

# The Africa Liaison Program Initiative II (2003-2006) Evaluation

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## ACRONYMS

<b>ALP</b>	<b>Africa Liaison Program</b>
<b>ALPI</b>	<b>Africa Liaison Program Initiative</b>
<b>CCA/ONG</b>	<b>Conseil de Concertation et d'Appui aux ONGs</b>
<b>CDPP</b>	<b>Committee on Development Policy and Practice, InterAction</b>
<b>CEO</b>	<b>Chief Executive Officer</b>
<b>CONGAD</b>	<b>Conseil des ONGS au Développement</b>
<b>CPDA</b>	<b>Christian Partners Development Agency</b>
<b>CRS</b>	<b>Catholic Relief Services</b>
<b>CTO</b>	<b>Contractor's Technical Officer</b>
<b>FAVDO</b>	<b>Forum of African Voluntary Development Organizations</b>
<b>GAPVOD</b>	<b>Ghanaian Association of PVOs in Development</b>
<b>GDA</b>	<b>USAID Global Development Alliance</b>
<b>IR</b>	<b>Intermediate result</b>
<b>MCA</b>	<b>Millennium Challenge Account</b>
<b>MCC</b>	<b>Millennium Challenge Corporation</b>
<b>NGO</b>	<b>Non-governmental organization</b>
<b>POSDEV</b>	<b>Pan African Organization for Sustainable Development</b>
<b>PVO</b>	<b>Private voluntary organization</b>
<b>SO</b>	<b>Strategic objective</b>
<b>USAID</b>	<b>United States Agency for International Development</b>



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## SUMMARY

The Africa Liaison Program Initiative (ALPI) is a tripartite effort to improve the effectiveness of US assistance to Africa by promoting and supporting strong partnerships among African non-governmental organizations (NGOs), US private voluntary organizations (PVOs), and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) missions — three key stakeholders in the development of Africa. To do so, ALPI has formed country teams in five countries (Ghana, Kenya, Mali, and Senegal, with Rwanda joining in late 2006) comprised of representatives of these stakeholder groups. Through ALPI, the country teams have the opportunity to come together to collaborate in identifying, discussing, and addressing common challenges at policy and program levels.

This report presents the findings of an evaluation of ALPI II, the project funded by USAID for the period from December 2003 to June 2007.

## BACKGROUND

**Strategic Objective.** The strategic objective (SO) of the Africa Liaison Program Initiative II (ALPI II) is to strengthen effective tripartite partnerships among US PVOs, African NGOs, and USAID. The three indicators for this SO are:

1. Partners demonstrate shared ownership of ALPI process.
2. Partners implement “new partnership” guidelines.
3. Partners carry out joint action items.

**Intermediate Results.** For ALPI II, the three intermediate results are:

- IR 1:** Exchanged information to enhance learning and collaboration.
- IR 2:** Consolidate country team model in selected countries.
- IR 3:** Joint action for advocacy on ALPI themes fostered.

**Expectation.** The expectation of ALPI II was to have strengthened tripartite partnerships in five countries so that lessons learned from each experience could be combined into a tripartite country team approach which could be replicated in other countries.

The intention was to create a forum, a *safe space*, in each of the countries to enable national NGOs, US PVOs and USAID to:

1. Discuss common concerns related to their relationships and the environment in which they work.
2. Choose topics to work on together which would improve their ability to achieve more effective development results.

## EVALUATION

In August 2006, InterAction retained the services of an independent consultant to conduct an evaluation of ALPI II. The consultant, Carolyn Long, is a development specialist who worked for ten years at InterAction, directed the first Africa Liaison Program (ALP), and has been an independent development consultant since 1998. Ms. Long began the evaluation at a three-day,

self-evaluation workshop in Accra, Ghana with four of the country teams from Ghana, Kenya, Mali and Senegal, and representatives from Rwanda and InterAction. Ms. Long facilitated this participatory workshop. Subsequently, she continued the evaluation process through interviews and analysis of documents, and submitted a final report in January 2007.

**Purpose.** The evaluation had a two-fold purpose:

1. Assess the extent to which the activities carried out from 2003 to the present have advanced ALPI's strategic objective.
2. Assess the extent to which the ALPI mechanism has proven suitable to addressing tripartite collaboration around the implementation of US assistance to Africa.

**Objectives.** The evaluation's three objectives were to:

1. Assess the extent to which ALPI has achieved its intermediate results (IRs).
2. Highlight lessons learned.
3. Make recommendations about mechanism(s) to further enhance and build on the achievements of the ALPI process.

**Methodology.** The evaluation methodology included a self-evaluation workshop for the four country teams in Accra, Ghana, in September 2006 (facilitated by Ms. Long); in-person interviews in Ghana and Senegal following the workshop; phone interviews with respondents in Mali, Kenya, and Washington, DC; and a review of various ALPI-related documents.

**Framework.** As a framework in which to consider the evaluation's findings, the evaluator briefly examined the existing state of the relationships among USAID missions, PVOs, and NGOs in Sub-Saharan countries. Because of the way each of these stakeholder groups behaves, views its own work, and relates to the other two groups, creating a truly collaborative tripartite partnership among the three stakeholders presents a formidable challenge.

## FINDINGS

### **ALPI II made some, but not complete, progress in achieving the Strategic Objective.**

Based on all evidence reviewed, there are encouraging results in Ghana toward achievement of a strengthened tripartite partnership, but only limited progress in the other three countries. The major reason for Ghana's progress thus far is a sense of ownership of the ALPI process on the part of all stakeholders on the country team. The evaluator found at least nine elements that were key to developing the sense of ownership in Ghana, the most important of which were:

- Commitment and sustained interest by the USAID mission director.
- Sustained leadership by the country team's secretariat.
- Effective facilitation of the country team process.
- Skillful advocacy by NGOs and PVOs vis-à-vis the government.

This sense of ownership, however, does not extend yet to the wider community of NGOs and PVOs. Here, as in the other three countries, stakeholder representatives on the country team have seldom fulfilled their obligation to report back to their constituencies regarding ALPI activities and results and to seek input from the constituencies regarding the initiatives.

When the evaluator asked participants in the self-evaluation workshop and others during interviews to assess the extent to which the strategic objective had been met, nearly two-thirds

responded that there has been moderate progress toward strengthened tripartite partnerships. The most common reasons given as to why they didn't give a higher score were:

- Lack of interest and commitment on the part of US PVOs.
- Lack of capacity of local NGOs and the NGO networks.
- Poor selection of activities on the part of the country team.
- Lack of interest by USAID senior management.
- Lack of clarity as to USAID mission expectations for the process.

Such a large percentage of scores in the medium range indicates that the country teams did not have clear, agreed upon performance indicators since the evaluation revealed significant differences in progress from one country to another. Another reason for Ghana's relatively modest scores may be that respondents took into account the fact that knowledge of ALPI activities and results was limited to active participants (country team members and particular committee members). Therefore, the benefits of ALPI activities, especially in terms of expected change in both organizational attitudes and practices, have been limited.

### **The ALPI II process met participants' expectations to some extent.**

Here again, rankings were largely in the medium range for all four countries. (The mean response for each country fell in the medium range on a scale of 1-10.) Reasons given for these scores include:

- Disappointment at the relatively low level of collaboration in some countries due to lack of interest on the part of USAID missions or PVOs or both.
- Lack of interest in activities chosen by country teams.
- Continued lack of access to USAID direct funding to local NGOs.
- No opportunity for building organizational capacity.

### **Tension among and between groups has decreased, but no clear patterns regarding trust, knowledge, and the balance of power among and between groups emerged.**

During the self-evaluation workshop, the evaluator asked respondents to indicate if mutual trust, knowledge, tension, and balance of power between and among the three stakeholder groups had increased, decreased, or remained the same as had been at the start of ALPI II. The one clear pattern noted in the results — and a very important one — was that all indicated that tension between and among the three groups had decreased. This is an important finding since ALPI's original hypothesis was that the more these groups know about each other's interests and focus, the less animosity there would be among them. Beyond this finding, there were no clear patterns regarding trust, knowledge or balance of power.

### **Tripartite collaboration increased, but not beyond the country teams. The limited capacity of NGO networks hampered achievement of results.**

Findings were reported in regard to the formation of country teams, the performance of the secretariats chosen, action plans and activities carried out. Country teams were formed and have functioned in all four countries, but they vary in terms of their cohesion and effectiveness. As noted earlier, in some of the teams, there has been very limited interest on the part of PVOs and senior levels of USAID missions. While all teams reported different levels of mutual trust and understanding, and effective working relationships have been developed in some of the teams, in no instance have these positive achievements extended to the wider community of NGOs, PVOs and USAID missions. As regards the secretariats, the design of the ALPI II process

assumed that NGO networks in the countries chosen would be strong, well-functioning organizations with appropriate ability to convene the over-all NGO community, facilitate meetings and events and communicate effectively about results. The reality is that the limited capacity of NGO networks in these four countries has hampered the full achievement of results.

The development of the action plans in the four countries and then the negotiation and approval process with InterAction all were accomplished, although the process took several months and did not result, in all instances, in all activities chosen being of equal interest to all three stakeholders. The activities of interest to all three stakeholders have been those where most progress has been made:

- The development of NGO standards in Ghana.
- Work to influence the MCA in Ghana and Senegal.
- Beginning of an effort to coordinate efforts related to food security in Mali.
- An effort to harmonize the tax laws for NGOs and PVOs in Kenya.
- A workshop to promote cooperation between NGOs/PVOs and the private sector in Kenya.

It should be noted, however, that all of these activities are in progress and ultimate results remain to be determined.

### **To date, the three Intermediate Results have been achieved at least partially.**

**IR 1: Exchanged information to enhance learning and collaboration.** InterAction's hope for regular, sustained information exchange among the three stakeholder groups in ALPI countries was partly realized during ALPI II. The work undertaken by the Ghana and Senegal teams on the Millennium Challenge Account, together with significant substantive assistance from InterAction, stands out as a success of ALPI II.<sup>1</sup> This is an example of the kind of collaboration that can advance development interests at both the country level and in Washington, DC. If more work like this had been accomplished, ALPI II would have been a resounding success. Four other specific instances of information sharing include workshops or meetings:

1. In Mali on food security.
2. In Kenya on PVO/NGO/private sector collaboration.
3. The USAID Global Development Alliance in Kenya.
4. The poverty reduction strategy (PRS) in Ghana.

As they organized themselves, all country teams used documents prepared by InterAction regarding experiences of partnership, but the extent to which they were read or used by the wider stakeholder constituencies is unknown. Lastly, a regular InterAction e-newsletter which served as the only routine source of information sharing among the teams was discontinued in mid-2005. In its place, InterAction provided more targeted information in response to specific requests by country teams.

**IR 2: Consolidate country team model in selected countries.** The ALPI II country team "model" was implemented on a pilot basis in all four countries and is the only such mechanism available for systematic consultations among representatives of the three stakeholder groups. Nevertheless, only in Ghana has the country team come close to consolidating itself. Most of the elements of ownership noted in this report need to be present in order for a country team to establish and sustain itself, and launch a successful country-level dialogue. As noted earlier,

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1. In Senegal, CONGAD's work on the MCA has not yet produced concrete results, but the network is directly involved in deliberations and considered an important player by the Government of Senegal and the MCC.

even in Ghana, the stakeholder representatives on the country team still need to create information-sharing mechanisms in order to fulfill their responsibility to feed back regular information on ALPI activities and results to the NGO/PVO and USAID community as a whole and continue to get their input to initiatives underway. This is essential in order for the ALPI process to be a truly successful national dialogue with the potential to lead to greater coordination and collaboration among the three stakeholder groups. In hindsight, because of the amount of time needed to establish these multi-stakeholder initiatives, the ALPI II cooperative agreement should have been a five-year, rather than a three-year, effort.

**IR 3: Joint action for advocacy on ALPI themes fostered.** As far as can be determined from the proposal (modification) submitted to USAID by InterAction, ALPI themes were to be determined by each country team. No over-all themes were to be chosen ahead of time by InterAction that would then be taken up by all the country teams. Whether joint advocacy action was undertaken was dependent on the topics the country teams chose. Given the topics chosen and the actual progress made thus far on each, a limited amount of advocacy work has been undertaken. In Ghana and Senegal, ALPI country teams have worked to influence the development of the MCA compact in their countries. Also in Ghana, ALPI is the framework through which NGOs are involved in the government’s formulation of the NGO law, and several meetings between NGOs and government have taken place. (The NGO standards are being put in place as a self-monitoring accountability mechanism and are an important tool in NGO advocacy efforts vis-à-vis the government.) In the other countries, once initiatives are more developed, advocacy work may be taken up (e.g., food security in Mali and the tax scheme in Kenya).

## Challenges Faced During the ALPI II Process

Reasons why the countries had limited results include:

- Limitations of the ALPI II **design**.
- **Delays** at different points in the process.
- Limited **organizational commitment**.
- **Weak communication** within and among countries.
- **Limited funding** levels for the country teams.

**Design.** The two major limitations in the ALPI II design were:

1. The **lack of a coherent vision and clear goals** which linked InterAction to the country activities in terms of what InterAction, together with the country teams, wanted to accomplish.

In other words, there was no “glue” bringing the four country team efforts together with InterAction work to achieve major programmatic or advocacy results on particular development topics. While a detailed multi-stakeholder process was to be created and carried out, the purpose for this process was vague — to develop greater collaboration among the stakeholders. There was no incentive for, or commitment by InterAction to serve as a leader in this initiative by promoting active participation of its members. ALPI was never seen by InterAction leadership as a strategic opportunity. Nor was there any indication of whether and how the four countries might work together on topics of common concern other than to share lessons learned.

While it was expected that InterAction would be the catalyst to launch the country processes, ALPI’s benefit to InterAction and its members at headquarters level was absent. Had there been some indication as to how greater collaboration at the country level on specific important advocacy objectives could have been linked with InterAction and its members’ advocacy efforts in the US, this may have served as the incentive to engage the leadership

of InterAction together with its members at headquarters level. As it was, InterAction leadership (in both ALPI I and II) took no interest in this work and did nothing to urge its members to encourage their field offices to participate. ALPI staffers were never able to develop an effective strategy to persuade their organization's leadership of the potential benefit to InterAction.

2. The **faulty assumption about African NGO network capacity** to perform the role of secretariat. The decision by InterAction to have an African NGO or network in the four countries designated as the secretariat without first carefully assessing their capacity was a significant mistake and caused serious problems in the ALPI process in all four countries.

**Delays.** There were several significant delays during the ALPI II process, which means that expected results have not been achieved thus far in the initiative. Changes in ALPI personnel at InterAction, problems with the secretariats chosen in all four countries, delays in developing action plans, having them approved, and getting money out to the countries caused the work in all four countries to move slowly.

**Organizational Commitment.** Particularly as regards PVOs and USAID missions, there appears to have been limited organizational commitment in many cases. As for the PVOs, this was largely due to a lack of interest in the topics chosen by the country team, *even though* these PVO representatives had participated in the choice. Regarding USAID missions, except for Ghana, there was never a strong commitment made to the process by the mission directors.

**Weak Communication.** Other than e-mail communication among country team members, regular, systematic communication from the secretariats in the four countries to their full NGO/PVO communities was extremely poor, and in some cases, non-existent. Therefore, only the country teams, themselves, were well informed about ALPI activities. For its part, InterAction prepared a monthly e-newsletter for all country teams and others interested in ALPI but stopped doing this in September 2005 in favor of more targeted information sharing in response to country team requests. This meant there was no ALPI-wide regular communication to keep people informed and motivated. Each country team did have a representative on the ALPI advisory committee that met twice a year. There, these representatives made presentations about their teams' progress and challenges, which were then discussed by the full committee.

**Limited Funding.** Many interview respondents from all four countries indicated that the financial resources available from InterAction were not sufficient to carry out the activities they had planned. These "incentive funds" had been intended as a catalyst to the launch of activities country teams viewed as particularly important. InterAction hoped that the missions and local NGO/PVO communities in the countries could identify other money to supplement these funds. Other than in-kind contributions of time and resources by NGOs, PVOs and missions, and the underwriting of the private sector collaboration workshop in Kenya by the Cooperative Bank, no funds have been raised for ALPI activities.

## Role of InterAction in ALPI II

The expectation was that InterAction would be a catalyst in launching the ALPI II initiative in the particular countries and would continue to provide information and networking assistance, but that the country teams would play the major role in managing their own ALPI work. In addition, because InterAction held the cooperative agreement with USAID, it was responsible for monitoring progress toward achievement of the strategic objective. In reality, because of difficulties already discussed regarding the role of the secretariats in three of the four countries and the lack of any mentoring arrangements for these secretariats, InterAction ALPI staff ended up playing a bigger role in providing technical assistance, guidance and oversight of ALPI activities in the countries. As noted earlier, InterAction played an important role in providing information to, and linking country teams with, key representatives of the MCA, staffs of

the US Congress and US PVOs — with regard to the MCA and the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and USAID (in regard to the GDA in Kenya), both in Washington and at country levels.

For the most part, interview respondents valued InterAction’s role in bringing the ALPI II process to the country level and launching it, providing guidance on the development of action plans, feedback on the over-all process, financial assistance (although all country teams felt it was not sufficient, as noted earlier), and information and networking assistance on key initiatives. Interview respondents were very critical of InterAction’s failure to persuade headquarters staff of PVOs to encourage and support participation of their field staff in ALPI activities.

## LESSONS LEARNED

- ❶ Creating an ALPI-type initiative in the midst of long-established hierarchical relationships of USAID missions, PVO field offices and NGOs is important but very difficult and must include strong enough incentives for each of the stakeholders to commit their time and resources.
- ❷ A well-functioning NGO network is the ideal organization to be the secretariat for an ALPI-type initiative.
- ❸ Effective facilitation and negotiation skills are essential in guiding the discussions and the decision-making process concerning shared goals and priorities in an initiative such as ALPI that involves a variety of stakeholders with diverse interests.
- ❹ An NGO sector initiative such as the ALPI II process requires significant time for information sharing, organization, mobilization, and advocacy efforts to be carried out. The ALPI II cooperative agreement should have had a five-year rather than a three-year duration.
- ❺ Fully utilizing the ALPI framework — by linking InterAction and its outreach, access to policy makers and expertise with country-level advocacy efforts on a common topic such as the MCA — produced important results for Ghana and Senegal and should have done so for other important development topics.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

There are two sets of recommendations. During the self-evaluation workshop held in Ghana in September 2006, participants proposed a set of **short-term recommendations** — listed in priority order — to be implemented in the remaining six months of the USAID-funded ALPI II program.<sup>2</sup> The evaluator has proposed a second set of long-term recommendations for any future ALPI-type activity.

### Short-Term Recommendations

- ❶ It is imperative to clearly define the complementary roles and responsibilities of the three stakeholder groups in Africa’s development.
- ❷ InterAction needs to be more pro-active in encouraging USAID/Washington and the headquarters leadership of PVOs to catalyze the interest of their field offices in ALPI countries.
- ❸ Country team members should work harder to deepen relationships at the country level.
- ❹ ALPI objectives require longer-term activities, beyond three years of implementation.

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2. The report of the workshop, prepared by InterAction, provides additional context for these recommendations.

- 5 InterAction should provide more visibility to ALPI at its annual forum, i.e., the opportunity for a plenary session presentation on African development by ALPI participants.
- 6 Country teams should develop activities that incorporate the interests of all three of the primary stakeholder groups.

### Long-Term Recommendations

- 1 InterAction needs to re-design the ALPI initiative in such a way that it links directly to the new goals adopted through the coalition's recent strategic plan and to key initiatives that InterAction is undertaking.
- 2 InterAction should use its credibility and power to lobby governmental and private donors and PVOs to commit ample resources to strengthen local capacity in African countries, beginning with the national NGO networks.
- 3 Prior to designing a new ALPI initiative, InterAction should conduct an open-ended discussion with African NGOs, PVOs and USAID missions in the four ALPI countries to learn what the highest priorities of each are, discuss what InterAction's highest priorities are, and how the country teams might be willing to agree on a common objective on which they could work together with InterAction to achieve.

## CONCLUSION

Although all stakeholder groups involved in this endeavor agreed on the need for a forum such as ALPI and noted its value in interviews, one has to question the true desire for it, given the results of this evaluation. It seems that all three of the stakeholders have higher priorities than to create and sustain such a forum. Having said that, we have seen encouraging signs in Ghana regarding the willingness of all stakeholders to commit themselves to work together on a jointly-negotiated set of activities. Had the key elements of ownership been present in the other three countries, it is possible that more impressive results may have been achieved. What remains a problem is that InterAction, although it has hosted this program for many years, has never defined for itself the value of this initiative to its own work. This has been a lost opportunity and should be corrected in any future ALPI-type process which InterAction decides to pursue. InterAction's own primary goals for its membership must be incorporated into such a process — both for the good of the membership and for the larger development work in which we are all involved.

# I. INTRODUCTION

The strategic objective (SO) of the Africa Liaison Program Initiative II (ALPI II) is to strengthen effective tripartite partnerships among US PVOs, African NGOs, and USAID. The three indicators for this SO are:

**Indicator 1:** Partners demonstrate shared ownership of ALPI process.

**Indicator 2:** Partners implement “new partnership” guidelines.

**Indicator 3:** Partners carry out joint action items.

The three Intermediate Results are:

**IR 1:** Exchanged information to enhance learning and collaboration (knowledge management).

**IR 2:** Consolidate country team model in selected countries.

**IR 3:** Joint action for advocacy on ALPI themes fostered.

The expectation of ALPI II was to have strengthened tripartite partnerships in five countries so that what was learned from each of these experiences could be combined into a tripartite country team approach which could be replicated in other countries.

ALPI II is the third iteration of a USAID-funded project to InterAction that began in 1990. The first phase was known as the Africa Liaison Program (ALP) that served, primarily, as a way for USAID’s Africa Bureau to inform, engage in dialogue with, and get input from US PVOs’ headquarters concerning proposed strategies and programs to be undertaken by the Bureau. ALP also provided funding each year to enable a delegation of African NGO network leaders to attend InterAction’s Annual Forum and an additional Washington Week. The Washington Week served as an orientation to different important donor agencies based in Washington, DC, to the US Congress, and to US organizations involved in social justice work in the US. The NGO network leaders attended meetings with USAID and the World Bank, with staff of US congressional representatives and/or senators, and visited the headquarters of US domestic social justice organizations. A different group of leaders came each year.

As a result of an evaluation of ALP in 1999, the project was re-funded with a broader purpose and a slightly different name, the Africa Liaison Program Initiative (ALPI I). This project ran from 1999 to 2003. This initiative’s strategic objective was “more effective collaboration and partnership among US PVOs, African NGOs and USAID leads to sustainable development in Africa.”<sup>1</sup> Its three Intermediate Results were:

**IR 1:** A regular dialogue among and between our member organizations, African NGOs, and USAID involved in African development around development issues.

**IR 2:** Best practices and organizational learning developed by our member organizations, African NGOs and USAID documented and disseminated on a regular basis.

**IR 3:** The strengthening of the relationships of these actors at the country, sub-regional, and regional levels, and the empowerment of African NGO networks and consortia to effectively represent the perspectives of the rural and urban poor in development policy-making processes.<sup>2</sup>

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1. Committee on Development Policy and Practice, InterAction. (September 17, 1999) “Africa Liaison Program Initiative, October 1999—October 2002, Proposal to USAID”, p. 5.

2. Ibid, p. 5.

ALPI carried out a series of regional and sub-regional conferences in Africa for African NGOs, field staff of US PVOs and USAID missions on topics of major significance to all three stakeholder groups.<sup>3</sup> A delegation of NGO leaders continued to participate in InterAction's Annual Forum and Washington Week, although under ALPI the delegation was not restricted to NGO *network* leaders and rather than bringing in a completely different group of leaders each year, some of the same NGO leaders came each year. (InterAction had created an Advisory Committee to oversee the initiative, and some of the African NGO leaders coming to the Forum and Washington Week were members of this Committee that met during this time.) Both InterAction and participating organizations prepared a variety of documentation (abstracts on issues circulated before sub-regional conferences, reports of sub-regional conferences, case studies by participating organizations about their own experiences and lessons learned, and a mapping exercise of development relationships in Senegal and Uganda, which was used at the 2002 sub-regional conference).

The evaluation of ALPI I indicated that the initiative had been "very successful in improving knowledge and mutual understanding among the three stakeholder groups."<sup>4</sup> There was less agreement that development relationships were strengthened as a result of the improved understanding although participants indicated that many of the qualities desired in effective development relationships had been experienced within the ALPI events (such as greater voice for African NGOs and a sense of mutual trust). There was least agreement that either equity among the partners or influence of African NGOs had increased — except with US partners, which is, in itself, significant. What is noteworthy is that the "highest levels of average tripartite satisfaction have been with the documentation and dissemination of best practices and organizational learning."<sup>5</sup> This finding shows the importance of tangible products in a project with such a heavy emphasis on process and discussion.

While the evaluation clearly affirmed the need for a forum in which US PVOs, African NGOs and USAID can come together to engage with one another on topics of vital importance, it also noted the participants' recommendation to continue ALPI at the national level in order "to increase ownership by local actors and its impact at the country level."<sup>6</sup> The evaluation, together with additional consultations with ALPI constituencies, recommended that ALPI II be designed to foster development of tripartite country teams in fewer countries with the expectation of more concrete outcomes than under ALPI I. The evaluation also endorsed InterAction's continued role as facilitator and manager of the overall initiative. In carrying out ALPI II, InterAction decided to identify an African NGO or network member of each country team to serve as the secretariat for the initiative to manage and facilitate the activities undertaken. In doing this, InterAction hoped to "not only foster ownership by the African NGOs but increase their sphere of influence within the country tripartite team."<sup>7</sup> At the time of the evaluation of ALPI II, September–December, four country teams were functioning in Ghana, Kenya, Mali and Senegal with a fifth team having just been created in Rwanda.

To fully place ALPI II in its proper historical context, it should be noted that InterAction carried out an "Africa Partnership Project" between September, 1988 and September, 1990 through which InterAction member PVOs and African NGOs came together in three consultations in Africa and the US to explore and foster development partnerships between African NGOs and US PVOs. This was at a time when Africans, themselves, were beginning to create NGOs in large numbers, and the concept of partnership between "Northern" (industrialized country) NGOs or PVOs and Southern" (developing country) NGOs was new and not well understood. At the

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3. These topics were: relationships and capacity strengthening, mutual accountability and relational governance.

4. Ashman, D. (January 27, 2003). "Africa Liaison Program Initiative (ALPI) 1999-2002. Final Evaluation Report", p. 11.

5. *Ibid*, p. 16.

6. Committee on Development Policy and Practice, InterAction (September 9, 2003). Africa Liaison Program Initiative (ALPI) Modification Proposal to USAID/AFR, p. 3.

7. *Ibid*, p. 3.

founding meeting of the Forum of African Voluntary Development Organizations (FAVDO)<sup>8</sup> in 1987 in Dakar, Senegal, Peter J. Davies, InterAction’s President and CEO at the time, committed the coalition to “greater North-South dialogue and exchange.”<sup>9</sup> Subsequently, InterAction succeeded in getting a grant from United Support of Artists for Africa (USA for Africa) for the Africa Partnership Program, which had three objectives: “building trust among African and U.S. leadership, program collaboration at the field level, and changing the image of the way Africa is portrayed.”<sup>10</sup> The results of this project were captured in a book written jointly by the African and US participants and published in both French and English by InterAction. Subsequently, InterAction continued to promote development of partnerships between its members and national NGOs in developing countries. Of all who participated in this early effort at partnership development, Kevin Lowther, Southern Africa Regional Director of Africare, is the only person – from either a US PVO or an African NGO — who has continued his involvement throughout all three phases of ALP, ALPI I and II.

## II. METHODOLOGY

The Scope of Work for this evaluation states the purpose as two-fold:

1. Assess the extent to which the activities carried out from 2003 to the present have advanced ALPI’s strategic objective.
2. Assess the extent to which the ALPI mechanism has proven suitable to addressing tripartite collaboration around the implementation of US assistance to Africa.

The evaluation’s objectives are to:

1. Assess the extent to which ALPI has achieved its intermediate results (IRs).
2. Highlight lessons learned.
3. Make recommendations about mechanism(s) to further enhance and build on the achievements of the ALPI process.

InterAction selected Carolyn Long as the evaluator. She worked ten years at InterAction, directed the Africa Liaison Program, and has been an independent consultant since 1998. ALPI I began a year after she left InterAction. A first step in this evaluation was a three-day, self-evaluation workshop in Accra, Ghana for the four country teams from Ghana, Kenya, Mali and Senegal, representatives of the new Rwanda country team, and four representatives of InterAction. Ms. Long was the facilitator of the participatory workshop. The workshop took place during three mornings, with the afternoons devoted to panel discussions on topics of significant interest to the country teams: roles and development of NGO networks, relationships with the private sector, and NGO/PVO involvement in the development of the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). A separate report of this workshop is available from InterAction.

In addition to this workshop, the evaluator held in-person interviews with members of the Ghana country team while in Accra, and subsequently traveled to Dakar to interview members of the Senegal country team and others associated with ALPI II. Interviews with members of the country teams and others associated with ALPI activities in Mali and Kenya were done by phone. The evaluator also interviewed individuals associated with ALPI II from USAID/ Washington, headquarters staff of US PVO members of InterAction, and InterAction, itself. She

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8. FAVDO was the first Pan-African network created by and for African NGOs.

9. Ingersoll, P and J. (1992). *Toward Partnership in Africa. Leadership, Development Education, Field Programs/Vers le Partenariat en Afrique. Conduite, Education pour le developpement , implementation*. New York: InterAction, p. 10.

10. Ibid, p. 10.

also reviewed a variety of ALPI documents and historical documents. All of this information has been reviewed and analyzed to prepare this evaluation report.

### III. INITIAL EXPECTATIONS OF ALPI II

According to InterAction's cooperative agreement with USAID, the intention of ALPI II was to create a forum, a *safe space*, in each of the four countries which would enable national NGOs, US PVOs and USAID to discuss common concerns related to the relationships among these three stakeholders, the environment in which they work, and to choose topics to work on together which would improve their ability to achieve more effective development results. Although issues of common concern had been discussed in ALPI I, the forum was at a sub-regional level; and while follow up had been expected at the country level, most often it did not occur. This led some of those interviewed in this evaluation to refer to ALPI I as a "talk shop."

The ALPI II forum was to be created through country teams comprised of members drawn from all three stakeholder groups. Having the involvement of the particular USAID mission and PVO representatives was particularly important since in the previous phase of ALPI, their participation often had been poor. The hope for the country team was that it would become a space where each stakeholder group could bring forward the issues it most wanted to discuss to advance its own program agenda and then negotiate with the other two stakeholders which two or three issues served that purpose most effectively for all three of the actors. The country team and the over-all ALPI country process was to be managed and coordinated by a secretariat that would be an African organization, anticipated to be the national NGO network in each country. InterAction's role was to be that of a catalyst to launch the process and then a facilitator providing advice and key information as needed and available from Washington, DC. InterAction was also to provide modest incentive funds to enable each country team to carry out an action plan which it would develop and which would be approved by InterAction. The goal for each action plan was to include activities in which all three stakeholders had a vested interest in order to provide an incentive to participate and to develop ownership of the work carried out.

In both the self-evaluation workshop held in Accra as well as in subsequent interviews, participants in the country teams and other respondents were asked what their expectations had been at the beginning of the ALPI II process. Among the most common expectations were:

- Increased trust among members of the tripartite partnership.
- Increased understanding of each other's perspectives and policy stances.
- More cooperation and collaboration among the three stakeholder groups.
- Enhancement of each other's capacities.
- Improved and equitable partnerships between PVOs and NGOs.
- Improved and equitable tripartite partnership.
- Improved access of local NGOs to direct funding by USAID.
- Joint advocacy regarding development policies and programs.

### IV. RELATIONSHIPS AMONG STAKEHOLDERS

Any examination of findings in this evaluation of ALPI II must take into consideration the existing state of the relationships among USAID missions, PVOs, and NGOs in Sub-Saharan African countries. Given the way each of these stakeholder groups behaves and views its own work, it

is questionable whether each has sufficient interest to create a truly collaborative tripartite partnership with the other two. These comments are based on interviews done for this evaluation as well as 25 years of observation and analysis of the roles and inter-relationships of USAID missions, PVOs and NGOs in Sub-Saharan African countries by the evaluator.

## A. USAID MISSIONS

Where USAID missions work with civil society organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa, they work mainly with PVOs. There is a limited amount of USAID mission money that goes to local NGOs; and, in such cases, these tend to be well-established and strong development NGOs or democracy and governance organizations created by highly experienced individuals with former careers in either government or as international civil servants and whose organizations have significant capacity. Some missions began funding efforts in the 1980s and 1990s to strengthen the capacity of local development NGOs. In recent years available funding for such capacity strengthening work for local NGOs has been somewhat more limited, channeled primarily through US PVOs and more rigorously results-oriented, but not always effectively carried out or monitored sufficiently. In general, capacity building efforts have focused on financial accountability and technical aspects of NGO work and seldom on over-all organizational development. At the same time, over the past several years, missions have begun to fund larger and larger projects because of more limited staffing levels at missions as well as in the headquarters in Washington. Even strong PVOs often have been obliged to join forces with other organizations to be able to qualify for funding through large contracts or cooperative agreements. Increasingly, USAID mission staff levels are smaller. Therefore, individual staff members have more and more work to do to carry out their assigned duties of oversight of program design, awards and implementation, and considerably less time to devote to perhaps desirable but lower priority issues such as improved consultation with civil society or efforts to collaborate more effectively with either PVOs or local NGOs. As for information sharing, in French-speaking countries, USAID documents are available only in English, even those focused specifically on NGO-related activities.

*"I have seldom met USAID folks in the field who are enthusiastic about African NGOs. There's a lot of talk about building capacity but no action."*

Interview with US PVO representative

*"When USAID started to put an emphasis on results, that's when there began to be a lack of interest in capacity building and organization development of NGOs... local capacity."*

Interview with African NGO representative

## B. PVOS

Many, perhaps most, of the PVOs with operations in these four countries already receive USAID funding and have the skills and knowledge necessary to prepare successful proposals to USAID missions. In general, they have little to no interest in assisting local NGOs to gain direct access to USAID funds. Only a very few in the whole universe of PVOs have, as a major objective, the strengthening of local NGO capacity. While some PVOs now have "partnerships" with local NGOs, these arrangements are, for the most part, not true partnerships according to the definition in the InterAction partnership assessment tool (i.e., equitable arrangements where power is balanced between the two organizations). They are, in reality, subgrants or subcontracts through which the NGOs implement projects designed and funded by the particular PVO. Normally, these agreements have limited or no funding designated for capacity building purposes, nor do they have administrative or overhead funds for the local NGO to use to strengthen itself as an organization. The NGOs serve as implementers or "labor" for the PVO. Normally, the

NGOs have had no involvement in the design of the particular project. Even when the US PVO has the desire to involve the NGO in the design phase, that desire is usually thwarted by the limited time given by USAID to respond to requests for applications or requests for proposals. Many PVOs say they would like to work with local NGOs but are critical of the limited capacity of most. While PVOs often talk of their desire to see greater local capacity, most are busy preparing proposals and carrying out programs and don't have time or resources or encouragement from their headquarters to work to strengthen local NGO or CSO capacity. Even though many PVOs belong to national NGO networks in African countries, there is very limited collaboration between PVOs and NGOs on important development topics.

*"PVOs are seen as gatekeepers – keeping local NGOs away from USAID."*

Interview with USAID representative

### C. NGOS

All but a small number of local NGOs in any Sub-Saharan African country have limited capacity to carry out development programs. Many have a strong director and perhaps a strong deputy but beyond that, capacity dwindles quickly. Many NGOs are run in a hierarchical manner, and staffers lower than the director or deputy director are not encouraged to make decisions or to take initiative to solve problems. Many NGOs are struggling to find enough money to survive as organizations. While local NGOs work with PVOs as subgrantees or subcontractors, it is fair to say that their preference is to have direct funding from USAID and to work independently of PVOs. In Francophone countries, many NGOs think the problem of accessing USAID funds is primarily a matter of language, but this is not the case. In both Anglophone and Francophone countries, many are reluctant to acknowledge their need to strengthen their capacity and to take the time and make the effort to examine the ways in which they need to improve their operations, their organizations and their accountability mechanisms in order to be eligible for funding from USAID or other major donors.

*"Local NGOs want something concrete like certification with USAID. It's a much easier solution than being self-reflective, which is not an easy task."*

Interview with US PVO representative

## V. FINDINGS

The following sections discuss the extent to which:

- ALPI II has achieved its strategic objective.
- Members of country teams think their expectations have been met.
- Members of country teams think that mutual trust, mutual understanding, balance of power and tension have either increased, decreased or remained the same.
- The ALPI mechanism (creation of country teams, selection of a secretariat, preparation of action plans, and activities undertaken) has been carried out and the extent to which it is suitable to addressing tripartite collaboration regarding US assistance to Africa.
- The three intermediate results have been achieved.

### A. ACHIEVING THE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE

Based on all evidence reviewed, there are encouraging results in Ghana toward achievement of a strengthened tripartite partnership but only limited progress in the other three countries

(See Table 1, p. 9). The major reason for Ghana’s progress thus far is a sense of ownership of the ALPI process on the part of all three stakeholders on the country team.

The modification InterAction submitted to USAID stated that the three stakeholder groups would need to feel ownership of the ALPI II process in order for it to be successful. The expectation was that the expansion of the roles of Africa-based stakeholders in the ALPI process would increase feelings of ownership, strengthen the capacity of the three stakeholders to hold self-sustaining dialogue, and “institutionalize a culture of shared learning and achievement that will, ultimately, result in increased effectiveness.”<sup>11</sup>

The only country where it can be said that a sense of ownership exists on the part of all three stakeholders on the country team is Ghana. There were numerous elements that have been key in developing this sense of ownership. In the other countries some, or even many, of these were not present. These key elements were:

- Intensive discussion by the USAID/Washington CTO for ALPI II with the USAID mission director regarding the importance of the ALPI II process.
- Commitment and sustained interest on the part of the USAID mission director.
- Specific assignment by the mission director of a senior USAID mission staff person to the country team.
- Sustained leadership by the Ghana country team secretariat in moving the process forward.
- Effective facilitation of the country team process of choosing key topics for focus resulted in a choice of topics in which all three stakeholders had a vested interest, i.e., an incentive to participate in the ALPI II process (development of a set of standards — an NGO code of conduct — and work to influence the MCA in Ghana).
- Financial and substantive support from InterAction regarding the topics the Ghana country team was working on (Standards and MCA).
- Choice of an effective committee to develop the Standards.
- Skillful advocacy by the community of NGOs in Ghana (both NGOs and PVOs) vis-à-vis the Government of Ghana and the MCC in order to achieve results.
- Excellent nomination by the Ghanaian NGO community of an individual to represent them on the MCC board who was selected by the MCC and is currently serving.

Even in Ghana, where this sense of ownership is present in the country team, it does not extend yet to the wider community of NGOs and PVOs. Here, as in the other three countries, stakeholder representatives on the country team have seldom fulfilled their obligation to report back to their constituencies regarding ALPI activities and results and to seek input from the constituencies regarding the initiatives. As a consequence, knowledge of ALPI activities and a sense of engagement in them are very limited among PVOs and NGOs and, to a lesser extent, USAID missions.

In the self-evaluation workshop held in Accra for the four country teams, and in subsequent interviews, participants were asked to assess the extent to which the strategic objective of strengthened effective tripartite partnerships had been met in their own country (on a scale of “1” to “10,” with “1” being “not at all” and “10” being “completely”).

Of the total of 33 respondents,<sup>12</sup> the scores were the following: nearly two-thirds of all respondents believe that there has been moderate progress toward strengthened tripartite partnerships. Some of the most common reasons given by respondents as to why they did not give a higher score were:

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11. Op cit, p. 5.

12. Of all people interviewed, only those with direct experience in a particular country were asked this question.

- Lack of interest and commitment on the part of US PVOs.
- Lack of capacity of local NGOs and the NGO networks.
- Poor selection of activities on the part of the country team.
- Lack of interest by USAID senior management.
- Lack of clarity as to USAID mission expectations for the process.

Scores in the low range reflect experiences from two countries, and scores in the high range reflect experiences from all four countries. The fact that the majority of these scores are in the medium range indicates that the country teams did not have clear, agreed upon performance indicators since the evidence reviewed by the evaluator and the interviews conducted reveal significant differences in progress from one country to another. For example, members of the Ghana country team scored their work within the same medium range as other lower performing country teams. Another reason for Ghana's scores may be that respondents took into account that knowledge of ALPI activities and results was limited to active participants (country team members and particular committee members). Therefore, benefits of ALPI activities, especially in terms of expected change in both organizational attitudes and practices, have been limited.

A small number of those interviewed who had a perspective on the whole ALPI II initiative were asked to assess the extent to which the strategic objective had been met in terms of the over-all project. Of those, all gave scores in the medium range.

In analyzing the over-all accomplishments of ALPI II at this time, the scores in the medium range seem to be most in line with the evaluator's findings.

## B. COUNTRY TEAMS' EXPECTATIONS

As part of the evaluation, members of all four country teams were asked to indicate to what extent their expectations had been met. (A few members of country teams indicated they had no expectations or were uncertain of what they were; therefore, they are not included in this sample.) Respondents were asked to give a ranking on a scale of "1 to 10," with "1" being "not at all" and "10" being "completely." These responses include opinions of sixteen NGOs, seven PVOs, and only one response from a USAID mission representative (See Table 2, p. 9). Results for each country are as follows:

Reasons for these scores include:

- Disappointment at the relatively low level of collaboration in some countries due to lack of interest of USAID missions or PVOs or both.
- Lack of interest in activities chosen by country teams.
- Continued lack of access to USAID direct funding to local NGOs.
- No opportunity for building organizational capacity.

These results indicate that the extent to which most country team members in Ghana and Mali thought their expectations were met were the same even though greater results have been accomplished in Ghana than in Mali. In no country is the level of expectations met in the highest range ("7" to "10") on the scale of "1" to "10." Kenya has the lowest level of expectations met but this country team suffered the greatest delays in getting started because of the need to change the secretariat twice before being able to develop an action plan. If one examines the range of responses, even in Ghana, there was at least one ranking at the level of "4" (at the bottom of the "medium" range) and one ranking at the level of "10" or the very top of the high range. The spread among the countries indicates quite a variance in views regarding the extent to which expectations were met. These scores are similar to the responses of the country teams regarding the extent to which the strategic objective has been met in each country and

**Table 1: Extent to Which Strategic Objective Was Met**

Extent SO Was Met	No. of Respondents	Percentage of Respondents
Met little or not at all	3	9%
Met moderately	21	64%
Met highly or completely	9	27%

point as well to a lack of clear performance indicators and measures of success — and lack of information about ALPI results in the wider PVO/NGO community.

### C. MUTUAL TRUST, KNOWLEDGE, BALANCE OF POWER, & TENSION

In the self-evaluation workshop in Ghana, members of all four country teams were asked to indicate if mutual knowledge, mutual trust, tension, and balance of power between and among the three stakeholder groups in their particular country had increased, decreased, or remained the same — compared with the start of the ALPI II initiative. The choice of “more” was a “3”; the “same” was a “2”; and “less” was a “1.” Of the total of 20 respondents, 15 were NGO representatives, 4 were PVO representatives, and 1 was a USAID mission representative. Each respondent was asked to indicate his or her individual perspective as to whether there was more, less or the same of each of the four categories and to give a score for each of the stakeholders vis-à-vis the other two. In other words, did the respondent think that NGOs had more mutual trust between themselves and PVOs and USAID; did PVOs have more mutual trust between themselves and NGOs and USAID; and did USAID have more mutual trust between themselves and NGOs and PVOs? Because these instructions were ambiguous and therefore open to interpretation, the evaluator has a low level of confidence in the results. Nevertheless, they do give a rough indication of what the respondents felt was the current state of affairs regarding these four important attitudes (See Tables 3A, 3B, 3C, and 3D, p. 12)

The one clear pattern in these results — and a very important one — is the decrease in tension, whether perceived or real, between and among stakeholder groups. This is an important finding since ALPI’s goal is to promote more collaboration among these parties. In fact, ALPI’s original hypothesis was that the more these groups know about each other’s interests and focus, the less animosity there would be among them. This is the second rationale for Intermediate Result No. 1, information exchange. Beyond this finding, there are no clear patterns regarding trust, knowledge or balance of power. Respondents from Ghana, Kenya and Senegal all thought that NGOs had more mutual trust and mutual knowledge between themselves and PVOs and USAID, but Mali respondents felt the level of NGOs’ mutual trust and mutual knowledge vis-à-vis the other stakeholders had not increased. Kenyans felt that the balance of power between NGOs and USAID had improved. Once again, as in earlier responses to questions posed to the country teams, the results reveal a lack of clear performance indicators and a lack of planning and strategy development to achieve outcomes. This set of data and the earlier

**Table 2: Extent to Which Country Teams’ Expectations Have Been Met**

Country Team	Mean (Average)	Range of Responses	Median (Half-Way Point)
Ghana (9 respondents)	6.4	7 (4-10)	6
Kenya (7 respondents)	4.7	5 (3-7)	4
Mali (5 respondents)	6.4	4 (5-8)	6
Senegal (3 respondents)	5.6	4 (4-7)	6

data reported provide little insight into how tripartite country teams are created successfully and how they might be replicated in other countries (a goal of the Intermediate Result No. 2 of this ALPI II initiative).

## D. SUITABILITY FOR ADDRESSING TRIPARTITE COLLABORATION

### 1. Country teams formed

Country teams were formed and have functioned in all four countries, but they vary in terms of their cohesion and effectiveness. As noted earlier, in some of the teams, there has been very limited interest on the part of PVOs and senior levels of USAID missions. While all teams reported different levels of mutual trust and understanding, and effective working relationships have been developed in some teams, in no instance have these positive achievements extended to the wider community of NGOs, PVOs and USAID missions, as had been the hope of the overall ALPI II process.

In all four countries, ALPI country teams were formed and have met on a regular basis (usually once a month). In some countries, these meetings have been held on a rotating basis at each of the stakeholder's offices to encourage ownership and to expose the stakeholders to each other's office environment. These meetings have enabled the particular representatives of the three stakeholder groups to get to know each other better and to understand each other's operations more fully — a microcosm of what was hoped for in the wider community of NGOs, PVOs and USAID. In certain of the countries, respondents indicated that the meetings had resulted in a trusting relationship being developed among the members of the country team.

For some of the African NGO representatives involved, the country team meetings enabled them to enter the USAID building for the very first time, something they considered a real achievement. In two countries, US PVO representatives expressed the concern that team meetings took a lot of time and did not accomplish much. In some instances, the PVOs were not interested in the activities chosen (e.g. direct access to USAID funding by national NGOs) — even though they agreed to their selection. Therefore, their interest in the ALPI process was never optimal and has waned over time, resulting in very limited commitment to the initiative. In some instances, the US PVO representatives have gone off the country team or the particular PVO representative has handed over responsibility to a more junior colleague.

As for USAID, in Ghana, as noted earlier, there has been a strong and continuing commitment to the ALPI II process on the part of the mission director. In the other three countries, while there has been more or less continuous involvement by USAID mission representatives in the country team — and even some interest expressed by the mission director in at least one country — USAID involvement has been less enthusiastic than in Ghana. In the other countries, in the span of eight months from April to November, all the principal USAID mission representatives involved in the ALPI process have left their missions. In one country, a new staff person has been assigned to the ALPI process but in the other two, it is not yet clear whether a new person will be designated for ALPI. Therefore, it remains to be seen whether there will be regular USAID representation in the future in these two countries, particularly given the current turmoil in USAID regarding its future, budgets and staffing levels, following the absorption of USAID into the State Department and the resultant changes in program emphasis.<sup>13</sup>

### 2. Country team secretariats chosen

The design of the ALPI II process assumed that NGO networks in the countries chosen would be strong, well-functioning organizations with appropriate ability to convene the over-all NGO

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13. Internal discussions were continuing at USAID during the time of this evaluation and it was unclear what final decisions would be taken regarding these issues.

community, facilitate meetings and events and communicate effectively about results. The reality is that the limited capacity of NGO networks in these four countries has hampered the full achievement of results.

In three of the four countries, the NGO network was the organization initially chosen — or chosen very early in the process — to be the secretariat.<sup>14</sup> This was done because these networks were already set up to be convening mechanisms for the NGO community (national and international). InterAction's expectation was that they would have current databases of their members, communication channels set up to reach their members, visibility as the place to go to in order to gather the NGO community, and where community-wide positions or principles should be developed.<sup>15</sup> In the fourth country, Ghana, a Pan African network (POSDEV) whose headquarters are in Ghana was chosen as the secretariat because GAPVOD, the national network, was not functioning properly. As it turned out, in the other three countries, the networks had various problems that hindered their performance as the secretariat to varying degrees. In Kenya, the NGO Council, which had been chosen as the secretariat, soon had leadership and governance problems and had to hand over the job to another organization, Christian Partners Development Agency (CPDA). In Mali and Senegal, leadership changes occurred in CCA/ONG and CONGAD. These changes, together with limitations in capacity, affected the smooth functioning of the ALPI II process.

### 3. Action plans developed and approved

The development of the action plans in the four countries and then the negotiation and approval process with InterAction were accomplished, although the process took several months and did not result, in all instances, in all activities chosen being of equal interest to all three stakeholders.

In all four countries, at least one topic — and in two cases, more than one — were of common interest to all three stakeholders (the standards project and the MCA in Ghana, the MCA in Senegal, food security in Mali, and taxation and public-private sector collaboration in Kenya). However, the level of enthusiasm about these topics varied within country teams, and active involvement in them was extremely limited in two of the four countries.

### 4. Activities carried out

The activities of interest to all three stakeholders have been those where most progress has been made: the development of NGO standards in Ghana; work to influence the MCA in Ghana and Senegal; beginning of an effort to coordinate efforts related to food security in Mali; an effort to harmonize the tax laws for NGOs and PVOs in Kenya; and a workshop to promote co-operation between NGOs/PVOs and the private sector in Kenya. It should be noted, however, that all of these activities are in progress and ultimate results remain to be determined.

In Ghana, a draft set of standards has been developed which are intended to govern the behavior of both international and national NGOs. The standards are currently being reviewed and edited and are expected to take effect sometime in the next several months.

In Mali, a meeting on food security in July 2006, in which NGOs, PVOs, USAID, and the Government of Mali participated, resulted in a formal group being created to share information every three months to achieve better coordination of food security efforts among the various actors. It is not clear whether this group has met yet. Plans for follow-up on this initiative are included in the Mali country team's action plan for the final six months of ALPI II.

14. In Kenya, the Kenya AIDS Consortium (KANCO) was the first network chosen as the secretariat, but it handed over responsibility within three months to the Kenya NGO Council, the national network.

15. These networks had organized and carried out sub-regional meetings in their countries for ALPI I, and InterAction believed, therefore, that they had the capacity to manage the ALPI II process – an erroneous assumption.

**Table 3A: Changes in Mutual Trust, Knowledge, Balance of Power and Tension Among the Three Stakeholders**

Ghana*	NGOs	PVOs	USAID
Mutual trust	Significantly more	Same	Same
Mutual knowledge	Significantly more	Same	Same
Balance of power	Same	Same	Same
Tension	Slightly less	Slightly less	Significantly less

\*7 Respondents = 6 NGO + 1 PVO

**Table 3B: Changes in Mutual Trust, Knowledge, Balance of Power and Tension Among the Three Stakeholders**

Kenya*	NGOs	PVOs	USAID
Mutual trust	Significantly more	Same	Significantly more
Mutual knowledge	Significantly more	Same	Same
Balance of power	Significantly more balance	Same	Moderately more balance
Tension	Moderately less	Moderately less	Significantly less

\*5 Respondents = 4 NGO + 1 PVO

**Table 3C: Changes in Mutual Trust, Knowledge, Balance of Power and Tension Among the Three Stakeholders**

Mali*	NGOs	PVOs	USAID
Mutual trust	Same	Moderately less	Moderately less
Mutual knowledge	Same	Same	Same
Balance of power	Moderately less balance	Moderately less balance	Same
Tension	Moderately less	Significantly less	Significantly less

\*5 Respondents = 3 NGO + 1 PVO + 1 USAID

**Table 3D: Changes in Mutual Trust, Knowledge, Balance of Power and Tension Among the Three Stakeholders**

Senegal*	NGOs	PVOs	USAID
Mutual trust	Significantly more	Slightly more	Slightly more
Mutual knowledge	Clearly more	Slightly more	Significantly more
Balance of power	Slightly more balance	Same	Same
Tension	Significantly less	Slightly less	Clearly less

\*3 Respondents = 2 NGO + 1 PVO

In Kenya, an ALPI stakeholders meeting was held at which the issue of tax burdens on NGOs and PVOs was discussed. This resulted in the creation of a task force to examine how international and national NGOs are taxed by the Government of Kenya and to make recommendations to harmonize the tax regime for all NGOs. The work of this task force is currently underway.

Also in Kenya, a workshop was held to explore cooperation and collaboration between PVOs/NGOs and the private sector. While there has been no follow up as of the time of this evaluation, plans to continue this initiative are included in the Kenya country team's action plan for the final six months of ALPI II.

Efforts in both Ghana and Senegal to influence the development of the Millennium Challenge Account compact as well as its implementation have borne fruit. In Ghana, a position on the Ghana Millennium Challenge Account Board has been created for an NGO representative. That representative was chosen by the community of NGOs active in ALPI II and is at work on the board already. In Senegal, CONGAD is fully engaged with the Government of Senegal and the Senegalese MCC in efforts to influence the compact, expected to be signed within the next few months. CONGAD has played an important role in calling attention to concerns of the population in the geographic area chosen for MCC activity. While CONGAD has not yet achieved any concrete results such as in Ghana, it is considered a vital part of the deliberations and is well positioned to play a possible role in implementation as well as to monitor such implementation. It should be noted that interviews reveal that the involvement of CONGAD members in these efforts seems to be very limited as yet.

In Mali, where the compact was signed in October 2006, there have not yet been similar results achieved through the ALPI process. There, UNDP provided money to the government to ensure participation of civil society in development of the compact. The Government of Mali engaged its own consultants who carried out consultations in the Segou region, where a portion of the MCC work is to take place. Two other civil society representatives were chosen to be on the MCC technical committee. One was a representative of a US consulting firm who met with and informed US PVOs of MCA developments and served to channel PVO ideas to the MCC technical committee. The president of the National Council of Civil Society Organizations served as the representative of Malian NGOs. He channeled information to them and sought their input, which he passed on to the MCC. As yet, the ALPI secretariat has not played any bridging role that would bring all NGOs and PVOs together to agree on a common approach to the NGO role in implementation — or in NGO monitoring of the implementation — of the compact.

There were other activities carried out in which not all three stakeholders had a strong vested interest. In Kenya, the ALPI country team held a workshop to train PVOs and NGOs to use the partnership assessment tool created by InterAction. A pilot test of the tool was then carried out with KeNAAM, a network of organizations working to reduce the incidence of malaria. PACT also tested the tool with its partner NGOs. A feedback workshop is planned to discuss the tool further and agree on next steps. This effort did not involve the USAID mission at all.

Other topics chosen by the country teams were primarily of interest to African NGOs, and therefore did not hold the interest of PVOs and, only marginally, of USAID. For example, both Mali and Senegal explored how local NGOs can gain access to direct funding from USAID, and Mali carried out a workshop on fundraising strategies for local NGOs. In neither Senegal nor Mali did any US PVO representatives attend the workshops on direct funding by USAID of national NGOs. In Mali, 30 Malian NGOs attended the workshops on direct funding from USAID and fundraising strategies, held on the same day and facilitated by a consultant. In both countries, USAID staff made the presentations about USAID rules and regulations. These two experiences in Senegal and Mali call into question the commitment of the overall country teams to tripartite involvement in ALPI activities.

## E. ACHIEVING INTERMEDIATE RESULTS

### 1. Intermediate Result 1

InterAction's hope for regular and sustained information exchange among the three stakeholder groups in the four countries was partly realized during ALPI II. The work undertaken by Ghana and Senegal ALPI teams in relation to the Millennium Challenge Account, together with significant substantive assistance from InterAction, stands out as a success of ALPI II. This is an example of the kind of collaboration that can advance development interests at both the country level and in Washington, DC. If more work like this had been accomplished, ALPI II would have been a resounding success. There were four other specific instances of information sharing workshops or meetings in Mali, Kenya and Ghana (food security in Mali, PVO/NGO — private sector collaboration in Kenya, the USAID Global Development Alliance in Kenya, and the poverty reduction strategy (PRS) in Ghana). As they organized themselves, all country teams used documents prepared by InterAction regarding experiences of partnership, but the extent to which they were read or used by the wider stakeholder constituencies is unknown. Lastly, a regular InterAction e-newsletter, which served as the only routine source of information sharing among the teams, was discontinued in mid-2005. In its place, InterAction provided more targeted information in response to specific requests by country teams.

#### a. Regular information exchange

InterAction's expectation regarding this IR, was that "brown bag" lunches or similar kinds of meetings would be held in each of the four countries once a month — or at least periodically — where PVOs, NGOs, and USAID representatives would come together to discuss a particular sectoral issue. A representative from each of the three stakeholder groups, knowledgeable about the particular topic and the work of his or her stakeholder group in it, would be asked to make a brief presentation. A government representative from the appropriate ministry would be asked to speak as well. In this way, stakeholders could share information, gain knowledge and increase their understanding of the particular topic and of the work being done on it by the other stakeholders and the government. Ideally, greater coordination and collaboration by the stakeholders could result in, and even lead to, more effective development work on the topic.

In reality, such regular meetings did not take place in the countries. There were four workshops or meetings undertaken, as noted above. These were intended to share information, increase knowledge and understanding, and possibly result in concrete steps to be taken as follow up. Other than these four cases, more routine monthly meetings did not take place. According to the teams, they were unable to have more due to the cost of organizing them. It is not clear why these were so expensive unless the ALPI secretariats were paying consultants to facilitate such meetings, renting hotel meeting rooms instead of using conference rooms at PVO or NGO offices, and giving per diems to NGOs to come into the capital city from the interior. In Ghana and Kenya, where the secretariats were not national NGO networks, such monthly meetings may have been harder to organize, given the absence of established communication mechanisms and databases. In Mali and Senegal, where the secretariats were both national NGO networks, it seems that such routine information sharing meetings on sectoral issues or topics of common concern do not happen with the regularity that they do at a network such as InterAction where brown bag meetings are held routinely on a wide variety of topics. This is partly due to the fact that CONGAD and CCA/ONG are based in developing countries where member organizations are busy carrying out field projects and capital city offices are focused on providing administrative and logistical support to field operations. However, for all four countries, the absence of monthly or routine information-sharing meetings seems to reveal a lack of capacity — or will — within these development communities to draw on the expertise present to educate one another and to look for opportunities to collaborate. Again, it also reveals the failure of the secretariats to feed back information on ALPI initiatives to the wider PVO/NGO communities. Lastly, it may also reflect the environment of competition among

PVOs and NGOs, noted by several individuals interviewed, where organizations are unwilling to share information on their work for fear of losing a competitive advantage.

### **b. Millennium Challenge Account**

As InterAction and three of the country teams became interested in the MCA, InterAction ALPI II staff undertook a study of the extent of civil society consultation in the development of the MCA compact in Madagascar. The purpose of this report was two-fold. It was intended to give feedback to the Millennium Challenge Corporation in Washington, DC regarding the extent to which the commitment to civil society consultation had been carried out in this particular country. The report was also intended as a resource to ALPI II countries as they began to organize efforts to influence development of the compact for their countries. It appears to have been a useful resource to the country teams in their work on the MCA.

As already noted, the work carried out on the MCA by Ghana and Senegal, together with significant substantive assistance by InterAction, is one of the successes of the ALPI II process thus far. InterAction's assistance to the ALPI teams included the Madagascar report, meetings during the annual Washington Week with the Millennium Challenge Corporation, interested Congressional staff, and US PVOs involved in influencing the MCA process. An important meeting was also held with the CEO of Catholic Relief Services who became a member of the board of the MCC, and who continues to channel important information to InterAction and the ALPI country teams regarding the progress of the MCC.

### **c. Documents related to partnership**

In the first year of ALPI II, just prior to leaving InterAction, Evariste Karangwa prepared "Partnerships in Practice: A Compendium" which included case stories of PVO/NGO partnerships, promising practices and a mapping exercise which examined the context for developing partnerships, motivations for such partnerships and how they took shape. Several organizations that had been active in ALPI I contributed to this document. A copy of this compendium was sent to all participants in ALPI I and II as a resource in launching ALPI II. As already noted, this excellent compendium was used by the country teams in determining relationship principles to be used to govern the operation of the teams. InterAction ALPI staff also used it to create the partnership assessment tool.

### **d. Regular communication from InterAction to the ALPI country teams**

Throughout ALPI I and for part of ALPI II (until September 2005) InterAction's ALPI staff prepared a monthly or sometimes bi-monthly e-newsletter for circulation to all country teams and others in the InterAction community who were interested in the ALPI process. The e-newsletter contained information about work of the country teams as well as reports on important development topics such as the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act. This was the only regular ALPI-wide communication that kept all stakeholders informed about the initiative. It was discontinued because InterAction ALPI staff could not determine that it was adding value to the work of the country teams and translating it into French each month was costly. Instead, InterAction began to provide more targeted information in response to specific requests from country teams.

## **2. INTERMEDIATE RESULT 2**

The ALPI II country team "model" was implemented on a pilot basis in all four countries and is the only such mechanism available for systematic consultations among representatives of the three stakeholder groups. However, only in Ghana has the country team come close to consolidating itself. Most of the elements noted on page 7 need to be present in order for a country team to establish and sustain itself and launch a successful country-level dialogue. Even in

Ghana, the stakeholder representatives on the country team still need to create information-sharing mechanisms in order to fulfill their responsibility to feed back regular information on ALPI activities and results to the NGO/PVO and USAID community as a whole and continue to get their input to initiatives underway. This is essential in order for the ALPI process to be a truly successful national dialogue with the potential to lead to greater coordination and collaboration among the three stakeholder groups. In hindsight, because of the amount of time needed to establish these multi-stakeholder initiatives, the ALPI II cooperative agreement should have been a five-year, rather than a three-year, effort.

### **a. Partnership Principles as guidelines for country team development**

The partnership principles developed by InterAction ALPI staff were provided to all stakeholder representatives as the country teams were forming and were used as the basis for how the tripartite country teams should operate. The partnership assessment tool was introduced by InterAction to each country's community of PVOs and NGOs while it was in draft form, and feedback was requested. The tool focuses on how Northern PVOs and Southern NGOs can work together to develop partnerships based on equity and mutual accountability. According to interviews, feedback from PVOs was that the tool was too idealistic and that "their relationship with NGOs is determined by USAID." In other words, because of USAID requirements and restrictions, (i.e., limited time to design proposals thereby pre-empting any possibility of collaborative design with NGOs, specific reporting formats and accountability requirements) it would not be possible to develop partnerships with NGOs in the way suggested by the partnership assessment tool. NGOs, for their part, also found the tool and the approach to be idealistic in the sense that such a partnership orientation could only apply to two organizations, which were equally powerful to begin with. Nevertheless, they applauded the effort and appreciated the focus on values to be developed in partnership, such as trust, transparency and integrity.

Although the partnership principles were used as the foundation for the operation of the country team, the partnership assessment tool was discussed seriously and tested in only one country, Kenya. Interviews conducted with Kenyans indicate that several found the partnership assessment tool to be quite useful and important. While the formal testing of the instrument was carried out with only one network of NGOs, other PVOs/NGOs have tested it and intend to use it in their work.

### **b. Sub-regional conferences on lessons learned**

According to InterAction's proposal (modification) submitted to USAID/Washington for ALPI II, two major sub-regional conferences were to take place in Africa in order to enable country teams to share "their promising practices and lessons learned with other attendees from the region, so that those in the process of forming their own country teams can learn how to begin a national dialogue."<sup>16</sup> The proposal called for up to three participants from 15 countries to participate in the sub-regional conference — in addition to those from the four country teams — to learn about the tripartite partnership model and to ask for technical assistance to enable them to begin the process in their own countries. InterAction also committed itself to prepare a publication, which would compile lessons learned to disseminate as a tool to be used in replicating the ALPI model.

The self-evaluation workshop held in Ghana in September 2006 was a limited version of the sub-regional conference described in the previous paragraph. There, the four country teams were able to reflect on their own experiences, determine lessons learned, and engage with the other teams to learn about their experiences, challenges faced, and how they were resolved. Given the time required to launch the country teams and to have them carry out activities, the self-evaluation workshop was the first effort at capturing lessons learned from the ALPI II initiative.

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16. Op cit, p. 7.

As noted above, only in Ghana have all team members exhibited a sense of ownership of the ALPI process. In two of the three other countries, PVO representatives interviewed indicated a diminishing level of interest in the ALPI process and pessimism that it would continue after the end of the InterAction funding for the activities underway. Moreover, with USAID presently undergoing major changes and re-organization, it is not at all clear that missions will continue to designate staff to participate in the ALPI country teams.

### 3. INTERMEDIATE RESULT 3

As far as can be determined from the proposal (modification) submitted to USAID by InterAction, ALPI themes were to be determined by each country team. No over-all themes were to be chosen ahead of time by InterAction that would then be taken up by all the country teams. Whether joint advocacy action was undertaken was dependent on the topics chosen. Given the topics chosen and the actual progress made thus far on each, a limited amount of advocacy work has been undertaken. In Ghana and Senegal, ALPI country teams have worked to influence the development of the MCA compact in their countries. Also in Ghana, ALPI is the framework through which NGOs are involved in the government's formulation of the NGO law, and several meetings between NGOs and government have taken place. (The NGO standards are being put in place as a self-monitoring accountability mechanism and are an important tool in NGO advocacy efforts vis-à-vis the government.) In the other countries, once initiatives are more developed, advocacy work may be taken up (e.g. food security in Mali and the tax scheme in Kenya).

Interviews indicate that the ALPI participants who attended the InterAction Forum and Washington Week benefited from seeing the ways in which US PVOs undertake advocacy work vis-à-vis the US Congress and the US Government.

#### a. Expectations for advocacy in ALPI II

The country teams to be created in ALPI II — together with their wider NGO/PVO communities — were expected to engage in joint advocacy toward national governments or international or multilateral donor entities on important development topics. Tools they might use to undertake advocacy could be task forces created, development of joint case studies on a particular topic, working papers, use of the media, or introduction of legislation.

#### b. Opportunities for advocacy work and results in ALPI II

Actual advocacy-related work in ALPI II has been limited because of the topics chosen by the four country teams and because of delays in carrying out activities. As noted above, the most advocacy work has been carried out thus far on the MCA in Ghana and Senegal through the ALPI II process, with significant assistance from InterAction — as noted earlier. The Ghana ALPI team, led by POSDEV, and the Senegal ALPI team, led by CONGAD, have gathered and analyzed information regarding the MCA in their countries, participated in national meetings and stated NGO/PVO positions vis-à-vis the proposed compacts, and worked to influence the development of the compacts in their countries. In Ghana, the ALPI team succeeded in getting an NGO representative on the MCA board. In Senegal, CONGAD has carried out a study of the views of the population of the targeted area outside Dakar, expected to become an industrial zone through the assistance of the MCC. As of the time of this evaluation, the CONGAD study was complete and was to be presented to the MCC working group. As noted earlier, InterAction provided continual assistance and information to these efforts.

Beyond the advocacy work on the MCA and the work on the NGO law in Ghana noted above, it is likely that if activities begun by all four country teams continue, advocacy work will be undertaken. In Kenya, once the work of the NGO taxation task force is completed, advocacy work will be necessary if the country team proposes legislation to harmonize the tax scheme for all NGOs. In Mali, the food security committee that has been set up may, at some point, wish to

advocate for changes in government policy. Thus far, the Mali and Senegal ALPI teams' work on direct USAID funding for NGOs is only in the information-sharing stage. These teams may wish to develop a strategy, hopefully with PVO assistance, to work to convince the USAID missions to provide changes in their requirements and regulations that would enable local NGOs to access funds.

## VI. CHALLENGES

Earlier in this report, we examined reasons why the Ghana country team achieved significant progress in its ALPI activities. Following here are reasons why the other countries had more limited results:

- Limitations of the ALPI II design.
- Delays at different points in the process.
- Limited organizational commitment.
- Weak communication within and among countries.
- Limited funding levels for the country teams.

### A. LIMITATIONS OF THE ALPI II DESIGN

The design of ALPI II had its origins in recommendations which ALPI I participants from African NGOs, PVOs and USAID mission representatives made at three different times: at the end of each sub-regional conference, in the evaluation of ALPI I, and in discussions about the evaluation. The InterAction proposal to USAID for the modification of the cooperative agreement for the ALPI II initiative speaks of “unanimous support for the continuation of the ALPI program”<sup>17</sup> on the part of the tripartite stakeholders. It talks of the importance of creating several country teams which could launch national-level dialogues with the expectation that these dialogues would lead to joint activities to increase coordination and collaboration among the three stakeholder groups. The modification submitted to USAID by InterAction for ALPI II included the outline of the national country team framework and stated that the stakeholders will design the program themselves, including the decision-making process, implementation, evaluation and the choice of discussion themes and research topics.

The design of ALPI II was limited in two major ways:

#### **Lack of a coherent vision and clear goals that linked InterAction to the country activities**

The most important problem with the design was that there was no clear over-arching vision and clear goals that linked InterAction to the country activities in terms of what InterAction, together with the country teams, wanted to accomplish. In other words, there was no “glue” bringing the four country team efforts together with InterAction work to achieve major programmatic or advocacy results on particular development topics. While a detailed multi-stakeholder process was to be created and carried out, the purpose for this process was vague — to develop greater collaboration among the stakeholders. There was no incentive for, or commitment by InterAction to serve as a leader in this initiative by promoting active participation of its members. ALPI was never seen by InterAction leadership as a strategic opportunity. Nor was there any indication of how the four countries might work together on topics of common concern other than to share lessons learned.

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17. Op cit, p. 3.

While it was expected that InterAction would be the catalyst to launch the country processes, the benefit of this initiative to InterAction and its members at headquarters level was absent. Had there been some indication as to how greater collaboration at the country level on specific important advocacy objectives could have been linked with InterAction and its members' advocacy efforts in the US, this may have served as the incentive to engage the leadership of InterAction, together with its members at headquarters level. As it was, InterAction leadership (in both ALPI I and II) took no interest in this work and did nothing to urge its members to encourage their field offices to participate. ALPI staffers were never able to develop an effective strategy to persuade their organization's leadership of the potential benefit to InterAction.

The modification submitted to USAID by InterAction stated that: "Discourse informed by multiple perspectives leads to better cooperative work whether in formal partnerships or more informal operational relationships. Moving towards more effective collaboration and partnership at the country level will thus be the result of the iterative and synergistic nature of these processes, as well as the interaction and exchange of ideas by and between the three actors themselves."<sup>18</sup> The emphasis was all on the process and not on the substance. What precisely this discourse would focus on was left to each country team to determine. While there was some expectation for regional or sub-regional conferences for participating countries, there was no discussion of how such conferences would be useful to participants if each country were working on a different topic — except to learn from one another about how the process was being carried out. Nor was there any discussion of how the results of the four countries' work would be compiled and synthesized to be of use to InterAction's membership or the wider development community.

### **Faulty assumption about African NGO network capacity to perform the role of secretariat**

InterAction's decision to have an African NGO or network in each of the four countries designated as the secretariat without first carefully assessing their capacity was a significant mistake and caused serious problems in the ALPI process in all four countries.

There seem to have been two assumptions in the design:

- The first was that the NGO or network already had the capacity to carry out the role of secretariat effectively.
- The second was that being the secretariat would somehow automatically strengthen the capacity of the particular organization – without any plan for a mentoring role provided by InterAction or any other organization.

Although there was a set of criteria to be followed in choosing the African organization, the clear expectation was that the existing national NGO network in each country would play that role — because such networks are set up to play a convening role and to communicate with the wider NGO community. Moreover, networks had successfully hosted the ALPI I sub-regional conferences in all the countries where they had taken place; and there was a belief that they could handle the management of the ALPI II process. In all four countries chosen, the NGO networks were designated as the secretariat.<sup>19</sup> As noted earlier, all four had significant problems and limited capacity to manage and facilitate the ALPI process. In two countries, the NGO networks were dysfunctional and the ALPI secretariat was eventually set up in other organizations. In the other two countries, the networks had leadership problems and limited capacity that presented important challenges to the effective management of the ALPI process.

It seems that InterAction decided to have an African organization assume the role of the secretariat out of an idealistic sense that this would redress the balance of power among the three stakeholder groups. Leaving the choice of the secretariat to the particular stakeholder groups

18. Op cit, p. 3.

19. In Kenya, the Kenya AIDS NGO Consortium (KANCO) was originally chosen as the secretariat but handed over the role to the NGO Council only a few months later.

in each country might have been a better approach. Or, alternatively, planning a clear and consistent mentoring relationship for the secretariat by the field office of a US PVO in the particular country, by InterAction or by an Africa-based coordinator should have been done.

### B. DELAYS AT DIFFERENT POINTS IN THE PROCESS

There were several significant delays during the ALPI II process, which meant that expected results have not been achieved thus far in the initiative. Changes in ALPI personnel at InterAction, problems with the secretariat chosen in all four countries, delays in developing action plans and having them approved, and getting money out to the countries caused the work in all four countries to move slowly.

The ALPI II cooperative agreement modification was signed in late September 2003. Evariste Karangwa, who had been InterAction's Program Manager of ALPI I, left the organization in December 2003. His successor, Sylvain Browa, began work at InterAction in April 2004. Little work was done during this time to choose countries and start the process of country team development. This hiatus of six months caused delays in getting the initiative underway. This meant that three of the country teams (Ghana, Mali and Senegal) did not have their first meeting until September 2004 a full year after the modification had been signed. The fourth country team in Kenya was only formed in December 2004, and then delayed again significantly because of problems with the first two organizations chosen as the secretariat. Further delays ensued in development and approval of action plans and in getting money to the particular country teams. All these steps took an inordinate amount of time, due partly to either a very broad consultative process used to determine activities (as in Senegal), overly ambitious or poorly developed draft action plans, and delays by InterAction in preparing grant agreements with the particular country teams — or a combination of these. As a result of these delays, most of the activities in the four countries began in late 2005 or even in 2006; and most have not achieved concrete results as of the time of this evaluation.

### C. LIMITED ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITMENT

Particularly as regards PVOs and USAID missions, there appears to have been limited organizational commitment in many cases. As for the PVOs, this was largely due to a lack of interest in the topics chosen by the country team, even though these PVO representatives had participated in the choice. Regarding USAID missions, except for Ghana, there was never a strong commitment made to the process by the mission directors.

In the case of some of the PVOs, senior-level staff agreed to be members of the country team but later turned over involvement to more junior staff when they did not perceive enough value in the process. This involvement in ALPI was in addition to a full-time work load so the incentive to participate and the likely value had to be strong.

According to interviews, some of the USAID missions were skeptical of ALPI II from the beginning, based on attitudes regarding what they considered limited results from ALPI I. While certain of the missions designated a staff person to serve on the country team, that participation did not carry with it the support of the senior levels of the missions. In some cases, regarding both PVOs and USAID missions, the involvement of individuals seemed to be driven more by personal interest than an organizational commitment. In several instances, personnel changes were made in PVOs and USAID missions during ALPI II that affected the level of participation of those organizations. In one country team, a particular PVO representative had been very active and committed to ALPI II activities but when this individual was transferred to another country, his replacement showed no interest in ALPI activities. As of the time of the evaluation, the PVO had not instructed this person to participate. Personnel turn-over in PVOs and missions is much more frequent than in the NGOs and has disrupted participation. In both USAID missions and PVOs, there appears to be little to no organizational memory passed from one participant to another to enable effective continuation of involvement when a newly designated representative begins to participate in the ALPI activities.

## D. LIMITED COMMUNICATION WITHIN AND AMONG COUNTRIES

Other than e-mail communication among country team members, regular, systematic communication from the secretariats in the four countries to the full NGO/PVO communities was extremely poor, and in some cases, non-existent. Therefore, only the country teams, themselves, were well-informed about ALPI activities. For its part, as noted earlier, InterAction prepared a monthly e-newsletter for all country teams and others interested in ALPI but stopped doing this in September 2005 in favor of more targeted information sharing in response to country team requests. This meant there was no ALPI-wide regular communication to keep people informed and motivated. Each country team did have a representative on the ALPI advisory committee that met twice a year. There, these representatives made presentations about their teams' progress and challenges, which were then discussed by the full committee.

According to several interviews, communication from the secretariats in all of the countries was sporadic at best and sometimes non-existent. While communication within the country teams by email apparently was good, more widespread communication to the full NGO/PVO community was very sparse. One PVO respondent said, "ALPI doesn't exist. We haven't heard anything about it from the secretariat since we were in the first meeting where we endorsed the choice of PVO representative for the country team." This situation seems to have been the case in all four countries. Only the country teams were well informed about ALPI II activities and progress.

The times when country teams shared information and learned from each other were during the InterAction Forum and Washington Week, attended by an average of three to five persons from each team, and on regular teleconferences between InterAction and country teams where updates on progress in other countries were provided.

## E. LIMITED FUNDING LEVELS FOR THE COUNTRY TEAMS

Many interview respondents from all four countries indicated that the financial resources available from InterAction were not sufficient to carry out the activities they had planned. These "incentive funds" had been intended as a catalyst to the launch of activities country teams viewed as particularly important. InterAction hoped that the missions and local NGO/PVO communities in the countries could identify other money to supplement these funds. Other than in-kind contributions of time and resources by NGOs, PVOs and missions, and the underwriting of the private sector collaboration workshop in Kenya by the Cooperative Bank, no funds have been raised for ALPI activities. Raising money for such a forum is difficult since it falls outside the normal development project framework. The fact that all the country teams looked to InterAction for the money and have not succeeded in raising money on their own calls into question the commitment of these teams to the activities taken up — and whether they are perceived as priorities. If the topics were important enough to the teams, it seems they would have persisted in raising funds for them.

## VII. ROLE OF INTERACTION IN ALPI II

The evaluation of ALPI I gave a generally favorable review of InterAction's management of the program. The evaluation endorsed InterAction's continued role as facilitator and manager of ALPI II. The expectation was that InterAction would be a catalyst in launching the ALPI II initiative in the particular countries and would continue to provide information and networking assistance but that the country teams would play the major role in managing their own ALPI work. In addition, because InterAction held the cooperative agreement with USAID, it was responsible for monitoring progress toward achievement of the strategic objective. In reality, because of difficulties already discussed regarding the role of the secretariats in three of the four countries and the lack of any mentoring arrangements for these secretariats, InterAction

ALPI staff ended up playing a bigger role in providing technical assistance, guidance and oversight of ALPI activities in the countries. As noted earlier, InterAction, both in Washington and at country levels, played an important role in providing information to, and linking country teams with, key representatives of the MCA, Congressional staff, and US PVOs, regarding the MCA and the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and USAID regarding the Global Development Alliance in Kenya.

For the most part, interview respondents valued InterAction's role in bringing the ALPI II process to the country level and launching it, providing guidance on the development of action plans, feedback on the over-all process, financial assistance (although all country teams felt it was not sufficient, as noted earlier), and information and networking assistance on key initiatives. African NGO and PVO field staff respondents were particularly appreciative of Washington Week activities and the value they derived therefrom, although certain USAID respondents felt the trips to the InterAction Forum and Washington Week were not a good use of resources and others felt they could have been organized more effectively.

Interview respondents were very critical of InterAction's failure to persuade headquarters staff of PVOs to encourage and support participation of their field staff in ALPI activities. As noted elsewhere, although InterAction ALPI staff made efforts directly to PVO headquarters staff and through the ALPI advisory committee, there was an almost total lack of effort by InterAction leadership — during ALPI II or ALPI I, for that matter — to convince the leadership of PVOs in their headquarters of the value of participation in ALPI activities at country levels. (As noted earlier, this failure had its roots in the flawed design of ALPI II.) It should also be noted that InterAction, itself, had its own leadership difficulties in 2005 and 2006 and a transition to a new CEO in mid-2006. This prevented ALPI staff from developing a useful strategy for greater involvement in the program by InterAction leadership during this time.

## VIII. LESSONS LEARNED

- 1 Creating an ALPI-type initiative in the midst of long-established hierarchical relationships of USAID missions, PVO field offices and NGOs is important but very difficult and must include strong enough incentives for each of the stakeholders to commit their time and resources.

The current relationships among USAID missions, PVOs and NGOs have been in place a very long time. Even though everyone says that local capacity should be strengthened and that new ways to achieve development effectiveness should be sought, determining new ways to collaborate to achieve these goals takes time, openness to new ways of doing things and humility. Moreover, everyone already has a full-time job and little time to devote to such an endeavor. Therefore, incentives are key in attracting all stakeholders to commit their time and energy to such an effort.

- 2 A well-functioning NGO network is the ideal organization to be the secretariat for an ALPI-type initiative.

In all countries, ALPI country teams had difficulty carrying out action plans because of leadership and/or governance problems of the NGO network or platform in the particular country. In Ghana and Kenya, the country teams overcame the problems of their national networks by placing the secretariat in different organizations with the interest and commitment to carry out the work. However, the arrangements were not ideal in terms of communication and outreach. An ALPI-type process needs to have an effective network as the secretariat in order to ensure that the work of the initiative is carried out well, that the NGO/PVO community is involved, regularly informed of progress, and able to provide input to initiatives, and that results which benefit all stakeholders are achieved.

- 3 Effective facilitation and negotiation skills are essential in guiding the discussions and the decision-making process concerning shared goals and priorities in an initiative such as ALPI that involves a variety of stakeholders with diverse interests.

These skills were essential to ensure successful “buy-in” by all three stakeholders to the activities ultimately chosen for joint action. Only in Ghana was this done in a fully effective way.

- 4 An NGO sector initiative such as the ALPI II process requires significant time for information sharing, organization, mobilization, and advocacy efforts to be carried out. The ALPI II cooperative agreement should have had a five-year rather than a three-year duration.

It was unrealistic to expect that concrete results would have been achieved in three years’ time. Such an initiative — taking place outside the normal framework of development projects — takes a long time to take shape and yield results.

- 5 Fully utilizing the ALPI framework — by linking InterAction and its outreach, access to policy makers and expertise with country-level advocacy efforts on a common topic such as the MCA — produced important results for Ghana and Senegal and should have been done for other important development topics.

The fact that ALPI was designed without clearly defining the value InterAction would derive from linkages with four country-level development initiatives was a missed strategic opportunity, both in regard to the potential for progress on important topics as well as for providing an incentive to the leadership of InterAction and its member agencies to actively support the initiative.

- 6 Frequent and effective two-way communication is essential to be able to engage a national community of NGOs and PVOs in dialogue and potential advocacy action on development topics of significant interest and importance.

Regular and timely communication is key to the effective functioning of an initiative such as ALPI II. Such communication was sorely lacking in all four countries and directly limited the results achieved. Moreover, the failure to share information on ALPI activities and results with, and seek input on the initiatives from, the PVO/NGO community in each country limited a sense of ownership of ALPI to the members of each country team.

## IX. RECOMMENDATIONS

There are two sets of recommendations. The first set of short-term recommendations — listed in priority order — was proposed in the self-evaluation workshop held in Ghana in September 2006, to be implemented in the remaining six months of the USAID-funded ALPI II program. The second set of long-term recommendations is proposed by the evaluator for any future ALPI-type activity.

### A. SHORT-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS

- 1 It is imperative to clearly define the complementary roles and responsibilities of the three stakeholder groups in Africa’s development.
- 2 InterAction needs to be more pro-active in encouraging USAID and PVOs to catalyze the interest of their field offices in ALPI countries.
- 3 Country team members should work harder to deepen relationships at the country level.
- 4 ALPI objectives require longer-term activities, beyond three years of implementation.
- 5 InterAction should provide more visibility to ALPI at its annual forum, i.e., the opportunity for a plenary session presentation on African development by ALPI participants.
- 6 Country teams should develop activities that incorporate the interests of all three of the primary stakeholder groups.

## B. LONG-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS

- 1 InterAction needs to re-design the ALPI initiative in such a way that it links directly to the new goals adopted through the coalition's recent strategic plan and to key initiatives that InterAction is undertaking.

It was a failure of ALPI II that InterAction, itself, did not have a "stake" in the work of the country teams and did not work directly with them to achieve results on important development topics — other than the work on the MCA. InterAction's new goal to demonstrate PVO/NGO accountability and impact in development and humanitarian action may be a way in which InterAction might shape a continuation of the ALPI initiative, which would link its own agenda with interests of the NGO sector in African countries. InterAction's new effort to conduct research on the development impacts of aid reform in five countries may represent an opportunity to link the organization with ALPI teams in African countries on this topic of common interest.

- 2 InterAction should use its credibility and power to lobby governmental and private donors and PVOs to commit ample resources to strengthen local capacity in African countries, beginning with the national NGO networks.

The limited capacity of national NGO networks in Africa has been a long-standing problem ever since large numbers of local NGOs began to be created. The majority of these networks have never had the level of capacity and sustained leadership needed to serve their memberships in the important ways necessary to enable NGOs and PVOs to work together to operate effective development programs and to advocate to improve national and local policies related to important development issues.

- 3 Prior to designing a new ALPI initiative, InterAction should conduct an open-ended discussion with African NGOs, PVOs and USAID missions in the four ALPI countries to learn what the highest priorities of each are, discuss what InterAction's highest priorities are, and how the country teams might be willing to agree on a common objective which they could work together with InterAction to achieve.

## X. CONCLUSION

Although all stakeholder groups involved in this endeavor agreed on the need for a forum such as ALPI and noted its value in interviews undertaken, one has to question the true desire for it, given the results of this evaluation. It seems that all three of the stakeholders have higher priorities than to create and sustain such a forum. Having said that, we have seen encouraging signs in Ghana regarding the willingness of all stakeholders to commit themselves to work together on a jointly-negotiated set of activities. Had the key elements of ownership been present in the other three countries, it is possible that more impressive results may have been achieved. What remains a problem is that InterAction, although it has hosted this program for many years, has never defined for itself the value of this initiative to its work. This has been a lost opportunity and should be corrected in any future ALPI-type process that InterAction decides to pursue. InterAction's own primary goals for its membership must be incorporated into such a process — both for the good of the membership and for the larger development work in which we are all involved.

## APPENDIX 1: SCOPE OF WORK EVALUATION OF THE AFRICA LIAISON PROGRAM INITIATIVE (2003 – 2006)

### History of the ALPI Cooperative Agreement

The Africa Liaison Program Initiative (ALPI) is a tripartite effort to improve the effectiveness of US assistance to Africa. ALPI operates within the framework of the Development Fund for Africa's mandate for USAID to consult with African, US and other private voluntary organizations (PVOs) involved in long-term grassroots development in defining USAID's operational priorities for Africa. ALPI creates a venue, outside of the traditional procurement sphere, for African NGOs, US PVOs, and USAID to collaboratively, identify, discuss and address common challenges at the policy, practice, and operational relationship levels.

ALPI's first cooperative agreement with USAID extended from October 1, 1999 through September 30, 2002. It was the fourth in a series of similar but relatively smaller projects that began in 1989, and the first to convene regular forums at the sub-regional level in Africa, in addition to annual meetings in Washington, DC. The agreement has since known several modifications. The current modification, which extends from December 1, 2003 through November 30, 2006, uses the following indicators to track progress and assess achievements:

**Indicator 1:** Partners demonstrate shared ownership of the ALPI process.

**Indicator 2:** Partners implement "new partnership" guidelines.

**Indicator 3:** Partners carry out joint action items.

The current cycle of ALPI (2003 – 2006) works towards the following intermediate results (IR):

**IR 1.** Exchanged information to enhance learning and collaboration.

**IR 2.** "New partnership" concept adopted in selected countries.

**IR 3.** Joint action for advocacy on issues of common interest implemented.

To advance its programmatic objectives, ALPI's current cycle also embodies a number of significant changes from the previous approach of periodic events at the sub-regional and regional levels. The most important change for the current ALPI process is a pilot effort that has shifted the focus to the country level. This change was made based on recommendations from the 2002 external evaluation and reflects an effort to adapt to member needs. The new focus is implemented at the country level through tripartite country teams. To be successful, all three groups in the ALPI process must take part in, and feel ownership of, ALPI activities on the ground. Only a shared ownership can further the other key components of the program. Overall, the changes made include:

**Increased country-level focus:** In order to achieve concrete outcomes, ALPI is focusing its activities at the national level and in fewer countries. Countries are selected based on a number of criteria, including USAID presence, a commitment of all three-stakeholder groups to form and manage a tripartite country team, a track record of committed participation in previous ALPI activities, and the availability of a strong African organization with the necessary human and social capital to facilitate collaborative planning and joint action at the country level.

The focus on the country level is implemented through the tripartite country teams. To be successful, all three groups in the ALPI process must take part in, and feel ownership of, ALPI activities on the ground. Only a shared ownership can further the other key components of the program, including the implementation of the tripartite partnership model of dialogue and joint action, the establishment of linkages between country processes and the ALPI Washington Week in the US, and between development delivery practice and policy formulation, and finally, ALPI's approach of addressing issues that complement participating organizations' own programmatic objectives at the country level.

Enhanced ownership by USAID, US PVOs, and African NGOs: ALPI partners — USAID missions, US PVOs, African NGOs — lead the process at the country level and participate in the design of the program, the decision-making process, implementation, and evaluation. They choose discussion themes and research topics and also select attendees to regional conferences in Washington and other advocacy meetings.

**Incentive Funds:** One important lesson learned over the previous years is that good will to improve partnerships and enhance ownership of the ALPI process is, in and of itself, not enough. Stakeholders wishing to engage in ALPI in a systematic way have legitimate resource needs. Therefore ALPI has modified its program to contribute incentive and institutional capacity-strengthening funds to meet these needs.

**Added value through complementary strategies:** The final external evaluation of the ALPI program in 2002 found that some participants felt ALPI events ran parallel to their own efforts in improving relationships. The current program addresses this concern by allowing the country level process of action plan formulation to select issues and activities of strategic (achievements that will improve the operational environment or add value to participants' individual programmatic goals) and synergetic (part of ALPI planned activities that can be carried out through participants' day to day operational activities) relevance to participating organizations.

### Purpose of the Evaluation

The purpose of the evaluation is to assess the extent to which: 1) activities carried out from 2003 to the present have advanced ALPI's strategic objective, and 2) the ALPI mechanism has proven suitable to addressing tripartite collaboration around the implementation of US assistance to Africa. The evaluation will provide recommendations on the future of the ALPI mechanism for: on-going consultations and information exchange among African NGOs, US PVOs, USAID, and other US bilateral development agencies; increased understanding about the effectiveness of collaborative approaches around African development; and improved development relationships among the three actors in African development.

### Suggested Areas of Focus

- Structural Set Up/Mechanism/Actors.
- The role of a country team secretariat in the ALPI process: pro-active leadership.
- InterAction and the mobilization of the US PVO community (also look at linkages – influence/learning – between Africa-based operations and headquarters in Washington, DC).

### Objectives of the Evaluation

The objectives of the evaluation are to: 1) assess the extent to which ALPI has achieved its intermediate results (IRs), 2) highlight lessons learned, and 3) make recommendations about mechanism(s) to further enhance and build on the achievements of the ALPI process.

### Statement of Work

The evaluation will be carried out via a combination of interactive/participatory learning sessions with ALPI country teams, document review and interviews of key informants in the US and in Africa (face-to-face and/or phone, e-mail, or fax exchanges). These will include ALPI participants from all three stakeholder groups and other external actors deemed relevant (such as GRAP in Ghana and MCA national programs in Ghana and Senegal). The evaluation will primarily focus on Ghana and Senegal but will include viewpoints and feedback from Kenya and Mali to capture ALPI experiences in these countries.

For each of the intermediate results and outcomes, the evaluator will use ALPI’s current Performance Monitoring, Evaluation, and Reporting plan as a resource to assist in adequately: 1) describing what was done and the process used, 2) identifying outcomes (anticipated and unanticipated), 3) analyzing the effectiveness of the process based on defined indicators, and 4) providing recommendations to further advance the goal of improved dialogue and development relationships among USAID, US PVOs, and African NGOs.

### Evaluation Methods and Procedures

The evaluator will be a senior development professional with significant prior experience in the implementation of PVO and NGO development programs in Africa, knowledge of InterAction and the ALPI program, and prior experience in conducting USAID evaluations. The evaluator will work in collaboration with InterAction staff and the ALPI country team secretariats to identify potential key informants and plan and conduct interviews in each of the participating countries. In countries to be visited (Ghana and Senegal) the evaluator could leverage the assistance of a development professional in-country to help in carrying out the work. The evaluator will, however, be the sole responsible party for the design/choice of appropriate instruments and methodologies to be used for this evaluation.

The interviews should include but not be limited to:

- US-based stakeholders – USAID/Africa Bureau, InterAction staff, ALPI advisory committee members, and InterAction member agencies’ staff.
- Africa-based stakeholders – USAID country missions, ALPI country team member agencies, other local NGO and US PVO country offices (to be recommended by country teams), and other development actors deemed critical.
- A maximum of 40 days is authorized for this consultancy. The consultant will be paid for each day spent up to, and not to exceed, the 40 days. The consultation will begin in September 2006 and be completed by November 30<sup>th</sup>, 2006.

### Tentative Evaluation Schedule:

#### A. Activities in the United States

1. Document review
2. “Instruments” development
3. Evaluation planning, including lessons learned conference in Ghana
4. Contact and preparation of interviews
5. US interviews
6. Data collection and analysis
7. Draft report
8. Final report and presentation of findings

#### B. Activities in Africa

1. Contacts and preparation of interviews
2. Travel to Ghana and Senegal
3. Lessons Learned workshop
4. Africa interviews (individual/group)
5. Data collection and analysis

6. Planning and implementation of interviews in Kenya and Mali
7. Report format

The presentation of the final report should be guided by the basic outline:

Executive Summary

Introduction

Evaluation Methodology

Findings

General findings

Lessons learned

Recommendations

Future directions

Conclusions

Appendices

Scope of Work

Individuals and Organizations Contacted

Reference Documents

## APPENDIX 2: PERSONS INTERVIEWED

### GHANA

Kofi Adu, GAPVOD, member, ALPI country team  
 Lawrencia Adams, POSDEV, ALPI country team secretariat  
 Kojo Ansah, CARE, member, ALPI country team  
 Sharon Cromer, USAID Mission Director  
 Ismail Lansah, Northern Ghana NGO network  
 Ted Lawrence, USAID Democracy & Governance Officer, member, ALPI country team  
 Letitia Ohene-Effah, OICI, member, ALPI country team  
 Walter Pimpong, International Needs, ALPI Standards Committee  
 Peter Subaab, Centre for Sustainable Development  
 Clement Tandoh, USAID Democracy and Governance Team  
 Albert Tenga, INPRODEC, NGO representative on MCC board

### KENYA

Irene Gathinji, PACT, member, ALPI country team  
 Felix Gichaga, Cooperative Bank  
 Alice Kirambi, CPDA, ALPI country team secretariat  
 Edgar Lumbasio, CPDA, ALPI country team secretariat  
 Michael Oliewo, Chair, ALPI Task Force on Taxation  
 Peter Omondo McOdida, International Medical Corps, member, ALPI country team  
 Mark Rabudi, formerly KANCO and member, ALPI country team  
 Steve Ragama, USAID Program Office, member, ALPI country team

### MALI

Dembele Hawa Sow Cisse, CCA-ONG, ALPI country team secretariat  
 Sheryl Cowan, Africare, member, ALPI country team  
 Mamoutou Diabate, AMPRODE, member, ALPI country team  
 Julie Fishcer, formerly Winrock and member, ALPI country team  
 Allaye Kassambara, CCA-ONG, ALPI country team secretariat  
 Dante Rokiatou N'Diaye, USAID Program Office, member, ALPI country team  
 Lisa Nichols, ABT Associates, member of MCA technical team for PVOs  
 Ely Simpara, AMPPF, member, ALPI country team  
 Boureima Allaye Toure, OMAES, member, MCA technical team for NGOs

### SENEGAL

Boubacar Aw, Millennium Challenge Corporation  
 Lillian Baer, Africa Consultants International

Marietou Coulibaly, Syndicat Professionnel des Industries et des Mines du Sénégal

Asane Diagne, CRS and member, ALPI country team

Abdrahmane Diallo, USAID Program Office and member, ALPI country team

Scott Dobberstein, formerly USAID mission

Lisa Franchett, USAID Program Office Director

Mazide N'Diaye, RADI

Ousseynou Samb, Africare

Boubacar Seck, CONGAD, ALPI country team secretariat

Vore Seck, CONGAD

### WASHINGTON, DC

#### InterAction

James Bishop, Director, Humanitarian Policy and Practice, InterAction

Sylvain Browa, Program Manager, ALPI, InterAction

Kimberly Darter, Program Associate, ALPI, InterAction

Ken Giunta, Director, Membership and Standards, InterAction

Evariste Karangwa, Lutheran World Relief, formerly Program Manager, ALPI, InterAction

Suzanne Kindervatter, Director, Commission on the Advancement of Women, InterAction

Erin Tunney, Bread for the World, formerly, Public Policy & External Affairs, InterAction

Cherri Waters, Senior Advisor on Development to the Interim President & CEO, InterAction

John Zarafonitis, Congressional Hunger Center, formerly, Director, CDPP, InterAction

#### InterAction Members

Margaret Goodman, World Learning, Program Advisory Group, CDPP

Laura Henderson, Christian Children's Fund, Program Advisory Group, CDPP

Jeff Kwaterski, PACT

Kevin Lowther, Africare, ALPI Advisory Committee

#### USAID

Robert Groelsema, Associates in Rural Development, formerly CTO, ALPI for USAID/  
Washington

Tom Kennedy, Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation

Steve Pierce, Senior Advisor for Donor Affairs, Office of Development Planning, formerly  
with the Africa Bureau

### APPENDIX 3: DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

- African Liaison Program Initiative Kenya Country Team (ALPI/KCT), "Work Plan for 2005/2006"
- Ashman, Darcy, "Africa Liaison Project Initiative, 1999-2002, Final Evaluation Report", January 27, 2003
- Ashman, Darcy, "Africa Liaison Program Initiative (1999-2002) Final Evaluation Survey"
- Equipe Pays ALPI, Senegal "Atelier des ONG sur l'Appropriation des Objectifs Strategiques de l'USAID et l'Acces a ses Ressources", 27 Juillet 2006
- Equipe Pays ALPI, Mali, "Plan d'Action 2005-2006"
- InterAction, ALPI E-bulletin: October, 2004
- InterAction, ALPI E-bulletin: May/June, 2005
- InterAction, ALPI, "The Africa Liaison Program Initiative...moving forward" (undated)
- InterAction, ALPI Partnership Principles (undated)
- InterAction, ALPI, "African Liaison Program Initiative (ALPI) Regional Conference on Lessons Learned, September 27-29, 2006"
- InterAction, ALPI, "Africa Liaison Program Initiative Lessons Learned Conference", September, 2006 (power point presentation)
- InterAction, ALPI, "Mutual Accountability in African Development Relationships. A Report of the ALPI Sub-Regional Conference", December 2000
- InterAction, ALPI, "Partnerships in Practice, A Compendium", 2004
- InterAction, ALPI "Scope of Work, Evaluation of the Africa Liaison Program Initiative (2003 – 2006)"
- InterAction, ALPI, "The Africa Liaison Program Initiative Performance Monitoring, Evaluation, and Reporting Plan" (undated)
- InterAction, Committee on Development Policy and Practice, "Africa Liaison Project Initiative, October 1999-October, 2002, Proposal to USAID", September 17, 1999
- InterAction, Committee on Development Policy and Practice, "Africa Liaison Project Initiative, Modification Proposal to USAID/AF", September 9, 2003
- InterAction, "Enhancing the Millennium Challenge Account Implementation Process. Lessons from Madagascar" (undated)
- InterAction/FOVAD, "Toward Partnership in Africa/Vers le Partenariat en Afrique" (undated)
- InterAction, "Notes and Outcomes of the InterAction Board Retreat, Charting InterAction's Strategic Directions, 2007 – 2009", September 11-12, 2006
- InterAction, "Proposed InterAction Goals", November 11, 2006







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