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**LINCS PROGRAM FINAL & PHASE OUT REPORT**

**Program Name:** Locally Initiated Networks for Community Strengthening (LINCS)

**Grantee:** CHF International

**Country:** Liberia

**Region:** West Africa

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**Focus Area:** Peace Building

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## Table of Acronyms

ABA	American Bar Association
ADR	Alternative Dispute Resolution
CDA	Collaborative For Development Action
CPC	Community Peace Council
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN
FIND	Foundation of International Dignity
FOHRD	Foundation for Human Rights and Democracy
FTP	Flomo Theater Production
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IPPM	Integrated Production and Pest Management
LINCS	Locally Initiated Networks for Community Strengthening
LISTALS	Liberian Institute for Success Technologies and Leadership Studies
LMA	Landmine Action
LNBA	Liberia National Bar Association
LTHRP	Lutheran Trauma Healing Program
LURD	Liberians United For Reconciliation And Democracy
LWI	Liberia Women Initiative
MAWOPNET	Mano River Union Women Peace Network
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NAPRHR	National Association of Psychosocial Rehabilitation and Human Rights
NEPI	National Ex-Combatant Peacebuilding Initiative
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NSPP	Next Steps in Peace Program
PACE	Participatory Action for Community Enhancement
PakBatt	Pakistani Battalion
Pak-EngBatt	Pakistani – English Battalion
PMC	Project Management Committee
SAA	Small Arms and Ammunition
TOT	Training of Trainers
UNCIVPOL	United Nations Civilian Police
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
VOWODA	Voinjama District Women Association
ZODOWCA	Zorzor District Women Care, Inc.

## 1.0 Executive Summary:

CHF International was awarded a Cooperative Agreement from USAID to implement the Locally Initiated Networks for Community Strengthening (LINCS) Program to support the building and strengthening of peace constituencies at the community and district level in Voinjama, Salayea, and Zorzor Districts in Lofa County. The LINCS Program was designed to respond to peacebuilding objectives of the Next Steps in Peace Program (NSPP). In an effort to meet these objectives, the program activities focused on strengthening and expanding constituencies for peace, mitigating conflict and violence, and addressing root causes and consequences of conflicts.

LINCS effectively started on May 3, 2004 and was originally scheduled to end on May 2, 2005; however, a 90-day no-cost extension was granted followed by a one-year Modification of Assistance, extending the program until August 2, 2006 (LINCS II). In August, 2006, CHF was granted an additional Modification of Assistance extending LINCS until December 31, 2006 (LINCS II Extension), with a subsequent Modification of Assistance granted to extend LINCS II until January 31, 2007

The program was designed to benefit an estimated 145,000 people in three districts (Voinjama, Salayea, and Zorzor District) of Lofa County.

The objective of the LINCS program was to achieve a reduction of violence in Lofa County and contribute to the peaceful return of internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, and ex-combatant reintegration, facilitation of reconciliation between ex-combatants and their families as well as their host communities. Through the development of Community Peace Councils (CPCs) and the training of members, the program was able to achieve positive results through support of CPCs and working with them to enhance and support reintegration, while also serving as key actors for resolving disputes and adjudicating perceived crimes. Under this program, CPC interventions also extended to mobilize communities' efforts towards peacebuilding and community development.

Through CHF's intervention in three districts in Lofa County – Voinjama, Salayea, and Zorzor – the program helped increase the capacity of Community Peace Councils, trained and empowered them to be active in sensitizing communities and the worked with them to address specific issues regarding returned IDPs, refugees and ex-combatants to their original communities, and settling community level disputes (e.g., ethnic disputes, domestic, land, etc.). Another objective of the LINCS program was to increase participation of all community members in community decision making and increased peaceful interaction among diverse ethnic groups and sometimes contentious religious and traditional groups within the communities.

With funding and support from USAID, the LINCS program increased the effectiveness and organization of district and county level peace constituencies and created mechanisms to facilitate communication between Community Peace Councils (CPCs) and other local and national leaders as well as UNMIL, UNCIVPOL and Liberia's new security forces.

This is the Final Report of the LINCS Program, covering the period from May 2004 through 31 January 2006.

## 2.0 Program Summary

### 2.1 Program Background

The LINCS program was designed to address issues of conflict in Lofa County, as well as work with communities in three districts - Voinjama, Salayea, and Zorzor – to revitalize effective leadership and build supportive social and economic networks in Lofa County. CHF International began the implementation of the Locally Initiated Networks for Community Strengthening (LINCS) program in May 2004, under a Cooperative Agreement awarded by USAID.

The implementation of the LINCS program focused primarily on providing support to build and strengthen peace constituencies at the community and district levels in 70 selected communities within Voinjama, Salayea, and Zorzor districts in Lofa County. Peace constituencies were strengthened and expanded and there was substantial mitigation of conflict, resulting in the reduction of violence among community members. The intervention of the program also addressed root causes and consequences of conflicts. LINCS effectively started on May 3, 2004 and was originally scheduled to end on May 2, 2005; however, a 90-day no-cost extension was granted followed by a one-year Modification of Assistance, extending the program until August 2, 2006 (LINCS II). Again in August, 2006, CHF was granted an additional Modification of Assistance extending LINCS until December 31, 2006, when the no-cost extension was approved for LINCS II Extension,. Another no-cost extension was granted until January 31, 2007

### 2.2 Program Goals and Objectives

**Goal:** The goal of LINCS program was supporting, building and strengthening peace constituencies at community and district levels in Voinjama, Zorzor and Salayea districts in Lofa County.

**Objectives:** The LINCS program was designed to respond to the following Objectives of the Next Steps in Peace Program (NSPP).

#### *Strengthen and expand constituencies for peace*

- Increase the effectiveness of peace-building constituencies at the local, district and county level.
- Strengthen democratic civil leadership with a vested interest in peace.
- Increase quantity, quality and timely delivery of communication on issues affecting national to local peacebuilding processes.
- Build capacity for local organizations to advocate for responsive national policies that contribute to peace.
- Provide logistical support for advocacy and collaboration.
- Assist community leadership groups to build inclusive and transparent management structures.

#### *Mitigating Conflict and Violence*

- Build and/or support local and county capacity for ongoing conflict mitigation, adjudication and peace building activities.
- Prepare communities and leadership for potential outbreaks of conflict and deal with the after effects of violent acts.
- Promote dialogue and collaboration among contentious ethnic groups.
- Build local capacity for reconciliation of all returnees.
- Assist democratic leadership to build skills and confidence in effectively managing community security and in reducing the impact of conflict.

- Build the effectiveness of traditional and culturally appropriate mechanisms for reconciliation.

#### *Address Causes and Consequences of Conflict*

- Facilitate peaceful resolution of property and resource claims.
- Build Lofa-based peace constituencies' ability to affect national decisions on resource allocation and management of extractive resources.
- Build Lofa-based Peace Constituencies' ability to affect national decisions on composition, structure, and civil leadership of reconstituted military and/or police.
- Build the number and quality of psycho-social assistance mechanisms in Lofa.

*Expected Results:* CHF expected to achieve the following results by the end of the program:

- Reduced violence in Lofa County;
- Peaceful return of internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, and ex-combatants;
- Facilitation of reconciliation between ex-combatants and their families;
- Facilitation of reconciliation between ex-combatants and their 'host' communities;
- Development of Community Councils, which can support reintegration, act to resolve disputes and adjudicate perceived crimes, and mobilize the community to work towards peace;
- Community Councils trained and active in sensitizing the community to addressing the special issues regarding returned ex-combatants;
- Increased participation by all community members in community decision making;
- Increased peaceful interaction among diverse, sometimes contentious groups within the community;
- Increased effectiveness and organization of district and county peace constituencies; and
- Creation of a mechanism to facilitate communication between Community Councils and other leaders with UNMIL, UNCIVPOL as well as the Government of Liberia's new security forces.

## 2.3 Synopsis of Program Closure

The LINCS program closed due to the expiration of cooperative agreement number 669-A-00-04-00009-00 between USAID and CHF International. During implementation of the program, the LINCS program made achievements in building Peace Constituencies and enhanced ex-combatant reintegration, as well as facilitated the return of IDPs and refugees. At the beginning of the program implementation phase, CHF was one of the first NGOs to work with local communities in building Peace Constituencies and mitigating conflict in Lofa County. The high return of refugees and IDPs population to Lofa County over the life of the program can also be attributed to the level of peacebuilding interventions conducted by CHF and the support of CHF's partner community initiatives for improved livelihoods. January 2007 completed the final phase of the LINCS program's implementation.

The numerous interventions and resolution of community based disputes by the CPCs and a high level of cooperation received from the community members including local leaders, Lofa and Monrovia based opinion leaders over the life of the program can also be attributed to the level of peacebuilding interventions made by CHF and the support of CHF and its implementing partners' initiatives to improve the skills of the community members and CPCs in conflict management and reconciliation.

## 3.0 LINCS Program Performance and Accomplishments Against Goals, Objectives, and Indicators

### 3.1 Program methodology:

CHF International's use of its *Participatory Action for Community Enhancement (PACE) Methodology*, developed internally over the past 12 years, has been effective in working with communities for participatory decision making. The LINCS program maximized the use of this methodology which has ensured acceptable administrative processes, public decision and adjudication processes. CHF International used the PACE methodology as a guiding tool consistently throughout the program, beginning during the program's initial assistance to community leaders to address the range of problems faced by their communities.

Consistent with the PACE Methodology, CHF International placed emphasis on the important roles women play in peacebuilding. Within the first weeks of the program, CHF International met separately with groups of women and young adults to ensure their involvement in all phases of the program. Over the life of the program, women have been very much engaged with implementation of program activities.

CHF International also utilized a broad range of methodologies complimentary to PACE, including Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) and focused discussion methodology for building community capacity for effective organization and action to build peace constituencies and mitigate conflict. The combined use of these methodologies helped to increase the communities' understanding and expanded community initiatives and peace building efforts in Lofa County. It also facilitated CHF's assistance to several organizations seeking assistance in reducing conflict, and enabled these organizations to work primarily through the Community Peace Councils and Peace Constituencies and helped support peace and development initiatives. The LINCS program supported a transparent and open selection process of these councils and helped create them where they did not exist.

### 3.2 Program Assessment

#### 3.2.1 *Baseline Assessment*

Before the start of the LINCS program, a rapid assessment of the situation was done in Salayea, and Zorzor districts of Lofa County. The assessment did not consider communities in Voinjama district because of inaccessibility of the area at the time. The assessment outlined some of the prominent conflict issues in Salayea, Zorzor and Voinjama districts. This assessment informed CHF about some potential conflict issues that could affect CHF's work in the county.

A purposeful sampling method enabled CHF to select communities for the assessment. Criteria included:

1. Commitment of local leaders and community members to democratic, inclusive and transparent decision making processes.
2. Demonstrated needs of community/destruction during conflict (though CHF will work with communities that experienced varying levels of relative destruction).
3. Potential for CHF to have substantial impact in community, especially on conflict management and peacebuilding.
4. Potential for effective adjudication and reconciliation activities to take place in community – community members' willingness to participate in such activities.
5. Anticipated level of refugee/IDP returns and community capacity to manage these returns.
6. Correlation between priorities, interests and needs of community and CHF programmatic objectives.

7. Willingness of community to share project responsibilities.
8. Potential for community to serve as a model for others (a “showcase” community).
9. Ability of community to function as a “trigger” community that will stimulate self-starting participatory activity in nearby communities.
10. Potential for leveraging local, national and international resources.

The communities selected were Borkeza, Fissebu, Gbanway, Kiliwu, Kpaiyea, Luyeama, Salayea, Sucromu, Wouzi, yarpuah, Yeala, Zuwulor and Zorzor. Focused group discussions and some structured interviews were conducted to gather information that informed CHF on the security status and conflict issues in the county. The assessment results also showed that in the areas where participants were interviewed, there were three (Kpelles, Lormas and Mandingos) major tribes residing of the areas prior to the war, with the Kpelles being the dominant tribe in Salayea district while the Lormas are dominant in Zorzor district. Mandingos were found to be a minority groups living in these districts. In Voinjama, the number of Mandingos was reported to be higher than in Salayea and Zorzor districts.

Before the war, Mandingos were traditionally perceived to be traders and temporary settlers, who were hosted by the people of Lofa. The assessment discovered that the intensity of the crisis produced many IDPS and refugees, with very scarce populations in the communities at the time serving as verifiable indicators. The assessment found that the LURD forces comprised a high proportion of Mandingos, During the conflict, LURD forces acted as a source of authority within the county.

The assessment also unveiled potential issues that would renew violence in Lofa County. These included issues of tribal conflict and intermarriages disputes, land disputes, issues of ex-combatants behavior toward returnees as well as dissatisfaction of ex-combatants, rights to and return of prewar property, leadership struggles, and revenge.

Based on these findings, CHF designed strategies for implementation of LINCS program activities.

### 3.2.2 *Beneficiary Selection*

CHF selected to work with three districts - Salayea, Zorzor & Voinjama districts in Lofa County. These districts were selected based on criteria set and results of the initial program assessment, coupled with the level of accessibility to these areas at the time and the population density in selected communities within these districts. The selection criteria also took into account the security condition in the areas, level of commitment by local leadership and citizens to the reintegration and reconciliation processes, and potential of the community to contribute meaningfully in reducing conflict in the region.

At the beginning of the program, the security situation was unstable in Lofa County because the area was still controlled by LURD militias. In spite of this, the districts of Zorzor, Salayea and Voinjama were quite accessible and there were opportunities to work through the existing structures, including beginning intervention processes for peacebuilding with the LURD rebel faction. Additionally, access to these areas was much better than the other districts of Kolahun, Vahun and Foya that are very far apart and had more logistical challenges.

### 3.2.3 *Formation of Community Peace Councils (CPCS)*

CHF International worked with its local partners and targeted communities to review the community selection criteria and explain the goals of the LINCS Program. LINCS program staff took into consideration the logistic challenges of transportation and weather to ensure that communities could

be accessed throughout the life of program. CHF worked with its local partners and the communities to identify existing groups and individuals in the communities who were believed to have ‘stakes in stability’ and were willing to work as volunteers in the community in support of the LINCS objectives.

Building upon existing leadership elements as appropriate, CHF International facilitated the creation of Community Peace Councils (CPCs) representative of all segments of the community, including: the community chief and other recognized leaders including Zoes<sup>1</sup>; women’s leaders; youth leaders; religious leaders; respected community elders (both men and women); and other members that villagers feel were necessary for adequate representation. The CPC selection process was both transparent and accountable. Communities themselves were asked to meet together in a public setting and elect a six to eight council members (which later expanded to twelve to allow for returnees to participate) of which a set number had to be female, youth, and where necessary, with representation of all tribes existing in the communities. Community leaders recognized the selection process as a collaborative effort with CHF staff and implementing partners.

By the end of December 31, 2006, there were 70 Community Peace Councils formed by the host communities. Up to January 2007, there were 70 CPCs comprised a total of 840 members. The composition of CPCs included tribal representation of Lormas (395), Mandingos (229) Kpelles (143) and other tribes (73). The CPCs’ role and understanding of community issues assisted greatly in helping CHF to understand most of the communities’ activities whether they were trainings, forums, workshops, or micro/livelihood projects. The CPCs also served as entry points into the communities for other INGOs, specifically the American Bar Association and Landmine Action (LMA), and conducted activities ranging from gender-based violence prevention and mitigation, identification and removal of small arms and unexploded ordinances, as well as health and sanitation interventions.

### 3.2.4 *CPC activities*

During the life of LINCS, CHF International provided guidance and technical trainings to the Community Peace Councils and other leaders, increasing their capacity to:

1. Improve cooperation and co-existence among groups within the community with a history of conflict
2. Enhance community capacity to manage potential conflicts;
3. Insert concepts of minority protection, human rights, and equal treatment into community activities;
4. Interface effectively with UNMIL and other international security bodies, the Government of Liberia, INGOs;
5. Develop or improve transparent and appropriate policies, procedures, and community programs;
6. Facilitate rehabilitation and reintegration processes.
7. Assist with the commencement of peacebuilding, counseling, and conflict mitigation activities;
8. Strengthen information collection and management skills (activities, projects, demographics, etc.);
9. Identify, prioritize, implement, maintain mobilize support for community micro and livelihood projects; and
10. Monitor infrastructure and conflict-reduction activities so potential conflicts are identified and resolved.

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<sup>1</sup> Zoes are spiritual and traditional leaders of sacred societies within the communities. These are people who are highly respected in the communities. These are people of either gender.

Overall, the CPCs' major activities included resolving disputes centered on domestic conflict including relationship issues, house spots,<sup>2</sup> and farm land. The CPCs were the initial managers of the conflict situation in the partner communities, mitigating conflict in a way that enabled communities to feel respected, while saving time and money compared to court cases that demanded heavily on their time and cash resources<sup>3</sup>.

### 3.2.5 *Construction of Community Centers*

CHF International's experience suggests that by implementing projects that offer tangible results, community-wide cooperation and involvement is enhanced. As such, CHF International supported 67 micro projects (under the first phase of LINCS) and 70 livelihood projects (under 'LINCS II') in CHF's 70 partner communities as a way to foster this collaboration and to boost the legitimacy of the CPCs, while improving livelihoods of targeted members participating in the livelihood project.. In addition, recognizing that in many communities most public infrastructure had been destroyed during the war, CHF International attempted to rehabilitate or construct 70 multi-use Community Centers to act as hubs for information sharing and discussion centers and a place for a wide range of activities to take place.

While the original plan for the Community Center initiatives was to build 15 large sized Centers in strategic communities ('5 in each districts'), CHF in collaboration with USAID decided that Community Centers would instead be built in each community due to the difficulty in selecting which communities would receive a Community Center.

At the time, it was anticipated that these Centers would serve certain purposes including: psycho-social assistance and family reconciliation services; meeting spaces for Community Councils and other community leadership; classrooms for literacy programs etc. Additionally, these centers were also intended to serve as areas for discussing a range of issues important to individuals in the community, such as substance abuse assistance and special problems of ex-combatants; a forum to promote revival of cultural exchanges. The centers were also earmarked to be used as a base of operation for CHF staff and LINCS partners that would support the range of needs of the communities in the LINCS Program area. In fact, the Community Centers proved to be central gathering points in many of the communities and were used in an even wider range of activities than originally expected such as workshop space for INGO and Local NGOs not participating in the LINCS program, LNCO activities, elections (voter registration and voting), places of worship and temporary health clinics and other community based meetings.

### 3.2.6 *Livelihood Projects and Community Entrepreneurial Grants:*

*Livelihood Projects:* Using CHF International's 'PACE' methodology, the CPCs with the support of CHF staff identified community oriented projects from which entire communities were intended to benefit. During the original phase of the LINCS project, community 'micro' projects focused on rice, 'local beans,' and peanuts production. During the second phase of LINCS (LINCS II), the range of projects identified by communities expanded significantly to include restocking of livestock (goats, cows, pigs, and sheep); livestock multiplication (goats, sheep, pigs and cows); as well as the production of cassava, eddoes and oil palm (under tree crops) nurseries, etc., and infrastructure projects (Clinic and school construction/ rehabilitation). The micro and livelihood projects and the community center construction projects all had significant community matching contribution components where communities were responsible to provide labor and various locally produced

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<sup>2</sup> "House Spot" is Liberian English vernacular referring to the plot of land upon which a house was or is built.

<sup>3</sup> It is customary in Liberia for both parties to pay the town chief for his services in settling a dispute.

materials, while CHF provided various tools, other inputs and incentives for skilled labor (masons and carpenters).

A principle of benefit was developed by CHF in consultation with the communities. This was confirmed by an MOU which was signed by all of the 70 communities that implemented livelihood projects.

*Community Entrepreneurial Grants:* In an effort to accelerate economic activity and create opportunities in CHF partner communities, CHF offered two \$100 Entrepreneurship Grants to each community, for 140 grants total. CHF field staff worked successfully to ensure that the grant opportunities were available to the widest number of applicants possible. Approximately 700 applications were distributed to the partner communities. In addition, CHF created an open and transparent selection process.

Large town hall meetings were conducted by CHF field teams in advance, which brought community members together to introduce the grant opportunities and review the grant application forms. CHF teams shared information that all community members were entitled to apply for the grants and that a committee comprised of two CHF staff, one CPC member and one non-CPC community member would decide who would be awarded the grants based on a developed set of weighted criteria. Grants awarded were based on the viability of current business(es) where there must be an accessible market and where people must want to purchase the product. The award of the grants also considered factors such as the communities' potential for income, the business knowledge of the group or individual and the ideas of how to make the business profitable, and the reflection of the items requested in the application within the budget. CHF also considered the individual or group's experience in the business favorably, although it was not a determinant.

### 3.2.7 *Peace Forums*

Under the LINCS program, the peace forum was initiated to address key conflict issues that affected the lives of people in flash point communities within Voinjama, Salayea and Zorzor districts in Lofa County. Implementation of the forum was an important aspect of the program because it helped increase the knowledge of CPCs of conflict issues, which, although primarily handled by the CPCs could not be mitigated as desired because of the link between these conflict issues with traditional means of intervention, which required inputs of prominent members of the communities living in other locations in Liberia and in neighboring Guinea. The peace forums created opportunities for dialogue and discussions among communities affected by conflict as a result of land, domestic, intermarriage and tribal indifferences that developed as a result of the civil crisis in Liberia.

Focus group discussions provided real time learning for CHF to understand issues of each of the flash point communities that participated in the forum. Multi-community discussions were narrowed down to inter-community dialogue and participants made informed decision and advanced critical resolutions for follow up implementation by the local communities themselves.

The forum was also designed to enable community members to resolve disputes among themselves and helped to forward a united peace front in Lofa County. The forum objectives were aimed at achieving the following:

1. Assisting communities affected by the conflict to identify long lasting issues that are of potential threat to peace in the affected communities.
2. Engage Monrovia and Guinea based “opinion leaders” in dialogue geared towards building peace between Mandingoes and Lormas, and Mandingos and Kpelle by facilitating a minimum of twenty eight (28) peace forums including community, national and county level forums in an effort to resolve long standing and complex disputes.

3. Work with flash point communities to continue to develop leaders in Lofa with capacity to speak out, advocate, and generate opportunities to make their voices heard in an effort to mitigate conflict.

CHF identified local and national leaders, elders, zoes, opinion and community leaders from Monrovia, Guinea, and individual flash-point communities to participate in the community, county and national level forums.

One major output of the forum was that it helped communities to hold dialogue and discussion sessions. These dialogues and discussion sessions helped address problems of tribalism and helped to inform all concerned parties about measures to take to ensure a marked reduction in tensions as much as possible. The joint interventions to make common agreement regarding developing actions points to address these issues served as indicators for reduced ethnic tensions. CHF also identified traditional conflict resolution practices, structures and capacities that contributed meaningfully to the peacebuilding process in Lofa County

### 3.2.8 *Trainings*

CHF international realized that providing training(s) to local communities in areas of peacebuilding, conflict resolution, ex-combatant re-integration, psychosocial awareness, community policing, conflict mediation, livelihood and micro-project management training(s) as well as the management of small entrepreneur grants was essential to building the capacity of community members to deliver sophisticated conflict mitigation services at community levels and effectively implement community livelihood support projects.

CHF International utilized local capacity to support the establishment of CPCs. Implementing partners included: Zorzor District Women Care (ZODWOCA), the Lutheran Trauma Healing and Reconciliation Program (LTHRP), the Foundation for Human Rights and Democracy (FOHRD), the National Ex-Combatant Peacebuilding Initiative (NEPI), Liberian Institute for Success Technologies and Leadership Studies (LISTALS), and the National Psycho-Social Rehabilitation and Human Rights (NAPRHR). CHF International worked successfully through these partners to provide technical trainings, workshops, and forums in the areas of conflict mediation, peace building and reconciliation, human rights, community policing and security, trauma healing, and leadership to the CPCs, other community leaders and ordinary citizens.

Before the commencement of program implementation in the field, CHF field staff received training from the Liberian chapter of the regionally based organization - Mano River Union Women Peace Network (MAWOPNET) and their allied organization, Liberia Women Initiative (LWI) in conflict resolution and conflict management. The capacity building workshop for CHF staff was essential to the support of the Community Peace Councils and conflict mitigation and prevention activities. CHF's support was central to the beginning and strengthening of the CPC activities through provision of direct trainings in conflict mitigation and resolution. CHF complemented this training through regular monitoring activities.

## **4.0 Achievements Against Objectives**

### **4.1 Formation of CPCs and Conflict Mitigation efforts by CPC**

Over the life of the program, 70 Community Peace Councils (CPCs) were formed in Salayea, Zorzor, and Voinjama districts in Lofa County. The break down of CPCs per district is as follows: Salayea (15), Zorzor (16) and Voinjama (39). Voinjama is the largest district in Lofa county and had the most communities under the program. There is representation of all tribes and efforts were made to ensure a gender and youth balance on all the CPCs formed. Ex-combatants were also represented on the CPCs. As large populations returned to their communities of origin from IDP and refugee camps, new relationships were forged between town chiefs, members of the CPCs, and community members. Efforts were made by CHF to integrate members of the returned population into the CPC. (*Please see Table 4 of CPCs formed and membership composition*).

To address issues relating to the possibility of conflict in or between communities, CHF/LINCS staff worked with the Community Peace Councils to devise effective and appropriate mechanisms to identify potential tensions and defuse them before they resulted in actual violence.

CHF and its implementing partners provided advice and guidance on how to best approach conflict situations and provide timely intervention as needed. Mechanisms were put in place which allowed the Community Peace Councils and the LINCS team to track activities and/or conflicts while ensuring that issues were addressed and resolved in a timely fashion, satisfactorily to all parties involved. The emphasis on support to CPCs and community leaders was intended to define roles and responsibilities of CPCs and implement conflict management activities, in a more democratic manner to ensure justice for affected parties.

During the life of the program, CHF made efforts to re-visit the composition of CPCs in order to ensure that there was a balance of all ethnic groups within partner communities, and also to prevent minority representation on the CPC of any of the tribes within the communities. This decision resulted in the expansion of the CPCs to include twelve members from the original six. For example, Mandingos and members of other non Lorma and Kpelle tribes were given an opportunity to be adequately represented on the CPC.

During the program period, CPCs took initiative and ownership in resolving and preventing conflicts in their respective communities. Over the life of the program, a total of 951 disputes were resolved by CPCs, including domestic, ethnic, house spots and farm land disputes. Over the life of program, CPC reported that their members frequently intervened and resolved marital and domestic disputes, often involving violent behavior of husbands toward their wives. (*Please see Table 2 for breakdown of disputes*.)

The volunteer commitment which CPC members put into CHF activities over the two years gradually led to fatigue on the side of the CPC due to the lack of financial compensation to CPCs. In addition, the continuous demand for compensation to perform their responsibilities as CPC members, including attending trainings, led CHF staff and implementing partners to question the level of commitment of the CPC members to the program.

#### **4.1.1 Community Visits by CHF:**

During the life of the program, a total of 3,131 monitoring visits were made. A total of 1,734 monitoring visits to partner communities were made to follow up on CPC activities and 1397 monitoring visits were made to follow up on activities carried out by members of Project Management Committees.

Regular meetings were held with the CPCs to follow up on disputes mitigated and/or resolved by them. CHF field staff followed up on conflict issues identified and mitigated by CPCs and provided guidance and trainings to the various CPC members upon request for assistance. These visits helped motivate the CPCs to continue their work as peacebuilders and encouraged their continued engagement in community issues and dialogue with their peers. During these visits, the field staff also provided coaching and mentoring support to the CPCs.

On the other hand, the Livelihood Project Officers made follow up visits to communities to work with PMCs and community members that implemented livelihood project activities. During these visits, efforts made by CHF program field staff accelerated the work of CPCs and PMCs to effectively manage the project implementation. Additionally, CHF field staff provided guidance and “hands-on” training and mentoring support to increase the capacities of CPCs and PMCs to use best practices in management of the livelihood project implementation. This helped to strengthen the level of collaboration and coordination among CPCs and PMCs. It was observed that such visits encouraged PMCs and CPCs to be more proactive in engaging community residents on issues affecting their lives and continue dialogue with their peers to use various skills learned to resolve conflict issues.

Table 1. Summary CPC formations:

Program Period	Indicators ( Summed over LOP)	LOP Target	Results over LOP	% Achieved (LOP)
LINCS I, II & II ext	Number of peace councils formed Form (70 CPCs )	70	70	100%
	<b>Total</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>100%</b>

Table 2: CPC activities against targeted deliverables

Program Phase	Indicators	Results Achieved	
Phase I (LINCS I)	Number of CPC meetings with CHF participation	528	
	Number of CPC meetings held without CHF participation	38	
	<b>Total meetings</b>	<b>566</b>	
	<i>Breakdown of disputes of total disputes resolved in LINCS I</i>		
	<i>Land Disputes</i>		
	--- Farm land	12	
	--- House Spots	38	
	--- Inter Community land	1	
	--- Non Specified land issues	15	
	<b>Total Land</b>	<b>66</b>	
	<i>Domestic Disputes</i>		
	---- Relationship	111	
	---- Fighting	4	
	---- GBV (related to husband abusing wife)	2	
	---- Conflict settled with regards to property theft (especially relating to properties hidden during the war)	17	
	Conflict settled with regards to issues with Ex-combatants	17	

	<b>Total Domestic Disputes</b>	<b>151</b>
	Others	
	a) Ethnic conflicts settled ( <i>especially among people of different tribal groups lining in the same community</i> )	1
	b) Others conflict settled ( <i>conflict issues not related to any of the above</i> )	42
	<b>Total disputes (Others)</b>	<b>43</b>
	<b>GRAND TOTAL DISPUTES SETTLED DURING LINCS 1 PERIOD</b>	<b>260</b>

		Target	Results Achieved	% Achieved	
LINCS II	CPC Meetings with CHF participation	-	965	-	
	CPC Meetings without CHF participation	500	318	64%	
	<b>Total meetings</b>	<b>500</b>	<b>1283</b>	-	
	<i>Breakdown of disputes resolved in LINCS II</i>				
	--- Farm land		10		
	--- House Spots		7		
	--- Inter Community land		4		
	--- Non Specified land issues		97		
	<b>Indicators</b>			<b>Results Achieved</b>	<b>%</b>
	Domestic				
	---- Relationship			267	
	---- Fighting			8	
	---- GBV ( <i>related to husband abusing wife</i> )			3	
	---- Conflict settled with regards to property theft ( <i>especially relating to properties hidden during the war</i> )			20	
	Conflict settled with regards to issues with Ex-combatants			31	
	<b>Total Domestic Disputes</b>			<b>319</b>	
	Others			<b>Results</b>	
	a) Ethnic conflicts settled ( <i>especially among people of different tribal groups lining in the same community</i> )			19	
	b) Others conflict settled ( <i>conflict issues not related to any of the above</i> )			95	
	<b>Total disputes (Others)</b>			<b>114</b>	
			<b>Target</b>	<b>Results Achieved</b>	<b>% Achieved</b>
	<b>GRAND TOTAL DISPUTES SETTLED DURING LINCS II PERIOD</b>		<b>300</b>	<b>551</b>	<b>183%</b>
	Phase II ext (LINCS II Ext!)	CPC Meetings with CHF Participation	-	241	-
CPC Meetings without CHF participation		250	75	30%	

	Total meetings		316	
		Target	Results Achieved	% Achieved
<i>Breakdown of disputes resolved in LINCS II ext.</i>				
--- Farm land			2	
--- House Spots			19	
--- Inter Community land			3	
--- Non Specified land issues			9	
<b>Total Land</b>			<b>33</b>	
<i>Domestic Disputes</i>				
---- Relationship			68	
---- Fighting			5	
---- GBV (related to husband abusing wife)			21	
--- Conflict settled with regards to property theft (esp. relating to properties hidden during the war)			2	
Conflict settled with regards to issues with Ex-combatants			1	
<b>Total Domestic Disputes</b>			<b>97</b>	
Others				
a) Ethnic conflicts settled (especially among people of different tribal groups lining in the same community)			2	
b) Others conflict settled (conflict issues not related to any of the above)			8	
<b>Total disputes (Others)</b>			<b>10</b>	
<b>GRAND TOTAL DISPUTES SETTLED DURING LINCS II PERIOD</b>		<b>150</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>93%</b>

Table 3. Summary chart of disputes:

Program Period	Indicator (Cumulative over LOP)	LOP Target	Results over LOP	% Achieved (LOP)
LINCS I, II & II ext	CPC Meetings with CHF participation	1,680 <sup>4</sup>	1,734	103%
	CPC Meetings without CHF participation	250	431	172%
	<b>Total meetings</b>	<b>1,930</b>	<b>2,165</b>	<b>112%</b>
	Total Disputes Resolved in the life of LINCS		<b>951</b>	

Table 4: Composition of CPC Members disaggregated by tribe

Program Phase	Membership			Disaggregated by Tribe							
	Target	Results Achieved	% Achieved	No of Kpelles	% Achieved	No of Lormas on CPCs	%	No of Mandingos on CPC	% Achieved	No of other Tribes on CPC	%
Voinjama District	468	468	100%	1	0.21%	191	41%	203	43%	73	16%
Salayea District	168	168	100%	121	72%	43	26%	4	2%	0	0%
Zorzor District	204	204	100%	21	10%	161	79%	22	11%	0	0%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>840</b>	<b>840</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>17%</b>	<b>395</b>	<b>47%</b>	<b>229</b>	<b>56%</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>16%</b>

<sup>4</sup> This assumes one monitoring visit per month per community over a 24 month period (1\*70\*24=1,680)

## 4.2 Theater/Drama Performances

Drama performances were implemented during the second phase of the LINCS program. The Flomo Theater Production (FTP) group is widely recognized in Liberia for the promotion and dissemination of peacebuilding messages using traditional, local cultural approaches into its work.

CHF supported initiatives for assessments and the results highlighted the need to address issues related to ex-combatants and returnees to the communities, as well as issues of ethnic conflict.

CHF’s partnership with the FTP ensured messages promoting peace building, preservation of Liberian cultural heritage, ensuring civic education, and advocating for community development through theater, were in line with the objectives of LINCS. The implementation of drama performances also ensured dissemination of trauma healing and reconciliation messages and information. The initiative contributed meaningfully towards educating the community members and enabled them to participate actively in community level peacebuilding initiatives.

With support from CHF, FTP conducted thirty drama & peace performances targeting CHF partner communities in Lofa County. The drama performances involved a re-creation of actual events in each of the respective communities. These performances were participatory and tailored the content of peacebuilding, trauma healing, and reconciliation messages and opened a broader avenue for discussions and dialogue where they told stories about their experiences during the war and how they felt about their return home, and what they hoped to see in the peacebuilding process.

CHF’s experience shows that this innovative theater based approach offered an opportunity for community members to speak out, and broke the “culture of silence” that existed long before the war. This offered community members, especially women who had less chances to be heard publicly, the opportunity to state their opinions and views.

Table 5: Drama Performances against targeted deliverables

Program Phase	Activity	Target	Results Achieved	% Achieved	Total Participants	Number of participants gender <sup>5</sup>			
						W'men	% Achieved	Men	% Achieved
Phase I (LINCS I)									
Phase II (LINCS II)	Drama performances Workshops	7-10	30	300%	6,226	762	12%	464	7%
Phase II ext (LINCS II Ext)									
<b>Total</b>		<b>10</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>300%</b>	<b>6,226</b>	<b>762</b>	<b>12%</b>	<b>464</b>	<b>7%</b>

## 4.3 Construction of Community Centers

<sup>5</sup> Due to irregular reporting by communities, the number of participants in theater productions is known. However, the breakdown by gender was not conducted systematically.

The construction and renovation of community centers in CHF partner communities was an initiative that provided the communities with a meeting hall to accommodate community members, including the CPCs and Town Chiefs, during public meetings.

The community centers were used for multiple purposes including:

- Meeting space for the CPCs and town chiefs to resolve conflicts, to discuss livelihood projects with PMCs, and to engage in general community development;
- Workshops and trainings led by CHF LINCS and other NGOs operating in the area;
- National voter and civic education, voter registration, and voting;
- Temporary classroom for returnees and other community children
- Temporary lodging for returnees;
- Social events such as traditional weddings and cultural performances
- Places of worship, prayer houses, churches, and mosques;
- Meetings with NGOs, and a place to receive special guests;
- Shelter for mobile clinic activities

Communities made matching contributions in kind, of locally available materials and labor. CHF provided the communities with materials (zinc roofing, or sheet roofing tiles, nails, cement and paints, etc) that they did not have the capacity to procure locally. CHF also provided cash support that covered payment of skilled-labor services. To date, sixty-eight (68) out of seventy CHF partner communities in Lofa County completed the construction of their community centers. The challenges were in Lawalazu (Voinjama District) and Borkeza (Zorzor district). In Lawalazu, the community centers were not completed due to lack of community commitment. In Borkeza, the community center was not constructed due to a lack of commitment.

Borkeza was a tremendous challenge for CHF in terms of community center construction. CHF field teams worked tirelessly to motivate the community members to build the center but these efforts did not meet with success. After two years of efforts, there was some momentum by the community members to build the Community Center but this momentum did not last and the center was never built.

Table 6: Community Centers Construction projects

Program Phase	Deliverables	Target	Results Achieved	% Achieved
Phase I (LINCS I)	Community Center Construction	15	58	386%
Phase II (LINCS II) & LINC II EXT	Community Center Construction	10	10	100%
<b>Total</b>	<b>25</b>		<b>68</b>	<b>460%</b>

#### **4.4 Micro projects Support**

In addition to CHF's support building the CPCs' capacity to effectively mitigate conflict, the need for activities that promoted community cohesiveness for positive co-existence became evident. To adequately address this, CHF launched and implemented micro projects in its partner communities. The micro projects were designed to strengthen unity among community members and provide an opportunity for power sharing opportunities. Participants were able to learn new leadership skills and they appreciated the value and contributions that team work made in ensuring community cohesiveness. The micro projects support also provided opportunities for sharing and participating community members learned added skills for proper project management and record keeping.

The micro projects provided livelihood support to the 70 communities and also made tremendous impact in getting community members to discuss common conflict issues affecting their lives and taking actions to properly address the issues and solve them amicably. Communities adapted very quickly to working together and realized that team work was a sure way to fulfill ones' sense of belonging. They also recognized that team work helped them to complement each others' efforts. Additionally, these projects bridged some gaps in terms of providing basic livelihood support to help communities move forward in the midst of the burdened socio economic status of people.

Table 7. Micro projects Implemented

Program Phase	Deliverables	Target	Results Achieved	% Achieved
Phase I (LINCS I)	Implement 70 Micro Projects	70	69	100
Phase II (LINCS II)				
Phase II ext (LINCS II Ext!)				
<b>Total</b>		<b>70</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>99%</b>

*\*\* 39 Micro projects were completed in Voinjama district and 30 Micro projects were completed in Salayea & Zorzor districts*

#### **4.5 Livelihood Projects Support**

The Livelihood Projects were added to the second phase of the LINCS program to directly address critical needs in the LINCS communities and to strengthen community cohesion, advance reconciliation, and build local leadership capacity. CHF used its PACE participatory methodology to help the communities identify a diverse range of community oriented livelihood projects, Project types ranged from animal husbandry to food and tree crop development and extended to market renovation and construction of a three classroom school building as support to community initiatives.

CHF's Livelihood Specialists provided “hands-on“ training, mentoring, and technical support. At the beginning of the livelihood projects, project management committees were formed including the CPCs and members from the wider communities. Upon the formation of the PMCs, CHF required the various CPC representatives and town chiefs to sign Memorandums of Understandings to minimize potential future conflicts that may arise from the livelihood projects.

PMCs carried out activities for the day-to-day management of the projects. In collaboration with community representatives, the PMCs ensured accountability for the distribution of farm implements, and allocation of post-harvest yield as planned. As part of the initiatives of the livestock projects, the PMC ensured that animals were bred so that a substantial level of multiplication would take place before allocation as planned. For each livelihood project, the work force comprised of between 30 and 60 community members. Community work groups coordinated their work so that groups were put into teams and these teams worked on the project on scheduled days to make sure that work was regularly done on the project.

As part of the leadership development process, CHF provided PMC members, as well as various community members, with training on how to effectively manage and maintain the range of projects which were implemented. These trainings made substantial improvements in the leadership and

management skills of PMC members and also helped CPCs, take on additional responsibilities that ensured an increase in self help initiatives and a more positive trend in the peacebuilding process.

A major challenge for CHF staff was to mobilize communities to work on community oriented projects. Community members had a history of working almost exclusively as individual subsistence farmers for their own families on their own plots of farm land. As a result, the communities had not experienced the benefits of combined labor in developing larger scale and more efficient community projects. It is interesting to note that with the development of the livelihood support, the people participating in these projects became more interested in working in teams. CHF staff regularly monitored the projects to track progress of implementation and to ensure projects were completed on time.

#### *a) Rice Projects*

In April, 2006, Lofa County authorities recognized CHF's significant contribution to the livelihoods of the communities where LINCS was implemented. They noted that CHF made an immense contribution to the development of the agriculture sector. The Superintendent pointed out that CHF was among leading International NGOs that provided seed rice to farmers in Voinjama, Salayea and Zorzor Districts. In an effort to efficiently address the acute shortage of seed rice due to import restrictions from Guinea, rather than procuring seed rice from neighboring Guinea as most INGOs had done, CHF procured seed rice from local farmers of neighboring Bong county.

CHF supported rice projects in nine of its seventy communities. Five of these projects were lowland (swamp) rice projects. The lowland rice projects are considered to be the most efficient form of subsistence rice farming in Lofa County. Given Lofa County's former status as the breadbasket of Liberia due to its high concentration of subsistence and low land farmers, especially in Voinjama and Foya districts, lowland rice projects provide the most promising future for many community members in the area. CHF trained some of the livelihood (rice) project community members in swamp development techniques and best practices to enable them cultivate swamps using improved methods and cultural practices. Building skills of these low land farmers and monitoring the yields was a major activity during the LINCS extension phase.

#### *b) Livestock Projects*

The largest percentage of livelihood projects requested was animal husbandry or livestock re-stocking. In spite of the requests for livestock, CHF Livelihood staff noted the communities' inexperience of using improved animal husbandry methods to manage livestock. As such, while the livestock procurement process was on-going, CHF Livelihood Specialists prepared and implemented 24 on-site leadership and animal husbandry workshops within twenty-four communities that implemented livestock projects. This initiative was carried out in collaboration with the Technical and Veterinarian section of the Ministry of Agriculture.

CHF prepared for the sizeable livestock projects by working with communities to construct four quarantine sites in selected communities. These quarantine sites were also used as animal assessment locations. At the quarantine sites, the animals were observed for at least two to three weeks. During this time, they were also vaccinated and certification was given by the staff of the Veterinarian Services unit of Ministry of Agriculture (MOA). Animals were distributed to the communities once the MOA staff gave the certificate of good health. Based on the advice of the MOA technical expert, CHF worked with volunteer community labor to build shelters for the livestock project to house and protect the animals.

Several of the animals died after being delivered to the communities due to lack of proper care combined with stress on the animals. CHF acted immediately by isolating and quarantining at-risk animals, and contacting all the relevant authorities including the MOA and Ministry of Health County

Health Team in Lofa to assess any public health threat. The MOA worked rapidly with CHF to investigate the causes of death and to assess any public health threat. The MOA report indicated that there was no public health threat and that CHF reacted appropriately in disposing of the animal remains. CHF worked closely with the MOA to revise the livestock procurement process and the quarantine process.

*Note: The tables listed below ( 8 & 9 ) display the status of the projects for all 70 communities*

Table 8. Livelihood Projects Implemented

Program Phase	Deliverables	Target	Results Achieved	% Achieved
Phase I (LINCS I)				
Phase II (LINCS II)				
Phase II ext (LINCS II Ext!)	Implement livelihood projects	70	70	100%
<b>Total</b>		<b>70</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>100%</b>

*\*\* 39 livelihood projects were conducted in Voinjama district and 31 were conducted in Salayea & Zorzor districts*

Table 9: Category of livelihood projects implemented during program

Program Phase	Deliverables	Target	Results Achieved	% Achieved
Phase II ext (LINCS II Ext!)	Implement 70 livelihood projects	70	70	100%
<b>Total</b>		<b>70</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>100%</b>
Breakdown of category of livelihood project support				
A . Agriculture ( farming/vegetable garden projects)				
----- Rice farms			9	
----- Beans farms			5	
----- Vegetable gardens			1	
----- Tuber farms (cassava, Eddoes, Yam etc)			9	
----- Tree Crops (Oil Palm)			6	
<b>Sub Total</b>			<b>30</b>	
B. Livestock Projects				
----- Goats			27	
----- Pigs			7	
----- Cows			2	
<b>Sub Total</b>			<b>36</b>	
C. Construction /Rehabilitation				
----- School construction			1	
----- Health Post Rehabilitation			1	
----- Market Hall rehabilitation			1	
<b>Sub Total</b>			<b>3</b>	
<b>D. Income Generation – Soap Production</b>				
<b>Total</b>			<b>70</b>	

*\*\* Figures represent projects implemented in Voinjama, Zorzor & Salayea districts*

*c) Livelihood Workshops*

During the last phase of the LINCS program, (70) livelihood workshops were conducted in the CHF partner communities in Voinjama, Zorzor and Salayea districts. A total of 1883 participants, including 1078 male, 805 female, 297 youth, 405 CPC members, and 599 PMC members attended the workshops.

Livelihood project workshops were conducted to increase the knowledge and skills of PMCs and community members in basic project management. These trainings ranged from leadership and project management, technical aspects of the projects, to low land farming techniques and livestock management. Major areas highlighted during these workshops included understanding the value of raising animals, selection of good animal breeds and preparing for the day to day management of livestock, including feeding, regular care, and managing pregnant animals and young. The other aspect of the workshops focused on best practices for food crop production

Table10. Livelihood Project trainings Conducted

Program Phase	Objective	Target	Results Achieved	% Achieved	Total participants				Percentage of participants per Category			
					Target	Results achieved	% Achieved	Total Number of Participants	Targeted % of women	% Achieved	Targeted % of Youth	% Achieved
Phase I (LINCS I)												
Phase II (LINCS II)												
Phase II Ext (LINCS Ext!)	Number of Livelihood project trainings conducted	70	70	100%	1400	1883	134%	1883	30% (# =805)	43%	30% (# = 297)	16%
<b>Total</b>		<b>70</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>1400</b>	<b>1883</b>	<b>134%</b>	<b>1883</b>	<b>805</b>	<b>43%</b>	<b>1078</b>	<b>57%</b>

**4.6 Community Entrepreneurship Grants**

In the LINCS II phase of the program, CHF implemented small scale entrepreneurship grants projects for each CHF partner community. The goal of the grants was to stimulate economic livelihood opportunities in each of the participating communities. These were two modest \$100 entrepreneurship grants per community (140 grants in total). CHF field staff worked successfully to ensure that the grant opportunities were made available to the widest number of applicants as possible.

Outcome of monitoring visits showed that recipients utilized these grants in a wide range of businesses including ‘petty trade’. Some of the items were sold in a weekly market stall such as seed rice, beans and tools for farming, soap making materials, items for oil production and sale, sugar, kerosene and furniture making, tailoring, bakery, blacksmithing items, etc.

Table 11. Entrepreneur Grants (Livelihood) Projects Implemented

Program Phase	Deliverables	Target	Results Achieved	% Achieved
Phase I (LINCS I)				
Phase II (LINCS II)				
Phase II ext (LINCS II Ext!)	Implement 140 entrepreneur grants	140	140	100%
<b>Total</b>		140	140	100%

#### **4.7 Regional Reconciliation & Peace Forums**

During the life of the project, a total of 31 peace forums were held in different communities in Lofa County, including participants from Voinjama, the capital of the county and citizens of flash points communities residing in Monrovia and Guinea. A total of 820 persons participated in all of the forums conducted over the period. These forums also brought together CPC members, town chiefs, paramount chiefs, elders, youth, and women leaders. These participants were able to directly address the conflict issues identified and then recommended resolutions to CHF.

CHF facilitated the Peace Forums from community, county, and national levels by bringing stake holders face to face to discuss their community disputes together with the peace councils, community opinion leaders, town chiefs, and elected authorities from Lofa County.

Some action points developed during this forum included the following:

- Information on timing of cultural practices should be shared among all community members in order to provide an opportunity for communities to respect each others' cultural and religious practices.
- Land ownership should be open to everyone born and living in the respective communities as well as those who acquired land or house spots through other 'traditional means'. Illegal occupants of house spots should be relocated in the same community as a way of encouraging peace and harmony.
- All non-community members wishing to stay in a community must register with the town chief through their hosts.
- Community members wishing to settle in other quarters of the same community must go through the traditional method of settlement in a quarter.
- All 'strangers' (non-community members) settling in communities with the elders and town chief approval shall be permitted to farm rice on community land but are not entitled to plant live trees without the approval of the chiefs, landlords, and elders of the community.
- General acceptance that ex-combatants of Lofa County be granted amnesty and be allowed to reintegrate in their original communities, develop skills, set up businesses, and conduct normal farming activities in their communities.

Each forum lasted for two days and helped to develop a set of guidelines and recommendations under which communities would continue to move forward peacefully with the support from local county authorities to properly address the recommendations made from the forums.

A national level peace forum was conducted in December, 2006 to conclude the peace forums under the program. The national forum brought together representatives and opinion leaders from the flashpoint communities of the Zorzor, Salayea and Voinjama districts in Lofa County and also brought together Lofa citizens residing in Monrovia. In attendance at this forum were also prominent Lofa

County citizens residing in Monrovia and a Lofa County citizen serving as member of on National Legislature. The two days discussion ended with recommendations that were compiled into an agreement which was signed by representatives of each community and ethnic group. The agreements were also shared with Lofa County Representatives on the National Legislature and the Lofa County administrative authorities to enable them to provide support for implementation. Copies of these forum documents were also given to other stake holders that collaborated with CHF in carrying out peace building initiatives in Lofa County.

Major issues highlighted during the forum included the following:

*Revenge:* The issue of revenge was as a major source of conflict where one ethnic group retaliated against the other upon reflection of what each did to the other during the civil conflict. With the implementation of the forums, there is a drastic change in the communities and these ethnic groups that were against each other can now hold dialogue sessions with each other – to discuss issues that jointly affect them in the communities.

*Abuse of cultural Norms:* Abuse of sacred traditional practices valued by the Lormas has been a sticky issue discussed during the forums. The Lormas have often accused the Mandingos of not respecting these values. Conversely, Mandingoes accused the Lorma of disrespecting their religious values. The destruction of traditional shrines and mosques were indicators of such violence. The result of these forums has enabled members of these ethnic groups (Mandingo, Lormas and Kpelles) to understand that to co-exist with each other in a positive way requires respect for the traditional practices and cultural values of the other. The implementation of some action points developed jointly by members of these ethnic groups has to a great extent curbed the issue of abuse of cultural norms, religious and traditional practices

*Land disputes:* Land (house spots and farm land) disputes in the seventeen flash point communities have been a major cause of conflict between the Mandingo, Kpelles and Lorma communities. The Mandingos being the minority are concerned about provision of equal assess to all farm and other community land in Lofa County. Although the forum has greatly created opportunities to discuss this issue, it still remains a major concern of the communities.

The issue of land ownership was important to all of the ethnic groups (Mandingos, Kpelles and Lormas) concerned. Hence, participation of the land commissioner in the national forum conducted in December 2006, helped to provide information to the forum participants about land distribution and ownership. Although addressed in general, it remains a fact that the Lofa County authority had to follow up with communities to ensure that they work together in harmony in order to address land ownership issues.

CHF support to CPCs has enabled them to efficiently settle disputes and coupled with the outcome of the peace forums, there is an increase in communities' efforts to resolve conflict issues arising from land ownership. People in these communities now have their own guiding rules about reclaiming property to allow the rightful property owners (these who owned said property before the war) to have adequate access to and ownership of their properties. In many CHF partner communities, the relocation of illegal squatters and the return of land to its pre-war owners is a direct result of mediation by CPCs provided to property owners.

The members of the flash point communities will collaborate closely with the county authorities and opinion leaders to address actions points for the communities to implement in order to enhance peace co-existence among adversarial ethnic groups in the communities.

*Abuse of cultural Norms:* “Disrespect of sacred practices” was commonly identified as a major cause of conflict between the Mandingos and Lorma. During the war, the Mandingo factions engaged in

‘exposing the Lorma culture’ by entering the sacred shrines which is intended only to be seen by members of a secret society (Poro and Sande). Sacred shrines were desecrated, an act unforgivable according to the standards of the Poro and Sande societies.

During the assessment period, the Lorma complained that the Mandingo youth do not respect the coming out of the bush devil by refusing to go indoors during the time that the “devil” is seen. Mandingos counter that they are not informed when the devil is to appear and in some instances refer to offensive acts once they have actually agreed to go inside. Mandingos also claim that many atrocities committed by the Lorma fighters occurred while being forced ‘indoors’ to avoid exposure to the Lorma ‘bush devil’. CHF’s Conflict mitigation efforts including the peace forums have now helped to provide chances for the two ethnic groups to fully discuss these issues.

*Citizenship:* Mandingo respondents complained of discrimination, saying that despite the fact that Mandingos are one of the sixteen ethnic groups of Liberia, they are often told by some community members that they are foreigners. Further complicating the issue, some Lormas claim that their fore fathers were the original owners of the land the Mandingos now claim, hence the rights of the Mandingos to ownership and citizenship is limited. Many Lorma repeatedly explained that their ancestors only allowed the Mandingos (many of whom were traders) to settle temporarily as guests, and conduct their trade. The forum had helped to explain the clear meaning of who a citizen is according to the Liberian constitution. Like any other Liberian, Mandingos born in Liberia are considered citizens only if they do not claim citizenship of the country(ies) from which either of their parents originated. This explanation helped to inform communities on the issue of citizenship.

*Follow Up:* Although the LINCS program is closed, CHF has put in place mechanisms to follow up with flash point communities that attended the forums to ensure that they work with their community members to move the process forward to address issues in the recommendations and implement action points that were developed to ensure lasting peace and avoid ethnic or religious conflict. Currently, CHF has two field offices and field coordinators who are working with ten communities within the previous LINCS program operational areas. CHF continues to maintain its presence in Lofa County to ensure sustainability of the program efforts.

Table12: Peace Forums against targeted deliverables

Program Phase	Activity	Target	Results Achieved	% Achieved	Participation <sup>6</sup>				# of Recommendations made	
					Total Participants	Women	% Total	Men		% Total
Phase I (LINCS I)	Community, district, county, and national forums	-	9	-	361	68	18%	197	55%	-
Phase II (LINCS II)	Community, county, and national level forums	7-10	7	100%	1,022	429	42%	629	62%	54
Phase II ext (LINCS II Ext!)	Community, county, and national level forums	15	15	100%	1,078	338	31%	740	69%	248
<b>Total</b>		<b>25</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>170%</b>	<b>2,461</b>	<b>835</b>	<b>91%</b>	<b>1566</b>	<b>186%</b>	<b>302</b>

<sup>6</sup> Due to irregular reporting by communities, the number of participants in theater productions is known. However, the breakdown by gender was not conducted systematically.

Table 13: Category of participants attending Peace forums.

Total Attendance per of participants		Representation of tribes in forums <sup>7</sup>			
Program Phase	Results Achieved	No of Kpelles	No of Mandingos	No of Lormas	No of other Tribes
Phase I (LINCS I)	361	0	46	29	0
Phase II (LINCS II)	1,022	86	134	313	81
Phase II ext (LINCS II Ext)	1,078	91	90	88	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,461</b>	<b>177</b>	<b>270</b>	<b>430</b>	<b>82</b>

#### 4.8 Youth Support Activities

*Youth Focused Forum:* A total of 15 youth focused activities were implemented during LINCS. These included a number of county, district and community level youth forums organized in support of these youth focused activities. CHF also supported numerous sporting events and theatre performances to complement youth focused activities.

Many youths were key players in combat activities during the civil crisis in Liberia. Given the involvement of youth in the conflict and the important roles of youth in ensuring peace and security – important factors for development of Liberia, CHF sponsored a number of activities which focused on addressing the challenges that youth face on a daily basis in post-conflict Liberia. Activities commonly focused on issues related to ex-combatant reintegration and working with them to understand the causes and consequences of conflict and trauma. CHF targeted the most at-risk youth and youth groups from ethnic groups that are often at odds with others in the community. The youth activities helped the youth to preserve their self image and they contributed immensely to the recovery process, thus reducing the incidences of conflict and violence, while assuming more challenging roles for promoting the truth and reconciliation processes. Youth focused activities were implemented by NEPI and FHORD, local NGO partners of CHF.

Table 14: Youth Forums &amp; Events Results

Program Phase	Activity	Target	Results Achieved	% Achieved	Number of participants per gender <sup>8</sup>				
					Total Participants	Female	% Total	Male	% Total
Phase I (LINCS I)									
Phase II (LINCS II)	Campus based, Community, and district level youth focused activities	15	15	100%	562	156	28%	318	57%
Phase II ext (LINCS II Ext!)									
<b>Total</b>		<b>15</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>562</b>	<b>156</b>	<b>28%</b>	<b>318</b>	<b>57%</b>

<sup>7</sup> Some participants did not declare their tribal affiliation during the Peace Forums.

<sup>8</sup> Due to irregular reporting by communities, the number of participants in theater productions is known. However, the breakdown by gender was not conducted systematically.

**Sporting Activities:** Over life of the LINCS program a total of thirty-three sporting activities were conducted. These activities included more than 732 participants. There were many people attending these events, including players and spectators from the community. The number of participants at the beginning of the program was not recorded and thus there is no aggregate data on the number of participants.

The purpose of the sporting events was to bridge the “gap of silence” amongst communities and also help to promote trauma healing and reconciliation interventions. The experience gained was fruitful to community members and relationships were rebuilt and strengthened through their participation in the sporting events. The sporting events were instrumental in facilitating ex-combatant reintegration and mending of ethnic tensions.

Table 15: Sporting Events Results

Program Phase	Activity	Target	Results Achieved	% Achieved	Number of participants per gender		
					Results achieved	Female	Male
Phase I (LINCS I)	Number of sporting events held between target communities; and number of participants & spectators	-	8	-	52	-	-
Phase II (LINCS II)	Number of sporting events held between target communities; and number of participants & spectators	20	16	80%	N/A	N/A	N/A
Phase II ext (LINCS II Ext!)	Number of sporting events held between target communities; and number of participants & spectators	6	9	150%	784	140	92
<b>Total</b>		<b>26</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>127%</b>	<b>784</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>92</b>

## 4.9 Trainings

### 4.9.1 Psychosocial Trainings

The Lutheran Trauma Healing Program (LTHRP), a CHF implementing partner, provided psychosocial trainings and other activities for CPC members, ex-combatants, and returnees from IDP and refugees camps in the 70 CHF partner communities in the three districts. Trainings focused on community members’ lost confidence resulting from the 14 years civil war that destroyed relationships, lives, and properties. As post conflict survivors, there was a need for community

member trauma healing and support in order to address the psychosocial status of community members

Psychosocial activities that followed the trainings strengthened the Peace building initiatives and accelerated confidence building through cultural awareness. Some elders of participating communities were engaged to tell “folk stories” around a fire. These activities reawakened community spirit and built upon the cultural and traditional strengths, norms and values of communities, especially with regards to peacebuilding.

Young people of the communities who were highly affected by the civil war were brought together for the first time after several years through recreation where they had opportunity to interact with each other. Youths of contending ethnic groups played soccer and other games, while good sportsmanship heightened chances for more positive interaction.

Psychosocial activities established a primary reconciliation process, which empowered people of CHF partner communities to take ownership of the peacebuilding process and take initiatives that helped them identify the common factors that divided the ethnic groups (language, ritual, ideology, values or religions, etc) during the war and explored means that promoted conflict resolution.

#### *4.9.2 Trauma Healing & Ex-combatant Reintegration Activities*

CHF also supported trauma healing and ex-combatant reintegration activities which were conducted through LTHRP. These also included individual and group counseling and cultural activities to reduce conflict tensions among adversary ethnic groups. The trauma healing and ex-combatant reintegration activities also assisted communities to restore their once pre-war traditional values and norms. Many of the trauma healing sessions were conducted in traditional songs, group discussion, and dialogue. Drama performances that focused on reflection on events and finding problem solving measures were informative and helpful to the process.

#### *4.9.3 Peace Building Trainings*

Peace building trainings were provided by CHF and its partners to build the capacity of the CPCs and some local chiefs in positive conflict mitigation. Peacebuilding trainings were mechanisms developed by the LINCS program to provide conflict management skills to community members as a way of avoiding violence and destruction of their communities. The LINCS program also built upon traditional methods that exist in the communities. LINCS’ effective and improved methodology in conflict management increased and provided effective communication skill developed. The trained CPCs enabled community members to have the capacity to manage their community conflict with less outside intervention.

#### *4.9.4 Community Policing Trainings*

CHF provided Community Policing Trainings in an effort to upgrade the knowledge and skills of community members and leaders in tracking security issues pertinent to their respective communities. These trainings were conducted by one of CHF’s implementing partners, Foundation for Human Rights, and Democracy (FOHRD). People targeted for the training were CPC members, community members, local chiefs, and some state security personnel in Voinjama, Salayea, and Zorzor Districts.

The Community Policing trainings focused on relationship building for improved security especially between the national security forces and the communities. It also clarified roles and responsibilities of community members in ensuring stable security, and how to host an immigrant in the community. Additionally, these Community Policing trainings provided opportunities for the CPCs and the local

chiefs to understand the functions of the police and other national security forces such as the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization personnel.

#### 4.9.5 *Leadership Trainings*

The Leadership trainings targeted major contentions over leadership between ethnic groups in the flashpoint communities. During the crisis period, leadership structures broke down and there was less regard for traditional norms and cultural values. Additionally, Youths who were armed took over leadership positions for which they were not competent. And gross disrespect for elders and former leaders became common issue of the period. Consequently, the issue of a leadership crisis became paramount as trust and confidence in most of the traditional and established leadership was eroded. Additionally, with the prevailing ethnic tension between various ethnic groups including Lormas, Kpelles, and Mandingos, there was a crisis of confidence, where community members did not trust the leadership capability of others in their community. CHF's leadership trainings, which were conducted by Liberia Institute of Success Technology & Leadership Studies (LISTALS), targeted these communities. These trainings focused on the characteristics of a good leader (fairness, honesty, compassion, justice, integrity, information sharing, etc). These trainings empowered CPCs and local chiefs and helped them acquire and utilize skills that enabled them to add better quality to the way they administered the affairs of their communities.

#### 4.9.6 *Conflict Mediation Trainings - The ABA module*

CHF and the American Bar Association (ABA) partnered to develop a standardized mediation model which was used by CHF to conduct conflict mediation workshops during the LINCS II extension phase of the program. The goal of this partnership was to develop a mediation and Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) process which can become court annexed. In collaboration with a variety of stakeholders in Liberia including the Liberia National Bar Association (LNBA), the University of Liberia Arthur Grimes Law School, the UN Mission in Liberia legal officers, the Foundation of International Dignity (FIND) and CHF, the ABA developed a standardized mediation model which was used in a training of trainers (TOT). CHF became the lead trainer of this model of mediation by adopting the model during conflict mediation trainings involving CPCs, County and District administrators and officers of the judicial system in Lofa County. During the LINCS II Extension period, CHF agreed to implement thirty-five (35) of these 40-hour certificate courses.

CHF started basic mediation trainings using the ABA module in May 2006. The initial phase of the mediation training was a pilot phase that ended in July 2006. Realizing that the training had made an impact and that more CPC members often used mediation as a common means of mitigating conflict, CHF extended the conflict mediation training to another phase in the LINC II extension period. A total of 38 mediation trainings were conducted, with 36 trainings conducted during the LINCS II extension phase. CHF directly implemented sixteen (16) of these trainings and twenty (20) trainings were implemented through its two implementing partners, NEPI (National Ex-combatant Peacebuilding Initiative) and NAPRHR (National Association of Psychosocial Rehabilitation and Human Rights).

The application of learning from these trainings meant CPCs were seen as honest brokers in mediating conflict. This also increased worries of local chiefs and courts, which often rely on fines imposed on their clients as a regular means of income, especially since they feel underpaid and sometimes are not paid for months.

To alleviate such fears, two county level conflict mediation trainings were conducted for training of district commissioners, paramount chiefs, clan chiefs, circuit judges and heads of national security units, as well as heads of women's groups, including the local marketing association. All appreciated

the training as added knowledge to improve their skills for mitigating conflicts, especially those beyond the scope of the CPCs.

A major lesson learned was that both illiterate and literate persons in the training had capacities to learn and use mediation as a conflict mitigation skill; however, it was learned that the application of what was learnt was demonstrated at different levels.

Table 17: Conflict Mediation Training ( ABA Module) against deliverables

Program Phase	Activity	Target	Results Achieved	% Achieved	Number of participants per gender				
					Total participants	Female	% Achieved	Male	% Achieved
LINCS II extension Phase)	Number of conflict mediation trainings conducted	35	38	108%	958	346	36%	612	64
<b>Total</b>		<b>35</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>108%</b>	<b>958</b>	<b>346</b>	<b>36%</b>	<b>612</b>	<b>64</b>

## 5.0 Others LINCS Activities

### 5.1 Landmine Action (LMA)

The UK-based agency, Landmine Action (LMA), approached CHF in an effort to identify a partner already established in Lofa County with an infrastructure in place that could help identify communities interested in participating in projects focusing on the collection and destruction of small arms and unexploded ordinances (UXOs) in exchange for work (minor community development) projects. As an added value to the LINCS project, CHF felt that the CPCs would be a suitable organized body capable of identifying and managing this kind of project. Not only would the project empower the CPCs to continue acting as leaders in their communities, but it would offer another opportunity to contribute to their profile as a group which ties peacebuilding initiatives to economic development.

The objective of LMA's pilot program was to identify threats, assess current coping mechanisms, and to generate sustainable, community based systems to address these threats. The pilot was conducted in collaboration with CHF by using the CPCs as rapid intervention into communities. The CPCs helped to mobilize community members, chiefs and elders who jointly identified the small arms and UXOs and turned them over to the relevant authorities. CPCs played a central role in the recording and marking of these lethal remnants from the war. LMA also coordinated closely with the Liberia National Police of Zorzor and Salayea, relevant community authorities, UNMIL General Duty (PakBatt in Zorzor) and Explosive Ordinance Disposal (Pak-Eng - Voinjama) to ensure their activities were conducted safely and successfully.

The results of the LMA activities was instructive in regards to community security and safety. Following safety and correct marking and reporting practices, 93 ERW (Explosive Remnants of War) were safely reported and disposed of over 2 months by the 24,000 target population. This figure represents a 522% increase over UXO reports from both the entire districts of Zorzor and Salayea combined over the 20 month period ending in April 2006, which had shown a reported average of 9 items per month.

Aside from the physical yield, the pilot communities are now equipped and trained to deal safely with ERW in a sustainable manner. Previously, communities were not versed with good safety procedures. There was an element of complacency about dangerous objects which is a signature of post conflict trauma where ERW is considered commonplace or familiar. LMA staff were able to teach community members from each of the five communities how to mark UXO's and small arms with special marking tape which would be recognizable by international military who currently have the mandate to destroy these weapons. Individual CPC members were responsible for following up with community members who identified these ordinances to make sure they were properly marked, not touched or moved, and then recorded for LMA and UNMIL. After leaving the various communities and then returning a few days later, LMA staff found areas clearly marked for weapons and UXO's with detailed lists of where the items were found, who found them and when. Through large community meetings coordinated by the CPCs, LMA successfully raised awareness about the dangers of the UXOs, and the importance of recording and communicating their existence to the relevant authorities. In some instances, UXO's were found in fields about to be burned for clearing, and in others, unexploded hand grenades with the triggers partially removed were found in kitchens. LMA worked with communities to encourage a better understanding of the dangers of the status quo and to overcome the general acceptance of these items inside their communities.

One major concern uncovered during the pilot projects was what LMA refers to as the 'UNDP drive by sensitizations' in 3 of the targeted communities in early May without any safety briefings. LMA uncovered 17 ERW that had been handed (in some cases by children) to town chiefs to keep 'until the development came'. These ERW were being stored in central town locations and several of the items were extremely unstable. In two cases, the towns previously had contacted UNMIL, but had ceased this practice on advice from the UNDP Small Arms Program.

Within 6 of CHF's partner communities, 17 military weapons and 6,400 rounds of SAA (Small Arms Ammunition) were reported and handed to UNMIL during the project. This is considerably higher than all of the UNDP Weapons for Development pilot areas in one third of the time over a significantly smaller target population, using only a safety message.

Landmine Action noted in their report that reward mechanisms do not work – the best message is safety. LMA found that when they offered small development projects which would employ community members for approximately 10 days for \$2 per day, community members were not as responsive to the UXO/small arms handover process. LMA subsequently decided to try approaching communities with a message focusing on the importance of removing these devices for safety reasons without offering development projects. The change was found to be successful, with a much better attitude about marking and handing over the items than previously experienced. This could be attributed to the initial emphasis on community members receiving money rather than focusing on the effects of handing over such dangerous items, however, it is hard to explain why the community members were much more cooperative with the “safety only” message. It is postulated that paying for UXO represents competition over opportunity costs – UXO or other income generating activity. Safety, on the other hand, has an impact on the person, family, and community.

## 5.2 *FAO Integrated Production and Pest Management (IPPM) Trainings for Farmers*

As part of its efforts to collaborate with other agencies, CHF implemented the Integrated Production and pest Management training for farmers within 13 CHF partner communities in collaboration with FAO. The training was a response to the need to build the skills of food crop and tree crop farmers to efficiently managing pest control activities for increased production. The training provided relevant information and improved the skills of local farmers, enabling them to properly manage pest destruction, especially with regards to pests that destroyed their crops.

Ten farmers from each of the targeted communities were trained. However, during the training the number of participants increased because of the interest farmers had to learn new skills. Over all, a total of 387 farmers (231 male and 156 females) were trained, representing 298% of the targeted number. Direct beneficiaries of the project totaled 140 persons (63 male and 77 females) originally targeted for the training and who completed the entire training course. CHF also assisted in the distribution of 117 bird nets (to prevent birds from destroying the crops), 363 bells, 378 wire traps, and 65 pieces of zinc.

## 6.0 Lessons Learned

### ➤ **CPC Formation:**

- *Interest of the community and other stake holders in peacebuilding initiatives through community structures:* In its extensive assessments and interaction with a range of actors in Lofa County during the startup period, CHF found that almost all of the actors wanted to see a lasting peace; however, their immediate concern at the time was community security since combatants that were responsible for most of the destruction in the county were still carrying arms. This was before the Liberian warring factions began to disarm to the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in August 2004.
- *Prioritization of flash point communities:* The prioritization of flash point communities with regards to the formation of CPCs was a major action that CHF's implementing partners, Zorzor District Women Care, Inc. (ZODOWCA), and Voinjama District Women Association (VOWODA) undertook. These two groups pioneered the formation of the Community Peace Councils and the involvement of the flashpoint communities was an effort to quickly begin peacebuilding interventions in communities with potential for levels of violence that could undermine the peace process.
- *Involvement of community leaders in the information of CPCs:* As an INGO, the process of identifying the actual pre-war community members was a challenge which required investigation to avoid problems on the council. The involvement of local leaders (chiefs, elders, etc.) enabled CHF to gradually work out strategies for the formation of efficient Peace Councils.
- *Commitment of Peace Council members:* Peace Council members were always excited to serve their communities with the hope that relative peace will return to them and the majority of their kinsmen who fled in the IDP (Internally Displaced Camps) and refugee camps could once again return to their original communities. As the peace councils made headways to achieve this goal the issue of incentive began to fold in. The demand for cash incentive by CPCs became a force to the decline in motivation, especially in the last few months of the LINCS program. It should be noted that due to significant infrastructure considerations, CPC activity generally occurred during twilight hours due to competition for hours used for income generating activities.
- *Expanded roles of CPCs:* CHF's work with the CPCs provided skills training in leadership and peacebuilding. With the added skills the demand for the time of CPC members became evident as other NGOs began to work with the CPCs. The diverse responsibilities of CPCs raised concerns regarding their active participation, especially when cash incentive was not available.

### ➤ **CPC activities (Disputes Settled and conflict mitigation efforts):**

- *Trainings:* Training of CPCs in various peacebuilding and leadership skills enhanced the participatory process in building peace constituencies in the 70 partner communities. Such empowerment accounted for the degree to which conflict issues were mitigated by the CPCs.

- *Complementing traditional conflict mitigation efforts:* The conflict mitigation process using traditional methodology has been part of the lifestyle of the people of Lofa County. Intervening and resolving disputes using improved methods by the CPCs were difficult in the beginning due to the “culture of silence;” however, the CPCs collaborated with the traditional leaders and as some traditional leaders gained skills in leadership and peacebuilding skills, the level of collaboration with CPCs increased and this level of collaboration supported CPCs efforts in conflict mitigation.
- *Record keeping of disputes settled:* Most community members felt strongly that their dispute should not be recorded and records on their disputes should not be kept or reported to CHF. CHF worked with members of the peace councils to identify recorders for each council. Communities were educated on the importance of recording these disputes for the purpose of record keeping on every dispute resolved and the impact that the resolution had on the parties and assured communities that the records would be confidential.
- *Settling disputes involving ex-combatants:* In many instances ex-combatants gave CPCs the wrong information during councils’ interventions in disputes with community members. With the CHF conflict management training to increase their capacity, the CPCs at some point succeeded in intervening and resolving disputes between ex-combatants and other people.

➤ **Construction of community centers:**

- *Selection of communities for community center construction:* CHF intervened in 70 communities in three districts (Voinjama, Salayea, and Zorzor Districts) in Lofa County. CHF proposed construction of five Community centers in each of the districts. The methodology required selection of communities in the most need, based on criteria including level of infrastructure destruction. It became clear that earlier proposed methodology was not the right approach to peacebuilding. CHF, in consultation with USAID, reverted to constructing one community center in each participating community.
- *Community participation in construction of community centers:* Community driven approaches to community development and the absence of many construction materials from Lofa County at the time, especially in CHF 70 partner communities, slowed the construction of the community centers. Nevertheless, 69 centers were successfully completed during the life of the program and are now being use by the communities.
- *Use of the community centers for peacebuilding activities:* The first batch of community centers constructed served as centers for recreation, health posts, and pre-school activities, cultural festivals, community mass meetings, etc. These centers were used to conduct national election (voting process) of Liberia in 2005. The centers also served in some communities as the temporary lodging facilities for returnees from IDP and refugee camps.

➤ **Peace Forums:**

- *Support of participatory decision in conflict mitigation processes:* The Peace Forums facilitated formation of an informal decision making body comprising stake holders from within participating communities and those living out of the communities but with strong influential decision making powers within the communities. The forum was able to bring together these two groups in meaningful dialogue which provided key information for conflict mitigation.

- *Transportation of Participants:* The demand for logistical support was high. It was difficult at the beginning to get people of rival ethnic group (Lorma and Mandingo) to ride in the same vehicle to the forums. CHF had to design special mechanisms to resolve this issue.
- *Demand for personal benefit to participate in Peace Forums:* Assembling large groups of community members with diverse ethnic and religious background became a major challenge for CHF because the demand for personal benefits, such as stipends, t-shirts, certificates, or documents identifying CPC members or cash compensation, by participants took most of the early days of each forum.
- *Implementation of action points – addressing recommendations:* It was observed that most of the recommendations that were forwarded during these forums were similar from one community forum to the other. This suggested that the conflict issues in Lofa were not confined to a particular geographic area. Recommendations made were intended to reverse ethnic conflict and encourage ethnic and religious tolerance among people in Lofa County. As a result, community and county leaders were more involved with the implementation of activities to ensure that recommendations made were properly addressed. Currently, CHF is conducting follow-up on the communities' joint actions to address issues raised in a more peaceful way. CHF follow-up activities also ensure that county authorities will support communities' efforts to ensure that the decisions of the people are fully implemented.
- *Return of pre-war property:* During the life of LINCS, many of the flashpoint communities already implemented some of the recommendations; and returnees that were prevented from regaining their pre-war property (land, possessions) are once again back in their original communities carrying out their normal work.

➤ **Trainings:**

- *Improved skills of community members in peace building and leadership roles:* The trainings provided by CHF made an impact in increasing the knowledge and skills of community members in peacebuilding. The peace councils are now better informed about the functions of state security and are referring to the police and other state security cases that require their involvement, and follow up is conducted regularly by the councils to make sure the rights of the persons involved in the dispute(s) are not violated.
- *Low literacy rates of many CPC members versus the ABA training modules:* Although the ABA training module was quite useful in conflict mediation trainings. The module had to be modified to ensure that the training provided requisite skills for groups with low literacy levels. Trainers had to employ other participatory methods to ensure that the training had an impact on its target group.

➤ **Livelihood Project Support:**

- CHF's work with the peace councils in the 70 partner communities for implementation of livelihood projects in all of the partner communities contributed immensely in restocking live stocks, the production of staple food, and tree crops (oil palm). The project actually provided support for the revival of economic livelihood.
- CHF learned that animal husbandry projects, although useful to communities, needed more support to ensure that animals survived and multiplied. The animal project did not achieve the expected yield .

- Communities learned an improved method of raising animals other than the traditional free range method, care for animals, and are now able to diagnose common diseases in small ruminants and administer first aid treatment to their animals.
- Low land farming helped farmers to learn improved means of farming. Many communities that implemented rice production in these low lands now have basic knowledge that will help them to increase their yield.

➤ **Coordination/Support from community authorities and County level stake holders:**

- From the beginning, CHF’s LINCS program had difficulties in getting support from the community and county stakeholders. LINCS started when there was no presence of any of established authorities in the three districts.
- CHF field staff and some of the peace councils in most instances went beyond their call of duty and got involved in the re-establishment of some of the Community and District leaders in the three districts in Lofa County. CHF staff and many of the Community Peace Councils were supportive in the re-establishment of community leadership structures. Additionally, with skills gained from trainings and mentoring interventions by CHF, community leaders were able to make better judgment in contributing to the re- establishment of district leaders within Salayea, Zorzor and Voinjama Districts.
- CHF facilitated the work of the Lofa County Superintendent and one district commissioner for several months in 2004 as a way of linking them to the peace councils and to serve as a catalyst for confidence building in the leadership of the county by the people.

## 7.0 Summary of Success Stories During Life of Program

### **Success Story No. 1** (*The Victoria K. Massaquoi “Vicky’s Business Center”*)

CHF International’s entrepreneurship grants has literally changed the life of grantees and their families. It has also added to the communities’ economic status. One example is Victoria K. Massaquoi, a single parent of Telemai, Salayea district, who received a modest \$100 grant. This grant enabled Ms. Massaquoi to expand her business. She turned her small ‘petty trade’ table in the local market into a “Mini shop” in Telemai.

*When interviewed by the CHF program staff, she said “Before I received the grant, I was selling table wares at a very small scale. I had very small money which I used to start my business. I started with only a small amount of flour and sugar which I used to buy by cups. With the grant from CHF, I am now able to add more goods to the flour and sugar and now I have started to buy more of full bags of flour, sugar, and other assorted goods. Buying the full bags enabled me to sell and make good profit. The added profits have also allowed me to buy crates of soft drinks, and bags of caustic soda (sodium bicarbonate) for local soap making. I have also started to buy palm oil by containers which I sell to marketers who transport the oil to Monrovia market. Most times I also make bread for sale and sometimes I supply some of the NGOs that come to conduct workshops in Telemai. I’m very happy with CHF. What I’m now earning from the business is helping me to provide food for my children and also send them to school”*

**Success story number 2:** *Peace Initiative (The Selega, Nyamakamadu, Gbegbedu, Mamekonedu towns peace initiative efforts - Voinjama District, Lofa County)*

Selega is a small community situated on the eastern side of Voinjama City. The current population of Selega is approximately six hundred and ninety five inhabitants and presently Lorma predominant,. Though Mandingos lived in this community prior to the civil war, they have not returned to settle.

Selega, a predominantly Lorma community is a gateway community to more than ten (10) Mandingo communities. Before CHF/LINCS intervention this community in August, 2004, the Mandingos were denied passage through the community to Voinjama. The residents of the communities beyond Selega commute regularly use this route, especially on Fridays to attend the weekly market days. After the formation of the Community Peace Councils (CPCs) in three neighboring communities that are predominantly Mandingo (Gbegbedu, Nyamakamadu, Mamekonedu) and Selega, the four councils saw the need to lay to rest their differences and find a peaceful solution for positive co-existence.

This joint action resulted into an in-depth group discussion and dialogue at which time Selega took the lead to host the first reconciliation meeting in January, 2005.

After series of meetings between the four councils, it was unanimously agreed that a reconciliation program be held in order to serve as a new beginning in the post war period, for attainment of peace between the Lorma and Mandingo ethnic groups of these communities. This program was held in January 2005 and CHF attended the program.

Currently, the road through Selega leading to the other communities as well as to Voinjama is widely used by these commuters.

In subsequent initiatives, the three Mandingo community councils decided along with their community members to invite the council and community members of Selega for another peace and reconciliation program in September 2005. This time around, the program was held in Mamekonedu. At this program, the four councils of Selega, Gbegbedu, Nyanmakamadu and Mamekonedu signed a joint resolution to embark on a development project that would be named in honor of Mame Konneh of Mamekonedu, one of the elders of the four councils

In fulfillment of the agreement, the communities of Nyamakamadu and Gbegbedu being the two central communities, offered a parcel of land situated between Gbegbedu and Nyamakamadu for the joint implementation of an agreed upon rice farm project as more members from the four communities concerned return from Guinea or IDP camps.

***Success story No 3 Livelihood Project support (The Gonyea rice Projects and The Zuwolor Piggery Project -- Zorzor and Salayea Districts)***

Many of CHF's partner communities were successful in implementing livelihood projects but among the most successful were:

➤ Gbonyea community

250 participants of Gbonyea were directly involved in implementation of rice farm project. A total of 14 bags of seed rice were issued to the community. After harvest, the yield was 92 bags of seed rice, an increased benefit for the community. This production had a great impact in that the community acquired seed rice for the next planting season.

➤ Zuwolor Community

This community is highly successful among the communities that chose to raise livestock. Zuwolor is undertaking piggery. 12 animals were issued. After 7 months the sows produced a litter of 18 piglets

and 4 are in-sow or pregnant. The Project Management committee (PMC) and Peace Council Members (CPC) directly managed the project which benefited community members of about 3,700 people through skills transfer and hands-on training in livestock management.

➤ Kpotoi Community

Kpotoi is a small community that has no school building. Due to the peace and development initiatives of the community, a community driven school project construction was identified. Commitment of the community was a push factor to the mobilization of local materials and the community themselves began the project at a substantial level. Resources requested from CHF were provided. CHF support enabled them to complete a three (3) classroom building. It was expected that the project would benefit about 100 students each academic year. On this note, the community, through their Town Chief, Mr. Kamah Kotimai, expressed their heartfelt gratitude for giving their children a brighter future.

➤ Zelemai Community

CHF's assistant also benefited the Zelemai community which undertook a clinic renovation project. Based on the cost-sharing MOU signed, the community immensely contributed labor and local material resources. The community was very cooperative and saw CHF's input as a compliment to their efforts.

The impact covered a population of about 4,000 community dwellers and residents. In the words of the Town Chief,

*“We appreciate CHF very much because we will no longer carry sick people especially women in labor pain in hammock any more,”* he said.

## **8.0 Program Review & Evaluation**

A team from the Boston-based Collaborative for Development Action (CDA) conducted an impact assessment of the LINCS project in the summer of 2006. The assessment focused primarily on the conflict resolution and reconciliation elements of the program. CDA emphasized that this was not a “standard” evaluation of the program because the assessment took into consideration a broader societal assessment of program impacts: impacts on peace writ large. The assessment focused on issues of program implementation, largely with respect to how changes in the program approach might have increased the contribution to peace-building.

The central purposes of the assessment were to determine the extent to which CHF efforts in Lofa have succeeded in helping to stabilize the post war environment; determine to what extent the structures and processes established by LINCS have prevented the escalation of conflicts or are serving to transform the conflict by addressing the attitudes, behavior and structures that have been driving forces in the conflict; assess whether and how LINCS contributed to peace writ large; and determine whether structures and processes created by LINCS can contribute to a basic justice system.

The CDA assessment also investigated real-time learning around leadership, dispute resolution processes and truth, justice, and tolerance issues.

Information was gathered through group and individual interviews with CPCs, community members, CHF staff and other partners engaged in peacebuilding work in Lofa County. The CDA report submitted to CHF and USAID outlined analysis and findings with regards to CPCs and conflict resolutions initiatives by CHF including peace forums and project support. It also provided key

information on findings related to program management, information flow, record keeping and other program issues.

Overall, the assessment concluded:

*“The LINCS Program represents an admirable contribution to peacebuilding in Liberia. Most of the programs effects remain at the community and Lofa County level, and there is a mixed picture regarding the program’s achievements against its stated objectives. However, the current progress and potential impacts from this effort have significance for the entire country, as Lofa County is well known as one of the most volatile areas that suffered most deeply during the war. Few other organizations are attempting community-by-community reconciliation in Liberia—and for this reason alone, the LINCS Program represents a valuable initiative. While we have made recommendations for program strengthening during the next phases of CHF programming, overall, we were impressed with the accomplishments to date and the dedication of local and international staff members.”*

The CDA report provided a number of recommendations for future modifications to LINCS, all of which CHF could not address due to limited time close to the program close-out. The report provided a number of recommended options that CHF is considering in order to improve the effectiveness of future CPCs. *(Please refer to the CDA Evaluation Report submitted to USAID in September 2006 for more detailed information).*

## **9.0 Summary of Constraints/Challenges Over the Life of Program**

The implementation of LINCS program was characterized by numerous challenges. CHF entered Lofa County in the early months of 2004 to commence work in 70 communities within three districts (Voinjama, Salayea, and Zorzor Districts) in Lofa County when the majority of the communities’ members were still either in IDP and refugee camps or in Monrovia.

CHF addressed the psychosocial needs of CPC and community members. However, numerous requests to provide cash assistance for daily livelihood support throughout the life of LINCS became the major challenge for field staff. Post-war population demands were enormous. CHF was able to assist the CPC and community members with livelihoods projects. These projects were predominantly the production of local beans funded by CHF.

CHF worked in communities that had high populations of ex-combatants whose command structures at the time was invisible, thus making it a high risk for LINCS program staff in the field. Disputes involving ex-combatants and community members during this period had to be handled delicately, bearing in mind the risk factor in dealing with an irregular, armed group.

The county did not have government officials, police, as well as civil courts to protect the legal interest of the population. Most of the communities’ chiefs were still in IDP or refugee camps awaiting repatriation. CPC formation was delayed and communities were awaiting the return of the chiefs. Some of the peace council members had to move back to their original communities thus creating the need to have them replaced by the affected communities.

The constant requests from the CPC members and communities for financial rewards as well as county and district officials demand for logistical support etc, were among the early challenges that CHF field staff faced.

Poor road conditions and adverse weather conditions during the rainy season, was a major factor in the delay in meeting some of LINCS targets on times. The road network in Lofa County had not been

maintained for almost 14 years of the conflict period; so getting to most of the LINCS communities was a challenge for field staff.

Poor road conditions contributed immensely to the constant breakdown of field vehicles, as a result, field staff had to postpone field activities while waiting for the vehicle(s) to be repaired

Constant damage of vehicle required frequent vehicle repairs. This put a burden on the vehicle maintenance and repair budget. However, with backstopping from the Monrovia office, CHF was able to provide support that prevented undue delay in implementation of program activities.

CPCs activities with CHF (meetings, trainings, etc.) were challenging. Some of the CPC members were busy with their own subsistence farm work and had a hard time participating in the peacebuilding activities. In a very few instances, language barriers stalled implementation of activities, where a particular CPC member could not understand the common spoken language. In such instances, time had to be extended providing allowance for interpretation.

The return of some pre-war chiefs to some of CHF's 70 partner communities almost silenced the CPCs in those communities. The chiefs at the beginning of the program feared that the CPCs would prevent the chiefs from receiving money from fees they usually imposed on parties that take disputes for resolution to them. Other pre-war chiefs feared the CPCs would expose them for their unfair distribution of NFIs (Non Food Items) brought to the communities by NGOs for community members. CPCs made efforts to collaborate with the chiefs to reduce these fears as they worked together to move the peace process forward.

Although the CPCs and communities had prior information about the closure of the LINCS program, the close-out of the program was a challenge because CPCs and communities were not quite ready to accept the closure of the program. They expressed the opinion that there was still more to be done that needed CHF support.

## **10.0 Financial Performance:**

As per CHF's revised 269 report resulting from CHF's A-133 audit for the 2006 Fiscal Year, during the implementation of the LINCS program, a total of US \$3,025,380 was spent, representing 98.4% of the total award of US \$3, 076,061. In addition, CHF leveraged US \$241,787 in community matching funds. This number is subject to the results of the final program audit and CHF's company-wide audit for Fiscal Year 2007.

The financial performance report for this award is being submitted separately, in accordance with 22 CFR 226.70-72.

## **11.0 Inventory:**

Inventory of Real and Personal property arising under the LINCS Award has been accounted for in accordance with 22 CFR 226.37. A Close-out plan has been submitted explaining the disposition of inventory balances.

## **12.0 Audits:**

The LINCS program is subject to an A-133 audit. An end of program audit was conducted and a separate report of findings issued in compliance with the provisions of A-133.

## **13.0 Recommendations**

CHF’s USAID funded LINCS program, covering the Voinjama, Salayea, and Zorzor Districts in Lofa County was timely and appropriate. The LINCS program was implemented in communities that had serious ethnic and other community based conflicts that would have prevented successful repatriation and re-settlement of the IDPs and refugees in those areas.

For the past two years LINCS successfully worked with peace constituencies in 70 communities in the three districts. The peace constituencies (Community Peace Councils) have become development agents and entry points for many other community development activities.

The 70 CPCs formed were trained in conflict management, community security and policing, agriculture, etc. They have skills that other partners can tap for various community development and works.

In view of the above, and as LINCS program closed in Lofa County, CHF recommends continued support of peace and development initiatives. CHF recommends that USAID provides funding to CHF or a similar agency to continue work with the CPCs and other communities in Lofa County, focusing on economic empowerment and community development.

CHF highly recommends that USAID takes action to continue the momentum generated by the LINCS program to support initiatives and stakeholders who are interested in continuing to rely upon peaceful means of community based conflict resolution to ensure peace in Lofa County. CHF identifies this as support for both direct CPC support as well as continuation of livelihoods projects that reinforce the rewards for peaceful conflict resolution.

## **14.0 APPENDICES**

- Appendix A - CHF Livestock Report
- Appendix B - Landmine Action Project Report
- Appendix C - ABA Project Report
- Appendix D - FAO Project Report
- Appendix E - CDA Project Assessment Report
- Appendix F - CHF Closeout Report

**Appendix A - CHF Livestock Report**



October 3, 2006

**Sharon Pauling**  
**Supervisory Program Officer**  
**USAID Mission in Liberia**

Dear Sharon:

As a follow up to my email to you dated May 29, 2006 in regards to a number of animals which had fallen ill (*see copy of email correspondence attached*), I would like to provide you with an updated report explaining the circumstances. To remind you, CHF is involved in the implementation of seventy livelihoods projects in all existing partner communities in Lofa County. Using a community-driven participatory methodology to identify projects to support, thirty six of the seventy communities identified “re-stocking” (of livestock) projects. Of these, twenty-seven were either sheep or goat projects, with the remaining projects either pig or cow projects.

Given the high demand for livestock in CHF’s partner communities, the CHF senior management team (composed of the Country Director, the Director of Finance and Administration, and the Field Coordinators from Zorzor and Voinjama) met with representatives from the Ministry of Agriculture in early December, 2005, to ensure that CHF was technically capable of handling a re-stocking project for the number of communities interested. Based on the discussions, CHF made an official request to the Ministry of Agriculture on December 14, 2005, to assign a staff member to assist CHF in the process of livestock procurement and animal health certification (*please see attached letter addressed to the Honorable John B. Samuels, Deputy Minister for Technical Services*).

Mr. Samuel Tucker, the Coordinator for Technical Services at the Ministry of Agriculture (*please see attached Memorandum from the Government of Liberia, Ministry of Agriculture appointing Mr. Tucker to be the overseer of all activities of veterinary services and the attached photocopy of Mr. Tucker’s identification*) was referred to CHF to oversee the various activities identified. A contract was then drafted by CHF and signed by Mr. Tucker as the representative for the Ministry of Agriculture to work on the LINCS project (*see attached contract for Samuel Tucker dated February 2, 2006*).

Mr. Tucker assisted CHF in setting up quarantine sites for cows, pigs, sheep and goat projects, providing vaccinations for all animals, de-worming all animals, and certifying animals to be in good health prior to their distribution to the communities (*sample health certificates attached*). All animals were ear tagged by Mr. Tucker to assist CHF in monitoring health and for recording medication and vaccination provided (a process unique to Liberia at the present time).

Upon the advice of Mr. Tucker, CHF worked with communities to construct quarantine sites for sheep and goats in two locations within CHF partner communities. All animals were procured by Liberian vendors and were given purchase approval by Mr. Tucker. As advised, all animals were kept in quarantine for a two week period. According to Mr. Tucker, this time period was mandated by the Ministry of Agriculture. In addition, Mr. Tucker advised on the temporary feed for the animals while in quarantine and the type of medication required while in quarantine. In short, CHF took all necessary precautions to prevent illness among animals by coordinating closely with the Ministry of Agriculture and using their senior veterinary technician as an advisor.

Shortly after the livestock procurement process began reports from the CHF field offices in Voinjama and Zorzor suggested that there were high mortality rates among goat and sheep while they were in the quarantine sites as well as in communities who had received livestock. (*See attached table on sheep and goat mortality*). As a result of the reports, CHF immediately undertook the following actions to mitigate the potential damage within the communities:

1. The Ministry of Agriculture was informed immediately and were asked to provide an additional technical expert to assist in identifying the causes of death and to provide suggestions to prevent further deaths. (*See attached letter to the Ministry of Agriculture*).

It is important to note, that when we initially contacted the MOA to inform them of the unfortunate circumstances surrounding livestock deaths despite Mr. Tucker's involvement, they refused to acknowledge that Mr. Tucker was sent to work with CHF on behalf of the MOA. Although they knew Mr. Tucker as an MOA staff person, they informed CHF that he had not reported to the MOA for several months and had know idea of his whereabouts. Furthermore, the MOA stated that Mr. Tucker did not have the proper qualifications to handle the scope of work required for the livestock initiative. The MOA also stated that although the Minister might have referred Mr. Tucker to CHF, this was a referral under the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) and was therefore no longer valid.

With this in mind, CHF continued to proceed with the immediate investigation by collaborating with the current Ministry of Agriculture. The late Dr. Leon Ladlum (Deputy Minister for Technical Services at the time of the emergency) and his colleague Dr. Koikoi (the only two qualified veterinarians in the MOA) referred CHF to a veterinarian assistant from the MOA (Edward Fatuma) to work with

- CHF on the investigation. Although Mr. Fatuma is not a licensed veterinarian, he has significant practical experience and technical training.
2. CHF staff were ordered to identify the following information which was later shared with the Ministry of Agriculture:
    - a. What type of animals died?
    - b. Where were the origins of the animals?
    - c. When did they die?
    - d. How long were they sick?
    - e. What were the symptoms?
    - f. What appears to be the mode of transmission?
    - g. What were they eating?
    - h. What was their water source?
    - i. What is currently being done with the animal carcasses?
    - j. How far away is the site from the closest human settlement?
    - k. How close is the burial site to the human settlements?
    - l. How are the animals being handled? (Teams were asked to go to the nearest INGO health clinics to obtain gloves and masks to pass around).
    - m. Provide stool specimens from the dead animals. (Teams were asked to obtain specimen collection devices/containers from the INGO health clinics. These were to have been sealed and refrigerated and transported as soon as possible to an expert to examine).
    - n. Provide an autopsy. Have a Government of Liberia, Ministry of Agriculture specialist do sample autopsies.
    - o. Inform the Ministry of Health staff and County Health team to obtain advice on how to ensure human health around the areas of death.
  3. CHF staff accompanied a Ministry of Agriculture staff to affected livestock areas in partner communities to assess the causes of death and to speak with community members on how to clean up the areas. The MOA staff person assigned to assist in this process provided a report detailing causes of death and future prevention methods (*see attached Diagnostic Survey on Mortality of Restocked Livestock (sheep, goat) in Voinjama, Zorzor and Salaye by Edward Fatuma*).
  4. CHF used the MOA technical expert to train all CHF staff on improved livestock management processes and types of medication required for various animals.

The findings reported to the CHF team by Mr. Fatuma of the MOA indicated that the mortalities could have been prevented by an improved transport, quarantine, medication and feeding process for the livestock. The findings included:

- a. The selection of livestock (sheep and goat specifically) was not properly conducted by Mr. Tucker.
- b. Livestock might have come with previous illnesses which rapidly spread during the transport and quarantine process.

- c. Livestock were partially vaccinated by Mr. Tucker but did not receive certain medications necessary before going into quarantine.
- d. Livestock were severely stressed and should have been given anti-stress medication by Mr. Tucker. Stress was exacerbated by traveling to regions where there is significantly different climate.
- e. The animals were improperly fed bulgar wheat upon the advice of Mr. Tucker. If bulgar wheat becomes the sole source of feed for the livestock, it could cause significant illness (related to digestive problems) leading to death. Animals were not given an opportunity to graze after transport and went directly into the quarantine sites. This process significantly affected the food which the animals consumed and were therefore seriously malnourished.
- f. The quarantine process should not have been “full quarantine” where the animals were confined to one farm space. Animals should be subject to “semi-quarantine” where animals spend the day grazing freely while spending the evenings in the quarantine area. This allows for a more balanced and complete diet. Certain animals, especially goats, require more space to move around. Confinement affects both their physical and mental health. The largest number of deaths occurred among the goats in the quarantine sites.
- g. Animals should not be confined exclusively to their farm location and they should be in “semi-free range” where animals can graze throughout the day and stay overnight inside the enclosed farms.
- h. Animals which appeared unhealthy were not isolated from the other animals thus allowing disease or illness to spread.
- i. While in quarantine, sheep and goats were not separated.

Based on the MOA findings, CHF was advised that procurement could continue with improved measures. All CHF livelihood specialists and officers were trained by Mr. Fatuma in a range of areas related to livestock management. In particular, staff learned which medications were required for the animals at different stages and also how to properly quarantine and feed animals. Subsequent trainings have taken place in the communities as well.

CHF and the MOA decided that it was no longer necessary to have one specific quarantine site for the livestock. Instead, CHF had all remaining livestock delivered directly to the communities where a process of “semi-quarantine” was initiated. To date, the crisis of animal mortality in the re-stocking projects has disappeared, and mortality rates are at a relatively ‘normal’ level.

Despite the crisis, CHF has recovered extremely well and the communities are benefiting from the re-stocking projects. Communities, LNGOs, INGOs and the UN Mission officers have all recognized the significant contribution that CHF has made in support of the re-stocking of Lofa County animals. CHF was able to negotiate with the vendors to provide replacement animals at significantly reduced rates, and in some cases free of charge, in recognition that several animals delivered by the vendors brought illnesses

which spread rapidly to the other animals. As such, while each community did not necessarily end up with all twelve animals as originally planned (8 female and 4 male per community), many still benefited greatly from the continued support. CHF is continuing to monitor, train and provide technical support to the communities as the projects proceed. Already, animals are giving birth and the livestock populations in the communities is expected to grow notably over the next several months. **It is important to note that there have been no reports of transmission of animal related disease to the human population. Disease and deaths have been limited exclusively to the animals procured and quarantined by CHF.**

While the initially high mortality rates were a major cause of distress for both CHF staff and communities who had spent a huge amount of time in preparation of the project sites, CHF sees the re-stocking challenges as a major learning experience for both community members in Liberia and NGOs engaging in re-stocking projects. During the recent team visit from Langston University supported by USAID which included Dean Marvin Burns, Director Tilahun Sahlu, and Research Program Leader Arthur L. Goetsch, CHF met on two occasions to provide advice on challenges to re-stocking programs in Liberia. The team commented on the usefulness of those discussions and planned to include the CHF feedback in their future considerations for programming in Liberia.

If you have any follow-up questions regarding this report, please do not hesitate to contact me at any time for additional details.

Yours truly,

Brett Massey  
Country Director  
CHF International-Liberia

The following table outlines the number of sheep and goat deaths during the quarantine period when the crisis started:

<b>Location</b>	<b>Type of animal</b>	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>	<b>Total</b>
Voinjama District	Sheep (in communities only)	3	2	5
	Goat (in 7 communities*)	10	44	54
	Goat (in quarantine site**)	7	29	36
Zorzor/Salayea Districts	Sheep (in 5 communities***)	5	4	9
	Sheep (in quarantine site****)	3	7	10
	Goat (in 5 communities)	3	3	6
	Goat (in quarantine site)	15	15	30
<b>Total animals</b>		<b>46</b>	<b>104</b>	<b>150</b>
<b>Total sheep</b>		<b>11</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>24</b>
<b>Total goats</b>		<b>35</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>126</b>

\* 7 communities in Voinjama District include: Barkadu, Selega, Bolongoidu, Lormai, Betejama, Vezela, Kuluka

\*\* Quarantine site in Voinjama District is located in Kolliemai

\*\*\* 5 communities in Zorzor/Salayea Districts include: Zolowo, Tinsue, Kokulo Zaza, Telemu, Passama

\*\*\*\* Quarantine site for Zorzor/Salayea Districts is located in Telemai

# Memo

To: Andrew Mwatha; Momo Kamara; George Kandakai; Samuel Tucker  
From: Brett Massey  
CC:  
Date:  
Re: Livestock Procurement Process

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## Livestock Procurement Process

Based on previous discussions about the need to examine the health of each animal we purchase and distribute to communities for the livestock projects and the need to provide health certificates as per USAID regulations, here is what we have agreed to:

1. Identify vendors who will agree to travel with the CHF team and Mr. Tucker to Guinea to identify healthy animals. We MUST get at least three (3) pro forma invoices from different vendors. **Momo, George and Mr. Tucker** will be responsible for this task. Make sure that when gathering pro formas you bring a booklet of unused pro formas so that the vendors can fill them out with prices, their names, contact details and business name (if they have one) in the event that they do not have pro forma invoices available. MAKE SURE THAT THEY SIGN THE PRO FORMA.
2. **Mr. Tucker** shall make 2 separate trips with **Momo and George** to Guinea with the selected vendors (George and Momo will be traveling to different parts of Guinea to purchase livestock). When in Guinea, you must team up with the vendors to identify animals.
3. **Mr. Tucker** shall collaborate with the **Guinean veterinarian services** personnel and acquire healthy animal certificates FOR EACH ANIMAL. The certificate must clearly represent Guinean authority approval.
4. Tag each animal and make sure that the tag number is listed on the Guinean certificate of good health. **Mr. Tucker and Momo and George** are responsible persons for this action.
5. **Mr. Tucker** must put his signature on each certificate issued by the Guinean authorities. Again, there must be one certificate for each animal.
6. The purchase co-ordination and transport of the animals to Liberia must be co-ordinated by **Momo and George**. **Mr. Tucker** shall ensure smooth passage of the animals from Guinea to Liberia.

7. Animals must then be taken to the quarantine sites already prepared. CHF staff must be stationed at each quarantine site for this period.
8. After 14 days, **Mr. Tucker** will examine the animals a second time and issue Liberian Ministry of Agriculture certificates for EACH ANIMAL. Again, the tag number of each animal must be noted on the MOA certificates to assist in monitoring each individual animal.
9. Once certificates are issued, animals can be transported to the various communities. **Momo and George** will be responsible for this co-ordination.



1<sup>st</sup> Old Road Junction, Longo Town  
Monrovia, Liberia  
Cell # 06 467612

14<sup>th</sup> December, 2005

Hon. John B. Samuels  
Deputy Minister for Technical Services  
Ministry of Agriculture  
5<sup>th</sup> Street, Sinkor  
Monrovia, Liberia

Dear Sir:

On behalf of CHF International, I extend warm season's greetings to you and your staff. I would also like to thank you for cordially hosting the CHF staff in your office during the exploratory visit on the subject matter of this letter.

CHF International is currently operating in the three districts of Zorzor, Salayea and Voinjama in Lofa County, implementing a USAID funded Peace Building and Reconciliation initiative. In our current programming phase, we will be working with identified communities to implement livelihood projects that tangibly affect and improve the quality of daily life of Liberians.


The livelihood projects will entail purchase by CHF of livestock (e.g. goats, sheep, cows, pigs) and seeds (e.g. beans, palm oil, peanuts, rice). Most of these inputs are expected to be sourced within Liberia; however, depending on availability, some may be purchased across the border especially in Guinea.

We seek the assistance of your good offices in two areas, namely:

1. Quality certification and assurance: CHF would like to ensure that the livestock and seeds purchased meet prescribed quality standards as per laws or regulations of the government of Liberia. Please appraise us on the relevant statutory requirements and also advise on how to go about securing the necessary quality assurance certification. Please also let us know if it would be possible for one of your officers to accompany our staff during the identification of livestock and seeds.
2. In the event that we procure livestock/seeds outside the country, we understand that an import permit would be required. We would appreciate if you could help us in processing the permit and, waiver of the associated fees.

Thanking you in advance for your assistance and prompt attention

Yours sincerely,

  
Andrew Gathecha  
Director of Finance & Administration

May 29, 2006

**Deputy Minister for Technical Services**  
**Ministry of Agriculture**  
**5<sup>th</sup> Street, Sinkor**  
**Monrovia, Liberia**

Dear Sir:

On behalf of CHF International (Community Habitat Finance), I would like to follow up on our conversation in regards to our livestock project in Lofa County. To remind you, CHF is an international NGO implementing a USAID-funded peacebuilding and livelihoods project in Lofa County. Since early 2004, CHF has worked in seventy communities to address conflicts in the districts of Zorzor, Salayea and Voinjama caused by inter-tribal feuds and arising from large numbers of returning IDPs, refugees and ex-combatants. To complement the peacebuilding activities, CHF supports numerous agriculture, livestock and other projects in effort to restore economic livelihoods to members of partner communities.

As we discussed on Friday, May 26, 2006 at approximately 10:15am, I was alerted by my colleagues in both Voinjama district and Zorzor district that many of the animals (sheep and goats) have suddenly started to die. In effort to minimize the damage caused by the deaths of the animals, I immediately contacted you for advice on how to proceed. It is unfortunate that your technical team is not present to assist CHF at this time. As the numbers of deaths are close to 150 animals, we feel that this is a significant problem worthy of the attention of the Ministry of Agriculture.

I have informed my staff in the field to take the following actions and prepare the following information:

1. What type of animals died?
2. Where were the origins of the animals?
3. When did they die?
4. How long were they sick?
5. What were the symptoms?
6. What appears to be the mode of transmission?
7. What were they eating?

8. What was their water source?
9. What is currently being done with the animal carcasses?
10. How far away is the site from the closest human settlement?
11. How close is the burial site to the human settlements?
12. How are the animals being handled? I have asked that the CHF teams in the field go to the nearest INGO health clinics to obtain gloves and masks.
13. Provide stool specimens from the dead animals. The CHF teams have been asked to obtain specimen collection devices/containers from the INGO health clinics. These will be sealed and refrigerated and transported as soon as possible to an expert to examine.
14. Provide an autopsy. Have a Government of Liberia, Ministry of Agriculture specialist do sample autopsies.
15. Inform the Ministry of Health staff and County Health team to obtain advice on how to ensure health around the areas of death.

CHF International has taken due diligence since the inception of the livestock activities to ensure that preventive measures were put in place to minimize any potential damage should problems occur in the livestock procurement and distribution process. In this respect, CHF has been collaborating with the Ministry of Agriculture and incorporating standard procedures such as quarantining animals, de-worming, vaccinating and ear-tagging.

On December 14, 2005, CHF requested that the Ministry of Agriculture assign a staff member to assist CHF in this process (*please see attached letter addressed to the Honorable John B. Samuels, Deputy Minister for Technical Services*). Mr. Samuel Tucker, the Coordinator for Technical Services at the Ministry of Agriculture (*please see attached Memorandum from the Government of Liberia, Ministry of Agriculture appointing Mr. Tucker to be the overseer of all activities of veterinary services and the attached photocopy of Mr. Tucker's identification*) was referred to CHF to oversee the various activities.

As a Livestock and Agriculture Specialist of the Ministry of Agriculture as referred by the Ministry of Agriculture in December of 2005, Mr. Tucker has assisted CHF in setting up quarantine sites for pig, sheep and goat projects, providing vaccinations for all animals, de-worming all animals, and certifying animals to be in good health prior to their distribution to the communities. As the only livestock specialist available to CHF in Lofa County, Mr. Tucker will be responsible for conducting autopsies in effort to identify the causes of death of the animals. CHF is fortunate that many of the animals have died on the quarantine sites. In the nine communities where sheep or goats have been distributed, many of these have died.

Although in our conversation you stated that there are no Ministry of Agriculture staff available to assist at this critical time period to follow up with a set of activities, we request that you provide immediate support to ensure that all potential problems are mitigated.

CHF International is committed to taking due diligence in all aspects related the problems described, this includes having the Ministry of Agriculture input on how to proceed.

Thank you very much for your consideration of this note. We look forward to a timely response from the Ministry of Agriculture.

Yours,



**Brett Massey**  
Country Director

Brett Massey  
Country Director  
CHF International-Liberia



2<sup>nd</sup> February, 2006

Mr. Samuel Tucker  
Coordinator, Technical Department &  
Director, Veterinary Services Division  
Ministry of Agriculture, Republic of Liberia  
Sinkor, Monrovia  
Telephone 04 713 729  
Liberia

Dear Mr. Tucker,

**Livestock and Seeds Procurement and Quality Assurance Contract**

Following discussions between yourself and CHF International Liberia, we are pleased to engage you as an independent contractor for the purpose of carrying out the work specified in this contract

**The following terms and conditions apply:**

1. The primary purpose of this agreement is to secure the specialist services of the contractor in procurement and quality assurance of livestock and seeds that CHF International will be procuring and providing to certain communities in Lofa county of the Republic of Liberia, under the terms of the LINCS (Locally Initiated Networks for Community Strengthening) project funded by the United States Agency of International Development (USAID)
2. It is understood that whilst the contractor is engaged by CHF International on an independent basis, he remains an official representative of the Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of Liberia and on loan to CHF International.
3. It is understood that this is not a contract of employment and that the Contractor shall not present himself as an employee of CHF International.
4. It shall also be understood that the Contractor is responsible for any financial claims made by the Liberian Ministry of Agriculture for the time spent working on the CHF International LINCS project and away from MOA responsibilities.
5. This agreement is effective from 2<sup>nd</sup> February, 2006 through 31 March, 2006 or such time as the work specified herein will have been completed satisfactorily, whichever date occurs earlier. CHF International reserves the right to terminate the contract at any time, for cause or no cause and without assigning any reasons thereof, provided that the contractor is given one day advance notice of the intended termination.
6. Regarding livestock procurement and quality assurance, the Contractor will perform the following services on behalf of CHF International:
  - Travel with CHF Staff and the livestock vendor to the actual point of purchase, to certify the health of the animals to be purchased. This will

CHF International ♦ 1<sup>st</sup> Old Road Junction, Congo Town ♦ Monrovia, Liberia


CHF International ♦ 8601 Georgia Avenue, Suite 800 ♦ Silver Spring, MD 20910 USA  
Phone: (+1) 301.587.4700 ♦ Fax: (+1) 301.587.7315 ♦ [mailbox@chfinternational.org](mailto:mailbox@chfinternational.org)

[www.chfinternational.org](http://www.chfinternational.org)

- include collaborating with other livestock health or veterinary officers as appropriate.
- Ensure that the selected animals are specifically identified as belonging to CHF by means of a tag to be attached to the ear of the animal
  - Contractor will assist CHF in procurement of appropriate animal tags
  - Accompany the animals from point of purchase to the temporary quarantine location identified by the Liberian Ministry of Agriculture and, ensure that proper quarantine procedures are put in place
  - After the quarantine period is over, facilitate the removal of animals from the holding location and subsequent transportation to the local CHF office (Distribution site)
  - The guidance notes issued to the Contractor by CHF International Country Director on 2<sup>nd</sup> February, 2006 titled "Livestock Procurement Process" form an integral part of the work to be carried out under this contract
7. Regarding Seeds procurement and quality assurance, the contractor will perform the following services on behalf of CHF International:
- Carry out purity and germination tests
  - Working in conjunction with CHF staff, certify that the seeds are viable before purchase from vendors.
8. Costs and Contractor fee:
- CHF will meet all the expenses occasioned by the work specified in this contract. In particular, while traveling outside of Monrovia for a period longer than 8 hours, CHF will provide the Contractor with transport, lodging and a per diem of US\$ 5per day, for each day worked.
  - The Contractor shall not incur costs on behalf of CHF without prior express authorization by the CHF Country Director
  - CHF will pay the contractor a fee pegged on a monthly rate of US\$ 450 and computed pro rata. Provided, however, that if the entire period taken to complete the work is less than 1 month, the contractor will be paid the full fee of US\$ 450.
  - The Contractor will be required to present a formal fee note to CHF for the payment
  - The Contractor fee will be paid without any tax deductions. It is the responsibility of the Contractor to discharge any tax obligations arising under the laws of the Republic of Liberia
  - Upon request, the Contractor may be paid an advance fee of up to 50%, the balance becoming payable upon satisfactory conclusion of the work specified in this contract.
  - The contractor will prepare and present to CHF International for approval, a budget of the items required to inspect, vaccinate/deworm the livestock and carry out the seeds purity/germination test
9. It is hereby agreed that any revisions or modifications to this contract, or any interpretations shall be done in consultation by both parties to the contract and evidenced in writing.

Please sign below as a confirmation that you are in agreement with the terms of this contract.

Sincerely,

  
Brett Massey  
Country Director

-----  
I Samuel Tucker has read and is in agreement with the terms and conditions of the above contract:

Name, Signature and Date: Tucker 3/2/06

CHF International ♦ 1<sup>st</sup> Old Road Junction, Congo Town ♦ Monrovia, Liberia

CHF International ♦ 8601 Georgia Avenue, Suite 800 ♦ Silver Spring, MD 20910 USA  
Phone: (+1) 301.587.4700 ♦ Fax: (+1) 301.587.7315 ♦ [mailbox@chfinternational.org](mailto:mailbox@chfinternational.org)

[www.chfinternational.org](http://www.chfinternational.org)

14<sup>th</sup> April, 2006

**Mr. Samuel Tucker**  
**Coordinator, Technical Department &**  
**Director, Veterinary Services Division**  
**Ministry of Agriculture (MOA)**  
**Republic of Liberia**  
**Sinkor, Monrovia**  
**Telephone 04 713 729**  
**Liberia**

Dear Mr. Tucker,

**Agreement between Mr. Samuel Tucker of MOA and CHF International:**  
**Livestock/Seeds Procurement, Quality Assurance and limited implementation of**  
**Community Livestock/Crops projects**

We refer to the agreement entered into between yourself and CHF International dated 2<sup>nd</sup> February, 2006. By mutual consent, w.e.f 1<sup>st</sup> March 2006, the agreement is hereby extended under similar terms and conditions, except for the changes noted below:


1. The title of the original contract is re-worded to read as shown above
2. Paragraphs 1, 4 and 8 of the original contract are revised in their entirety and now read as stated below:
  1. The primary purpose of this agreement is to secure the specialist services of the MOA staff person in:
    - (a) procurement and quality assurance of livestock and seeds that CHF International will be purchasing and providing to certain communities in Lofa county of the Republic of Liberia, under the terms of the LINCS (Locally Initiated Networks for Community Strengthening) project funded by the United States Agency of International Development (USAID)
    - (b) ensuring successful implementation of the Livestock and Crops projects by activities including, but not limited to: advising and training communities on proper animal and crop husbandry practices
  4. This agreement is effective from 2<sup>nd</sup> February, 2006 through 31 July, 2006 or such time as the work specified herein will have been completed satisfactorily, whichever date occurs earlier; However, CHF International reserves the right to terminate the contract at any time, for cause or no cause and without assigning any reasons thereof, provided that Mr. Tucker is given one day advance notice of the intended termination.

8. Costs and Per diem payments:

- CHF will pay Mr. Tucker a monthly per diem of US\$ 486/00, the same to be paid upon presentation of a formal invoice by Mr. Tucker to CHF
- CHF will meet all the expenses occasioned by the work specified in this agreement. In particular, where necessary, CHF will provide Mr. Tucker with transport, lodging in accordance with prevailing CHF policies and procedures
- Mr. Tucker shall not incur costs on behalf of CHF without prior express authorization by the CHF Country Director
- The per diem payment will be made without any tax deductions. It is the responsibility of Mr. Tucker to fully discharge any tax obligations arising under the laws of the Republic of Liberia

Please sign below as a confirmation that you are in agreement with the terms of this contract.

Sincerely,



**Brett Massey**  
Country Director

**Brett Massey**  
Country Director

-----  
I Samuel Tucker has read and is in agreement with the terms and conditions of the above contract:

Name, Signature and Date: Samuel Tucker (Tucker) 17/4/06

# Excerpt from Zorzor field report : May/06.

Death rate of Goats and Sheep *at quarantine in*  
Salayea and Zorzor districts

N0	Date	Description	sex	Qty. died
1	25-Apr-06	Goat	M	1
2	28-Apr-06	Goat	M	2
3	28-Apr-06	Sheep	F	3
4	29-Apr-06	Goat	F	1
5	29-Apr-06	Sheep	M	2
6	4-May-06	Sheep	F	1
7	9-May-06	Sheep	M	1
8	9-May-06	Goat	M	1
9	11-May-06	Goat	F	1
10	16-May-06	Goat	F	1
11	16-May-06	Sheep	F	1
12	20-May-06	Sheep	F	2
13	20-May-06	Goat	F	1
14	21-May-06	Goat	M	3
15	21-May-06	Goat	F	1
16	22-May-06	Goat	M	3
17	24-May-06	Goat	F	1
18	25-May-06	Goat	M	4
19	25-May-06	Goat	F	2
20	26-May-06	Goat	F	2
21	26-May-06	Goat	F	2
22	27-May-06	Goat	M	1
23	29-May-06	Goat	F	1
24	30-May-06	Goat	F	1
25	31-May-06	Goat	F	1

40

Sheep	F	7	
Sheep	M	3	10
Goat	F	15	
Goat	M	15	30

## 23-Apr-06 RECEIPT

Received from Mr. Duana Nyan the amount of **fifty-three (53)** living livestock delivered at the quarantine site in Telemai in the following categories:

N0.	Description	Type		
		M	F	T
1	Goats	16	17	33
2	Sheep	10	10	20
<b>TOTALS</b>		<b>26</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>53</b>

## 14-May-06 RECEIPT

Received from Mr. Duana Nyan the 2nd batch of **fifty-four (54)** living livestock delivered at the quarantine site in Telemai in the following categories:

N0.	Description	Type		
		M	F	T
1	Goats	0	9	9
2	Sheep	10	35	45
<b>TOTALS</b>		<b>10</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>54</b>

## 29-May-06 RECEIPT

Received from Mr. Duana Nyan the 2nd batch of **forty (40)** living livestock delivered at the quarantine site in Telemai in the following categories:

N0.	Description	Type		
		M	F	T
1	Goats	3	20	23
2	Sheep	3	14	17
<b>TOTALS</b>		<b>6</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>40</b>

Total Received from Vendor

147

	Community	Description	Qty issued			Date	Mortality			Mortality Date	
			M	F	Total		M	F	Total		
1	Zuwulor	Pig	4	8	12	12-May-06	0		0		
2	Woumai	Pig	4	8	12	12-May-06			0		
3	Telemai	Sheep	3	5	8	31-May-06			0		
4	Zolowo	Sheep	4	8	12	13-May-06	1	1	2	15-May-06	
5	Tinsue	Sheep	3	9	12	22-May-06	2	1	3	May 24 - 28, 2006	
6	Kokulo Zaza	Goat	3	9	12	19-May-06	3	3	6	May 29 -31, 2006	
7	Gbanway	Goat	1	7	8	2-Jun-06			0		
8	Nekebuzu	Sheep	1	6	7	2-Jun-06			0		
9	Boi	Sheep	1	6	7	2-Jun-06			0		
10	Worzi	Goat	1	6	7	3-Jun-06			0		
11	Telemu	Sheep	3	9	12	19-May-06	2	1	3	25-May-06	
12	Passama	Sheep	3	9	12	22-May-06	0	1	1	25-May-06	
			31	90	<b>121</b>				8	7	15

Total in Community

**106**

	Sex		
	M	F	
Sheep	18	52	
Goats	5	22	
Pigs	8	16	
<b>Bal</b>			
Sheep	13	48	61
Goats	2	19	21
Pigs	8	16	24
			<b>106</b>

Excerpt from Volufjama report : June/06.

UP - DATE ON LIVELIHOOD PROJECT ( LIVESTOCKS) JUNE 2006

Annax --- 3

No.	Community	Date	Project Type	No. of animal delivered to community	SEX		MOTILITY		Balance		Causes of death	Remarks		
					Male	Femal	Male	Femal	Male	Female				
1	Barkadu	April 24. 2006	COW		1	4	1	1		3		All in healthy condition		
2	Mamekonedu	April 24. 2007	"		1	4	0	0	1	4		All in healthy condition		
<b>Grand Total</b>							<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>21</b>				
3	Nyandisu	April 24. 2006	PIG	5	1	4	0	0	1	4		All in healthy condition		
4	David Selma-Ta	"	"	5	0	5	0	0	0	5		"		
5	Massamai	"	"	5	1	4	0	0	1	4		"		
6	Johnny's Town	"	"	5	1	4	0	0	1	4		"		
7	Kpakamai	"	"	5	1	4	0	0	1	4		"		
<b>Grand Total</b>							<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>				
8	Lazelemai		SHEEP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Bloody Diaherra			
9	Womanor		"	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	"			
10	Selega	May 18. 2006	"	12	4	8	3	2	3	4		At semi free range		
11	Moibadu		"	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	"			
12	Quakelemai		"	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	"			
<b>Grand Total</b>							<b>10</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>6</b>				
13	Bolongoidu	May 6. 2006	GOAT	12	2	10	2	9	0	1	Bloody Diaherra	At semi free range		
14	Lormai		"	12	2	10	2	9	0	1	"	"		
15	kolliemai		"	0		0	0	0	0		"			
16	Bazagizia		"	0		0	0	0	0		"			
17	Betejama		"	12	2	10	2	9	0	1	"	At semi free range		
18	Galamai		"	0							"			
19	Vezela		"	12	2	10	2	7	0	3	"	At semi free range		
20	Zawordamai		"	0					0		"			
21	Kuluka	May 15. 2006	"	12	2	10	2	10	0	0	"			
<b>Grand Total</b>							<b>7</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>		
					QUANTITY IN Paddock									
QUARANTINE SITE							Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Bloody diaherra	At semi free range
							7	30	7	29	0	1		

June 12, 2006

Dr. Leon Ledlum, Deputy Minister  
Technical Services  
Ministry of Agriculture  
5<sup>th</sup> Street, Sinkor  
Monrovia, Liberia

Dear Dr. Ledlum:


CHF International is an NGO funded by USAID to implement Locally Initiated Networks for Community Strengthening (LINCS) program and operating in three Districts in Lofa County (Voinjama, Zorzor and Salayea) since 2004. CHF major activity at this time include: Conflict Resolution, Human Rights, Community Policing, Agricultural and Livestock in 70 Communities.

Recently, we requested and were granted permission for Mr. Edward S. Fatoma, Veterinarian Assistant, a member of your staff to accompany our staff to Lofa in order to assess and recommend causes and prevention of mortality to our animals. Mr. Fatoma, to that affect, recommended training in **Livestock Management** for our staff which should take approximately, but not more than seven (7) working days to conduct; therefore request is being made for Mr. Fatoma to travel to Lofa to conduct said workshop.

CHF International-Liberia was originally accredited to operate in the Republic of Liberia by the Ministry of Planning & Economic Affairs since November 24, 2003.

Thank you for your kind consideration.

Sincerely,



Brett Massey  
Country Director

BM/ch

cc: Dr. KoiKoi, Director of Veterinarian Medicine  
Technical Services, Ministry of Agriculture








# REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE

P. O. BOX 10-9010  
1000 MONROVIA 10, LIBERIA  
MEMORANDUM

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY MINISTER/TECH.

**TO:** All Importers of products of Animal Origin/Cattle Dealers/Battery Management etc.

**FROM:** *Handwritten signature*  
Hon. John B. Samuels  
Deputy Minister/Technical Affairs  
Ministry of Agriculture  
Mobile: 511550



**DATE:** November 30, 2004

**MESSAGE:** Effective as of today's date November 30, 2004, bearer of this document is hereby appointed by the Ministry of Agriculture to oversee all activities of veterinary Services, import permits of products of animal origin, poultry managers and farms.

Mr. Samuel Tucker takes over from Dr. Kpadeh Koikoi, who is no longer an employee of the Ministry of Agriculture. Anyone doing business with Dr. Koikoi on behalf of the Ministry of Agriculture will be doing so at his or her own risk.

We advise that all our business partners give full cooperation to Mr. Tucker.

HAPPY CHRISTMAS AND PROSPEROUS NEW YEAR.

CC: Hon. George F. Karmee  
MINISTER

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11/20/03


**NATIONAL TRANSITIONAL  
GOVT. OF LIBERIA  
MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE**

**SAMUEL TUCKER**  
Name

**COORDINATOR**  
Position

**TECHNICAL SERVICE**  
Department

**OCT. 14, 2003**      **TS/012**  
Date issued      ID No.



Tucker

Holder's Signature

**WORKING ID. CARD**

If found please deliver to the front  
address of the nearest Police Station

[Signature]

Authorized Signature


MILITARY

**TO: HEAD OF MISSION  
CHF – INTERNATIONAL  
REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA**

**DIAGNOSTIC SURVEY ON MORTALITY  
OF RESTOCKED LIVESTOCK  
(SHEEP, GOAT) IN VOINJAMA,  
ZORZOR AND SALAYEA DISTRICTS**

**– LOFA –**

**Submitted by: Edward S. Fatoma**



## **OVERVIEW**

Considering the bloody and devastating civil war in Liberia resulted in the destruction of national infrastructures such as road network and livestock and caused displacement of more than one million people. In this light, CHF International in Liberia have already started replacing some of these livestock (sheep, Goat, Cattle and pigs) to communities in Lofa in the following districts – Voinjama, Zorzor and Salayea through a restocking programs.

## **INTRODUCTION**

On the 1 – 4 June 2006, CHF – International in Liberia, in collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture made immediate fact finding diagnostic survey mission in Lofa. CHF requested the Ministry of Agriculture to send Technical expert to Lofa to investigate the high mortality amount the quarantined and restocked animals in the various districts, Voinjama, Zorzor and Salayea.

## **OBJECTIVES**

The primary objective of the livestock restocking programs in Lofa is to **enhance the food security capabilities rural farmers through the optional of livestock resource.**

The specific objectives of the mission are the followings:

To determine the cause of mortality of small ruminant (sheep and goat)

Perform autopsies on a cross section of the mortality.

To list preventive actions that CHF – International can take in proceeding with further animal procurement.

To list down preventive and responsive medication that should be made. Available in the event of further livestock (sheep & goat)

Advise CHF – International on how to clean the location of the mortality sites and either quarantine sites or animals form.

Verify the health of recently procured animals.

- Others advice should question arise while on the mission to Lofa.

### **TEAM COMPOSITION**

☞ Luther K. Kortue	CHF
☞ Salie Kromah	Driver CHF
☞ Samuel Tucker	Livestock Tech. CHF
☞ Edward S. Fatoma	MOA

### **GENERAL OBSERVATION OF MORTALITY SURVEY OF LIVESTOCK (SHEEP & GOAT)**

- ☞ Selection of livestock (sheep & goat) was not property or professionally done
- ☞ Pathogen may have come along with livestock in the country from place of origin.
- ☞ Confinement of small ruminant (sheep & goat) immediately from purchasing.
- ☞ Quarantine of livestock without vaccination with
- ☞ Transporting of animals without proper handling from place of origin.
- ☞ Feeding of livestock (Goat & sheep) with burglar wheat)
- ☞ Disregard disinfecting quarantine sites after serious mortality

## AUTOPSIES RESULT (JUNE 3, 2006).

- ↵ Community: Telemu
- ↵ District Salayea
- ↵ Livestock (sheep)
- ↵ # Livestock restocked (sheep) 

M	F
2	10
- ↵ Age – yearling
- ↵ Livestock origin: Guinea

Autopsies was done on { # 14 62 } as follows:

### General Appearance

- ↵ Emaciated body
- ↵ No rigarmatis present
- ↵ No stiffness of limbs
- ↵ Lungs discoloration
- ↵ Heart normal
- ↵ Liver discolored
- ↵ Rumen (no foreign matter present)
- ↵ Spleen abnormal & discolored
- ↵ Small intestine & liquid stool
- ↵ Diagnosis suspended
- ↵ Death (diarrhea & pneumonia)

### Preventative measures (Action)

- ↵ Selection of livestock (sheep & goat) must be done with a knowledgeable persons (veterinary) from the Ministry of Agriculture
- ↵ Small ruminants (sheep & goat) do not need must conferment. Must be semi-intensive followed by supplementary feeds daily in fence e.g. Cassava leaf, potatoes green etc)
- ↵ Don't feed (sheep & goat) with bulgar wheat.
- ↵ Vaccinate all livestock (sheep & goat) before quarantine (postovin, ovinpest etc..)
- ↵ Transport animals with care, wither in well ventilated (car & truck)
- ↵ Remove sick animals from quarantine site.
- ↵ Disinfect site when mortality occurs with agrigerm or lindane

# PREVENTIVE AND RESPONSIVE MEDICATION DOSAGE

No	Drugs	Animals	Diseases	Dosage
1	Oxtetracycline 10%	Small ruminant (pig, cattle)	Antibiotic anti – infection abscess, keratite, pneumonia, hepatitis, metrite mastitis, arthritis	For injection in the muscle - <b>Adult:</b> 1ml/20kg body weight during 3 days - <b>Young:</b> 1ml/10kg body weight during 3 days
2	Emivet 200 LA	Cattle, sheep, goat, pig	Antibiotic, anti-infection abscess, keratite, pneumonia chapattis metrite mastitis arthritis	For injection in the vein or in the muscle - <b>First day :</b> 2ml/10kg body weight - <b>Day 2 – 6:</b> 1,5 ml / 10 kg body weight
3	Ivomec	Cattle, goat, sheep	Anti – parasite for external and internal action.	Use in subcutaneous - <b>Cattle:</b> 1 ml for 50 kg of body weight - <b>Small ruminant:</b> 0,5 ml for 5 kg of body weight
4	Ovipest	Small ruminant (sheep , goat)	Small ruminant pest	Each animal above 6 weeks old 1 ml for injection under the skin renew 1 year after.
5	Stress – vitam	Cattle, Small ruminant ( pigs, house, dog)	Amino – acid vitamins	Direct oral use or for injection in the muscle - <b>Normal pig:</b> 10 ml every 3 days - <b>Pregnant pig:</b> 10 ml every month - <b>Piglets (6-15 days old):</b> 10 ml for 5 – 8 kids - <b>Small ruminant:</b> 10 ml every 2 weeks
6	Amprolum 20% UMD	Cattle, small ruminant	Prevention at treatment of coccidiosis	Oral use in drinking H <sub>2</sub> O to be used in one day small ruminant ½ tablespoon, L / animals one day during 5 days.
7	Multivitamin	All animals	Vitamin lacking, growth problem, reproduction or production problems	For intra muscular injection ( cattle – 5 – 10 ml 200 kg) - <b>Small ruminant:</b> 20 kg 3 – 6 ml - <b>Pig + 30 kg</b> 3 – 10 ml
8	Polystrongle	Cattle, pig, small ruminant	Internal parasite, digestive and respiratory tract infection	Oral use renew if necessary 3 weeks later ruminant, pig 0.4 kg in H <sub>2</sub> O
9	BIA calcium	Small ruminant	Stress, gestation growth, perturbation lactation recoving, locking intensive production	For 10 – 15 days with possible renewal - <b>Small ruminant:</b> one teaspoon per days.
10	Veto spray & oxyvet spray	All animal	Wound dressing	Local use on wounds and sores one or two times daily until cure.
11	Agrigerm	All animals houses	Disinfectant for houses virus, bacteria fungus	Fungus (1 teaspoon/litres (5ml / litres) Bacteria (1½ teaspoon) litres 7.5 ml / litres) Virus (3 soup spoons) 1 litres (30 ml / litres)
12	Trypazen	cattle		Dissolve in 12.5 ml for animal of 300 kg

13	Aminovit	Small ruminant (sheep & goat)	Stress, weakness appetite	1 teaspoon (5g) in 5 l H <sub>2</sub> O or 10 kg of feeds.
14	Albenil 750	Cattle, small ruminant	Dewormer	For direct oral use with H <sub>2</sub> O Adult 1 bolus for 4 animals Young 1 bolus for 4 animals
15	Phenylarthrite	Cattle, sheep, pig, goat	Anti inflammatory	For injection - 1ml, 1 tms 3 days
16	Limoxin concentrate	All animal	Stress, growth OTC infection intestinal tract infection	- Oral use with H <sub>2</sub> O
17	Alfovithosal	All animal	Growth, stress condition reproductive problem	- 5 – 10 grams / liter of drinking H <sub>2</sub> O

**DIAGNOSTIC NARRATIVE DATA**

Town	District	Contact person	Livestock	Restock		Mortality		Cause of mortality	Morbidity	Gestating	Remarks
				M	F	M	F				
Nyanchsin	Voinjama	Mulbah B. Flomo	Swine	1	4			Diarrhea			
Betegama	Voinjama	James T. Mawolo	Goat	2	10	11		Diarrhea			Floor is smooth need ruff floor
Vezala	Voinjama	Roland Karvah	Goat	2	10	1	8	Diarrhea	1	1	
Johanny Town	Voinjama	Lowance Gimeh	Pig	1	4			Diarrhea		1	
Massamai	Voinjama	Karmah Marwolo	Pig	1	4			Diarrhea			
Kpakamai	Voinjama	Alphonso Baku	Pig	1	4			Diarrhea		1	
David's Town	Voinjama	-	Pig	1	4			Diarrhea		1	
Barkadu	Voinjama	Varfee Sirleaf	Cattle	2	8			Diarrhea			
Lormai	Voinjama	Zorzay Mawolo	Goat	2	10	2	8	Small ruminant pest	1		
Salaga	Voinjama	Oldman Somme	Sheep	2	10	1	1	Diarrhea			
Barzewar	Zorzor	Kahakpai Gbazzie		1	7			Diarrhea	1		
Zuzulor	Zorzor	Big Boy Gayflor	Pig	4	8			Diarrhea	1		
Passama	Salayea	Mulbah Tarnue	Sheep	3	9	1	1	Diarrhea		1	
Telemu	Salayea	John Tokpa	Sheep	2	10	1	7	Diarrhea			
Telennai	Salayea	Morris Togbo	Sheep	2	10	1	5	Diarrhea			

# NARRATIVE SUMMARY ON DIAGNOSTIC SURVEY

Date	Districts	Mission main objectives	Achievement	Constraint	Recommendation	Remarks
June 1 – 4, 2006	Voinjama, Zorzor & Salayea	To identify, prevent, advice CHF management the cause of high mortality and morbidity with small ruminant for further event in communities restocked circle	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Cause of mortality and morbidity – identified</li> <li>- Preventative technique established</li> <li>- 15 communities surveyed in 3 districts               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 3 Salayea</li> <li>• 2 Zorzor</li> <li>• 10 Voinjama</li> </ul> </li> <li>- 1 sheep gestating</li> <li>- 2 goats gestating</li> <li>- 3 pigs gestating</li> </ul>	Bad Road network leading to Bostoched communities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Establish semi intensive system in quarantine and restocked sites</li> <li>- Drugs be available at all time during livestock multiplication and development et. Sheep &amp; goat</li> <li>- Vaccinate all livestock (sheep &amp; goat) before restocking</li> <li>- H<sub>2</sub>O, supplementary feed and, mineral lick be available in restocked pan / fence</li> <li>- When identified sick animals remove a treat separately</li> <li>- Carefully select animals (sheep &amp; goat) for quarantine and restocking</li> <li>- Do not vaccinate sick animals</li> <li>- Palatable feeds be fed to (sheep &amp; goat)</li> <li>- Technician be trained to identify disease or parasite and be able to treat abnormalities</li> </ul>	Always consult Ministry of Agriculture Authorities for advice.

**Appendix B - Landmine Action Project Report**

## Psycho social impact of Landmine Action's work

In 2003 Liberia came out of a 14 year old war and started a process of recovery. For the people of Liberia this recovery is taking place on many levels – economic sustainability for them and their families, in particular through agriculture; recovery of health of people who had been physically or mentally affected during the war; enrolment of their children in schools so that they may gain normalcy into their lives and benefit of opportunities the previous generation had missed; and establishing methods of law and order so that their nation is able to sustain peace long term.

Landmine Action are working on a pilot project in four rural towns in Lofa and Zorzor; they are; Gaglota, Salayea, Tinsu and Yaella. The pilot project is a fourfold integrated approach to weapons and UXO/ mines collection. The process of the weapons and mines/ UXO collection and the quick impact project is detailed below.

- a) A **community liaison** process is carried out to get a background of the community during and after the war, history of incidents relating to UXO, a profile of the community resources (water, health clinics, schools, other public buildings and gathering places), to get a perception of the main concerns of the community, both related to UXO and weapons and to the wider developmental context, projects international NGO s have (or in the process of) initiating, and communal projects that community themselves have started /completed. The community then identifies a small community based project concerning a resource that they are in particular need of.
  
- b) **Mine Risk Education** (MRE) relating to dangers of mines and unexploded ordnances is conducted for the communities participating. In particular persons that have not passed through a refugee transit camp and therefore not seen MRE posters, returning IDPs and refugees that have little idea of what UXO look and are beginning to farm on land that may be dangerous, or which areas have been battle grounds.  
However, the entire community will need to know how to act safely if they do identify a dangerous item, how to recognise a dangerous area, encourage reporting items to their local chief (or other traditional authority figures) and receive information on how that reporting system follows through via the police/ UNMil , leading to quick response and removal of the UXO.  
MRE will be carried out separately for adults and child audiences and is to focus on practical approach to living and working safely in the realities of a dangerous environment and establishes a sustainable reporting system after Landmine action have left the area.
  
- c) Inviting people to hand in any weapons they may have or find, whether serviceable or not, to make a verbal report of where they have seen unexploded ordnance and mines. Anyone who reports an item or hands in a weapon is registered and invited to participate as labourers in a **Quick Impact Project**.

Cooks, a mason and carpenter are also hired. Food is purchased within the community where possible.

**Any school going child that makes a report of UXO is not permitted to participate in the work, but can select an adult relative (father, brother, uncle, etc.) to labour.**

The labourers will ear \$2.00 per day and work a maximum of 10 days on the project which may be a pt latrine, well construction, etc.

- d) Monitoring of the quick impact project as it is being initiated, Completion and assessment of the project. There is a **ceremonial process** on the completion of the communal quick impact project. Weapons will be ceremonially handed over to UNMil for removal and destruction. UXO/ landmine reports will be handed to UNMil for marking where necessary, removal and destruction by their EOD teams.

The impact on the psycho social well being of the communities participating in the landmine action project is detailed below.

### **1/ Psycho social impact of weapons and unexploded ordnance removal**

An established reporting system and MRE are invalid to community perceptions unless dangerous items are removed and destroyed. The removal and destruction by trained EOD teams have a visible and concrete psychological impact on a community, confirming faith in their security organisations and that their concerns are acted upon.

They can farm, travel and live in confidence in their environment. Just one report leading to removal and destruction has a knock on effect on everyone in that community; it will lead to creation of a civic responsibility to make further reports where necessary and further action taken, further increasing security.

Communities respond positively to visible action the removal of dangerous ordnances and weapons without legal repercussions on the reporter; it helps to increase their sense of security and psychological well being during this vulnerable period of recovery after the civil war.

### **2/ Psycho social impact of MRE weapons and unexploded ordnance information**

Communities will continue to find more weapons and UXOs and mines in their midst after LMA have completed the QIP and moved on to other towns. This is particularly the case as all of the towns in the pilot project are facing a rapid population increase as people return after the war and begin farming – the main economic activities for the rural communities. This as already resulted in a number of explosions during the burning of farmland and accidents and death while digging.

Communities need to identify what a dangerous item looks like so that they recognise it as dangerous and can take appropriate action. They need to be informed on what physical action they need to take in order to stay safe. This information needs to be sustained through mothers teaching MRE to their own children within the normal process of safe child upbringing.

Through MRE, LMA will encourage people to have confidence because they know how to act appropriately and remove the fear of interacting in their environment. MRE is basic life skill that, when done well, has repercussions for other people who learn through informal communication networks.

### **3/ Psycho social impact of weapons and unexploded ordnance reporting systems**

All communities with a presence of landmines, small weapons and unexploded ordnance, need to have an established system of being able to report the dangerous item to an authority figure, so that it may be dealt with safely. The system needs to be non complex in order to not put people off from following and without hurdles; it needs to be accessible to people of all ages, both genders and all tribes. Importantly, the system needs to have a visible impact, so that people who have reported an item are reassured that the report has initiated a response, and that the response is given within a reasonable amount of time.

LMA's approach is to encourage people through MRE and community liaison meetings to report any dangerous items to their local chiefs (town chiefs, quarter chiefs, clan chiefs, etc) or community peace committees. These authority figures would have greater access to the police and UNMil, and are able to pass on reports. The body at this present time that have the capacity to remove dangerous items are UNMil. This may change in the future, and the reporting systems will alter accordingly.

By creating a system of reporting and response, ordinary people in the community are empowered to take action for their own safety and their communities safety. It will help build a confidence in the capacity of their law and order and security organisations, and build confidence that these organisations provide a public security service. It is hoped by LMA, that this process will contribute to the development of the police force as a public law and order service, working alongside with communities and demonstrating a responsibility. LMA intend to develop this process of public confidence in the police by including them in all stage of the project process and community liaison.

The building of public confidence in UNMil and the police and regular use of their traditional authority figures, will increase peoples' sense of trust in their security institutions and have repercussion for wider law and order and security issues, by continuing use of those services.

A good reporting system will build confidence that any complaints and concerns communities have are taken up by the appropriate authorities and dealt with in an effective and timely manner.

### **4/ participation in a quick impact project.**

The quick impact project focuses on the payment of labour rather than payment for submission of weapons. The intention behind this moves away from notions of bounty hunting and help to build a sense of civic responsibility through voluntary reporting and handing in of weapons and reports of UXO.

The resulting end project does not reward the individuals who reported or handed in weapons. The quick impact project rewards the whole community by providing communal and public resources that have immediate and practical benefits for all of

them. The result is equitable (the resources may be used regardless of gender, age, social status). The QIP will be of long term benefit.

This differs from other suggestions of handing out seeds to people who report items or hand in weapons, which benefits individuals only and does not allow entire community to participate; or from building town halls which are of direct benefit only to persons of some local social status, but have no practical benefit for the majority and are not equitable.

The community will achieve in a short period a momentum of starting and completing a community project that has been suggested by them, constructed by them and of benefit to them long term. This psychologically momentum will help to create a communal pulling together of community members, build a sense of civic responsibility through working on a project that is of benefit to all of them, and build a real sense of achievement. This will be of further benefit to the communities by helping them to embark on future self initiated communal projects, believing that it is possible, and that there is much they can do for themselves. The LMA QIP will use as much of the local resources (food, material, labour), as possible, and therefore LMA will encourage self sustainability rather than fostering dependence through aid.

Additionally, weapons holders are often in a self or externally imposed sense of dislocation from communities and are often the individuals most likely to cause trouble, be migrant or turn to crime. These programs have the effect of allowing these individuals to be seen and applauded by their own communities for work done and for taking the leap of faith to hand over their weapons.

### **Enfilade Community System**

The project is operated in clusters of 4 communities, each with a differing tribal makeup, conflict participation history and current status. By choosing communities in these 'clusters', this goes a long way to avoiding comparative resentments, suspicions and even fears. These projects encourage inter as well as intra community awareness and ideas exchanges that have a ripple effect on alleviating security concerns. As the project expands in this way, communities may be encouraged to join together to negotiate development input that has a compounded effect on several previously isolated communities.(markets, bridges, roads, clinic and school rehabs, shared water sources etc)

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**Appendix C - ABA Project Report**

**COMMUNITY MEDIATION PROGRAM**

***END OF PROJECT REPORT***

**Submitted to**

**Brett Massey  
Country Director  
C H F International –Liberia**

**By**

**Albert M. Colee  
Training Specialist  
CHF International – Liberia**

**December 11, 2006  
Monrovia, Liberia**

**I. Background**

CHF International – Liberia started work in Lofa County in 2004. CHF works in 70 communities in 3 districts (Salayea, Zorzor and Voinjama) in Lofa County. CHF set up 70 Peace Councils (1 in each of the 70 communities) to help prevent or settle disputes amongst community members. CHF has provided different types of training including training in leadership, human rights and agriculture to the CPCs and partner communities in order to build capacity. Early this year, CHF got a grant from USAID to replicate the ABA mediator training program based on the ABA mediation model in its partner communities in Lofa County. In March this year, CHF participated in a two day workshop organized by the ABA to review the curriculum of what is now being referred to as the ABA mediation model and develop scenario depicting conflict situations in Liberia which could be used in mediation practice sessions during mediator trainings. The ABA trained a total of 17 persons under CHF. These included CHF staff and partners.


CHF started basic mediation training in May 2006 for members of Community Peace Councils in its target communities in Lofa County. The initial phase of the mediation training (which was more of a pilot phase) came to an end in July 2006. because of the degree of success, the enthusiasm of the participants and the possibility of mediation becoming the main alternative dispute resolution mechanism for community people, USAID provided another grant to CHF to extend its mediation training program for another five months (August – December 2006).

This report does not focus so much on the content and process of the mediation training but on what CHF planned to do from August to December 2006 with reference to mediator training, what CHF has achieved so far, the challenges CHF encountered along the way and how it dealt with those challenges, the lessons CHF has learnt so far and our proposal for moving forward with the mediation program. It also includes participants’ expectations and worries arising out of the training which have the propensity to make the mediation a success or failure in the communities. It ends with suggestions on future program direction and emphasis.

**II. Proposed Targets Vs Actual Targets Achieved**


<b>Proposed Targets</b>	<b>Actual Targets Achieved</b>
35 ABA mediation Workshops	38 ABA mediation Workshops
630 CPC members trained in mediation (75%)	630 CPC members trained in mediation
189 women trained in mediation (30% )	323 women trained in mediation
195men trained in mediation (70%)	578 men trained in mediation (64.45%)
195 youth trained in mediation (30%)	64 youth trained in mediation (5.78%)
-	6 Police Officers
70 Chiefs	127 Chiefs
-	5 County Authorities
-	22 Judicial Officers
-	47 Women Leaders

STATISTICS OF CHF TRAINED MEDIATORS




1 =Men; 2 = Women; 3 = Number of Persons Trained; 4= Youth; 5= CPC Members; 6=Police; 7=Chiefs; 8=County Authorities; 9=Judicial Offers; 10=Others

TOTAL MEN AND WOMEN MEDIATORS TRAINED




1 = Men  
2 = Women




1= Youth; 2= CPC Members; 3=Police; 4=Chiefs; 5=County Authorities; 6=Judicial Officers; 7=Others

**STATISTICS OF MEDIATORS ZORZOR DISTRICT**




1 =Men; 2 = Women; 3 = Number of Persons Trained; 4= Youth; 5= CPC Members; 6=Police; 7=Chiefs; 8=County Authorities; 9=Judicial Officers; 10=Others

STATISTICS OF MEDIATORS TRAINED IN VOINJAMA DISTRICT




1 =Men; 2 = Women; 3 = Number of Persons Trained; 4= Youth; 5= CPC Members; 6=Police; 7=Chiefs; 8=County Authorities; 9=Judicial Offers; 10=Others

STATISTICS OF MEDIATORS TRAINED IN SALAYEA DISTRICT



1 =Men; 2 = Women; 3 = Number of Persons Trained; 4= Youth; 5= CPC Members; 6=Police; 7=Chiefs; 8=County Authorities; 9=Judicial Offers; 10=Others



1 =Men; 2 = Women; 3 = Number of Persons Trained; 4= Youth; 5= CPC Members; 6=Police; 7=Chiefs; 8=County Authorities; 9=Judicial Officers; 10=Others

### III. Challenges and how we dealt with them

1. How were we going to Replicate the ABA mediator training which was designed for literate people in communities where most of the CPC members are illiterate
2. How were the CHF participants in the ABA TOT which took place in Monrovia going to practice training other mediators and doing actual mediation when they return to Lofa County since only one of them was CHF staff.
3. How would the mediation program be sustained in Lofa after CHF pulls out
4. keeping our participants who are mostly farmers in the workshop for five days

#### *Replicating the ABA mediator Training*

We recruited people who could speak the local languages. We changed the training method from a formal classroom learning to an informal participatory learning (we replace teacher with the facilitator). We conducted two weeks training of trainers for our trainers focusing mainly on adult learning methods, group facilitation methods and training practicum. Our trainers conducted the training in the local languages when it became necessary

#### *Skill practice for CHF participants in the ABA TOT*

Most of the people CHF brought to the first ABA TOT in April this year were not CHF staff and CHF did not have the resources to hire them after the training. But they still had to practice the skill they had acquired. To deal with this challenge, CHF Training Specialist held a meeting with the initial mediator trainers to look at creative ways of applying the mediation skills they had acquired from the ABA. At the end of the meeting, the initial trainers agreed to work with the CHF Training Specialist as training Assistants on a voluntary basis. CHF provided small cash incentive to the volunteers to enable them take care of their basic needs during the times they served as volunteer trainers.

*Holding 40 hour mediator training for participants who are mostly farmers*

Most of the CPC members that were the main targets of the community mediator training are farmers who have just returned from refugee camps. These people rank survival as their number one priority and so they are less inclined to spend time away from their livelihood activities. CHF provided incentives in the form of transportation and toiletries which they used to hire people to work their some one to work in their place on the farm while they were at the workshop.

*Linking Community Mediation to County Level Local Structures*

Reactions so far from the communities show that they are very eager to practice the mediation skills they acquire from the CHF mediation training. But the Community Peace Council members who have better understanding of local conflicts because they are local people acknowledge that there are very complex and deeply rooted conflicts that communities might not be able to handle by themselves. Thus, a major concern members of Community Peace Councils have often raised is where they can refer complex disputes that are beyond their capacity to settle through mediation. Secondly, Community Peace Council members have been expressing fear that local chiefs and courts may feel threatened by the mediation role of the Community Peace Council members and may decide to take punitive measures against community mediators for helping to resolving disputes outside of the courts. This is a very genuine fear. In the Liberian country side, chiefs and judges are under paid and sometimes go for months without pay. These chiefs and judges survive mainly on fees they collect from parties in disputes they settle. Because mediators help settle disputes without taking money, eventually more disputes will go to them. For this reason, chiefs and judges are beginning to view the mediators as people who want to take away their livelihood.

The two county level mediation training for commissioners, paramount chiefs, clan chiefs, circuit Judge, magistrates, heads of security agencies, heads of women group and the local Liberia Marketing Association branch, were intended to address some of the concerns raised by members of the Community Peace Councils and to provide mediation skills to local government authorities in Lofa County that they could use when face with the challenge of dealing with higher level disputes.

*The challenge of sustaining the mediation program in Lofa when CHF closes its activities in December this year has not been dealt with*

**IV. Lessons learnt so far**

1. 40 hour training in basic mediation skills is not sufficient to make one a mediator trainer. Trainers need continuous training, practice, mentoring and support to master the mediation and training skills and gain more confidence
2. participants who come back for retraining after practicing mediation skills acquired during initial training in the community for a while will have better understanding of the mediation process and therefore will do better mediation than those who don't come back for retraining
3. both literate and illiterate people have the capacity to learn and do mediation only that each category needs a different method of education
4. one of the factors that is most likely to undermine the community mediation program in the issue of incentive for the community mediator. If we can develop creative ways of providing incentives for our community mediators, the mediation training program will be very successful

5. there is a need for more coordination and information among the groups working in the area of mediation otherwise there will be overlaps of function and target groups which could lead to unwise use of resources
6. the place where the training takes place affects the quality of the training just as the skill level of the trainer

**V. What Needs to be Done to sustain the mediation program in Liberia**

- Organize advanced training for present trainers in participatory research methods, androgogy, group facilitation and conflict analysis which will enable them do mediation training effectively and to adequately deal with expectations of participants in mediation workshops.
- Lobby for extension of mediation program so that more mediation training, more follow up and coaching will be conducted for local people
- Work with paramount and clan chiefs to set up Peace Councils & Elders Council on Mediation at clan, chiefdom, district and county levels to handle complex disputes that communities can not handle such as land disputes
- Set up a conflict mediation centre that will
  1. provide various forms of support (including training, logistics and facilities) to the mediation councils on a continuous basis
  2. research the root causes of conflicts in Lofa and traditional conflict transformation methods which have worked in Lofa in the past and sharing their findings with peace building groups
  3. conduct more training for different groups in Lofa County interested in using mediation as an alternative dispute resolution method including the training of trainers

**Community Mediation Program – End of Project Report December 2006**

<b>Date of training</b>	<b>Name of participating community</b>	<b>District</b>	<b>No of parti. per commu.</b>	<b>Total male</b>	<b>Total Female</b>	<b>GRAND TOTAL OF No. OF PERSONS TRAINED</b>	<b>Total Youths</b>	<b>Total CPCs trained</b>	<b>Police officers</b>	<b>Local Admin. Authorities (T/chiefs/ local leaders) etc</b>	<b>County admin. Authorities (Supt &amp; admin officers) etc</b>	<b>Justices of the Peace/ Judicial</b>	<b>oTHERS</b>
September	NyamaKamadu	Voinjama	12	8	4	12	1	8	1	2	0	0	0
	Mamekonedu	Voinjama	12	10	2	12	1	9	0	2	0	0	0
	Selega	Voinjama	12	7	5	12	1	8	1	2	0	0	0
	Gbegbedu	Voinjama	12	8	4	12	1	9	1	1	0	0	0
	Malamai	Voinjama	8	3	5	8	0	8	0	0	0	0	0
	Lazelemai	Voinjama	12	7	5	12	1	10	0	1	0	0	0
	Dezabah	Voinjama	14	8	6	14	1	9	0	1	0	0	1
	Tenebu	Voinjama	10	6	4	10	1	8	0	1	0	0	1
October	Dougomai	Voinjama	11	6	5	11	1	9	0	1	0	0	0
	David Selma Ta	Voinjama	12	8	4	12	1	9	0	1	0	0	1
	Bologoidu	Voinjama	12	6	6	12	1	10	0	1	0	0	0
	Konadu	Voinjama	12	4	8	12	1	10	0	0	0	0	0
	Lormai	Voinjama	12	9	3	12	1	9	0	1	0	0	1
	Kolliemai	Voinjama	12	5	7	12	1	10	0	0	0	0	0
	Mavekonedu	Voinjama	14	9	5	14	1	11	0	0	0	0	0
	Quekelemai	Voinjama	9	5	4	9	1	7	0	1	0	0	0
September	Kugbemai	Voinjama	12	8	4	12	0	12	0	0	0	0	0
	Vonema	Voinjama	12	8	4	12	0	12	0	0	0	0	0
	Kluka	Voinjama	12	7	5	12	0	12	0	0	0	0	0
	Sakonedu	Voinjama	12	7	5	12	0	12	0	0	0	0	0
	Samie Ta	Voinjama	12	6	6	12	0	12	0	0	0	0	0
	Lawalazu	Voinjama	12	5	7	12	0	12	0	0	0	0	0
	Kpakaamai	Voinjama	12	7	5	12	0	12	0	0	0	0	0
	Bazagizia	Voinjama	12	8	4	12	0	12	0	0	0	0	0

Community Mediation Program – End of Project Report December 2006

	Massamai	Voinjama	11	6	5	11	0	12	0	0	0	0	0
	Velezala	Voinjama	12	9	3	12	0	12	0	0	0	0	0
	Zawordamai	Voinjama	12	7	5	12	0	12	0	0	0	0	0
	Jonny Town	Voinjama	12	7	5	12	0	12	0	0	0	0	0
November	Kanela	Voinjama		8	4	12	6	2	0	4	0	0	0
	Korlela	Voinjama		8	4	12	5	3	0	4	0	0	0
	Samodu	Voinjama		7	5	12	3	7	0	2	0	0	0
	Womanor	Voinjama		7	5	12	2	8	0	2	0	0	0
	Nyandisu	Voinjama		7	5	12	3	8	0	1	0	0	0
	Betejama	Voinjama		8	4	12	2	9	0	1	0	0	0
	Voinjama	Voinjama	41	27	14	41		0	1	21	3	11	5
	Zorzor	Zorzor	40	29	11	40	9	6	1	18	1	3	8
	Salayea	Salayea	23	22	4	26	0	13	1	7	1	3	1
	Jarmulor	Voinjama		14	10	24	1	21	0	1	0	0	1
	Moibadu	Voinjama		9	3	12	1	10		1	0	0	0
	Sazanor	Voinjama		7	5	12	0	10	0	1	0	0	0
	Telemu	Salayea	12	5	9	14	0	12	0	2	0	0	0
	Tinsue	Salayea	12	8	2	10	0	7	0	3	0	0	0
	Zolowo	Salayea	9	7	2	9	0	8	0	1	0	0	0
	Telemai	Salayea	15	9	5	14	4	6	0	3	0	0	2
	Passama	Salayea	14	9	6	15	4	6	0	2	0	0	1
September	Beyan Town	Salayea	13	7	6	13	0	12	0	1	0	0	0
	Kpotoi	Salayea	11	8	3	11	0	10	0	1	0	0	0
	Ganglota	Salayea	13	10	3	13	0	12	0	1	0	0	0
	Gorlu	Salayea	12	7	5	12	0	11	0	1	0	0	0
	Gbanyea	Salayea	12	10	2	12	0	11	0	1	0	0	0
	Sucromu	Salayea	14	10	4	14	1	7	0	2	0	0	4
	Kpaiyea	Salayea	14	11	3	14	1	7	0	2	0	0	4
	Gbanway	Salayea	15	11	4	15	1	7	0	2	0	0	5
	Yarpuah	Salayea	14	10	4	14	1	6	0	2	0	0	5
	Kolahun	Kolahun	3	3	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
	Vahun	Vahun	2	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	0

	Zuwulor	Zorzor	15	11	4	15	0	11	0	4	0	0	0
	Zelemai	Zorzor	9	6	3	9	0	8	0	1	0	0	0
	Kokolo	Zorzor	11	7	4	11	0	10	0	1	0	0	0
	Yeala	Zorzor	13	9	4	13	1	10	0	1	0	0	1
	Kilewu	Zorzor	13	8	5	13	0	9	0	1	0	0	3
	Borkeza	Zorzor	14	9	5	14	2	6	0	4	0	0	2
	Fissibu	Zorzor	13	8	5	13	2	6	0	4	0	0	1
	Konia	Zorzor		8	5	13	0	12	0	1	0	0	0
	Ziggida	Zorzor		9	2	11	0	10	0	1	0	0	0
	Boi	Zorzor		5	5	10	0	9	0	1	0	0	0
	Luyeyama	Zorzor		10	4	14	0	12	0	2	0	0	0
	Nekebozu	Zorzor		8	2	10	0	8	0	2	0	0	0
	Barziwen	Zorzor		6	8	14	0	12	0	2	0	0	0
<b>TOTALS</b>				<b>578</b>	<b>323</b>	<b>901</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>630</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>127</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>47</b>

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District	Total male	Total Female	GRAND TOTAL OF No. OF PERSONS TRAINED	Total Youths	Total CPCs trained	Police officers	Local Admin. Authorities (T/chieves/local leaders) etc	County admin. Authorities (Supt & admin officers) etc	Justices of the Peace/Judicial	Total No. of other S/holders trained
Voinjama	8	4	12	1	8	1	2	0	0	0
Voinjama	10	2	12	1	9	0	2	0	0	0
Voinjama	7	5	12	1	8	1	2	0	0	0
Voinjama	8	4	12	1	9	1	1	0	0	0
Voinjama	3	5	8	0	8	0	0	0	0	0
Voinjama	7	5	12	1	10	0	1	0	0	0
Voinjama	8	6	14	1	9	0	1	0	0	1
Voinjama	6	4	10	1	8	0	1	0	0	1
Voinjama	6	5	11	1	9	0	1	0	0	0
Voinjama	8	4	12	1	9	0	1	0	0	1
Voinjama	6	6	12	1	10	0	1	0	0	0
Voinjama	4	8	12	1	10	0	0	0	0	0
Voinjama	9	3	12	1	9	0	1	0	0	1
Voinjama	5	7	12	1	10	0	0	0	0	0
Voinjama	9	5	14	1	11	0	0	0	0	0
Voinjama	5	4	9	1	7	0	1	0	0	0
Voinjama	8	4	12	0	12	0	0	0	0	0
Voinjama	8	4	12	0	12	0	0	0	0	0
Voinjama	7	5	12	0	12	0	0	0	0	0
Voinjama	7	5	12	0	12	0	0	0	0	0
Voinjama	6	6	12	0	12	0	0	0	0	0
Voinjama	5	7	12	0	12	0	0	0	0	0

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Voinjama	7	5	12	0	12	0	0	0	0	0
Voinjama	8	4	12	0	12	0	0	0	0	0
Voinjama	6	5	11	0	12	0	0	0	0	0
Voinjama	9	3	12	0	12	0	0	0	0	0
Voinjama	7	5	12	0	12	0	0	0	0	0
Voinjama	7	5	12	0	12	0	0	0	0	0
Voinjama	8	4	12	6	2	0	4	0	0	0
Voinjama	8	4	12	5	3	0	4	0	0	0
Voinjama	7	5	12	3	7	0	2	0	0	0
Voinjama	7	5	12	2	8	0	2	0	0	0
Voinjama	7	5	12	3	8	0	1	0	0	0
Voinjama	8	4	12	2	9	0	1	0	0	0
Voinjama	14	10	24	1	21	0	1	0	0	1
Voinjama	9	3	12	1	10		1	0	0	0
Voinjama	7	5	12	0	10	0	1	0	0	0
Voinjama	27	14	41	0	0	1	21	3	11	5
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>296</b>	<b>194</b>	<b>490</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>366</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>10</b>

Kolahun	3	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
Vahun	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>0</b>
Salayea	22	4	26	0	13	1	7	1	3	1
Salayea	5	9	14	0	12	0	2	0	0	0
Salayea	8	2	10	0	7	0	3	0	0	0
Salayea	7	2	9	0	8	0	1	0	0	0
Salayea	9	5	14	4	6	0	3	0	0	2
Salayea	9	6	15	4	6	0	2	0	0	1
Salayea	7	6	13	0	12	0	1	0	0	0
Salayea	8	3	11	0	10	0	1	0	0	0
Salayea	10	3	13	0	12	0	1	0	0	0

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Salayea	7	5	12	0	11	0	1	0	0	0
Salayea	10	2	12	0	11	0	1	0	0	0
Salayea	10	4	14	1	7	0	2	0	0	4
Salayea	11	3	14	1	7	0	2	0	0	4
Salayea	11	4	15	1	7	0	2	0	0	5
Salayea	10	4	14	1	6	0	2	0	0	5
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>206</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>22</b>

Zorzor	29	11	40	9	6	1	18	1	3	8
Zorzor	11	4	15	0	11	0	4	0	0	0
Zorzor	6	3	9	0	8	0	1	0	0	0
Zorzor	9	4	13	1	10	0	1	0	0	1
Zorzor	8	5	13	0	9	0	1	0	0	3
Zorzor	9	5	14	2	6	0	4	0	0	2
Zorzor	8	5	13	2	6	0	4	0	0	1
Zorzor	8	5	13	0	12	0	1	0	0	0
Zorzor	9	2	11	0	10	0	1	0	0	0
Zorzor	5	5	10	0	9	0	1	0	0	0
Zorzor	7	4	11	0	10	0	1	0	0	0
Zorzor	10	4	14	0	12	0	2	0	0	0
Zorzor	8	2	10	0	8	0	2	0	0	0
Zorzor	6	8	14	0	12	0	2	0	0	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>133</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>129</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>578</b>	<b>323</b>	<b>901</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>630</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>127</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>47</b>

**Appendix D - FAO Project Report**

**REPORT ON  
INTEGRATED PRODUCTION AND PEST MANAGEMENT  
TRAINING WORKSHOPS AND INPUTS DISTRIBUTION  
VOINJAMA DISTRICT  
OCTOBER – NOVEMBER 2006**

**INTRODUCTION:**

The Integrated Production and Pests Management (IPPM) is a practical approach introduced to local farmers to enable them combat pests in Liberia which have destroyed approximately fifty percent (50%) of the crops grown by the local farmers annually.

CHF International staff attended a two-day Training of Trainers (TOT) Workshop sponsored by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) on October 12 -13, 2006, after which, an informal agreement was reached between CHF International and the FAO whereby CHF field staff would train ten (10) local farmers in each of thirteen existing CHF partner communities currently involved in Food Crop Production, especially rice.

Since CHF field staff were already engaged in Livelihood Farmers Training in the areas of Livestock, Food Crop and Tree Crop Production, a two-day workshop to incorporate the IPPM training into the Livelihood Project Workshops was developed and conducted in the thirteen selected communities from October to November 2006.

**COURSE CONTENT ON THE IPPM**

The course content developed by experts at the FAO Training of Trainers Workshop in Monrovia was made simple in order to meet the level of understanding of the local farmers. Discussion topics can be found in Annex 1 (workshop course content).

**METHODOLOGY OF THE WORKSHOPS:**

Since the local farmers already had a broad knowledge on the various pests that are destructive to their crops, the participants at the workshop were placed in smaller groups to brainstorm and come up with their own ideas on the stages of pest damage and the most applicable control mechanisms. By the end of each workshop, participants identified problematic pests, their stages of crop damage, and some control mechanisms.

Facilitators summarized the listing adding whatever was overlooked and introduced some applicable control mechanisms which were discussed at the TOT workshop in October, 2006.

## **PARTICIPANTS RESPONSES**

What is pest?

- Any thing that damages feed crops
- Eg: Ground hogs, rats, birds, grasshopper, worms, bush cow, elephant, monkey and insects

What are the characteristics of crop damage and the effect of pests on crop performance?

a) The characteristics:

There are four ways in which pests can damage crops.

- Leaves
- Stem
- Fruits
- Roots

b) The effect on crop performance

The effects of pests on crop performance are many but just to name a few,

- Poor growth
- Low yield
- High mortality rate
- Infestation of diseases

Major pests of field crops in Liberia especially rice. There are many pests of field crops but the major ones for rice are:

- Birds
- Rats
- Ground hogs
- Money
- Bush cow
- Deers

What are some major diseases of field crops in Liberia and their control?

**See Annex II** (Diseases on feed crop)

## **WHAT ARE THE PRINCIPLES OF INTEGRATED PRODUCTION AND PESTS MANAGEMENT (IPPM)?**

There are four principles of a good Agricultural Practices (GAP)

They are:

- Constant visitation
- Regular weeding
- Daily observation
- Group participation

## **MANAGEMENT OF BIRDS / RODENTS:**

The most practical ways of dealing with pests such as birds and rodents are:

- By trapping them after building fence
- By hunting with (gun, or other animals such as dogs)
- Digging holes to let them drop inside
- Digging hole in a 10 or more feet reed and place food to allow them come in enough to eat them you move them by day time.
- By building your kitchen far from one another and far from the edge of the bushes

## **DISTRIBUTION OF IPPM INPUTS:**

The distribution plan was developed by FAO in collaboration with CHF International.

**See Annex – III** (On inputs distribution)

Annex: I

INTEGRATED PRODUCTION AND PESTS MANAGEMENT MINI WORKSHOP  
COURSE CONTENT

1. Definition of crop pests and characteristics of crop pests damage.
2. Characteristics of crop damage and effect of pests on crop performance
3. Major pests of field crops in Liberia. Special ref. to vertebrate pests
4. Major diseases of field crops in Liberia
5. Principles of integrated production and pests management IPPM
6. Crop Management for integrated pest management (IPPM)
  - a) The principles of good agricultural practices (GAP)
7. Decision making in pest management
  - a) Agro-ecosystem analysis
  - b) Planning for and implementation of pest management actions
8. Management of birds and other pests in rice fields
9. Management of rodent pests
10. Working with farmers, IPPM extension
11. Planning farmers training and networking

## Annex – II

### SUMMARY OF DISEASES ON FEED CROPS

Common Name of Diseases	Causitives Agent	Method of Treatment	Symptoms	Control
Rice smut	Tilletia horrida basidiomycetes	Deposit on leaves of air born diseases	Grains converted to a mass black of fungal spores	Cut and burn disease-affected plants. Cut and bury disease plants.
Rice bacterial blight	Xanthomonas Oryzae	Spores dispersed by wind and rain	Purple or light brown angular spots on leaves and stem	Plant clean healthy stock use resisted varieties
Rice Iron Toxicity	Too much Iron despite in swamp	Spread of iron in plots	Stunted growth or dwary plants tip of growing leaves show brown color	Always allow water in the plots and let out water to put in fresh water frequently.

## ANNEX - III

## FAO / CHF IPPM INPUTS DISTRIBUTION SUMMARY

NO.	Community	Type of Project	Date of workshop	No. of participants in the workshop			No. of beneficiaries			QTY of inputs distributed			
				Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Bird Net	Bell	Trap wire	Zinc
1	Sazanor	Low Land Rice	November 1 - 2, 2006	17	10	27	4	6	10	10 pcs	30 pcs	30 meters	5 pcs
2	Jarmulor	Up Land Rice	November 3-4, 2006	19	5	24	5	5	10	10 pcs	30 pcs	30 meters	5 pcs
3	Tenebu	Low Land Rice	November 5, 2006	14	18	32	3	7	10	10 pcs	30 pcs	30 meters	5 pcs
4	Kanela	Up Land Rice	November 6 - 7, 2006	19	6	25	5	5	10	10 pcs	30 pcs	30 meters	5 pcs
5	Dazabah	Up Land Rice	November 12, 2006	18	12	30	6	4	10	10 pcs	30 pcs	30 meters	5 pcs
6	Malamai	Low Land Rice	November 14, 2006	23	10	33	8	2	10	10 pcs	30 pcs	30 meters	5 pcs
7	Sakonedu	Low Land Rice	November 15 - 16, 2006	23	10	33	2	8	10	10 pcs	30 pcs	30 meters	5 pcs
8	Mavekonedu	Low Land Rice	November 18 - 19, 2006	18	12	30	6	4	10	10 pcs	30 pcs	30 meters	5 pcs
9	Kondadu	Low Land Rice	November 21 - 22, 2006	20	10	30	8	2	10	10 pcs	30 pcs	30 meters	5 pcs
10	Dougomai	Up Land Rice	November 23, 2006	21	9	30	7	3	10	10 pcs	30 pcs	30 meters	5 pcs
11	Lawalazu	Low Land Rice	November 24 - 25, 2006	2	28	30	1	9	10	2 pcs	18 pcs	30 meters	5 pcs
12	Vonema	Up Land Rice	November 27 - 28, 2006	21	9	30	2	18	20	5 pcs	15 pcs	18 meters	5 pcs
13	Samodu	Up Land Rice	November 29 - 30, 2006	16	17	33	6	4	10	10 pcs	30 pcs	30 meters	5 pcs
	<b>Grand Total</b>			<b>231</b>	<b>156</b>	<b>387</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>117</b>	<b>363</b>	<b>378</b>	<b>65</b>

NOTE: Inputs were only distributed to rice farmers.

**Appendix E - CDA Project Assessment Report**



## COLLABORATIVE LEARNING PROJECTS

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### **CREATING A RIVER BETWEEN TWO FIRES**

*Impact Assessment of the  
Locally Initiated Networks for Community Strengthening Program (LINCS)  
Lofa County, Liberia*

A Program of  
CHF International - Liberia  
With financial support from  
The US Agency for International Development

Subgrantee Name: CDA Collaborative Learning Projects  
Stable Society Study: LINCS Substudy  
Prime Subgrant Number: 669-A-00-04-00009-00  
Subgrant Number: 23101-06-G-01

**August 2006**



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## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

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This document reports the findings of an impact assessment of the Locally-Initiated Networks for Community Strengthening Program (LINCS) operated by CHF International in Lofa County, from 2004 to the present. The assessment is focused primarily on the conflict resolution and reconciliation elements of the program.

In some ways, this was not a “standard” evaluation, as CHF and the assessment team were interested in the broader societal impacts of the program—impacts on “Peace Writ Large” in Liberian society. While the assessment touched on the typical inquiry regarding whether the program completed certain activities efficiently and on time, we were mainly interested in whether the program contributes to proximate and long term peace in Liberia—and how. Fulfilling the basic program requirements does not, in itself, address the question of broader impacts. The findings reported below address issues regarding program implementation, but largely with respect to how changes in program approach might increase the contribution to peace and reconciliation.

### **INTRODUCTION TO THE ASSESSMENT**

The Terms of Reference for this assessment stated the purpose of the effort as follows:

1. To determine to what extent CHF’s efforts in Lofa have succeeded in helping to stabilize the post-war environment;
2. To determine to what extent structures and processes established by LINCS have either prevented escalation of conflicts in communities or are serving to transform the conflict by addressing the attitudes, behaviors, and structures that have been driving forces in the conflict;
3. To assess whether and how LINCS has contributed to Peace Writ Large; and
4. To determine whether LINCS-created structures and process can contribute to a base-level justice system.

In addition, CHF staff and USAID officials indicated interest in learning about several important topics in relation to the LINCS Program, including leadership and decision making at the community level; dispute resolution processes and access to justice; deeper reconciliation, truth, justice and tolerance issues; the development of democratic mechanisms; the evolution of security in the area; linkages among program elements. This group of questions and topics served as the basis for our inquiry. Each of these topics is addressed—often in multiple ways—in the full report.

### **Sources of Information**

The CDA team gathered information from several sources, including:

- a. Interviews with groups and individuals in 13 Lofa County communities that have been participating in the LINCS Program;

- b. Interviews conducted in 3 Lofa County communities that have not been participating in the LINCS Program;
- c. Interviews with CHF staff in Monrovia, Lofa County; Washington and Boston;
- d. Interviews with other NGO staff working in Lofa County, as well as local officials and UN personnel in Lofa;
- e. Interviews of government officials and NGO staff in Monrovia;
- f. A conflict analysis workshop conducted with members of several communities in Lofa County; and
- g. Review of project documents and reports.

## **BACKGROUND OF THE LINCS PROGRAM**

The LINCS Program was designed to address the objectives of USAID Liberia’s Next Steps in Peace Program (NSPP). The goal of NSPP was to support the early stages of the peace process and facilitate a peaceful reintegration of displaced persons, refugees, and ex-combatants. Within this overall goal, NSPP sought to (a) strengthen constituencies for peace; (b) mitigate ongoing violence and avert imminent violence, and (c) address some of the causes and consequences of conflict. CHF’s LINCS Program sought to support the building and strengthening of peace constituencies at the community and district levels in Voinjama, Zorzor, and Salayea districts of Lofa County with a core goal of improving community level conflict management capacities.

The choice of Lofa County was significant, as this area was the scene of some of the worst violence (massacres, atrocities, destruction of churches, mosques and sacred spaces, widespread destruction of housing, etc.). During the fourteen years of warfare, the violence in Lofa County followed ethnic lines, and, in the aftermath, the contending tribal groups harbor deep resentment, fear, mistrust, and hostility towards each other. Groups that reportedly lived in relative harmony for many decades now live apart, as some groups have refused to return to their former houses and lands, and other groups have refused to receive their perceived enemies. Lofa County is considered as one of the areas of Liberia where violence is most likely to recur, a “flash point” county in a country only beginning to reemerge from national trauma.

### **Major Program Elements**

For more than two years, the LINCS Program has included three major components:

1. Establishment of Community Peace Councils and support for local leadership development, including training programs and associated awareness-raising activities.
2. Conduct of forums or dialogue sessions across ethnic lines, more formally called the National and County Level Forums.
3. Undertaking of livelihood projects and other joint community efforts communities.

### ***Community Peace Councils***

In brief, the Community Peace Councils (CPCs) were established as an alternative mechanism for handling a range of dispute types at the community level, especially in the absence of an effective judicial system. CHF hoped that the CPCs would provide a means for early resolution of conflicts that would contribute to preventing escalation to violence, especially conflicts associated with IDP/refugee returns and reintegration of ex-combatants. The CPCs were also meant to become a peace constituency and to provide leadership in their communities. Finally, it

was intended that the CPCs would offer a model of an inclusive community structure that would help ensure participation by all groups in local level governance.

Efforts were made to make sure that all key groups were represented among the CPC membership: men/women; old/youth; and all ethnic groups. Most CPC members received four different training programs: basic peacebuilding skills, leadership, trauma healing, human rights, community security and community policing. Many of these training programs were also attended by other key community leaders (town chiefs, elders, members of women's and youth groups, etc.). The CPCs serve as CHF's principal point of contact in the communities, and are the base for organizing other community activities, including livelihood projects (see below).

### ***National and County Level Forums***

CHF realized that, while the CPCs might be able to address a variety of conflicts at the community level, some issues would likely be beyond their capability. One of the most salient inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts in Lofa County is between the Lorma tribe (and, in Salayea District, the Kpelle tribe) on one side and the Mandingo tribe on the other, largely as a result of actions taken by armed members of these ethnic groups against each other during the past fourteen years. The most obvious result is that many communities remain split. In some cases, groups that formerly lived intermingled are now living separately but near each other; in other cases, Mandingo families have not returned to their former communities at all.

CHF found that powerful people connected with the area, but living in Monrovia or Guinea, often determine policies and actions at the community level. Therefore, as they wished to contribute to reconciliation among Lorma/Kpelle and Mandingo, they worked to identify those "opinion leaders" and bring them into the dialogue process. CHF, with support from the Foundation for Human Rights and Democracy (FOHRD) and other implementing partners, held a series of forums during 2004/5 among contending groups in several key communities. In the spring of 2006, CHF hired an additional staff person to focus solely on organizing and implementing forums, as a follow-up to the earlier efforts. CHF staff and its implementing partners facilitate inter-ethnic dialogue sessions in an effort to identify outstanding issues and grievances and to negotiate agreements.

### ***Community and Livelihood Projects***

For several reasons, CHF undertook additional practical efforts in the communities. These projects generally took two forms: construction of community centers and income-generating or livelihood efforts, usually support for some form of farming or animal husbandry. One purpose of these efforts was to provide more concrete benefits to the participating communities, to give people tangible results from inter-ethnic cooperation, and to engage members of various tribes in working together on common projects to promote tolerance and cooperation. The projects also provided personal benefit to CPC members as incentive for continued service.

## **APPLICATION OF RPP TOOLS**

Section III of the full report explores the LINCS Program, using a set of concepts and frameworks developed through the Reflecting on Peace Practice process (a project of CDA Collaborative Learning Projects). These tools were devised as a way to assess the effectiveness

of peacebuilding programs, including whether and how the program contributes to broader peace in a society experiencing violent conflict—what we call “Peace Writ Large.” The report explores the LINCS Program using four tools/concepts from RPP: the RPP Matrix; Theories of Change; Criteria of Effectiveness; and Conflict Analysis. The program analysis presented in this Section provides the basis for the conclusions presented in Section IV.

## **LINCS PROGRAM IN RELATION TO ITS OBJECTIVES AND EXPECTED RESULTS**

The LINCS Program proposal to USAID articulated several objectives, including those restated below, along with a brief summary of the CDA team’s findings in relation to these objectives.

### **1. Strengthen and Expand Constituencies for Peace**

Program objectives: a) Increase the effectiveness of peace-building constituencies at the local, district and country level; b) Strengthen democratic civil leadership with a vested interest in peace; c) Increase quantity, quality and timely delivery of communication on issues affecting national to local peace building processes; d) Build capacity for local organizations to advocate for responsive national policies that contribute to peace; e) Provide logistical support for advocacy and collaboration; and f) Assist community leadership groups to build inclusive and transparent management.

The CPCs may consider themselves to be, broadly speaking, peace constituencies, but they are not mobilized to advocate for peace. Rather, they are working—effectively in many cases—on local and interpersonal issues of conflict. They are not engaging in advocacy activities at the local, county or national levels. The team did hear repeated support for peace, exhaustion with the war process, a willingness to put the experiences of the past fourteen years behind them, a desire to avoid further violence, and a pragmatic desire to get on with life. In other words, there is strong public support for peace—but there is no identifiable civic organization or network of organizations advocating for it, and the CPCs do not appear to be filling this role. Furthermore, it is important to note that, alongside the verbal support for peace, we observed stark separation of populations along ethnic lines and explicit refusal to allow Mandingos to return to their lands, and heard persistent expressions of hostility based on war experiences.

The Forums, however, represent the potential for building a durable peace in Lofa County, supported by influential people both living in the county and in Monrovia. In a sense, then the Forums may be, slowly and indirectly, developing a peace constituency, though not by that name. If the Forum process succeeds at both the community-by-community and county levels, and if an institutional base can be found to continue support for an ongoing long-term reconciliation process, a truly influential peace constituency could emerge.

The program objectives stated above also call for strengthening democratic and civic leadership and inclusive and transparent management. The overall LINCS Program effort, including all of the training programs for the CPCs and others in leadership, has injected new concepts and skills into the communities. However, the CDA team also directly observed the dynamics among participants in the interviews (most of which were in groups), and we saw little evidence that the workshops have resulted in obvious democratic practices, either within the CPCs or in the larger communities.

While it is too early to know for certain, the Forums may induce changes in leadership of some of the communities—either changes in the approaches to problem solving by individual leaders,

or changes in the expectations of community members towards their leadership. The agreements themselves, if well implemented, will also reinforce community desires for peace.

In sum, the LINCS Program has laid the groundwork for addressing these objectives. However, additional work is needed to consolidate the introduction of new concepts in leadership and to truly mobilize constituencies for peace advocacy in the County, and a number of specific components need to be realized in the Forums for their contribution to become significant.

## **2. Mitigating Conflict and Violence**

Program objectives: a) Build and/or support local and county capacity for ongoing conflict mitigation, adjudication and peace building activities; b) Prepare communities and leadership for potential outbreaks of conflict and deal with the after effects of violent acts; c) Promote dialogues and collaboration among contentious ethnic groups; d) Build local capacity for reconciliation of all returnees; e) Assist democratic leadership to build skills and confidence in effectively managing community security and in reducing the impact of conflict; and f) Build the effectiveness of traditional and culturally appropriate mechanisms for reconciliation.

An ultimate conclusion about the effectiveness of the CPCs turns on the expectations about what they could/should be handling. As noted above, the CPCs represent a new community-based mechanism for handling a wide range of conflicts. With the exception of land conflicts and the deeper inter-ethnic tensions, the CPCs are currently capable, in many cases, of addressing most of the conflicts that arise at the community level, promote communications among parties, and perform a referral function for cases they cannot handle. CHF staff also report that the CPCs are able calm down volatile situations and did address land issues earlier during the transition period

The capacity of the CPCs could be argued two ways. On the one hand, with considerable variation from community to community, they are addressing most community-level conflicts. On the other hand, they are not currently dealing with those conflicts most likely to result in widespread violence (land and religious/cultural issues). The CPCs' positive and helpful role and experience needs to be expanded and strengthened to achieve a social institution closer to the stated program objectives.

As regards the objectives calling for dialogue and collaboration among contending ethnic groups and the application of culturally appropriate mechanisms for reconciliation, the Forums program represent the best hope for achieving these desired outcomes. If well executed, the Forums show promise for exerting a significant impact in this regard.

Considering the combined impacts of the CPCs and the Forums, the LINCS Program, as a whole, is achieving progress towards the objectives stated above.

## **3. Address Causes and Consequences of Conflict**

In this area, the program objectives were to: a) Facilitate peaceful resolution of property and resource claims, perceived war crimes; b) Build Lofa-based peace constituencies' ability to affect national decisions on resource allocation, management of extractive resources; c) Build Lofa-based peace constituencies' ability to affect national decisions on composition and civil leadership of reconstituted military and/or police; d) Build number and quality of psycho-social assistance mechanisms in Lofa.

So far, the LINCS Program is not addressing the peaceful resolution of property and resource claims or perceived war crimes. Interpersonal issues regarding property hidden as people fled the area have been handled by the CPCs, but as discussed already, the CPCs have not so far dealt with more serious land and property disputes—and certainly not war crimes.

The team did hear accounts of trauma healing workshops, held under the LINCS Program, in which individuals were able to recount their personal experiences of atrocities—and some level of interpersonal reconciliation took place, when people who had participated in such activities were present. One woman interviewed in Voinjama District said that she faced a young man who had killed her son and told him, “You must disarm your heart.” So far, these kinds of healing encounters are not a regular occurrence in the county, however. The LINCS Program has cooperated with other programs working on trauma healing. For instance, LINCS arranged for performances by the Flomo Theatre group. These performances brought together up to a thousand community members and addressed, through drama, issues regarding ex-combatant reintegration and reconciliation. In these public settings, community members were able to reach out to each other and shout out how they should forgive each other and move on.

As mentioned elsewhere, the community Forums may be able to incorporate some elements of reconciliation and healing by working directly across the ethnic groups on specific issues and grievances that divide them. The CHF staff were clear that the objectives associated with national level policy advocacy have proven unrealistic, as least to date.

In sum, the LINCS Program has contributed in small ways to achievement of this set of objectives. With some rethinking and restructuring, the program has potential for making a more significant contribution.

### **Expected Results**

The LINCS Program, by achieving the three major goal areas above, was expected to show the following results by the end of the program: a) Reduced violence in Lofa County; b) Peaceful return of internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, and ex-combatants; c) Facilitation of reconciliation between ex-combatants and their families; d) Facilitation of reconciliation between ex-combatants and their ‘host’ communities; e) Development of Community Councils which can support reintegration, act to resolve disputes and adjudicate perceived crimes, and mobilize the community to work towards peace; f) Community Councils trained and active in sensitizing the community to addressing the special issues regarding returned ex-combatants; g) Increased participation by all community members in community decision making; h) Increased peaceful interaction among diverse, sometimes contentious groups within the community; i) Increased effectiveness and organization of district and county peace constituencies; and j) Creation of a mechanism to facilitate communication between Community Councils and other leaders with UNMIL, UNCIVPOL as well as the NTGL’s new security forces.

The full report includes an extensive discussion of these Expected Results and how the various program components have contributed to them.

From our community visits and from discussions with local officials and UNMIL personnel, the CDA team feels that there is a relatively low level of violence in Lofa County, people have returned and been reintegrated successfully *within* their own ethnic groups, but not *across or between* different ethnic groups. Most disputes are handled nonviolently, so far. While the

LINCS Program may have contributed to these results, it would be difficult to attribute these outcomes solely to LINCS activities. In addition, they may have, through their very existence, promoted an atmosphere of conflict resolution and problem solving without resort to violence.

In our view, the results regarding reconciliation have not been accomplished in Lofa County, as yet. In Zeawordemai a group of women and youth asserted that they would “never forgive, no matter what.” They recalled that 500 boys were killed by Ulimo on Black Monday, an incident still on their minds many years later. This ongoing pain and hostility reinforces the need for the CHF Forums program, which has promise for making a significant contribution in this area.

In terms of democratic decision making and participation, our observations field suggest that traditional forms of leadership are in full operation, with elders, town chiefs and landlords firmly in control. Women and youth are formally represented in town discussions, but their voices are not strong. Minority groups do not speak up readily. Clearly more work is needed in this area.

In relation to the creation of peace constituencies, as already noted, there is strong public sentiment in favor of peace, but no active and visible constituency openly advocating for it—and there is persistent hostility and tension, unresolved incidents from the war, and obvious separation along ethnic lines.

As regards security issues, in repeated comments, communities attributed security to the presence of UNMIL—and appreciated their role. The team heard reports of young men (some ex-combatants) volunteering for the new Liberian army and police—an indication that communities favor these revived national institutions and hope that they will be able to guarantee peace after UNMIL withdraws. It is hard to attribute this situation to the LINCS Program, although one set of workshops under the program addressed community-police relations.

## **SUMMARY OF PROGRAM STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES**

The following is a summary of strengths and weakness of the Community Peace Councils and National and County Level Forums, which are directly addressed in the Recommendations presented in Section VI.

### **Community Peace Councils**

#### ***Strengths:***

The CDA heard from two different community members that the CPCs are a “river between two fires” (from which we have taken the title for this report). We take this as an appreciation for the effective role the CPCs play in handling local disputes.

- The program has created the foundation for longer term, larger scale dialogue processes.
- The program informed communities about conflict and basic problem solving approaches.
- CPCs provide a low-cost mechanism for handling local-level (mainly) interpersonal disputes.
- CPCs provided an effective dispute resolution mechanism during the critical transition time of the return and reintegration of IDPs/refugees, handling interpersonal disputes and, in some cases, land issues.
- CPCs have provided some forms of leadership in communities, supplementing (and not replacing) traditional authorities.

- CPCs are an appropriate mechanism that do not contradict existing and historical structures that do work.
- The program introduced key leaders to a variety of important skills and concepts that can be useful for any future development and/or conflict resolution programming.
- CPCs have provided a useful entry point to communities for other important programs (e.g., Land Mine Action, domestic violence, trauma healing).
- The CPCs, with additional attention and resources, constitute a possible new permanent social institution for first level dispute resolution.

***Weaknesses/Critiques:***

- CPCs are currently out of date, in terms of their representative function and credibility, since they were formed in 2004, and many more people have now returned to the communities.
- While the CPCs members have received at least four training programs, there has been little direct follow up to see whether/how people are applying those skills and concepts—CPCs are left to function on their own without direct support or mentoring, such as sitting in on actual dispute resolution processes or regular CPC meetings to discuss cases.
- The main contact between CHF and the CPCs is a monthly visit in which the group reports on their activities.
- There is no independent verification regarding the actual roles that CPCs are playing (types of cases handled, processes used, style of mediation/arbitration employed, rate of settlement, acceptance of any settlement, durability of agreements, etc.).
- CPC members feel burdened by their role, in terms of the time requirements without compensation—which has raised questions about the sustainability of the model, as interest may wane without some better reward system.
- In many cases, only a few CPC members are truly active.
- CPCs are not able to contradict traditional authorities—and in some cases town chiefs, elders and other leaders are fully involved with the CPCs (which has both positive and negative effects!).<sup>1</sup>
- Generally, the CPCs reflect the same prejudices and dominant/subordinate patterns of their social context: minority groups in the towns are also minority groups on the CPCs, and have no stronger voice there than in other settings.
- The CPCs are mostly dealing with interpersonal disputes that the town chief is happy for someone else to handle; more serious issues, including land disputes, are handled through other more traditional means. (Whether this is a weakness or not depends on what the groups are expected to do.)
- CPCs are not equipped to address deeper issues of inter-group reconciliation or more difficult types of disputes, and are not used directly to support Forum activities, such as following up, monitoring compliance, helping to negotiate actual implementation, etc.
- There is widespread confusion about the real function/purpose of the CPCs (livelihood project implementers, dispute resolvers, the “CHF group,” etc.), and many community members (perhaps mostly recent returnees) are not aware of the services available.

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<sup>1</sup> Many CPC members were elected/selected because they were respected members of the community. In some cases, this means they are part of the town power structures, not an alternative to them. Other CPC members were simply those present in the early days of returns—and as traditional authorities have returned, their influence has diminished, in some cases.

- The CDA teams found that some CPCs appear to be inactive, while there is open conflict among CPC members in other cases.

## **National and County-Level Forums**

### ***Strengths:***

- National forums represent a potential for deeper resolution and reconciliation of inter-ethnic conflicts.
- The Forums offer relatively neutral outside facilitation that enables contending groups to address sensitive issues.
- The Forum program is able to bring together all of the key players, including influential people from Monrovia and Guinea.
- The Forums support the negotiation of agreements between conflicting groups, that can serve as the basis for resolving many specific disputes, especially over land ownership/use.
- The Forums can help to develop a model of inter-group dialogue and negotiation that would be applicable elsewhere in Liberia.
- The Forums are organized in a way that links national, regional and local levels regarding inter-ethnic tensions.

### ***Weakness/Critiques:***

- At present the CHF Forum program is understaffed and overstretched, trying to organize processes in too many communities at the same time. High quality processes in a few places may be better than poorly implemented processes in many.
- The program is not benefiting directly from previous experiences of dialogue and negotiation in Liberia, during earlier periods or by other organizations.
- Previous dialogue/negotiation efforts by CHF and its partners (in 2004-5) resulted in formal agreements, but these were not written down, nor was there adequate follow up.
- Formal agreements appear to be at the level of broad principles only—more concrete and specific actions and an implementation plan are not addressed. For instance, in Ziggida, local people said that a Forum had negotiated an agreement, but tensions arose again, partly because the agreements were never implemented.
- Current staff do not have the time to provide sufficient follow-up to the current round of dialogue processes.
- In the long-term, this kind of effort needs a sustainable Liberian institutional base.
- There is not always good communication to community members about what the purpose and result of the Forums are. Community members seldom mentioned the Forums in interviews, and in two communities their impression was that the Forums were “just another workshop.”<sup>2</sup>

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

The full CDA team met in Monrovia to develop an initial set of recommendations—which were then presented and discussed with the CHF Country Director. The summary of the recommendations presented below are only slightly different in substance and include

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<sup>2</sup> The current round of Forums are apparently making more specific plans for reporting back to the communities.

explanatory text not included with the originals presented in Monrovia. (See Section VI of the report for the full text, with extensive discussion and explanation.)

The first section of recommendations addresses the overall CHF program. We are assuming that conflict resolution and peacebuilding will remain at least one major program focus. Conditions in Lofa County certainly support a continuing emphasis on reconciliation and peacebuilding. Subsequent sections address the two major peacebuilding efforts.

### **General Program Recommendations**

1. Adopt narrower goals/objectives, expected results and indicators.
2. Develop a stronger long-term plan, with associated staffing and structure of CHF programs.
3. Create better communication and cooperation among CHF program components—less compartmentalization.
4. Develop closer cooperative working relations with other NGOs working on similar/allied issues in Lofa County.
5. Provide for explicit follow up to training in concepts and skills: tracking of indicators that the training is being used; coaching in skills application support for desired changed behaviors.
6. Establish a more robust M&E plan, including baseline data, specific indicators, a tracking and reporting system.

### **Community Peace Councils**

The CPC program has made a significant contribution during the past two years—and the program was appropriate for that transition period. The situation has changed considerably. Therefore, CHF needs to rethink the structures and approaches for this program component, even if this is only one of several different major program elements. The CDA team recommends that CHF perform a fundamental program redesign, building on the best elements of the past two years, and preparing for follow-up efforts.

We don't have a clear recommendation regarding the exact direction the program should take, but we do see a range of possible options to be considered. Consider the following **OPTIONS** for the CPCs (*not all mutually exclusive*):

1. **Phase them out.** Consider that the CPCs were a good mechanism for a transitional time, but that continued effort is not appropriate.
2. **Transition them into development committees.** As CHF undertakes other more development-oriented activities, build on the relationships established through the CPCs as the base for that work, but discontinue their conflict resolution role.
3. **Wait and see.** Merge with traditional mechanisms for dispute resolution. Watch what happens with the new government in relation to base level justice. Explore a role for the CPCs in terms of decision making and local level dispute resolution, if appropriate.
4. **Explore a role in relation to the TRC process.** The CPCs could play a role in identifying local people to testify, and to participate in County-level activities. CHF could facilitate such participation with transport and other support. The CPCs might also play a role (with others) in local-level truth and reconciliation activities.

5. **Conduct a participatory process to determine the future shape, function, etc.** Let the communities themselves decide the future of the CPCs. This might lead to a phasing out (#1 above), serious investment (#6) or some combination.
6. **Make a serious investment in full development of the CPC model.** Figure out how to transform the present structures into a sustainable community-level mechanism that is fully owned by the communities and performs a needed dispute resolution function.

Numbers 1 - 5 above are fairly self evident. We have offered specific detailed recommendations about how to approach Number 6. The headlines of those detailed recommendations are presented below.

### **Redevelopment & Strengthening of the CPCs**

Throughout the report, we have indicated ways in which the CPCs have contributed, and some ways in which they miss the mark. We believe that the CPCs show potential for playing a more important role, but to realize that potential will require revision of the concept and further investment in the people and necessary structures. If CHF chooses to pursue #6 above, the following elements will be needed:

- a. Clarify the model and functions through a participatory process.
- b. Clarify the roles and functions of the CPC through participatory development of a simple charter (composition, functions, types of cases in/out, operating principles...).
- c. Restructure and “re-elect” the councils.
- d. Complete the mediation training, using the ABA/CHF model.
- e. Follow up training with direct coaching and mentoring.
- f. Establish a better tracking and monitoring mechanisms.
- g. Solve the compensation/reward issue.
- h. Seriously reduce the number of members.
- i. Develop (with ABA?) a resource center in Lofa County that offers resources, support, technical assistance.
- j. Reduce the number of CPCs by developing town clusters.

### **County and National Forums**

By our assessment, already laid out earlier in this report, the Forum effort shows great promise, and the potential for having a profound effect on inter-ethnic relations in Lofa County. The suggestions below are intended to indicate how the program could be strengthened further.

1. Devote more staff resources: reduce dependence/burden on one person.<sup>3</sup>
2. Clarify/tighten the goals and objectives of the program.

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<sup>3</sup> This recommendation, reported informally while the CDA team was still in Liberia, has been implemented already, and there are now three staff working full time on the Forums effort.

3. Ensure that any agreements reached include a specific implementation plan. Develop the staff capacity to provide follow up.
4. Find an appropriate long-term institutional base for this kind of effort, and cooperate in development of that mechanism. (Options: university, government agency, combo, free-standing reconciliation NGO, sub-group of TRC...)
5. Draw on expertise/experience regarding this type of dialogue and negotiation process held by other people/organizations in Liberia. Be sure to learn from past failures and successes. Develop capacity to share lessons learned in Lofa County.
6. Engage Forum participants in a process to determine future directions.
7. Complete a thorough review/assessment/stocktaking at completion of the current round of Forums, using an outside independent evaluator.
8. Participate in Lofa County meetings in Monrovia for background information about what opinion leaders and others are thinking about.
9. Explore the potential roles for religious/ spiritual leaders in the Forums.
10. Bring issues to closure: don't open issues and then leave. Consider these deeper reconciliation efforts as a long-term commitment.

## **CONCLUSION**

The LINCS Program represents an admirable contribution to peacebuilding in Liberia. Most of the programs effects remain at the community and Lofa County level, and there is a mixed picture regarding the program's achievements against its stated objectives. However, the current progress and potential impacts from this effort have significance for the entire country, as Lofa County is well known as one of the most volatile areas that suffered most deeply during the war. Few other organizations are attempting community-by-community reconciliation in Liberia—and for this reason alone, the LINCS Program represents a valuable initiative. While we have made recommendations for program strengthening during the next phases of CHF programming, overall, we were impressed with the accomplishments to date and the dedication of local and international staff members.

# **I. INTRODUCTION & APPROACH TO THE ASSESSMENT**

This document reports the findings of an impact assessment of the Locally-Initiated Networks for Community Strengthening Program (LINCS) operated by CHF International in Lofa County, from 2004 to the present. The assessment is focused primarily on the conflict resolution and reconciliation elements of the program.

This first section reviews the purpose of the assessment and the approach taken to accomplish it. Section II presents the basic background, in brief, to the LINCS Program, while Section III applies the tools and concepts of the Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) Project, as one way to explore the LINCS Program. Section IV presents the essential findings of the assessment team, and Section V addresses a set of key questions posed by CHF and/or USAID in preparation for the assessment. Finally, Section VI offers recommendations, based on the observations and conclusions in the early sections of the report.

In some ways, this was not a “standard” evaluation, as CHF and the assessment team were interested in the broader societal impacts of the program—impacts on “Peace Writ Large” in Liberian society. While the assessment touched on the typical inquiry regarding whether the program completed certain activities efficiently and on time, we were mainly interested in whether the program contributes to proximate and long term peace in Liberia—and how. Fulfilling the basic program requirements does not, in itself, address the question of broader impacts. The findings reported below will address issues regarding program implementation, but largely with respect to how changes in program approach might increase the contribution to peace and reconciliation.

The full CDA team would like to express its appreciation for all of the assistance received in Monrovia, in Lofa County and in Washington, from many CHF staff members. It was a real privilege to be offered the opportunity to accompany this significant program, even for a short while, on their journey towards peace and reconciliation in Liberia.

## ***Purpose of the Assessment***

The Terms of Reference for this assessment stated the purpose of the effort as follows:

1. To determine to what extent CHF’s efforts in Lofa have succeeded in helping to stabilize the post-war environment;
2. To determine to what extent structures and processes established by LINCS have either prevented escalation of conflicts in communities or are serving to transform the conflict by addressing the attitudes, behaviors, and structures that have been driving forces in the conflict;
3. To assess whether and how LINCS has contributed to Peace Writ Large; and
4. To determine whether LINCS-created structures and process can contribute to a base-level justice system.

In addition, CHF indicated interest in learning about several important topics in relation to the LINCS Program:

- *Leadership*: Has the program helped develop more effective and responsive leadership, as well as opportunities to reduce and manage conflict?
- *Dispute Resolution Processes*: Has the program contributed to development of mechanisms for dispute resolution?
- *Truth, Justice and Tolerance Issues*: Has the program created processes for addressing outstanding justice issues?
- *Democratic Mechanisms*: Has the program created more access to decision making that affects individuals in the community and/or forums for discussion of issues critical to the community?

Finally, USAID staff in Monrovia identified the following themes of interest:

- What are the dynamics of decision-making in the communities, and how are these changing? (Related to the Leadership and Democratic Mechanisms questions above.)
- How is the security situation evolving at the community level, including the persistence or dropping away of old military command structures?
- How do the various elements of the CHF program link to each other: community peace councils, livelihood projects, and the construction of community centers?
- What processes are helping to address deep seated problems and more profound reconciliation? (Related to the Truth, Justice and Tolerance question above.)
- Is the program succeeding in forming “peace constituencies”?
- Is the program helping people gain access to the justice system, in the absence of rule of law? (Related to the Dispute Resolution and Truth, Justice and Tolerance questions above.)
- Should donors promote traditional rituals in reconciliation?

This group of questions and topics served as the basis for our inquiry. Each of these topics will be addressed—often in multiple ways—in the report below. As much as possible, the issues have been grouped in logical ways, to avoid repetition. See also Section V, where some of these questions have been addressed separately.

### **Challenges in Impact Assessment**

In the proposal for this assessment, CDA addressed some of the possibilities and limitations of impact assessment:

“CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, mainly through its Reflecting on Peace Practice Project (RPP), has been working with the conflict resolution and peacebuilding communities regarding a broad range of issues and controversies regarding the evaluation of programs that aim to contribute to peace. To date, experience shows that it is possible,

using standard methods, to evaluate the immediate *outputs* (activities performed, events held, numbers of participants engaged, etc.), against project plans. More importantly, it is possible to ascertain the proximate *outcomes* of those efforts, in terms of relatively short-term changes in behaviors, attitudes, establishment of new institutions, and so forth. The peacebuilding community as a whole is still struggling with the issue of how to measure *impacts*, on what we have called “Peace Writ Large” or the broader societal level peace. Here, the question is, given the successful delivery of outputs and the observable immediate outcomes, can we determine if these have contributed to the broader peace?

In this case, CHF has already documented the projects outputs, through a series of reports already available to the donor and others. Some of those reports also provide indications about outcomes—in terms of disputes resolved, participation in reconciliation activities, leadership development, and so on. The job for the Impact Assessment will be to obtain additional information about outcomes in the participating communities, and to explore the impacts at the Lofa County level. It may prove too early to make any definitive judgments about impacts at the national level, but the assessment team will work with the information that emerges and, as the evidence accumulates, infer the linkages between the proximate outcomes and the national peace and reconciliation process.”

This estimation of the possibilities and difficulties proved accurate. As we report in full below, we came away with a clear sense of the near-term outcomes to date and some indications of their potential impacts on Peace Writ Large. Possible longer term impacts of the program can be projected—but these cannot be verified conclusively at this stage.

## **Approach to the Impact Assessment**

### ***CDA Assessment Team***

Five people participated in gathering information for the assessment:

Mabel Kear: An experienced Liberian organizer and trainer who has worked with several NGOs on peacebuilding programs.

Maureen Lempke: A professor of Development Studies at Duke University and an experienced project manager.

Christof Kurz: A PhD candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, who has worked for several years in NGO program administration in West Africa.

Korto Williams: Former USAID staff in Liberia and an experienced program organizer.

Peter Woodrow, staff of CDA Collaborative Learning Projects and Co-Director of its Reflecting on Peace Practice Project, who served as team leader.

Peter Woodrow consulted with CHF staff in Washington and Monrovia to establish the parameters of the assessment and worked with the team to set up the protocols for field data gathering. The bulk of the community-level and other interviews in Lofa County were conducted by the other team members, while Peter pursued other contacts in Monrovia.

## ***Process and Methodology***

The CDA team gathered information from several sources, including:

1. Interviews with groups and individuals in 13 Lofa County communities that have been participating in the LINCS Program;
2. Interviews conducted in 4 Lofa County communities that have not been participating in the LINCS Program;
3. Interviews with CHF staff in Monrovia, Lofa County; Washington and Boston;
4. Interviews with other NGO staff working in Lofa County, as well as local officials and UN personnel in Lofa;
5. Interviews of government officials and NGO staff in Monrovia;
6. A conflict analysis workshop conducted with members of several communities in Lofa County; and
7. Review of project documents and reports.

## ***Community Interviews***

The CDA team spoke with a wide range of people in Lofa County. These interviews were focused conversations, rather than the administration of a formal survey or questionnaire. While the team used a consistent set of topics for discussion, this was not the administration of a questionnaire.<sup>4</sup> This process, used by CDA in many settings, allows for more interaction and follow up for clarification, and also gives room for the local people to talk about what is most important to them.

The team talked with a range of groups and individuals in the communities, including local-level leaders or officials (town chiefs, elders, landowners, heads of women’s and youth groups, etc.), members of the Community Peace Councils that CHF had created, and community members encountered “on the street.” In each locale, the team endeavored to hear from men and women, old and young, and from different ethnic groups.

During the past two years, CHF has implemented the LINCS Program in 70 communities in Lofa County. In order to gain a full picture of the project outcomes and impacts, the assessment team conducted interviews in 13 of those communities, in the districts of Salayea, Zorzor and Voinjama. A list of the communities visited is presented in Appendix B. These visits represent interaction with approximately 270 people, almost always in groups—although it is difficult to estimate the exact number, as in many cases people joined and left in the course of conversations.

The team also conducted interviews in four communities similar to those where CHF has been working, but where no CHF activities have taken place. About 85 people were interviewed in that process, again almost all in groups. This provided information for purposes of comparison with the participating communities. We explored the same general themes as with the

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<sup>4</sup> See Interview Protocol in Appendix A.

“participating” communities, leaving out those directed specifically at the LINCS Program. Several of these communities were quite remote and had little contact with NGOs.

An effort was made to interview people in Monrovia who have participated in the National Forum program (described in full below). However, due to logistical difficulties, only one such interview was completed.

### ***Interviews with CHF Staff, Officials and NGO Staff,***

The team made an effort to speak with all CHF program staff in either Monrovia or Lofa County, to obtain their own reflections on the program. Conversations with other officials (magistrate, development committee members, Ministry of Internal Affairs, UNMIL) and NGO staff were conducted in order to gain information about conditions and trends in the area, as well as additional perspectives on the CHF program.

### ***Document Review***

The CDA team reviewed various documents. These included:

- CHF initial LINCS Program proposal and other conceptual/analytical documents;
- Regular LINCS Program quarterly reports, staff reports and assessments, and reports from implementing partner organizations; and
- A sampling of field reports from contacts with Community Peace Councils in Zorzor

While this was not an exhaustive review, it did include the vast majority of the relevant and available documents.

### ***Conflict Analysis***

In order to assess the impacts of the CHF program, the CDA team needed an analysis of the conflict dynamics in Liberia at the Lofa County level. Such an analysis provides the basis for determining whether the project is addressing the right issues, as articulated by those who live in Lofa. To gain an analysis, the CDA team conducted a conflict analysis exercise in Konia town (Zorzor District), with participants from four nearby communities (Zegeda, Boi, Borkeza, Konia), one CHF staff person, and a representative of a CHF partner organization. The resulting analysis, expanded and refined through additional conversations in Lofa County and Monrovia, is presented below in Section III.

### ***Strengths and Weaknesses of the Data Gathered***

It is our judgment that the interview process enabled the CDA team to gain a thorough understanding of community-level dynamics in Lofa County and the effects of the CHF program in those communities—within the limits that any outsider would encounter. Indeed, the Liberian team members, while better able to communicate directly with villagers, were clearly outsiders to these remote areas as well. Thus, even though we were obtaining good and (as a whole)

reliable information, we were aware of deeper levels and layers of culture, dynamics and history that were not accessible to outsiders, perhaps rightly so.

At times, townspeople actively discouraged the team from making contact with minority group members—and the ability of minority group representatives to express themselves in larger gatherings was clearly proscribed. The team found ways to gain access to those groups and to supplement mixed group conversations with separate frank exchanges.

In addition, the towns selected by CHF staff for visits turned out to be mainly those that CHF calls “flash point” (i.e., high conflict) communities. Thus there was a bias towards more difficult areas, rather than a mix of less and more conflictual areas. We do not feel that this bias causes a real problem in the data, as it would if the tilt were towards more peaceful communities. In other words, the team saw the program where it was challenged most deeply. And, if we compare the participating and non-participating communities, they all face more or less the same issues.

In sum, we feel comfortable with the information gathered at the community level. While no single interview would provide a clear picture, the sheer number of discussions with a diverse range of people provided sufficient information to draw conclusions about the contributions of the Community Peace Councils, livelihood projects and, to a certain extent, the National and County Level Forums.

A final note about the data: While we had thorough conversations with CHF staff and with one participant in the National and County Level Forums program, we do not feel that we gained adequate information for a full assessment of that program element, although we will address its place in the range of program activities and its potential impacts. We recommend below (see Section VI) that, upon completion of the current round of forum events, CHF undertake an independent, locally-based (that is, lower cost!) stocktaking of the forum program, including interviews with a range of direct participants in Lofa County and Monrovia.

### ***Team Discussions and Data Analysis***

Upon completion of community and other interviews in Lofa County, the full CDA team reconvened in Monrovia for two days of analysis and reflection. The team identified patterns that they observed, lessons learned and recommendations. These preliminary findings were shared in Monrovia with the CHF Country Director.

## **II. BACKGROUND OF THE LINCS PROGRAM**

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The LINCS Program was designed to address the objectives of USAID Liberia's Next Steps in Peace Program (NSPP). The goal of NSPP was to support the early stages of the peace process and facilitate a peaceful reintegration of displaced persons, refugees, and ex-combatants. Within this overall goal, NSPP sought to (a) strengthen constituencies for peace; (b) mitigate ongoing violence and avert imminent violence, and (c) address some of the causes and consequences of conflict.

Applicants for NSPP funding were asked to proposed programs to address these objectives in some way. CHF's LINCS Program sought to support the building and strengthening of peace constituencies at the community and district levels in Voinjama, Zorzor, and Salayea districts of Lofa County with a core goal of improving community level conflict management capacities.

The choice of Lofa County was significant, as this area was the scene of some of the worst violence (massacres, atrocities, destruction of churches, mosques and sacred spaces, widespread destruction of housing, etc.). During the fourteen years of warfare, the violence in Lofa County followed ethnic lines during significant periods, and, in the aftermath, the contending tribal groups harbor deep resentment, fear, mistrust, and hostility towards each other. Groups that reportedly lived in relative harmony for many decades now live apart, as some groups have refused to return to their former houses and lands, and other groups have refused to receive their perceived enemies. Lofa County is considered as one of the areas of Liberia where violence is most likely to recur, a "flash point" county in a country only beginning to reemerge from national trauma.

The rationale behind the LINCS Program is that a focused, locally-based mechanism for conflict resolution, involving mentoring and targeted skill building, would create strong peace constituencies at the community level. Therefore, the LINCS Program intends to develop community councils and other peace-building structures, in order to provide communities with the tools needed to address the ongoing challenges of building peace in Liberia. In other words, the LINCS Program seeks to contribute to "Peace Writ Large," on the premise that by improving the conflict management and reconciliation environment at the local level, security in Liberia as a whole will be enhanced, thus providing additional assurance of reduced violence in the period after peacekeeping troops and other external (international) sources of support leave.

### **Major Program Elements**

For more than two years, the LINCS Program has included three major components:

1. Establishment of Community Peace Councils and support for local leadership development, including a series of training programs and associated awareness-raising activities.
2. Conduct of forums or dialogue sessions across ethnic lines, more formally called the National and County Level Forums.

3. Undertaking of livelihood projects and other joint community efforts in participating communities.

We will describe each of these components in brief below—and they will be discussed at length in subsequent sections.

### ***Community Peace Councils***

In brief, the Community Peace Councils (CPCs) were established as an alternative mechanism for handling a range of dispute types at the community level, especially in the absence of an effective judicial system. CHF hoped that the CPCs would provide a means for early resolution of conflicts that would contribute to preventing escalation to violence, especially conflicts associated with IDP/refugee returns and reintegration of ex-combatants. The CPCs were also meant to become a peace constituency and to provide leadership in their communities. Finally, it was intended that the CPCs would offer a model of an inclusive community structure that would help ensure participation by all groups in local level governance.

The CPCs were established over a period of months in 2004 and early 2005 and initially included about six members, expanding over time to about twelve. Efforts were made to make sure that all key groups were represented among the CPC membership: men/women; old/youth; and all ethnic groups. Most CPC members received four different training programs: basic peacebuilding skills, leadership, trauma healing, human rights, community security and community policing. Many of these training programs were also attended by other key community leaders (town chiefs, elders, members of women's and youth groups, etc.). The CPCs serve as CHF's principal point of contact in the communities, and are the base for organizing other community activities, including livelihood projects (see below).

### ***National and County Level Forums***

CHF realized that, while the CPCs might be able to address a variety of conflicts at the community level, some issues would likely be beyond their capability. One of the most salient inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts in Lofa County is between the Lorma tribe (and, in Salayea District, the Kpelle tribe) on one side and the Mandingo tribe on the other, largely as a result of actions taken by armed members of these ethnic groups against each other during the past fourteen years. During the war, massacres and atrocities were committed, homes destroyed, people assassinated, churches/mosques and other sacred places desecrated. The most obvious result is that many communities remain split. In some cases, groups that formerly lived intermingled are now living separately but near each other; in other cases, Mandingo families have not returned to their former communities at all. In most (but not all) areas of the three districts, the Mandingo are a distinct minority.<sup>5</sup> For more information on this conflict, see the conflict analysis of Lofa County in Section III.

CHF found that powerful people connected with the area (raised there, often with family still living there), but living in Monrovia or Guinea, often determine policies and actions at the

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<sup>5</sup> While there is some tension between Lorma and Kpelle, the conflicts between either of those groups and the Mandingo are the most serious.

community level. Therefore, as they wished to contribute to reconciliation among Lorma/Kpelle and Mandingo, they worked to identify those “opinion leaders” and bring them into the dialogue process. CHF, with support from the Foundation for Human Rights and Democracy (FOHRD) and other implementing partners, held a series of forums during 2004/5 among contending groups in several key communities. In addition to dialogues focused on specific communities, they also organized at least one county level meeting to address broader issues.

In the spring of 2006, CHF hired an additional staff person to focus solely on organizing and implementing forums, as a follow-up to the earlier efforts. In May 2006, this new staff member performed an assessment in sixteen designated “flash point” communities in Lofa County, identified opinion leaders that would need to participate, and communicated with government authorities and others. In both the earlier effort and in the most recent activities, CHF staff and its implementing partners facilitate inter-ethnic dialogue sessions in an effort to identify outstanding issues and grievances and to negotiate agreements. The current effort is focused on those flash point communities in the three districts.

### ***Community and Livelihood Projects***

For several reasons, CHF undertook additional practical efforts in the communities. These projects generally took two forms: construction of community centers and income-generating or livelihood efforts, usually support for some form of farming or animal husbandry.

One purpose of these efforts was to provide more concrete benefits to the participating communities—since the conflict resolution functions were less visible. CHF field staff reported that a main thrust of the community center and livelihood projects was to give people tangible results from inter-ethnic cooperation. That is, if all ethnic groups work together and reap the fruits from it, there will be peace. CHF also hoped that engaging members of various tribes in working together on common projects would promote tolerance and cooperation. A second reason for these projects was that CPC members were devoting their own time and energies to community level issues and needed some form of personal benefit as incentive for continued service. Finally, CHF envisioned a time when they would be undertaking additional development-oriented programming, and initial projects would serve as an introduction to such efforts. As in other programs around the world, CHF uses its PACE (Participatory Action for Community Enhancement) methodology for this aspect of the program.

### **III. APPLICATION OF RPP ANALYTICAL TOOLS**

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This Section explores the LINCS Program, using a set of concepts and frameworks developed through the Reflecting on Peace Practice process. These tools were devised as a way to assess the effectiveness of peacebuilding programs, including whether and how the program contributes to broader peace in a society experiencing violent conflict—what we call “Peace Writ Large.” The TORs for this evaluation also states that it will, “assess whether and how LINCS has contributed to Peace Writ Large.”

The program analysis presented in this Section provides the basis for the conclusions presented in the following Section. Some readers may prefer to “skip to the bottom line” (Section IV), but they may also find that the conclusions presented there are not fully understandable without the analysis here in Section III.

One might also ask whether it is “fair” to assess the LINCS Program according to concepts and criteria that were not part of its original conception, even if those concepts are basically generic. All peacebuilding programs desire to contribute to peace in some way, and the goals and objectives of the LINCS Program are quite ambitious—and clearly at the Peace Writ Large level.

We will use four concepts from the Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) process to explore the LINCS Program:


- The RPP Matrix
- Theories of Change
- Criteria of Effectiveness
- Conflict Analysis

The RPP Matrix and the Theories of Change work together—and the Criteria of Effectiveness and Conflict Analysis also function together, at least in part.

#### **The RPP Matrix and Theories of Change**

The RPP Matrix was developed during the earlier phase of RPP (1999-2003), through research and writing of 26 case studies, cross-case analysis, and workshops with peace practitioners across the globe. It represents one way to delve into a program’s strategy—often uncovering an implicit strategy and the choices made by the project or program.

The RPP Matrix reflects the fact that peace practice is driven by two essential strategies, represented by the two columns of the matrix. The first is aimed at influencing “key people,” those who have the power to decide for or against peace. While key people often hold recognized positions in society, they may also be people who are not so obviously powerful. A good example of a less obvious key people group is former soldiers (ex-combatants). While ex-combatants do not often hold important positions and may be unemployed, they can undermine a peace process, as they maintain contacts with former colleagues and commanders, retain weapons, and have suffered trauma.



**Figure 1: The RPP Matrix**

The other main program strategy is aimed at “more people,” based on the understanding that it is necessary to educate and mobilize large groups of people into active support of peace (or at least acceptance) to make progress towards peace. Some such programs seek, eventually, to influence key decision makers by building a strong constituency in support of peace. Others proceed on the assumption that engaging larger and larger groups of people and helping them develop resistance to further violence is a critical aspect of peace making.

The rows of the matrix show two levels of change at which most peace practice is aimed. The top row represents changes in individual skills, attitudes and behaviors, while the bottom row represents socio-political changes in social norms, institutions, laws, rules, regulations, structures and relationships among groups.


Theories of Change (or Theories of Peacebuilding) are the underlying assumptions built into a program regarding how to induce the changes we seek. In simple generic terms a Theory of Change might state: “If we do X [action], it will result in Y [change in favor of peace]. Program designers rarely state their theories of change explicitly—although it is usually possible to figure them out from the program logic presented. In the RPP process, we have been working with peace practitioners to make their Theories of Change explicit—so that the assumptions can be tested against reality and the experiences gained through program implementation.

In the text below we will look at two program components: Community Peace Councils and National and County Level Forums. We will not discuss the livelihood components of the program here, as they are not, in themselves, peacebuilding efforts and are not suited to application of these analysis tools.

**Community Peace Councils (CPC)**

Figure 2 below presents the CPC program as understood through the RPP Matrix. In the LINCS Program, once the CPCs were formed, the members and other key community members received a series of training workshops designed to enhance their skills in handling conflict and to build their leadership capacities as well. This initial series of activities is represented on the matrix in Figure 1, showing the CPC members and others receiving training. CPC members are shown on the “more people” side but somewhat towards the “key people” side, as the members are, in many cases, respected and/or influential individuals. Ex-combatants, and other influential town members are shown as key people, since they have greater direct influence on peace.

The CPC itself is shown as a new tentative social institution, designed to handle local level conflicts and prevent escalation. The matrix then shows dotted lines to “maintaining peace and preventing violence” and from there to an effect on the broader Liberian context. The lines are dotted because these impacts are hoped for but not proven.



**Figure 2:  
Application of RPP Matrix to CPC Program Strategy**

Evidence from our interviews in communities participating in the LINCS Program indicates that the CPCs are handling interpersonal conflicts at the local level and work with other authorities to

address more difficult issues, such as land disputes. The types of conflicts handled by the CPCs alone involve domestic quarrels and violence, petty theft, claims regarding property hidden during the war and found by others, unpaid debts, public drunkenness and minor squabbles leading to fist fighting.

The most serious conflicts in these communities involve religious/cultural issues and land claims (house sites and/or farm land). In most cases (with a few exceptions), the CPCs are not handling such cases. Rather, we heard reports that the members of the CPCs help identify emerging disputes and then recruit other authorities (town chief, landlord, elders) to bring resolution at the local level, if possible. Cases that remain unresolved at that level are referred on to a paramount chief and/or to the court system (which is widely regarded as ineffective, corrupt and expensive). Newly reestablished government Land Commissions will also begin to reassert their role.

The CPCs also helped to smooth the process of IDP and refugee return to the communities, including addressing some land issues, especially during the past two years of transition, when few local authorities (town chiefs, elders, district and county authorities) were present. Now that those authorities are back, the role of the CPCs in this area is less certain. While the CPCs were originally envisioned as addressing issues with respect to ex-combatants, community and CPC members did not mention their role in this. It is possible that they have contributed indirectly insofar as ex-combatants were parties to interpersonal disputes. In addition, some of the LINCS training programs (trauma healing, Flomo Theatre) addressed ex-combatant issues directly, which contributed to the ability of communities and ex-combatants themselves to cope with tensions.

CHF also hoped that the CPCs would represent a new model of inclusive leadership. However, training, awareness, and a position of responsibility do not necessarily counterbalance socialization and the profound effects of war and violence. While some CPCs seem to have succeeded in bridging the inter-ethnic divide, in most cases, the prejudices, resentments and distrust that prevail in the community at large are reflected in CPC members as well. One Mandingo group was quite vociferous: “The CPC cannot help, because they do not have equal membership and issue biased decisions. The CPC will never vote with a Mandingo. The good thing is that it is a place to bring problems, and the decisions that they make do stand.” While this is only one direct statement, the team did hear such doubts expressed frequently by Mandingos. This issue should be addressed in future programming decisions.

### ***Theory of Change for the CPCs***

The CPC effort is based on several Theories of Change, which we will examine one by one. These theories (in bold italics below) have never been stated in this form in program documents, although they are implicit throughout. Rather, these formulations are the CDA team’s extrapolations from the program proposal and from discussions with CHF staff in the field.

Embedded in the original concept for the CPCs was the following Theory of Change:

***Theory #1 (CPCs): By establishing a new community-level mechanism for handling a range of dispute types, we will contribute to keeping the peace and avoiding incidents that have the potential for escalating into serious violence.***

This theory represents a challenging issue not only for the LINCS Program, but for the entire peacebuilding field. Peace practitioners are engaged in efforts to develop new or enhanced base-level community alternative dispute resolution (ADR) processes in many conflict zones around the world. Many of these efforts explore traditional conflict resolution mechanisms and seek to reinforce and/or modernize them. Other efforts seek to connect local level ADR with the lowest levels of the judicial system.

The question is whether such community-level ADR processes contribute to the broader peace—and if so, how. The answer turns on the extent to which local conflicts have the potential for escalating and inciting widespread violence. If they do, then local level mechanisms for containing such conflicts would directly contribute to stopping a key factor in violent conflict. If, however, local conflicts are unconnected to the driving factors of the conflict or the local level conflict handling mechanisms are not able to address the types of conflict most likely to escalate, then the ADR effort would make little or no contribution to Peace Writ Large. On the other hand, such program may be quite important, useful and effective for entirely other reasons—contributing to PWL is not the only reason to undertake such efforts!

The CPCs have provided a more accessible form of dispute resolution for a wide range of community-level problems. Thus, they contribute to containing local-level violence, and, during the transition period, some CPCs were able to handle certain land issues—one of the concerns most likely to lead to violence. At present, however, they are not dealing directly with the most volatile issues likely to result in violence (land and religious practices). The CPCs do reinforce the general notion of peace and model how to find nonviolent solutions to problems. In some circumstance, CPC members and other participants in leadership positions may apply the skills and concepts presented in training programs in considering a wider set of approaches to conflict resolution. They also, on occasion, prompt early response to rumors and volatile situations.

Another theory behind the CPCs concerns the idea of inclusion:

***Theory #2 (CPCs): By creating inclusive structures for community problem solving, we can improve communication, respect and productive interactions among subgroups in the community, and improve the access of disenfranchised groups to decision making.***

Simply by requiring representation from all “quarters” (ethnic and other divisions) within the communities, the CPC program may have helped erode the sense of separation resulting from the war. However, minority groups (mainly the Mandingos) in the community are also in the minority on the CPCs—and have no more power and influence on the CPCs than they do in other community forums where they are always outnumbered and their views can be dismissed.<sup>6</sup> In meetings of the CDA team with groups of CPC members, it was evident that the Mandingo members did not feel free to speak openly. On those occasions when Mandingo members did speak up, this was often followed by sharp exchanges in local languages (hence incomprehensible to the team) that seemed to silence the minority members. In separate

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<sup>6</sup> This poses an issue regarding the nature of “democracy.” If minorities are consistently denied their rights and/or a full voice, because they can always be outvoted, does this represent democracy? Structures that provide more equal voice/representation, while not reflecting the same proportions as the population, may be more effective, depending on the goals of the overall effort.

interviews, Mandingo community members were much more open and quite critical of community leadership and, in some cases, of the CPCs themselves. Mandingo members of CPCs who are able to exert influence in community decision making are probably able to do so because of the positions of respect they continue to hold, not because of their CPC membership.

As the CDA team conducted interviews in the communities, they heard many expressions of appreciation and respect for the CPCs. However, this appreciation was rarely (only one or two comments) associated with the inclusive nature of the group.

A third theory behind the CPCs and the broader LINCS Program training effort concerns the development of new leadership models:

***Theory #3 (CPCs): By creating a new leadership group infused with democratic concepts and provided with critical skills, we can foster more effective and responsive leadership.***

Most of the leadership training provided to CPC members was also provided to other town/community leaders (town chiefs, elders, women's and youth group leaders, landlords, etc.). CHF partner organizations who provided some of the training report that they saw and heard participants gaining new insights about leadership in their sessions. The CDA team also heard some references to concepts that interviewees must have picked up in training workshops. Since there were multiple participants from each participating community in those workshops, it is possible that they will be able to reinforce or challenge each other with regard to how leadership is exercised in the communities.

In some communities, new leadership is emerging—although it is certainly too early to tell if they will be any more responsive than the old leaders. In any case, it would be difficult to attribute any of these changes to the CPCs or the LINCS Program generally.<sup>7</sup> The various training programs, offered to both the CPC members and others, may begin to sink in and produce some changes over time. On the other hand, there is little or no follow-up to the training, no accompaniment of people as they attempt to apply the skills, and no mentoring of training participants. As far as we could see, CHF staff are not sitting in on community meetings or tracking specific decision making processes to see whether there are any discernable changes in leadership and how decisions are made. (I.e., are the skills introduced in LINCS workshops being applied?)

### ***National and County Level Forums***


If we apply the RPP Matrix to the National Forum program, the diagram in Figure 2 results. This program places greater emphasis on “key people,” as opinion leaders in Monrovia and Guinea are engaged in the process—recognizing that these people exert influence for or against reconciliation in Lofa County communities. By necessity, local and County level authorities and UNMIL representatives—who also influence peace and violence—are also engaged. The

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<sup>7</sup> It might be interesting (a research project by a university student from Lofa?) to explore the relationship between the CPCs and new/emerging leadership. A study could look at the past and current positions of CPC members and how they interact with traditional leadership structures.

Forums have also involved broader representation from the communities, including members of the CPCs.

The Forums themselves represent an activity at the socio-political level, since they deal with relations among significant groups. That is, the dialogues are aimed not at improving interpersonal relationships but at negotiating real agreements on important issues. We have placed the Forums on the line straddling More People and Key People, since larger groups of the community are involved, along with the more powerful participants.



**Figure 3:**  
**Application of RPP Matrix to National Forum Strategy**

If all goes well, each Forum results in a formal written agreement regarding how the two (or more) groups will interact as they live together in the communities. Such agreements, if honored, could result in actual improved relations among groups in the long term. In fact, it is possible that the increased positive contact and communication of the Forums could directly improve relationships. Those improved relations (from the Forums and/or agreements) would, in turn, produce positive effects on the broader Liberian context—demonstrating the potential for reconciliation and peaceful coexistence.

In Figure 2, the “improved relations” and “effects on the broader Liberian context” are presented in dotted lines, since those are hoped-for impacts not yet realized. CHF reports from the earlier round of Forums indicate that some improvements were noted following the interactions—in Konia, for instance. However, in other communities, earlier Forums did not result in improvements, and CHF staff are undertaking further rounds of talks in an effort to make

headway. In Borkeza, for instance, a group of influential people from the community and from Monrovia met several times and drew up a series of agreements. However, these were not written down formally and subsequent actions by the two groups eroded trust. In most areas, the Forum efforts are just beginning, and it is too early to tell whether they will succeed.

### *Theories of Change for the Forums*

The issues between Mandingo and Lorma/Kpelle tribal groups are quite difficult, derived in large measure from the damage done by groups perceived as coming from the various ethnic groups during the war. Early in the 1990s there were ethnically-based attacks on Mandingos—and Lorma/Kpelle were seen by some as cooperating or even assisting these attacks. Later, in the late 1990s, Mandingos and others formed LURD (Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy), which attacked and occupied Lofa County for several years. LURD and its allies committed numerous atrocities, often perceived as targeting Lorma and Kpelle groups and their sacred places. In addition, Mandingos are often seen as “foreigners” for a variety of reasons. Some Mandingos have lived in Lofa County for many generations—even predating other tribes in some places. However, many Mandingos engage in trade throughout the region (Liberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast) and families are often quite dispersed and mobile.

This is a highly simplified recounting of a complex history. In any case, Lormas/Kpelle and Mandingos harbor deep resentments, distrust and fear of each other—as demonstrated by changed housing patterns and widespread disputes over house site and farm land use and ownership. The need for the Forums arises from a need to address these intense inter-ethnic tensions. The situation calls for a deeper process of reconciliation facilitated by relatively neutral outside parties with the skills for inter-group dialogue and mediation of actual agreements.

The Forum program embodies two theories of change that we will examine in turn.

***Theory #1 (Forums): If we bring together influential representatives and other community members of both (all) ethnic groups that are experiencing tension to engage in dialogue and negotiate formal agreements regarding outstanding issues, we can improve inter-ethnic relations and develop the basis for long-term coexistence.***

This basic premise appears warranted by the situation and the programmatic approach. A process of reconciliation on a community-by-community basis is clearly needed, in order to address the hostility created by actions taken during the war. The effort is also engaging the appropriate mix of local and national/regional actors in the negotiation process.

However, success of the Forums will likely depend on the details of implementation, including the role of the facilitator(s); the quality of agreements reached (including implementation plans); the “meaning” of written statements; the degree of implementation and follow-through; linkages among levels (community, district, county and national); involvement of formal authorities (tribal chiefs, district and county government, national ministries); and ongoing and repeated processes of reconciliation at multiple levels. These issues will be discussed in the Recommendations section of this report.

One might also consider whether negotiated agreements are the best or only means for addressing inter-ethnic tensions. Indeed, the dialogue process itself opens up communication and sharing of perspectives about the traumatic events experienced by all groups over the past years of warfare. It will be interesting to see how the overall process of reconciliation unfolds—and which mechanisms prove most effective in resolving issues and improving relationships. The program should assess, in an ongoing way, how the different Forums succeed and why.

Some dialogue processes in Liberia have included various traditional methods of reconciliation. Some people think that these traditional ceremonies are an important component of the process, while others stress that such ceremonies are most useful for reinforcing concrete agreements achieved through some form of negotiation. Indeed, we heard Liberians expressing cynicism about high officials arriving in communities to preside over empty rites (slaughtering of a cow, and so forth) that did nothing practical to improve relationships. Liberia has also launched a national truth and reconciliation process—and Lofa County will participate. It remains to be seen whether that national process will have impacts at the county and local levels (and vice versa).

A second theory is implied by the Forum approach:

***Theory #2 (Forums): If we can negotiate the basis for coexistence among influential people at the national level and key local leaders of contending ethnic groups, it will become more possible to settle individual disputes over such issues as land claims.***

By this approach, rather than trying to deal with many individual disputes, the program attempts to develop broad agreements in principle—which can then guide resolution of specific claims. This is a sound logic to this approach. There is, however, also a risk that groups will remain deadlocked at the leadership level, leaving many festering land issues (and others) that could, over time, lead to violence, especially as the pressure on land increases with the return of more people to their former communities.

Separate attempts are underway to address land issues without any broader inter-ethnic agreements. Town chiefs, landlords, elders, paramount chiefs, district and county officials, Justices of the Peace, magistrates and the courts (insofar as they exist) and the revived Land Commission are all theoretically empowered to address land issues. However, these officials and institutions are all controlled by the dominant ethnic groups, and the minorities (Mandingos) have no faith in their ability to handle inter-ethnic issues fairly. The same institutions/officials are unable to address the other key area of concern, religious and spiritual practices. Rather, the various formal and informal religious leaders must be engaged in resolving those.

Disputes also arise over interpretations of the Liberian constitution and provisions that allow land ownership by all Liberian citizens and guarantee ownership to those who have used a plot for twenty years. In particular, these provisions are disputed in relation to Mandingos, and there is widespread refusal to acknowledge their citizenship or their user rights to land.

## RPP Criteria of Effectiveness

The first phase of RPP (1999-2003), developed several Criteria of Effectiveness—elements of peacebuilding that all peace programs should address in one way or another. These Criteria continue to evolve as learning and testing proceeds during the current phase of the RPP process. Although still evolving, these constitute a useful lens for looking at program effectiveness. We are currently using the following six Criteria:

1. The effort *addresses a key driving factor* of the conflict or tensions.
2. The effort results in the *creation or reform of institutions or mechanisms* that address the specific grievances or injustices that are factors in this conflict.
3. The effort causes participants and communities to develop *independent initiatives* that decrease inter-group dividers and increase inter-group connectors.
4. The effort prompts people increasingly to *resist violence* and provocations to violence.
5. The effort results in an *increase in people's security* and in their sense of security.
6. The effort results in a significant improvement in *relations among groups in conflict*.

The Criteria can be used as one method for assessing whether a program is likely to have an impact on the wider peace (“peace writ large”). While individual programs seldom address all of the areas included in the Criteria, RPP found that the more Criteria that a program addresses, the more likely the program is to contribute to the larger peace.

The CDA team used the Criteria as one framework for determining topic areas to be covered in community interviews and other forms of inquiry regarding the LINCS Program.<sup>8</sup> Thus the CDA team was interested in seeing whether and how the program was addressing key driving factors, whether the CPCs and Forums might be the kernel of new community-level institutions to address abiding grievance, and whether communities are induced to take their own initiatives as a result of the program. Similarly, we explored issues of violence and security and how the program might have had impacts in that domain. The issue of inter-group relations was a key issue of concern, as this had been identified as a major source of conflict in the area.

The RPP learning process has also found that, as the Criteria are applied to programs, it is also necessary to pose several additional questions that cut across the Criteria: Is the program fast enough? Is the program big enough? Is it sustainable? And is the program linked to other levels (local to district to county to national to regional) and other to other programs addressing similar issues using complementary approaches? The relationships of each program component to the Criteria and to these cross-cutting factors (fast enough, big enough, etc.) are discussed further below.

### Conflict Analysis as a Basis for Identifying Key Driving Factors (Criterion One)

Before we discuss the program components and the Criteria, we must first look at conflict analysis. In order to determine if a program has contributed to “stopping a key driving factor of conflict” (the first Criterion), it is necessary to perform an analysis that identifies those key

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<sup>8</sup> See the interview protocol in Appendix A.

driving factors. For this reason the CDA team worked with CHF staff to organize a one-day workshop in Lofa County, to hear the perspectives of local people regarding the ongoing conflicts in their area. That workshop provided useful information for the CDA team regarding how local people view the key driving factors of the conflict.

When the workshop information was supplemented by information from other sources (program documents and the full range of interviews at the community level, and with officials and implementing partners), we gained a comprehensive picture of the nature of conflict at the Lofa County level. Figure 4 presents that information as a conflict system, showing the dynamics among the conflict factors. This method of conflict analysis considers conflicts as “systems” of factors that operate in a pattern of dynamic interactions.

In the Lofa County context, the combination of the mutual destruction and killings during the war and the resulting mistrust, fear and hatred are the central factors that link other elements. “Key driving factors” of the conflict are shown in larger and different typeface and include the two central issues already mentioned (war and the resulting mistrust, etc.), plus discrimination/unequal power, the influence of opinion leaders, ignorance and misunderstanding, and the debate over who is a “real” Liberian.


Broadly speaking there are two major areas of concern in the conflict system in Lofa County. The first surrounds the dynamics of land and land ownership, which results from the war experiences and the questions raised about the citizenship status of Mandingos. Long-term arrangements for land use, rarely written or provided in a formal title, have now been rejected (referred to as “breaking of pre-war arrangements” on the conflict map).

The other major issue area concerns the isolation and separation of populations. In some communities, no Mandingos have returned at all. The team heard a story in Boi about the attempt of one Mandingo man to return, only to be chased out. In other places the separation is only a few hundred yards, as the Lorma have occupied one area, while the Mandingo are living in another (examples: Borkeza and Nekebouzo).

In Nekebouzo for example, the CDA team heard from a mixed group of Mandingo and Lorma youth. At one point in the conversation, one youth accused the Lorma of killing and raping Mandingo, and then another said the Mandingos killed Lormas—and an argument ensued. The team asked why people are “confused and tense,” and why they are separated into an old town (now mostly Lorma) and new town (now Mandingo). They heard the following two perspectives:

*Lorma perspective:* The Mandingos refuse to live in the old town where we all used to live together. Everyone has land and they are free to return to where they lived. The problem is that the community now has “aliens” from Bong, Nimba and Guinea, and they don’t belong in the community at all. These people are taking the land by force in the new town section. Prior to the war the new town section was market land. There was one man who had a coco/coffee plantation but that was all. There are some Mandingoes who have returned and they have returned to old town.

A document was signed between the Lorma and Mandingo chiefs in 2000 in Baziwen[?] stating that the Mandingo would leave new town and allow that land to return to its pre-war status as market land. We really want to work together with the Mandingos and don’t understand why they are living separately



**Figure 4:  
Dynamics of Conflict in Lofa County, Liberia, July 2006**

*Mandingo perspective:* That agreement is completely illegitimate for several reasons. At the court site Lorma held guns and forced our leaders to sign it. The document contained nothing about a land agreement but rather was an entirely different document that stated that the Mandingo admitted to killing all the Lorma. The new town was not market land at all, but was where Mandingo had lived and farmed

This brief exchange illustrates the depth of the hostility between groups in the wake of the fourteen years of war and violence, much of it undertaken with an ethnic twist. The issue of ignorance and misunderstanding—in addition to the destruction of churches, mosques and sacred places during the war—lies behind much of the current tension over religious practices. The relative isolation exacerbates that problem, and underlines the need to involve religious leaders in dialogue and negotiation processes.

Based on the village-level interviews and discussions with local officials, the situation in Lofa County could be characterized as a “fragile peace.” One young man in Konia stated, “There are no guns, but there is no peace....I can forget, but I will not forgive. I know people who murdered my family and friends.”

While the various armed groups have been demobilized and UNMIL troops are in place, NGOs and officials assert that many ex-combatants maintain contact with their former comrades-in-arms and commanders. Some armed groups associated with the former LURD forces are said to be armed and ready to respond if needed just over the border in Guinea.<sup>9</sup> Whether this latter is true or not, people in the communities perceive it to be true—which represents a threat to security or their sense of security.

In this context, the land issues, and the causes of them, acquire significance as potential catalysts of violence, especially if the groups that remain armed perceive a threat to groups whose interests they are pledged to protect. Will groups currently excluded from farm land and house sites they formerly occupied for generations move to repossess them? How will other groups respond if such forcible reoccupations take place? If UNMIL withdraws will the situation of relative calm deteriorate?

While this analysis is useful for thinking about the first criterion, it can also serve as the basis for thinking more broadly about program strategies and determining whether a program is appropriately targeted—that is, addressing the right things.

### **The Criteria and the Community Peace Councils**

The chart below indicates our assessment that the CPCs have had only a subtle and indirect impact on the key driving factors of conflict (Criterion #1). As already mentioned, the CDA team found that the CPCs, while performing an appreciated and valuable service in relation to interpersonal conflicts and some other forms of local conflict, are not addressing

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<sup>9</sup> Note that the CDA team has no direct evidence to support or refute these rumors, but is reporting the experience of others in Lofa.

those issues most likely to escalate towards serious violence. (Fist fights and domestic violence are serious concerns, but not likely to precipitate widespread bloodshed.) If the CPCs are contributing at all to stopping key driving factors, it is by promoting a general atmosphere of problem solving and quelling rumors.

Criterion	Community Peace Councils
1. The effort <i>addresses a key driving factor</i> of the conflict or tensions.	Earlier contribution Currently indirectly
2. The effort results in the <i>creation or reform of institutions or mechanisms</i> that address the specific grievances or injustices that are factors in this conflict.	Certain kinds of disputes, potential for more
3. The effort causes participants and communities to develop <i>independent initiatives</i> that decrease dividers, increase connectors.	In some cases (but signs of dependency also present)
4. The effort prompts people increasingly to <i>resist violence</i> and provocations to violence.	Yes, at a local level
5. The effort results in an <i>increase in people's security</i> and in their sense of security.	Somewhat
6. The effort results in a significant improvement in <i>relations among groups in conflict</i> .	Not directly

In most communities, the CPCs bring people together for joint community projects. These efforts begin to address, in small ways, the lack of community unity and low development factors (which are effects rather than key factors in our analysis). “Contact theory” or the “contact hypothesis”<sup>10</sup> would suggest that joint projects are an effective way to erode distrust and fear. Might the LINCOS livelihood projects and construction of community centers, undertaken across ethnic lines, contribute to reducing some of the factors in the analysis, such as the cycles associated with “separation and isolation” and “communities not together”? CHF staff reported that the joint projects do have these objectives.

In response to critiques of the original contact theory, social scientists found that increased social interaction can be effective in reducing prejudice, distrust and fear, but only under specific conditions: the groups must have mutual interdependence, common goals, equal status, informal and personal contacts, social norms of equality, and the support of

<sup>10</sup> Originally posited by Gordon Allport in the 1950s and elaborated by Armour and Pettigrew (among others). See Allport, Gordon, *The Nature of Prejudice*, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1954; Armour, D. 1972. "The Evidence on Busing." *Public Interest* 28:90-128; Pettigrew, T.F., "Intergroup Contact Theory", *Annual Review of Psychology*, 49 (65-85), 1998.

authorities, among others.<sup>11</sup> While some of these conditions are met in the relations among tribal groups in Lofa County, others are clearly not—which may, then call into question the effectiveness of activities based on the assumption that contacts will help reduce hostility.<sup>12</sup>

The strongest contribution of the CPC program is towards Criterion #2: creating/reforming an institution to address specific grievances or injustices. As already noted, the CPCs are handling a range of interpersonal disputes, including petty theft, personal property claims, and domestic issues. Community members frequently expressed appreciation for the CPC's services, as they do not like paying the town chief to resolve issues or using the slow and corrupt judicial system.

We should note that there is widespread confusion about the true role and function of the CPCs, including among CPC members themselves. In the course of our interviews, we heard reference to the following roles:

- Community mediators
- Development project managers
- Fund raisers
- CHF contact persons
- Community mobilizers and leaders
- Landmine action contacts
- Human rights activists
- Child protection agents

While some mix of these roles may be appropriate for the CPCs, nevertheless, community members were not clear about what the groups are really for. Given this confusion, if the CPCs are to become a more permanent and useful social institution for base-level justice and dispute resolution, there must be greater clarity—among community members—about what they want the CPCs to do.

As noted already, the biggest issue is land disputes—and the CPCs, with a few exceptions, are not able to address these directly, at least not at present. CHF staff report that earlier in the program, before local authorities (town chief, landowner, elders) had returned, CPCs were playing a much more direct role in resolving land issues, although this was not reported in our interviews. The team found that CPCs are involving themselves in land issues, but are not playing a mediating or arbitrating role themselves. Rather, they identify the problem and bring it to the town chief and other authorities for resolution. In some cases, the town chief and other influential elders serve on the CPC—and therefore play a more central role in land disputes, but this is not due to their CPC membership. If the CPCs are to play a more significant role in handling more difficult disputes and deeper

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<sup>11</sup> See, for instance, Aronson, E. and D. Bridgeman. 1979. "Jigsaw Groups and the Desegregated Classroom: In Pursuit of Common Goals." "Equal-Status Inter-racial Contact: A Review and Revision of a Concept." International Journal of Intercultural Relations 2:161-185

<sup>12</sup> Indeed, other social scientists have gone to great lengths to challenge the basic assumptions of contact theory. See H. D. Forbes, *Ethnic Conflict: Commerce, Culture and the Contact Hypothesis*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997.

issues at the level of grievances and injustice, they will require additional capacity. This issue is taken up in Section VI/Recommendations.

Regarding Criterion #3, the team found considerable evidence that most of the participating communities are not taking their own initiatives. The dependency syndrome is announced loudly, as the entrance to every community is adorned with multiple signboards declaring the active engagement of NGOs (and some foreign governments) in aid to that town. Of course, this situation was not created by CHF. In fact, most of those agencies arrived in Lofa County after CHF did. However, the general atmosphere is one of waiting for the initiative of the NGOs. Most NGOs have their own point-of-contact groups in the communities, resulting in a dizzying array of local community groups, each associated with a different NGO effort, and lots of overlapping memberships. This situation is regrettable and outside of CHF's control—and correcting it would require efforts of coordination.<sup>13</sup>

In contrast, the team's visits to "non-participating" communities in which CHF and other NGOs are *not* active, revealed that community members there, while just as poor or even poorer than communities with extensive NGO involvement, were much more engaged in self-initiated efforts. For instance, in Bulor, a poor and isolated all-Mandingo community, they had rebuilt the mosque and town hall on their own initiative.

Of more direct concern for CHF, team interviews in the communities revealed, in many cases, that the CPC is viewed as the "CHF group," not as a function or body fully owned and supported by the community. As they consider future programming, CHF must think about how to transfer greater ownership of the CPC function to the communities. Even though CHF is not solely responsible for the dependency dynamics noted above, they must still consider how their own program can minimize the negative effects.

Regarding Criteria 4 and 5, the team found evidence that the program has contributed to containing violence at the local level—particularly interpersonal disputes that might escalate. In this way, local people may feel more secure if such incidents are handled well and in a timely manner. However, when the team asked people whether they felt secure (and many did), they attributed that sense of security to the presence of UNMIL and the new Liberian police, the reestablishment of government functions, the revival of economic activity, and the return of people to their homes. The CPCs were never cited as the source of a sense of security, even though most interviewees knew that we were there to talk about the LINCSP Program. The LINCSP Program also provided workshops on community policing, but community members rarely mentioned those—and those activities probably have gotten lost in the innumerable workshops provided by so many different groups. We were not able to determine whether people are more resistant to violence than previously—even though there is a strong sense of weariness with war.

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<sup>13</sup> In fact, the team heard repeated complaints from community members about actions of various NGOs that exacerbate conflict, such as inequitable distribution of relief and resettlement goods, favoritism towards certain leaders and their cohorts, and differential access to water and sanitation facilities. These issues were outside the scope of this assessment, but a multi-agency "Do No Harm" analysis of aid to the County is sorely needed!

In terms of Criterion #6, the CPCs are not addressing inter-ethnic issues directly. If they are having an impact on inter-group relations, it is through joint projects, such as construction of community centers and livelihood projects. (See the discussion above regarding contact theory.) The fact that all “quarters” (geographic and ethnic areas) are represented on the CPCs themselves represents the potential for impact on inter-group relations. Interactions and cooperation among multi-ethnic members of the CPCs may have improved relationships in some instances, but those interviewed in the communities did not mention this.<sup>14</sup>

As for the cross-cutting factors (fast enough, big enough, sustainable and linked), the CPCs demonstrate some commendable attributes. Certainly, CHF introduced the CPS effort in a timely manner as the first significant numbers of people were beginning to return to their communities. In the crucial transition period, the CPCs are reported to have played an important role in facilitating orderly returns and reintegration (at least among those ethnic groups allowed to return!). In recent months, it appears that this leadership role has passed back to traditional authorities in most cases—and many other NGOs are operating in Lofa County.

The coverage of the CPC program is impressive: seventy towns in the three districts of Lofa County. This is a scale that has potential for real impacts. Those impacts will be stronger if the role of the CPCs can be expanded and consolidated, with full community ownership and support, as needed, from CHF.

The sustainability of the CPC program is a serious question, treated more fully below in the Recommendations section. We see three dimensions of this issue: a) how to sustain participation of CPC members (through some form of compensation/reward); b) how to further evolve the dispute resolution function of the CPCs; and c) how to gain greater community ownership. Although the livelihoods projects were conceived partly as a way to provide some compensation to CPC members, they do not always see the projects as compensation. In one community, the CPC members were under the impression that CHF had promised compensation, but none was forthcoming—and they said, “The sheep [from the livelihood project] are not compensation.” While not always stated this way, the issue of compensation was repeated in almost every conversation with the CPC members. Quite likely, the program should hold to the volunteer principle (partly because any form of monetary compensation is a slippery slope!), while looking for other ways to reward participants.

The CPCs would benefit from better links with base-level government and, if the taint of corruption can be eased, judicial functions. Recently, CHF has developed a partnership with the American Bar Association program on dispute resolution—which may provide a natural avenue for linking the CPCs to the judicial system and to other dispute resolution

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<sup>14</sup> CPCs operate differently in handling specific disputes/cases. In some cases, individual CPC members handle the issue. In others, they work in teams. In still others, the CPC acts as a full group. Given these wide variations, it is difficult to tell how much actual interaction takes place among CPC members of different ethnic groups.

efforts. As for other linkages, so far, the CPCs have largely functioned independently from other programs, and the CDA team heard sharp criticism of CHF from several other organizations for not attending key coordination meetings in Voinjama—whether this is deserved or not. On the other hand, the team did hear of ongoing cooperation with CCF’s work on gender-based violence and with Land Mine Action, and, in the early phases of the program, with Lutheran efforts for trauma healing. Decisions regarding which institutions, organizations and programs to link with (since they take time and energy) should be based on a conflict analysis and strategies for enhancing the effectiveness of the program.

### **The Criteria and the National and County Level Forums Program**

The chart below presents the CDA teams assessment of how the Forums program contributes to the Criteria of Effectiveness. In our view, the Forums are potentially (but not yet) a powerful means for addressing some of the key driving factors of the conflict, including those most likely to precipitate renewed rounds of violence.

If the National and County-Level Forums can effectively address some of the issues that divide the tribal groups, including those that have caused groups to refuse to return, refuse to live alongside people from the other group, or refuse to allow people to return to former lands, they will make a significant contribution to stopping key driving factors of the conflict and improving inter-group relations (Criteria #1 and #6).

<b>Criterion</b>	<b>National and County Level Forums</b>
1. The effort <i>addresses a key driving factor</i> of the conflict or tensions.	Potential significant impact
2. The effort results in the <i>creation or reform of institutions or mechanisms</i> that address the specific grievances or injustices that are factors in this conflict.	Possible modeling of mechanisms for wider application
3. The effort causes participants and communities to develop <i>independent initiatives</i> that decrease dividers, increase connectors.	Unclear
4. The effort prompts people increasingly to <i>resist violence</i> and provocations to violence.	Potential indirect effect
5. The effort results in an <i>increase in people’s security</i> and in their sense of security.	Potentially
6. The effort results in a significant improvement in <i>relations among groups in conflict</i> .	High potential

It remains to be seen whether the Forums will be able to negotiate agreements on relatively practical issues (land use and access, respect for religious practices) without dealing

directly with the more emotive issues that may require deeper levels of reconciliation (acknowledgement, apology, forgiveness, cleansing, and so forth). The Forum process is currently understaffed and overstretched, which impedes its capacity to follow up and follow through on dialogue and negotiation sessions. This concern will be addressed further in the Recommendations section.<sup>15</sup>

The Forum program might be considered an experiment in reconciliation at the community and county levels. Other such efforts have been attempted in Liberia in the past—and CHF would benefit from learning more about the successes and failures of those other efforts from Liberian experts available in Monrovia.<sup>16</sup> Meanwhile, the Forum program has potential for being incorporated into a new/renewed Liberian institution that takes responsibility for long-term attention to ground level reconciliation among contending groups (Criterion #2). So far, the appropriate institution has not been identified, and CHF will need to undertake additional consultations to determine how their efforts can contribute to related national initiatives.

It is too early to tell if the current round of Forum activities will help communities to start taking their own initiatives for inter-group reconciliation (Criterion #3). We can imagine a scenario in which formal agreements that are implemented fully would contribute to people's resistance to violence and to an increase in their sense of security, at least over time (Criteria #4 and #5).

As for the other cross-cutting factors (fast enough, big enough...), for the Forums, the real question is quality, rather than speed or quantity. The dialogue process needs to proceed at its own pace, without delaying unnecessarily. We also address the issue of size in the Recommendations, as we are convinced that undertaking dialogue processes well in fewer communities will be more beneficial than spreading resources too thin.

Ultimately, the CHF effort cannot be sustained, so a high priority for the next period will be to find a strong Liberian institutional base for such efforts. We also suggest in the Recommendations that CHF link more closely with others who have previous experience with dialogues in Liberia. A key element of the program is developing community to county to national linkages, so this is a real strength.

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<sup>15</sup> CHF has increased staff support and budget for this program component since the CDA team's visit.

<sup>16</sup> Former WANEP director, Sam Doe, would be a place to start.

## **IV. ESSENTIAL FINDINGS**

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This section will present the basic conclusions of the CDA assessment team regarding the LINC'S Program. We start with a reiteration and discussion of the program's goals and objectives, followed by a reflection on the strengths and weaknesses of the main program elements.

### **The LINC'S Program in Relation to Its Objectives and Expected Results**

The LINC'S Program proposal to USAID (and other subsequent documents reporting on the program) articulated several objectives, including those restated under the subtopics below. Taken together, these represent an ambitious set of goals—more than a single program might accomplish in a relatively short period! [We might note, in passing, that CDA's Reflecting on Peace Practice Program (RPP) has discovered a common deficiency in peacebuilding program planning: broadly stated goals that claim (hope for) too much and expected results that are difficult to measure.]

#### **1. Strengthen and Expand Constituencies for Peace**

In this area, the program objectives were to:

- Increase the effectiveness of peace-building constituencies at the local, district and country level.
- Strengthen democratic civil leadership with a vested interest in peace.
- Increase quantity, quality and timely delivery of communication on issues affecting national to local peace building processes.
- Build capacity for local organizations to advocate for responsive national policies that contribute to peace.
- Provide logistical support for advocacy and collaboration.
- Assist community leadership groups to build inclusive and transparent management.

The CPCs may consider themselves to be, broadly speaking, peace constituencies, but they are not mobilized to advocate for peace. Rather, they are working—effectively in many cases—on local and interpersonal issues of conflict. They are not, as far as we could see, engaging in advocacy activities either locally, at the county level, and certainly not at the national level. The team did hear repeated support for peace, exhaustion with the war process, a willingness to put the awful experiences of the past fourteen years behind them, a real desire to avoid further violence, and a pragmatic desire to get on with life. In other words, there is strong public support for peace—but there is no identifiable civic organization or network of organizations advocating for it. And the CPCs do not appear to be filling this role. Furthermore, it is important to note that, alongside the verbal support for peace, we observed stark separation of populations along ethnic lines and explicit refusal to allow Mandingos to return to their lands, and heard persistent expressions of hostility based on war experiences.

The Forums, however, represent the potential for building a durable peace in Lofa County, supported by influential people both living in the county and in Monrovia. In a sense, then

the Forums may be, slowly and indirectly, developing a peace constituency, though not by that name. If the Forum process succeeds at both the community-by-community and county levels, and if an institutional base can be found to continue support for an ongoing long-term reconciliation process, a truly influential peace constituency could emerge.

The program objectives stated above, although not clearly defined, also call for strengthening democratic and civic leadership and inclusive and transparent management. The overall LINCS Program effort, including all of the training programs for the CPCs and others in leadership, has certainly injected new concepts and skills into the communities. In one community, a young man volunteered the statement, “true leaders do not seize power,” as something he had learned in the leadership workshop.

However, the CDA team also directly observed the dynamics among participants in the interviews (most of which were in groups). We saw little evidence that the workshops have resulted in obvious democratic practices, either within the CPCs or in the larger communities. Rather, participants frequently interrupted and intimidated each other and engaged in heated arguments. These encounters went beyond healthy debate and were usually unproductive and discouraging of frank exchanges.

On the other hand, the experiences of war and displacement, participation in programs in refugee/IDP camps, and the emergence of younger leadership seem to foreshadow a trend towards more democratic and transparent processes, as people’s expectations of their leadership have shifted. These changes cannot be attributed to the LINCS Program, although, again the training programs and some contribution from the CPCs may support movement in that direction.

While it is too early to know for certain, the Forums may induce changes in leadership of some of the communities—either changes in the approaches to problem solving by individual leaders, or changes in the expectations of community members towards their leadership. If new agreements support coexistence, towns may seek leaders who are best able to implement such concepts. The agreements themselves, if well implemented, may also reinforce community desires for peace. Finally, if the Forum processes include effective elements of reconciliation, they may strengthen the notion that peaceful coexistence is even possible among formerly hostile groups.

In sum, the LINCS Program has laid the groundwork for addressing these objectives. However, additional work is needed to consolidate the introduction of new concepts in leadership and to truly mobilize constituencies for peace advocacy in the County, and a number of specific components need to be realized in the Forums for their contribution to become significant.

## **2. Mitigating Conflict and Violence**

In this area, the program objectives were to:

- Build and/or support local and county capacity for ongoing conflict mitigation, adjudication and peace building activities.

- Prepare communities and leadership for potential outbreaks of conflict and deal with the after effects of violent acts.
- Promote dialogues and collaboration among contentious ethnic groups.
- Build local capacity for reconciliation of all returnees.
- Assist democratic leadership to build skills and confidence in effectively managing community security and in reducing the impact of conflict.
- Build the effectiveness of traditional and culturally appropriate mechanisms for reconciliation.

An ultimate conclusion about the effectiveness of the CPCs turns on the expectations about what they could/should be handling. As noted above, the CPCs represent a new community-based mechanism for handling a wide range of conflicts. With the exception of land conflicts and the deeper inter-ethnic tensions, the CPCs are currently capable, in many cases, of addressing most of the conflicts that arise at the community level, promote communications among parties, and perform a referral function for cases they cannot handle. CHF staff also report that the CPCs are able calm down volatile situations and did address land issues earlier during the transition period. Some town chiefs refer cases to the CPCs, and some CPCs ask town chiefs to refer cases to them. There is wide variation in the relationships between the chiefs, representing the traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, and the CPCs.

Therefore, the capacity of the CPCs could be argued two ways. On the one hand, with considerable variation from community to community, they are addressing most community-level conflicts. On the other hand, as noted in Section III, they are not currently dealing with those conflicts most likely to result in widespread violence. The CPCs' positive and helpful role and experience needs to be expanded and strengthened to achieve a social institution closer to the stated program objectives.

The CPCs appear also to have played a useful role in helping to smooth the process of return for refugees and IDPs. CHF staff report that CPCs handled land disputes during the transition period. Some of the CPCs are also playing an early intervention role—responding to rumor and information about impending violence. This role could be further reinforced, particularly as it becomes clearer how the CPC are to relate to other authorities (town chiefs, police, government officials, etc.).

As regards the objectives calling for dialogue and collaboration among contending ethnic groups and the application of culturally appropriate mechanisms for reconciliation, the Forums program represent the best hope for achieving these desired outcomes. If well executed, the Forums show promise for exerting a significant impact in this regard.

Considering the combined impacts of the CPCs and the Forums, the LINCS Program, as a whole, is achieving progress towards the objectives stated above.

### 3. Address Causes and Consequences of Conflict

In this area, the program objectives were to:

- Facilitate peaceful resolution of property and resource claims, perceived war crimes.
- Build Lofa-based peace constituencies' ability to affect national decisions on resource allocation, management of extractive resources.
- Build Lofa-based peace constituencies' ability to affect national decisions on composure and civil leadership of reconstituted military and/or police.
- Build number and quality of psycho-social assistance mechanisms in Lofa.

So far, the LINCS Program is not addressing the peaceful resolution of property and resource claims or perceived war crimes. Interpersonal issues regarding property hidden as people fled the area have been handled by the CPCs, but as discussed already, the CPCs have not so far dealt with more serious land and property disputes—and certainly not war crimes.

In reality, the picture is quite mixed regarding land disputes. We found some CPCs that claimed they were handling land disputes, but when we probed further about exactly what they did, it turned out that they played a role in identifying the issue and bringing the appropriate authorities (usually the town chief and/or landlord) forward to make decisions. Some CPCs apparently handled house site and/or farm land issues by themselves in the earlier period, but we did not find a lot of evidence that they are currently playing this role.

The team did hear accounts of trauma healing workshops, held under the LINCS Program, in which individuals were able to recount their personal experiences of atrocities—and some level of interpersonal reconciliation took place, when people who had participated in such activities were present. One woman interviewed in Voinjama District said that she faced a young man who had killed her son and told him, “You must disarm your heart.” So far, these kinds of healing encounters are not a regular occurrence in the county, however. The LINCS Program has cooperated, at least in its early stages, with other programs working on trauma healing.

CHF staff also described the performances by the Flomo Theatre group in the area, arranged through the LINCS Program. These performances brought together up to a thousand community members and addressed, through drama, issues regarding ex-combatant reintegration and reconciliation. In these public settings, community members were able to reach out to each other and shout out how they should forgive each other and move on. This type of dialogue in a public setting was apparently a rare occurrence.<sup>17</sup>

As mentioned elsewhere, the community Forums may be able to incorporate some elements of reconciliation and healing by working directly across the ethnic groups on specific issues and grievances that divide them.

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<sup>17</sup> Although these experiences were apparently rare and moving, interviewees in the communities rarely mentioned them. Even when prompted directly, interviewees only remembered them vaguely.

The CHF staff were clear that the objectives associated with national level policy advocacy have proven unrealistic, as least to date.

In sum, the LINCS Program has contributed in small ways to achievement of this set of objectives. With some rethinking and restructuring, the program has potential for making a more significant contribution.

### **Expected Results**

The LINCS Program, by achieving the three major goal areas above, was expected to show the following results by the end of the program:<sup>18</sup>

- Reduced violence in Lofa County;
- Peaceful return of internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, and ex-combatants;
- Facilitation of reconciliation between ex-combatants and their families;
- Facilitation of reconciliation between ex-combatants and their ‘host’ communities;
- Development of Community Councils which can support reintegration, act to resolve disputes and adjudicate perceived crimes, and mobilize the community to work towards peace;
- Community Councils trained and active in sensitizing the community to addressing the special issues regarding returned ex-combatants;
- Increased participation by all community members in community decision making;
- Increased peaceful interaction among diverse, sometimes contentious groups within the community;
- Increased effectiveness and organization of district and county peace constituencies; and
- Creation of a mechanism to facilitate communication between Community Councils and other leaders with UNMIL, UNCIVPOL as well as the NTGL’s new security forces.

The Expected Results presented above are, in many cases, stated in terms of activities (facilitation, training, establishment of institutions), rather than in terms of specific outcomes or impacts—what those activities or entities might accomplish. In some cases there is an implied desired outcome, such as increased participation, increased interaction, increased effectiveness. Furthermore, there is no baseline data that would enable determination of whether the expected outcomes had occurred.

Nevertheless, it is possible to extrapolate a set of specific outcomes that the program was striving towards. These are presented below in present tense, positive terms, along with possible measures offered for illustrative purposes. In most cases, these are restatements of the Expected Results above in a somewhat different format. Note that these are still goals—and the use of the present tense is a convention in goal statements and does not imply that the aims have been achieved. We discuss the extent to which these have been accomplished in Lofa County below.

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<sup>18</sup> From the LINCS program description (Attachment 2 of the Cooperative Agreement).

We have taken the time to offer these restatements and possible measures below because these represent the kinds of things that the CDA assessment team tried to explore during visits and interviews in the communities and interviews with officials. Clearly the team did not attempt to gather information on all of these factors, which would have been an impossible task. However, especially in those areas where CHF staff indicated that they thought the program had achieved some impact, the team tried to find out what results could be observed. Community interviews touched on each of these topics to some extent, although not in equal measure. (Number 7, for instance, was not a major focus, since CHF indicated that they had not expended a lot of program resources in that area.)

1. Lofa County communities experience low levels of violence. [Possible measures: number of violent incidents, murders, attacks, intimidation; rate of calls upon UNMIL or Liberian police/security forces to intervene in violent situations; increase in the sense of security among all groups.]
2. Communities have accomplished the peaceful reintegration of returnees and ex-combatants. [Possible measures: percentage of families returned to communities; proportion of different ethnic groups returned; active participation of ex-combatants in community life/work/activities; housing and land use patterns based on ethnicity or other factors; peaceful resolution of competing claims for land; positive attitudes towards people perceived as “different” in some way; growing acceptance of all as Liberians.]
3. Contending groups (ex-combatants/families, other groups undefined) have achieved reconciliation (undefined) and interact regularly and peacefully. [Possible measures: observed “normal” interactions among groups formerly hostile; willingness of victims and perpetrators to place past history of violence behind them; open expressions of regret and/or forgiveness; evidence of joint rebuilding and/or reparation activities; spaces established and used for recounting difficult personal histories from the war; active trauma healing programs used by all groups.]
4. Disputes at the community level are handled effectively and without resort to violence. [Possible measures: documentation of the number of disputes, types, parties and issues; tracking of the processes used to attempt resolution; rate of successful resolution by the varied mechanisms; durability of settlements; “satisfaction” surveys among disputants.]
5. All constituencies have a voice in community decision making. [Possible measures: attendance by various groups (young/old, women/men, X/Y ethnic groups, etc.) in community meetings; tracking of who speaks how often and with what force; who is listened to and by whom; tracking of decisions actually made by whom and taking into account what input.]
6. There is a mobilized, visible and credible constituency for peace. [Possible measures: there are groups who self-identify openly as peace advocates; individuals representing such groups speak up and/or intervene regarding potentially volatile issues; locally-initiated activities bring people together across various divides for dialogue and/or joint work.]

7. Community members are in regular positive communication with security forces. [Possible measures: how secure do people feel by their own report and why; numbers of meetings between community members and security forces; number of issues/problems brought to security forces; positive attitudes by community towards security forces and vice versa (by survey); rate of local people signing up to serve in forces.]

From our community visits and from discussions with local officials and UNMIL personnel, the CDA team feels that numbers 1, 2 and 4 above have taken place in Lofa County. That is, there is a relatively low level of violence, people have returned and been reintegrated successfully *within* their own ethnic groups, but not *across/between* different ethnic groups. Most disputes are handled nonviolently, so far. While the LINCS Program may have contributed to these results, it would be difficult to attribute these outcomes to LINCS activities. The Community Peace Councils appear to have facilitated smooth returns and are handling interpersonal disputes. In addition, they may have, through their very existence, promoted an atmosphere of conflict resolution and problem solving without resort to violence.

In our view, the reconciliation called for in #3 has not been accomplished in Lofa County, as yet. In Zeawordemai a group of women and youth asserted that they would “never forgive, no matter what.” They recalled that 500 boys were killed by Ulimo on Black Monday, an incident still on their minds many years later. This ongoing pain and hostility reinforces the need for the CHF Forums program, which has promise for making a significant contribution in this area.

Based on our observations in the field, # 5 is problematic. Traditional forms of leadership appear to be in full operation, with elders, town chiefs and landlords firmly in control. Women and youth are formally represented in town discussions, but their voices are not strong. Minority groups do not speak up readily. Clearly more work is needed in this area.

In relation to #6, as already noted, there is strong public sentiment in favor of peace, but no active and visible constituency openly advocating for it—and there is persistent hostility and tension, unresolved incidents from the war, and obvious separation along ethnic lines.

As regards #7, in repeated comments, communities attributed security to the presence of UNMIL—and appreciated their role. We also heard reports of communities calling on UNMIL to intervene when situations seemed to be getting out of hand. One group said that they called UNMIL right away when they saw a group of young men fighting. Another called upon UNMIL when hunters in the bush frightened people by shooting too close to towns.

The team also heard reports of young men (some ex-combatants) volunteering for the new Liberian army or for the renewed police—an indication that communities favor these revived national institutions and have hope that they will be able to guarantee peace after UNMIL withdraws. It is hard to attribute this situation to the LINCS Program, although one set of workshops under the program addressed community-police relations.

## **Summary of Program Strengths and Weaknesses**

The following is a summary of strengths and weakness of the Community Peace Councils and National and County Level Forums, which we have directly addressed in the Recommendations presented in Section VI.

### **Community Peace Councils**

#### ***Strengths:***

The CDA heard from two different community members that the CPCs are a “river between two fires” (from which we have taken the title for this report). We take this as an appreciation for the effective role the CPCs play in handling local disputes.

- The program has created the foundation for longer term, larger scale dialogue processes.
- The program informed communities about conflict and basic problem solving approaches.
- CPCs provide a low-cost mechanism for handling local-level (mainly) interpersonal disputes.
- CPCs provided an effective dispute resolution mechanism during the critical transition time of the return and reintegration of IDPs/refugees, handling interpersonal disputes and, in some cases, land issues.
- CPCs have provided some forms of leadership in communities, supplementing (and not replacing) traditional authorities.
- CPCs are an appropriate mechanism that do not contradict existing and historical structures that do work.
- The program introduced key leaders to a variety of important skills and concepts that can be useful for any future development and/or conflict resolution programming.
- CPCs have provided a useful entry point to communities for other important programs (e.g., Land Mine Action, domestic violence, trauma healing).
- The CPCs, with additional attention and resources, constitute a possible new permanent social institution for first level dispute resolution.

#### ***Weaknesses/Critiques:***

- CPCs are currently out of date, in terms of their representative function and credibility, since they were formed in 2004, and many more people have now returned to the communities.
- While the CPCs members have received at least four training programs, there has been little direct follow up to see whether/how people are applying those skills and concepts—CPCs are left to function on their own without direct support or mentoring, such as sitting in on actual dispute resolution processes or regular CPC meetings to discuss cases.

- The main contact between CHF and the CPCs is a monthly visit in which the group reports on their activities.<sup>19</sup>
- There is no independent verification regarding the actual roles that CPCs are playing (types of cases handled, processes used, style of mediation/arbitration employed, rate of settlement, acceptance of any settlement, durability of agreements, etc.).<sup>20</sup>
- CPC members feel burdened by their role, in terms of the time requirements without compensation—which has raised questions about the sustainability of the model, as interest may wane without some better reward system.
- In many cases, only a few CPC members are truly active.
- CPCs are not able to contradict traditional authorities—and in some cases town chiefs, elders and other leaders are fully involved with the CPCs (which has both positive and negative effects!).<sup>21</sup>
- Generally, the CPCs reflect the same prejudices and dominant/subordinate patterns of their social context: minority groups in the towns are also minority groups on the CPCs, and have no stronger voice there than in other settings.
- The CPCs are mostly dealing with interpersonal disputes that the town chief is happy for someone else to handle; more serious issues, including land disputes, are handled through other more traditional means. (Whether this is a weakness or not depends on what the groups are expected to do.)
- CPCs are not equipped to address deeper issues of inter-group reconciliation or more difficult types of disputes, and are not used directly to support Forum activities, such as following up, monitoring compliance, helping to negotiate actual implementation, etc..
- There is widespread confusion about the real function/purpose of the CPCs (livelihood project implementers, dispute resolvers, the “CHF group,” etc.), and many community members (perhaps mostly recent returnees) are not aware of the services available.
- The CDA teams found that some CPCs appear to be inactive, while there is open conflict among CPC members in other cases.

## **National and County-Level Forums**

### ***Strengths:***

- National forums represent a potential for deeper resolution and reconciliation of inter-ethnic conflicts.
- The Forums offer relatively neutral outside facilitation that enables contending groups to address sensitive issues.

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<sup>19</sup> Records regarding each CPC and its cases are kept in the CHF field offices. The CDA team reviewed the files in the Zorzor office and found that records there were fairly complete through February 2006, but were quite incomplete after that.

<sup>20</sup> CHF records rely on accurate reporting by the CPCs themselves. While the groups have no particular reason to distort the facts, they may not fully understand terminology—and CHF staff may not either. For instance, the records report that many cases are “mediated,” yet it is also clear that CPCs are almost all using an arbitration model. Sorting that out would require direct observation by an informed person.

<sup>21</sup> Many CPC members were elected/selected because they were respected members of the community. In some cases, this means they are part of the town power structures, not an alternative to them. Other CPC members were simply those present in the early days of returns—and as traditional authorities have returned, their influence has diminished, in some cases.

- The Forum program is able to bring together all of the key players, including influential people from Monrovia and Guinea.
- The Forums support the negotiation of agreements between conflicting groups, that can serve as the basis for resolving many specific disputes, especially over land ownership/use.
- The Forums can help to develop a model of inter-group dialogue and negotiation that would be applicable elsewhere in Liberia.
- The Forums are organized in a way that links national, regional and local levels regarding inter-ethnic tensions.

***Weakness/Critiques:***

- At present the CHF Forum program is understaffed and overstretched, trying to organize processes in too many communities at the same time. High quality processes in a few places may be better than poorly implemented processes in many.
- The program is not benefiting directly from previous experiences of dialogue and negotiation in Liberia, during earlier periods or by other organizations.
- Previous dialogue/negotiation efforts by CHF and its partners (in 2004-5) resulted in formal agreements, but these were not written down, nor was there adequate follow up.
- Formal agreements appear to be at the level of broad principles only—more concrete and specific actions and an implementation plan are not addressed. For instance, in Ziggida, local people said that a Forum had negotiated an agreement, but tensions arose again, partly because the agreements were never implemented.
- Current staff do not have the time to provide sufficient follow-up to the current round of dialogue processes.
- In the long-term, this kind of effort needs a sustainable Liberian institutional base.
- There is not always good communication to community members about what the purpose and result of the Forums are. Community members seldom mentioned the Forums in interviews, and in two communities their impression was that the Forums were “just another workshop.”<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> The current round of Forums are apparently making more specific plans for reporting back to the communities.

## **V. REFLECTIONS ON KEY QUESTIONS**

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This section addresses a series of issues raised by CHF in the Terms of Reference and/or USAID. In some cases, the comments here are quite brief, as the issue has already been addressed elsewhere.

### **The Security Dimension**

We have already commented on our perceptions regarding the current security situation in Lofa County, which we have characterized as a “fragile peace.” Local people and CHF’s implementing partners and staff all assert that old command structures, if not formally in place, still exist informally, and some armed groups are rumored to exist in Guinea.

The CDA team did explore people’s perception of security—whether they felt secure and why, whether this had changed over the past year or more and why. Generally people did feel fairly secure, and attributed this to mainly UNMIL. Many community residents mentioned that they hope that UNMIL’s peace keeping mission will be extended until an effective security system (police and military) is set up in Liberia. Residents also mentioned the formation of the new government; there is a lot of faith in the new government’s ability to really change things. As indicators of security, people pointed to the ability to travel and go to market without fear, the resurgence of economic activity, the widespread (although incomplete) return of IDPs and refugees, rebuilding of homes and other structures, and the functioning of schools.

### **Decision Making, Leadership and Democracy**

As noted earlier in this report, traditional structures and styles of leadership are reasserting themselves in Lofa County. On the other hand, there are forces of change at work, and there may be opportunities for change. CHF can build on the training programs offered through the LINCS Program by reinforcing the skills and concepts and accompanying community leaders as they try to apply them. In the Recommendation section we discuss several options for the future role of the CPCs—and several of those options would lend themselves to supporting further community leadership development.

### **Access to Justice: Civil Adjudication and Mediation Processes**

People in the communities feel alienated from the official justice system, finding it universally corrupt, slow and expensive. One interviewee said, “There is no justice.” This is one of the reasons they appreciate the CPCs, limited as they are. If the CPCs can be strengthened, they have the potential for expanding their role to a more regularized/institutionalized community mechanism for dispute resolution. Further cooperation with the ABA program is one avenue for supporting the CPCs, and other suggestions are offered in the Recommendations section.

In most communities, even where the CPCs were quite active, the traditional conflict resolution systems are functioning, especially for the more serious issues, such as land

disputes. Some issues are taken up by a quarter chief (sub-area of a town) and referred from there to the town chief, elders and paramount chief. Some people mentioned a role for the District Commissioner as well.

If that route fails, then the issue is taken to the court system, as problematic as it is. If the issue is a land dispute, the landlord (a traditional hereditary role) is seen as the final decision maker at the local level, although his decision can be appealed to the court system. We found that the town chiefs are often referring cases to the CPCs and the CPCs are either referring cases to the chief or asking for permission to handle cases. Decisions by the CPC are sometimes reviewed by the town chief and/or elders.

All of these processes use an arbitration model in which the authority (CPC, chief, etc.) hears from the parties and renders a decision, which the parties can accept or reject. Only recently has a more mediating (i.e., non-decision making) role been introduced through the ABA/CHF training program.

### **Deeper Conflict Resolution: Truth, Justice and Tolerance**

At present, the various ethnic groups harbor deep resentments, distrust, fear and even hatred, as a result of actions that the groups (or their representatives) took against each other during the war. If the recently launched national truth and reconciliation process can reach to the local level, it might have a beneficial effect. However, additional mechanisms will be needed at the local level to supplement whatever processes are undertaken nationally—and it is also important that local people be given a chance to participate (testify) at the national process.

Meanwhile, as noted, the Forums provide an opportunity to explore deeper reconciliation on a community-by-community basis. It will be important to engage in ongoing reflection on what is working and not—and document the process so that others can benefit from this experience.

### **The Role of Traditional Reconciliation Methods**

We did not uncover a lot of information about traditional methods of reconciliation. However, we did hear cynicism regarding empty ceremonies that have not been preceded by serious negotiation and reconciliation. Thus traditional rites can be (mis)used to gloss over real problems. But they have their place in long-term committed processes of conflict transformation and reconciliation.

We did find, however, that traditional culture—which is a tightly guarded secret—is an unspoken yet powerful force in the conflicts. Secret societies play a role that is only dimly understood by outsiders (including our team!) or even by local people who are not part of them. In some cases, traditional practices (visits by the “devil” for instance) seem to be used to control and intimidate minority groups. Important aspects of the conflicts in Lofa County involve such traditional practices. Therefore, local religious leaders will have to be involved in any successful reconciliation efforts.

## **Linkages between Livelihood and Conflict Resolution Processes**

While community members expressed appreciation for the LINCS livelihood programs, they have also caused some problems. In some cases, the livelihood efforts have helped CPC members who have not otherwise been compensated for their work. However, even though the livelihood projects are not at the core of the program, they have absorbed enormous amounts of time, energy, attention and resources. As far as the CDA team could tell, CHF staff have been almost exclusively focused on the livelihood projects and community center construction in recent months, and have reduced support for the CPCs in their conflict resolution role.

In addition, there is confusion in the communities (and in the CPCs) about the role of the CPCs and the Project Management Committees. In some cases community and CPC members could not distinguish the two groups. Despite written agreements (contracts) for the livelihood projects, community members appeared quite confused about who would benefit and in what proportion from the projects.

## **VI. RECOMMENDATIONS**

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The full CDA team met in Monrovia to develop an initial set of recommendations—which were then presented and discussed with the CHF Country Director. The recommendations below are only slightly different in substance and include explanatory text not included with the originals presented in Monrovia.

The first section of recommendations addresses the overall CHF program. We are assuming that conflict resolution and peacebuilding will remain at least one major program focus. Conditions in Lofa County certainly support a continuing emphasis on reconciliation and peacebuilding. Subsequent sections address the two major peacebuilding efforts.

### **General Program Recommendations**

1. Adopt narrower goals/objectives, expected results and indicators.

The LINCS Program goals and objectives were extremely broad, making it difficult to determine the extent to which the program was achieving the outcomes desired. Future program efforts would benefit from tighter goals and objectives aimed at accomplishing a few key things well. It also should prove possible to articulate more specific indicators for such objectives. As one step in program planning, it would also be important to make the program's Theories of Change explicit and to test whether they are valid in the situation.

2. Develop a stronger long-term plan, with associated staffing and structure of CHF programs.

The LINCS Program was undertaken during a transition period, when swift action was warranted. Future programming can and should take a longer view, and build on the areas of considerable success of the program so far. Staff should be recruited and trained with the expectation that they will be retained for an extended period, and their skills should be keyed to the specific program goals. In particular, greater staff diversity (reflecting the ethnic makeup of Lofa County)<sup>23</sup> and more emphasis on conflict resolution skills would strengthen the program.

3. Create better communication and cooperation among CHF program components—less compartmentalization.

The CDA team found that CHF team members were not always aware of what other program elements were doing or why. The Forum program does not build on the CPCs directly. The livelihood staff are not fully informed about the Forum effort, and do not seem interested in further development of the CPCs.

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<sup>23</sup> However, CHF cannot assume that simply by hiring from all ethnic groups that they will benefit inter-group relations. CHF can model fairness and equality in their manner of working—and avoid mirroring current social inequalities in society.

CHF should ensure that all staff understand the overall program and how CHF intends to achieve them, in their own area and other areas. Although the CDA team may have visited the field at a particularly hectic time (many CHF staff were preoccupied with completing certain tasks before specific deadlines), the interviews with staff indicated that some were not fully aware of how the overall program fit together—how the CPCs, livelihood projects and Forums are related. The overall program would be strengthened by a greater sense of team, in which everyone knows their own role, the functions performed by other units, and how it all fits together.

4. Develop closer cooperative working relations with other NGOs working on similar/allied issues in Lofa County.

Whether it is deserved or not, CHF is perceived by other NGOs and UN staff working in Lofa County as going it alone. CHF has made efforts in the past to cooperate more fully, but currently the program would benefit from closer ties, especially with those groups that have related programs. We are not suggesting coordination for its own sake, but rather carefully determining where linked efforts will enhance effectiveness.

5. Provide for explicit follow up to training in concepts and skills: tracking of indicators that the training is being used; coaching in skills application support for desired changed behaviors, etc.

CHF/LINCS and its implementing partners have invested considerable time and energy providing training to the CPCs and other leaders in Lofa County. However, in most cases there is no follow up to support training participants in the application of the skills and concepts presented in workshops. Received wisdom in the professional training field indicates that a high percentage of training is wasted when there is no system for supporting and coaching trainees. CHF should adopt a strategy for reviewing and reinforcing the skills and concepts already introduced, and for accompanying people who are trying to use them, in order to mentor/coach in a way that will improve decision making and conflict resolution efforts.

6. Establish a more robust M&E plan, including baseline data, specific indicators, a tracking and reporting system.

In 2004, it was difficult to collect baseline information in Lofa County. The situation is much more stable at present, and a full monitoring and evaluation plan can be implemented, including specification of indicators that will be tracked. Those indicators will be most useful if baseline information can be collected on them.

The CDA team also came away with the impression that CHF field staff are not sure why they are collecting information about what the CPCs are doing—and how this might inform their own work. Rather, the information is fed upward in the organization for inclusion in quarterly reports. It also appears that the information-gathering process has deteriorated during recent months, as the priority was placed on completing certain deliverables. CHF should develop a system for collecting and analyzing data from its

programs, and use the results as feedback to the program that also informs mid-course changes.

## **Community Peace Councils**

Section IV above on Essential Findings summarized the strengths and weaknesses of the CPC program element—which already raised questions about possible future directions.

The CPC program has made a significant contribution during the past two years—and the program was appropriate for that transition period. The situation has changed considerably. Therefore, CHF needs to rethink the structures and approaches for this program component, even if this is only one of several different major program elements. The CDA team recommends that CHF perform a fundamental program redesign, building on the best elements of the past two years, and preparing for follow-up efforts.

We don't have a clear recommendation regarding the exact direction the program should take, but we do see a range of possible options to be considered.

Consider the following ***OPTIONS*** for the CPCs: *(not all mutually exclusive)*

1. ***Phase them out.*** Consider that the CPCs were a good mechanism for a transitional time, but that continued effort is not appropriate.
2. ***Transition them into development committees.*** As CHF undertakes other more development-oriented activities, build on the relationships established through the CPCs as the base for that work, but discontinue their conflict resolution role.
3. ***Wait and see.*** Merge with traditional mechanisms for dispute resolution. Watch what happens with the new government in relation to base level justice. Explore a role for the CPCs in terms of decision making and local level dispute resolution, if appropriate.
4. ***Explore a role in relation to the TRC process.*** The CPCs could play a role in identifying local people to testify, and to participate in County-level activities. CHF could facilitate such participation with transport and other support. The CPCs might also play a role (with others) in local-level truth and reconciliation activities.
5. ***Conduct a participatory process to determine the future shape, function, etc.*** Let the communities themselves decide the future of the CPCs. This might lead to a phasing out (#1 above), serious investment (#6) or some combination.
6. ***Make a serious investment in full development of the CPC model.*** Figure out how to transform the present structures into a sustainable community-level mechanism that is fully owned by the communities and performs a needed dispute resolution function.

Numbers 1 - 5 above are fairly self evident. Number 6 requires a bit more explanation—and some further specific recommendations.

## **Redevelopment & Strengthening of the CPCs**

Throughout the report, we have indicated ways in which the CPCs have contributed, and some ways in which they miss the mark. We believe that the CPCs show potential for playing a more important role, but to realize that potential will require revision of the concept and further investment in the people and necessary structures.

### **a. Clarify the model and functions.**

Make a basic choice regarding the appropriate model and function of the CPCs for the future and secure buy-in from other authorities (town chiefs, Superintendent, district authorities, appropriate national ministries, etc.)

There are many variants on the community peace council model, each implying different roles and functions, membership, relation to other authorities and structures (such as the justice system). Some of these variations are discussed more fully (yet still briefly) in Appendix C, including inter-ethnic councils, community mediation panels, a land dispute resolution mechanism, and community councils.

Depending on which model/function is chosen, the CPCs might have quite different membership, training needs, etc. For instance, the inter-ethnic council model would imply equal membership by ethnic group, and the role of the group would be to monitor relationships among the tribal groups, calling joint meetings for problem solving as needed.<sup>24</sup> This is quite different from the violence-prevention function of the community council, which keeps alert to rumors of impending violence, and uses a council widely representative of women, men, elders, youth, police, and local government to initiate early intervention. Still another model, a local land dispute resolution group, requires more technical knowledge, and works closely with a land commission or ministry. Of course, these models are not mutually exclusive, and many different combinations and variations could be devised.

If CHF is moving forward with the CPCs (whether called by that name or another), this fundamental choice of model and function must be made. Who should be consulted and/or decide that model/function is an important question. Local authorities (County Superintendent), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Justice, and people in the communities themselves are some of the groups that might be consulted. If time, energy and resources are going to be invested in a future function, it will be important to develop wide agreement that the groups should exist and what they are expected to do.

### **b. Recharter the CPCs.**

Clarify the roles and functions of the CPC through participatory development of a simple charter (composition, functions, types of cases in/out, operating principles...).

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<sup>24</sup> Inter-ethnic councils can be structured or composed in many ways. Generally, though, efforts usually try to equalize membership, rather than reflect the proportions in society. Otherwise, minority groups remain minorities, even in an entity designed to improve relationships. If the dynamics of dominance are carried into such a group, it is less likely to succeed in promoting better interactions.

As we have noted previously, there is a lot of confusion, even among CPC members themselves, about what the functions of the CPCs are. If the CPCs are to continue, one way to clarify their role would be to convene a representative group of CPC members who would, first, discuss the ways the CPCs have functioned best, and second, outline the future functions for the councils. The same group could also discuss a “charter” that would define membership, means of election, criteria for membership (issues of diversity of gender, age, ethnicity, etc.), the types of cases the CPCs would be empowered to handle, relationship to other authorities, and so forth.<sup>25</sup> The charter could also lay out the principles and ethics for the functioning of the CPCs, such as impartiality and confidentiality. [Note: Suggestion b) could be done without a). Or b) could be undertaken after a), in order to determine more detailed parameters within the basic model chosen.]

**c. Restructure and “re-elect” the councils.**

Since most of the CPCs were formed in 2004 or early 2005, they were selected by the communities members who were present at that time—and many more have returned since. It is widely acknowledged, including by CHF, that the groups need to be reconstituted, if only to gain the credibility of being elected by the current community members.<sup>26</sup>

If the groups are going to be reconstituted, consistent procedures for election/selection should be clearly laid out, possibly using a process designed by local people as suggested in b) above. New selection should await the redefinition of the role, since that should guide choices of community members to serve.

**d. Complete the mediation training.**

The ABA mediation training model (which CHF helped develop) would be appropriate and useful under most of the models and functions discussed. The training might need to be further adapted somewhat, depending on the functions of the redefined CPCs. It should be noted that, in the view of CHF staff, the CPCs are currently using basically an arbitration model consistent with traditional practice in the area. That is, the CPC members hear from the parties and offer a solution—which the parties can accept or not. In some cases, the “decision” is referred to the town chief or elders for approval or enforcement. So far, then the CPCs do not provide a different kind of procedure, rather they are more immediately available and cheaper than going to the town chief or magistrate.

[CHF has an ambitious schedule of training planned for the next four-five months, training hundreds of people. This should be slowed down, awaiting a firm decision about the future role and function of the CPCs. If the CPCs are also reconstituted through a new election/selection, the new members will have to be trained as well—again arguing for slowing the training process down.]

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<sup>25</sup> As many community members are illiterate, strategies would be needed to cope with that reality.

<sup>26</sup> The CDA team also found that the process for designating the current CPCs varied widely. In some communities, they were selected by the elders and town chief, after discussion in a community meeting. Formal voting election seems to have been the exception, rather than the rule.

**e. Follow up training with direct coaching and mentoring.**

Experience shows that training in new personal skills is usually ineffective unless a) participants have an immediate opportunity to apply the skills with support to do so; and b) benefit from coaching/mentoring from a person more skilled than they are. If the CPCs are expected to function truly as mediators, the mediation training will not be enough. This has been proven over and over in the U.S. context and elsewhere—and there is no reason to believe that the situation in Liberia is different.<sup>27</sup> In addition, the mediation model included in the ABA/CHF training contradicts the traditional modes of conflict resolution in Liberia, emphasizing a neutral/impartial mediator and a confidential process. (Indeed this model, widely used in the U.S., is also a challenge for most Americans!) If we really expect Liberians to apply this model of mediation, coaching is required. If so, then that may be an argument for reducing the total numbers of mediators (CPC members...) in order to focus on quality, rather than quantity.

**f. Establish a better tracking and monitoring mechanisms**

The program would benefit from better information regarding how and where CPC's exactly resolve disputes, settlement rates, methods used, adaptation of models/methods, learning and feedback.

So far as the CDA team could tell, CHF staff members do not observe the CPCs when they actually attempt to resolve local conflicts.<sup>28</sup> Therefore, there is a gap in understanding how they are functioning, what methods they are using, whether concepts and skills introduced in training are applied, and so forth. Several of the recommendations above suggest that CHF needs staff in the field who have skills in conflict resolution (mediation, negotiation, reconciliation) and are prepared to work more directly and consistently with the CPCs, monitor their progress, and keep consistent records.

**g. Solve the compensation issue**

CPC members mentioned the lack of compensation in almost every conversation with the CDA team. This is a huge issue for the sustainability of this community institution. Clearly a first step will be to gain greater community ownership of a dispute resolution (or other) function that they truly value. With that community ownership, it may be possible to devise a system of in-kind payment to CPC members, through community labor donated to their farming or other mechanisms. This is an issue for many NGOs all over Liberia—and would benefit from coordination, at least within Lofa County, as the strategies of one NGO will affect the others.

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<sup>27</sup> The main author of this report, Peter Woodrow, was a mediation trainer in the U.S. and in various international locations for more than ten years, and speaks from personal experience.

<sup>28</sup> Apparently one CHF staff person was previously placed in the field and worked more closely with the CPCs. That staff person now works from Monrovia and has little opportunity to monitor CPCs functions or to support them.

**h. Seriously reduce the number of members.**

As already noted, it may prove helpful to reduce the total number of CPC members—to focus on quality, allow for coaching/mentoring, reduce the compensation burden, and, under some models, equalize the participation from different ethnic groups. Of course, the number of members should be driven by the function(s) of the councils. In line with g. above, if there were fewer members, it would be possible to increase a focus on developing greater professionalism. Another strategy would be to concentrate on high priority communities (perhaps the flashpoint ones) or those CPCs/individuals that are most effective.

**i. Develop (with ABA?) a resource center in Lofa County** that offers resources, support, technical assistance.

Depending on the model/function, it may prove effective to establish a resource center in Lofa County that provides ongoing support and technical assistance to the councils. Ideally, such a center would be established under an appropriate government body, in order to gain at least some assurance of sustainability.

**j. Reduce the number of CPCs by developing town clusters**

Another idea for reducing the burden of support, training and skill development would be to reduce the number of CPCs by establishing CPCs with fewer members that serve several neighboring communities.

**County and National Forums**

By our assessment, already laid out earlier in this report, the Forum effort shows great promise, and the potential for having a profound effect on inter-ethnic relations in Lofa County. The suggestions below are intended to indicate how the program could be strengthened further.

**1. Devote more staff resources: reduce dependence/burden on one person.<sup>29</sup>**

The Forums are an important and sensitive initiative. They are also a high gain and high risk venture. If they fail, for whatever reason, the effects could be widespread, souring efforts to bring contending groups together elsewhere in Lofa County and Liberia. We recommend, therefore, a deliberate pace with sufficient staff resources and time. Quality is much more important in this effort than quantity. Any success at resolving issues between ethnic groups in one community will have an effect on others nearby. Therefore it is more important to move slowly and steadily, taking on only the number of communities that can be responsibly engaged with the staff resources available. While the CDA staff were there, the two staff people working on this were functioning at their limit—and doing well. But they acknowledged that they were barely able to maintain the pace required to meet contract deliverables.

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<sup>29</sup> This recommendation, reported informally while the CDA team was still in Liberia, has been implemented already, and there are now three staff working full time on the Forums effort.

## **2. Clarify/tighten the goals and objectives of the program.**

The staff people working on this program are the most senior and most skilled at CHF, and by all reports they know what they are doing. (The CDA team did not have an opportunity to observe them at work.) We recommend that the program develop quite specific objectives for each community, based on the situation there and the potential for success. It should also be possible to identify several indicators that can be tracked for each community, in observable behavioral terms. Examples: follow-up contacts between groups on their own initiatives; agreements implemented; new problems identified and addressed independently; changes in housing/land use patterns (better mixing, more permission to return to farming, etc.).

## **3. Ensure that any agreements reached include a specific implementation plan. Develop the staff capacity to provide follow up.**

So far, agreements appear to be stated in terms of broad principles, with few specifics and no implementation plans (who will do what, when, how, with what resources, etc.). If such detailed implementation plans are negotiated and agreed, there will be increased need for CHF staff to follow up to see if the plans are carried out. Additional negotiation regarding implementation may also be required.

## **4. Find an appropriate long-term institutional base for this kind of effort, and cooperate in development of that mechanism. (Options: university, government agency, combo, free-standing reconciliation NGO, sub-group of TRC...)**

In the long term, Liberia needs the institutional capacity to undertake reconciliation at the community-level (and at other levels!), including negotiation of practical issues. CHF can be working with other groups to help develop that capacity, whether it is based in a government department or at a university or straddling the two, or another model.<sup>30</sup>

## **5. Draw on expertise/experience regarding this type of dialogue and negotiation process held by other people/organizations in Liberia. Be sure to learn from past failures and successes. Develop capacity to share lessons learned in Lofa County.**

Several people interviewed in Monrovia noted that this is not the first effort at community-level dialogue, reconciliation and negotiation in Liberia. There have been notable failures and some successes in the past—from which the CHF-led effort can learn.<sup>31</sup> At the same time, CHF should increase its ability to document, analyze and share what it is learning.

## **6. Engage Forum participants in a process to determine future directions.**

In July, CHF was completing one round of community Forums. Participants in those activities should be consulted/interviewed to determine their level of satisfaction with the process, to hear any ongoing concerns about the process, and to obtain suggestions for next steps, in relation to their particular community or for the Forum project in general.

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<sup>30</sup> UNMIL is concerned with developing this capacity and Interpeace (formerly the War-Torn Societies Project) is in the process of developing a new community dialogue effort in Liberia.

<sup>31</sup> The CDA team did not research such past efforts. CHF could start by talking with Sam Doe (formerly with WANEP) and its partners at LISTALS for references.

**7. Complete a thorough review/assessment/stocktaking at completion of the current round of Forums, using an outside independent evaluator.**

Related to number #6 above, we recommend that CHF hire a local person or team to undertake a more thorough review of the Forum program to provide specific and detailed feedback before CHF staff launch the next round of dialogues. That feedback should be the basis for a thorough internal discussion at CHF to determine how to revise the program approach to better achieve its ambitious objectives.

**8. Participate in Lofa County meetings in Monrovia** for background information about what opinion leaders and others are thinking about.

The CDA team became aware that there is a regular set of meeting of Lofa County-related people in Monrovia, most likely attended by many of the influential persons that CHF wants to engage in the dialogues. As possible and appropriate, CHF could attend these meetings to gain additional perspectives on events in Lofa County.

**9. Explore the potential roles for religious/ spiritual leaders in the Forums.**

As noted, religious leaders are an important set of stakeholders in any dialogue about community and inter-ethnic issues in Lofa County. As far as possible, they should be included in any negotiations, as they would likely invalidate any agreements touching on religious matters that did not involve them.

**10. Bring issues to closure:** don't open issues and then leave. Consider these deeper reconciliation efforts as a long-term commitment.

Related to #1 above, it is more important to bring a few things to real closure, than to address too many issues. And, if there is any question regarding future funding for the Forums component of the program, CHF should immediately scale back to what they can accomplish responsibly and fully within available resources.

**Conclusion**

The LINCS Program represents an admirable contribution to peacebuilding in Liberia. Most of the programs effects remain at the community and Lofa County level, and there is a mixed picture regarding the program's achievements against its stated objectives. However, the current progress and potential impacts from this effort have significance for the entire country, as Lofa County is well known as one of the most volatile areas that suffered most deeply during the war. Few other organizations are attempting community-by-community reconciliation in Liberia—and for this reason alone, the LINCS Program represents a valuable initiative. While we have made recommendations for program strengthening during the next phases of CHF programming, overall, we were impressed with the accomplishments to date and the dedication of local and international staff members.

## **APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL**

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Interviews took place along several dimensions of change that are important to peacebuilding, including: 1) sense of community security; 2) conflict resolution and management; 3) community decision-making and leadership; 4) inter-ethnic relations.

Within these lines of inquiry, we developed illustrative questions that address the six RPP Criteria of Effectiveness, among other things. These questions did not constitute a questionnaire or survey, but represented directions a conversation could take.

### **1. Sense of Community Security**

#### **LINCS issues and goals relevant to this area:**

- Improving local security
- Accelerate flow of information on national peace process
- Increase quantity, quality and timely delivery of communication on issues affecting national to local peacebuilding processes
- Prepare communities and leadership for potential outbreaks of conflict and deal with the after effects of violent acts
- Build local capacity for reconciliation of all returnees.
- Assist democratic leadership to build skills and confidence in effectively managing community security and in reducing the impact of conflict.
- Addressing substance abuse and violent behavior in ex-combatants

#### **Potential questions:**

- How secure do feel now in your community? Why/why not? What does security mean for you? What are the indicators of security?
- Has security changed in the past two or more years? How?
- Have people mostly returned to your community or not? If so, why? If not, why not? Percentage of people returned? IDPs/refugees? Have community leaders and chiefs also returned?
- Are community institutions functioning?
- Are some of your family members living elsewhere? What is the family coping strategy?
- What would make you feel more secure here in your community?
- How do questions of reconstruction and economic well-being affect the security situation?

### **2. Conflict Resolution and Management**

#### **LINCS issues and goals relevant to this area:**

- Provide technical and organizational support to the community councils and other legitimate peace constituencies on a range of challenges to peace such as: facilitating fairer and more peaceful adjudication of claims; and creating and improving reconciliation mechanisms;
- Build and/or support local and county capacity for ongoing conflict mitigation, adjudication and peace building activities;

- Build the effectiveness of traditional and culturally appropriate mechanisms for reconciliation.
- Facilitate peaceful resolution of property and resource claims, war crimes;
- Build Lofa-based peace constituencies' ability to affect national decisions on resource allocation, management of extractive resources;
- Build number and quality of psycho-social assistance mechanisms in Lofa.

**Potential questions:**

- What kinds of disputes/problems among people typically arise in your community? Have the kinds of issues changed since the war?
- In the past, how were such disputes in the community handled? Did that process work well, or were there ever problems with it?
- Are those traditional dispute resolution processes still available and functioning? Do people still use that process? Why/why not?
- Are you aware of any new mechanisms for resolving conflicts? How does that work? Are people using that way of handling problems? Is it working well—or are there problems with it?
- [If they don't mention the CPC] Do you know about the CPC and how it works? What have you heard about it?
- What kinds of conflicts has the CPC been working on? Have they been effective? Why/why not?
- Who has access to the CPC? Does everyone use it? Why/why not?
- Are there any other kinds of issues that are not handled adequately in the community—and how should they be addressed?
- What is the relationship of the CPCs to the traditional ways of handling disputes?
- Will the CPC likely continue or not?

### 3. Community Decision-making and Leadership

**LINCS issues and goals relevant to this area:**

- Build effectiveness of peace constituencies through targeted support for:
  - Improving vertical linkages with, among others: UNMIL (security support), and national peace constituencies (engaging in national policy issues on resource extraction and the composition and responsiveness of security forces).
  - Improving horizontal linkages to like-minded Lofa County groups seeking to improve collaboration on approaches to reconciliation, security, and advocacy on key national issues.
  - Increase the effectiveness of peace-building constituencies at the local, district, and county level
  - Strengthen democratic civil leadership with a stake in peace
  - Build capacity for local organizations to advocate for responsive national policies that contribute to peace. Provide logistical support for advocacy and collaboration.
  - Assist community leadership groups to build inclusive and transparent management.

- Build Lofa-based peace constituencies' ability to affect national decisions on composure and civil leadership of reconstituted military and/or police.

**Potential questions:**

- How are decisions made in the community? Who takes part?
- Do you feel that you have a say in decisions that are made?
- Has community decision making changed since before the war? If so, how?
- Are there processes that seek input from community members regarding decisions for the whole community? How do those work? Who is involved or not involved?
- Have there been any recent changes in the ways that people participate in decision making. Are these improvements or not?
- Have the CPCs played a role in helping make decisions? What is your view of that?
- Who is taking leadership in the community for peace and reconciliation? What are they doing?
- Is your community able to (1) identify and define problems and (2) formulate and apply solutions to those problems? Is this working better or worse than before the war? Why?
- How do you get information about what is happening outside of your village?

**4. Intergroup/Inter-ethnic Relations**

**LINCS issues and goals relevant to this area:**

- Encourage civil society links across ethnic and tribal lines and build multi-ethnic organizations
- Promote dialogues and collaboration among contentious ethnic groups.

**Potential questions:**

- Are different groups in the community getting along, or are there serious tensions? Are the inter-group tensions increasing or decreasing? Why/why not?
- What kinds of disputes arise between different groups in the community? What are the usual issues?
- How are those issues between groups (as opposed to issues between individuals or families) handled? Who gets involved? How does it work out?
- Who is involved with the CPC in your community? Does this represent all of the "quarters"?
- How were the CPC members chosen? What is your view of participation from all quarters?
- Have CPCs tried to address issues or tensions among different groups in the community? How has this worked out?

## **APPENDIX B: LIST OF COMMUNITIES AND INTERVIEWS**

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### *Participating Communities (estimated # of people in parenthesis)*

#### Zorzor

1. Zorzor Town (20)
2. Borkeza (35)
3. Konia (15)
4. Boi (30)
5. Ziggida (20)
6. Nekebouzo (15)

#### Salayea

7. Salayea Town (15)
8. Telemai (15)
9. Gorlu (20)

#### Voinjama

10. Malamai (15)
11. Selegai (20)
12. Velezala (12)
13. Zawordemai (40)

### *Non-Participating Communities*

14. Bulor (Voinjama district) (12)
15. Boiboimai (Voinjama district) (20)
16. Kalimai (Zorzor district) (25)
17. Gpayaquelleh (Salayea district) (30)

### *Other Interviews*

#### Monrovia

- Brett Massey CHF Country Director ( 2 interviews)
- Albert Collee, CHF Mediation Training Specialist
- Guessippina Bonner, American Bar Association
- Tom Ewertt, Mercy Corps
- Prof. Joseph W. Geebro, Ministry of Internal Affairs – Deputy Minister
- Sharon Pauling, USAID Liberia Mission Office
- Mike Curry, LCIP
- Erin McCandless, Jonathan Andrews, UNMIL
- Forum participant from Mkapamai
- Implementing Partners:
  - NEPI: Zeleh Kolubah
  - LISTALS: Sam Hare, Jesse Karanley, Kemoh Sharif
  - FHORD: John Jallah and Thompson Keyta

#### Zorzor

- UNPOL Zorzor
- LWS: Mr. Howard LWS
- Concern
- CHF Staff:
  - Momo Kamara
  - Phillip Zoryu
  - Peter and Manyou
  - Swengbe

#### Salayea

- District Development Committee coordinator

#### Voinjama

- LRRRC
- Legal/Judicial Watch UNMIL
- IRC Field Coordinator
- IRC, Gender Based Violence Manager
- Mandingo Chief
- Magistrate
- CHF Staff: CPOs and Field Director

## **APPENDIX C: MODELS OF COMMUNITY DISPUTE RESOLUTION**

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The following are thumbnail sketches of four quite different models of community-based dispute resolution mechanisms. Each model was developed in response to different conditions and problems, and was also adapted to local cultures. The documents noted (with the exception of the video) are provided in a separate volume for use by CHF.

### **Rumor Control/Early Intervention (Wajir, Kenya)**

The Peace and Development Committee in Wajir, northeastern Kenya was initiated by local women who were tired of burying their sons as a result of inter-group fighting, often associated with cattle rustling or other illegal activities. Some of the incidents leading to deaths were caused by rumors that had no basis in the facts. The group of local women initiated dialogue with groups of youth, and with elders, local government authorities and the police. The result was the establishment of the Peace and Development Committee, which operated across a series of towns in the area, and included representatives of youth, women, elders, government administration and police. The group was trained in dispute resolution techniques, including early intervention, and was prepared to respond immediately to any hints or rumors of impending violence.

#### **Documents:**

- “Kenyan Peace Initiatives: Kenya Peace and Development Network, the Wajir Peace and Development Committee, the National Council of Churches of Kenya and the Amani People’s Theatre.” Janice Jenner & Dekha Ibrahim Abdi, RPP Case Study, 2000.
- “Kenyan Women Lead Peace Effort,” Emma Dorothy Reinhardt, *National Catholic Reporter*, April 26, 2002
- “The Wajir Story” Video documentary. Responding to Conflict, Birmingham, UK and Coalition for Peace in Africa, 2002.

### **Inter-ethnic Councils (southern Bulgaria)**

The inter-ethnic councils were established in southern Bulgaria, as a way to avoid the inter-ethnic bloodshed witnessed in neighboring former Yugoslavia. The council idea was developed through a series of participatory workshops that included representatives from the three key ethnic groups, Bulgarians, Turks and Roma (gypsies). The council concept was written up as a formal charter, which was then presented and approved through a vote of the town council in five communities. Each inter-ethnic council had an equal number of representatives of each ethnic group, all of them respected members of their communities. The council served as a place a) to build closer relationships and communication between key community leaders, and b) to identify and solve problems of common concern.

#### **Documents:**

- “Accommodating Diversity, Promoting Cooperation and Managing Ethnic Conflict in Central Europe: Final Report.” Submitted to the Pew Charitable Trusts, by CDR Associates, November 1995
- Project to Institutionalize Multiethnic Participation and Democratic Decision Making in Bulgaria: Final report.” Submitted to the Pew Charitable Trusts, by CDR Associates, November 1998

## **Land Dispute System (East Timor)**

As the Indonesian occupation East Timor ended, many of the records of deeds were deliberately destroyed, resulting in widespread chaos regarding land ownership, particularly in urban areas. In some cases, there were competing records (privately held) from Portuguese colonial authorities and from the Indonesian administration. In rural areas, most land was held in common and had no formal written title. Many people were displaced (IDPs and refugees) in the fighting during the long occupation and most intensely in the period leading up to independence. Due to these long absences, people appropriated property, occupied dwellings and farmed land to which they had no legal claim. As a result of all of these factors, there were many land claims in both urban and rural areas—and no functioning judicial system to deal with them.

The Land and Property Directorate (of the Ministry of Justice) was charged by the new government to establish a way to resolve the many land claims, recognizing that it would be many years before a newly reestablished judicial system could deal with them. The Directorate set up a mediation program. In urban areas, Directorate staff trained as mediators worked directly on cases. In rural areas the trained staff mediators worked closely with the traditional land authorities to mediate disputes together. Disputants were given choices of how they wanted a dispute mediated—and could revert to the courts if needed.

### **Documents:**

- “Designing Dispute Resolution Systems and Building Local Capacities for Settling Land and Property Disputes in Post-Conflict and Post-Crisis Societies.” Christopher Moore, Gary Brown, CDR Associates, 2006.
- Land and Property Directorate (LPD) Dispute Resolution System (Graphic), CDR Associates, 2003
- “Custom and Conflict: The uses and limitations of traditional systems in addressing rural land disputes in East Timor.” (A discussion paper prepared for a regional workshop on “Land Policy and Administration for Pro-Poor Rural Growth”, Dili, December 2003.) Laura S. Meitzner Yoder, with research assistance from Calisto Colo, Zacarias F. da Costa, and Francisco Soares. 2003
- “Report on Research Finding and Policy Recommendations for a Legal Framework for Land Dispute Mediation.” Timor Leste Land Law Program. 2004

## **Community Mediation Panels (Sri Lanka)**

In Sri Lanka by the late 1980s, it would take at least five years for a civil claim to be heard in a court of law. Recognizing the enormous backlog of cases, the Ministry of Justice sought an alternative way to handle at least some matters. With technical support from the Asia Foundation, they established a network of Community Mediation Panels throughout government-controlled areas of the country. There are now 273 mediation boards and 5,860 mediators.

The mediation panels are comprised of respected local people—people like school teachers, Buddhist monks, and local landowners. The panels work as a team (usually three people) and hear cases on a designated day in a public space. The parties are instructed to appear on the appointed day and, when their case is called, present their issue to the mediation panel—often with their families and neighbors in attendance. The panel then

asks questions of the parties or of anyone else who may be present, probes for possible solutions, confers among themselves and, using a fair amount of persuasion, moves the parties to resolution, if at all possible. If the parties reject the proposed settlement, the case can be appealed to the court system.

Note: this model is quite different from the “pure” mediation model used in most US-based mediation programs. The mediators (plural, rather than singular) are well known to the parties (rather than unknown/neutral); the process is quite public (as opposed to confidential); the mediators are free to question anyone they like (rather than only the parties or their legal representatives); the panel usually offers a proposed solution and will exercise their moral authority to try to persuade acceptance (as opposed to a purely facilitative mediation model). These elements are appropriate to the Sri Lankan context and work well there.

**Documents:**

- Mediation Boards Act, No. 72 of 1988, Government of Sri Lanka, Ministry of Justice.
- “Designing Dispute Resolution Systems and Building Local Capacities for Settling Land and Property Disputes in Post-Conflict and Post-Crisis Societies.” Christopher Moore, Gary Brown, CDR Associates, 2006.
- [Additional reports to Asia Foundation may be available if needed.]

**Appendix F - CHF Closeout Report**



International

Building a Better World

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**Locally Initiated Networks for  
Community Strengthening (LINCS)**

Award No. 669-A-00-04-00009-00

**Summary Close-Out Plan**

**December 2006**

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# 1 Executive Summary

## 1.1 Overview

This document constitutes the Summary Close-Out Plan submitted by CHF to USAID for the Locally Initiated Networks for Community Strengthening program (LINCS).<sup>1</sup> The official final program report for the LINCS program shall be submitted by CHF International to USAID as agreed upon in the cooperative agreement, within 90 calendar days following the date of completion of the award.

On April 30, 2004, USAID awarded a grant to CHF International LINCS program to support the building and strengthening of peace constituencies at the community and district level in Voinjama, Zorzor, and Salayea districts of Lofa county, Republic of Liberia. The initial award has been modified several times, with total funding for the program being \$3,295,061 of which USAID support amounts to \$3,076,061. The contribution of CHF and its partner communities is \$219,000. The LINCS program was to be managed and implemented by CHF in partnership with the communities as well as selected local non-governmental organizations.

Program activities focus on strengthening and expanding constituencies for peace, mitigating conflict and violence, and addressing root causes and consequences of conflicts. LINCS effectively started on May 3, 2004 and was originally scheduled to end on May 2, 2005; however, a 90-day no-cost extension was granted followed by a one-year Modification of Assistance, extending the program until August 2, 2006 (LINCS II). Again in August, 2006, CHF was granted an additional Modification of Assistance extending LINCS until December 31, 2006 (LINCS II Extension).

LINCS was designed to respond to the following Objectives of the Next Steps in Peace Program (NSPP).

### **Strengthen and expand constituencies for peace**

- Increase the effectiveness of peace-building constituencies at the local, district and county level.
- Strengthen democratic civil leadership with a vested interest in peace.
- Increase quantity, quality and timely delivery of communication on issues affecting national to local peace building processes.
- Build capacity for local organizations to advocate for responsive national policies that contribute to peace.
- Provide logistical support for advocacy and collaboration.
- Assist community leadership groups to build inclusive and transparent management.

### **Mitigating Conflict and Violence**

- Build and/or support local and county capacity for ongoing conflict mitigation, adjudication and peace building activities.
- Prepare communities and leadership for potential outbreaks of conflict and deal with the after effects of violent acts.
- Promote dialogues and collaboration among contentious ethnic groups.
- Build local capacity for reconciliation of all returnees.
- Assist democratic leadership to build skills and confidence in effectively managing community security and in reducing the impact of conflict.
- Build the effectiveness of traditional and culturally appropriate mechanisms for reconciliation.

### **Address Causes and Consequences of Conflict**

- Facilitate peaceful resolution of property and resource claims, perceived war crimes.

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<sup>1</sup> Cooperative Agreement No. 669-A-00-04-00009-00

- Build Lofa-based peace constituencies' ability to affect national decisions on resource allocation, management of extractive resources.
- Build Lofa-based peace constituencies' ability to affect national decisions on composure and civil leadership of reconstituted military and/or police.
- Build number and quality of psycho-social assistance mechanisms in Lofa.

### **Expected Results**

- Reduced violence in Lofa County;
- Peaceful return of internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, and ex-combatants;
- Facilitation of reconciliation between ex-combatants and their families;
- Facilitation of reconciliation between ex-combatants and their 'host' communities;
- Development of Community Councils which can support reintegration, act to resolve disputes and adjudicate perceived crimes, and mobilize the community to work towards peace;
- Community Councils trained and active in sensitizing the community to addressing the special issues regarding returned ex-combatants;
- Increased participation by all community members in community decision making;
- Increased peaceful interaction among diverse, sometimes contentious groups within the community;
- Increased effectiveness and organization of district and county peace constituencies; and
- Creation of a mechanism to facilitate communication between Community Councils and other leaders with UNMIL, UNCIVPOL as well as the Government of Liberia's new security forces. On December 31, 2006 the LINCS program will come to completion, as specified in the cooperative agreement, and all program activities outside of reporting will have ceased. CHF has requested a No Cost Extension for the period of 1 January – 31 January 2007 in order to implement this close out plan and to conduct the end of program audit.

## 1.2 Finances and Disposition of Property

December 31, 2006 will be the award end date.

Upon completion of the LINCS program on December 31, 2006 will account for real and personal property in accordance with the requirements of sections 226.31 through 226.37

### **1.2.1 Supplies**

Upon completion of the LINCS program on December 31, 2006 there will be a minimal inventory of unused supplies in the nature of generator fuel, vehicle fuel and stationery, the same being only the quantity required for use during the close out period.

### **1.2.2 Other Expendable Equipment**

Upon completion of the LINCS program on December 31, 2006 there will be no residual inventory of unused other expendable equipment.

### **1.2.3 Personal property**

A program impact assessment was carried out by CDA Collaborative Learning Projects. The report arising from the assessment has since been submitted to USAID.

In accordance with the requirements of CFR section 226.36, any and all proprietary rights to the CDA study shall vest with USAID

### **1.2.4 Non- Expendable Equipment over \$5,000**

VEHICLES

Upon completion of the LINCS program on December 31, 2006 the following equipment will be used by CHF in connection with its future USAID and other federally funded activities in Liberia in accordance with CFR Sub-section 226.34 (c):

- Vehicle – Toyota Land Cruiser Hard Top Jeep, Engine No. 1HZ-0470681; Serial number JTERB71J10-0025003; acquisition date February 2005; original cost \$38,840; estimated current cost: \$13,250.
- Vehicle – Toyota Land Cruiser Hard Top Jeep, Engine No. 1HZ-0470800; Serial number JTERB71JX0-0025003; acquisition date February 2005; original cost \$38,840; estimated current cost: \$13,250.
- Vehicle – Ford Ranger Double Cab Pick up, Engine No. W9AT 157 466; Serial number MNCBSFE805W464628; acquisition date October 2005; original cost \$25,060; estimated current cost: \$15,200.
- Vehicle – Ford Ranger Double Cab Pick up, Engine No. W9AT 157 419; Serial number MNCBSFE805W464872; acquisition date October 2005; original cost \$25,060; estimated current cost: \$15,200.
- Vehicle – Isuzu Double Cab Pick up, Serial No. JAATFS54H37101057; acquisition date June 2004; original cost \$22,000; estimated current cost: \$4,449.

The following vehicle which was destroyed in an accident will be sold as scrap and the proceeds credited back to the award:

- Vehicle – Nissan Terrano II, Engine No. TD27-277072Y; Serial No. VSKTVUR20UO-543490; acquisition date June 2004; original cost \$24,160; estimated current cost: \$750.

The following vehicles which had initially been bought as 'second-hand' are poorly functioning, unserviceable and unsafe. CHF proposes to sell them on as-is basis and credit the proceeds back to the award:

- Vehicle – Mitsubishi Pajero Jeep, Engine No. 4D56; Serial No. JMBLC490WJJ461288; acquisition date August 2004; original cost \$12,000; estimated current cost: \$1,350.
- Vehicle – Nissan Patrol Jeep, Serial No. JN1WYG60U0867169; acquisition date August 2004; original cost \$12,000; estimated current cost: \$750.
- Vehicle – Isuzu Trooper Jeep, Serial No. JACUBS55FL7101933; acquisition date August 2004; original cost \$12,000; estimated current cost: \$750.

#### OTHER EQUIPMENT

One (1) 17Kva generator initially bought for \$7,000 in May 2004; estimated current cost: \$1,000.

CHF requests that it retain use of all equipment over \$5,000 for continued programmatic purposes. CHF has recently submitted a proposal to the US Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM). In addition, CHF anticipates submitting a proposal application for the anticipated Community Challenge Grants, and CHF is currently discussing funding for a SME development program with USAID and OPIC (Overseas Private Investment Corporation) for activities in Liberia. Retention of these vehicles will significantly reduce expenditures on future US Government funded activities. CHF anticipates notification on the PRM proposal, issuance of the Community Challenge Grants RFA, and results of the negotiations with USAID and OPIC by 31 March 2007. If the results of these potential funding activities is negative, CHF will request guidance from USAID on equipment disposal.

See *Annex A* for the inventory list of equipment.

### 1.2.5 Reporting

In accordance with 22 CFR 226.70-72, CHF International shall submit financial reports to USAID as agreed upon in the cooperative agreement, within 90 calendar days following the date of completion of the award. The final financial report will be submitted upon conclusion of CHF's A-133 audit of the LINCS program.

The final program report shall be submitted by CHF International to USAID as agreed upon in the cooperative agreement, within 90 calendar days following the date of completion of the award. CHF will make every effort to submit before this period.

### **1.2.6 Program and Field Offices**

The main central and administrative office of LINCS on 1<sup>st</sup> Old Road Junction, Congo Town, Monrovia will continue to be partially open after December 31, 2006 for program closeout purposes. The lease agreement and charge to the LINCS program award will terminate upon expiry of the existing lease on January 31, 2007. Lease obligations after this date will be borne by CHF International.

The program offices in Zorzor/Salayea and Voinjama will also remain partially open after December 31, 2006 but with no lease or other operational charges to the LINCS program award.

### **1.2.7 Employees**

Some of the employees will be released on December 31, 2006 upon expiry of their contracts. A few program, support and security staff members who are needed for closeout and audit purposes will be retained up to the end of January 2007.

### **1.2.8 Sub-contract activities**

There were no sub-contract activities under the LINCS award.

### **1.2.9 Partners**

All sub-awards to LINCS collaborating organizations (Liberia Partner Organizations) have been completed and closed.

### **1.2.10 Records**

In accordance with the regulations of the USAID Controllers Office, the original copies of all financial and project records will be retained in a secure, readily accessible place for the next three years.

## 2 Annexes

### A Inventory of Equipment

**CHF Liberia - Schedule of non expendable Equipment over \$5,000 - LINCS Program as of 18 December 206**

Count	Make	Plate No.	Engine No.	Serial No.	Purchase Date	Purchase Price USD	Present Condition	Present Price USD	Location	Proposed Disposition
1	Toyota Land Cruiser Hard Top Jeep	CHF-3	1HZ-0470681	JTERB71J10-0025003	3-Feb-05	38,840	Good	13,250	CHF Voinjama	Continued Use by CHF, located in Monrovia
1	Toyota Land Cruiser Hard Top Jeep	CHF-4	1HZ-0470800	JTERB71JX0-0025033	3-Feb-05	38,840	Good	13,250	CHF Zorzor	Continued Use by CHF, located in Monrovia
1	Ford Ranger Double Cab	NG-0894	W9AT 157 466	MNCBSFE 805W464628	19-Oct-05	25,060	Good	15,200	CHF Zorzor	Continued Use by CHF, located in Monrovia
1	Ford Ranger Double Cab	NG-0895	W9AT 157 419	MNCBSFE 805W464872	19-Oct-05	25,060	Good	15,200	CHF Voinjama	Continued Use by CHF, located in Monrovia
1	Isuzu Double Cab Pickup	NG-0986	N/A	JAATFS54H37101057	Jun-04	22,000	Fair	4,449	CHF Monrovia	Continued Use by CHF, located in Monrovia
1	Nissan Terrano II	1451-GP	TD27-277072Y	VSKTVUR20UO-543490	Jun-04	24,160	Destroyed	750	CHF Monrovia	Sale by CHF with funds received recorded as program income.
1	Mitsubishi Pajero Jeep	NG-0915	4D56	JMBLC490WJJ461288	Aug-04	12,000	Not Serviceable	1,350	CHF Monrovia	Continued Use by CHF, located in Monrovia
1	Nissan Patrol Jeep	TBA	N/A	JNIWYG60U0867169	Aug-04	12,000	Not Serviceable	750	CHF Monrovia	Continued Use by CHF, located in Monrovia
1	Isuzu Trooper Jeep	NG-0916	N/A	JACUBS55FL7101933	Aug-04	12,000	Not Serviceable	750	CHF Monrovia	Continued Use by CHF, located in Monrovia
1	17Kva generator	N/A	N/A	N/A	May-04	7,000	Fair	1,000	CHF Monrovia	Continued Use by CHF, located in Monrovia

