

**Casamance Special Objective**  
**June 16, 2000**  
**Results Framework Discussion – What we changed and Why**

The Technical Team of the Special Objective of the Casamance met to review the Results Framework. The original framework was proposed to give Washington a preliminary idea of the kind of results and indicators, which could be achieved under the SPO. The project was submitted to Washington with the specification that the framework was *preliminary* -- in order to permit a fine-tuning of the framework according to conditions in the field.

The first months of the SPO made it clear that while the Preliminary Results framework covered most of the needs as they were expressed by the population, some modification was needed in order to render the framework more effective and precise. The technical team spent considerable time thinking through the wording proposed. The proposed new framework allows for program flexibility while clarifying SPO objectives. The following explains the changes made, and why.

**Special Objective level**

**Original wording:**        *Conditions for Economic and Political Development in the Casamance Region Established*

**New wording:**            *Increased Economic, Social and Development Activities in Support of the Peace Process*

**Explanation:** The technical team felt that the original goal did not accurately express what the program seeks to accomplish and was somewhat vague. It was pointed out that the conditions for economic and political development are those factors which foster, inter-alia, investment, openness, and good governance. The insurgency adversely affects those factors. Our program focuses more on the community level and aims at supporting the peace process as a prerequisite for stability and development. Our program is really to increase activities actually taking place, in hopes that it will help stabilize the situation in the Casamance and give the population incentives to return to their villages of origin, and above all to instill confidence in the peace process.

**Possible Measures:** number of new activities sponsored (activities to be disaggregated by type and by gender), ...

**KIR 1**

**Original wording:**        *Increased Economic Activity*

**New Wording:**            *Improved Economic Activities for Affected Populations*

**Explanation:** The Technical Team felt that increasing economic activities was only part of the goal. Instead, we want to build on on-going initiatives and consolidate the existing efforts. This way the technical team felt that improving existing activities is of great importance. The Technical Team also felt it necessary to be specific about the target population of the SPO: affected populations. The affected population in the Casamance would include refugees, internally displaced, ex- MFDC, mine victims, host families, etc.

**Possible Measures:** number of persons benefiting from the program (persons to be desegregated by category, ie. refugee or mine victim and by gender.), ...

**IR 1.1.****Original:***More people gainfully employed***New:***Improved Marketing mechanisms/methodologies for local products***Explanation:**

The rationale behind the new wording of the IR is to create more marketing opportunities for agricultural, fishing and forest products as a mean to increase local employment opportunities free from seasonally patterns. The word 'gainfully' brings up difficult issues. Much of the economic activity in the Casamance region is likely to fall within the informal sector (i.e. not official businesses). Agricultural activity employs people for only part of the year, and in the case of women such activity is often overlooked. Many agricultural and artesian products are currently produced in the Casamance, the problem is how to get these products to markets and how to commercialize them. In other words, production is less a problem than marketing – in fact, by many accounts fruit and other produce currently go to waste because there is no way to sell the products. While this might not actually increase the numbers of those gainfully employed, it would increase profits and income for those already producing.

**Possible Measures:**

Indicators could include: number of markets set up, number of loans used to rent transport for goods, number of producers assisted in finding buyers for their products.

**IR 1.2****Original:***Increased production of Cash Crops and Rice***New:***Use of Natural Resources for Income Generation in a Sustainable Way***Explanation:**

One of the major problems in the Casamance is the loss of arable land due to salt-water intrusion. Associated problems are land erosion and deforestation that provoke sanding over of the valleys where rice is usually grown. The original goal of increasing production of cash crops and rice is encompassed by the proposed new wording, which the team feels promotes a more global view of natural resources. Practical matters were also taken into consideration with this IR – it would be very difficult and time consuming to calculate the actual production of cash crops and rice and to then demonstrate an increase in production. In the case of salt-water dikes to reclaim rice fields, rice production in the reclaimed areas would not resume for a couple of years – beyond the lifetime of the project. The new wording also would allow for activities like fisheries, marketing and management of forest products, palm and cashew farming. Also, it would allow the SPO to fund demining: as mined land cannot be used to cultivate.

**Possible Measures:**

. Number of initiatives supported involving sustainable use of natural resources for income generation, number of new palm and cashew plantations, number of new fruit orchards, number of hectares reclaimed.

**IR1.3****Original:***Loans to Micro Enterprises Increased***New:***Increased Access to Micro-Finance***Explanation:**

The Technical team felt that part of the problem for people in the Casamance is a lack of information about available sources of credit and loans. As pointed out before, there is also a problem using the word micro-enterprises, as many of those accepting loans will be involved in the informal sector.

**Possible Measures:** Number of loans made, number of information and outreach campaigns, , amount of loans made, number of beneficiaries, reimbursement rates, percentage of loan applications processed.

#### **KIR II**

**Original:** *Increased Local Capacity*

**New:** *Increased Capacity for Local Development Partners*

**Explanation:** The original wording is very vague. It is unclear whether the wording was referring to economic, social or managerial capacity, in particular in view of the three IRs that followed (displaced population returns home, more work options for former rebels, and managerial skills of local NGOs improved). The new wording specifies who the target group is. Under this KIR the target population and their local organizations are those involved in the development process (NGOs, individuals, local government, and private sector).

**Possible Measures:** percentage of supported local development partners (desegregated by type and by gender) capable of self-reporting on management-related financial data.

#### **IR 2.1**

**Original:** *Displaced Population Returns Home*

**New:** *Managerial Skills of Local Development Actors Improved*

**Explanation:** There were various problems with the original IR. First, the technical team felt that the link between a returning population and increased local capacity was tenuous. Returning populations could actually have a hindering effect on local capacity, as needs are stretched to the limits. Secondly, the team felt that the number of displaced persons returning would be an *indicator* of several factors: i.e. the security situation, the situation in neighboring countries and regions, the peace process, and economic opportunities. The proposed IR focuses on managerial capacity of Development actors. This envisages activities which would help local organizations manage their programs which contribute to the reconstruction process of the Casamance. It could cover training in accounting, transparency, program management and evaluation.

**Possible Measures:** Number of small grants given to training for local partners. Number of workshops or working sessions on accounting, managerial practices. Number of local NGOs meeting USAID standards of business (proposals, reporting, etc).

#### **IR 2.2:**

**Original:** *More Work Options for Former Rebels*

**New:** *Vocational Skills Enhanced*

**Explanation:** Trips to the field and experience elsewhere have shown that it is not always a wise choice to focus on specific parties to a conflict. While it is clear that members of the MFDC must be part of our target group, they should not necessarily receive favorable treatment or access to services which the population, as a whole does not. Focusing on them will not only reinforce their identity as fighters, it could also create resentment in the population and hinder the reintegration process. Assisting ex-MFDC fighters would fall under KIR 1 – Improved Economic Activities for Affected Populations – as the MFDC is certainly an affected group. The new IR would allow for vocational training of individuals and groups. Examples might include: training for orthopedic technicians? in fabrication of prostheses for mine and accident victims,

courses in carpentry, wood working, etc for affected populations, fabric dying and basket weaving, computer courses.

**Possible Measures:** Number of courses/scholarships/trainings sponsored. Number of attendees to courses and trainings sponsored.

### **IR 2.3**

**Original:** *Managerial Skills of Local NGOs Improved*

**New:** *Better understanding and Use of Decentralization Mechanisms*

**Explanation:** The original idea is now covered under IR 2.1. The proposed new IR would allow for activities, which involve local government. In field visits the problem of decentralization has come up over and over again. While many in the Casamance see decentralization as something, which could be extremely useful in addressing many of the factors, which sparked the conflict, there is a lack of understanding about what decentralization is and how it can be used. Many of the leaders at the local (commune and communautés rurales) level are unaware of their rights and duties toward the population. The population often considers local leaders to be 'politicians', and thus does not monitor their activities or pressure them to mobilize resources and work for their constituencies. Possible activities include information sessions on decentralization and what it means, media coverage, advocacy for decentralization measures, training for local officials in resource mobilization.

**Possible Measures:** Number of communities which put together a development plan following activities, percentage of the population knowledgeable about the transferred authorities, percentage of project committees in which regional authorities have representatives, proportion of local government entities who publicly announce their proceedings.

### **KIR III**

**Original:** *Reconciliation and Peace Sustained*

**New:** *Improved Conditions for Local Level Conflict Reduction*

**Explanation:** There are too many factors, which affect the chances of Sustained Reconciliation and Peace in the Casamance. Many of the factors are beyond the control and even influence of the SPO. Peace will depend not only upon our program's activities, but on politico-military conditions and decisions beyond the scope of the SPO. The technical team felt that the best we can realistically hope to accomplish is to improve conditions for local level conflict reduction through encouraging dialogues on resource allocation, land tenure and use, and development priorities as well as resolution of disputes over resources and cultural issues.

**Possible Measures:** number of inter-localities committees set up to prevent or mitigate disputes, number of inter-localities meetings on development issues,... Number of conflicts solved by communautés rurales.

### **IR 3.1**

**Original:** *Civil Society Grievances Resolved*

**New:** *People to People Reconciliation Activities Fostered*

**Explanation:** As in the KIR, the technical team felt that resolving the grievances of civil society was beyond the control of the program. Some effects of the conflict will take years to repair. It is also not clear what kind of grievances is envisaged under the original wording. The new wording would allow the SPO to fund activities, which would encourage members of

civil society to communicate with one another, regardless of their political affiliation during the conflict. Activities might include: cultural and social exchanges – including activities to promote ethnic reconciliation, community fairs, arms control programs, peace conferences, cross-border visits (refugees), conflict resolution activities and seminars – including discussions with regional actors who have resolved conflicts in their own countries (Mali, Mauritania).

**Possible Measures:** Number of activities, number of participants in activities,

### **IR 3.2**

**Original:** *Increased Knowledge and Awareness of Conflict Factors and How to Resolve and Prevent Them*

**New:** *Increased Awareness of Conflict Factors and Conflict Management Strategies*

**Explanation:** The technical team did not feel that we had (or will have) a viable formula for preventing or resolving conflicts. Therefore the IR was changed to reflect awareness of Management strategies. Types of activities possible: war trauma and stress management, media presentations on ethnic bias, the history of the Casamance, support to responsible journalism, conflict resolution committees, peace committees, local self-policing.

**Possible Measures:** Number of programs, number of people reached (attendance), number of school adopting a conflict-resolution curriculum.

### **IR 3.3**

**Original:** *Peace Negotiations Between GOS and MFDC Concluded*

**New:** *Basic Infrastructure Rehabilitated*

**Explanation:** The original IR was seen by the Technical Committee to be beyond our control. At best we felt we could provide some support to the peace negotiations (which could be done under IR3.1 or 3.2) but certainly our influence as to whether or not they are concluded is minimal. On the other hand, the committee felt that in order for conditions to improve at the local level, some basic infrastructure rehabilitation would be necessary. This could include support to refurbishing schools, pharmacies, connecting roads, health posts, wells– things which the local population is likely to request before returning to villages of origin. Furthermore, as many of these structures are currently used by the military in abandoned villages (schools as barracks, for example) rehabilitation of such structures is likely to reduce potential for conflict.

**Possible Measures:** Number of structures rehabilitated or refurbished. Number of loans (under micro credit) given to repair damage to infrastructure.

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### **CRITICAL CONDITIONS**

While reviewing the Results Framework, the Technical Team identified outside factors that will be of critical importance to the success of the SPO. Some of these were mentioned in the Original Results framework. Critical conditions identified include:


**Commitment of the Government of Senegal and the MFDC.** One of the greatest challenges in the Peace Process will be convincing all parties concerned to negotiate. This is especially true of those who are still in the bush and fighting, or in exile. On the positive side, President Wade of Senegal has announced that he is willing to speak with ‘anyone who will speak with him’,

including MFDC members. On the negative side, the MFDC does not appear to be a unified front at present – some schisms could create problems if they are not included in the negotiations.

**The Role of Guinea-Bissau and the Gambia.** The Casamance region shares borders with both Guinea-Bissau and the Gambia. Cultural linkages between the three are also strong. Gambian President Yaya Jammeh is part Diola. The leader of the Junta Militar in Bissau, Ansumane Mane, also has strong ties to the region – as his mother is from the Casamance. During the war for independence in Guinea-Bissau, many people from the Casamance fought along side the PAIGC against the Portuguese. More recently, during the war in Bissau from 1998-99, members of the MFDC fought with the Junta Militar against troops loyal to Nino Vieira (supported by Senegalese troops). Salif Sadio, the leader of the hardline wing of the MFDC, currently resides in Bissau. Reports seem to indicate that Ansumane Mane is close to Sadio, and uses their relation to as a power-broker tool. Recent attacks on the border, including some with heavy artillery, have been carried out from within Guinea-Bissau. Following attacks, bandits or members of the MFDC have also sought refuge within the Gambia. The politico-military situation is not stable in either the Gambia or Guinea-Bissau, and the potential for outbreak of internal conflict in both countries is high. Any conflict within the sub-region would have impact upon the situation in the Casamance.

**Security on the borders:** Political movements are not the only potential instigators of conflict in the Casamance. Problems along the Guinea-Bissau /Senegal border are frequent. Not all of the attacks are likely to be politically motivated: cattle rustling and simple thievery are common, for example. The borders are porous and difficult to monitor, and communication between Senegal and Guinea-Bissau is not good. Arms are easy to obtain. Most accounts of attacks along the border areas end with the perpetrators fleeing into Guinea-Bissau with their loot. Recent discussions between Presidents Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal and Cumba Yala of Guinea-Bissau have acknowledged this problem. President Wade of Senegal has requested a UN force to monitor the borders. In the past, Senegal has asked for the right to pursue attackers up until a certain distance in Guinea-Bissau. This request was with opposition in Guinea-Bissau. There is no love lost between members of the Military Junta and the Senegalese Army – as the fighting was often fierce in Bissau.

**PRELIMINARY RESULTS FRAMEWORK (ORIGINAL)**



**SPO2 REVISED RESULTS FRAMEWORK -- PROPOSED**

