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THE IMPACT OF THE SECOND NATIONAL KENYA CIVIC
EDUCATION PROGRAMME (NCEP II-URAIA) ON
DEMOCRATIC ATTITUDES, VALUES, AND BEHAVIOR
FINAL REPORT

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ON DEMOCRATIC ATTITUDES, VALUES, AND BEHAVIOR
DRAFT REPORT

Prepared for U.S. Agency for International Development, Nairobi, Kenya,

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The author's views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This document reports the results of the Kenya National Civic Education II–Uraia Impact Study, a study funded by USAID/Kenya that assesses the effectiveness of the NCEP II-Uraia program in terms of changing individuals’ awareness, competence and engagement in issues related to democracy, human rights, governance, constitutionalism, and nation-building. The program was the second National Civic Education Program implemented throughout the country, and built on the successful outcomes produced by NCEP I from 2002-2003. The program took the name “Uraia”, meaning “citizenship” in Kiswahili. Forty-three Kenyan civil society organizations (CSOs) linked to four larger civil society Consortia took part in the program, which ran from April 2006 until September 2007. Program documents show that NCEP II-Uraia involved approximately 79,000 discrete workshops, poetry or drama events, informal meetings, cultural gatherings, and other public events, as well as extensive programming on democracy, governance, and rights-related topics through television, radio, and other mass media outlets. Documents indicate that some 10 million individuals were exposed in some form or another to face-to-face civic education activities. Presumably many more were reached via the mass media component, which represented a new and innovative feature of NCEP II-Uraia compared with its predecessor. The program was completed before the disputed December 2007 National Elections, and before the inter-communal violence and dislocations that wracked the nation in subsequent months.

The current study is a “Participant Impact” study. That is, it is an effort to assess whether, how, and under what conditions the program was successful in changing rights awareness, democratic orientations and political engagement among individuals who were exposed to the program’s activities, or who were exposed to the program’s messages in the Kenyan mass media. The primary source of data for the study is a survey of 3,600 individuals conducted across the country between 10 December 2008 and 30 January 2009. 1,800 individuals who had been exposed to NCEP II-Uraia face-to-face activities were interviewed by survey teams from the firm Research International as the “treatment group” sample, along with 1,800 “control group” individuals who were similar to the treatment group but who had no NCEP II-Uraia face-to-face exposure. Treatment group individuals were selected based on a two-stage random sampling process: a random sample of 360 NCEP II-Uraia activities was first selected based on the “Form D” cover sheets that facilitators were required to complete after each activity; five specific treatment group respondents were then interviewed based on a random sampling of households in the areas where the selected activities took place. Finally, a detailed procedure was implemented to interview five control group individuals from those same areas, and who were matched to the treatment group on a series of demographic characteristics, including education, age, gender, and membership in civil society organizations.

We included questions in the survey relating to the five general themes of the Uraia program: good governance, human rights, democracy, constitutionalism, and nation-building. For some of these dimensions, the questions relate to individuals’ *awareness, involvement, or perceived competence* regarding an issue or theme, and we categorize these items under the general rubric of *Civic Competence and Involvement*. For other dimensions, the questions related to individuals’ preferences or values about politics, the rights of citizens, leaders, institutions, or the overall political system, and we categorize these items under the general rubric of *Democratic Values, Rights, and Responsibilities*. We also included questions that addressed the “cross-cutting” themes emphasized in NCEP II: gender, HIV/AIDS, and environment. Finally, the survey included a range of questions on ethnic social and political relations, taking into account the highly polarized conditions following the inter-communal violence that occurred after Kenya’s 2007 election.

We found that the program did have meaningful long-term effects on several important dimensions, notably the cluster of orientations that we labeled *Civic Competence and Involvement*. Individuals who were exposed to NCEP-II Uraia face-to-face activities were significantly more knowledgeable about politics, more efficacious generally and specifically in regards to the Constituency Development Fund, more participatory at the local level, more aware of how to defend their rights, and more informed about constitutional issues and the desirability of public involvement in the constitutional review process, than were similarly “matched” individuals who did not participate in NCEP-II Uraia activities. This suggests the program was successful in achieving at least some of its stated goals.

Moreover, there was some influence of NCEP II-Uraia on variables related to *Identity and Ethnic Group Relations*: program activities led to significant increases in individuals’ identification as a “Kenyan” relative to their tribal identification, led to significant increases in the amount of social tolerance the individual is willing to extend to his or her “most disliked group”, and led to significant increases in the perception that violence is not an appropriate means for ethnic groups to defend themselves if they feel threatened. This dimension is crucial to the Uraia themes of “nation-building”, and the fact that non-negligible long-term impact was seen for face-to-face activities on several important variables in this category is indicative again of the program’s success in achieving some of its stated goals. In addition, the events following the 2007 election showed that this dimension is particularly crucial to Kenyan politics and society, and thus the effects seen here are especially welcome in terms of the furthering of the country’s democratic political culture.

At the same time, the impact of the program on nearly all other democratic orientations examined in the study was negligible. There were limited effects on a series of variables we called *Democratic Values, Rights and Responsibilities*, and these included such important factors as rejection of anti-democratic regime alternatives, support for the rule of law, trust in institutions and others, and the acceptance of extensive political responsibilities of citizenship. And we found virtually no effects of the program on the *Cross-Cutting Issues* of HIV/AIDS, gender, and the environment that figured prominently in the program’s curriculum. All of this suggests that NCEP-II Uraia was a relatively effective long-term agent of political *empowerment*, but a relatively ineffective long-term agent for value and issue *advocacy*.

We examined the impact of NCEP II-Uraia mass media, which represented a new and innovative component of the program compared to the NCEP I program from 2000-2002. Here the effects were mixed as well. On the one hand, we found that there was extensive exposure to Uraia messages in the mass media, in particular its radio programming, and we found extensive recognition and favorability towards the “Uraia brand.” We also found that exposure to Uraia mass media did augment the effects of face-to-face activities on several variables in the Civic Competence and Involvement dimension, notably political knowledge, awareness of how to defend one’s rights, and awareness of the Kenyan constitution. Yet the media component – even on these competence and awareness variables – *by itself* produced relatively little in the way of meaningful impacts. And on virtually all other orientations we examined, there were no significant positive impacts registered for media exposure.

We examined further the conditions under which NCEP II-Uraia produced larger and more lasting impacts. In this regard, the findings strongly confirmed the conclusions reached in the NCEP I and earlier impact assessments. The effects of NCEP II-Uraia civic education were influenced strongly by the amount of the individual’s exposure to civic education activities, by the kinds of instructional methods used, by the quality of the facilitators, and by the degree to which individuals engage in discussions about democracy issues after their direct exposure to civic education. Specifically:

- Those who participated in three or more face-to-face activities exhibited consistent and stronger effects on a set of core democratic orientations, while those who participated in only one or two

activities often showed *no differences* compared to the control group. This confirms again the overriding importance of *multiple exposures* to civic education in order to produce lasting impact;

- Exposure to multiple participatory teaching methodologies led to significantly greater impact than exposure to lecture-based and other passive pedagogical techniques;
- When facilitators of NCEP II-Uraia activities were perceived to be of higher quality, significantly stronger impacts were observed than when facilitators were perceived to be of lower quality; these effects were particularly prevalent on certain variables where weak overall effects of NCEP II-Uraia treatment were observed; and
- There was significant post-activity discussion of NCEP II-Uraia civic education with individuals in both the treatment and control group’s social networks, and these post-activity discussions led to extensive “secondary effects” of NCEP II-Uraia exposure. These effects, however, were evident on a more limited number of democratic orientations than was the case in the NCEP I evaluation.

Taken together, these findings offer strong confirmation, within the context of a study examining long-term impact, of what we knew previously about the conditions under which democracy training works. It also, however, offers strong confirmation of what we knew previously about the extent to which individuals tend *not* to be taught in the conditions most conducive to program impact. For example, about two in five members of the treatment group was exposed to three or more participatory methods in his or her activities; about one-third perceived that at least four out of five positive qualities described their activities’ facilitators “very well”; about half attended three or more NCEP II-Uraia activities; and about one in three spoke to three or more people about NCEP II-Uraia activities that the others may have attended. Thus, the results indicate both the strong *potential* for effects if individuals were “correctly” taught, as well as the more limited *actual* impacts the program had on participants.

Finally, we examined the role that the violence following the disputed election of 2007 may have had on the results. In contrast to our expectations, we found little evidence that the post-election upheaval had negative effects on the magnitude of NCEP-II impact. By contrast, there was some suggestion that the NCEP II-Uraia program played some role in mitigating the negative impacts of the traumatic events of the post-election period. The direct experience of post-election violence tended to undermine individual’s faith in Kenyan democracy and their role in it, but these negative effects were sometimes attenuated among those who had been exposed to NCEP II-Uraia civic education. To this extent, the program was at least partially successful in preventing even more disillusionment and democratic “backsliding” as a result of the tragic events that occurred in Kenya after the program had formally concluded.

Based on these findings, we propose the following recommendations for the design and implementation of future civic education in Kenya:

- Future programs should continue to emphasize the promotion of orientations related to civic competence and involvement, the promotion of national versus tribal identities, and the promotion of ethnic social tolerance;
- Future programs should rethink whether and how to teach values related to democracy and the rule of law, and whether and how to include issue advocacy as part of civic education curricula;
- Future programs should focus in a more targeted fashion on issues of direct concern to Kenyan citizens
- Future programs should rethink how mass media should be utilized to maximize individual impact;
- Future programs should change the way that civic education is delivered, so as increase the numbers of individuals who are taught in ways that are most conducive to impact. This means greater emphasis on the training of facilitators, greater emphasis on the use of participatory

teaching methods, and greater emphasis on stimulating multiple exposures to civic education activities;

- Future programs should include a revised Facilitator Handbook
- Future programs should emphasize post-workshop discussions of participants, especially with individuals outside of their immediate social networks; and
- Future impact evaluations should include a pre-test component to measure individuals' baseline orientations before exposure to civic education activities, and future programs must keep better records of program participants and program activities to facilitate the evaluation process.

I. INTRODUCTION: THE NCEP II-URAIA IMPACT STUDY

This document reports the results of the Kenya National Civic Education II–Uraia Impact Study, a study funded by USAID/Kenya that assesses the effectiveness of the NCEP II-Uraia program in terms of changing individuals’ awareness, competence and engagement in issues related to democracy, human rights, governance, constitutionalism, and nation-building. The program was the second National Civic Education Program implemented throughout the country, and built on the successful outcomes produced by NCEP I from 2002-2003. The program took the name “Uraia”, meaning “citizenship” in Kiswahili. Forty-three Kenyan civil society organizations (CSOs) linked to four larger civil society Consortia took part in the program, which ran from April 2006 until September 2007. Program documents show that NCEP II-Uraia involved approximately 79,000 discrete workshops, poetry or drama events, informal meetings, cultural gatherings, and other public events, as well as extensive programming on democracy, governance, and rights-related topics through television, radio, and other mass media outlets. Documents indicate that some 10 million individuals were exposed in some form or another to face-to-face civic education activities.¹ Presumably many more were reached via the mass media component, which represented a new and innovative feature of NCEP II-Uraia compared with its predecessor. The program was completed before the disputed December 2007 National Elections, and before the inter-communal violence and dislocations that wracked the nation in subsequent months.

The current study is a “Participant Impact” study. That is, it is an effort to assess whether, how, and under what conditions the program was successful in changing rights awareness, democratic orientations and political engagement among individuals who were exposed to the program’s activities, or who were exposed to the program’s messages in the Kenyan mass media. It is a critical part of the overall monitoring and evaluation effort of the program, and indeed it is the *sole mechanism* for assessing the effects of the program on ordinary individuals who took part in the workshops, drama events, and other public gatherings. An earlier study completed by the Steadman Group in December 2007 examined the impact of Uraia mass media in raising awareness of the program’s themes in a limited number of regions throughout the country, and we shall refer to that study’s findings at various points in this document as well.²

The study was commissioned in August 2008. After discussions with the Study Team during its visit to Nairobi in October of that year, it was decided by the Donor Steering Committee to add an additional component to the overall evaluation of the program. We call this component the “Civil Society Impact Study”, as it attempts to assess the impact of NCEP II-Uraia on Kenyan civil society more generally, its effectiveness in articulating a reform and rights agenda, and its impact on Kenyan political and social institutions. Management Systems International also conducted this aspect of the evaluation, whose findings are summarized in a separate report.³ In this document, we limit our focus to the Participant Impact component, to the assessment of how the program may have changed individuals who were

¹ We cannot determine from program documents the exact proportion of the 10 million individuals who were exposed to multiple NCEP II-Uraia activities. Our best estimate from the survey data used in this study, taking into account self-reported multiple exposures to civic education activities over the time-period spanned by NCEP II-Uraia, is that the program reached between 4.5 and 5.5 million individuals through its face-to-face components.

² *The National Civic Education Programme Phase II (NCEP II) Analysis Report: Stakeholders Presentation*, Powerpoint presentation, The Steadman Group, December 2007.

³ Stephen Orvis, Nicolas Van de Walle, Richard Bosire, *The Second Kenya National Civic Education Program (NCEP II-Uraia): Impact on Civil Society*, Report prepared for KMPG: Management Systems International, May 4, 2009.

exposed to the program’s activities, and to the recommendations for future civic education that stem specifically from those findings.

The Participant Impact study consists of two primary sources of data. One is a survey of 3,600 individuals conducted across the country between 10 December 2008 and 30 January 2009. 1,800 individuals who had been exposed to NCEP II-Uraia face-to-face activities were interviewed by survey teams from the firm Research International as the “treatment group” sample, along with 1,800 “control group” individuals who were similar to the treatment group but who had no NCEP II-Uraia face-to-face exposure. Treatment group individuals were selected based on a two-stage random sampling process: a random sample of 360 NCEP II-Uraia activities was first selected based on the “Form D” cover sheets that facilitators were required to complete after each activity; five specific treatment group respondents were then interviewed based on a random sampling of households in the areas where the selected activities took place. Finally, a detailed procedure was implemented to interview five control group individuals from those same areas, and who were matched to the treatment group on a series of demographic characteristics, including education, age, gender, and membership in civil society organizations. These procedures give us as much confidence as possible – given the inherent limitations of the data that we will discuss below – that differences observed between the treatment and control group can be attributed to NCEP II-Uraia exposure.

The second source of data consists of six focus groups that were conducted in March-April 2009. The focus groups were small group discussion that were designed to provide open-ended, qualitative data regarding participants’ assessments of the NCEP II-Uraia activities in which they took part, their assessments of what could have been done differently and what might be improved upon in the future. Two of the focus groups were conducted with NCEP II-Uraia facilitators, and four with ordinary participants in NCEP II-Uraia activities. One session focused on the perceptions of individuals who were exposed to Uraia messages in the mass media, one on the perceptions of women participants, one on the perceptions of participants in poetry-drama events, and one on the perceptions of participants in NCEP II-Uraia workshops. Focus group participants were asked their perspectives on what worked and what did not work during the sessions that they ran or attended, their impressions of the quality of the training or teachings that they received, and the recommendations they have for the content and implementation of future civic education programs.

The current study builds directly on MSI’s previous participant impact evaluations of civic education programs in developing democratic contexts. Four evaluations have been conducted over the past twelve years, most notably the evaluation of the first Kenya National Civic Education program from 2000-2002.⁴ Given the organic linkage between the two NCEP programs, we use a variety of questions and indicators that were also employed in the first evaluation. Moreover, at various points in the analysis we compare the impact of the two programs. At the same time, it must be recognized that the two programs were implemented at vastly different stages of Kenya’s democratic development; the NCEP I took place during the last stages of the Presidency of Daniel Arap Moi, a time when civic education was not completely unencumbered but also a time of intense optimism regarding the possibility of democratic change in the

⁴ See Steven E. Finkel, with the assistance of Paul Mbatia and David Leuthold, *The Impact Of The Kenya National Civic Education Programme On Democratic Attitudes, Knowledge, Values, And Behavior*, Report prepared for USAID Contract No. AEP-I-00-00-00018, Task Order No. 806, Washington D.C.: Management Systems International, December 30, 2003; Christopher A. Sabatini, Gwendolyn G. Bevis, and Steven E. Finkel, *The Impact of Civic Education Programs on Political Participation and Democratic Attitudes*, Report prepared for USAID Contract No. AEP-5468-I-00-6012-00, Delivery Order No. 5, Washington, D.C.: Management Systems International, February 2, 1998; and Steven E. Finkel and Sheryl Stumbras, *Civic Education in South Africa: The Impact of Adult and School Programs on Democratic Attitudes and Participation*, Report prepared for USAID Contract No. AEP-I-00-96-90012-00, Task Order No. 10, Washington D.C.: Management Systems International, February 7, 2000.

run-up to the 2002 national elections. NCEP II took place in a political context that was more hospitable to civic education, but also in a context of some disappointment with how Kenyan democracy and political institutions were functioning. This disappointment would turn even more sharply negative after the events surrounding the disputed 2007 election and its violent aftermath. These contextual differences should be kept in mind as the assessment of program impact proceeds.

Several methodological issues should be kept in mind as well. First, in contrast to the previous NCEP I assessment, the current study does not contain a “pre-test” component. That is, we do not have baseline data on individuals’ democratic orientations before the NCEP II-Uraia activities took place. This means that we cannot rule out completely – despite our best efforts at statistical control – the possibility that individuals in the treatment group were already different on democratic outcomes, or on factors relevant to changes in democratic outcomes, before their exposure to NCEP II-Uraia civic education. Moreover, the events following the 2007 election prevented the study from being implemented until over a year after the end of the program itself. This means that the study represents an assessment of the *long-term impact of the NCEP II-Uraia program on individuals*, as we have no data on how the program may have affected individuals in the short or even medium terms. It also means that the study by necessity must rely on individuals’ recollection of activities that took place many months before the survey interviews.⁵ Finally, time and cost constraints prevented a separate national survey of a random sample of the Kenyan population from being conducted, as was the case in the NCEP I study. This means that we cannot relate the results from our study to Kenyan public opinion in general, nor can we estimate as accurately as desired the actual “reach” of the program throughout the entire population, nor assess fully the demographic and political characteristics of the treatment group compared to the overall Kenyan population.

We note these issues at the outset not to question the validity of the study, as we have gone to great lengths to ensure the methodological integrity of the research design and data collection process. But we note that the study was made more difficult by the time delay and, in particular, by the absence of the pre-test and national survey components.⁶ We strongly recommend that future evaluations return to the methodological framework of a pre-test/post-test design that was utilized in NCEP I, return to the use of staggered post-tests so that short, medium, and long-run effects of programs can be accurately assessed, and incorporate national surveys so that general trends and comparisons between treated individuals and the overall Kenyan population can be made.

The report is organized as follows. In Section II, we discuss the conceptual framework and methodology used for assessing the effects of NCEP II-Uraia activities. We discuss the orientations that we examine among NCEP II-Uraia participants and the control group, the sampling strategy and respondent selection procedures used in the survey component of the study, and a description of the questionnaire and the specific items used to measure democratic attitudes and other orientations in the survey. In Section III, we present the basic results regarding the impact of NCEP II-Uraia civic education on individual’s attitudinal and behavioral change, and, in subsequent sub-sections, analyze the specific impact of face-to-face

⁵ As we explain below, there were no accurate lists of participants in program activities kept by the implementing CSOs or Consortia, so the primary “independent variable” of the study – exposure to NCEP II-Uraia civic education – by necessity was based on respondent recall as well. We urge future civic education programs to institute comprehensive procedures for recording and tracking participants in order to facilitate the evaluation process.

⁶ The inclusion of a pre-test is, in our view, absolutely necessary for future evaluations. Pre-test data not only controls for the individual’s baseline (pre-treatment) orientations, but also facilitates the identification and tracking of the treatment group over time. In the NCEP I evaluation, we were able to interview individuals right as they entered a civic education workshop; we were thus certain that they in fact *were* treated, and we obtained their address and contact information to facilitate re-interviews some months in the future. This greatly eased the burden of finding individuals who were exposed to NCEP activities in the first place, which was the main problem we faced in the present study.

activities and the Uraia media components. In Section IV we identify the conditions under which NCEP II-Uraia civic education produced a larger or smaller impact. We focus on a number of factors that potentially affect the impact that the civic education activities had on the individual, including the methods of instruction that were employed, the teaching qualities of the civic education facilitators, the individuals' demographic characteristics, and the extent to which individuals discussed the topics of the civic education activities with others in their social networks. We discuss in this section the potential effects of the violence following the 2007 election in attenuating the impact of NCEP II-Uraia civic education as well. In section V we summarize insights gleaned from the focus group discussions. In section VI we summarize the study's findings and provide recommendations for improving the design and implementation of future Kenya civic education programs.

II. STUDY FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

A. A Framework for Analyzing the Effects of NCEP II-Uraia Civic Education

The Kenya National Civic Education Program (NCEP II-Uraia) was a large-scale country-wide civic education initiative conducted through forty-three civil society organizations within four larger Consortia between April 2006 and September 2007.⁷ The goals of NCEP II-Uraia, as stated in the official training document of the program, *The Uraia Manual*, were aimed:

“...at fostering a mature political culture in Kenya: a culture in which citizens are able to exercise their rights and responsibilities – and to participate effectively in the broadening of democracy in the country. It will raise awareness of human rights and good governance, and it will promote tools for enabling Kenyans to hold their government accountable.” (*The Uraia Manual*, p. 3).

Thematically, the NCEP II-Uraia program centered around the areas of:

- Nation-building
- Democracy
- Good governance
- Constitutionalism
- Human Rights

The activities conducted under the NCEP II-Uraia rubric sought to increase individuals' level of awareness and knowledge of these five thematic areas, as well as to cultivate the skills, values, and dispositions that would facilitate effective citizen participation, that would serve to hold political elites accountable, and that would enable individuals to assert and defend their political and human rights against possible encroachment by the state or other members of Kenyan society.⁸ An assessment of the

⁷ The consortia were *Constitution and Reform Education Consortium (CRE-CO)*, *Consortium for Empowerment and Development of Marginalised Communities (CEDMAC)*, *Ecumenical Civic Education Programme (ECEP)*, and *National Muslim Civic Education Consortium (NAMCEC)*. The first three consortia listed had also participated in NCEP I.

⁸ These goals are explicitly laid out in the program documents that the Study Team consulted, including David Everatt (Strategy and Tactics), *Kenya National Civic Education Program Phase II (NCEP II) Framework Report*, Prepared for Danida (Kenya), July 2004; and *Kenya's National Civic Education Programme: The Uraia Manual*,

program's impact, therefore, should focus on these specific orientations and how they may have changed as a result of direct program participation and exposure to NCEP II-Uraia messages in the various mass media. Further, the assessment should examine the conditions under which program participation leads to more or less impact on individuals, the kinds of activities that lead to greater impact, and the kinds of individuals who responded most strongly to the messages conveyed. The objective of this study, then, is to determine whether NCEP II-Uraia was successful in changing orientations related to citizen awareness, involvement, values and skills, and if so, which ones, under what conditions, and for which kinds of individuals.

Most of the orientations that NCEP II-Uraia sought to influence – including awareness of politics, rights, and citizen responsibilities, skills, support for democratic values, tolerance and political participation – are well known to political scientists as precisely those aspects of public opinion that are most important for the development and consolidation of democratic political culture. They have been researched extensively in both established and emerging democratic systems for over fifty years, and have also been examined specifically in the context of assessing the impact of civic education programs in many settings, including the Dominican Republic, Poland, South Africa, as well as in the Kenya NCEP I program from 2000-2002.⁹ Hence we have a good deal of knowledge of exactly how these orientations should be conceptualized and measured, and we include indicators used in the past for many of these attitudes, values, and beliefs in the current study.

At the same time, NCEP II-Uraia included discussion and teaching on many Kenya-specific issues, such as the ongoing and still inconclusive Kenyan constitutional review process, and on the three “Cross-Cutting Issues” of the program, HIV/AIDS, Gender, and Environmental concerns. Moreover, Kenyan democracy has been challenged repeatedly – and most starkly in the events following the 2007 election – by feelings of tribalism and inter-ethnic rivalries that have impeded the development of national identity and unity. These orientations relate to the NCEP II-Uraia theme of “Nation building” in particular. Because of their importance to the program, and to Kenyan democracy more generally, we devote considerable attention to these sets of issues in the study as well.¹⁰

We describe briefly the specific orientations that were examined in the Impact Study as well as our method of determining the impacts of NCEP II-Uraia activities and media exposure.

I. Civic Competence and Involvement

The first set of orientations encompasses what we term “Civic Competence and Involvement,” or the extent to which the individual has the knowledge, capabilities, and perceived abilities to influence the political process, and whether he or she acts on that knowledge by taking part in political activities. We

and IntermediaNCG, *Kenya National Civic Education Programme (URAIA): Technical Advisory Team End of Contract Report*, May 2008.

⁹ See, for example: Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999); Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Richard Rose, William Mishler and Christian Haerpfer, *Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Soviet Societies* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University, 1998); and Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). For research on the impact of civic education in developing democracies, see Steven E. Finkel, “Can Democracy Be Taught? *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 14, October 2003, pp. 137-151, and Steven E. Finkel, “Civic Education and the Mobilization of Political Participation in Developing Democracies, *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 64, November 2002, pp. 994-1020.

¹⁰ The themes pertaining to the program's Cross-Cutting Issues are discussed more fully in documents detailing the so-called “learning platforms”, or program-wide conferences that gave CSOs a chance to learn about each issue before incorporating the topics into their civic education activities. The Study Team developed the topics and questions included to measure these issue dimensions based on the “learning platform” reports.

expect exposure to NCEP II-Uraia activities to influence the individual's basic knowledge of the political system, the structure of the political system, and basic information about political parties and politicians. Given the importance of "Constitutionalism" as one of the program's main themes, we may also expect the exposure to civic education to lead to increased awareness of the constitution and the ongoing reform process.

Civic education may also be expected to influence what is known as the individual's sense of "political efficacy", or the extent to which individuals believe that they can have influence and participate effectively in the political system. This was a crucial component of the NCEP II-Uraia program, as stated above in its goal of "promoting tools to hold elites accountable" and promoting means for effective citizen involvement in the political process. Perceptions of efficacy are critical in determining individual participation in politics. And as a systemic factor, efficacy is important in holding elites accountable to ordinary citizens, as elected officials are thought to be more responsive to public pressures when they believe that citizens feel efficacious and may take future collective actions to further their interests. We examine a series of efficacy related items in the study, including general feelings of political influence, ability to understand and influence issues related to the Constituency Development Fund (CDF), and whether individuals feel informed or efficacious about the ways they can protect their rights, should they be threatened. Finally, we examine the extent to which individuals who are exposed to NCEP II-Uraia activities are more likely as a result to take part in a series of democratic political behaviors, ranging from local-level participation, contact with local and national authorities, electoral participation and peaceful protests and demonstrations.

Thus the "Civic competence and Involvement" cluster of orientations that we examined is:

- Knowledge about the political system, institution and incumbents
- Sense of efficacy that individuals can influence the political process
- Sense of efficacy regarding the Kenyan Constituency Development Fund
- Awareness about ways to defend the individual's political and human rights
- Awareness of the Kenyan constitution and constitutional review process
- Democratic political participation at the local and national levels

2. Democratic Values, Rights and Responsibilities

The second set of orientations we examine encompasses the individual's adherence to a general set of important democratic values, rights, and norms. What precise values and rights should NCEP II-Uraia activities have been expected to change? Political scientist James Gibson and his colleagues provide a useful description of the "democratic citizen" as someone who

"...believes in individual liberty and who is politically tolerant, who holds a certain amount of distrust of political authority but at the same time is trustful of fellow citizens, who is obedient but nonetheless willing to assert rights against the state, who views the state as constrained by legality, and who supports basic democratic institutions and processes."¹¹

Thus, the democratic citizen is one who adheres to the principles inherent in democracy – competitive elections with majority rule, political equality, inclusive political participation, civic liberties and protection of the rights of minorities – and is willing to apply these principles in practice. Individuals should support democratic procedures, support the view that governments cannot encroach on areas of individual and human rights, and provide some degree of support toward existing democratic institutions,

¹¹ James Gibson, Raymond Duch and Kent Tedin, "Democratic Values and the Transformation of the Soviet Union," *Journal of Politics* 54 (1992), p. 338.

though not without a healthy skepticism and willingness to hold elites to account. Individuals should reject corruption and corrupt democratic practices. Finally, the consolidation of democratic culture is facilitated when individuals prefer democracy against all possible alternative forms of government, such as a return to authoritarian rule, military governments, and the like.

As a result, we examined the following specific orientations in this cluster:

- Support for democracy as a form of government against alternative political systems
- Support for the rule of law
- Rejection of violence as a means for resolving political conflict
- Institutional trust
- Social trust
- Awareness of corruption in politics
- Rejection of vote-buying
- Support for basic political and human rights
- Support for humanitarian interventions to protect individuals
- Acceptance of political responsibilities of the individual

3. Cross-Cutting Issues

The NCEP II-Uraia program also involved three “cross-cutting issues”: HIV/AIDS, Gender, and the Environment. These issues were meant to “cut across” the various themes of the program and be treated in particular activities as part of the general process of building awareness and support for democratic orientations, institutions and processes. We examined the following orientations in this cluster:

- Awareness of the importance of the HIV/AIDS Issue
- Support for non-discrimination against HIV/AIDS victims
- Awareness of the importance of gender issues
- Support for women’s rights to own land, participate in politics, and be part of the clergy
- Support for national norms against female genital mutilation
- Awareness of the importance of environmental issues
- Support for alternative energies such as wind and solar power

4. Identity and Ethnic Group Relations

Given the importance of “nation-building” to NCEP II-Uraia and to the country’s political culture more generally, we devote much attention to this dimension in the evaluation. As in NCEP I, we include questions related to an individual’s sense of identity as a Kenyan, and in relation to his or her particular tribe. The program also attempted to instill a sense of tolerance for other ethnic groups, which includes both political tolerance, or the willingness to extend procedural liberties to out-groups, and social tolerance, or the willingness to accept out-group members as family members or neighbors. Moreover, individuals should reject the use of violence as a means for resolving ethnic disputes. We therefore examined the following orientations related to this general cluster:

- Identity as a Kenyan
- Kenyan versus tribal Identity
- Political tolerance for other ethnic groups
- Social tolerance for other ethnic groups
- Rejection of violence as a means for resolving ethnic disputes

Based on our extensive review of NCEP II-Uraia program documents, we are confident that these orientations reflect well the specific goals of the NCEP II-Uraia program in terms of developing democratic attitudes, awareness, values and participation among ordinary Kenyans. They also reflect well the views of political scientists regarding the dispositions that are most appropriate for the deepening and consolidation of democratic political culture in developing political systems.

As noted above, the assessment of the effects of NCEP II-Uraia involves not only determining what impacts it had, but also determining the conditions under which the program's activities were more effective. We investigate these issues by focusing on several dimensions of the individual's experience with NCEP II-Uraia civic education:

- **Involvement with Face-to-Face NCEP II-Uraia activities.** What kind of activity did the individual attend, a workshop, a poetry-drama event, or an informal or cultural gathering?
- **Exposure to NCEP II-Uraia mass media.** Did the individuals attend to Uraia television programming, or attend to Uraia messages on the radio, in newspapers, or see Uraia neighborhood murals?
- **Frequency of NCEP II-Uraia Exposure.** Did the individual attend one or two activities, or was the exposure to civic education more extensive?
- **Teaching Methodologies.** Were the methods used in the face-to-face activities more active and participatory, or were they more passive in nature? Were individuals encouraged to express their opinions and participate in games, simulations, role playing, mock elections, and the like, or were they exposed solely to lectures and presented with material with little interaction with the instructors
- **Facilitator Quality.** Did individuals believe that the facilitators or trainers who conducted the civic education were knowledgeable, interesting, likeable, and competent?

Many of these factors are likely to condition the impact that NCEP II-Uraia civic education activities may have had on individuals. We expect individuals who receive more intensive exposure to civic education, exposure to more participatory teaching methodologies, and teaching by high quality instructors to be more likely to absorb and act on the messages imparted in civic education. These were the basic findings from the NCEP I and previous impact evaluation as well; there is every reason to expect the same kinds of patterns to hold in this study.

As was the case in NCEP I, civic education activities may have also indirectly impacted others through the discussions they stimulated within an individual's social network. We characterized these types of effects as "secondary effects" of NCEP II-Uraia, as they may occur after the activities may have already exerted their "primary" effects on the participants themselves. Secondary effects of civic education may occur in two possible ways: 1) workshop participants may discuss democracy or constitutional issues with others, thereby amplifying in their own minds the messages that they may have learned in the workshops; and 2) individuals who did not attend workshops may have discussed democracy-related topics with individuals who did, thereby becoming exposed to the messages conveyed in the workshops indirectly. These kinds of effects were some of the most important that were uncovered in the NCEP I evaluation; again, there is strong reason to expect the same pattern of findings here as well.

Finally, it was crucial in the current context to take into account the impact of the inter-communal violence that followed the 2007 election. The NCEP II-Uraia program ended in September 2007, and, as noted earlier, it would have been ideal to have conducted at least some interviews with program participants and non-participants in the months just preceding the election. The tragic set of events following the election presents the additional unfortunate possibility that whatever short-term gains the Uraia program may have achieved in the months just preceding the election could have been wiped out by

the upheaval and trauma that the country experienced thereafter. We cannot determine for certain whether there were short-term pre-election effects of the program, nor, obviously, can we determine what the long-term effects would have looked like had the violence *not* occurred. But we can attempt to understand how the events following the election may have played a role in attenuating the effects of the NCEP II-Uraia program by examining the pattern of effects among individuals who were and who were not directly affected by the violence. We therefore include items in the study related to the individual's experience with post-election violence, and we include additional items that attempt to assess individual attitudes and beliefs about democracy before the violence and dislocations occurred. In later analyses (Section IV-C), we attempt to untangle how these factors may have influenced the impact of NCEP II-Uraia civic education.

B. Study Methodology

I. Sampling Procedures for Selecting Uraia Activities

Our initial plan for obtaining a “treatment group” for the study – i.e., individuals who had been exposed to Uraia civic education – was to generate a random sample of participants in NCEP II-Uraia activities from lists that were to have been kept by the implementing CSOs or Consortia. Unfortunately, we discovered during the October 2008 trip to Nairobi that lists of participants were kept for only a very small minority of Uraia activities, and that only a small minority of the lists contained enough contact information that would have enabled our survey teams to locate and interview those respondents. This was a potentially damaging blow to the prospects of conducting the study altogether, as we faced the possibility that we would have no obvious way of finding individuals who had taken part in Uraia activities. We consulted the quarterly financial reports submitted by all implementing CSOs, but again, they did not contain enough concrete information about where specific activities took place, and when, let alone names or contact information of particular individuals who might have attended. We considered conducting a large-scale national survey, but, without reliable information about the likely “hit rate” – i.e., how often a Uraia participant could be expected to be encountered through random sampling methods – such an undertaking would have been prohibitively expensive and potentially unsuccessful in any case.

Fortunately, during the latter part of the October 2008 Nairobi trip, we became aware of the existence of the so-called “Form D” cover sheets for each Uraia activity that were completed by the activity facilitators and submitted to their Consortium's central office. These Form D cover sheets contained information about the nature, timing, content and location of each Uraia civic education activity that was conducted during 2006-2007. These Form D sheets served as our basic sampling frame. A plan was developed to select a random sample of these activities, stratified by the four Consortia to ensure that all four were adequately represented in the study. We would then send the Research International survey teams directly to the sublocations and to the specific sites where each NCEP II-Uraia activity took place, and instruct the teams in specific random route canvassing procedures that would be used to locate and interview individuals from that area who may have attended the specific NCEP II-Uraia activities that were selected.

The first task was to gather all of the Form D sheets from the four Consortia and conduct a “serialization”, or a simple count of how many activities were conducted by each Consortium. Until that task was completed, we would not be in a position to know the proportion of each Consortium's Form Ds that would need to be selected in order to achieve an accurate representation of each Consortium's civic activities. The results of the serialization are shown below in Table II-1.

Table II-I. Number of Reported Uraia Activities from Form D Activity Cover Sheets

Consortium	Number	Percentage
CRECO	8,750	7.6%
CEDMAC	4,348	5.5%
NAMCEC	5,992	11.1%
ECEP	59,950	75.8%
Total	79,040	100%

It can be seen, first, that the NCEP II-Uraia program reported having conducted more than 79,000 discrete civic education workshops, poetry and drama events, and other public gatherings. In terms of Consortia representation, ECEP activities made up approximately 75% of all Uraia activities, with the remaining Consortia's activities comprising between 5% and 11% of the total. This presented a thorny sampling issue, in that any purely random sample of the NCEP II-Uraia activity data base would result in a very large number of ECEP activities, far outpacing the activities of any of the other consortia. At the same time, it was evident from the Form D and quarterly financial reports that the vast majority of the ECEP activities were informal meetings conducted in connection with church or religious gatherings, and were also of relatively shorter duration than the activities undertaken by the other consortia. Thus it was not clear that a purely random sample of activities in the serialization data base would have accurately represented the kinds and ranges of activities that were conducted in the NCEP II-Uraia program overall. Based on these considerations, we decided to stratify the activities by Consortium, and include in the final sample an *equal number* of activities conducted by each of the four Consortia. We set a quota of ninety (90) activities to represent each of the four Consortia's overall activities. We recognize that this mandated quota of 25% of the total activities allocated to each Consortium may not represent the "true" proportion of the total Uraia activities that the given Consortia undertook, but we doubt that it is possible that such a figure could be accurately determined from the available information. We think it prudent instead to assume a rough equality between the Consortia, and base our assessments of program impact on that assumption.

We next conducted a detailed coding of a random sample of approximately 2000 Form D activity sheets for each Consortium. (It would have taken months to code all of the 79,040 activities in the serialization data base, and would have been prohibitively expensive as well). This coding contained information on where a given activity was conducted, what kind of activity it was, which CSO undertook the activity, how many people attended, and other aspects related to the nature of the particular Uraia civic education event. We used this data base to determine the mix of civic education activities, e.g., workshops, poetry/drama, informal gatherings, that were undertaken by each Consortium, and we then allocated a proportional number of each Consortium's 90 total activities to each kind of civic education event. So, for example, if 20% of CRECO activities were workshops, we allocated 20% of the 90 total CRECO activities (or 18 activities) for inclusion in the study to be workshops. In this way the 90 selected activities for each Consortium represent an accurate reflection of the kinds of civic education activities that each undertook as part of the Uraia program.

An added benefit of this coding exercise was to provide a comprehensive account of exactly the kinds of activities that Uraia conducted from 2006-2007, the activities that each Consortium and each CSO conducted, and where and when each of those activities took place. Table II-2 shows the figures for type of activity. It can be seen that informal meetings (including "community cultural meetings") were the most frequent activity type, representing nearly 70% of all Uraia activities. Workshops (including "focused group discussions") represented 25% of all activities, and poetry-drama ("community theatre" and "oral poetry," "song and dance") comprising the remaining 5% of Uraia activities. There was large variation across the four Consortia in the concentration of different kinds of activities. Informal meetings made up the vast majority of NAMCEC (85%) and CEDMAC (80%) activities, approximately two-thirds

of ECEP activities (66%), and just under one-half of CRECO (46%) activities. CRECO conducted the highest number of formal workshops (43% of their total activities), with workshops representing 30% of ECEP’s activities and between 13-16% of the activities of other two Consortia. Poetry-drama represented 10% of CRECO’s activities, 5-6% of ECEP and CEDMAC’s, and a negligible amount of NAMCEC activities.

Table II-2. Total Distribution of Uraia Activities

Consortia	Workshops	Poetry-Drama	Informal Meetings
CRECO	43.3%	10.4%	46.3%
CEDMAC	16.6	5.3	78.1
NAMCEC	13.0	.1	86.9
ECEP	30.0	6.5	63.5
Total	25.1%	5.4%	69.5%

We next selected the specific Uraia activities for inclusion in the study, using the quota of 90 activities per Consortium discussed above. We decided first to limit the sampled activities to those conducted during 2007, as activities from 2006 were judged to have taken place so long ago by the time of data collection (December 2008) that accurate respondent recall would be very difficult. 2007 activities, moreover, represented nearly 80% of all Uraia activities, so there was very little given up in terms of program representativeness in limiting our sampling points to activities from that year. Within each Consortium, we then calculated the appropriate number of workshops, poetry-drama, and informal meetings that, given a total sample of 90 activities per Consortium, would accurately reflect that Consortium’s overall mix of activities. That figure became the “baseline” number of workshops, poetry-drama, and informal meetings that would be drawn at random from the coded activity data base. This procedure resulted in 93 targeted workshops, 20 targeted poetry-drama activities, and 247 targeted informal meetings, for a total of 360 targeted activities.

It was clear from this exercise, however, that there would not be sufficient numbers of poetry-drama activities (and therefore treated respondents) to allow a credible assessment of these kinds of activities’ relative impact. There would also be a “surplus” of informal meetings, as the marginal impact of having 250 compared to, say, 200 of these kinds of activities, would not be that significant in terms of assessing the impact of this kind of activity. We decided therefore to “upweight” the number of poetry-drama activities by a factor of 2.5, yielding 51 targeted poetry-drama activities compared to the initial figure of 20. Similarly, we “upweighted” the number of workshops by a factor of 1.2, yielding 111 targeted workshop activities compared to the initial figure of 93. This weighting procedure was designed to provide a large enough number of respondents who would have been exposed to each of the major kinds of Uraia activities, so that credible assessments of their respective impacts could be made. We stress, however, that whenever we make statements about the effectiveness of the Uraia program *as a whole*, these are based on analyses that re-weight the data in line with the overall Uraia population figures shown in Table 11-2.

Based on the weighted figures, we selected *at random* the requisite number of each kind of activity for each Consortium from the coded activities data base. The Research International survey team then went to the exact venue (such as a school or marketplace) where each of the 360 sampled activities took place, and searched for respondents following the random route procedures outlined in the next sub-section. If, after one full day of interviewing, the survey team was unable to locate any respondents who had been exposed to *any* Uraia activities, the sampling site was abandoned and replaced with – whenever possible – another of the same type of activity for that Consortium drawn from the coded activities data base. This occurred in approximately 18 instances, half of which were associated with poetry-drama events. We show in Table II-3 the targeted number of activities of each type for each Consortium, and the total

number of each activity that is contained in the final sample. Given the lack of participant lists, and given all of the other uncertainties involved in these procedures, we consider the sampling for the study to have been extremely successful.

Table II-3. Targeted and Sampled Activities by Uraia Consortium

Consortium	Targeted Activities			Sampled Activities		
	Workshops	Poetry-Drama	Informal Meetings	Workshops	Poetry-Drama	Informal Meetings
CRECO	47	23	20	47	23	20
CEDMAC	18	12	60	18	8	64
NAMCEC	14	1	75	15	0	75
ECEP	32	15	43	33	11	46
Total	111	51	198	113	42	205

Table II-4 shows that the final sample of activities accurately reflects the regional distribution of Uraia activities as well.

Table II-4. Distribution of Sampled Activities by Province

Province	Number of Targeted Activities	Number of Activities in Final Samples	Percent of Sampled Activities	Percent of Total Uraia Activities
Nairobi	16	11	3.1%	4.5%
Central	46	39	10.8	12.7
Coast	36	45	12.5	10.0
Rift Valley	80	71	19.7	22.3
Western	31	32	8.9	8.6
Nyanza	35	38	10.6	9.6
Eastern	89	95	26.3	24.7
North Eastern	27	29	8.1	7.5
Total	360	360	100%	100%

Finally, we note that the random selection and other sampling procedures that we implemented produced a final sample that represented a diverse set of the forty-three CSOs which implemented Uraia civic education activities. Table II-5 shows the number of sampled activities for each CSO within CRECO, CEDMAC and ECEP, and the regional distribution for the 90 ECEP activities.

Table II-5. Civil Society Organizations Included in the NCEP II-Uraia Activities Sample

	Number of Sampled Activities
CRECO	
ABANTU	3
CLARION	1
CPDA	8
CREDO	9
ECJP	16
ECWD	13
GADECE	4
ILISHE	2
LARC	1
LRF	11
MAPACA	10
SANAA	5
YUU	5
CEDGG	2
CEDMAC	
AFUB	2
UDEK	22
DEEDS	12
FONI	5
KOLA	9
WOMANKIND	15
CEMIRIDE	25
NAMCEC	
SUPKEM	76
ALDEF	7
KCIU	7
ECEP	
NAIROBI	2
CENTRAL	14
COAST	8
RIFT VALLEY	10
WESTERN	11
NYANZA	19
EASTERN	18
NORTH EASTERN	8

2. Procedures for Selecting Treatment and Control Group Respondents

Survey enumerators were given extensive training in the procedures required to select “treatment group” respondents (individuals exposed to Uraia civic education) and “control group” respondents (similar individuals not exposed to Uraia activities). The exact procedures are described in the *Instruction Manual for Field Surveyors* that is attached to this report as Appendix A.

Interview teams started at the exact venue where each of the 360 sampled Uraia activities took place. Interviewers then followed a random walk in a pre-determined direction (depending on the day of the week), proceeded at least 200 meters, and began screening either the first or second household that they encountered (again depending on the day of the week). A detailed set of screening questions was asked of

all potential respondents, and if a given respondent reported attending at least one civic education activity **before the 2007 election** and that the activity/activities were “**not concerned only with helping people to register and vote in the 2007 election,**” the individual was selected for inclusion in the “treatment group.”¹² The latter screen was necessary to include, as the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) carried out voter education meetings just prior to the election, and we sought to ensure that those included in the treatment group actually had participated in civic education programs, not just ECK’s voter education. The full set of screening questions can be found as part of the final survey questionnaire that is attached to this report as Appendix B.

Once a treatment group respondent interview had been successfully completed, the interviewer recorded that person’s demographic information in terms of:

- Gender
- Age
- Education (highest level of schooling)
- Number of Secondary Group Memberships (number of groups to which the person belongs, including church or religious organization, youth or sports group, trade union, women’s group, cultural or school organization, burial society, tribal or clan association, business or professional association, political party, or other group).

Interviewers were then instructed to find **control group** individuals who had similar demographic characteristics as the given treatment group individual but who had **not attended** Uraia civic education activities. Interviewers were told to skip at least four houses and then begin contacting households, looking for individuals with the same gender as the treatment group respondent, whose age was within 10 years of the treatment group respondent, who was in the same general category of education (Primary, Secondary, Post-Secondary), and who was in the same general category of group memberships (0, 1-2, 3 or more). In addition, the potential control group individual was screened to verify that he or she had **not** attended civic education activities either **before** or **after** the 2007 elections.

This set of procedures was repeated until five treatment group respondents and five matching control group respondents were interviewed from each of the 360 sampling points.

The resultant sample consists, therefore, of 1,800 treatment group respondents (5 per sampling point) and 1,800 matched control group respondents (5 per sampling point). The treatment group sample, moreover, may be considered to be as accurate a representation of the population of Kenyan citizens who were “treated” or exposed to Uraia civic education activities as was possible to achieve, given the time and cost constraints associated with the project: the activities themselves were selected at random according to the procedures laid out in the previous section, and the specific individuals were selected according to the random route and screening procedures just described. Accordingly, in the analyses that follow, the treatment group is considered to be a statistically representative sample of the “treated Kenyan population.”¹³

¹² The exact wording to define “civic education activities” for the respondent in the screening questions was: “As you may know, there are some programs going on in Kenya that try to engage people about democracy and human rights, and about how to solve community problems. Sometimes they are sponsored by community organizations or religious organizations, and they can involve workshops, public barazas, theatre or drama presentations, town meetings, or other kinds of public discussions in churches or mosques about citizens’ rights and responsibilities. We call these kinds of activities “civic education.”

¹³ With the proviso discussed above regarding the assumption of relative balance in total activities across the four Consortia.

However, because the control group was constructed solely based on the demographic characteristics of the treatment group, it **cannot** be considered to be a reflection of the overall Kenyan population that was not treated by Uraia. This means that the control group’s purpose in the analysis is solely to stand for the “counterfactual condition” of what the treatment group *would have looked like in the absence of treatment*; it is not possible to use it to make claims about the overall Kenyan population or even the overall Kenyan population that was not treated by Uraia. For that, a random sample of the overall population of Kenya would have been required (and which was included in the NCEP I evaluation); cost and time considerations prevented this component from being included in the current study.

Finally, we note that, despite our best efforts at implementing the random site and random route respondent and treatment selection procedures, there are still likely to be some unavoidable biases in the samples. Relying on respondent recall of their participation in Uraia activities to select the treatment and control groups introduces possible biases, in that individuals who were more affected by the activities may be more likely to remember them. It may also be the case that individuals could not distinguish completely between Uraia and non-Uraia civic education, or between pre- and post-election civic education. And it may also be the case that treatment group respondents attended some other Uraia activity aside from the specific activity that took place at the sampling point. Our procedures were explicitly designed to overcome all of these potential problems as best as possible. Nevertheless, because the study is based on respondents’ retrospective recall of events that took place long before the interviews, some biases are likely to remain. We **strongly recommend** that future evaluations return to the pre-test/post-test design followed in NCEP I; a pre-test interview with treatment and control individuals *before* a treatment group experiences civic education is crucial, not only for establishing respondents’ baseline attitudes or democratic orientations, but also for verifying whether individuals are or are not treated, and for tracking and re-interviewing them at future points in time. We strongly recommend that future civic education programs also include extensive procedures for recording contact information for program participants to facilitate the evaluation process.

3. Fieldwork

The fieldwork took approximately 38 days, beginning on 10th December 2008 and ending on 30th January 2009. Fieldwork took place on weekends, but not on 12 December (Jamhuri or Independence Day), nor between 24th December to 4th January. A total of 72 interviewers were used on the project, with 15 team leaders and 3 overall supervisors. Before fieldwork commenced, all interviewers and team leaders underwent a three-day training session, of which there were seven spread throughout the country.¹⁴

C. Survey Instrument and Scales

The survey instrument was constructed using a variety of sources, including the MSI-USAID impact survey conducted for the first National Civic Education Programme (NCEP I), recent Afrobarometer surveys carried out in Kenya and other surveys on human and political rights from other parts of the world. The questionnaire was tailored to the Kenyan context, taking into account the goals and objectives of NCEP II, as articulated in the *Uraia Resource File* and other official documents, as well as in conversations with donors and implementers at the start of the evaluation. As noted above, the final survey instrument can be found in this report as Appendix B.

¹⁴ In Nakuru (Rift Valley), Eldoret (Rift Valley), Kisumu (Nyanza), Mombasa (Coast), Meru (Eastern), Nyeri (Central), and Garissa (North Eastern).

We included questions relating to the five general themes of the Uraia program: good governance, human rights, democracy, constitutionalism, and nation-building. For some of these dimensions, the questions relate to individuals' *awareness, involvement, or perceived competence* regarding an issue or theme, and we categorize these items under the general rubric of *Civic Competence and Involvement*. For other dimensions, the questions related to individuals' preferences or values about politics, the rights of citizens, leaders, institutions, or the overall political system, and we categorize these items under the general rubric of *Democratic Values, Rights, and Responsibilities*. We also included questions that addressed the "cross-cutting" themes emphasized in NCEP II: gender, HIV/AIDS, and environment. Finally, the survey included a range of questions on ethnic social and political relations, taking into account the highly polarized conditions following the inter-communal violence that occurred after Kenya's 2007 election. Nearly all of the questions represent either standard measures of the respective items in the political science literature or adaptations of recent surveys that were done in Kenya, in particular the NCEP I Impact Evaluation.

We also included a series of questions related to individuals' experience with Uraia civic education, including frequency of attending workshops and other activities, the types of instructional methods that were used at the activities, the content areas that were covered, and the perceived quality of the instructors. The individuals' rating of their experience was also assessed, as was the extent to which they believed that the activities had increased their knowledge about democracy. We also included a number of questions that asked about exposure to the media activities conducted by NCEP II. Basic demographic and political information was also gathered in order to determine the effect of civic education over and above other influences on individual orientations, as well as to determine whether civic education has differential effects on certain types of individuals or individuals with certain kinds of prior political attitudes or levels of pre-existing political resources.

The questionnaire was translated into Kiswahili by members of the Research International staff, and back-translated by a professional translator in Nairobi. This process resulted in many changes in the Kiswahili and a much improved final version of the questionnaire. Practice interviews were conducted in both Kiswahili and English during the training sessions in order for each interviewer to be comfortable with the questionnaire in both languages. In addition, interviewers who spoke the local language were assigned to each of the regional interview teams. Kiswahili and English were by far the dominant languages in which the interviews were conducted: 67% were conducted in Kiswahili, 26% were conducted in English, and 7% were carried out in one of Kenya's other languages.

Below we summarize the questions and scaling procedures used to measure the main attitudes and behaviors. In addition, we present below information about the statistical "reliability" of scales that were used. Reliability in a statistical sense refers to the extent to which a scale that contains multiple questions related to a single topic can be viewed as an accurate measure of the underlying concept. The basic notion is that scales are "reliable" measures of an underlying concept when the individual questions that make up the scale are highly correlated with one another. If the individual questions are not highly correlated, it is very possible that a scale that combines them into a single measure will reflect several different underlying concepts or will contain much random "noise."

The standard statistical measure for assessing the degree of reliability in a scale is Cronbach's alpha, which provides a sense of how well the individual items are correlated with each other and the entire scale. The coefficient represents the ratio of "true score" variation in responses over the total response variation in the scale, that is, how much of the total variation in the scale can be attributed to variation in the respondent's true, underlying attitudes that is separate from random error. Alpha coefficients range from 0, when all the response variation is random error, to 1, when all the response variation results from "true" attitudes. It is not uncommon to see alpha coefficients in the .6 to .7 range in published political

science research, though values of .8 or higher (80% true score variance) are typically desired. *Higher numbers mean a more reliable scale.*

I. Civic Competence and Involvement

Respondents were asked a series of questions regarding their knowledge of how the Kenyan government works, ways to protect their basic rights, and their knowledge about the constitution and its reform. Respondents were also asked about their perceived political efficacy, or ability to influence government and politics. In addition, the survey asked respondents about the extent to which they participate in local and national-level politics.

Political Knowledge. Respondents were asked four questions about knowledge of political leaders and institutions in Kenya: whether they knew the title of the person who chairs the Kenyan parliament, who appoints members of the Kenyan High Court, how the constitution can be amended, and who is responsible for deciding how money from the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) is used. We summed respondents' correct answers to create a *Political Knowledge* scale ranging from 0 to 4. The reliability of the scale was .69.

Political Efficacy. We measured the individual's sense of perceived influence in politics, or political efficacy, by asking individuals whether they agreed with the statement: "I feel well prepared for participating in political life." Responses were scored as "1" for "strongly disagree" to "4" for "strongly agree."

CDF Efficacy. To measure the respondent's sense of efficacy relating specifically to the use of Constituency Development Funds (CDF), we asked two questions: "I am able to influence how CDF funds are used in my constituency" and "The CDF is too complicated for people like me to understand." The questions were scored as "1" for "strongly disagree" to "4" for "strongly agree" for the first question, and 1 for "strongly agree" to "4" for "strongly disagree" for the second question, and the items were averaged to form a composite scale. The inter-item correlation for the two questions was .12.

Political Participation. The survey instrument included questions on whether the respondent had done any of the following in the past year: 1) discussed political issues with friends, family, or coworkers; 2) worked for a political party or candidate; 3) participated in an organized effort to solve a neighborhood or community problem; 4) attended a meeting of the local town council or with other government officials; 5) contacted a local official, like a local councilor or an official who works for a government agency; 6) lodged a complaint with a government body or a civil society organization about unfair treatment or a violation of your rights; 7) contacted a national elected official; 8) taken part in a protest, march, or demonstration on some national or local issue; and 9) contacted a local chief or traditional leader about a problem. For each item, responses were scored on a three-point continuum, with "1" for "not done," "2" for "once," and "3" for "several times." A factor analysis showed that the items tended to "load" on two different dimensions, one corresponding to *Local Political Participation* (items 1, 3, 4, 5, and 9) and one corresponding to *National Political Participation* (items 2, 6, 7, and 8). We created scales associated with each dimension by averaging the responses for the respective items. The reliability of the *Local Participation* scale was .66, and the reliability of the *National Participation* scale was .69.

Informed about How to Protect Rights. We asked whether individuals felt informed about what they could do to defend their rights if the police or some other group tried to stop them from exercising basic political and social rights, with responses coded as "1" for "not very informed," "2" for "somewhat informed," and "3" for "very informed."

Informed about the Contents of the Constitution. Individuals were asked how informed they felt about the contents of the Kenyan constitution, with responses coded as “1” for “not informed,” “2” for “somewhat informed,” and “3” for very informed.

Support for Public Involvement in Writing the Constitution. Respondents were asked whether “writing a constitution is a job for experts, with no role for ordinary citizens,” with the responses coded as “1” for “strongly agree” to “4” for “strongly disagree.”

Support for Constitutional Change. Individuals were asked about the extent to which the current constitution should be changed, with “major changes” coded as “3,” “minor changes” coded as “2,” and “kept as it is” coded as “1.”

Reduce the Power of the President. Respondents were asked whether they agreed with the following statement: “In the new constitution, the powers of the President should be reduced and those of other institutions, like the Parliament and the Courts, should be increased.” Responses were scored from “1” for “strongly disagree” to “4” for “strongly agree.”

2. Democratic Values, Rights, and Responsibilities

We asked a series of questions concerning the respondent’s support for various democratic norms values, and institutions. These questions addressed five main topics: support for democracy as a form of government; support for the political values that are inherent in democratic governance; support for certain social values that tend to support democratic politics; support for current political institutions and the democratic political system; and the perceived rights and responsibilities of citizenship.

Democracy is Best. We asked respondents, “Sometimes democracy does not work. When this happens, some people say that we need a strong leader that does not have to bother with elections. Others say that even when things do not work, democracy is always best. What do you think?” Responses were scored as “0” for those who say that the country needs a strong leader, and “1” for those who say that democracy is always best.

Non-Support for Anti-Democratic Alternatives. We included three questions that asked respondents whether they would approve or disapprove of each of the following non-democratic alternatives: 1) “only one party is allowed to stand for election and hold office;” 2) “the army comes in to govern the country;” and 3) “elections and the national assembly are abolished so that the president can decide everything.” For each question, “approve” was scored as “0” and “disapprove” was scored as “1.” From these we created a *Non-Support for Anti-Democratic Alternatives* variable that averages responses to the three items. The reliability of this scale was .45.

Support for Rule of Law. We asked respondents about two aspects of support for the rule of law in a democracy. We asked whether “it is sometimes necessary to ignore the rule of law and solve problems using other means” and whether “suspected criminals do not deserve the same legal rights as everyone else.” Each of the questions was coded as “1” for “strongly agree” to “4” for “strongly disagree,” and the two scores were averaged to create a general Rule of Law variable. The correlation between the variables was .23.

Institutional Trust. Respondents were asked how much they trusted a total of ten political and social institutions, including: religious institutions, the Presidency, local councils, the police, Parliament, the judicial system, the electoral commission of Kenya (ECK), civil society and community-based organizations, village elders, local chiefs, and the media. Respondents were asked how much they trusted each institution, and responses were scored as “1” for “none,” “2” for “a little,” and “3” for “a lot.” We

averaged the scores for the six political items (the Presidency, local councils, the police, Parliament, the judicial system, and the ECK) to create a *Trust in Political Institutions* variable. The reliability of this scale was .82.

Social Trust. We asked individuals whether they thought that “generally speaking, most people can be trusted.” Responses were coded from “1” for “strongly disagree” to “4” for “strongly agree.”

Perceptions of Corruption. We asked individuals to assess “how many politicians and people who work for the government in Kenya” are “corrupt,” with corruption defined as instances where “people in government and in the civil service illegally use public money for their own benefit, or take bribes.” Responses were coded as “1” for “all,” “2” for “almost all,” “3” for “some of them,” and “4” for “only a few.”

Vote Buying. We asked two questions about whether respondents thought it was wrong for “a candidate or party official to offer money in return for a vote” and for “a voter to accept money in return for his or her vote.” Responses were coded as “1” for “not wrong at all,” “2” for “wrong but understandable,” and “3” for “wrong and punishable.” The questions were correlated at .59, and we created a *Vote Buying Wrong* variable by averaging the two items.

Political Violence. We included a question that asked whether respondents thought the use of violence was morally justifiable “to achieve an important political goal.” Responses were scored from “1” for “strongly agree” to “4” for “strongly disagree.”

Rights Consciousness. We probed respondents about their support for eight basic political and human rights: 1) “the right of individuals to criticize the government,” 2) “the right to form groups that push for political changes,” 3) “the right to obtain information about how government funds are spent,” 4) “the right to be free from unlawful arrest or prosecution by the government,” 5) “the right of anyone to run for elected office, regardless of ethnicity or political viewpoint,” 6) “the right to travel and work anywhere in the country,” 7) “the right of all political parties to campaign for people’s votes in all parts of the country, regardless of which ethnic group is the majority,” and 8) “the right to own land anywhere in Kenya.” For each item, responses were scored as “3” if the respondent thought that the right “should always be maintained,” “2” for “it depends on the situation,” and “1” for “almost never be maintained.” Factor analysis showed that all eight items loaded on a single dimension, and therefore a *Rights Consciousness* scale was created by averaging the responses to the eight questions. The reliability of this scale was .73.

Humanitarian Intervention. Respondents were asked whether they agreed with the following statement: “If the Kenyan government cannot provide people with safety from violence, then other countries acting through the United Nations have the responsibility to come in, no matter what our own government says.” Responses were scored from “1” for “strongly disagree” to “4” for “strongly agree.”

Political Responsibilities. The survey asked whether respondents thought each of the following responsibilities was important for democracy: 1) “to vote in local elections,” 2) “to pay their levies and taxes for services,” 3) “to take part in political discussions that affect their community,” 4) to become informed about the candidates and parties who are running for elected office,” 5) “to settle political conflicts without using violence,” and 6) “to accept the results of free elections, even if your party or candidate does not win.” Responses to each item were scored as “1” for “not at all important,” “2” for “somewhat important,” and “3” for “very important.” Factor analysis showed that all six items loaded on a single dimension, and therefore a *Political Responsibilities* scale was created by averaging the responses to the six questions. The reliability of this scale was .64.

3. Cross-Cutting Issues

Respondents were asked a series of questions relating to the three cross-cutting themes from Uraia: HIV/AIDS, gender, and environment.

HIV/AIDS issues. Respondents were asked two questions about issues relating to HIV/AIDS. The first asked, “Compared with other issues, how important in general do you think it is for the government to address problems related to HIV/AIDS, like ensuring proper care for people with the virus, or making sure that they are not discriminated against.” Responses were scored from “1” for “much less important” to “5” for “much more important.” The second asked respondents how they felt about employment discrimination against people with HIV/AIDS. The question asked whether respondents agreed that, “It may be unfortunate, but it is understandable for employers to give preference to people without the HIV/AIDS virus.” Responses were scored from “1” for “strongly agree” to “4” for “strongly disagree.”

Importance of Gender Issues. Respondents were asked, “Compared with other issues, how important in general do you think it is for the government to address issues related to women’s rights and equality for women in Kenya?” Responses were scored from “1” for “much less important” to “5” for “much more important.”

Women’s Rights. We asked individuals three questions about women’s role in Kenyan society, 1) whether “women and men should both be allowed to inherit land,” 2) whether “there should be a certain number of parliamentary seats and cabinet positions reserved for women,” and 3) whether “women should have the same right as men to serve as religious leaders, that is, as priests, pastors, or imams”. All three questions were coded from “1” for “strongly disagree” to “4” for “strongly agree,” and the three scores were averaged to create a general *Women’s Rights* variable. The reliability of the scale was .58.

Female Genital Mutilation (FGM). Respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement, “Individual communities should be able to decide whether they support female circumcision according to their own culture and traditions.” Responses were scored from “1” for “strongly agree” to “4” for “strongly disagree”.

Environmental Issues. Two questions about environmental issues were included. The first asked, “Compared with other issues, how important in general do you think it is for the government to address environmental issues, that is, things like pollution, global climate change, and protecting forests and wildlife?” Responses were scored from “1” for “much less important” to “5” for “much more important.” The second question asked whether respondents thought “Businesses and public utilities like electric and gas companies should be required to use more alternative energies like wind and solar, even if this increases the cost of their products in the short-run.” Responses were coded from “1” for “strongly disagree” to “4” for “strongly agree.”

4. Identity and Ethnic Group Relations

In light of the inter-ethnic violence that occurred after the 2007 election, we included several questions on the strength of ethnic and national identification, tolerance of other ethnic communities, and beliefs about ethnic group rights. We also asked about the role of ethnicity in voting and the perceived need for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

National Identity. We asked individuals “how important is being Kenyan to the way you think of yourself,” with responses coded as “3” for “very important,” “2” “ for “somewhat important,” and “1” for “not important.”

National Versus Tribal Identity. We asked individuals to provide an assessment of their identity as a Kenyan *versus* that of a particular tribe or ethnic group. We first asked individuals, “What is your tribe,” and then asked them: “Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a Kenyan and being a (INSERT TRIBE). Which of the following statements best expresses your feelings: “I feel only Kenyan,” “I feel more Kenyan than (TRIBE),” “I feel equally Kenyan and (TRIBE),” “I feel more (TRIBE) than Kenyan,” and “I feel only (TRIBE).”

Ethnic Tolerance. We included a battery of questions to test respondents’ willingness to extend basic political and social rights to members of other ethnic communities, particularly groups that the respondents disliked. For this, we used a multi-step procedure. First, we asked respondents about their feelings toward each of Kenya’s five largest ethnic communities (Kalenjins, Luos, Kikuyus, Kamba, and Luhyas). Respondents were asked whether they liked or disliked each group, and responses were recorded on a five-point continuum with “1” indicating “like the group very much” and “5” indicating “dislike the group very much.” Next, we asked respondents whether there was one group among the five that they liked the *least*. We considered this the respondent’s “Most Disliked Group” (MDG).¹⁵ Third, after having identified a Most Disliked Group, respondents were asked whether members of that group should be allowed to “form their own political party” and “speak in your community even if they say things that you do not think are right.” Responses were scored from “1” for “strongly disagree” to “5” for “strongly agree.” These two items were moderately correlated at .24, and were averaged to create a *Political Tolerance of Most Disliked Group* variable. Next, we asked two questions about inter-ethnic social relations. Respondents were asked whether they would want their son or daughter to marry a member of the MDG, and whether they would support an organized effort to keep members of the MDG from living in their area. Again, responses were from “1” as “strongly disagree” to “5” as “strongly agree.” The two items were averaged to create a *Social Tolerance of Most Disliked Group* variable. The inter-item correlation between the two questions was .33.

Ethnic Voting. To probe feelings about ethnic voting, we asked respondents which of the following statements was closer to their own view: 1) “It is normal to want to elect someone from your own ethnic community” or 2) “Voters should place much less emphasis on ethnic considerations.” Responses were coded as “1” if the respondent chose the first statement and “2” for the second.

Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Respondents were asked whether they agreed that “Kenya needs a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to deal with the problem of historical injustices and ethnic violence.” Responses were coded from “1” for “strongly disagree” to “4” for “strongly agree.”

5. Experience with NCEP II-Uraia Civic Education

The primary variables that were used to assess the impact of NCEP II-Uraia are derived from a series of questions relating to the individual’s experience with civic education activities. Individuals in the “treatment group” (those who participated in NCEP II face-to-face activities), were first asked questions about the number and types of activities in which they participated, as well as the length of the activities. Then, respondents were asked questions about: the *content areas* covered in the activities; the extent to which the workshop was taught with *participatory methodologies* such as dramatizations, problem-solving activities, and role playing exercises; and the individual’s perception of the *teaching quality* of the instructors. Following these questions, individuals were asked whether they had *spoken to others* about the topics covered in the workshop, with specific questions related to family members, friends, people at work, and people in “groups to which you belong.” As noted above in the respondent selection section,

¹⁵ In the event that a respondent refused to identify any group as her MDG, we used the group with the lowest score on the like/dislike questions as that respondent’s MDG. In the case of a tie, we randomly selected one of the five largest groups as the respondent’s MDG.

we also asked whether the activities that respondents had attended were conducted right before the 2007 election. This was important because the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) carried out voter education meetings just prior to the election, and we sought to ensure that those included in the treatment group actually had participated in civic education programs, not just ECK's voter education. Questions related to the timing of the civic education exposure were part of the respondent screening in order for individuals to be included in the study at all, but we asked further questions during the interview in an attempt to verify the specific kind of activities in which the individual took part. The specific coding schemes used to measure these areas are discussed in the appropriate results sections below.

Both treatment group and "control group" respondents were asked about whether they recalled Uraia media communications. We asked whether individuals recalled seeing "Uraia" talks shows or messages on TV, heard them on the radio, saw articles or messages in newspapers, or saw public murals before the 2007 election. We also asked whether respondents recalled seeing talk shows about democracy or governance on the television program called *Newsline*.

Individuals in both the workshop and control group samples were asked whether, regardless of their own participation in democracy or constitution workshops, other individuals had *spoken to them* about the workshops or teachings that *they* had attended, and if so, how many individuals had done so. These responses permitted us to measure the extent to which the NCEP II workshops and other activities had "secondary effects" on individuals who themselves may not have participated, through hearing about the topics discussed in workshops attended by their family members, friends, colleagues and neighbors. Finally, given that a number of groups had carried out civic education activities after the inter-communal violence that followed the 2007 election, all respondents were asked whether they had participated in any such events, and if so, the number of events.

D. Statistical Procedures

The basic statistical method that will be used to assess the effects of Uraia civic education is a regression analysis of the effect of Uraia "treatment group status" on each of the democratic orientations discussed in the previous section. In these analyses, the democratic orientation or behavior is predicted from variables that represent whether or not the individual was exposed to Uraia civic education activities (workshops, poetry-drama, informal meetings) and a set of control variables described below. For example, we attempt to determine whether individuals who were exposed to formal Uraia activities were more knowledgeable about politics, more participatory, more aware of their democratic rights, and so forth, than were matched control group individuals who were *not* exposed to Uraia activities. Subsequent analyses explore the effects of different kinds of Uraia activities, different levels of total exposure, different experiences with post-activity political discussion, the effects on Uraia on different kind of individuals, the impact of the post-election violence on the results, and other variants of the baseline models described here.

We report, first, the "unstandardized" regression coefficients for the effect of Uraia civic education treatment. These coefficients represent the net difference in the level of each variable between individuals who were exposed to Uraia civic education, and individuals in the control group who were not exposed to Uraia. For example, the overall political knowledge scale ranges from 0 (if the respondent answered none of the 4 questions correctly) to 4 (if the respondent answered all the questions correctly). If it were shown that the regression coefficient for Uraia treatment is .6, this would indicate that the individuals in the treatment group sample scored on average .6 correct answers more than the control group, over and above the effects of all other variables included in the models. This .6 difference is then evaluated to determine whether it is "statistically significant," which means that the results were unlikely to have come about by chance. We report statistically significant relationships at the .10 and .05 level, indicating that the chances

of observing the differences between the treatment and control groups if there were *no true differences between the groups in the overall population* were less than 10% and 5% respectively.

It is important that the baseline model include several additional variables aside from exposure to Uraia civic education. Most importantly, it is essential to distinguish the effects of having attended workshops, poetry or drama events, or informal civic education meetings from the effects of exposure to Uraia messages in the mass media. Individuals who attended formal Uraia events were likely to be more attentive to Uraia media programs than control group individuals, and the failure to include a Uraia media exposure variable would risk overestimating the “pure” effect of Uraia workshops, meetings, or poetry-drama events. It is also the case that estimating the effect of Uraia media on democratic orientations is an important goal of the evaluation in its own right, and thus we include *both* a Uraia activity and a Uraia media exposure variable (including television talk shows, *Newsline*, or exposure through radio, newspapers, or public murals) in the baseline model in order to provide estimates of the independent effects of each.

We included several additional control variables in the baseline models, including:

- Education
- Gender
- Age
- Number of voluntary organizations to which the individual belongs
- Whether the respondent is a “leader” of any organization
- Political Interest
- General Media Exposure
- Post-2007 Civic Education Exposure

The specific questions used to measure each of these variables can be found on the survey Instrument in Appendix B.

Including these factors in the analysis has several purposes. First, many of them are known from previous research to influence democratic attitudes and political participation. Therefore, including them in the analysis provides a better explanatory model of each of the democratic orientations under consideration. Second, following the logic of our discussion of Uraia media above, including these variables allows us to estimate the effect of Uraia civic education on the democratic orientations more accurately. We know that individuals who seek out Uraia activities are likely to be relatively more interested politically, relatively more attentive to politics generally in the mass media, relatively more likely to be in leadership positions within civil society organizations, and relatively more likely to have attended civic education *since* the 2007 election. Including these variables in our regression models thus allows us to isolate the effect of Uraia treatment, *over and above* the impact that these other factors may have on the relationship between treatment status and the democratic orientations in question. In effect, the analyses allow us to say that, “even among individuals who are leaders of civil society organizations, those who were also treated in a Uraia civic education activity *still* have, for example, a .6 greater score on the political knowledge scale than civil society leaders who were not treated”, or that “there is still a .6 difference between treatment and control group respondents even among those who are already highly interested in politics, or highly attentive in general to the mass media”.

The same logic applies to estimating the impact of Uraia media, as individuals exposed to Uraia media programs are also likely to be more politically interested, and more attentive in general to politics in the Kenya mass media. The inclusion of these control variables thus provides greater confidence that the effects that we report are truly attributable to Uraia civic education and to specific Uraia media exposures.

We note that several of these control variables, including gender, age, education, group memberships, were the variables that served as the matching criteria for selecting control group respondents. Therefore, there is likely to be little to no relationship between these variables and treatment group status, as formal balance between the treatment and control groups on these factors was built into the sampling design. We include them nevertheless because our matching criteria were somewhat coarse (e.g., dividing individuals into three categories on education and group memberships), and it may be the case that some small residual differences between treatment and control groups on the variables remain.¹⁶

For each of the analyses, we also include a “standardized” coefficient for the Uraia civic education variables that represents the unstandardized regression coefficient divided by the variable’s standard deviation.¹⁷ (The standard deviation for a variable signifies how far the typical individual is from the overall sample average. In a “normal,” or bell-shaped distribution, 68% of all individuals are within 1 standard deviation from the overall average, and 95% of all individuals are within 1.96 standard deviations from the overall average). A “standardized” coefficient of .5 indicates, for example, that the treatment group scored one-half of a standard deviation higher on the orientation in question than did the control group, once the effects of all other control variables are taken into account. This coefficient, because it is expressed in standard deviation terms, can be directly compared across all of the variables, even those that are measured on different scales. For example, a value of .2 can be interpreted as substantially higher than a standardized coefficient of .1, regardless of whether the variable in question is measured on a 0-4 scale of correct knowledge responses, or a 1-4 “strongly agree-strongly disagree” attitudinal scale. Such comparisons would not be valid for the unstandardized coefficients, which can only be interpreted in terms of the scale of the original variable.

III. THE IMPACT OF NCEP II-URAIIA CIVIC EDUCATION: BASIC RESULTS

In this section we report the results from the baseline models that estimate the impact of NCEP II-Uraia civic education on individuals who were exposed to face-to-face Uraia activities, as well as those exposed to Uraia messages in the mass media. In Section III-A we present the full set of results from the baseline models on all the democratic outcomes described in the previous section; in section III-B we present more extensive analyses regarding the impact of face-to-face Uraia activities, including analyses of Uraia versus other civic education, analyses of the impact of particular kinds of activities (e.g., workshops versus poetry-drama), as well as analyses regarding the impact of the total number of exposures to Uraia activities; and in Section III-C we explore in more detail the impact of Uraia mass media.

¹⁶ We also include in the analyses control variables that correspond to the 360 specific sampling points where interviews with respondents were conducted. These sampling points are obviously unrelated to “treatment group status” in that there are always 5 treatment group and 5 control group respondents per sampling point. But it may be the case that some sampling points corresponded to Uraia activities that targeted specific kinds of individuals – be they more highly involved, more highly motivated, or the opposite – in ways that were related to Uraia media exposure or other control variables, or related to the democratic outcomes in ways that all of our control variables failed to capture. Including these “sampling point controls” is an additional way of ensuring that estimates of the effect of Uraia treatment, media exposure and all of the control variables are as unbiased as possible.

¹⁷ This coefficient is sometimes referred to as the “Y-standardized” coefficient. See J. Scott Long, *Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables*, (Sage Publications, 1997). In this context the Y-standardized coefficient is similar to Cohen’s D and other “effect coefficients” that are frequently used in experimental and quasi-experimental research.

We remind the reader again that these effects should be viewed as the *long-term* impacts of the Uraia exposures on individuals. All of the Uraia events that were included as sampling points for the study took place *at least* 15 months before the survey teams went into the field to begin the interviews. In addition, Kenya experienced extreme political and social disruptions in the time since the Uraia program was implemented. Of course, it is of much importance to determine whether civic education has long-term impact, but the success of the program should not be judged solely on that basis. This study cannot speak to what Uraia may or may not have achieved in terms of changing democratic orientations in the shorter term, that is, in the run-up to the 2007 election, nor speak to what the longer-term gains may or may not have been in the absence of the country's post-election upheaval.

A. The “Baseline Effects” of NCEP II-Uraia Activities and Media Exposure

This section reports the basic results of the impact of exposure to NCEP II-Uraia face-to-face activities and Uraia media on the full range of democratic outcomes we measured in the study. The main conclusions of this section can be summarized as follows:

- Overwhelming majorities of the NCEP II-Uraia treatment group were satisfied with the activities that they attended, and believed that their understanding of democracy increased at least somewhat as a result of their taking part in NCEP II-Uraia activities;
- The program had meaningful long-term effects on variables related to citizen competence and involvement; these effects were particularly important for individuals who had exposure to both Uraia face-to-face activities and Uraia media programming;
- The face-to-face component of NCEP II-Uraia had long-term impact on a limited number of important variables related to nation building and ethnic tolerance;
- The program had essentially negligible impact on most variables related to democratic values, norms and institutions; and
- The program had virtually non-existent impact on variables related to the cross-cutting issues of HIV/AIDS, Gender and the Environment.

We can begin our assessment of NCEP II-Uraia impact by presenting the subjective views of the program among individuals who attended NCEP II-Uraia civic education activities. Judged according to this criterion, the program was highly successful. Figure III-1 shows that feelings of satisfaction with NCEP II-Uraia activities among the treatment group is nearly universal. Half report being “very satisfied” with the civic education activity they attended, and another 43% report being “satisfied”. Figure III-2, moreover, shows that approximately 57% of treatment group individuals believe that their understanding of democracy improved “a great deal” as a result of attending the activity, while another 36% believe their democratic understanding improved “somewhat”. These results show that the NCEP II-Uraia activities were very popular among those taking part, with a very high *perceived effectiveness* as well.

Figure III-1

Subjective Satisfaction with Uraia Activity






Figure III-2

Perception of Increased Democratic Understanding from NCEP-II Uraia Activities



Demonstrating program effectiveness, however, must go far beyond whether treated individuals liked the activities in which they took part, and whether they believed that they learned anything from the experience. The core analyses of the study thus involve testing whether treated individuals actually do register different and more positive democratic orientations than do demographically similar individual who were not exposed to NCEP II-Uraia activities.

Table III-1 presents the results of the baseline models assessing the impact of *any* exposure to Uraia face-to-face activities, and *any* exposure to Uraia mass media presentations, on the full range of democratic orientations investigated in the study. The table reports only the effects of the two primary variables of interest, Uraia face-to-face activities and Uraia media exposure; the full set of results for the baseline models can be found in Appendix C of this document. The *unstandardized* effect of “Uraia activities” in the table represents the net difference between the treatment and control group on the given orientation in terms of the variable’s raw scale (e.g., the number of correct responses on the knowledge scale, or the 1-4 rating for the “strongly agree-strongly disagree” items). The unstandardized effect of “Uraia media exposure” in the table represents the net difference on the variables between individuals who had some exposure to Uraia media presentations and those individuals who had none, again in terms of the given variable’s raw scale. The respective *standardized* effects represent the difference between the treatment and control groups, or those exposed and no exposed to Uraia media, in terms of the variables’ “standard deviation”, so that a value of .2 would mean that the treatment (or media) group scored .2 standard deviations higher on a given variable than the control (or no media) group. As noted above, when making comparisons of the magnitude of impact across variables that may be measured on different raw scales, the standardized measure is preferable.¹⁸

¹⁸ It should be noted that the table shows the multivariate effects of both Uraia activities and Uraia media exposure controlling for the other; that is, the estimate of the effect of Uraia activities, controlling for whether the individual was exposed to Uraia media, and the estimate of the effect of Uraia media exposure, controlling for whether the individual was treated via Uraia face-to-face activities.

Table III-I. The Impact of NCEP II-Uraia Civic Education on Democratic Orientations

	URAIA ACTIVITIES		URAIA MEDIA EXPOSURE	
	B	Y-Standardized	B	Y-Standardized
Civic Competence and Involvement				
Political Knowledge	.17**	.12	.23**	.17
Political Efficacy	.13**	.12	.01	.01
CDF Efficacy	.10**	.11	.02	.02
Local Political Participation	.05**	.09	-.003	-.01
National Political Participation	.01	.02	.03*	.06
Informed About How to Protect Rights	.11**	.17	.07**	.11
Informed About Contents of Constitution	.10**	.15	.08**	.12
Public Participation Needed for Cons. Writing	.15**	.14	.05	.05
Major Changes Needed in Constitution	.03	.05	.03	.05
Reduce Power of the President	.08*	.07	-.02	-.02
Democratic Values, Rights and Responsibilities				
Democracy is Best	.03*	.08	-.01	-.03
Non-Support for Anti-Democratic Alternatives	.001	.01	.004	.02
Support for Rule of Law	.03	.03	-.03	-.03
Institutional Trust	-.01	-.02	-.03*	-.06
Corruption in Politics	.04*	.05	-.0003	-.0004
Social Trust	.05	.05	-.04	-.04
Vote-Buying Wrong	.05**	.09	-.02	-.04
Political Violence is Not Justifiable	.05	.05	-.01	-.01
Humanitarian Intervention	.08**	.08	-.04	-.04
Rights Consciousness	.02**	.06	-.02	-.05
Political Responsibilities	.01	.04	-.01**	-.07
Cross-Cutting Issues				
Importance of HIV/AIDS Issue	.02	.02	.003	.003
HIV/AIDS Non-Employment Discrimination	-.003	-.003	-.03	-.03
Importance of Gender Issues	.02	.02	-.02	-.02
Women's Rights Scale	.04	.04	.07**	.08
Female Genital Mutilation (FGM)	.09**	.08	.05	.04
Importance of Environmental Issue	-.04	-.05	.001	.001
More Alternative Energies	.06*	.06	.003	.003
Identity and Ethnic Group Relations				
National Identity as a Kenyan	.01	.02	.01	.02
National Versus Tribal Identity	.07**	.11	.03	.05
Most-Disliked Ethnic Group Political Tolerance	-.03	-.03	.07	.06
Most-Disliked Ethnic Group Social Tolerance	.10**	.08	-.01	-.01
Ethnic Violence is Not Justifiable	.09**	.11	-.05	-.06
Reduce Ethnic Voting	.02	.05	.004	.01
Truth and Reconciliation Commission	.03	.03	-.06	-.06

**p<.05 (two-tailed) *p<.10 (two-tailed)

The table contains a wealth of important findings regarding the impact of NCEP II-Uraia civic education. First, we find that NCEP II-Uraia face-to-face activities produced *small but significant long-term changes* in the cluster of orientations that we label “*Civic Competence and Involvement*”. Individuals who were exposed to NCEP-II Uraia face-to-face activities were significantly more knowledgeable about politics, more efficacious generally and specifically in regards to the CDF, more participatory at the local level, more aware of how to defend their rights, and more informed about constitutional issues and the desirability of public involvement in the constitutional review process, than were similarly “matched” individuals who did not participate in NCEP-II Uraia activities. These effects indicate that NCEP-II Uraia activities produced somewhat more *empowered* individuals: they became more informed, more confident in their abilities to influence politics and to protect their basic rights, and more willing to become involved in the political process. Given the importance of these empowerment-related outcomes to democratic political culture, we may judge the program to have been successful in achieving some of its primary goals.

Second, NCEP II-Uraia media exposure produced additional change on some of these same “civic competence” dimensions. Individuals with some exposure to Uraia media were significantly more knowledgeable, more informed about defending basic rights, more informed about the Kenyan constitution, and more participatory at the national level than were individuals who were not at all attentive to Uraia mass media programming. Taken together, exposure to *both* face-to-face and media programming is associated with relatively *moderate long-term changes* on these democratic outcomes. For example, individuals who attended face-to-face activities *and* who had some Uraia media exposure scored nearly one-third of a standard deviation (.29) higher on overall political knowledge than individuals with no exposure; the differences are .28 and .27 standard deviations on individuals’ awareness of how to protect their rights and on constitutional awareness, respectively. Given the length of time that has passed since the actual exposures to NCEP II-Uraia, these results are all the more impressive.

We can put these results into better perspective by comparing the “standardized coefficients” for NCEP II-Uraia activities to those obtained in the NCEP I evaluation on similar items. In that study, we found the total standardized effects of workshops and other face-to-face activities (recall that there was no formal media component to NCEP I) to be .43 on political knowledge, .29 on political efficacy, .30 on constitutional awareness, and .30 on political participation.¹⁹ These effects, some of the largest seen in the study, were observed at a maximum of seven months after the exposures for over three-quarters of the NCEP I sample, and at a maximum of one year after the exposures for the remaining one-quarter of respondents. Here, we see the long-term effects of NCEP II-Uraia – with exposures at least a half a year and up to one year farther in the past compared to their NCEP I counterparts – to be similar in terms of constitutional awareness, about 30-50% smaller on knowledge and efficacy, and dramatically smaller only on political participation. So in terms of producing lasting changes in individual empowerment, that is, in political awareness and perceived ability to influence the political process, the combined impact of Uraia face-to-face activities and Uraia media exposure was relatively meaningful.

Third, the effects of NCEP II-Uraia civic education on democratic orientations aside from civic competence and involvement was *much more limited*. On the “Democratic Values, Rights and Responsibilities” dimension, only four significant effects were registered. Uraia face-to-face activities produced significant effects on several rights-related variables, in particular on the individual’s insistence that a series of democratic and human rights “always be maintained,” and on the individual support for international humanitarian interventions, significant effects on the individual’s perception that vote-buying is wrong and that democracy is the best form of government. Yet none of these effects were

¹⁹ See Tables III-3 and III-5, pages 28-34 of Finkel, *The Impact Of the Kenya National Civic Education Programme On Democratic Attitudes, Knowledge, Values, and Behavior*.

associated with standardized impacts greater than .1, which we take to be near the minimum threshold for a non-negligible substantive effect. Moreover, in none of these instances were the effects augmented positively by Uraia media exposure, and in fact, in two instances there were anomalous (and small) negative effects registered by exposure to Uraia media. On most of the variables associated with this dimension – support for democracy compared to non-democratic alternatives, support for the rule of law, trust in institutions, trust in others, and acceptance of extensive political responsibilities of citizenship – the long-term effects of NCEP II-Uraia were statistically indistinguishable from zero.

Fourth, there were essentially **no long-term effects** of NCEP II-Uraia activities on the entire series of variables related to Uraia’s **cross-cutting issues of HIV/AIDS, gender, and the environment**. In only one instance, individual’s lack of support for community determination of the suitability of female circumcision, did exposure to Uraia face-to-face activities produce significant impact, and again the standardized effect is only .08 in magnitude. Similarly, Uraia media exposure has impact on only the women’s rights scale, with a very small standardized effect as well. On the overwhelming number of variables asked related to the cross-cutting issues, there were insignificant long-term differences between the treatment and control groups, and between those exposed and not exposed to Uraia media messages.

Fifth, there were **some long-term effects** registered on the *Identity and Ethnic Group Relations* dimension, though these effects were **limited exclusively to NCEP-II face-to-face activities**. Uraia activities led to significant increases in individuals’ identification as a “Kenyan” relative to their tribal identification, led to significant increases in the amount of social tolerance the individual is willing to extend to his or her “most disliked group”, and led to significant increases in the perception that violence is not an appropriate means for ethnic groups to defend themselves if they feel threatened. The effects produced standardized impacts in the .08 to .11 range, greater than were seen for the *Democratic Values and Rights*, and *Cross-Cutting Issues* dimensions, but weaker than were seen for *Civic Competence and Involvement*. Moreover, on **none of these items were effects registered for exposure to NCEP II-Uraia mass media**. Nevertheless, this dimension is crucial to the Uraia themes of “nation-building”, and the fact that non-negligible long-term impact was seen for face-to-face activities on several important variables in this category is indicative again of the program’s success in achieving some of its stated goals. In addition, the events following the 2007 election showed that this dimension is particularly crucial to Kenyan politics and society, and thus the effects seen here are especially welcome in terms of the furthering of the country’s democratic political culture.

In sum, our “bottom line” findings regarding the impact of NCEP II-Uraia civic education are mixed. On the one hand, the program had meaningful long-term effects on variables relating to citizen competence and involvement; these effects were particularly important for individuals who had exposure to both Uraia face-to-face and Uraia media programming. Moreover, the face-to-face component had some impact on important variables related to the crucial dimension of nation-building and ethnic tolerance. On the other hand, the program had essentially negligible long-term effects on nearly all variables related to instilling support for democratic values, norms and institutions, and had negligible effects on nearly all variables related to the specific cross-cutting Uraia issues of HIV/AIDS, Gender, and the Environment. In general, we may say that NCEP II-Uraia was a relatively effective long-term agent of political *empowerment*, but a relatively ineffective long-term agent for value and issue *advocacy*.

B. The Effects of Face-to-Face NCEP II-Uraia Activities: Further Analyses

In this section we explore further the impact of exposure to face-to-face NCEP II-Uraia activities such as workshops, poetry and drama events, and informal meetings and gatherings. This section has three specific goals. First, we conduct a series of tests to ensure that the positive impacts found in the previous section can be attributed to NCEP II-Uraia and not to other governance or peace-building programs that were carried out around the same time in Kenya. Second, we examine whether certain kinds of face-to-face civic education activities are more effective than others. Finally, we seek to determine whether and how the total amount of the individual's experiences with face-to-face NCEP II-Uraia activities affects long-term democratic impact.

The main conclusions of this section can be summarized as follows:

- We find supporting evidence that the positive effects reported thus far can be attributed *specifically* to NCEP II-Uraia, independent of other civic education programs;
- We find little evidence that any one type of civic education was consistently more effective than others.
- We find significant *threshold effects* on about half of eleven core democratic orientations; that is, those who participated in three or more face-to-face activities exhibited consistent effects, while those who participated in only one or two activities often showed no differences compared to the control group.

I. Can the Impact Be Attributed to NCEP II-Uraia?

We first need to verify that the impacts described in the previous section can be attributed to NCEP II-Uraia, and not to other programs taking place within the same time period. As has been noted, other organizations also carried out activities over the past several years that in some cases touched on similar themes as NCEP II-Uraia. For example, prior to the 2007 election, the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) held community-level meetings, primarily on voting and registration voting procedures. Also, following the post-election violence, many civil society groups carried out peace-building initiatives in 2008 that sought to increase tolerance between ethnic communities. There is a danger, therefore, that the positive effects we attributed to URAIA might be the result of respondents in the “treatment” group having participated in these other programs.²⁰

The analysis presented so far controlled for this possibility in two ways. First, the screening procedures used to select potential respondents for the survey was designed explicitly to ensure that the treatment group would not include anyone who had participated **only** in an ECK-sponsored activity. Second, the survey asked respondents whether they had participated in any workshops addressing peace-building issues after the election, and all analysis so far has controlled for this. In this section, we go a step further and present evidence from additional questions asked in the survey that increases our confidence that the effects we find are in fact attributable to the NCEP II-Uraia activities.

To facilitate this analysis, we look for impact on eleven key indicators, drawn from the previous section. These indicators were chosen as a sample of the larger set of outcomes examined above. In most cases,

²⁰ Of course, from the point of view of democratic political development in Kenya, effects attributable to other programs are highly desirable as well. Our analyses suggest, however, that post-election civic education has had only sporadic positive effects on democratic orientations, with significant (and relatively small) effects seen for local and national political participation, knowledge about the Constitution, and confidence in Kenyan political institutions.

the indicators we use here are ones for which we found evidence of impact in the previous section. These indicators are listed in Table III-2. Column 1 repeats the results found in the previous section, which are again listed here for comparative purposes.

Our approach in this section is to look for evidence of impact among those respondents who recall participating in the specific NCEP II-Uraia activity that served as the sampling point for that particular interview. Recall that when we implemented the survey, sampling was done based on the activity records, known as the Form Ds, that were completed by the NCEP II-Uraia facilitators. As described in the methodological section, each sampling point for the survey was chosen to correspond to a specific activity from a Form D. During the interview, treatment group respondents were asked whether they had participated in the *specific Uraia activity* listed on the Form D for that particular sampling point. 44% of the treatment respondents recalled participating in the specific activities, while 56% said they participated in “another” civic education activity.²¹ We are therefore more certain that the 44% of respondents truly participated in a NCEP II-Uraia activity, and one way to test whether the effects found earlier can be attributed specifically to NCEP II-Uraia is to limit our treatment group only to this sub-sample.

Column 2 in Table III-2 shows the results when we rerun the analyses on this treatment group only. Looking across the 11 indicators, we see that evidence of impact remains consistent, and for many of the indicators, the magnitude of the effect increases, relative to the full treatment group in Column 1. These findings give us added confidence that the impacts can be attributed to NCEP II-Uraia activities, and not the activities of other civic education programs.

We can further restrict the analysis by looking for impact among treatment group respondents who claimed to have attended the specific activities listed on the Form Ds *and* who said that the activities they attended were not conducted “right before the 2007 election”. Doing so provides added insurance that our treatment group does not include anyone who may have participated in ECK election-oriented workshops. This limits our analysis to some 345 treatment group respondents, or 19% of the treatment group. The results of these analyses are shown in Column 3. We again find evidence of impact on nearly all of the key indicators. In particular, we find evidence that the impact of civic education exposure among those individuals for whom we have the greatest confidence of having attended NCEP II-Uraia activities was larger than the impacts registered for the entire treatment group. We conclude that the effects we have shown for NCEP II-Uraia face-to-face activities thus far are truly attributable to the program, and that, moreover, the impacts are magnified among those respondents for whom we have the greatest confidence in having attended the program’s activities.

²¹ This “other” activity, it should be noted, may still have been part of the NCEP II-Uraia program, and indeed a large proportion of civic education activities in Kenya during this time frame were Uraia-related. For this reason, and because of the extensive screening procedures described above, we are “relatively certain” that the full treatment group was indeed involved in NCEP II-Uraia activities, and we continue to examine the full treatment group in subsequent analyses.

Table III-2. The Effects of Face-to-Face Civic Education Activities Among Treated Individuals with Varying Certainty of NCEP II-Uraia Involvement

	Column 1: Full treatment group (Relative Certainty)		Column 2: Treatment respondents who participated in specific Form D activities (Higher Certainty)		Column 3: Treatment respondents who participated in specific Form D activities and not in ECK events (Highest Certainty)	
	B	Y-Stand	B	Y-Stand	B	Y-Stand
Political Knowledge	.17**	.13	.21**	.15	.35**	.26
CDF Efficacy	.10**	.11	.11**	.13	.14*	.16
Local Political Participation	.05**	.09	.05**	.09	.11**	.20
Informed about How to Protect Rights	.11**	.17	.12**	.18	.16**	.24
Women’s Rights Scale	.04	.05	.05	.06	.02	.02
More Alternative Energies	.06*	.06	.12**	.11	.14**	.13
Vote-Buying Wrong	.05**	.09	.07**	.12	.06*	.11
Rights Consciousness	.02**	.07	.02	.07	.04**	.14
National Versus Tribal Identity	.08**	.10	.04	.05	.09*	.11
Most-Disliked Ethnic Group						
Social Tolerance	.10**	.08	.13**	.11	.06	.05
Ethnic Violence is Not Justifiable	.09**	.11	.14**	.17	.13*	.15

**p<.05 (two-tailed) *p<.10 (two-tailed)

2. Does the Type of Civic Education Affect Impact?

We sought to examine whether certain kinds of face-to-face NCEP II-Uraia civic education activities were more beneficial than others. For this, we conducted statistical tests in which we disaggregated the treatment group by the type of activities in which respondents participated. We knew from the Form D cover sheet the kind of activity that took place at each sampling point, for example, a workshop, a poetry or drama event, or an informal or cultural meeting. We reran the analyses reported thus far by including variables that would gauge whether the impact of poetry-drama events, workshops, or informal meetings were statistically different from one another. *In no instance did we find evidence of differential effects.* That is, the impact of workshops, poetry-drama events, and informal meetings were statistically equivalent. The same conclusion of equal effects obtained when we limited the analysis to individuals who claimed to have attended the specific civic education activity listed on the Form D cover sheet.

3. Total NCEP II-Uraia Activities and the Possibility of “Threshold Effects”

Next we sought to test whether the overall frequency of civic education participation mattered. In particular, we investigated whether so-called *threshold effects* existed, such that individuals needed to have participated in a certain number of face-to-face activities for changes in democratic orientations to occur. Such effects have been found in previous analyses of adult civic education impact in the Dominican Republic, Poland, and South Africa, where the effect of only one or two workshop exposures on democratic orientations was often found to be negligible.²² In the previous NCEP I evaluation, we

²² See, for example, Steven E. Finkel, “Can Democracy Be Taught? *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 14, October 2003, pp. 137-151.

found limited evidence of threshold effects, but in virtually all instances the impact of one or two workshop exposures was nevertheless relatively weak.

To investigate these possibilities, respondents were asked how many times they had participated in each of the following: 1) workshops or participatory seminars, 2) public gatherings or discussions in one's community, 3) organized activities conducted in at one's church or mosque, and 4) theater presentations like drama or puppet shows. We summed the answers to these questions to create a composite measure of overall NCEP II-Uraia face-to-face civic education participation. Among the treatment group, 41% report one or two face-to-face exposures, while 59% report three or more.²³

We then tested to see whether the impact differed between those who had attended one or two face-to-face activities, and those who had attended three or more. The results, shown in Table III-3, provide evidence of important threshold effects of NCEP II-Uraia activities on six of the eleven democratic orientations. For example, one or two face-to-face NCEP II-Uraia exposures has *no impact whatsoever* on local level participation, while individuals who attended three or more activities registered a full .17 standard deviations higher on participation than the control group. Similar threshold effects were found for women's rights, environmental attitudes, rights consciousness, national versus tribal identity, and ethnic social tolerance. In all of these cases, the individual needed to have attended three or more NCEP II-Uraia face-to-face activities in order to show significant differences compared the control group. Interestingly, many of these variables are related to the dimensions of Democratic Values and Rights, and Cross-Cutting Uraia Issues, where very few significant effects in general of NCEP II-Uraia exposure were found in previous sections. This suggests that multiple exposures are perhaps most acutely necessary to produce change on those value and issue advocacy dimensions where the overall effects of exposure are weakest. And in all cases, the impact of three or more exposures was significantly greater than the overall impact for *any* amount of exposures shown in Table III-1. We conclude that multiple exposures to NCEP II-Uraia face-to-face activities *always* produced greater long-term effects than one or two exposures, and that in many instances, multiple exposures produced the *only* long-term effects seen on a given democratic orientation.

²³ These results on the frequency of exposure for treatment individuals can also be used to estimate the total number of Kenyans who attended face-to-face activities. Given the stated totals in NCEP II-Uraia documents of 10 million individuals reached, and given the proportion who claim in our survey to have attended once, twice, and more than two times, we estimate the numbers reached to have been approximately 4.5 million individuals. More conservative estimates of the amount of multiple exposures would result in the numbers reached to have been approximately 5.5 million individuals.

Table III-3. The Effects of Total NCEP II-Uraia Face-to-Face Activities and the Possibility of “Threshold Effects”

	Column 1: One or two activities		Column 2: Three or more activities	
	B	Y-Stand	B	Y-Stand
Political Knowledge	.15**	.11	.18**	.13
CDF Efficacy	.10*	.11	.10**	.11
Local Political Participation	.01	.02	.09**	.17
Informed about How to Protect Rights	.07*	.11	.14**	.21
Women’s Rights Scale	-.02	-.02	.09**	.10
More Alternative Energies	.02	.02	.10**	.09
Vote-Buying Wrong	.04*	.07	.06**	.11
Rights Consciousness	.001	.00	.03**	.11
National Versus Tribal Identity	.04	.05	.11**	.13
Most-Disliked Ethnic Group Social Tolerance	.07	.06	.12**	.10
Ethnic Violence is Not Justifiable	.09**	.11	.09**	.11

**p<.05 (two-tailed) *p<.10 (two-tailed)

C. The Effects of URAIA Mass Media: Further Analyses

This section examines in more detail the impact of NCEP II-Uraia’s media component, drawing on data collected for this impact evaluation, as well as the media evaluation conducted by the Steadman Group in June and October 2007. We first review the main findings from the Steadman Media Evaluation. We then turn to the impact evaluation data to examine the extent to which respondents recall being exposed to Uraia messages in various media prior to the 2007 election. Finally, we conduct tests to determine whether this exposure had positive impact on the democratic orientations considered in this study.

The findings can be summarized as follows:

- We find that a large portion of respondents were familiar with the Uraia “brand name”;
- A substantial portion of respondents recall hearing or seeing Uraia media messages in some form;
- Respondents were highly satisfied with Uraia media programs and reported that the programs increased their understanding of democracy;
- The long-term impact of Uraia media exposure on the democratic orientations considered in this study, however, was relatively weak, aside from the impact on the civic competence and awareness factors shown previously;
- There were no consistent threshold effects, such that a particular amount of Uraia media exposure was necessary for impact to be observed; and
- There were no consistent difference in the impact found between electronic and non-electronic media

Before presenting our detailed findings, we first review the main findings from the Steadman Media Evaluation. The Steadman evaluation collected data on four main indicators: awareness of the Uraia Media Campaign, sources of media exposure, frequency of exposure, and recall of Uraia themes. The evaluation used a two-wave panel approach in which the same respondents were interviewed in June and October 2007. This approach was designed to measure changes in *exposure* and *recall* between the two waves.

The main findings of the Steadman Media Evaluation were as follows:

- In the October wave, 74% of respondents reported being aware of the Uraia Media Campaign. This represented a substantial increase over the June wave in which 39% of respondents gave the same answer.
- Among those who said they were aware of the Uraia Media Campaign in the October wave, the largest share of respondents (57%) reported having heard of the program on television, with a smaller share (29%) saying they had heard of the program on radio.
- Among those who said they had heard of the Uraia Media Campaign on the radio in the October wave, the largest share (41%) said they heard the campaign every week, with a smaller share (21%) saying they heard the campaign once a month, and the remainder (38%) saying less than once a month. The figures on frequency of exposure on TV were nearly identical.
- Among the 317 respondents who were interviewed both in June and October, recall of most Uraia themes was very low. When asked about eight main Uraia themes, on average 12% of respondents in the October wave recalled having heard of each theme in the media.
- Among the 317 respondents who were interviewed both in June and October, there was little evidence of positive change in recall of the main Uraia themes over time. While there were small increases in the share of respondents who said they recalled hearing five of the eight themes in the media, the magnitude of the increases in each case were generally very small.

While the Steadman findings provide some useful information, several design choices made the study less than ideal for evaluating the impact of Uraia’s Media component. First, the surveys were carried out primarily in Kenya’s largest urban areas. Given that media consumption practices differ between urban and rural areas, it is not possible to make any conclusions about exposure and recall outside of the urban areas based on the Steadman data. Second, the study asks only about *exposure* and *recall*, and does not include any questions that could gauge whether knowledge or behaviors changed as the result of exposure. While it is important to know whether citizens were exposed to the program, it is equally if not more important to know whether exposure to the media campaign had any effects on Kenyans’ attitudes and practices. Unfortunately the Steadman surveys did not include such questions, making it impossible to draw conclusions about the *impact* of exposure to the Media campaign.

Having reviewed the main findings of the Steadman Media Evaluation, we now turn to the NCEP II-Uraia impact evaluation, which was designed more explicitly to test for the impact. We first examine data on whether the media component reached the Kenyan public. The impact evaluation included a battery of questions that asked respondents whether they had ever heard of the “Uraia civic education program before today,” and, if yes, whether they recalled hearing or seeing Uraia messages or programs on the radio, on television, or in the newspapers. We also asked, in particular, whether respondents recalled seeing programs about democracy on *Newsline*. Finally, we asked whether respondents remembered seeing Uraia murals in their area.

It is not possible to offer exact estimates of the program’s national reach from this data, however, because, as noted above, the sample for the impact evaluation was designed to be representative of the treatment group, not the national population. Nonetheless, we found that the sample for the impact evaluation was similar to other recent nationally-representative surveys of the Kenyan population on many demographic dimensions, such as education and age. This gives us some confidence that, while the data collected for the impact survey cannot be used for exact estimates of the views of the national population, it does provide some suggestive evidence of the general levels of Uraia media exposure that would be obtained in a national survey, albeit with a large margin of error.

Bearing these considerations in mind, we first present the results for the initial question that asked respondents “Before today, have you ever heard of the “Uraia ” civic education program?” Table III-4


shows that, among the treatment group, a full two-thirds had heard of the program. This could, of course, be from NCEP II-Uraia media programming, from word-of-mouth, or simply from exposure to the face-to-face activities that resulted in the respondent being in the treatment group in the first place. More telling, though, is that some 43% of the control group – those who participated in no face-to-face activities in the run-up to the 2007 election – nevertheless had heard of the “Uraia brand.” As noted, technically this means that almost half of Kenyans who are similar to people that Uraia treated in face-to-face activities had some other exposure to Uraia sometime before December 2007. But the evidence also suggests that Uraia was still relatively successful in reaching those elements of the control group that were less likely to be politically engaged, as 30% of those less educated reported having heard of Uraia, 36% of those under 22 years of age, and 40% of those who belong to only one or two secondary associations. With appropriate caution, we may claim that Uraia in general was able to reach a substantial portion of the Kenyan population, and that recognition of the Uraia brand was relatively long-lasting.

Table III-4. Recognition of “Uraia Brand”

	Treatment Group	Control Group
Had Heard of “Uraia Civic Education”	64.7%	42.7%
Had Not Heard of “Uraia Civic Education”	35.3%	57.3%

Turning specifically to Uraia media exposure, the data shown in Figure III-3 indicate that radio had the greatest reach and that other components were relatively similar in reach. 56% of the treatment group, for example, also had some exposure to Uraia radio programming, along with 36% of the control group. Other Uraia media were viewed by approximately 20-25% of the control group, and between 30-35% of the treatment group, with television and newspapers being somewhat more likely to have been viewed than neighborhood murals. Interestingly, the reach of the Newline television program was relatively extensive as well, with recognition scores of 29% for the treatment group and 16% for the control group.²⁴

Figure III-3. Exposure to NCEP II-Uraia Mass Media



²⁴ We note that respondents in the treatment group were considerably more likely to have heard or seen NCEP II-Uraia media activities. As a result, we control for Uraia media exposure whenever we estimate the effects of NCEP II-Uraia face-to-face activities throughout all of the analysis conducted in this report.

The data on media exposure differ from those reported by the Steadman Media Evaluation. As noted above, Steadman found that in October 2007 about 74% of Kenya's urban population was aware of the Uraia Media Campaign. Our own data show that 55% of urban control group respondents had heard of the program. While it is difficult to directly compare findings from the two studies because each employed different questions and sampling strategies, one possible explanation for the lower exposure rates found in our study is simply that recall may have faded with time.

Our evaluation finds that respondents were highly satisfied with Uraia media programming, and believed that the programs increased their understanding of democracy. A full 91% of all respondents who had some recognition of the "Uraia" brand reported that they were "satisfied" or "very satisfied" with the Uraia media programs they had seen. Further, 88% of respondents who had some Uraia recognition reported that the programs had increased their "understanding of democracy" "some" or a "great deal". These figures did not differ substantially between the treatment and control groups. We conclude that overall satisfaction and *perceived* effectiveness of the media among individuals who were exposed to the programming was high.

Next we sought to determine whether individuals who were exposed to NCEP II-Uraia media messages had any impact, compared to individuals who were not exposed, on the series of democratic orientations we have analyzed thus far. Recall that Table III-1 showed the baseline effect of *any Uraia media exposure* being statistically significant on political knowledge and three of the civic competence and involvement measures: whether individuals were informed about how to protect their rights, whether they were informed about the Kenyan constitution, and their level of national political participation. On nearly all other items, we found insignificant and sometimes small negative impacts. In this section, we conduct more finely-grained analyses that demonstrates how multiple media exposures may have mattered, and which media were more effective in changing individuals' attitudes or behavior.

For this, we first generated an overall Uraia media exposure variable that counted the number of media components that respondents recalled having seen or heard. This variable ranged from 0 for those who did not recall seeing or hearing of Uraia in any media to 5 for those who recalled being exposed to all five Uraia media components (television, radio, newspapers, murals, *Newsline*). The results indicate that 59% of the control group and 37% of the treatment group had *no exposure* to Uraia media, 19% of the control group and 27% of the treatment group were exposed to one or two Uraia media sources, and 22% of the control group and 36% of the treatment group were exposed to three or more of the Uraia media sources.

We then conducted statistical analysis to test for impact on all of the democratic orientations examined in Section III-A above. Table III-5 shows the results of this analysis. The results confirm the findings reported earlier: Uraia media exposure in general affected knowledge, national participation, awareness of the Constitution and awareness of how to defend one's rights. Moreover, there are several additional significant impacts within the cluster of *Civic Competence and Involvement*. When examined in terms of the *number* of Uraia media exposures, the potential impacts are even greater than those reported above. For example, if individuals were exposed to all five Uraia media channels, they are predicted to have knowledge scores that are a full ½ of an item greater on the four point scale than those with no exposure. Similarly, five Uraia media exposures is associated with a .14 increase on awareness of defending one's rights, and this translates into a full ½ of a standard deviation impact. So on these particular items, Uraia mass media had clear long-term impact, and cumulative impact that was potentially substantial. We note, however, that only 9% of the control group was exposed to all five of the Uraia media channels, along with 15% of the treatment group, indicating that the number of individuals whose *actual* impact from high levels of media exposure was relatively limited.

We find that treating media in terms of the *number* of exposures resulted in little change in the overall significance of Uraia media effects on other democratic orientations. NCEP II-Uraia media exposure had

no positive impact on any of the *Democratic Values, Rights and Responsibilities* items, and, among the Uraia Cross-cutting issues, only one small positive effect on perceptions of the importance of the HIV/AIDS issue. There was a weak positive effect on Kenyan national identity, but otherwise only a few sporadic anomalous negative findings.

We explored possible threshold effects of Uraia media exposure as well. We considered whether exposure to at least three NCEP II-Uraia media channels may have been necessary for *any* impact to be seen whatsoever, similar to the threshold effects found for NCEP II-Uraia face-to-face activities. We found significant threshold effects only on the political knowledge and vote-buying variables, and thus we conclude that no general threshold effects exist, and certainly not to the extent that they obtained in our earlier analysis of the impact of face-to-face activities.

Finally, we explored the relative impact of particular *types* of media exposure. We divided the media into electronic (television, radio, *Newsline*) and non-electronic (newspapers, murals) and tested the independent impact of each form of exposure. No clear pattern of effects emerged: In some instances (political knowledge, awareness of the constitution) electronic media proved to have greater impact, in other instances (awareness of how to defend one's rights, national political participation), non-electronic media had greater impact. On most variables, however, no impact of either set of Uraia media channels was found.

Table III-5. The Impact of NCEP II-Uraia Media Exposure on Democratic Orientations

Civic Competence and Participation	B	Y-Standardized
Political Knowledge	.10**	.07
Political Efficacy	-.003	.00
CDF Efficacy	.01	.01
Local Political Participation	-.004	-.01
National Political Participation	.01**	.02
Informed About How to Protect Rights	.03**	.05
Informed About Contents of Constitution	.03**	.05
Public Participation Needed for Cons. Writing	.02*	.02
Major Changes Needed in Constitution	.02*	.04
Reduce Power of the President	.01	.01
Cross-Cutting Issues		
Importance of HIV/AIDS Issue	.02*	.02
HIV/AIDS Non-Employment Discrimination	.01	.01
Importance of Gender Issues	.01	.01
Women's Rights Scale	.02	.02
Importance of Environmental Issue	.01	.01
More Alternative Energies	.00	.00
Democratic Values, Rights and Responsibilities		
Democracy is Best	-.002	-.01
Non-Support for Anti-Democratic Alternatives	.002	.01
Support for Rule of Law	-.01	-.01
Institutional Trust	-.01*	-.02
Corruption in Politics	.001	.01
Social Trust	-.02	-.02
Vote-Buying Wrong	.01	.01
Political Violence is Not Justifiable	.01	.01
Humanitarian Intervention	-.03**	-.03
Rights Awareness	-.01**	-.03
Extensive Responsibilities of Citizenship	-.01	-.03
Identity and Ethnic Group Relations		
National Identity as a Kenyan	.01**	.02
National Versus Tribal Identity	.01	.01
Most-Disliked Ethnic Group Political Tolerance	.02	.02
Most-Disliked Ethnic Group Social Tolerance	.01	.01
Ethnic Violence is Not Justifiable	-.01	-.01
Ethnic Rights Awareness	-.003	-.01
Reduce Ethnic Voting	-.001	.01
Truth and Reconciliation Commission	-.02	-.02

**p<.05 (two-tailed) *p<.10 (two-tailed)

IV. WHEN IS CIVIC EDUCATION MOST EFFECTIVE? FURTHER EXPLORATIONS INTO THE “CONDITIONAL IMPACT” OF NCEP II-URAI A ACTIVITIES

In this section, we continue the investigation of the conditions under which NCEP II-Uraia face-to-face activities have greater or lesser impact. In section III-B above, we showed that one important conditioning factor is the frequency of exposure to NCEP II-Uraia activities, in that multiple exposures were sometimes necessary for *any* impact of civic education on democratic orientations to occur. Here we extend these analyses to include other factors that may facilitate or impede the impact of NCEP II-Uraia activities. We focus in Section A on factors related to the pedagogical methods employed in the civic education activity and the perceived quality of the facilitators, following the findings from NCEP I and earlier impact evaluations that *active, participatory teaching methods* conducted by *high quality instructors* were necessary to achieve impact on individual attitudes and behaviors. We then turn our attention in Section B to factors related to the individual’s socio-demographic characteristics, and investigate whether NCEP II-Uraia activities were more effective in changing the orientations of certain kinds of individuals compared with others. In Section C we investigate what we call the “secondary effects” of civic education, that is, whether post-treatment discussions about NCEP II-Uraia civic education activities resulted in greater democratic change among the treatment group, and among individuals in the control group who discussed others’ NCEP II-Uraia civic education experiences. Finally, in Section D we examine whether the post-election upheaval in Kenya attenuated the effects that we have found thus far, that is, whether the lasting impact of NCEP II-Uraia activities were smaller among those whose direct experience with the ethnic violence may have led to disillusionment with the democratic process.

The main findings from this section can be summarized as follows:

- Exposure to multiple participatory teaching methodologies led to significantly greater impact than exposure to lecture-based and other passive pedagogical techniques;
- When facilitators of NCEP II-Uraia activities were perceived to be of higher quality, significantly stronger impacts were observed than when facilitators were perceived to be of lower quality; these effects were particularly prevalent on certain variables where weak overall effects of NCEP II-Uraia treatment were observed;
- No consistent differences were seen in the impacts of NCEP II-Uraia activities across any of demographic categories analyzed, including age, education, income, place of residence, or religion;
- Greater impacts were observed on several important variables among the relatively small percentage of individuals who were *not* members of either the civil society organization that was invited to a particular activity or of the group that sponsored it;
- There was significant post-activity discussion of NCEP II-Uraia civic education: Over half of the treatment group discussed the activity in which they took part with at least five other persons; 44% of the treatment group discussed the civic education activities of at least three other persons as well, and even 25% of the control group discussed the activities in which at least three other persons in their social networks took part;
- These post-activity discussions led to extensive “secondary effects” of NCEP II-Uraia civic education, but only on a more limited number of democratic orientations than was the case in the NCEP I evaluation; and
- The violence and social upheaval following the 2007 election did *not* appear to influence the impact of NCEP II-Uraia civic education in a substantial way, and in fact there is some evidence

that the NCEP II-Uraia program had some role in mitigating the negative impacts of the traumatic events of the post-election period.

A. The Effects of Teaching Methods and Teacher Quality

In previous impact assessments, including the NCEP I evaluation, we found that the effects of civic education were influenced strongly by the degree to which workshops and other activities were conducted with active, participatory teaching methodologies. Activities were most effective when they were conducted with methodologies such as role-playing, simulations, mock elections, and the like, while lecture-based civic education had negligible impact on nearly all democratic orientations. In some impact assessments as well, though not as strongly evident in NCEP I, it was found that activities were most effective when the facilitators or trainers were perceived to be knowledgeable, inspiring, and interested, while trainers who did not engage with and who were not well-regarded by the participants had little success in transmitting democratic knowledge, values, or participatory inclinations.

We measured these factors in similar ways as in the previous impact assessments. Respondents were asked to recall whether any of the following methods were used in the civic education activities that they attended:

- Breaking into small groups to discuss material
- Stage plays or dramatizations
- Playing games
- Solving problems and developing proposals
- Role playing exercises
- Mock trials
- Mock elections

We counted the number of these activities so that each individual received a value of 0 to 7. We then separated the sample into three categories: no civic education exposure, individuals who attended activities and experienced three or fewer of these participatory methodologies, and individuals who attended activities and experienced four or more participatory teaching methods. We call this variable “*Participatory Methods*”. Among the treatment group, just over 1/3 (35%) reported being taught with four or more of these methods, 40% were taught with zero or only one of these methods, and 24% were taught with two or three. These figures are roughly similar to the findings among individuals treated in NCEP I; 28% were taught with four or more participatory methods, 35% with zero or one of the methods, and 37% with two or three.

To measure individuals’ perceptions of the quality of their civic education instruction, we asked respondents to rate how well each of the following words “describe the people who led the activities”: knowledgeable, interesting, likeable, understandable, and inspiring. We divided the sample into individuals who received no workshop exposure, individuals who thought that only some of these words (three or fewer) described their teachers “very well” and individuals who thought that nearly all of these words (four or more) described their teachers “very well.” We label this factor “*Teacher Quality*”. It is important to note that the *Teacher Quality* variable measures only the perception of the quality of the facilitator, as we have no objective evaluation of the performance of the individuals who led the workshops or other activities. However, the way participants feel about their trainer is an important predictor of how well they learn.

Table IV-1 shows the results for *Participatory Methods* on the eleven core impact variables we have been considering thus far. The table shows the estimated impact on each of the orientations for two groups: individuals who experienced few participatory methods (less than four) in their NCEP II-Uraia activities, and individuals who experienced many (four or more) of these kinds of instructional techniques. The table will enable us to draw conclusions about the general impact of participatory methodologies, as well as test whether significant threshold effects, exist such that the use of multiple participatory methods is necessary for any impact to be observed.

Table IV-1. The Effects of Participatory Teaching Methodologies

	Column 1: One or two activities		Column 2: Three or more activities	
	B	Y-Stand	B	Y-Stand
Political Knowledge	.16**	.12	.20**	.15
CDF Efficacy	.05	.06	.18**	.21
Local Political Participation	.04**	.07	.08**	.15
Informed about How to Protect Rights	.08**	.11	.18**	.27
Women’s Rights Scale	.03	.03	.07	.08
More Alternative Energies	.03	.03	.10*	.09
Vote-Buying Wrong	.04**	.07	.06**	.11
Rights Awareness	.01	.04	.02	.07
National Versus Tribal Identity	.07	.09	.10*	.12
Most-Disliked Ethnic Group Social Tolerance	.08**	.07	.15**	.13
Ethnic Violence is Not Justifiable	.09**	.11	.08**	.10

**p<.05 (two-tailed) *p<.10 (two-tailed)

The results in Table IV-1 show that the use of more participatory methods in NCEP II-Uraia civic education led to substantially greater impacts. Individuals who were exposed to three or more participatory teaching methodologies, for example, registered .18 units higher on “awareness of how to protect rights” variable than the control group; these effects translate into a standard deviation differences of .27, far higher than the impact of .17 shown in Table III-1 for overall NCEP II-Uraia exposure. Similarly, individuals exposed to more participatory methods showed greater impact on political knowledge, CDF efficacy, social group tolerance, and local-level participation than the control group as well, and in all cases higher standard deviation impacts than were seen in the baseline models in Table III-1. The pattern is clear, in that *exposure to multiple participatory teaching methodologies had greater impact than exposure to lecture-based and other passive pedagogical techniques.*

At the same time, it is also the case that exposure to fewer participatory methodologies had *some* impact on six of the eleven core variables as well. Threshold effects exist for participatory methods on several of the variables, so it is not the case that participatory methods are necessary for *any* long-term impact to be seen. Rather, NCEP II-Uraia activities had some impact on many factors regardless of the number of participatory methods used in the activity; the use of more participatory teaching methods served to enhance and amplify these effects to a sometimes substantial degree.

Table IV-2 shows a similar estimation for individuals who thought that three or fewer of the positive terms mentioned above described their facilitators of teachers “very well”, and individuals who thought that four or five of the positive terms mentioned above describe their teachers “very well.”

Table IV-2. The Effects of Teacher Quality

	Column 1: Three or Fewer Positive Qualities		Column 2: Four or Five Positive Qualities	
	B	Y-Stand	B	Y-Stand
Political Knowledge	.15*	.11	.19**	.14
CDF Efficacy	.09**	.10	.09**	.10
Local Political Participation	.04**	.07	.06**	.11
Informed about How to Protect Rights	.08*	.12	.16**	.24
Women’s Rights Scale	.03	.03	.03	.03
More Alternative Energies	.06	.06	.05	.05
Vote-Buying Wrong	.04*	.07	.07**	.12
Rights Awareness	.00	.00	.04**	.14
National Versus Tribal Identity	.05	.06	.13**	.16
Most-Disliked Ethnic Group Social Tolerance	.02	.02	.21**	.18
Ethnic Violence is Not Justifiable	.10**	.12	.08**	.10

**p<.05 (two-tailed) *p<.10 (two-tailed)

The results suggest a generally similar pattern as was found for *Participatory Methods*. When facilitators were perceived to be of higher quality, stronger impacts were observed on nearly all of the eleven core democratic orientations. Among participants who perceived their instructors to be of lower quality, the magnitude of the effect was substantially smaller in most cases, and non-existent in others. An interesting pattern is seen for three of the eleven variables, in that the *only* significant effects observed are when instructors are of relatively high quality. These all concern variables related to Values and Rights and Ethnic Relations, categories in which weaker effects in general have been found in the analyses to this point. Here, we see that individuals’ insistence that a series of democratic and human rights be maintained, their rejection of vote-buying, their social tolerance for disliked ethnic groups, and their level of Kenyan versus tribal identity, all show long-term impacts from NCEP II-Uraia activities *only when instructors are perceived to be of the highest quality*. We cannot make too much of this finding, but it is suggestive evidence that the way to achieve more lasting changes on even “difficult” democratic orientations is via instruction by well-regarded facilitators.

B. The Effects of Individual Socio-Economic and Demographic Characteristics

In this section, we explore the effects of NCEP II-Uraia civic education on different kinds of individuals. Such a determination is useful first in understanding where the program had the most significant impacts in the Kenyan population, that is, which social groups and demographic categories changed the most in response to the workshops, poetry-drama and other activities organized by the Programme. Equally important, the information will be useful for donors and implementing CSOs in deciding on the most promising target populations for future civic education programs. If, for example, civic education is found to be ineffective in rural areas compared to smaller towns or metro centers, then policy makers and CSOs might adjust their allocation of resources accordingly. And if there is a desire to change the democratic orientations of particular sub-groups, for example, women or young people, and if the results of these analyses demonstrate that few effects on these kinds of individuals have occurred, then substantial changes in the ways that civic education is delivered to these populations would need to be undertaken.

In the NCEP I evaluation, we found few significant differences in the effects across different demographic groups. But when differences across groups did exist, it was usually the case that individuals from *less dominant* social groups exhibited greater change from NCEP I exposure than individuals from more dominant social strata. In this way we concluded that the NCEP helped to equalize the pre-existing differences in democratic orientations between many of these groups.

As in the previous impact assessment, we investigate the differential effects of NCEP II-Uraia civic education for the following demographic sub-groups in the Kenyan population:

- Gender (women versus men)
- Age (18-35 versus 36 and above)
- Education (primary, secondary, and high school)
- Household Income (Less than versus More than 5000 Ksh per month)
- Religion (Protestant, Catholic, Muslim)
- Community Size (urban versus rural)

In Table IV-3, we show the simple proportions of the treatment group that fall into each of these demographic categories. For comparative purposes, we also include demographic data collected from a national, random-sample survey, conducted by the Afrobarometer in September 2005.²⁵ In many regards, the demographic profile of NCEP II-Uraia participants mirrors the Kenyan population. However, it can be seen that Uraia included a disproportionately large number of men, rural participants, and Muslims. To a lesser extent, the program was also slightly over-representative of highly-educated people.

²⁵ The survey was carried out from September 6-28, 2005, with a sample size of 1,278. Data is available from www.afrobarometer.org

Table IV-3. Demographic Profile of NCEP II-Uraia Participants and National Comparison

	URAIA Treatment Group	Afrobarometer 2005
Gender		
Female	40%	50%
Male	60%	50%
Age		
18-35	62%	59%
36 or more	38%	41%
Educational Attainment		
Primary School	43%	40%
Secondary School	34%	33%
High School or More	23%	15%
Income		
Less than 10000 Ksh	67%	Data not available
Greater than 10000 Ksh	33%	
Area		
Rural	85%	71%
Urban	15%	29%
Religion		
Protestant	54%	38%
Catholic	24%	27%
Muslim	22%	12%

We test for these effects by creating “interaction terms” that multiply NCEP II-Uraia treatment status by a particular category of a given demographic variable (e.g. being a woman, or being over 35 years of age). We then enter NCEP II-Uraia treatment group status *and* the interaction term in the same regression equation. If the interaction term is statistically significant, then this indicates that there are significant differences in the effects of NCEP II-Uraia activities for individuals who are in the given category of the demographic variable, compared to individuals who are not in the given category of the demographic variable. This is the standard way in statistical analysis for testing for differences between regression coefficients for individuals or units that belong to different groups.

The conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis is very clear: we found *no consistent differences in the effects of NCEP II-Uraia activities across any of the demographic categories analyzed*. We conducted six different sets of tests for the eleven core impact variables, that is, whether the effects of NCEP II-Uraia activities differed by gender, by youth status, by educational attainment, by income, by religious affiliation, and by urban or rural place of residence. Out of some 66 different regression models, there were less than a handful of significant differences that emerged in these analyses. Moreover, the differences that emerged showed no clear pattern of larger or smaller effects for socially dominant or disadvantaged groups. We conclude that the long-term impacts of the NCEP II-Uraia program, such as they exist, were statistically similar for virtually all politically-relevant demographic groups in the Kenyan population.

C. Social Influence and the “Secondary Effects” of NCEP II-Uraia Civic Education

I. The Impact of Social Group Memberships

The differential effects of civic education may, however, go beyond the kinds of demographic factors just considered. In NCEP I and in other previous impact assessments, we examined the effect of civic

education on individuals with different levels of civil society involvement as well. In earlier assessments, we found that civic education tended to have greater effects on individuals who were *more integrated* into civil society, that is, who belonged to a greater number of secondary groups and local organizations. We speculated that such individuals have the opportunity to engage in group discussions that reinforce and sustain the messages that are transmitted in civic education workshops. In the NCEP I evaluation, however, we found consistent effects regardless of the level of the individual's civil society involvement, though greater impacts were seen among individuals who were members of the *specific* civil society groups that conducted, or that were invited to, particular NCEP I workshops. We consider the question of whether or not the effects of civic education are amplified by group involvement to be unresolved in previous impact assessments, and we continue the investigation into this important issue here.

We examined the differential impact of NCEP II-Uraia civic education among individuals with different levels of civil society involvement in the same way as in the previous section. We created “interaction terms” to stand for treated individuals with zero or one group membership, treated individuals with two or three secondary group memberships, and individuals with four or more group memberships. We then entered these interaction variables into a single regression model to determine whether the impact of NCEP II-Uraia activities differed for individuals in the different group membership categories. We found two instances (out of the eleven core impact variables) where group memberships made a difference in the magnitude of NCEP II-Uraia impact. For political knowledge, impact was substantially greater (.25 versus .08, or standardized effects of .19 versus .06) among those with *higher* levels of group memberships, while for local level participation, impact was greater (.10 versus .07) among those with *lower* levels of group memberships. No consistent pattern thus emerges regarding the facilitative impact of group memberships in general on NCEP II-Uraia impact.

We also examined the impact of civic education on individuals who were, and who were not, members of the groups that sponsored or were invited to the specific NCEP II-Uraia activities. We note first that a full three-quarters (76.5%) of individuals in the treatment group reported being a member of either the group that sponsored (9%) or was invited (72%) to the civic education activity.²⁶ This means that the NCEP II-Uraia program tended to conduct activities through particular civil society groups, with relatively few individuals (23.5%) coming to the activities without being attached to either the sponsoring group or a group to which an invitation was extended.

However, the results in Table IV-4 suggest that, to the extent that differential impact exists, it is *greater* among individuals who were *not affiliated with either group*. On most of the eleven core variables, no significant differences in impact between the affiliated and unaffiliated are found. But on three of variables, it can be seen that the effects of NCEP II-Uraia exposure is substantially greater among those treatment group respondents who are not affiliated with the civic education event's sponsoring or invited civil society organization. In the case of CDF efficacy, for example, the impact among the unaffiliated is estimated to be .22 (or a standard deviation effect of .16), compared to an estimated impact among the affiliated of only .06 (or a standard deviation effect of .07). Similar differences are found for local level participation and support for alternative energies. On only one item, woman's rights, is the opposite pattern found, whereby impact is significantly greater among those affiliated with the sponsoring or invited groups. We conclude that long-term NCEP II-Uraia impacts are generally consistent among individuals who are formally attached to groups involved in the civic education process and individuals who are unattached, but that a slight tendency exists for effects to be stronger among the unaffiliated. To this extent, it suggests that altering NCEP targeting strategies to broaden the kinds of individuals who attend future civic education activities may produce even greater impacts.

²⁶ The numbers do not add to 76.5% because some individuals were members of both the sponsoring and invited groups.

Table IV-4. The Effects of Membership in Sponsoring or Invited Civil Society Groups on NCEP II-Uraia Impact

	Effect Among Sponsoring or Invited Group Members		Effect for Unaffiliated Members	
	B	Y-Stand	B	Y-Stand
CDF Efficacy	.06*	.07	.22**	.16
Local Political Participation	.04**	.07	.09**	.10
Women’s Rights Scale	.06**	.07	-.02	.03
More Alternative Energies	.02	.02	.19**	.22

**p<.05 (two-tailed) *p<.10 (two-tailed)

2. The “Secondary Effects of NCEP II-Uraia Civic Education

This focus on the effect of the individual’s group environment in amplifying or inhibiting the impact of civic education leads to a more general possibility that individuals may exert direct influence on one another’s knowledge, attitudes, and values about democracy and democratic political processes. If this is the case, then civic education may have added impact through political discussions it may stimulate within an individual’s social network, regardless of (or in addition to) processes that may take place within groups to which the individual belongs. We refer to these types of effects as “secondary effects” of civic education programs, as they occur after the workshops or other activities have already exerted their “primary” effects on the participants themselves. Secondary effects of civic education may occur in two possible ways: 1) civic education participants may discuss democracy or other issues with others, thereby amplifying in their own minds the messages that they may have learned in the civic education activities; and 2) individuals who did not attend activities of their own may nevertheless discuss democracy-related topics with other individuals who did, thereby becoming exposed to the messages conveyed in the activities *indirectly*. Of course, both of these processes could occur for treatment group individuals, as they could speak to others about their direct experience with civic education activities and also hear about the topics or messages to which others were exposed.

In the previous evaluation of NCEP I, we found that post-workshop discussion among members of the treatment group was extensive, and that even members of the control group reported having discussions with individuals who themselves had been treated by NCEP I. Moreover, both sets of individuals showed relatively powerful effects from these kinds of post-workshop discussions, and the “secondary effects” of the NCEP I emerged from that study as two of the most important conditional effects of civic education that were found.

We tested for the “secondary” effects of civic education with several questions in the survey instrument. First, we asked individuals who attended NCEP II-Uraia activities whether, after the activity was over, they had discussed the “issues in the activities” with a) members of their family, b) friends, c) people where they work, and d) people in groups to which they belong. We then asked them to estimate altogether the number of people they had discussed the issues with, with the response categories being none, one or two people, three to five people, or more than five people.

We then asked all respondents, those who attended NCEP II-Uraia activities and those who did not, the following question: “Setting aside any events or workshops that you attended personally, has anyone you know talked to you about events or activities about democracy or human rights that they attended during the run-up to the December 2007 elections?” Respondents who answered yes were then asked to estimate the number of individuals who discussed these activities with them, with the same response categories as described for the previous variable.

We show in Table IV-5 the extent to which treatment group and control group members engaged in these kinds of post-activity discussions.

Table IV-5. Post-Activity Discussion of NCEP II-Uraia Topics

Number of Persons with Whom Respondent Discussed NCEP II-Uraia Topics	Treatment Group: Own Activity	Treatment Group: Others' Activity	Control Group: Others' Activity
None	4.1%	44.9%	60.3%
1-2 Persons	11.7	11.0	14.3
3-5 Persons	29.6	20.4	13.6
More than 5 Persons	54.6	23.6	11.8

The results show that post-activity discussion was extensive among individuals who had been treated in NCEP II-Uraia civic education. The overwhelming majority (84%) of the treatment group went on to discuss their experiences with at least three persons, with more than half (55%) discussing topics related to their experiences with more than five persons. This figure is roughly comparable to the results in NCEP I; about 10% fewer treatment group respondents reported discussing topics with “more than 5 persons” compared with NCEP I, though again the time period since exposure was significantly longer here and thus the precise figures are undoubtedly more difficult for respondents to recall. The findings indicate, as in NCEP I, that the *reach* of the NCEP programs goes beyond members of the formal treatment group, as these individuals go on to discuss civic education topics with a number of other people in their social networks. This creates much *potential* for NCEP II-Uraia to exert significant secondary effects.

It is also the case that individuals in both the treatment and control group report having extensive discussions with others about those people’s civic education experiences. In column 2 of Table IV-5, we see that over 40% of the treatment group discussed at least three other persons’ civic education experiences, with approximately one-quarter discussing the experiences of at least five other individuals. To some extent, this is an expected result, because members of the treatment group, as shown above, tend to belong to those social networks that are more likely to be involved in civic education activities. But the table also shows that one-quarter (25%) of the control group discussed at least three other persons’ civic education experiences as well. We cannot take this figure to be representative of individuals in the overall Kenyan population “control group,” as the control individuals in our sample were closely matched to the specific treatment group individuals. Nevertheless, the figure confirms the general tendency we found in NCEP I for civic education messages to be prevalent well-beyond the specific individuals who were formally taught. Even among those with no direct exposure to civic education themselves, there is a reasonable likelihood of having engaged in discussions with those who had been taught. And this creates the possibility that the effects of NCEP II-Uraia civic education reached beyond the formal treatment group as well.

We show in Table IV-6 the estimated impact of post-activity discussion on the eleven core democratic orientations. We estimated the impact of discussing one’s own civic education activities, as well as the impact of discussing the civic education activities of others.

Table IV-6. The Secondary Effects of Post-Activity Discussion

	Discussed Own Activity		Discussed Activity of Others	
	B	Y-Stand	B	Y-Stand
Political Knowledge	.06**	.04	.06**	.04
CDF Efficacy	.05**	.06	-.03**	-.03
Local Political Participation	.02**	.04	.02*	.04
Informed about How to Protect Rights	.04**	.06	.03**	.05
Women’s Rights Scale	.01	.01	-.02	-.02
More Alternative Energies	.02	.02	.01	.01
Vote-Buying Wrong	.02*	.04	-.01	-.02
Rights Awareness	.003	.01	.01*	.04
National Versus Tribal Identity	.02*	.02	.01	.01
Most-Disliked Ethnic Group Social Tolerance	.03*	.03	.01	.01
Ethnic Violence is Not Justifiable	.03*	.04	-.01	.00

The results suggest that post-activity secondary effects are significant in about two-thirds of all instances, and that generally the effects of talking about one’s own activities and the activities of others are comparable. For the most part, the significant effects relate to the civic competence and involvement variables where the strongest effects of the study have been found to this point. Effects of moderate magnitude are seen, for example, on political knowledge, local participation, and informed about protecting rights for both kinds of secondary effects. Individuals in the highest categories of both post-activity discussion variables, for example, are estimated to be .36 units higher than individuals who engages in *no* discussion on political knowledge (or a standard deviation difference of .26); this is significantly larger than the simple “treatment” effect shown in Table III-1 of .17 (or a standardized effect of .12). Similar compound secondary effects are seen for local-level participation (maximum standard deviation difference of .22 compared to .09 in Table III-1), and Informed about Protecting Rights (maximum standard deviation difference of .32 compared to .17 in Table III-1). This indicates that on many of the core variables where impact of NCEP II-Uraia activities have already been found, the effects of post-activity discussion serves to amplify the impact considerably.

At the same time, it should be noted that on the “difficult” variables where less impact has been found to this point, post-activity discussion, especially about others’ workshops, does not seem as consequential. Moreover, we find an anomalous negative impact of discussion of others’ activities on CDF efficacy, so the pattern of effects of post-activity discussions is not altogether consistent, even among the competence and involvement variables. We conclude that the long-term secondary effects of NCEP II-Uraia civic education were extensive, but only on a more limited number of democratic orientations than was the case in the NCEP I evaluation.

D. The Impact of Post-Election Violence

One important concern that we faced in this evaluation was the possibility that the inter-communal violence that followed the 2007 election might have attenuated, or even erased, the positive effects of NCEP II-Uraia civic education. If this were the case, the evaluation might be unable to find evidence of impact, even if substantial and consistent effects had been realized before the violence occurred. In previous sections, we documented the program’s impact on several important dimensions. In this section, we seek to determine the extent to which the post-election violence may have reduced the impact that we observed. We answer this question by disaggregating the treatment group into those who reported being affected by the post-election violence and those who were not. Our rationale is that if the post-election

violence did reduce impact, we would see less evidence of impact among those respondents who had participated in NCEP II-Uraia activities but were subsequently affected by the violence.

We asked individuals whether “you or your family was affected by the violence that occurred after the 2007 election”; 31% of the treatment group and 27% of the control group reported that they had been affected. We then entered this variable into the regression models predicting the core democratic orientations, so as to estimate how being affected by violence in general may have influenced attitudes about democracy, and more important for our specific purposes here, how those experiences may have affected the impact of NCEP II-Uraia treatment.

Table IV-7 shows the results of this analysis. We present in one column the results for treatment group respondents who were *not* affected by the violence, and in the next column the results for treatment group respondents who *were* affected by the violence. When we compare the results, we see little support for the hypothesis that the violence reduced the impact of NCEP II-Uraia activities among those individuals who were taught. For the most part, the magnitude of the effects are relatively similar among the two kinds of treatment group respondents. Interestingly, on several key ethnic-related variables, there are *stronger impacts among treatment group respondents who were directly affected by the violence compared with treatment group respondents who were not*. The impact of NCEP II-Uraia activities was more than double in size for directly-affected treatment group respondents on the social tolerance and ethnic violence variables. This suggests that NCEP II-Uraia activities had longer-lasting impact on ethnic-related attitudes among those individuals who experienced the upheavals following the 2007 election directly. We cannot determine if this occurred because the direct experience of violence reinforced messages of nation-building and tolerance that were presented in the civic education activities, or whether the experience of violence led treated individuals to think differently about topics related to ethnicity that were not specifically covered in their own activities. But there is an intriguing suggestion that NCEP II-Uraia civic education mitigated some of the negative effects that the post-election violence had on ethnic-related orientations.²⁷

Table IV-7. The Effects of Post-Election Violence on NCEP II-Uraia Impact

	Treatment respondents who were not affected by the violence		Treatment respondents who were affected by the violence	
	B	Y-Stand	B	Y-Stand
Political Knowledge	.16**	.12	.17**	.13
CDF Efficacy	.08**	.09	.14**	.16
Local Political Participation	.06**	.11	.02	.04
Informed about How to Protect Rights	.11**	.17	.10**	.15
Women’s Rights Scale	.02	.02	.08	.09
More Alternative Energies	.10*	.09	-.04	-.04
Vote-Buying Wrong	.06**	.11	.04	.07
Rights Awareness	.02	.07	.02	.07
National Versus Tribal Identity	.09**	.11	.06	.07
Most-Disliked Ethnic Group Social Tolerance	.07**	.06	.16**	.13
Ethnic Violence is Not Justifiable	.07**	.08	.13**	.15

**p<.05 (two-tailed) *p<.10 (two-tailed)

²⁷ Further support for this interpretation is given by the fact that the experience of violence among individuals in the control group had *negative* effects on social tolerance and rejection of ethnic violence as a legitimate means of defense. This means that, in the absence of treatment, individuals who experienced violence following the election were *less* socially tolerant, and less likely to reject ethnic violence, than individuals who did not experience violence. The effects seen in Table IV-7 for these variables means that NCEP II-Uraia civic education activities blunted the deleterious negative effects of the individual’s personal experience with the post-election violence.

This interpretation is strengthened when we examine responses to the final set of questions we asked concerning the traumatic events following the 2007 election. We asked respondents to “Please think about the time right before the December 2007 elections, that is, before all the violence and dislocations that occurred in Kenya,” and then asked if they agreed or disagreed with the following statements:

- At that time I thought that democracy was a better system of government than I do now.
- At that time I thought I could influence the political process more than I do now.
- At that time I was more willing to consider the views of people from other ethnic groups than I am now.
- At that time I was more optimistic about building a true democracy in Kenya than I am now.

Positive responses on these items mean that the impact of the post-election upheavals caused individuals to become less optimistic about Kenyan democracy, their roles in it, and their consideration of other ethnic groups’ points of view. The overall responses to these questions are revealing, in that between 62% and 72% of all respondents “agree” or “strongly agree” with each of the statements.

We show in Table IV-8 the effect of the direct experience of post-election violence on each of these orientations, among individuals who were treated in NCEP II-Uraia civic education activities and individuals who were not. It can be seen that on two of these dimensions, Perceived Influence and Consider Other Ethnic Views, the effect of personal experience with violence had strongly positive effects on these variables *only among the control group*. That is, people in the control group who directly experienced post-election violence became more pessimistic about their role in Kenyan democracy, and less willing to consider the views of other ethnic groups, while *no such negative impact occurred among the treatment group*. Thus we conclude that the NCEP II-Uraia program had some role in mitigating the negative impacts of the traumatic events of the post-election period.

Table IV-8. The Effects of Post-Election Violence on Disillusionment with Kenyan Democracy Among NCEP II-Uraia Participants and Control Group

	Estimated Effect of Experience with Violence among the Control Group		Estimated Effect of Experience with Violence among the Treatment Group	
	B	Y-Stand	B	Y-Stand
I thought Democracy was a Better Form of Government	.03	.03	.05	.04
I thought I could Influence Politics More Than Than Now	.19**	.15	.04	.03
I was More Willing to Consider the Views of Other Ethnic Groups	.13**	.10	-.02	-.02
I was More Optimistic about Kenyan Democracy	.09	.07	.09	.07

**p<.05 (two-tailed) *p<.10 (two-tailed)

V. INSIGHTS FROM FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS

As part of the impact evaluation, six focus groups were conducted between 26 March and 7 April 2009. The focus groups were small group discussion that were designed to provide open-ended, qualitative data regarding participants’ assessments of the NCEP II-Uraia activities in which they took part, their assessments of what could have been done differently and what might be improved upon in the future. The groups were led by a trained Research International facilitator, following an outline prepared after the quantitative analyses summarized in the previous chapters had been completed. Each group was comprised of eight or nine participants, and the discussions lasted between two and a half and three hours. Participants were recruited by Research International from the pool of “treatment group” individuals in the quantitative portion of the study, and were provided between 500 and 1000 KES to attend the sessions.

Table V-1 summarizes the details of the six focus groups. Two of the groups were conducted with NCEP II-Uraia facilitators, and four with ordinary participants in NCEP II-Uraia activities. One session focused on the perceptions of individuals who were exposed to Uraia messages in the mass media, one on the perceptions of women participants, one on the perceptions of participants in poetry-drama events, and one on the perceptions of participants in NCEP II-Uraia workshops. Focus group participants were asked their perspectives on what worked and what did not work during the sessions that they ran or attended, their impressions of the quality of the training or teachings that they received, and the recommendations they have for the content and implementation of future civic education programs.

Table V-1 Focus Group Discussions

Groups	Specifications		Location
Group 1: (facilitators)	- Mixed gender	- Secular, {CRECO and CEDMAC}	- Nairobi, conducted in RI Nairobi office on 26 th March
Group 2: (facilitators)	- Mixed gender	- Religious {NAMCEC and ECEP}	- Nairobi, conducted in RI Nairobi office on 26 th March
Group 3: (participants)	- Female only	- Any Uraia activities	- Rural Rift Valley, conducted in Nakuru on 2 nd April
Group 4: (participants)	- Mixed gender	- Uraia poetry-drama	- Rural Rift Valley, conducted in Nakuru on 2 nd April
Group 5: (participants)	- Mixed gender	- Uraia workshops	- Rural Coast, conducted in Kilifi on 7 th April
Group 6: (Media exp.)	- Mixed gender	- Uraia media	- Urban Central, conducted in Nyeri on 31 st March

A. Insights from Facilitator Focus Groups

The participants in the two facilitator focus groups were generally pleased with their experiences with NCEP II-Uraia, and reported that the activities in which they took part were generally successful. One particular effect that several participants noted was consistent with the results reported in earlier section regarding increases in citizen political competence and awareness of their rights. As respondents in Group 1 said:

I helped them, because they thought they had nowhere to go and air their problems but after educating them through civic education, the curtain of silence was broken; because for example, they now have the courage to face the chiefs and the sub-chiefs...

It helped them to mostly know their rights and they were awakened from a deep sleep whereby people did not know what to do, and whereby they were approached by one party, it was as if they were colonized. But now when multi-partyism came and we taught them what it meant, people have now changed a lot. They can now shout without fear and condemn a vice that may be happening and maybe say, “this is not what we want”. So, they were awakened.

Still, the facilitators also noted many challenges they faced when conducting the NCEP II-Uraia activities, and they had many suggestions for things that should be improved in the future. We focus on these aspects of the group discussions, without intending to leave the impression that they were generally dissatisfied with the program or their experiences. The tone of the group discussions and of the criticisms that were raised was overwhelmingly constructive in nature, and reflective of a genuine desire to improve the delivery of civic education in Kenya in the future.

One problem that was raised in both focus groups was **interference in their activities by politicians** or local chiefs, or candidates for office or their supporters. To some degree, this was related to a perception that NCEP II-Uraia was conducted too close to the 2007 national elections, with some participants advocating a more “continuous process” that would minimize political tensions. A respondent in Group 1 discussed the general problem:

The Administration was very much negative towards us. [What do you mean by ‘administration’?] The chiefs and the provincial administration. You know, when we are talking about people’s rights or human rights, they know they will be affected because they have been violating people’s rights or they have been mistreating them, so they tend to turn away. Sometimes, they can hire people to come and disturb your meeting. They can even incite people; you know, we were not given money to motivate the participants; we were not given sitting allowance or transport; so they would incite other leaders and people and tell them that we had a lot of money for the facilitation process and that if the people were not given money, then they should not attend.

A respondent in Group 2 discussed the election proximity problem this way:

In Kikuyu, we had a big problem. We mobilized the youth and then it turned out to be a political meeting. The aspiring politicians would come to our meetings and take over, yet it was us who had mobilized the youth to come and teach them about voting and the whole process then it was hijacked by politicians, so we ended up being so desperate, that was our major problem.

It is difficult to determine how widespread these kinds of disruptions were, but there was a sense among the participants in these discussions that there would be some value in conducting civic education on a more continuous basis and at a further remove from political campaigning and partisan politics.

The groups spent a good deal of time discussing aspects of their own **training** by NCEP II-Uraia that could be improved in the future. One common theme was the difficulty in using the Resource Manual, given its size and given what some participants claimed was its “academic” or “theoretical” tone. As respondents in both groups said:

Another issue, as my sister pointed out, is that you have the resource book- it is very good, but that resource book is purely academic; When you are talking about Human Rights, you have to relate it to what is actually happening on the ground. We didn't have time to develop those types of materials or resources to develop such type of materials, and you have about 5 thematic areas that you have to touch on, including Nationalism, Constitutionalism, Democracy and Human Rights; so you find that it is a big challenge if I don't have proper material that has been prepared and I have to improvise, and you will find if you don't have the capability of finding someone who will help you with the support, you will find that it is a big challenge. (Group 2)

And also bear in mind that in this book, there are no Human Rights or HIV/AIDS sections, but they were still part of the URAIA program. So, the time that you are actually given to read through the resource book and go and deliver was short, yet the book was so big. If they could organize things a bit better, the outcome can be much better. (Group 1)

A related concern was the large number of topics covered in the NCEP II-Uraia curriculum, which some respondents felt limited their ability to digest their own trainings, and to conduct the sessions that they ran effectively. As one facilitator in Group 2 said:

The program was very good and very effective, but it was very crowded with so many topics to be covered in a very short time and it was not very interactive; the facilitators come and give you so much and you don't have time to interact and air some of the views.

This point, in turn, relates to more general criticisms by many of the respondents of their own training to be facilitators in the NCEP II-Uraia program. Again, these criticisms were voiced in a constructive manner, but it was clear from the comments that the training of trainers was of uneven quality and in some instances rushed and incomplete. These comments came from individuals in both groups:

The induction for the facilitators, which was a very bogus process, let me not lie! Because there is no way you can go through a whole resource file of 800 pages for 2 days, and when we moved to the ground, the implementing CSOs – the NGOs which were implementing, promised people good things. They told us to go and when we had mobilized people, we come back and they will give us something to facilitate; but when we went out on the ground doing our trainings, it didn't happen. (Group 1)

[If I understand you, what you have said is that when you went out to train for URAIA, the period allocated for the training was short?] Yes, very short. And if you look at the resource book, it has 5 key thematic areas tackling issues of Nationhood- which can take 2 days for people to internalize, and people did not internalize what nationhood is and that is why things happened in the elections; because somebody doesn't know why he is a Kenyan and he didn't own the process in the first place. (Group 1)

The issue is the duration. If I have to tackle the whole resource file, I cannot internalize everything in one day; it should be taken maybe for 5 days, one day for each thematic area. And then on the last day, we summarize everything. Also on the issue of training, you cannot train 40 people in one session, it is impossible, that is preaching, not training! If it is 40 people, each CSO should be mandated with maybe 8 people. (Group 1)

[What about the teaching methodologies that were used during the training?] They were standard methodologies, not very creative! They were good for a formal session but there is need for being a little bit more creative. And the methodology should not always be verbal. And apart from the very large resource book that we were given, we were given very little materials, so were restricted in terms of prepared material to supplement what the resource book had; because basically, according to me, the facilitator was just repeating what was in those books, maybe just to bring the points out and maybe discuss them so that they can make us understand a bit more, but basically that's it and you ask yourself why you should go for the training if you can read the resource book at home. One of the failures was that we focus more on the content than to actually build the capacity of the people being trained to enable them to communicate more effectively and to find more creative ways to engage the people. (Group 2)

The reason is that there was limited time, there were like 2 days and we had to cover very many topics in the time that was allowed because we were in a hotel; so we were restricted time wise. So the facilitators there may be brought a resource person and maybe he was supposed to give a 40- minutes talk, and another one is also maybe waiting. So you find that the training time did not allow for all the methods to be used. (Group 2)

These comments reinforce one of the most important findings from earlier sections of the report: the overriding importance of training facilitators in the content of the NCEP II-Uraia curriculum, and of training them to use active participatory teaching methods. According to focus group participants, this was an uneven and not always successful process. Further, the comments illuminate the possibility that the program perhaps attempted to do too much in terms of different topics or aspects of democratic education, and that the sheer number of topics hindered the ability of the facilitators to discuss them as effectively as they might have in a program focused on fewer content areas.

We asked focus group participants to provide other concrete suggestions for improving civic education in the future. The most widespread suggestion, perhaps unsurprisingly, was increased resources for facilitation, which in their view would result in more exposure to civic education messages and also more *repeat* exposures that could reinforce democratic messages. As participants noted:

By financial motivation. The whole thing boils down to finance, there is no way about it, because by then, you know in NCEP 1, you call people like in certain workshops and as you talk to them, you give them tea and snacks, and definitely they are motivated to come for the second time. In the process of coming because of money, they will also gain knowledge. But when NCEP 2 came, you are told to use opportunities that arise and people are no longer motivated. If you get 30 people in the first station, you are lucky if you get 20 people in the next station! (Group 2)

Well, I worked in the urban centres. And there is a perceived idea that if you are working for an NGO, there is transportation and facilitation provided, so whenever we call people and want to talk to them, they ask us if we will give them fare to cater for their transport, and maybe that guy just came from around the corner, but because this is what has been happening on the ground; every time there is a workshop or seminar, they are used to be given food and transport, and here you are, wanting to talk to the people without even giving them a soda or the sh.50 or the sh.100 they are so used to, that actually negatively impacted on our programs; because that perception is

there whether we like it or not. When we talked to our coordinators, they said we have to talk to our people; but if you have been working in Nairobi, you know the situation. You cannot convince someone that you do not have the money, they are convinced that you are the one who has maybe pocketed the money and hence you have refused to give them! With that in mind, you cannot get the full attention of the people. (Group 2)

By adding our hospitality; for example we used to give sh.100 for lunch. If this can be increased to sh.200 or sh.250, the people can come from very far. (Group 1)

Another thing is the distance. When we went for facilitation in Machakos, we were not given the allowances that could help in terms of transport and movement. So we kept educating the same people in our church and the people around us; we did not move out- as in go out to different people; because there are no roads and you have to trek and the distances are long; there were a lot of challenges. (Group 2)

The downside is that we were limited in resource because we had a bigger area to cover, and we were spread out thinly and we couldn't concentrate on key areas; we had to go round and that means we had to generalize a lot because each area has its own particular problems that have to be brought out so that the program can become relevant to the people we are talking to. (Group 2)

Finally, participants suggested that future civic education include more detailed teachings on conflict resolution and ethnic relations, in response to the current situation in the country. As participants noted:

The resource file has to come up with issues to do with conflict resolution mechanisms. I think there were some elements that were missing, maybe URAIA hadn't projected that this would happen, but I know they are working on it and the issue of resolution should come in, and then the methodology of how people can solve their conflicts in their areas. (Group 1)

But some of these areas should be given major themes, so that the facilitator can give them more concern. Also on peace building and we should also be reminded who we are and how to resolve our conflicts. (Group 1)

B. Insights from Media Focus Group

The focus group discussion on NCEP II-Uraia media yielded many interesting insights regarding the impact of the program's media component and how it might be more effective in the future. In terms of the reach of the program, many respondents recalled hearing or seeing Uraia programming on radio or TV. When asked what they remembered, some respondents cited the Louis Otienna Show. Others reported hearing about Uraia on a local radio station, *Inooro*. Some respondents also remembered seeing billboards and advertisements in newspapers. Many respondents, however, were unsure whether the specific programs they had seen or heard were sponsored by Uraia. Generally, respondents associated Uraia with any programs or activities that touched on themes related to democracy, voting, or political rights. Thus, while many people recalled having been exposed to Uraia's media activities, in some cases it was unclear whether respondents were thinking of programs actually sponsored by Uraia.

Respondents associated Uraia with programs that talked about elections and rights:

It [Uraia] is making people aware about their rights

I saw it [Uraia] on a billboard on elections where people were drawn on a queue waiting to cast their ballot, and there below it was written ‘your vote is your right, and you do not have to sell it’ or something like that.

It [Uraia] was telling us that it was our right to vote without considering what candidates other people are choosing.

Respondents mentioned a number of positive impacts that resulted from exposure to Uraia’s media component. Several noted that Uraia educated people about their rights, leading to increased comprehension. For example, one respondent said:

I also tend to think that even our local radio stations have helped people a lot in knowing about citizenship (URAIA), democracy and their rights; they have made a huge contribution.

Several respondents mentioned that Uraia and programs like it affected voting practices. One said,

They [Uraia] made awareness that your vote is your right and that you should not sell it; and if you sell it, you are selling your right. They enlightened us.

Previously, I would have sold my vote! But because of reading about the advert many times, I saw that if I sold my vote, it would have be very bad.

Finally, respondents also indicated that they discussed issues presented in the media with friends, family, or colleagues, passing information along to others who may not have been exposed directly. One said,

Some people in the upcountry used to sell their votes, so you go to educate them, and tell them that if they sell their votes, they will come to regret it later.

You know, at times even when I may not have watched and maybe one of my colleagues, we might discuss about it and I will still get to know about the information.

There were many suggestions in the group about improving media programming in the future. Many respondents indicated that, despite their exposure to Uraia and other media programs, they still felt confused about the contents of the constitution, their rights, and what actions to take when their rights are violated. Respondent said:

We need to know more, for example, about the constitution and about the Law and the Courts.

Even if you go to the Courts, you don’t know how to defend yourself, and you even don’t know about the Constitution and your rights therein; you will find that it is only the Judges in courts who know about the constitution.

When you are arrested by a police officer, they can spend several nights in a prison cell, and you don’t even know what you have done wrong and you also don’t know what the Law says.

We are supposed to be advised that if we go to a Government hospital and we don’t find someone who can attend to us, maybe you can take your grievances and complaints to a specific place; they should tell us which office we can take such complaints to.

Tell us what to do in case we do not receive services at the Government Institutions.

One suggestion that was offered by several respondents was that Uraia should work on combating ethnic tension and violence. Respondents said:

They [Uraia] should have taught people that elections come and go, and that even after voting, people should not fight and that they should live in harmony. They should look for a way to teach people to co-exist even after the elections.

They should also educate people on tribalism; that we are all Kenyans.

They should also teach people that everyone has a right to live anywhere in Kenya.

Regarding the format of future media programming, respondents agreed that radio ought to be prioritized over TV, since more Kenyans own radios than TVs. Several respondents also agreed that media programs should be aired more often and not just during campaign times. One said:

To me, I should think that for example, Louis Otieno's program should come more frequently so that people become more informed, not coming on screen just once in a while.

C. Insights from Participant Focus Groups

We conducted focus groups with individuals who had participated in NCEP II-Uraia face to face activities, including one session with female participants, one with participants in poetry-drama activities, and one with participants in NCEP II-Uraia workshops. Unfortunately, these sessions were not as informative as the facilitator workshops, largely due to the long time that had elapsed since their exposure to the activities of the program. Many could not recall much about the specific NCEP II-Uraia event they had attended, and so the discussion proceeded at a more general level which did not yield as many concrete insights or suggestions regarding improving the delivery of civic education in the future. Nevertheless, some interesting observations were recorded that amplify and extend some of the conclusions we have reached from earlier sections of the report, and from the other focus group discussions as well.

There was general agreement that the NCEP II-Uraia activities had been enriching experiences for the participants. Participants reported an increased understanding of many aspects of democracy, and in particular an awareness of their rights as Kenyan citizens and their abilities to defend their rights. This is consistent with the results reported earlier on subjective satisfaction with NCEP II-Uraia, and with the positive results reported on competence and rights-related factors in the quantitative analyses. As respondents noted:

They (Uraia) make people know their rights. Previously, I could not be able to handle grievances with my employer, but after the training, I was able to go and demand what I deserved. (Group 4)

In previous times, we knew it was our right to get birth certificates, but we went to claim for them in fear, as if it was not our right or like you were not a Kenyan. Or maybe you go to any office seeking for assistance or any information, and you are treated as if you are a foreigner, but with the laws and rights that have come up, I can ask for help in confidence. (Group 4)

From the skit, I can remember there were people walking at night and the police were harassing them and asking them harassing questions. And then one of the policemen asks the people if they have 'something small' to give; so after the skit, the facilitator came and said that there are some rights that we are denied; because they should have been given a right to say where they had

come from. They were also not given the right to roam, and also the issue of corruption came in. so we were told that we have the freedom to go wherever we wanted, as long as you are within Kenya and as long as you are a Kenyan. And that you also have the freedom of expression , where they should have been given a chance to explain where they had come from. (Group 5)

Focus group participants echoed the themes mentioned above regarding the importance of properly-trained teachers/facilitators, and the use of active participatory methods in the teaching as well. As participants noted:

To be sincere, there are some training that one attends and then one regrets why they even attended them! [Why?] Talking as a teacher as well, I can have the knowledge but how to give it out is very important. If I am boring, the whole class will go to sleep. The facilitators have to be very active and to find lots of ways and activities; you know, here you have a class of grownups- these are people who went to school 30 to 40 years ago, you can't stand on the black board with some white chalks! At the end of the day people end up sleeping, I think they should give us activities as opposed to lots of lectures. (Group 4)

Yes, they should avoid lots of lectures. Yes, lectures are there but they should look for a way to give it out. I think charts can be made, or ask students to sit down for some few hours and come up with a chart on that theme, and maybe they can come up with videos and plays. (Group 4)

I think most of the trainings are supposed to be participatory. In fact if you want to achieve your objective, let the trainers and the trainees participate by talking a lot, having group discussions as well as having role plays. It makes people understand whatever you want them to know, much better than just lecturing and letting them write. On the side of giving them hand outs, it is better that you let them write what they want to know. If you give me a very big book, I will only read a small portion of it. (Group 4)

I was thinking that maybe the point where the facilitator is talking; there is a point where the facilitator is supposed to ask you a question or bring out a topic, he or she should take account of the points that you are giving out. You can go to some workshops and you will find the facilitator is talking more as opposed to hearing people's opinions, so I think they should improve on that and not bring facilitators who are doing more talking than listening. (Group 5)

They should not be like teachers; who in class, they just lecture continuously. If you go to another workshop and you find they brought a facilitator who is a teacher, he or she will be the one talking, and not listening to your points. (Group 5)

Participants also mentioned the problem of too many topics being covered in the program, an issue which was noted in the facilitator focus group discussions as well:

For the ones I have attended, there have been so many topics; but they rush on them and they don't elaborate so that they can complete in the scheduled time; more than 3 topics. Maybe they are lacking time or the sponsors are not giving out money. You know, they are used to conveying them in hotels and some of the hotels are very expensive. Maybe they compete with time, and if you exceed that time, then you have to pay more. They use a projector and just rush over so many topics. (Group 4)

Given the problem noted above that many participants lacked specific recall about particular NCEP II-Uraia activities they had attended in the past, the focus groups spent a good deal of time discussing the themes and topics that should be covered in future civic education. There was considerable agreement on

the following themes: ethnicity and ethnic relations, corruption, and issues related to the CDF (Constituency Development Fund). As participants said:

They should be encouraged to talk about ethnicity, which is the challenge we are facing today. They should let people know that everybody is equal regardless of tribe. (Group 4)

You had asked earlier why there was violence; it is usually said that if the foundation is not strong enough, there is no way you can raise a building like this one. The civic educators did their work, but they failed to tackle the issues that were affecting the society. [Which were the issues?] For instance, the reason for people fighting was not all about the elections or the rigging of elections, because we know that elections have been rigged before. In our communities, we have always had the incidence of some communities feeling to be more superior to others and so they put the others down. I think that when they were coming to teach civic education, they would have tackled these issues so that each community may see the other community as being equal. If they had tackled that issue before, they would have saved us a lot of trouble, there would have been no fighting- even after the rigging of elections. People would have sat down and talked to each other and see the solution, because with fighting, we cannot get any solution. So those people failed to tackle the issue that they were supposed to tackle. (Group 5)

Our leaders have divided us into tribes. Because right from independence, we co-existed among ourselves- the 42 tribes even intermarried among themselves and we have lived as brothers and sisters, but what has happened that has made us to turn against each other or against people of different tribes. And this is man-made..... People have a lot of bitterness and this is something that has to be cursed. We have to refuse these issues completely. If it continues to affect our children, this will something that will affect generations. (Group 3)

And also corruption. We are now suffering because of the lack of proper structures in the judiciary and the other institutional breakdowns. but I think that the major word here is the constitution and everybody has been crying about that for a long time it is high time that everybody works towards it. [Institution breakdown in what way?] I think good governance was previously there, but it did not work. People want change, but which change? From the traditional behavior and the legal systems. We Kenyans wanted change in the constitution, because this is the foundation of the law. We accept democracy, but where is it, if the legal system does not support? So, the catch word is change, but the change has to be from the foundation. So the constitution change is still a demand. (Group 4)

And corruption has also increased, but we are the contributors, because we accept bribes before accepting to do work. And we also accept bribes before voting. So people should be taught on them, to not accept bribes. (Group 4)

What we ought to be concerned about if the CDF, which directly concerns them, and LATIF. (Group 3)

Let us now go to the CDF and LATIF. You find that if you were not supporting a certain politician to get into power, you won't get access to the CDF or LATIF, or if you are not the same tribe as the politician, you won't also benefit. Let us now go to Administrative posts; they have been announcing posts for Chiefs, Assistant chiefs and the like, and you apply; like for me, I have applied severally without even getting a response or even an invitation letter for an interview. When I go to inquire about it, they tell me to go the registry and find out what went amiss, because maybe my letter was not sent to them; do you really believe that is an oversight? You will just sit and watch, but for how long? (Group 3)

When it comes to CDF, you will find that is the money the politician is using to reward the people who campaigned for him through giving them appointments maybe as the chairperson, and treasurer among others. Like for me not being a Kikuyu, do you think I can get access to the CDF? I have never even tried. To be honest, if you are not a Kikuyu, you cannot get that money, and even if you do get, you will get just such a little amount that it can't be of benefit to you. But when the money originally comes, it comes to the constituency as a whole, not to a Kikuyu or a Kalenjin. Then the MP now selects, if I was a Kalenjin and I supported him, I get. And for our area, It was the teachers who supported and campaigned for him, so they were getting the CDF and they were the ones who were given the first priority. (Group 3)

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE CIVIC EDUCATION IN KENYA

This study was undertaken to determine whether, how, and under what conditions the Second Kenya National Civic Education Program (NCEP II-Uraia) was successful in changing rights awareness, democratic orientations and political engagement among individuals who were exposed to the program's activities. To accomplish this task, we conducted a survey of 3,600 individuals interviewed nationally between 10 December 2008 and 30 January 2009. After selecting 360 NCEP II activities at random from a data base constructed from all of the program's "Form D" activity cover sheets, 1,800 "treatment group" individuals who had been exposed to the program's face-to-face activities were interviewed in neighborhoods adjoining the activity sites, along with 1,800 "control group" individuals who were matched to the treatment group on a series of relevant demographic characteristics but who had no NCEP II-Uraia face-to-face exposure. We also conducted a series of focus group discussions with small groups of program facilitators, individuals exposed to face-to-face NCEP II-Uraia activities, and individuals exposed to Uraia messages in the Kenyan mass media.

Because of the long time period that elapsed between NCEP II-Uraia activities (April 2006-September 2007) and the interviews with program participants (December 2008-January 2009), the study presents evidence only on the *long-term impact* the program may have had. Moreover, the violence and upheaval in Kenya following the disputed election of 2007 may have impacted Kenyan public opinion in ways that altered the effects of NCEP II-Uraia programming compared to the effects of civic education in more "normal" political and social circumstances. We cannot determine whether there were short-term effects of the program in the run-up to the 2007 election, nor, obviously, can we determine what the long-term effects of the program would have looked like had the violence *not* occurred.

Given these limitations, it may have been expected that few solid conclusions about program impact could be drawn. Yet the study points to a series of rather definitive findings about the kinds of long-term effects that NCEP II-Uraia civic education had, and the conditions under which the program had its strongest impacts. Some of the findings are unique to the NCEP II-Uraia experience, and some echo the conclusions that were drawn in the previous NCEP I evaluation and in even earlier impact assessments of civic education in South Africa, the Dominican Republic, and Poland. In this section we shall first summarize these key results; we then discuss the important implications the findings have for the design and implementation of future Kenyan civic education programs.

A. Major Findings

We investigated the impact of NCEP II-Uraia civic education on a large and diverse set of democratic orientations, ranging from basic political knowledge and rights awareness to attitudes about gender and

environmental issues, to ethnic tolerance, to attitudes about democratic institutions, norms and values. We found that the program did have meaningful long-term effects on several important dimensions, notably the cluster of orientations that we labeled *Civic Competence and Involvement*. Individuals who were exposed to NCEP-II Uraia face-to-face activities were significantly more knowledgeable about politics, more efficacious generally and specifically in regards to the Constituency Development Fund, more participatory at the local level, more aware of how to defend their rights, and more informed about constitutional issues and the desirability of public involvement in the constitutional review process, than were similarly “matched” individuals who did not participate in NCEP-II Uraia activities. This is an important finding, one that suggests the program was successful in achieving at least some of its stated goals.

Moreover, there was some influence of NCEP II-Uraia on variables related to *Identity and Ethnic Group Relations*: program activities led to significant increases in individuals’ identification as a “Kenyan” relative to their tribal identification, led to significant increases in the amount of social tolerance the individual is willing to extend to his or her “most disliked group”, and led to significant increases in the perception that violence is not an appropriate means for ethnic groups to defend themselves if they feel threatened. This dimension is crucial to the Uraia themes of “nation-building”, and the fact that non-negligible long-term impact was seen for face-to-face activities on several important variables in this category is indicative again of the program’s success in achieving some of its stated goals. In addition, the events following the 2007 election showed that this dimension is particularly crucial to Kenyan politics and society, and thus the effects seen here are especially welcome in terms of the furthering of the country’s democratic political culture.

At the same time, the impact of the program on nearly all other democratic orientations examined in the study was negligible. There were limited effects on a series of variables we called *Democratic Values, Rights and Responsibilities*, and these included such important factors as rejection of anti-democratic regime alternatives, support for the rule of law, trust in institutions and others, and the acceptance of extensive political responsibilities of citizenship. And we found virtually no effects of the program on the *Cross-Cutting Issues* of HIV/AIDS, gender, and the environment that figured prominently in the program’s curriculum. All of this suggests that NCEP-II Uraia was a relatively effective long-term agent of political *empowerment*, but a relatively ineffective long-term agent for value and issue *advocacy*.

We examined the impact of NCEP II-Uraia mass media, which represented a new and innovative component of the program compared to the NCEP I program from 2000-2002. Here the effects were mixed as well. On the one hand, we found that there was extensive exposure to Uraia messages in the mass media, in particular its radio programming, and we found extensive recognition and favorability towards the “Uraia brand.” We also found that exposure to Uraia mass media did augment the effects of face-to-face activities on several variables in the Civic Competence and Involvement dimension, notably political knowledge, awareness of how to defend one’s rights, and awareness of the Kenyan constitution. Yet the media component – even on these competence and awareness variables – *by itself* produced relatively little in the way of meaningful impacts. And on virtually all other orientations we examined, there were either no significant impacts registered for media exposure or, occasionally, effects in the *negative* direction.

We examined further the conditions under which NCEP II-Uraia produced larger and more lasting impacts. In this regard, the findings strongly confirmed the conclusions reached in the NCEP I and earlier impact assessments. The effects of NCEP II-Uraia civic education were influenced strongly by the amount of the individual’s exposure to civic education activities, by the kinds of instructional methods used, by the quality of the facilitators, and by the degree to which individuals engage in discussions about democracy issues after their direct exposure to civic education. Specifically:

- Those who participated in three or more face-to-face activities exhibited consistent and stronger effects on a set of core democratic orientations, while those who participated in only one or two activities often showed *no differences* compared to the control group. This confirms again the overriding importance of *multiple exposures* to civic education in order to produce lasting impact;
- Exposure to multiple participatory teaching methodologies led to significantly greater impact than exposure to lecture-based and other passive pedagogical techniques;
- When facilitators of NCEP II-Uraia activities were perceived to be of higher quality, significantly stronger impacts were observed than when facilitators were perceived to be of lower quality; these effects were particularly prevalent on certain variables where weak overall effects of NCEP II-Uraia treatment were observed; and
- There was significant post-activity discussion of NCEP II-Uraia civic education with individuals in both the treatment and control group’s social networks, and these post-activity discussions led to extensive “secondary effects” of NCEP II-Uraia activities. These effects, however, were evident on a more limited number of democratic orientations than was the case in the NCEP I evaluation.

Taken together, these findings offer strong confirmation, within the context of a study examining long-term impact, of what we knew previously about the conditions under which democracy training works. It also, however, offers strong confirmation of what we knew previously about the extent to which individuals tend *not* to be taught in the conditions most conducive to program impact. For example, about two in five members of the treatment group was exposed to three or more participatory methods in his or her activities; about one-third perceived that at least four out of five positive qualities described their activities’ facilitators “very well”; about half attended three or more NCEP II-Uraia activities; and about one in three spoke to three or more people about NCEP II-Uraia activities that the others may have attended. Thus, as has been found in previous impact assessments, the results indicate both the strong *potential* for effects if individuals were “correctly” taught, as well as the more limited *actual* impacts the program had on participants.

Finally, we examined the role that the violence following the disputed election of 2007 may have had on the results. In contrast to our expectations, we found little evidence that the post-election upheaval had negative effects on the magnitude of NCEP-II impact. By contrast, there was some suggestion that the NCEP II-Uraia program played some role in mitigating the negative impacts of the traumatic events of the post-election period. The direct experience of post-election violence tended to undermine individual’s faith in Kenyan democracy and their role in it, but these negative effects were sometimes attenuated among those who had been exposed to NCEP II-Uraia civic education. To this extent, the program was at least partially successful in preventing even more disillusionment and democratic “backsliding” as a result of the tragic events that occurred in Kenya after the program had formally concluded.

B. Recommendations for Future Civic Education

The study’s findings and conclusions have definite implications for how civic education should be structured in the future to maximize individual-level impact. We make the following recommendations for the design and implementation of future Kenyan civic education.

1. Future programs should continue to emphasize the promotion of orientations related to civic competence and involvement, the promotion of national versus tribal identities, and the promotion of ethnic social tolerance. This study, as well the previous NCEP I and other earlier impact evaluations, has shown that civic education has its greatest short-term and long-term effects on competence-related orientations such as political knowledge, efficacy, awareness of individual rights, and political

participation; emphasizing these dimensions in future programs will likely continue to produce positive impacts. National identity and ethnic group tolerance have also been consistently affected by NCEP civic education in both the short and long term; though the impacts have been somewhat smaller in magnitude, the evident need for developing these factors further within Kenyan political culture supports the continuation and expansion of these themes in future civic education efforts.

2. *Future programs should rethink whether and how to teach values related to democracy and the rule of law, and whether and how to include issue advocacy as part of civic education curricula.* As laudable as the goals are of instilling democratic values in the Kenyan citizenry, instilling support for democratic institutions and the rule of law, and changing attitudes related to critical political issues such as HIV/AIDS and the environment, the fact remains that these orientations appear to be relatively impervious to change, given current methodologies and approaches utilized in NCEP civic education. The relatively minor impact in these areas was already evident in NCEP I, and was shown even more strongly in the current assessment. As in the previous study, there were some suggestions that more intensive teaching with more frequent exposures *may* prove more successful in influencing these kinds of democratic orientations. But simply doing what has been done in the past will likely show equally disappointing results on these dimensions in future civic education initiatives.

3. *Future programs should focus in a more targeted fashion on issues of direct concern to Kenyan citizens.* In line with the two recommendations just mentioned, the analyses here indicate that there may be advantages in narrowing the content of future programs to focus on specific topics and themes that are likely to resonate with the Kenyan public. The quantitative portions of the study showed that many of the topics covered in NCEP II-Uraia had limited long-term impact, and the qualitative (focus group) portions showed that some facilitators and program participants thought that NCEP II-Uraia attempted to cover too many topics in too little depth, given the time and resource constraints that the program faced. We therefore recommend streamlining future civic education to focus on issues (such as civic competence and rights awareness) that have had demonstrable impact, and those that are of high importance to average citizens. At the moment, this would mean placing increased emphasis, for example, on themes related to ethnic conflict, corruption, and on issues related to CDF allocation and what citizens can do to increase accountability in the CDF process. We emphasize, however, that the particular priorities of Kenyans may change prior to the next round of civic education, and thus we recommend that NCEP should conduct a “demand survey” to find out other topics which Kenyans may wish (and need) to learn about.

4. *Future programs should rethink how mass media should be utilized to maximize individual impact.* The inclusion of mass media programming was a major innovation in NCEP II-Uraia. But the long-term impacts of individuals’ exposure to Uraia media was relatively limited. It played a supporting role in promoting civic competence and rights awareness, but by itself did not affect major change in any of the democratic orientations considered in the study. To some degree, this result is consistent with decades of social science research that shows the *relatively* limited impact that media have on political attitudes and values. Media can play a role in stimulating learning and in promoting political participation, but *changing attitudes* through mass media exposure has been shown consistently to be more difficult than its enthusiasts imagine. Our recommendation is to develop *a more targeted, frequent, and intensive media campaign* that can overcome some of the limitations of media effects that we have shown here; otherwise, devoting substantial resources to this component will likely prove to be a relatively ineffective use of program resources. In designing the future media activities, we also recommend that NCEP review best-practices from other countries in the region to identify innovative options that can enhance impact. For example, in Ghana’s recent election, the media produced short programs about ethnic conflicts in Rwanda, Sierre Leone, and other African countries. These programs, which were repeated many times, were designed to sensitive citizens to the costs of ethnic politics; they also have featured respected musicians, athletes, and other public personalities who can speak out against tribalism.

5. *Future programs should change the way that civic education is delivered, so as increase the numbers of individuals who are taught in ways that are most conducive to impact. This means greater emphasis on the training of facilitators, greater emphasis on the use of participatory teaching methods, and greater emphasis on stimulating multiple exposures to civic education activities.* We are now more or less certain that multiple exposures to civic education (three or more) are needed to achieve substantial impact, that participatory teaching methodologies are essential, and that well-trained, knowledgeable and inspiring facilitators are essential. Yet large numbers of individuals continue to be taught in “one-off” kinds of events, with lecture-oriented pedagogical techniques, and with inadequately trained and insufficiently knowledgeable instructors. This must be changed in order to increase program effectiveness, and the changes must be built into the design, participant recruitment and roll-out procedures of future civic education efforts.

6. *Future programs should include a revised Facilitator Handbook.* While NCEP II-Uraia succeeded in producing a highly informative Resource File for the facilitators, feedback from the focus groups suggests that facilitators found the Resource File unwieldy, both because of the format and the content. One approach for the future would be to produce a Handbook that would be smaller in size, making it easier for the facilitators to carry it with them. Also, the Handbook could be revised to include a smaller number of modules more closely related to the key themes that will be included in the next round of NCEP. Thus, for example, if CDF continues to be an important theme in the future, a teaching module specifically related to CDF could be included. Other aspects that are not being emphasized could be removed from the Handbook, making it less cumbersome for the facilitators.

7. *Future programs should emphasize post-workshop discussions of participants, especially with individuals outside of their immediate social networks.* As in NCEP I, we found considerable evidence of “secondary effects” of civic education activities. Individuals exposed to NCEP II-Uraia civic education discussed their experiences with others, even those who had not been taught themselves, and these kinds of discussions often exerted substantial impacts. Civic education programs should exploit this possibility to maximize both the reach and the impact of future activities. Participants in civic education programs should be encouraged *explicitly* to discuss workshop topics with family, friends, colleagues, and neighbors. Equally important, programs must develop ways in which these topics can be broached with individuals outside of their immediate social networks. Further evidence supporting this recommendation was provided by the greater impacts we found among individuals who were *not* members of the civil society organizations that sponsored or were invited to the NCEP II-Uraia activities; this indicates the need to expand participant recruitment beyond the immediate social networks of groups engaged in the civic education process. The more that such individuals are sought out and included in future activities, the more likely it is that programs will extend their reach and their impact throughout Kenyan society.

8. *Future impact evaluations should include a pre-test component to measure individuals’ baseline orientations before exposure to civic education, and future programs must keep better records of program participants and program activities to facilitate the evaluation process.* These recommendations flow directly from the limitations and difficulties faced in this study in terms of locating and tracking participants in NCEP II-Uraia activities, and in assessing the program’s impact on individuals. With a pre-test, evaluators will have solid baseline data on individual attitudes before civic education exposure takes place, and thus will have a great deal more confidence that differential changes in orientations over time between the treatment and control groups can be attributed to civic education. Moreover, a pre-test will also provide evaluators with greater ability to verify that the treatment group actually is “treated”, as the measurement of civic education exposure will not have to depend solely on respondent recall. Finally,

we recommend strongly that future programs institute more comprehensive procedures for recording and tracking participants in order to facilitate the evaluation process.²⁸

²⁸ Ideally, future evaluations should include not only a pre-test for baseline data on treatment and control group individuals, but also a *random assignment* component as well, whereby individuals would be randomly assigned to be “treated” in civic education activities or randomly assigned to be in the control group. Such a design would statistically equate the treatment and control groups on *all* factors before the exposure took place, thus providing the highest possible certainty that differential change over time between the two groups was caused by the treatment. In our view the use of fully randomized designs is the next logical methodological step in demonstrating the effect of civic education on democratic attitudes and behaviors. We recommend that randomized designs be used for at least part of future Kenyan civic education initiatives; given the successful use of the pre-test/post-test design in the NCEP I evaluation, the inclusion of random assignment would pose few additional operational difficulties. It would, though, have implications for roll-out procedures and participant recruitment that would need to be carefully thought through and agreed upon by donors, Consortia and implementing civil society organizations.

ANNEX A.
INSTRUCTION MANUAL FOR FIELD SURVEYORS

November, 2008

This publication was prepared and implemented under the National Civic Education Program (Phase II) - NCEP II Survey

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BACKGROUND

The Uraia Programme builds on NCEP-I. NCEP-I ran from August 2000 to September 2002, just before the December 2002 General Elections. NCEP-I was evaluated positively by Management Systems International (MSI) in December 2003 as having been effective in promoting democratic values, awareness, knowledge, and political engagement among ordinary Kenyan citizens. The Programme is reported to have reached a fifth of adult Kenyans with a positive impact on those it reached, through promoting democratic values and awareness.

Uraia commenced soon after the referendum and aims at consolidating a vibrant democratic political culture in Kenya, where citizens are aware of and fully exercise their rights and their responsibilities. The Programme took the name Uraia (Citizenship) since civic education is about citizenship.

The current phase of the Programme commenced in April 2006 and ended in September 2007. 43 Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) were contracted by Uraia to facilitate and raise awareness on the stated themes. The CSOs began implementation in the month of August 2006. The CSOs engage Civic Education Providers (CEPs) at the local levels who are mandated to mobilize citizens and organize fora where they discuss and deliberate around Uraia themes.

The 43 CSOs are engaged through four Consortia which are thematically-oriented; Constitution and Reform Education Consortium (CRECO), Consortium for Empowerment and Development of Marginalized Communities (CEDMAC), National Muslim Civic Education Consortium (NAMCEC) and Ecumenical Civic Education Programme (ECEP).

The programme has a media component which implements the uraia media strategy. The media strategy is aimed at reinforcing the work being undertaken by the **CSO'S**. It was initiated in order to streamline productions and ensure a common, programme-wide approach to media interactions. The strategy also aims at connecting to **CSO'S** at local level to ensure that it is truly national in reach, and to augment 'on-the-ground' educational activities. Thus, an impact assessment was needed to assess both the impact of **NCEP II** and to inform any follow-on civic education programs.

PROJECT INFORMATION

Research International is carrying out a personal interview survey among a random sample of both urban and rural Kenyan adults age 18 and older.

This is a second evaluation following the successful evaluation of the National Civic Education Programme I. The programme is also known and "branded" as an Uraia programme.

OBJECTIVES

The objective of this second evaluation is to assess the impact of the Civic Education program nationally. The evaluation will focus on assessment of impact, relevance and appropriateness of the approach and content, different methodologies used relevance of information and effectiveness of media programs. It will also be used to measure impact of completed activities and inform design of new ones. Provide information about the effectiveness of various types of civic education activities in order to guide future design and implementation of this type of programming.

The assessment should establish the following:

- Verify if democratic attitudes and behaviors really do change after civic education program participation, that participants were not just more democratically inclined in the first place (or conversely, that they were different from non-participants and if so to what extent).
- Assess possible gender/age/socio-economic/urban-rural (including marginalized districts e.g. those in North Eastern) differences in impact
- Test the impact of a common curriculum. In other assessments a mix of civic education programs was included, while here a common program was throughout the initiative. This uniformity of program instrument will lend greater credibility to our findings.
- Confirm the conditions under which civic education programming is effective (elsewhere these have centered on frequency of participation in training, participatory methods used and perceived instructor quality). This knowledge will help build in-country NGO implementation capacity for conducting civic education programming in the future, as well as donor capability to design and manage such programs.
- Examine the different impact of various types of training programs (i.e. workshops, theatre, puppet shows, songs, media, Luanda show etc.), and examine which mode(s) achieved the best value for money and were most effective.
- Examine the external factors that influenced the level of impact achieved (e.g. politics and other civic education programmes such as wider media programmes).
- Appraise the perceptions of the recipient of Uraia about Uraia as a programme (credibility, power, brand etc).
- Make recommendations on what would be the best future nature and characteristics of an Uraia Programme.

Recommendations shall be given on the five core thematic areas namely:

- Nation-building;
- Democracy;
- Good Governance;
- Constitutionalism;
- Human Rights.

THE PURPOSE OF THIS MANUAL

This manual will serve as a reference for surveyors while they are in the field interviewing respondents. It is important that data be collected as carefully and completely as possible. Information collected on the questionnaires will be coded and entered into a database where it will be analyzed to summarize findings from the survey. Carefully collected and reported information is critical to avoiding biases and errors in the later data tabulation and analysis.

IF SURVEYORS HAVE ANY QUESTIONS AT ALL ABOUT THE INFORMATION IN THIS MANUAL OR INSTRUCTIONS ON THE QUESTIONNAIRE, THEY SHOULD CONSULT THEIR SUPERVISORS BEFORE PROCEEDING WITH ANY FURTHER INTERVIEWS.

Approach to this Training

Behaviours

- Listen
- Join in
- Speak up and share ideas
- Ask questions – as many as possible; you are probably asking for everyone else
- Put your mobile phone(s) in a mode that will not distract others

Attitudes:

- Question and challenge us
- Bring up any problems or potential problems now – not later!
- Have fun
- Help each other

Responsibilities of Field Survey Supervisors

If you are a field survey supervisor you will:

- Read and become fully familiar with this survey manual and with the survey questionnaire to be used to collect information from respondents in the geographic area you will be allocated.
- Participate in and direct the process of selecting respondents to be interviewed.
- Organize and direct the work of the survey teams and draw up the interviewer and supervision itinerary for your area.
- Allocate activities each morning – a half hour meeting should take place before the start of each day where you recap important sampling issues, review field progress so far, and make sure that necessary information (e.g., serial numbers, Form D information to be explained below) is filled in on each questionnaire that goes out to the field that day.
- Manage funds required during fieldwork days.
- Accompany field survey interviewers when they are conducting interviews
 - To assess interviewing and interpersonal relationships quality.
 - Feedback to the entire team on errors / problems and solutions.
- Review completed questionnaires at the end of each day of fieldwork to assure they have been filled in correctly and accurately and work with field survey enumerators to correct any errors found in recording responses. Be on hand each evening to solve queries
- Send interviewers back to repeat sections / or personally back-check those that seem to have problems.

- Make sure that completed questionnaires reach the office for data entry to commence once you have a reasonable number completed.

If you are a field survey enumerator you will:

1. Read and become fully familiar with this survey manual and with the survey questionnaire to be used to collect information from respondents in your geographic area.
2. Take your own detailed notes about each question in the questionnaire during training
3. Follow instructions from your field survey supervisor in selecting respondents to be interviewed.
4. Conduct survey interviews at the respondent’s house but in a location that will allow the respondent to give answers in privacy.
5. Set up a good relationship with the respondent.
6. Meet the daily strike rate.
7. Interview using all the relevant questions **AS THEY ARE WRITTEN**. Read out the questions as they appear on the printed page.
8. Read and understand the questionnaire completely in order to be able to assist the respondent where they are not clear, but **NOT** giving leading responses.
9. Write down verbatim answers as spoken **WORD FOR WORD** for **ALL** open ended questions
10. Probe properly for all the information under verbatim answers.
11. Consult your supervisor when you have any questions or concerns about the questionnaire or about methods of selecting respondents or collecting information.
12. Complete answers to all questions and make any corrections or additions as directed by your supervisor.

Daily fieldwork schedule

8.00 am Meet with team leader/supervisor

- Go through problems with yesterday’s questionnaires with the whole team – not just those who made the errors
- Answer any questions / forward questions on to team leader/supervisor
- Receive allocations and location of today’s interviews

8.30 am Leave for field

- Preferably travel as a team even though this depends on the sample locations and team size

5.30 pm Leave field for base

- But not if halfway through an interview!
- Hand in days questionnaires to team leader/supervisor

6.00 pm Rest

- Team leaders/supervisors continue to work until all the questionnaires are checked and any issues are highlighted and summarized for the following morning’s meeting

METHODOLOGY

This will be a study consisting of two main groups.

- Half of the total respondents will be individuals who participated in the NCEP II (Uraia) civic education activities by various NGOs operating in Kenya. These will be referred to as the “Treatment Group.”
- The other half of respondents will be similar to the treated individuals in all respects but who did NOT attend the civic education activities. They will be referred to as the “Control Group.”

The sample breakdown for the sample groups is as follows:

Treatment Group	1800
Control Group	1800

The sample coverage is expected to have a national outlook.

The treatment group of study participants will be randomly selected from the sample of activities that took part in NCEPII, implemented by the partner NGO. The control group will be a matched sample to the treatment group. The following are the matching demographic characteristics for the control group:

- Education
- Gender
- Age
- Group membership

A set of screening questions will be used at the outset of the questionnaire to select the match for the control group. IT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT YOU FOLLOW THE INSTRUCTIONS IN THE SCREENING SECTION EXACTLY, SO THAT THE CORRECT KIND OF RESPONDENT IS FOUND AND INTERVIEWED FOR THE STUDY.

Selecting And Locating Respondents

Sampling

It is the responsibility of field survey supervisors and interviewers to carefully and accurately apply the sampling instructions.

Respondent Identification Procedure:

1. You will be given information from what is called a “Form D” for each sampling point. The Form D contains information about a particular civic education activity that was carried out near the particular sampling point by one of the CSOs in the National Civic Education Program (NCEP II). Before you begin working at a new sampling point, the team leader and interviewer(s) **must** fill in the necessary information from the Form D on the first page of fourteen blank questionnaires. This will ensure that the information is recorded correctly for all surveys conducted in one sampling point.
2. Starting point:
 - a. Where the venue of activity is indicated on the Form D, this will be the starting point for the random walk. Locate the venue. Walk for 200 metres in the direction given by the team leader or supervisor. Select the first house according to the date. If it is an even date (e.g., 4th of the month), start with the 1st house on the left. If it is an odd date (e.g., 3rd of the month), start with the second house on your left.
 - b. Where the venue of activity is not indicated on the Form D, the starting point for the random walk will be the centre of settlement of the the sampling point. Locate the centre of settlement of the assigned sampling point. Walk for 200 metres in the direction given by the team leader/supervisor. Select the first house according to the date. If it is an even date (e.g., 4th of the month) start with the 1st house on the left. If it is an odd date (e.g., 3rd of th month) start with the second house on your left.
3. Begin by looking for a treatment group respondent using the screening questions on the questionnaire. If you do not find a treatment respondent at the first house, go house-to-house until you do. As you

walk, always stay to the left, which means that you will turn left whenever you reach a junction. If you find a household in which more than one person qualifies to be a treatment group respondent, use the last birthday method to select the respondent.

4. You should note the **number of contacts** that it took to find each treatment respondent, and the **number of contacts** it took to find each matched control respondent, on the **CONTACT TALLY SHEET** that will be given to you at each sampling point.
5. Immediately after finishing an interview with a treatment respondent, record the matching information (gender, age, education, group membership) AND THE TREATMENT RESPONDENT'S SERIAL NUMBER onto the appropriate places on the cover sheet of a blank questionnaire that will be used for the corresponding control group respondent. The cover sheet refers back to the specific question numbers from the treatment respondent's questionnaire where the matching information can be found.
6. After completing a treatment respondent interview, your next task is to find a corresponding control group respondent. If you're in an urban area, skip four houses. If you're in a rural area, continue to the next house without skipping any houses, unless the area has an urban settlement pattern, in which case you should skip four houses. Start looking for a control group respondent for the first treatment group respondent. PLEASE NOTE THAT THE CONTROL RESPONDENT MUST BE AT LEAST 200M AWAY FROM THE CORRESPONDING TREATMENT RESPONDENT. Follow the instructions exactly on the cover sheet of the control respondent questionnaire to find an eligible person to interview. The person must have the exact characteristics noted on the cover sheet in terms of gender, age, education level, and group memberships.
7. When you have completed an interview with a control group respondent, go back to the corresponding treatment group respondent's questionnaire and record the SERIAL number of the control group respondent onto the treatment respondent's questionnaire. If your supervisor has possession of the treatment respondent's questionnaire, work with him/her to make sure that the correct serial number for the control respondent is entered onto the appropriate treatment respondent questionnaire, and that the two questionnaires are then kept together as a "matched pair" for purposes of data entry.
8. There may be instances where you find another person who participated in NCEP II (Uraia) activities, i.e., a potential treatment group respondent #2, while you are looking for a control group match for another treatment group individual (treatment person #1). If this occurs, you should conduct the interview with treatment person #2 using a FRESH BLANK questionnaire. Mark the new questionnaire as "TREATMENT GROUP" in the appropriate place and immediately go to the substantive part of the interview on page 6. After finishing this interview, follow the instructions in #4 above regarding filling in the serial number and matching information about treatment person #2 on a blank questionnaire that will be used for his/her control respondent. Then continue looking for control respondents for BOTH treatment person #1 and treatment person #2 until both control respondents are found. Continue this way until you complete five treatment interviews and five matching control interviews in a sample point.
9. Toward the end of the questionnaire, there are questions referring to the respondent's experience with NCEP II (Uraia) activities, with their awareness of Uraia activities in the Kenyan media and elsewhere, and with their experiences with other civic education activities before and after the December 2007 elections. There are separate sections for treatment and control respondents, so please be sure to ask only the questions that are relevant for the particular kind of respondent you are interviewing. Section 11 is for the treatment group, and Section 12 is for the control group. After

these sections are completed, there is a final Section 13 on demographics that you will ask for ALL respondents.

10. Substitution Rule for Sampling Points: If you spend an entire day (at least 8 hours) looking for the first treatment group respondent in a sampling point and are unable to find anyone who qualifies, tell your supervisor and you may be assigned to a new sampling point.
11. Substitution Rule for Respondents: Occasionally you may have a hard time finding a matching control group respondent for one of the treatment group respondents in a particular sampling area. If you have finished four matching pairs and cannot find a final control group respondent for the last pair after a full day (8 hours) of looking, you may abandon that control group respondent. In this case, you must find a new treatment respondent and a new control respondent for that sampling point.
12. Team leaders need to check the matching information at the end of each day. The questionnaires for both the treatment and control group will be serialized, the FORM D information about the activity from that sampling point must be entered on all questionnaires, and the team leader must ensure that the serial numbers for control and treatment group matches are correctly transferred onto the two corresponding questionnaires.
13. DO NOT TAKE ADVICE FROM ANYONE: Some of the respondents may offer you advice on how to find respondents, for example, by telling you which direction to go. Do not listen to this advice and do not deviate from the prescribed route.
14. “SNOWBALLING” IS NOT ALLOWED: Some respondents may want to tell you the names of other people who participated in a particular civic education activity so that you can also interview those people. You are not allowed to use this information. You must stick to the prescribed household selection procedures.
15. Please note that it is OK if you cross into another sub-location while you are looking for respondents. You do not need to stay in one sub-location only.

Selecting an Individual within a Household

The screening questions for treatment and control group respondents are on the first few pages of the questionnaire. They are repeated here in English and in Swahili.

OPENING SCRIPT AND DETERMINATION OF RESPONDENT ELIGIBILITY FOR INTERVIEW (IN ENGLISH):

My name is _____ . I work for a research company called Research International. We have been asked to visit Kenyans across the country, to find out what you think about your life, and perceptions regarding the things that affect ones quality of life.

As you may know, there are some programs going on in Kenya that try to engage people about democracy and human rights, and about how to solve community problems. Sometimes they are sponsored by community organizations or religious organizations, and they can involve workshops, public barazas, theatre or drama presentations, town meetings, or other kinds of public discussions in churches or mosques about citizens' rights and responsibilities. We call these kinds of activities "civic education."

We are interviewing people to ask first about their participation in civic education activities in the time before the 2007 election.

Q1. Do you recall participating in any of these activities?

NO → GO TO Q.4 AT THE TOP OF THE NEXT PAGE

YES → CONTINUE WITH:

Q2. To the best of your recollection, could you tell us approximately how many activities you participated in?

ONE → GO TO Q.3

TWO OR MORE → ACCEPT FOR TREATMENT GROUP WITH "GREAT. MY INSTRUCTIONS SAY WE CAN CONTINUE WITH THE INTERVIEW."

BEGIN THE SURVEY ON PAGE 6.

[INTERVIEWER: START WITH A FRESH QUESTIONNAIRE IF THIS QUESTIONNAIRE WAS ALREADY PRE-MARKED TO BE A CONTROL RESPONDENT.]

MARK THE NEW QUESTIONNAIRE AS "TREATMENT" AND IMMEDIATELY BEGIN NEW INTERVIEW ON PAGE 6 OF THE NEW QUESTIONNAIRE

Q3. Do recall whether this activity was concerned ONLY with helping people understand how to register and vote in the 2007 election, or was it concerned with other things like human rights, democracy, or gender issues?

VOTING AND HOW TO VOTE ONLY → TERMINATE THE INTERVIEW WITH "THANK YOU VERY MUCH. THE PROCEDURES THAT ARE WRITTEN DOWN HERE FOR ME SAY THAT I HAVE TO FIND SOMEONE ELSE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. WE APPRECIATE YOUR TIME. HAVE A NICE DAY."

OTHER THINGS → ACCEPT FOR TREATMENT GROUP WITH “GREAT. MY INSTRUCTIONS SAY WE CAN CONTINUE WITH THE INTERVIEW.”

BEGIN THE SURVEY ON PAGE 6.

[INTERVIEWER: START WITH A FRESH QUESTIONNAIRE IF THIS QUESTIONNAIRE WAS ALREADY PRE-MARKED TO BE A CONTROL RESPONDENT.]

MARK THE NEW QUESTIONNAIRE AS “TREATMENT” AND IMMEDIATELY BEGIN NEW INTERVIEW ON PAGE 6 OF THE NEW QUESTIONNAIRE

Q4. [ASKED ONLY FOR “NO” RESPONSES TO Q1]:

There have also been some activities and organized teachings about democracy and human rights after the December 2007 elections, some of them talking about reducing conflict and problems between different ethnic and religious groups in Kenya. Do you recall whether you have attended any activity or organized teachings on these topics after the December 2007 elections?

YES → TERMINATE THE INTERVIEW WITH “THANK YOU VERY MUCH. THE PROCEDURES THAT ARE WRITTEN DOWN HERE FOR ME SAY THAT I HAVE TO FIND SOMEONE ELSE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. WE APPRECIATE YOUR TIME. HAVE A NICE DAY.”

NO → THIS PERSON IS A POTENTIAL CONTROL GROUP RESPONDENT. CONTINUE WITH:

SCREENING QUESTIONS FOR A POTENTIAL CONTROL GROUP RESPONDENT:

BEGIN WITH SOMEONE WHO IS THE CORRECT GENDER.

1. How old were you at your last birthday?

IF RESPONDENT IS IN THE CORRECT AGE RANGE, CONTINUE. OTHERWISE, TERMINATE.

2. What is the highest level of school that you have completed?

IF RESPONDENT IS IN THE CORRECT EDUCATION CATEGORY, CONTINUE. OTHERWISE, TERMINATE.

3. Now I am going to read through a list of groups and I'd like you to tell me whether you are a member of each group or not.

A church or religious organization?

A youth or sports group?

A trade union?

A women's group?

A cultural or school organization?

A burial society?

Shirika la kijamii?

A tribal or clan association?

A business or professional association?

A political party?

Other?

COUNT THE NUMBER OF “YES” ANSWERS. IF THE REpondent IS IN THE CORRECT GROUP MEMBERSHIP CATEGORY, THEN SAY, “GREAT. MY INSTRUCTIONS SAY WE CAN CONTINUE WITH THE INTERVIEW.” CONTINUE WITH SURVEY ON PAGE 6..

IF THE REpondent IS NOT IN THE CORRECT GROUP MEMBERSHIP CATEGORY, THEN TERMINATE.

WITH “THANK YOU VERY MUCH. THE PROCEDURES THAT ARE WRITTEN DOWN HERE FOR ME SAY THAT I HAVE TO FIND SOMEONE ELSE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. WE APPRECIATE YOUR TIME. HAVE A NICE DAY.”

OPENING SCRIPT AND DETERMINATION OF RESPONDENT ELIGIBILITY FOR INTERVIEW (IN SWAHILI):

Jina langu ni----- nafanya kazi katika kampuni ya utafiti inayojulikana kama Research International. Tumeulizwa kutembelea wananchi wa Kenya kote nchini ili kutambua unayoyafikiria kuhusu maisha yako na utambuzi wako kuhusu vitu vinavyodhuru hali bora ya maisha ya mtu.

Kama ujuavyo, kuna miradi inayoendelea nchini Kenya ambayo huhamasisha watu kuhusu demokrasia na haki za kibinadamu na vile vile kuhusu jinsi ya kutatua shida za kijamii. Wakati mwingine, miradi hii hufadhiliwa na mashirika ya kijamii ama yale ya kidini. Miradi hii hujumuisha warsha, mikutano ya hadhara, tamasha na michezo ya kuigiza, mikutano ya mitaa ama majadiliano mengine ya hadhara inayoandaliwa katika makanisa, misikiti na inahusu haki na majukumu ya raia. Masuala haya yote ndiyo huelezewa kama “elimu kuhusu haki za raia.”

Tunawahoji watu ili tuweze kufahamu kama walishiriki katika shughuli zinanazohusiana na haki zao kabla ya uchaguzi wa mwaka wa 2007.

Q1. Je, unakumbuka ukijihusisha na mojawapo wa shughuli hizi?

NO → GO TO Q.4 AT THE TOP OF THE NEXT PAGE

YES → CONTINUE WITH:

Q2. Je, ukikumbuka vizuri, unaweza kutufahamisha ni takriban shughuli ngapi ulishiriki??

ONE → GO TO Q.3

TWO OR MORE → ACCEPT FOR TREATMENT GROUP WITH “GREAT. MY INSTRUCTIONS SAY WE CAN CONTINUE WITH THE INTERVIEW.”

BEGIN THE SURVEY ON PAGE 6.

[INTERVIEWER: START WITH A FRESH QUESTIONNAIRE IF THIS QUESTIONNAIRE WAS ALREADY PRE-MARKED TO BE A CONTROL RESPONDENT.]

MARK THE NEW QUESTIONNAIRE AS “TREATMENT” AND IMMEDIATELY BEGIN NEW INTERVIEW ON PAGE 6 OF THE NEW QUESTIONNAIRE

Q3. Je, unakumbuka iwapo shughuli hii ilijihusisha TU na suala la kuwafanya watu kuelewa kuhusu namna ya kujisajili kama wapiga kura na jinsi ya kupiga kura katika uchaguzi wa mwaka wa 2007 au ilijihusisha pia na masuala mengine kama vile haki za kibinadamu, demokrasia au masuala ya kijinsia?

VOTING AND HOW TO VOTE ONLY → TERMINATE THE INTERVIEW WITH “THANK YOU VERY MUCH. THE PROCEDURES THAT ARE WRITTEN DOWN HERE FOR ME SAY THAT I HAVE TO FIND SOMEONE ELSE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. WE APPRECIATE YOUR TIME. HAVE A NICE DAY.”

OTHER THINGS → ACCEPT FOR TREATMENT GROUP WITH “GREAT. MY INSTRUCTIONS SAY WE CAN CONTINUE WITH THE INTERVIEW.”

BEGIN THE SURVEY ON PAGE 6.

[INTERVIEWER: START WITH A FRESH QUESTIONNAIRE IF THIS QUESTIONNAIRE WAS ALREADY PRE-MARKED TO BE A CONTROL RESPONDENT.]

MARK THE NEW QUESTIONNAIRE AS “TREATMENT” AND IMMEDIATELY BEGIN NEW INTERVIEW ON PAGE 6 OF THE NEW QUESTIONNAIRE

Q4. [ASKED ONLY FOR “NO” RESPONSES TO Q1]:

Kumekuwepo pia na mafunzo na hafla zilizopangwa kuhusiana na demokrasia na haki za kibinadamu baada ya uchaguzi wa 2007. Baadhi ya mafunzo na hafla hizi zilikuwa juu ya kupunguza mizozo na shida baina ya makundi mbalimbali ya kikabila na ya kidini. Je, unakumbuka ukihudhuria hafla au mafunzo yoyote kuhusu masuala haya baada ya uchaguzi wa mwaka wa 2007.

YES → TERMINATE THE INTERVIEW WITH “THANK YOU VERY MUCH. THE PROCEDURES THAT ARE WRITTEN DOWN HERE FOR ME SAY THAT I HAVE TO FIND SOMEONE ELSE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. WE APPRECIATE YOUR TIME. HAVE A NICE DAY.”

NO → THIS PERSON IS A POTENTIAL CONTROL GROUP RESPONDENT. CONTINUE WITH:

SCREENING QUESTIONS FOR A POTENTIAL CONTROL GROUP RESPONDENT (IN SWAHILI):

BEGIN WITH SOMEONE WHO IS THE CORRECT GENDER.

1. Je, ulikuwa mwenye umri gani mara ya mwisho ulipoadhimisha siku yako ya kuzaliwa?

IF RESPONDENT IS IN THE CORRECT AGE RANGE, CONTINUE. OTHERWISE, TERMINATE.

2. Nieleza kiwango chako cha juu zaidi ulichohitimu katika elimu?

IF RESPONDENT IS IN THE CORRECT EDUCATION CATEGORY, CONTINUE. OTHERWISE, TERMINATE.

3. Sasa nitasoma orodha ya makundi mengine, na ningependa uniambie kama wewe ni mwanachama wa kila kikundi au la.

Kanisa au dini. Wewe ni mwanachama?

Kikundi cha vijana ama kikundi cha michezo?

Chama cha wafanyikazi?

Kikundi cha akina mama?

Shirika la kitamaduni au la kielimu?

Kikundi cha maombolezi/mazishi?

Shirika la kijamii?

Shirika la kijamii au ukoo?

Shirika la kibiashara au kitaaluma?

Chama cha kisiasa?

Kuna makundi au mashirika mengine ambayo unashiriki?

COUNT THE NUMBER OF “YES” ANSWERS. IF THE REPDNENT IS IN THE CORRECT GROUP MEMBERSHIP CATEGORY, THEN SAY, “GREAT. MY INSTRUCTIONS SAY WE CAN CONTINUE WITH THE INTERVIEW.” CONTINUE WITH SURVEY ON PAGE 6..

IF THE REPDNENT IS NOT IN THE CORRECT GROUP MEMBERSHIP CATEGORY, THEN TERMINATE.

WITH “THANK YOU VERY MUCH. THE PROCEDURES THAT ARE WRITTEN DOWN HERE FOR ME SAY THAT I HAVE TO FIND SOMEONE ELSE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. WE APPRECIATE YOUR TIME. HAVE A NICE DAY.”

ADMINISTERING THE QUESTIONNAIRE

Ensure you have read the questionnaire fully and understood it. Follow the interviewer instructions provided in the questionnaire in bold typeface carefully; the words in bold typeface are instructions for you the interviewer and should not be read out to the respondents. The questionnaire should be administered word for word.

INTERVIEWING RESPONDENTS

Preparing for the Interview

Dress: When interviewing, it is important to look professional at all times. Your dress should be appropriate and comfortable. Do not necessarily wear your best clothes, or clothes that would make you stand out (such as a business suit). Do not wear expensive jewelry that may make you appear to be much richer than the people that you are interviewing. Such considerations are important, and have been found to influence how comfortable people feel about being interviewed.

Supplies required: Before leaving for the field, check to make sure you have adequate supplies for the day's work. These supplies include:

- A sufficient supply of questionnaires (bring extras)
- This Field Survey Interviewer's Manual
- Identification documents
- Information sheets on the survey study
- A clipboard
- Blue ballpoint pens
- A briefcase or bag to carry the questionnaires
- Any personal items you will need to be comfortable
- WATER

Finding a Good Interview Location—Try to conduct the interview in a location that is private and where there are not many distractions. This could be a room in the house or outside at some other location. It is important that the respondent is listening carefully during the interview.

CONDUCTING THE INTERVIEW

At the Beginning of the Interview

Remember to build rapport with respondents. At the beginning of an interview, you and the respondent are strangers to each other. The respondent's first impression of you will influence his/her willingness to cooperate with the survey. Be sure that your manner is always friendly.

Make a good first impression—When first approaching the respondent, do your best to make him or her feel at ease. Open the interview with a smile and greeting such as "Good Afternoon" and then proceed with introducing yourself and the purpose of your visit.

Always have a positive approach—Never adopt an apologetic manner, and do not use words such as "Are you too busy?", "Would you spare a few minutes?" or "Would you mind answering some questions?" Such questions invite refusal before you start and may be used to build conversation stoppers.

Stress confidentiality of responses when necessary—If the respondent is hesitant about responding to the interview or asks what the data will be used for, explain that the information you collect will remain confidential, no individual names will be used for any purpose, and that all information will be grouped together to write a report. Never mention other interviews or show completed questionnaires to other interviewers or supervisors in front of a respondent or any other person. Request honesty and openness.

Give the respondent the opportunity to ask questions before continuing with the interview—Before agreeing to be interviewed, the respondent may ask you some questions about the survey or how she was selected to be interviewed. Be direct and pleasant when you answer. Answer any questions from the respondent frankly.

Explain that the purpose of the survey and research—

Indicate that the interview should take no more than half an hour—ask if the respondent has available that much time. If not indicate your willingness to return at another time if it is inconvenient for him/her to answer questions then.

Before starting the actual interview make sure you have already filled in the following information—

- Interviewer name and ID;
- Date, time start interview;
- Location of interview;
- District and Sampling Point Number

Be neutral throughout the interview—Most people are polite and will tend to give answers that they think you want to hear. It is therefore very important that you remain absolutely neutral as you ask the questions. Never, either by the expression on your face or by the tone of your voice, allow the respondent to think that he has given the "right" or "wrong" answer to the question. Never appear to approve or disapprove of any of the respondent's replies.

If the respondent gives an ambiguous answer—try to probe in a neutral way, asking questions such as:

- “Can you explain a little more?”
- “I did not quite hear you; could you please tell me again?”
- “There is no hurry. Take a moment to think about it.”

Never suggest answers to the respondent—If a respondent's answer is not relevant to a question, do not prompt him by saying something like "I suppose you mean that..... Is that right?" Rather, you should probe in such a manner that the respondent himself comes up with the relevant answer.

Do not change the wording or sequence of questions—The wording of the questions and their sequence in the questionnaire were carefully chosen for a reason. If the respondent has misunderstood the question, you should repeat the question slowly and clearly. If he still does not understand, you may reword the question, being careful not to alter the meaning of the original question. Provide only the minimum information required to obtain an appropriate response.

Handle hesitant respondents tactfully—If the respondent is reluctant or unwilling to answer a question, try to overcome his or her reluctance by explaining that the same question is being asked of citizens all over the country and that the answers will all be merged together. If he still refuses, simply write REFUSED next to the question and proceed as if nothing had happened. If you have successfully

completed the interview, you may try to obtain the missing information at the end but the respondent should not be forced to give an answer.

Do not make assumptions—You should also be careful not to jump to conclusions based on previous information. Do not assume the answer to any question based on your previous experience with ‘the way people behave or think.’

Do not skip questions—Do not skip a question even when you think the answer is obvious. Some of the questions are purposefully overlapping in order to check for consistency in answering.

Do not hurry the interview—Ask the questions slowly to ensure the respondent understands what he is being asked. After you have asked a question, pause and give him time to think. If the respondent feels hurried or is not allowed to formulate his own opinion he may respond with "I don't know" or give an inaccurate answer. If you feel the respondent is answering without thinking, just to speed up the interview, say to the respondent, "There is no hurry. Your opinion is very important so consider your answers carefully."

Do not show the questionnaire to anyone, including the respondent—You must not show the questionnaire to anyone, unless otherwise told to by your supervisor. For example, sometimes a respondent may want to complete the questionnaire himself, or to read a question himself. It is important that you do not show the document to him. If respondent does request this, be polite but firm about your refusal.

If you are ever unsure, write out all of the respondent’s reply on the questionnaire—Anything out of the ordinary can also be noted on the back page or in the margins directly on the questionnaire.

Use “Show Cards”—Use a show card for relevant questions so as to give the respondent something visual and concrete to help him/her answer. Be clear in indicating out loud and by pointing to which ends of the scale correspond to which statements. If the respondent points to a number, repeat the answer verbally in order to confirm what he/she meant. Also use a show card for sensitive information such as education and income. In this case, do not repeat the answer verbally, but rather point to confirm the respondent’s answer.

Write legibly—It is important that those who will be entering the data from your survey can decipher what you have marked. Checks should be clearly within one box and not another. If you are circling an item, be sure not to circle other items nearby.

At Conclusion of the Interview

Say that the interview is now over and thank the respondent for their participation.

ANNEX B.

SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

RI 6863 National Civic Education II-URAIA V17	FOR OFFICE USE ONLY SERIAL No. (101-104)
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INTERVIEWER: FILL OUT THE FOLLOWING SECTION BEFORE LOOKING FOR A RESPONDENT

Form D Serial Number (from Form D)		(210/12)
---	--	-----------------

Activity Type (from Form D)
(215)

Workshop 1
Drama/poetry 2
Informal meeting 3

Consortium (from Form D)	(221/30)
---------------------------------	-----------------

CSO (from Form D)	(241/50)
--------------------------	-----------------

VENUE WHERE ACTIVITY WAS HELD (from Form D)	(251/50)
--	-----------------

DATE OF ACTIVITY (from Form D)	(261/70)
---	-----------------

IS THIS QUESTIONNAIRE FOR A TREATMENT OR CONTROL RESPONDENT?

1. Treatment
2. Control

If TREATMENT, fill in serial number of the corresponding CONTROL field serial number (AFTER CONTROL INTERVIEW TAKES PLACE)

--	--	--	--	--

If CONTROL, fill in serial number of the corresponding TREATMENT field serial number NOW

				272/75
--	--	--	--	---------------

IF CONTROL, FILL IN THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION BEFORE YOU BEGIN LOOKING FOR A RESPONDENT. TRANSFER THE REQUIRED INFORMATION FROM THE TREATMENT RESPONDENT'S QUESTIONNAIRE.

Treatment respondent's gender (FROM Q1301): male / female

Treatment respondent's age (FROM Q1302): _____

Treatment respondent's education level (FROM Q1304): primary / secondary / post-secondary

Number of groups that treatment respondent belongs to (FROM SECTION 8): 0 / 1-2 / 3 OR MORE

THE MATCHING INTERVIEW FOR THE CONTROL RESPONDENT MUST BE CONDUCTED WITH SOMEONE WHO IS:

Gender: male / female

Age Range (plus or minus 10 years from the treatment respondent): _____

Respondent's education level: primary / secondary / post-secondary

Number of groups that the respondent belongs to: 0 / 1-2 / 3 OR MORE

OPENING SCRIPT AND DETERMINATION OF RESPONDENT ELIGIBILITY FOR INTERVIEW (IN ENGLISH):

My name is _____. I work for a research company called Research International. We have been asked to visit Kenyans across the country, to find out what you think about your life, and perceptions regarding the things that affect ones quality of life.

As you may know, there are some programs going on in Kenya that try to engage people about democracy and human rights, and about how to solve community problems. Sometimes they are sponsored by community organizations or religious organizations, and they can involve workshops, public barazas, theatre or drama presentations, town meetings, or other kinds of public discussions in churches or mosques about citizens' rights and responsibilities. We call these kinds of activities "civic education."

We are interviewing people to ask first about their participation in civic education activities in the time **before the 2007 election.**

Q1. Do you recall participating in any of these activities?

NO → GO TO **Q.4 AT THE TOP OF THE NEXT PAGE**

YES → **CONTINUE WITH:**

Q2. To the best of your recollection, could you tell us approximately how many activities you participated in?

ONE → GO TO **Q.3**

TWO OR MORE → **ACCEPT FOR TREATMENT GROUP WITH "GREAT. MY INSTRUCTIONS SAY WE CAN CONTINUE WITH THE INTERVIEW."**

BEGIN THE SURVEY ON PAGE 6.

[INTERVIEWER: START WITH A FRESH QUESTIONNAIRE IF THIS QUESTIONNAIRE WAS ALREADY PRE-MARKED TO BE A CONTROL RESPONDENT.]

MARK THE NEW QUESTIONNAIRE AS "TREATMENT" AND IMMEDIATELY BEGIN NEW INTERVIEW ON PAGE 6 OF THE NEW QUESTIONNAIRE

Q3. Do recall whether this activity was concerned ONLY with helping people understand how to register and vote in the 2007 election, or was it concerned with other things like human rights, democracy, or gender issues?

VOTING AND HOW TO VOTE ONLY → TERMINATE THE INTERVIEW WITH “THANK YOU VERY MUCH. THE PROCEDURES THAT ARE WRITTEN DOWN HERE FOR ME SAY THAT I HAVE TO FIND SOMEONE ELSE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. WE APPRECIATE YOUR TIME. HAVE A NICE DAY.”

OTHER THINGS → ACCEPT FOR TREATMENT GROUP WITH “GREAT. MY INSTRUCTIONS SAY WE CAN CONTINUE WITH THE INTERVIEW.”

BEGIN THE SURVEY ON PAGE 6.

[INTERVIEWER: START WITH A FRESH QUESTIONNAIRE IF THIS QUESTIONNAIRE WAS ALREADY PRE-MARKED TO BE A CONTROL RESPONDENT.]

MARK THE NEW QUESTIONNAIRE AS “TREATMENT” AND IMMEDIATELY BEGIN NEW INTERVIEW ON PAGE 6 OF THE NEW QUESTIONNAIRE

Q4. [ASKED ONLY FOR “NO” RESPONSES TO Q1]:

*There have also been some activities and organized teachings about democracy and human rights **after the December 2007** elections, some of them talking about reducing conflict and problems between different ethnic and religious groups in Kenya. Do you recall whether you have attended any activity or organized teachings on these topics after the December 2007 elections?*

YES → TERMINATE THE INTERVIEW WITH “THANK YOU VERY MUCH. THE PROCEDURES THAT ARE WRITTEN DOWN HERE FOR ME SAY THAT I HAVE TO FIND SOMEONE ELSE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. WE APPRECIATE YOUR TIME. HAVE A NICE DAY.”

NO → THIS PERSON IS A POTENTIAL CONTROL GROUP RESPONDENT. CONTINUE WITH:

SCREENING QUESTIONS FOR A POTENTIAL CONTROL GROUP RESPONDENT:

BEGIN WITH SOMEONE WHO IS THE CORRECT GENDER.

1. How old were you at your last birthday?

IF RESPONDENT IS IN THE CORRECT AGE RANGE, CONTINUE. OTHERWISE, TERMINATE.

2. What is the highest level of school that you have completed?

IF RESPONDENT IS IN THE CORRECT EDUCATION CATEGORY, CONTINUE. OTHERWISE, TERMINATE.

3. Now I am going to read through a list of groups and I'd like you to tell me whether you are a member of each group or not.

A church or religious organization?

A youth or sports group?

A trade union?

A women's group?

A cultural or school organization?

A burial society?

Shirika la kijamii?

A tribal or clan association?

A business or professional association?

A political party?

Other?

COUNT THE NUMBER OF "YES" ANSWERS. IF THE RESPONDENT IS IN THE CORRECT GROUP MEMBERSHIP CATEGORY, THEN SAY, "GREAT. MY INSTRUCTIONS SAY WE CAN CONTINUE WITH THE INTERVIEW." CONTINUE WITH SURVEY ON PAGE 6..

IF THE RESPONDENT IS NOT IN THE CORRECT GROUP MEMBERSHIP CATEGORY, THEN TERMINATE.

WITH "THANK YOU VERY MUCH. THE PROCEDURES THAT ARE WRITTEN DOWN HERE FOR ME SAY THAT I HAVE TO FIND SOMEONE ELSE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. WE APPRECIATE YOUR TIME. HAVE A NICE DAY."

OPENING SCRIPT AND DETERMINATION OF RESPONDENT ELIGIBILITY FOR INTERVIEW (IN SWAHILI):

Jina langu ni----- nafanya kazi katika kampuni ya utafiti inayojulikana kama Research International. Tumeulizwa kutembelea wananchi wa Kenya kote nchini ili kutambua unayoyafikiria kuhusu maisha yako na utambuzi wako kuhusu vitu vinavyodhuru hali bora ya maisha ya mtu.

Kama ujuavyo, kuna miradi inayoendelea nchini Kenya ambayo huhamasisha watu kuhusu demokrasia na haki za kibinadamu na vile vile kuhusu jinsi ya kutatua shida za kijamii. Wakati mwingine, miradi hii hufadhiliwa na mashirika ya kijamii ama yale ya kidini. Miradi hii hujumuisha warsha, mikutano ya hadhara, tamasha na michezo ya kuigiza, mikutano ya mitaa ama majadiliano mengine ya hadhara inayoandaliwa katika makanisa, misikiti na inahusu haki na majukumu ya raia. Masuala haya yote ndiyo huelezewa kama “elimu kuhusu haki za raia.”

Tunawahoji watu ili tuweze kufahamu kama walishiriki katika shughuli zinanazohusiana na haki zao *kabla ya uchaguzi wa mwaka wa 2007.*

Q1. *Je, unakumbuka ukijihusisha na mojawapo wa shughuli hizi?*

NO → GO TO Q.4 AT THE TOP OF THE NEXT PAGE

YES → CONTINUE WITH:

Q2. *Je, ukikumbuka vizuri, unaweza kutufahamisha ni takriban shughuli ngapi ulishiriki??*

ONE → GO TO Q.3

TWO OR MORE → ACCEPT FOR TREATMENT GROUP WITH “GREAT. MY INSTRUCTIONS SAY WE CAN CONTINUE WITH THE INTERVIEW.”

BEGIN THE SURVEY ON PAGE 6.

[INTERVIEWER: START WITH A FRESH QUESTIONNAIRE IF THIS QUESTIONNAIRE WAS ALREADY PRE-MARKED TO BE A CONTROL RESPONDENT.]

MARK THE NEW QUESTIONNAIRE AS “TREATMENT” AND IMMEDIATELY BEGIN NEW INTERVIEW ON PAGE 6 OF THE NEW QUESTIONNAIRE

Q3. *Je, unakumbuka iwapo shughuli hii ilijihusisha TU na suala la kuwafanya watu kuelewa kuhusu namna ya kujisajili kama wapiga kura na jinsi ya kupiga kura katika uchaguzi wa mwaka wa 2007 au ilijihusisha pia na masuala mengine kama vile haki za kibinadamu, demokrasia au masuala ya kijinsia?*

VOTING AND HOW TO VOTE ONLY → TERMINATE THE INTERVIEW WITH “THANK YOU VERY MUCH. THE PROCEDURES THAT ARE WRITTEN DOWN HERE FOR ME SAY THAT I HAVE TO FIND SOMEONE ELSE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. WE APPRECIATE YOUR TIME. HAVE A NICE DAY.”

OTHER THINGS → ACCEPT FOR TREATMENT GROUP WITH “GREAT. MY INSTRUCTIONS SAY WE CAN CONTINUE WITH THE INTERVIEW.”

BEGIN THE SURVEY ON PAGE 6.

[INTERVIEWER: START WITH A FRESH QUESTIONNAIRE IF THIS QUESTIONNAIRE WAS ALREADY PRE-MARKED TO BE A CONTROL RESPONDENT.]

MARK THE NEW QUESTIONNAIRE AS “TREATMENT” AND IMMEDIATELY BEGIN NEW INTERVIEW ON PAGE 6 OF THE NEW QUESTIONNAIRE

Q4. [ASKED ONLY FOR “NO” RESPONSES TO Q1]:

Kumekuwepo pia na mafunzo na hafla zilizopangwa kuhusiana na demokrasia na haki za kibinadamu baada ya uchaguzi wa 2007. Baadhi ya mafunzo na hafla hizi zilikuwa juu ya kupunguza mizozo na shida baina ya makundi mbalimbali ya kikabila na ya kidini. Je, unakumbuka ukihudhuria hafla au mafunzo yoyote kuhusu masuala haya baada ya uchaguzi wa mwaka wa 2007.

YES → TERMINATE THE INTERVIEW WITH “THANK YOU VERY MUCH. THE PROCEDURES THAT ARE WRITTEN DOWN HERE FOR ME SAY THAT I HAVE TO FIND SOMEONE ELSE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. WE APPRECIATE YOUR TIME. HAVE A NICE DAY.”

NO → THIS PERSON IS A POTENTIAL CONTROL GROUP RESPONDENT. CONTINUE WITH:

SCREENING QUESTIONS FOR A POTENTIAL CONTROL GROUP RESPONDENT (IN SWAHILI):

BEGIN WITH SOMEONE WHO IS THE CORRECT GENDER.

1. Je, ulikuwa mwenye umri gani mara ya mwisho ulipoadhimisha siku yako ya kuzaliwa?

IF RESPONDENT IS IN THE CORRECT AGE RANGE, CONTINUE. OTHERWISE, TERMINATE.

2. Nieleza kiwango chako cha juu zaidi ulichohitimu katika elimu?

IF RESPONDENT IS IN THE CORRECT EDUCATION CATEGORY, CONTINUE. OTHERWISE, TERMINATE.

3. Sasa nitasoma orodha ya makundi mengine, na ningependa uniambie kama wewe ni mwanachama wa kila kikundi au la.

Kanisa au dini. Wewe ni mwanachama?

Kikundi cha vijana ama kikundi cha michezo?

Chama cha wafanyikazi?

Kikundi cha akina mama?

Shirika la kitamaduni au la kielimu?

Kikundi cha maombolezi/mazishi?

Shirika la kijamii?

Shirika la kijamii au ukoo?

Shirika la kibiashara au kitaaluma?

Chama cha kisiasa?

Kuna makundi au mashirika mengine ambayo unashiriki?

COUNT THE NUMBER OF “YES” ANSWERS. IF THE REpondent IS IN THE CORRECT GROUP MEMBERSHIP CATEGORY, THEN SAY, “GREAT. MY INSTRUCTIONS SAY WE CAN CONTINUE WITH THE INTERVIEW.” CONTINUE WITH SURVEY ON PAGE 6..

IF THE REpondent IS NOT IN THE CORRECT GROUP MEMBERSHIP CATEGORY, THEN TERMINATE.

WITH “THANK YOU VERY MUCH. THE PROCEDURES THAT ARE WRITTEN DOWN HERE FOR ME SAY THAT I HAVE TO FIND SOMEONE ELSE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. WE APPRECIATE YOUR TIME. HAVE A NICE DAY.”

Respondent's Full Name _____
 Address _____
 City/Town _____ Province _____ Postal Code _____

Telephone Number:
 _____ (111/20)

Interview Date _____ (121/24)
 Interviewer's name _____ I.D.# * (125/28)
 Time Interview Began(131/34)

I declare that this interview has been carried out strictly in _____ Interviewer's signature. _____ Checked by supervisor _____
 _____ (142/45)

KENYA (146/48)

Country Code	254
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PROVINCE (149)

Nairobi	1
Central	2
Coast	3
Eastern	4
North Eastern	5
Nyanza	6
Rift Valley	7
Western	8

District	_____ (151/53)
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Division	_____ (154/56)
----------	----------------

Location	_____ (157/60)
----------	----------------

Sub-Location	_____ (161/64)
--------------	----------------

Constituency	_____ (165/68)
--------------	----------------

(c169)

Male..... 1
 Female... 2

Actual Age.....	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> (170/71)
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(172)

Urban	1
Rural	2

Year/ Month of Interview (173/76)

D	D	M	M	Y	Y	Y	Y
				2	0	0	8
Day of Interview				(177)			
Monday		1	Friday		5		
Tuesday		2	Saturday		6		
Wednesday		3	Sunday		7		
Thursday		4					

Language of Interview (178/80)

English	001
Swahili	002
Other (Specify)	003

Please note that the information you give us is confidential and will not be passed on to anyone else. We are a totally independent research agency and are not affiliated to any political or civic organization. Please feel free to say exactly what you want to say in response to the questions that I am going to ask you.

Tafadhali ufahamu kuwa habari unayotupa ni siri na haitapitishwa kwa mtu ye yote mwengine. Sisi ni ajenti ya utafiti huru na hatujahusishwa na mfumo wote wa kisiasa au wa kiraia. Tafadhali kuwa huru kusema kikamili unachotaka kusema katika kujibu maswali ambayo nitakuuliza.

SECTION 1: INTEREST IN POLITICS

Q. No.	Question and Filters	Coding Categories	Codes	Skip to	Col. Nos.
Q101	Thinking first of your community, would you say you have <u>a great deal of interest</u> , <u>some interest</u> , or <u>very little interest</u> in local community affairs? <i>Kwanza kabisa, ukifikiria jamii yako, unaweza kusema una hamu kiasi gani ya kutaka kujua kuhusu shughuli zinazoendelea katika jamii yako? Je, un a hamu kubwa sana, hamu kiasi au una hamu ndogo sana?</i>	A great deal of interest <i>Hamu kubwa sana</i> Some interest <i>Hamu kiasi</i> Very little interest <i>Hamu ndogo sana</i> Don't know <i>sijui</i> No answer <i>Hakuna jibu</i>	01 02 03 98 99		(c310/11)
Q102	What about national politics? Would you say you have <u>a great deal of interest</u> , <u>some interest</u> , or <u>very little interest</u> in national politics and national affairs? <i>Je, kuhusu siasa za kitaifa, unaweza kusema una hamu kiasi gani ya kutaka kujua kuhusu siasa za kitaifa na shughuli za kitaifa? Je, una hamu kubwa sana, hamu kiasi au una hamu ndogo sana?</i>	A great deal of interest <i>Hamu kubwa sana</i> Some interest <i>Hamu kiasi</i> Very little interest <i>Hamu ndogo sana</i> Don't know <i>sijui</i> No answer <i>Hakuna jibu</i>	01 02 03 98 99		(c312/13)
Q103a	About how often would you say you pay attention to news about politics on the radio - <u>about every day</u> , <u>a few times a week</u> , <u>rarely</u> , or <u>never</u> ? <i>Je, unaweza kusema ni kwa mara ngapi unatilia makini habari za siasa kupitia kwa redio - kama kila siku, mara chache kwa wiki, si kawaida, au hutilii makini kamwe?</i>	about every day <i>kama kila siku</i> few times a week <i>mara chache kwa wiki</i> rarely <i>si kawaida</i> never <i>sijasikiza kamwe</i> don't know <i>sijui</i> no answer <i>hakuna jibu</i>	01 02 03 04 98 99		(314/15)

Q. No.	Question and Filters	Coding Categories	Codes	Skip to	Col. Nos.	
Q103b	And about how often would you say you pay attention to news about politics on television? [REPEAT RESPONSE CATEGORIES AS NECESSARY] <i>Na je, unaweza kusema ni kwa mara ngapi unatia makini habari za siasa kupitia kwa televisheni? Kama kila siku, mara chache kwa wiki, au si kawaida?</i>	about every day <i>kama kila siku</i> few times a week <i>mara chache kwa wiki</i> rarely <i>si kawaida</i> never <i>sijasikiza kamwe</i> don't know <i>sijui</i> no answer <i>hakuna jibu</i>	01 02 03 04 98 99		(316/17)	
Q103c	And about how often would you say you pay attention to news about politics in newspapers or magazines? [REPEAT RESPONSE CATEGORIES AS NECESSARY] <i>Na je, unaweza kusema ni kwa mara ngapi unatilia makini habari za siasa kupitia kwa magazeti au majarida? Kama kila siku, mara chache kwa wiki au si kawaida</i>	about every day <i>kama kila siku</i> few times a week <i>mara chache kwa wiki</i> rarely <i>si kawaida</i> never <i>sijasikiza kamwe</i> don't know <i>sijui</i> no answer <i>hakuna jibu</i>	01 02 03 04 98 99		(318/19)	
Q103d	And about how often would you say you pay attention to news about politics on the internet? [REPEAT RESPONSE CATEGORIES AS NECESSARY] <i>Na je, unaweza kusema ni kwa mara ngapi unatilia makini habari za siasa kupitia kwa mtandao wa intaneti? Kama kila siku, mara chache kwa wiki au si kawaida?</i>	about every day <i>kama kila siku</i> few times a week <i>mara chache kwa wiki</i> rarely <i>si kawaida</i> never <i>sijasikiza kamwe</i> don't know <i>sijui</i> no answer <i>hakuna jibu</i>	01 02 03 04 98 99		(320/21)	
Q104	In your opinion what is the <u>most important</u> problem facing your community that the government ought to address? (ONE ANSWER ONLY) <i>Kulingana na maoni yako, shida iliyo muhimu mno inayowakumba watu katika jamii yako na ambayo inahitaji kushughulikiwa na serikali ni gani?</i>	(WRITE IN) (c324/26) Don't know / <i>Sijui</i> 998 > GO TO Q201 No answer / <i>hakuna jibu</i> 999 > GO TO Q202				
Q105	Compared with other issues, how important in general do you think it is for the government to address environmental issues, that is, things like pollution, global climate change, and protecting forests and wildlife? <i>Ikilinganishwa na maswala mengine, unafikiri kwa jumla serikali imetilia umuhimu kwa kiwango gani katika</i>	5 points, from "much more important" to "much less important" <i>pointi 5 kutoka, "umuhimu sana" hadi umuhimu kidogo sana</i> (327)				
		5 Much More Important <i>Umuhimu kabisa</i>	4	3	2	1 Much less important <i>Umuhimu kidogo sana</i>

Q. No.	Question and Filters	Coding Categories	Codes	Skip to	Col. Nos.	
	<i>kushughulikia maswala ya mazingira kama vile uchafuzi, kubadilika kwa hali ya anga ulimwenguni na kulinda misitu na wanyama pori?</i>					
Q106	How would you rate the overall performance of the government in addressing environmental issues? Would you say the government's performance is - <u>very poor</u> , <u>poor</u> , <u>average</u> , or <u>good</u> ? <i>Unaweza kueleza utendakazi wa serikali kuyashughulikia maswala ya mazingira ni wa kiwango gani? Je, ni mbaya sana, mbaya, wa kadiri au ni mzuri?</i>		Very Poor - <i>mbaya sana</i> Poor - <i>mbaya</i> Average - <i>kadiri</i> Good - <i>mzuri</i> Don't know - <i>sijui</i> No answer - <i>hakuna jibu</i>		(328/29) 01 02 03 04 98 99	
Q107	And compared with other issues, how important in general do you think it is for the government to address problems related to HIV/AIDS, like ensuring proper care for people with the virus, or making sure they are not discriminated against? <i>Na ikilinganishwa na maswala mengine, unafikiri serikali imetilia umuhimu wa kiwango gani katika kushughulikia shida zinazohusishwa na ugonjwa wa UKIMWI kama vile kuhakikisha utunzi unaofaa kwa walio na virusi vya ukimwi au kuhakikisha kuwa hawabaguliwi?</i>	5 points, from "much more important" to "much less important" <i>pointi 5 kutoka muhimu sana hadi muhimu kidogo sana</i>			(330)	
		5 Much More Important <i>umuhimu kabisa</i>	4	3	2	1 Much less important <i>umuhimu kidogo sana</i>
Q108	Compared with other issues, how important in general do you think it is for the government to address issues related to women's rights and equality for women in Kenya? <i>Ikilinganishwa na maswala mengine, unafikiri kwa jumla kuna umuhimu gani kwa serikali kushughulikia mambo yanayohusiana na haki za wanawake na usawa kwa wanawake nchini Kenya?</i>	5 points, from "much more important" to "much less important" <i>pointi 5, kutoka "muhimu sana" "hadi muhimu kidogo sana"</i>				(331)
		5 Much More Important <i>Umuhimu kabisa</i>	4	3	2	1 Much less important <i>umuhimu kidogo sana</i>

a. Only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold office. <i>Kuruhusu Chama kimoja tu cha kisiasa kushiriki katika uchaguzi na kushikilia nyadhifa mbalimbali za ofisi.</i>	1	2		(c349)
b. The army comes in to govern the country. <i>Nchi itawaliwe na wanajeshi.</i>	1	2		(c350)
c. Elections and the National Assembly are abolished so that the president can decide everything. <i>Mambo ya uchaguzi na bunge yatupiliwe mbali ili raisi pekee awe wa kuamua kila kitu.</i>	1	2		(c351)

SECTION 3: POLITICAL EFFICACY, RULE OF LAW, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Q301- Q308 Now I'd like your opinion on some political issues. I'm going to read a list of statements, and I'd like you to please tell me the extent to which you agree or disagree with each one.

Sasa ningependa kujua maoni yako kuhusu maswala kadhaa ya kisiasa. Nitasoma orodha ya maelezo na ningependa uniambie kiwango ambacho unakubaliana au hukubaliani na kila mojawapo.

		Strongly agree Nakubaliana kabisa	Somewhat agree Nakubali kiasi	5 0 100	Strongly disagree Sikubaliani kabisa	Don't know Sijui	No answer Sina jibu	Cols
Q301	I feel well prepared for participating in politics. Do you <u>strongly agree</u> , <u>somewhat agree</u> , <u>somewhat disagree</u> , or <u>strongly disagree</u> ? <i>Nahisi kuwa nimejitayarisha kabisa kushiriki katika siasa. Je, unakubaliana kabisa, unakubaliana kwa kiasi fulani, sikubaliani kwa kiasi fulani au sikubaliani kabisa?</i>	01	02	03	04	98	99	(352/53)
Q302	The CDF is too complicated for people like me to understand. <i>CDF (Pesa za maendeleo katika maeneo bunge) ni jambo gumu sana kwa watu kama mimi kuelewa.</i>	01	02	03	04	98	99	(354/55)
Q303	I am able to influence how CDF funds are used in my constituency. <i>Ninaweza kushawishi jinsi ambavyo pesa za CDF zinavyoweza kutumika katika eneo bunge langu.</i>	01	02	03	04	98	99	(356/57)
Q304	It is sometimes necessary to ignore the law and solve problems using other means. <i>Mara nyingine inalazimu kupuuza sheria na kusuluhisha shida kwa kutumia njia nyingine tofauti.</i>	01	02	03	04	98	99	(c358/59)
Q305	Suspected criminals do not deserve the same legal rights as everyone else. <i>Wanaoshukiwa kuwa wahalifu hawastahili haki zilizo sawa kisheria na za watu wengine.</i>	01	02	03	04	98	99	(c360/61)
Q306	If it is necessary to achieve an important political goal, the use of violence is morally justifiable. <i>Ikiwa italazimu kupata lengo la kisiasa lililo muhimu, basi matumizi ya vurugu inaweza kuhalalishwa.</i>	01	02	03	04	98	99	(362/63)
Q307	If one ethnic or religious group feels threatened by other ethnic or religious groups, the use of violence to defend itself is morally justifiable. <i>Ikiwa kabila moja au vikundi vya kidini vitahisi kutishwa na kabila au vikundi tofauti vya kidini, matumizi ya vurugu ili kujikinga imehalalishwa</i>	01	02	03	04	98	99	(364/65)
Q308	It is sometimes necessary to use violence to avenge past wrongs committed against your family or ethnic community. <i>Kwa wakati mwingine ni vyema kutumia vurugu ili kulipiza makosa yaliyotendwa hapo awali dhidi ya familia au makabila fulani.</i>	01	02	03	04	98	99	(366/67)

Q309. People have many different opinions about the rights and liberties that people should have in our Kenyan democracy. I am going to mention some rights and liberties, and for each of these can you tell me if you think they should **always** be maintained, it **depends on the situation**, or they should **almost never be maintained**?

Watu wana maoni tofauti kuhusu haki na uhuru ambao wananchi wanastahili kuwa nao katika demokrasia ya Kenya. Nitataja baadhi ya haki na uhuru na katika kila mojawapo niambie kama wafikiri inastahili kudumishwa kila wakati, kulingana na wakati ulivyo, ama haistahili kudumishwa kamwe.

		Always be maintained <i>Indumishwe kila wakati</i>	Depends on the situation <i>Italingana na wakati ulivyo</i>	Almost never be maintained <i>Haistahili kudumishwa kamwe</i>	Cols
Q309	The right of individuals to criticise the government <i>Haki ya watu kukosoa serikali</i>	1	2	3	411
	The right to form groups that push for political changes <i>Haki ya kuanzisha vikundi vinavyoitisha mabadiliko ya kisiasa</i>	1	2	3	412
	The right to obtain information about how government funds are spent <i>Haki ya kupata habari kuhusu jinsi pesa za serikali zinavyotumika</i>	1	2	3	413
	The right of anyone to run for elected office, regardless of ethnicity or political viewpoint <i>Haki ya mtu yeyote kugombea ofisi yoyote ya kuchaguliwa bila kuzingatia kabila ama msimamo wa kisiasa</i>	1	2	3	414
	The right to travel and to work anywhere in the country <i>Haki ya kuzuru au kufanya kazi kila mahali nchini</i>	1	2	3	415
	The right to be free from unlawful arrest or prosecution by the government <i>Haki ya kutokamatwa ovyo bila kuzingatia sheria na kushtakiwa na serikali</i>	1	2	3	416
	The right of all political parties to campaign for people's votes in all parts of the country, regardless of which ethnic group is the majority <i>Haki ya vyama vyote vya kisiasa kuomba kura kutoka kila sehemu ya nchi, bila kuangalia kabila lililo kubwa</i>	1	2	3	417
	The right to own land anywhere in Kenya <i>Haki ya kumiliki shamba pahali popote nchini Kenya</i>	1	2	3	418
Q310	Imagine that the police or some other group of people tried to stop you from exercising one of these rights. Would you say you are very informed about what you could do to defend your rights, somewhat informed about what you could do to defend your rights, or not very informed about what you could do to defend your rights? <i>Tafakari ya kwamba polisi au watu fulani walijaribu kukunyima moja kati ya haki hizi, Je, unaweza kusema kwamba unaelewa kabisa jinsi ya kutetea haki zako, unaelewa kiasi jinsi ya kutetea haki zako, au haelewi sana jinsi ya kutetea haki zako?</i>	Very informed about what you could do to defend your rights <i>Unaelewa kabisa jinsi ya kutetea haki zako</i>	1	(420)	
	Somewhat informed about what you could do to defend your rights <i>Unaelewa kiasi jinsi ya kutetea haki zako</i>	2			
	Not very informed about what you could do to defend your rights <i>Haelewi sana jinsi ya kutetea haki zako</i>	3			

Q311. There are also many different opinions about the responsibilities that citizens have in a democracy. I am going to read some activities and I would like you to tell me how important you think it is for citizens in Kenya to do each one.

Kuna maoni tofauti kuhusu majukumu ya wananchi katika demokrasia. Nitasoma baadhi ya majukumu hayo, na ningependa unieleze kiwango unachofikiria ni muhimu kwa kila mwananchi wa Kenya kufanya.

	Very important Muhimu sana	Somewhat important Muhimu kiasa	Not at all important Sio muhimu hata kidogo	
a) To vote in local elections. Is it very important, somewhat important, or not at all important? <i>kushiriki katika uchaguzi wa mashinani</i>	01	02	03	(421/22)
b) To pay their taxes and levies for services <i>kulipa ushuru na kodi kwa huduma zilizotolewa</i>	01	02	03	(423/24)
c) To take part in political decisions that affect their community <i>kushiriki katika uamuzi wa kisiasa unaoathiri jamii</i>	01	02	03	(425/26)
d) To become informed about the candidates and parties who are running for elected office <i>Kufahamu kuhusu wanaopigania viti na vyama vinavyoongoza katika ofisi za kisiasa</i>	01	02	03	(427/28)
e) To settle political conflicts without using violence <i>Kusuluhisha mizozano ya kisiasa bila kutumia vita</i>	01	02	03	(429/30)
f) To accept the results of free elections, even if your party or candidate loses. <i>Kukubali matokeo ya uchaguzi huru hata kama chama chako au mtu wako ameshindwa</i>	01	02	03	(431/32)

Q312. What is the single most important factor that you think people should consider about a candidate who is running for political office when deciding which candidate or party to support in an election?

Je, ni jambo gani muhimu zaidi unalofikiria watu wanastahili kuzingatia kuhusu anayeng'ang'ania ofisi ya kisiasa au chama cha kisiasa atakachosimama nacho katika uchaguzi?

(434/36)

Q313. In presidential elections Kenyan voters often vote for a candidate from their own ethnic group. Which of the following statements is closer to your view?

Katika uchaguzi wa urais nchini Kenya, wapiga kura mara nyingi huchagua mtu kutoka kabila lao. Ni taarifa gani inayokaribiana na maoni yako?

A	It is normal to want to elect someone from your ethnic community. <i>Ni jambo la kawaida kutaka kuchagua mtu kutoka kabila lako</i>	1
B	Voters should place much less emphasis on ethnic considerations. <i>Wapiga kura hawastahili kutilia maanani sana ukabila</i>	2

(437)

SECTION 4: CROSS-CUTTING URAIA ISSUES: GENDER, HIV/AIDS, ENVIRONMENT

Q401 – Q407 Would you say you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements:

Unaweza kusema kwamba unakubaliana kabisa, unakubaliana kiasi, haukubaliani kiasi, au haukubaliani kabisa na taarifa zifuatazo:

		Strongly agree Nakukubali kabisa	Somewhat agree Nakukubali kiasi	Somewhat disagree Nakataa kiasi	Strongly disagree Nakataa kabisa	Don't know / Sijui	No answer / Hamna jibu	Cols
Q401	Women and men should both be allowed to inherit land. <i>Wanawake na wanaume wanastahili waruhusiwe kurithi mashamba.</i>	01	02	03	04	98	99	(441/42)
Q402	There should be a certain number of parliamentary seats and cabinet positions reserved for women. <i>Wanawake watengewe idadi fulani ya viti vya ubunge na nafasi za uaziri.</i>	01	02	03	04	98	99	(443/44)
Q403	Individual communities should be able to decide whether they support female circumcision according to their own culture and traditions. <i>Kila jamii iwe na uwezo wa kutoa uamuzi wake kuhusu kuunga mkono kutahiriwa kwa wanawake kulingana na desturi na mila zao.</i>	01	02	03	04	98	99	(445/46)
Q404	Women should have the same right as men to serve as religious leaders, that is, as priests, pastors, or imams. <i>Wanawake wanafaa wawe na haki sawa na wanaume katika kuhudumu kama viongozi wa kidini, kama vile mapadri, wachungaji, au maimamu.</i>	01	02	03	04	98	99	(447/48)
Q405	It may be unfortunate, but it is understandable for employers to give preferences to people without the HIV/AIDS virus. <i>Inaweza kuwa ni jambo la kusikitisha ingawa inaeleweka kwa waajiri kuwapendelea watu ambao hawana virusi vya UKIMWI</i>	01	02	03	04	98	99	(449/50)
Q406	Businesses and public utilities like electricity and gas companies should be required to use more alternative energies like wind and solar, even if this increases the cost of their products in the short-run. <i>Biashara pamoja na makampuni ya nguvu za umeme na gesi huduma za umma kama vile yahitajike kutumia aina tofauti za nguvu kama upepo na sola, hata kama hii itaongeza gharama ya bidhaa zao kwa muda mfupi.</i>	01	02	03	04	98	99	(451/52)

		Strongly agree Nakukubali kabisa	Somewhat agree Nakukubali kiasi	Somewhat disagree Nakataa kiasi	Strongly disagree Nakataa kabisa	Don't know / Sijui	No answer / Hamna jibu	Cols
Q407	If the Kenyan government cannot provide people with safety from violence, then other countries acting through the United Nations have the responsibility to come in, no matter what our own government says. <i>Ikiwa serikali ya Kenya haiwezi kuwapa watu usalama kutokana na vurugu, basi nchi zingine zinazohudumu kupitia kwa Shirika la Umoja wa Kimataifa zina jukumu la kuingilia kati, bila kujali yanayosemwa na serikali yetu.</i>	01	02	03	04	98	99	(453/54)

SECTION 5: TOLERANCE, ETHNICITY, AND NATIONALITY

I'd like to ask you a few questions about tribes and ethnic groups in Kenya. *Ningependa kukuuliza maswali machache kuhusu makabila au makundi mbalimbali ya kikabila yaliyoko nchini Kenya*

Q501. What is your **tribe**? *Kabila lako ni gani?* [Interviewer: Prompt if necessary: You know your ethnic or cultural group.] [Do NOT read options. Code from response] **(455/56)**

Kuria	01	Borana	10	Taita	19
Teso	02	Kisii	11	Somali	20
Luo	03	Samburu	12	Turkana	21
Rendille	04	Kalenjin	13	Pokot	22
Luhya	05	Arab	14	Bajuni	23
Kikuyu	06	Masai	15	Kenyan only or "doesn't think of self in those terms" <i>Mkenya tu au hajifikirii kulingana na kabila</i>	24
Kamba	07	Swahili	16	Don't know / Sijui	25
Embu	08	Mijikenda	17	<i>Other specify:</i>	
Meru	09	Indian	18		

INTERVIEWER: NOTE RESPONDENT'S ETHNIC GROUP/TRIBE _____

IF RESPONDENT IDENTIFIED ANY TRIBE IN Q501, ASK Q502. REST GO TO Q504.

Q.No	Question and Filters	Coding Categories	Code	Col.
Q502	How important is being (INSERT TRIBE) to the way you think of yourself - <u>very important</u> , <u>somewhat important</u> , or <u>not important</u> ? <i>Je, kuna umuhimu kiasi gani katika kuwa (KABILA) kulingana na jinsi unavyojifikiria: Ni muhimu sana, ni muhimu kidogo, au sio muhimu?</i>	Very important - <i>Muhimu kabisa</i> Somewhat important - <i>Muhimu kiasi</i> Not important - <i>Sio muhimu</i> Don't know - <i>Sijui</i> No answer - <i>hakuna jibu</i>	01 02 03 98 99	(511/12)
Q503	How important is being Kenyan to the way you think of yourself - <u>very important</u> , <u>somewhat important</u> , or <u>not important</u> ? <i>Je, kuna umuhimu gani kuwa Mkenya kulingana na unavyojifikiria wewe mwenyewe: Ni muhimu sana, ni muhimu kidogo, au sio muhimu?</i>	Very important - <i>Muhimu kabisa</i> Somewhat important - <i>Muhimu kiasi</i> Not important - <i>Sio muhimu</i> Don't know - <i>Sijui</i> No answer - <i>hakuna jibu</i>	01 02 03 98 99	(513/14)

Q504	<p>Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a Kenyan and being a (INSERT TRIBE), which of the following statements best expresses your feelings? <i>Tuseme kuwa ulilazimika kuchagua kati ya kuwa mkenya na kuwa (KABILA), ni maelezo yapi kati ya yafuataya yanayoonyesha jinsi unavyojihisi?</i></p> <p>[IF RESPONDENT DID NOT IDENTIFY ANY TRIBE ON Q501, THAT IS, THEY REFUSED TO ANSWER DIDN'T KNOW, OR SAID "KENYAN ONLY" – THEN MARK = NOT APPLICABLE]</p>	<p>I feel only Kenyan <i>Najihisi Mkenya tu</i></p> <p>I feel more Kenyan than (INSERT TRIBE) <i>Najihisi Mkenya zaidi ya (KABILA)</i></p> <p>I feel equally Kenyan and (INSERT TRIBE) <i>Najihisi Mkenya pamoja na pia (kabila)</i></p> <p>I feel more (INSERT TRIBE) than Kenyan <i>Najihisi KABILA zaidi kuliko Mkenya</i></p> <p>I feel only (INSERT TRIBE) <i>Nahisi KABILA pekee</i></p> <p>Not applicable Don't know [Do not read]</p>	<p>1</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p> <p>4</p> <p>5</p> <p>6</p> <p>7</p>	(515)
Q505	<p>I'd like to ask you a few more questions about different tribes or ethnic groups in Kenya.</p> <p>How often do you come into contact with people from other tribes or ethnic groups? <i>Ningependa kuuliza masawali machache zaidi kuhusu makabila tofauti au makundi tofauti ya kikabila nchini Kenya. Nitakusomea orodha ya makundi. Unawasiliana kwa mara ngapi na watu kutoka makabila tofauti au makundi tofauti ya kikabila?</i></p>	<p>Daily - <i>Kila siku</i></p> <p>Once a week - <i>Mara moja kwa wiki</i></p> <p>Once a month - <i>Mara moja kwa mwezi</i></p> <p>A few times per year - <i>Mara chache kwa mwaka</i></p> <p>Rarely/never - <i>Si kawaida/siwasiliani kamwe</i></p> <p>Don't know - <i>Sijui</i></p>	<p>1</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p> <p>4</p> <p>5</p> <p>6</p>	(516)

Q506. On a scale of 1-5 where the number 1 means you dislike a group very much; 5 means you like the group very much; and 3 means you neither like nor dislike the group. What number on this scale best indicates your feelings for:

Katika kiwango cha 1-5 ambapo nambari 1 ina maana kuwa hukipendi kikundi sana; 5 inamaanisha unakipenda kikundi hicho sana; 3 inamaanisha kuwa hukipendi wala kukichukia kikundi hicho. Ni nambari gani katika kiwango hiki inayoonyesha hisia yako kwa:

Groups	Scale					
	1	2	3	4	5	(517)
a. Kalenjins	1	2	3	4	5	(517)
b. Luos	1	2	3	4	5	(518)
c. Kikuyus	1	2	3	4	5	(519)
d. Kambas	1	2	3	4	5	(520)
e. Luhyas	1	2	3	4	5	(521)

NEW: Among those groups that I have just mentioned, is there one that you like the least?
Kati ya vikundi niliyotaja hapo juu, kuna kikundi ambacho hukipendelei kabisa?

IF YES, RECORD GROUP NAME: _____ (522/23). THIS IS THE “MOST DISLIKED GROUP”, OR “MDG.”

IF NO: USE THE GROUP WITH THE LOWEST SCORE FROM QUESTION Q506 AS THE MOST DISLIKED GROUP, OR MDG.

IF THERE ARE SEVERAL GROUPS TIED FOR THE LOWEST SCORE ON QUESTION Q506, ASK: Is there any group on this list that you like less than the others? *Kati ya makundi yaliyo kwenye orodha, ni kundi lipi ambalo hulipendelei sana ikilinganishwa na makundi mengine?*

RECORD ANSWER: _____ (524/25). THIS IS THE MOST DISLIKED GROUP, OR MDG.

IF THE RESPONDENT REFUSES TO PROVIDE AN ANSWER, RANDOMLY SELECT ONE OF THE GROUPS WITH THE LOWEST SCORE ON Q506 AS THE MOST DISLIKED GROUP USING THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURE:

- 1. LOOK AT THE LAST DIGIT OF THE SERIAL NUMBER ON THE FRONT OF THIS QUESTIONNAIRE. USING THE TABLE HERE, FIND THE LETTER DIRECTLY BELOW YOUR NUMBER. FOR EXAMPLE, IF YOUR NUMBER IS 3, THEN THE CORRESPONDING LETTER IS “D”.**

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E

- 2. NOW, FROM QUESTION Q506, USE THE GROUP THAT IS LABELED WITH THE LETTER YOU HAVE JUST SELECTED, IF THAT GROUP IS ONE OF THE GROUPS TIED FOR THE LOWEST SCORE. FOR EXAMPLE, IF YOUR LETTER IS “D”, CHOOSE “KAMBAS” AS THE MOST DISLIKED GROUP.**
- 3. IF THE GROUP THAT IS LABELED WITH YOUR LETTER IS NOT ONE OF THE GROUPS TIED FOR THE LOWEST SCORE, MOVE DOWN THE ALPHABET UNTIL YOU GET TO ONE OF THE GROUPS THAT IS TIED FOR THE LOWEST SCORE. USE THAT GROUP AS THE MOST DISLIKED GROUP.**

WRITE IN THE NAME OF THE “MOST DISLIKED GROUP” _____ AND USE THIS AS THE “MDG” IN THE NEXT SET OF QUESTIONS.

Q507. Please tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements:

Tafadhali niambie iwapo unakubaliana sana, unakubaliana kwa kiasi fulani, kwa kiasi fulani hukubaliani, au hukubaliani kabisa na maelezo yafuatayo:

	Stongly agree <i>Nakubali kabisa</i>	Somewhat agree <i>Nakubali kiasi</i>	Neither agree nor disagree <i>Sikatai na sikubali</i>	Somewhat disagree <i>Nakataa kiasi</i>	Strongly disagree <i>Nakataa kabisa</i>	Don't know <i>Sijui</i>	No answer <i>Hakuna jibu</i>	
a. Members of the [INSERT MDG] ethnic group should be allowed to form their own political party. <i>Wanachama wa (MDG) waruhusiwe kuunda chama chao cha kisiasa.</i>	01	02	03	04	05	98	99	(533/34)
b. Members of the [INSERT MDG] ethnic group should be allowed to speak in your community even if they say things you do not think are right. <i>Wanachama wa (MDG) waruhusiwe kuzungumza kati ya jamii yako hata ikiwa wanasema vitu ambavyo unafikiria si sawa.</i>	01	02	03	04	05	98	99	(535/36)
c. I would not want my son or daughter to marry a member of the [INSERT MDG] ethnic group. <i>Singependa mtoto wangu wa kiume au wa kike kuoa au kuolewa na mmojawapo wa MDG</i>	01	02	03	04	05	98	99	(537/38)
d. I would support an organized effort with my neighbors to keep members of the [INSERT MDG] ethnic group from living in this area. <i>Ningeunga mikono juhudi zo zote na majirani zenye utaratibu unaofaa ili kuwazuia wanachama wa MGD wanaoishi katika sehemu hii.</i>	01	02	03	04	05	98	99	(539/40)
e. If a group of [INSERT MDG] was was holding a <i>harambee</i> or fundraiser to raise funds for a local school, I would be willing to attend. <i>Kama kikundi usichokipendelea kabisa (MDG) kingekuwa kinapanga harambee(mchango) ili kuchanga pesa za shule za kwao, ningekuwa tayari kuhudhuria mikutano hiyo.</i>	01	02	03	04	05	98	99	(541/42)
f. Members of the [INSERT MDG] ethnic group have too much economic or political power in this country. <i>Wanachama wa MGD wana nguvu zaidi kabisa kiuchumi na kisiasa katika nchi hii.</i>	01	02	03	04	05	98	99	(543/44)

		Gotten better imeboreshwa	Gotten worse imedhohofika	Stayed the same imekuwa pale pale	Cols.
Q508.	Would you say that your tribe's economic condition has gotten better, gotten worse, or stayed the same since the elections took place last year? <i>Je, ungeweza kusema kuwa hali ya uchumi ya kabila lako imeboreshwa, imedhohofika, au imekuwa pale pale kutoka wakati ambapo uchaguzi ulifanywa mwaka uliopita?</i>	1	2	3	(551)
Q509	And would you say that your tribe's treatment by government has gotten better, gotten worse, or stayed the same since the elections took place last year? <i>Na ungesema vile kabila lako linavyochukuliwa na serikali kumeimarika, kumesambaratika au kumbaki vilevile tangu uchaguzi mkuu wa mwaka jana?</i>	1	2	3	(552)

Q.No	Question and Filters	Coding Categories	Codes		Col.
			Yes	No	
Q510	Now thinking about yourself and your family, have you or members of your family ever been unfairly treated because of your ethnic background in any of the following areas? <i>Kwa sasa unapofikiria kujihusu wewe na jamii yako, je, watu katika familia yako wamewahi kudhulumwa kwa sababu ya kabila lako katika sehemu zifuatazo?</i>	Education / <i>elimu</i> Employment / <i>ajira</i> Dealing with the Police / <i>kukabiliana na polisi</i>	1	0	553
			2	0	554
			3	0	555
Q511	And thinking about yourself and your family, have you or members of your family ever been unfairly treated because of your RELIGION in any of the following areas? <i>Na unapofikiria kujihusu wewe na jamii yako, je, watu katika familia yako wamewahi kudhulumwa kwa sababu ya dini yako katika sehemu zifuatazo?</i>	Education / <i>elimu</i> Employment / <i>ajira</i> Dealing with the Police / <i>kukabiliana na polisi</i>	1	0	556
			2	0	557
			3	0	558

Q512 – Q513 There are always some people whose ideas other people consider bad or dangerous. Please tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements: *Kila mara huwa kuna watu ambao hudhaniwa kuwa mawazo yao ni mabaya au ni ya hatari. Tafadhali niambie ikiwa unakubaliana sana na maelezo yafuatayo , unakubaliana nayo kwa kiasi fulani au hukubaliani nayo kamwe:*

		Strongly agree Nakubali sana	Somewhat agree Nakubali kiasi	Somewhat disagree Sikubaliani kiasi	Strongly disagree Sikubaliani kabisa	Don't know / Sijui	Nno answer Hakuna jibu	Cols.
Q512	A person who opposes religion should <u>NOT</u> be allowed to make a speech in your community. <i>Mtu ambaye anapinga dini HAPASWI kuruhusiwa kuhutubia jamii yako.</i>	01	02	03	04	98	99	(c610/11)
Q513	A person who opposes religion should <u>NOT</u> be allowed to organize a peaceful demonstration to express their point of view. <i>Mtu ambaye anapinga dini HAPASWI kuruhusiwa kuandaa maandamano ya amani ili kutoa maoni yao. Je, unakubaliana sana, unakubaliana kwa kiasi fulani au hukubaliani kamwe.</i>	01	02	03	04	98	99	(c612/13)

SECTION 6: GOVERNANCE AND TRUST

Q.No	Question and Filters	Coding Categories	Codes	Skip to	Col. Nos.
Q601	Would you say that you are <u>very satisfied</u> , <u>somewhat satisfied</u> , <u>somewhat dissatisfied</u> , or <u>very dissatisfied</u> with the way democracy is working in Kenya? <i>Unaweza kusema kuwa umeridhika kabisa, umeridhika kwa kiasi fulani, hujaridhika kwa kiasi fulani au hujaridhika kabisa na jinsi demokrasia inavyofanya kazi nchini Kenya?</i>	Very satisfied <i>Nimeridhika kabisa</i> Somewhat satisfied <i>Nimeridhika kwa kiasi fulani</i> Somewhat dissatisfied <i>Sijaridhika kwa kiasi fulani</i> Very dissatisfied <i>Sijaridhika kamwe</i> Don't Know / <i>sijui</i> No Answer / <i>hakuna jibu</i>	01 02 03 04 98 99		(c614/15)

I'd like to ask you some questions about Kenya's political institutions, parties, and politicians.
Ningependa kukuuliza maswali kuhusu taasisi za kisiasa, vyama vya kisiasa na wanasiasa.

No	Question and Filters	Coding Categories	Codes	Skip To	Col. Nos.
Q602	<p>Please think about corruption in politics, that is where people in government and in the civil service illegally use public money for their own benefit, or take bribes. How many politicians and people who work for the government in Kenya do you think are corrupt - <u>almost all politicians and people who work for the government, some of them, or only a few?</u></p> <p><i>Tafadhali fikiria kuhusu ufiisadi katika siasa, pale ambapo watu katika serikali na utumishi wa serikali wanatumia pesa za umma kiharamu kwa faida zao wenyewe, au wanapokea hongo. Unafikiri ni wanasiasa wangapi na watu wanaoifanyia kazi serikali katika nchi ya Kenya walio wafisadi - Karibu wanasiasa wote na watu wanoifanyia serikali kazi, baadhi yao, wachache tu?</i></p>	<p>All Wote</p> <p>Almost all <i>karibu wote</i></p> <p>Some of them <i>Baadhi yao</i></p> <p>Only a few <i>wachache tu</i></p> <p>Don't know / <i>sijui</i></p> <p>No answer / <i>hakuna jibu</i></p>	<p>01</p> <p>02</p> <p>03</p> <p>04</p> <p>98</p> <p>99</p>		(c616/17)

Q603 – Q6014 How much confidence do you have in the following institutions in Kenya – a lot, a little or none?
Una imani kiasi gani na mashirika yafuatayo katika Kenya. Kiwango kikubwa, Kiwango kidogo, ama huna?

		A lot <i>Kiwango kikubwa</i>	A little <i>Kiwango Kidogo.</i>	None <i>Huna</i>	Cols
Q604	Religious institutions <i>Taasisi za kidini</i>	1	2	9	(c621)
Q605	The Presidency <i>Urais</i>	3	4	9	(c622)
Q606	Local Councils <i>Baraza za miji.</i>	5	6	9	(c623)
Q607	Police <i>Polisi</i>	7	8	9	(c624)
Q608	Parliament <i>Bunge</i>	1	2	9	(c625)
Q609	Judicial System <i>Mfumo wa mahakama</i>	3	4	9	(c626)
Q610	The Electoral Commission of Kenya <i>Tume ya uchaguzi ya Kenya.</i>	5	6	9	(c627)
Q611	Civil Society and Community-Based Organizations <i>Mashirika ya kutetea haki za umma na yale ya kutoa huduma katika jamii</i>	7	8	9	(c628)
Q612	Village Elders <i>Baraza la wazee wa vijijini</i>	1	2	9	(c629)
Q613	Local Chiefs <i>Machifu</i>	3	4	9	(c630)
Q614	The Media <i>Vyombo vya habari</i>	5	6	9	(c631)

Please tell me if you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements:

Tafadhali niambie ikiwa unakubaliana sana na maelezo yafuatayo, au kama unakubaliana nayo kwa kiasi fulani, au hukubaliani nayo kamwe:

		Strongly agree Nakubaliana kabisa	Somewhat agree Nakubaliana kiasi	Somewhat disagree Nakataa kiasi	Strongly disagree Nakataa kabisa	Don't know / Sijui	No answer Hamna jibu	Col
Q61 5	Generally speaking most people can be trusted, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree <i>Kwa jumla, watu wengi wanaweza kuaminika, Je unakubali kabisa, unakubali kiasi, unakataa kiasi au unakataa kabisa</i>	01	02	03	04	98	99	(641-42)
Q61 6	Kenya needs a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to deal with the problem of historical injustices and ethnic violence <i>Kenya inahitaji tume ya Haki na Maridhiano ili kushughulikia shida za dhulma zenye msingi wa kihistoria pamoja na vita vya kikabila.</i>	01	02	03	04	98	99	(645/46)

Q617. In some places in Kenya, candidates for political office or people from political parties sometimes offer money to voters in return for their vote. Do you think it is not wrong at all, wrong but understandable, or wrong and punishable for:

Katika sehemu kadha nchini Kenya, wgombeaji wa ofisi za kisiasa au watu kutoka katika vyama vya kisiasa wakati mwengine huwapa wapigaji kura pesa ili wawapigie kura. Unafikiri jambo hili si kosa kabisa, ni kosa ila linaeleweka, au ni kosa na la kuadhibiwa?

		Not wrong at all Si kosa kabisa	Wrong but understandable Ni kosa ila linaeleweka	Wrong and punishable Ni kosa la kuadhibiwa	
617.A	A candidate or party official to offer money in return for a vote? <i>Mgombeaji au afisa katika chama cha kisiasa kutoa pesa ili apigiwe kura?</i>	1	2	3	(649)
617.B	A voter to accept money in return for his or her vote? <i>Mpigaji kura kubadilisha pesa na kura yake.</i>	1	2	3	(650)

Q618. Please tell me if the following things are worse or better now than they were a few years ago, or are they about the same? *Tafadhali niambie iwapo mambo yafuatayo yamedorora au yameimarika kuliko yalivyokuwa miaka michache iliyopita, au yamesalia vile yalivyokuwa?*

		Worse	Better	Same	
A	The state of the national economy <i>Hali ya uchumi wa nchi</i>	1	2	3	(c651)
B	The freedom to join any political organization you want <i>Uhuru wa kujiunga na chama chochote cha kisiasa unachokitaka</i>	1	2	3	(c652)
C	The freedom from being arrested when you are innocent <i>Uhuru wa kutoshikwa wakati hauna makosa</i>	1	2	3	(c653)
D	The freedom to choose who to vote for without feeling pressured <i>Uhuru wa kumpigia kura unayemtaka bila kushawishiwa au kulazimishwa</i>	1	2	3	(c654)

E	Safety from crime and violence <i>Usalama kutokana na uhalifu na ghasia</i>	1	2	3	(c655)
F	The availability of jobs <i>Kuwepo kwa kazi</i>	1	2	3	(c656)
G	Equal and fair treatment of all ethnic groups by government <i>Usawa na haki katika kuhudumiwa kwa makabila yote na serikali</i>	1	2	3	(c657)

Q619: Please think about a 1 to 10 scale, where 1 means “extremely bad” and 10 means “extremely good.” Where on the scale would you rate the performance of the Kibaki government **before last year’s national elections**?
*Tafadhali tafakari tena kwa kipimo cha 1-10 ambapo 1 yamaanisha “vibaya zaidi” na 10 yamaanisha “vizuri zaidi”. Ni wapi katika kipimo hiki ungeweka utendaji kazi wa serikali ya Kibaki kabla **uchaguzi wa mwaka jana**?*

Extremely Bad <i>Vibaya zaidi</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Extremely Good <i>Vizuri zaidi</i>	(c658/59)
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Q620: And where on the scale would you rate the performance of the **current** Grand Coalition Government headed by President Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga?
*Na kwenye kipimo, ni wapi ungeweka utendaji kazi wa serikali **ya sasa** ya mseto inayoongozwa na rais Kibaki na waziri mkuu Raila Odinga?*

Extremely Bad <i>Vibaya zaidi</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Extremely Good <i>Vizuri zaidi</i>	(c660/61)
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SECTION 7: CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

Q701 – Q702. Let us talk about the Constitution for a while. A Constitution contains the rules and principles that are the most important laws of the country. It describes how the government will be elected, what powers it has, and what the rights and responsibilities of the people are.

Hebu sasa tuzungumze juu ya katiba kidogo. Katiba inajumlisha taratibu na kanuni za sheria ambazo ni muhimu sana nchini. Inaelezea jinsi serikali huchaguliwa, uwezo au upeo wake, na haki na majukumu ya wananchi.

Q.No	Question and Filters	Coding Categories	Codes	Skip to	Col. Nos.
Q701	Would you say you are <u>very informed</u> , <u>somewhat informed</u> , or <u>not informed</u> about the contents of the Kenyan constitution? <i>Je, unaweza kusema kuwa umearifika vizuri, umearifika kwa kiasi fulani, au hujaarifika kuhusu yaliyomo ndani ya Katiba ya Kenya?</i>	Very informed <i>Umearifika vizuri</i> Somewhat informed <i>Umearifika kiasi</i> Not informed <i>Hujaarifika kabisa</i> Don't know <i>Sijui</i> No Answer <i>Hamna jibu</i>	01 02 03 98 99		(c710/11)
Q702	I'd like to ask you some questions about the current constitution. Do you think that there should be <u>major changes</u> in the current Constitution, <u>minor changes</u> in the current Constitution, or do you think the current Constitution should be <u>kept as it is</u> ? <i>Ningependa kuuliza maswali kadhaa kuhusu katiba ya sasa. Je, unafikiri kuwa kunahitajika kuwepo na mabadiliko makuu, mabadiliko madogo katika katiba ya sasa, au unafikiri kuwa</i>	Major Changes <i>Madiliko makuu</i> Minor Changes <i>Mabadiliko machache</i> Kept as it is <i>Ibaki kama ilivyo</i> Don't know <i>Sijui</i>	01 02 03 98		(c712/13)

Q703- Q704 Please tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about the Constitution.

Tafadhali niambie ikiwa unakuabiana kabisa na maelezo yafuatayo kuhusu katiba, au unakubaliana nayo kwa kiasi fulani, au hukubaliani nayo kamwe.

		Strongly agree <i>Kubaliana kabisa</i>	Somewhat agree <i>Kubaliana kiasi</i>	Somewhat disagree <i>Sikubaliani kiasi</i>	Strongly disagree <i>Sikubaliani kabisa</i>	Don't know <i>Sijui</i>	No answer <i>Sinaibu</i>	Cols
Q703	Writing a Constitution is a job for experts and there is no role for ordinary citizens, <i>Kuandika katiba ni kazi ya wataalamu na hakuna nafasi ya wananchi wa kawaida.</i>	01	02	03	04	98	99	(c714/15)
Q704	In a new constitution the powers of the President should be reduced and those of other institutions, like the Parliament and the Courts, should be increased. <i>Katika katiba mpya, mamlaka ya Raisi inafaa ipunguzwe na ya taasisi zingine, kama vile Bunge na Mahakama kuongezwa.</i>	01	02	03	04	98	99	(c716/17)

SECTION 8: GROUP MEMBERSHIP

Q801 – Q811.

FOR CONTROL GROUP RESPONDENTS:

At the beginning of this interview I asked you about the groups you belong to. I am going to read through the list of groups again, and I would like you to tell me whether you are a member of each group or not. If you are a member, please tell me if you are an active or not so active member in that group.

Mwanzo wa mahojiano nilikuuliza wewe huwa mwanacham wa kikundi gani. Nitakusomea tena orodha ya makundi hayo. Tafadhali niambie kama wewe ni mwanacham wa kila kikundi au sio. Kama wewe ni mwanachama tafadhali niambie kama wewe ni mwanachama kamilifu au sio mwanachama kamilifu wa kikundi hicho.

FOR TREATMENT GROUP RESPONDENTS:

Now I am going to read through a list of groups, and I'd like you to tell me whether you are a member of each group or not. If you are a member, please tell me if you are an active or not so active member in that group.

Sasa nitasoma orodha ya makundi mengine, na ningependa uniambie kama wewe ni mwanachama wa kila kikundi au la. Kama wewe ni mwanachama, tafadhali unieleze kama unashiriki kamili kwenye kile kikundi, ama hushiriki kikamilifu au wewe sio mwanachama kabisa.

Q.No	Question and Filters	Coding Categories	Codes	Skip	Col. Nos.
Q801	A church or religious organization. Are you a member? [IF YES] Are you an <u>active member</u> , or <u>not so active member</u> ? <i>Kanisa au dini. Wewe ni mwanachama? [KAMA NDIO], Ni mwanachama halisi au mwanachama kiasi tu ?</i>	Yes, active member - <i>Halisi</i> Yes, not active member - <i>Kiasi</i> . Not a member - <i>Sio mwanachama</i>	1 2 3		(c721)
Q802	A youth or sports group <i>Kikundi cha vijana ama kikundi cha michezo</i>	Yes, active member - <i>Halisi</i> Yes, not active member - <i>Kiasi</i> . Not a member - <i>Sio mwanachama</i>	1 2 3		(c722)
Q803	A trade union <i>Chama cha wafanyakazi.</i>	Yes, active member - <i>Halisi</i> Yes, not active member - <i>Kiasi</i> . Not a member - <i>Sio mwanachama</i>	1 2 3		(c723)
Q804	A women's group <i>Kikundi cha akina mama.</i>	Yes, active member - <i>Halisi</i> Yes, not active member - <i>Kiasi</i> . Not a member - <i>Sio mwanachama</i>	1 2 3		(c724)
Q805	A cultural or school organization <i>Shirika la kitamaduni au la kielimu.</i>	Yes, active member - <i>Halisi</i> Yes, not active member - <i>Kiasi</i> . Not a member - <i>Sio mwanachama</i>	1 2 3		(c725)
Q806	A burial society <i>Kikundi cha maombolezi/mazishi</i>	Yes, active member - <i>Halisi</i> Yes, not active member - <i>Kiasi</i> . Not a member - <i>Sio mwanachama</i>	1 2 3		(c726)
Q807	A civic organization <i>Shirika la kijamii.</i>	Yes, active member - <i>Halisi</i> Yes, not active member - <i>Kiasi</i> . Not a member - <i>Sio mwanachama</i>	1 2 3		(c727)
Q808	A tribal or clan association <i>Shirika la kijamii au ukoo</i>	Yes, active member - <i>Halisi</i> Yes, not active member - <i>Kiasi</i> . Not a member - <i>Sio mwanachama</i>	1 2 3		(c728)
Q809	A business or professional association <i>Shirika la kibiashara au kitaaluma.</i>	Yes, active member - <i>Halisi</i> Yes, not active member - <i>Kiasi</i> . Not a member - <i>Sio mwanachama</i>	1 2 3		(c729)
Q810	A political party <i>Chama cha kisiasa.</i>	Yes, active member - <i>Halisi</i> Yes, not active member - <i>Kiasi</i> . Not a member - <i>Sio mwanachama</i>	1 2 3		(c730)
Q811	Are there other kinds of groups or associations that you belong to? <i>Kuna makundi au mashirika mengine ambayo unashiriki?</i>	Yes No	1> Continue 2> Go to Q 814		(c731)

IF RESPONDENT IS A MEMBER OF ANOTHER GROUP, FOLLOW WITH Q812. IF NOT, GO TO Q.814

Q.No	Question and Filters	Coding Categories	Codes	Skip to	Col. Nos.
Q812	<p>Could you tell me what they are? [NOTE: INTERVIEWER MAY CODE INTO ABOVE CATEGORIES IF APPROPRIATE] <i>Unaweza kunieleza ni vikundi gani?</i></p>	----- (c732/50)			
Q813	<p>And would you say you are an <u>active member</u> or <u>not so active</u> member of this group? <i>Unaweza kunieleza kama wewe ni mshiriki halisi wa vyama au vikundu hivi au unashiriki kiasi tu?</i></p>	Active Halisi Not so active Kiasi Don't know Sijui No answer Hamna jibu QNA	01 02 97 98 99		(c751/52)

IF RESPONDENT IS MEMBER OF ONE OR MORE GROUPS FROM Q801 – Q812:

Q814	<p>Thinking about all the groups we just spoke about, are you or have you ever been a leader of any of these groups? <i>Ukizingatia vikundi vyote ambavyo tumezungumzia, unaweza kunieleze kama umewahi kuwa kiongozi wa mojawapo wa hivi vikundi?</i></p>	Yes No Don't know No Answer QNA	01 02 97 98 99		(c810/11)
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SECTION 9: POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE

Now we'd like to talk about different governmental leaders and institutions in Kenya,
Sasa ningependa tuzungumze kuhusu viongozi wa kiserikali na idara za serikali ya Kenya.

Q.No	Question and Filters	Correct response	Incorrect response	Don't know	No Answer	Col. Nos
Q901	What is the title of the person who chairs the Kenyan parliament? <i>Cheo cha yule anayesimamia vikao vya bunge yaitwa aje?</i> (CORRECT ANSWER=SPEAKER)	01	02	98	99	(c821/22)
Q902	Who appoints members of the Kenyan High Court? <i>Ni nani anayeteua majaji na mahakimu wa mahakama kuu ya Kenya?</i> (CORRECT ANSWER=PRESIDENT)	01	02	98	99	(c823/24)
Q903	Are amendments to the Kenyan constitution made by a declaration of the President or by a simple majority of the Parliament, or by a two-thirds majority of the Parliament, or by a majority vote by the people? <i>Je, marekebisho ya katiba ya Kenya hufanywa kupitia uamuzi wa rais, au na wabunge walio wengi wakati wa mjadala bungeni, au na zaidi ya thuluthi mbili ya wabunge, au kwa uwingi wa wapiga kura?</i> (CORRECT ANSWER=BY A TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY OF THE PARLIAMENT)	01	02	98	99	(c825/26)
Q904	Who is responsible for deciding how money from the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) is to be used in your area? <i>Ni nani aliyepewa jukumu la kuamuwa jinsi ambavyo fedha za eneo bunge zinavyotumika?</i> (CORRECT ANSWER=CDF COMMITTEE)	01	02	98	99	(c827/28)

PARTY SUPPORT

Q905	Do you feel close to any particular political party? <i>Je, wewe unajihisi kuwa karibu na chama chochote cha kisiasa?</i>	Yes No	1 2			(829)
Q906	IF YES: Which party is that? <i>Ni chama kipi?</i>					(830/31)
Q907	IF YES: Do you feel very close to this party, somewhat close, or not close to this party? <i>Unajihisi kuwa karibu kwa kiasi gani na hiki chama? Je, ni karibu sana, Karibu kiasi au sio karibu.</i>	Close to this party Karibu na hiki chama Somewhat close Karibu kiasi Not close Sio karibu	1 2 3			(c832)
Q908	Did a candidate or agent from any party come to your home during the campaign before last year's election? <i>Kuna mgombeaji yeyote ama mwakilishi wa chama chochote ambaye aliwatembelea nyumbani kwenu wakati wa kampeni kabla ya uchaguzi wa mwaka jana?</i>	Yes No	1 2	<GO TO Q910		(c833)

Q909	IF YES: Which party or parties came to your home? <i>Ni chama ama vyama gani?</i> [Multiple Answer]	KADDU DP FORD Kenya NARC FORD People ODM ODM Kenya PNU SAFINA FORD Asili KANU NARC Kenya Other (Specify)	01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13		(c834/60)
Q910	Did any parties hold political rallies in this area during the campaign before last year's election? <i>Kuna vyama vyovyote vilivyoandaa mikutano ya kisiasa katika sehemu hii wakati wa kampeni kabla ya uchaguzi wa mwaka jana?</i>	Yes No	1 2	<GO TO Q1001	(c911)
Q911	IF YES: Which parties? <i>Ni vyama vipi?</i> [Multiple Answer]	KADDU DP FORD Kenya NARC FORD People ODM ODM Kenya PNU SAFINA FORD Asili KANU NARC Kenya Other (Specify)	01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13		(c912/40)
Q912	Did you attend any of these parties' rallies? <i>Je ulihudhuria mikutano yoyote ya kisiasa iliyoandaliwa hapa?</i>	Yes No	1 2	<GO TO Q1001	(c941)
Q913	IF YES: Which parties' rallies did you attend? <i>Ni mikutano ya vyama gani ulihudhuria?</i> [Multiple Answer]	KADDU DP FORD Kenya NARC FORD People ODM ODM Kenya PNU SAFINA FORD Asili KANU NARC Kenya Other (Specify)	01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13		(c942/70)

SECTION 10: PARTICIPATION

Q.No	Question and Filters	Coding Categories	Codes	Skip to:	Col. Nos.
Q1001	In talking to people about elections, we find that they are sometimes unable to register to vote because they don't have time or they have difficulty getting to the offices. How about you, have you been able to register to vote? <i>Tunapozungumza na watu kuhusu uchaguzi, tunapata ya kwamba wakati mwingi wanashindwa kujisajili kama wapiga kura kwa sababu ya kukosa wakati ama wanapata shida katika kufika kwenye vituo vya kujisajili kama wapiga kura. Je, umeshapata nafasi ya kujisajili kama mpiga kura?</i>	Yes No Don't Know - <i>Sijui</i> No answer – <i>Sina jibu</i>	01 02 98 99	IF NO GO TO Q.1004	(1010/11)
Q1002	And did you vote in the 2007 general elections? <i>Na ulipiga kura katika uchaguzi mkuu mwaka jana?</i>	Yes No Don't Know - <i>Sijui</i> No answer - <i>Sina jibu</i>	01 02 98 99	IF NO GO TO Q.1004	(1012/13)
Q1003	IF YES: In the election for President, for which candidate did you vote? <i>Kama ndio, kwa uchaguzi wa urais, ni mgombea yupi uliyempigia kura?</i>	Kalonzo Musyoka Raila Odinga Pius Muiru Mwai Kibaki Other RTA	01 02 03 04 05 06		(c1014/15)

Q1004 – Q1011 I'm going to list a number of other political activities besides voting. Please tell me whether you have not done this activity in the last year, whether you have done it once or whether you have done this activity several times in the last year. The first one is:

Nitaorodhesha shuguli zingine za kisiasa bali na upigaji kura. Tafadhali nieleze kama umewahi kufanya shughuli zifuatazo mara moja, umefanya zaidi ya mara moja, ama umekuwa ukifanya mara kwa mara kwa kipindi cha mwaka mmoja uliopita?

Q.No	Question and Filters	Not done	Once	Severa l times	Col
Q1004(a)	Discussed political issues with friends, family, or co-workers. Have you <u>not done</u> this, <u>done it once</u> , or <u>done</u> this several times in the last year? <i>Kujadiliana kuhusu siasa na jamaa, marafiki, au wafanyi kazi wenzako?</i>	1	2	3	(1021)
Q1004(b)	Worked for a political party or candidate. Have you <u>not done</u> this, <u>done it once</u> or done this <u>several times</u> since your previous interview?	1	2	3	(1022)
Q1005	Participated in an organized effort to solve a neighborhood or community problem? <i>Umewahi kushiriki kwa juhudi za kutatua shida za majirani na wakaaji wa eneo lako? [REPEAT RESPONSE CATEGORIES AS NECESSARY]</i>	1	2	3	(1023)
Q1006	Attended a meeting of your local town council or with other government officials? <i>Umewahi kuhudhuria mkutano wa baraza la mji wako au kujumuika pamoja na maafisa wengine wa serikali? [REPEAT RESPONSE CATEGORIES AS NECESSARY]</i>	1	2	3	(1024)
Q1007	Contacted a local official, like a local councillor or an official who works for a government agency? <i>Umewahi kuwasiliana na afisa yeyote wa eneo lako kama diwani au afisa wa serikali? [REPEAT RESPONSE CATEGORIES AS NECESSARY]</i>	1	2	3	(1025)

Q.No	Question and Filters	Not done	Once	Severa l times	Col
Q1008	Lodged a complaint with a government body or a civil society organization about unfair treatment or a violation of your rights <i>Kuwasilisha malalamishi yako kwa shirika la serekali au shirika la kutetea haki za kibinadamu?</i>	1	2	3	(1026)
Q1009	Contacted a national elected official like a member of Parliament? <i>Umewahi kuwasiliana na afisa wa kitaifa aliyechaguliwa kama vile mbunge?</i>	1	2	3	(1027)
Q1010	Taken part in a protest, march, or demonstration on some national or local issue? <i>Kushiriki katika maandamano ya kupinga/kulalamikia juu ya masuala fulani ya kitaifa ama ya kijamii?</i>	1	2	3	(1028)
Q1011	Contacted a local chief or traditional leader about some problem that you have <i>Umewahi kuwasiliana na chifu au kiongozi wa kijamii kuhusu tatizo uliyo nayo?</i>	1	2	3	(1029)

Q1012	Thinking about the place or neighborhood where you live, do you feel <u>very safe</u> , <u>somewhat safe</u> , or <u>unsafe</u> in your neighborhood? <i>Unapofikiria kuhusu mahala au maeneo unamoishi, unawaweza kusema kuwa kuna usalama wa kutosha, usalama kiasi, au hakuna usalama?</i>	Very safe Somewhat safe Unsafe Don't know No answer	01 02 03 98 99		(1031/32)
Q1013	Were you or your family affected by the violence that occurred after the 2007 elections? <i>Je, wewe au jamaa yako, kuna yeyote aliyeathirika kutokana na ghasia zilizotokea baada ya uchaguzi wa mwaka uliopita?</i>	Yes No Don't know No answer	01 02 98 99	IF NO GO TO Q10 15	(1033/34)

Q1014	<p>If yes, how were you affected? <i>Uli/Mli/Waliadhirika kiviipi?</i></p> <p>(MULTIPLE ANSWERS)</p>	<p>Family member was injured or killed <i>Mmojawapo wa familia yenu alijeruhiwa au aliuawa</i></p> <p>Destruction of home or personal property <i>Uharibifu wa boma na mali</i></p> <p>Destruction of business <i>Uharibifu wa biashara</i></p> <p>Forced to leave area where living at the time <i>Lazimishwa kuhama makao zetu wakati huo</i></p> <p>Damage to crops or theft of livestock <i>Uharibifu wa mimea na wizi wa mifugo</i></p> <p>Others (Specify) _____</p>	01 02 03 04 05 06		(c1035/50)
Q1015.	<p>Regarding the post-election ethnic violence, which of these statements is closer to your view: A) certain tribes were responsible for the events that occurred, or B) all Kenyans were responsible for the violence. <i>Kuhusu ghasia za kikabila vilivyozuka baada ya uchaguzi, ni taarifa gani inayokaribiana na maoni yako: A) Ni makabila fulani yaliyohusika na vitendo hivyo, au B) Wakenya wote walihusika kwenye ghasia?</i></p>	<p>A. Certain tribes were responsible for the events that occurred <i>Makabila fulani yalihusika katika kuzua ghasia zilizofanyika</i></p> <p>B. All Kenyans were responsible for the violence <i>Wakenya wote walihusika katika kuzua ghasia</i></p>	1 2		(1110)
Q1016.	<p>To what extent would you say that you have forgiven those responsible for the post-election ethnic violence? <i>Ni kwa kiwango kipi unaweza kusema kuwa umewasameheha waliohusika na vita vya kikabila baada ya uchaguzi?</i></p>	<p>A lot - <i>Nimewasameheha sana</i></p> <p>Somewhat - <i>Nimewasameheha kwa kiasi</i></p> <p>Not at all - <i>Sijawasameheha kamwe</i></p>	1 2 3		(1111)

Q1017. Please think about the time right before the December 2007 elections, that is, before all the violence and dislocations that occurred in Kenya. Could you tell me if you strongly agree, weakly agree, neither agree nor disagree, weakly disagree or strongly disagree with the following statements?

Tafadhali kumbuka Disemba 2007 kabla ya uchaguzi, kabla ya ghasia na uharibifu uliotokea nchini Kenya. Unaweza kunieleza kama unakubaliana sana, au kidogo, haukubaliani nayo wala haupingi, au haukubaliani kamwe na taarifa zifuatazo.

	Strongly agree	Weakly agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Weakly disagree	Strongly Disagree	
At that time I thought that democracy was a better system of government than I do now. <i>Nilifikiri kwa wakati huo kuwa demokrasia ilikuwa mfumo mzuri wa serikali kuliko vile ninavyofikiria kwa sasa.</i>	1	2	3	4	5	1112
At that time I thought I could influence the political process more than I do now. <i>Nilidhania kuwa kwa wakati huo nilikuwa na ushawishi mkubwa wa kisiasa kuliko ilivyo sasa.</i>	1	2	3	4	5	1113
At that time I was more willing to consider the views of people from other ethnic groups than I am now. <i>Kwa wakati huo, nilikuwa nikitilia maanani maoni ya watu wa kabila zingine kuliko hivi sasa.</i>	1	2	3	4	5	1114
At that time I was more optimistic about building a true democracy in Kenya than I am now. <i>Kwa wakati huo nilikuwa na imani ya kuunda demokrasia ya haki kuliko ilivyo hivi sasa.</i>	1	2	3	4	5	1115

SECTION 11: FOR TREATMENT GROUP RESPONDENTS ONLY

INTERVIEWER CHECKPOINT: IF RESPONDENT IS TREATMENT GROUP, CONTINUE HERE. IF RESPONDENT IS CONTROL GROUP, SKIP TO SECTION 12

Thank you very much. At the beginning of the interview you indicated that you had attended at least one civic education activity in the time before the December 2007 elections. I would like to ask you a few more questions about civic education now.

Asante sana, mwanzoni ulikuwa umenieleza kuwa umewahi kuhudhuria mafunzo kuhusu haki za raia kabla ya uchaguzi wa mwaka jana. Ningependa kukuuliza maswali machache kuhusu mafunzo hayo.

1101. Could you tell me approximately how many of those civic education activities were:
Waweza kunieleza kulikuwa na takriban hafla ngapi za kuelimisha wananchi kuhusu haki zao:

Workshops or participatory seminars? <i>Warsha au mikutano ya mafunzo</i>	1121/22
Public gatherings or discussions in your community? <i>Mkutano wa hadhara au mijadala ya kijamii kijijini.</i>	1123/24
Organized activities that were conducted at your church or mosque? <i>Hafla zilizoandaliwa kanisani au mskitini mwenu?</i>	1125/26
Theatre presentations like drama or puppet shows? <i>Hafla kama vile michezo ya kuigiza na vichekesho vya uhamasishaji?</i>	1127/28
OTHER (specify)	1129/30

INTERVIEWER CHECK ACTIVITY INFORMATION ON COVER PAGE OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE BEFORE ASKING THIS SECTION.

1102. **MY RECORDS SAY THAT THERE WAS A _____ (INSERT ACTIVITY TYPE) CONDUCTED AROUND HERE AT THE _____ (INSERT VENUE) DURING _____ (INSERT MONTH) OF LAST YEAR.**

Do you happen to recall if you attended this particular activity, or did the activities you attended take place somewhere else? *Waweza kumbuka kama ulihudhuria hafla hii ama hafla uliohudhuria ilifanyika mahali pengine?*

(c1141)

- Attended this particular activity.....1
Ulihudhuria hafla hii
- Activities attended took place somewhere else.....2
Hafla ulizohudhuria zilifanyika mahali pengine

1103. Just to the best of your recollection, were most of these activities that you attended conducted right before the 2007 election, or did they take place some months before or even a longer time before the election?

Hafla hizi ambazo ulihudhuria zilifanyika mara tu kabla ya uchaguzi au miezi kadhaa kabla ya uchaguzi ama hata muda mrefu kabla ya uchaguzi?

(c1142)

- Conducted right before the 2007 election.....1
Zilifanyika punde tu kabla ya uchaguzi
- Took place some months before or even a longer time before the election.....2
Zilifanyika miezi kadhaa au hata muda mrefu zaidi kabla ya uchaguzi

I'd like to ask you a few more questions about your experiences at these activities
Ningependa kukuuliza maswali mengine kuhusu maoni yako juu ya hafla ulizohudhuria.

Q.No	Question and Filters	Coding Categories	Codes	Skip to	Col. Nos.
Q1103.	<p>Are you a member of any of the groups that conducted these civic education activities, or a member of groups that were invited to the activities? <i>Je, wewe ni mwana chama wa kundi lolote ambalo liliweka mikakati ya hafla hizo au wewe ni mwanachama wa makundi yaliyoalikwa kwenye hafla hizo?</i></p>	<p>Member of group that conducted the workshop <i>Mwanachama wa kikundi ambacho kiliongoza warsha hiyo</i> Member of group that was invited to the workshop <i>Mwanachama wa kikundi kilichoalikwa kwenye warsha hiyo</i> Member of both groups <i>Wanachama wa vikundi vyote viwili</i> Member of neither group <i>Sio mwanachama wa kikundi chochote</i> Don't recall, no answer <i>Sikumbuki , hakuna jibu</i> QNA</p>	<p>01 02 03 04 98 99</p>	<p>>Q1104 REST GO TO Q.1119</p>	(c1143/44)
Q1104	<p>Generally speaking, can you recall about how long you were at each of these activities? Was it generally for <u>two hours or less</u>, <u>about 4 hours</u>, <u>about 8 hours</u>, or <u>more than 8 hours</u>? <i>Unaweza kukumbuka muda uliochukua kwa kila hafla ulio hudhuria? Ilikuwa kama</i></p>	<p>Two hours or less <i>Saa mbili au kidogo</i> About 4 hours <i>Kama saa nne hivi</i> About 8 hours <i>Kama saa nane hivi</i> More than 8 hours <i>Zaidi ya saa nane</i> Don't recall QNA</p>	<p>01 02 03 04 98 99</p>		(c1145/46)
Q1105	<p>Just as best as you can remember, were any of the following things discussed in the activities? <i>Je ukikumbuka vizuri, mambo yafuatayo yalizungumziwa kwenye warsha?</i> A. Community problems like crime, HIV/AIDS, water, or health, or environmental issues? <i>Shida za kijamii kama vile uhalifu, UKIMWI, maji, afya au masuala ya mazingira?</i></p>	<p>Yes No Don't recall QNA</p>	<p>01 02 98 99</p>		(c1147/48)
	<p>B. Voting in elections and participating in politics? <i>Kupiga kura wakati wa uchaguzi na kushiriki katika siasa?</i></p>	<p>Yes No Don't recall QNA</p>	<p>01 02 98 99</p>		(c1149/50)
	<p>C. Strengthening democracy in Kenya? <i>Kudhibiti demokrasia nchini Kenya?</i></p>	<p>Yes No Don't recall QNA</p>	<p>01 02 98 99</p>		(c1151/52)

Q.No	Question and Filters	Coding Categories	Codes	Skip to	Col. Nos.
	D. Human rights in Kenya? <i>Haki za kibinadamu nchini Kenya?</i>	Yes No Don't recall QNA	01 02 98 99		(c1153/54)
	E. The constituency development fund (CDF) or the local authority transfer fund (LATF) <i>Hazina ya fedha ya eneo bunge au ya udiwani</i>	Yes No Don't recall QNA	01 02 98 99		(c1155/56)
	F. Nationhood and nation building <i>Uzalendo na ujenzi wa taifa</i>	Yes No Don't recall QNA	01 02 98 99		(c1157/58)
	G. The constitution <i>Katiba</i>	Yes No Don't recall QNA	01 02 98 99		(c1159/60)
Q1106.	Did any of the following take place at the activities? <i>Kuna lolote kati ya haya lililotendeka kwenye hafla hizo?</i>				(c1210/11)
	a. Did you break into small groups to discuss material <i>Je, mligawanyika katika vikundi vidogo kujadiliana?</i>	Yes No Don't recall QNA	01 02 98 99		
	b. Were there stage plays or Dramatizations? <i>Kulikuwa na michezo kwenye jukwaa na miigizo?</i>	Yes No Don't recall QNA	01 02 98 99		(c1212/13)
	c. Were there lectures? <i>Kulikuwa na mihadhara?</i>	Yes No Don't recall QNA	01 02 98 99		(c1214/15)
	d. Did you play games? <i>Mlicheza michezo kwenye hafla uliohudhuria?</i>	Yes No Don't recall QNA	01 02 98 99		(c1216/17)
	e. Were people asked to repeat or memorize information? <i>Mliombwa kurudiarudia au kukumbuka mambo yale yaliojiri?</i>	Yes No Don't recall QNA	01 02 98 99		(c1218/19)
	f. Did you try to solve problems and develop proposals? <i>Mlijaribu kutatua shida na kutoa mapendekezo?</i>	Yes No Don't recall QNA	01 02 98 99		(c1220/21)
	g. Were there role-playing exercises? <i>kulikuwa na vitendo vya kuwapa watu majukumu kwa kila jambo?</i>	Yes No Don't recall QNA	01 02 98 99		(c1222/23)

Q.No	Question and Filters	Coding Categories	Codes	Skip to	Col. Nos.
	h. Were there mock trials or legal proceedings? <i>Kulikuwa na hukumu za kimzaha au kufanya kesi mahakamani?</i>	Yes No Don't recall QNA	01 02 98 99		(c1224/25)
	i. Were there mock elections or other kinds of political activities? <i>Kulikuwa na uchaguzi wa kimzaha au hafla zozote za kisiasa?</i>	Yes No Don't recall QNA	01 02 98 99		(c1226/27)
Q1107.	During these activities, how much encouragement were you given to express your opinions? Was it <u>a great deal, some, a little or none</u> ? <i>Wakati wa hafla hizi, ulipewa motisha kwa kiasi gani ili ujieleze na maoni yako? Je ilikuwa kubwa sana, kiasi, kidogo au hakuna?</i>	A great deal Some A little None Don't recall QNA	01 02 03 04 98 99		(c1228/29)
Q1108.	Would you say that the people who led the activities presented the material <u>very well, well or not very well</u> ? <i>Je, waweza kusema kuwa watu waliokuwa wakiongoza hafla hizo walielezea mambo vyema kabisa, vyema ama hawakuelezea vyema kabisa.</i>	Very well Well Not very well Don't recall QNA	01 02 03 98 99		(c1230/31)
Q1109.	Does the word _____ (ASK FOR EACH WORD) describe the people who led these activities <u>very well, well or not very well</u> ? <i>Je, neon _____ linaeleza vyema kuhusu wasimamizi wa hafla hizo, vizuri sana, vizuri, sio vizuri sana?</i>				
	1. Knowledgeable <i>Wenye maarifa</i>	Very well Well Not very well Don't recall QNA	01 02 03 98 99		(c1232/33)
	2. How about interesting? Does the word interesting describe the people who led these activities very well, well or not well? <i>Neno hili linaelezea vizuri sana, vizuri, au halelezei vizuri kuhusu wasimamizi wa hafla hizo?</i>	Very well Well Not very well Don't recall QNA	01 02 03 98 99		(c1234/35)
	3. Likeable <i>Kupendeza</i>	Very well Well Not very well Don't recall QNA	01 02 03 98 99		(c1236/37)
	4. Understandable <i>Wanaeleweka</i>	Very well Well Not very well Don't recall QNA	01 02 03 98 99		(c1238/39)

Q.No	Question and Filters	Coding Categories	Codes	Skip to	Col. Nos.
	5. Inspiring <i>Wanahamasisha</i>	Very well Well Not very well Don't recall QNA	01 02 03 98 99		(c1240/41)
Q1110.	With regards to the government and politics in Kenya, were the people who led these activities <u>very critical</u> , <u>somewhat critical</u> , <u>somewhat supportive</u> or <u>very supportive</u> ? <i>Ukizingatia serikali na siasa za Kenya je, watu waliosimamia hafla hizo walikuwa ni watu wazushi, wazushi kiasi, wenye busara kiasi, wenye busara sana?</i>	Very critical Somewhat critical Somewhat supportive Very supportive Don't recall QNA	01 02 03 04 98 99		(c1242/43)
Q1111.	After these activities were completed, <i>Baada ya hafla hizi kukamilika,</i> a. How often did you speak with members of your family about the issues in the activities: <u>a lot</u> , <u>a little</u> , or <u>not at all</u> ? <i>Ni mara ngapi wewe na watu wa familia yako mlijadili kuhusu yaliyojiri kwenye hafla hizo: Mlijadili sana, au haukujadili?</i>	A lot A little Not at all Don't recall QNA	01 02 03 98 99		(c1244/45)
	b. How about your friends? Did you discuss activity issues with them <u>a lot</u> , <u>a little</u> , or <u>not at all</u> ? <i>Je marafiki zako? Mlijadili mambo ya hafla hizo sana, au hamkujadili?</i>	A lot A little Not at all Don't recall QNA	01 02 03 98 99		(c1246/47)
	c. People where you work? <i>Watu wa pahala ufanyapofanya kazi?</i>	A lot A little Not at all Don't recall QNA	01 02 03 98 99		(c1248/49)
	d. People in groups to which you belong? <i>Watu wa vikundi ambavyo unashiriki?</i>	A lot A little Not at all Don't recall QNA	01 02 03 98 99		(c1250/51)
Q1112.	Were you given any materials, like pamphlets or books or posters, about the topics in the activity so that you could share them with friends, family members or neighbors? <i>Mlipewa bidhaa zozote kama vile vitabu au mabango kuhusu yaliyojiri kwenye hafla ili uenezee marafiki, jamaa, au majirani?</i>	Yes No	01 02		(c1252/53)

Q.No	Question and Filters	Coding Categories	Codes	Skip to	Col. Nos.
Q1113.	Would you say that, altogether, the number of people you spoke with about the issues in the activities was more than five people, three to five people, one or two people, or none? <i>Kwa jumla, unaweza kusema kuwa idadi ya watu uliozungumza nao kuhusu mambo mliojadili kwenye hafla walikuwa zaidi ya watano, kati ya 3-5, wawili au mmoja ama hukuzungumza na yeyote?</i>	More than five people Three to five people One or two people None Can't recall QNA	01 02 03 04 98 99		(c1254/55)
Q1114.	In general, how satisfied would you say you were with these activities – <u>very satisfied</u> , <u>somewhat satisfied</u> , <u>somewhat dissatisfied</u> or <u>very dissatisfied</u> ? <i>Kwa ujumla, uliridhika kiasi gani na hafla hizo? Niliridhika zaidi, kiasi, kidogo, sikuridhika?</i>	Very satisfied Somewhat satisfied Somewhat dissatisfied Very dissatisfied Don't know QNA	01 02 03 04 98 99		(c1256/57)
Q1115.	Would you say that the activity or activities that you participated in increased your understanding of democracy, <u>a great deal</u> , <u>some</u> , <u>a little</u> or <u>not at all</u> ? <i>Unaweza kusema kuwa hafla uliyohudhuria au ulizohudhuria zilikufanya uelewa zaidi kuhusu demokrasia, kwa kiwango kikubwa, kiasi, kidogo, au haikuchangia?</i>	A great deal Some A little Not at all Don't know QNA	01 02 03 04 98 99		(c1258/59)
Q1116	Setting aside any events or activity that you attended personally, has anyone you know talked to you about events or activity about democracy and human rights that they attended during the run-up to the December 2007 elections ? <i>Mbali na hafla ambazo umehudhuria, kuna mtu yeyote unayejua ambaye amewahi kukuongelea kuhusu hafla walizohudhuria kuhusu demokrasia na haki za kibinadamu kabla ya uchaguzi wa mwaka jana?</i>	Yes No	1 2	<GO TO Q.1118	(1310)

Q.No	Question and Filters	Coding Categories	Codes	Skip to	Col. Nos.
Q1117	<p>IF YES: Would you say that, altogether, the number of people who talked with you about activities or events that they attended before the 2007 election was more than five people, three to five people, one or two people, or none? <i>Kwa ujumla, unaweza kusema kuwa idadi ya watu walioongea na wewe kuhusu hafla waliohudhuria ni zaidi ya watu watano, watu watatu hadi watano, mtu mmoja au wawili, ama, hakuna?</i></p>	<p>More than five people <i>Zaidi ya watu watano</i> Three to five people <i>Watu watatu hadi watano</i> One or two people <i>Mtu mmoja au wawili</i> None <i>Hakuna</i></p>	<p>1 2 3 4</p>		(1311)
Q1118	<p>And setting aside any activity or activities that you attended personally, do you recall seeing or hearing television programs or radio shows before the December 2007 elections that were devoted to teaching people about issues related to democracy and human rights in Kenya? <i>Mbali na hafla ulizohudhuria, unaweza kumbuka kuona au kusikia vipindi vya televisheni au radio kabla ya uchaguzi wa Disemba 2007 ambavyo vilikuwa vikitilia maanani kufunza watu kuhusu demokrasia na haki za kibinadamu?</i></p>	<p>Yes No</p>	<p>1 2</p>		(1312)

The next few questions I have are about a particular civic education program called "URAIA" that was conducted during the time before the 2007 election. This program sponsored events around the country, and also television and radio and other media programs devoted to civic education issues.

Maswali machache yajayo ni juu yamradi wa kufundisha/kuelimisha wananchi kuhusu haki zao uitwao "URAIA." Mradi huu uliletwa kabla ya uchaguzi mkuu wa 2007. Mradi huu ulismamia hafla nyingi nchini, hata kwenye televisheni, radio, na vyombo vingine vya habari kuhusu haki zetu.

Q1119	<p>Before today, have you ever heard of the "URAIA" civic education program? <i>Kabla ya leo, umewahi kusikia kuhusu mradi wa kuelimisha wananchi kuhusu haki zao uitwao "URAIA"?</i></p>	<p>Yes No</p>	<p>1 2</p>	<p><NO: SKIP TO Q1127</p>	(1313)
Q1120	<p>IF YES: Do you recall seeing "URAIA" talk shows or messages on TV prior to the 2007 elections? <i>Unaweza kumbuka kutazama vipindi vya mjadala au maelezo kuhusu "URAIA" kwenye televisheni kabla ya uchaguzi wa 2007</i></p>	<p>Yes No Don't know</p>	<p>1 2 3</p>		(1314)

Q1121	Do you recall hearing “URAIA” talk shows or messages on the radio prior to the 2007 elections? <i>Unaweza kumbuka kusikiliza kuhusu mradi wa “URAIA” kwenye mijadala ya redio kabla ya uchaguzi wa 2007?</i>	Yes No Don't know	1 2 3		(1315)
Q1122	Do you recall seeing “URAIA” articles or messages in newspapers prior to the 2007 elections? <i>Unaweza kukumbuka ukiona maandishi au maelezo kwa magazetti kuhusu mradi wa “URAIA” kabla ya uchaguzi wa 2007?</i>	Yes No Don't know	1 2 3		(1316)
Q1123	Do you recall seeing “URAIA” murals in this area prior to the 2007 elections? <i>Unaweza kukumbuka kuona vibandiko na mabango ya mradi wa “URAIA” katika sehemu hizi kabla ya uchaguzi wa 2007?</i>	Yes No Don't know	1 2 3		(1317)
Q1124	Do you recall seeing talk shows about democracy and governance on the program called Newslines before the 2007 election? <i>Unaweza kukumbuka kutazama kipindi cha mjadala kuhusu demokrasia kilichoitwa Newslines kabla uchaguzi wa 2007?</i>	Yes No Don't know	1 2 3		(1318)
Q1125	In general, how satisfied would you say you were with the “URAIA” programs – <u>very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied or very dissatisfied</u> ? <i>Kwa ujumla, unaweza kusema uliridhika kiasi gani na miradi ya “URAIA” - niliridhika zaidi, kiasi, kidogo, hata?</i>	Very satisfied Somewhat satisfied Somewhat dissatisfied Very dissatisfied	1 2 3 4		(1319)
Q1126	Would you say that the “URAIA” programs you heard or saw increased your understanding of democracy, <u>a great deal, some, a little or not at all</u> ? <i>Unaweza kusema kuwa miradi ya Uraia uliyoona au kusikiliza ilikufanya uelewe zaidi kuhusu demokrasia, kwa kiwango kikubwa, kidogo, chache, hata?</i>	A great deal Some A little Not at all	1 2 3 4		(1320)
Q1127	There have been some activities and organized teachings about democracy and human rights after the December 2007 elections, some of them talking about reducing conflict and problems between different ethnic and religious groups in Kenya. Do you recall whether you have attended any activity or organized teachings on these topics after the December 2007 elections ? <i>Kumekuwa na hafla na mafunzo kuhusu demokrasia na haki za kibinadamu baada ya uchaguzi wa 2007. Zingine zinazungumzia kuhusu kupunguza migogoro na shida za kikabila na zile za vikundi tofauti vya kidini hapa Kenya. Unaweza kukumbuka ukihudhuria kongamano kuhusu haya maswala baada ya</i>	Yes No Don't know	1 2 3	<Go To SECTION 12	(1321)

	<i>uchaguzi wa 2007?</i>				
Q1128	About how many of those events – activity or organized teachings – have you attended after the 2007 December elections? <i>Ni takriban kongamano ngapi umewahi kuhudhuria baada ya uchaguzi wa 2007?</i>				(1325/28)

FOR TREATMENT GROUP RESPONDENTS, SKIP TO SECTION 13 NOW.

FOR CONTROL GROUP RESPONDENTS ONLY, CONTINUE WITH SECTION 12.

SECTION 12 (FOR CONTROL GROUP RESPONDENTS ONLY)

We talked earlier about civic education in Kenya, that is, programs that try to engage people about democracy and human rights, and about how to solve community problems. Sometimes they are sponsored by community organizations or religious organizations, and they can involve workshops, public barazas, theatre or drama presentations, town meetings, or other kinds of public discussions in churches or mosques about citizens' rights and responsibilities.

Hapo awali tumezungumza kuhusu elimu kwa raia nchini Kenya, hii ni miradi ambayo inajaribu kuenezea watu mambo ya demokrasia na haki za kibinadamu, ikiwemo vile tunaweza kutatua shida za jamii. Wakati mwingine, miradi hii hufadhiliwa na mashirika ya kijamii ama yale ya kidini. Miradi hii hujumuisha warsha, mikutano ya hadhara, tamasha na michezo ya kuigiza, mikutano ya mitaa ama majadiliano mengine ya hadhara inayoandaliwa katika makanisa, misikiti na inahusu haki na majukumu ya raia.

Q1201	You said earlier that you had not personally attended these kinds of activities before the December 2007 elections. Sometimes people hear about these activities in other ways, from friends or neighbors, or even on television or the radio. Did anyone you know talk to you about civic education events or activities about democracy and human rights that they attended during the run-up to the December 2007 elections? <i>Hapo awali ulisema kuwa haujawahi kuhudhuria hafla kama hizi kabla ya uchaguzi wa 2007. Wakati mwingine watu husikia habari hizi kupitia njia tofauti, Kwa mfano kutoka kwa marafiki, majirani, runinga, au redio. Kuna mtu yeyote unayejua ambaye alikuzungumzia kuhusu mafunzo ya Uraia au hafla yoyote kuhusu demokrasia ama haki za kibinadamu alizohudhuria muda mfupi kabla ya uchaguzi wa 2007?</i>	Yes No Don't know	1 2 3	<NO GO TO Q1203:	(1329)
1202	Would you say that, altogether, the number of people who talked with you about activities or events that they attended before the 2007 election was more than five people, three to five people, one or two people, or none? <i>Unaweza kusema kuwa watu waliozungumza nawe kuhusu hafla walizohudhuria kabla ya uchaguzi wa 2007, walikuwa zaidi ya watu 5, kati ya 3-5, kati ya 1-2, ama hakuna?</i>	More than five people Three to five people One or two people None	1 2 3 4		(1330)

ASK ALL CONTROL RESPONDENTS:

1203	<p>And setting aside any activity or activities that you attended personally, do you recall seeing or hearing television programs or radio shows before the December 2007 elections that were devoted to teaching people about issues related to democracy and human rights in Kenya? <i>Mbali na hafla ambazo umeshawahi kuhudhuria, unaweza kukumbuka kuona au kusikiliza vipindi vya televisheni au redio kabla ya uchaguzi wa 2007 ambazo zilikuwa zikieneza mafunzo kuhusu demokrasia na haki za kibinadamu nchini Kenya?</i></p>	<p>Yes No</p>	<p>1 2</p>		<p>(1335)</p>
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During the time before the 2007 election, a civic education program called “URAIA” was conducted throughout Kenya. This program sponsored events around the country, and also television and radio and other media programs devoted to civic education issues.

Kabla ya uchaguzi wa 2007, kuna mradi unaoitwa URAIA ambao uliendelezwa kote nchini Kenya. Mradi huu ulidhamini hafla mbalimbali kote nchini, kwenye televisheni, redio na hata kwenye vyombo vingine vya habari na ulikuwa unafundisha watu juu ya haki zao.

Q1219	Before today, have you ever heard of the “URAIA” civic education program? <i>Kabla ya leo, umewahi kusikia kuhusu mradi wa kuelimisha wananchi kuhusu haki zao uitwao “URAIA”?</i>	Yes No	1> Continue 2> If NO Skip to Section 13	(1336)
Q1220	IF YES: Do you recall seeing “URAIA” talk shows or messages on TV prior to the 2007 elections? <i>Unaweza kumbuka kutazama vipindi vya mjadala au maelezo kuhusu “URAIA” kwenye televisheni kabla ya uchaguzi wa 2007</i>	Yes No Don't know	1 2 3	(1337)
Q1221	Do you recall hearing “URAIA” talk shows or messages on the radio prior to the 2007 elections? <i>Unaweza kumbuka kusikiliza kuhusu mradi wa “URAIA” kwenye mijadala ya redio kabla ya uchaguzi wa 2007?</i>	Yes No Don't know	1 2 3	(1338)
Q1222	Do you recall seeing “URAIA” articles or messages in newspapers prior to the 2007 elections? <i>Unaweza kukumbuka ukiona maandishi au maelezo kwa magazetti kuhusu mradi wa “URAIA” kabla ya uchaguzi wa 2007?</i>	Yes No Don't know	1 2 3	(1339)
Q1223	Do you recall seeing “URAIA” murals in this area prior to the 2007 elections? <i>Unaweza kukumbuka kuona vibandiko na mabango ya mradi wa “URAIA” katika sehemu hizi kabla ya uchaguzi wa 2007?</i>	Yes No Don't know	1 2 3	(1340)
Q1224	Do you recall seeing talk shows about democracy and governance on the program called Newsline before the 2007 election? <i>Unaweza kukumbuka kutazama kipindi cha mjadala kuhusu demokrasia kilichoitwa Newsline kabla uchaguzi wa 2007?</i>	Yes No Don't know	1 2 3	(1341)
Q1225	In general, how satisfied would you say you were with the “URAIA” programs – very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied or very dissatisfied? <i>Kwa ujumla, unaweza kusema uliridhika kiasi gani na miradi ya “URAIA” - niliridhika zaidi, kiasi, kidogo, hata?</i>	Very satisfied Somewhat satisfied Somewhat dissatisfied Very dissatisfied	1 2 3 4	(1342)
Q1226	Would you say that the “URAIA” programs you heard or saw increased your understanding of democracy, a great deal, some, a little or not at all? <i>Unaweza kusema kuwa miradi ya Uraia uliyoona au kusikiliza ilikufanya uelewe zaidi kuhusu demokrasia, kwa kiwango kikubwa, kidogo, chache, hata?</i>	A great deal Some A little Not at all	1 2 3 4	(1343)

SECTION 13: [FOR ALL RESPONDENTS] DEMOGRAPHICS & PROPERTY OWNERSHIP

We're just about finished with the interview. *Tukokaribu kumaliza.*

Q. No.	Question and Filters	Coding Categories	Codes	Skip to	Col. Nos.
Q1301	Record Sex of the respondent <i>Jinsia ya mhojiwa</i>	Male Female	1 2		(c1344)
Q1302	How old are you? <i>Una umri gani?</i>	Age in years_____ Don't know No response [Estimate best answer]	97 98		(c1345/46)
Q1303	Have you ever-attended school? <i>Umewahi kuhudhuria shule?</i>	Yes No No response Not applicable	01> Continue 02> Go to Q 1306 98 99		(c1347/48)
Q1304	What is the highest level of school that you have completed SINGLE MENTION <i>Nieleza kiwango chako cha juu zaidi ulichohitimu katika elimu.</i>	No formal schooling Some primary education Primary education completed Some Secondary education Secondary school completed Completed High School Completed college (certificate) Completed college (diploma) Some University Education University Degree Post-Graduate Degree /Higher Don't know No response	01 02 03 04 05 06 11 07 08 09 10 98 99		(c1349/50)
Q1305	Are you currently attending school? <i>Hivi sasa bado unasoma?</i>	Yes No No response Not applicable	01 02 98 99		(c1351/52)
Q1306	What is your religion? <i>Dini yako ni ipi?</i> [Circle one]	Protestant Roman catholic Muslim Orthodox Other------(specify) None Don't know No response	01 02 03 04 05 06 97 98		(c1353/54)

Q1307	About how often would you say you attend religious services, <u>more than once a week, once a week, once a month, once a year, or less often?</u> <i>Unaweza kusema unahudhuria maombi mara ngapi – zaidi ya mara moja kwa wiki, Mara moja kwa wiki, mara moja kwa mwezi, mara moja kwa mwaka au mara kidogo tu?</i>	More than once a week Once a week Once a month Once a year Less often	01 02 03 04 99		(c1355/56)
Q1308	What is your marital status? <i>Hali yako ya ndoa ni gani?</i> <i>Marital status</i> <i>Hali ya ndoa</i>	Single Married Separated Divorced Widowed No answer	01 02 03 04 05 99		(c1357/58)
Q1309	What is your occupation? <i>Unafanya kazi gani?</i>	Large scale farmer Small scale farmer Professional/ technical Managerial/Clerical/Secretarial Sales/service Teaching Skilled manual Unskilled manual Household and domestic Student Unemployed Other -----[SPECIFY]	01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12		(c1359/60)
Q1310	RACE	African Indian White Other	01 02 03 04		(c1361/62)
Q1311	What type of roof does your shelter at home have? (OBSERVATION IF AT RESPONDENT'S HOME) <i>Paa ya nyumba yako imejengwa na nini?</i>	Tiles Asbestos Corrugated Iron Grass Reeds Palm leaves Stones Cement Mud Cow dung----- Other (SPECIFY)_____	01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11		(c1363/64)
Q1312	AVERAGE FAMILY MONTHLY INCOME What is the average monthly income for your household? SHOW CARD. <i>Mapato ya kila mwezi ya familia yako ni ya wastani gani? (ONYESHA KADI)?</i>	Up to Kshs. 5, 000 5, 001 – 10, 000 10, 001 – 15, 000 15, 001+ Don't know No answer	01 02 03 04 98 99		(c1365/66)

INTERVIEWER DEMOGRAPHICS: QUESTIONNAIRE FIELD NUMBER				(c1371/75)
1313	AGE of interviewer	Age in years		(c1410/11)
Q1314	GENDER of Interviewer	Male	1	(c1412)
		Female	2	
Q1315	EDUCATION LEVEL of Interviewer	No formal schooling	01	(c1415/16)
		Some primary education	02	
		Primary education completed	03	
		Some Secondary education	04	
		Secondary school completed	05	
		Completed High School	06	
		Completed college (certificate)	11	
		Completed college(diploma)	07	
		Some University Education	08	
		University Degree	09	
		Post-Graduate Degree /Higher	10	
		Don't know	98	
		No response	99	
Q1316	ETHNIC GROUP of Interviewer			(c1417/19)

Our company usually conducts another type of research where we invite people to our offices or to specified venues for informal discussions about various products/services that are available in our country today. At the end of this discussion, a small token of appreciation is given to the participants. Would you be interested in attending such a discussion?

1.

Yes	1	CONTINUE
No	2	CLOSE

2. **Have you ever attended an informal group discussion about products/services?**

Yes	1	ASK Q3
No	2	ASK Q5

3. **How long ago was that discussion?**

Less than 6 months ago	1
6 months ago	2
More than 6 months ago	3

4. **What was the discussion about? INTERVIEWER PLEASE WRITE IN RESPONSE**

5. Can I please take your contact details so that I can get in touch with you when we are holding a group discussion?

Full Names:	
Mobile Tel No:	
Co./Business No:	

FIELD CHECKS	Circle appropriate section	Column No.	Employee No.	Column No.	Quality ranking 1 - 5	Column no.	Signature	Date	Column No.
INTERVIEWER		CARD				CARD		DD /MM / YR	
Questionnaire Check	1	C1608			c1621-26	c1708		/ /	c1721-24
TEAM LEADER								DD /MM / YR	
Questionnaire check	2	C1609			c1627-32	c1709		/ /	c1725-28
Back check (Tel.)	3	c1610			c1633-38	c1710		/ /	c1729-32
(Visit)	4	c1611			c1639-44	c1711		/ /	c1733-36
Accompany	5	c1612			c1645-50	c1712		/ /	c1737-40
SUPERVISOR/ COORDINATOR								DD /MM / YR	
Questionnaire check	6	c1613			c1651-56	c1713		/ /	c1741-44
Back check (Tel.)	7	c1614			c1657-62	c1714		/ /	c1745-48
(Visit)	8	c1615			c1663-68	c1715		/ /	c1749-52
Accompany	9	c1616			c1669-74	c1716		/ /	c1753-56
QUALITY ASSURANCE AUDITOR	Circle appropriate section	Column No.	Employee No.	Column No.	Quality ranking 1 - 5	Column No.	Signature	Date	Column No.
TL / SUPERVISOR		CARD				CARD		DD /MM / YR	
Questionnaire check	1	c1808			c1821-26	c1908		/ /	c1921-24
Back check (Tel.)	2	c1809			c1827-32	c1909		/ /	c1925-28
(Visit)	3	c1810			c1833-38	c1910		/ /	c1929-32

FIELD CHECKS	Circle appropriate section	Column No.	Employee No.	Column No.	Quality ranking 1 - 5	Column no.	Signature	Date	Column No.
Accompany	4	c1811		c1839-44		c1911		/ /	c1933-36
DP CHECKS	Circle appropriate section	Column No.	Employee No.	Column No.	Quality ranking 1 - 5	Column No.	Signature	Date	Column No.
EDITOR		CARD				CARD		DD /MM / YR	
Coding	1	C2008		C2021-26		C2108		/ /	C2121-24
Editing	2	C2009		C2027-32		C2109		/ /	C2125-28
TEAM LEADER- EDITING								DD /MM / YR	
Back check	3	C2010		C2033-38		C2110		/ /	C2129-32
DATA ENTRY CLERK								DD /MM / YR	
Questionnaire Punching	4	C2011		C2039-44		C2111		/ /	C2133-36
Data Cleaning	5	C2012		C2045-50		C2112		/ /	C2137-40
DATA ENTRY T.L								DD /MM / YR	
Data Verification	6	C2013		C2051-56		C2113		/ /	C2141-44

TEAR AND LEAVE WITH RESPONDENT

Name of Respondent	_____	Name of Interviewer	_____
Contacts (Fixed)	_____	Interviewer RI No.	_____
(Mobile)	_____	Interviewer Mobile No.	_____
(Email)	_____		
Physical Address (Details)	_____	Team Leader	_____

Date of Interview	_____	Time of interview	_____
		Signature	_____
YOUR TIME HAS BEEN OF GREAT VALUE - THANK YOU			
MUDA WAKO UMEKUWA WA MANUFAA MAKUBWA- AHSANTE SANA			
Research International (EA)- P.o box 72951 Nairobi Tel +254 20 4451015-22 Email Research@rieal.com Internet www.research-int.com			

ANNEX C.

THE EFFECT OF NCEP II-URAIA CIVIC EDUCATION ON DEMOCRATIC ORIENTATIONS

Table AC-1. The Impact of NCEP II-Uraia Civic Education on Political Knowledge

	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	P-Value
Uraia Civic Education	.17	.04	.00
Uraia Media Exposure	.23	.05	.00
Post-Election Civic Education	.06	.06	.32
Media Exposure	.46	.04	.00
Political Interest	.11	.04	.01
Group Involvement	.36	.11	.00
Group Leadership	.14	.05	.00
Age	-.00	.00	.76
Female	-.32	.05	.00
Educational Attainment	.09	.01	.00
Constant	-.09	.16	.57
Adjusted R ²	.43		
Number of Observations	3592		

Parameter Estimate Significant at $p \leq .05$

Table AC-2. The Impact of NCEP II-Uraia Civic Education on Political Efficacy

	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	P-Value
Uraia Civic Education	.13	.04	.00
Uraia Media Exposure	.01	.04	.78
Post-Election Civic Education	-.04	.06	.53
Media Exposure	.22	.04	.00
Political Interest	.19	.04	.00
Group Involvement	.22	.09	.02
Group Leadership	.13	.05	.00
Age	-.00	.00	.12
Female	-.17	.04	.00
Educational Attainment	.02	.01	.13
Constant	1.52	.15	.00
Adjusted R ²	.28		
Number of Observations	3534		

Parameter Estimate Significant at $p \leq .05$

Table AC-3. The Impact of NCEP II-Uraia Civic Education on CDF Efficacy

	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	P-Value
Uraia Civic Education	.10	.03	.00
Uraia Media Exposure	.02	.03	.56
Post-Election Civic Education	.01	.05	.87
Media Exposure	.10	.03	.00
Political Interest	.04	.03	.26
Group Involvement	-.02	.08	.81
Group Leadership	.11	.04	.00
Age	.00	.00	.09
Female	-.03	.04	.48
Educational Attainment	.02	.01	.00
Constant	1.62	.12	.00
Adjusted R ²	.29		
Number of Observations	3554		

Parameter Estimate Significant at $p \leq .05$

Table AC-4. The Impact of NCEP II-Uraia Civic Education on Local Political Participation

	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	P-Value
Uraia Civic Education	.05	.01	.00
Uraia Media Exposure	-.00	.02	.88
Post-Election Civic Education	.05	.03	.08
Media Exposure	.09	.02	.00
Political Interest	.07	.02	.00
Group Involvement	.35	.04	.00
Group Leadership	.12	.02	.00
Age	.01	.00	.00
Female	-.13	.02	.00
Educational Attainment	-.00	.00	.45
Constant	1.08	.07	.00
Adjusted R ²	.41		
Number of Observations	3591		

Parameter Estimate Significant at $p \leq .05$

Table AC-5. The Impact of NCEP II-Uraia Civic Education on National Political Participation

	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	P-Value
Uraia Civic Education	.01	.01	.41
Uraia Media Exposure	.03	.02	.09
Post-Election Civic Education	.08	.03	.01
Media Exposure	.08	.02	.00
Political Interest	-.01	.02	.59
Group Involvement	.26	.04	.00
Group Leadership	.11	.02	.00
Age	.00	.00	.00
Female	-.09	.02	.00
Educational Attainment	-.00	.00	.99
Constant	.96	.06	.00
Adjusted R ²	.30		
Number of Observations	3591		

Parameter Estimate Significant at $p \leq .05$

Table AC-6. The Impact of NCEP II-Uraia Civic Education on Informed about How to Protect Rights

	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	P-Value
Uraia Civic Education	.11	.02	.00
Uraia Media Exposure	.07	.03	.01
Post-Election Civic Education	.00	.03	.90
Media Exposure	.16	.02	.00
Political Interest	.07	.02	.00
Group Involvement	.13	.06	.00
Group Leadership	.06	.03	.03
Age	.00	.00	.00
Female	-.03	.02	.02
Educational Attainment	.02	.01	.01
Constant	1.18	.09	.00
Adjusted R ²	.27		
Number of Observations	3591		

Parameter Estimate Significant at $p \leq .05$

Table AC-7. The Impact of NCEP II-Uraia Civic Education on Respondent Information about Contents of Constitution

	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	P-Value
Uraia Civic Education	.10	.02	.00
Uraia Media Exposure	.08	.03	.00
Post-Election Civic Education	.07	.04	.05
Media Exposure	.16	.02	.00
Political Interest	.09	.02	.00
Group Involvement	.13	.06	.02
Group Leadership	.10	.03	.00
Age	.00	.00	.78
Female	-.07	.03	.01
Educational Attainment	.02	.01	.00
Constant	.89	.08	.00
Adjusted R ²	.36		
Number of Observations	3463		

Parameter Estimate Significant at $p \leq .05$

Table AC-8. The Impact of NCEP II-Uraia Civic Education on Belief that Major Changes are Needed for the Constitution

	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	P-Value
Uraia Civic Education	.03	.02	.13
Uraia Media Exposure	.03	.03	.21
Post-Election Civic Education	-.03	.04	.45
Media Exposure	.05	.02	.03
Political Interest	.03	.03	.32
Group Involvement	-.09	.06	.13
Group Leadership	.04	.03	.13
Age	-.00	.00	.16
Female	.01	.03	.52
Educational Attainment	-.00	.01	.58
Constant	2.47	.09	.00
Adjusted R ²	.17		
Number of Observations	3100		

Parameter Estimate Significant at $p \leq .05$

**Table AC-9. The Impact of NCEP II-Uraia Civic Education
on Belief that Public Participation is Needed for Constitution**

	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	P-Value
Uraia Civic Education	.15	.04	.00
Uraia Media Exposure	.05	.04	.22
Post-Election Civic Education	-.18	.06	.00
Media Exposure	.02	.04	.64
Political Interest	.11	.04	.00
Group Involvement	-.16	.10	.12
Group Leadership	-.03	.04	.55
Age	-.00	.00	.71
Female	-.00	.05	.99
Educational Attainment	.02	.01	.32
Constant	2.80	.15	.00
Adjusted R ²	.29		
Number of Observations	3422		

Parameter Estimate Significant at $p \leq .05$

**Table AC-10. The Impact of NCEP II-Uraia Civic Education
on Desire to Reduce the Power of the President**

	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	P-Value
Uraia Civic Education	.08	.04	.04
Uraia Media Exposure	-.02	.05	.74
Post-Election Civic Education	-.07	.07	.36
Media Exposure	.02	.05	.66
Political Interest	.07	.04	.13
Group Involvement	-.28	.12	.02
Group Leadership	.16	.05	.00
Age	-.00	.00	.83
Female	.02	.05	.76
Educational Attainment	.02	.01	.07
Constant	2.60	.17	.00
Adjusted R ²	.26		
Number of Observations	3378		

Parameter Estimate Significant at $p \leq .05$

Table AC-11. The Impact of NCEP II-Uraia Civic Education on How Respondent Rates the Importance of HIV/AIDS Issue

	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	P-Value
Uraia Civic Education	.02	.03	.45
Uraia Media Exposure	.00	.03	.94
Post-Election Civic Education	-.14	.05	.01
Media Exposure	.01	.03	.85
Political Interest	.20	.03	.00
Group Involvement	.03	.07	.72
Group Leadership	-.03	.03	.41
Age	.00	.00	.26
Female	-.01	.03	.68
Educational Attainment	.01	.01	.07
Constant	3.59	.11	.00
Adjusted R ²	.34		
Number of Observations	3569		

Parameter Estimate Significant at $p \leq .05$

Table AC-12. The Impact of NCEP II-Uraia Civic Education on HIV/AIDS Employment Non-discrimination

	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	P-Value
Uraia Civic Education	-.00	.04	.93
Uraia Media Exposure	-.03	.05	.56
Post-Election Civic Education	-.07	.07	.31
Media Exposure	.03	.04	.53
Political Interest	.18	.04	.00
Group Involvement	.04	.11	.72
Group Leadership	.04	.05	.40
Age	.00	.00	.13
Female	-.04	.05	.43
Educational Attainment	.01	.01	.20
Constant	2.21	.16	.00
Adjusted R ²	.27		
Number of Observations	3512		

Parameter Estimate Significant at $p \leq .05$

Table AC-13. The Impact of NCEP II-Uraia Civic Education on Importance of Gender Issues

	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	P-Value
Uraia Civic Education	.02	.03	.49
Uraia Media Exposure	-.02	.04	.65
Post-Election Civic Education	-.09	.06	.12
Media Exposure	.01	.04	.69
Political Interest	.20	.04	.00
Group Involvement	-.02	.09	.81
Group Leadership	-.04	.04	.29
Age	-.00	.00	.81
Female	.16	.04	.00
Educational Attainment	.02	.01	.10
Constant	3.49	.13	.00
Adjusted R ²	.26		
Number of Observations	3569		

Parameter Estimate Significant at $p \leq .05$

Table AC-14. The Impact of NCEP II-Uraia Civic Education on Women's Rights Scale

	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	P-Value
Uraia Civic Education	.04	.03	.13
Uraia Media Exposure	.07	.03	.04
Post-Election Civic Education	.06	.05	.20
Media Exposure	.02	.03	.41
Political Interest	.01	.03	.65
Group Involvement	.13	.08	.10
Group Leadership	.06	.03	.07
Age	.00	.00	.81
Female	.46	.03	.00
Educational Attainment	.01	.01	.42
Constant	2.42	.11	.00
Adjusted R ²	.32		
Number of Observations	3583		

Parameter Estimate Significant at $p \leq .05$

Table AC-15. The Impact of NCEP II-Uraia Civic Education on Limiting Community Control of Female Genital Mutilation

	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	P-Value
Uraia Civic Education	.09	.04	.02
Uraia Media Exposure	.05	.05	.31
Post-Election Civic Education	.06	.07	.33
Media Exposure	.03	.04	.46
Political Interest	.06	.04	.16
Group Involvement	.07	.10	.52
Group Leadership	-.02	.05	.72
Age	-.00	.00	.07
Female	-.06	.05	.19
Educational Attainment	.01	.01	.52
Constant	2.67	.16	.00
Adjusted R ²	.29		
Number of Observations	3439		

Parameter Estimate Significant at $p \leq .05$

Table AC-16. The Impact of NCEP II-Uraia Civic Education on Importance of Environmental Issues

	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	P-Value
Uraia Civic Education	-.04	.03	.15
Uraia Media Exposure	.00	.04	.99
Post-Election Civic Education	-.01	.05	.80
Media Exposure	.04	.04	.31
Political Interest	.14	.04	.00
Group Involvement	.02	.09	.80
Group Leadership	-.06	.04	.10
Age	.00	.00	.84
Female	.03	.04	.45
Educational Attainment	.02	.01	.00
Constant	3.73	.12	.00
Adjusted R ²	.31		
Number of Observations	3569		

Parameter Estimate Significant at $p \leq .05$

Table AC-18. The Impact of NCEP II-Uraia Civic Education on Support for More Alternative Energies

	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	P-Value
Uraia Civic Education	.06	.04	.09
Uraia Media Exposure	.00	.04	.95
Post-Election Civic Education	-.09	.06	.15
Media Exposure	.01	.04	.89
Political Interest	.01	.04	.79
Group Involvement	-.01	.09	.55
Group Leadership	.10	.04	.02
Age	.00	.00	.03
Female	-.04	.04	.39
Educational Attainment	-.00	.01	.99
Constant	2.81	.14	.00
Adjusted R ²	.26		
Number of Observations	3470		

Parameter Estimate Significant at $p \leq .05$

Table AC-19. The Impact of NCEP II-Uraia Civic Education on Belief that Democracy is the Best form of Government

	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	P-Value
Uraia Civic Education	.03	.01	.07
Uraia Media Exposure	-.01	.02	.55
Post-Election Civic Education	-.03	.02	.23
Media Exposure	.03	.02	.04
Political Interest	-.02	.02	.37
Group Involvement	-.05	.04	.22
Group Leadership	-.03	.02	.09
Age	-.00	.00	.68
Female	-.03	.02	.08
Educational Attainment	.00	.00	.42
Constant	1.79	.06	.00
Adjusted R ²	.25		
Number of Observations	3460		

Parameter Estimate Significant at $p \leq .05$

Table AC-22. The Impact of NCEP II-Uraia Civic Education on Non-Support for Anti-Democratic Alternatives

	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	P-Value
Uraia Civic Education	.00	.01	.87
Uraia Media Exposure	.00	.01	.58
Post-Election Civic Education	.00	.01	.78
Media Exposure	.00	.01	.68
Political Interest	.02	.01	.01
Group Involvement	.00	.02	.86
Group Leadership	.00	.01	.75
Age	.00	.00	.21
Female	-.00	.01	.89
Educational Attainment	.00	.00	.20
Constant	.84	.02	.00
Adjusted R ²	.31		
Number of Observations	3591		

Parameter Estimate Significant at $p \leq .05$

Table AC-23. The Impact of NCEP II-Uraia Civic Education on Support for Rule of Law

	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	P-Value
Uraia Civic Education	.03	.03	.26
Uraia Media Exposure	-.03	.03	.35
Post-Election Civic Education	-.03	.05	.49
Media Exposure	-.01	.03	.67
Political Interest	.03	.03	.37
Group Involvement	-.09	.08	.20
Group Leadership	.04	.03	.27
Age	-.00	.00	.44
Female	.01	.03	.84
Educational Attainment	-.00	.01	.67
Constant	3.14	.11	.00
Adjusted R ²	.28		
Number of Observations	3536		

Parameter Estimate Significant at $p \leq .05$

Table AC-24. The Impact of NCEP II-Uraia Civic Education on Institutional Trust

	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	P-Value
Uraia Civic Education	-.01	.01	.34
Uraia Media Exposure	-.03	.02	.06
Post-Election Civic Education	.08	.03	.01
Media Exposure	.01	.02	.53
Political Interest	-.03	.02	.06
Group Involvement	.06	.05	.21
Group Leadership	.03	.02	.17
Age	.00	.00	.48
Female	.04	.02	.06
Educational Attainment	-.01	.00	.04
Constant	1.79	.06	.00
Adjusted R ²	.34		
Number of Observations	3592		

Parameter Estimate Significant at $p \leq .05$

Table AC-25. The Impact of NCEP II-Uraia Civic Education on Perception of Corruption in Politics

	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	P-Value
Uraia Civic Education	.04	.03	.09
Uraia Media Exposure	-.00	.03	.99
Post-Election Civic Education	.00	.04	.97
Media Exposure	-.02	.03	.42
Political Interest	.01	.03	.83
Group Involvement	.09	.07	.21
Group Leadership	.01	.03	.69
Age	.00	.00	.09
Female	.02	.03	.58
Educational Attainment	-.01	.01	.36
Constant	2.05	.11	.00
Adjusted R ²	.33		
Number of Observations	3572		

Parameter Estimate Significant at $p \leq .05$

Table AC-26. The Impact of NCEP II-Uraia Civic Education on Social Trust

	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	P-Value
Uraia Civic Education	.05	.03	.16
Uraia Media Exposure	-.04	.04	.33
Post-Election Civic Education	.02	.06	.74
Media Exposure	.02	.04	.53
Political Interest	-.07	.04	.07
Group Involvement	.03	.09	.76
Group Leadership	.08	.04	.05
Age	-.00	.00	.42
Female	-.00	.04	.95
Educational Attainment	-.01	.01	.24
Constant	2.15	.14	.00
Adjusted R ²	.34		
Number of Observations	3526		

Parameter Estimate Significant at $p \leq .05$

Table AC-27. The Impact of NCEP II-Uraia Civic Education on Belief that Vote-Buying Is Wrong

	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	P-Value
Uraia Civic Education	.05	.02	.00
Uraia Media Exposure	-.02	.02	.48
Post-Election Civic Education	.00	.03	.88
Media Exposure	-.01	.02	.47
Political Interest	.05	.02	.01
Group Involvement	.07	.05	.13
Group Leadership	.04	.02	.07
Age	.00	.00	.00
Female	.01	.02	.69
Educational Attainment	-.00	.00	.56
Constant	2.27	.07	.00
Adjusted R ²	.32		
Number of Observations	3589		

Parameter Estimate Significant at $p \leq .05$

Table AC-28. The Impact of NCEP II-Uraia Civic Education on Belief that Political Violence is Not Justifiable

	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	P-Value
Uraia Civic Education	.05	.03	.12
Uraia Media Exposure	-.01	.04	.83
Post-Election Civic Education	-.08	.06	.14
Media Exposure	-.01	.03	.74
Political Interest	.11	.03	.00
Group Involvement	-.07	.08	.37
Group Leadership	-.01	.03	.84
Age	.00	.00	.69
Female	.00	.04	.98
Educational Attainment	.01	.01	.34
Constant	3.15	.11	.00
Adjusted R ²	.31		
Number of Observations	3521		

Parameter Estimate Significant at $p \leq .05$

Table AC-29. The Impact of NCEP II-Uraia Civic Education on Support for Humanitarian Interventions

	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	P-Value
Uraia Civic Education	.08	.04	.03
Uraia Media Exposure	-.04	.04	.37
Post-Election Civic Education	-.06	.06	.29
Media Exposure	.04	.04	.34
Political Interest	.11	.04	.01
Group Involvement	.12	.09	.22
Group Leadership	.05	.05	.29
Age	.00	.00	.02
Female	.04	.04	.31
Educational Attainment	.01	.01	.18
Constant	2.57	.14	.00
Adjusted R ²	.19		
Number of Observations	3527		

Parameter Estimate Significant at $p \leq .05$

Table AC-30. The Impact of NCEP II-Uraia Civic Education on Respondent Rights Consciousness

	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	P-Value
Uraia Civic Education	.02	.01	.05
Uraia Media Exposure	-.01	.01	.14
Post-Election Civic Education	-.04	.02	.01
Media Exposure	-.01	.01	.55
Political Interest	.05	.01	.00
Group Involvement	-.10	.02	.00
Group Leadership	.00	.01	.68
Age	.00	.00	.03
Female	.01	.01	.61
Educational Attainment	.00	.00	.27
Constant	2.65	.03	.00
Adjusted R ²	.34		
Number of Observations	3591		

Parameter Estimate Significant at $p \leq .05$

Table AC-31. The Impact of NCEP II-Uraia Civic Education on Acceptance of Political Responsibilities

	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	P-Value
Uraia Civic Education	.01	.01	.19
Uraia Media Exposure	-.02	.01	.07
Post-Election Civic Education	-.02	.02	.18
Media Exposure	.03	.01	.01
Political Interest	.04	.01	.00
Group Involvement	-.07	.03	.00
Group Leadership	.01	.01	.26
Age	.00	.00	.53
Female	-.01	.01	.39
Educational Attainment	.01	.00	.04
Constant	2.60	.04	.00
Adjusted R ²	.29		
Number of Observations	3592		

Parameter Estimate Significant at $p \leq .05$

**Table AC-32. The Impact of NCEP II-Uraia Civic Education
on Respondent's Identity as a Kenyan**

	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	P-Value
Uraia Civic Education	.01	.02	.69
Uraia Media Exposure	.01	.02	.62
Post-Election Civic Education	.01	.03	.60
Media Exposure	.03	.02	.10
Political Interest	.09	.02	.00
Group Involvement	-.07	.04	.06
Group Leadership	-.01	.02	.59
Age	.00	.00	.27
Female	.04	.02	.02
Educational Attainment	-.00	.00	.89
Constant	2.51	.06	.00
Adjusted R ²	.21		
Number of Observations	3519		

Parameter Estimate Significant at $p \leq .05$

**Table AC-33. The Impact of NCEP II-Uraia Civic Education
on Respondent's National Versus Tribal Identity**

	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	P-Value
Uraia Civic Education	.07	.02	.00
Uraia Media Exposure	.03	.02	.18
Post-Election Civic Education	.03	.04	.42
Media Exposure	.06	.02	.02
Political Interest	-.02	.02	.32
Group Involvement	-.11	.06	.04
Group Leadership	.02	.03	.51
Age	-.00	.00	.39
Female	.00	.02	.98
Educational Attainment	-.01	.01	.37
Constant	3.37	.08	.00
Adjusted R ²	.24		
Number of Observations	3587		

Parameter Estimate Significant at $p \leq .05$

Table AC-34. The Impact of NCEP II-Uraia Civic Education on Political Tolerance for Most-Disliked Ethnic Group

	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	P-Value
Uraia Civic Education	-.03	.03	.32
Uraia Media Exposure	.07	.05	.13
Post-Election Civic Education	.06	.06	.27
Media Exposure	.08	.04	.04
Political Interest	-.02	.04	.57
Group Involvement	.17	.11	.12
Group Leadership	.03	.04	.51
Age	.01	.00	.00
Female	-.06	.05	.19
Educational Attainment	-.01	.01	.58
Constant	2.00	.14	.00
Adjusted R ²	.34		
Number of Observations	3574		

Parameter Estimate Significant at $p \leq .05$

Table AC-35. The Impact of NCEP II-Uraia Civic Education on Social Tolerance for Most-Disliked Ethnic Group

	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	P-Value
Uraia Civic Education	.10	.04	.01
Uraia Media Exposure	-.01	.05	.89
Post-Election Civic Education	-.05	.06	.40
Media Exposure	-.04	.04	.32
Political Interest	.03	.04	.39
Group Involvement	-.29	.10	.01
Group Leadership	.09	.04	.04
Age	.00	.00	.12
Female	-.09	.04	.04
Educational Attainment	.03	.01	.00
Constant	3.31	.15	.00
Adjusted R ²	.35		
Number of Observations	3563		

Parameter Estimate Significant at $p \leq .05$

Table AC-36. The Impact of NCEP II-Uraia Civic Education on Belief that Ethnic Violence is Not Justifiable

	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	P-Value
Uraia Civic Education	.09	.02	.00
Uraia Media Exposure	-.05	.03	.11
Post-Election Civic Education	-.02	.04	.71
Media Exposure	-.00	.03	.98
Political Interest	.10	.03	.00
Group Involvement	-.10	.07	.16
Group Leadership	.01	.03	.79
Age	-.00	.00	.59
Female	.03	.03	.42
Educational Attainment	.02	.01	.01
Constant	3.17	.09	.00
Adjusted R ²	.38		
Number of Observations	3563		

Parameter Estimate Significant at $p \leq .05$

Table AC-38. The Impact of NCEP II-Uraia Civic Education on Desire to Reduce Ethnic Voting

	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	P-Value
Uraia Civic Education	.02	.01	.16
Uraia Media Exposure	.00	.01	.75
Post-Election Civic Education	.02	.02	.28
Media Exposure	.02	.01	.16
Political Interest	.01	.01	.27
Group Involvement	.04	.03	.23
Group Leadership	-.01	.01	.44
Age	.00	.00	.20
Female	.01	.01	.71
Educational Attainment	.00	.00	.93
Constant	1.70	.05	.00
Adjusted R ²	.24		
Number of Observations	3592		

Parameter Estimate Significant at $p \leq .05$

Table AC-39. The Impact of NCEP II-Uraia Civic Education on Support for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission

	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	P-Value
Uraia Civic Education	.03	.03	.27
Uraia Media Exposure	-.06	.04	.14
Post-Election Civic Education	-.08	.05	.12
Media Exposure	.10	.04	.00
Political Interest	.02	.03	.34
Group Involvement	-.22	.08	.01
Group Leadership	.14	.04	.00
Age	.00	.00	.70
Female	.10	.04	.01
Educational Attainment	.01	.01	.17
Constant	3.01	.12	.00
Adjusted R ²	.28		
Number of Observations	3517		

Parameter Estimate Significant at $p \leq .05$