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FINAL REPORT

SUPPORT TO THE CASAMANCE PEACE PROCESS

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
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BACKGROUND

The Casamance region of Senegal (comprised of three administrative regions: Ziguinchor, Sedhiou and Kolda), is both geographically and culturally distinct from the rest of Senegal. As the southern-most part of country, Casamance is physically separated from Northern Senegal by the Gambia, linked to the rest of country by the Trans-Gambian highway. Its lush, tropical topography contrasts with the northern part of Senegal, where the Sahel begins. It is predominantly inhabited by the Diola people, known to embrace customary beliefs and practices in addition to Catholicism or Islam, in contrast to predominantly Wolof, Muslim north.



In the post-colonial era high incidences of ethnic and cultural discrimination combined with geographic isolation further resulted in economic marginalization by the Dakar-based administration. In 1947, *Le Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance* (MFDC) was launched to serve as a political movement representing the interests of the Casamançais population but only took on a secessionist bent in the 1980s, after becoming increasingly disgruntled by how the Dakar-based government was handling the political and economic affairs of the region.

In 1982, a peaceful protest march organized by the MFDC in Casamance turned violent and fueled one of the longest low-scale civil wars on the continent to date. The MFDC has led the Casamançais secessionist movement since the early 1980's, continuously recruiting older boys and young men to join the movement's military wing and execute acts of violence against the Government of Senegal (GoS), as well as civilians as a means to destabilizing the government in the region. The MFDC's actions have ranged from ambushed and raids on Senegalese military units to targeted attacks on villages. The GoS fought the MFDC, captured and interrogated civilians but has not been able to eliminate the MFDC.

Ethnic groups in the Casamance straddle the borders with the Gambia and Guinea Bissau, giving each country a stake in the conflict. Of the 60,000 displaced persons, many have become refugees in the Gambia and Guinea Bissau. Relations between the Gambian and Senegalese governments are strained, owing to the safe harbor granted to Salif Sadio, the most recalcitrant of the MFDC faction leaders, and accusations of coup plots against him by Gambian President Yaya Jammeh. The Bissau government permits the MFDC Kasolole wing to remain in country with the consent of the Senegalese government, a sign of the collaboration between the two governments.

EVOLUTION OF THE PEACE PROCESS

In 2000, there was an attempt to effectively engage in negotiations for a durable peace to the Casamance conflict. A cease-fire accord was negotiated between the MFDC and the GoS, Peace Accords were signed in 2004 in Ziguinchor, and a meeting was held in Foundiougne (a town just north of the Gambian border in the Fatick region) in February 2005 to discuss political solutions. A second meeting was planned but never held, thus the accords have yet to be fully implemented. This has resulted in the state commonly referred to as a state of "no war, no peace." Most observers argue that the peace process broke down because of factionalization within the MFDC and lack of political will within the GoS to push ahead. The general question of who had the legitimacy to negotiate on behalf of the MFDC and what they could reasonably negotiate remains an obstacle to finding a durable solution.

Until recently, the cease-fire has been honored by both parties; however the general security situation in the Casamance region remains unstable, toggling between periods of calm and instability fueled by

increasing banditry often thought to be committed by MFDC combatants looking for means for survival. As a result, travel by road to Senegal is at times considered risky. In addition, the potential for drug trafficking has increased across the Guinea-Bissau and Senegalese border, which continues to present an additional security threat to the region.

The first signs of new trouble emerged in May 2009, when the MFDC fired on a group of military vehicles, resulting in minor injuries but no fatalities. A MFDC military commander was killed by dissident elements in June, and MFDC elements challenged military patrols but did not draw fire. On August 21, fighting occurred between MFDC element and the Senegalese army on the outskirts of Ziguinchor, causing a great deal of panic within the city, which has not seen this kind of fighting in more than a decade. More than 600 civilians fled the neighborhood of Diabir, most of whom returned in the following days. In September and October of 2009 there were more attacks. A younger, more radical leadership is challenging the older generation, which it sees as corrupted by funds from the GoS, to either resume hostilities or negotiate a settlement. In this sense, a rebellion has emerged within the rebellion.

President Wade responded to this resumption of violence by stating that he would seek a definitive solution to the conflict. Lansana Goudiaby, appointed by Kasolole faction leader César Badiate as his spokesperson, has also indicated his objective of seeking negotiations with the GoS, but it is unclear if he speaks for the other MFDC factions.

PROBLEM ANALYSIS

To ensure project activities were designed to advance the peace process, AECOM continually met with stakeholders to discuss obstacles to advancing the peace process. AECOM recognized that there were a variety of factors that could prevent the MFDC and the GoS from moving forward with negotiations, and that strategies were needed to either overcome or minimize these obstacles. The obstacles shifted subtly each year, and beginning in Year 2, were ranked according to their importance and AECOM's ability to influence them. This led to a prioritization of actions to address obstacles that were both of critical importance and susceptible to outside influence.

Obstacles within the Government

Discussions with stakeholders in and outside of the government suggested that the Government itself faced a certain number of obstacles that impeded it from negotiating effectively with the MFDC, some of which reflect problems at the highest levels of government while others reflect lack of coordination, vertically and horizontally, within the government.

G1. Absence of delegation of power. The cause of this problem stems from centralization of decision-making powers with the President. Observers argue that the real manager of the Casamance portfolio is President Wade who decides what role to delegate to whom. As a result, peace process managers feel constrained to take initiatives, the decision making process is slow and often ad-hoc based on who has access to the President at any given point. There is often an information blackout and a tendency to aim to please the President as opposed to recommending difficult actions.

G2. Politicization of the Casamance portfolio. Protagonists within and outside the government have long used the Casamance portfolio as a way to serve their own political or economic interests. They often aim to curry favor with the President, who in turn seems to rely primarily on loyal political allies. As a result, initiatives are neither uniform nor standard in their approach.

G3. Lack of coordination. Those who do have a role in the Casamance dossier do not necessarily coordinate their actions outside their chain of command. As a result, protagonists undermine each other, either accidentally or deliberately, in order to maintain their position and access to resources. Each change in management has brought a new set of expectations and constraints. The end result is that the Government's interventions are ineffective.

G4. Lack of vertical connection within the government. As a result of a centralized political structure, processes and systems to harmonize policies made by decision makers in Dakar with the actions taken by policy managers at the regional level. Consequently, regional policy managers have to second-guess the instructions passed down by policy makers, resulting in gaps in coordination of actions and implementation of programs that could support a peace culture. Furthermore, the aspirations and wishes of affected population are not adequately channeled upward and reflected in GoS response strategy.

G5. Neighboring countries contribute to conflict. It is increasingly accepted that neighboring countries need to be involved in finding a definitive resolution to the Casamance crisis, despite President Wade's rebuff of its internationalization. The Gambia and Guinea Bissau border the region and house combatants, manipulating them for their own ends.

Obstacles within the MFDC

Observers and stakeholders have noted that obstacles within the MFDC tend to be interrelated, with one exacerbating another, creating a vicious cycle that is difficult to break.

M1. Factionalization of MFDC. A major impediment to peace is the factionalization that occurs in both the political and the military wings of the MFDC. Different factions espouse opposing political visions and positions, while also competing with each other for access to resources. The consequences of this problem include lack of coordinated strategy, mutual distrust, and intra-group sabotage of peacemaking efforts. Many argue that the GoS has taken a 'divide and conquer' strategy, which is both, facilitated by and feeds existing fissures.

M2. Competition for top posts, lack of clear mandate. When the project was launched in 2006, three individuals claimed the title of Secretary General, two of whom were housed at Government expense. All had contacts in the military wing, but none could claim to speak on behalf of the combatants as a group. Even as these individuals have allied with each other, faded into the background or taken a lower profile, the MFDC has not been able to speak with one voice. There is no spokesperson and no coherent strategy for achieving peace.

M3. Lack of genuine dialogue between MFDC & community. Because the MFDC suffers from not having fully developed organizationally and structurally, it lacks channels for consultation and dialogue with Casamançais at the community level. Their repeated calls for peace are in direct contradiction to the MFDC's armed rebellion, which has diminished its legitimacy and ability to represent Casamançais goals and aspirations.

M4. Fratricidal fighting within MFDC/Military. Fratricidal fighting has been a problem over the years, generally ebbing and flowing, but always remaining in the background as an impediment to fostering greater unity within the MFDC. It feeds off of and into factionalization within the political wing and divisions in society as well. Sources suggest a generational gap has emerged, with younger combatants more willing to challenge existing command structures to either resume hostilities or negotiate with the government.

Obstacles within Civil Society

Civil society actors tend to be very vocal about the conflict, many of whom live it every day. They often are unable to acknowledge the problems they face in successfully addressing the conflict, suffering from some of the same problems as Government or MFDC stakeholders.

C1. Lack of collaboration. Civil society organizations (CSOs) are all over the map in Casamance, and compete with each other for access to donor resources. As a result, civil society groups are hesitant to collaborate with each other for fear of competition and loss of their position. They also suffer from weak capacity in alliance and coalition building and generally do not appreciate the benefits in collaboration.

As a result, organizational efforts lack focus, complementarity and synergy. The disconnect and lack of coordination amongst groups hinders civil society's ability to influence the process with a unified voice.

C2. Lack of financial resources. Over time, Casamançais civil society organizations (CSOs) have suffered from lack of financial resources. Weak economic conditions hinder their ability to raise funds locally. Donor resources are slow, oriented towards project-specific activities, and rarely focus specifically on the peace process. As a result they miss out on opportunities to push the peace agenda forward.

C3. Lack of communication. CSOs often do not communicate with each other on program activities, sometimes a result of being in competition for resources. Federative organizations' communication policies and practices are insufficient to facilitate effective cooperation among members, resulting in diminished ability to influence the peace process. The physical dispersion of actors in Dakar, Ziguinchor and the communities located throughout the region complicates communication. The fact that so many actors at the macro, meso, and micro level have the ability to play a role makes communication and collaboration essential to their having an impact.

C4. Absence of public pressure for peace. The Casamance problem remains largely absent from the national agenda. The media continues to focus on sensational events—banditry, ear slashing, mine accidents—rarely providing a deeper analysis of the problem. Absorbed by their own problems, Senegalese outside the Casamance do not connect with or even express disdain for the conflict. A summary of the obstacles for all actors in the peace process is summarized in the chart below.

Figure 1: Summary of AECOM Obstacle Assessment and Rankings

Problem		2007		2008		2009	
		Obstacle Ranking	AECOM's Ability to Influence	Obstacle Ranking	AECOM's Ability to Influence	Obstacle Ranking	AECOM's Ability to Influence
G1.	Absence of delegation of power	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low
G2.	Politicization of the Casamance portfolio	High	Low	Medium	Low	Medium	Low
G3.	Lack of coordination	Low	Medium	Low	Medium	Low	Medium
G4.	Lack of vertical connection within the government	Medium	Low	Medium	Low	Medium	Low
G5.	Neighboring countries contribute to conflict	Medium	Low	Medium	Low	Medium	Low
M1.	Factionalization of MFDC	High	Medium	Medium	High	Medium	Medium
M2.	Competition for top posts, lack of clear mandate	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium
M3.	Lack of genuine dialogue between MFDC & community	Medium	High	Medium	High	Low	High
M4.	Fratricidal fighting within MFDC/Military	High	Low	Medium	Low	High	Low
C1.	Lack of collaboration	High	High	High	Medium	High	High
C2.	Lack of financial resources	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium
C3.	Lack of communication	Medium	High	Medium	Medium	Medium	High
C4.	Absence of public pressure for peace	High	High	High	Medium	High	Medium

Positive movement in 2009. Yellow signifies either improvement in AECOM's ability to influence a given obstacle or its diminished importance as an obstacle. The ability of our partners to influence a given situation evolved during Year 3. With AECOM's support, the Groupe de Contact (GdC) played a very positive role in helping to foster a community dialogue with the MFDC, in that their community forums gave people a chance to express themselves in a way they never had before. "Lack of dialogue" diminished as an obstacle. Civil society collaboration and communication has improved in the past year. In particular, collaboration between Alliance for Peace in Casamance (APAC) and *Conseil des ONGs d'Appui au Developpement* (CONGAD) improved. In addition, communication and collaboration between APAC and the Casamançais community at-large has also increased.

Negative movement in 2009. Green signifies either deterioration in AECOM's ability to influence a given obstacle or its increased importance as an obstacle. The tensions within the MFDC military wing increased, ultimately resulting in both internal combat and combat with the Senegalese army. Factionalization within the political wing did not change as an obstacle, as tensions in the military wing did not spill over into the political wing. Nonetheless, AECOM's ability to influence the political wing was more limited than anticipated. Ironically, though the fratricidal fighting within the MFDC increased as an obstacle, AECOM's ability to address the problem through APAC was actually improving as the project ended.

PROGRAM SUMMARY

GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

The purpose of the Support to Casamance Peace Process activity is to increase the capacity of the GoS, the MFDC, and civil society actors to successfully reach and implement a peace agreement. The main objective of this activity is to support key stakeholders in the peace process and assist them to reach a definitive end to the conflict.

In order to accomplish the goals and objectives for this project, AECOM worked with the above key stakeholders to achieve three program objectives:

1. Increase the capacity of key stakeholders (the GoS, MFDC, and civil society) to successfully carry out a peace process.
2. Facilitate the effective participation of civil society in the peace process.
3. Assist the GoS and MFDC to overcome obstacles to peace negotiations.

Providing support to actors engaged in a peace process is complicated because many factors are well beyond the control of the project's implementers and even some of its partners, particularly those in civil society. The program sought to contribute to the process, which is far from complete, by building capacity and fostering alliances that could try to move the process in a positive direction. As such, the program sought to lay a foundation from which stakeholders can respond to the process as it unfolds.

The challenges in program implementation were significant. Hardly homogenous, these stakeholders comprise a multitude of interests sometimes in competition with each other. Collaboration with them was geared to their strengths and weaknesses, as well as the opportunities and threats that emerged during the life of the project. Collaboration and capacity building support was provided at the micro, meso, and macro levels. Activities aimed to create a window of opportunity for negotiations to occur and strengthen the stakeholders' ability to participate in those negotiations, should they take place.

Even a task as basic as developing work plans was challenging because opportunities and obstacles were constantly shifting. It was necessary to be flexible, and develop multiple approaches simultaneously, with the understanding that only some would be pursued based on the context at the time. As a result, planned work plan activities were not always implemented, and others were added that had been unforeseen. Locking ourselves into a specific timeline simply was neither possible nor advisable.

The program targeted explicitly the process, without trying to address the content of the negotiations to avoid becoming a party to the conflict. Proposing content, or even being perceived as proposing content, ran the risk of proposing solutions favorable to one party or the other. Instead AECOM supported alliances that would seek to move the process forward in a neutral fashion, without taking positions that would be seen as biased.

The GoS has always rejected 'internationalization' of the conflict, so in order to avoid being accused of interfering in sovereign affairs, it was necessary to focus on supporting Senegalese actors, as opposed to taking a direct role in any negotiations or mediations. The MFDC has been highly suspicious of the GoS, so it was important to maintain a certain distance from government institutions in order to ensure neutrality. At the same time, it was critical to inform government representatives of activities to establish a comfort level and even obtain their support.

Finally, AECOM viewed this program as one that would need to address the *politics* of the peace process. To help stakeholders find ways to advance the process, AECOM needed to recognize and understand the political realities of the conflict. In particular, political will was necessary to address the conflict, but continued to dissipate throughout the life of the project.

APPROACH

To address the afore-mentioned obstacles, AECOM developed a program strategy that featured a variety of tools to advance the peace process. These included: Facilitated Dialogues, Training Workshops, Technical Assistance, Relationship Building and Seed Projects. Annex 1 features a summary of the Facilitated Dialogues, Training Workshops and Technical Assistance delivered by AECOM throughout the life of the Project. Karuna Center for Peacebuilding, subcontractor to AECOM on the project, led many of the Facilitated Dialogues and Training Workshops, along with AECOM staff. Both provided technical assistance. Annex 2 features a summary of the grants provided during the life of the program.

AECOM staff and Karuna consultants were neutral outsiders, thus their analysis and expertise was seen as unbiased by the Senegalese beneficiaries. Bringing in Rwandan experts, for example, gave beneficiaries insights from other African countries dealing with similarly challenging situations. Senegalese program staff helped to ensure concepts were adapted to social and cultural realities, as well as the skills and existing capacities of the stakeholders involved. The same training topic was provided to different stakeholders, but geared to their specific needs and perspectives on the conflict.

Facilitated Dialogues, Training Workshops, and Technical Assistance supported each other by building capacity of key actors, and helping them determine modalities for working with each other that would take advantage of the skills they were learning. The grants became a mechanism for partners to put into action all that they had learned and accomplished in the different seminars, complemented as needed by additional seminars and technical assistance. Flexibility was required to ensure that programs were appropriately tailored. Programs often had to be revised at the last minute based on a new opportunity or new obstacle.

To increase sustainability and avoid interfering in an internal affair, the program emphasized supported Senegalese stakeholders without being a direct actor, except in the area of bringing people together to resolve their differences. All sets of stakeholder—GoS, MFDC, and civil society—suffered from internal disagreements and conflicts, some more than others. Helping them to overcome their differences was a balancing act because their natural tendency was to either ignore the differences or avoid them altogether by working solely with those of like mind. Knowing who to target and how to bring them together is one of the biggest challenges in supporting stakeholders seeking to advance a peace process because the stakeholders, even in the same sector, are rarely of like mind on how to advance.

Facilitated Dialogues

Facilitated dialogue sessions provided the opportunity and space for two or more groups/sub-groups and/or individuals to overcome a specific problem directly or indirectly tied to the peace process, or prepare for a specific facilitated dialogue with another group.

Facilitated dialogues played a vital role in the first year of the program by tackling competing interests and agendas among all the key stakeholders—GoS, MFDC, and civil society. As intra-group cohesion increased, efforts shifted towards helping stakeholders implement activities they believed would advance their objectives. Facilitated dialogues then involved other actors in Casamance and neighboring countries.

Year	No.	Select Themes
1	18	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Working towards a common goal • Intra-group dialogue and problem solving • Review of MFDC's Vision & Mission • Vertical linkages for peace building • Inter-group dialogue—civil society and MFDC • Civil society intra-group dialogue
2	10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cross Border Relations • MFDC and civil society collaboration for peace • Cross Border Collaboration for Peace • Alternatives for the Casamance
3	2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • APAC information session with Casamance CSOs • MFDC activity reporting

Training Workshops

Training workshops provide skills training and/or capacity building in areas such as conflict analysis, peace building, and negotiations. Training workshop subjects were provided to multiple stakeholder groups, adapted to their needs at a given moment.



Training in Years 1 and 2 helped to prepare actors to fulfill their roles and implement activities in Years 2 and 3. The value added of the training is that it helped Senegalese stakeholders better understand the conflict using an analytical framework that was based on internationally accepted models yet flexible enough for the stakeholders to express their own vision of the conflict and their ability to contribute to its resolution.

Year	No.	Select Themes
1	16	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Introduction to Conflict Analysis • Group Identity • Building Political Will for Peace • Building Consensus • Effective Approaches for Conflict Transformation • Effective Approaches for Conflict Transformation • Social Communication for Peace
2	7	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internal Communications for Peace • Accounting Procedures • Advocacy for Peace • Collaborative Negotiation Techniques
3	1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pardon and Reconciliation

Technical Assistance

Technical assistance (TA) sessions provided critical support to a specific group to address emerging challenges or take advantage of new opportunities. TA addressed a specific problem and targets specific outcomes. AECOM provided extensive TA during Years 2 and 3, to help partners implement activities, including advice on how to approach specific issues and obstacles.

The chart (below left) demonstrates how the project activities evolved over time. The majority of the beneficiaries were in civil society, followed by the MFDC and the Government, in addition to seminars with multiple stakeholders (above right). This targeting of resources was based on a realistic assessment of where AECOM could have the most impact. The project's ability to influence positive change was greatest within civil society, so the bulk of the FD, TW and TA were directed to civil society. Support to the MFDC civilian and political wing was based on the opportunities available and the ability to influence. This was a niche that only AECOM was able to tackle directly because other donors were leery of taking on the task, so FD, TW and TA became vital. Support to the government was emphasized less because senior-level decision makers were not interested in participating, presumably because they were not mandated to take on these responsibilities.



Relationship Building

The relationship building component included efforts to gain stakeholders' trust and strengthen the relationships needed for AECOM to be perceived as a neutral facilitator. In addition, this component facilitated trust building among key project beneficiaries and significant stakeholders in ways that would allow them to contribute to the peace process. Gaining their confidence, for example, allowed AECOM to provide advice on things they should—or should not—do to advance the process. Helping partners avoid making mistakes can be just as important as helping them to take steps that will have impact. AECOM's role as a neutral outsider allowed it to address taboo subjects, particularly conflicts within civil society and the MFDC. Demonstrating an understanding of their situation and presenting ideas for moving beyond a specific problem was only possible through ongoing relationship building. Key stakeholders opted to participate only when they trusted AECOM and Karuna staff and consultants.

Seed Projects

Seed projects (grants) provided small financial assistance to a group to enable the implementation of concrete actions that can advance the peace process. The table below provides an overview of grants provided. A more detailed summary is featured in Annex 2.

No.	Recipient	Title	Duration	Amount
1	CONGAD	National Process of Citizen Engagement for Peace	Feb 08 – Aug 08	\$42,196
2	APAC	Civil Society Actions for a Definitive Peace	Feb 08 – July 08	\$15,586
3	APAC	Casamance Alternatives Seminar	Aug 08 – Nov 08	\$10,065
4	RC/PDC	Community Radio Peace Building	Nov 08 – Mar 09	\$8,441
5	APAC	Citizen Engagement to Advance Peace Process	Nov 08 – Aug 09	\$53,511
6/7	APAC/GdC	GdC Forums on Pardon & Reconciliation	Dec 08 – Mar 09	\$29,135
8	CONGAD	Citizen Initiatives to Re-launch GoS-MFDC Dialogue	Mar 09 – Aug 09	\$29,125
Total				\$188,059

PARTNERS

During the first year of project implementation participants in AECOM seminars opted to create organizations that AECOM subsequently supported through sub-grants and/or direct support for activities. These included the *Comité Administratif Régional*, APAC, and the GdC. AECOM also provided grants to CONGAD and to a network of community radios, both existing organizations.

Comité Administratif Régional

The *Comité Administratif Régional*, or Regional Administrative Committee, emerged as a result of training seminars with regional authorities. Under AECOM's guidance, it became a vehicle for collaboration across services to foster an environment that would allow peace to flourish. In its first year of activities, AECOM provided training to the Governor of Ziguinchor region, who was newly installed as well as his prefects and sub-prefects, military command, and gendarmerie command. The training focused on conflict analysis and group identity, and steps the regional authorities could take to buttress the peace process. The *Comité Administratif Régional* developed an action plan that focused on supporting economic and social redevelopment of the Casamance, as well as fostering an environment for peace.

Groupe de Contact

In February 2007 AECOM facilitated the creation of Groupe de Contact (GdC), a group of MFDC supporters and ex-combatants that aims to harmonize the positions of the different factions of the political

and military wings of the MGDC. The GdC has three specific objectives: reunify the political wing, ensure the reunification of the combatant wing, and engage in a dialogue with the population in order to elaborate a consensual document with the State. The GdC has articulated the need for non-violent approaches to resolve the conflict, and is viewed positively by many civil society leaders as a mechanism that facilitates communication within and toward the MFDC. Its activities included outreach to the different political and armed factions of the MFDC.

Alliance for Peace in Casamance (APAC)

The Alliance for Peace in Casamance (APAC), a broad coalition of individuals and organizations that work collaboratively to advance the peace process, was formed as a result of facilitated dialogues and training workshops conducted with Casamançais elites and organizations. The establishment of APAC was a major achievement, helping bring together many influential and diverse Casamançais to form a unified approach towards the peace process. APAC's membership reaches across grassroots organizations, including farmers associations, traditional and religious leaders, NGOs, and Casamançais with influence at the highest levels of government. Most APAC activities were implemented through grants, supported by technical assistance and training from AECOM.

CONGAD—the National Council of Development NGOs

Created in 1982, the *Conseil des ONGs d'Appui au Développement* (CONGAD) is comprised of 178 local and international NGOs. Its mission is to develop dialogue and exchanges between NGOs, promote international solidarity between NGOs in supporting communities, defend the interests of NGOs and mobilize around the needs and concerns of NGOs and wider Civil Society. It provides the framework for social, political, economical and cultural discussions. It approached AECOM with the idea of implementing a program to highlight the Casamance conflict as a national problem.

Réseau des Radios Communautaire pour la Paix et le Développement en Casamance (RC/PDC)

The Network of Community Radios for Peace and Development in Casamance (RC/PDC) brings together eight community radios located in Ziguinchor, Sedhiou, and Kolda regions that aim to advance the social, cultural, and economic well-being of their communities through interactive media programs. They work in partnership with World Education, which provides technical assistance and training.

YEAR 1 PROGRAM ACTIVITIES

The months leading up the launch of program activities were characterized by a backsliding of stakeholder relationships. As a result, dialogue deteriorated considerably between the protagonists. Intra-group divisions and rifts continued, leading to a stagnation of the peace process.

Early in the first year, AECOM conducted a convening process. In meeting with more than 50 stakeholders, AECOM identified issues, players, and opportunities for advancing the peace process. GOS, MFDC, and civil society representatives participated in individual and focus group meetings. The convening exercise assisted in gauging stakeholders' expectation of AECOM's intervention while the opportunity was equally availed to garner support for future activities. During the convening process, a Stakeholder Map was also developed and submitted to USAID/Senegal. This actor analysis comprised not only the identification of key actors but also the relationships between them.

On November 17, however, President Wade hosted a meeting with a group of civil society actors, under the aegis of an association named *Comité des Sages de la Casamance*. During the audience, President Wade announced that the group would subsequently serve as the Government of Senegal's (GOS) mediator with the combatants of the Movement for the Democratic Forces of the Casamance

(MFDC). In addition, President Wade announced his designation of Minister Farba Senghor as the GoS point of contact with the *Comité des Sages*.

GOVERNMENT

During the first year of implementation, AECOM engaged in activities to help the GoS overcome obstacles to the peace process. As the project launched in 2006, there was no focal point (aka *Mr. Casamance*) for peace process management and, therefore, the implementation of Government's actions was haphazard. The lack of process meant that there was limited opportunity for the policy input of the regional policy managers implementing government policy.

Given this situation, in consultation with and approval of USAID, AECOM initially focused its efforts on national level decision makers, seeking to penetrate the government at the highest levels where decisions are made. Regional policy managers were also targeted because of their role in implementing policy, however many were newly appointed and had never worked in conflict environments. There was equally a need to assist the policy managers to develop a peace culture that could facilitate dialogue with the MFDC and civil society. This aimed to ensure that concerted actions could be developed for the multiplier effect of jump-starting national-level peace talks. It was further deemed important to provide assistance for the establishment of a regional peace management structure and processes.

Therefore, activities were designed: (i) strengthen the technical skills of regional policy managers to understand their roles in conflict environment and context; (ii) build capacity for the exploration of new approaches especially inclusive and participatory management of the peace process; (iii) facilitate horizontal and vertical linkages among policy managers – civilian and military; and (iv) provide technical assistance for the creation of structures, processes, and systems for management of the peace process.

AECOM supported activities to establish working relationships with Government decision-makers and policy managers. The purpose of the meetings was to understand the Government's strategy and activities for the peace process, encourage an advancement of the peace process, elicit ideas on areas of assistance, propose what AECOM can do to assist in meeting the needs, and suggest alternative peace building approaches.

Despite the political sensitivity and barriers to implementing activities targeting the myriad of obstacles within the GoS, AECOM was able to establish several important relationships with leading GoS officials. In addition to technical presentations on drivers for peace and conflict, advice was offered on the consequences and risks of delayed actions to advance peace talks. Recommendations were also tabled on how to mitigate the risks and organizing successful peace processes. On other occasions, technical presentations were made on comparative experiences where intractable conflicts have mutated to criminality, such as Colombia.



Comité Administratif Régional after a training session, 2007.

Given that they were new to the region, AECOM staff led a training workshop in January 2007 on *Conflict Analysis and Transformation*, as a method of introducing the participants to the concepts of the nature and dynamics of conflict. Managers were capacitated to map the root causes and triggers of conflict as well as transformative interventions. Through workshops, AECOM facilitated discussion on successes, hopes, and challenges as well as conflict mitigation and transformation. For instance, AECOM organized a workshop on the topic of *Group Identities in Peace and Conflict* with the goals of enabling the policy managers to: appreciate the perspective of other parties; examine the role group identities could play in

developing a sustainable peace, and imagine cross-cutting identities that could promote common ground. These workshops were intended to enable the participants to better manage the peace process by thinking more of the consequences of their roles as well as how their actions could contribute to or fuel the conflict.

To help the regional policy managers understand how they collaborate to advance the peace process, a training workshop on *Peace Commissions* was organized in March 2007, led by Karuna Center consultant Joseph Sebarezi. The participants were asked to develop a vision, mission, values, and strategic for a peace commission. The theoretical portion of the training focused case studies on the causes of causes from Rwanda, South Africa, Sudan and others, from which participants assessed the relevance to the Casamance conflict. Examples of peace committees in South Africa, Ghana, and Nicaragua were assessed, from which the participants recognized the necessity for their actions to be implemented through a structure. After discussing different names, the participants decided to create the *Comité Administratif Régional*, a regional administrative committee focused on improving the conditions for peace and development in Casamance. The Committee was to serve as a forum for coordination of the peace process, and for collaboration among the policy managers. The Committee was offered TAs on topics such as, “*What Action to be Implemented and by Whom?*” and “*Information Technology for Peacebuilding.*” For improved and effective coordination, additional technical assistance was provided to the Committee on how to develop the mission and objectives for peace process management.

MFDC

Working with the MFDC may have been AECOM’s most challenging yet important task because no other donor was focusing on direct assistance to the MFDC civilian and political wings. Civil society efforts were generally hampered by being overtly partisan in favor of one faction, or unable to reach across the different factions. The approach taken was to directly engage the civilian and political wings of the MFDC, giving them an opportunity to express their points of view and explore ways to reduce friction and increase collaboration.

MFDC’s internal division in 2006 was a factor leading to the stagnation of peace talks, and caused the Movement’s credibility to erode. The fratricidal conflict among the military factions led many to believe that the Movement itself was the biggest impediment to the Movement’s progress. Overcoming this factionalization and arriving to consensus were therefore prerequisites for the MFDC to dialogue effectively during peace talks. In order for this intra-party agreement to emerge, it was important for the Movement to review its mission and vision so that the desire of their constituency, the Casamançais society, could be better represented. A new vision and mission, in turn, provide “talking points” for within group discussion as well as platform for inter-group discussion.

Extensive and several meetings were held with a wide array of MFDC/Political factions. The purpose of the meetings was to better understand the intra-group disposition for overcoming the problem of lack of group cohesion and encourage the diverse political factions to participate in AECOM’s planned activities aimed at intra-group reconciliation. Overall, there was a willingness among the different factions to reconcile. MFDC interlocutors also disclosed the Movement’s incapability to reconcile without outside help. They all



MFDC civilian and political wings following the first training session organized with all factions present, 2007.

agreed to participate in AECOM's planned activity aimed at fostering intra-group cohesion.

A series of workshops organized for MFDC/Political members sought to address the lack of capacity in understanding the context and dynamics of the conflict. Starting with the workshop on *Conflict Analysis and Transformation*, MFDC members were introduced to the key concepts of peaceful resolution of conflicts. The topic also provided an opportunity for participants to analyze process issues such as: what was responsible for the stagnation of the peace process; what can advance the process; hopes for the future; biggest challenges; and the requirements to be effective players. The conflict analysis workshop was built upon with the workshop on *Group Identities*, which offered the opportunity to explore the role of group identity in promoting conflict and in constructing peace. The workshop also created safe spaces to explore and express essential aspects of various group identities. Of particular importance was participants' increased understanding of the required shifts in identity for building peace.

After the death of the MFDC's charismatic leader Abbé Diamacoune, a dialogue session was organized for key political faction leaders. The overall goal of the session was to help prevent the Movement's disintegration into unmanageable factions after Diamacoune's death. Specific objectives were to assist the MFDC with overcoming the sub-group identity problem and to lay a foundation for intra-group collaboration. The session's nine participants represented four out of the six political factions. An important outcome of the dialogue session was the creation of a *Groupe de Contacte* (GdC), which was set up to promote cohesion and reach out to the different factions in the hopes of eventually developing a management structure for the political wing.

Recognizing the deep mistrust that exists among these factions, AECOM made available the expertise of two seasoned local experts, Abba Diatta and Nouha Cissé, to periodically assist the GdC in achieving its objectives. The two experts, both of whom enjoyed the trust and confidence of the MFDC, facilitated several other dialogues and continued to nurture the political factions to adopt a shared objective for peace. Facilitated dialogue sessions were organized for MFDC/Political factions on topics such as *Outreach Strategies*. Other activities, aimed at overcoming the problem of factionalization, included a training workshop in March 2007 on *Vision, Mission, and Objectives*, led by Joseph Sebarenzi of the Karuna Center. The workshop was planned to enable the political factions to reflect on their roles and responsibilities (individually and collectively) in advancing a vision that builds trust.

Complementary workshops were organized on the topics of *Building Political Will for Peace* in March 2007 and *Building Consensus for Peace* in May 2007. In the political will workshop, participants received capacity on how to address current obstacles to building effective coalitions within and across groups. Additional competences were developed on collaborative leadership and strategies for increasing political will. The goals of the building consensus workshop were to enable the participants to understand both the potential and challenges of consensus building as a peace-building technique, and to develop skills on how to build common ground and joint goals for agreed upon courses of action. Through group work exercises, participants were able to identify macro and micro level uses of consensus building while also understanding its processes and techniques. Competences were developed on approaches to reaching and including diverse stakeholders.

The MFDC had problems of mandate and little power as the legitimate representatives of the Casamançais due to, among other reasons, its disconnect from the popular wish for peace. In order to address this, AECOM organized a technical assistance session on *Group Mandate & Role in Search for Peace*. The TA was aimed at assisting MFDC members to understand their limitations within the wider Casamançais society while providing them with tools and approaches to connect with their constituency, the Casamançais society. Through a spectrum analysis of MFDC's initial explicit and implicit goals and a reflection on the current major needs of the Casamançais, participants conducted a SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats) analysis that resulted in a list of actions to be undertaken with consideration of public opinion and popular wish.

In order to enable MFDC members to ‘learn by doing,’ the training workshops were complemented with a TA on Activity Planning and Implementation. The objectives of the TA were to: assist the participants to move from knowledge acquisition to design of concrete actions; provide tools on the various components and stages of activity planning; develop skills for implementation of concrete actions for peace; and facilitate the development of a plan of actions for intra-group consensus and inter-group dialogue. At the end of the TA, the participants used the skills to develop an Action Plan. When the GdC had difficulty with internal coordination and management, a session was organized on identification and mitigation of obstacles to collegial management. This session was complemented with another on intra-group problem solving so that it could develop the capacity to problem-solve within it and across all factions.

CIVIL SOCIETY

A key component of the project focused on civil society support for the peace process, and much of AECOM’s efforts were directed toward helping civil society engage in an efficient and effective manner. At project launch, civil society appeared to be finally finding its voice in speaking out publicly in favor of a definitive peace, but still reacted haphazardly. AECOM focused on different strata and layers. At the macro (national) level, the *Collectif des Cadres Casamançais* had long been active in efforts to end the conflict. At the meso (middle) level, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were programmatically focused on social peace-building (community building and reconciliation processes, training, etc.) activities as well as economic reconstruction. At the micro level are loosely affiliated groups of community and opinion leaders, sometimes operating as associations. Their efforts were often fruitful in a limited way, but were uncoordinated with similar efforts in other communities or linked to meso or macro efforts.

Within civil society are also influential individuals whose participation in the peace process was essential. Some of these actors were either sidelined or personally chose not to play a role; and in fact, while some were passive observers, there were those who worked inadvertently or consciously against the peace process. Consequently, AECOM’s activities with civil society consisted of: (i) connecting CSOs together - horizontally and vertically; (ii) providing increased knowledge on peace building and coalition building for peace; (iii) facilitating exchange among civil society actors and securing their buy-in for active participation in the peace process; (iv) creating linkages between organizations and actors; and (v) providing technical assistance for civil society’s strategic intervention.

AECOM convened a wide segment of CSOs and actors to do a ‘force field’ analysis on the common challenges to collaborative work. Based on the outcome of this analysis, considerable time was invested on relationship building with a wide segment of actors to explain the value and importance of undertaking joint actions for peace.

The workshop on *Introduction to Conflict Analysis and Transformation* enabled beneficiaries to: explore competitive versus collaborative approaches to conflict resolution; identify root causes of peace process stagnation; distinguish between positions, interests, and needs; and map the aspirations, needs and fears of the different groups. A particular emphasis was placed on the role that the civil society could play in the peace process particularly as the voice and advocate of the population and as bridge builder between the conflict protagonists and among the protagonists and the population. Another workshop, *Group Identities in Conflict and Peace*,



Participants at civil society meeting, January 2008.

aimed at creating awareness of how issues of identity affect conflict and peace process; providing skills for loosening rigid identities while creating space for multiple identities; developing capacity to find common ground through broader bases for identity; and refining the understanding of the roles of civil society.

Karuna Associate Director Olivia Dreier led a workshop in March 2007 on *Building Political Will for Peace*, which assisted participants to understand how to forge an effective group identity and create political will and coalitions/alliances for peace. Through a mapping exercise, participants gained a clear sense and tools for identifying: major obstacles, gaps in current efforts; and strategic points of entry for more effective interventions. During the civil society workshop there was a clear consensus among the participants for a broad based coalition – an idea that grew organically at the end of the workshop with the purpose of “creating a synergy of actions for establishing a durable peace in the Casamance.” A spectrum analysis exercise enabled participants to identify the underlying factors of past coalition building failures.

These efforts were complemented with facilitated dialogue sessions with macro-level civil society actors and organizations. A facilitated dialogue session in April 2007, *Concertation sur la Crise Sénégalaise en Casamance*, was organized as a space and an opportunity for Casamançais opinion leaders to brainstorm on actions to advance the peace process. This brought together people with qualitative influence on other actors within the GoS and MFDC.

As a follow on to the political will workshop and recognizing that fragmentation invariably arises in intractable conflicts or stalled peace process, Dreier returned to lead another workshop in May 2007 on *Building Consensus for Peace*. Efforts at the macro- and micro/meso-level had sufficiently advanced to the point where their objectives were so similar that giving them an opportunity to share them with each other could help create vertical and horizontal connections and enable the construction of common ground among disparate groups. The workshop offered the first opportunity for all targeted levels of the civil society to come together as a group and provided a context for a joint facilitated dialogue the day after the workshop on ways to collaborate in the future. It was at this meeting that the different groups opted to form the Alliance for Peace in Casamance (APAC). The core competencies they developed included: identification of macro and micro level uses of consensus building; understanding of the processes and techniques for consensus building; approaches for reaching and including diverse stakeholders; and strategies for addressing the challenges and maximizing the potential of each stage of building consensus.

In order to move from a general understanding of the conflict context and roles, several technical assistance sessions were organized on development of a vision, mission, objectives, and Action Plan. Once this technical assistance was provided, civil society entities received another skills building in June 2007 in *Effective Approaches for Conflict Transformation*, led by Karuna consultant Peter Woodward. The goal of the workshop was to build on the work done in previous workshops and further refine program

strategies and plans by applying the tools and concepts of the effective practices of peace building. APAC emerged from this seminar with a multi-pronged Action Plan and budget for implementing activities.



APAC Training Session, 2007.

YEAR 2 PROGRAM ACTIVITIES

Overall, the conflict did not change radically from the first to the second year of program activities. The state of “no war, no peace” continued to prevail, with little momentum for change within either the Government or the MFDC. The GoS continued to rely on its chosen interlocutor, the *Comité des Sages*.

Senegal’s relations with Guinea Bissau continued to be strong notwithstanding the latter’s tenuous political stability. Relations with the Gambia fell short of hostility, but were colored by suspicions over acts deemed to threaten national security. The Gambia perceived Senegal as a threat to its national security and regime, while Senegal did not consider its neighbor as helpful in the resolution of the Casamance conflict. As a result, each maintained a guarded position, preserving options to keep the other off balance.

Senegal continued to maintain a large military presence in the Casamance, yet sporadic attacks persisted, often taking the form of banditry against civilians. The passing of MFDC leader Abbé Diamacoune in February 2007 led many to fear that the MFDC would implode entirely, which the formation of the GdC seemed to prevent. Civil society efforts had a new vehicle for collaboration in APAC, and plans were laid for collaboration.

At the national level, there was little discourse about the Casamance conflict and the peace process. This was particularly striking during the electoral campaigns when the few candidates who talked about the conflict did not allude to its resolution as a matter of national urgency. The consequence was a lack of national pressure on the protagonists to accelerate the peace process.

GOVERNMENT

The GoS approach to dealing with the government shifted somewhat during the second year of implementation, but did not radically change direction. When the head of the *Comité des Sages* was assassinated on December 21, 2007, the government’s official vehicle for communicating with the rebels went dormant for several months. Moustapha Bassene emerged as its leader during the summer, but when his patron, Minister of Transportation Farba Senghor, was removed from his ministerial position on August 28, 2008, the group again went dormant for several months. This state of flux left many wondering who in the government was focusing on the Casamance question. Given the lack of clear signals at the national level, AECOM opted to shift its focus to regional policy managers.

Comité Administratif Régional – Regional Administrative Committee

AECOM provided two-day training, *Collaborative Negotiation Techniques*, to 17 regional authorities, including the Governor, all the prefects and sub-prefects in Ziguinchor, zone commanders from the police, army, and gendarmerie, and select lieutenants, many of whom had received training from AECOM in the past. The selection of participants was excellent and reflected real interest on the part of the governor in making full use of the training opportunity. AECOM used different exercises to teach practical negotiation and mediation skills. The scenarios closely corresponded to real-world situations that they would face in their positions. An important exercise was to develop a needs and fears map for the stakeholders of the Casamance conflict. In general, this group of government officials had much more trouble empathizing with the interests, needs and fears of the MFDC.

Participants nonetheless seemed to relate well to the interactive style of the workshop, and engaged enthusiastically in the negotiations exercises. Through their evaluations participants stated that they felt the concepts and techniques, like management of grazing and land disputes, handling challenges in their managerial roles, and improving relations with their colleagues resulted in practical applications in their work. Participants specifically mentioned the importance of distinguishing between positions and interests and the value of the needs and fears mapping. They also spoke of developing a better

understanding of the motivations and interests of different actors in the Casamance crisis. A few noted that they feel constrained from influencing the overall situation in their government roles.

An action plan item for the *Comité Administratif Régional* was to engage counterparts in neighboring countries to collaborate on peace and development initiatives. To that end, AECOM supported in November 2007 a workshop, *Cross-Border Collaboration*, between regional and local authorities from the Ziguinchor and Cacheu regions in Senegal and Guinea Bissau. The objective of the meeting was to discuss how the authorities directly across the border from each other could collaborate to reduce cross-border tensions that exacerbate the conflict in Casamance. The two-day meeting featured 13 Guinean and 20 Senegalese authorities, including civil society representatives. The first session provided an introduction to conflict processes, communication dynamics, and a presentation on why cross-border collaboration can be fruitful. The next two sessions were spent in working groups, which produced a final report.

A second meeting with these same regional authorities took place in July 2008 in Ziguinchor. The governors of Ziguinchor and Cacheu led their respective delegations, along with ranking representatives from the Police, Army, Gendarmerie and Customs. Both delegations described their national and regional administrative structure, which were later compared and contrasted to understand the appropriate homologues across the border. On the second day of the meeting, delegations divided into two working groups: the Security Group, and the Social and Economic Group. The working groups analyzed their problems and defined a work plan and a meeting schedule for both groups.

MFDC

A window of opportunity opened in the second year of implementation that AECOM and its partners sought to exploit. During the first year, there was a leadership contest within a highly fractured political movement, but a leadership emerged in the second year that allowed lower-level leadership to work more freely. While in 2007 the GdC struggled to communicate with its composite factions, during its second year, it sought to resolve internal disagreements and became an interlocutor to the Kasolole military wing, giving it greater legitimacy than it previously had.

Several factors contributed to this transformation. Two competing Secretaries General, Ansoumana Badji and Jean Marie Biagui, reconciled in January 2008 with assistance from APAC and the *Collectif des Cadres Casamançais*. Biagui left the scene entirely in February 2008, and Badji remained largely silent. The other erstwhile leader, Nkrumah Sane, became less vocal than he was in the first year of activities. As a result, support was provided to the GdC to partially step into that leadership vacuum.

At the same time, the Badiate-led military wing held a general assembly of active and ex-combatants in Kasolole on April 5-6, 2008. The military wing asked for pardon from the assembly for the fratricidal fighting that had taken place during the previous years, and for the attempt to eliminate the Salif Sadio faction in Gambia. Sadio neither accepted nor rejected olive branch extended. They also requested forgiveness from the Casamançais population for the transgressions committed against them, and mandated the GdC to continue efforts to unify the civilian wing while they continued efforts to unify the military wing. The GdC was increasingly seen as an effective interlocutor with Kasolole, and sought to make a concerted effort to overcome internal tensions.

Groupe de Contact (GdC)

AECOM initiated and supported a number of activities aimed at reducing factionalization within the MFDC, operating primarily through the GdC. In November 2007, AECOM organized a two-day training session, *Internal Communication* to address the communication problems that severely hampered the organization. The skills obtained from these trainings were intended to permit participants to reduce their frustrations related to the MFDC's lack of a policy for producing and circulating documents. Participants

recognized how bad interpretations are linked to poor communication, and negatively impact group cohesion.

Similarly, a second training on project elaboration permitted the GdC to collectively develop a 6-point action plan that elaborated a mission, a vision, global objectives, and specific activities to achieve those objectives. Entitled *Projet de Renforcement du Processus de Paix en Casamance* (Project to Strengthen the Peace Process in Casamance), its objective was to harmonize the positions of the different factions of the political wing to bring one voice from the people to the negotiations table. They decided on three specific objectives: reunite the political wing of the MFDC around the same vision and common objectives, ensure the reunification of the combatant wing of the MFDC under one command, and engage in a dialogue with the population in Casamance to elaborate a consensual negotiation document with the State. AECOM agreed to support the implementation of the GdC's action plan and activities, as they were congruent to USAID's mandate, and provided considerable technical and financial assistance to the GdC.

A workshop on *Collaborative Negotiation Techniques* was provided in July 2008. With this workshop the GdC developed a foundation in the basic concepts and overall structure of interest-based negotiations. They also learned some rudimentary negotiation skills that will serve them in their current efforts to build greater unity within the MFDC. Participants seemed to better understand the necessity of open and transparent communication among themselves, and become more adept and strategic at working with resistance. Their recognition by Kasolole had given them some legitimacy, but they understood that they had to build upon this carefully, given the fractious history of the MFDC.

The GdC's action plan included outreach to administrative officials, which began with Governor Leopold Wade in Ziguinchor. After their first introduction from APAC, they routinely requested meetings with him before and after their trips to Kasolole. In turn, the Governor facilitated their contact with the prefect and sub-prefects. The ongoing information sharing was borne out of trust and respect for each other's motives and intentions.

The GdC conducted this community-level outreach in August and September 2008. They presented the GdC, its objectives, and the new dynamic of pardon and reconciliation undertaken by the Badiate-led faction of the military wing. The administrative authorities strongly approved and supported the GdC demarche, and the Presidents of the Rural Councils (PCRs) committed themselves to support the GdC to mobilize and organize the community dialogue sessions, which took place in Year 3.

CIVIL SOCIETY

AECOM's vision for Year 2 focused extensively on building public pressure for peace. The GoS was seen as lacking the political will to move the process forward, so AECOM supports its partners' efforts to try to foster that political will.

To help the newly formed civil society coalition APAC begin to function, a workshop *Internal Communications* was organized in November 2007. The coordination cell developed mechanisms for sharing information, strategies for communications with external actors, and did role playing exercises. In addition, participants engaged in a mapping exercise, to decide who else should be included in APAC, and those with whom APAC should work collaboratively. They also discussed potential spoilers and how to minimize their negative impact.

In January 2008, AECOM invited representatives of Casamance NGOs to participate in



CONGAD regional forum in Matam, 2008.

a day-long *Journée de Reflexion* to share information on AECOM's activities and discuss ways to improve collaboration in supporting the peace process in Casamance. APAC and the GdC also gave presentations on their purpose, objectives and formation. AECOM staff assisted Governor Sambou of APAC and Louis Tendeng of the GdC to prepare presentations and understand the type of questions they were likely to get during the meeting. After these presentations and Q&A period, participants were broken into working groups to discuss obstacles and opportunities for collaboration. Each working group reported back to the plenary, and the participants decided to establish a commission to examine how to effectively collaborate. Throughout the year, AECOM continued to meet with other organizations to continue its outreach and collaboration.

In March 2008 AECOM organized a seminar, *Cross-Border Collaboration for Peace*, for 28 representatives from civil society organizations in the Gambia, Guinea Bissau, and Senegal that had developed partnerships across borders. These partnerships (in diverse areas including refugees, the struggle against the proliferation of light arms, livestock theft, and relations with local administrations) have helped improve socio-economic conditions in the area and reinforced the notion that peace in Casamance involves its neighbors to the north and south. The objective of the meeting was for participants to share experiences on cross-border collaboration and strategize on how this collaboration can create opportunities for transforming the current situation of "no war, no peace" into a more permanent peace. When asked to brainstorm on how their micro-level activities can serve as a basis for advancing a peace process, they focused on three notions: expand coordination of activities, deepen existing cross-border early warning systems, and engage in advocacy for peace.

AECOM authorized three grants to civil society partners during the second year, providing the financial resources necessary to support their activities. Technical assistance was provided throughout the year, complemented by training, to help them advance their agendas. Consultants were brought in as needed to provide counsel on dealing with specific issues, and help refine their approaches.

CONGAD

In order to address the lack of a national dialogue on the Casamance question, CONGAD received a grant in February 2008 to implement its *Citizen Dialogue for the Return of Peace in the Casamance* project. The grant included funding for 11 regional forums around the country to discuss the Casamance peace process and engage citizens in advocating for peace, as well as funding for a national forum attended by representatives of each regional forum. The result was a synthesis report expressing the opinion of those who participated in the forums. These forums were intended to lay the foundation for a lobbying campaign to encourage peace negotiations.



CONGAD's main objective was to increase citizen dialogue. Prior to beginning grant activities, AECOM organized a two day training session with CONGAD on conflict assessment and group identity. By having regional representative undertake practical exercises to assess the root causes of the Casamance conflict, map out key actors, and then share results with their colleagues, they were able to discuss and correct each other's misperceptions. The session on group identity was considered key, since identity is a fundamental element of the Casamance conflict.

CONGAD proceeded to establish an Advisory Committee, comprised of eminent Casamançais and their own Board members to provided technical input to the development of the forums' content and the overall approach. CONGAD launched their 11 regional forums from May-June 2008. Participants

included religious and cultural leaders, and representatives of popular associations such as women's and youth groups.

Five of the nine regional forums received press coverage, including two television news segments, 12 radio segments, and 3 newspaper articles. The 17 news segments exceed the target set by AECOM for USAID. Journalists participated in the opening and closing sessions, but not the working group discussions. CONGAD also developed a report summarizing the regional forums and a memorandum describing the recommendations proposed.

The August 2008 national forum brought together about 50 people from all of CONGAD's regional committees and representatives of the Ministry of Social Action, the President of the National Assembly, ANRAC, and the MFDC. Participants debated and validated the memorandum, which analyzed the current situation and offered recommendations for the State, the MFDC, civil society, citizens, neighboring countries, and development partners, calling for re-launching dialogue between the State and the MFDC, investing in Casamance, unifying the MFDC, and involving neighboring countries. Participants broke into working groups to develop an action plan intended permit CONGAD, through its regional committees, to continue to play a role in awareness raising, early warning and advocacy.

As with the regional forums, CONGAD's media plan resulted in excellent coverage of the national forum. RTS broadcast the opening session in French, Wolof, and Mandingue. RTS also covered the press conference on the last day, which was later broadcast on AFRICABLE in the sub-region. The TV station 2S covered the press briefing as well. *Le Soleil*, *Le Populaire* each wrote two articles, and *Le Matin* published one article on August 29. Radio coverage included RTS, RFM (which also announced the forum in advance), and Ocean FM, which organized a special broadcast and invited CONGAD Vice President Amacadou Diouf and Advisory Committee member Moussa Cissé to a roundtable discussion.

APAC

APAC received a grant in February 2008 to implement its Action Plan, *Civil Society Actions for a Definitive Peace in Casamance*, whose four objectives were to: reactivate the peace process in Casamance; contribute to developing a large consensus for peace by synergizing actions on the ground; bring the political wing, the military wing, and the MFDC Diaspora together for negotiations; and accompany the pre- and post peace negotiations. With this grant, APAC intended to implement meetings, forums, lobbying campaigns, release media stories targeted at decision makers, public awareness campaigns, involve religious leaders in lobbying campaigns, and support MFDC in unifying the civilian wing and connect to the military wing.



Group photo of participants in the seminar, "What Alternatives for Casamance?" August 2008.

In order to help APAC manage the funds received, AECOM provided training and technical assistance on grants management. APAC member organizations were at different levels, so a common training was held in March 2008. Coordinators of organizations also defined the priority activities for the next three months, and the group decided to start by informing regional authorities of their activities, organizing prayer days, and organizing community forums. Once the activities were selected, the participants reviewed the budget and prepared a budget request for the funds required to implement the activities. AECOM provided technical assistance throughout the grant, assisting APAC in the preparation of financial reports.

APAC undertook valuable outreach to regional government authorities, religious leaders, and Casamançais populations, but the bulk of the activities identified in the work plan were not implemented. Those that were implemented did not have significant impact in advancing the process or changing perceptions of the conflict. As the six-month grant neared its expiration date and only a small portion of the planned activities was implemented, AECOM opted to allow the grant to expire and start afresh.

APAC received a second grant in August 2008 to sponsor a two-day seminar: “*What Alternative for the Casamance?*” APAC sought to bring together different elements of Casamance political and civil society, and asked elected officials and government representatives to develop options that address the major issues at the core of the conflict, and to use these to champion negotiations. Four themes were chosen: institutional framework, political development, socio-cultural values, and mediation.

The steering committee identified and contacted experts for each thematic area, asking them to prepare a document and an oral presentation. The seminar was a success, with good representation from a range of actors. The Groupe de Contact, including Louis Tendeng and Bertrand Diamacoune, represented the MFDC and CONGAD sent three people from Dakar and Ziguinchor, creating greater synergy between the two organizations. National Assembly President Macky Sall sent an advisor, Abdoulaye Badji, and the Kolda PCR attended, as did several rural council presidents.

Participants engaged in the debates very seriously, and their enthusiasm meant that sessions often ran long. Moderators regained lost ground by working later than planned on Saturday, to which participants readily agreed. The presentations from the commissions were then debated, and participants elaborated next steps – refining of the final report, validation by the participants, and diffusion.

A press release was drafted and presented to plenary for review and validation. It was presented at a press briefing Sunday afternoon. APAC arranged for journalists from Mbour to participate, and two very positive articles have since appeared in the *Quotidien* and *Walf*, which ran a very large photo of APAC Coordinator Governor Saliou Sambou, who emphasized the need for a durable peace because the current calm was not a permanent peace. He noted the facilitative role that APAC wants to play and its neutrality between the State and the MFDC. Both articles confirmed the inclusive nature of the forum.

Karuna Center for Peacebuilding consultant Hizkias Assefa gave the committee a debrief Sunday evening on his thoughts of the discussions and how APAC needed to proceed cautiously so they don’t inadvertently restrain the negotiations as opposed to open them up. In particular, he felt they were confusing the role of mediation and the role of facilitation. He was concerned that they needed to proceed carefully in order to maintain their neutrality. Committee members responded that they walked this fine line in the past and sometimes taken positions that were not popular either with the State or the MFDC. Over time they have gained a certain amount of credibility with both sides. He advised them to proceed very carefully in developing options for the GoS and MFDC to consider so they didn’t accidentally close off options for the MFDC at the negotiating table. Of particular concern was the question of independence, which MFDC could choose to hold as a card to negotiate something in return. APAC might unwittingly force MFDC to settle for less in elaborating options to independence.

The seminar indirectly helped to rejuvenate APAC’s internal dynamic, evident in a meeting after the seminar where they further refined their role, the audience for the seminar report, and its expected results. We gave them a survey that morning to complete and then a small team summarized the results and organized the session so that they could reach agreement. Ultimately, they gravitated more to the facilitator and advocate role, without entirely abandoning the potential for mediation in the future. They opted over the short term to have the audience remain the state and the MFDC, without closing the door to eventually sharing it with a larger audience. Assefa noted that a wide dissemination could make either the State or the MFDC more reticent to use the document or interact with APAC. Patience won the day, and APAC was able to present a summary of the seminar directly to the Prime Minister in Year 3.

With nudging from CONGAD, APAC also decided to renew its strategic plan. Recognizing the weak implementation of the first work plan, it sought assistance in developing a more focused strategy. AECOM hired a consulting firm to engage them in a reflective process that resulted in a revised document, which became the basis for third year activities. They identified their mission as contributing to the creation of conditions for a definitive peace through dialogue, concerted agreement, and negotiation between the State of Senegal and the MFDC involving all national actors and the sub-region. Their objectives focused on reactivating the peace process, encouraging reunification of the MFDC, and sharing options with the MFDC and the GoS to facilitate consensus around focal points.

YEAR 3 PROGRAM ACTIVITIES

As Year 3 opened, the conflict in Casamance was not radically different from the second year, but this would change significantly during the year. Observers came to describe the GoS strategy as one of *pourrisement*, or allowing the MFDC to generally rot away in their bases. The MFDC itself was not moving quickly in any direction. Civil society was mostly focused on economic reconstruction, with some efforts to raise the profile of the need for negotiations to definitively resolve the conflict. Efforts to build public pressure for peace had not gone as far as had been hoped, so AECOM went back to the drawing board to develop new ideas for helping its partners be effective.

GOVERNMENT

The GoS approach was not significantly different from its approach in Year 2. The GoS interlocutor had been removed from his ministerial position, but not explicitly removed from his role in managing the government's efforts to dialogue with the MFDC. The lack of certainty around the role they were being asked to play made government ministers generally wary of either getting involved or demonstrating too much interest in the conflict. Keeping a low profile seemed to be the order of the day.

Relations with neighboring Gambia remained on a course that neither deteriorated from the previous year, nor improved significantly. Gambian authorities participated in the April 2009 Independence Day celebrations. Relations with Guinea Bissau went into unknown territory with the March 2009 assassination of the Bissau president and Army Chief of Staff, both of whom were seen as allies of President Wade. The time it took for an interim government to be installed, elections to be organized and a new government sworn indicated that the new government was not going to be as closely allied to the Senegalese government as its predecessor.

Instead, civil society partners focused on raising awareness of the need for the government to rethink its strategy, in particular on the use of money to manage the conflict and the designation of a Mr. Casamance. AECOM partners often discussed the need for a team of players, anchored in an existing institution such as the Ministry of the Interior, to manage the process. In general, they were very critical of the "Mr. Casamance" approach. Media organs and civil society organizations, including AECOM partners, were increasingly outspoken on this issue, calling for the President to shift gears in how he dealt with the Casamance. Observers noted that former Transportation Minister Farba Senghor was desperate to maintain his role in the Casamance portfolio because it was his last and only involvement with the government. Indeed shortly after the ruling party lost the March 2009 local elections in which he was a candidate, he made a bold attempt to demonstrate to the President his value in the process, which did not work.

Late in the third year, APAC obtained several meetings with high-ranking government officials. In June 2009, sought and obtained a meeting with Prime Minister Souleymane Ndene Ndiaye at which they presented a summary of their activities, including their contact with the different elements of the MFDC and other members government officials, giving him greater perspective on coordination of the Casamance portfolio within the Senegalese government. In September 2009 CONGAD and APAC met

with the Minister of Defense to discuss their program activities. The wide-ranging discussion gave him greater perspective on efforts of other ministries, giving him an opportunity to improve coordination with them.

To build cross-border relationships, Governor Wade attempted to organize a tri-national meeting of counterparts from the Gambia and Guinea Bissau in Bissau, and was able to secure the formal blessing of the Gambian Interior Ministry to participate in the meeting. The fact that Governor Wade took this initiative with no support from AECOM presented itself as a sign of its long-term sustainability. All parties adopted the working documents that were drafted in a meeting in July 2008, which AECOM supported. It was decided that Gambia would chair the working group on security while Guinea Bissau would chair the working group on development. Each agreed to host working group meetings in the first half of April. Senegal would chair the overall effort and would host a meeting of representatives from 14 regions from the three countries sometime thereafter. Governor Wade solicited AECOM's support for the aspects related to security, and acknowledged need to involve a second donor to support the development commission. Given the instability in Guinea Bissau following the March 1 double assassination of the President and the Army Chief of Staff, the tripartite meeting could not be organized.

MFDC

At the outset of Year 3, opportunities for overcoming the internal divisions within the MFDC seemed to improve from practically impossible to merely daunting. First, the military wing was largely unified under César Badiate, and the possibility of bringing Salif Sadio into the fold seemed remote but not obligatory to advancing the process. However, new divisions emerged during the third year, with a younger generation more willing to challenge older leaders in the military wing. Second, the leaders competing for the post of secretary general—Jean Marie Biagui and Nkrumah Sane—were more or less withdrawing from the scene in 2008, leaving a vacuum at the top for a different kind of leadership to emerge. Biagui was ambivalent in the fall of 2008 on taking a more active role, and was largely silent until March 2009 when he suggested Casamance vote MFDC in the local elections. Biagui reemerged periodically in Year 3 as a more vocal player. Third, the GdC was rapidly gaining greater cohesion at the time, with the participation of elements affiliated with Biagui. The gulf between them widened in Year 3, though the GdC did reach out to other elements of the political wing, affiliated with Nkrumah Sane, and succeeded in reducing those longstanding tensions. Efforts in Year 3 focused on reducing the divisions within the MFDC.

Consequently, efforts in the third year focused on establishing a dialogue between the MFDC and the community and overcoming the factions within the MFDC. AECOM saw the two as interrelated because the community viewpoints would help to create a bottom-up pressure for the MFDC to find points of convergence. The principle vehicle for these efforts was the GdC, with support from APAC.

Throughout Year 3, the GdC was in regular contact with Kasolole and engaged in outreach to other elements of the MFDC. Internally, it began to operate in a more homogenous fashion, overcoming some of the divisions associated with members' affiliations with different factions. The GdC frequently traveled to Kasolole and Sao Domingos in Guinea Bissau to engage military elements in a discussion about pardon and reconciliation.

The GdC proposed organizing community forums on pardon and reconciliation as a way to launch the dialogue with the community. The idea traced back to the *assises* held in Kasolole in April 2008, but evolved to include a discussion of fostering greater unity



Bertrand Diamacoune speaking at Oussouye forum, February 2009.



Participant talking to GdC Coordinator Louis Tendeng, Oussouye, February 2009.

within the MFDC. In November 2008, they planned for the meetings that they intended to organize – a meeting of ex-combatants, a planning meeting with Rural Council Presidents (PCRs), and the forums. A grant was signed with APAC to organize these meetings.

A training session, *Pardon and Reconciliation*, was also provided to help them understand the reality of what it means to go before the community and ask for pardon. In particular, the training was designed to let them know that communities would not offer their pardon in one day; instead the forums would be the beginning of a process. The fact that they

have a direct affiliation with the MFDC is what sets them apart from other groups. As such, they needed to be prepared for negative and potentially violent reactions from the communities, some of whom have suffered tremendously and will not be so cavalier in forgiving. They also needed to be careful to not get defensive over acts committed during the conflict. One heated topic was the question of rape, which participants at first were hesitant to acknowledge had actually occurred. The training also served to discuss traditional systems of pardon and reconciliation used in different parts of Casamance. Their hopes and fears for the forums became tangible. They want to be well-received and well-perceived, to have their message understood and accepted, and to build greater unity and stability that will contribute towards peace. They feared rejection, vengeance, misunderstanding, and frustration on the part of the population.

This careful planning allowed the GdC to finally hold its forums on pardon and reconciliation in February 2009 in Ziguinchor's eight *arrondissements*. Active combatants attended most of the forums. Thirty percent of the participants were female, and 59% of the villages in Casamance were represented. Participant reaction was overwhelming. Except for one forum, turnout far exceeded what was planned, often creating logistical problems. Participants were also extremely vocal in expressing themselves, itself taken as a positive sign of peace. While reacting very favorably to the initiative and generally supportive of the idea itself, they were not about to let an opportunity to speak their minds slip away. They were quite specific in saying that the combatants themselves needed to come and ask for pardon. They also felt that MFDC needed to seek greater unity and reconciliation within the movement, before seeking pardon from the community. They wondered if the request for pardon could be seen as sincere if acts of banditry were still taking place. They also wanted the MFDC to leave them in peace, and allow them to cultivate their lands. They asked for their sons to disarm and come home, noting that they should be assisted in their reintegration.

A second meeting of ex-combatants was held in March 2009. The purpose of the meeting was to bring together the wider group of ex-combatants and MFDC supporters from the region to report on the forums, present the report, and discuss next steps. Given the tendency towards misinformation within the MFDC, it was critical to share the same information with everyone. Participants began arriving on the eve of the meeting, at which time the GdC showed video footage of the forums, allowing people to see forums that they had not attended. That combined with the synthesis report made everyone realize that there were many similarities across the forums. Nonetheless, the debate was very heated. Upon hearing the many explicit criticisms of the MFDC, there was a tendency towards disbelief, but the evidence was compelling. The group validated the report, and left with copies, allowing for a further dissemination of the forums' results.

As the dissidence grew within the MFDC to Badiate's leadership, the GdC played an active role in reducing tensions by talking directly with the dissidents. For example, GdC Coordinator Louis Tendeng traveled to Kasolole in November 2008 to address a conflict between the older generation of combatants

and the younger generation, who have been promised a greater role for some time but have yet to see a tangible change in the command structure. He encouraged them to avoid using violence to resolve the conflict. By playing a neutral role, he was able to calm the tensions between them. Throughout the GdC sought to maintain a neutral role in the leadership struggles, understanding that it was crucial to their ability to mediate between the different sides. Increasingly they focused on inter-MFDC *assises* as a way for protagonists to air and overcome their differences.

In May 2009, the GdC intensified its dialogue with the different elements of the Southern Front to debrief on the eight forums held in the Ziguinchor region; pursue dialogue with the command and the dissidents; and inform the combatant wing of their activities with Geneva Call, an international organization focused on humanitarian demining. The visits included meeting dissident lieutenants, who indicated they were unaware of GdC activities and had received little information from their commanders. They were receptive to GdC efforts to facilitate a discussion of the command issues, particularly the question of organizing inter-MFDC *assises*, which they saw as a way to formally change the command structure. They were also receptive to the need for humanitarian demining.

As the divisions deepened, the GdC stepped up its efforts to meet with different elements of the MFDC, in both the northern and the southern front. They traveled to Diakaye in July 2009 and again in August 2009 to continue making contact with dissident elements. During the meeting, the GdC explained their mission and objectives, as well as their activities, and discussed the need to organize inter-MFDC *assises*, in order to develop a consensus around negotiations with the government.

Fratricidal fighting within the MFDC reemerged as a problem in Year 3, and both the GdC and APAC took a proactive approach in reaching out to the different combatants. They collaborated on developing a common understanding of the different MFDC bases, based on what they knew from their area. They then developed a map to describe the different elements of the MFDC, and the relationships between those elements and external actors. In particular APAC relied on its network to address a bitter conflict between two cousins in the MFDC, one of whom was responsible for the murder of the other's top lieutenant. APAC members took the initiative to meet with the different players to search for non-violent solutions to the problem.

CIVIL SOCIETY

Year 3 activities incorporated the lessons learned from Year 2 activities, particularly the tendency of civil society partners to take on more than they could handle. The efforts to build public pressure did not have a noticeable impact on either the GoS or the MFDC, so both CONGAD and APAC adjusted their strategies. A third partner, the Network of Community Radios for Peace and Development, was identified as a way to raise awareness through peace messaging.

AECOM provided technical assistance and training throughout the year to help civil society partners develop realistic work plans and fine tune their approach to the realities of trying to advance a peace process. In January 2009, Karuna conflict negotiation expert Hizkias Assefa led work sessions with CONGAD and APAC on how they could collaborate to reinvigorate the peace process. The session with CONGAD focused on fleshing out their strategy and reviewing the Terms of Reference for the different meetings contained in their proposal.

The session with APAC focused on stocktaking and forward planning. In evaluating their activities, Hizkias outlined the different roles that they can play and how to separate them. They tend to describe themselves as facilitators, when their actions are more vague than the specific definition of facilitation, which is to either formally guide discussions between two parties in an open context or more informally serve as a go-between for the two parties, working behind the scenes.

After reviewing the difference between technical and political negotiations, participants concurred that it would be difficult to get both parties to agree to discuss the roots of the conflict and potential

political solutions—the essence of political negotiations. The MFDC has never controlled any territory and does not have the military power to force discussion of these issues. Pain and suffering has been inflicted but not enough to force Senegal to the negotiating table. The current situation of “no war, no peace” has removed the pressure to negotiate. Further, the GOS could argue that the National Assembly, duly elected by the people, has more of a mandate to address political issues than the MFDC, which has not been elected and therefore may not have a popular mandate. Considering that Casamançais have participated in elections at levels either similar to or exceeding other regions of the country, it would be possible for the GOS to portray the National Assembly as legitimate in the eyes of the Casamançais electorate. As a result, the government could favor technical negotiations that address reintegration of combatants and economic development in Casamance, without addressing larger political issues.

APAC Community forum in Wangaran, November 2008.



Cognizant of this reality, participants still agreed on the need to address political issues, and were vehement that they could not be kept out of negotiations. Indeed, an oft-repeated phrase during the seminar was that “Casamance belongs to all Casamançais” and the MFDC doesn’t have the right to negotiate a political settlement without civil society participation.

In April 2009, Karuna consultant Hizkias Assefa returned to Senegal to work with APAC leadership, to allow them to reflect on how APAC can contribute to building consensus around the peace process. He opened the meeting with an analysis of various types of participation in establishing lasting peace settlements. The very obvious conclusion to be drawn was that the use of force, though immediately effective, simply does not work in the long run as leads to buried hostilities, festering resentments and the desire for revenge. In more participatory processes such as negotiation and mediation, where opposing sides become part of the solution, the result tends to be a more lasting form of peace. He highlighted how reconciling previously warring factions requires not brute strength, but the harder task of bringing about changes in minds and hearts. This led APAC leadership to focus on how participatory processes build consensus around specific solutions.

APAC

APAC began the third year of the program with a new work plan. Given the challenges in implementing the first work plan, AECOM opted to take a more flexible approach in Year 3. Instead of asking for a budget and calendar of activities for the entire plan, AECOM supported the program activities that made the most sense to implement and had volunteers ready to take on the tasks at hand. As a result, community forums to encourage populations to discuss ways of reactivating the peace process became the top priority. APAC partners met to develop a Scope of Work and budget, which was approved as a grant in November 2008. This was a manageable and focused task that APAC member organizations could implement.


The grant consisted of a series of community forums in areas of Casamance deeply affected by the conflict to mobilize the populations to take action in favor of reactivating the peace process. Member organizations agreed to organize forums in areas where they had a pre-existing relationship with the community. Facilitators were chosen based on their ability to lead a meeting in the language spoken by

the participants, and all adopted the same methodology. This allowed information from the forums to be amassed into a collective strategy for action after the forums. They focused on three questions: how to get negotiations to resume, how to encourage greater unity within the MFDC, and how to encourage the State to resume a dialogue with the MFDC.

The APAC community forums in November and December 2008 mobilized more than 3,000 individuals to discuss the question of how to reactivate the peace process. All 16 forums proposed doing marches followed by a press conference to call for the re-launch of negotiations; 7 villages agreed to return to the *bois sacré* (sacred woods) to organize ceremonies to release combatants from their commitments; All 16 forums proposed establishing local committees charged with meeting with the MFDC combatants and local authorities; Ten forums agreed to multiply the content of the APAC forums in the different villages and neighborhoods; All agreed on the awareness raising campaign on pardon, tolerance, and reconciliation between APAC and the State until the return of peace becomes the principal concern of all populations.

Among the ideas that were proposed, some were not feasible because of timing. Despite their universal appeal in the forums, APAC members were hesitant to organize marches in the lead up to local elections scheduled for March 2007 because they were concerned they could be interpreted as political or even infiltrated by political partisans for their own purposes. APAC itself is representative of many political strains, so their political sensors were acute to these types of concerns. After the elections were held, AECOM organized a meeting with APAC focal points who organized forums in their area to analyze the different options, prioritize and develop proposals. They gravitated around two ideas: circulating a petition asking for a dialogue to resume and meeting with MFDC camps in their area. Participants were divided into two groups to develop the methodology for each activity. The result was a template that focal points were asked to take back to their organization, validate, and then develop a proposal for actions. Two more meetings were required to get the focal points to a point where the proposals adhered to the common methodology and contained realistic budgets. AECOM and APAC agreed to prioritize sending delegations to meet with the MFDC because APAC didn't have sufficient capacity to implement both activities simultaneously and viewed that outreach to the MFDC was a comparative advantage and priority to advancing negotiations.

With this plan in hand, the grant ceiling and duration was increased and extended in May 2009 to permit APAC to send five delegations to meet with different MFDC camps. Even with the violence that



occurred in June, APAC focal points reiterated their desire to undertake effort, arguing the gunfights between the Army and the MFDC made their work all the more necessary. The patience finally paid off when APAC focal points were able to send delegations to meet with Kasolole, the different Front Nord elements, and lieutenants of Salif Sadio. In addition, after many weeks of trying, Abba Diatta of APAC met with a group of dissidents originating from his village who were at the source of a bitter dispute between rival cantonments. The focal points and delegation heads met to debrief each other on their respective efforts. They noted several points of convergence among the different meetings:

- The MFDC wants a dialogue with citizens because they want to know what people want.
- All appreciate the APAC approach, based on a collective and transparent effort to speak to all of them. They don't like the individual approach, because it shows the individuals are not speaking to each other. They also like the fact that everyone spoke the same language.
- They expressed the need to tell the *cadres Casamançais* (elites) what they want.
- They accept the principle of negotiation.
- They recognize that money has been used to divide them and were happy to learn that GoS was not financing APAC.

Ultimately, the focal points and delegation leaders decided to create a 'cadre de concertation' to continue the work they started. This nascent network takes advantage of the credibility of individual community leaders and their direct relationship with different faction leaders by linking their efforts.

APAC developed a proposal for Abba Diatta and the focal points to return to the *maquis* to work on resolving the tension between different MFDC camps. Authorization was granted and funding provided for implementation..

At the national level APAC engaged in advocacy activities that would share the results of their work at the grassroots level. APAC sought and obtained a meeting with Prime Minister Souleymane Ndene Ndiaye in June 2009. The Prime Minister was impressed with the activities, of which he was unaware. The fact that there are others active on the ground besides the government's official interlocutors was noted and appreciated. APAC was also part of a larger Casamançais delegation that received an audience with President Wade in September 2009 to press for the need for peace negotiations to resume. APAC Coordinator Saliou Sambou spoke about APAC's purpose and mission, as well as its different activities.

CONGAD

In February 2009, AECOM finalized its grant agreement with CONGAD to implement *Citizen Initiatives to re-launch dialogue between the GoS and the MFDC*, comprised of advocacy activities aimed at the GoS and the MFDC. The overall objective of the program was to facilitate the re-launch of a dialogue between the State and the MFDC, using the memorandum it developed in the national forum as a tool for discussion and advocacy with actors at the national level (line ministries, religious families, the National Assembly donors, and the diplomatic community) and at the regional level (senators, deputies, local elected officials, and civil society). AECOM included APAC members in its Steering Committee, which provided advice and counsel on the content of its advocacy program.



Breakout session at CONGAD forum in Diourbel, 2009.

In April 2009, CONGAD met with its advisory committee to develop their strategy for achieving their objective, convincing the President to reengage in a dialogue with the MFDC. All of those targeted in the meetings served as potential conduits to President Wade, some having a role to play in managing the conflict or related processes. Participants also agreed upon the need for close collaboration between APAC and CONGAD, due to APAC's potentially important role to play in building consensus within Casamance for the process content of the negotiation.

CONGAD forums held in each region of Senegal from May-August 2009 allowed for civil society actors, elected officials, and administrative authorities to collaborate on ways to raise awareness on the need for dialogue to resume and on how to advance those discussions towards national-level decision makers.

The forums garnered considerable media attention, raising the profile of the Casamance conflict and the need for a definitive solution. There were a total of 35 media stories: 6 in print, 22 on the radio and 5 on television. In addition, two online stories were published – St. Louis online and Scoops de Ziguinchor. The roadmaps they developed included follow-up actions. For example, in Ziguinchor, CONGAD provided the memorandum to the Presidency's regional representative who agreed to share it with the President. In Fatick, the mayor's office hosted a meeting, organized by CONGAD, with deputies from the region to talk about how they could put in place mechanisms to re-launch the MFDC-State dialogue.

CONGAD's efforts to reach the religious community were very successful. Representatives met with the son of the chief of the Tidiane brotherhood to discuss the peace process, as well as Archbishop Theodore Adrien Sarr. Both reacted favorably to the initiative and agreed to lend their support.

Community Radio

The *Réseau des Radios Communautaires pour la Paix et le Développement en Casamance* (RC/PDC), a network of Casamance community radios supporting peace and development received in November 2008 a grant to do a series of broadcasts on peace building. AECOM provided funding to: (i) develop radio broadcasts that create a space for exchange between the cultures of the region working for a definitive peace; (ii) promote the culture of tolerance and pardon and encourage conflict resolution through peaceful means; (iii) contribute to a progressive return of peace through awareness building; and (iv) support the AECOM program by giving it great visibility to its actions in Casamance.

In January 2009, the network began in earnest their activities funded by AECOM. Based on the action plan developed in December 2008, each station developed a series of hour-long broadcasts, aired every Sunday evening and spots to accompany those broadcasts. The hour-long broadcasts were in the dominant language of the area reached by the radio station, while the spots were in multiple languages. The content focused on pardon and reconciliation, both within the communities and between them and the MFDC. During February 2009, the radios developed and broadcast theatrical pieces on issues related to the conflict. Some had in-house theater troupes, while others relied on troupes from their community.

During March 2009, the community radios developed several themes tailored to the realities of the area where the radio broadcast. The themes included refugee returns, reintegration of ex-combatants into active life, socio-cultural relations, and the life of a combatant. The theater pieces were developed with the support of local troupes, whether in the radio or the community. The radios also covered GdC activities, particularly the forums held in March. The radio station in Oussouye covered the three forums in Djibonker, Oussouye and Kabrousse, while the station in Sindian covered that forum.

PROGRAM IMPACT

After more than three years, the project has had modest but important impact in select areas, even though the macro outlook did not advance as hoped. The goals of the project were to build capacity to help bring about a peace process, yet neither the MFDC nor the government was in a position to negotiate a definitive solution during the project period. Recognizing the lack of political will, the project aimed to build a core constituency capable of bringing about pressure for a peace process to be undertaken. See Annex 4 for indicator data collected for USAID.

GOVERNMENT

The project had some early successes with the government, organizing a session for a potential negotiating team that was hand-picked by President Wade, and engaging in significant backroom relationship building with high-ranking government authorities. When these did not translate into advances in the Government's willingness or ability to negotiate with the MFDC, the project turned its attention to strengthening regional-level policy managers and their ability to share critical information with their superiors in ways that might advance the process.

Working closely with Governor Wade, the training provided through the project helped establish a cadre of officials that were skilled in conflict resolution and ready to work together to create a climate where the peace process could advance. Governor Wade was repeatedly encouraged to continue working with AECOM, by then Interior Minister Ousmane Ngom and his successor Minister Chiekh Tidiane Sy, who assumed the post in April 2008. Governor Wade became an important partner. His support to activities implemented by the GdC was an intangible result of AECOM's work with him.

Near the end of the third year, government ministers expressed an interest in the project, and AECOM met with Defense Minister Becaye Diop and the Secretary General of the Presidency and Ziguinchor Mayor Abdoulaye Baldé. APAC was able to meet with the Prime Minister. All were interested in the contact that APAC was able to make with the different elements of the MFDC. As part of a larger delegation of Casamançais elites, APAC had an audience with the President of the Republic.

MFDC

The project fostered greater cohesion within the civilian and political wings of the movement, while falling short of its objectives to help the MFDC organize itself in a way that it could have a non-military leadership capable of speaking for a more cohesive military wing. When the GdC was formed in 2007, it deliberately brought together individuals with different affiliations in the political and military wings. The formation of the GdC, a blend of the civilian and political wings, was significant because it overcame existing divisions among individuals and ex-combatants that dated back to the 1990s. Over time, the GdC operated with greater sense of purpose and cohesion, owing in part to its relationship with the Kasolole-based military wing under the leadership of Cesar Badiate.

The GdC's efforts to organize eight community forums were remarkable for several reasons. Their approach in preparing the forums was thorough and deliberative. They made efforts to reach a wide audience and collaborate with both administrative authorities and political representatives, ensuring that the government would be comfortable with their activities. They also organized themselves into committees, each responsible for carrying out specific tasks. They readily accepted the training offered to prepare them for the realities of asking pardon, which carried over into how they interacted with forum participants. Finally, they readily admitted and learned from the mistakes. The forums' greatest impact was the opportunity it gave to citizens to speak their minds on subjects long considered taboo.

The cohesion within the GdC and its success in establishing a community-based dialogue did not translate into greater cohesion in either the political or the military wing. In 2008, the political wing of the

MFDC seemed to be fading rapidly from active engagement. By 2009, its relevance came sharply into question as dissension within the military wing of the MFDC exploded into the open. The rebellion within the rebellion bears several grievances. First and foremost, it sees its leaders as corrupted by the State's largesse. Those in the political or military wing that have taken funds from the State are no longer legitimate. Related to this question is of course the fact that they accuse the leadership of inadequately sharing the resources, leaving them to fend for themselves. Regardless, these dissidents are tired of sitting in the bush, waiting for the next handout. They want to either return to war or negotiate an end to the conflict, but the interminable cease fire is no longer acceptable to these dissidents. Since August, they have made their presence felt in the southern front.

CIVIL SOCIETY

The project made the most important gains in terms of capacity building within civil society. Casamançais are part and parcel of the conflict, yet few are able to recognize this fact. The Alliance for Peace in Casamance (APAC) was an important step in the right direction because it sought to federate actions of organizations that previously operated independently of each other and to build strong horizontal and vertical linkages from the grassroots to those with influence in Dakar. The notion that civil society can be unified is as utopian as saying the MFDC can be unified, yet helping disparate interests collaborate to achieve their objectives was a fundamental achievement of the project.

APAC differed from other initiatives because it federated horizontally and vertically. The alliance is a mixture of different interests: individuals and organizations, Dakar- and Casamance-based, NGOs and associations, opposition and ruling party, government functionaries and private sector. The federative qualities helped disparate interests achieve their own objectives while working toward a common objective. The vertical alliance came by linking up organizations based in the Casamance with those having access at the national level, allowing their activities and the impact of those activities to reach national-level decision-makers.

APAC also made important gains in federating actions at the local level, both among NGOs based in Ziguinchor and associations based in the many departments and rural communities. Noted for competing more than collaborating with each other, women's groups Kabonketor and USOFORAL both participated in APAC in ways that advanced their individual goals. Both the NGOs and the associations collaborated on organizing community forums, using the same methodology and adhering to the same objectives and principles. This was an important alliance within the region and across the three regions of Ziguinchor, Sedhiou and Kolda.

An important achievement for APAC came late in the third year when, after much technical assistance from AECOM, local associations and NGOs developed a federative approach for communication and outreach to the MFDC bases in their area. Coming from different parts of the Casamance—Blouf, Foigny and Kassa—associations agreed to adopt a similar approach in communicating with the MFDC, which was much appreciated by the cantonments they visited. They used an approach based in local traditions, by nominating village elders to lead the respective delegations, bringing significant moral authority to their efforts. They also shared information with each other, allowing for the individual visits to have greater impact by being part of a larger dynamic.

CONGAD was able to introduce aspects of its work with AECOM in its activities with other donors and other Senegalese actors. In August 2009, the European Commission agreed to incorporate the cultural dimension of the Casamance conflict into its programs. The organizing committee for the national assises met with CONGAD to hear about CONGAD's activities on Casamance, and were impressed by the national memorandum and agreed to adopt it into their report. CONGAD and the organizing committee agreed to meet with a delegation of the Assises to finalize the modalities.

CHALLENGES

GOVERNMENT

In the final two years of the project, national-level government authorities turned a deaf ear to any effort to inform or engage them in the process. President Wade had his designated interlocutors, and no one wanted to be seen as overreaching his or her mandate by showing interest in the Casamance peace process. Project staff and partners were never able to make significant inroads into the government until very late in the project, when the Government's strategy for dealing with the conflict appeared to be failing and the conflict was again heating up.

MFDC

One of the biggest challenges is that no one speaks for the MFDC, which is divided into multiple factions, making it difficult for the GoS to know with whom it should dialogue. In 2008, staff concluded that reaching a peace agreement meant reaching those with the guns, and that those with the guns did not have anyone speaking effectively on their behalf. There were a multitude of intermediaries, none with credibility to talk to everyone in a neutral manner. Divisions within the military wing emerged in 2009 that presented severe challenges to the peace process and to working on the peace process. The struggle for access to resources led to a severe leadership contest for the heart and soul of the military wing.

The approach that APAC developed with AECOM assistance took a long time to develop and is complicated to implement. It was challenging to identify the micro-level actors capable of engaging in this kind of discussion, develop a workable methodology and common language. It was unfortunate that the *cadre de concertation* came together only at the end of the project, when AECOM was unable to help them go beyond merely establishing contact with the MFDC factions.

CIVIL SOCIETY

Working with Casamançais civil society brought with it many challenges because APAC's strengths were also its greatest weaknesses. The federative qualities that APAC represented were at times overcome by the different interests that APAC's members represented. Each member, whether individual or organizational, brought to the table its own interests and often times reacted according to own interests. This is to be expected, and the challenge was to get everyone to see the benefits of associating their own efforts with others. The process of associating those efforts was often long and cumbersome since dialogue was absolutely critical to ensuring cohesion of actions. Meetings were required in Dakar and Ziguinchor, and it was beneficial to bring Dakar members to Ziguinchor and vice versa to ensure sharing of information and adherence to planned activities. This naturally slowed APAC's ability to execute actions.

Tensions emerged at times when members of the alliance undertook activities related to the peace process that did not include the larger membership. All members agreed that APAC was not to replace or substitute for individual organizations' activities. They all agreed they could accomplish more in conjunction with each other than they could separately, but there were times when organizations could not resist the opportunity to take a lead role. This led to tensions within APAC, but the members tended to take a direct and forthright approach in discussing their internal issues. These kinds of tensions are an inherent part of coalition building, and should not be minimized.

Determining legitimacy of a given set of actors is highly subjective. Federating the actions of civil society at the macro-, meso- and micro-levels increased their legitimacy by giving them a broader base, but without access to either the GoS or the MFDC, their broad base meant little. Our experience was that meso- and micro-level actors were crucial for obtaining access to the MFDC, while macro- and meso-level actors were critical to obtaining access to high-level government officials. The MFDC saw APAC as

credible for a variety of reasons, including their roots in the community and the fact that they were not financed by the government. Senior government officials became more interested in APAC activities once APAC had established contact with the different MFDC factions, a sign of their legitimacy.

LESSONS LEARNED

Activities will always take longer to implement than anticipated. AECOM grantees and partners were often unable to implement activities in the proposed timeframe. The first grant to CONGAD was set to last three months, yet CONGAD required nearly eight months to complete the task. The GdC began planning its community forums six months before they were actually held. The reasons behind the delays generally stemmed from the fact that partners had not thought through all the different steps, too few accepted to take on responsibilities, and those that did often became overburdened. The lesson learned is to build more preparatory time into the calendar, ensure adequate human resource are available, develop manageable goals and objectives, and hold people accountable when they fail to deliver for reasons within their control.

Competition for position and personal gain is endemic to all sectors. Those active in peace building in the Casamance know each other quite well, and may disagree with each other on tactics and strategy. At a deeper level, they are in competition with each other for consultancies with international and local NGOs, and even the prestige of being seen as an expert or vital to resolving the conflict. Endemic to all sectors, government and non-governmental, is the desire to be the one that brought peace to Casamance, and belief that they are the only ones who can do it. As a result, they have little confidence in efforts of others, and may seek to avoid collaboration because they do not feel it is worthwhile. Worse they may seek to undermine someone else's efforts simply because they themselves are not in charge or they will not benefit from what someone else accomplishes. The lesson is to help individuals and organizations understand how their own interests can be advanced in collaboration with others. It is naïve to think they will set aside their own interests in favor of peace, but it is possible for them to see how working with others advances their own interests more so than working alone. APAC was a significant step in the right direction.

Competition for access to resources can be overcome but still impedes collaboration. NGOs operate in Casamance with donor funding. They undertake a wide variety of peace building and economic reconstruction activities. It has been argued that they make a living off the conflict and thus have no interest in seeing it resolved because their cash cow would disappear. This is misleading in many ways. First, a resolution in the conflict will only bring more donors to Casamance, thereby increasing the funds available. A poor security situation inhibits donors, and certainly the recent resurgence in violence has caused some organizations to pull back. Second, NGOs have an ability to evolve to meet new needs. Peacebuilding activities have laid a foundation for other types of activities. More problematic is that they are in competition with each other for the same pool of resources, limiting their desire to share information and protect their turf. This is never going to dissipate entirely, yet the experience of APAC shows that they can collaborate without losing control over their own activities.

There will always be embedded interests that favor the status quo, even in situations of “ni guerre, ni paix.” Just as conflict results in a war economy where interests emerge that do not favor resolution of the crisis because they lose financially, the same can be said of the current situation in Casamance where embedded interests benefit from a relatively stable situation (i.e. no active fighting) that does not quite result in a definitive resolution of the crisis. Leaders within the MFDC, including both political and military leaders, benefiting from State largesse would likely lose access to those resources if a peace accord were implemented. As such, they may have an incentive to see the cease fire drag on as long as possible. Civil society leaders whose expertise is sought to help resolve the conflict may similarly not have an interest in seeing the conflict resolved. Government officials or political leaders who can use the

conflict, while professing a desire to advance the process, actually seek to prolong it to serve their own interests.

Helping Casamançais sort out their differences is critical to finding a definitive solution to the conflict. Conflict within Casamance exists at many levels – between and even within villages, between organizations, between political groupings and even within elites competing for leadership. Helping macro- and meso-level actors sort out their differences, and build trust through actual collaboration enables them to interact with the GoS and MFDC in a coherent fashion. Managing egos was a big part of the task that AECOM needed to undertake in order to help Senegalese collaborate.

Diplomatic support is vital to advancing the process. Whether or not the diplomatic community wants to take on the issue of the conflict, and where the conflict resides among their priorities will affect the process. An engaged diplomatic corps can raise issues with senior level government officials in ways that civil society cannot. In the first ten-month project that AECOM implemented, the Ambassador was proactive in facilitating access to government leaders and secured their willingness to participate in project seminars. This kind of diplomatic support was not available during much of this project. Prospects improved greatly in Year 3 when an Ambassador took up her post after it being vacant for a year, but the diplomatic community remained largely aloof to the Casamance question.

CONCLUSION

The conclusion of the project came at an awkward moment, with both positive and negative developments. Less than three months from the project's end date, APAC was gaining traction in its efforts to establish a channel of communications with the *maquis*. At the same time, the conflict between the MFDC and the GoS was starting to heat up again, giving even greater impetus to the project's mission and objectives. Much was accomplished, but much remains to be done.

More than a year in the making, APAC's decentralized network of meso- and micro-level actors was able to meet with the different *maquis* factions. This was a very tangible impact that merits further support, in order not to lose out on the benefits gained thus far. As challenging as establishing contact was, an even greater challenge rests in the next steps: figuring out how to establish an ongoing dialogue that helps bring the MFDC back to the negotiating table.

The next steps with the GoS would be to renew their interest in participating in the kinds of training seminars that AECOM and Karuna Center can offer. The renewed conflict may have given new impetus to changing its approach, and a readiness to benefit from the expertise offered by specialists in conflict analysis, mediation, and negotiations.

What directions the MFDC will take is hard to predict, and is dependent on the leadership struggles within the *maquis*. Efforts with the MFDC should focus on helping them find their voice. Unification of the movement is unlikely, yet some degree of cohesion is required for them to be able to identify their positions, interests, and needs in any negotiations with the GoS.

The diplomatic and donor community may be willing to play a more active role in pushing for a solution and making available the resources to implement it. USAID's efforts, past and present, are well-respected and the United States benefits from a positive image among the Senegalese, including the Casamançais.

ANNEX 1: LIST OF WORKSHOPS

Chronological list of Facilitated Dialogues, Training Workshops, and Technical Assistance.

Date	Year	Title of Activity	Type	Target
October 6	2006	Working towards a common goal	FD	<i>JM Biagui & A. Badji</i>
January 8-9	2007	Introduction to Conflict Analysis	TW	<i>Comite des Sages</i>
January 9-10	2007	Group Identity	TW	<i>Comite des Sages</i>
January 12-13	2007	Introduction to Conflict Analysis	TW	GOS/PM (Group 1)
January 16-17	2007	How to Develop an Action Plan	TA	<i>Comite des Sages</i>
January 19-20	2007	Introduction to Conflict Analysis	TW	GOS/PM (Group 2)
January 26	2007	Working towards a common goal	FD	<i>JM Biagui; A. Badji; Y. Badji</i>
January 26-27	2007	Group Identity	TW	GOS/PM (Group 1)
February 2-3	2007	Group Identity	TW	GOS/PM (Group 2)
February 5-7	2007	Intra-group dialogue	FD	MFDC
February 13	2007	Convening	FD	MFDC : <i>Comite de Contact</i>
February 19-20	2007	Revision to MFDC's Vision & Mission	FD	<i>MFDC</i>
February 22	2007	Working towards a common goal	FD	<i>JM Biagui & A. Badji</i>
February 27-28	2007	Introduction to Conflict Analysis	TW	CS Coalition
February 28-March 1	2007	Group Identity	TW	CS Coalition
March 1	2007	Intra-group facilitation of meeting	FD	<i>Comite de Contact</i>
March 6-8	2007	Building Political Will for Peace	TW	<i>CS Coalition</i>
March 9-10	2007	Building Political Will for Peace	TW	MFDC
March 16-17	2007	Development of Vision & Objectives	TA	GOS/PM
March 19-20	2007	Development of Vision & Objectives	TA	MFDC
April 13	2007	Structuring an Action Plan	TA	CS Coalition
April 14-15	2007	Developing an Action Plan	TA	GOS/PM Committee
April 21	2007	Casamance Crisis	FD	CS Macro leaders
April 28	2007	Developing an Action Plan	TA	CS Macro leaders
May 10-11	2007	Building Consensus	TW	CS
May 12	2007	Vertical linkages for peacebuilding	FD	CS (micro, meso, macro)
May 14-15	2007	Building Consensus	TW	MFDC
May 15	2007	Intra-group problem solving session	FD	<i>MFDC</i>
June 7	2007	Analysis and adoption of Action Plan	FD	CS
June 8-9	2007	Effective Approaches for Conflict Transformation	TW	CS
June 11-12	2007	Effective Approaches for Conflict Transformation	TW	GOS/PM
June 16	2007	Intra-group problem solving session (over per diem demands)	FD	<i>Comite de Contact</i>
June 17-18	2007	Activity Planning and Implementation	TA	MFDC
June 22	2007	Inter-group dialogue	FD	CS/MFDC

Date	Year	Title of Activity	Type	Target
June 22-23	2007	Social Communication for Peace	TW	GOS/PM
June 25	2007	Information Technology for Peace	TA	GOS/PM Committee
July 11-12	2007	Operationalizing Information Technology for Peace	TA	CAR
July 12	2007	Implementing Short-Medium Term Activities	TA	CAR
July 13-14	2007	Applying for seed project	TA	APAC
July 20	2007	Conducting Outreach Activities to Partners	TA	APAC
July 21	2007	Inter-group Communication: Processes, Procedures, and Systems	TA	APAC
July 21	2007	Echange direct entre APAC et le GdC	FD	APAC-GdC
August 24	2007	Echange de recadrage	FD	APAC
August 25	2007	Echange entre APAC et les autres organisations de la société civile	FD	APAC & CSO collaborating partners and actors
September 15	2007	Partage d'info pour lever les malentendus	FD	APAC–Collectif des cadres casamançais
September 29	2007	Contraintes liées à la mise en œuvre du plan d'action	FD	APAC
September 28-29	2007	Communication sociale pour la paix	TW	APAC
October 1	2007	Echange pour une connaissance des plans d'action respectifs	FD	APAC- Comité Administratif Régional
October 20	2007	TdR pour le FD entre les administrations frontalières du Sénégal et de la G. Bissau	TA	CAR
October 15	2007	Montage de seed project	TA	CONGAD
October 17	2007	Montage de seed project	TA	APAC
October 19	2007	Montage de seed project	TA	APAC
October 22	2007	Montage de seed Project	TA	MFDC
November 6-7	2007	Internal Communications for Peace	TW	MFDC/ Political
November 12	2007	Internal Communications for Peace	TW	APAC
November 8	2007	Project Proposal Elaboration	TA	MFDC
November 13	2007	Repartition des activités identifiées dans le plan d'action	FD	APAC
November 23-24	2007	Cross Border Relations	FD	SEN & GB regional authorities
January 22	2008	<i>Groupe de Contact</i> Cohesion	TA	MFDC
January 23	2008	Presentation of Action Plans	FD	APAC, MFDC
January 24	2008	Grant management	TA	APAC
January 25	2008	Collaboration in the Peace Process	FD	CSOs
January 30	2008	Financial management procedures	TA	APAC
February 2	2008	Message and Strategy development	TA	APAC
February 6	2008	Administrative procedures	TA	CONGAD
February 23	2008	Strategic planning, evaluation	TA	CONGAD
February 22	2008	Communication	TA	APAC

Date	Year	Title of Activity	Type	Target
March 1-2	2008	Conflict Assessment & Group Identity	TW	CONGAD regional reps
March 6-7	2008	Accounting Procedures for APAC	TW	APAC member orgs
March 28-29	2008	Cross Border Collaboration for Peace	FD	CSOs from GAM, GB and SEN
March 31-April 1	2008	Advocacy for Peace	TW	APAC
April 26	2008	MFDC Planning	TA	MFDC
April 27	2008	APAC Planning	TA	APAC
April 16-17	2008	Financial Management	TA	CONGAD
April 17	2008	Activity Planning	TA	CONGAD
May 9	2008	Activity Planning	TA	APAC
May 13	2008	Activity Planning	TA	Groupe de Contact
May 21	2008	Activity Planning	TA	Groupe de Contact
May 31	2008	Activity Planning	TA	APAC
June 4	2008	Activity Planning	TA	APAC-Ziguinchor
June 5	2008	Outreach, internal cohesion	TA	Groupe de Contact
June 19	2008	Activity Planning	TA	APAC-Ziguinchor
June 21	2008	Activity Planning	TA	APAC-Dakar
July 1-2	2008	Collaborative Negotiations Techniques	TW	Groupe de Contact
July 2-3	2008	Collaborative Negotiations Techniques	TW	Regional Government
July 11	2008	Activity Planning - Alternatives seminar	TA	APAC
July 18-19	2008	Cross-Border Collaboration	TA	SEN & GB regional authorities
July 25	2008	Activity Planning	TA	Groupe de Contact
July 28	2008	Activity Planning	TA	Groupe de Contact
August- 5-6	2008	Coordination Cell - Planning meeting	TA	APAC
August 13	2008	Alternatives Seminar Steering Committee planning meeting	TA	APAC
August 14	2008	Review and approval of memorandum, synthesis report, and action plan	TA	CONGAD
August 21	2008	Planning meeting	TA	Groupe de Contact
August 26	2008	Alternatives Seminar Steering Committee planning meeting	TA	APAC
August 25	2008	Review of logistics, speakers, and approval of introduction	TA	APAC
August 26-27	2008	National Forum on Citizen Dialogue for the Return of Peace in Casamance	FD	CONGAD
August 30-31	2008	What Alternatives for the Casamance?	FD	APAC
September 1	2008	Defining Mission, Vision, & Role of APAC	TA	APAC
September 1	2008	Joint Planning and Collaboration	TA	APAC, GdC & CONGAD
September 11	2008	Planning for GdC, APAC activities	TA	GdC - APAC
September 11	2008	Follow-up to Alternatives Seminar	TA	APAC

Date	Year	Title of Activity	Type	Target
September 19-20	2008	Action Plan Development	FD	APAC
September 30	2008	Action Plan	FD	CONGAD-APAC
October 18	2008	Alternatives Seminar report preparation	TA	APAC
October 22-23	2008	Activity Planning	TA	APAC
October 23	2008	Defining APAC, GdC Collaboration	TA	APAC, GdC
October 24	2008	Activity Planning	TA	APAC, CSOs
November 6	2008	Activity Planning – Community Forums	TA	APAC, GdC
November 12-14	2008	Pardon and Reconciliation	TW	GdC
November 7	2008	APAC information session with Casamance CSO	FD	APAC, Civil Society
November 17	2008	Activity Planning Community forums	TA	APAC
November 18	2008	Activity Planning	TA	APAC, animators
November 25-26	2008	Activity Planning Meeting of Ex Combatants	TA	GDC
January 20	2009	Strategic planning	TA	CONGAD
January 23-24	2009	Stocktaking, strategic planning	TA	APAC
January 26	2009	Stocktaking, strategic planning	TA	GdC
January 27	2009	Training of Animators	TA	GDC
January 28	2009	Strategic planning	TA	CONGAD
March 12	2009	Forum evaluation	TA	GdC
March 16-17	2009	Event planning	TA	GdC
March 19	2009	Report on Forums, discussion of results	FD	MFDC
March 25	2009	Project Planning	TA	APAC
March 31	2009	Project planning	TA	APAC
April 1	2009	Force Field Analysis	TA	GdC
April 20	2009	Strategic Analysis of APAC's role in negotiations	TA	APAC
April 21	2009	Strategic Analysis of CONGAD's advocacy role	TA	CONGAD
April 21	2009	Project Planning	TA	APAC
April 23	2009	Strategic Analysis of APAC's role with MFDC	TA	APAC
May 5	2009	Activity Planning	TA	APAC
May 6	2009	Activity Planning	TA	CONGAD
May 12	2009	Activity Planning	TA	GDC
May 26	2009	Debriefing	TA	GDC
May 27	2009	Budget development	TA	GDC/APAC

ANNEX 2: SUMMARY OF GRANTS

Note: Grants were budgeted and tracked in local currency. USD amounts represent prevailing exchange rate at the time of payment.

Recipient	Title	Duration	Amount	Grant Description
01 CONGAD	National Process for Citizen Engagement for Peace in Casamance	Feb 08 – Aug 08	\$42,196	CONGAD organized forums in each of Senegal's 11 regions to discuss the Casamance peace process and engage citizens in advocating for peace. A national forum was held, attended by representatives of each regional forum. They produced and adopted a synthesis report and memorandum of recommendations, the basis of a future advocacy campaign.
02 APAC	Civil Society Actions for a Definitive Peace in Casamance	Feb 08 – July 08	\$15,586	APAC's strategic plan sought to: 1) reactivate the peace process in Casamance; 2) contribute to developing a large consensus for peace by synergizing actions on the ground; 3) bring the political wing, the military wing, and the MFDC Diaspora together for negotiations; and 4) accompany the peace negotiations, pre- and post. The final amount was less than the original budget (\$99,024) because APAC did not implement as many activities as planned.
03 APAC	Seminar <i>What Alternatives for Casamance ?</i>	Aug 08 – Nov 08	\$10,065	APAC brought together different elements of Casamance political and civil society, plus targeted elected officials and government representatives, in a two-day seminar to develop options to address the major issues at the core of the conflict and use these options to advocate for negotiations to resume. Four themes were chosen: institutional framework, political development, socio-cultural values, & mediation. A final press briefing resulted in one television story and two articles.
04 RCPDC	Peacebuilding through Community Radio	Nov 08 – Mar 09	\$8,441	The program sought to: 1) develop radio broadcasts that create a space for exchange between the cultures of the region working for a definitive peace, 2) promote the culture of tolerance and pardon and encourage conflict resolution through peaceful means, 3) contribute to a progressive return of peace through awareness building, and 4) support the AECOM program by giving it great visibility to its actions in Casamance.
05 APAC	Community forums to mobilize citizens in favor of peace	Nov 08 – Aug 09	\$53,511	APAC organized community forums in conflict-affected parts of the Casamance to mobilize the populations to take action in favor of reactivating the peace process. The grant was twice amended to add funds for APAC (through its Focal Points and Resource Persons) to engage in a dialogue with MFDC factions on their internal divisions.
06 & 07 APAC/GdC	Groupe de Contact (GdC) forums on pardon and reconciliation	Dec 08 – Mar 09	\$29,135	APAC supported the GdC in its effort to begin a dialogue between the MFDC and population on pardon and reconciliation, involve the people in search for peace, and obtain their support in efforts to reunify the MFDC. The grant funded planning meetings with ex-combatants and local elected officials in the region, followed by 8 community forums in the Ziguinchor region.
08 CONGAD	Citizen initiatives to relaunch a GoS-MFDC dialogue to resolve the Casamance conflict	Mar 09 – Aug 09	\$29,125	The objective was to advocate for the re-launch of dialogue between the GoS and the MFDC, using the memorandum it developed in the national forum as a tool for discussion and advocacy with actors at the national level (line ministries, religious leaders, the National Assembly, and donors and the diplomatic community) and at the regional level (senators, deputies, local elected officials, and civil society).