM. N.d. Hop Hoy for Peace (Rivers State). Port Harcourt, Nigeria.

CALM. N.d. Jingle in English Language on Youth Empowerment. Port Harcourt, Nigeria.

CALM. 2009. Radio Jingles Rivers State 2005-2009. Port Harcourt, Nigeria.

CMMRC Plateau State. 2008. Peace Jingle on Local Government Election. Jos, Nigeria.

**U.S. Agency for International Development**

1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20523

Tel: (202) 712-0000

Fax: (202) 216-3524

**[www.usaid.gov](http://www.usaid.gov)**