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EVALUATION OF AID PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM IN COLOMBIA

JUNE 1969

*514-11-710-066
Public Safety
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Civil Police Training*



Office of Public Safety
Agency for International Development
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20523

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A. *Terms of Reference*

State telegram 083071 sent to Embassy Bogota on May 23, 1969, set forth the terms of reference for the present study in the following language:

"1. Purpose of study is to determine effectiveness of the past and presently planned public safety program in Colombia and its appropriateness as an instrument for strengthening internal security and stability of Colombia within the context of US interests in the country. The team will also consider the plans and capabilities of the Colombian police forces as they relate to the public safety program, and the Colombian plans for the role of US assistance. The team will assess the need for future US assistance to the country's civil security forces. If aid will be needed, the team will make recommendations as to scope and dimensions.

"2. To make this assessment, the study will embrace:

a. A review of the C.T.'s assessment of the current and anticipated threat to internal security.

b. An evaluation of the abilities of the respective civil security elements to carry out their assigned mission. This will include, but not necessarily be limited to: assigned roles, administration, organization, budget, personnel strengths and systems, deployment, operations, training systems, communications, mobility and maintenance capabilities.

c. An examination of the objectives of the public safety program since its inception, and measurement of the degree objectives have been reached to date. Evaluation will be made of the utilization of project resources such as technical assistance, commodity input and participant training.

"3. The study will also consider the role of the public safety program as related to the whole of US objectives in Colombia and programs designed to carry out these objectives."

B. *How Evaluation Was Conducted*

The evaluation team consisted of:

Joseph A. Yager, FSO retired, Team Leader.

Lauren J. Goin, Chief, Operations Division, Office of Public Safety, AID.

Peter Ellena, Deputy Chief, Latin American Branch, Operations Division, Office of Public Safety, AID.

The evaluation team began its work in Washington on May 26 by reviewing relevant policy documents and intelligence analyses and by consulting senior officials concerned with the subject of the study. On June 10, the team left for the field. June 11 was spent in consultations at the Headquarters of the U.S. Southern Command in Panama. The team

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arrived in Bogota on the evening of June 11 and remained in Colombia until July 4, when it returned to Washington. While in Colombia, the team consulted intensively with officers of the US Embassy, the AID Mission and the U.S. Military Group, and with Colombian officials concerned with problems of internal security and police administration. (A list of persons consulted in the field is provided in Annex A.) The team also traveled outside Bogota to several areas which have been the scenes of insurgent activity.

Before leaving Bogota, the team briefed senior US officials on its principal findings and recommendations and left behind a draft of the present study. Field comments on this draft were invited, but have not yet been received.

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PRINCIPAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. *Internal Security*

1. If the security forces retain an adequate performance level and external support for insurgency does not materially increase, none of the varieties of internal violence (insurgency, urban political violence and ordinary crime) are likely to get out of hand to the point where they would (in the words of the CASP) constitute "a serious impediment to accelerated democratic political, social and economic development."

2. At the same time, all three forms of violence (with the possible exception of ordinary crime) are more likely to increase than decrease. Of the three, the potential for urban political violence appears the most threatening.

3. The generally favorable prognosis for Colombia's internal security rests on a number of predictions and assumptions, any one of which could go wrong with varying adverse consequences. Several possible contingencies appear to deserve special attention:

a. Unemployment, poverty and economic inequality — possibly exploited effectively by subversive or opportunistic political elements — might lead to an uncontrollable explosion of urban violence.

b. The "seeding" activities of the FARC might enjoy greater success than is now expected and make possible an increase in insurgent activity whenever the Communists deem conditions favorable.

c. During the period 1970-74, weak Conservative leadership and a revival of partisan rivalry might slow economic progress and increase the danger of larger-scale violence in both the cities and the countryside.

d. After 1974, freed of the restraints of the National Front system, Liberals and Conservatives might sacrifice the national interest to narrow party advantage, possibly leading to a recurrence of Liberal-Conservative violence.

e. The ELN (or part of it) might combine with the EPL or (less likely) with the FARC.

B. *Capabilities of the Colombian Internal Security Forces*

1. *The National Police*

a. *General.* The Colombian National Police are not markedly better or worse than the average for South American police forces. They fall short in a number of critical respects, however, when their capabilities are measured against the problems which they face.

b. Leadership is good and organization is adequate, except for the excessive number of subordinates reporting directly to the Director General.

c. The effectiveness of the staffs and support elements varies, but generally falls far short of present requirements.

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d. The overall size of the force is inadequate to the needs for police services in a country with Colombia's population and geographical extent. The planned police force expansion is badly needed, but will inevitably bring with it other problems.

e. Comments on specific police activities follow:

(1) Personnel management practices are inadequate. A study of manpower requirements is needed.

(2) Investigative capabilities are limited. Criminal records are inadequate. There are no crime laboratory capabilities. Training in this field is improving, but has a long way to go.

(3) The planning potential in headquarters is good, but guidance is needed on what to do and how to go about it. The planning staff is not used fully or properly.

(4) The logistics and supply system is antiquated and inadequate in some respects (e.g., a requisition system which will remedy the poor supply flow is needed).

(5) The effectiveness of patrol in urban areas is fair to good, but with generally inadequate coverage. The same is true for rural areas.

(6) Training has greatly improved and graduates of AID's International Police Academy (IPA) are making an impact. Follow-up training and special in-service courses are still insufficient.

(7) Transportation will be greatly improved with the arrival of 1253 new vehicles beginning next year. This will not meet the current police needs as to numbers, however, and more vehicles will be needed as the force expands in coming years.

(8) Radio communications are good in the critical Departments and will get better. The need now is to solidify gains by establishing adequate maintenance facilities, to expand the networks to other Departments and to provide equipment for patrol purposes in both urban and rural areas.

(9) Weapons are adequate in numbers and kinds for a force of 31,500. (The present force is 37,760.) Deficiencies in the proper kinds and numbers of weapons will become greater as the force expands. Very little is done in the way of marksmanship training.

(10) Riot control capabilities are good, but can be maintained only by a continued training and re-training effort.

2. *The Department of Administrative Security*

a. Even though the capabilities of DAS have improved somewhat over the past six years, performance in both intelligence and investigations remains generally poor.

b. DAS is afflicted by inadequate funds, poor quality of personnel, high turnover, a lack of career tenure, a history of political manipulation and a general lack of professional skills and attitudes.

3. *The Military Services*

a. The Army, which is responsible for conducting military operations against the Communist guerrillas, can contain the insurgency to the present acceptable level, unless outside support for the guerrillas increases significantly, or urban disturbances divert Army units to the cities.

b. The most useful Air Force capability in the present situation is provided by its 13 UH-type helicopters which are used extensively in support of the Army's counterinsurgency operations. The small Colombian Navy has limited surveillance and control capabilities in nearby waters.

4. *Police-Military Cooperation*

a. In contrast with the situation which prevailed only a few years ago, cooperation today among the Army, the National Police and the DAS is very good.

b. Cooperation among the three organizations extends to both operations and intelligence.

(1) In areas of active military operations (designated as "emergency areas"), the National Police are placed under the control of the responsible Army Brigade Commander. The Army's special counter-guerrilla companies include police personnel, and the Army and National Police sometimes conduct joint patrols.

(2) Intelligence cooperation takes place both informally on a day-to-day basis and through a system of national and sectional intelligence councils.

5. *Recommendations for the Government of Colombia's Consideration*¹

a. *With respect to the National Police, we recommend that:*

(1) The F-3, or Planning Section of the General Staff develop a planning program, including studies of manpower needs and evaluations of supervision, administrative practices and police operations.

(2) Four regional automotive maintenance garages be established.

(3) An intensive review of the supply system be conducted.

(4) The Training Section acquire a capability of producing training texts and other written material.

(5) A correspondence school program be developed.

(6) Detailed equipment requirements associated with the five-year force expansion plan be identified.

b. *With respect to the Department of Administrative Security, we recommend that the Government establish a career personnel system which will guarantee tenure to all employees, except the Chief, and remove them from the patronage system.*

¹ For a complete list of recommendations for the GOC's consideration, see Part One, Section III.D.

C. *Accomplishments and Effectiveness of the AID Public Safety Program.*

1. *General Assessment.*

The Public Safety Program is judged to have been very successful in improving the capabilities of the National Police and to a lesser extent those of the DAS. Since its inception in early 1963, the U.S. has provided through the Program some 36 man years of technical assistance, trained a total of 323 police and DAS officers in the U.S. and in special schools elsewhere outside of Colombia, and has provided commodities valued at \$3.9 million.

2. *Major accomplishments* of the Public Safety Program include upgrading the professional level of the police officer corps, developing a meaningful training system, improving police weaponry, improving urban policing and rural patrol methods, developing riot control capabilities, and providing communications networks for servicing critical areas of the country. The job is not done in any of these fields, however. Requirements have changed, and new problems are presented with the impending increase in the size of the force.

3. *The effectiveness* of U.S. aid has been high. The beneficial impact of advisory aid and participant training is especially notable.

a. Public Safety advisors with whom we worked during the study demonstrated that they had developed close rapport with large numbers of police officers.

b. Graduates of the International Police Academy provide a nucleus of younger officers who will lead the force in years to come and who are now receiving assignments where their training can best be used.

4. *Commodities* provided have been used effectively by the police in the achievement of project goals, most particularly the communications equipment, vehicles and weapons.

D. *Relationship of the Public Safety Program to U.S. Objectives and Programs as a Whole.*

1. *The Public Safety Program and U.S. Objectives.*

a. In greater or lesser degree, the Public Safety Program supports five of the seven General Objectives listed in the CASP for FY 1971-73.

b. The program is most relevant to General Objective A (dynamic political and social stability and strengthening democratic institutions) and General Objective E (containment of insurgency, subversion and criminality). The Program also supports General Objective B (economic growth and social development), General Objective C (increased agricultural production) and General Objective G (understanding of U.S. values and primacy of U.S. influence and prestige).

2. *The Public Safety Program and Other U.S. Programs.*

a. The Public Safety Program, the Military Assistance Program (MAP) and the various economic assistance programs administered by AID are mutually supporting in that

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all of them contribute to the achievement of one or more of the General Objectives set forth in the CASP.

b. The Public Safety Program now competes with the various economic assistance programs for personnel positions and funds. In our opinion, it should compete primarily with MAP, since in Colombia both Public Safety and Military Assistance are concerned with problems of internal security. We recommend that:

(1) In working up the CASP, internal security be defined as a planning sector embracing both Public Safety and Military Assistance.

(2) The proposed Public Safety Program, in at least its broad outlines, be considered by the Country Team before the AID Mission makes any final decision on the level of funding to be recommended for the Program. In this way, the Program can be judged by an appropriately broad range of political, social and economic criteria.

(3) The Chief Public Safety Advisor and the Chief of the U.S. Military Group be involved in all important stages of preparing both of their programs, including the final reviews.

E. *The Future of the Public Safety Program.*

1. *National Police*

a. The program of advisory assistance to the National Police should be continued with a staff large enough to do the job. We believe that a staff of eight advisors is required.

b. If a minimum useful advisory staff (which we believe to be five advisors) cannot be provided, we recommend that the advisory assistance program be terminated in FY 1970.

c. If the advisory assistance program is continued, it should be supported by a small commodity program of less than \$100,000 annually, which would be designed to increase the effectiveness of the advisory effort.

d. We do not now recommend any specific AID loans to finance National Police requirements, but believe that any future applications for such loans should be viewed sympathetically if they are found to be based on real, high priority needs.

e. Training of National Police officers at the International Police Academy should be continued and if possible increased to a minimum of 25 officers per year. Training of police personnel in automotive vehicle maintenance and jungle warfare at U.S. military schools in the Canal Zone should be continued at present levels, unless a technical assistance arrangement between the National Police and the Ford Motor Company makes possible reduction or elimination of the former type of training. We also recommend that one National Police officer continue to be sent annually to the FBI Academy.

f. Participant training should continue even if the Public Safety advisory staff is withdrawn.

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2. *Department of Administrative Security (DAS)*

a. As presently constituted, DAS could not effectively use more assistance than is now planned. We therefore concur in the decision to reduce aid to DAS to a single investigations advisor and training at the IPA for two or three members of DAS annually.

b. We believe, however, that it is in the interests of both Colombia and the United States that DAS become a highly competent, non-political and professional security organization. We therefore recommend that at an appropriate time the Embassy approach the Government of Colombia, probably at the Presidential level, and urge that Government to undertake a thorough-going reform of DAS.

c. The future level and composition of assistance to DAS should be determined in the light of the Colombian response.

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I. *US Interests and Objectives in Colombia*

A. *U.S. Interests*

The US has several important interests in Colombia: ²

1. *Strategic.* Because of its proximity to the United States, its even greater proximity to the Panama Canal and its potential as a route for a new canal, it is essential that Colombia not come under the control of elements hostile to the United States.

2. *Political.* With its rapidly growing, relatively homogenous population, large geographic area, and the commitment of its leaders to resolve the problems of under-development, Colombia is likely to be the leader among the Andean countries. Colombia also has an unusually great potential for providing an example, badly needed in terms of wider US hemispheric interests, of rapid economic and social growth within a democratic framework. On both counts, the US has an interest in Colombia's friendship and cooperation, in strengthening Colombia's democratic institutions and in promoting Colombia's economic and social development.

3. *Economic.* The United States has been for many years Colombia's principal trading partner. US private investments in Colombia are estimated at about \$800 million and are expected to continue to grow.

B. *US Objectives*

The CASP for FY 1971-73 lists the following general objectives of the US in Colombia:

1. Dynamic political and social stability under the National Front system with increased popular participation on a broad basis in democratic institutions at all levels of society, and strengthening of these institutions.

2. More rapid economic growth and social development which will contribute to the alleviation of social discontent while at the same time reducing the need for concessionary assistance.

3. Increased agricultural production in areas where Colombia has the greatest potentials to meet growing domestic food requirements, to produce for export while achieving long-run solutions to the problems of low income for agricultural workers.

4. Modernization and reform of the education system to provide skills necessary and consistent with economic development, and broaden participation in the democratic process.

5. Containment of insurgency, subversion and criminality, and counteraction of any Soviet bloc efforts in this area.

²The interests presented here are based on the CASP for FY 1971-73, transmitted under cover of Bogota's A-102, March 1, 1969 (Secret).

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6. Colombian leadership and cooperation in international and hemispheric affairs, with emphasis on an expanded Colombian role as a leader of the Alliance for Progress and as a major exponent of policies and positions consistent with the interests of the United States.

7. Increased Colombian understanding of and respect for American cultural, educational, and scientific values and achievements, primacy of United States influence and prestige, and, concomitantly, minimization of Soviet penetration of and influence in Colombian society and efforts to thwart United States objectives.

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II. *The Internal Security Problem in Colombia*

A. *Historical Background*

Since the days of the Spanish conquest, the history of Colombia has been marked by recurrent violence. Indeed, many observers regard a tendency toward extreme, brutal and often seemingly senseless violence as a part of the Colombian national character. In all periods, including the present, some violence has been simple banditry, aggravated in some cases by a recurrent strain of sadism. Other violence has represented the efforts of local chieftains – often not clearly distinguished from bandits – to establish and defend relatively small autonomous enclaves. Some of these local chieftains – and indeed some of the roving bandits – have cited political beliefs and affiliations as justification for their actions.

Politics as either a cause or rationalization for violence has a long history in Colombia. The bitter hostility between Liberals and Conservatives goes back almost to the very beginning of the republic and has erupted periodically into open civil war down to modern times. Between eruptions, the Liberal-Conservative feud has underlain much of the endemic violence which has continued to plague the nation.

Liberal-Conservative conflict reached a peak after the assassination of the popular Liberal leader Gaitan, in 1948. At least 40,000 persons per year died violent deaths in the period 1950-52. In 1953, the military leadership seized the government and installed General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla as President. After a fairly promising beginning, the Rojas regime became increasingly repressive. Mounting popular opposition to Rojas led to re-establishment of civilian rule under a unique agreement between the Liberals and Conservatives. These two major parties joined to form the National Front under which the Presidency would alternate between the parties for four times covering the period 1958-74. Representation in the legislative branch and executive positions were divided equally.

Despite removal of the major political motivation for domestic violence, deaths from guerrilla³ activities increased to 5,342 in 1958, as compared with an estimated 3,600 in 1957. The trend since 1958, however, has been generally downward with only 509 deaths from guerrilla activities recorded in 1968.

Estimates of active guerrillas have also trended downward in the 1960's. In 1961, 1,451 guerrillas were believed to be active in 99 bands. In 1968, there were only 14 known active bands with a total strength of 300-700 men. Over the same period, the estimated number of inactive guerrillas did not change significantly (2,250 in 1961 and 2,300 in 1968).

The totals cited above, however, obscure one very significant development. In 1961, only one active guerrilla band of nine persons was known to have Communist connections, and none of the inactive bands were regarded as Communist. Seven years later in 1968, *all* active guerrillas and 600 (15 bands) of the inactive guerrillas were Communist affiliated.⁴

³As used here, "guerrillas" are armed bands professing some political affiliation and motivation, in contrast to the non-political bandit gangs.

⁴All figures cited above for guerrilla strengths and deaths from guerrilla activities are from *Order of Battle Summary Insurgent Forces Colombia* (Secret/Noforn), Defense Intelligence Agency, Feb. 1, 1969, pp. 2 and 3.

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B. Current Situation ⁵

1. Insurgency

The CASP for FY 1971-73 states that "insurgency, although not eliminated, has been reduced so that at this time it is not a serious impediment to accelerated democratic, political, social and economic development." ⁶ After more than two weeks of intensive briefings and discussions with responsible American and Colombian officials, we have found no reason to question this Country Team assessment.

The insurgency problem in Colombia today is almost exclusively a Communist problem. The Communist guerrillas, however, are not a united or even a coordinated force. Three separate and mutually antagonistic Communist guerrilla movements exist: the Soviet-oriented Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the Castroite Army of National Liberation (ELN), and the pro-Peking People's Army of Liberation (EPL).

a. *The FARC* is the largest and best armed of the three Communist guerrilla organizations. It enjoys a certain amount of peasant support and has the further advantage of being connected with the regular, Moscow-oriented Communist Party of Colombia (PCC). The FARC is believed to consist of about eight bands operating in the Departments of Huila, Tolima, Cundinamarca, Boyaca and Meta and in the National Territory of Caqueta. Total FARC strength is estimated at 170 to 500 men. The overall commander of the FARC is the widely advertised "Tiro Fijo" ("Sure Shot"; real name, Pedro Antonio Marin).

The FARC has been relatively inactive for the past two years. Observers disagree concerning the reasons. Some attribute the FARC's quiescence primarily to the effectiveness of the Colombian security forces and to a disinclination on the FARC's part to expose its limited number of seasoned leaders to death or capture. It is true that the FARC has received severe setbacks from the security forces, including the rounding up of part of its clandestine support apparatus in Huila and the death in October 1968 of its second in command, "Major Ciro" (Ciro Trujillo Castano).

Other observers lay less stress on the successes of the security forces and view the FARC's inactivity as the result of a deliberate PCC policy decision, reluctantly accepted by the FARC. Much circumstantial evidence supports this thesis. The PCC follows the current Moscow line of de-emphasizing armed insurgency and concentrating on political activity. The PCC apparently rationalizes the application of this line to Colombia by arguing that conditions more favorable to revolutionary activity will arise either after 1970, when a less popular (and possibly weaker) Conservative President will succeed President Lleras, or after 1974, when the National Front system of alternating the Presidency between the two major parties ends. The need of the newly opened Soviet Embassy to gain respectability is no doubt an additional reason reinforcing the apparent decision to de-emphasize armed insurgency.

⁵ Much of the factual information presented in this section is based on the Supplement to the DIA Intelligence Bulletin of May 9, 1969, entitled *Communist Insurgency in Colombia*. Also see Section I of Annex B, which reproduces a briefing paper prepared by Mr. Herbert O. Hardin, formerly Chief Public Safety Advisor in Bogota.

⁶ Botoga A-102, March 1, 1969 (Secret).

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Whatever the explanation, the FARC appears for the most part to be refraining from acts of violence and to be concentrating on training, political organization and the creation of local self-defense units. Several FARC leaders have reportedly been sent to areas far from the scenes of past FARC activity to engage in "seeding" operations.

FARC strategy appears to be one of building strength for use in a more favorable future situation. Successes in application of this strategy appear thus far to be limited, but the FARC nevertheless remains the major armed threat to Colombia's domestic peace and stability.

b. *The ELN* was formed by pro-Castro elements in late 1964. It has been in decline since mid-1967 and now consists of three bands with a total strength of from 80 to 100 men operating in the Departments of Santander, Bolivar and Antioquia.

The ELN has suffered from losses in encounters with the Army, desertions, surrenders and – most important of all – bitter internal dissension. Earlier this year, the principal ELN leader, Fabio Vasquez Castano, reportedly ordered the execution of several dissenters from his line of unqualified militancy. The ELN has received little or no material aid from Cuba recently and has thus far failed to win the support of peasants in its areas of operation.

Despite its greatly reduced effectiveness, the ELN retains a capability of carrying out sporadic armed actions. Also, its militant line has gained it some support among urban workers and students.

c. *The EPL* is affiliated with the pro-Peking Communist Party of Colombia – Marxist Leninist (PCC-ML). It is the least effective of the three Communist guerrilla organizations and is believed to consist of eight small bands with a total strength of about 120 men. The EPL originally established itself in early 1967 in the low, densely jungled mountains of southern Cordoba. Since late 1967, owing to the pressure of security forces, some EPL activity has spilled over into northern Antioquia.

Despite the EPL's proclaimed loyalty to the thought of Mao Tse Tung, the Chinese Communists have shown relatively little interest in the group. The Chinese did provide financial support to the EPL at first, but have withheld money for the past year because of division within both the EPL and the PCC-ML. Contact has, however, been maintained, and reports have been received that financial support will be resumed.

The EPL remains small, isolated and ineffective. It is a nuisance in its limited areas of operation, but not a major security problem at the present time.

2. *Urban Political Violence*

Politically motivated violence in Colombia's cities has taken two forms in recent years: terrorism and riots. Communist or pro-Communist organizations have been heavily involved in both. The work of the Communists has, however, been to some extent facilitated by the fact that many of Colombia's young people are with good reason deeply concerned over the social inequities which afflict the nation. Many members of the Catholic

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clergy share this concern and a few of them have taken extreme positions approaching open collaboration with the Communists. ⁷ One priest, the famous Father Camilo Torres Restrepo actually joined the ELN and was killed in a clash with the security forces.

Urban terrorist groups are known to exist, but have been relatively inactive since 1966 when high-powered bombs caused several deaths and extensive damage in the Ministry of Defense building and the Colombian-American Center, both in Bogotá. Explaining the quiescence of the terrorist groups poses much the same kind of problem as was discussed earlier in connection with the decline in FARC-initiated violence. Presumably, the terrorists are under instructions to lie low until the right time.

The potential for urban riots was most recently demonstrated in May of this year when students in Bogotá, Cali and elsewhere demonstrated against the visit of Governor Nelson Rockefeller. On this occasion, the security forces were generally successful in preventing serious property damage or disruption of the Rockefeller visit.

3. *Non-Political Violence*

Although attention is generally focused on the insurgency problem or on politically motivated urban violence, the modern history of Colombia convincingly illustrates the fact that ordinary, non-political crime can also seriously threaten political stability and economic progress.

Colombians are a relatively violent people. Moreover, widespread unemployment, poverty and unequal distribution of income inevitably contribute to anti-social and criminal behavior. It is therefore not surprising that violent crime remains a major problem in Colombia today. There are, however, encouraging signs. Reliable statistics are lacking, but the best available evidence indicates that urban crime rates have declined during the past two years. A large portion of violent crimes against persons and property are now concentrated in the lightly policed countryside.

C. *Future Prospects*

1. *Country Team Assessment*

The CASP for 1971-73 contains the following estimate of future prospects in the field of internal security:

“A continued and persistent effort on the part of the security forces will be required to contain the insurgency threat at this (i.e., the present) level. The threat could again increase to a dangerous level if (1) armed forces and police do not retain an adequate performance level, (2) external support for insurgency materially increases, or (3) there is a serious deterioration in the political, social and economic climate.”

The CASP does not deal explicitly with future prospects for urban political violence or ordinary non-political criminal violence. Presumably, however, the Country Team believes that these two forms of violence can also be held to acceptable levels, unless

⁷See Embassy Bogotá's A-256, June 4, 1969 (Limited Official Use) for a discussion of the ferment within the Catholic Church.

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the performance level of the security forces falls significantly, or there is a serious deterioration in the political, social and economic climate.

The first of the Country Team's three-key variables (performance of the security forces) will be dealt with in Chapter III below. The second variable (external support of insurgency) is clearly important, but lies outside the scope of this study. The third variable, which is in fact a vast complex of variables adding up to no less than the future prospects of Colombia as a nation, will be considered here along with the contingency that two or more of the three Communist guerrilla organizations might one day coordinate their efforts.

2. *The Political, Social and Economic Climate*

a. *Economic and social conditions* could affect Colombia's internal security in a number of ways. Large scale unemployment (currently estimated at 14 percent of the labor force) provides fertile ground for Communist agitation and recruitment, as does the failure of the lowest income groups to share the benefits of economic development. Even without Communist stimulation, an outburst of urban violence is an ever present possibility.

In the countryside, large areas are only marginally, if at all, part of the national economy. Young people, seeing no future on their parents' subsistence farms, migrate to the cities where they add to the number of ill-housed, and often unemployed, urban poor. A few have joined the Communist guerrillas, and one may wonder why more have not made this choice.

Economic and social ills need not of course redound solely to the benefit of the Communists. They can equally well be exploited by demagogues of the right or the non-Communist left. Former dictator Rojas Pinilla still retains support among some of the lower income groups. A truly charismatic figure (which General Rojas is not) might attract wide support by blaming the two major parties for all that is wrong in Colombian society. If such a leader came to power, and, as is likely, failed to solve Colombia's problems himself, he might be tempted to rule by force with unpredictable consequences for the nation's internal peace and stability. Even if he did not achieve power, he might make it impossible for any government to deal effectively with the nation's problems. In that event, the Communists might see opportunities for renewed and expanded revolutionary violence in both the cities and the countryside.

The government of President Lleras is well aware of the dire possibilities inherent in the present situation. Economic development is viewed as not only desirable, but essential to the nation's future. The gross national product (GNP) has been increasing at an annual rate of six percent, and the government intends to maintain this rate in the future.

This rate of economic growth is of course no small achievement. Unfortunately, it is not quite good enough to provide the answer to Colombia's most pressing problem: large-scale unemployment aggravated by widespread underemployment. The total labor force is growing by about three and one-half percent each year, and in the larger urban centers it may be growing twice that fast as poor farmers move in from the countryside. Also, owing to increases in productivity, a six percent rise in GNP does not

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mean a like increase in jobs. Current progress in reducing unemployment and under-employment is therefore small at best. In the larger cities, these twin problems may actually be growing.

The current rate of economic growth also does not promise an early solution to the problems of poverty and unequal distribution of income. Over half of the current annual increase in GNP goes to provide for new additions to the population. The remainder has gone largely to the middle and upper-income groups. The real income of the poorest part of the population is either static, or in some instances declining.

b. *Political prospects* are, as has been brought out above, closely dependent on future economic developments. The reverse is also true. If Colombia does not continue to have intelligent, responsible political leadership, its economic prospects and therefore its over-all welfare will be in jeopardy.

In 1970, if all goes well, the Conservative Party will take its last turn at the Presidency under the National Front system which was set up by the two major parties in 1958 in a successful effort to end Liberal-Conservative violence and restore representative government. 1970 also marks the beginning of a carefully phased dismantling of the National Front system. In that year, elections for seats in municipal and Departmental legislatures will once more be "open." (That is, the seats will not be divided equally between the two major parties.) In 1974, the Presidential election will be "open," as will elections for seats in Congress. 1974 does not, however, mark the complete end of the National Front system. For four more years, the incumbent President will be required to maintain Liberal-Conservative parity in executive appointments. Even after 1978, the President has a somewhat vague obligation to give the major opposition party some role in the cabinet and in subordinate executive positions.

Most observers are confident of a smooth transition in 1970. Failure of the National Front leaders to agree on a Conservative successor to President Lleras is seen as only a remote contingency. Were it to occur, however, the immediate beneficiary might be General Rojas Pinilla with the Communists standing to gain strength in the longer run.

Barring an unlikely premature break-up of the National Front, the real question posed by 1970 is whether the new Conservative President will be willing and able to continue the constructive, progressive policies of the present Liberal administration. The PCC apparently believes (or at least hopes) that he will not.

Non-Communist observers are for the most part more sanguine, although they see a number of dangers. They believe that the pressing nature of the country's economic and social problems, reinforced by a natural desire to build popular support for the open electoral content in 1974, will induce the Conservatives to continue Lleras' policies and possibly move a bit to the left to curry the favor of the powerful labor unions. At the same time, they recognize that no likely Conservative President can match Lleras in ability and firmness of purpose. Also, they anticipate that as 1974 approaches strains within the National Front may grow, conceivably leading to an impasse and a partial paralysis of government initiative.

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After 1974, political prospects are less clear. The key question is whether the dismantling of major components of the National Front system will bring a revival of the bitter Liberal-Conservative partisanship which tore the country apart for so many years. Most observers express moderately qualified optimism on this score. They foresee some increase in partisan feelings, but believe that the leaders of both major parties would keep these feelings from getting out of hand. A few observers are less optimistic. They believe that strong partisan feelings still exist beneath the surface of the country's political life and reserve judgment on where these feelings may lead after elections for major offices are once again open.

3. *Prospects for Cooperation Among Communist Factions*

If the Moscow, Havana and Peking-oriented faction of the Communist movement in Colombia were to resolve their differences and unite, their combined potential for organizing violence in both urban and rural areas would be significantly increased. They would presumably be in a better position to obtain outside material assistance, and they would almost certainly find it easier to enlist support within the country. Even a loose arrangement to coordinate guerrilla activities would complicate the task of the security forces.

A full unification of the three factions appears most unlikely. In any case, it would depend on major developments within the Communist world extending far beyond Colombia and therefore lying outside the scope of the present study.

More limited cooperative arrangements, however, are by no means inconceivable. Some evidence exists of cooperation between ELN and EPL supporters in Antioquia. A formal union of these two guerrilla organizations (or perhaps of one ELN band and the EPL) is possible, given the similarities in their ideologies. Union of the FARC with the EPL appears to be out of the question, barring a healing in the Sino-Soviet split. A FARC-ELN union is less improbable, but by no means as likely as would be ties between the EPL and at least part of the ELN.

4. *Conclusions*

If we assume that the security forces retain an adequate performance level, and that external support for insurgency does not materially increase, the above discussion points toward three major conclusions:

a. None of the varieties of internal violence (insurgency, urban political violence and ordinary crime) are likely to get out of hand to the point where they would (in the words of the CASP) constitute "a serious impediment to accelerated democratic political, social and economic development."

b. At the same time, all three forms of violence (with the possible exception of ordinary crime) are more likely to increase than decrease. Of the three, the potential for urban political violence appears the most threatening.

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c. The generally favorable prognosis for Colombia's internal security rests on a number of predictions and assumptions, any one of which could go wrong with varying adverse consequences. Several possible contingencies appear to deserve special attention:

(1) Unemployment, poverty and economic inequality – possibly exploited effectively by subversive or opportunistic political elements – might lead to an uncontrollable explosion of urban violence.

(2) The “seeding” activities of the FARC might enjoy greater success than is now expected and make possible an increase in insurgent activity whenever the Communists deem conditions favorable.

(3) During the period 1970-74, weak Conservative leadership and a revival of partisan rivalry might slow economic progress and increase the danger of increased violence in both the cities and the countryside.

(4) After 1974, freed of the restraints of the National Front system, Liberals and Conservatives might sacrifice the national interest to narrow party advantage, possibly leading to a recurrence of Liberal-Conservative violence.

(5) The ELN (or part of it) might combine with the EPL or (less likely) with the FARC.

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III. *Capabilities of Colombian Internal Security Forces*⁸

A. *Police*

1. *The National Police*

The National Police are responsible for maintaining order and safeguarding the rights of citizens; protecting life and property; assisting in the enforcement of the laws; and cooperating in the investigation of crime. Various decrees have specified these duties, with the most recent dealing with investigatory duties (Annex C).

To carry out these responsibilities, the force employs 37,760 policemen and 4,023 civilians. The National Police organization in its present form was established only in 1961, although there was a national police organization as early as 1891. Police services in the first sixty years of the century were provided mostly by various municipal and Departmental police organizations throughout the country.

At the present time, the ability of the force to manage its resources and to use them economically is only fair, but is improving. There are significant deficiencies in the organization of the force. The commander's span of control is excessive. Some of the staff elements of the force are being used inadequately, such as the Inspectorate General and the Planning Section. Logistics and supply systems are also inadequate, although some aspects of this function are performed well. Deficiencies also exist in the areas of training, transportation, communications, weapons and police operations, including patrol and investigations. Considerable improvement has been realized in the area of public relations, but much more needs to be done.

Rapid progress must be made in eliminating current deficiencies if the force is to meet the problems which lie just ahead. Possibilities of increased internal security problems were discussed in Chapter II above. But quite apart from those problems, the National Police must increase its capabilities if it is to discharge its responsibilities adequately in a country which is undergoing rapid social and economic change and which will pass through a major political transition in the early 1970's. The expansion of the force, which is already underway, is essential, but brings with it aggravated problems in the fields of logistics and support facilities.

Fortunately, leadership at the top is very good and individual capabilities of many officers are impressive. AID-sponsored training of members of the force, especially at the International Police Academy in Washington, has been particularly valuable. A core of younger, trained officers has been developed around which the strength of the force can increase and through which the modern, democratic concepts of police administration and operations can be instilled.

Urban policing has been greatly improved in recent years. Yet, available manpower is not being used to best advantage. Bogota, for example, has about 500 men on patrol at any one time for a city of two and a half million people! The number of vehicles

⁸See Part Two, Chapter I, for a more detailed discussion of the civil security forces.

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and radios available for mobile patrol purposes continues to be inadequate. Riot control capabilities appear to be good. However, necessary refresher training must be provided, if this ability is to be maintained.

Rural policing is barely adequate in critical areas and lacking in others. Police limit their activities in rural areas to villages and towns and rarely patrol outside of them. The specially trained rural police (Carabineros) are effective and well respected by the people, but are limited in number. About half of the political jurisdictions in the country do not have police stationed in them at the present time. The capability of the police to provide services in the rural areas is enhanced by the AID-supplied radio networks in thirteen Departments, but suffers from a lack of vehicles and repair facilities for both radios and vehicles.

For the past two years, the police budget has been increasing steadily. Most of the increase is due to the addition of 6,250 men in the past two fiscal years. 82.5 percent of the budget is devoted to personnel salaries and allowances. President Lleras has indicated that he is in favor of further increases in the strength of the police. The question arises, of course, as to whether or not the President's Conservative successor will feel that such increases are equally important.

2. The Department of Administrative Security

The DAS is responsible for collecting domestic intelligence on subversive activities and for investigating crimes against the nation or its fiscal integrity. Until recently, the DAS shared with the National Police the responsibility for investigating some ordinary crimes. This task has now been given to the National Police, but the DAS has resisted the change and continues to investigate some ordinary crimes. The DAS is also responsible for Presidential security, administration of immigration laws, maintenance of a foreigners' registry and control of private security guards, street vendors and automotive repair shops.

The DAS has an authorized strength of approximately 3,100, but actually employs only about 2,500 persons. The DAS is nominally under the Minister of Government, but the Chief of DAS often reports directly to the President. Offices with from two to twenty personnel are maintained in the capitals of each of the Departments.

The capability of the DAS to perform its functions is spotty. The DAS counterintelligence capability is fair to poor due to a lack of trained manpower, funds for buying information, transportation and professional leadership. Investigative abilities are somewhat better, especially where an investigator has been with the agency for more than three years. Otherwise, abilities are marginal. The laboratory facilities are generally good, and DAS's ability to conduct scientific examinations is greater than that of the National Police. DAS's fingerprint files and name index files are the only adequate files in the country.

The fundamental deficiency of the DAS is that it is not a professional organization and cannot become one as long as the patronage system prevails. A turnover of manpower in key posts every four years cripples any effort to develop trained manpower qualified to perform complex investigation and intelligence functions.

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B. *Military Services*⁹

1. *General*

The Colombian armed forces consist of an army of 45,800 men, a navy of 7,100 men, and an air force of 5,900 men. All three services operate under the control of the Minister of Defense, an Army General, as do the National Police. The mission of the armed forces is to maintain the territorial integrity of the nation, eliminate bandit and guerrilla groups, and maintain or restore public order. In carrying out the second of these tasks, the armed forces are assisted by the police. In the third task, the police have initial responsibility, and the armed forces are required to act only if a threat to public order appears to be exceeding police capabilities. For the past several years, the armed forces have been preoccupied with fighting Communist insurgency.

2. *The Army*

The army consists of 11 brigades, of which one is in reserve and one is stationed in Bogotá, leaving 9 brigades available for tactical operations. The army is a disciplined force, with good professional leadership and a demonstrated willingness to fight. Its major weaknesses are in logistics and maintenance, areas in which efforts of the U.S. Military Group have been concentrated. Improvements are also needed in intelligence and troop mobility.

The task of conducting military operations against the Communist guerrillas has fallen entirely to the army. The army is capable of mounting battalion size operations against the guerrillas and can contain the threat to the present acceptable level, unless outside support for the guerrillas increases significantly, or urban disturbances divert army units to the cities. Only in a few recent instances have army troops been called on to help the police handle riots.

Because of the success of the army against the guerrillas, and possibly also because the Government recognizes that complete elimination of the guerrillas is beyond the army's present capabilities, the army's counter-insurgency strategy appears to be shifting away from military operations and toward civic action in guerrilla-influenced areas. The theory appears to be that, by establishing a government presence in those areas and demonstrating the government's interest in the people, support will be drawn from the guerrillas and they will eventually disappear.

3. *The Air Force*

The air force has a limited air-ground support capability and a limited capability for patrol and surveillance of the borders and coastline. Its most useful capability in the present situation is provided by its 13 UH-type helicopters which are used extensively in support of the army's counter-insurgency operations. Because of maintenance requirements, however, only half of these are available for duty at any given time. The air force also has 14 C-47s and 6 C-54s, which provide aerial resupply and troop transport services for the army.

⁹Much of the factual information presented in this Section is drawn from the "Military Assistance Plan for Colombia," United States Southern Command, June 27, 1968 (Secret/Noforn).

The major deficiencies of the air force are insufficient numbers of aircraft, especially helicopters, and a shortage of qualified air crews.

4. *The Navy*

The small Colombian navy has limited surveillance and control capabilities in nearby waters. Its major units are three destroyers and one high speed transport. The navy also has five MAP-supported gunboats capable of limited internal security and civic action work. The Marine battalion is capable of counter-insurgency operations or of assisting the police in riot control in coastal cities.

C. *Police-Military Cooperation*

1. *Background*¹⁰

Relations among the Army, the National Police and the DAS are now generally good, but this has not always been the case. Before Major General Bernardo Camacho Leyva became Director of the National Police in April 1965, relations among the three organizations can only be described as poor, especially in Bogota.

General Alberto Ruiz Novoa, Minister of War (now Defense) from August 1962 to January 1965, was on bad terms with the then Director General of the National Police and visibly favored the Army over the police. During his term of office, the Army increasingly injected itself into police matters, conducting investigations of crimes and attempting to capture ordinary criminals. General Ruiz seemed to take delight in exacerbating relations between the National Police and the DAS by making public statements to the effect that the police would assume DAS functions. During this period, moreover, Army-DAS relations were clouded by Army resentment over the existence of DAS's "irregular" Rurales in the Llanos.

General Ruiz was forced out of office in January 1965, and General Camacho took over command of the National Police shortly thereafter. Since assuming his present position, General Camacho has worked with considerable success to improve the relations of the National Police with both the Army and the DAS. General Gabriel Reveiz Pizarro, who succeeded General Ruiz as Minister of Defense, deserves a share of the credit for improved Army-National Police relations. Relations between the National Police and the DAS, however, did not become better until late 1966 when retired Army General Luis Etilio Leyva, a personal friend of General Camacho, became Chief of the DAS. In February 1967, a Presidential Decree gave the National Police responsibility for investigating common crimes. When fully implemented, this Decree will eliminate one cause of friction between the National Police and the DAS.

Relations among the Army, the National Police and the DAS have continued to improve under the present Minister of Defense, General Gerardo Ayerbe Chaux, who took office in January 1967. General Ayerbe has allowed General Camacho almost complete autonomy, including direct access to the President.

¹⁰For a more detailed treatment, see Section III of Annex B.

2. *Present State of Cooperation*

In the course of collecting information for the present study, we raised the question of Army-National Police-DAS cooperation with a number of responsible American and Colombian officials. The responses were without exception that cooperation today is very good. The only qualifications attached to this appraisal were in terms of the limited capabilities of the DAS, which is of course a different problem.

Cooperation among the three organizations extends to both operations and intelligence.

a. *Operational cooperation* involves principally the Army and the National Police. In areas of active military operations, the National Police are placed under the control of the responsible Army Brigade Commander. The Army's special counter guerrilla companies include police personnel. Also, on occasion, the Army and the National Police conduct joint patrols in guerrilla areas.

The DAS has substantial operational responsibilities of an internal security nature only in the Llanos, where it maintains the Rurales, a small elite police force. In our brief visit to this vast, thinly populated area we did not obtain a clear picture of the state of cooperation there among the DAS, the Army and the National Police.

b. *Intelligence cooperation* takes place both informally on a day-to-day basis and through a system of national and sectional intelligence councils. The National Intelligence Council in Bogota consists of representatives of the National Police, the DAS, the Public Order Section of the Ministry of Government and each of the three Armed Services. Sectional Intelligence Councils are formed wherever there is a Brigade Headquarters. These Councils include intelligence officers from the Army Brigade, the National Police and the DAS.

D. *Recommendations for Consideration by the Government of Colombia*

Based on its analysis of the capabilities of the National Police and the Administrative Department of Security, the Team proposes that a number of steps be taken to upgrade the effectiveness of these organizations. The Government of Colombia could undertake some of these steps without U.S. assistance; others would require some U.S. technical aid.

Elsewhere recommendations are made with respect to the Public Safety Program for consideration by the responsible U.S. officials.

With regard to the National Police, the Team recommends that:

1. *A research and planning program be pursued by the F-3 Section of the Headquarters staff.* Studies should be undertaken of manpower needs (see item 6 below), across the board evaluations of supervision and administrative practices, and of police operations generally. These studies should support the functions of the Inspector General and provide a basic administrative tool for the Director General in the administration of the force.

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2. *Four regional automotive maintenance garages be established.* These should be able to provide repairs through the third echelon and be located strategically, depending upon the distribution of vehicles, nature of use of vehicles by area, and accessibility by road for the area to be served.

3. *An intensive review of the force's supply system be made.* This study should identify courses of action needed to remedy deficiencies in the system.

4. *The Docente (Training) Section be given the capability for the production of training texts and written materials.* The Section should be able to print books, manuals, lesson plans and other materials needed for the training system. Police ownership of a printing facility would lead to significant economies within a short period of time. This facility could also be used for the production of wanted notices, training bulletins and information notices of various kinds which should be regularly distributed by the command.

5. *A correspondence school program be developed.* The training of members of the force can be enhanced through the development of a program whereby text materials and examinations would be provided from headquarters, and the training supervision would be given by commanders in the field.

6. *Manpower plans be developed for each department.* Guidelines for the manpower survey should be developed by F-3 and each Department Commander should make a detailed assessment of the policing needs for this Department. These should then be collated by F-3 and the final study should form the basis for decisions regarding manpower utilization and deployment for the succeeding two to three years.

7. *Current methods of urban policing be reviewed and modern patrol planning factors be utilized.* Crime incident statistics should include the location and time of occurrence. These statistics could then be used to anticipate criminality and preventive patrols could be deployed accordingly.

8. *Rural patrols be increased.* The extent of the increase needed can be determined from the Departmental survey recommended in item 6 above. The Team believes that a pervasive police presence in rural areas is required and that present patrols are inadequate. The patrols should afford a greatly increased contact between the police and public, as well as a concentration of police personnel in problem areas. The purpose of these patrols would be to: (a) gain information on guerrilla and bandit capabilities and plans, (b) deny the guerrillas and bandits a popular support base, and (c) provide police services to the rural population.

9. *Detailed equipment requirements be identified for the force strength expansion proposed in the new Five-Year Plan.* Vehicles, radios for vehicles, weapons and personal equipment will have to be increased.

10. *Special bomb disposal squads be developed for Bogota, Cali, Medellin and other major cities.* These should be developed to prepare for a possible uprising in urban terrorism. Additional squads should be available for detail to other cities where problems might arise.

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11. *An inspection of riot control material and equipment should be conducted biennially.* The adequacy and condition of all equipment for the force should be monitored closely, especially in the major cities. Out-of-date tear gas should be assigned to the police schools for training purposes.

12. *Refresher training be given in instructor methods, riot control, marksmanship, police-community relations and intelligence.*

13. *The ammunition reloading facility be expanded.* A periodic refresher training program in marksmanship for the members of the force is needed and would require approximately 8 million rounds per year, including those needed for the training schools. This is eight times the capacity of the present reloading facilities. Funds to purchase the necessary brass, powder, primers and lead for this program should be included in the annual budget.

14. *A standard firearms range design be adopted and existing ranges modified.* Particular emphasis should be given to safety of persons using the ranges and the surrounding area. Figure 1 is a photograph of the firing range at the General Santander School in Botota and illustrates a danger of having rounds go over the backstop.




Figure 1. The Firing Range at the General Santander Police Officer's School in Bogotá

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15. *A seminar for senior officers be held twice yearly.* A seminar of one week's duration attended by officers of the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and above would serve the purpose of focusing managerial and supervisory experience and knowledge on the problems facing the force. The seminars could be used to tackle problems of specific nature having to do with administrative procedures, management, and methods of police operations. The studies proposed in recommendations 1, 3 and 6 could very well be reviewed in such meetings.

16. *Colombian industrial capabilities be reviewed again to determine whether or not appropriate riot control shields can be manufactured at an acceptable cost.*

With regard to the DAS, the Team believes that a continued effort is needed to bring about improvements recommended in the initial survey of the force.¹¹ As mentioned elsewhere, some gains have been made, but much more needs to be done. It is recommended that the Government establish a personnel system for the organization which will remove all but the Chief from the patronage system and guarantee tenure to other qualified employees. Employees lacking proper qualifications should be dismissed. The organization will be unable to develop the measure of professionalism needed unless these steps are taken.

¹¹"Report on the Police of the Republic of Colombia," Department of State, Agency for International Development, Office of Public Safety, December, 1962 (LOU).

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IV. *The AID Public Safety Program* ¹²

A. *Objectives*

The Public Safety Program began in early 1963 with the arrival of the first Chief Advisor. The program's objectives were set forth in a letter from the USAID Director covering the survey report ¹³ conducted after receiving a request for assistance from the Colombian Government. These objectives were to effect improvements in riot control, the police radio network, mobility and patrol, firearms training, training methods and public relations. The objectives of the Program were defined more precisely in succeeding years and, in general, were to increase the ability of the police to deal with Communist-inspired subversion and banditry in the countryside and to develop the police force as a responsible and democratic institution of government.

The most recent objectives of the National Police project are to complete the installation of the communications networks and the development of regional maintenance and supply depots for radios, and to upgrade the professional level of police personnel through training.

Over the past seven years, the program has contributed 25 man years technical assistance to the National Police and seven man years to DAS. During this same period, 320 participants were trained in the US, 115 of which were from the National Police and 246 from DAS. About \$2.7 million has been spent for commodities, half of which was used for the procurement of weapons, communications equipment and riot control items in FY 1966. The total expenditures for the project to date (of \$4.364 obligated) are \$3.937 million.

B. *Achievements*

Through technical assistance principally, significant reforms were effected in police administrative practices and in the police organization. A police training system was developed and the quality of training improved in both content and teaching methods. Some sixty thousand training aids and pamphlets were provided. Through various training programs, over 60,000 students received basic, refresher and in-service training.

Training at the International Police Academy has been especially helpful in supporting the efforts of the AID advisors and has led to the development of a core of younger officers on whom the hopes for the force in the future rest.

The commodities provided during the life of the program have been of significant help in providing the tools which the police need to do their job. The radios provided for thirteen Departments have made the greatest impact in contributing to an improvement in rural policing. Further, the items provided have had a "seeding" effect, in that the Colombian Government is now buying what it needs when it can afford to do so.

With respect to the National Police, some of the objectives as set forth in the Project Agreements have nearly been reached. But new requirements for improvement of

¹² See Part Two, Section II.A. for a more detailed discussion of the Public Safety Program.

¹³ "Report on the Police of the Republic of Colombia," Department of State, Agency for International Development, Office of Public Safety, December, 1962 (LOU).

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the force have been created by (a) the stresses accompanying rapid social and economic change, (b) the special problems which may arise during the political transition of the early 1970's, and (c) the impact of the planned force expansion on requirements for administrative and management skills and support facilities.

With regard to the DAS, the effectiveness of the program is much less evident. With little or no Colombian attempt to develop DAS into a professional organization, US efforts have had to be limited to very short term goals. Some progress has been made in developing records, establishing a school for the Rurales, and improving the capabilities of crime laboratories.

C. *Current Status and Future Plans*

The FY 1970 Program Memorandum states in part that: "AID assistance to the National Police and DAS is financing the completion of a program, undertaken in prior years, to modernize the administrative and logistic structure of the police forces at their present level, in order that these organizations may effectively contribute, within their assigned roles, to maintenance of law and order in Colombia. The funding proposed for FYs 1969 through 1971 represents the final costs of this multi-year program. The primary elements of the program have included rearmament, better communications and training. It is anticipated that the major program requirements will have been accomplished by 1971. Under present plans, more modest assistance after that date would be addressed primarily to residual liaison functions."

The Program Memorandum also notes that the BALPA II review has forced an acceleration in the phase-down of the public safety staff which will reduce the staff working with the National Police to only two advisors in September 1969, "placing a considerable burden on the present staff to complete the installation of the communications network and the restructuring of police training before the end of the BALPA period."¹⁴ The Memorandum goes on to state that the AID Mission considers this feasible only if:

"(a) Provision of occasional short-term advisory services will be possible after the phase-down to meet special needs. Such services could assist in assuring continued viability of administrative and logistic advances under the current program, or technical advice on such potential major add-ons as a possible ExIm loan to upgrade an aging police vehicle fleet.

"(b) Recourse to special relief from the BALPA ceiling will be possible in case of certain major contingencies, e.g.:

"(i) a decision of the GOC to approve and execute the sweeping reorganization under the Five-Year Expansion Plan of the National Police now under study, or some similar move; and/or

"(ii) serious deterioration of the internal security situation."

¹⁴ Subsequently, the tour of the senior communications advisor was extended to the end of FY 1970.

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The effects of the BALPA cuts on projected funding for the public safety program are shown in the alternative levels presented in the Program Memorandum. Alternative A, which the AID Mission prefers, assumes some relief from the BALPA cuts. Alternative B assumes that the cuts stand.

	(\$000)	
	<u>Alternative A</u>	<u>Alternative B</u>
FY 1968 Actual	341	341
FY 1969 Requested	250	250
FY 1970 Proposed	250	180
FY 1971 Estimated	200	130
FY 1972 Projected	100	100
FY 1973 Projected ¹⁵	50	50

For FY 1969, the Mission has been provided \$230,000 by AID for its Public Safety Program, \$20,000 less than the amount requested. It is expected that this sum will be spent as follows:

Technicians	\$ 95,000
Participants	65,000
Commodities	60,000
Other Costs	10,000
	\$230,000

Relatively the same distribution of funds for the FY 1970 request of \$250,000 would be expected.

As can be seen from the CASP and from the data set forth above, the Mission proposes to phase out the Public Safety Program by the end of FY 1973 with the provision of \$50,000 for that year. Indeed, on page 25 of the CASP, under options, the Embassy says that if aid funds were decreased 25 percent it would eliminate the Program altogether and should it be provided 25 percent more funds it would not increase the Public Safety or any other on-going program, but would look for new starts.

It might be noted that short-term advisory services (proposed in the FY 1970 Program Memorandum quoted above) are no substitute for full term advisors. Specialists on temporary duty can develop plans and make recommendations. In many instances, however, these plans and recommendations cannot be put into effect unless qualified advisors are on the scene and working with the police over a period of time.

¹⁵ From 1971-73 CASP.

V. *Relationship of AID Public Safety Program to U.S. Objectives and Programs as a Whole*

A. *The Public Safety Program and U.S. Objectives*

In greater or lesser degree the Public Safety Program supports five of the seven General Objectives listed in the CASP for FY 1971-73.¹⁶ Only in the cases of General Objectives D and F (educational reform and hemispheric cooperation, respectively) is there no significant contribution from the Public Safety Program.¹⁷

General Objective A – Dynamic political and social stability under the National Front system with increased popular participation on a broad basis in democratic institutions at all levels of society, and strengthening of these institutions.

The role of the police in maintaining dynamic political and social stability is always important. In a country such as Colombia, which is experiencing rapid economic and social change, the role of the police is sometimes crucial. The nation's leaders need a competent, professional police force to help keep a change in orderly, constructive channels, and to hold in check the activities of subversive elements which seek to exploit the inevitable strains present in a rapidly evolving society. At the same time, great care must be taken to keep the National Police organization from becoming either the tool of one political faction or a reactionary, suppressive force, alienated from the nation which it should seek to serve.

The Public Safety Program has sought with considerable success to increase both the efficiency of the National Police and their sense of professional, non-political devotion to public service. A major aspect of the Program is, in fact, the effort to strengthen the National Police as an important institution in a rapidly changing democratic society. Not too many years ago, the police were the hated and demoralized tool of a military dictator. Today, it is gratifying to hear senior police officers speak with pardonable pride (and only slight exaggeration) of their professional, non-political status and of their adherence to strict legality and the minimum use of force.

Like other institutions in Colombia today, however, the police must continue to change and modernize. If they were to stand still they could become a drag on the nation's progress, rather than constructive participants in it.

General Objective B – More rapid economic growth and social development which will contribute to the alleviation of social discontent while at the same time reducing the need for concessionary assistance.

General Objective C – Increased agricultural production in areas where Colombia has the greatest potentials to meet growing domestic food requirements, to produce for export, while achieving long-run solutions to the problems of low income for agricultural workers.

¹⁶The CASP states this fact explicitly only in the case of General Objective E.

¹⁷Even in these cases, it might plausibly be argued that in seeking to improve the National Police training schools the Public Safety Program is raising the general level of education and that, through sending police officers to the International Police Academy, the Program promotes a form of hemispheric cooperation.

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Achievement of these two economic objectives requires a secure environment for the expansion of production, trade and investment. The essential role of the police in creating and maintaining such an environment is clear. By helping increase the effectiveness of the police, the Public Safety Program therefore supports both of these objectives.

General Objective E – Containment of insurgency, subversion and criminality, and counteraction of any Soviet bloc efforts in this area.

It is, of course, in working toward this objective that the Public Safety Program makes its greatest contribution.

The National Police, which the Program supports, have the major role in dealing with crime and the violent manifestations of subversion in the cities. The police also provide important support to the army in countering insurgency. Although the army has the major responsibility for fighting insurgents, police on occasion join in army-led counter-insurgency operations. On a continuing basis, rural police posts provide intelligence on insurgents' activities and inhibit their freedom of movement. Perhaps of greatest importance, the police are required to move in behind the army in newly pacified areas and establish a governmental presence.

The DAS, to which the Public Safety Program has given smaller amounts of technical and material assistance, has the major responsibility for countering clandestine subversive activity and shares with the National Police responsibility for dealing with major crime. The DAS has, however, not yet developed into an effective organization.

In addition to assisting the National Police (and to a lesser extent the DAS), the Public Safety Program has provided legal advice to the Colombian Ministry of Justice, which is designed to produce improvements in the administration of criminal justice.

General Objective G – Increased Colombian understanding of and respect for American cultural, educational, and scientific values and achievements, primacy of U.S. influence and prestige, and, concomitantly, minimization of Soviet penetration of and influence in Colombian society and efforts to thwart U.S. objectives.

Under this objective, the CASP calls for maintaining primacy of U.S. influence in the military field by continued advice, training and other assistance. Emphasis is placed upon the importance of maintaining the U.S. military mission in Colombia. The CASP is silent on the question of whether U.S. primacy is also important in the police field.

We believe that U.S. primacy in the police field is moderately useful, but not essential. The main value of the Public Safety Program in the context of General Objective G is as insurance against the contingency of Soviet bloc penetration of the police. Such penetration now seems remote, but Soviet bloc technical assistance to the police can no longer be regarded as out of the question, in view of the recent acceptance by the police of 100 Gaz jeeps under the Colombia-USSR coffee barter agreement.

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B. *The Public Safety Program and Other U.S. Programs*

1. *General*

The Public Safety Program, the Military Assistance Program (MAP) and the various economic assistance programs administered by AID are, in differing degree, mutually supporting in that all of them contribute to the achievement of one or more of the General Objectives set forth in the CASP. The problem is not one of general compatibility of these programs, but effective coordination, careful setting of priorities, and accurate assessment of marginal advantages.

2. *Public Safety and Military Assistance*¹⁸

These two programs are for good reasons administered separately both in Washington and the field. Methods and doctrines applicable to armed forces are generally not suitable for use with civilian police organizations. Nevertheless, both programs are principally concerned with the same problem – the maintenance of internal security – and they should ideally be planned as a single integrated whole.

We found that personal relations between AID Public Safety Advisors and members of the U.S. Military Group (Milgroup) are excellent. The Chief of the AID Public Safety Section and the Chief of the Milgroup sit on the Country Team Internal Security Committee. They and their staffs have frequent informal contacts and help one another in various ways. The Chief of the Milgroup sits in on the review of the proposed Public Safety Program. The Public Safety Chief, however, takes no part in the review of the proposed Military Assistance Plan and does not even receive a copy of the approved Plan.

The Ambassador, the Deputy Chief of Mission and, to some extent, the members of the Country Team may be presumed to be informed on both the Public Safety and the Military Assistance Programs and to use their knowledge to achieve a fair degree of consistency between the two. Nevertheless, we strongly suspect that procedures designed to force joint consideration of the two programs would yield useful results.

Differing programming cycles and procedures would probably rule out fully integrated planning of Public Safety and Military Assistance. At a minimum, however, the Chief of the Milgroup and the AID Public Safety Chief should be involved in all important stages of preparing both programs, including their final reviews. Beyond this, the Ambassador and the Country Team might consider making greater use of the CASP as an integrating mechanism.¹⁹ In working up the CASP, internal security might be defined as a planning sector embracing both Public Safety and Military Assistance. In this way, questions such as the following could receive full consideration by the responsible officials:

a. Is the simultaneous, gradual phase-out of the Public Safety Program and near phase-out of MAP wise?

¹⁸See Part Two, Section II.B. of this report for a brief description of the Military Assistance Program.

¹⁹The Evaluation Team was impressed by the cursory treatment of the Public Safety Program in the most recent CASP, in contrast with the full treatment of MAP.

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b. Would maintenance of modest grant MAP for a longer period facilitate the early termination of the Public Safety Program?

c. What implications do Colombian Army counter-insurgency plans have for the National Police and, indirectly, for the Public Safety Program?

d. Similarly, what does the National Police expansion plan mean for the Army and, indirectly, for the Military Assistance Program?

e. Is the present allocation of American personnel to these two programs justifiable? (57 in the Milgroup and 7 in the AID Public Safety Section, including contract and local hire personnel.)

We would answer the first two questions in the negative, will deal generally with questions (c) and (d) elsewhere, and regard question (e) as outside our competence. What we think on these and other cross-program questions, however, is not the point at issue here. What is important is that questions such as these be raised and answered.

3. *Public Safety and Economic Assistance*

We have, in effect, argued above that the Public Safety Program should be forced to compete with the Military Assistance Program. In actual fact, it competes with the other, largely economic programs administered by AID, and it does so at a disadvantage.

Personal relations between the Public Safety Advisors and other officers of the AID Mission appear to be generally good, and both the Mission Director and his Deputy have a firm grasp of the essentials of the Public Safety Program, as well as of the other programs for which they are responsible. Like other AID Missions, however, the Mission in Bogotá is largely staffed and run by economists, and the Public Safety Program tends to be judged from an economic point of view. This is not to argue that Public Safety specialists should write their own ticket, or that the economic consequences of the Public Safety Program are not important. Our point is that because it relates to so many of the CASP General Objectives and affects (or is affected by) so many other programs, the Public Safety Program should be judged by a broad range of political, social and economic criteria, preferably concurrently with, and in competition with, the Military Assistance Program.

This means that the proposed Public Safety Program should, in at least its broad outlines, be considered at the Country Team level before any decision is made by the AID Mission on the level of funding to be provided for it. To reverse these steps, as has been past practice, and make the funding level decision first, renders it virtually impossible for the Ambassador and the Country Team to treat Public Safety and Military Assistance as a single, internal security planning sector. Achieving this objective would be further facilitated if Public Safety were a separate appropriation line item, but this change would require Washington action on a worldwide basis and lies beyond the scope of the present study.

The Director of the AID Mission cannot, of course, abdicate his responsibilities for this or any other program, and we do not suggest that he do so. After Country Team discussion, the decision on what Public Safety Program to submit to AID/Washington would still be his, subject only to the review and approval of the Ambassador.

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VI. ANALYSIS OF AID PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES

Since the National Police and the DAS present quite different problems and opportunities, they will be dealt with separately.

A. Assistance to the National Police

1. Program Alternatives

AID assistance to the National Police has three major components: advisory services, commodities and participant training in the United States and the Canal Zone. Advisory services are by far the most important of these three categories and can properly be used in the initial definition of program alternatives. Setting aside for the moment possible variations in the levels of participant training and commodity aid, the following alternatives appear worthy of consideration:

- a. Withdrawal of all advisors by the end of FY 1970.
- b. Gradual phase-out of advisors ending in FY 1973 (the CASP formula).
- c. Holding the advisory staff at its present authorized level of three (Chief Advisor, Training Advisor and Communications Advisor) for several years.
- d. Adding one or more advisors to the present staff and maintaining that level for several years.

The last of these alternatives is, of course, itself a group of alternatives which will be explored more fully below.

2. Assessment of Program Alternatives

a. *The Minimum Useful Level.* In any technical assistance program, there may be a level of advisory staff below which futility begins to set in and the Government's money is not well spent. The program of advisory assistance to the National Police has, in our considered opinion, fallen below that level. Given the size of the National Police, the extensive area over which they are deployed and the nature of their deficiencies, three public safety advisors cannot be expected to produce results commensurate with the costs involved. Moreover, by remaining in Colombia, they, in effect, advertise an intention to achieve results of which are beyond their capabilities. The consequence might well be to discredit the United States in the eyes of the concerned Colombian officials.

We therefore believe that a fairly rapid, orderly withdrawal of the remaining advisory staff is much preferable to either a gradual phase-out or maintaining the staff at the present level.²⁰

b. *Withdrawal vs. Augmentation.* The choice then is between rapid withdrawal and continuing to maintain an advisory staff at some level above the one now authorized.

²⁰This might be done by (1) not filling the vacant position of Chief Advisor, (2) transferring the Training Advisor when he departs on home leave in October, 1969, and (3) terminating the position of Communications Advisor on schedule at the end of FY 1970.

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The case for withdrawal can be summarized under five points:

(1) The program of assistance to the National Police has substantially achieved its original objectives.

(2) In any case, the National Police can now stand on their own feet and should be encouraged to do so.

(3) The internal security situation is now satisfactory and will probably remain so.

(4) The Government of Colombia has no real interest in the Public Safety Program and would not be displeased to see it terminated.

(5) If BALPA constraints are to be relaxed, other personnel requirements of the AID Mission should receive priority over the Public Safety Program. (For example, we understand that the Program Office lacks adequate staff to handle the programming of counterpart funds.)

These arguments deserve serious consideration, but we believe that convincing answers can be made to all of them, with the possible exception of the last:

(1) and (2). The achievements of the Public Safety Program have been substantial, but — as it brought out below in Part Two, Chapter II — the shortfall in terms of original objectives is also substantial. Helping create an adequate police force to serve a rapidly modernizing nation is no small task, and it should be no surprise if the task has not been completed in only seven years. The police have in fact fallen behind the growth of the nation and are seeking to catch up through a five-year expansion plan. (See Part Two, Section I.A.12, below.) Execution of this plan creates new requirements for advisory services.

The National Police must of course be encouraged to stand on their own feet. This has in fact been the approach of the Public Safety Program to date. At the same time, it must be recognized that Colombia is still a developing country, lacking in many modern skills and held back by ignorance and tradition. The National Police have the deficiencies of the society of which it is a part and still need the guidance and stimulus afforded by American technical advice.

The size of the Public Safety Program has scarcely been such as would stifle initiative or breed unhealthy dependence. To the best of our knowledge, no such charge has been levelled at the much larger military advisory effort, and it would appear to be even less applicable to the Public Safety Program.

(3). The improvement in internal security has in fact relieved the National Police of some problems, but has created other, possibly larger ones. As the army moves out of pacified, or partially pacified, areas, the police are expected to take over. Of greater importance, we must recognize that improvement in internal security may not last. As a matter of simple prudence, the National Police must be prepared to meet the contingencies which were flagged at the end of Chapter II above.

(4). In response to a direct question, the Minister of Defense stated without qualification that he wished the Public Safety Program to continue. The Director

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General of the National Police took the same position and also expressed concern over the recent reduction in the Public Safety Advisory Staff.

(5). We are not qualified to pass judgment on the personnel priorities of the AID Mission, but suggest that this is at least in part a false problem. As we argued in Chapter V, above, the Public Safety Program should be judged primarily in competition with the Military Assistance Program, rather than in competition with the other programs administered by AID. In any case, we conceive our task as limited to recommending what, if any, Public Safety Program would best serve U.S. national interests, on the assumption that any required personnel and other resources would be made available.

After careful weighing of all relevant considerations, we have concluded that the program of advisory assistance to the National Police should be continued at some level above the present authorization.

c. Different Approaches to Staff Augmentation

Precisely what size and composition of staff would be best depends of course on which of the deficiencies of the National Police the U.S. should, in its own national interest, seek to remedy, and how rapidly. At least in theory, the answer to this question depends in turn on which of the CASP's General Objectives should be given greatest weight in shaping the Public Safety Program. Of the five General Objectives which the Public Safety Program supports (see Section IV.D. above), General Objective A (dynamic political and social stability and strengthening of democratic institutions) and General Objective E (containment of insurgency, subversion and criminality) are clearly the most relevant. Any program which adequately supports these two objectives will inevitably contribute satisfactorily to the other three.

We considered and rejected the possibility of constructing alternative advisory staffs which would give priority to either General Objective A or General Objective E. On close analysis, we found that such staffs would be of about the same size and composition. We decided that the real choice is between a very small staff which could make only slow progress in helping remedy the deficiencies of the National Police and a somewhat larger one which could achieve results more swiftly. The two staffs would look as follows:

	STAFF I	STAFF II
Public Safety Officer (Chief Advisor) (0083.01)	1	1
Public Safety Advisor (0083.05)	3	4
Generalist	(3)	(2)
Urban	(0)	(1)
Rural	(0)	(1)
Public Safety Electronics Specialist (Telecommunications) (0856.20)	1	2
Public Safety Advisor (Logistics) (2150.26)	0	1
Total	5	8

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Staff I represents the smallest advisory effort which we would be prepared to support. Any smaller staff would, in our opinion, be below the minimum useful level.

The sole advantage of Staff I is its relatively small size. Even this advantage might in the end prove illusory. Progress with Staff I would unavoidably be slow, and the program would probably have to be maintained for a longer period than would be the case with a more adequate staff. Staff II, on the other hand, might be reduced to the dimensions of Staff I within three or four years. At this point, the program should be re-examined.

The fact that Staff II could contribute to a more rapid improvement in police capabilities than could Staff I is an important consideration. The contingencies which were flagged at the end of Chapter II could arise in the near future. Also, the police cannot afford to fall still further behind the development of the country. The case for an advisory effort which could achieve fairly quick results is therefore strong.

The advantages of Staff II over Staff I may be brought out further by examining the specific ways in which they differ:

(1) *Public Safety Advisors.* The three advisors provided in Staff I would be spread thinly among the National Police General Staff in Bogota, the extensive police school system, and the police headquarters, stations, and posts throughout the country. The one additional advisor provided by Staff II would not only permit better coverage, but would also allow one advisor to specialize in urban police problems and one in rural problems.

(2) *Communications.* As is explained in Annex D, completing installation of the already programmed radio net plus the large task of creating an adequate radio maintenance system may require five man-years of effort. The difference between Staffs I and II in this area is thus clearly a matter of how rapidly this work can be completed.

If, as we believe desirable, the National Police decide to extend their communications net to areas not now covered and to buy additional radios as part of their force expansion plan, still further requirements for technical assistance will arise.

(3) *Logistics.* The greatest need for a logistics advisor is in the area of motor vehicle fleet management and maintenance. The National Police recently purchased over 1,200 vehicles from the Ford Motor Company, financed by an Export-Import Bank loan. The police are negotiating with Ford for technical assistance in maintaining these vehicles. The prospect of such assistance is the reason for not including a logistics advisor in Staff I. At the same time, we believe that it is most unlikely that Ford will provide the sustained and comprehensive assistance needed if the National Police are to (a) create a badly needed regional motor vehicle maintenance system and (b) establish an orderly system of purchase, assignment and replacement of vehicles. For this reason, a logistics advisor has been included in Staff II. A logistics advisor would also assist in the badly needed overhaul of the police logistics system.

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Either Staff I or Staff II could, and should, be supplemented as required by contract, direct local hire or temporary duty personnel. Temporary duty assignment of specialists in the fields of criminalistics and records and identification would appear to have particularly high priority. The current study of the Colombian administration of criminal justice should be continued.

3. *Commodity Aid*

a. *Technical Assistance*

Barring a major emergency, commodity aid to the National Police financed by Technical Assistance funds should be limited to very small inputs, designed to strengthen the effectiveness of the advisory effort. For example, an offer of textbooks or visual training aids might both make it more likely that advice for improving police school curricula would be accepted and increase the quality of instruction if the advice is followed. Other possible examples might be provision of hand tools for police civic action work to increase the "leverage" of the rural police advisor, and a grant of automotive maintenance tools to facilitate the work of the logistics advisor.

We have not attempted to develop a commodity assistance program to be financed under Technical Assistance, but believe that it could be kept under \$100,000 annually.

b. *Loans.* We do not have any specific recommendations for AID loans to finance National Police requirements. We can, however, foresee possible requests for help in buying additional communications equipment, arms, motor vehicles and motor vehicle maintenance equipment. If any such requests are found to reflect real and high priority requirements, we see no reason why — assuming the availability of funds — they should not be dealt with sympathetically. In our opinion, a loan to meet police requirements is as appropriate as any other public sector loan.

We recognize that circumstances may again arise in which an Export-Import Bank loan is the best available means of financing police requirements. In that event, we suggest that serious consideration be given to asking ExIm to assign AID responsibility for monitoring use of the loan and providing any necessary supporting technical assistance. We believe that AID might usefully have been given such a role in connection with the recent ExIm loan to finance the purchase of motor vehicles for the National Police.

c. *Excess Property*

The National Police could make good use of a number of items which are from time to time declared excess by the U.S. military and offered for sale at a fraction of original cost. Examples include blankets, tents and shelter halves. We suggest that AID explore the possibility of obtaining a determination of National Police eligibility to purchase appropriate excess military items. Failing in this, about \$10,000 should be provided to the project for seizing opportunities to buy especially useful excess property items for the police. This sum could probably be accommodated within the \$100,000 over-all estimate for commodity assistance.

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4. *Participant Training*

a. *The International Police Academy (IPA)*

Training of National Police officers at IPA has been one of the most useful aspects of the Public Safety Program. Graduates of IPA return with new ideas applicable to their work, a heightened sense of professional pride, and – perhaps of greatest importance – an improved understanding of the proper role of the police in a democratic society. Their experience in the United States also tends to make IPA graduates more interested in working closely with American public safety advisors.

We strongly recommend that National Police officers continue to be trained at IPA. The number of officers currently going to IPA (18 in 1969) should be maintained and if possible increased. Twenty-five officers per year should be regarded as the minimum figure. Only one-eighth of the National Police officers now on duty have received IPA training. If IPA doctrines are to have the desired pervasive effect in the National Police organization, at least one-third of all officers should be IPA graduates. Since some past graduates will in due course retire or leave for other reasons (only four have left to date), and the officer corps is being expanded, it is clear that this goal could not be reached for many years, even if the rate of IPA training were substantially increased.

b. *Panama Canal Zone*

About ten members of the National Police receive training each year at U.S. military schools in the Canal Zone. Two or three of that number attend the jungle warfare course and the remainder are trained in automotive vehicle maintenance. We believe that both types of training are useful and should be continued at about the present level, unless (as appears possible) the National Police enter into a technical assistance arrangement with the Ford Motor Company which would make it possible to reduce or eliminate automotive vehicle maintenance training in the Canal Zone.

c. *FBI Academy.* One National Police officer attends the FBI Academy each year. The value of this training has increased with the added responsibilities of the National Police in the field of criminal investigation. We recommend that it be continued.

5. *Cost Estimates*

The recommended program of assistance to the National Police would cost about \$375,000 per year, broken down as follows:

		(\$000)
Advisors (8)		200
Participant Training		65
IPA	(50)	
Other	(15)	
Commodities		100
Other Costs		<u>10</u>
Total		375

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The average cost of an advisor has been estimated at \$25,000 annually, which is the figure used by the AID Program Office in Bogota. The cost of a minimum program using five advisors would be about \$300,000 per year.

B. *Assistance to the DAS*

1. *The Special Problem Posed by the DAS*

At first sight, there would appear to be a strong case for increased assistance to DAS. DAS has major responsibilities in the field of internal security and is unable to discharge those responsibilities satisfactorily. The Chief of DAS, moreover, has made clear his strong interest in more help. There is only one difficulty: DAS as presently constituted could not make effective use of more assistance. (See Part Two, Section I.B. for a full description of DAS's problems and deficiencies.)

Under existing circumstances, we see no alternative to the decision to limit assistance to DAS, to include one investigations advisor and training at the IPA each year for two or three members of the DAS in whom the U.S. has a special interest. The investigations advisor is able to perform certain useful liaison functions and also keep the door open for a possible increase in U.S. assistance.

2. *Possible Future Actions*

We believe that before an increase in assistance to DAS can be considered, the Government of Colombia at its highest levels must decide that it wants DAS to become a highly competent, non-political and professional security organization and that it is prepared to make the sustained effort and take the drastic actions required to achieve that goal. It may well be that the U.S. Government can do little to induce the Colombian authorities to make this decision. We believe, however, that the effort should be made, probably through a carefully prepared approach to the President himself.

The key question, as we see it, is timing. President Lleras might be receptive to the approach which we have in mind, but he will remain in office only a little over a year. Any effort to reform DAS which he might initiate might be viewed by his Conservative successor as merely a Liberal effort to fasten a permanent grip on a key and politically sensitive organization. There would therefore be a real danger that the next President would undo anything that President Lleras might achieve.

On the other hand, we do not like to accept over a year's delay in attacking some very important problems. We understand that President Lleras has close personal relations with Ambassador Pastrana, the leading Conservative candidate for the Presidency. Conceivably, Lleras could obtain the concurrence of Pastrana in a plan to reform DAS, thereby ensuring continuity of effort after Lleras leaves office. An approach to Lleras after Pastrana's nomination is assured might therefore make good sense.

We do not feel qualified to determine which timing would be best. We can only strongly recommend that a high level approach to the Government of Colombia be made at an appropriate time. The future level and composition of assistance to DAS should be determined in the light of the Colombian response.

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C. *Conclusions*

1. *National Police*

a. The program of advisory assistance to the National Police should be continued with a staff large enough to do the job. We believe that a staff of eight advisors is required.

b. If a minimum useful advisory staff (which we believe to be five advisors) cannot be provided, we recommend that the advisory assistance program be terminated in FY 1970.

c. If the advisory assistance program is continued, it should be supported by a small commodity program of less than \$100,000 annually, which would be designed to increase the effectiveness of the advisory effort.

d. We do not now recommend any specific AID loans to finance National Police requirements, but believe that any future applications for such loans should be viewed sympathetically if they are found to be based on real, high priority needs.

e. Training of National Police officers at the International Police Academy should be continued and if possible increased to a minimum of 25 officers per year. Training of police personnel in automotive vehicle maintenance and jungle warfare at U.S. military schools in the Canal Zone should be continued at present levels, unless a technical assistance arrangement between the National Police and the Ford Motor Company makes possible reduction or elimination of the former type of training. We also recommend that one National Police officer continue to be sent annually to the FBI Academy.

f. Participant training should continue even if the Public Safety advisory staff is withdrawn.

2. *DAS*

a. As presently constituted, DAS could not effectively use more assistance than is now planned. We therefore concur in the decision to reduce aid to DAS to a single investigations advisor and training at the IPA for two or three members of DAS annually.²¹

b. We believe, however, that it is in the interests of both Colombia and the United States that DAS become a highly competent, non-political and professional security organization. We therefore recommend that at an appropriate time the Embassy approach the Government of Colombia, probably at the Presidential level, and urge that Government to undertake a thorough-going reform of DAS.

c. The future level and composition of assistance to DAS should be determined in the light of the Colombian response.

²¹Costs for this assistance would be about \$30,000 per year (\$25,000 for the advisor and \$5,000 for training) and in addition to project costs for aid to the National Police estimated above.

PART TWO

I. *The Colombian Civil Security Forces*A. *THE NATIONAL POLICE*1. *History*

The National Police is the principal civil security force in Colombia and was founded on November 5, 1891. The force was abolished in 1948 following the assassination of Gaitan and reconstituted as the Military Police Corps. By 1953 the force had regained its civil character, but was placed under the Ministry of War (now called Defense). At this time, the Colombian Intelligence Service (SIC, now called DAS, see Section I.B. below), was formed. Criminal investigative responsibilities were transferred entirely from the police to the SIC at that time.

Until 1961, most of the 17 Departments (states) maintained their own police forces, though officers were provided in most instances by the National Police. By 1962, all civil police organizations were incorporated into the National Police by a Decree issued in 1959.

2. *Assigned Role*

The legislative Decree No. 01667 of 1966 defines the police role as to maintain order and safeguard rights of the citizens; to protect life and property; to lend any assistance required for the enforcement of the laws; and to cooperate in the investigation of crimes (see Annex E). It is significant to note that *prevention* of crime is given as the primary task of the police (Annex E, Art. 14). The police tasks are normally carried out in collaboration with the political authority of the region.

Larger municipalities maintain separate police forces for traffic and, in the case of Medellin in Antioquia, a force for urban patrol.

The responsibility for criminal investigation has been undergoing a shift. In 1967, responsibility for investigating "common" crimes (e.g., assault, robbery, sex offenses, etc.) was shifted from DAS to the National Police with DAS retaining jurisdiction over "major" offenses (Decree No. 271, see Annex C, also see below under "Investigations").

3. *Organization*

The National Police is commanded by a Director General, currently Major General Bernardo COMACHO Leyva, who reports to the Minister of Defense. The fact that General Comacho is an able administrator is recognized by the Minister, who does not intervene in the direction of the force and, General Camacho has direct access to the President.

The organization of the force is depicted in Annex F. The organization allows for staff sections (F-1 through F-8) for Personnel, Criminal Statistics and Investigation, Planning and Operations, Administrative Services, Budget and Fiscal, Training, Health, and Public Relations. The Chiefs of these sections form the "General Staff." There is a Chief of

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Staff, but the Section Chiefs report directly to the Director General, as do the Commanders in each of the 23 Departments. The Commander's span of control, in practical terms, encompasses 34 subordinate officers.

Departmental police organizations include the first four staff elements mentioned above. An organizational chart for the Capital District of Bogotá, presented as Annex G, is representative of Department organizations throughout the country.

With respect to the effectiveness of several organizational elements, the Team has the following comments:

a. *Inspector General*. While his tasks are supposed to include inspection of both management and operations, he limits his inspections to some aspects of management. In the latter area, he deals almost exclusively with fiscal matters of the various commands. He should engage in or direct inspections of operations and training, including all aspects of command supervision.

b. *Planning (F-3)*. The major accomplishment of this section has been the development of the first Police Five-Year Plan, at the suggestion of the Chief Public Safety Advisor. Otherwise, it has not functioned as an effective staff element in planning. Much more could be done with proper guidance. The need is apparent for the development of long and short range plans to anticipate police requirements. This element should also exercise supervision over planning in the Departments — encouraging and stimulating innovative plans and collating these for the country. The approach taken by the Planning Section should lean heavily toward research. The Section represents an excellent potential asset to the Director General in helping him administer the force.

c. *Administrative Services (F-4)*. The logistical and supply procedures used by the force are unsuitable for its size and responsibilities. Requisitioning procedures are non-existent and field commanders find it difficult, if not impossible, to acquire supplies from Bogotá in a reasonable time. This section is also responsible, among other things, for transport, communications and weaponry. Studies, in collaboration with F-3, should be undertaken to determine precise needs as the force expands its manpower. These matters are discussed more fully elsewhere in this report.

d. *Public Relations (F-8)*. The Team considers this activity an essential one in order for the police to develop a good image in the eyes of the public. To date, a number of things have been done, but much more could be done — given proper guidance. Police activities with school children and youth groups seem sporadic and not well publicized; special police public service campaigns; increased sponsorship of orphanages; vocational schools for underprivileged children; and police-community group meetings, are ideas that come to mind.

Deficiencies also exist in other areas of police administration and management which deprive the force of the capability that it must have. These are in the areas of training, transportation, communications, weapons and police operations, including patrol and investigations. These are dealt with separately in the following pages.

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4. Budget

The Colombian fiscal year coincides with the calendar year. During the first quarter of the year, needs are estimated, using various factors, including statistics of various kinds. The request is then finalized and forwarded to the Minister of Finance, who fits this into the overall budget. One Finance Ministry official is assigned to work with the police full time on the preparation of the budget and related matters.

After the Finance Ministry review and collation of all budget requests into an overall budget for the country this is then given to the Planning Department for review and comment. The head of the Planning Department advised the Team that he reviews the police budget in general terms, but does not examine the investment aspects of it in detail. He mentioned they have managed their own investment fund (Rotating Fund) to earn income for the pension fund and for other purposes and that he felt that better use could have been made of the funds available for this purpose in some instances.

After the Planning Department review, the national budget goes to the Council of Ministers for approval and then to the President for final approval.

The approved Police budget for FY 1969 and that proposed for FY 1970 is given in Table 1. The total provided in FY 1967 was \$574,321,210 pesos and that for FY 1968, \$602,909,347 pesos (up 4.9%). Due largely to the increase in personnel, the FY 1969 budget is 54 percent greater than that for the preceding year. An increase of 15.5 percent is being requested for FY 1970.

The police report that, as is usually the case throughout the world, their requests are cut as a result of the review process. They plan to request a supplemental amount for the current fiscal year of 71 million pesos for procurement of equipment, provision of health services and other purposes. Should additional funds be available later this year for the additional personnel requested (2,750) additional funds will have to be provided for their salaries for the balance of the year.

As can be seen by an analysis of the budgetary figures given in Table 2, 82.5 percent of the budget for both FY 1969 and FY 1970 is devoted to personnel salaries, allowances and related expenses. This is a low percentage in comparison with other Latin American police forces. About 2.5 percent of the budget is devoted to what can be determined as operational expenses in FY 1969 and 3.4 percent for next year will be used for this purpose. About 8 percent of the budget for both years will be used for capital equipment, and about 2 percent for the construction and maintenance of buildings. The Police stated that they intend to request about 1,150 million pesos over the next five years for the construction of police buildings, including seven Departmental headquarters and fifty municipal headquarters.

Earlier this year the USAID Program Office conducted an analysis of the budgets of the various security forces of the country. Differences in the police budget reflected in this analysis and those presented here are attributable to the fact that the latest information on the budget provided the Team was not available to the USAID at the time of its study. Table 2 summarizes the results of the USAID study.

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Table 1.

**1969 POLICE EXPENDITURES
AND PROPOSED EXPENDITURES FOR 1970**

	1969	1970
PERSONAL SERVICES	716,899,764.00	821,008,431.00
Personnel Payroll	Col\$ 414,041,784.00	Col\$ 466,296,672.00
Representation Expenditures	327,000.00	327,000.00
Payment of Technical Services	264,000.00	300,000.00
Salaries Paid to Professionals	500,000.00	500,000.00
Wages	250,560.00	250,000.00
Family Subsidy and Other Legal Benefits	252,060,951.00	295,308,943.00
Food Bonus	2,957,040.00	3,425,760.00
Bonus for Food, Clothes Washing and Barbershop Service	1,512,000.00	1,312,000.00
Christmas Bonus	34,286,429.00	38,988,056.00
Transportation Bonus	7,200,000.00	10,800,000.00
Housing Construction Bonus	3,500,000.00	3,500,000.00
GENERAL EXPENSES	171,229,038.00	188,095,507.00
Maintenance and Insurance	17,776,810.00	21,525,403.00
Equipment Purchases	72,915,536.00	79,695,471.00
Perdiem and Travel Expenses	5,000,000.00	7,500,000.00
Communications Services	2,000,000.00	3,000,000.00
Public Services	2,500,000.00	4,000,000.00
Materials and Supplies	57,712,358.00	64,926,113.00
Printed Matter and Publications	550,000.00	569,520.00
Rental Expenses	505,334.00	800,000.00
Private Investigations	960,000.00	900,000.00
Various & Unforseen Expenses	400,000.00	600,000.00
Upkeep of Cattle, Horses and Facilities	3,679,000.00	3,679,000.00
Expenses Incurred in Civic Action		
Activities in Violence Areas	1,200,000.00	800,000.00
Reimbursement of Bonuses and Insurance	30,000.00	100,000.00
Upkeep of Social Welfare Activities	6,000,000.00	-----
Severance Pay, Compensation and Indemnities	30,000,000.00	39,000,000.00
Partial Liquidation of Severance Pay	-----	6,000,000.00
Pensions for Invalidity	9,500,000.00	11,200,000.00
Debts to Retirement Fund (Nat. Pol.)	2,000,000.00	7,000,000.00
TOTAL	929,628,802.00	1,072,303,938.00

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Table 2

**SECURITY EXPENDITURES
TOTAL BUDGET AND GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT**

	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972
Total GOC Budget ^a	8,418	10,100	11,817	13,826	16,176	18,926
Ministry of Defense Budget ^b	1,035	1,350	1,485	1,634	1,846	2,086
Police Budget ^c	594	883	1,046	1,232	1,445	1,690
DAS Budget ^d	51	58	61	64	67	70
Ministry of Defense as Percent of Total Budget	12.3	13.4	12.6	11.8	11.4	11.0
Total Police as Percent of Budget	7.7	9.3	9.4	9.4	9.3	9.3
Total Security as Percent of Budget	20.0	22.7	22.0	21.2	20.7	20.3
Ministry of Defense as Percent of Total GDP	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.2
Total Police as Percent of GDP	0.8	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Total Security as Percent of GDP	2.1	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.2

^a1968 Figure based on most recent estimate available. For 1969-72, total budget projected to increase at 17% per annum.

^b1968 Figure includes initial 1968 budget of 1,148 million pesos, plus supplementary budget 570 of April 18, 1968, totalling 189.5 million pesos for military pay increases, plus 12.5 million pesos for miscellaneous supplementary budgets throughout the year. For 1969 and 1970, increase is projected at 10%. For 1971 and 1972, increase is projected at 13%.

^c1968 Figure includes initial budget of 613 million pesos, plus 207 million pesos for salary and force increases contained in Decree 570 of April 18, 1968 plus 63 million pesos of additional supplemental budgets throughout the year. Figures for 1969-1972 are rough estimates of funding needed for police expansion plan presently under study.

^dDAS budget projected to increase at 5% per annum.

5. Personnel

The actual strength of the National Police force is 37,760 men. They are deployed countrywide operating out of 24 police headquarters. In addition, there are 4,023 civilian employees, bringing the total number of police force employees to 41,783. The authorized strength of the police force is reported as 42,500 police and 4,619 civilians, see Annex H for current police personnel deployment.

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Patrolmen, referred to as *agentes* or agents, are recruited locally and trained in one of the 7 regional agent training schools in Colombia. Recruit classes are divided into groups of not over forty-five men. Hours of study are normally from 0730 to 1630. In the areas of extreme heat, however, students are given a rest period during the afternoon and attend night classes.

Officers and men are eligible for retirement after 15 years of service at 50 percent of their salary at time of retirement. If they remain on the job beyond 15 years, they can increase their retirement annuity by 4 percent annually to a maximum of 85 percent of their salary.

6. *Training*

Recruitment for the position of agent (policeman) is conducted in all parts of the country. Applicants register at the nearest police station. When a sufficient amount of applicants are on file, they are called into the nearest training school for written, oral, and physical examinations. The general requirements that must be met are (1) to be a Colombian born citizen, (2) to have had active military duty, (3) to be over 19 years of age but under 26, (4) to be at least 5'5" in height with appropriate weight, (5) to have no criminal record, (6) to have a minimum of five years of elementary school training, and (7) to present a birth certificate or baptismal certificate. Preference is given to single applicants; however, married applicants with not more than two children are accepted.

Once these general requirements are met, the applicant is given a written examination that includes (1) arithmetic, (2) geography, (3) history, (4) composition and spelling, (5) Spanish, and (6) written expression. Those applicants that pass this examination are then given an oral and physical examination and assigned to recruit training schools nearest their homes.

During their training period the recruits earn the basic salary of an agent, 720 pesos. However, 50 percent of the salary is returned to the school to help defray operating costs. Three years after graduation, the agent is eligible for promotion.

The standard course in each regional school for police recruits is conducted twice yearly. Each course is of five months duration and is divided into two periods, basic and specialized. The basic course is of twelve weeks duration and the specialized course lasts eight weeks. The specialized course is provided as the needs of the various departments dictate; some of the specialized courses offered are (1) traffic control, (2) investigation, (3) juvenile procedures, (4) custodial work, (5) driver training, (6) grenadiers, (7) K-9 corp training, (8) seaport and airport police duties, and (9) highway patrol. Upon completion of the basic course, those men selected for Carabinero training receive an additional three months of specialized training prior to their field assignment as Carabineros.

The basic police agents course is divided into three phases of instruction: (1) the police culture phase which includes classes in police discipline, mobile and foot patrol, traffic, custodial duties, criminal investigation, intelligence gathering and counter-intelligence, public relations, law and penal procedures; (2) the general culture phase which includes such subjects as geography, Colombian history, composition, oral and written

expression, arithmetic, language, civic instruction and sociology; and (3) physical and military training, including close order drill, riot control, marksmanship, personal defense and gymnastics.

The National Police operate nine full time training institutions, situated in different parts of the country, to provide for all recruit, promotional and officer training needs. The General Santander School for cadet and officers promotional training is located in Bogota. Pre-promotional training to or within the ranks of noncommissioned officers is provided at the Jimenez de Quesada School which is also located in the Capital City. The remaining seven schools are regional schools which provide recruit, limited noncommissioned officers pre-promotional, Carabineros (mounted police), Grenaderos and specialized training. The general police training schools are (1) Simon Bolivar School in Tulua, (2) Antonio Narino School in Barranquilla, (3) Carlos Holguin School in Medellin, and (4) the Gabriel Gonzalez School in Espinal. The National Police maintain three schools that provide special training for the Carabineros; these are (1) National School for Carabineros at Suba (Bogota), (2) Alejandro Gutierrez School at Manizales, and (3) the Eduardo Cuevas School in Orocué. Each advancement in rank from corporal 2nd class to master sergeant requires satisfactory completion of five months training for each step. There are normally approximately 1,000 men in pre-promotional noncommissioned officer training at any one time.

Recruitment for Cadet Officers training is also conducted on a nationwide basis. To be eligible to attend the General Santander Police Cadet School the following general requirements must be met: (1) to be Colombian born, (2) to be over 19 and under 24 years of age, (3) to be single and agree to remain single until five years after graduation, (4) to provide a certificate of good family and personal conduct issued by two persons of acknowledged reliability, (5) to provide a good conduct certificate by DAS, (6) to be a minimum height of 5'5" with weight and thoracic capacity in proportion, and (7) to complete satisfactorily written, oral, endurance, medical, and psychiatric examinations. The Cadet course begins on the first Monday of February each year and is of two years duration. After a two year period of study and upon graduation, the cadet is commissioned a sub-lieutenant and assigned to patrol or administrative duties in one of the 23 departments of the National Police. While attending the officers preparatory course, the cadets earn the equivalent of US \$61.50 which is turned over to the Academy to defray school expenses. The cadet is given C \$50.00 pesos monthly for personal expenditures. The curricula for the officers preparatory school is as follows:

1st semester

- Criminal Law
- General Constitutional Instruction
- Sociology
- Accounting
- Police Regulations
- Physical Education
- Military Drill and Riot Control

2nd semester

- Criminal Law
- Police Administration
- Criminal Statistics
- Penal Instruction
- Public Relations
- Psychology
- Physical Education
- Military Drill and Riot Control

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3rd semester

Forensic Medicine/Laboratory
Penal Instruction
Judicial Proceedings
English
First Aid and Hygiene
Police Tactics
Military Drill and Riot Control

4th semester

Interviews and Reports
Criminal Investigation
Police Services
Penal Procedure
Military Penal Code
Legal Evidence
Police Planning
English
Military Drill and Riot Control

Officer promotional training is also offered at the General Santander School. Once commissioned, the officer must serve as a sub-lieutenant for a period of four years and complete a six months training program prior to establishing eligibility for promotion to first lieutenant. A similar pre-promotional training of six months duration is given before promotion to captain and major. Eligibility for promotion to lieutenant colonel requires ten months training which includes 226 hours of police and public administration which was initiated by the USAID Public Safety Mission to Colombia.

In addition to the formal training discussed in this section, numerous other types of training are utilized for the benefit of the National Police. In-service training is regularly scheduled to assure that each agent and noncommissioned officer receives two hours of training every fourth day. Instruction is given in police related subjects and in others, such as reading, Colombian history, etc. Through the efforts of the USAID Public Safety program, contracts have been made for outside educational training through various civic organizations for badly needed specialty training. SENA Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje) the National Institute for Apprenticeship training, a semi-autonomous trade school, has been utilized to train 60 police communication technicians. O.C.C.A. (Organizacion Civica Colombiana para la Alfabetizacion), the Colombia Civic Organization for Literacy, provides instructor training, visual aids, and human communications to a total of 172 members of the national police. E.S.A.P. (Escuela Superior de Administracion Publica), the Superior School of Public Administration has provided training for 1,157 National Police officers. The graduates from these institutions are used in the various police training schools or on the job training to disseminate their newly learned knowledge and skills in multiplier fashion.

Through the sponsorship of the USAID, 115 officers of the National Police have attended formal training schools in the United States. Others have been sent to Panama and third countries. Upon their return the participants are assigned duties in training schools or in positions that will enable the force to obtain maximum benefits from their newly learned knowledge and skills and their association with members of police departments throughout the free world. Of the 115 National Policemen trained in the United States only four are no longer in the police service.

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In addition, in-country training is provided by the Public Safety members or TDY technicians in a great variety of police and police related subjects. Multiplier training through U.S. sponsored instruction has brought training to 80,000 members of the National Police in various subjects; many personnel have received instruction in more than one subject. Approximately 1,000 police text books in the Spanish language have been furnished by the USAID Public Safety Mission to augment the forty-five libraries used as reference for in-service training by seventy-eight district stations of the National Police.

7. *Pay and Other Benefits*

The National Police pay scale is identical to the Army pay scale. Though the National Police pay scale appears to be quite low in comparison with private industry, it doubles on an average when the fringe benefits are taken into account.

a. *Basic National Police Salary Scale*

Officers	Pesos Monthly
General	\$3,400.00
Major General	3,100.00
Brigadier General	2,900.00
Colonel	2,700.00
Lt. Colonel	2,500.00
Major	2,300.00
Captain	2,100.00
Lieutenant	1,850.00
2nd Lieutenant	1,600.00
Non-Commissioned Officers	
Master Sgt.	1,500.00
1st Class Sgt.	1,350.00
Sergeant	1,250.00
Corporal 1st Class	1,000.00
Corporal 2nd Class	800.00
Agents and Drivers	720.00

b. *Fringe Benefits*

1. Police Service Bonus – 30 percent of the basic salary for officers, non-commissioned officers and agents.
2. Longevity Pay – Officers receive 10 percent after 15 years of service and an additional 1 percent for each year exceeding 15; no maximum. Non-commissioned officers and agents receive 10 percent after 10 years of service and an additional 1 percent for each year exceeding 10; no maximum.

3. Family Bonus for All Personnel – 30 percent to married personnel, 5 percent for first child, and 4 percent for each additional child not to exceed 48 percent of basic salary.
4. Transportation Pay (non-coms and agents only) – \$55.00 monthly for those serving in Bogota, Barranquilla, Medellin, and Cali. \$50.00 for those serving in Barrancabermeja, Cartagena, Santa Marta, Armenia, Bucaramanga, Buga, Cartago, Cucta, Girardot, Ibague, Monteria, Manizales, Neiva, Popayan, Pereira, Pasto, Palmira, Sevilla, Tulna, and Villavicencio.
5. Free medical, dental, hospitalization and drugs for all National Police personnel and dependents.
6. Uniform Allowance – Personnel annually receive the equivalent in pesos of the current cost of one complete uniform.
7. Christmas Bonus – The Christmas bonus amounts to the equivalent of one month's salary.

8. Operations

Police service is provided from various command levels down to the police posts. The chain of command extends from the National Police Headquarters in Bogotá to each Department command to District commands to Stations to Sub-stations to Posts.

In Colombia, Departments are divided into *Municipalities* (similar to counties), which are divided into *precincts*. *Hamlets* are situated in the precincts. There are 936 Municipalities, 3,046 Precincts and 405 Hamlets, or a sum total of 4,387 political subdivisions in the country (data as of August 1967). In 1967, the police reported that 2,126 of these jurisdictions were covered by police services (Annex I). The Team believes that these figures reveal a serious deficiency in police coverage, even though some areas without police officers stationed there can and do draw on adjacent areas for service when needed and military forces are probably present in some other uncovered areas. The Police Five Year Plan (see p 61) is intended to deal with this problem through an expansion of the force of about 60 percent.

a. Urban Policing

One factor affecting the way in which police service is provided is the watch or "turn" worked by the policeman. Under current practice, the men work six hour shifts: 6 hours on duty, 6 hours on reserve in the station and 12 hours off, with each man working a different six-hour watch for each of four days. Thus, one-fourth of the patrol force should be on duty and one-fourth on reserve in the station at any given time.

In Bogotá, a city of 2.4 million people, the actual numbers of police available for patrol are less than the above system would suggest. There are 6,000 police

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assigned to Bogotá (Capital District). Because of illness, vacations, etc., however, only 1,000 to 1,100 are available on each shift. Of these,

- 200-250 men are assigned to radio patrol
- 120 men are assigned to fixed posts at banks
- 60 men are assigned to traffic
- 80 men are assigned to fixed posts at Embassies
- 500-550 men are assigned to foot patrol.

The Police Commander has about 1,000 police "in reserve" during each watch and can call upon any or all of these to supplement his patrols if necessary. He advised the Team that he did so, especially on weekends during the high crime incident period.

Foot patrol is conducted in pairs with the policemen equipped with sidearms and nightsticks. When an arrest is made, the police must take the person to the sub-station or station out of which he operates. The Team observed the patrol in operation at expected peak incident hours at night time. The patrolmen appeared neat, well disciplined and were tending to business. It does not appear, however, that there are sufficient foot and mobile patrol units for an adequate preventive patrol for the entire city - even should the reserves be used all of the time.

Crime statistics are maintained after a fashion by the F-2 Section of the Bogotá Command, but no apparent effort has been made to study incidents in terms of time of day and area in order to better manage the patrol operation.

Patrol supervision appeared adequate, with supervisors in mobile radio patrol cars, cruising their areas and stopping to talk with foot patrolmen.

Motorized Patrol. Vehicles for urban patrol used by the police are of various kinds and may or may not be radio equipped. The mobility of the force is discussed elsewhere and inventory is provided in Annex J. An example of the use of vehicles in patrol is seen in Bogota.

Bogotá has a total of 120 patrol vehicles all of which could be available for duty for each shift. However, as many as 40 percent are deadlined at any one time. Of the 120 vehicles, only 80 are equipped with radios. Thus, about 45 radio equipped vehicles are usually available for supervisory patrol, responding to calls and patrolling areas not (or insufficiently) covered by foot patrols. Each of the twelve patrol sectors of the city has two or three cars.

The Team agrees with the Bogotá Police Commander's comment in this case that more radio patrol vehicles are needed. Although new vehicles have been procured by the Police by means of an ExIm Bank loan, it is not expected that total numbers will increase proportionately since the new vehicles (Fords) are intended for the most part to replace old vehicles now on hand.

There is a need to assure that mobile radios are installed in all new vehicles to assure their maximum utility for patrol and supervisory purposes.

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Additionally, police-owned motor patrols are supplemented by the vehicles provided to the police by the municipalities (see Mobility, below). There are about 50 of these for Bogotá. Some are radio equipped and are controlled by the Central Communications Center (Station 100).

Control Police. The Control Police number some 2,000 and are regular members of the force, selected on the basis of appearance and/or physical ability. The function of this element is to act as the front line in riot control and in crowd control at sports events and fiestas. They are also used for special details (the Christmas pickpocket patrol in Bogotá, for example); and in case of emergencies. When not engaged in these functions, they are used for police facility guards and, on occasion, to supplement police foot patrols. In Bogotá, 460 Control Police are included in the total of 6,000 mentioned above.

b. *Rural Policing*

Basically, police services in the Departments are provided by two categories of police personnel. Regular police personnel man stations, sub-stations and posts which are in populated areas. Some posts are at isolated points in emergency areas where guerrilla bands are known to have been active, but personnel at such posts generally patrol within the populated area. The second category are the Carabineros — or rural police.

The Carabineros. The National Police Corps of Carabineros is an elite category of National Police, selected from volunteers who have just successfully completed their training as police recruits, as police cadets, or from police personnel who are already in service and can meet the physical and mental standards required.

Aspirants for carabinero status must successfully complete a 6-month course which includes a multitude of subjects including:

Horsemanship	Unarmed Defense
Grooming and Care of Horses and Mules	First Aid
Sociology of Rural Colombia	Organization of Command Action Projects
Rural Police Tactics	Elementary Veterinary Medicine
Crowd Control	Elementary Agriculture
Public Relations	Field Sanitation and Hygiene
Marksmanship	Elementary Mechanical Repairs
Survival	

The Carabineros wear a National Police uniform distinguished by gold braid, a gold colored neckerchief, leather puttees, cartridge bandoleer slung over the shoulder, a campaign hat with turned up brim, and crossed rifle insignia.

The Carabineros work principally in rural areas, mounted or dismounted, not only performing normal police functions, but assisting ranchers, farmers, and other rural residents by providing first aid to persons and animals, advice on crops, help in repairing farm equipment, etc.

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Besides being deployed at police posts, squadrons of Carabineros are strategically deployed in various parts of the country and can be detached in groups of various sizes depending on their mission. An elite squadron of 150 Carabineros is stationed at the School for Carabineros at Suba on the outskirts of Bogota and can be flown by the Colombian Air Force to any point in the country on short notice. This squadron moves only when authorized by the Director General of the National Police.

The personnel in these squadrons, when not on missions, are assigned to patrol in areas adjacent to where they are stationed, and also devote considerable time to training. They also perform crowd control missions in urban centers.

Sometimes Carabineros are integrated into Army patrols in violence areas. They have over 200 German Shepherd dogs trained to assist in rural police operations, and some personnel have been trained as dog handlers. The Army often calls on the Carabineros for dogs and handlers to lead patrols in order to warn of ambushes.

Coverage. The police are widely dispersed throughout the country – as indeed they should be. Of the 37,760 man force, 19,500 are assigned to duties outside of the larger cities. Colombia's growing urban population is found in 22 urban centers, having a total of 6,834,000 people (35 percent). There are about 12,693,000 people elsewhere in the country in isolated rural areas, hamlets and smaller towns and cities. The Team was unable to determine precisely which of the jurisdictions are not provided on-site police services, nor, of course, the significance of this factor in terms of current or anticipated violence areas (see Annex I for National Police statistics on jurisdictions receiving police service).

Some police posts are situated in remote areas and have 5 to 10 policemen assigned. Supply and personnel rotation for these posts present difficult problems. For example, five such posts in the Department of Huila can be reached only by a 6 to 8 hours trek through guerrilla country. These posts are manned by Carabineros.

Communications. The Departmental communications networks provided by the Public Safety Program have been a major factor in increasing the ability of the police to carry out effective rural patrols and to respond to requirements for police services in the populated areas. The Commanders of Departments visited by the Team uniformly were enthusiastic regarding the performance of the network while pointing out difficulties in rapid repair of out of service units.

Counterinsurgency. The National Police do not have a special paramilitary element. The military forces have been given the task of combatting armed guerrillas and bands. They have been known to use small unit patrol tactics in this regard as well as the more conventional larger unit "sweeps."

The National Police have trained 718 selected police personnel in a "Ranger" type training program in their school at Espinal (Tolima). Graduates are called "granaderos" or grenadiers and have been assigned to work with military elements in counterguerrilla activities. At the time of the Team's visit to Ibaguè and Rovira in the Department of Tolima, a joint military and police operation was underway involving both police and military personnel.

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With regard to the relative effectiveness of the police and military in counter guerrilla and subversive operations, a study of incidents for a two year period (July 1, 1966 to June 30, 1968) revealed: ²²

	National Police	Army
Bandits Killed	190 (29 Subversives)	129 (63 Subversives)
Bandits Captured	973 (75 Subversives)	73 (13 Subversives)
Subversives Captured	122	11

The source of these figures is the Information Bulletin issued semi-monthly by the National Police. These bulletins contain a listing of all incidents reported by the Army and the Police during the period covered and are distributed within the police force, to the Army and other military services, and to other interested GOC agencies.

In compiling the statistics, only the "hard case" rural bandits and members of identified guerrilla gangs were counted, omitting the run-of-the-mill criminal. Where the action was a joint Army/Police exercise, each was given credit for half those captured or killed. Subversives were counted as those who were acting in some support capacity to the guerrillas without taking an actual part in the operations.

These statistics are not surprising if one realizes that the National Police do not ordinarily operate in force against the bandit and guerrilla elements, but make the majority of their contacts with them in the course of ordinary, unspectacular police operations conducted on a continuous basis, and therefore capture a larger percentage than they kill. The National Police are usually excluded from zones of actual military operations and therefore rarely meet guerrillas in operational status, except, of course, where they are engaged in joint operations with military forces.

The Colombian military officers with whom the Team talked seemed confident that the Army was able to meet any anticipated guerrilla threat. The Army sees its role as that of "combatting" the guerrillas. The Team's view, borne out by Hardin's study above on incidents during a two-year period, is that the Police and the Army should continue to share this task, with the police being engaged in regular police operations and the Army carrying those tasks requiring heavier fire-power.

Police Commanders were less confident of being able to carry out the police role in rural areas, mostly for a lack of equipment and, in some cases (for example, the Department of Santander), personnel.

Comment. The Team believes that every effort should be made by the police to assure a pervasive patrol in current and anticipated troubled areas in order to (a) provide police services to the people, (b) to gain information on guerrilla and other criminal elements, and (c) to deny guerrillas a popular support base. The police are aware of this need and have been taking some steps to meet it (force strength expansion, more vehicles, etc.). The police need assistance in the development of their resources for this activity.

²² This study was conducted by Chief Public Safety Advisor Hardin in July 1968.

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c. *Deployment*

The National Police have not made a study of manpower requirements for the country. The AID Public Safety staff stimulated some interest in the headquarters F-3 section some time ago in this direction, but had to drop this advisory effort when the staff was reduced.

Deployment of police personnel is reflected in Annex H. While it is not possible to derive conclusions as to adequacy of numbers from the data provided, deployment does appear to be generally in terms of population. Each Department should undertake a manpower requirements study, assisted by F-3 headquarters. The Public Safety staff should assist in the planning, execution of this study, and the evaluation of results.

In general, the Team believes that the National Police have the potential for performing rural policing more effectively with their present assets, but lack manpower and materiel to provide the kind of police services that are needed. Additional manpower planned for over the next several years and additional material probably would satisfy this need. To reach this goal, U.S. technical aid will be needed in order to provide counsel in the administration and management of these resources at the Department level, in the conduct of training classes, and in the development of modern operational plans and tactics.

d. *Riot Control*

Prior to 1963, the Police had little or no capability for riot control using minimum force. Following the Public Safety survey in late 1962, U.S. advisory assistance was given in the rudiments of riot control formations and the use of the baton. By 1965, 18,000 personnel had been given training and an operations manual on riot control procedures had been developed. This activity has been continuously pursued by the Public Safety staff. Training has been a major factor in developing a police riot control effectiveness.

The capabilities of the police in controlling riots with a minimum use of force in the major cities is good. There have been no instances of the use of firearms by the police against rioters since 1963, whereas this was the control method chosen prior to that time. There have been some instances of over-reaction, such as last May in Bucaramanga when the police used aggressive tactics in clearing the School of Agronomy of students after a police officer had been seriously wounded by a rock. This suggests that constant retraining is necessary and retraining is an area where police performance has been spotty. The Team estimates that the capability of the police in controlling riots will hold as long as the riots are conventional in nature. Continued effort will be required by the police to maintain this ability, however. For additional discussion on riot control see p 80 regarding the Public Safety Program.

The inventory of tear gas munitions is considered adequate for anticipated needs, although police planning for future supply is lacking. Related equipment, such as helmets and shields, are in short supply.

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During January of this year in Cali, there were 10-15 small riots in different locations of the city at the same time. The same tactic was used in March in Monteria (Cordoba). Earlier (1965) small groups used hit and run tactics in Bogota. During this latter situation, the police used 10-15 men in non-radio equipped trucks to chase the rioters and disperse them without effectiveness.

These "brush fire" tactics have been seen elsewhere in Latin America, starting with the January 1964 riots in Panama City and Colon. They have been seen since then in Brazil and Uruguay where the police have been unable to cope effectively with this tactic. If this tactic is used in Colombia the police would be unable to handle the problem with their present procedures and resources.

New preventive procedures have been developed by AID/W, Office of Public Safety, utilizing preventive patrols in force to obstruct "brush fire" riots at their earliest stages and to arrest agitators. These procedures should be developed as a contingency plan for all major cities. Technical assistance will be needed to do this, as well as to assist in the refresher training that is needed and for resource planning.

e. *Criminal Investigations*

Prior to 1967, the responsibility for investigation of all major crimes was vested in the DAS. The 1967 Decree (see Annex C) returned most of this responsibility to the National Police, where it is assigned to the F-2, Criminal Investigations and Statistics Section. As can be seen by the comparison given in Annex C, the police have responsibilities for major crimes against persons and property. However, the DAS still engages in these investigations, and which Agency investigates an offense often depends on who gets to the crime scene first. Consequently, despite the terms of the 1967 decree, there is not in fact a clear delineation of investigative responsibility.

The Chief of DAS told the Team that he required the responsibility for traditional police investigative tasks in order to provide a cover for his intelligence investigations. The Team considers this argument unconvincing. In any case, the array of tasks assigned to DAS by Decree No. 271 would probably meet this need, if indeed it does exist.

At the present time the Attorney General (Ministry of Justice) has been given authority to utilize some 600 prosecutors throughout the country in the administration of criminal justice. The implications of this are that the prosecutors may be given (by another Decree, to be issued soon) operational control over all criminal investigative activities, which would require the police and DAS officials to be responsive to them in the conduct of investigations. Both the Police and DAS have submitted proposals to the Attorney General regarding the delineation of investigative responsibilities. It is expected that the new Decree will more specifically define the responsibilities of the two forces. The National Police propose that DAS be given the task for handling crimes against the nation and against its fiscal integrity and that all of the rest be given to the police.

The police capabilities for investigation have been steadily improving since responsibility in this field was given to the police in 1967. This capability is estimated as fair to good, depending largely on personnel involved.

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The police are aware of the value of scientific aids (criminalistics), but lack a sufficient technical capability to utilize this resource. They have developed a plan (derived in part from a 1964 survey by a Public Safety Criminalistics Advisor, but divergent from the principal recommendations contained therein) for the development of crime laboratories in Bogota at the Santander Officers' School and in the F-2 Section of the Headquarters staff. "Laboratories" are under construction or planned for each of the recruit schools for training purposes.

The Team considers that the National Police should develop an *adequate* criminalistic capability. To determine the dimensions of this requirement and to make recommendations for meeting it, the USAID requested that a survey be conducted. The Office of Public Safety, AID/W, provided a trained advisor for this purpose and the study began on June 30, 1969.

The Team considers it important that training in criminal investigations continue to be emphasized, including the processing of crime scenes. The latter should be part of an overall program for the development of a capability in scientific investigations. A detailed proposal for this program is expected to be a product of the current criminalistics survey.

9. *Mobility*

The National Police have control of a total of 1,145 vehicles, but own only 656 of this number. The remaining vehicles were purchased by Departments, Municipalities, Civil Defense and Civic organizations for patrolling areas specified by these groups, augmenting the regular police patrol. However, since the purchasers limit the use of their vehicles to certain areas or towns and in some cases even specify the time of patrol, their contribution to overall police patrol capability is less than it might be.

Of the total vehicles owned by the National Police, 577 are in excess of five years old and 241 are in excess of thirteen years old. Repairs are frequent and costly. See Annex J for vehicle age.

From the inception of the USAID Public Safety program the National Police have received 137 vehicles through project grants (see Annex L).

In theory, the responsibility for major repairs rests with the National Police Vehicle Maintenance Center in Bogotá. This establishment appears to be a reasonably well organized repair facility capable of performing all major and minor repairs. However, due to the distances between Bogota and the areas where many vehicles are used, attempting to transport damaged or malfunctioning vehicles into Bogotá is impractical at best and during the rainy season almost impossible. In practice, each Department maintains its own small and usually ill equipped repair shop, normally with poorly trained mechanics and a serious spare parts problem.

In April of 1968, as a result of the Soviet Union and Colombian Coffee Barter Agreement, 100 Russian built GAZ Jeeps were purchased and assigned to the National

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Police Special District of Bogota. The vehicles have proven to be ineffective due to two basic problems: (1) GAZ Jeeps are apparently inferior vehicles, and (2) lack of spare parts complicates repairs during the frequent breakdowns. There is a general dissatisfaction of the police with the vehicles, particularly among the patrol crews. During the team's visit to the National Police vehicle repair center, it was discovered that of the one hundred original GAZ Jeeps, fifty had been cannibalized for parts and were considered permanently out of service (examples are seen in Figure 2). Of the remaining GAZ Jeeps, twenty were deadlines for repairs and thirty were performing patrol duties in the special district of Bogota.

In an effort to modernize and increase police mobility an Export-Import Bank loan has been obtained in the amount of \$3,027 million. The police plan is to standardize the fleet (Ford) to alleviate the present logistics problems due to the variety of makers. A regular replacement plan will be put into effect which will include the vehicles purchased by the Municipalities, Departments, and civic groups. There are, however, some doubts as to whether or not the Municipalities and other organizations will readily relinquish title to their vehicles.

The 1,253 Ford vehicles that have been purchased through the ExIm Bank loan and destined for police service are as follows:

Quantity	All vehicles are Ford	Unit US\$	Total US\$	COMMISSION	
				Unit \$P	Total \$P
50	Sedans for use by Commanders	2,167.36	108,368.00	600.00	30,000.00
200	Patrol sedans for Patrol use	2,283.87	456,774.00	600.00	120,000.00
100	Panels for Patrol use	2,242.94	224,294.00	600.00	60,000.00
150	2½ Ton Truck	2,156.03	323,404.50	600.00	90,000.00
50	3½ Ton Truck	2,608.55	130,427.50	700.00	35,000.00
50	6 Ton Truck chassis	4,345.22	217,261.00	700.00	35,000.00
10	8 Ton Truck chassis	6,072.74	60,727.40	700.00	7,000.00
50	Bus chassis	3,937.99	196,899.50	700.00	35,000.00
20	¾ Ton Pick up Trucks	5,404.57	108,091.40	700.00	14,000.00
20	Ambulances	4,410.37	88,207.40	600.00	12,000.00
5	Ambulances, De lux	3,076.44	15,382.20	600.00	3,000.00
70	Double cab pickups	2,719.74	190,381.80	600.00	42,000.00
3	10 Ton Wreckers	7,587.03	22,761.09	700.00	2,100.00
25	Microbuses with 10 to 15 pass. capacity	2,698.92	67,473.00	600.00	15,000.00
2	Funeral coaches	3,101.22	6,202.44	600.00	1,200.00
450	Jeeps	2,408.26	1,083,717.00	425.00	191,250.00
2	Tractors agriculture Model 5000	2,964.00	5,928.00		
1	Tractor Agriculture Model 3000	2,313.60	2,313.60		

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Figure 2. Russian GAZ Jeeps deadlined at the automotive maintenance center in Bogota.

It will be noted that the total cost for the vehicles listed above is \$3,308,613.83, or somewhat over the amount of the ExIm loan of \$3,027,000. To make up the difference the police have taken about 15 percent of this amount, or \$495,055, in pesos from their FY 1969 budget and will draw some from their FY 1970 budget. This will in fact provide an excess of about \$213,342, which the police will use for the procurement of spare parts. Commission costs indicated in the right hand columns of the list, above, are in pesos and these will be drawn from the FY 1969 budget as well.

10. *Communications*

The Public Safety Telecommunications Advisor has prepared an up to date comprehensive report on the Colombian police telecommunications system. The report deals in depth with the past, current and future requirements of the program as well as the accomplishments (see Annex D).

11. *Logistics and Supply*

The Team was unable to delve into this area in depth, but we were told that the police maintain good inventory records and stock control files.²³ This is especially true of communications spares and equipment where U.S. technical assistance has been used.

²³ USAID Audit Report No. 69-07, "Results of Examination of Public Safety Project, No. 514-11-710-066," dated March 31, 1969.

It is reported, however, that supply flow to users is very poor. Equipment and materiel is allowed to gather in the warehouse in Bogotá and extremely long periods of time pass before an equipment request is met. In fact, a "requisition" in the form of a letter is customarily sent from the Department Commander and he often will send an officer in a truck to Bogotá some time later to see what he can get of what he had asked for. There is no uniform requisitioning system except for communications spares.

Attention should be directed to this problem by the headquarters F-3 division to determine what should be done to make the supply system responsive to field requirements.

12. *Criminal Records*

The Police have not as yet developed adequate criminal records to support its investigative activities. Card files are maintained on stolen vehicles, arrested persons, suspects and known subversives. No arrest records are maintained. Persons arrested are taken directly to an officer of the court for "booking."

Some fingerprint files are being maintained at the headquarters F-2 Section, but this has not been developed sufficiently to be of much help. Fingerprints are classified using the VUCETICH system.

If the police in the Department arrest a person and wish to identify him positively, they will take his fingerprints to the local DAS office, who then can forward a file search request to DAS in Bogotá. General Comacho reportedly believes it best that DAS maintain a national fingerprint file and that the police provide cards and request information from this file from DAS. There is obvious merit in this as an alternative to the police maintaining a separate file.

The F-2 Section also keeps investigation reports, but by and large the maintenance of records by the Section is barely adequate to support its activities.

13. *Weaponry*

Since 1963 the USAID input has been \$823,000 in grant funds to improve the weaponry of the National Police. The A.I.D. arms grant included 1,360 .38 revolvers, 2,760 12 guage shotguns, 13,950 MI .30 caliber carbines. The purchases were made to replace the obsolete and dangerous weapons that were in use, and providing them with more modern appropriate weapons for police use. As the new weapons were received, the older San Cristobal carbines, Mauser rifles, and Madsen submachine guns were retired from police service. However, the National Police have increased their force by over 6,000 personnel since the last quarter of 1967 and in order to equip these additional police officers the National Police have reissued the obsolete weapons which had previously been retired.

The five-year expansion plan developed by the National Police calls for an increase of 10,000 .30 caliber carbines, 2,000 shotguns, 20,000 .38 caliber revolvers for general use, and tear gas equipment for use as support in riots. This increase in weapons probably will be through GOC funding, given adequate budgetary support.

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Firearms training was given a high priority to effect distribution of the weapons and to train the police officers in the use and maintenance of the USAID furnished arms. To implement the distribution and training program it was necessary to schedule a three phase time plan. The first phase included delivery of the arms, sighting in of each carbine and the distribution of the arms to the various Departments. The second phase was devoted to the training of National Police firearms instructors and the third stage was the training of the rank and file of the National Police by the USAID trained firearms instructors. To date, 24,568 men have received training in the MI carbine and shotgun, 1,048 have been trained as firearms instructors, and almost 5,000 have received training in the use of the revolver. However, very little is presently being done in marksmanship training due to lack of ammunition. The National Police have a limited reloading capacity that was provided through AID grant reloading equipment furnished in FY 1963. The reloading equipment has been extensively utilized and kept in good repair; its present capacity is approximately 1,000 rounds per day under ideal conditions.

The current National Police arms inventory includes 892 automatic weapons, comprised of Reising .45 and Madsen 9 MM submachine guns. There are 20,821 revolvers, principally of Smith and Wesson manufacture and of .38 caliber with some limited amounts of .32 and .22 revolvers for training purposes. The shotguns number 2,329 of 12, 16, and 20 gauge, manufactured by Mossberg and Winchester. The 21,304 rifles in the inventory include .30 cal. MI carbines, .30 cal. San Cristobals, .30 cal. Belgas and Tamage, 9 MM Winchesters and 7 MM Mauser. In addition to these weapons, some interior departments have purchased additional arms to be used by the police stationed in their jurisdiction.

The ammunition supply on the surface, appears to be adequate. However, the age and manner of storage casts doubts on the reliability of the ammunition stock. See Annex M for a breakdown of types and distribution of arms and ammunition.

14. *Special Functions*

Special Services. Because of the nature of the services provided under this part of the police organization, some explanation is warranted. The commander of this section sits in Bogota and his section is on a par organizationally with the police subdivisions in the Departments of the country (see Annex F). His responsibilities include the provision of police services for the Intendency of Amazonas and for various special police services as described below.

In 1966 a Decree provided the police with authority to charge for services provided to other government elements and to private firms, such as banks. The services provided below fall under this category in some instances.

a. *Road Police.* Five to six hundred police personnel are used to operate Public Works vehicles on the highways as a sort of highway patrol. Their function is to engage in a safety patrol, removing obstacles in the roadway, and to assist motorists and to investigate accidents. The Ministry of Public Works reimburses the Police for these services.

b. *Guards for Mines.* The National Police or the Army are used to provide protection against theft at gold and emerald mines. Some 75-200 personnel are involved in this duty at any one time. The Police are not reimbursed for this service.

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c. *Bank Protection.* The Police provide protection for the movement of currency and other valuables to and from government banks. Prior to the 1966 Decree mentioned above the Police provided police agents on fixed post duty at any bank on request. Now police are provided as bank guards as before, but private banks are paying the police for these services in most instances. The amount paid goes to the Police Rotating Fund, if the policeman is on a regular tour of duty. If he is on his off-time, 90 percent goes to the man and the remainder to the Fund. The Fund is used for investment purposes to produce income for the pension fund, to construct police housing, to support police commissarys and the like.

d. *Port and Harbor Police.* A relatively small number of personnel are detailed to the Dock and Port authority to provide police services on and around docks and harbors. These policemen function under the jurisdiction of the Dock and Port Authority.

e. *Prisons.* The Police lend relatively high ranking officers for duty as administrators of the prisons, and some of the guard force (principally, non-commissioned officers) assigned to the prison guard force are made up of police personnel. About 100 police personnel are involved in this duty at any one time.

f. *Fire Protection.* The chiefs of most fire departments and some fire stations are National Police personnel. Fire Departments are under the control of the municipal governments. (About 30 police personnel are currently involved in this kind of work.)

g. *Railway Police.* About five to six hundred police personnel are engaged in railroad station security work – the protection of luggage and in the security of trains underway. The Police are not reimbursed for this service.

15. *The Five-Year Plan*

In 1967 the Chief Public Safety Advisor suggested to the Director General of the National Police that the police develop a five-year plan encompassing manpower and materiel requirements to meet the responsibilities of the force.

Such a plan was prepared by IPA graduates working in the F-3 Section. General Comacho discussed the plan with the President, who authorized an increase of 5,000 men over the 15-month period from October 1, 1967 through December 31, 1968. The President directed that General Comacho request (of the U.S. Ambassador) U.S. assistance in implementing the Plan, after which the General made a presentation of his plan to the Country Team Internal Security Committee.

In general, the initial plan called for an increase of 24,450 personnel comprised of 300 officers, 2,650 non-commissioned officers, 20,000 policemen and 1,500 drivers (who normally do not receive basic training). The plan defined transportation, armament and police facility and housing needs and provided budgetary estimates for all increases. However, planning factors were not identified nor were supporting statistics provided to allow an insight into why more police are needed. The Public Safety staff prepared a critical analysis of the Plan, which assessed the adequacy of the planning and identified its shortcomings.

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The Mission response to the GOC request for assistance is reflected in the 1969 CASP submission as follows, under Options:

"The Country Team has considered the desirability of extending further assistance to the National Police, especially related to the draft 5-year expansion plan prepared by the National Police. There is a general consensus among the Country Team that more police are needed in Colombia. Despite a population increase in excess of 35 percent in Colombia over the past decade and an accelerated urban growth rate of up to 7 percent a year, the size of the National Police has increased by only 19 percent. Additional police would permit (a) better coverage of rural areas where 2,261 or more have half of the political jurisdictions in the country are not now receiving police service, (b) better police service within the expanding cities, (c) relieving army personnel of police duties not in keeping with their training and objectives, thus allowing them to concentrate on guerrilla bands.

"While the Country Team agrees with the National Police expansion program and the general magnitude of its logistics component, AID grant financing of this logistic element is not recommended for the following reasons:

"1. GOC should be encouraged to take care of its own police equipment needs, and has the resources to do so. (This does not rule out the possibility of an Ex-Im Bank or some other medium-term credit arrangement.)

"2. The GOC itself has not made any determination as to the importance or priority of the police proposal. The Country Team believes that this should be a GOC decision and request, and does not want to leave the impression that we favor the expansion of the police to the detriment of the army which is and should remain the principal element in the battle against the insurgents. The police function should be principally to maintain public order, provide support to the army when and where needed, and by its presence, to inhibit growth of incipient insurgency. This balance we consider essential, and in keeping with the goal of building an independent civil police organization of high prestige and efficiency.

"3. The import requirements of the present expansion plan are beyond any realistic projection of grant funding available.

"4. While the Country Team considers maintenance of the present predominant role of the U.S. in influence on the Colombia security forces to be important, grant financing of the logistic element of the police expansion plan appears to be an unduly costly, uncertain and probably unnecessary to this objective. Further acquisition of equipment from countries unfriendly to the U.S. may prompt review of this position."

In the absence of the availability of other sources of financing, the possibility of an Ex-Im Bank loan was mentioned at the time to General Comacho. The GOC then submitted a request for such a loan for the procurement of vehicles and spare parts. A loan for \$3,027 million was obtained and the favored bidder for the vehicles was the Ford Motor Company. Delivery is expected to begin by the end of the year. The total number being procured under the loan is 1,253 vehicles of various kinds (see page 57). These vehicles will be used to replace obsolete vehicles and the need remains for additional vehicles to accommodate the force strength expansion.

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In June, 1969, the National Police drafted a new Five-Year Plan covering the 1970 through 1974 time period. In conversations with the Team, General Comacho said that the President approved this plan in principal, but that of course the implementation of it would be dependent upon the yearly budget. A copy of this plan was provided the Team and is reproduced as Annex N. It is noted that now that the entire vehicular fleet will be renovated, the plan calls for adding 20 percent per year for the life of the plan, or 251 vehicles at an estimated annual cost of about \$750,000.

In examining both the first Five-Year Plan and the new one, the Team found that the Plan covering the 1970-1974 time frame is better prepared in terms of narrative justification for the manpower increase proposed. However, the National Police have not conducted the in-depth manpower analyses in each of the country's Departments which would lead to an accurate projection of manpower and materiel needs. Until such studies can be made, the general yardstick used in the development of the new plan will suffice.

The USAID has not had an opportunity to study the new plan, but probably will continue to hold a view similar to that stated in the FY 1969 CASP.

The Team believes that an expansion program (63 percent increase in personnel) brings with it management problems of considerable magnitude. Particularly vital are logistics and maintenance systems, which must be geared to a larger force with correspondingly more equipment and need for support services.

Requirements for major items of equipment, such as vehicles, armament and radios could very well be financed through a loan from either AID or the Export-Import Bank. In either case, it is suggested that there be some involvement of the Public Safety staff in the preparation of the procurement plan for the loan, and to the degree that it is feasible, in its management. The leverage factor of this arrangement would be important in the sense that conditions precedent for the loan could deal with needed organizational and management reforms. Technical assistance in administration, organization, management and police urban and rural operations should be provided over the life of the procurement plan to assist in its implementation.

B. *The Department of Administrative Security (DAS)* ²⁴

1. *Assigned Role*

On July 18, 1960, the President signed a decree (No. 1717) which changed the name and character of the Colombian Intelligence Service (SIC). The new organization was named the Department of Administrative Security and was assigned the following functions:

- a. to exercise the functions of a Judicial Police, as an aid to the Judicial Branch of the Ministry of Justice and to the Attorney General.
- b. to cooperate in the maintenance of public order under the direction of the Government in close collaboration with the National Police.

²⁴The information presented here on the DAS is less comprehensive than would be desirable. DAS, however, proved unable to honor the Team's requests for data to the same extent as did the National Police. This failure may be taken as further evidence of DAS's relative ineffectiveness.

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c. to maintain the registry of foreigners in Colombia and enforce compliance with the laws and regulations regarding foreigners.

The transformation, by accident or design, left the responsibility for the collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence undefined, although it was generally understood that the DAS was to carry on with these tasks, formerly performed by the SIC. During the late 1950s, the SIC had acquired a poor reputation and the establishment of a meaningful intelligence organization under the DAS banner was an uphill climb.

2. 1963 AID Survey

A study of the capabilities and limitations of the DAS was conducted by AID in the fall of 1963. The recommendations of this study called for limitation of DAS responsibilities for criminal investigation; elimination of DAS's responsibility for bodyguards, protective services and the regulation of private businesses; a concentration of DAS's effort on foreigners to those suspected of subversion and other threats to internal security; elimination of the certificate of conduct; establishment of a new DAS academy and a rural intelligence school; tightening security measures and operational control of the DAS organization; and an imaginative public relations program.

U.S. aid to DAS through these earlier years was especially helpful in assisting the organization to become established (see comments on this assistance in Chapter II, below). General Leyva told the Team that the 1963 AID survey continues to guide efforts to improve the DAS. At the same time, he said that not all of the recommendations could be implemented. Some major reforms have, however, been made, especially in improving the evaluation of intelligence through the establishment of a Central Intelligence Office for the collation of information and the coordination of information gathering elements.

3. Organization

The present organization of DAS is given as Annex O. This is responsive, according to General Leyva, to the most recent decree, delineating the responsibilities for criminal investigation between DAS and the National Police (Annex C). The organization now has an authorized strength of about 3,100 officials and subordinate employees. However, it is believed that only about 2,500 are actually on the payroll, of which 60 percent are in Bogota.

The Chief of DAS sits on the National Security Council along with the Ministers of Government, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Justice. The Council reviews government actions having to do with the security of the country and provides advice regarding actions to be taken.

The functions of the principal subdivisions of the DAS are described below. The 1963 AID Survey presents a fairly comprehensive description of the organization as it existed at that time. The functions of surviving elements of the organization remain the same for the most part.

a. *Public Order Division.* This division is composed of four sections and is the division most concerned with the intelligence functions of the organization. It is also

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concerned with Presidential protection, which requires 90-100 of the 234 personnel assigned to the Division daily. With regard to intelligence, the appropriate section analyzes incoming information and sends a resumé to the Central Intelligence Office. It also sends intelligence requests to the field. It is responsible for covert operations and the maintenance of informant nets. The Embassy assesses the DAS counterintelligence capability as fair to poor due to lack of trained manpower, funds for buying information, transportation and good leadership.

b. *Foreigner Control.* This section is concerned with the entry and exit of foreigners into the country and their activities while there. It deals with residents, tourists and persons in the country on work visas. There are 120-125,000 foreigners in the country at the present time, and there is an average of 15,000 tourists per month. The Minister of Foreign Affairs issues passports and delegates this responsibility to Departmental Governments to preclude the necessity of the citizens having to come to Bogota. Illegal immigration presents a potential problem in that DAS has little ability to patrol border areas. Some Rurales personnel are now stationed on the border between the Intendency of Arauca and Venezuela as a security measure, but little border patrol is conducted. About 100 personnel are involved with this activity in Bogota and about fifty more at the various seaports.

An AID public Safety survey of foreigner control was conducted in November, 1966, which noted that a nucleus of capable and dedicated personnel existed in the organization around which a good control program could be built.²⁵ Several recommendations were made in this report, some of which have been accepted and put into effect by DAS. The limited size of the Public Safety staff has prevented any serious consideration of providing DAS with technical assistance in this area.

c. *Judicial Police.* As can be seen from the organization chart for DAS (Annex O), it considers itself to have responsibilities for the investigation of crimes against people, against the public order, against public treasury, against public health and against public faith (such as mis- or malfeasance in office). It will be noted that this does not coincide with the array of responsibilities set forth in the decree setting out the delineation between DAS and the National Police in the criminal investigation field (Annex C). Additionally, DAS undertakes the responsibility for the control of private security guards, street vendors, and auto repair shops. Approximately 1,000 personnel are employed in this section for the entire country (it was reported that 1,500 personnel are authorized, however). There are, of this number, about 650 investigators, 200 of which are located in Bogota and the Department of Cundinamarca. Approximately 350 persons are concerned with the maintenance of fingerprint files, photographic facilities and other files in Bogota and in administrative duties. The DAS Chief states that he would like to specialize his investigators, but hasn't enough men. Each investigator is reported to handle about 10 cases at one time. The general investigative capability of the DAS is judged to be spotty, with some of the investigators who have survived changes in administration of government doing a creditable job, but with many of the others lacking training. The Public Safety project

²⁵"Report on Alien Control in Colombia," November 1966, B.L. Quick, Public Safety Advisor.

provided some assistance in the development of investigative capabilities by means of technical assistance for awhile, but this had to be discontinued due to staffing restraints.

d. *Supply and Service Division.* This Section concerns itself with communication and transportation services, maintenance, and other support services and appropriate files. There are 36 radio installations throughout the country, with some of them tied into the Ministry of Government network. These are CW-operated units and are 15 years old with the expected low reliability. Thirty-four FM sets are used by the Rurales in the Llanos. The DAS reports that it has about 200 vehicles of all kinds throughout the country, about forty percent of which are of the 1954-56 vintage. Some small boats and two large ones are used for river patrol in the Llanos. In general, the communications capability of the DAS is low, although the Public Safety project is attempting to alleviate this problem with the help of a contract telecommunications technician. Vehicles are inadequate in number and poorly maintained due to an inadequate budget for repair parts. The weapons used by DAS personnel vary from the .38 revolver for investigators to the carbine, shotgun and 30-30 rifle for rural patrol in the Llanos. No training or refresher program for marksmanship of any significance is being conducted at the present time.

e. *Laboratory and Identification Division.* The Team did not examine these facilities since it was known that a Public Safety Criminalistics Advisor would be conducting a thorough survey of the laboratory as a part of a broader study of overall police needs in this special area. It is reported (by the police) that the capabilities of the DAS laboratory are greater than those of the police in laboratory examinations and the criminal and non-criminal files maintained in this Section represent the only such files of any magnitude that exist in Colombia.

f. *Rural Security Division.* Started by cattlemen in the Llanos years ago, the Rurales are the only rural patrol force covering that area. They are a distinctive group, dressing in cowboy boots, hats and with holster slung on their hips like the marshals or sheriffs of the U.S. West in the late 19th century. Their strength is about 450, with about half of that number on active patrol. A recent decree has given the Rurales the right to exercise patrols in areas of the country other than the Llanos. At the present time some 25 of these personnel are supplementing regular police patrols in areas along the Magdalena River between Puerto Berrio and La Dorado bordering the Departments of Boyaca, Caldas and Cundinamarca. The history of the Rurales parallels that of the U.S. Texas Rangers, and their future should probably also be similar, in the sense that the Rurales should eventually be absorbed by the National Police force, perhaps as a part of the Carabineros.

In sum, the DAS organization has not yet developed into a capable intelligence organization, the investigative functions given it earlier will probably be transferred to the Police, except for certain offenses against the state; individual capabilities are generally low due to the rapid turnover of personnel. It is the Team's conviction that much more needs to be done to develop the necessary abilities within the force, but that this cannot be done until there is a personnel system that will assure tenure.

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C. *Other Civil Security Forces*

While the National Police and the Department of Administrative Security represent the essential civil security forces for the country, there are other forces which supplement these in the performance of the police task throughout the country.

1. *Municipal Police*

In several of the large cities — although not in Bogotá — the Municipality has organized municipal forces for the provision of the normal range of police services. The personnel in these organizations have powers of arrest as do the National Police and function as regular police for populated areas. An example of this kind of force is found in Medellin. It is comprised of about 100 personnel, whose principal task is to assist the National Police in the patrol of the city, particularly the bars and canteens and in the control of prostitution. Fifteen radio equipped vehicles are used for this patrol, with the radios being tied into the National Police radio center. The force is called the Department of Security and Control and the National Police commander for the Department states that it has been of valuable assistance to him in the patrolling of the city.

It appears that the custom of maintaining a separate police organization by municipality administrations is a carryover from the time, not too long ago, when all policing was the responsibility of local administration. It is undoubtedly a result of the fact that the National Police have been short of necessary manpower for the provision of a desirable level of police protection and patrol. It is expected that eventually the National Police should be able to carry the entire police burden for the country and the various supplementary police organizations can be disbanded.

2. *Traffic Police*

In some of the larger cities, most notably in Bogotá, the municipality has organized a traffic control force. The function of these forces is the control of traffic and the enforcement of traffic laws. While it is reported that the traffic police in Bogotá have regular police powers, they have not exercised these when confronted with crimes — often turning aside when thefts are committed in their presence. Where these forces are not in existence, the National Police provide personnel for traffic control work.

3. *Civil Defense Groups*

On April 6, 1967, a Decree (No. 606) was issued which established a National Directorate for Civil Defense, whose Director reports directly to the President. The Director is responsible for the function of Civil Defense Boards throughout the country, and for the coordination of these Boards with the activities of the military forces, and National Police and the DAS. The Decree affirms an earlier Decree (No. 3698 of 1965) which declared that "it is the obligation of all Colombians to participate actively in the National Defense, whenever the public needs may deem it so, whether through external aggression or internal disturbances or public disaster." It is the function of the Civil Defense Boards in the respective areas of the country to assure this participation of the people in the defense of the country in times of strife and disaster.

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The first such group was organized in Medellin. Members of the group number about 150 people and have no police powers. The group is organized into four sections: patrol, rescue, social action, and health. They function in their patrols under the command of the National Police and use 15 radio equipped vehicles for this purpose. The vehicles used are privately owned, but the police (through AID assistance) have provided the radios. The membership in the group is voluntary and the members buy their own weapons from the military service. They have had no training in the use of firearms, however. In Medellin, the function of this group is to provide aid in the case of disaster, but it is also used by the police to provide sources of information on criminal activities in the city.

4. *Customs*

The National Customs Service under the Ministry of Finance, has the responsibility for controlling the movement of goods into and out of the country. While this function is vested in the National Police agency in some of the countries of Latin America, this is not so in Colombia. The Customs Service also has the responsibility for border control to interdict the movement of contraband, although very little is being done in the way of active patrol on the borders and the Customs personnel are concentrated at airports and ports.

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II. U.S. Security Programs

A. The AID Public Safety Program

1. Assistance to the National Police

a. Origin of Program

The Public Safety Program had its beginning in the early part of 1963 following a request by the Government of Colombia for assistance in this field under the provisions of the General Agreement for Economic, Technical and Related Assistance of July 23, 1962, to help curb the then prevalent violence and lack of security that impeded normal economic and social growth of the country. Following this formal request and at the request of the Ambassador, an AID Public Safety survey was conducted in late 1962 at the request of the Colombian Government and a report, including conclusions and recommendations, was prepared.²⁶ Copies of this report were provided the Colombian Government and the recommendations contained therein formed the basis for the preparation of the first Project Agreement (ProAg) for assistance to the National Police, signed on February 14, 1963.

The USAID Director forwarded a letter to the Minister of War, enclosing the survey report, in which he outlined an assistance program which would have the following objectives:

1. the improvement of riot control capability;
2. improvement and extension of the radio network;
3. more mobility and more patrol coverage;
4. the use of firearms reloading equipment for intensified firearms training;
5. modifications in training so as to provide more field exercises and demonstrations; and
6. more intensive public relations programs.

b. Project Goals

The first Project Agreement was dated February 14, 1963 and described the purpose and objectives of the project as follows:

"The purpose of the project is to improve the overall operation of the National Police of Colombia, which is under the Ministry of War, so that it can more adequately protect life and property, and to assure internal stability. This will be done through a mutual program of assistance between the Government of the United States, represented by the Agency for International Development (AID), and the Government

²⁶"Report on the Police of the Republic of Colombia," Department of State, Agency for International Development, Office of Public Safety, December, 1962 (LOU).

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of Colombia, represented by the Ministry of War. Although the general objective and purpose will be the overall improvement of police operation, specific objectives will be:

1. Improved vigilance and patrol so as to prevent crimes and provide more protection to the public.
2. Reduce violence in the rural areas.
3. Extension of the Public Relation program so that it will operate on a wider scope.
4. Increase in the number of technical police materials in the training schools.
5. A study of the present legal system with recommendations for improvement.
6. The providing of additional arms and transportation to the police in the rural areas.
7. An intensive study of the present communications network so that plans can be made for improvement in this area."

The generally stated objectives underwent modification in expression in subsequent agreements. The FY 1968 Agreement (No. 9, signed June 28, 1968) gave general objectives as follows, with specific activities to be pursued given under each objective (beginning on p. 6):

1. Improve the professional level of police force personnel through the use of various training programs.
2. Complete installation of police communication system.
3. Improve uniformed police operations.
4. Increase the capability and effectiveness of criminal investigations.
5. Develop an increased police planning capability.

Better specificity in the description of project goals was first seen in the FY 1966 Agreement (No. 3, signed January 31, 1966), a fact commented upon favorably by an interagency study group in November of that year.²⁷

An example of the changes in project goal description can be seen when following one objective through the various Agreements. The first objective of the 1963 ProAg underwent the following changes in expression:

Objective No. 1: "Improved patrol and more protection to the public." This is restated in 1964 and the language "to reduce the number of fixed posts" added. The objective was then generalized in the 1965 Agreement (No. 5, signed March 5, 1965). The "umbrella" objectives of the latter agreement are:

1. To strengthen National Police forces in order to reduce violence in rural areas and prevent rebirth of violence in areas where it has been effectively suppressed.
2. To improve the capability of the National Police forces to maintain law and order in urban areas, to move quickly and effectively to prevent and suppress outbreaks of terrorism, to quell civil disturbances, and to deal effectively with other unlawful acts which threaten economic, political and social stability.

²⁷"U.S. Internal Security Programs in Latin America," Volume IV, Colombia, November 30, 1966, p. 43.

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3. To assist the National Police in the development of management and administrative practices which will utilize most effectively the human, financial and material resources of the organization.

The FY 1966 Agreement (No. 3, signed January 31, 1966) is much more specific in the definition of project goals. However, the "patrol and protection of the public" objective of 1963 is found expressed as a "specific target" using the same language as in paragraph 2 of the 1965 Agreement, above. A more specific goal is described later (p. 6); however, under administration and organization:

"... to assure that by June 30, 1967 a minimum of 20% of the police personnel are on patrol or otherwise engaged in rendering police services to the public at peak periods of need. This will be an increase over the present figure, estimated at less than 13%."

The FY 1967 Agreement continued with the same general statement of the objective and described how this was to be done as follows (p. 18) under "Uniformed Police Operations":

"The National Police will continue to improve their operations in the Special District of Bogotá and in the departmental commands by improving supervision of uniformed foot and motorized patrol, identification of problems demanding police attention, delineation of special high crime rate areas with corresponding distribution of personnel on a geographical and time basis to meet the need and control of vehicular traffic with the objective of moving persons (labor force) and goods to their destinations with maximum safety and speed.

"The National Police will keep their riot control training up to date, maintaining the special forces which exist for that purpose in a state of constant preparedness to deal effectively with civil turbulences or prevent their arising. In support of Articles 20, 21 and 22 of the Decree, they will continue to emphasize use of minimum necessary force, employing standard formations and using non-lethal dispersing and protective devices as taught by the National Police-AID Public Safety team during the latter half of 1966. When the special forces are not engaged in crowd control operations or training, the National Police will seek to derive maximum benefit from such special forces by assigning them on a temporary basis where flexibility of application is important, such as patrol saturation either in uniform or civilian clothes, or both, in areas affected by sudden crime waves, control of vehicular traffic in especially congested situations, disaster work, etc."

The 1968 Agreement, signed on June 28, 1968, restated the objective slightly, but without changing its scope or dimension. The language used in the FY 1968 Agreement is probably the most descriptive of the project goals and activities. This part of the Agreement is given as Annex P.

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The objectives of the project have been modified considerably in the FY 1969 Project Agreement, which was signed on June 27, 1969. Two major objectives remain in the project:

1. Complete installation of police communications networks and communications maintenance and supply depots, and
2. Upgrade the professional level of National Police personnel through training.

U.S. contributions mentioned in the Agreement include the services of a communications advisor and training advisor, \$38,000 for communications equipment, spare parts and training aids, \$10,000 for training aids for the police schools, and training for approximately 25 officers in the U.S. Additionally, the Agreement states that funds from the peso Trust Fund account would be used at an estimated total cost of 353,000 pesos (\$30,760) for purposes including procurement of local services, leasing of program time on a local computer to facilitate the study and use of a parts accountability program for the communications center in Bogotá, financing in-country training at ESAP, paying local costs incidental to the receipt, inventory, warehousing of USAID-purchased equipment prior to transfer to the National Police, translating manuals and publications, paying for one local technician to work with the Communications Advisor, and covering local currency costs of U.S. advisors (local allowances, in-country per diem and travel, etc.).

Details of activities to be undertaken under the main objectives quoted above are given in Annex Q.

c. *Project Resources*

U.S. dollar costs for the implementation of the project for all prior years and for projections through FY 1972 are given in Table 3. Total *expenditures* for all years through FY-68 (six years) by category are:

	\$000	Percentage
Technicians	734.3	18.7
Participants	391.8	10.0
Commodities	2,723.0	69.1
Other Costs	88.4	2.2
TOTAL	<u>3,937.5</u>	<u>100.0</u>

Obligations were greater for most of the project years and prior year funds were used in succeeding years. Total obligations by year were:

FY 1963	717.9
FY 1964	357.8
FY 1965	798.8
FY 1966	1,685.5
FY 1967	463.4
FY 1968	340.6
TOTAL	<u>4,364.0</u>

Of the \$427,000 difference between obligations and expenditures, \$152,109 is for FY 1968. Bills have not been paid as yet for some of this and the balance is due to less than expected technician costs due to Balpa. Other unexpended funds were in earlier years not spent due to savings in technician costs and in lesser costs for commodities. These funds were deobligated.

Technicians. The project was initiated with a staff of four advisors, three of which worked with the National Police and the fourth with DAS. The staff expanded to nine advisors and one U.S. secretary in FY 67. This level was subsequently reduced to three as a result of the Balpa exercise (a reduction of 70%). One position, the remaining Communications Advisor was extended at the request of the USAID through June of 1970. Therefore, the currently authorized level is one Chief Advisor, one Training Advisor, one Communications Advisor and one Investigations Advisor (DAS). A bar chart showing advisor employment in the project is given as Figure 3.

Participants. A total of 375 participants have been trained in the U.S. through FY 1968. Of this number, 129 have been from the National Police and 246 from DAS. Most of these have received training at the International Police Academy (320) while some have been given specialized training in various fields (55). Annexes R and S give the numbers that have been trained to date in the U.S. and in the School of the Americas, Canal Zone, for the National Police and DAS, respectively.

Commodities. About \$2.7 million has been spent for commodities through FY 1968, half of which was spent in FY 1966 for weapons, communications equipment and riot control items. Commodities provided through FY 68 are given in Annex T. The percentage breakdown of commodity expenditures was as follows:

	Percent
Vehicles	16.7
Communications	47.4
Weapons	31.6
Riot control, Laboratory items, training aids	4.3

Other Costs. These funds have been used for the procurement of local supplies and spare parts, training materials and film for the production of training aids and public relations, and for local training in SENA and ESAP. It is expected that the latter costs will be borne by the counterpart trust fund (pesos) in FY 1969 and succeeding years.

d. *Achievements*

Since the initiation of the Public Safety Project in Colombia in January, 1963, some 60,000 pamphlets or training aids, adapted and translated, have been reproduced and distributed within the National Police and DAS, and over 1,000 textbooks and booklets in Spanish on police subjects and related themes have been provided to the National Police libraries and to DAS.

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	FY-63	FY-64	FY-65	FY-66	FY-67	FY-68	FY-69	FY-70	FY-71
Chief Advisor	-----	-----						-----	-----
Investigation Adv.	-----				-----	-----			-----
Rural Advisor		-----			-----				
Training Adv.		-----	-----	-----					-----
Commo. Adv.	-----				-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Municipal Adv.									
Training Adv.				-----	-----	-----			
Commo. Adv.					-----	-----	-----	-----	
Investigation Adv.				-----	-----	-----			
Total at end of FY.	3	5	4	7	7	6	5	4	3

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Figure 3
Public Safety Advisor Employment

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Table 3

PROJECT DOLLARE XPENDITURES *
(\$000)

	63	64	65	66	67	68	TOTAL
TECHNICIANS	32.0	80.3	113.5	144.5	214.5	149.6	734.3
PARTICIPANTS	4.6	55.6	156.2	81.3	60.5	33.6	391.8
COMMODITIES	538.1	171.5	553.9	1,379.4	79.6	.5***	2,723.0
OTHER COSTS	3.4	11.5	7.8	39.7	21.1	4.8	88.4
TOTAL **	578.1	318.9	831.4	1,644.8	375.7	188.5	3,937.5

* Source: "Audit of Public Safety Project," March 31, 1969, Exhibit A.
 ** Columns may not add due to rounding.
 *** Sub-obligations for this year total \$46,000.

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One hundred fifteen National Police officers and 205 DAS personnel have been trained in U.S. schools. Of these, most have taken general and specialized courses at the International Police Academy. Two National Police officers have graduated from the FBI National Academy.

In the nine National Police training installations – which have received extensive AID advisory assistance – 718 key personnel have completed training in police counterinsurgency operations. Thirty-two have received specialized telecommunications maintenance training. Refresher type training in miscellaneous police subjects have been given to approximately 63,000 personnel (with most trainees receiving two or more courses).

Special National Police task forces have been formed in the major cities to cope with special problems and their members have received intensive riot and crowd control training under the advice and with the help of AID advisors. Instructors' training in marksmanship and firearms safety has been provided by AID advisors to 1,048 key personnel who are, in turn, intended to pass the training on to the rank and file. Eight hundred sixty-three National Police personnel have received the AID-sponsored training in leadership and supervision from the Superior School of Public Administration; 193 have received the 72-hour course in fundamentals of Police Administration, while 87 have received the 220-hour course in Police and Public Administration. AID-financed courses in Public Relations have been given 1,444 key National Police personnel.

Surveys have been completed on police automotive fleet management and maintenance, communications, and small arms. Principal recommendations of the latter study have been implemented, and accompanied by appropriate training and technical advice in weapons use, maintenance and storage.

Police vehicles on patrol in Bogotá have been increased from 5% to 60% of the equipment available in the existing fleet. Mobile radio patrols have been augmented on a self-help basis in seven key cities with AID providing the mobile radio sets and stations. Tactical, urban, FM radio sets for use in riot control and patrol operations, provided by AID, have been established in six cities. Installations of AID-provided rural tactical radio-communications systems have been completed in 13 important Departments, with the assistance of AID communications advice. Installations of AID-provided voice and teletype equipment to strengthen the National point-to-point net is underway.

Other important developments during the past three years which are expected to enhance the effectiveness of the National Police considerably (and for which AID can claim some credit) are:

(1) The President signed a decree authorizing improved organization of the National Police and providing for more intensive and widespread inspection procedures and benefits are becoming increasingly apparent, especially in the areas of training and operations.

(2) Another Presidential decree vested in the National Police the responsibility for investigation of common crimes. The National Police commanders are implementing an order by the Director General to assign 10% of their personnel to this

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activity, and USAID is collaborating in the organization of investigative units, and training of personnel in investigative techniques, including use of AID-provided investigative equipment.

(3) An initial plan developed by the National Police for expansion by 20,000 over a 5-year period, although not approved in its entirety, was implemented to the extent that a net 5,000 personnel were added during the last quarter of 1967 and during 1968. One thousand two hundred fifty additional personnel were authorized in the 1969 budget, and the General Directorate hopes to receive authorization for 2,750 more after a firmer estimate of tax receipts is completed in August. A new plan has just been drafted covering the 1970-1974 time frame. This is discussed on p 61 and in Annex N.

(4) USAID assisted the National Police in making application for a \$3,027 million Export-Import Bank loan to replace its worn-out fleet of about 1,000 motor vehicles. The National Police have awarded a bid to the Ford Motor Company for 1,253 vehicles and spare parts.

e. *Observations Regarding Project Accomplishments*

The objectives of the project are in the process of being achieved and in some cases are nearly reached. The Team's assessment of progress with respect to each activity covered in the FY 1968 Agreement (Annex P) follows:

Training. Through technical assistance and training of 115 policemen in the U.S., the school system of the National Police has improved markedly. Three of the five officers of the Training Department in police headquarters are IPA graduates and about 33 percent of all faculty members of the respective schools have been U.S.-trained. Instructor training has been provided, the schools' curricula have been tailored to police needs and non-police subject matter reduced. Most of the progress has been realized since mid-1965 with the arrival of the present training advisor.

Training was elevated in importance within the headquarters staff by moving the training activity in headquarters from the F-3 Section and establishing it as a separate staff department. General Comacho emphasized in conversation with the Team that his department's ability is directly influenced by how well it trains its men. He now appears to be convinced of the value of IPA training for his officers; he has assigned IPA graduates to appropriate posts; and he believes IPA training should continue for an increased number of his officers (he said that he would like to see forty officers per year attend IPA). The impact of past training and its multiplier effect are discussed elsewhere.

Even if the strength of the force were not to be increased, more would have to be done to bring the training capabilities of the police to the necessary level. Since the force will probably expand in the coming years, even greater burdens will be placed on the training system. Improvements in the system should take the form of:

(a) expanded in-service training courses in urban and rural patrol tactics, riot control, firearms, criminal investigations, and in police-community relations.

(b) better planning and management to assure uniformity of course content and instruction.

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(c) greater use of the ESAP and SENA resources for courses in supervision and leadership and in technical subjects.

(d) the development of senior officer workshops to deal with organization, administration, management, and operational matters.

In order to bring about these improvements in the next three to four years, the following should be done:

(a) Two U.S. advisors should be provided (see a discussion on priorities elsewhere in this report) to assist in the planning, evaluation and utilization of all training programs. One would work with the Training Section in headquarters on countrywide training plans and programs, curricula and bulletins. The second would work with each of the schools on the implementation of national training plans, instructor training, and in-service training programs.

(b) About \$10,000 worth of commodities should be provided each year for the procurement of slide projectors, textbooks and other training aids and demonstration materials. It is considered that the leverage factor of these commodities would be high. If not provided by the U.S., the police would probably not obtain the necessary aids in the quantity needed nor within the time that they would be required.

(c) Reproduction equipment should be purchased (possibly with some AID financial help) to allow the police to produce their own books and training bulletins. (The USAID has been meeting a portion of the needs to date, using its mimeograph equipment.) With their own equipment, the police will be better able to achieve the necessary level of production, and they will also have greater flexibility in choice of training aids (e.g., manuals, pamphlets, bulletins or texts).

Urban Policing – Prior to 1963, there were no mobile radio patrols in Colombia. In 1963 it was determined that in Bogotá only five percent of available manpower was actually patrolling the streets and that too many men were assigned to fixed posts. Through advisory assistance, immediate steps were taken to assign more men to foot patrol and to review fixed post assignments. In Bogotá today, it is estimated that about 30 percent of those on each watch are assigned to foot patrol duty and an additional 15 percent to patrol cars. Bogotá's demonstration of manpower use led other major cities to improve their patrol effectiveness.

While the actual number of patrolmen in the major cities is considered inadequate for an effective preventive patrol, the utilization of available manpower has been improved.

Public Safety assistance included a municipal advisor for a period of time until the end of 1965; provided vehicles for Bogotá and some other cities and provided radios for use in other vehicles (56 in Bogotá, 59 for the rest of the country) not provided by the project.

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More effective urban patrol operations can be brought about by

- (a) greater numbers of police on foot patrol and mobile radio units.
- (b) the deployment of personnel in accordance with crime incidence (time and area in which crimes are committed, high crime potential areas, and high crime situations: sports events, parades, etc.). The police have the latent ability of performing the necessary analyses, but need constant guidance and follow-through in order that the required information is obtained and used properly.
- (c) better police supervision and administration by better planning (e.g., in development in accordance with (b), above), and by the constant review of performance levels in riot control training, communications work, criminal investigation, logistical support and patrol procedures.

To accomplish these improvements, U.S. technical assistance in the area of police organization and administration would be needed for a number of years. The Chief Advisor, with appropriate support from his staff, should work with F-3 on planning and research and with the commanders of larger city police departments in the country. Additional work with urban police commanders and others will be necessary to develop a police ability to prevent and cope with urban terrorism. This is considered especially important in view of the Team's belief that the greatest future threat to internal security is in urban areas.

Rural Policing — With the cooperation of the MILGROUP, a special rural police training course was established in the Espinal School, which had a curriculum similar to U.S. Ranger training. There have been 718 graduates, called *Granaderos*, from this course to date. Suspended for the time being, this course is expected to be resumed soon.

Weaponry for the police was modernized and old bolt action rifles were replaced by the M-1 carbine. About 75 vehicles were provided for rural patrol in the then violence areas of Santander, Tolima and Huila. One aircraft (Cessna 185) was provided for use in the Llanos for the supply and movement of personnel.

One Rural Police Advisor was provided from June of 1963 until late 1966 to work with Department Commanders regarding rural police tactics and operations, counter-bandit actions, protection of posts from attack and the provision of police services generally to the rural population. This position was cancelled by the USAID upon the departure of the advisor.

The establishment of communications networks in rural areas has been the single most effective instrument in improving rural policing. However, the police capability is still not uniform in rural areas, and in any case, is not as high as it should be. The Colombian military forces are vacating areas previously protected by them and turning to the police to provide the necessary law enforcement and protection of life and property for these areas. The police have inadequate manpower for an active preventive patrol and therefore have to restrict their personnel largely to sub-stations and posts in populated areas.

Also, while the major element of the threat to internal security is expected to be urban, the potential for increased rural violence remains. Preventive police

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actions, including intelligence gathering and police services to the rural populace, are necessary to keep this potential from developing.

In order to achieve the necessary capability for rural policing:

- (a) Additional weapons will be needed as the force expands (about 14,000 carbines in all).
- (b) Additional motor vehicles, horses and mules will be required for patrol.
- (c) Constant refresher training in marksmanship will be needed.
- (d) Training of personnel in posts and sub-stations in rural police methods, counter-bandit operations, and intelligence collection will be required.
- (e) Technical assistance should be given to station and district commanders on rural policing generally.

Assistance should be given in this area in the form of a rural police advisor who would be active in areas indicated by (c), (d), and (e) above.

The costs for commodities (except for a small amount of demonstration equipment) should be borne by the GOC, perhaps with the help of an AID loan. Without U.S. help in this area it is probable that the GOC would (or could) not buy them themselves, but would use the old weapons which they retired after the U.S. provided weapons in 1967.

Riot Control – Public Safety assistance has been especially valuable in changing the thinking of the police as to how to control riots and in the development of capabilities for doing so with a minimum amount of force. The police were successful in preventing any serious outbreaks of violence in the country during Governor Rockefeller's visit in May, 1969. The goal for riot control set in the ProAg has for the moment been reached. There is constant need, however, for refresher training and for logistical planning to sustain the present riot control capabilities of the police. U.S. advisory help by training advisors will be required, since it has been found that these matters are left unattended when advisors do not work with the police frequently. (See also a discussion on this subject under Police Capabilities, p 54.)

Communications – In June, 1963, a Telecommunications Engineer from the AID Office of Public Safety in Washington conducted a survey of police communications needs and capabilities. His report set forth various recommendations for improving police communications capabilities.²⁸

Major recommendations in this report were:

- (a) to assign a communications advisor to the USAID Public Safety Division who would be responsible for planning and implementing the various communications projects needed.

²⁸ "Republic of Colombia Police Communications Survey Report," AID/Office of Public Safety, July 1963, Mr. Paul Katz.

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(b) to provide AID commodity assistance through the communications advisor to expand and improve telecommunications facilities of both the National Police and the DAS.

(c) wherever possible, to integrate telecommunications facilities of the National Police, DAS and the Ministry of Government to avoid duplication of equipment and to expand the capabilities of all agencies.

(d) to initiate training programs for communications officers and technicians of both the National Police and the DAS.

The report also pointed out a need for greatly improved urban radio networks for mobile patrol.

The communications activity of the project was initiated as a result of the above study. A detailed presentation of the current status of this activity is given in Annex D.²⁹

The AID Mission has been active in the telecommunications field for about six years. During this time it has taken on different dimensions as a result of the nature of rural insurgency. For example, it was decided to install a rural tactical network in Santander because of the violence in that Department in 1964, then to add such networks in other departments for the same reasons. As mentioned earlier, the presence and reliability of these networks has been the significant factor in the improvement of rural police capabilities.

To date, the planned for networks in 13 departments have been installed, with Antioquia being the last net to be installed. Even so, some of these Departments are requesting additional radios to place in newly established posts or for special tactical purposes. About 30 percent of the needed radios for urban patrol cars have been provided and installed. The communications maintenance and supply center in Bogota has been established and is functioning, but none of the regional centers have yet been constructed. Thus, the initial objective of the activity was reached, the goal then modified and that newly defined objective, in turn, was reached. There remains, however, the following to be done in order that the police can sustain the capability they have achieved in certain departments and to provide for this capability in certain others:

(a) regional communications repair and supply depots should be established in four locations.

(b) mobile radios should be supplied to patrol vehicles in both urban and rural areas. The requirement for radios is not known in detail, but should be determined after studying the manner in which the new vehicles, being procured under the ExIm Bank loan, are utilized.

(c) tactical communications equipment, similar to that placed in 13 departments, should be placed in five more departments (Cundinamarca, Boyaca, Bolivar,

²⁹ This report was prepared by the Public Safety Telecommunications Advisor, Mr. Mark Seaton, at the request of the Evaluation Team.

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Cordoba and Meta) and additional radios are needed in Antioquia. The total cost of these radios is about \$280,000; AID help in covering this cost may or may not be required.

The Katz survey report proposed that the Minister of Government, the National Police and the DAS all use the same network. This has not come to pass, largely because of a disagreement among the three governmental elements as to who should have the operational control of the common user network. The Public Safety Telecommunications Advisor for the project sees the common user concept as unsuitable under the circumstances.

It is estimated that an additional five man-years of technical assistance will be required to complete tasks already under way or projected in the communications field. This can be accomplished with the use of one advisor for this period of time or by employing two advisors for less time. Work cannot possibly be completed by the end of FY 1970, which is the time the one remaining advisor's position is to be terminated as a by-product of the BALPA exercise.

Additional communications requirements, set forth above, would require yet an additional input of technical assistance.

Criminal Investigation — An objective was added to the project in the FY 1964 ProAg . . . "to effect the incorporation of investigative responsibility over common crimes under the National Police and assist in carrying out this responsibility." The responsibility for these types of investigation was given to the F-2 Section and the project proceeded to assist this Section with technical assistance and some commodities. Training programs were developed for several of the schools and a survey of crime laboratory requirements was conducted in 1964 by a Public Safety Criminalistics Advisor. The project staff has not included someone especially trained in this field and such assistance as has been provided has been from the municipal advisor and the training advisor. (See also a discussion on capabilities in this area, p. 55.)

The amount of assistance has been small relative to other activities of the project, and the suitability of some of the plans of the F-2 and Training Section relating to the establishment of laboratories in the respective schools for training and operations purposes is open to question. A further survey of criminalistics requirements is underway as this report is written and these plans should be redirected, based on the findings of that study. It may be that technical assistance in the criminalistics field will be required, perhaps through temporary duty assignments.

Weaponry — The original survey identified a serious problem in the great variety and number of obsolete weapons in the hands of the police. The FY 1966 ProAg included provisions for the modernization of police weaponry, utilizing .38 caliber revolvers and the M-1 Carbine as the basic police weapons for urban and rural police use, respectively. During the life of the project, AID has provided 360 revolvers, 13,950 carbines, 2,760 12 gauge shotguns and several small ammunition reloading machines to the police. The total cost of all of these weapons amounted to approximately \$860,000.

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Public Safety advisors were active in developing marksmanship training programs and in the training of instructors. Sufficient ammunition was provided initially to carry out an appropriate training program, but not enough for the necessary and continuous refresher training.

The number of weapons provided was based on the needs of a force of some 31,000 men. Since the force has now been augmented by 6,250 men, and may be increased yet further by some 15,000 to 20,000, a requirement for additional weapons remains. The Police have armed the newly acquired personnel with the old weapons that were retired after receiving the AID-provided new weapons in early 1967. The present need is for 3,000 additional carbines and 1,000 revolvers. The recent police procurement of 4,000 revolvers will not alleviate this problem since these are intended to replace worn out or obsolete hand guns. Additional weapons will be needed should the force be expanded further. Estimates of these needs and related costs are:

Present increase of 6,250 men	
3,000 carbines at \$35.00 each	\$105,000
1,000 revolvers at \$50.00 each	50,000
Expected additional increase over the next four years, 13,750 men	
9,000 carbines	\$315,000
1,000 shotguns at \$60.00 each	60,000
7,000 revolvers	350,000
Total	<u>\$880,000</u>

These cost estimates are approximate and will be lower should excess property shotguns be available. Costs of spare parts and ammunition are not included.

The principal need at this time is to assure that the policeman is able to use the weapon assigned to him. A continuous training program should be pursued at all levels. Adequate firearms training ranges are available in some locations, though two observed by the Team were of generally poor design from a standpoint of safety.

Technical assistance in this area is required on the part of the training advisor.

Transportation – In pursuit of one of the original objectives of the project, a total of 137 vehicles of various kinds, including one aircraft, have been procured and delivered to the National Police and 137 vehicles and one aircraft have been provided to the DAS. A list of these by type and year provided is provided as Annex L.

Of the equipment provided, a recent study revealed that five vehicles and one aircraft provided the Police have been destroyed in accidents and that four vehicles provided to DAS are out of service due to lack of repair parts. (USAID Audit Report No. 69-07, March 31, 1969.) During the Team's visits throughout the country it found that vehicles provided by the project were being used properly and reasonably well taken care of. There remains a problem of maintenance and repair for all police vehicles, regardless of how they have been acquired.

From the standpoint of the original statement of the objective having to do with transportation, the Team views that it has been achieved. This is particularly true in light of the present vehicle replacement program undertaken by the Police with the use of a loan from the ExIm Bank. What is now required is a review of the needs for transportation at this time and for the future, given the likelihood of a force strength expansion. Additional vehicles will be needed. The Public Safety staff estimates, for example, that a force of 51,500 men would require approximately 2,000 vehicles of various types. Detailed field surveys to determine actual requirements, based on operational needs, have not been conducted. The exact numbers and types and detailed plans as to where and how vehicles would be utilized should be the product of an intensive study by the F-3 Section of the police headquarters, assisted by AID Public Safety advisory assistance.

2. *Assistance to the Department of Administrative Security (DAS)*

a. *Objectives*

The Public Safety activities related to DAS have been prescribed in Project Agreements separate from those for the National Police. The first ProAg was signed on February 28, 1963 and set forth the following objectives:

1. To improve the quality of DAS personnel through better recruitment, training, and supervision.
2. To recommend an improved concept of the mission and jurisdiction of DAS.
3. To coordinate the functions of DAS with those of the National Police and the Armed Forces.
4. To improve the transportation services, technical services, and communications system in DAS.
5. To recommend an improved program of public relations in DAS.
6. To examine the security procedures within DAS against penetration by alien and subversive groups, and recommend improvements.
7. To develop an intelligence capability in DAS, in the areas of subversive activities and rural violence, adequate to the needs of the Executive in dealing with these problems.

An advisor was provided to implement the above plan and conducted a survey of DAS needs and capabilities. His recommendations formed the basis for subsequent ProAg objectives and were:

1. Limitation of DAS criminal investigative jurisdiction to cases involving the internal security of the nation, and criminal cases of national importance.
2. Elimination from DAS of the responsibility for bodyguards, protective services, and regulation of private business.

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3. Emphasis in the Foreigner Control Division on cases affecting internal security and involving subversion of the Government of Colombia.

4. Elimination of certificates of conduct.

5. Establishment of a new DAS Academy and a Rural Intelligence School, accompanied by an accelerated training program and a career program for Investigative Officers of DAS.

6. A tightening of physical and personal security measures and operational control in DAS.

7. Establishment of a well planned and organized public relations program.

With the modification of DAS responsibilities in criminal investigation matters in 1964, and the Public Safety Survey of Alien Control Methods, the ProAg for 1967 reflected areas of activity to improve DAS capabilities as follows:

1. Rural and urban intelligence requirements related to the internal security of Colombia.

2. Investigations of vital importance to the National Government.

3. Establishment and maintenance of a system of control over non-Colombian nationals present in the country, particularly those engaged in activities inimicable to the interests of the Government of Colombia.

4. Technical, criminological, and identification services for authorized government entities.

5. Carry out the following modifications:

a. Restriction of DAS criminal investigative jurisdiction to cases involving the internal security of the nation, and criminal cases of national interest such as those against the country's fiscal integrity, based on decrees outlining these duties.

b. Continue the reassignment to other entities of current DAS responsibility for bodyguards, protective services, and regulation of private business.

c. Emphasis in the Foreigner Control Division (*Extranjeria*) on cases affecting internal security and involving subversion against the legally constituted Government of Colombia, on the basis of recommendations contained in the survey conducted by an AID Immigration Specialist.

d. Elimination of certificates of conduct now being issued by DAS to individuals upon request and assignment of personnel delegated to that task to more important duties.

e. Establishment of new curricula for the DAS Academy and Rural Intelligence School, accompanied by an accelerated training program and a career program for investigative officers of DAS.

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f. A tightening of physical and personal security measures and operational control in DAS.

g. Continuation of a well planned and organized public relations program.

The most recent Agreement, for FY 1969, was signed on September 30, 1968, with much more limited objectives:

1. Improve the professional level of DAS personnel through various training programs at IPA in Washington, and in investigations and in automotive maintenance and repair through training in-country.

2. Strengthen the maintenance and utilization of the DAS communications system.

3. Increase the capability and effectiveness of criminal investigations.

b. *Accomplishments*

The Public Safety project has provided advisory assistance in counter-intelligence operations for 7½ man years and in criminal investigations for 3 man years (the latter position was abolished in the BALPA exercise). One advisor to DAS remains on the Public Safety staff. A total of 246 participants have been trained in the United States. Commodities of various kinds have been provided. These have been in the categories of vehicles (including one aircraft), radios, weapons, investigative aids and laboratory items and training aids.

As a result of this aid and a commitment of GOC resources

- a new urban investigative training center was established.
- a new rural patrol (Rurales) school was established at Aquazul in the Llanos.
- administrative reforms have been effected (personnel selection and management).
- a capability for laboratory examinations has been developed.
- a portion of the transportation need has been met.
- appropriate weaponry was provided the Rurales.
- training curricula were developed for the investigators' school and improved for the Rurales school.
- greater effectiveness of immigration procedures.
- improved counterintelligence capabilities.

The Chief of DAS, in conversations with the Team, referred to the 1963 Public Safety Study and said that he was attempting to carry most of its recommendations. While the accomplishments have been significant over the past five and a half years, there is

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yet a long way to go. Present capabilities of the DAS are discussed in the previous chapter. The most recent ProAg is seen to limit the effort of the project to the development of abilities through training, communications and criminal investigations. The latter responsibilities may very well be limited to offenses against the nation and against the nation's fiscal integrity. This would restrict considerably the requirement for the development of an investigative capability covering the much broader range of offenses, which would fall under the purview of the National Police.

Accomplishments in the professionalization of the force will be extremely difficult as long as members of DAS are appointed on a political basis. A career system will have to be developed before there can be much hope in this direction. At the present time, the project is financing a local hire technician to work under the Public Safety Communications Advisor to upgrade the communications maintenance and repair capabilities of DAS personnel and to put its system back in working order. This may be accomplished by the end of this year. Should additional contract time be required, the technician should be extended accordingly.

For the future, plans are to continue the project on the present basis, without significant commodity or training input. The present advisor is fully engaged in day-to-day activities and has no time for counseling DAS leaders regarding needed reforms nor for working with other elements of the force, such as in training or patrol. He also will not be able to provide technical advice regarding the improvement of the ability of criminal investigators, regardless of the charter that DAS may eventually have in this regard.

The Team sees a continuing requirement (first seen in the initial surveys in 1963) for the development of an adequate capability for the collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence on threats to Colombia's internal security. It sees the path to this goal as rough indeed as long as there is the organization's personnel do not have job tenure. Once this barrier is crossed, all of the other problems will become manageable, although the DAS would then probably require additional U.S. advisory assistance.

Assistance provided by the project to date has been effective to the extent that some achievements have been realized, as indicated above. Technical assistance has been the most effective and participant training the least. As can be seen elsewhere in this report, an extremely high percentage of the participants trained in the U.S. are no longer with the organization — a product of the lack of tenure. Commodities have been effectively utilized in most instances, though not as effectively as have those provided the National Police. In the case of communications, DAS has not been able to take care of the equipment provided as well as is required. This may be due to the fact that the project did not concentrate technical assistance in this area for the DAS as it has for the Police. The USAID Audit Report mentioned earlier took note of the fact that some of the vehicles have been deadlined for two years — and this may have been due to the unfortunate choice of vehicle type since spare parts for this vehicle are not to be found in-country.

In short, the project probably has been doing as well as possible given the nature of the organization with which it has been working, and the restrictions on staffing imposed by BALPA. Further aid, beyond the presently contemplated level, should await a

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decision by the Government of Colombia to make DAS into a highly competent, non-political and professional security organization.

c. *Effectiveness of U.S. Assistance*

U.S. aid of various kinds provided the National Police has been more effective than that provided to the DAS, largely for the reason that the lack of job tenure in DAS has prevented the development of its human resources.

With regard to the National Police, technical assistance, participant training and commodities have been effective in varying degrees depending on the activity, and generally in the order given.

Technical Assistance. The Team was impressed with the close rapport that is apparent between the remaining advisors (including the Chief Advisor, who, although he had left post prior to the Team's arrival, returned to assist the Team in its efforts) and their counterparts. The police leaders with whom the Team talked mentioned a number of present and past advisors as having provided very valuable assistance. Obviously, some were more effective than others and the Chief Advisor made appropriate changes in assignment to utilize the abilities of the respective advisors most effectively.

Various police commanders commented on the effectiveness of past aid and on the need for U.S. assistance in the future. In Cali, the commander stated that aid in the past had been very helpful and that it should continue in the areas of training, investigations, communications and in the development of a records system for the force. In Medellin, the commander saw a future need for training aid in riot control, marksmanship and transportation. The commander in Santander stated "Public Safety assistance has been especially helpful during a period of development of the police. We will need this kind of help for quite a few years to guide us on what needs to be done and how to do it. Younger officers will be leaders of the force in the near future and the training given them in the U.S. will bear fruit at that time. I see a need for advisory aid for some time in the future, for you have gotten us through primary school, but we still need to get through high school and college."

General Camacho commented on the AID Public Safety role in general, saying that he sees the role of Public Safety as being very important to his force. He saw training in the U.S. is especially valuable; and equipment has been important also in the past, due to the difficulty experienced by the police in getting allocations of foreign exchange. He would like to have advisory assistance in the same areas as in the past, but with more intensive help in the fields of communications and investigations, the latter because of the new role given the police most recently. When asked as to whether he believes the Public Safety project should continue, he responded by saying, "Certainly, and increased. If it keeps going as it has, it will soon be nothing."

With regard to the DAS, effective advisory assistance has been provided in effecting some reforms and in training in counterintelligence and in criminal investigations. The most effective period was during the initial years when time could be devoted to

reforms and the general operations of the organization. At the present time, this is not possible because of the workload of the one advisor working with DAS.

3. *Participant Training*

The training given to the police has been particularly valuable and has created a small core of younger trained officers in various operational and junior command positions where the concepts of policing learned can be applied. A significant number of IPA-trained officers are in the training system where their effectiveness is leading to a constantly improved program for all ranks. More DAS officers have been trained than have National Police officers, yet the effectiveness has been less and a significant number have left the force (about 30%). Of those that remain, the training provided has had a beneficial effect and these officers represent a core to build on should the opportunity present itself in the future.

4. *Commodities*

The Public Safety project has provided a considerable amount of equipment, principally communications items and weapons to stiffen the police abilities to deal with rural insurgency problems which were especially serious in the early years of the project. Otherwise, the amount of commodity input is about what would be expected to assure the best utilization of the advice and training provided in the project and to assist in the building of a civil police institution. The Team believes that the material provided has been effectively used by both the police and DAS (with some minor exceptions in transportation equipment and in communications in the latter instance). This coincides with the conclusion of the USAID Audit Report of last March.

5. *Reforms in the Judicial System*

Soon after the initiation of the Public Safety project, the Chief Advisor urged that some effort be made to assist in bringing about some reform in the judicial system. The problems in existence at that time persist today.

An arrested person is usually held in custody for long periods of time before his case is heard in court. In 1964, for example, Mr. Swenson found that of a prison population of 30,032 persons, 22,316 were "accused, but do not know if they will be tried or freed" and 779 had been indicted and were awaiting trial.³⁰ This situation is believed due to the inadequate trial procedures, starting from the time that the arrested person is brought before the magistrate and until such time that his case is heard before the trial judge.

In 1968, the USAID secured the services of two consultants who reviewed the situation and made recommendations for improvement of the part of the system having to do with pre-trial investigations and case preparation on the part of investigating officials.

³⁰"Survey of Colombian Prison System," AID, Office of Public Safety, 1964, Harold R. Swenson, Federal Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Department of Justice.

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Decree No. 16 of 1968 made sweeping reforms in the judicial process, giving power to the President to do certain things that normally require legislative action. These steps were included in the Decree:

- (a) reorganize the jurisdiction of the courts, encompassing both criminal and civil matters;
- (b) restructure the salary level for officers of the courts;
- (c) impose organizational and performance standards on the courts.

As a part of the latter provision, the manner in which crimes are to be investigated and tried is dealt with, but in somewhat vague terms. This was an attempt to bring about a better performance in the collection of evidence and information prior to the presentation of the case in court.

Earlier, and at the present time, the information gathered by the police in the initial stages of the investigation (first 48 hours) is presented to the "instructional judge," and this judge is then responsible for developing the case to its conclusion and presenting it to the prosecutor, who takes it to the trial court. The instructional judges are untrained and often prefer to conduct their own investigations rather than rely on the police or DAS investigators to do so. As a consequence, time passes and persons who normally would be released because of an obvious lack of culpability or to lack of evidence remain in jail awaiting trial.

The obvious solution was to tackle the problem on a nationwide basis and to turn to the Federal official most responsible, the Attorney General. As a consequence, the Attorney General has prepared a new decree that was on the President's desk at the time of the Team's visit, which is to serve as a means for implementing the decree of last year. The Director General of the National Police and the Chief of DAS have submitted proposals to the Attorney General prior to the writing of the decree, suggesting the manner in which investigative responsibilities could be apportioned between the two agencies. Should the decree be signed, which is believed to be likely and soon, it is planned that some sixty assistant prosecutors, or agents of the Attorney General would be hired for the execution of a plan for Bogotá only, which will be used as a pilot area to determine if the use of these agents in concert with police and DAS investigators will indeed resolve some of the problems facing the judicial system.

To assist in this pilot plan, the USAID plans to hire the services of a consultant for a period of six months, probably beginning about mid-September. This consultant has been an Assistant Attorney General for the State of California for eight years and will advise the Attorney General on the establishment of the administrative machinery for handling the agents and will look into the nature of the training to be provided the newly hired personnel. It is expected that he will work closely with the Public Safety staff during this period of time. The FY 1969 ProAg has been amended to allow for costs for these services to come under the Public Safety project.

Should this plan succeed, it is anticipated that the procedure will then be expanded to other parts of the country over a period of time, using the experience in

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Bogotá as a guide. Additional reforms will then be given attention, such as those in trial court procedures.

B. *The Military Assistance Program*³¹

1. *Background*

Military assistance to Colombia began in 1952. Through FY 1969, grant military assistance has totalled US\$92 million. During its first nine years, military assistance to Colombia emphasized defense of the Western Hemisphere. In 1961, emphasis was shifted to internal security.

During the latter period, the Military Assistance Program was based on strategic estimates of what units and equipment would be needed to reduce guerrilla activity and influence to an acceptable level. That level was defined as "that degree of insurgency, short of representing a threat of overt overthrow of the constitutional process and short of an ability on the part of dissident elements to influence significantly the will of the rural people or disavow their support of duly elected officials."³²

One year ago in the CASP for FY 1970-72, the Country Team expressed satisfaction with the success achieved by the Military Assistance Program by stating that:

"... as of this date the MAP-supported units have nearly reached their full authorization of personnel and equipment and at the same time have *nearly*, but not entirely, reached the internal security objective of reduction and containment of guerrilla activity and influence at an 'acceptable level'. The equipment programmed in the FY69 and FY70 Military Assistance Plans is designed to fill out the equipment requirements of these units, on an austere basis, so that they will be fully effective and capable of completing the tasks before them."³³

2. *Present Status and Future Plans*

In the CASP for FY 1971-73,³⁴ the Country Team maintained its optimistic view of progress in the internal security field and declared that:

"Insurgency, although not eliminated, has been reduced so at this time it is not a serious impediment to accelerated democratic political, social and economic environment."

The Country Team stressed, however, that the insurgency threat could again increase to a dangerous level, if the armed forces and police do not retain an adequate performance level and urged "continued military advisory, training, and material assistance programs through 1973." Grant military assistance was called for in the following

³¹ Much of the information presented in this section is drawn from the Military Assistance Plan for Colombia, United States Southern Command, June 27, 1968 (Secret NoForn).

³² Annex C of the CASP for FY1970-72, transmitted under cover of BOGOTA A-882, July 16, 1968 (Secret).

³³ BOGOTA A-882, op. cit.

³⁴ BOGOTA A-102, March 1, 1969 (Secret).

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amounts: FY 71 - \$3,490,000; FY 72 - \$1,950,000; FY 73 - \$1,450,000. The figure proposed for FY 71 was slightly below the \$3.6 million authorized for FY 70 and substantially below the FY 69 level of \$4.2 million.

Decisions made in Washington have accelerated the gradual reduction of military assistance recommended by the Country Team. The approved FY 71 grant program totals \$2.1 million and consists only of training, and limited follow-on support. No new end items are provided in the FY 71 grant program. Five helicopters requested for FY 71 by the Country Team were deleted from the program. As matters now stand, the grant programs for FY 72 and FY 73 will be limited to \$0.9 million for training in each year.

Even after the near phase-out in grant military assistance in FY 72, the U.S. Military Group will presumably remain in Colombia. The Country Team has recommended this course of action, and it would be consistent with the fact that the U.S. Armed Services had missions in Colombia long before the Military Assistance Program was initiated. In this respect, the projected future of the U.S. military advisory effort differs markedly from that in the field of public safety. If the Public Safety program is phased out in FY 73, as is now planned, no advisors will remain behind.

3. *Problems*

The accelerated phase-out of MAP has contributed to two major problems:

a. *Maintenance.* After June 30, 1971 the Government of Colombia will be required to budget for operating costs previously covered by MAP. Most of these costs represent follow-on spares for MAP equipment already provided or scheduled to be delivered to the Colombian Armed Forces. The sum involved represents only a small fraction of the current Colombian military budget. Nevertheless, this new burden is a real problem for the Government of Colombia, particularly since all of the expenditures involved require the use of scarce foreign exchange. A real danger exists that the Ministry of Defense will not be able to obtain all of the needed funds and that important items of military equipment will become unusable owing to a lack of spare parts.

b. *Troop Mobility.* Colombia is a large country with vast stretches of rugged terrain and few roads. In these conditions, helicopters have played an important role in counterinsurgency operations. The Colombian Armed Forces now have only 13 UH-type helicopters, and not all of those are operational all of the time. As has already been noted, five more helicopters were requested, but have been deleted from the program. A senior Colombian Army officer has reportedly expressed the belief that with 40 to 50 helicopters the insurgency could be totally eliminated. Given present MAP plans and Colombian budgetary constraints, it is unlikely that this thesis will ever be tested.

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ANNEX A

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Director General, National Police

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Commander SA of Bogota

Col. Henry Garcia Bohorquez
Chief F-3

Col. Ignacio Acosta Zambrano
Chief F-1

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National Police Commander,
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Lt. Col. Cesar A. Tello Ramirez
National Police Commander,
Department of Huila

Lt. Col. Otilio Calderon Avila
Deputy Commander, Department of Huila

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Lt. Col. Luis Alberto Gonzalez
Commander, Department of Antioquia

Lt. Col. Mario Castillo Ruiz
Commander, Department of Santander

Lt. Col. Jorge Collazos
Deputy Commander,
Department of Santander

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Dep. Commander, Department of Tolima

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Major Carlos Jaimes Mogollon
Director National Police School
"Gabriel Gonzalez"

Major Segundo Absalon Guerra Rubio
Deputy Director "Gabriel Gonzalez"

Major Paulo Guarin
Chief Night Patrol, Bogota

Major A. Padua
Patrol Supervisor, Bogota

Major Eduardo Suarez Prias
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Major Enrique Valderrama Vegas
Chief F-2

Major Jaime Ospina Pineros
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Capt. Jaime Ramirez Gomez
Assistant Chief of Detectives, Bogota

Major Jose De Jesus Prada Vera
Commander First District, Cali

Capt. Juan Francisco Alvarez Patino
Communications – A.I.D. Coordinator

Major Jorge Guillermo Crazo Maya
Commander First District, Medellin

Capt. Salomon Rojas Orjuela
Chief F-2, Cali

Major Hernando Alzate Munoz
Chief F-4, Medellin

Capt. Luis Hergert Espana Pena
Chief F-3, Cali

Major (M.D.) Alberto Restrepo Posada
Chief F-7 (Med.), Medellin

Capt. Harvey Borrero Calero
Chief F-8, Cali

Major Parra Rincon
Director, Vehicle Maintenance Center

Capt. Lascano Cervantes
Chief F-4, Cali

Captain Jose Ignacio Gomex Jaramillo
Chief, F-4 Neiva

Capt. Eduardo Pinilla Mendoza
Chief F-1, Medellin

Captain Jorge Enrique Sanchez Torres
Chief F-3 and Carabineros, Neiva

Capt. Juan B. Toloza Chirinos
Chief F-3, Medellin

Capt. Jose Octavio Ruiz Reyes
Chief F-2, Neiva

Capt. Jairo Humberto Villamil Casa
Chief F-3 "Carlos Holguin" School

Capt. Gonzalo Berdugo
Commander 2nd District, Rovira

Capt. M. A. Vallejo
Chief F-2, Bucaramanga

Capt. Jesus Ariosoto Lasso Ordonez
Chief F-2, Ibague

Lt. Munevar Perez, Jose Elias
Chief F-1, Nieva

Capt. Jose Bohorquez Alvarez
Chief F-4, Ibague

Lt. Luis Alberto Robles Pena
Chief, F-3, Neiva

Capt. Guillegardo Suarez Hernandez
Chief F-1, Ibague

Lt. Rodrigo Vargas Ruiz
Chief Training Section "General Santander"
School

Capt. Antonio Aragon Mondragon
Chief of Training
"Gabriel Gonzalez" School

Lt. Rodolfo Diaz Rodriguez
Chief of Laboratory "General Santander"
School

Capt. Scheavenato Acosta Livio
Company Commander
"Gabriel Gonzalez" School

Capt. Jorge Hernandez Ortiz
Adjutant "General Santander" School

Lt. Manuel S. Gustavo Rozo
Chief of Instruction
"Gonzalo Jimenez de Quesada" School

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Lt. Julio Enrique Florez Amaya
Communications

Col. Enrique Millan Perdomo
Chief Central Intelligence

Lt. Harold Lozano Jaramillo
Administration Officer, Communications

Dr. Ediberto Tamayo Medina
Chief of Judicial Police

Lt. Alfonso Herrera
Communications Division

Sr. Constantino Galindo
Chief of Administration and Services

Lt. Rodrigo Carbonel
Communications Division

Sr. Yebrail Puentes
Chief of Laboratories

Lt. Luis Efren Murillo Alzate
Planning, Statistics –
Communications Division

Sr. Epaminondas Gordillo
Chief of Public Order

Lt. Hugo Ferreira Avella
F-6 – National Police

Dr. Oswaldo Lopez
Chief of Personnel

Lt. Gentil Andrade Ocana
F-3 National Police

Sr. Alberto Fernandez
Chief of Graphology and Identification

Lt. J. Emilio Duque Montoya
Adjutant, Medellin

Major (Ret.) Manuel Navia
Chief of DAS, Department of Huila

Lt. Hernando Torres Sosa
Chief of Communications, Medellin

Sr. Jose Ignacio Lara
Executive Secretary, Department Huila

Lt. Guillermo Leus
Chief of Training “Carlos Holguin” School

Sr. Aristobulo Santacruz Ricardo
Chief of Public Order, Department of Huila

Lt. G. Diaz
Chief, District of Bucaramanga

Major (Ret.) Antonio Arciniegas Castilla
Chief of DAS, Department of Tolima

Sgt. v/1 Pedro Millan Marin
Post Commander, Natagaima

Sr. Jaime Ortegon
Chief of Public Order, Department of Tolima

D A S

General Luis Etilio Leiva
Director of DAS

General Alberto Rueda Teran
Chief of Immigration

General Leon Orjuela
Chief Inspector General

ARMY

Brigadier General Sanchez
Commander 3rd Brigade, Department of Valle

Col. Armando Pinzon
Commander 6th Brigade,
Department of Tolima

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OTHERS

General Gerardo Ayerbe Chauz
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Sr. Edgar Gutierrez Castro
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Mr. Miguel Leon Gonzalez
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ANNEX B

THE INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION AND THE COLOMBIAN SECURITY FORCES—1962-1969

by Herbert O. Hardin—May 15, 1969

I. INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION

A. *General*

From 1962 to 1968, the internal security situation in Colombia underwent visible changes. President Guillermo Leon Valencia's decision in 1962 to wipe out violence in the rural areas marked the beginning of the end of the rural bandit gangs and the "Independent Republics" or communist enclaves, principally consisting of Sumapaz, Marquetalia, Rio Chiquito, and El Pato. Amnesties, and offers of economic assistance provided few favorable results.

The Departments of Tolima, Valle, Huila, Cauca, Caldas, Antioquia, Boyaca, Magdalena, Santander, Northern Santander, and the southern part of Cundinamarca were overrun by bandit gangs, some politically oriented, some not, who ranged over the countryside pillaging and murdering at will, ambushing Army and National Police patrols, and attacking their posts. An atmosphere of terror dominated these regions, causing large migrations of poor and dispossessed people to the urban centers, and blighting productiveness of the affected lands.

In the major cities there were terrorist gangs in operation, composed mostly of extreme leftist orientation, but some remnants of the ANAPO (Rojas Pinilla's National Popular Alliance). Their activities consisted mainly of planting nuisance bombs.

Civil disturbances by radical student and other groups were frequent and could effectively disrupt normal urban life. Gangsterism in the cities, involving audacious major attacks on financial and business establishments, accompanied by wanton killing of police and private guards as well as employees, was a major concern because of its prevalence.

Street crimes involving robbery, assault, purse and watch snatching, pocket-picking, as well as crimes of stealth, such as burglary, larceny and auto theft were prevalent.

B. *The Turning Point*

The nationalization and unification of the uniformed police in 1961 and the adoption of more appropriate tactics by the Army were the first positive GOC steps toward elimination of the rural bandit gangs in Colombia.

Efforts were increasingly successful during the years 1963, 1964, and 1965. The Army, by occupying certain areas, was able to deprive the gangs of their normal haunts, forcing them into unfamiliar territories where operations and concealment were more difficult, making them more vulnerable to the National Police and Army units who killed and captured increasingly large numbers. In 1963, the Army was able to ambush and kill the most daring of the leaders, one dubbed "Chispas" (Sparks), with 631 murders to his credit, and the breakup of his gang followed.

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In 1964, National Police killed "Desquite" (Revenge) and "Sangre Negra" (Black Blood), two other dreaded leaders, and tracked down their followers, either killing or capturing them. "Tarzan" was killed by the Army in late 1964. This accounted for four of the worst gangs in southern Colombia, all of them extreme leftist oriented. In the meantime, many of the lesser gangs were eradicated by the National Police and the Army. In July, 1965, the Army cornered Efrain Gonzales, a conservative bandit from Boyaca, in South Bogotá, and after several hours of fierce fighting between him and about 450 soldiers, a National Police tear gas squad flushed him out of the house where he was barricaded and he was killed.

By early 1966, Northern Tolima, Caldas, Boyaca, western Valle, and western Cauca had been cleared of criminal bandit gangs to the extent that travel, farming, and other productive activities were relatively safe in these areas.

Late in 1964, the Army occupied the "Independent Republic of Marquetalia" comprising parts of southern Tolima, northern Huila, eastern Valle, and eastern Cauca. Pedro Antonio Marin, alias Manuel Marulanda, alias Tiro Fijo (Dead Shot), a PCC-oriented bandit leader had proclaimed himself the chief of this enclave. The occupation was publicized and Tiro Fijo and his forces withdrew in advance to the surrounding mountains from where they harassed the troops.

The first evidence of any concerted effort by Castro-supported forces to initiate a guerrilla movement in Colombia became apparent on 7 January 1965 with a large-scale attack on the town of Simacota in the Department of Santander by a force of approximately 40 guerrillas calling themselves the National Army of Liberation (ELN). This group held the town for several hours, killing three police and one soldier, herding the populace into the square where it was subjected to a haranguing, and sacking the Farm Credit Bank, as well as several business establishments. The group escaped successfully, losing only one member.

On 17 April 1965, a gang estimated to number about 120, headed by "Tiro Fijo" attacked the town of Inza in western Cauca, first ambushing a bus a short distance from town and killing several passengers, including two nuns. During the attack on the town several more people were killed, and the populace was again harangued in the town square. After sacking financial and commercial establishments, the gang withdrew, kidnapping one police agent who was later released. The gang is said to have passed through Army lines in groups of 10 on its return to the Huila-Tolima area.

In April 1966, a meeting was held between heads of the PCC-backed guerrilla gangs in the southern part of Colombia. The product of this meeting was an organization called the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) headed by "Tiro Fijo," with Ciro Trujillo Castaña, alias "Major Ciro," second in command. Its announced objectives were to meet the Colombian Army units in force and destroy their effectiveness, after which the overthrow of the legally constituted Government in Colombia would follow.

The fight between the FARC forces, the Army, and the National Police centered in Huila but extended into southern Tolima, Quindio, and the southeastern Valle. The critical period in that region was during the months of September, October, and November, 1966, when FARC forces successfully ambushed a number of Army units. The Minister of Defense ordered the elite Mobile Squadron of 150 National Police Carabineros, stationed in Bogotá under direct command of the Director General of the National Police, into the area where they combined forces with the Army. At that time DAS had very good intelligence sources

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and was able to provide much useful information to the Army and National Police which assisted them in killing and capturing numerous members of the FARC as well as forcing the FARC into their former status of operating as small scattered bands whose most effective method of operation was hit-and-run attack. The Army units continued to occupy and patrol, having occasional encounters, while the National Police in the course of their regular duties "whittled away" at the FARC, killing and capturing its members in the course of routine police operations.

Although FARC carried out several major ambushes against Army units in southern Colombia up to the end of May, 1967, its effectiveness as a guerrilla fighting force had been materially reduced and its morale was visibly depressed. One gang leader in the Quindio region surrendered to National Police while the latter destroyed most of another gang and the Army killed its leader. As of today, the Quindio region and eastern Valle have been cleared of practically all FARC guerrilla gangs.

During the year 1966, the ELN was still posing a threat to stability in the Department of Santander. Camilo Torres, defrocked priest, and former sociology professor and chaplain at the National University in Bogota, lost the support of the moderate left splintered party, the Christian Democrats, and seeing his last popular backing disappear, went to Santander where he joined the ELN. Although Torres had no guerrilla training, he was placed in charge of a gang and assigned to ambush Army patrols in the region of Carmen San Vicente. After carrying out one successful ambush in January 1966, he was killed in the course of carrying out another such operation in the same vicinity on February 15, 1966. There is popular opinion that the ELN deliberately exposed Torres in order to create a popular martyr to its cause. However, if this was the design, it was swept under the wave of sorrow and pity from the general populace which regarded him more as a dupe who had made a very foolish mistake by aligning himself with forces of violence.

ELN attacks continued sporadically through the first half of 1967, the most serious one taking place on March 9, when a group blew the track and wrecked a small railway payroll train near Barrancabermeja, Santander, killing two trainmen and six National Police guards riding the train, and wounding a seventh. The cash box was stolen, along with the arms and uniforms of the police.

The last major operation by the ELN took place at dawn on 17 February 1967 when forces estimated between 100 and 200 attacked the small town of Vijogual in Santander where one of the few National Police posts without radio communication was located. Six of the eight National Policemen were killed. The financial and business institutions were sacked, and the forces withdrew after haranguing the population in the town square for about 2 hours. It was later learned that the attack originally had been planned for 15 February, the first anniversary of Camilo Torres' death. However, it was delayed because the Army and National Police had re-inforced their strength in the town, withdrawing on 24 February.

The ELN and the FARC made several smaller ambushes against Army troops and police until June 1967, when a lull developed prior to the Latin American Solidarity Conference (OLAS) held in Havana June 1967.

Although the resolutions emanating from the OLAS indicated stepped up rural and urban guerrilla activities in all of the Latin American countries, especially Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, and included armed robberies of financial institutions as well as kidnap

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for ransom as feasible means of financing guerrilla attacks, the wave of guerrilla violence anticipated in the wake of OLAS was replaced by a period of relative quiet found to be based on indecision and dissent within the ELN.

At about the same time the later-realized hopes of the PCC that GOC would establish diplomatic relations with the USSR prompted the PCC to call for a near cessation of armed activities by FARC in order not to jeopardize the prospects of relations being established, and later because it was believed that the aggressive development-reform programs of the Llera Restrepo Administration did not afford a climate favorable to successful guerrilla operations. Therefore, the FARC general strategy has become one of "seeding" and organizing "self defense" units in strategic rural communities of Colombia, these groups to be transformed into guerrilla gangs when the political-economic climate again become conducive to their operation. Beside the Departments of Hila, Tolima, and Cauca, FARC appears to be establishing self-defense units in Boyaca, Cundinamarca, Bolivar, Cordoba, Magdalena, and Antioquia, as well as on the eastern slopes of the eastern mountain range in the territories of Putamayo and Caqueta.

It was during one of these "seeding" operations that *Ciro Castaño Trujillo*, second in command of FARC, was killed by Army troops in the PAEZ area of Boyaca during the latter part of 1968 after National Police and DAS had established his whereabouts.

The Popular Army of Liberation (EPL) has some relative significance in the overall picture of Colombian guerrilla activities. Since it still exists, and carries out an occasional attack, it should be mentioned. This group, now estimated to number between 40 and 80 members initiated operations in the upper San Jorge and upper Sinu regions of the Department of Cordoba during the latter part of 1967, and some of its activities have "spilled over" into Antioquia along the boundaries of Cordoba. The group is made up principally of bandit gang remnants as well as escaped convicts, some from the Tolima-Valle region, who settled in the low mountainous jungled regions of southern Cordoba. After the group was organized it began operating against the larger land-holders, stock raisers, rural merchants, construction and mining camps, and patrols and posts of the National Police and Army. The EPL had its beginning as a Peking-oriented group. However, the lack of effective communications with the Communist Chinese and their apparent lack of confidence in the EPL as an effective revolutionary group seemingly has given the organization an insular status. To counteract its effectiveness, the GOC initiated concentrated social and rural economic development programs in the affected area, and also sent in additional Army and National Police personnel to contain the guerrillas.

C. *Terrorism*

Urban terrorist groups, although they exist, have been relatively inactive since 1966, a year in which high-powered bombs placed in the Ministry of Defense Building and the Colombian-American Center caused several deaths and injuries as well as considerable property damage. There is reason to believe that these organizations, made up principally of leftist university students, are still training, accumulating supplies, and may go into action when they consider the time "right." Among them are the United Front (UF) principally centered on the National University campus in Bogota; Movement of Workers and Students (MOEC) whose remnants are scattered about the country; Urban Guerrilla Movement (MOGUR), centered in Cali, Department of Valle; Rebellion Movement, centered in Medellin, Department of Antioquia; and the Revolutionary Organization of Colombia (ORC), centered in Popoyan, Department of Cauca.

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D. *Civil Turbulence*

President Valencia, during his term appeared to take a tolerant attitude toward civil disturbances and is believed to have used some to his political advantage. This is believed true of the riots of April 1965 when Valencia allegedly scolded National Police for their efforts to prevent and suppress the disturbances which Valencia ultimately used as a basis for declaring a State of Siege lasting until December 1968.

Soon after his inauguration in 1966, President Carlos Lleras Restrepo and John Rockefeller III were victims of stonings at the National University in Bogota. President Lleras reacted immediately by sending Army troops on the campus and withdrawing them when he chose. He declared publicly that he would not tolerate such incidents during his administration. He ordered a National Police post established on the campus as a symbol of order and has not hesitated to use troops and police to suppress disturbances, which have diminished in frequency and scope.

E. *Urban Crime*

Because of reporting methods it is difficult to determine the true incidence of common crime in Colombia. However, it is high. As a whole, Colombian society has a propensity toward violence when the individual is armed or when he and his confederates outnumber the adversary. Since criminals are products of their societies, the social traits tend to exaggerate themselves in the individual delinquent. It is rare that a "stick-up man" will work alone in Colombia. More frequently, an urban armed robbery is perpetrated by several, sometimes as many as ten individuals, armed with everything from revolvers to sub-machine guns. They wantonly kill the guards or the victims for a relatively small yield. Even petty burglars and thieves are likely to be armed and are likely to use their weapons if challenged. Street crimes such as pocket-picking, and purse and wrist-watch snatching are very common.

According to USAID-maintained statistics, there has been an actual decrease in the incidence of major crimes of violence in urban centers between 1967 and the present time. The audacious stick-ups, accompanied by wild shooting are almost unknown in Bogota, and have been drastically reduced in the other major cities. This could be due in part to the increasing aggressiveness of the National Police, new tactics adopted by them and their assuming the responsibility for investigating common crimes. The comprehensive mobile radio patrol established in Bogota with USAID assistance also may explain why the number of violent robberies has receded faster in the capital than in the outlying cities.

With the recession of incidence of armed robberies, there have been increases in crimes of stealth, especially residential and commercial burglaries, and auto theft. Burglars are not skillful in selecting their loot and usually will steal anything moveable.

Because of import restrictions and high tariff rates, an automobile brings a very high price in Colombia. Auto theft rings are extremely active and skillful. Common vehicles, especially the jeep-type, are often disassembled and sold in pieces through parts dealers. Appearances of late model passenger vehicles are altered, after which they are sold in-country. On other occasions they are driven to Venezuela and smuggled into that country for sale. Sometimes auto thieves hold a car for amounts of ransom from \$1,000 to \$3,000 US. However, insurance companies in Colombia now refuse to make such payments.

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II. THE SECURITY FORCES

The large security forces include the National Police, the Army, Air Force, and Navy and are under the Minister of Defense, and are commonly referred to as "The Armed Forces," but when mention is made of the "Military Forces," this includes only the latter three.

A. *National Police*

The present authorized strength of the National Police is 37,775 uniformed personnel and detectives including 1,475 officers, 3,800 non-commissioned officers, and 32,500 agents. The National Police Command is organized somewhat along military lines, with a Major General (authorized Lieutenant General) as Director General, a Major General Sub-Director, a Colonel Chief of Staff (Brig. General authorized) and a general staff consisting of F-1, Personnel Department; F-2, Department of Information and Criminality; F-3, Department of Planning and Organization; F-4, Administrative Services Department; F-5 Budget and Fiscal Control Department; F-7 Training Department; F-7 Sanitary Department (Medical); F-8 Public Relations. Among the Chiefs of these Departments are authorized three additional Brigadier Generals. There is also General Inspectorate, a Legal Department, and a Social Welfare Department. The major sub-division of the National Police is into 23 Departments, corresponding to the 22 Departments (political sub-division like provinces) and the Special District of Bogota. The National Police are further sub-divided into Districts, Stations, Sub-Stations, Posts, and Retens. Operationally, the National Police are divided into Patrol, Carabineros (rural police), Judicial Police, Juvenile Protection Police, Traffic Police, Tourist Police, and Special Services which includes Highway Police, Railway Police, Harbor Police, and the Air Wing, composed of one Cessna 411. The National Police are deployed and operate as civil police. It is a career service, members being free to resign at any time.

The National Police are responsible for maintaining law and order, investigating common crimes, repression of rural violence, including guerrilla and bandit activities, at levels below those necessitating military force, and repression of civil disturbances and urban terrorism. On occasions, the National Police integrate in small numbers with a few Army personnel for the purpose of carrying out a specified mission. In zones defined as "Public Order" areas, either on a temporary or indefinite basis, the National Police come under the direction of the military commander in that particular area. Otherwise, although they respond operationally through the chain of command to the Director General, they also react to the policy and specific request of the governors or majors in their respective jurisdictions.

The National Police have nine excellent training plants throughout the country, one for officers and cadets, one for non-commissioned officers, and one for recruits and carabineros, all in Bogota, while there are six recruit schools in outlying departments, 3 of which also provide carabinero training. Six-month courses are required prior to promotion for officers and non-commissioned officers. Training content is becoming increasingly composed of police subjects and taking recognition of current problems confronting the police.

The National Police have a motorized fleet which includes motorboats, motorcycles, jeep and passenger-type vehicles, busses, trucks, and farm tractors. They also have about 2,000 horses and mules. The Police have title to only about half the vehicles, the remainder belonging legally to departments, municipalities, and neighborhood associations who acquired the autos for police use. The National Police Automotive fleet is generally in a

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rundown condition; the ages of some vehicles dating back to 1953. Maintenance capability is good, but overly centralized.

The National Police are armed principally with .38 caliber revolvers, M-1 Caliber .30 carbines, and 12-gauge police-type shotguns. They have also called out of retirement a number of Madsen sub-machine guns, San Cristobal Kiraly carbines, and old Mauser rifles to arm some 6,225 personnel added since the last quarter of 1967.

The National Police share a Swiss-built micro-wave relay point-to-point communications system with the Army. The system provides the National Police communications during parts of the day between Bogota and their commands in 15 Departments when the system is functioning properly. However, there are days when as many as 33% of the departmental command stations are off the air for need of repair. The net is currently being strengthened with U.S. voice teletype equipment. The National Police have rural tactical communications systems in 13 departments where real or potential violence is a problem. These systems are composed of a total of about 1500 HT-1s, 7R-5s, TR-20s, and SB-20s integrated into a system of district nets in each department so that there is adequate communication among the principal police posts and departmental headquarters. The National Police have mobile radio patrol systems in the major cities of the country. Some of the radio equipment is of U.S. manufacture while some is Swiss.

B. *Army*

The Colombian Army numbers 45,800 uniformed officers and men. It claims the principal role in fighting rural bandits and guerrillas. While most of its privates are fulfilling obligatory service requirements, it has a corps of career officers and non-commissioned officers, as well as some privates. These professional personnel draw salary and fringe benefits identical to those of the National Police.

Although most of the Army units are organized along conventional lines, there are some special units such as the so-called "Intelligence Companies," composed of some 30 personnel, whose mission is to hunt down and break up by the most expedient means, organized groups of rural bandits and guerrillas.

C. *The Air Force*

The Colombian Air Force has an authorized strength of 5,900 uniformed personnel. It does considerable pilot training, provides transport and helicopter support to the Army, and in lesser amounts to the National Police. It also operates an airline called SATENA into some parts of the National Territories where the commercial airlines cannot operate profitably. The Air Force has some light-bombing, strafing and rocket-fire capability provided by jet fighters converted from trainers.

D. *The Navy*

The Colombian Navy has 7,100 uniformed officers and men. Although its Chief is in Bogota, the majority of its physical installations are at Cartagena. Its largest vessels are destroyers and it has some tankers, as well as some small patrol craft used offshore and in rivers and harbors. It has a Marine Corps of which little is heard. However, the Marines back up the National Police in situations of civil turbulence or other emergencies in Cartagena, Barranquilla, and San Andres Island.

E. *The Administrative Department of Security (DAS)*

The Administrative Department of Security, better known as "DAS," is a semi-autonomous organization of some 3,100 personnel, whose Chief, a retired Army General not noted for his stability, reports directly to the President. DAS has the role of investigating offenses against the security of the State and other crimes of national importance, as well as immigration and foreigner control matters. It gradually has been relinquishing responsibility for investigation of common crimes as the National Police develop the capacity to assume the role. An important branch of DAS is the Rural Security Service of about 200 men operating in the Llanos Orientales. The "Rurales," as they are called, resemble in appearance and operations the Texas Rangers of a bygone era in the U.S. Their function is to suppress cattle rustling, the principal industry of the Llanos, and gather security type information.

DAS has some civil service employees. However, the majority are appointed on a patronage, political parity basis, a formula developed under the National Front Agreement between the Liberal and Conservative parties. Therefore, attempts to effect a genuine professionalization within DAS meet with frustration.

Although base salaries in DAS are higher than those of the National Police and the Army, the lack of fringe benefits reduces the overall income of personnel.

DAS has two training centers, one on the outskirts of Bogota where detectives are trained, and one in Agua Azul, Llanos Orientales, where "Rurales" are trained. Although attempts have been made to orient the training content more in the direction of operational needs, the changes in directorships at the training schools as well as lack of understanding by school personnel have detracted seriously from the permanence of any improvements in this area.

DAS personnel are armed principally with revolvers, but carry some sub-machine guns and shotguns in automobiles and on special missions. The "Rurales" are armed with revolvers, Winchester 30-30 caliber carbines, and some shotguns.

The DAS automotive fleet consists of some 200 sedans and jeep-type vehicles of various models dating back to 1952, two river boats of 40-man or 8-horse capacity, and various outboards. There are also two Cessna 185 Skywagons, one in the Llanos and one in the middle Magdalena River Valley. Automotive maintenance is considered poor-to-fair.

DAS has an outmoded CW communications system giving part-time service between the departments and Bogota. It has a more modern SSB net in the Llanos and communication with Bogota. Communications maintenance is considered poor.

III. INTERPLAY BETWEEN SECURITY FORCES

General Alberto Ruiz Novoa was named Ministry of War (now Defense) in August 1962, at the beginning of the Valencia Administration. He was probably the most controversial public figure since the overthrow of Dictator Gustavo Rojas Pinilla. His cold, disagreeable personality won him no friends, and his arrogant attitude toward his subordinates created deep resentment in them. However, he visibly favored the Army against the Navy, the Air Force, and the National Police. He held DAS in complete disdain. It is believed that he felt he would maintain the support of the Army regardless of the feeling in the other services. The National Police often charged privately that Ruiz allowed

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the Army to sequester their equipment and real property. Ambiguous press stories often gave the Army credit for successes scored by the Police against bandits and guerrillas, quoting Army command sources. The Director General of the National Police at that time, Brig. General Saul Gil Ramirex Sendoya, was out of favor with the Minister and there were reports from various reliable sources that Minister Ruiz was determined to retire Ramirez and replace him with the National Police Chief of Staff at the time, Colonel Juan Felix Mosquera Mosquera. Mosquera is reported to require psychotherapy, along with hospitalization from time to time. It was reported that Ruiz regarded General Ramirez as a strong personality who would not bend to his will, but he regarded Mosquera as a weakling who would agree to anything. General Ramirez was said to have had a confrontation with the Minister and, although the two never "warmed up" to one another, they apparently arrived at an arrangement of "peaceful coexistence." In another shrewd maneuver, General Ramirez obtained the return of Col. Bernardo Camacho Leyva (now a Major General and Director of the National Police) from London where he was assigned to the Colombian Embassy as Civil Attache. Colonel Camacho, a strong personality as well as a wily negotiator, resumed his former post as Chief of Staff, displacing Mosquera.

The relationships between the National Police and DAS was marked with constant friction in Bogota. Neither organization missed an opportunity to take verbal potshots at the other in the press. General Ramirez had a charming personality as well as a sharp tongue and seemed to take delight in needling DAS in the press by making statements about the National Police assuming the functions of DAS. Outside the capital the rivalry tended to diminish and in some places the National Police and DAS worked in complete harmony. In the Llanos Orientales, the National Police and the Rurales spoke to each other, but chose opposite sides of the street. The Army indicated a deep resentment toward the Rurales because, it charged, they were an "irregular" force, and would not support any of their activities. In Bogota, National Police arriving at the scene of a violent crime sometimes arrested DAS personnel as suspects if found in the vicinity.

During the middle and latter part of 1964, it became clearly evident that Minister Ruiz Novoa had political ambitions. On one occasion, President Valencia attacked him in a public speech without naming him, challenging him "to take off his uniform and become an active contender" if he had political designs. A general strike by the large labor syndicate was threatened for 29 January 1965. The Armed Forces set about making preparations to control any civil turbulence. Ruiz called a meeting of the top military figures down through rank of Colonel and called for "moderation" in handling any outbreaks. The officers charged that Ruiz' talk was so interwoven with political overtones that there was no mistaking that it demonstrated definite selfish political goals. The principal officers of the group met with General Gabriel Reveiz Pizarro, Chief of the Armed Forces, and demanded that Reveiz go immediately to the President with an ultimatum to dismiss Ruiz. Doubtlessly this was the opportunity which many of the officers had been awaiting. However, General Ramirez was mysteriously absent when the showdown came and "could not be reached." Ruiz was "retired" on 25 January 1965, and was replaced by Reveiz. During the next several weeks, General Ramirez' wife was quoted as having made disparaging remarks about Reveiz under circumstances where the latter could not help becoming aware of them. The feeling between Reveiz and Ramirez became increasingly bitter. In late March 1965, General Ramirez, known as a "rounder" became involved in an early morning incident at a "grill." Later that day, during a bitter exchange, Reveiz gave Ramirez two hours to make up his mind whether to retire voluntarily or to be forced into retirement with full news coverage.

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Ramirez chose the former and Camacho was appointed Director General as of 1 April 1965. He immediately, but carefully, set about improving the quality of key officer personnel, selecting the most able for the important positions, raising behavior standards, tightening discipline, and attempting to better the lot of personnel, especially that of the agents and non-commissioned officers. He also took a firm line of command and adopted measures to improve organization, training, and operations.

During the latter part of 1964 and 1965, the Army had been injecting itself increasingly into operations at the police level, attempting to conduct investigations of notorious crimes and capture ordinary criminals. The National Police and DAS resented what they regarded as encroachment on their operational jurisdictions, and they justifiably criticized the Army's bungling.

Reveiz had the reputation of being a field commander. He was a large, gruff man, impatient with details, but willing to listen. The Efrain Gonzalez case, described earlier, was believed to be an "eye opener" for Reveiz, and Army participation in police-type operations began to diminish rapidly. It is believed that Camacho's tactful persuasiveness was also a strong factor in the Army's withdrawal.

Since his assumption of command, General Camacho has worked to improve relations with the other security forces. It is believed that his having two brothers in the Army, one a Colonel and one now a Brigadier General, was of considerable advantage in bringing about harmony. There was some abatement in hostilities between National Police and DAS, but working relationships, including exchange of information, were no better until late 1966 when the Chief (retired) Col. Alfonso Rojas Martinez, was replaced by Retired General Luis Etilio Leyva, a personal friend of Camacho. This marked the real beginning of better communication between the two groups, and an improved attitude on the part of the Army toward DAS. A Presidential Decree enacted in February 1967, enabled National Police to assume the role for investigation of common crimes, thus eliminating another basis for conflict and resentment between the Police and DAS. DAS officials were pleased to be rid of the responsibility so that their organization could concentrate on "higher crimes" and the National Police welcomed assuming it because it afforded them the means to strengthen their overall operations by giving them "eyes and ears." Because crimes classified as "common" such as murder, kidnapping, extortion, robbery, etc., are frequently committed by rural guerrillas and bandits, this afforded the National Police with a more solid basis for action against those elements.

Reveiz died suddenly on 22 January 1967, and General Gerardo Ayerbe Chaux was immediately named to succeed him. Ayerbe appears to be generally well liked and respected. He is a quiet, scholarly man, having a broad outlook with respect to his country's welfare. Relations among the services and with DAS have continued to improve until today there appears to be optimum harmony. General Ayerbe gave the Director General of National Police almost complete autonomy, limiting his supervision to coordination, and allowing the Director General direct communication with the President. He has not interfered with police expansion plans, on the other hand, probably to avoid friction with the Army, has not come out in strong support of them.

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ANNEX C

NATIONAL DECREE 271-67

ASSIGNMENT OF INVESTIGATIVE DUTIES

DAS

Crimes against the existence and security of the State.

Crimes against the Constitutional regime and the interior security of the State.

Crimes against Public Administration.

Crime of Conspiracy.

Crimes against public faith.

Crimes against the Community's health and integrity.

Crimes against the National Economy, and industry and commerce.

Crimes against suffrage.

Crimes against the individual's liberty and other rights.

NATIONAL POLICE

Crimes against the administration of justice.

Crimes against public morals.

Crimes against sexual liberty and honor.

Crimes against moral integrity.

Crimes against the family.

Crimes against life and personal integrity.

Crimes against property.

Anti-social behavior.

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ANNEX D

STATUS REPORT—PUBLIC SAFETY PROJECT TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACTIVITY

I. *Relationship of Activity to Project Goals*

The Public Safety Project has placed major emphasis on development of modern, rapid communications systems for the National Police as a prerequisite to timely and efficient police administration. AID Public Safety commodity assistance has been concentrated in this area, particularly in the development of a rural tactical radio network, which involved the installation of some 1,500 radios throughout 13 Departments during the period 1965-1968. The installation phase of that activity is now complete and the communications capability so provided is believed an important factor in the recent and continued suppression of violence in those areas. Attention is now being shifted to completion of other communications systems which had been deferred or de-emphasized during installation of the rural tactical network, and to the all-important development of a logistical support system capable of sustaining this large and rather sudden communications expansion.

II. *AID Expenditures in Support of the Activity*

A. The total USAID commodity assistance program for the National Police communications activity is presently estimated at \$1,382,000, of which \$1,292,000 has been obligated through FY 1969:

FY 1964	\$120,000	FY 1969	\$ 42,000
FY 1965	\$300,000	FY 1970	\$ 30,000
FY 1966	\$650,000	FY 1971	\$ 30,000
FY 1967	\$140,000	FY 1972	\$ 30,000
FY 1968	\$ 40,000		

In addition, USAID has supported Colombian peso expenditures for miscellaneous local procurements, translation of technical material, contract training, etc., at an estimated cost of US\$60,000 over the past six years.

B. USAID technical assistance has consisted of 8½ man-years of direct hire advisors over the 5½ year period, and 5 man-years of contract advisory assistance.

III. *Background of Police Communications Prior to AID Assistance*

A. The National Police Telecommunications Section was established in March, 1955, by Decree #833, to provide essential countrywide communications for National Police activities, and to establish and maintain necessary communications systems within the City of Bogotá. At this point in time, there was virtually no radio communications capability within the police organization; however, it had been decided by the GOC to procure a VHF-UHF multi-channel radio network for countrywide communications needs of the Colombian Army and the National Police. It was for this purpose that the Telecommunications Section of the National Police was established.

B. The radio equipment subsequently procured was of Swiss manufacture, "Autophone," and for some rather vague reason has come to be referenced as "Radiovox." The system originally consisted of 12 mountain-top radio relay stations with terminal radio

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stations in 15 of the 17 Department or State capital cities. All communications to and from Bogotá was handled by the "Mochuelo" relay located on a mountain top near Bogotá. From there, four circuits branched off to other mountain-top relays, etc. (See Tab "A".) Six of the 14 terminals required either four or five relays between Bogotá and the State capital. The system was procured at an approximate cost of \$10 million U.S., including equipment, building and road construction, etc. The National Police provided approximately \$4.3 million U.S. and the Army \$5.7 million U.S. The police manned 7 of the 12 relay sites exclusively and provided technicians to assist in maintaining the 5 Army-controlled stations. An additional feature of the system was a 12-channel terminal in Bogotá, with a repeater located on "Cable Mountain" overlooking the city, and various fixed station, mobile and portable radio equipment for use in municipal police and Army operations. Again, all communications were handled by one, vulnerable, mountain-top repeater station.

C. In 1962, the National Police procured and installed some 30 each HF-SSB radio transceivers to provide voice communication between Bogotá and the 2 State capitals not serviced by "Radiovox," and the 8 National Territories and Intendencias, plus certain other strategic posts. (See Tab "B".)

D. As of the initiation of AID assistance in 1963, no other significant communications capability existed in the police organization. State Police commanders were without direct communications to their "County Headquarters," and police stations in towns, villages and rural areas had to rely on postal services or communications facilities of other nearby government agencies or commercial facilities, if and where available. Major cities outside of Bogotá were generally without police radio patrol facilities, riot control radios or even rapid administrative communications, and police patrols were operating in the violence areas without inter-patrol communications or means of rapid contact with their command post.

IV. *Initiation of the AID Activity*

A. The Public Safety Communications Activity was indirectly initiated by a USAID Civic Action Project Agreement, dated 25 February 1963, which provided for the joint USAID/GOC procurement of HF-SSB radio equipment "to establish a civic action communications network in the Llanos-Amazones area of Colombia, where communications facilities are virtually non-existent." The first two objectives of the Agreement were: "(1) provide communications facilities to the population of these *isolated areas* (emphasis added for later reference); (2) provide communications for the military, police and border security of these areas." The radio equipment was subsequently procured from the United States, "RCA," and installed in the National Territories and Intendencias - the "isolated areas" of Colombia (see Tab "C"). USAID supervision of the installation was provided by the U.S. Army Mission and maintenance of the equipment was arranged by contract with the local RCA agency.

B. The Office of Public Safety, AID/W, conducted a general police survey of Colombia in December 1962, and in the ensuing report recommended that a separate telecommunications survey be accomplished. As a result, OPS/W dispatched a telecommunications engineer, Mr. Paul Katz, to Colombia for the period June 4-18, 1963. The major recommendations resulting from that survey were:

1. To assign a Communications Advisor to the USAID Public Safety Division who would be responsible to plan and implement the various communications projects needed.

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2. To provide AID commodity assistance through the communications advisor to expand and improve telecommunications facilities of both the National Police and the DAS.

3. Wherever possible, to integrate telecommunications facilities of the National Police, DAS and the Ministry of Government to avoid duplication of equipment and to expand the capabilities of all agencies.

4. To initiate training programs for communications officers and technicians of both the National Police and the DAS.

In accordance with these recommendations, a telecommunications advisor was assigned to the USAID Public Safety staff in December 1963, a local technician was contracted by USAID in February 1964, and approximately \$120,000 were provided under the FY 1964 Public Safety National Police Project Agreement to initiate the telecommunications activity.

V. *Technical Projects of the Telecommunications Activity*

A. *Administrative Radio-Teletype (RTTY) Network*

1. This sub-activity was conceived during the initial Public Safety communications survey conducted in June 1963. At that time, it was visualized that the fixed-station radio equipment being provided to the Ministry of Government under a separate USAID project could be shared by the National Police and other civil security agencies if the traffic handling capability was enhanced by the addition of modern teletypewriters and multiplexing equipment to permit simultaneous voice and telegraph transmissions. Appropriate equipment was subsequently ordered under the USAID Public Safety project and arrived in-country during September 1965. A USAID Public Safety communications specialist was requested to provide necessary technical assistance, and he arrived during April 1966. The following August, a change was made in the senior communications advisors for USAID and a new study of the RTTY sub-activity was undertaken. A completely new approach was developed and approved by early 1967 (see Tabs "D" and "E"), and pertinent points became part of the FY 1967 and FY 1968 Public Safety Project Agreements. Additional equipment required to implement the new concept was ordered and has arrived. The installation phase of this sub-activity is now in process and completion is scheduled for the end of FY 1970.

Estimated duration of AID commodity support:

FY 1969 - \$29,000

Estimated duration of AID technical assistance:

One Year - (FY 1970)

2. The relationship of this new approach to a "common-user" administrative communications network and the project goal of divorcing the police from their joint venture with the military in the "Radiovox" administrative communications network is relevant. The original concept of using the Ministry of Government radio network to the "isolated areas" of Colombia as the backbone of a common-user network not only was impracticable from an administrative point of view, but would not have provided the police with reliable communications to the main population areas of the country and would have accomplished nothing toward the urgent need to phase the police out of the antiquated,

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extremely expensive and unreliable "Radiovox" system. That need is illustrated by the following facts:

a. The average reliability of the "Radiovox" network as a whole is no more than 50%. Communications from Bogotá to terminal radio stations in 11 of the 17 States now serviced must pass through three, four or five mountain-top relays. Obviously, the reliability to these points is much less and communications to the four States requiring five relays to reach Bogotá is virtually non-existent for public safety purposes.

b. The police expend approximately 80% of their *total* communications budget on maintenance support of the "Radiovox" system, and approximately 80% of their total daily personnel strength of 160 is devoted exclusively to support of "Radiovox." For example, the 1968 Police communications budget was \$2,457,423 pesos, of which nearly \$2,000,000 was expended in support of "Radiovox." During the same year, the military expended \$1,400,000 for "Radiovox" maintenance and had approximately the same number of support personnel assigned.

c. In spite of the fact that the police provide 50% or more of the required support, they obtain only approximately 10-15% of the total "Radiovox" service. For example, during the month of May 1969, the military passed 1,382,920 written words over the "Radiovox" teletype system, while the police passed 133,393 words, or less than 10% of the total. During the same month, the military conducted 6,331 voice conversations of 5-minute average duration over "Radiovox," while the police had 2,734 similar voice conversations, or 30% of the total voice traffic. Considering total combined messages handled, in round numbers, the police passed 5,000 of 45,000 messages. Allowing 10-year amortization of the original equipment investment, salaries of operating and maintenance personnel, and yearly maintenance costs broken down to monthly operating expenses, the police are spending \$53,600 U.S. per month for the "Radiovox" system, or \$10.30 U.S. per message — an atrocious cost! Even after the amortization of the initial investment, the cost is \$3.50 U.S. per message, at least ten times the acceptable rate.

The AID-supported HF-SSB RTTY network is designed to provide voice and automatic teletype service to those States where "Radiovox" service is either non-existent or unreliable, and in that respect, will not duplicate operating circuits of either "Radiovox" or the Ministry of Government network. Attention is invited to Tab "F." The "Radiovox" circuits operating through one or two relays are considered reliable and will continue to be used. The AID-supported HF-SSB RTTY network will service all other States and the distant Island of San Andres. The Ministry of Government will provide communications to the "isolated areas" and one State capital, Rio Hacha, which was an Intendencia at the time the network was installed. Once these facilities are completed and electronically combined, the services will be extended to the DAS and other interested agencies. Finally, it is anticipated that once the police experience the higher reliability, lower maintenance costs and greater traffic handling capability of the HF-SSB RTTY network, they will expand this service to the remaining States, up-grade the entire system and divest themselves of the "Radiovox" burden.

B. *Urban Radio Communications*

This sub-activity involves the installation of radio patrol equipment in Bogotá and six other major cities, and provision of F-2 and riot control communications equipment to Bogotá and 22 other cities. The completion of this sub-activity has been delayed due to the

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priority rural tactical radio installations; however, it currently stands at 66% of the required 305 radio installations completed. Tab "G" indicates the current status of installations.

In addition, it involves the modernization of the Bogotá radio patrol dispatch center. The physical location of the center is complete and the number of telephone answering positions has been expanded from 6 to 20, with a total of 60 incoming telephone lines. Completion of this project is expected by the end of FY 1970, after arrival of the modern dispatch consoles procured by AID under the FY 1968 Pro Ag.

Estimated duration of AID commodity assistance: Completed.

Estimated duration of AID technical assistance: One Year (FY 1970).

C. *Rural Tactical Radio Network*

This sub-activity began in 1965 as a countermeasure to the sharp increase in violence in the rural areas of Colombia. Its objective was to provide instant voice communications between all police posts, even in the most remote areas, and their respective district police headquarters and to provide voice communications between district and department police headquarters in those departments selected. The first trial department was completed in CY 1965, the second group of four departments in 1966, five more in 1967 and the final three departments were completed in CY 1968. The installation phase of this sub-activity, which involved more than 1,500 radios, is not complete; however, the development of associated logistical support facilities has been lagging due to the urgent operational requirement to install equipment even before support facilities could be developed. (Since logistical support involves all communications sub-activities, it is treated here as a separate activity.) Tab "H" is the current distribution chart for A.M. Rural Tactical Radios and a typical department network.

Estimated duration of AID commodity support: Completed.

Estimated duration of AID technical assistance: One Year (FY 1970).

D. *Logistical Support*

Adequate supply and maintenance facilities and well-trained technicians are the key to a successful communications program. The development of these facilities poses the greatest challenge to our technical assistance effort as it faces an indifferent attitude from the host government and requires a seemingly intolerable consumption of time for the mean results obtained. The internal security situation in Colombia dictated the priority of equipment installations over prior development of logistical support facilities and, as a result, limited maintenance facilities were concurrently established on an individual department basis. Supply support and technical assistance has been provided directly from AID sources to the 13-plus departments at considerable cost to the availability of technical assistance for other needs.

Meanwhile, an entirely new support concept has been developed which will require a complete reorganization of the National Police Communications Section and the expenditure of over 4 million pesos from the police construction fund. (See Tab "I"). Agreements on reorganization, staffing, training and construction have been reached and pertinent points incorporated into Public Safety Project Agreements. Progress is expectedly

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slow, but steady. AID influence and technical assistance must be concentrated in this area until a self-sustaining and irreversible logistical support system is established as an integral part of the National Police organization. Any lesser course of action would jeopardize the substantial AID investment and the long-term internal security goals of the Public Safety project.

Estimated duration of AID commodity assistance:

FY 1969	\$17,500
FY 1970	\$30,000
FY 1971	\$30,000
FY 1972	\$30,000

Estimated duration of AID technical assistance:

Three Years (FY 1970-72)

E. *Technician Training*

1. Although training is part of the overall logistical support effort, it is dealt with separately here due to the variety of programs involved.

2. Technician training for support of the "Radiovox" network was accomplished by the equipment manufacturer as part of the package contract. Many technicians were trained abroad at the Swiss "Autophone" facility and they, in turn, trained other police personnel in Colombia.

3. At the outset of the AID telecommunications activity, there were no technicians within the police organization qualified in areas other than VHF-UHF "Radiovox" equipment. In 1965, USAID sponsored a basic communications training course through the facilities of the GOC-supported vocational school (SENA) at their Medellin branch. The course was attended by both Police and DAS students; however, SENA-Medellin was unable to provide a suitable instructor and the course was discontinued after six months. In July 1966, a new course was started with SENA-Bogotá and three successful one-year courses have been completed to provide the nucleus of technicians needed to staff Department repair shops.

4. Realizing that technician training is a continuing problem and that relatively low-salaried organizations like the National Police must expect a fairly high turnover of technicians, USAID proposed establishment of a training center within the police Communications Section. The proposal was accepted and pertinent points were included in subsequent ProAgs.

The police have hired two civilian instructors and are remodeling classroom and laboratory facilities. USAID has procured various professional training aids, a library of technical reference books and is preparing a complete telecommunications basic training course in Spanish with the assistance of both a local University Electronics College (Javeriana) and a local technical consultant organization. The course is designed on an equivalent level with the best U.S. military electronic training programs, and is scheduled to begin in September 1969.

5. Further realizing the need for professional-level training for National Police communications officers, USAID sponsored a contract with the University of Javeriana to

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provide a full five-year electronics engineering course for six young National Police officers. It is anticipated that the two or three officers who will survive this rigorous course and remain as career police communications officers will provide the much needed professional facility at the staff level of the police Communications Section. In addition, the contract with the University provides for engineering consultant services to the police during the five-year training period. It also provides short-term specialized training courses at the technician level in such difficult areas as instrument maintenance, teletype repair, etc. This package contract took more than one year to finalize, but is considered a major accomplishment in the Public Safety Communications Activity.

VI. Summary

A. Prior to 1955, the National Police had no organic telecommunications organization and virtually no organic communications capability.

B. During the period 1955-1963, a countrywide VHF-UHF multi-channel radio relay network ("Radiovox") was installed as a joint police-army system. This provided the police with voice or teletype communications from Bogotá to all but two "Departamentos" or State Capitals. The system also provided Municipal mobile radio patrol and fixed-station communications in Bogotá. During this same period, the police procured and installed HF-SSB equipment for communications from Bogotá to the two States not serviced by "Radiovox" and to the eight Colombian National Territories and Intendencias.

C. AID technical and commodity assistance to the National Police Telecommunications activity began in FY 1964. The period 1964-1966 was primarily one of planning, equipment evaluation, hardware procurement and initiation of the rural tactical radio network as a countermeasure to violence in the rural areas.

D. The major portion of AID commodities arrived in-country during the period 1966-1968, and five sub-activities were established: (1) Administrative HF-SSB Radio-Teletype Network, (2) Rural Tactical Radio Network, (3) Urban Radio Communications, (4) Logistical Support, and (5) Training. Priority was given to the Rural Tactical Radio Network and over 1,500 two-way radios were installed in 13 States experiencing the highest incidence of violence. The installation phase of that sub-activity is now complete. Urban radio projects were accomplished concurrently with rural installations, where appropriate, and that sub-activity is now approximately two-thirds complete. The concepts of Administrative HF-SSB Communications, Logistical Support and Training underwent radical changes during this period and, although formal agreements were reached and considerable "spade-work" was accomplished, these sub-activities were not fully initiated due to the priority of the rural project and the indifferent attitude of an unqualified police officer appointed as Communications Chief in late 1966.

E. The period 1969-1970 is now one of completing hardware installation and initiating logistical support reforms. A new police Communications Chief has been appointed who is not only much more qualified and of higher rank (Lt. Col.), but is aggressive, anxious to reform and upgrade the police Communications Section, and in complete accord with AID plans and objectives. Therefore, the period 1969-1970 should not only successfully conclude the hardware installation phase of USAID technical assistance in the National Police Telecommunications Activity, but should show significant progress toward reorganization of the police Communications Section, reform of logistical

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support procedures, inter-agency cooperation in combining and sharing communications facilities, and the general upgrading of technical proficiency within the police communications organization.

F. The period 1970-1972 will be the critical period of completing and solidifying reforms and final establishment of a professional communications organization within the National Police capable of deriving maximum benefit from the available facilities and of developing new facilities to meet the changing needs of the police in future years. It is this organization, this professionalism, that must be the ultimate goal of the AID activity, for the mere procurement and installation of hardware does not make an operable communications system. It requires a professional organization to operate it, maintain it, modify it, extend it, and make it the required nerve center of police administration. AID technical assistance during this final and critical phase of development is essential to obtain long-term project goals; for, as the present police Communications Chief recently stated, "Our entire organization is based on common sense and logic because we lack the professionalism to know a better way."

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
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
Certain islands of the Archipiélago de San Andrés y Providencia (13°00'N 81°30'W) and the Isla de Malpelo (3°58'N 81°35'W) belonging to Colombia are not shown on this map.



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Mr. Herbert O. Hardin, Chief Public Safety Division

February 2, 1967

Mr. Mark R. Seaton, Public Safety Advisor

Concept of Radio Maintenance – National Police

Prior to the end of CY-68, the National Police Tactical Radio installations will be completed and some 1500 radios will be in service on this network. In addition, there will be new radio patrol equipment in use in the major cities throughout Colombia, and over 100 of the new FM-1 and FM-5 radios will be providing F-2 and riot-control communications. Finally, there will be 16 new teletypewriters, multiplex equipment, and high-power SBB-radio base stations of the latest and most complex type installed throughout the country. The total AID commodity investment will exceed one-million U.S. dollars.

The successful establishment of these radio communications services is a formidable task in itself; however, even more difficult and equally important is the concurrent establishment of adequate maintenance facilities and a resupply system that can and will be sustained by the National Police after phase-out of AID assistance. Unless such facilities are properly established, these radio communications systems will be lost as an effective service within three years.

The present logistical support plan calls for the establishment of a one-man maintenance shop in each of ten departments as tactical radio installations are completed, and eventual establishment of similar shops in all departments. Three such facilities are presently in operation in Bucaramanga, Cucuta and Santa Marta. The shops are equipped with AID-procured tools and test instruments and are provided with an initial load of AID-procured repair parts and expendable maintenance material.

It is the opinion of this advisor that the present logistical support plan, as described above, is wholly inadequate to sustain the various communications systems being provided to the National Police. The major deficiencies of the present system are as follows:

- a. Lack of Central Support. There is no existing provision or plan for providing either fiscal or technical support from National Police Headquarters in Bogota to the departmental facilities. Each of twenty departmental shops will be left to obtain replacement parts and expendable maintenance material from local sources. Even if funds could be obtained locally, it is not clear how these shops would procure peculiar items available only from U.S. manufacturers. Furthermore, if the department technician encounters a technical problem beyond his ability to resolve, he has no place to go for assistance.
- b. Lack of a Resupply System. Each departmental shop is being provided with an initial load of repair parts and expendable maintenance material of an arbitrary quality. No central records are being maintained and each shop is left to catalog and account for this material on their own. Establishment of sufficient repair parts stocks to cover any eventuality in each of twenty shops is a costly and inefficient system. Furthermore, without central records, radios can be deadlined in Department "X" for parts that are available in Department "Y".
- c. Lack of Qualified Technicians. Under existing National Police salary scales and policy, which seems unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, qualified technicians will be extremely difficult to retain. (This problem is universal in

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governmental agencies.) Attempting to establish and sustain twenty, or even ten, separate maintenance shops with the technical capability to perform all echelons of maintenance is not feasible.

The following corrective actions are urgently recommended:

- a. Establishment of a central logistical support depot in Bogota responsible for providing supply and maintenance support to the field.
- b. Identification of specific and adequate funds within the National Police budget to sustain this central depot.
- c. Consolidation of technical talent and material resources into four regional maintenance facilities responsible for supply support and higher echelons of maintenance for the several departmental shops within their geographic area. These regional facilities would be under direct control of the central depot, and not the commander of the department in which the facility is physically located. They would be staffed by a commanding officer, administrative personnel, National Police technicians of the highest available caliber, and one U.S. contract technician responsible for training throughout the region.
- d. Establishment of "2nd-echelon" shops with limited technical facilities in each department, equipped to handle common problem repairs, which account for approximately 75% of all maintenance jobs. Repairs requiring higher-level maintenance facilities would be evacuated to the region shop where they would be exchanged with maintenance float stocks and subsequently repaired and returned to float stocks.

The foregoing description and discussion of this critical problem was deliberately presented in an abbreviated form, since agreement in principle only is required at this time. Implementation of the above recommendations would require the following cooperative actions:

- a. National Police.
 - (1) Administrative establishment of the central logistical support depot and its four regional facilities.
 - (2) Identification of approximately Ps 320,000 in the annual budget of the National Police for replenishment of repair parts and expendable maintenance material stocks.
 - (3) Provision of building facilities for the central depot and region shops, preferably from new construction.
- b. USAID/Public Safety
 - (1) Commodity assistance to equip the central depot, region and department shops with tools, test equipment, and initial stocks of repair parts and expendable maintenance material. The majority of these commodities are presently on hand; however, an additional \$35,000 will be needed to implement this new maintenance concept.
 - (2) Technical assistance in establishing appropriate records, controls, and operational procedures for the central depot and region facilities.

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- (3) Contribution of approximately \$75,000 for five each U.S. contract technicians to provide training in the central depot and region facilities for a period of one year.
- (4) Contribution of approximately \$12,000 for four each panel-type trucks to provide necessary transportation for the region facilities.
- (5) Contribution of \$10,000 to accelerate training of National Police technicians at SENA-Bogota.

Your concurrence in the foregoing recommendations is requested. It is further requested that subsequent concurrence be obtained from the National Police and Ministry of Defense through execution of the Public Safety Pro-Ag-1967.

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National Police Radio-Teletype Network

Radio-teletype (RTTY) equipment is presently onhand from AID procurement to improve National Police country-wide communications capabilities; however, a firm operational concept has not been established and present police radio facilities are not suitable for the simple addition of teletype equipment.

The teletypewriters are of the more sophisticated variety and contain facilities for "pre-recording" messages on perforated tape for later automatic transmission at maximum machine speed. This increases traffic handling capabilities, reduces error, and reduces the need for highly skilled operators. In addition, multiplex equipment has been procured and is on-hand, which will permit voice conversations to be conducted simultaneously with teletype message transmission. However, it becomes obvious that the multiplex equipment can only be utilized on a "duplex" radio circuit, i.e., where the transmitting and receiving radio equipments are separated from each other both physically and in radio frequency, enabling them to operate simultaneously and independently of each other. It would serve no purpose to multiplex voice and teletype on a simplex circuit where teletype transmissions would have to be interrupted at the voice talk-listen intervals.

The National Police presently are operating a simplex, single-side-band voice radio network from Bogotá to approximately 10 department and national territory headquarters. Other departmental police headquarters are reached via the "Radio VOX" UHF relay network; however, service to several of these locations is marginal at best.

The present location of the SSB radio central at Sección Transmisiones in Bogotá is completely unsatisfactory for the following reasons:

- a. The compound is not large enough to erect proper antennas, even for a simplex circuit.
- b. Radio reception is hampered by the high level of electrical noise in the immediate area.
- c. Normal radio repair activities are hampered by interference from the adjacent transmitting station.
- d. Separate transmitter and receiver sites must be established for RTTY duplex operation, but the present location is not particularly suitable for either.

The equipment being used by the National Police on this SSB-radio network is of the "transceiver" type, i.e., the transmitter and receiver share certain common circuitry and therefore cannot be operated simultaneously, as is necessary for duplex operation. In addition the transmitters are generally 60 watts in power output, which is inadequate for high reliability circuits in an area such as Latin America where only lip service is paid to frequency control. Control is basically reduced to the "firstest with the mostest".

The Ministry of Government operates a high-power SSB-radio network to several of the same cities as the National Police SSB net, and it was originally planned to utilize MOG radios with NP teletype equipment in a "common-user" type of service, to include DAS, Customs, and other appropriate agencies. However, the MOG has not been willing to accept

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police or DAS traffic on their network except when the circuits are completely idle, and the NP are no longer interested in the common-user concept. Customs also stated recently that they were no longer interested in such an arrangement. It is the opinion of this advisor that we should not pursue this point further until the police are in a position to offer reciprocal service to the Minister of Government.

In view of the above, a new operational plan for the RTTX network has been developed and is outlined as follows:

- a. Installation of the teletype and multiplex equipment at locations presently serviced by the NP SSB voice radio network, as well as those locations where the UHF radio relay system does not provide adequate service.
- b. Establishment of a regional communications relay facility in one of the northern coastal cities, probably Barranquilla, to handle traffic to Barranquilla, Cartagena, Richacha, Santa Marta and San Andres. One reliable circuit from Bogotá to the northern coast could be established using high-power equipment and directional antennas. Reliable circuits from this relay to the other cities could be established with lower-power equipment and simple antennas. This would obviate the need for five separate high-power circuits from Bogotá to the northern coast and would provide more reliable and efficient service.
- c. Procurement of linear amplifiers, where necessary, to increase the power output of existing transmitters, and utilization of separate receivers to permit duplex operation. (Ten appropriate receivers and four transmitters have been previously procured by AID and are available for this use.)
- d. Construction of a new communications center with separate transmitter and receiver sites to permit duplex-multiplex operation. The UHF radio relay central would also be properly located at this new communications center rather than its present location at Station 100. Adequate space is available on NP property at both Suba and the Santander School. Transfer of maintenance facilities from the present location at Sección Transmisiones to the new comm center area, would permit the NP to sell that property, as was suggested by the Director General some time ago.
- e. Upon completion of the net comm. center and its associated RTTY network, consideration would be given to linking the NP, DAS, and MOG comm centers together for the purpose of extending the facilities of each. Some relocation of equipment would be necessary at that time to avoid duplication of circuits; however, it is emphasized that while duplication of circuits between related government agencies should be avoided to the maximum extent practicable, each agency has justifiable need for operations circuits under their exclusive control. Inter-agency cooperation in sharing circuits for routine administrative traffic is extremely difficult to accomplish when one interested agency has physical possession of the equipment. Attempting to make one agency completely reliant on the cooperation of another for all communications with its subordinate headquarters is futile and not in the best interests of the operational needs of that agency.

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Implementation of the above plan for a country-wide National Police RTTY network would require the following cooperative actions:

a. National Police

- (1) Administrative establishment of a new combined communications center for both the SSB and "Radio Vox" teletype networks.
- (2) Administrative establishment of a regional communications relay facility in one of the northern coastal cities, preferably at the same location as the regional maintenance shop recommended for that area by separate memo.
- (3) Provision of suitable real estate and buildings for the new combined communications center, transmitter site, receiver site, maintenance depot, and the regional relay facility.

b. USAID/Public Safety

- (1) Contribution of \$40,000 for procurement of necessary radio equipment, auxiliary items, and spare parts.
- (2) Contribution of \$15,000 for procurement of services of a U.S. contract technician to conduct training on teletype operation and maintenance for a period of one year.
- (3) Technical assistance in the installation of all RTTY equipment and development of a modern, efficient communications center.

Your concurrence in the foregoing plan is requested. It is further requested the concurrence be obtained from the Director General of the National Police and the Minister of Defense through execution of the 1967 Public Safety Pro-Ag.

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May 29, 1967

Paul Katz, Chief
Telecommunications Branch, OPS/TSD

Mark R. Seaton
Public Safety Sr. Communications Advisor/Colombia
Colombian Common-User Communications Network

The country of Colombia is presently divided politically into 21 departments or "States" that contain approximately 80% of the total country population and all of the major industrial and commercial centers. Each department has a major city as its capital and 13 of these cities have over 100,000 population each.

In addition, there are 9 National Territories, primarily in the plains and jungle area, that are sparsely populated but important agriculturally.

The Colombian Ministry of Government (MOG) received a SSB radio network under an AID Civic Action project in 1963, which provides them with voice communications from the MOG, Department of National Territories, to the capitol cities of 8 territories, and from each of these capitols to other major population centers within the territory. This project was jointly financed by AID and GOC, each contributing \$132,000, and was installed under the auspices of the American Military Mission.

The National Police, under the Ministry of Defense, also have a SSB radio network procured from GOC funds which provides them with voice communications to these same 8 territories plus 3 state capitols. Police communications to the remaining 18 states is provided by an antiquated VHF-relay system which has been found to be less than 25% operational at any given time. This system, costing "several millions" of dollars, was jointly financed by the National Police and the Colombian Army, and is jointly operated and maintained by these two agencies, although the Army is by far the main beneficiary of the system. A major portion of National Police communications operations funds are expended on maintenance of this system but services realized are relatively small. For this reason, a major Public Safety project objective is to divorce the police from this system and replace the service with HF-SSB radio-teletype circuits.

The Department of Administrative Security (OAS), which is included with the National Police in the basic AID/Public Safety Program Agreement, has a GOC-funded radio-telegraph system which provides them with message service from Bogota to the 21 state capitols and other field offices. This system is also old and in poor state of repair.

The Customs Service, under the Ministry of Finance, has no radio communications system of their own but is planning such a facility with 300,000 "coffee dollars" recently provided by the GOC. This system would provide radio-teletype service from Bogota to major ports of entry throughout the country, 75% of which are located in the 21 states.

In mid-1963, a Public Safety communications survey was conducted by OPS/W which provided the basis for the subsequent commodity and technical assistance. It was during this survey that the OPS technician brought to light the duplication of circuits between Bogota and the 8 territories, i.e., the National Police and MOG SSB radio networks, and the National Police and DAS. Recommendations were subsequently made by the OPS technician to avoid this duplication of circuits by establishing a "common user" concept, whereby all interested agencies would share the services provided by the MOG radio

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network. AID, in turn, would increase the traffic handling capabilities of the Minister of Government circuits by the addition of teletype and multiplex equipment.

On June 25, 1963, a meeting was held in the Ministry of Government to discuss the "common-user" concept. Representatives of MOG, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Communications, National Police, DAS, American Military Mission, and AID Public Safety were present. The committee arrived at certain basic conclusions as follows:

1. That the National Territories have the radio network through the MOG.
2. That all official organizations and entities *could* utilize the service of this network.
3. That it is necessary to improve and amplify this network.
4. That it is necessary to arrive at an agreement between MOG, the Police and DAS in regard to the use and maintenance of this network.
5. That a committee should be appointed to study this matter and prepare appropriate regulations.

During the meeting two very pertinent points were made and discussed that set the pattern for later events:

1. Dr. Fidel Cano Jaramillo, Chief of the MOG National Territories Division, stated that "the principal objective of the radio network of the National Territories is to provide administration for them since (they) are responsible to the MOG." He added that "such objectives cannot be subordinated to others," and he repeated that the objective of the network is essentially civil, and that certain problems would arise if these were installed in offices of the Police. He added that this had been his opinion since the beginning.
2. Mr. John Doney, AID Public Safety, stated that "in case the MOG did not accept the integration of this network with these installations then they would be intalled separately in offices of the Police and DAS."

Basically, no further progress has been made on the "common-user" concept and the Coordination Committee has never convened. A new communications center was established in MOG/Bogota and teletype circuits extended to the Police, DAS, and Customs. However, these agencies are not utilizing the service for the following reasons:

1. The negative attitude taken by the MOG Chief of National Territories has prevailed and little or no priority is given to messages of other agencies.
2. The vast majority of total traffic from these other agencies is to the 21 states that are not serviced by the MOG network. Consequently, they were quick to take an indifferent attitude when the first problems arose in the use of the MOG net.
3. Although these law enforcement agencies *might* cooperate on a "common-user" administrative communications system between themselves, it is extremely doubtful if they will ever effectively utilize a civil communications system which is not under their control.

At the time of the arrival of this advisor in Colombia in July, 1966, the MOG Common-user Network was still considered an active project. Plans were being made to add the teletype and multiplex equipment to the net even though it was known that the Police, DAS and Customs were not utilizing the system. It was later determined by this advisor that

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the phrase "common-user communications system" had been extremely exaggerated in the minds of the AID Mission executive personnel to the point where they envisioned our total effort, including the tactical radio network, going into some type of grandiose system that would resolve everyone's communications problems. No documentation subsequent to the July 1963 survey could be found that clearly outlined the concept and those progress reports that were made reflected only installation status and not operational status from a cooperative basis.

Various discussions were held between this advisor and the Chief Public Safety Advisor during which it was decided that the teletype and multiplex would not be added to the MOG on a "loan basis" as proposed by the previous communications advisor (if they don't provide service to the security agencies we take back the teletype equipment), but instead we should install the new equipment directly into the Police and DAS nets where it could be more effectively utilized. A detailed study of this proposal was conducted and a new concept evolved for the use of the teletype and multiplex equipment. It was subsequently approved by the National Police and became part of the applicable 1967 ProAg. Pertinent points are as follows:

1. A new communications center would be established for the Police in Bogota to contain both their present HF-SSB and VHF-relay networks.
2. *High-power radio equipment* would be procured by AID to be used with existing teletype and multiplex gear in establishing a reliable 24 hr/day circuit from Bogota to a region relay site on the northern coast. Branch circuits from the region relay would provide vital communications to the major coastal state capitols of Barranquilla, Cartagena, Santa Marta and Rio Hacha. Adequate Police communications does not presently exist to these locations and the MOG net services only Rio Hacha.
3. Linear amplifiers would be procured by AID to increase the power output of Police SSB transmitters presently in use in 3 other state capitols, and "CAI" receivers procured by AID some time ago would be added to accommodate the teletype and multiplex equipment.
4. Four "CAI" transmitters and receivers previously procured by AID would be used with new linear amplifiers in four other state capitols where the present VHF-relay system does not provide adequate service.
5. Once this system was installed, services would be extended to DAS.
6. Excess teletype equipment resulting from these installations could then be transferred into the MOG net and the two communications centers tied together under a "you scratch my back, I'll scratch yours" agreement. The Police would have control of the State net which would account for 80% of their traffic, the MOG would have control over the Territory net which would account for 80% of their traffic, each having access to the other.

It is felt that this concept not only will resolve the problem of establishing a common-user network, but will place the teletype and multiplex equipment, that has laid idle in Bogota for some 20 months into the hands of the Police as quickly as possible and will provide them with vitally needed communications services. In late 1966, several teletype machines were assembled and tested with the multiplex equipment. After resolution of various problems, a successful test was conducted between Bogota and Villavicencio on the Police SSB net. Lastly, it will be a giant step toward the major objective of divorcing the Police from the costly Ministry of Defense VHF-relay system.

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URBAN "FM" RADIOS—MAY 1969
INSTALLED TO DATE

CITY OR ACTIVITY	%COMPLETION	INSTALLED TO DATE				PENDING			
		FM-1	FM-5	FM Mobile	FM Base	FM-1	FM-5	FM Mobile	FM Base
Bogota	70	19	4	49	2	4	2	21	4
Bucaramanga	100	4	1	15	1				
Cucuta	100	6	1	10	1				
Santa Marta	50	4					4		
Ibague	55		6			4	1		
Medellin	72	8					3		
Villavicencio	100	8	1						
Barranquilla	74	7	3	9	1			6	1
Cali	72	8					3		
Cartagena	0					4	2		
Manizales	66	6					3		
Pasto	0					4	2		
Neiva	0					4	3		
Tunja	0					4	2		
Monteria	0					4	2		
Quibdo	100	4	2						
Popayan	0					4	1		
Armenia	0					4	2		
Pereira	0					4	2		
Valledupar	0					3	1		
Sincelejo	0					3	1		
Riohacha	0					*4	2		
Barranca	0		5						
Training	100	1	1						
DGeneral	100	2							
DAS	100	20	5	9	4				
TOTAL	66	97	29	92	9	48	36	27	5
ON ORDER						0	0	0	0

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STATUS RADIO INSTALLATIONS RURAL "AM" RADIOS—MAY 1969

DEPTS. SCHEDULED FOR 100% COVERAGE	% COMPLETION INITIAL INSTAL.	INSTALLED TO DATE				IN PROCESS			
		HT-1	TR-5	TR-20	SSR-20	HT-1	TR-5	TR-20	SSB-20
Santander	100	94	11	22	6				
N. Santander	100	81	6	10	4				
Magdalena	100	94	12	16	7				
Guajira	100	16	9	6	3				
Huila	100	84	0	15	17				
Tolima	100	172	13	24	12				
Cauca	100	55	6	19	10				
Quindio	100	50	2	11	3				
Risaralda	100	81	2	8	2				
Caldas	100	46	1	6	5				
Antioquia	93	154	11	21	20	15	0	0	0
Valle	100	122	8	21	4				

MISC. INSTALLATIONS
WITHIN DEPTS. NOT
SCHEDULED FOR 100%
COVERAGE. OTHER MISC.

Cordoba		10		14	3				
Meta					6				
Misc. National Police		18		3	5				
DAS	100	40			59				
Other		5	1		6				
IN STOCK						3	3	8	7
IN ORDER						0	0	0	0
TOTAL	98	1122	82	196	172	18	3	8	7

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**The Director General of the
National Police in Exercise
of His Legal Authority, and**

CONSIDERING

That it is necessary to reorganize the maintenance service of the National Police Communications Section in order to ensure the effectiveness of expanding communications capabilities,

RESOLVES

ARTICLE 1. — That, as of this date, the communications maintenance service of the National Police will be reorganized according to the following Articles.

ARTICLE 2. — There will be established in Bogota a logistical base depot facility to serve as the central point of supply, maintenance and technical support for all radio communications equipment of the National Police in Colombia. The base depot facility will extend such support through four regional sub-depots located in Santa Marta, Cucuta, Cali and Medellin, plus one organizational maintenance shop in each Department. The regional sub-depots will remain under the direct and complete operational control of the base depot in Bogota and will respond to the Police Commander of the Department in which they are physically located only in disciplinary and other administrative personnel matters under normal jurisdiction of those Department Commanders. Technicians assigned to Department maintenance repair shops will obtain technical supervision from their respective regional support facility and will follow supply and maintenance procedures established by the base depot in Bogota. In addition, they will provide the base depot with such technical reports and information as requested, and correspondence may be exchanged directly between Department technicians, Regional Commanders, Base Depot Commander and/or Chief of Transmisiones on purely technical matters not affecting Department operations or matters not affecting established operational policy or procedures.

ARTICLE 3. — The base depot in Bogota will establish shops capable of the highest echelon of maintenance, including complete equipment rebuild; fabrication of mechanical parts; coil, transformer and electric motor rewind; instrument repair and calibration; teletypewriter disassembly and repair; etc. These services will be in support of the four regional sub-depots. In addition, the base depot will provide regional sub-depot services to certain Departments outlined under Article 6. The four regional sub-depots will establish shops capable of accomplishing all normal equipment repairs other than major overhaul, teletypewriter disassembly, fabrication of parts, coil rewind, etc. The Department repair shops will perform first and second echelon maintenance only; that is, preventive maintenance and replacement of high mortality parts not requiring sophisticated tools and/or testing apparatus. (Existing tools and/or testing apparatus may be redistributed from Department shops at the time of activation of regional support facilities.) Communications equipment requiring repairs above the second echelon level will be evacuated from the Department shop to the regional or base depot facility, as required.

ARTICLE 4. — The base depot in Bogota will establish a supply control facility for the receipt storage and issue of repair parts and expandable maintenance material in support of

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the country-wide maintenance effort. This supply facility will establish an integrated stock control system for all makes of communications equipment in the National Police system to avoid stockage duplication of parts common to various equipments. In addition, minimum and maximum levels will be established for repair parts stockage in Department repair shops, regional sub-depots and the base depot, and usage data will be accumulated and assimilated to ensure minimum value inventory consistent with maximum parts availability. Department shops will stock only high-mortality repair parts and will replenish those stocks from their designated regional support facility under a requisition and issue control system designed to ensure minimum equipment down-time and proper parts usage. Regional sub-depots will stock repair parts consistent with their echelon of maintenance and will replenish those stocks from the base depot in Bogota.

ARTICLE 5. — The base depot in Bogota will establish a technical training center capable of providing basic communications training for preparation of technicians needed for future expansion of personnel requirements and to replace those technicians lost through normal attrition. In addition, the training facility will provide advanced training for preparation of technicians responsible for higher echelons of maintenance, and will provide specialized courses and refresher and retraining programs to ensure maximum technical proficiency in the National Police Communications Section.

ARTICLE 6. — The area of responsibility of each regional sub-depot will be as follows:

a) *Central Region*

This region will be satellited on the base depot in Bogota and will comprise the Departments of Cundinamarca, Special District of Bogota, Boyaca, Tolima, Huila and Meta; the National Territories and Intendencias of Caqueta, Amazonas, Vaupes, Guainia, and Vichada; and the mountain relay sites of Alto de Cable, Mochuelo, Manjuí, Campanario, Cerro Neiva and Peñas Negras.

b) *Northern Region*

This region will be headquartered in Santa Marta and will comprise the Departments of Magdalena, Guajira, Cesar, Atlántico, Bolívar, Sucre and Córdoba; The Islands of San Adres and Providencia; and the mountain relay sites of Carmen de Bolivar and San Lorenzo.

c) *Eastern Region*

This region will be headquartered in Cucutá and will comprise the Departments of Santander and North Santander, the Intendencia of Arauca, and the mountain relay site of Orocue.

d) *Western Region*

This region will be headquartered in Medellín and will comprise the Departments of Antioquia and Chocó, plus the mountain relay site of Boquerón.

e) *Southern Region*

This region will be headquartered in Cali and will comprise the Departments of Valle, Cauca, Nariño, Risaralda, Quindío and Caldas; the Intendencia of Putumayo; the Island of Gorgona; and the mountain relay sites of Munchique, El Ruiz, Pan de Azúcar Amarillo.

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ARTICLE 7. — The communications logistical support facility will be staffed with the following personnel:

a) Base Depot — Bogotá

1) Office of the Base Depot Commander		6) Office of Supply	
Depot Commander	1	Supply Officer	1
Secretary	1	Supply Sergeant	1
AID Coordinator	1	Assistant to Supply Sergeant	1
Messenger	1	Supply Clerks	3
		Warehouseman	1
2) Office of Administration		Secretary	1
Administrative Officer	1		
Administrative Personnel	14	7) Office of Maintenance	
		Maintenance Officer	1
3) Office of Information and Security		Secretary	1
Chief of the Guard	2	Chief RadioVox Mobile Radio Lab.	1
Guards	8	RadioVox Mobile Radio Technicians	7
		RadioVox Portable Radio Technicians	2
4) Office of Communications		Chief Radio Vox Fixed Plant Lab	1
Communications Officer	1	RadioVox Fixed Plant Technicians	7
Secretary	1	Chief Tactical AM Radio Lab	1
Chief HF-SSB Network	1	Tactical AM Radio Technician	2
Site Chief, Suba	1	Chief Tactical FM Radio Lab	1
Transmitter Technician Suba	4	Tactical FM Radio Technicians	2
Site Chief, Muzu	1	Chief HF-SSB Radio Lab	1
Receiver Operator, Muzu	10	HF-SSB Radio Technician	2
Receiver Technician, Muzu	4	Chief Teletype Lab	1
TTY Operator, Hdqs.	4	Teletype Technician	2
Radio Terminal Operators	20	Chief Instrument Lab	1
Chief VHF-UFH Network	1	Instrument Technician	1
Operators, Bogotá	12	Chief Audio Lab	1
Relay Site Commander	14	Audio Technician	1
Relay Site Operator	15	Battery Technician	2
Relay Site Personnel, Misc.	2	Dynamotor Technician	3
Radio Terminal Personnel	10	Commercial Radio Technician	1
		Chief Electrical Generator Shop	1
5) Office of Plans and Training		Electrical Generator Technician	6
Plans and Training Officer	1	Motor Rewind Technician	2
Secretary	1		
Instructors (Civilian)	2		
Draftsman	1		

b) Regional Sub-Depots

	North	South	East	West
Commanding Officer	1	1	1	1
Secretary	1	1	1	1
Supply Technician	1	1	1	1
Electric Generator Technician	1	1	1	1
Tactical A. M. Tadio Technician	1	1	1	1
Tactical F. M. Radio Technician	1	1	1	1
RadioVox Technician	1	1	1	1
HF-SSB Radio Technician	1	1	1	1
Teletype Technician	1	0	0	0
Driver	1	1	1	1

c) Department Repair Shops

Radio Technicians 34

ARTICLE 8. – *Equipment*

a) Each repair shop of the base depot, sub-depots and Departments will be equipped with technical manuals, test equipment, tools and repair parts consistent with their individual echelon of maintenance responsibility and number of assigned technicians.

b) Each region sub-depot and the base depot will be provided with one cross-country type vehicle (Jeep) for transportation to mountain relay sites and rural areas. Each region sub-depot and the base depot, except the Western Region, will be provided with one heavy-duty, van-panel type vehicle for transportation from region headquarters to Department Commands over main arterial highways. These vehicles will be for the exclusive use of regional maintenance operations.

c) Officers, non-coms and agents will be armed with police revolvers. In certain emergency cases or in areas affected by violence, the Department Police Commander will issue special weapons as appropriate.

d) The uniform of the day will be as dictated by climate.

ARTICLE 9. – This resolution becomes effective as of the date of issue.

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ANNEX E

ORGANIC REGULATIONS OF THE NATIONAL POLICE

Decree No. 01667 of 1966 (June 30)

By which are drawn up the Organic Regulations of the National Police.

The President of the Republic of Colombia

making use of his legal faculties and especially of those conferred upon him by virtue of Article 121 of the National Constitution, and

Considering:

That Decree No. 1288 of 1965 declared the public order disturbed and the national territory under martial law;

That it is necessary to bring up-to-date the rules which regulate the functioning of the National Police, which rules were drawn up in 1949 under circumstances and in a situation totally different from the ones facing the country at present;

That as of June 1, 1962, and as a result of the dispositions contained in Law 193 of 1959 and in Decree No. 1217 of 1962, the whole Police Corps existing in the national territory was nationalized, with no effort having been made up to the present time to organize the Corps in accordance with the requirements of a national service;

That by virtue of Decree No. 1705 of 1960 the Ministry of War was reorganized and the National Police became a direct dependency of the Minister of War, today Minister of National Defense;

That in order to attend more efficiently to the re-establishment of public normality and to fully guarantee the maintenance of public order it is necessary to issue certain norms for the modernization, improvement and technification of the organization and operation of the National Police;

Decrees:

TITLE I

General Dispositions

CHAPTER I

Definition, Subordination and Functions

Article 1. The National Police is an eminently technical Armed Force made up of hierarchic personnel, which forms part of the Public Force with special management and discipline, under the immediate direction and control of the Minister of National Defense; its object is to prevent the order from being disturbed and to safeguard the rights of the citizens.

Article 2. The National Police has been instituted so as to protect the life, honor and possessions of all persons residing in Colombia, to lend any assistance required for the enforcement of the Laws and the Legal and Administrative Dispositions, to cooperate in the investigation of crimes and transgressions, to carry out work of education for social benefit, and in general to conserve internal Public Order in the realms of safety, peace and health.

Article 3. The National Police is not deliberative; its members are not allowed to make use of the vote while in active service, and neither may they take an active or inactive part in partisan politics.

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Article 4. The President of the Republic, as supreme administrative authority, is the Superior Chief of Police, which function may be exercised by him directly or through the Minister of National Defense.

Article 5. The functions of the National Police shall be carried out within the limits prescribed by the National Constitution, the Laws, ordinances, municipal agreements and regulations,

The General Director of the National Police, the Commanders of Departments and secondary Units shall answer for the effectiveness of the police service rendered within their respective jurisdictions, for which end they shall maintain a permanent, harmonical relationship with the authorities.

Article 6. The National Police shall normally carry out its preventive functions in collaboration with the political authority of the region. In the event that Police and Military Forces should be used simultaneously, they shall act in accordance with the plans provided or, in their defect, they shall act in complete coordination in accordance with the regulations which are issued.

In the event of foreign aggression, internal commotion or serious public calamity, the National Police shall act in accordance with the dispositions contained in the Law on National Defense.

Article 7. The Minister of National Defense, through the General Director of the Institution, exercises the functions of direction, organization, administration, inspection and supervision of all the Police Corps existing in the territory of the Republic, whether they are serving the Nation, the Departments, Intendencies, Commissariats or Municipalities.

Article 8. The National Government determines the selection designation, advancement, promotion, dismissal, transfer and retirement of the Officers of the National Police Force.

The Minister of National Defense, through the Director of the National Police, is in charge of the designations, advancements, promotions, and retirements of the Sub-Officials of the Institution. The Director of the same is in charge of carrying out the same dispositions with regard to Policemen.

Article 9. The responsibility for issuing rules and dispositions of a general nature on Police subjects, rests upon the entities and persons granted that faculty by the National Constitution and the Law; the Officers, Sub-officials and Policemen are in charge of executing and enforcing said rules.

Article 10. In the Department, Intendencies, Commissariats, Special District and Municipalities, the Police Corps shall be at the disposal of the respective Governor, Intendant, Commissary or Mayor, who shall transact orders through the Police Commander or whoever is replacing him. In special and urgent cases, they may do this directly if it is indispensable for immediate maintenance of order.

Article 11. All persons working for the National Police who should commit an infraction presented during service or caused by the same or by functions inherent to their position, shall be tried in accordance to the Penal Military Code of Justice and the dispositions which modify or amend it.

Article 12. The General Attorneyship of the National shall designate a Representing Attorney to act exclusively in the penal cases tried by Military Justice and relating to personnel of the National Police.

Article 13. The General Director of the National Police may, with approval from the Minister of National Defense, contract for remunerated permanent and special vigilance services by Police personnel, with official, semi-official or private entities or natural persons, incorporating into the Institution the number of Policemen required for the realization of each contract, the value of which shall be destined for payment of salaries and social

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benefits, and training of the personnel incorporated. The person contracting the service is obliged to contribute ten percent (10%) of the value of the contract to the *Police Fund for Social Well-Being*.

The special and temporary services treated in Article 2, Decree 2326 of 1953, which are not the obligation of the State, shall continue to be rendered in conformity with the dispositions of the same Decree.

CHAPTER II

Preventive, legal, educational and social work

Article 14. Preventive labor is the primary work of the Police, and in order to carry out this mission the personnel of the Institution should make use of all its intelligence, initiative, liveliness and spirit of observation.

Article 15. In the development of the dispositions stated in the preceding Article, the Police shall be in charge of the following principal functions:

1. To be informed in detail as to the environmental conditions of the zone under its care and the way of life of its inhabitants.
2. To keep an eye on known criminals and on individuals suspected of carrying on anti-social or dangerous activities, endeavoring to discover the methods or systems used by them in the perpetration of crimes.
3. To keep a record of loiterers, pickpockets, reducers, professional gamblers and other persons of notorious bad conduct.
4. To keep a map of the jurisdiction corresponding to each Unit, on which shall be registered each day the crimes perpetrated in each place, this with the object of following the movements of delinquency in the area. A map of all the Police Stations shall be kept at the District Command.
5. To keep a record of criminal activities at the Department and District Commands, in accordance with the maps mentioned in the preceding numeral.
6. To watch over urban zones with the object of preventing the perpetration of crimes and transgressions.
7. To take special care to patrol highways and country areas in order to avoid criminal attempts on the agricultural and livestock industries, as well as to prevent deforestation and illegal hunting and fishing.

This service shall be organized in a special form in each Unit or Division.

Article 16. The National Police shall promote private organizations of self-defense and collaboration with vigilance services and shall supervise the development of their activities.

The Officers, Sub-officials and Policemen of the National Police are to guard the national territory in order to guarantee public tranquility, safety and health and to prevent the perpetration of crimes and transgressions; they are to commence initial instruction in the event of transgressions which were impossible to prevent; and pass on to the legal authority or the instruction officials the proceedings which they have carried out in accordance with the dispositions of this Decree.

Article 17. The Directors of establishments of arrest, punishment and security measures all over the country are to submit on the first day of each month, a list of the convicts freed the month before, to the Police Departments corresponding to the zone where said individuals are going to reside and where they committed the crime, this with the object of allowing the Police to carry out an adequate vigilance over them.

Article 18. The Directors referred to in the preceding Article shall communicate immediately to the Police Department Commands the names and aliases of any individuals

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who have escaped from their respective establishments, together with all data collected on them, with the object of proceeding to their persecution and arrest.

Article 19. The National Police has, with relation to crime investigation and capture of transgressors, the functions of a Legal Police set out in Decree 1726 of 1964.

Article 20. The members of the Police Force shall employ those methods of coercion expressly authorized by the law or by regulations in the enforcement of the National Constitution, the laws, decrees, ordinances, agreements and orders issued by competent authorities; but they may make no use of their weapons except when it should be strictly necessary for the prevention of a crime or for repression of a tumultuous reunion generating into a riot, sedition or uprising. In this latter event, manifest warning shall be given to the rioters and use shall be made, if possible, of elements designed to disperse them, such as gases or water; only in extreme cases shall use be made of instruments subject to endangering the life or personal soundness of the individual.

Article 21. The command to utilize instruments subject to endangering the life or personal soundness of the individual should come from the Governor, Intendant, Commissary, Mayor or Commander of the respective Police Department; however, if it should be impossible, due to the circumstances, to receive orders from one of these officials, the Patrol Commander or Police Division Commander may issue them on their own responsibility.

Article 22. Whenever a person or persons should put up resistance to the enforcement of a law, regulation or legitimate order, they may be obligated by force to desist from said opposition, but without the use of instruments which may endanger their life or personal soundness, unless resistance is accompanied by aggression or violence.

Article 23. Any person arrested by the Police is to be put at the disposal of the official responsible within the twenty-four hours following his arrest, plus the term of the distance. During the time that this person remains under custody of the Police, he should be fed in accordance with the regulations prescribed.

Article 24. The function of repression is exercised whenever preventive labor has not produced results; in this function, the Police shall proceed to arrest the persons responsible for crimes discovered in flagrante delicto. Furthermore, in cases of disruption of public order or when sectors of the population rise against the legitimately constituted government or promote disorders which put the Power of the State in an insecure situation, the Police shall rapidly repress such actions and restore normality.

Article 25. The educational work of the Police consists in informing, orienting and instructing the people as to respect for the law, obedience to legitimate authority and social co-existence.

Article 26. The Police shall carry out a social function rendering the public services of cooperation and solidarity in the event of public calamities, assisting the sick and the hurt, protecting the old, the invalid, women and children.

Article 27. In each of the municipalities, mayor's districts and Police Inspector's Office, the personnel stationed by the Institution shall carry on an active and permanent campaign to promote, develop and maintain communal action with the help of civil and ecclesiastical authorities and outstanding representatives of the social nucleus.

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TITLE II
Specific Functions

CHAPTER I
Branches of Police Service

Article 28. The Police shall carry out the following specialized services within their general mission of guaranteeing public tranquility, preventing actions which could disturb the social order of the nation, and bringing about enforcement of the law:

1. Urban and Rural Patrolmen
2. Judicial Police
3. Route Patrol
4. Traffic Police
5. Juvenile Protection Police
6. Prison Police
7. Fire Police
8. Tourist Police, and
9. Any others which the General Management should consider it necessary to organize in conformity with the economic and social development of the Nation.

Article 29. The National Police urban and rural patrol service shall constitute the basis of its institutional activities. The Police shall be organized and distributed in the jurisdiction of the Unit in an uninterrupted manner and according to the needs and characteristics of the areas, the number of inhabitants, the idiosyncrasies and activities of its people and the type of transgressions which predominate.

Patrol in small towns and country areas shall be entrusted to Carabineer Units, which shall make the rounds and carry out interviews throughout neighboring settlements and farms, roads and paths.

The personnel destined for rural patrol shall receive special education and instruction which will permit them to lend rural inhabitants an efficient collaboration in land cultivation, use and conservation of waters, and care in the development of cattle raising, aviculture and in general all those activities which stimulate the development of the national economy.

Article 30. The Judicial Police shall collaborate with the judicial authorities in the different functions imposed by criminal investigation.

Article 31. The Route Patrol, including highway, railroad, waterway, ocean and airport services, shall collaborate in the enforcement of the dispositions issued by the National Transportation Superintendency to solve the problems caused by an increase in human and mechanical circulation, as well as in the care and conservation of roads.

Article 32. The Traffic Police shall be in charge of solving the problems which arise in urban sectors of the cities as a result of the increase in human and mechanical circulation. The efforts of the Traffic Police tend to lower the accident rate, avoid continuous obstruction of traffic movement, establish an adequate and orderly system of transit for pedestrians and vehicles, and enforce the regulations issued by the respective authorities.

Article 33. The Juvenile Police shall be in charge of collaborating with the respective officials in the prevention of juvenile delinquency, controlling enforcement of the dispositions issued concerning juveniles and carrying out, furthermore, works of education and protection of minors.

Article 34. The personnel in charge of Penal Service shall patrol and supervise the convicts held in prisons, colonies and other similar establishments; they are also responsible for the

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discipline of the prisoners. This work shall be carried out in accordance with the dispositions in effect concerning Penal Administration and upon request from the Minister of Justice.

Article 35. The Fire Police is in charge of putting out fires and assisting the citizens in all kinds of public calamities. In those places where there are no Firemen, police entities shall be created to carry out this function.

Article 36. The Tourist Police shall watch over national and international tourist movement in the country with the object of protecting and informing travellers and tourists; it shall also exercise police control over hotels and boarding houses.

CHAPTER II Collaboration Between Police and Justice

Article 37. The Police shall proceed to arrest all transgressors of the law, in the following cases among others:

- a) Those responsible for flagrant transgressions or anti-social conduct;
- b) Those appearing in orders from a competent authority, if the legal formalities have been observed in said documents;
- c) Those persons whose capture has been requested publicly by a competent authority through letters requisitorial, circulars or other orders;
- d) In the event of public outcry, to avoid the perpetration of a crime or the impunity or escape of a delinquent;
- e) In the event of flagrant Police violations which may justify this measure for assuring enforcement of the punishment due to the delinquent;
- f) Those who are seriously suspected of carrying on acts which precede a crime.

Article 38. Whenever a person is arrested by the Police, he should be searched immediately in order to take from him the arms or harmful elements which he may have in his possession, as well as those which may have been acquired in the perpetration of a crime.

If the individual arrested should present injuries, a doctor—preferably an official doctor—is to be called so that he may verify the nature of these injuries and give the medical assistance called for.

Article 39. The Officers, Sub-officials and Policemen pertaining to the National Police shall, in the development of their functions, collaborate with the officials of Penal Justice. Thus, they are under the obligation of commencing officially the preliminary measures in the investigation of crimes perpetrated within the territory included in their District or Station, and are also to avoid the development of harmful consequences.

Such steps shall be principally the following:

1. To assure conservation of proofs;
2. To bring the affair to the knowledge of the instruction official and the competent legal authority, without ceasing informative measures, within the twenty-four hours following initiation of the same;
3. To gather all physical elements which may serve as a basis for elucidation of the affair;
4. The questioning summarily of the accused and the witnesses;
5. To see to it that the prints and the physical elements of the crime are preserved;
6. In the event of flagrant crimes, to search individuals and homes even during the night and in any place where there exists a sound basis for believing that the suspect or the escaped may be found, or that there may be obtained elements which should be seized or prints which could be destroyed or altered, fulfilling, as far as possible, the requirements set forth in the Code of Penal Procedure for the corresponding proceedings, but without demanding any oath whatsoever from witnesses or experts; and

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7. To deliver, with no delay, to the general judicial authority and particularly to the instruction official, all the data which may be obtained and which could lead to the proving of the crime or to the discovery and identification of those responsible.

Article 40. The National Police Officers who exercise permanently the functions of Judicial Police shall be likewise criminal instruction officials, previous request by the President of the Penal Court of the respective Higher Tribunal and resolution by the General Director of the National Police.

Article 41. The Officers in charge of Districts and Police Stations shall carry out all commissions, orders and letters requisitorial issued or demanded of them by the investigation judges or instruction officials, especially in that relating to the capture of accused persons or criminals, the summons or appearance in court of witnesses and experts, and the technical services required of them. Said commissions, orders and letters requisitorial may only refer to the needs of the investigation.

Article 42. The Officers, Sub-Officials and Policemen of the National Police may not, in the exercise of their functions, open sealed or closed papers or documents, but are to deliver them intact to the competent Judge, except in the case of fulfillment of orders or letters requisitorial issued by competent authorities.

Article 43. The Officers, Sub-Officials and Policemen of the National Police who are notified of the existence in the Post and Telegraph Offices of letters, papers, packages, monies, correspondence or telegrams which may be confiscated or seized in accordance with the Code of Penal Procedure, shall proceed immediately to avoid their circulation and shall bring the affair, in writing, to the knowledge of the instruction official or the competent Judge, so that the latter may proceed as called for.

Article 44. The Officers, Sub-Officials and Policemen of the National Police may enter the telephone, telegraph, radio or public service offices or installations with the object of effecting communications, whenever there are grave reasons for fearing perpetration of a crime or when it should be necessary for assuring the results of an investigation or when they must communicate to the authorities in general or to their superiors any actions which may disrupt the public order.

Article 45. The General Director of the Police shall designate, through resolutions, the Officers, Sub-Officials and Policemen of the Institution who are to exercise permanently the functions of Judicial Police.

Article 46. The functions referred to in the two preceding articles are the following:

a) To obey and carry out the orders issued by magistrates, judges and agents of the public ministry for the initiation or effecting of the penal investigations corresponding to them;

b) To carry out directly the first investigative proceeding when they are informed of the perpetration of a crime officially punishable. In such a case, they are to go to the site of the occurrence and examine it closely, examine in detail the evidence left, and gather the elements which may serve to assure proof of the outward appearance of the crime and proof of responsibility, taking care that said evidence is not altered, erased or hidden; to draw up, when necessary, a map of the crime scene and to carry out all other procedures required by criminal investigation techniques for the due elucidation of the affair; to prohibit withdrawal or departure from the scene of those persons who have witnessed the crime or who have any particular information, taking care that they do not communicate with each other; to locate witnesses and receive sworn declarations from those considered urgent or indispensable;

c) To arrange for the arrest and incommunications of the persons who appear to be suspected of responsibility in the perpetration of a crime and to order the adequate

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procedures so that identification, opinions, comparisons and other pertinent analysis may be effected as soon as possible by the Legal Medical Institute or the Administrative Department of Security (DAS);

- d) To make identifications in groups of prisoners and at the lifting of corpses;
- e) To arrange for and carry out forcible entrance into buildings and searching of persons, establishments and other property in accordance with the norms established in the Code of Penal Procedure;
- f) To immediately inform the respective Municipal Judge as to the perpetration of the crime, and if the Judge decides to visit the scene of the crime, care should be taken that the state of the same is not altered until he arrives.

Article 47. The Minister of Justice, the Attorney General of the Nation, the General Director of the Police, the President of the Penal Court of the Supreme Court of Justice and the Chief of the Administrative Department of Security constitute the National Judicial Police Council, which is in charge of coordinating on a nationwide scale the repression of criminal activity, of unifying efforts for the success of penal investigations carried out in the country, and of instructing the Mayors, Inspectors and anyone else exercising permanently or temporarily the functions of Judicial Police, on the fulfillment of the pertinent legal dispositions.

Paragraph 1. The District Judicial Police Council, whose functions within the District are the same as those of the National Council, is made up of the President of the Penal Court of the Higher Tribunal, the Attorney of the respective Judicial District and the Officer or Sub-Official who is District Commander of the Patrol Force.

Paragraph 2. The Government shall regulate the organization and operation of the National Judicial Police Council, as well as of the District Councils.

TITLE III

Organization

CHAPTER I

National Police General Direction

Article 48. The National Police shall depend upon the Minister of National Defense for all effects of direction and command.

Article 49. The National Police shall be organized for the fulfilling of its functions, according to the dispositions of the present Regulations.

Article 50. The Director of the National Police shall be a General Officer and in his defect, a Higher Officer of the Institution, designated and removed freely by the President of the Republic.

The General Director shall be the direct representative of the Government in affairs concerning the Police, and as such he shall answer through the Minister for the command, administration, capacity, discipline, conduct, management and use of the Police Force in the territory of the Republic.

Article 51. The General Director shall exercise his functions of direction and command through the following organisms:

- 1. Technical Branch
 - a) Sub Direction
 - b) Staff
 - c) General Inspection
 - d) General Assistance

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2. Administrative Branch
 - a) General Secretariat
 - b) Special Organisms
 - c) Higher Police Auditorship (Defense)

A) SUB-DIRECTION

Article 52. The Sub-Direction is the organism which collaborates directly with the General Direction as executor of its orders and supervisor of its services.

B) STAFF

Article 53. The Staff is the consulting organism of the General Director and is in charge of recommending, planning and coordinating its decisions and orders.

Article 54. The Staff shall have a Chief whose principal function shall be to coordinate planning of the services and execution of the orders to be carried out by the Departments under his command.

Article 55. The Staff shall be made up of the following Departments:

- F-1 Personnel Department
- F-2 Department of Information, Crime and Statistics
- F-3 Department of Planning and Regulations
- F-4 Department of Administrative Services
- F-5 Department of Accounting, Control and Budget
- F-6 Teaching Department
- F-7 Health Department
- F-8 Public Relations Department

Article 56. The positions of Chief of each of the above Departments shall be filled by Upper Officials holding a Degree from the Higher Police Academy, excepting the Chiefs of the Departments of Accounting, Control and Budget and Health.

PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT

Article 57. The Personnel Department is in charge of incorporation, selection, promotion, removal, classification, advancement, retirement, dismissal, discharge and social benefits of the members of the Institution.

Article 58. The following Sections shall operate as dependencies of the Personnel Department:

- HV-1 Officers' Section
- HV-2 Sub-Officials' Section
- HV-3 Policemen's Section
- HV-4 Civil Personnel Section
- Cult Section

These Sections shall operate in accordance with the dispositions established in the Organic Regulations of the General Direction.

DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION, CRIME AND STATISTICS

Article 59. The Department of Information, Crime and Statistics shall receive, verify and coordinate any information related to public order, crime and statistics, maps and records or delinquency; and shall carry out periodical studies according to the Regulations, on the general situation of the country and the particular situation of the Sections with regard to

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delinquency and other social phenomena, which may be deemed convenient for planning the services.

Article 60. The following Sections shall operate as Dependencies of the Department of Information, Crime and Statistics:

1. Intelligence
2. Counter-Intelligence
3. Statistics
4. Crime Studies, and
5. Charts and Maps

DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING AND REGULATIONS

Article 61. The Department of Planning and Regulations plans, updates and coordinates the services to be rendered by Police Units; it projects and studies the modifications required by the institutional regulations, and sees to it that they are strictly obeyed.

It shall propose to the General Director those problems and suggestions which it deems should be considered, according to practice of the services and in the development of orders, by the entities and authorities capable of issuing and modifying Police Regulations and Orders with the object of lending them efficient collaboration.

Article 62. The following Sections shall operate as dependencies of the Department of Planning and Regulations:

1. Organization
2. Operations
3. Regulation, and
4. Planning.

DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES

Article 63. The Department of Administrative Services is in charge of drawing up and executing the budget of the National Police according to the budget law, the dispositions of the General Comptrollership of the Republic and the norms set forth by the General Direction of the Police; it is also in charge of acquiring and distributing opportunely the elements or implements required by the Units for their successful operation.

Article 64. The following Sections shall operate as dependencies of the Department of Administrative Services:

1. Management
2. Transportation and Workshops
3. Repairs and Veterinary
4. Arms and Munitions
5. Transmissions
6. Engineering and Construction

DEPARTMENT OF ACCOUNTING, CONTROL AND BUDGET

Article 65. The Department of Accounting, Control and Budget is in charge of the following:

- a) Administration of the funds allotted in the national budget for expenses of the National Police;
- b) Organization of Cashier Offices in Bogotá;
- c) Supervision of Accountants-Cashiers of outside garrisons;

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d) Attend to the requests for funds which are to be submitted monthly to the Ministry of Finance;

e) Drawing up and submitting to the approval of the General Direction the descriptive graphs of monthly expenditure which are to be included in the agreements authorized by the Ministry referred to;

f) To opportunely furnish the Cashiers outside of Bogotá with the funds necessary for payment of services;

g) Keeping control of expenses and carrying out their activity in such a way as to obtain correct execution of the budget;

h) Carrying out the dispositions issued by the Ministry of Finance for budget management;

i) Keep the accounts and inventories of the Institution and render the monthly funded account to the General Comptrollership of the Republic;

j) All other functions determined by the National Budget Direction and the General Police Director.

Article 66. The following Sections shall operate as dependencies of the Department of Accounting, Control and Budget:

1. Execution and Control
2. Payment Office
3. Accounting, and
4. Police Departments

TRAINING DEPARTMENT

Article 67. The Training Department is the highest educational authority of the National Police and, consequently, it shall organize, direct and determine the directors and the educational methods related to the formation and professional perfecting of the members of the Institute. Its general educational plans shall be studied by the Staff and approved by the General Directorship.

The educational operation of Police Schools shall also be directed by this Department.

HEALTH DEPARTMENT

Article 68. The Health Department is in charge of medical, pharmaceutical, surgical, odontological and hospital care of the personnel who, according to the law, has the right to receive such attention. It shall, according to Regulations, give its opinion as to the entrance or retirement of members of the Institution; it shall determine incapacity and shall carry out, in general, the programs necessary to guarantee not only the efficiency of treatments, but also a real and efficient service of preventive medicine for all personnel.

PUBLIC RELATIONS DEPARTMENT

Article 69. The Public Relations Department is in charge of all activities oriented towards promoting the prestige of the Institution, increasing cooperating from official or private entities and from natural persons in all relating to service operations, carrying out internal campaigns to make known the activities of the police, emphasize the virtues and capacity of the personnel and the Units, and maintain cordial relations between Upper and Subordinate members.

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Article 70. The following Sections shall operate as dependencies of the Public Relations Department:

1. Sports
2. Publications and printed matter
3. Publicity

C) GENERAL INSPECTION

Article 71. General Inspection is an organism dependent upon the General Direction and made up of five Upper Officials who have the following functions:

1. The Officer having the greatest seniority shall be General Inspector and Judge of the Primary Court in accordance with the Code of Military Penal Justice. He shall exercise, furthermore, the disciplinary attributes assigned him by the Regulations.

2. The Inspector who is second in seniority to the General Inspector shall be in charge of supervising and coordinating administrative distribution of the Institution within the territory of the Republic.

3. Other Inspectors shall supervise police work and fulfillment of the legal and lawfully prescribed dispositions at the service of the Police, through periodic inspection of the Divisions and Units which operate in the country. They shall also observe the morals and conduct of all officials of the Institution and are to receive, investigate and give their opinion on all complaints brought against personnel.

D) GENERAL ASSISTANCE

Article 72. General Assistance coordinates and distributes the work of all the organisms of the General Direction and collaborates for the success of the Director's actions, supervising the orders issued by him. The General Assistant shall be an Upper Official of the Institution.

Article 73. The following Sections shall operate as dependencies of General Assistance:

1. General Order
2. Records and Correspondence
3. Radio Center and Message Center
4. Musical Band.

2. ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH

A) GENERAL SECRETARIAT

Article 74. The General Secretary shall be an Upper Official of the Police holding a law degree or a professional lawyer chosen by the General Director of the Institution. He shall have the following functions:

- a) To communicate designations, resolutions and other acts of the General Direction;
- b) To authorize with his signature the decree, resolutions, certifications, copies, and to make known the dispositions;
- c) To take oaths and authorize with his signature the acts of possession of employees;
- d) To draw up the projects of resolutions to be issued by the General Director;
- e) To organize the General Files and maintain them up-to-date;
- f) To preside over the Lawyers' Meetings called for establishing policies for the solution of legal problems;
- g) All others determined by the Regulations.

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Article 75. The General Secretariat shall have the following dependencies:

1. Legal Bureau
2. General Files

The Legal Bureau shall contain the following Sections:

- a) General Business
- b) Social Benefits

Paragraph. The General Direction of the National Police shall organize and regulate the specific functions of each one of these Sections.

Article 76. The Legal Bureau is in charge of studying and proposing solutions to the problems of a legal nature and those referring to social benefits which are to be decided upon by the General Direction. It is also in charge of representing, through its lawyers, those members of the Institution charged with transgressions related to the service and determined by the General Director, and of representing the Police before Litigious Administrative or Judicial authorities.

Article 77. The General Director may grant power of attorney to the lawyers of the Legal Bureau or hire professional lawyers to represent the Police in the trials in which the Institution or its members are involved, for reasons of institutional interest.

B) SPECIAL ORGANISMS

Article 78. The following Organisms shall form part of the Direction and shall have direct relations with the Director:

1. Social Welfare Service
2. Retirement Pension Fund
3. Police Housing Fund
4. Rotating Fund
5. Officers' Club
6. Sub-Officials' Club
7. Policemen's Club

Article 79. The Organisms mentioned in the preceding article shall be governed by their own Rules and Regulations.

C) HIGHER POLICE AUDITORSHIP (Defense)

Article 80. For all effects of Military Justice, there shall be a Higher Police Auditor whose functions and designation shall be governed by the Code of Military Penal Justice. This official shall have direct relations with the General Director of the Institution.

CHAPTER II

Police Departments

Article 81. For all service purposes, the Institution is divided into Police Departments, whose organization shall be governed by resolution of the General Direction.

Each of the Departments into which the nation is politically divided—with the exception of National Territories—shall have at its service a Police Department, and the Special District of Bogotá shall likewise have its Police Department. The services such as Juvenile Police, Route Police and similar shall be grouped into a Department of Special Services.

Article 82. In the Intendencias and Commissariats, Police Districts shall be organized to depend upon the Police Departments determined by the General Direction.

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Article 83. The Police Department Commanders shall be responsible for the direction, distribution and operation of Police services within the territory of their jurisdiction, and for the conduct and discipline of the personnel under their command.

The Department Command shall be entrusted to Upper Officials of the Police Force.

Services, control and discipline of personnel shall be effected in conformity with the norms established in this Regulation, the legal precepts, rules and orders of the General Direction, the dispositions of the respective Governors and Mayors, and the Ordinances and Agreements of Municipal Assemblies and Councils.

Article 84. The District Commanders in Intendencias and Commissariats shall have full autonomy in the distribution of services and shall be subject to the dispositions and orders of the Intendants and Commissaries in the maintenance of public order within their respective territories.

CHAPTER III

Districts, Stations, Sub-Stations and Police Posts

Article 85. For the rendering of Police services, each Department shall be divided into Districts, each District into Stations and each Station into Sub-Stations and Posts. The Department shall have the number of Officers, Sub-Officials and Policement determined by the General Police Direction, within the Plan established by the Government.

In each Judicial District there shall be a Police District having the same headquarters, unless service requirements impose a different distribution.

Article 86. By District is understood the area of a Police Department which includes the jurisdiction of two or more Stations. The District Commands shall coordinate patrol services in the zone, they shall maintain direct contact with the authorities in their jurisdiction, and shall preserve the discipline of the personnel under their orders submitting periodic reports to the Department Command.

Article 87. The Police Station is the basic unit of the institutional organization which directs and controls all actions relating to crime prevention within a determined jurisdiction, guards the preservation of public order and collaborates with local authorities.

The Station Commanders shall attend to all matters incumbent upon the Police and arising within their jurisdiction and shall have full autonomy in the distribution of services and personnel.

Article 88. Operation of the Police Stations shall be directly subordinated to the District or Department Commands and shall be commanded by Officer holding the rank of Major or Captain.

Article 89. The Police Sub-Stations are Units dependent upon the Stations, and they shall operate in those municipalities or sites having lesser importance.

Paragraph. Police Sub-Stations shall be established, furthermore, in order to allow better development of services where the jurisdiction of the Stations is overly extensive.

Article 90. By Posts are meant the small police garrisons or guards used for watching over "corregimientos" (small districts), inspections or settlements, whose importance does not require the category of Station or Sub-Station.

Article 91. Said Posts shall be dependent upon the Stations or Sub-Stations, depending on the circumstances.

The Commanders of Police Posts shall be sub-officials of the different ranks or Outstanding Policemen, depending on their importance.

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Article 92. The Sub-Station and Post Commanders shall obey all dispositions relative to the effecting of services, ordered by the respective Mayors, Corregidores and Police Inspectors, and they shall command the services within their jurisdiction in conformity with the general norms issued by the Commanders of the Department, District, Station or Sub-Station. They shall be responsible for local services and shall have full autonomy in ordering and carrying them out.

Article 93. The Officers and Sub-Officials commanding the different Police Units may hold ranks other than those determined in this Regulation if, in the opinion of the General Direction, this is made necessary by reasons of service or lack of personnel.

TITLE IV

Administrative and Fiscal System

Article 94. The General Director of the National Police shall control expenditures corresponding to services of the Institution, conforming in this to the budget appropriations and standards.

Article 95. Any acquisitions to be made for satisfying the needs of the different services of the National Police, shall be made by the General Direction through the Department of Administrative Services and independently of the Administrative Department of General Services.

Article 96. All orders or contracts celebrated by the General Director through the Department of Administrative Services, except those celebrated with the Rotating Fund, are to conform to the following requirements:

- a) Acquisitions of up to fifty thousand pesos (\$50,000.00) may be effected by means of purchase orders, without the need of a written contract;
- b) Acquisitions for a value of fifty thousand pesos (\$50,000.00) or more shall require a written contract and shall conform to the requirements and procedures which the Law demands in accordance with the sum involved.

Article 97. All provisions delivered by the National Police Rotating Fund to the Institution, whatever the sum involved, shall require only a purchase order from the Department of Administrative Services once the transaction has been approved by the Purchasing Board. Value of the same shall be charged to the General Reserves which the Police may establish in the Rotating Fund.

Article 98. Acquisitions made by the Rotating Fund shall be subject to the legal dispositions which regulate said organisms.

Article 99. The Directors of the "General Santander" Cadet School and of the Sub-Officials' School "Gonzalo Jiménez de Quesada" may make acquisitions, charged directly to the budget of said Institutes, of up to twenty thousand pesos (\$20,000.00).

Acquisitions for values above that indicated above shall be subject to the regulations on acquisitions and contracts in effect for the National Police.

Article 100. Acquisitions made by the National Police for its endowment shall be exempt from import duty, tariffs and national, departmental and municipal taxes.

Article 101. All investments of over twenty thousand pesos (\$20,000.00) to be effected by the Department of Administrative Services, shall be first submitted for study and approval by the Purchasing Board, which is made up as follows:

1. General Director of the Police.
2. Sub-Director
3. Chief of Staff

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4. Chief of the Department of Administrative Services
5. Head of the Department of Accounting, Control and Budget.

The Intendant of the Department of Administrative Services shall act as Secretary.

The Fiscal Auditor of the General Comptrollership of the Republic shall have a voice—but no vote—in the decisions of the Board.

When the matter concerns acquisitions destined for the “General Santander” Cadet School or the Sub-Officials’ School “Gonzalo Jiménez de Quesada”, the Directors of said Institutes shall form part of the purchasing Board, and shall have voice and vote.

Article 102. The Police Director may delegate to the Department Commanders, the School Directors and District Commanders having Accountant Cashiers, the power of ordering expenditures up to the sum of twenty thousand pesos (\$20,000.00) in their respective Units. In all cases, the salaries and bills shall be authorized by the Unit Commander, School Directors or District Commanders.

Paragraph 1. The General Police Direction may likewise authorize Department Commanders, School Directors or District Commanders to effect, in its name, contracts concerning the acquisition of goods for a value of over twenty thousand pesos (\$20,000.00) but not exceeding one hundred thousand pesos (\$100,000.00); in the latter case, the approval of the General Director is required to make the contract valid.

Paragraph 2. For the satisfactory fulfillment of this article, the National Police General Direction, through the Departments of Administrative Services and of Accounting, Control and Budget, shall place at the disposal of the respective Cashiers, the funds necessary for covering all expenses.

Article 103. The Direction of the National Police may contract directly for the services of national or foreign technicians required in its different specializations.

Article 104. Control and supervision of the funds allotted in the budget for the National Police, are to be carried out by the General Comptrollership of the Republic, which shall issue the fiscal standards to which the different management organisms of the Police must conform.

TITLE V

Instruction

CHAPTER I

Instruction Institutions

Article 105. The Police shall maintain, for the professional instruction and specialization of its members, the following Institutions, whose organization is determined by the Government:

- a) *Higher Police Academy*
- b) *“General Santander” Police Academy* in Bogotá, for formation of officers.
- c) *“Gonzalo Jiménez de Quesada” School* in Bogotá, for formation of sub-officials.
- d) *Carabineers’ School* in Bogotá
- e) *Atlantic Coast School.* For the Departments of Atlántico, Bolívar, Córdoba, Guajira, Magdalena, and for the district of San Andrés y Providencia.
- f) *Western School.* For the Departments of Antioquia, Caldas, Chocó and Quindío.
- g) *School of the Pacific.* For the Departments of Cauca, Nariño, Valle and for the District of Putumayo.
- h) *Southern School.* For the Departments of Huila, Tolima and the districts of Amazonas and Caquetá.

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- i) *Central School.* For the Departments of Boyacá and Cundinamarca.
- j) *Northern School.* For the Departments of North Santander and Santander.
- k) *Eastern School.* For the Departments of Meta, Intendancy of Arauca, and Commissariats of Guainía, Vaupés and Vichada.

Paragraph. The National Police General Direction shall indicate the cities where these Institutes should operate and shall determine the names which shall distinguish them.

Article 106. The Institutes shall depend directly on the Teaching Department of the Staff and they shall submit to the supervision of the respective Police Department Commanders, with the exception of the institutes operating in the Special District of Bogotá, which shall be supervised by the Chief of Staff.

Article 107. The prescribed studies in the Institutes shall be determined by the Government and their development shall be carried out through Directorates approved by the General Direction.

CHAPTER II

Courses for Formation and Training of Officers

Article 108. Formation of Officers of the National Police shall be carried out only at the "General Santander" Police School.

Article 109. The requirements and conditions of entry into the school, as a Cadet, shall be determined by the Organic Regulations of the Institute and shall be contained in the Rules of Admission.

Article 110. The training courses for advancement in the ranks of Second Lieutenant, Lieutenant and Captain, shall be given at the "General Santander" Police School.

CHAPTER III

Higher Police Academy

Article 111. The Higher Police Academy is an institute designed for advanced studies in professional training for Upper Officials of the Police, and leads to advancement to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.

CHAPTER IV

Course for Formation of Sub-Officials and Policemen

Article 112. The courses of formation and training for advancement of Sub-Officials of the National Police, shall be given at the "Gonzalo Jiménez de Quesada" School.

Paragraph. Policemen shall be trained at Regional Schools.

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TITLE VI
Hierarchy
CHAPTER I
Uniformed Personnel

Article 113. The uniformed personnel of the National Police shall be classified according to the hierarchy and rankings indicated below:

1. *Officers:*
 - Major General
 - Brigadier General
 - Colonel
 - Lieutenant Colonel
 - Major
 - Captain
 - Lieutenant
 - Second Lieutenant

2. *Sub-Officials and Policemen*
 - Major Sargeant
 - First Sargeant
 - Vice-First Sargeant
 - Second Sargeant
 - First Corporal
 - Second Corporal
 - Policeman

Article 114. The professional carrier of Officers, Sub-Officials and Policemen shall be organized by law, which organization shall include: qualities for admission, studies, advancements, designations, retirements, removals, as well as retirement pay, pensions and other social benefits.

Article 115. The personnel aspiring to the rank of Officers of the "General Santander" Police School shall be called Cadets. Students in their last year of professional studies shall receive the title of Ensigns, granted by Governmental decree.

Article 116. The positions of Service Officers may be occupied by professionals holding a college degree in one of the following subjects: administration, architecture, law, economics, engineering, medicine, odontology, priesthood and veterinary science.

Article 117. In the ranks of Service Sub-Officials may be admitted those individuals who due to their technical preparation carry out special or administrative activities in the Institution, as long as they hold a degree or certificate of merit in one of the following branches: administration, arms, accounting, nursing, pharmacy, transmissions, transportation, repairs, health and veterinary science.

Article 118. The Policemen who are admitted into Formation Schools may receive only one monthly salary during the term of their studies, equivalent to 50% of their allotment, as well as the family benefit bonus for married personnel, settled on the basis of the basic pay of the Policemen. They likewise have the right, if such be the case, to a Christmas Bonus.

The difference between the Policemen's allotments and what he actually receives upon entering a training school for the first time, shall be destined for the payment of meals, washing and barbershop services, discounts for the Retirement Pension Fund, etc., and for paying special teachers and other costs required in the process of instruction.

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CHAPTER II

Un-uniformed Personnel

Article 119. The un-uniformed personnel of the National Police shall be classified preferentially into Specialists, Attachés and Assistants, and they shall have the obligations and duties determined by the Government in the corresponding by-laws.

Article 120. Admission of un-uniformed personnel into the Institution shall be effected preferentially by the minimum scale which corresponds to the category of their activities.

Article 121. Promotions of un-uniformed personnel shall be effected in general according to the dispositions established in the respective Regulations, when and if there is a vacancy and by means of the competitive contests prescribed.

TITLE VII

Regulations and Register

CHAPTER I

Regulations

Article 122. For the purpose of directing and determining the development of the Institution's functions, the Government shall issue, among others, the following Regulations:

1. Organization and distribution of the National Police (Organic Tables)
2. Internal Management of Police Units
3. Administration
4. Services for Upper Officers and Subordinates of the Police
5. Service for Sub-Officials and Policemen
6. Rating and Classification of Police personnel
7. Disciplinary Management
8. Uniforms, distinctive emblems and insignias
9. Documents, correspondence and files
10. Organic Regulations of the General Direction
11. Organic Regulations of the Higher Police Academy
12. Organic Regulations of the "General Santander" Police School
13. Organic Regulations of the Regional Schools
14. Police Arms and Munitions
15. Urban and Rural Patrol
16. Traffic Police
17. Formalities and Protocol
18. Repairs and Veterinary Science.


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NATIONAL POLICE ORGANIZATION CHART




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ANNEX F

SPECIAL DEPARTMENT OF BOGOTA

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ANNEX G

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ANNEX H

NATIONAL POLICE PERSONNEL – JUNE 1969

	Officers	Non-Commissioned		TOTAL	Civilians
		Officers	Agents		
Antioquia	45	179	3019	3243	180
Atlantico	16	79	1124	1219	65
Bogota	137	499	5758	6394	357
Bolivar	17	43	671	731	87
Boyaca	18	139	946	1103	71
Caldas	14	92	1270	1376	80
Cauca	13	76	717	806	62
Cesar	10	40	304	354	29
Cordoba	12	30	371	413	52
Cundinamarca	25	212	1662	1899	130
Choco	10	42	426	478	33
Guajira	11	21	233	265	29
Huila	27	116	1040	1183	71
Llanos O.	16	96	1004	1116	78
Magdalena	15	42	502	556	60
Nariño	16	83	801	900	62
North Santander	18	81	833	932	54
Quindio	13	56	732	801	38
Risaralda	10	41	735	786	49
South Santander	22	130	1075	1227	70
Sucre	8	29	237	274	28
Tolima	34	172	2498	2704	118
Valle	43	199	3519	3761	47
Schools	133	212	445	790	531
Special Services	17	94	673	784	105
General Headquarters	108	299	1293	1700	1537
Training School	45	347	1570	1962	
TOTAL	853	3449	33458	37760	4023

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ANNEX I

Police Departments	Areas Covered by Police				Areas Not Covered by Police			
	Equiv. of a County	Equiv. of a Precinct	Equiv. of a Hamlet	Total	Equiv. of a County	Equiv. of a Precinct	Equiv. of a Hamlet	Total
Antioquia	104	146	15	265	5	92	4	101
Atlantico	21	44	4	69	2	5		7
Bolivar—S. Andres	28	139	2	169	2	73	4	79
Boyaca	95	8	4	107	37	151	7	195
Caldas	24	52	30	106				
Cauca	31	32	7	70	5	275	13	293
Cesar	12	30	3	45		51	11	62
Cordoba	22	19	15	56		141		141
Cundinamarca	112	75	1	188	6	44		60
Choco	15	34	1	50	3	157	5	165
Guajira	7	12		19		56	5	61
Huila-Caqueta	29	49	9	87	14	28		42
Llanos O.	19							
Magdalena	20	19	2	41		62	9	71
Nariño	50	74	12	136	3	203	26	232
North Santander	35	40	2	77		118	32	150
Quindio	12	28		40		9		9
Risaralda	13	62	2	77		10		10
Santander	59	20		79	18	189		207
Special Services	20	7	25	52	2	8	3	13
Sucre	17	2		19		143	25	168
Tolima	43	72	6	121	1	83		84
Valle	40	115	24	179	3	356		359
TOTALS	838	1.079	164	2.052	101	2.255	144	2.509

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National Police Jurisdictions



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ANNEX J

NATIONAL POLICE VEHICLES – YEAR OF CONSTRUCTION

	48	53	54	55	56	57	58	60	61	62	63	64	65	67	68	69	Total
Sedans				9	1				13	20	30	5	26				104
Jeep Type			1		22			11	34		40	20		1		20	149
Station Wagon		6			5				3	3					1		18
Pick-Ups		4						1			30	3					38
Panel Trucks		4		23	80			25					13				145
Ambulances		1		1	11				1								14
Hearse	1					1											2
Buses		12			11			5				1			18		47
Dump Trucks		5			2			3									10
Tractors				1			1	4					1				7
Bulldozer				1													1
Fork Lifts				1													1
Trucks		19	1		4			19	45		8						96
Water Trucks				10													10
Wrecker		2															2
Motorcycles				3									4			5	12
Total	1	53	2	49	136	1	1	68	96	23	108	29	44	1	19	25	656

Vehicles shown above represent only those owned by the police. In addition vehicles have been purchased by the Departments, Municipalities and civic groups for use by the police. The total number of vehicles from all sources used by the police in performing the police service is 1,034 and are of the following types:

TYPE OF VEHICLE	MODEL	NUMBER
Automobile, Panel	SEDAN	440
Jeeps	WILLYS	207
Buses Including Vehicle Chassis	F/600	44
Trucks	F/600	30
Trucks	F/350	50
Trucks	F/250	50
Cranes	F/600	2
Ambulances	F/600	18
Dump Trucks	F/600	13
Station Wagon	F/250	34
Pickups	F/100	81
Motorcycles	HARLEY	11
Tractors	UNIMOC.	9
Boats (Maritime)		20
Boats (River)		25
TOTALS:		1,034

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ARMAMENT DEPLOYMENT NATIONAL POLICE	ANTIOQUIA	ATLANTICO	BOGOTA	BOLIVAR	BOYACA	CALDAS	CAUCA	CESAR	CORDOBA	CUNDINAMARCA	CHOCO	GUAJIRA	HUILA	LLANOS O. O.	MAGDALENA	NARINO	NORTE DE SANTANDER	QUINDIO	RISARALDA	SANTANDER SUR	SPECIAL SERVICES	SUCRE	TOLIMA	VALLE	NATIONAL POLICE SCHOOLS	MISCELLANEOUS TRANSPORTATION COMMUNICATIONS JAIL AND FARM	CENTRAL ARMORY	INVESTIGATION	TOTALS	
1. Rifles, Mauser, 7mm Ammunition	235 59805	10 30911	564 48274						67 17366	664 97515	165 38010	43 5194		63 10759	26 11721	9000	988		6 3775	10				3	2982 152574	89 8136	1628 670391	191 61179	6736 1225608	
2. Rifles, Belgas and Tamage, 30 Ammunition		3933	170 9153				3 120		1040		37 5803		5000	8 3908	3 1000			3 1148	3 200	4 5284			2 8000		72 17338		182 42169		487 104096	
3. Carbines, 30, M1 Carbines, San Cristobal, 30 Ammunition	1593 878 272476	330 34867	298 214 45840	179 51 28737	500 222 80496	790 347 133336	599 72 78189	30 50 8380	170 68 29006	826 166 113241	149 166 16486	149 43 26033	799 523 153281	395 481 161158	497 134 69540	200 30749	699 43 87050	398 244 81049	298 194 69035	685 203 93443	243 94 39358	119 14924	1687 1284 317101	1495 841 248031	971 374 107901	10 51 11203	114 411 570742	68 28647	13925 7056 2950299	
4. Sub-Machine Guns, Reising, 45 Ammunition			600																						3390		114 294467		114 298457	
5. Rifles, Winchester, 9mm Ammunition	26 26099																											130 1055		156 27154
6. Sub-Machine Guns, Madsen, 9mm Ammunition	51 14253	9 2292	135 27685	8 4364	25 6879	24 7420	21 6063		11 1959	30 9970	10 3888	6 10615	26 8290	15 8917	10 4643	11 4581	15 2108	7 1428	10 6298	19 12961	31 7372	3 665	61 27030	89 12844	86 35555	15 2691	15 36905	15 11697	758 279374	
7. Revolvers, 39 Spec. Ammunition Reloads	1436 24633 12610	413 3948 1000	3897 59676 280	712 18890	344 5422 2400	575 10103 680	269 6022 680	85 1954 1000	241 11825	506 8237 3283	195 14694 2500	130 6595 1570	283 7731 4920	425 8417 4920	404 9545	553 13382 1456	462 14352	182 3563	240 6848 627	406 23061 360	652 17556 1634	132 3033 2000	888 18100 1758	1138 18999 1165	791 25103 43656	294 4735 2000	3604 77607 33750	1112 23489 1545	20269 447520 125114	
8. Revolvers, 32L. Ammunition	184 1856																150							7			25 414	81 3683	50	302 6153
9. Revolvers, 22 Ammunition	15 5569	2977	28 988	3 8579	3 550	4 2237	3 920		3 13722	1 2268	3 19602		3 7145	2 3453	3 5000	3 10706	3 5234	1 4090	2 1840	2 7929	1 2610	2 1000	5 5090	8 16075	97 30124	2250	92153		250 252111	
10. Shotguns, 20 Ammunition													1 450								19 3055					1527	50	1 9287		21 14369
11. Shotguns, 16 Ammunition	10									200			5	9 375	500						45 1250					1 3170	14 19	26 12351		110 17865
12. Shotguns, 12, Mossberg Ammunition, "00" Buck and Number 4	5451	1800	24118	8 775	10 1098	15 4912	5 2825	1198	1121	9 5046	5 1794	5 183	10 3112	7 3849	5 1972	10 1893	4166	5 1852	6 2423	6 2304	6 11211	1340	100 13229	50 4935	8 10016	10 451	20 30732	775	300 144581	
13. Shotguns, 12, Winchester Ammunition, Number 7½	125	30	418	5	40	75	40	21	30	120 800	25	15	60	108 940	40	40	75	50	30	49 791	155	5	50	100	70 2795	2	118 17810	2	1898 23136	
14. Tear Gas Grenades, L. D. Tear Gas Grenades, S. D.	653	6	2378 61	197	588	124	245 30	240	180	83	36	47	60	83	445 13	60	9	60	197	290	120	20	281	1095 21	407		4456 10	20	12320 135	
15. Tear Gas Projectiles, L. D. Tear Gas Projectiles, S. C.	53	382 3	1500	160 4	234 52	35	153 25	192	25	31 8	10		120	266	115	35	17	35	70	88 20		35	85	281	485	35	360 112	10	4812 224	
16. Tear Gas Shells, 38, L. D. Tear Gas Shells, 39, S. D.		20	550 45				40			5					41									227 131	110		79		1070 176	

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ANNEX M

NATIONAL POLICE – GENERAL STAFF STUDY –
FIVE-YEAR PLAN

PROBLEM: Five-Year Plan for an increase of 20,000 men for the National Police, 1970-1974.

I. ANALYSIS:

A. The geometric multiplication of the population with a growth rate of 3.2%, considered one of the highest in Latin America, creates cultural and socio-economic problems which are typical of developing countries. This fact consequently generates factors of social decomposition, violence and a high index of criminality which makes it necessary for the police, as an entity for the prevention of crime, to contemplate future plans to increase its personnel, material and economic means in order to have a better approach to the factors that integrate its mission.

B. *Territory*

The country covers an area of 1,137,167 square kilometers and has an estimated population of 18,000,000. Politically speaking, it is divided into 22 Departamentos and from the jurisdictional point of view, for the purpose of vigilance there are two more, namely, the Police Department of Bogotá and the Department for Special Services, four "Intendencias" and four "comisarias". Within the same division, there is a total of 936 "Municipios," 3,046 "corregimientos" and Police Inspections and 405 "Caseros."

C. *Population Density*

A modern Police service must be planned in direct proportion to the number of inhabitants, the territorial extension, criminal index, economic, social, cultural and political problems. Furthermore, it should take into consideration the degree of industrial and commercial development in order to foresee a plan according to the modern development of the State.

The rapid growth of the country's population, and if the growth rate already mentioned continues to be the same the population will reach 20 million by 1972.

The ratio of the Police in Colombia is of 1.7 agents per 1,000 inhabitants. If we set a goal of an average of 2.578 per 1,000 inhabitants, which is the average for Latin American countries, we may conclude that by 1972 the Police should have 51,560 members.

D. *Criminality Increases*

The responsibility of the Police to maintain order in zones of violence which were previously controlled by the army has produced a great movement of Policemen resulting in a lesser vigilance of the cities. This has had as a consequence, that the cities do not have at the present moment the necessary police services in order to intensify, as much as possible, the work of the Police, in order to discourage any criminal activity and incipient insurrections, and to supply a more stable climate for economic, political and social development in the country.

Common delinquency is increasing at a dangerous pace as we have analyzed it and there is no doubt that one of the reasons for this increase is the lack of human services and material means to check deficiencies in the preventive services.

E. *Means*

The incidence in the additional costs will have an effect in the budget whose source should be considered in foreign financial terms if we take into account the fact that the country has committed itself to achieve certain goals in its development process. The increase therefore required material means that must be imported. However, the dollar reserve of the country cannot totally absorb these needs.

The acquisition of vehicles, communication equipment, armament and ammunition will have an approximate cost of US\$ 635 million. Most of these materials will have to be imported.

F. *Education of the Population*

According to statistics it has been established that the country has an illiterate population of 5,253,206, as indicated in the population census prepared by DANE (National Administrative Department of Statistics) in June, 1964. As it is logical, this fact implies a better training on the part of the Institution's personnel and to this effect, it has started a huge literacy campaign at a national level. This contribution makes it possible to raise the cultural standards of the Colombian population thus creating a closer relationship between the Police and the citizens.

Aside from what is mentioned in the above paragraph, there are also some campaigns in progress against alcoholism, prostitution, juvenile delinquency, which place our organization at a level of support between the State and the community. From the above it may be deduced that preventive services should increase in relation to the development index intended by the Government.

G. *Distribution of the Population*

The permanent migration of the rural population towards urban centers has created social and economic problems very difficult to solve, if we take into consideration that the cities are not prepared to absorb these rural migrations. The people from these areas come to the city looking for a way to fulfill their economic and general well-being aspirations. These problems arise due to the fact that the cities are not prepared to give work to these rural inhabitants, due primarily to two reasons:

- The scarce industrialization which already has the required employees and laborers;
- The rural personnel has only elementary knowledge on agricultural activities and the few industrial enterprises which could employ them required qualified personnel in their respective industrial activities.

As a conclusion to the above factors, the peasant who comes to the city, upon finding himself without work and the necessary means for his personal livelihood and that of his family, finds a way to survive, generally by means of small thefts and stealing which as time passes lead him to delinquency in all its aspects.

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II. INSTITUTIONAL ORGANIZATION:

A. The division of sectional Commands in connection with the Political-Administrative Division for a better coordination of police services. In each Departamento there is a Departamental Police Command with full autonomy to render vigilance services and to respond for the maintenance of public order in all its aspects, lending the required help to the authorities and the citizens and actively participating in campaigns for the benefit of the community.

B. Although this body fully responds to a hierarchy and within its organization it belongs to the Ministry of National Defense, the Governor, the Mayor, the Police Inspector or any other authority with the proper jurisdiction in administrative aspects may issue orders through the respective command in those cases when the law so requires it, in order to receive the necessary support and to see that its previous are complied with.

C. Aside from the non-uniformed personnel that is employed in its various functions, the Institution, within its hierarchical organization also counts with officers, non-commissioned officers and policemen whose present composition is as follows:

1. Officers	894
2. Non-commissioned officers	3,484
3. Policemen	34,248
4. Non-uniformed personnel	4,184
	<u>41,865</u>

The uniformed personnel includes 1,565 policemen who are under training at the Training School, and once they pass the academic tests (the physical examinations are required before joining the Police) they will join the vigilance personnel.

D. Presently, the Institution personnel is distributed into 2,563 groups that cover cities, towns, villages and "veredas," with an average of 15 units per group; the headquarters have 2,100 requests for the creation of new posts. There are 450 "veredas," villages and small towns that do not have a police force and have not requested it, the creation of said body has been considered necessary. Under these conditions, there are 5,113 groups that should have a police force, and in order to reach this total it would be necessary to cover 2,550 more. It may be deduced that from the point of view of social groups we have covered only 50%.

E. It is a known fact within the organization that from the above-given figures as to the personnel, it is necessary to deduct 20% which accounts for the personnel on vacation, sick leave, leave of absence and those who render security services to the Institution, leaving a total of 27,398 policemen divided into four shifts for purposes of vigilance, and since it is a continuous service, there are only 6,835 policemen on each shift.

Since there are also special services such as the vigilance of government offices, the residences of important officials, diplomats and other, the real vigilance is reduced to only 5,468 policemen.

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III. FUTURE PROJECTION

The above facts clearly indicates that the present number of police personnel is by no means sufficient to cover in an efficient manner the police and social aspects of the country, aspects such as security on which all other activities of the community are based. Taking into consideration that the Institution has been rendering all these important services with a reduced number of personnel and that the population in the country increases every year, and consequently also in the cities, towns and villages, it is necessary that the police increase both its personnel and material means.

It is only logical that if the present police personnel is insufficient to cover its functions, the problem will be greater each year due to the population growth which reaches 3.96 per thousand per year and the constant increase of delinquency all over the country, as a consequence of the scarce vigilance which results in a deficient crime prevention.

Under these circumstances, the police must think in a concrete manner in the progressive increase of its personnel at various levels as well as its material means in order to meet the continuous demands of the community.

It should be taken into consideration that the accumulation of these needs constitute greater problems for the government and for the institution which usually are impossible to solve in their totality, being it easier to foresee in advance annual programs within the frame of previously conceived possibilities.

IV. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM:

A. Increase of Personnel

An increase of 20,000 men is planned in the present project during a five-year period starting in 1970, in order to reach a total of 54,184 during this period.

This increase implies an addition to the number of officers, non-commissioned officers, policemen, drivers and civilian employees in the following proportion and during the five-year period.

Officers	300
Non-commissioned officers	2,650
Policemen Drivers	1,500

Regarding the staff of complementary civilian personnel, it would be advisable to make a separate study at a future date, because for the first two years the requirements may be covered with the existing personnel.

Table No. shows the progressive increase of personnel beginning in 1970 and up to 1974 (inclusive) and the annual cost of said increase based on the salaries earned in the present year.

The training of the personnel to be incorporated may be carried out in the schools that are now in operation without any increased expenses because the required capacity is available. (See Table No. 6.) The maintenance expenses of the schools do not undergo any change and therefore, it is not necessary to consider additional resources for this purpose.

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B. *Vehicles Increase*

The increase of personnel determines an increase in vehicles that has been estimated in 208 units per year for a total value of \$9,918,752.80 in accordance with prevailing prices. Most of these vehicles will be used for patrol services both in the cities and in the country. A very limited number will be used for transportation and complementary services. (See Table No. 3.)

C. *Armament Increase*

The increase of personnel requires an increase of armament. It has been estimated that 50% of the increase in men will be equipped with long-range weapons, that all the men will be equipped with short-range arms (revolvers) and a reasonable increase in rifles and gas equipment has also been estimated. (See Table No. 4.)

D. *Other Increases*

The general budget for the National Police must be increased to include sufficient allotments to cover the needs and services required for the increased personnel and the equipment of new units. An increase of \$44,661,803.00 has been estimated to be distributed under the different budget items as indicated in Table No. 2-A. Table No. 2 explains clearly how expenses are charged to each budget item.

E. *Investments*

For the suitable lodging of the new units, it is necessary to contemplate the construction of new and appropriate quarters. In accordance with past experience, and considering the lodging facilities now available, it has been estimated that \$20,000,000.00 per year will be required to be invested in new construction, to take care of the projected increase in men.

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SUMMARY

1. The National Police is now totally insufficient to cover adequately the need to maintain peace and order throughout the country.
2. The constant growth in common delinquency is evident, as well as the growing stimulus given daily to those that foment an armed revolution in order to impose a despotic government with outside help.
3. For the proper maintenance of law and order, and for the protection of the citizens, it is indispensable to increase the police force.
4. The enlargement of the police force must be carried out progressively, to allow for the supply of the required funds. It cannot be done in one year due to the difficulty in selecting personnel and training them in the limited school centers available to the institution.
5. The economic conditions of the country suggest the need to look for extraordinary sources in order to meet the expenses required for an increase in the police force.
6. The project that has been prepared for enlisting, during a five-year period, a total of 20,000 policemen, 300 officers, 2,500 non-coms, and 1,500 driver policemen, estimates additional appropriations beginning in 1970 for the amounts listed under Table No. 5, attached.

Col. HENRY GARCIA BOHORQUEZ
Chief of Planning and Regulating Department

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TABLE 1

(Table indicating cost of salaries (in thousands of Colombian Pesos) produced by the projected increase of 20,000 policemen and 1,500 policemen-drivers from 1970 to 1974.)

Rank	Basic Salary and Bonuses	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	Total Personnel Increase in Five Years
<u>OFFICERS</u>							
Combined Salaries		1,272	2,544	3,816	5,088	6,360	
Plus 65% Bonuses		826.8	1,653.6	2,480.4	3,307.2	4,134	
Total Salaries		2,098.6	4,197.6	6,296.4	8,395.2	10,494	
Captains	2.1	252	504	756	1,008	1,260	50
Lieutenants	1.85	444	888	1,332	1,776	2,220	100
Second Lieutenants	1.6	576	1,152	1,728	2,304	2,880	150
<u>NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS</u>							
Combined Salaries		6,552	13,104	19,656	26,208	32,760	
Plus 65% Bonuses		4,258.8	8,517.6	12,776.4	17,035.2	21,294	
Total Salaries		10,810.8	21,621.6	32,432.4	43,243.2	54,054	
Sergeant Major	1.5	180	360	540	720	900	50
First Sergeant	1.35	486	972	1,458	1,944	2,430	150
First Vice-Sergeant	1.25	1,350	2,700	4,050	5,400	6,750	450
Second Sergeant	1.1	1,320	2,640	3,960	5,280	6,600	500
First Corporal	1	1,680	3,360	5,040	6,720	8,400	700
Second Corporal	800	1,536	3,072	4,608	6,144	7,680	800
<u>POLICEMEN</u>							
Total Salaries		37,152	74,304	111,456	148,608	185,760	
Plus 60% Bonuses		22,291.2	44,582.2	66,873.6	89,164.8	111,456	
Total Salaries		59,443.2	118,886.4	178,329.6	237,772.8	297,216	
Vigilance Policemen	720	34,560	69,120	103,680	138,240	172,800	20,000
Policemen Drivers	720	2,592	5,184	7,776	10,368	12,960	1,500
<u>GENERAL SUMMARY</u>							
Officers		2,098.8	4,197.6	6,296.4	8,395.2	10,494	
Non-Commissioned Officers		10,810.8	21,621.6	32,432.4	43,243.2	54,054	
Vigilance and Driver Policemen		59,443.2	118,886.4	178,329.6	237,772.8	297,216	
GRAND TOTALS		72,352.8	144,705.6	217,058.4	289,411.2	361,764	24,450

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TABLE 2

COLOMBIAN MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE — NATIONAL POLICE, STAFF F3

(This table shows the increased payroll costs (in thousands of Colombian Pesos) arising from the projected increase of 20,000 policemen and 1,500 driver-policemen during the five-year period from 1970 to 1974.)

Purpose of the Expenditure	Totals	Program 338—Trg. of Personnel				Program 339 Sanitation & Social Asst.	Program 340 Formulation, Execution & Control
		Program 336 General Direction	Program 337 Police Services	Sub-Program 1 Gen. Santander School	Sub-Program 2 Jimenez Que- sada School		
Personal Services	104,309.2	11,933.2	89,345.1	850.6	321.6	1,786.8	72
Payroll personnel	52,254.9	4,733.4	46,144.8	145.1	20.5	1,211	
Technical Services Paid	36	36					
Social Benefits	43,248	3,152.7	36,610.4	680.2	297.4	435.2	72
Food Allowance	468.7	16.6	409.7	2.9		39.6	
Christmas Bonus	4,701.6	394.5	4,180.3	22.3	3.8	100.9	
Transportation Allowance	3,600	3,600					
General Expenses	22,961.8		17,823.6	81.2	20	5,037	
Maintenance & Insurance	3,748.6		3,702.6	26	20		
Purchase of Equipment	6,779.9		6,753.8	26.1			
Per diem & travel expense	2,500		2,500				
Communications Services	1,000		1,000				
Utilities	1,500		1,500				
Materials & Supplies	7,213.8		2,147.7	29.1		5,037	
Printing & Publications	19.5		19.5				
Miscellaneous & Unfore- seen Expenses	200		200				
Transfers	21,700		5,000			16,700	
Severance Pay, Rewards & Indemnizations	9,000					9,000	
Partial Liquidation of Severance Payments	6,000					6,000	
Disability Pensions	1,700					1,700	
Retirement Fund Debts	5,000		5,000				
Total Operation Budget in Actual Amounts	148,971,030	11,933,164	112,168,651	931,783	341,617	23,523,769	72,046

NOTE: To increase the projected personnel in a 5-year period, it would be necessary to approve increases to the present budget as follows:
1970 — 148,971,030; 1971 — 189,367,403; 1972 — 261,720,203; 1973 — 334,073,003; 1974 — 406,425,803.

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TABLE 2-B

YEARLY SUPPLIES FOR A POLICEMAN
(In Thousands of Colombian Pesos)

Initial Supply	No. of Articles	Cost per Article	Total Cost
Green wool uniforms and cap	2	332.55	665.10
Olive green khaki uniforms	2	66.76	133.52
Black leather boots, pairs	1	65.00	130.00
Wool coat	1	195.00	195.00
Cotton pillow	1	13.80	13.80
Cotton mattress	1	65.00	65.00
Baton	1	9.00	9.00
Straw Sleeping Mat	1	24.00	24.00
Leather cartridge boxes, pairs	1	17.56	17.56
Black leather belt	1	13.80	13.80
Fiber helmet	1	40.00	40.00
Metallic plate	1	12.00	12.00
Black leather case for gun	1	28.84	28.84
Black leather baldric carrier	1	8.00	8.00
Wool blankets	2	80.00	160.00
Flash light	1	39.90	39.90
Spoon, fork, knife set	1	18.00	18.00
Enamel cup	1	9.40	9.40
2 enamel dishes	2	8.90	17.80
Rubber coat	1	198.00	198.00
			<hr/>
	TOTAL		1,798.52

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TABLE 3
VEHICLES INCREASE PROJECT "FIVE-YEAR PLAN"

Type of Vehicle	Model	Amount	FOB Cost	Cost in Colombia With 30% Surcharge	20% Annual Vehicle Increase	Value in Colombia for Annual Acquisition	Total Value After Five Years
Automobile Panel	Sedan	250	Ps. 36,481.33	Ps. 47,425.72	50	Ps. 2,371,286.00	11,856,430.00
Jeeps	Land R.	450	36,188.08	47,044.50	90	4,234,005.00	21,110,025.00
Buses, including body of vehicle	Covol	50	112,631.12	146,420.45	10	1,464,204.50	7,321,022.50
Trucks	F-350	150	34,716.48	45,131.42	30	1,353,942.60	6,769,713.00
Trucks	F-500	50	40,805.73	53,047.44	10	530,474.40	2,652,372.00
Trucks	F-600	50	64,146.19	83,390.04	10	833,900.40	4,169,502.00
Cranes	Holms 500	3	116,231.01	151,100.31	1	90,660.18	453,300.93
Ambulances	Ranch W.	5	50,293.92	65,382.09	1	65,382.09	326,910.45
Tip-Cars	F-600	20	84,640.05	110,032.06	4	440,128.24	2,200,641.20
Station Wagon Van	F-200	100	35,794.44	46,532.77	20	930,655.40	4,653,277.00
Pick-ups	F-250	70	43,477.50	55,520.86	14	791,292.04	3,956,460.20
Motorcycles	1,200 CC	5	38,091.45	49,518.88	1	49,518.88	247,594.40
Tractors	Ford 5,000	5	51,129.00	66,457.70	1	66,467.70	332,338.50
Boats (Maritime)		20	40,000.00	52,000.00	4	208,000.00	1,040,000.00
Boats (Fluvial)		25	15,000.00	19,500.00	4	97,500.00	487,500.00
TOTALS		1,253	799,626.39	1,039,514.24	251	13,527,417.43	67,637,087.18


Note: The estimate (in Colombian Pesos) was made based on current prices which may present some variation next year.

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DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE SECURITY

Degree 3169 of 1968



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ANNEX N

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ANNEX O

Public Safety Project Goals—FY-1968

Project Agreement

1. *Improve the professional level of police force personnel through the following training programs:*

(a) Train up to 15 police officials in the United States, principally at the International Police Academy, involving such courses as police administration and organization, instructor training, crime prevention, investigation, firearms, narcotics, border control, etc. Plans call for 4 men in training at all times when the situation of public order permits.

(b) In-country training, not available at the National Police schools, at the Superior School for Public Administration in Bogotá for 30 officers in each of 4 courses in public administration and management techniques adapted to Colombian police force needs; 30 officers and non-commissioned officers for each of 2 courses in leadership and supervision; 30 officers to attend a special course designed to prepare them to serve as mayors in small municipalities in the "fringe" violence areas; and special communications technical training at SENA in Bogotá.

(c) A series of 50 training films and slides, supplies by USAID, on police subjects supporting overall training objectives, and including tactics of arrest, searches of persons and premises, control of persons in field custody, and urban and rural patrol.

(d) Development of a system of monthly training bulletins for all members of the police force. In addition, the National Police, with the advisory assistance of USAID, will continue its program of printing and distributing manuals, pamphlets, and other information media which deal with the problems of uniformed police hazards, personal safety in dealing with suspects, and methods of house and building search.

(e) Curriculum review and change in the National Police schools to keep abreast of current techniques and problems specifically confronting Colombian police enforcement and security. Emphasis will be placed on a review of the rural police course at the National Police School in Espinal in terms of problems in the violence areas. A USAID specialist will study bandit problems in rural areas and special counter-bandit training and operations. From this study, improvement in counter-bandit operations will be made in the field and in the National Police school training curriculum. A second important curriculum modernization program will take place at the "General Santander" School to improve courses in civil police management, criminal investigation, police intelligence, and public relations of the police force with Colombian communities. In this connection, the National Police will continue to emphasize public relations in police service to gain the confidence and support of the public for police operations. Texts, booklets, and films provided by USAID covering public relations will be used in public relations courses given at the national police schools, and printed material will be placed in the school libraries. Maximum use will also be made of the instructor training for teachers of literacy being provided at the National Police schools and in the Department commands by key personnel trained under previous USAID contract.

(f) Continuation of the program of small arms modernization, National Police personnel and USAID advisors will continue to work jointly on a department by department

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inspection of progress in training, adequacy of firing ranges, and development of additional small-arms training courses which will stress safety, ethics, and good judgment in the use of firearms.

(g) Special training to support continued development of the special task force and criminal investigation units of the National Police.

(h) Review of current and projected training requirements, identification and evaluation of the results of training programs, and continued review and reasonable increases in qualifications and skill levels of police personnel.

2. *Complete installation of police communication system.*

These systems provide closer coordination of police units, improve response time of police enforcement and security activities, and increase the efficiency and effective deployment of police forces throughout the country. Emphasis, during the period of this project, will be placed on completing systems and providing for their logistical and maintenance support. Considerable logistics planning and preparation have taken place over the past 2 years. USAID Public Safety advisors will work closely with the National Police on supply and maintenance housing facilities, equipping vehicles, test instruments, tools, repair parts stocks, new personnel staffing plans for supply and maintenance activities, and continuing training programs to develop required technical skills. Efforts will focus on the following:

(a) The final installation phase of the Rural Tactical Communications System, which should be completed during the period of this Agreement. A USAID Public Safety advisor will assist the National Police in the final installation of equipment; he will also assist in a resurvey of those Departments where rural tactical radios have been installed to insure adequacy of communications and to make adjustments and/or repairs where necessary.

(b) The National Police will continue to strengthen the Administrative Communications Network from Bogotá to the Departments by the installation of HF-SSB radio-teletype and multiplex facilities utilizing equipment previously provided by USAID. At the same time, the National Police will coordinate construction of the new communications centers and logistics depots in Bogotá and the 4 regions as outlined in the FY67 Project Agreement.

(c) USAID will assist the National Police in improving urban radio communications in the major cities of Colombia through completion of activities outlined in FY65, 1966, and 1967 project agreements. In support of the urban network, work will proceed on a modern, efficient radio dispatch center for Station 100 in Bogota.

3. *Improve Uniformed Police Operations.*

Performance of the uniformed police is an integral part of this project to streamline command, increase police capability to meet new and more complex responsibilities, and to effectively deploy and utilize uniformed police personnel.

(a) The National Police will continue to improve operations of the Special District of Bogotá and in the Departments by improving command supervision of uniformed foot and motorized patrol (completion of the Bogotá Dispatch Center will be an important element of this), identification of special high crime rate areas with corresponding distribution of personnel, and improved control of vehicular traffic.

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(b) The National Police will continue to keep riot control training current, maintaining the special task forces which exist for that purpose in a state of constant preparedness to deal effectively with civil disturbances. Training will emphasize the use of minimum necessary force, employing standard formations and utilizing non-lethal dispersing and protective devices. When the special forces are not engaged in crowd control operations or training, the National Police will assign them on a temporary basis to assist in patrol saturation activities in areas affected by sudden crime waves, control of vehicular traffic in especially congested situations, disaster relief work, etc.

(c) USAID Public Safety advisors will offer training support, and advise on the above operations, where needed, to improve uniformed police operations.

4. *Increase the capability and effectiveness of criminal investigations.*

In response to last year's Presidential decree establishing the responsibility for criminal investigations with the National Police, the following measures will be carried out during the period of this Agreement:

(a) The National Police will continue the expansion of the criminal investigation units in Bogotá and each department of the country. Personnel especially qualified by training, aptitude, and interest will continue to be selected and trained in the most modern investigative techniques, including protection of the crime scene, evidence collection and transportation to the laboratory, interrogation and witnesses and suspects, recovering stolen property, and development of a fugitive trace and capture capability.

(b) Investigative equipment, provided by USAID, will continue to be used by all investigative units, as well as the use of the criminalistics laboratory at the General Santander School, in support of the development of the investigative capabilities described above. The facility at the General Santander School will also be utilized as an observation and training center for National Police personnel from other parts of the country to speed up the process of reliance on physical evidence and the latest scientific techniques.

5. *Develop an increased police planning capability.*

An essential element in improving the efficiency of the National Police is the further development of capability for systematic planning to (1) assess the threat to public security, (2) refine the Police mission, (3) project future size, composition, deployment, and equipment of the force, and (4) formulate tactical, operational, procedural and management plans. Toward the achievement of improving planning capability, the National Police will:

(a) Review and recommend changes to existing planning staff organization, and consult with USAID Public Safety advisors where necessary.

(b) Draw up requirements for planning, including structure of the planning division and personnel qualifications.

(c) Take the necessary steps to implement a continuous review of short and long-range planning policies and recommendations as conditions in the country and within the National Police change.

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ANNEX P

THE FY 1969 PROJECT AGREEMENT, NATIONAL POLICE—OBJECTIVES

The specific objectives of this Agreement are to:

A. *Complete Installation of Police Communications Networks and Communications Maintenance and Supply Depots.*

(1) *Communications Networks.* The nation-wide, administrative radioteletype network, which connects Bogotá to 11 key departmental commands, will be a priority objective of this Agreement. So far, the departmental station in Cucuta is completed, and the National Police are making use of a temporary Bogota control center until the permanent facilities at Muzu and Suba are operational.

During the period of this Agreement, work will continue on the remaining 10 departmental stations. The new communications headquarters centers at Suba (transmission station) and Muzu (reception site, supply, maintenance, training and administrative headquarters) are under construction as well as the northern relay site at Santa Marta. Completion of the Muzu-Suba complex will significantly increase National Police capability to put into operation (a) expanded programs and controls for the communication maintenance and supply depot system, and (b) the administrative radio network which has, previously, been delayed due to lack of a central control station. In addition, installation of FM radio equipment for the tactical urban network and mobile patrol units will continue.

(2) *Communications Maintenance and Supply Depots.* A new National Police Communications Chief was appointed in 1968 and work is in progress on drafting regulations and procedures for the establishment of the communications, maintenance and supply depot network. During the period of this Agreement, the National Police will complete construction (and provide staffing) for the Central Bogotá depot and 4 regional depots. USAID Public Safety Advisors will assist the depots in maintenance and supply survey work and replacement part scheduling, utilizing the completed rural tactical radio network as the subject of the survey.

B. *Upgrade the professional level of National Police personnel through training.*

Essential training programs will be continued during the period of this Agreement to include: (1) In-country training at the Superior School for Public Administration (ESAP) in Bogotá for 30 officers who will attend public administration and management courses adapted to police needs; and 30 officers and non-commissioned officers for courses in leadership and supervision; (2) In-country training at a temporary school for communications and communication maintenance technicians. NOTE: The Muzu headquarters facility will ultimately provide the National Police with its own permanent training center, thereby increasing the scope of training and student capacity; (3) Development of 50 new training films and slide sets on police subjects to support training programs to be offered at departmental police stations. Additionally, the USAID Public Safety training advisor will assist the National Police in expanding police manual and pamphlet distribution as well as improved monthly bulletin preparation; (4) In-country training at the National Police schools, especially at the "General Santander" School where new courses in police management, criminal investigation and public relations will be introduced, utilizing USAID-provided text books and films.

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ANNEX Q

U. S. AND LOCAL TRAINING REPORT—NATIONAL POLICE

Place, Type of Training, Duration	Entered Tng. This Month	Total in Training	Returned This Mo.	This Yr. to Date	Cum. Total to Date
U. S. TRAINING					
FBI W. A. Course 3 Mos.					3
IAPA/Panama 1 Wk Bomb Disposal					2
IAPA/GEM Course		4	7	11	115
Vehicle Maintenance #3 Mos.				4	4
Criminalistics Training Caracas					1
Jungle Warfare 3 Mos.			3	3	3
Anti-Terrorism 2 Mos.			2	2	2
Total					
LOCAL TRAINING					
Criminal Inv. Refresher 16 Hrs.					889
Use of the Baton					18000
Riot Control Training					2889
Patrol Methods 1 Wk	476	476	476	2396	13320
Firearms Tng. M-1 and Shotgun 24 Hrs.					24568
Firearms Tng. for Instructors 24 Hrs.					1048
Shotgun Tng. 8 Hrs.					82
Revolver Refresher Tng. 2 Hrs.					4470
Firearms					
Decision Firing 8 Hrs.	1110	1110	1110	3240	3240
FBI-PPC Revolver Tng. 20 Hrs.					213
Counter-Bandit Tng. 12 Wks.					268
Counter-Bandit Tng. 3 Wks.					450
Criminal Invest. 3 Wks.					50
Criminal Invest. 1 Wk.					385
Supervision of Criminal Invest. 256 Hrs.					29
Legal Criminal Invest. Procedures 3 Mos.			145	145	2762
Technical Criminal Invest. 40 Hrs.					219
Communications Technician 9 Mos.					22
Communications Radio Operator 3 Mos.					20
Leadership and Supervision 38 Hrs.				145	863
Fundamentals of Police Admin. 72 Hrs.				89	193

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**U. S. AND LOCAL TRAINING REPORT—NATIONAL POLICE
BY SUBJECT**

Place, Type of Training, Duration	Entered Tng. This Month	Total in Training	Returned This Mo.	This Yr. to Date	Cum. Total to Date
U. S. Training					
Police and Public Admin. 220 Hrs.				25	81
Instructor Tng. 3 Hrs.					13
Human Communications 82 Hrs.					243
Audio-Visual 2 Wks.					24
Public Relations 2 Mos.			237	549	1681
Public Relations Tng. 2 Wks					21
Driver Tng. 2 Wks.				90	1115
Traffic Supervision 5 Wks.				440	645
Communications Engineering 5 Yrs.		2			
Instructor Training 2 Wks					284
Public Relations—Tourist Police 10 Months				27	139
Riot Control Refresher 5 Days					835
Bomb Disposal Tng. 2 Days	275	275	275	275	1283
Traffic 1 Day					176
Dog Management 3 Months				16	21
Audio-Visual 8 Hours	17	17	17	44	192
Rural Police Patrol					111
TOTAL	<u>1878</u>	<u>1885</u>	<u>2272</u>	<u>8301</u>	<u>80974</u>

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ANNEX R

U. S. AND LOCAL TRAINING REPORT ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENT OF SECURITY (DAS)

Place, Type of Training, Duration	Entered Tng. This Month	Total in Training	Returned This Mo.	This Year to Date	Cum. Total to Date
U. S. TRAINING					
IPA Training					213
Internal Security Supervisory Washington					1
IAPA/Panama - 1 Wk. Bomb Disposal Course					7
IAPA/Panama - 5 Wks. Internal Security Course					30
Advance Communications 6 Mos. Washington					1
Teletype Maintenance 5 Wks. Chicago					1
U. S. Post Office (X) Graphology 6 Months					1
LOCAL TRAINING					
Internal Security Course, Bogota					47
Rural Security School, Agua Azul					162
DAS Academy, SUBA New Agents - 6 Mos. In Service - 3 Mos.					653
Presidential's Special Group Training					49
Investigator's Advance Courses					31
Technical Criminology 4 Mos.					247
Conferences in Field Office By IAPA Graduates					630
SENA, SSB Radio Course, 6 Mos. Medellin and Bog.					12
20-Hr. Revolver Tng. FBI-PPC Course					311
(X) Post Office Inspectors' Course 4 Mos. - 6 Mos.					
TOTALS					<u>2384</u>

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ANNEX S

COLOMBIA

Commodity Profile

- *FY 63—\$706,000 — 800 .38 revolvers
500 .12 ga. riot guns
1,000 .30 Cal. carbines
22 rifles (unspecified)
40,000 .12 ga. shells (00)
50,000 .38 ammo
8,000 .30 cal. ammo
5,390 CN projectiles
3,700 gas masks
128 vehicles
2 Bailey bridges
Ammo reloading tools and supplies
Misc. electrical eqt.
Lab, photo and tng eqt.
44 SSB transceivers
- FY 64—\$165,000 — 94 SSB back pack Transceivers
5 sedans
3 trucks
3 SSB base stations
21 multiplex speech-plus-tone units
1 elect. generator
20 outboard motors
17 auto. TT machines
Crime lab eqt.
- FY 65—\$491,000 — 30 VHF-AM portable transceivers
100 VHF-AM hand carry transceivers
10 SSB transceivers
26 sedans
26 VHF-FM mobile station
4 VHF-AM desk top base stn.
10 SSB suppressed carrier rec.
4 SSB suppressed transmitter
31 VHF-AM portable transceivers
100 VHF-AM hand-carried transceivers
10 SSB transceivers
Criminal research supplies and eqt.
1 HF transceiver
1 transmitter
1 direction finder
misc. electronic eqt.
misc. telephone eqt.

*Figures shown are base sheet PIO/C subobligation levels. Actual expenditures may be more or less depending upon original price estimates and savings through procurement practices used.

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1,000 .30 cal. carbines
500 .38 cal. revolvers
150,000 rds. ammo (unspecified)
chemical apparatus and supplies (unspecified)

FY 66—\$1,492,000-11,600 grenades, tear gas, CN
3,000 Projectiles, tear gas, CN
11,950 carbines, .30 cal. M-1
160,000 shotshells
1,000 VHF-AM portable transceivers
120 VHF-FM transceivers
600 antennae
10 recorders-dictaphone type
50 telephone sets
76 VHF-FM stations
184 spare parts
1,000 riot shields
Lot general camera and investigative equipment
1,900 shotguns, riot, 12-gauge
Lot tools
2,390,000 cartridges, .30 cal., M-1
Misc. test and tool eqpt.
Switches, transformers, etc.
360 Shotguns
2 Single-motor planes
20 HT-1B Transceivers
3 FM base stations
6 FM mobile transceivers
2 SSB transceivers
6 Jeeps
6 Sedans
10 Transceivers (model SBT-20A)
60 .38 revolvers
10,000 rds. .38 ammo

FY 67—\$192,000 – 25 FM-1A, portable
44 FM-5A, mobile
7 HF Radio transmitters, SSB base
1 Truck
8 Sedans
Spare parts and equipment – commo
Misc. office equipment
Misc. spare auto parts

FY 68—\$ 44,051 – Misc. spare auto parts (excess)
1 Communications Control Center Console w/accessories and spare parts

*Figures shown are base sheet PIO/C subobligation levels. Actual expenditures may be more or less depending upon original price estimates and savings through procurement practices used.

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ANNEX T

National Comparative Index of Crimes

TYPES OF CRIME	1968	1969	Comparative Figures	
	First Tri-mester	First Tri-mester	Increase	Decrease
I CRIMES AGAINST THE SECURITY AND EXISTENCE OF THE STATE	1	2	1	
II CRIMES AGAINST THE CONSTITUTION AND THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF THE STATE				
Riots	3	5	2	
III CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION				
Embezzlement	12	11		1
Extortion	1	2	1	
Bribery	24	28	4	
Prevarication	1			1
Abuse of Authority	3			3
Usurpation of Public Functions	1	1		
Crimes Against Public Officials	2	1		1
IV CRIMES AGAINST ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE				
False charges before the authorities	13	3		10
False Testimony	9	7		2
Concealment	14	7		10
Prisoner Escape	131	109		22
V ASSOCIATION AND INSTIGATION TO COMMIT CRIME				
Association to transgress	14	5		9
VI CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC FAITH				
Counterfeit	14	16	2	
Circulation of Counterfeit Currency	11	32	21	
Falsification of Post Office Stamps	1	3	3	2
Adulteration and Falsification of Lottery Bills	4	3		1
Falsifying of Documents	29	15		14
VII CRIMES AGAINST THE PUBLIC MORALS				
Obscene Exhibitions	8	24	16	
VIII CRIMES AGAINST INTEGRITY AND COLLECTIVE HEALTH				
Arson	113	134	21	

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TYPE OF CRIME	1968	1969	Comparative Figures	
	First Tri-mester	First Tri-mester	Increase	Decrease
Use of Explosives Against Persons or Buildings	7	3		4
Water and Food Poisoning	2			2
IX CRIMES AGAINST THE NATIONAL ECONOMY, INDUSTRY OR COMMERCE				
Speculation and Hoarding	1			1
Contraband	24	22		2
Alteration of Weights and Measurements	2	1		1
X FRAUD AT POLLS				
Falsifying and Altering Electoral Registers	4			4
XI CRIMES AGAINST INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES AND OTHER RIGHTS				
Kidnap	17	10		7
Arbitrary Detention	1			1
House Breaking	221	176		45
Disclosure of Secrets and Correspondence	5	3		2
Corpse Profanation	3	4	1	
XII CRIMES AGAINST FREEDOM AND SEXUAL HONOR				
Carnal Violence	339	301		38
Rape	221	266	45	
Molesting	1	3	2	
Homosexuality	9	20	11	
Corrupting of Minors	254	256	2	
Soliciting	1	8	7	
XIII CRIMES AGAINST MORAL INTEGRITY				
Libel and Slander	28	43	15	
XIV CRIMES AGAINST THE FAMILY				
Abduction	583	585	2	
Incest	10	10		
Bygamy	11	2		9
XV CRIMES AGAINST LIFE AND PERSONAL INTEGRITY				
Homicide (Plain)	1,370	1,551	181	
Homicide (Complex)	87	80		7
Infanticide	19	11		8

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TYPES OF CRIME	1968	1969	Comparative Figures	
	First Tri-mester	First Tri-mester	Increase	Decrease
Personal Injuries	8,018	8,182	164	
Venereal Contamination	3	4	1	
Intentional Abortion	25	21		4
Abandonment and Exploitation of Children	17	13		4
Attempt Homicide	146	98		48
XVI CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY				
Theft	5,241	5,245	4	
Cattle Stealing	851	747		104
Robbery	4,472	3,972		500
Hold Ups	850	760		90
Extortion	10	10		
Blackmail	14	9		5
Swindle	791	654		137
Abuse of Trust Invested	921	792		129
Invasion of property		3	3	
Damage to Property	457	354		103
XVII ANTI-SOCIAL BEHAVIOR				
Prohibited gambling games	8	15	7	
Thieves	499	456		43
Bad checks, illegal money remittances	231	225		6
Marihuana (cultivation, use, commerce, etc.)	680	834	154	
Unjustified abandonment of home	257	303	46	
Explosives (illegal manufacturing and traffic)	4	4		
Vagrants	327	337	10	
Others	27	28	1	
TOTAL	27,478	26,826	729	1,381
Decrease				652

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ANNEX U

POLICE JURISDICTIONS POLICE-POPULATION RATIO

Jurisdiction	Population	Police Strength	Area Sq. Km.	Police per 1000 pop.
Antioquia	2,800,000	3,243	62,870	1.2
Atlantico	833,000	1,219	3,270	1.5
Bogota	2,148,000	6,394	1,587	3.0
Bolivar	815,000	731	26,436	0.9
Boyaca	1,144,000	1,200	67,750	1.0
Caldas	775,000	1,376	7,283	1.8
Cauca	664,000	806	30,495	1.2
Cesar	334,000	354	23,792	1.1
Cordoba	695,000	413	25,175	0.6
Cundinamarca	1,165,000	1,899	22,373	1.6
Choco	200,000	478	47,205	2.4
Guajira	201,000	265	20,180	1.3
Huila	597,000	1,183	110,175	2.0
Llanos O.	290,000	1,116	392,910	3.9
Magdalena	626,000	556	22,903	0.9
Nariño	825,000	900	56,615	1.1
N. Santander	586,000	935	20,815	1.6
Quindio	332,000	801	1,825	2.4
Risaralda	884,000	786	3,962	0.9
S. Santander	1,087,000	1,227	30,950	1.1
Sucre	343,000	274	10,523	0.8
Tolima	879,000	2,704	23,325	3.1
Valle	1,973,000	3,761	21,245	1.9
Amazonas	14,800	300	121,240	2.0

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