



**Sudan Radio Service**  
**(Associate Cooperative Agreement HDA A 03 0015 00)**

**Final Report to OTI**  
**13 March 2003 – 04 August 2006**

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**Acronyms Found In This Report**

AM	Amplitude Modulation
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
CCK	Communications Commission of Kenya
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
EDC	Education Development Center
FM	Frequency Modulation
GOK	Government of Kenya
GONU	Government of National Unity
GOS	Government of Sudan
GOSS	Government of Southern Sudan
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives
PSA	Public Service Announcement
RPA	Radio Programming Advisor
RSM	Radio Service Manager
SIL	Summer Institute of Linguistics
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
SRS	Sudan Radio Service
SW	Shortwave
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government

# 1. Executive Summary

This document is a final technical report to USAID/OTI highlighting the major successes and challenges Education Development Center, Inc. (EDC) has had in carrying out the Sudan Radio Service (SRS) project under the terms and conditions set forth in the Associate Cooperative Agreement HDA A 03 0015 00. The period covered in this report is 13 March 2003 to 04 August 2006. Per instructions from USAID/OTI, this document does not report on indicators or list quantitative measures of SRS' work (such as the total number of hours of broadcasting or the number of programs about the CPA) over the past 40.5 months. This final programmatic report to OTI will simply highlight best practices and lessons learned over the course of the cooperative agreement to date.

## ***Background***

A USAID assessment team in the autumn of 2002 determined that a lack of access to information in the Sudan, particularly regarding the then-ongoing peace process, was a significant problem. During the run-up to a peace agreement, independent media would help ensure that southern Sudanese, in particular, fully appreciate all aspects of an agreement and could articulate concerns and desires to their respective leaders. Moreover, the provision of balanced information was (and remains) critical to expand citizen participation in local governance and in peace/reconciliation efforts.


Given Sudan's great size and high rates of illiteracy, shortwave radio was identified as the best means to quickly establish independent media for southern Sudan because shortwave can be broadcast from outside the country and can cover an extremely wide area. Radio broadcasts in regional languages had been limited to broadcasts from the north and sporadic coverage from various international services like the BBC. USAID's plans for a radio service targeting southern Sudan constitute a critical component of the USAID strategy for development in Sudan and the wider USG support to successful implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in January 2005. In addition to increasing the flow of information into southern Sudan, the radio service enhances southern Sudanese journalistic capacity.

## ***Accomplishments***

SRS began broadcasting in July 2003 with some news, introductory messages, and music. SRS increased its transmissions from two to four hours per day then six hours per day by mid-2004. Current production studios are in Nairobi, Kenya. SRS hopes to relocate to southern Sudan if/when conditions permit.

The goal of SRS' programming is to promote peace and development through the provision of news and educational programming that both informs and entertains. News and current events are an important element of SRS programming. Information about local level conflict resolution efforts, humanitarian programs and government activities is also highlighted. The service also broadcasts programming on education, agriculture/animal husbandry, economic/business development, and health issues. The largest segment of programming has been civic education and governance programming, promoting the positive and peaceful development of government and civil society institutions. The radio service also promotes cultural programming such as music, poetry, story-telling, and dramas, using these forms of entertainment to draw in listeners. The issues and topics SRS tackles in its programming vary, of course, depending on current events and other factors, but over the course of the project, programming categories have generally broken down as follows.

**Breakdown of SRS Programming Time by Category**



SRS' six hours of original news and programming daily (6 – 9 a.m. and p.m.) can be heard on the radio, but also on the web at [www.sudanradio.org](http://www.sudanradio.org), which enables Sudanese and others around the world to access SRS without a radio.

SRS' regular programming targets speakers of Simple Arabic, Arabic, and English, as well as Dinka, Nuer, Bari, Shilluk, Zande, and Moru. English, Simple Arabic, and standard Arabic constitute most of the programming time currently.

SRS programming is developed from a journalistic perspective. This means our intention is to provide facts and present a variety of views, as much as is possible and appropriate. SRS actively seeks to counter rumors and disinformation that regularly circulate around the country.

An example of SRS programming is "The Way Forward." When SPLM/A leader Dr. John Garang de Mabior was killed in a helicopter crash in July 2005, just three weeks after he was sworn in as First Vice President of the Republic of Sudan, much of the country erupted in violence and protest. Word that the crash was caused by agents of the National Congress Party (formerly the National Islamic Front, the ruling political party in northern Sudan) and other rumors circulated wildly on the day the news broke.

On that day, SRS worked tirelessly to gather facts, record and air calls for calm from Dr. Garang's successor, Salva Kiir, his widow Madame Rebecca, and other Sudanese leaders in both the north and south. We also countered rumors that were being reported elsewhere, such as the rumor that then-militia leader Paulino Matip had been killed in Khartoum in pro-Garang protests. We had an interview with Paulino Matip, who was able to inform SRS listeners himself that he was still alive.

At USAID's request, within three days SRS was able to add an extra hour of programming each day devoted entirely to news and information about the aftermath of Dr. Garang's death. Called "The Way Forward," this hour-long program in English and Simple Arabic carried requests for calm and patience while also carrying interviews from northern and southern leaders reassuring the public that the CPA would continue to be honored and implemented and that Salva Kiir Mayardit was the SPLM's unanimous choice to succeed Dr. Garang. "The Way Forward" aired for two months.

Though no comprehensive audience survey was feasible during the project to date, a relatively large survey carried out in late 2004/early 2005, a small survey carried out by a USAID consultant in August 2006 and much anecdotal evidence indicates that SRS has gained a respectable audience that trusts the news and information SRS provides. SRS, thanks to its team of professional Nairobi-based producers, along with two Sudan-based producers and a network of stringers, has become one of the world's leading gatherers and reporters of news on Sudan. SRS is cited daily by major news agencies, such as BBC, Associated Press, Reuters, and many others.

SRS is seen as a reliable, trustworthy disseminator of information by our partners. Many organizations and entities, ranging from the United Nations to the Government of Southern Sudan itself, have used SRS to relay educational information, news, and even job announcements.

The project has faced several challenges and not all have been successfully overcome. SRS' stringer network has had ups and downs and the development of a board of trustees has proven to be most difficult. Being based outside of Sudan and using transmission facilities based outside Africa have been generally advantageous, but have been a source of frustration, also.

The use of local languages, which has set SRS apart from other stations and helped turn so many Sudanese into loyal listeners, is also arguably the number one complaint some have about SRS. Details on all these issues are provided in the following pages.

### ***Best Practices and Lessons Learned***

This report is broken into nine major sections, excluding this executive summary: Start Up; Management and Staffing Issues; Working for Sudan, Based in Kenya; Information Gathering; The Question of Languages; Marketing; Broadcasting and Reception Issues; and Project Extensions. Each section highlights what challenges we faced in that aspect of the project, as well as how we surmounted the challenge. Incorporated into that section of the narrative are what EDC has identified as best practices. At the end of each section we make recommendations in a separate section called "lessons learned," which provide possible recommendations for future projects or for SRS itself as the project continues to operate.

Usually, when a report like this is being written, the project is closing down. In the case of SRS, this report for USAID/OTI is being written at the same time that the project is beginning a cost extension under the management of USAID/Sudan's Democracy & Governance team. This means that while we are writing about the project's successes and remaining challenges to date, this is not the end of the story. We expect that by the time we write our next "final" report, SRS will have more stories of success and challenges overcome.

## **2. Start Up**

EDC proposed setting the SRS project up in Kenya because it seemed much easier than starting up in Sudan. While this was certainly not a mistake, starting up in Kenya also had its challenges.

EDC submitted the SRS proposal to USAID/OTI in early January 2003 and was awarded the project by USAID in mid-March that same year. In early April, EDC Senior Vice President Mike Laflin traveled to Nairobi to look for office space, begin the process of registering EDC, etc. By the end of April, then-Project Director Lisa Slifer, then-Chief of Party Mike Kuenzli, and Radio Programming Advisor Jeremy Groce were in Nairobi working on the multiple tasks involved in establishing the radio service. These tasks included: finalizing the registration of EDC in Kenya; identifying and obtaining office premises; setting up a bank account; installing telephone lines; identifying, hiring, and training of administrative and production staff; and most importantly, getting the radio service on the air.

Registration was the most important thing to get started because without it, EDC couldn't open a bank account, rent office space, or do much else that was critical to start-up. Registering EDC in Kenya as an NGO seemed the most appropriate thing to do, but the NGO board only met twice a year and the next meeting was not anticipated until September 2003. We sought advice from one of Nairobi's best law firms, but the firm was disappointingly slow and seemingly incapable of advising us on strategies for moving forward.

## ***“Plan B” – Production in Washington, DC***

By late June 2003, it was clear that registration was not going to be completed anytime soon and that getting SRS on the air could be delayed for many more months. EDC had just completed setting up an audio recording studio at its offices in Washington, DC. There is also a sizable Sudanese community in the DC area that could be involved in initial programming. So EDC decided that RPA Jeremy Groce would go to Washington, DC and begin identifying Sudanese who would be able and willing to voice news and introductory announcements, the programming SRS would start with.

Because SRS would only be in Washington for a few months, it was not feasible to hire people on a full-time basis. It became necessary to hire Sudanese on a purely part-time basis, with most news translators and readers coming to EDC’s studio to do their work after completing their regular jobs.

To start, EDC set modest programming goals. We knew that in the early days of the radio service, listenership would be virtually nonexistent, so initial broadcasts were only two hours long, lasting from 6 to 8 p.m. Sudan local time. The first hour was all original programming; the second hour was a repeat of the first hour. Programming started with introductory messages about SRS in the day’s languages (English, simple Arabic, Arabic, and the Language of the Day (LOD)<sup>1</sup>). Following the introductory messages, SRS broadcast short newscasts in those same languages. Introductory messages and news totaled about thirty to forty minutes each day. The rest of the hour was filled with Sudanese music and identifying “liners” (short identifying announcements, e.g., “You are listening to Sudan Radio Service”).

When Jeremy first arrived in Washington at the end of June 2003, the first priority was identifying people capable of and available to translate and voice news and other audio elements. Over a period of about two weeks, Jeremy was able to identify nine people, one for each of the languages featured on SRS. These nine people were the voices of SRS until late October, when production shifted to Nairobi.

## ***Registered in Kenya***

On 26 August 2003, EDC successfully registered in Kenya. In the end, EDC (and not our law firm) obtained the registration by spending three full days in the Kenyan Registrar of Companies’ office in Sharia House in Nairobi. EDC registered not as an NGO, but as a branch office of an international organization. This was by far the simplest option, but had never been suggested by our law firm.

Immediately COP Mike Kuenzli and his small team in Nairobi opened a bank account, signed a lease for office premises, requested telephone lines, etc. The team also began recruiting Sudanese individuals who could take over the translation/reading work being done in Washington.

Instead of occupying space in an office building, it was more affordable for EDC to rent a house and use it as an office. A large house in a quiet part of town (Kilimani) was identified and rented. Immediately the work of furnishing the house and setting up the studios was started.

Kenya regulates local broadcasters quite stringently and we were reminded that we might need permission from the CCK, the Communications Commission of Kenya, to operate. Strictly speaking, the CCK regulates broadcast frequencies and is not a censorship board or any regulator of media content. As SRS would not be transmitting its programs from Kenya, there was no need for us to seek a frequency allocation from the CCK, which the CCK eventually confirmed in writing, per our request.

Based on the estimated timeline for that work to be completed in Nairobi, it was determined that Jeremy would need to continue SRS production from Washington until mid-October 2003.

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<sup>1</sup> The LOD schedule is as follows: Monday – Dinka; Tuesday – Zande; Wednesday – Nuer and Moru; Thursday – Bari; Friday – Shilluk.

After Jeremy arrived in Nairobi on 18 October 2003, production did shift from Washington. One translator/reader, Buda Jimmy Mulla, was hired by EDC full-time in Washington to be a home office project assistant, as well as act as a US correspondent for SRS. Jimmy continued to produce programs from Washington and send them to Nairobi for inclusion in SRS broadcasts, but from late October 2003 the vast majority of news and programming was produced in Nairobi.

### ***USG – GOK MOU***

Two issues looming over the project and its non-Kenyan employees were taxes and work permits. For years, USAID had been negotiating with the Government of Kenya (GOK) to develop a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that would exempt regional projects from Kenyan taxes and make it easier for non-Kenyans to work legally in Kenya. When EDC began working to start SRS, the MOU was far from being finalized.

Speaking with other NGOs based in Kenya but working in Sudan, it was clear that none was in compliance with Kenyan law. The organizations were not obtaining work permits for their Sudanese staff, nor were any expatriate staff we met paying taxes.

The GOK and USAID finally did sign an MOU in December 2004, which made obtaining work permits easier and did eliminate the need for non-Kenyan staff to pay income tax. However, for the year and a half before the MOU was signed, EDC forged ahead and obtained work permits the old fashioned way—through applications and many follow-up visits to government offices. Details on this can be found in section 3 – Staffing.

### ***Lessons Learned – Start Up***

#### **Plan B**

Many lengthy delays to project implementation during the start up phase stem from time-consuming bureaucratic processes and requirements from the cooperating country government. Intervention or assistance from the US embassy or USAID mission is usually the fastest, most effective way to cut through this red tape. When intervention or assistance is not available, as was our case in Kenya, then a “plan B” is needed.

EDC’s “plan B” was to start production from Washington, DC. SRS worked out of Washington for almost three months. The initial funding period for SRS was only two years, so three months is nearly one eighth of the entire length of the project!

We recommend that implementing partners during the proposal phase consider how they will start up their projects in the event that bureaucratic hurdles are inordinately prolonged. For example, OTI has recently issued an award to establish three FM community stations in southern Sudan and the Three Areas. Chances are high that the process of obtaining permission from the local and regional government authorities to set up these stations will be long. The Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS), at the time of writing, has no media legislation, which means that setting up the stations will be dependent on getting access to individuals within the government and successfully arguing a case. We strongly urge the awardee for this project to develop a “plan B” in the likely event that there are delays in getting the stations established and on the air.

#### **Compliance with Local Laws**

Speaking with other NGOs based in Kenya/working in Sudan, we were surprised to find that not one was complying with the laws of Kenya as we understood them from the many law firms and tax

consultants with whom we spoke. This is dangerous for USAID, as any organization that breaks the law can be expelled and have its projects shut down. Some NGOs with whom we met feared bringing attention to themselves and resisted embarking on long, complicated bureaucratic processes. Sometimes, though, a courtesy visit to the right government official can lead to positive results. Our visit to the CCK to seek written confirmation that that body had no authority over SRS was viewed as a courtesy and rewarded with a letter that would have protected the project in the event our existence was questioned by Kenyan authorities.

We strongly recommend that implementing partners seek local legal advice for clear guidance on how to ensure their compliance with local laws. Furthermore, partners should have human resource (HR) staff whose main functions include obtaining work permits and sorting out tax questions for project procurements and staff.

### **3. Management and Staffing Issues**

#### ***SRS Organizational Structure***

SRS is an NGO project but also a media outlet. As a result, the organizational structure was designed more like a media's than an NGO's.

For the first two years of the project, SRS was headed by two expatriates. Michael Kuenzli, the Chief of Party (COP), was ultimately responsible for all aspects of the project. He reported to a Principal Investigator, or Project Director. Mike provided leadership to the project in terms of vision and mission, financial management, and attempts to establish an external board of trustees. Jeremy Groce, Radio Programming Advisor (RPA), supervised and advised the production team in their creation of programs, news, formats and schedules. Jeremy also was responsible for the training of producers and technicians. He also served as Mike's Deputy Chief of Party.

During that period, the finance and administration department was supervised on a day-to-day basis by Jane Kariuki, Finance and Administration Manager. Under Jane were two Administration Assistants.

There was a production department, consisting of radio producers and studio technicians, which created all news and programming. There was also a marketing department which was responsible for generating publicity and handling SRS' revenue generation.

In March 2005, when SRS received its first cost extension under OTI, funding was reduced significantly, which forced EDC to eliminate Michael Kuenzli from the project. Jeremy Groce assumed the COP role in addition to his duties as RPA.

The rest of the management structure shifted somewhat to assist Jeremy. The finance and administration department is supervised on a day-to-day basis by Jane Kariuki, now called Program Manager. Under Jane are an Admin / HR Coordinator, a Program Accountant, and an Admin Assistant/Logistician.

Assisting Jeremy as RPA is Radio Service Manager (RSM) John Tanza. John helps coordinate event coverage opportunities and ensures that the production team is always planning ahead to cover events. He also is a good link between production and other departments.

The marketing department went from three people to one. Marketing Coordinator Michael Renzi is the lead person getting the word out about SRS. He's designed posters, calendars, shirts, and other publicity materials. He also ensures distribution of the materials.

Running the day-to-day affairs of the production team are Managing Producer Albino Okeny and, under him, Executive Producers Victor Lugala and Rebecca Okwaci. Albino does all scheduling, listens to all programs, and prepares producers for trips to the field. Victor and Rebecca oversee areas of programming. Victor is responsible for news, civic education, and culture programming. Rebecca is responsible for health, agriculture, and education programming. Each does his or her own programs, as well.

Currently SRS has 12 full-time producers in Nairobi. Content teams are somewhat ad hoc. That is, no one producer works on only one type of program or in only one language. We have a core news team, but any producer can be called upon to investigate and write up a news item. One producer takes the lead on our civic education program “The Road to Peace,” but all have contributed to this program or have produced installments themselves.


In early 2005, SRS added two producers in Sudan—one in Khartoum and one in Juba. The role of the Sudan-based producers is to be the daily link with the GONU and GOSS—collecting information, recording interviews, attending press conferences, etc. Both feed news, programs, and program elements (interviews, sound bites, etc.) daily to SRS in Nairobi.

SRS also has three radio studio technicians. The technicians maintain and control the studios and field recording equipment. They also assist producers, as needed, in recording and editing programs. They also do “the builds” (the process of piecing together all the pre-recorded elements into a 6-hour set of audio files) and upload all the audio files to our London-based transmission provider, VT Merlin Communications.

SRS also has stringers in the field and in Nairobi. In the field, stringers provide news and, as much as possible, send audio. In Nairobi, stringers fill in for producers who are sick, on leave, or traveling in Sudan. Stringers, by definition, are people who send news and audio material for a fee. They are not employees, so are not equipped by SRS or paid regular salaries. They are only remunerated for what they provide. As such, they are no substitute for trips into Sudan by SRS producers. Virtually every week, an SRS producer is somewhere in southern Sudan or the Three Areas. While in the field, producers interview area officials and citizens about anything and everything that concerns them. They investigate and report on newsworthy events in the area. They also record music and other bits of culture and entertainment.

When our partners request that we cover an event or do a program on an activity, they usually convey their message to the COP, who in turn passes it on to the senior producers and RSM John Tanza. The most appropriate producer (based on language ability, set of skills, schedule availability, etc.) is identified and is briefed on the trip and expectations for coverage. After the trip the producer takes the data and audio collected during the trip and uses it in his or her own programs and shares it with other producers. For example, producer Koang Pal Chang was in Akobo in August 2006 to cover a civilian disarmament exercise. However, while there, he also was able to interview officials of a local hospital about health issues in the area. He provided the interview to our health program producer.

Below is the SRS organizational chart.



## ***SRS Staff and Programming***

The SRS local staff has always been very diverse. Being based in Kenya, we were required to hire Kenyans in administrative and supporting roles. Because we were programming for Sudan in Sudanese languages, we needed to hire Sudanese in technical roles.

As there was no MOU for regional projects based in Kenya when SRS started in 2003, hiring non-Kenyans was extremely risky, as the law requires that work permits be obtained for a prospective employee *before* they are employed. Before and even since the signing of the MOU, six to twelve months can pass before a work permit is issued to an applicant. This delay was unacceptable.

In the early months, thinking a “work around” solution had been found, SRS employed some Sudanese on a short-term consultancy basis, only later to learn that even that is a violation of Kenyan employment law. As SRS was violating the law already, it was decided to simply hire the Sudanese staff on regular contracts and immediately begin the long process of obtaining work permits for them, hoping that Kenyan authorities would view submitting the applications as clear intention that SRS was seeking to work within the law.

EDC commenced this process in early 2004. As there was still no MOU, we sought our own guidance from the Kenyan Ministry of Information and the Ministry of Home Affairs. With letters from these offices confirming the need for SRS to employ Sudanese, EDC successfully obtained work permits for many Sudanese staff, even before the MOU was finalized.

## **Efficiency**

Another issue related to staffing has revolved around the number of staff. During one meeting with OTI’s Erica Krug in late 2004, the question of efficiency was raised. Specifically, why was SRS not able to produce more than three hours of original programming each day with a staff of a dozen or more full-time producers and studio technicians?

The answer lies in the format and style of SRS programming. SRS’ format consists of newscasts, public service announcements (PSA’s), and packaged programs. The newscasts are currently 10 minutes long and are composed of 8 to 10 items. A typical news item can be found in Appendix A.

News items are not long and in-depth. They are short, concise packets of current events information. However, even such short packets of information can take several hours to collect, depending on the sources of the information and the degree of controversy connected to the issue or event.

PSA's (public service announcements) are short (60 seconds is standard) messages that are tightly produced, like advertisements, and deliver one specific message. PSA's run in select time slots, generally before and/or after the news and between programs. An example of an SRS PSA script can be found in Appendix B. PSA's usually require only an hour or two to write and produce, depending on the format. Short sketches or music take more time to produce than simpler voiced messages.

Packaged programs range from 8 to 14 minutes and cover certain topics or issues, or delve more in-depth into current events. Programs are usually composed of a variety of elements. Elements include interviews with experts, excerpted voices from concerned citizens, relevant authorities; discussions and debate about the topic or issue; profile of a person or organization; straight talk from the producer; music, skits, and other entertainment; etc. SRS airs both recurring programs (weekly series like "The Road to Peace" and "Our Voices," for example) and one-off programs (a special program or two on the anniversary of the signing of the CPA, for example). In Appendix C, see an example of a from a transcribed edition of "The Road to Peace" from October 2004.

Often, SRS strings programs like the example in Appendix C together to produce a thematic series, though not necessarily one right after the other. For example, a series could be shown episodically, with one edition being aired each week for several weeks. A thematic series may consist not only of two or more programs, but also of PSA's and news coverage. SRS has produced thematic programming on the Sudan peace process and the CPA, violence against women, landmine risk education, HIV/AIDS, cholera, and many other topics.

Producing this kind of programming is time-consuming. The program above, for example, consumed only about 14 minutes of airtime, but it took producer David Amuor and a studio technician two days to put it together. First David attended the DDR presentation and ceremony in Nairobi, where he spent several hours recording music and interviewing the then-GOS' and SPLA's chief DDR officers.

Upon returning to the SRS offices, he had to review his audio and write his script. He then recorded his voiceover in the studio and edited the entire piece together on the computer.

And David was reasonably lucky in the sense that both the GOS and SPLA authorities on this issue were at the same place and willing to speak with him. In other instances, SRS needs to spend more time tracking down the right people who can speak authoritatively on particular issues or events. Sometimes SRS must travel into Sudan in order to investigate an issue more thoroughly. Even a short newscast of 90 seconds can take a producer a few hours or more of researching and calling around for confirmations, etc.

The size of the team has allowed SRS to produce daily three full hours of programming that is informative, balanced, and interesting without relying on lengthy "chat show" and "call in" programs, which SRS cannot do because programming is prerecorded and so few Sudanese have the means to call SRS.

## **Training**

As there has never been an independent broadcast media in Sudan before, we knew we would not be able to find many trained radio producers. RPA Groce also feared that hiring staff whose training and experience was gained working for state radio in Sudan would have "bad habits," like pro-government self-censorship tendencies not compatible with SRS and its mission.

The senior Sudanese staff hired in the early months had mixed experiences. One was a print journalist who had worked for the Catholic Church. Another had been a presenter with Radio SPLA in the early 90's but then worked for years with the BBC Monitoring Service. Another had briefly been the head of the now-defunct Radio Voice of Hope, a New Sudan Council of Churches project broadcasting a few hours a week via Radio Netherlands. These three were brought on as senior

producers but still lacked many of the skills and experiences necessary to lead the kind of radio service SRS has become.

Apart from a strengthening of journalism skills, senior producers needed training in management and radio production.

The rest of the producers were mostly young people with little or no work experience. Their only real qualifying skills, in some instances, were proficiency in English and another target language of SRS. A few had been SPLA soldiers since they were young and were still readjusting to civilian life. These producers needed training in all aspects of journalism, audio production, use of a computer and other standard office equipment, and teamwork. Many needed what can only be described as an orientation to working in an office. For example, punctuality, company policies and procedures, and professional communications and interpersonal interactions were new to many.

In the first two years of the project, SRS' capacity to train production staff in all these areas was high. While we did hire some training consultants occasionally to help here and there, most of this was done in-house, led by RPA Jeremy Groce. Jeremy chaired (and still chairs) meetings with all production staff every morning to lay out the day's news roster, make assignments, review programs, etc. During these meetings, policies and procedures and many other basic aspects of working in an office were reviewed and clarified. Over the course of the project, significant improvement was seen amongst most of the staff.

### **Expatriate Staff Reduced**

USAID did not extend the SRS budget after mid-March 2005 at the same level it had been in the first two years of the project. To maintain the radio service at the same quality and quantity of programming SRS listeners had come to appreciate, EDC had to make cuts in other areas. Savings was made in cutting the number of expatriate staff from two to one. Mike Kuenzli left SRS and Jeremy Groce assumed both the Chief of Party and Radio Programming Advisor positions.

While the addition of COP duties to Jeremy's scope of work did not negatively impact the project, Jeremy no longer had the time to monitor three hours of daily radio programming and work one-on-one with producers to develop their skills as he had before. Many new staff joining the project needed the same quality and intensity of training delivered to producers in the early days of the project, but SRS had to find other means of delivering it.

Production training consultants were hired on short-term contracts to work on-on-one with the team. In addition, local hires in management positions assumed greater responsibility for their areas, though much oversight is still needed from Jeremy. As SRS shifts from OTI to DG management, it may be that the added reporting and M&E requirements, as well as the increase in SRS collaborations with other USAID partners, will compel the project to add another expatriate or very experienced hire.

### **Scars of War**

A project with such diverse people, working under American supervision in Kenya for Sudan, is inevitably going to face staff issues. Amongst some of the Sudanese staff, we've seen what could only be described as post-traumatic stress disorder. We've seen people get into raging arguments over quite trivial issues, threaten each other with violence at the slightest provocation, and collapse into tears for the smallest offenses. Sudanese often report feeling ostracized and discriminated against in Kenya. These feelings have erupted at times in the office. The situation is probably exacerbated by the fact that our Kenyan staff is in the administration and support departments and our Sudanese staff is in the production and technical departments. Lack of understanding and knowledge about the roles and responsibilities of the various departments can underscore the sense of "difference."

The project has had to expend significant time and money in coping with these issues. Good, open communication—particularly between management and junior members of staff—are key to maintaining trust. Even so, SRS has suffered from personality conflicts and general lack of trust on the part of staff, particularly Sudanese staff.

SRS' being a media also led to other unusual work practices for those expecting to work for an NGO. For example, most NGOs close for at least a week or more during the year-end holidays. SRS, like any media, could not close down for even a day, as news reporting must be updated on a daily basis. SRS does not broadcast its regular programming on weekends, so the office is generally closed on Saturdays and Sundays, but there have been many instances during which SRS staff must work long and unusual hours, including on the weekends. For instance, during the peace negotiations and other big events, many SRS producers and technicians worked late on many days to ensure that SRS listeners had the latest, most accurate information as soon as possible.

Many of the producers were not accustomed to such long and unusual hours. Changing attitudes and helping to instill the work ethic of a journalist have been ever-occurring processes. Some people did not adapt and did not stay with the project. Others have demonstrated incredible changes of attitude and their professionalism is now quite impressive.

Daily morning meetings with the entire production team and monthly all-staff meetings were a big part in achieving this transformation and building trust amongst staff. SRS' management style, particularly embodied in the COP, also seeks to promote openness and give all employees a say, as much as appropriate, in how the project operates, which encourages everyone to "own" their work and the SRS mission.

### **Peace and the Rush to Sudan**

The advent of peace in southern Sudan has also brought with it some challenges for SRS, which remains in Nairobi. Shortly after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in January 2005, SRS began suffering from NGOs and the SPLM's rush to Sudan. Since late 2005, SRS has lost several staff who found jobs or were appointed to government positions somewhere in southern Sudan.

Because of the great lack of trained, qualified people inside Sudan, the UN, other NGOs, and the governments (of Southern Sudan and the ten states in the south) were quick to lure Sudanese from Nairobi and other places with large salaries and other benefits. Many southern Sudanese are being treated like expatriates if they agree to return to Sudan. SRS cannot afford to make similar offers.

EDC is not alone in facing the frustrations of losing staff to the UN, the GOSS, or others in Sudan. However, because SRS continues to be based in Nairobi, replacing staff has become increasingly difficult. We have focused our Nairobi recruiting efforts on people who are less likely to return to Sudan, like people with children in schools in Nairobi. Because strong ability in Simple Arabic is key for SRS producers and many Sudanese who remain in Kenya do not have good Arabic language skills, we are also finding it necessary to recruit some new staff from within Sudan. Bringing these staff has been an added expense and has forced us to increase our salary scale and benefits package.

As a result of the staff changes, by late 2005 SRS had replaced about half of its original team. This required SRS to instigate a new training program for staff, as the new hires had to undergo massive in-house, on-the-job training.

## ***Establishing Governance Structures***

In the original project description, EDC proposed establishing an Advisory Committee and a Board of Trustees. The Advisory Committee would meet monthly or so and consist of representatives from the SPLM, USAID, and the many NGOs working in southern Sudan. This committee would, as the name implies, advise the project management on a variety of issues. The Board of Trustees was to be a group of about seven independent individuals who would meet twice a year or so to oversee the project. As it turned out, neither body was established as had been anticipated in the project description.

The primary tasks of the Advisory Committee were to “help coordinate and facilitate radio service activities in the field, to suggest program content, [and] to participate in marketing and promotion of the radio service.” Through SRS’ very regular contacts with the organizations and agencies active in southern Sudan, including the SPLM, all this was already being done. To formalize these collaborations through monthly meetings seemed redundant, not to mention impractical. Coordinating the schedules of so many people alone was a near impossibility.

The other tasks of this committee were “to advise on issues of growth, expansion of services, and sustainability.” In our view, these tasks were best carried out by the Board of Trustees. Why? Because the project description says the board should “set goals, define [the] mission and...provide general oversight” of the radio service, which during this stage is unrealistic. That is, while EDC is the implementing agency and USAID/OTI is the sole donor, how can a group of trustees truly govern? In reality, during the initial stages, this board must act more as advisors.

Also during this early stage, the board members must undergo some orientation and training. After the members learn about the radio and other aspects of trusteeship (the importance of independent media, how to read a financial statement, a business plan, understand a marketing plan, regulations of USAID and other potential donors, proposal writing, etc.), the board would then be able to take on the role as originally outlined in the project description.

On 08 November 2004 SRS e-mailed USAID/OTI with a proposal to revise the original design for the governance structures. We proposed creating what we were calling the “Advisory Committee,” but that would be the board while they are “in training.” Once the project enters a phase in which the board will actually direct the project, they would then be called the Board of Trustees.

SRS consulted with many Sudanese at all levels, including SRS staff, and identified several potential candidates for the Advisory Committee cum Board. SRS contacted and briefed all the candidates by the end of January 2005. There were eight candidates. A ninth slot was being left open. We thought nine is a good number, but the final number of positions on this body remains open for discussion.

The first Advisory Committee meeting was held on 15 February 2005 at the SRS offices in Nairobi. About half the members were traveling in Sudan and could not attend, but all expressed their intention to attend the next meeting.

At this meeting, COP Mike Kuenzli presented the project objectives, mission and vision. He explained that the advisory committee would evolve into the Board of Trustees. We hoped that all the members of the committee would stay on to become members of the board, but this is not mandatory, of course. Suggestions for alternative members would be welcome.

It was agreed in that meeting that the future development of Sudan Radio Service, the funding and other future challenges would be discussed in more detail at the next meeting. Attendees were taken on a tour of the studios and producers’ offices.

EDC intended to continue developing this body so that by the end of 2005 it would be in a position to take a more substantive role in governing SRS, but in the event, virtually all now live in various parts of

Sudan and are extremely difficult to get in touch with. In August 2005 SRS invited all to suggest a meeting space, such as Rumbek, Khartoum, or Nairobi, where we could meet again. Only two of the members responded, despite several invitations and requests from SRS. Of the two who responded, only one committed himself to continuing with SRS as a potential board member.

Continued efforts to set up the Advisory Committee would likely be equally fruitless for now.

## ***Lessons Learned – Management and Staffing Issues***

### **Taking Sudanese out of Sudan**

When peace was signed, many donors and NGO's expected projects to save money on rent and similar costs as projects shifted to southern Sudan, particularly Juba, which was presumed to be less expensive than Nairobi. Similarly, many assumed staff would be paid at Sudan "local hire" rates, so salaries would also be reduced.

The reality has been that all costs, including salaries, have greatly increased since peace came to Sudan. Planning and budgets have had to be readjusted to cope with this reality. For SRS or any project needing to continue operating outside the country, the increased costs of recruiting and retaining staff in Nairobi must be budgeted and planned for.

Costs for communicating and traveling into Sudan to talk and meet with sources and partners must also be planned and budgeted for.

### **Governance**

For "exile" radio stations like SRS, establishing governance boards may not be realistic, particularly now that SRS' potential board members are all in Sudan and SRS remains in Kenya. Given the justifiable expectation that SRS would pay for board members' travel to/from board meetings, such events could not happen more often than once a year without significantly impacting the budget. And if only meeting once a year, the impact such a board could have on the direction of the project is extremely minimal.

An alternate way forward would be to find new board candidates in Nairobi, but their remaining in exile would limit their credibility with Sudanese authorities. To find board candidates all within Juba, for example, would be another alternate way forward, but at least for the present, finding influential people in Juba who are independent of the SPLM and/or GOSS is virtually impossible.

If SRS moves into Sudan and as communications and transport infrastructure in Sudan improves, the logistics of organizing such a board will improve. Until such a time is reached, it won't be feasible.

## **4. Working for Sudan, Based in Kenya**

Working in/for Sudan and being based almost entirely in Nairobi presents other advantages and disadvantages. The advantages include better security and stability of necessary infrastructure, like power and communications. Disadvantages include negative perceptions towards those who continue to work outside Sudan.

## **Advantages**

It would almost certainly not have been possible for SRS to set up in the beginning in Sudan. No urban center in southern Sudan could offer the dependable infrastructure SRS needed to operate. Importing that infrastructure would have cost much more and been very difficult to sustain. The city of Khartoum would have provided the infrastructure, but the oppressive government regulatory environment in the north would have blocked the establishment of SRS, perhaps permanently, as the UN has seen with its efforts to set up an FM station there.

Even in the south, the SPLM would likely have stymied the start up of SRS, particularly since the SPLM was working very hard at that time (and is still unsuccessful) to get its own shortwave radio service on the air.

SRS works in several languages, so our producers come from many ethnic groups all over the country. When the project began, a relatively cosmopolitan urban center like Juba was off-limits. Trying to attract a large, ethnically-diverse staff to relocate to Rumbek or Yei would have been costly and fraught with security problems. In Nairobi, a diverse group of people with at least some skills was readily available.

Now that peace has come to Sudan, the infrastructure is being set up and, to a lesser extent, the regulatory environment appears to be improving, though remains far from ideal. NGOs have begun moving their operations to Sudan. NGOs that work in particular regions establish offices in regional urban centers.

SRS is not limited to any particular geographic region of Sudan. For a few reasons, one of which is that one of our main goals is to be a link between citizens and the GOSS, the most logical place for SRS to be located would be in Juba. However, the expense of relocating current staff to Juba (and housing them in Juba) would be prohibitively high.

Trying to collect information and audio from Sudan and report on issues and events in Sudan, all from Nairobi, sounds like it should be more difficult than doing the same from within Sudan. However, being based in Juba would not greatly improve things. The lack of telephone and other communications infrastructure in southern Sudan makes it no more difficult or even easier to reach people by satellite phone or e-mail from Nairobi than from Juba.

Travel from Nairobi to Juba is a relatively big expense, but housing and office space in Juba would be even bigger expenses. And flights from Juba to other places in Sudan do not cost much less than flights to those places from Nairobi.

The idea set-up would see SRS with a core editorial and management base in Juba with producers positioned in "bureaus" (field offices) permanently all over the country. Unfortunately, at this stage, poor communications between Juba and the bureaus would be an inevitable problem. Not only would it be expensive and difficult to get audio from the bureaus to Juba, it would be enormously challenging for managers in Juba to adequately supervise and guide the producers in the bureaus.

We've already said that the media regulatory environment in Sudan was not conducive to SRS during start up. Even now, the environment for truly free media does not exist. In Juba, it's true that the UN and a few commercial stations have been established. However, the commercial stations have been harassed by GOSS and Central Equatoria state officials and the UN has only been able to set up stations in the south.

In July 2006, the Central Equatoria Minister of Information closed down Liberty FM radio indefinitely for allegedly causing what the minister called "public discontent" and for allegedly operating without a license. The UN has been able to operate relatively freely in the south, to our knowledge, but has been barred from setting up any stations in the north. Whether SRS would be able to operate in the

south with the impunity that the UN appears to is uncertain. At least in part because of these reasons, USAID/Sudan has instructed SRS not to relocate.

### ***Disadvantages***

Sudan has never seen an independent broadcaster that provides news and information. As of the time of writing, even a majority of decision-makers within the GOSS clearly believe that dissemination of information must be tightly controlled by the state. Governments in Sudan worry less about newspapers than radio and TV outlets because most people are illiterate. As such, the power of newspapers is quite limited. So from that perspective, SRS is seen as a threat to government.

Furthermore, now that peace has been signed and most NGOs are relocating to Sudan, it is naturally vexing to the GOSS and other officials that SRS remains in Nairobi. It probably seems suspicious. Since the beginning of 2006, COP Jeremy Groce has met with GOSS Minister of Information Dr. Samson Kwaje and other officials within government. The first question is always, "When are you relocating to Sudan (specifically Juba)?" Even other USAID implementing partners have asked this question.

At some point, SRS may be unofficially, or even officially, blacklisted over this issue. This happened to SRS in our relationship with Sudan's embassy in Nairobi. Before the signing of the CPA, whenever we telephoned the ambassador or other top officials from the embassy, as soon as we identified ourselves as SRS, they would hang up on us. Only the press attaché would speak with us, but she would only give us reports or statements that were given to all media outlets. The reason for the cold shoulder, we were told, is that SRS was not registered in Khartoum and had not sought a broadcast license from the national government.

### ***Lessons Learned – Working for Sudan, Based in Kenya***

Any project not relocating into Sudan will need to justify their staying in Kenya to the GOSS. SRS COP Jeremy has and will continue to respond to various GOSS officials and even USAID partners about why SRS is remaining. USAID should also make it clear that the lack of a secure, free media environment is the primary concern as a form of leverage to encourage the government to pass laws protecting the freedoms of expression, speech, and media.

In the meantime, in early 2006 SRS installed full-time bureau producers in Juba and Khartoum, so that government press conferences and other key events are more consistently covered by SRS. The bureau producers also provide at least the appearance of local presence within Sudan that can help to deflect the criticism about remaining outside the country.

To this end it's important that our bureau producers in Juba and Khartoum work extra hard to make links with officials and establish trust between them and SRS. The best way to do this is not report whatever they like or not report what they don't like, but accurately and fully report on their efforts and achievements in these early days of government. It would also likely be helpful to have full-time bureaus in one or two other main urban centers, such as Wau and Malakal, though this is also dependent on the budget.

## **5. Information Gathering**

SRS covers the whole country, ideally, but even covering just the south and the Three Areas is a huge task. The country is so big, and communications and transport networks so poor, that this coverage would be an enormous challenge to even the most well-funded, well-staffed media entity.

EDC realized it would not be possible to have full-time producers based all over Sudan. As stated earlier, lack of direct supervision for these staff, who would inevitably be novices in journalism and radio production, would be problematic, even if we could overcome the communication challenges between the bureaus and home office. Even our current bureau producers, who had worked as SRS stringers for a long time before they were hired full-time, were disappointingly un-aggressive in pursuing news and stories. After bringing them to Nairobi for a month of orientation and training, the Khartoum bureau producer has improved, but the Juba producer will likely need to be replaced. Salaries, plus month-long orientations and training, for a dozen bureau producers would be financially prohibitive at this point.

Our solution to this problem has been to use stringers. Stringers are like commission-based salespeople. They make no regular salary. They are paid piecemeal for whatever they contribute to the radio service. Media entities around the world use stringers (in the typically exaggerated style of American job titling, stringers are usually called “contributing editors” nowadays) to maintain a presence in as many places as possible.

When SRS was setting up, we worked with Sudan Development Trust’s *Sudan Mirror* newspaper to develop a stringer network. SRS also established relationships with other stringers. About a half dozen of our stringers were journalists of one stripe or another. Many were NGO employees who had access to e-mail and/or a satellite phone. One or two stringers were community leaders (our first stringer in Juba was a priest).

The job of stringers who were not trained journalists was more to alert SRS to an event or happening than to report on it themselves. For example, the priest in Juba might hear an explosion in town and call us to say he heard an explosion. We would then “talk him through” the investigation, requesting him to go to certain places and speak with certain people in order to collect all the requisite facts.

Once SRS had the story, we would then pay the stringer based on a formula. The result was usually about \$20 or \$25 USD for a story. For most people working in southern Sudan, this amount was enough to encourage them to keep working and for those who wanted to make a living as a stringer, it was possible.

Since the signing of the CPA and the influx of NGOs and the UN into southern Sudan, most of our stringers have been employed full-time and no longer have the time or desire to send us news or audio material. In several instances, stringers told us they wanted a full-time job with housing and other benefits or they would stop working for us. A few NGO employees continue to send stories or information, but our stringer network is much smaller than it used to be. From a reliable 20 by the end of 2004, we now hear from only about six. And these six are not as reliable as they used to be. We’re happy when they send us material or news, but we are generally no longer able to give them assignments.

In late 2005 we undertook a major effort to rebuild the network and identify people in key places who would act as stringers for us. The effort succeeded in finding two stringers in Yambio. In other places, we could not identify anyone willing or able to be stringers or the person we identified never followed through. Today, even the two stringers in Yambio are very quiet.

To get around this, SRS simply sends Nairobi-based producers into the field as often as we can. We are assisted with transportation by the UN and others who organize events and activities in Sudan. The transport is sometimes free, particularly when we’re asked to provide coverage of a particular event. Other times, we send producers into the field just to “poke around,” ask questions, talk with officials and citizens, and come back with as much material and information as they can.

Another thing SRS has done is to collect satellite phone numbers for NGOs and county officials all over. We have also garnered relationships with military and civic leaders all over Sudan. This means we can telephone sources and get reliable information, even when we can’t be physically present.

Because of the many relationships SRS has and the trust of SRS felt by so many people, SRS is arguably the world's number one gatherer and reporter of news about southern Sudan, despite the virtual collapse of our stringer network.

This aspect of trust has also led the leaders of anti-government factions in Darfur—the SLM, JEM, and others—to regularly call and e-mail SRS with their news and views. This special relationship helped SRS to air an explosive expose on Darfur in August 2004, before most of the world's attention was so focused on Darfur.

### ***Lessons Learned – Information Gathering***

NGOs and others must work harder to share information. As SRS has been around for nearly four years now, our relationships with many NGOs and organizations working in Sudan has improved to the extent that we now hear about events and happenings much more often. However, in the start up days, it was clear that virtually no one saw the benefit of a radio service for southern Sudan. Regrettably, USAID partners were among the last to start contacting and utilizing SRS. Better coordination between OTI and other USAID partners would likely have helped the situation.

Using stringers is a very effective, affordable way to gather news from many locations without the expense and management burden of so many full-time staff. However, in places like southern Sudan, with no significant history of an independent media, stringers are not as skilled or as experienced as “freelance” correspondents in some other places. In Sudan, SRS' definition of a stringer has been virtually anyone with access to a phone or e-mail connection who can follow instructions and reliably pass on information. As people that match that description are in short supply, SRS has had to send producers to Sudan to do the bulk of information and audio gathering.

Full-time producers who are largely desk-bound, like those working for SRS, must know people and have contacts, but not be so connected that they are compromised or unreliable as providers of news. Developing impressive directories of important people with e-mail addresses and phone numbers, like SRS has done, is a vital tool for any media.

In situations that require a media project to remain outside the target country, establishing bureaus staffed by full-time, reliable and self-directed producers in a few locations would greatly improve the ability to gather information. Linking the radio service with local stations who can provide some reliable local news will also allow reporting on events and issues from more locations.

## **6. The Question of Languages**

Broadcasting in English and Arabic was never much of a question for SRS. Arabic is needed for understanding and English is needed because of its political importance. Both English and Arabic are given official status by the CPA as languages of government, commerce, and education.

Both varieties of Arabic—standard and Juba—were selected because we didn't want to be seen as communicating only with the south. In the first 18 months or so of SRS, the simple Arabic we used on the air was predominantly Juba-Arabic, a Creolized form of Arabic with heavy influence from Bari. Later, we began developing what we call Simple Arabic, which is not just the variety of Arabic spoken around Juba. Rather, it is pan-Sudanese Arabic, the language that most Sudanese from around the country speak when all together.

There is no one Simple Arabic. It is not written or taught. It has nearly as many variations as speakers. As such, one person's variation might make someone else laugh or even be a little unsure of what is being said, but overall Simple Arabic is the closest thing Sudanese have to a lingua franca.

Having said this, it was the unanimous advice of those with whom we consulted during start up that people in rural areas, particularly women and others who don't generally interact with people from other communities, would need local language programming in order to benefit from the radio service. Taking that advice, SRS took on the challenge of how to balance the use of local languages with Arabic and English. When the original project description was written, the research into this question was not complete. The proposal simply said that programming in English, Juba-Arabic, Dinka, and Nuer would be included, as well as time for other languages. But the consensus among the experts we consulted was that including Nilotic languages like Dinka and Nuer would be politically explosive unless we also included Equatorian languages like Bari and Zande.


During startup, our language research was intensified. Documents from SIL International<sup>2</sup> were obtained, an extensive interview and follow-up questioning with Sudanese professor of linguistics at the University of Nairobi Dr. George Nyombe were conducted, and we also conferred with many Sudanese community and SPLM leaders in Nairobi about the potential political repercussions of our selection of local languages.

No one advocated not using local languages on the radio. For most, it was an unquestioned must that local languages be part of the mix on SRS. Only Dr. George Nyombe warned that the use of some local languages and not others would spark some protests, but he also conceded that using only English and Arabic would exclude many rural listeners and many women, whose interactions with other communities is more limited.

In the end, SRS added 6 local languages: Dinka, Zande, Nuer, Moru, Bari, and Shilluk. Three are Nilotic languages and three are Equatorian languages, a balanced mix that reflects the largest ethno-linguistic groups in the south, according to the SIL information we obtained.

Currently, each of these local languages is broadcast on only one day a week. Simple Arabic, English, and standard (usually referred to as "classical") Arabic languages are broadcast each day. Based on a three-hour broadcast slot each day (three hours in the morning and three in the evening), each language is apportioned 45 minutes (except on Wednesdays, when the three main languages are reduced to 30 minutes so that both Nuer and Moru have 45 minutes). However, over the course of the week, English and both varieties of Arabic make up almost 75% of all programming (see the chart below).

Breakdown of SRS Programming Time by Language - as of August 2006



<sup>2</sup> Founded over 70 years ago, SIL International is a faith-based organization that studies, documents, and assists in developing the world's lesser-known languages. SIL is committed to academic excellence and professional engagement through literacy, linguistics, translation, and other academic disciplines. SIL makes its services available to all without regard to religious belief, political ideology, gender, race, or ethnic background. SIL (initially known as the Summer Institute of Linguistics) has grown from a small summer linguistics training program with two students in 1934 to a staff of over 5,000 coming from over 60 countries. SIL's linguistic investigation exceeds 1,800 languages spoken by over 1.2 billion people in more than 70 countries.

SRS is likely to shift the ratio of languages in the near future, boosting the amount of Simple Arabic programming we do at the expense of other languages. However, we believe that maintaining some local language broadcasting is key to reaching people in the most remote and rural areas of the country. This will be important because SRS, along with other shortwave broadcasts, will inevitably see their audiences diminish as FM stations pop up in the towns. Already, the UN is set to establish at least a dozen FM transmitters in southern Sudan alone.

In July 2006, an assessment of SRS carried out by USAID consultant J. Christian Quick had this to say about SRS and languages:

SRS's current approach to English-use, in the context of the GoSS's expressed intent to establish English as the Southern Sudan's official language, seems roughly appropriate and many in Southern Sudan appreciate the role of English as a neutral language (along with Arabic), however any higher ratio of English would leave the vast majority of rural persons underserved at this time - for many the preference of English seems to be more political than practical at this time, as comprehension levels show. SRS's present priority treatment of English language programming *does* seem to give it some special credibility among educated persons, but this may not ultimately translate into a broader listenership, while a higher percentage of Arabic and especially Simple Arabic likely would, if perhaps at the cost of some of the elite audience. This is particularly true if a larger rural audience is meant to be reached, wherein Simple Arabic would clearly serve the greatest number of listeners.

Mr. Quick's assessment said that no "minority language programming... [received] frequent spontaneous mention during his survey, but he believes this may be accounted for by lower SRS awareness levels in rural communities. On the other hand, he said Shilluk was cited by some Shilluk women interviewed on a boat west of Malakal, with one woman commenting, "Radio Malakal and Friday on Sudan Radio Service is all we can understand!"

Mr. Quick also sought to gauge the most appropriate languages for SRS to use. He asked people to assess their own Arabic and English language comprehension levels. He found that for Arabic, the levels are closely paralleled between rural and urban listeners, but with English the urban/rural comprehension levels diverged considerably.

Arabic Comprehension Levels

	<u>None</u>	<u>Little</u>	<u>Some</u>	<u>Most</u>
Rural	5%	13%	25%	52%
Urban	6%	18%	28%	46%

English Comprehension Levels

	<u>None</u>	<u>Little</u>	<u>Some</u>	<u>Most</u>
Rural	67%	12%	11%	6%
Urban	18%	10%	34%	36%

Due to the rains Mr. Quick was unable to visit more than a few areas and he did not venture very far from the main towns. We believe the number of people indicating "none" and "little" comprehension of English and even Arabic would be even higher if Mr. Quick had been able to visit more rural areas. Even so, these figures indicate that 20% or more of southern Sudanese need local languages on the radio in order to access the news and other programming.

The assessment report continues:

Thorough assessment of the use of minority languages on SRS requires a more comprehensive and regionally diverse study of language comprehension, though it is clear from the present study, for instance, that both Arabic and English comprehension is low among rural Dinka. Survey results suggest that smaller minority groups are more

likely to speak a second language - especially within towns, but less so when rurally isolated. It can be inferred that larger ethno-linguistic groups are more likely to benefit from non-English/non-Arabic programs, being less likely to need to assimilate into common language environments. The precise point at which this ceases to withstand inference cannot be established with the data gathered in this survey and there is a political dimension to radio listener opinions, wherein, the larger the language group, the more likely it is that its constituents will feel that their language should be represented in broadcast programming. Consequently, the only survey respondents who, given a limited choice, felt that their native tongue was appropriate for national broadcast, were from Dinka, Shilluk and Nuer groups, and among these only the demand for Dinka was statistically significant.

SRS, particularly in our first year or so of operation, received many questions and even some complaints about our lineup of languages. Accusations were leveled that SRS was attempting to marginalize ethno-linguistic groups whose languages are not represented on SRS. In each case, SRS responded by saying the languages were selected based on evidence and consultation, not political preferences. SRS no longer receives any such complaints.

SRS did receive and continues to receive a tremendous amount of positive feedback appreciating our use of local languages. The most touching came in late 2003 when some Azande men in southwestern Sudan said they were moved to tears the first time they heard Zande language on the radio. For Azande women, they said, the radio had always been a tool only for the educated men in the village because only they could understand what was being said. Now, with their language being broadcast once a week, at least some of SRS' radio programming is accessible to the women.

### ***Lessons Learned – The Question of Languages***

Languages are so political that consultation with linguistic experts and opinions from a wide variety of interested parties was essential to reach the decision to include local languages and which languages to include. While SRS is inevitably criticized by some for broadcasting in some languages and not others, overall SRS' inclusion of local language programming has been a plus.

Recent research has supported the decision to broadcast in local languages was the right one, with as many as 20% of southern Sudanese relying on local languages for comprehension, according to a USAID-commissioned survey in July 2006. Rural women, in particular, are less likely to speak another language.

With the advent of FM stations, in vast countries like Sudan with large rural populations, donors and governments must not ignore the need for SW coverage. Community radio stations broadcasting in more local languages will help cater to those within earshot, but the range of FM radio transmissions rarely exceeds 100 km, which means that most rural listeners will continue to rely on SW radio for their information needs. As Mr. Quick put it in his report:

While the UNDP reports that urban populations have increased by 75% in Southern Sudan since 1975, the UNFPA places the urban population at 40.8% of the total population of Sudan, as a whole. It goes without saying that engaging the rural population in the peace process and civic development will be critical to Sudan's future stability and that radio's role in this is vital.

Those listeners who rely on SRS' local language broadcasts have had no where else to go—for now and many years to come—and that has made them extremely loyal to SRS. Broadcasting in local languages has been a major factor in building trust between SRS and its audience. Presumably the same would be true elsewhere: listeners believe that a radio station that broadcasts in their languages is on their side and will tell them the truth.

## **7. Marketing**

Establishing a new nationwide radio service is difficult; informing the population that the new radio service exists is even more difficult.

Through the distribution of posters, t-shirts, brochures, and other materials, SRS at least created some name recognition. Big and small marketing events and visits to about 20 locations throughout southern Sudan and the Three Areas helped make SRS a very well-known entity in at least those places, though word-of-mouth to neighboring areas also spread. We engaged in a wide range of marketing activities—from football matches in SRS uniforms to workshop-type events for community leaders. The huge expense of marketing activities was not well appreciated during the initial assessment of the project. Just getting to an area with boxes of posters and shirts was very expensive. During the major marketing campaigns involving musicians and football uniforms, etc., SRS had to charter a plane. As such, it wasn't possible to do big launches in more than three places. In other places, we simply arrived to distribute a few shirts and other materials and brief community leaders about the radio. This is relatively extensive, but assistance from other USAID partners in distributing materials and just getting the word out about SRS would have made a difference. During most of the first two years of SRS' existence, only Pact was willing to assist SRS in distribution of materials and other marketing-related efforts.

During Mr. Quick's July 2006 assessment, he interviewed 280 people. An impressive 80% of urban respondents reported listening to SRS at least sometimes (ranked within their top 5 radio services). Penetration of SRS into rural areas, however, has not happened to the extent we would like. Mr. Quick found that only 42% of rural listeners reported listening to SRS at least sometimes. We (and Mr. Quick) believe that it is important to note that listenership figures are distorted to the extent that SRS does not broadcast for as many hours per day as the most successful radio services available in Southern Sudan, namely the BBC. Nonetheless, it's clear that there is a substantial difference between rural and urban listening habits.

### ***Revenue Generation***

Another aspect of SRS marketing is our collaboration with other partners and the generation of revenue from some of these collaborative projects. SRS worked hard in the first two years to inform NGOs, the UN, the wider USAID/Sudan program, and others of the importance and value of a media reaching southern Sudan. Very few realized this value. Most viewed SRS like any other media and so dismissed SRS' requests for information and offers to assist with "We can't talk to the press." They didn't realize that SRS could help them achieve their program goals through improved dissemination of information, despite our efforts to tell them this.

At OTI's urging, a few organizations came our way. American Refugee Committee (ARC), Tearfund, and Care were early utilizers of SRS as an information dissemination service. All three created drama programs about HIV/AIDS. Care also created a drama series on peace and another that modeled good pedagogical methods in classrooms. This last series was aired as a radio-delivered component of a teacher training course and was very well-received.

Thanks to the efforts of the SRS marketing team and the positive experiences of organizations like ARC, Tearfund, and Care, in the third year of the project more partners came to SRS to collaborate on programs, PSA's, and news. We even started doing ads, mostly job announcements for USAID and the UN.

Thanks to a modification to the SRS award, SRS was able to make some of the collaborations revenue-generating activities. SRS does not charge, of course, to report news or cover anyone's events. Collaborating on informational programs is also free, as it's part of our mandate. But work that requires extraordinary resources not readily available (for example, if someone wants SRS to develop and produce a drama series, we charge to hire scriptwriters and actors) or work that would be of specific benefit to the organization (like a job announcement or promotional ad) is charged. Revenue generation has added about \$50,000 USD to the project, which indicates that SRS has at least some potential to be self-sustaining.

### ***Lessons Learned – Marketing***

Most NGOs have no inherent appreciation for the value of radio or the media. Given this, USAID must prod its partners to assist media projects distribute materials and get the word out. Further, the “we’re not allowed to talk to the press” caveat must be clarified so that USAID media projects are not given the same tight-lipped treatment that is given, say, to “60 Minutes.”

## **9. Broadcasting and Reception Issues**

Shortwave radio has advantages and disadvantages over the two other standard forms of radio transmissions, AM and FM.

In general, FM broadcasts offer the clearest, strongest signal. The limitation with FM is that FM transmissions are limited to relatively short distances, usually no more than 100 kilometers or so.

AM (or Medium Wave) broadcasts are usually clear and strong, also, and can travel good distances. High-powered AM broadcasts, especially at night, can travel hundreds of kilometers. The biggest limitation with AM transmissions is they are more susceptible to atmospheric interference.

Shortwave transmissions work by bouncing signals off the charged layer of the atmosphere called the ionosphere, which consists of gas molecules which have been ionized by non-visible radiation from the sun (hence the name). This means that from a transmitter thousands of kilometers away, shortwave transmissions can be directed virtually anywhere in the world. The limitation is that there are so many shortwave frequencies that, unless one knows the frequency, finding one can be the radio tuning equivalent of finding a needle in a haystack.

Another aspect of shortwave transmissions is that the science of predicting propagation paths (the path the radio signal travels from the transmitter to the target area) and other aspects of transmission is complicated and requires the specialized expertise. It's not something SRS could manage on its own, for example.

Shortwave reception is also susceptible to atmospheric and solar interference. The radiation from the sun varies in strength according to the eleven-year sunspot cycle. It is strongest when the sunspot number is large and weakest when the sunspot number is small.

From late 2005 until the present, SRS has seen the lowest sun spot level in this cycle. The radiation from the sun in the ionosphere is at its weakest, which means the shortwave signals have not been as strong as we would prefer.

There are other factors beyond our immediate control that also impact reception. The regional broadcasting sites in Africa and the Middle East, which would offer the best transmissions to Sudan, have had no spare broadcast capacity. What capacity exists is during periods when SRS does not wish to broadcast. So SRS has had to broadcast from the UK, Russia, or other sites further away.

As a result of these issues, the SRS transmissions have been weaker than many other transmissions in the region.

For over a year, SRS has been working intensively with our transmission provider, VT Merlin Communications, to remedy the situation by changing frequencies (sometimes frequency changes can improve propagation) and trying to shift the source of SRS' transmissions from the UK to the Middle East, Egypt, or another site from which the propagation path and other factors are more conducive. Fortunately, we expect that solutions we are implementing now with VT Merlin Communications will significantly improve reception of SRS.

We are also preparing to do systematic monitoring of SRS from several sites within southern Sudan and the Three Areas which will allow us to report more detailed reception information to VT Merlin.

### ***Lessons Learned – Broadcasting and Reception Issues***

Even for people with significant experience in traditional radio broadcasting, shortwave presents its own unique challenges. For future SW media projects, EDC recommends that someone spend at least a few days with the transmission provider to learn more about shortwave transmission. How to properly monitor transmissions, what options are available if transmissions are poor, what factors may impact reception, etc. are all things that must be planned and budgeted for early on.

It also would be helpful to broadcast on more than one frequency simultaneously. Because there are so many shortwave signals, the more frequencies a service has, the more likely someone searching randomly will find the signal. Multiple frequencies also offer some redundancy in the event that one of the frequencies experiences atmospheric interference or is weak. Multiple frequencies, of course, essentially double transmission costs, which must be budgeted for.

We also recommend that USAID investigate the procurement of its own shortwave transmitter(s). It could be managed and maintained by VT Merlin Communications or another provider, but if the transmitter were based in a location very close to the broadcast target (for example, placing a transmitter in Kenya to reach Sudan), transmissions and reception would be exceptional. Perhaps sharing capacity on transmitters the Voice of America uses might allow USAID media projects greater flexibility in reaching key areas.

## **10. Project Extensions**

After SRS' initial two years of funding from USAID, EDC received two short-term (less than 12 months) extensions. This was unavoidable, due to USAID's budgetary processes and the ever-fluid situation in Sudan, but the nature of short-term extensions are challenging for a project to bear. Local staff was particularly anxious about whether or not they would have jobs and it's always tough to plan events and project activities when each extension is only for another few months or so. Having said that, EDC is also extremely grateful for USAID's continued support and believe this support has continued because of recognition of the valuable work SRS has done over the past three and a half years.

### ***Lessons Learned – Project Extensions***

The main lesson learned is that when this kind of uncertainty creeps into a project, as is probably unavoidable at times, the best thing is for the COP and others to be optimistic and do what they can to reassure staff. The COP and other project leaders must balance realism, optimism, transparency and trust. USAID can assist the COP to do this by briefing project staff on developments, if requested to do so, which would hopefully reinforce what the COP has been saying.

## Appendix A: Example of SRS News Item

**SLUG:** MOBILE TELEPHONES IN SOUTHERN SUDAN      **VERSION:**  
**DATE:** 21 APRIL 2006  
**SOURCE:** JUBA POST

1	MOBILE TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES MAY	<i>(TRANSLATION)</i>
2	BE UP AND RUNNING SOON IN SOUTHERN	
3	SUDAN.	
4		
5	THE MINISTRY OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS	
6	SAYS THEY WERE ABLE TO LAUNCH A SIGNAL	
7	LAST WEEK AND ARE NOW TESTING THE	
8	COVERAGE AND STABILITY OF THE NEW	
9	NETWORK.	
10		
11	THE JUBA POST NEWSPAPER QUOTES	
12	TELECOMMUNICATIONS MINISTRY	
13	UNDERSECRETARY ELIJAH BIAR KUOL AS	
14	SAYING THE SIGNAL HAS BEEN TESTED IN	
15	JUBA, YEI, AND OTHER TOWNS AND THAT	
16	AFTER INTERNATIONAL SIGNALS ARE TESTED,	
17	THE MINISTRY WILL DECLARE THE NETWORK	
18	READY TO USE.	
19		
20	ACCORDING TO BIAR, THERE ARE 10	
21	THOUSAND SIM CARDS IN JUBA FOR MOBILE	
22	PHONE USERS TO INSTALL ONCE THE	
23	NETWORK IS READY. PRICES FOR THE SIM	
24	CARDS ARE STILL UNKNOWN, BUT MR. KUOL	
25	CLAIMS THEY WILL BE CHEAPER THAN THE	
26	SIM CARDS OFFERED BY THE FORMER	
27	PROVIDER, MOBITEL.	
28		
29	IN OTHER TELEPHONE NEWS, THE MINISTRY	
30	SAYS THAT IN URBAN AREAS THEY WILL	
31	ALLOW PRIVATE COMPANIES TO RUN	
32	TELEPHONE SERVICES BUT IN RURAL AREAS	
33	IT WILL BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF	
34	THE MINISTRY.	
35		
36	NORTHERN BAHR AL-GHAZAL, WARAP,	
37	EASTERN EQUATORIA, AND JONGLEI STATES	
38	ARE THE PRIORITY AREAS SINCE THEY HAVE	
39	THE LEAST INFRASTRUCTURE AND MEANS	
40	FOR COMMUNICATION. THE WORLD BANK IS	
41	HELPING TO FUND V-SAT CONNECTIONS TO	
42	LINK THE 10 STATES WITH THE GOVERNMENT	
43	OF SOUTHERN SUDAN.	
44		
45		

## Appendix B: Example of SRS Public Service Announcement

### CARTER CENTER/SRS GUINEA WORM PSA :60 NUMBER 1

- VOICE 1: WOMEN, do your part to STOP Guinea Worm NOW.
- VOICE 1 & 2: Prevent it!  
Avoid it!  
Filter it!  
Report it!
- VOICE 1: Women, keep your family healthy by always filtering all of your drinking water. Do not let your children or family get Guinea Worm!
- VOICE 2: Drink only safe water. Filtered water is safe water. Water from a borehole or well is safe water. Do not drink water from ponds, dams, or stagnant rivers without filtering the water first – the water may contain Guinea worms.
- VOICE 1: Prevent everyone with Guinea Worm disease from entering any water source. Report all Guinea worm cases to your village health worker.
- VOICE 2: Women, protect your husband, your children, yourself, and your community from Guinea worm... only drink safe water.
- VOICE 1 & 2: STOP GUINEA WORM NOW! THINK BEFORE YOU DRINK!

## Appendix C: Example of SRS Program Script

ROAD TO PEACE: DDR  
BY DAVID AMOUR AND JEREMY GROCE

TO AIR 20 OCT. 2004

SUDAN RADIO SERVICE PRESENTS...

*STING*

THE ROAD TO PEACE, A CIVIC EDUCATION PROGRAM...

(SIG TUNE) FADE OUT AFTER :15 OR :20

:30 *FADE IN MUSIC FROM ON-SITE CELEBRATIONS*

IN THIS WEEK'S PROGRAM, WE'RE GOING TO LOOK AT THE JOINT ASSESSMENT MISSION ON D-D-R, OR DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION. WHAT DOES THAT MEAN? THAT MEANS THAT THE 2 PARTIES—THE SUDAN GOVERNMENT AND THE SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT—ARE WORKING TOGETHER TO FIGURE OUT HOW BEST TO REDUCE THE SIZE OF THEIR ARMIES AND HELP THE FORMER SOLDIERS RETURN TO CIVILIAN LIFE.

*MUSIC FADE OUT*

THAT WAS PART OF THE CELEBRATION THAT OCCURRED EARLIER THIS MONTH IN NAIROBI, KENYA, AS DELEGATES FROM THE SUDAN ARMED FORCES AND THE S-P-L-A MET TO SEE HOW BEST TO IMPLEMENT THIS D-D-R PLAN.

THE D-D-R PLAN IS REQUIRED BY THE PROTOCOL ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. IN AUGUST WE AIRED A SUMMARY OF THE PROTOCOL ON THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, WHICH WAS SIGNED BY BOTH PARTIES IN NAIVASHA ON SEPTEMBER 25<sup>TH</sup> LAST YEAR. IN OUR SUMMARY, YOU LEARNED THAT IN THAT PROTOCOL, BOTH PARTIES AGREED TO WORK TOGETHER TO DEVELOP A COMMON D-D-R PLAN.

*STING*

AGAIN, D-D-R STANDS FOR DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION.

DISARMAMENT IS THE PROCESS OF TAKING ARMS, OR WEAPONS, AWAY FROM SOLDIERS WHO WILL RETURN TO CIVILIAN LIFE.

DEMOBILIZATION IS THE ACT OF REDUCING THE SIZE OF ARMIES. SOLDIERS WHO ARE NOT NEEDED TO KEEP THE PEACE ARE RETURNED TO CIVILIAN LIFE.

REINTEGRATION IS THE PROCESS OF RETURNING TO CIVILIAN LIFE. AFTER YEARS OF FIGHTING, MANY SOLDIERS—ESPECIALLY YOUNG SOLDIERS—KNOW ALMOST NOTHING OF PEACEFUL, CIVILIAN LIFE. SO A REINTEGRATION PROCESS IS VERY IMPORTANT.

*STING*

THIS JOINT ASSESSMENT MISSION WAS SPONSORED BY THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM AND IGAD, THE INTERGOVERNMENT AGENCY FOR DEVELOPMENT, WHICH IS ALSO MEDIATING THE PEACE TALKS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE S-P-L-M.

WHEN I VISITED THE JAM, I SPOKE WITH COMMANDER DENG DAU DENG, WHO LED THE S-P-L-M DELEGATION, AND WITH SULAF MUHAMMED, THE SUDAN GOVERNMENT TEAM LEADER FOR THE D-D-R. BOTH MEN WERE EAGER TO TELL ME THAT THE EXACT DETAILS OF THE DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILIZATION WOULD NOT BE FINALIZED UNTIL THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IS SIGNED.

HOWEVER, BOTH SIDES SAID THEY REMAIN COMMITTED TO DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILIZATION BECAUSE THEY REALIZE IT IS PART OF RETURNING TO PEACEFUL, NORMAL LIFE. HERE'S DOCTOR SULAF MOHAMMED:

CLIP 4 (Sulaf Mohammed): "Landmines have to be removed. Extra forces, because everyone was carrying a gun to fight for his rights or whatever he thought was right... But after this war, when peace is signed, people have to go back to normal life. People have to go to their farms, their factories, schools. So we will need less guns. Only to protect the borders of Sudan. This is what we call demobilization."

DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT WILL NOT BE A QUICK AND EASY THING TO DO. RATHER, IT WILL GO IN STAGES AND WILL TAKE TIME.

CLIP 6 (Sulaf Mohammed): "It is a very comprehensive exercise. Starting by sensitization and telling them about peace, about the good, new environment, and helping them to join the normal life in terms of agriculture, industry. Those who want to join the schools, we help them to join the schools. So it is a package of activities. It is not only the collection of arms. It is a package of social, psychological, and economic activities, as well."

THE FIRST STEP IN THE PROCESS, ACCORDING TO THE S-P-L-A'S COMMANDER DENG DAU DENG, IS EDUCATION ABOUT PEACE. OTHERWISE, HE WARNS, MANY SOLDIERS WOULD LIKELY REFUSE TO GIVE UP THEIR ARMS:

CLIP 3 (Deng Dau Deng): "When they refuse, then that means the information was not well sent to them. And this is why people have to sensitize them first. They have to understand. So this is why the workshop and the planning are being done so that a system of education and information is made available to them. So it is a process. It will go in phases. It is not just one day. It may take time. It does not mean that if peace is signed tomorrow, everyone will disarm tomorrow. It will go in phases. It may start voluntary. People may be asked first. Some may opt to be moved. Jobs have to be created outside anyway."

AND THAT IS THE KEY. JOBS! A MEANS TO PROVIDE FOR ONESELF AND ONE'S FAMILY. IF SOLDIERS HAVE NOTHING TO TURN TO, DEMOBILIZATION MAY NOT BE A FAVORABLE ALTERNATIVE. COMMANDER DENG SAYS THIS IS ONE OF THE S-P-L-M'S MAIN PRIORITIES:

CLIP 1 (Deng Dau Deng): "This is one of the key concerns of the S-P-L-M—what to do with its fighting force. It has first to look at the issues, the needs, the requirements, the social welfare, the livelihood of the fighters. So this must happen first. It is not just a rush to demobilize them and send them home. But the S-P-L-M is looking at structures. So first we will be looking at what are the requirements, in the civilian community, what are the capacities? And what are the needs? Social? Economic? And infrastructure needs? So the S-P-L-M is really very concerned about the forces before we begin to demobilize. And the S-P-L-M is taking all the steps—looking at what is existing at the payam, at the village, even the household level. We are very much concerned about wounded people, about old age, about widows. So it is not just a matter of telling them the peace has come. We must also be concerned about the welfare."

DOCTOR SULAF MOHAMMED RAISED THE ISSUE OF DEMOBILIZING MILITIAS, WHO MAY NOT FEEL PART OF THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT THAT IS EXPECTED TO COME SOON. BUT FOR THEM, HE SAYS, THE NEED TO DEMOBILIZE WILL BE THE SAME:

CLIP 5 (Sulaf Mohammed): "I'm working on demobilization in northern Sudan, not southern Sudan. So in the north we have extra forces, militias. These people, when peace is signed, have to go to normal life. But instead of just asking them to surrender their weapons, we have to give them programs so that they go back to normal living. We talk to them about the peace, that the peace is good for everyone, in the north, in the south, and for our neighbors around the world. So then we help them start their normal life in factories and in farms. So these are the plans we are now discussing. And instead of just discussing them as a government alone, we want to share our experiences with our brothers in the south so that we develop one program for the whole of Sudan. Because people will be going from south to north and from north to south."

AS THE 2 PARTIES CONTINUE THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND ADVANCE TOWARDS A FINAL AGREEMENT, INCLUDING A COMPREHENSIVE CEASEFIRE, EXPECT TO HEAR A LOT MORE ABOUT D-D-R. WHILE NO ONE EXPECTS IT TO BE AN EASY OR FAST PROCESS, CLEARLY A TRANSITION FROM MILITARY TO CIVILIAN LIFE WILL BE A POSITIVE STEP FOR MOST SUDANESE.

THAT'S 'THE ROAD TO PEACE' FOR THIS WEEK. ON BEHALF OF STUDIO TECHNICIAN JAMES KWAJE AND THE REST OF THE ROAD TO PEACE TEAM, THIS IS DAVID AMUOR SAYING SO LONG. YOU ARE LISTENING TO SUDAN RADIO SERVICE.