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Evaluation of Livelihood Interventions funded through USAID Famine Fund Support to the Productive Safety Net Program



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**EVALUATION OF LIVELIHOOD INTERVENTIONS FUNDED THROUGH
USAID FAMINE FUND SUPPORT TO THE PRODUCTIVE SAFETY NET
PROGRAM
FINAL REPORT**

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ABG	Asset Building Group
ADP	Area Development Program
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ALT	Alternative Livelihoods Transition
CFW	Cash for Work
CIDA	Canadian Institute for Agricultural Development
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CS	Co-operating Sponsor
DA	Development Advisor
DAP	Development Assistance Program
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DPPC	Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission
EFSR	Emergency Food Security Reserve
EC	European Commission
ETB	Ethiopian ETB
FAO	Food and Agriculture Office
FFP	Food for Peace
FFW	Food for Work
FSCB	Food Security Coordination Bureau
GFDRE	Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IR	Intermediate Result
KMA	Kabele Marketing Association
MLVP	Market -led livelihoods for vulnerable populations
MOA	Ministry of Agriculture
ORDA	Oromya Region Development Agency
PA	Producers' Association
PSNP	Productive Safety Net Program
PSO	Program Support Initiative
REST	Relief Society of Tigray
SO	Strategic Objective
SNNPS	Southern Nations Nationalities' and Peoples State
SPSNP	Support to the Productive Safety Net Program
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Program

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In addition we would like to thank the Cooperating Sponsors for their assistance in providing program data, and for their willingness to provide information and be available to us when needed. We particularly appreciate the universal cooperation of all CS field staff and their helpful organization of field visits, interviews and beneficiary discussion groups.

Finally, and most importantly, we would like to acknowledge our gratitude to the many SPSNP and OFDA beneficiaries who waited hours to speak to us, answered seemingly endless questions patiently and provided us with a unique insight into the problems that they are facing and the solutions that they are adopting to move towards sustainable household food security.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report details the evaluation of selected livelihood interventions in support of the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) financed from the USAID Famine Fund. This is the first evaluation of such interventions, and covers only a proportion of the wide range of interventions undertaken by cooperating sponsors, many of which were only 75% complete at the time of assessment. As such, it is anticipated that some conclusions may be altered in the light of subsequent project developments.

SPSNP projects were required first to assist PSNP beneficiaries to graduate from the program through its livelihoods diversification and expansion component and secondly to address the two main elements of the PSNP (resource transfers and community asset building) through its capacity building component. The former component (livelihoods diversification and expansion) is the subject of this evaluation.

The original SPSNP proposals submitted by Co-operating Sponsors showed some uniformity of approach. In general, the proposals described programs and interventions that built upon Cooperating Sponsors past experience. Most of the proposed interventions were based around either social mobilization (e.g. savings and credit groups) and/or agricultural activities (e.g. backyard gardening, shoat rearing or beekeeping). In some cases, there was considerable infrastructural input (e.g. substantial water diversion structures), while in others, smaller amounts of physical inputs were provided. The proposals indicated a general awareness of the need for assistance in market development, and the need for attitudinal development was universally highlighted.

The process of project implementation appeared to have proceeded smoothly with one general exception. Although initial disbursements in January 2005 had been timely, the close coordination with local administrations required for SPSNP projects resulted in negotiations with regional authorities that delayed almost all projects by 4/5 months, so that in most cases project implementation did not begin until April/May 2005. Otherwise, Cooperating Sponsors indicated that most programs have progressed as expected since that time.

Project staff generally indicated that the development of a positive attitude amongst beneficiaries was a key element of every project, but that it required a longer time frame than was possible within a two-year project. Generally however, progress in project implementation can be considered good. Key indicators detailed in PMP documents have generally been met, although it must be accepted that for the most part, such indicators reflect project performance rather than project impacts.

The overall number of beneficiaries targeted during the first 18 months of the programs totaled 83,000 households or 415,000 beneficiaries (using the accepted approximation of five beneficiaries per household). This represents approximately 9% of the initial PSNP population and 6% of the revised figure and is slightly less than half of the coverage originally anticipated in the RFA. The total amount of funding spent on the development of household assets (as opposed to PSNP capacity development) amounted to US\$8.36 million. This is equivalent to an investment of US\$101 per household or US\$20 per beneficiary.

The intervention targeting process was subject to some criticism by SPSNP beneficiaries; it is suggested that the targeting process should seek to generate successful economic development on the basis of attitude, aptitude, and capacity. The selection process should involve selected members of the community and the local administration, but should not be allowed to become an “equitable distribution of assets”. The fact that the PSNP will support the more vulnerable members of the community allows such selective targeting to be achieved with minimal negative humanitarian effect.

The coverage anticipated by the original Famine Fund RFA was approximately one million beneficiaries or 20% of the PSNP. In practice, even with a substantial reduction in coverage, the Cooperating Sponsors nevertheless generally indicated that the areas covered have exceeded their original expectations and that their resources have been overstretched as a result. The intensive targeting looked for in the RFA was rarely achieved. This single factor (extent of coverage) appeared to contribute most significantly to the level of success of different projects. A critical impetus, derived from more than one and preferably at least three interventions was generally considered necessary to move a household towards food security. Extended project coverage reduced the number of interventions at the household level to the point where in some cases at least 80% of beneficiaries were only receiving one intervention and consequently were not making discernible progress towards food security.

The finance resources available within the SPSNP envelope were originally set at a maximum of ETB140/beneficiary. (US\$16.4 million total funding, with an expected target group of one million beneficiaries). In practice, investment appears to have been of the order of ETB174 (US\$20) per beneficiary due to reduced coverage. The cost of the interventions needed to achieve sustainable food security is estimated at approximately US\$70-90 per beneficiary (given an average household size of five people). This is approximately four times the level of funding initially provided for SPSNP activities.

A number of Cooperating Sponsors under SPSNP have started the process of group formation. The groups generally showed positive results, but it was evident that, the extent of the effectiveness of social mobilisation varies from Cooperating Sponsor to Cooperating Sponsor, largely as a function of the degree of assistance provided to the group by field staff. In particular the Evaluation Team noted deficiencies in the performance and management of revolving funds, which require immediate correction to avoid the inculcation of bad practices in credit management amongst beneficiaries.

The performance of revolving funds accumulating repayment for assets received by individuals or groups contrasts markedly with the performance of revolving funds in savings and credit groups. There was a clear sense of beneficiary ownership and self-determination in the latter case, which tended to be lacking in the former. It is recommended that both the Cooperating Sponsor and USAID undertake more rigorous monitoring of revolving funds initially offering small loans with short repayment periods and using peer pressure to ensure timely repayments.

Most Cooperating Sponsors have not placed significant emphasis on market development. This is due not only to an apparent lack of skills and capacity on their part but also to the fact that produce from SPSNP-sponsored activities such as honey or vegetables can either be consumed locally or that no marketable output has so far been produced.

It was observed that in almost all aspects of all projects, appropriate technologies had been used that could be easily replaced or repaired by beneficiaries.

Cooperating Sponsor projects were generally well compliant with gender issues and that most interventions were equally distributed between genders, although some exceptions were noted. In particular, participation of women in study tours was less than that of men. However, in terms of impact, there were no significant differences between genders in the extent of increased food security reported, in terms of both increased cash and food availability. Generally the survey results showed little differences between gender disaggregated data sets. This is not unexpected. Cooperating Sponsors have had long exposure to gender issues in Ethiopia and have developed appropriate responses.

Key factors affecting project success include the integration of interventions. Most beneficiaries indicated that at least three interventions are required to achieve sustainable food security. and it was clearly

reported and observed that greater impact was achieved if interventions were provided within the scope of an integrated community-based program. Field staff emphasized that the integration of programs within a common “software” environment (i.e. imparting a consistent philosophy of self-help and business development) is essential to the success and sustainability of all diversification initiatives. The integration of SPSNP interventions with PSNP programs was also observed to be a positive factor.

Field staff unanimously emphasized the importance of developing a positive beneficiary attitude in order to achieve sustainable development. To a considerable extent, all CS hardware and technical training interventions are effectively providing a “framework of opportunity” within which attitudinal development must take place.

Complementarity of PSNO and SPSNP interventions was generally observed to be good. The PSNP has successfully supported chronically impoverished communities and allowed SPSNP activities to be more successful as a result. However, it appears that Cooperating Sponsors have yet to make full use of the opportunities for focused development that the PSNP provides.

Given the limited resources available for SPSNP interventions, it is important that interventions should be easily replicated wherever possible, but experience in this area is variable. Generally, the lower cost, immediate impact interventions appear (not surprisingly) to be most replicable. These include backyard vegetable production, credit and savings groups and the provision of shoats on revolving basis. Frequently however, the evaluation team did observe complex and integrated interventions, especially those involving high initial capital costs or a significant degree of organization/administration that would not easily be replicated by small communities or individual households.

Interviews with field staff and local administrators indicated that all Cooperating Sponsors have developed good working relationships with government at the grass roots level. However, relationships with *woreda* and zonal level administration were less consistent. Generally however, the *woreda* administrations have welcomed the SPSNP interventions seeing them as complementing PSNP activities while Cooperating Sponsors have filled resource gaps where needed.

It was noted that in most interventions, the private sector was limited to the role of buyer. There was little observed attempt to involve private sector participation in other roles such as seedling nursery management, inputs supply, repairs to equipment or out-grower schemes. In particular, only limited evidence was observed of Cooperating Sponsors linking groups or individual households to public sector financial institutions to secure micro-credit.

In almost every case, SPSNP interventions were being undertaken in *woredas* and *kabeles* that had been subject to previous interventions by the CS. This meant that the interventions could not be considered as discrete initiatives, but rather as the culmination of a series of events extending back over several years prior to the SPSNP intervention. Such integration of programs over time may promote synergism, but it tends to confound the accurate analysis of impact

In general the evaluation team was not able to assess the actual sustainability of interventions. It noted with concern that major group interventions required continual CS input at this stage, however, those interventions that provided discrete support to individual households did indeed appear to be potentially sustainable.

The evaluation team found plenty of evidence on the ground to assess that overall, despite shortcomings, the impacts of both SPSNP interventions have been positive. 87% of beneficiaries stated that the activities they had undertaken under SPSNP had resulted in increased production of food for their own consumption. Of these 37% stated that livestock production/rearing had led to the most production of

food for own consumption. Sixteen per cent of positive respondents stated that the increase was large, 67% stated it was moderate and 17% stated it was insignificant. However, impact has been limited where Cooperating Sponsors have spread themselves too thinly geographically.

Nevertheless, the SPSNP intervention can be assessed to have shown significant impact, albeit at a lower level, over a longer time frame and amongst a more restricted target group than originally anticipated. It can also be expected that this impact will have a degree of sustainability, although again this is limited by the high degree of reliance upon cooperating sponsors that the more complex group interventions require.

Amongst the more traditional interventions, three activities stood out as being both well accepted, replicable, and generally sustainable. These were the facilitation of savings and credit groups, provision of shoats and establishment of household water supply systems. Each of these interventions had different strengths and was most appropriate in certain areas. Two areas of activity stood out as being of limited relevance under the current circumstances. The first of these was vocational training, which proved relatively costly and limited in both the number of beneficiaries that were assisted and the circumstances where skills could be applied. The second area of limited relevance was in the marketing of traditional agricultural produce. It was observed that at current levels of production, generated by SPSNP activities, outputs could be readily disposed of in rural markets without difficulty or additional assistance being required.

The underlying principles that determine the most effective practices were assessed. The importance of an integrated approach was recognized together with the ability to limit interventions to selected areas and specific target groups, including particularly those who would be able to make the best use of interventions. In addition, the relevance of a given intervention to the beneficiary community was considered critical to success.

All Cooperating Sponsor field staff reported that successful interventions also require coordination with local administration and in particular capacity development at the DA level so that successful interventions can be both sustained and replicated elsewhere.

Limited capacity at the local administrative level is perhaps the biggest issue facing the successful implementation of SPSNP or any subsequent development initiative.

The creation of successful examples should be one of the two underlying targets of the SPSNP exercise, and interventions should be integrated and focused to achieve this goal. The second target - of achieving successful replication of sound interventions depends upon the availability of local resources, and complementary programs will/are definitely required to facilitate this.

It appeared that most of the interventions undertaken by Cooperating Sponsors fell short of the original expectations of those who had drafted the initial SPSNP RFA in the sense that most interventions repeated previous agriculturally focuses programs and relatively few introduced new concepts or methodologies such as vocational training or other off-farm income generating activities. However, the evaluation team observed that the interphase between relief and market-orientated interventions (that are more typical of development) involves at least two stages. In the first, beneficiaries are assisted to achieve sustainable household food security with occasional surplus production. In the second, they are assisted to develop a consistent commercial surplus for the market with direct oversight and assistance from the Cooperating Sponsor. It is at this second phase of intermediate development that more market focused interventions are relevant. Until the second phase has been reached the traditional interventions are more appropriate to the level of development of both individual households and the surrounding economic environment.

Cooperating Sponsors have been accepted as stakeholders in the national development process to supplement limited local capacity. However within this context, it was observed that the role expected of

Cooperating Sponsors by local administrations is one that attempts to achieve too much with too limited resources. All parties should accept that the role of the Cooperating Sponsors in development is limited (by capacity, resources and by national mandate) to that of assistance and demonstration or the establishment of pilot models that government can replicate and take to scale.

The RFA for the SPSNP indicated that Cooperating Sponsors should liaise and learn from each other in terms of best practices. The opportunity for collaboration in this regard has not been fully exploited.

If sustainability is to be achieved then some form of exit strategy is required. However, none of the Cooperating Sponsors appeared to have an exit strategy in place and nor was this an issue they mentioned or indicated that they had thought about. Nevertheless, given the limited resources available to carry out SPSNP interventions, it is necessary that Cooperating Sponsors should develop the capacity to relocate their programs once development has reached an appropriate stage in a given area. It will therefore be necessary to develop a longer-term outlook, considering how their relationship with beneficiaries should evolve to the point where they are managing more and more activities themselves, forging linkages with extension and the private sector independently of the Cooperating Sponsor. At present this aspect of the development process has not received adequate attention.

Key conclusions and recommendations can be summarised as:

- Extension of SPSNP programs to a five-year (total) time frame.
- Redirection of targeting processes to concentrate on aptitude, attitude and capacity.
- Greater emphasis on the development of a positive self-help attitude.
- Integration of resources to provide at least two and preferably three interventions per household.
- Increased funding through the introduction of other donor resources.
- Greater use and profiling of savings and credit groups.
- Reinforcement of credit procedures and training of field staff in credit management.
- Increased private sector participation in the development process
- Increased community participation in the planning process
- Increased sharing of lessons learned and best practices between Cooperating Sponsors.
- The development of Cooperating Sponsor exit strategies within the context of realistically achievable programs.

Specific recommendations are also made for improved project design and selection.

Evaluation of Livelihood Interventions funded through USAID Famine Fund Support to the Productive Safety Net Program

1. INTRODUCTION

This report details the evaluation undertaken by Weidemann Associates Inc. of selected livelihood interventions in support of the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) financed from the USAID Famine Fund. This is the first evaluation of such interventions. It is based upon extensive field investigation, but covers only a proportion of the wide range of interventions undertaken by cooperating sponsors, many of which were only 75% complete at the time of assessment. The projects under evaluation are still operational and may in some cases be subject to further modification. As such, it is anticipated that some conclusions may be altered in the light of subsequent project developments

Under these circumstances, the conclusions of this report cannot be considered fully comprehensive, particularly where negative conclusions might be drawn; in which case, criticisms must be taken to refer to specific instances and circumstances. On the other hand, where positive conclusions and recommendations have been made, there are reasonable grounds to assume that these have more general predictive value. The evaluation has therefore been undertaken from a positive perspective, of assessing the overall value of the projects financed by the Famine Fund, of seeking out the most effective interventions in terms of both impact and sustainability, and of gathering insights into the transition from relief to development that these projects have been supporting so as to provide potential guidance for the design and implementation of further interventions in this critical area.

1.1. Composition of Study Team

The work was conducted by the Weidemann Associates Study Team consisting of Dr. George Gray (Development Specialist), Mr. Ali Dastgeer (Evaluation Expert) and Mr. Gebremeskel Desalegn (Agricultural Economist), working with two field interviewers (Mr. Tankir and Mr. Xiauo) who trained and supervised the activities of over 50 enumerators in the field. Data was subsequently processed by Agridev Consult. The report was compiled by the three principal consultants.

1.2. Outline of This Report

This report consists first of an introduction (this chapter) explaining the purpose of the evaluation exercise and giving a brief outline of the methodology used. It is followed by a chapter providing background information on the Support to the Productive Safety Net Program (SPSNP) initiative. The third chapter provides a detailed evaluation of the SPSNP initiatives from a general perspective, while the fourth assesses cross cutting issues including gender, relevance and sustainability. In the fifth chapter, key factors affecting success are discussed while the overall impact of projects is considered in chapter six. Chapter seven lists those interventions, which appeared to have the greatest potential impacts, while Chapter eight considers the role of the Cooperating Sponsors in this SPSNP development scenario. Finally Chapter nine presents the conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation.

This evaluation made extensive use of a field questionnaire that supports the narrative text and conclusions. To reduce the length of the report, few of the tables generated have been reproduced within

the text. They are instead referred to either in text boxes or in the text itself. References to tables numbered G1 to G69 refer to the complete tabulated data set which is to be found in Annex G.

1.3. Methodology and constraints

This study used two specific methodologies to evaluate the different projects. The first methodology, undertaken by the principal consultants, consisted of structured interviews using detailed checklists to obtain general information, both on the overall environment in which programs have been implemented and on the specific interventions themselves. In the first instance the consultants interviewed other donors and agencies working in the field of livelihood development, including CIDA, EC, WFP the World Bank, and the Food Security Coordination Bureau (FSCB). Secondly, information was collected from each of the Cooperating Sponsors with regard to baseline data and their specific experiences concerning the implementation and outcomes of the SPSNP initiatives at the head office level. Thirdly, twelve projects were visited in the field¹. These had been selected by USAID, on the basis of geographical coverage and the activities undertaken, to be broadly representative of SPSNP interventions overall. In the course of field visits, the principal consultants used standardized checklists to interview project implementation staff, local administration (where available) and beneficiaries.

The second methodology was based upon simple questionnaire to obtain data from a cross section of beneficiaries regarding the relevance, impact and sustainability of the different livelihood initiatives. The questionnaire was presented by local teams of interviewers (educational level of Grade 10 or above) who were given preliminary training in the required selection and interview process. Forty respondents were selected from each *woreda* as shown in Table 1. Beneficiaries were selected to obtain a representative cross section in terms of gender, age and income level within each *woreda*. As far as possible, the questionnaire was structured to allow statistical significant results to be readily determined. A copy of the questionnaire is attached (Annex F). It is recognized that the limitation of 40 respondents per *woreda* restricts the significance of results obtained at a *woreda* level, however, when accumulated across 11 *woredas*, the results show significant trends from which useful conclusions can be drawn.

The limited time available required that the study team be divided into two groups, each group visited six projects in a given study area, (Table 1). The principal consultants in each team undertook structured interviews while the field interviewers held training sessions and supervised initial data collection. Where the enumeration exercise could not be completed in a single day, the field interviewers traveled separately within each study area to collect all completed questionnaires. In total the Evaluation Team visited 52 separate *kabeles*, a full list is appended in Annex G.

Table 1. Project Sites Visited

Woreda	Cooperating Sponsor	In Support of:	Interventions
Degua Temben	REST	PSNP	Cooperative development, marketing, provision of inputs, training, water harvesting, micro-irrigation
Aheferom	REST	PSNP	
Enderta	CRS	OFDA	Provision of Agricultural Assets thru' Vouchers and Technical Assistance
Lay Gayint	CARE/ORDA	PSNP	Voucher-based training within farmer groups, development of seed banks, off-farm income generation activities, savings and loan groups, formation of market linkage nodes.
Tach Gayint	FHI	PSNP	Assistance in apiculture, provision of shoats, bio-intensive gardening, new crops and varieties,

¹ Ten of the project undertook SPSNP interventions and two were for similar OFDA livelihood initiatives.

			micro-irrigation, forestry, and attitude change
Habru	STC (UK)/ORDA	PSNP	Micro enterprise development, small scale irrigation, soil and water conservation, training in business management, restocking (shoats and poultry) community and family nurseries, apiculture, grain and seed banks, kitchen gardens and forage development.
Dodota Sire	CRS	PSNP	Seed and livestock fairs, multiple uses of water, training in rural business development, production and marketing of white pea beana
Chiro	CARE	PSNP	Voucher-based training within farmer groups, development of seed banks, off-farm income generation activities, savings and loan groups, formation of market linkage nodes.
Sodo Zuria	World Version	PSNP	Provision of Shoats and cattle, silk worm production, provision of improved seeds, pumps for micro irrigation, fruit trees.
Kedida Gamella	CHF	PSNP	Savings and Credit Group, training artisans (weaving, pottery and business skills), Support to women's business center
Meskan	CHF	OFDA	Development of 5 asset building groups for poultry, shoats,vegetables and cereals
Meskan	CHF	PSNP	Water resource development, apiculture, poultry rearing, silk production and marketing, enset processing, construction of bridges and access roads.

One recognized constraint of this methodology was that it did not provide a sound comparison between SPSNP beneficiaries and those PSNP beneficiaries who were not receiving the additional support of SPSNP. This was due to logistical constraints in that while the Cooperating Sponsors could assist in the congregation of SPSNP beneficiary discussion groups and interviewees for the evaluation team, the team had no means of identifying or selecting appropriate non-SPSNP beneficiaries either within the timeframe or with the resources available. However, in the course of beneficiary discussion groups, questions were repeatedly put to assess how much development SPSNP beneficiaries might have achieved using the resources available under the PSNP alone. Beneficiary responses were unequivocal that under the PSNP alone, households could be expected to achieve little development of their own assets.

It should be noted that while the original SOW of the Evaluation Team did include 2005 interventions, field visits were restricted to only two OFDA project sites. As a result, it has been difficult for the Team to draw comprehensive conclusions as to the effectiveness of OFDA FY2005 livelihood interventions in general. Nevertheless, the team was able to assess the two OFDA sites visited in terms of developmental impact and has incorporated the lessons learned within the overall conclusions of this report.

The Scope of Work for this evaluation is included in Annex D and a summary of the key questions, cross referenced against the relevant sections in this report, in Annex E.

Throughout this report, the authors have avoided references to individual Cooperating Sponsors where possible. This is because, in the team's opinion, the Cooperating Sponsors are all performing with equal effort and professionalism, but under widely differing circumstances. Moreover, it was quite clear that

most differences in performance could be ascribed mainly to individuals – not institutions. Under such circumstances it would be misleading to make specific references or comparisons.

2. SUMMARY OF THE SPSNP INITIATIVE

2.1. Underlying Assumptions and Objectives

The USAID SPSNP is financed from the Famine Fund, through Cooperative Agreements with a total award value of \$16 million over a two-year period (now subject to a one year extension), the primary objective of which is to decrease the number of persistently poor requiring food or cash assistance to meet basic needs. The SPSNP is a supporting and complementary element to the PSNP (Productive Safety Net Programme). This larger program is based on the hypothesis that predictably vulnerable individuals require predictable assistance so they may protect and/or rebuild assets². Through the provision of consistent, multi-year assistance to vulnerable households and in ways that strengthen their (and their communities’) coping abilities, targeted beneficiaries have potential to re-attain and maintain food security in the long-term.

The PSNP is designed around two basic transfer mechanisms: Public Works and Direct Support for the labor poor, which are targeted at chronically impoverished beneficiaries over the course of a three to five year period, through two main components (resource transfers and community asset development). USAID considered that in addition to these two components, livelihood diversification and expansion are important elements of a program designed to achieve sustainable household food security. Increased income or food production opportunities, would allow PSNP beneficiaries to become self-reliant and thus graduate from the PSNP program.

The SPSNP was thus required first to assist PSNP beneficiaries to graduate from the program through its livelihoods diversification and expansion component and secondly to address the two main components of the PSNP (resource transfers and community asset building) through its capacity building component. The former component (livelihoods diversification and expansion) is the subject of this evaluation. It should be emphasized that capacity development at the local administration level has not been assessed.

Under the five-year goal (FY2004-2008), USAID addresses four strategic objectives (SO) and one program support objective (PSO) See Annex C. Activities conducted under the SPSNP were expected to be primarily be reflected within Intermediate Result (IR) 4 of SO 16: “Livelihood options for the food insecure protected, expanded and diversified”. The assumptions underlying IR4 are detailed in Annex C. However, certain key elements deserve emphasis:

- The purpose of this IR is to meet people’s basic needs in a predictable manner that will reach them before they lose crucial assets. It is also important to provide different options to allow people diverse livelihoods and to enable them to meet their food needs throughout the year.
- By protecting livelihood systems and increasing opportunities to diversify livelihood options, IR 4, contributes to overall economic growth by enabling the chronically poor to participate in the market and production-based activities.
- The economic resiliency of the chronically poor will be achieved when they are able to rely on diverse livelihood strategies during times of both abundance and hardship, surviving the next shock with no outside assistance and without depleting their productive assets

² This hypothesis is quoted verbatim from the SPSNP RFA.

- Under this IR, by the end of 3-5 years, it is anticipated that sustainable increases in livelihood diversification opportunities will exist in all targeted *woredas*.
- In three years, success in protecting assets, while increasing the capacities and opportunities of the persistently poor to participate in rural growth, should result in the stabilization of the numbers of Ethiopians regularly requiring food assistance and within five years these numbers should begin to decline.

The primary objective of the SPSNP was to build upon the anticipated impacts of the PSNP (protection of household assets development of community assets), to develop a sustainable system that would protect, build, and diversify household assets, such that the resiliency to manage through shocks could be achieved. A robust economic growth strategy was envisaged together with a new approach to engaging with the chronically vulnerable that would not only provide safety nets, but would assist them with innovative asset protection and productive expansion opportunities.

A wide range of possible activities for livelihood diversification were envisaged including agro-forestry, adoption of new drought-resistant crops, efficient irrigation technologies, seed nurseries, bee-keeping, improved livestock marketing or training in the range of new value-added businesses that were expected to emerge as a result of other activities under SO16. In particular, it was expected that SPSNP projects would collaborate with and disseminate lessons learned from USAID/Ethiopia's Seeds and Fertilizer Input Systems Program, Agribusiness and Markets, and Irrigation programs.

In addition to the above, SPSNP projects were expected to liaise with the Agribusiness and Trade Expansion project and with the "Market -led livelihoods for vulnerable populations (MLVP) development activity. Finally, since traditional gender roles in Ethiopian society limit the country's ability to move forward; women's participation in the SPSNP was considered to be paramount and were also assessed in this evaluation.

2.2. Coordination and Partner Collaboration

It was assumed that greater synergy and improved outcomes would result from coordinated activities in each targeted region. In addition to working closely with each other, Cooperating Sponsors were expected to program activities as part of the GFDRE's Food Security Coordination Bureau (FSCB) Safety Net Program. Rather than operating as independent organizations, they were to operate as integral members of the GFDRE PSNP, programming in collaboration with government counterparts. It was also expected that a regional consortium operating modality would improve cooperation and coordination amongst partners, and would improve communication between *woreda*, regional and federal levels.

Cooperating Sponsors were expected to prioritize programs in the designated SPSNP *woredas* based on the following criteria: 1) existence of other USAID programs; 2) level of need (percent chronically food insecure, access to health services); 3) potential for impact; 4) prior Applicant programming/investment in the area; and 5) evidence of *woreda* willingness/desire to integrate SPSNP programming into the PSNP framework.

Cooperating Sponsors were encouraged to develop informal partnerships with other USAID/Ethiopia partners or international organizations implementing programs in the selected target areas.

2.3. Targeting

SPSNP programs were expected to ***intensively target*** livelihood diversification and expansion in *woredas* where they would be working closely with *woredas* officials so as to innovate effective PSNP elements with high rates of success. At the same time, programs were expected to incorporate **extensive targeting**

by focusing on improving systems that reach beyond initial impact *woredas* and by working closely with regional governments, so as to extend program impacts using local, zonal and regional administrative capacity.

Projects were to respond to both short- and longer-term objectives. These included the use of cash and food resources for immediate impact, such as protecting lives and smoothing consumption, while addressing longer-term objectives by enhancing community and household resilience to shocks, helping people build a more durable and diverse livelihood base (restoring and enhancing assets, resources, services and infrastructure), and enhancing the capabilities of individuals through a focus on health, nutrition and education. All projects were to contain elements the crosscutting themes of communities as a focal point and women's economic and political empowerment and to focus on water resource security. Overall, the SPSNP was expected to make a demonstrable contribution toward *reducing famine vulnerability in Ethiopia*.

2.4. Interventions proposed by Cooperating Sponsors

An assessment of the original proposals submitted by Co-operating Sponsors showed some uniformity of approach. In general, the proposals described programs and interventions that built upon Cooperating Sponsors past experience. With the exception of activities proposed by one new CS, there were no significant departures from activities that had been undertaken in previous Development Assistance Programs (DAP's). This may have been in part due to the relatively brief time available for proposal preparation in September and October 2004. It may also have been due to the fact that at that time, no knowledge was available as to how the PSNP would actually be implemented and what its impact might be on the ground. It is not surprising therefore Cooperating Sponsors were relatively conservative in terms of the type of interventions that they proposed to undertake. Interventions that had been successfully undertaken in previous projects were repeated in these proposals, or in some cases, ongoing interventions were built upon within the new SPSNP framework.

Although there were some exceptions (notably the greater emphasis on off-farm income generating activities in SNNPR and the more unified "watershed management" approach used in Tigray). Most of the proposed interventions were based around either social mobilization (e.g. savings and credit groups) and/or agricultural activities (e.g. backyard gardening, shoa rearing or beekeeping). Training was provided in a wide range of different skills either as an integral part of a specific intervention (e.g. training in goat management), or as a central element of income diversification (e.g. in blacksmithing skills). In some cases, there was considerable infrastructural input (e.g. substantial water diversion structures), while in others, smaller amounts of physical inputs were provided. The proposals indicated a general awareness of the need for assistance in market development, although the degree of emphasis also varied considerably, and significantly, the need for attitudinal development was universally highlighted, to the point of being described as a separate Intermediate Result in some Results Frameworks.

This is not to say that the proposed interventions were not appropriate to complement the PSNP. In many cases, projects were closely linked to PSNP activities and built upon them (e.g. backyard gardening activities based upon water collection ponds constructed under PSNP). Equally a number of new technologies were introduced as part of the SPSNP activities; some appeared relevant to the overall development process, others less so. There was a clear sense that in this regard, most projects were "feeling their way" as they progressed and that learning by doing had replaced the less risky approach of undertaking an analysis of costs and benefits prior to the introduction of a new technology. Given the short time frame available for project development and implementation, this is not surprising.

2.5. General overview of progress to date

The process of project implementation appeared to have proceeded smoothly with one general exception. Although initial disbursements in January 2005 had been timely, the close coordination with local administrations required for SPSNP projects resulted in negotiations with regional authorities that delayed almost all projects by 4/5 months, so that in most cases (with the exception of Tigray) project implementation did not begin until April/May 2005. This appeared to be due to the new conditions existing under the PSNP, including uncertainty as to the targeting of beneficiaries. However in some areas, the fact that Cooperating Sponsors had been working on similar initiatives in the same areas prior to the SPSNP programs meant that some limited activities were possible from February /March.

Cooperating Sponsors indicated that most programs have progressed as expected since that time, although at evaluation, implementation was inevitably no more than 75% complete and it was clear that some key results would not occur until November 2006 at the earliest (e.g., first harvests of honey for some beneficiaries) and many impacts would not be apparent until 2007.

Some interventions had progressed more slowly than expected. In some specific cases this had been due to logistical and administrative problems (e.g., difficulties in obtaining suitable livestock, shortage of drip irrigation equipment, limited availability of seed for new varieties). Generally however, there had been delays in two areas. First, in the implementation of market development programs and in the provision of market support. This was not the case in those projects for which marketing was a central theme (e.g. the marketing of haricot beans to international brokers, or the marketing of milk or honey), but project staff indicated that less emphasis than originally anticipated had been placed on marketing in those projects for which market development was a supporting element rather than a central issue (e.g., backyard garden development); on balance this may in fact have been an appropriate management response (see section 8.1 below).

Secondly, project staff generally indicated that the development of a positive attitude amongst beneficiaries was a key element of every project, but that it required a longer time frame than was possible within a two-year project. This aspect of development was something that was not always clearly defined, but was variously described by project staff as “a positive outlook”, “the necessary software”, “being business orientated”, a “can-do” attitude”, “ a self-help outlook” and “thinking outside the box”. Although this last description is a hackneyed management phrase, it does perhaps best describe the need to move away from the fatalistic outlook, constrained both by physical and social limitations that restricts the choices available to many beneficiaries.

Project staff in a number of cases highlighted the fact that “we have given them (the beneficiaries) the hardware (shoats, drip equipment, beehives etc) now we need to make sure they have the software”. The importance of this intangible element is widely recognized, but ways and means of imparting it are not well understood and there is a general sense that in the first 21 months of these projects, “software development” has not kept up with the provision of the hardware.

Generally however, progress in project implementation can be considered good. Key indicators detailed in PMP documents have generally been met, although it must be accepted that for the most part, such indicators reflect project performance rather than project impacts.

3. DETAILED EVALUATION OF PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

3.1. Physical Coverage of *Woredas* and *Kabeles*

The SPSNP projects under review have been implemented in 522 *kabeles* in 26 *woredas*. The numbers of *kabeles* and targeted beneficiaries together with associated ratios are given in Annex G . The coverage in terms of *woredas* represents a relatively small percentage (less than 10% of the total PSNP *woredas* in Ethiopia); within the PSNP *woredas*, coverage in terms of *kabeles* was much higher, averaging 61% and ranging from 20% of the *kabeles* in a *woreda* to 100%. Clearly at the higher levels, resources were more diluted and some implementation costs (such as travel) would be greater due to the wider geographical coverage. Within each *kabele* covered, the percentage of PSNP households targeted for SPSNP interventions averaged 37% and ranged from 3% to 100%. The percentage of PSNP households targeted for interventions within each *woreda* was very similar, at 30%, indicating that the *kabeles* in which the Cooperating Sponsors were active represented the majority of PSNP beneficiaries in their *woredas*.

The differences in coverage were quite marked and closely associated with the nature of the interventions undertaken. Thus where off-farm income generating activities had formed a significant part of the programs, coverage was consistently limited. Between 3% and 18% of all PSNP beneficiaries in the relevant *kabeles* received SPSNP assistance under these circumstances, as compared with between 55% and 76% of PSNP beneficiaries in Amhara *woredas* where more traditional interventions (such as the provision of shoats and backyard gardening) were practiced. These differences were also reflected in the amount of funding utilized per beneficiary. In the more focused situation of support to off-farm income generating activities, investment in training and other household development interventions ranged between US\$146 and US\$472 per household, while where coverage was more extensive, resources available to each household were understandably less, in this case between US\$21 and US\$60 per household.

In those projects where clear focus had been achieved within the context of integrated watershed development programs, the investment per beneficiary household was highest of all, ranging between US\$477 and US\$948 per household.

The overall number of beneficiaries targeted during the first 18 months of the programs totaled 83,000 households or 415,000 beneficiaries (using the accepted approximation of five beneficiaries per household). This represents approximately 9% of the initial PSNP population and 6% of the revised figure and is slightly less than half of the coverage originally anticipated in the RFA. The total amount of funding spent on the development of household assets (as opposed to PSNP capacity development) amounted to US\$8.36 million. This is equivalent to an investment of US\$101 per household or US\$20 per beneficiary.

3.2. Planning and targeting

The degree of project planning seemed to vary considerably according to individual circumstances. In those cases where the CS had very close links with local government, SPSNP activities appeared to be part of an integrated program (such as a watershed management plan) that had been developed in cooperation with the different arms of local government. Under such circumstances it also appeared that the CS had been able to support the local administration by providing technical skills (e.g. water engineers). This is significant given the clearly identified shortage of skills and coordination at the *kabele* and *woreda* level and undoubtedly contributed to the development of a coordinated intervention package that was synergistic with the PSNP activities.

In other cases, projects appeared to have “followed on” from previous activities undertaken by the same CS in the same area. This may have occurred in close collaboration with the local administration, but this was not always the case. The outcome of such a process was projects which appeared to be most appropriate to the circumstances, but which could not necessarily be viewed as an integrated response, or to build upon PSNP activities. Whether this apparent absence of “planning from first principles” could be ascribed to lack of preparation time, novelty of the PSNP environment or restricted thinking on the part of Cooperating Sponsors could not be determined, but it is evident that a new program, building upon the lessons of the last two years, should avoid the temptation to repeat traditional interventions unless they can be seen to contribute to an integrated approach to development within the context of the PSNP.

At a grass roots level, beneficiaries highlighted shortcomings in the planning process. On more than one occasion, it was learned that beneficiary communities had not participated in project planning and design and that the sense of community ownership had been reduced as a result. Some initiatives were being undertaken without enthusiasm (women caring for silk worms complained that the work was tedious and not remunerative “but we do it anyway because we have been asked to and it would not be right to refuse”). This shortcoming was as evident in those programs undertaken in close cooperation with the local administration as in those undertaken by the Cooperating Sponsors alone. In some cases, the evaluation team observed initiatives which had not been requested by beneficiaries, which included untested technologies and for which beneficiaries were expected to pay all or part of the costs over time (e.g. the provision of cream separators to dairy groups). At the same time, it was apparent that not all beneficiaries were aware of the responsibilities that they had taken on by becoming members of some business groupings, including the assets that they jointly owned and for which they were liable. It appeared that while overall project concepts might have been subject to community approval, detailed project mechanisms had not always been discussed with beneficiaries, giving rise to a paternalistic development process in which the CS was working out all details and beneficiaries were simply complying with the requirements placed before them.

The targeting process was similarly criticized by some beneficiaries, who complained that targeting by the community in conjunction with the CS and community administration, was not the most appropriate selection method. A commonly voiced criticism was that selected individuals who either spoke the loudest or had influence with the administration were too frequently selected as beneficiaries (indeed, “repeat beneficiaries”, who had taken part in more than one program over a number of years were observed by the evaluation team on more than one occasion) and it was recommended that the community elders should have a greater role in selecting beneficiaries, since they knew who had the greatest need. At the same time, beneficiaries occasionally complained that they had been selected to receive specific interventions without regard for their aptitude or needs. “They gave us chickens when we wanted sheep”, suggesting a somewhat arbitrary selection process that lacked detail.

Cooperating Sponsors indicated that they targeted “the poorest of the poor” and the local administration appeared to support this philosophy. In practice however, either as a result of undue influence exerted as above, or because of practical limitations the evaluation team saw little evidence that such philosophy was strictly applied. Beneficiaries appeared to be selected on the basis of access, capacity to develop the assets provided, or influence, in addition to the more formal criteria of poverty and need.

There are in fact sound arguments for moving away from an equitable selection process identifying the “poorest of the poor” to one that takes an individual’s capacity to successfully respond to a program of interventions into account. There is a clear distinction between the charitable distribution of relief, which normally attempts to cover all those in need and support to the process of development, where resources are rarely adequate to cover the entire target group. Given the restricted availability of resources and the vast potential target group of PSNP beneficiaries, there is a real possibility that using a “relief type” of targeting, resources might be so diluted as to create no discernible impact. If this is to be avoided,

targeting should instead focus on those beneficiaries who have the capacity to best utilize available resources and who can create both economic and visual impact within the community, on the basis that it is better to support a limited number of successful examples that can be followed by other beneficiaries using additional resources as and when they become available. The alternative, of providing limited support to a wide number of beneficiaries, might be equitable, but creates neither useful development nor effective precedents for others to follow.

It is suggested that the targeting process adopted by Cooperating Sponsors should not follow the traditional principles of relief targeting. Neither should it be unduly influenced by community meetings, but should instead seek to generate successful economic development on the basis of attitude, aptitude, and capacity, while avoiding the “professional beneficiary” syndrome that can lead to a select group of individuals becoming regular targets for successive programs. This is a more difficult targeting process than that required for relief exercises and it is to be expected that at the very early stages of economic development that SPSNP programs support, such targeting will be less than perfect. Under other circumstances, targeting would be based upon a front-ended matching contribution that would oblige the beneficiary to assume some element of ownership and risk. Within the PSNP target group, where beneficiary assets are extremely limited, it is difficult to impose such a requirement. This highlights the need for the careful and detailed selection of beneficiaries on a participatory basis where possible. Such a selection process should involve selected members of the community and the local administration, but should not be allowed to become an “equitable distribution of assets”. If the information held within the community can be accessed in an biased way, then it is reasonable to expect that improved targeting of beneficiaries who can make the best use of resources would lead to more successful interventions more effective demonstrations and hence more incentives for replication.

Targeting those who can make the best use of interventions may sound harsh, however, under circumstances where finances are limited, the achievement of successful projects that can serve to incentivize others is more important than diluting the impact of interventions to the point where no sustainable benefits are achieved. Other potentially more vulnerable members of the community may be sustained by PSNP support until adequate resources were available for more widespread development initiatives. This is one of the significant differences (and benefits) of the PSNP program – it permits greater focus on specific beneficiaries without the risk of malnutrition that would be incurred if the same approach was adopted without safety net support.

The original RFA recognized that resources for SPSNP development would be limited and made recommendations for *intensive* targeting that could be *extensively* utilized. The validity of this approach has been borne out by the experience of the last two years. Where intensive targeting has been possible, interventions have been more successful and incentives for replication greater. It is reasonable that some Cooperating Sponsors might prefer to engage households in multiple activities while simultaneously reaching a large number of beneficiaries. However, given current resource limitations such a strategy will be limited in its effectiveness. Under such circumstances, Cooperating Sponsors who wish to achieve impact must either lobby for more resources, or focus activities on potential success areas/beneficiaries, recognizing that the PSNP will look after those who cannot be addressed immediately.

3.3. Coverage/degree of focus

The coverage anticipated by the original Famine Fund RFA was approximately one million beneficiaries or 20% of the PSNP. This has proved overoptimistic and the actual number of beneficiaries has been closer to 415,000 . Despite this apparent concentration of resources, the Cooperating Sponsors nevertheless generally indicated that the areas covered have exceeded their original expectations and that their resources have been overstretched as a result. Although the original RFA looked for the “intensive targeting” of resources, this was rarely achieved. It was reported that during initial negotiations with local

authorities, Cooperating Sponsors were commonly requested to extend the scope of their coverage to cover a greater number of *kabeles* than originally intended. In some cases this resulted in the coverage of the entire *woreda* and meant that field staff spent considerable time traveling from one project site to another (in extreme cases in excess of five hours). At the same time, the number of specific interventions per beneficiary was reduced to one or two at most, reducing impact at the household level and extending the potential time taken to achieve food security.

In only one instance did the CS report the unhindered freedom to concentrate resources in a limited area. In this case, the close relationship between that CS and the local administration allowed the CS a greater degree of autonomy. This cooperation and concentration, together with the close integration with other programs (including PSNP) meant that resources were more effectively utilized, and impacts at the household level were greater, more immediate and more successful.

This single factor (extent of coverage) appeared to contribute most significantly to the level of success of different projects. As discussed below (see section 5.1: “Integration of Interventions”), a critical impetus, derived from more than one and preferably at least three interventions was generally considered necessary to move a household towards food security. Extended project coverage reduced the number of interventions at the household level to the point where in some cases at least 80% of beneficiaries were only receiving one intervention and consequently were not making discernible progress towards food security. Conversely, in some areas here concentration of resources had been possible, approximately 50% of targeted households had benefited from at least three interventions and anticipated achieving food security within four years.

3.4. Individual interventions

Cooperating Sponsors provided as many as 22 different interventions within a given target area. For ease of reference and comparison, these have been categorized under the following general headings:

- Provision of inputs
- Investment in large-scale infrastructure
- Vocational Training
- Formation of and support to Savings and Credit Groups
- Household Water harvesting
- Backyard gardening
- Market facilitation

Each of these categories contains a number of different interventions, which in turn might be implemented in different ways by different Cooperating Sponsors. At the same time, the environment within which different interventions might be implemented was also subject to considerable variation. Thus the degree of destitution was greater in some areas than in others, while availability of markets might be greater in some areas (particularly in SNNPS) than in others. This variation made it difficult to compare different interventions objectively. Nevertheless, it was possible to observe interventions that were clearly successful and others that were less so. It was also possible to determine areas of potential improvement that could make some interventions more effective. These aspects are considered in greater detail below. However, since it is important to understand exactly what sort of mechanisms are being considered, a brief description of each of the more common interventions is given in Annex A.

3.5. Cost: Benefit Analysis

The finance resources available within the SPSNP envelope were originally set at a maximum of ETB140/beneficiary. (US\$16.4 million total funding, with an expected target group of one million beneficiaries). In practice, investment appears to have been of the order of ETB174 (US\$20) per beneficiary due to reduced coverage. Given an average household of five beneficiaries, this amount would

provide approximately ETB870 per household. In practice, this amount appeared to be less than adequate. The average cost of a single intervention, including all necessary supports such as training rarely amounted to less than ETB900 (e.g. the provision of six shoats valued at ETB 150 each), and in some cases exceeded ETB1,200 (e.g. the installation of a hand-dug well). The evaluation team noted an average cost per intervention of at least ETB 1,000.

Chronically impoverished beneficiaries repeatedly emphasized the need for more than one intervention per household if they were to begin to move towards sustainable food security. At least three separate intervention packages were considered necessary in most cases (e.g. shoat rearing, beekeeping and backyard gardening) in order to provide the cash income and diversity of production necessary for a household to support itself on an ongoing basis. In the example given above, the three enterprises might annually yield seven shoats (worth ETB 1,050 if sold young), 40kg of honey (valued at ETB1,600) and three crops of vegetables (valued at ETB 900), giving a total annual income of between ETB 3,000 and ETB 4,000 (US\$350-460). The cost of the interventions needed to achieve such a level of income is estimated at approximately the same level (i.e. ETB3,000- 4,000, or US\$345-460 per household), or US\$70-90 per beneficiary (given an average household size of five people). This is approximately four times the level of funding initially provided for SPSNP activities.

On the basis of these field estimates, it would appear that assisting a chronically impoverished household to achieve a position of sustainable food security would require an investment of \$400. This implies a total investment of \$400 million to support the graduation of five million PSNP beneficiaries (assuming that two million PSNP beneficiaries will not be able to participate in the graduation process).

It might be argued that over time, and with experience, interventions might be better designed and targeted and thereby more cost-effective, reducing this overall cost. It must be recognized however that the figures quoted do not take all supporting costs into account. Moreover, the initial beneficiary households are in many cases lower cost targets (easily accessible, greater aptitude) and once such “low hanging fruit” have all been targeted, costs of interventions to other more remote and less developed households may actually increase. There are grounds therefore to conclude that the achievement sustainable development of most PSNP beneficiaries will cost at least \$400 million.

The above cost:benefit analysis is clearly only a rough approximation. Nevertheless it serves to indicate the extent of investment required at this level of development. An analysis of the average costs involved in raising a household from destitution to sustainable food security is a guide that can assist in determining the feasibility of both funding levels and goals in terms of beneficiary numbers and might usefully be repeated and refined in future project proposals.

4. CROSS CUTTING ELEMENTS

4.1. Social Mobilization and Group Formation

A number of Cooperating Sponsors under SPSPN have started the process of group formation. Groups may be general credit and savings groups or cater to a specific activity such as groundnut, honey or fruit production groups. A number of positive impacts can be observed from these groups including:

- Beneficiaries have been able to undertake activities that would have otherwise been impossible for them to do on an individual basis due to prohibitive costs associated with the activity. Economies of scale and distribution of responsibilities have made production and marketing easier, reducing costs and increasing profits.

- They provide fora for villagers to come together and discuss production methods and improved techniques. Villagers and the Cooperating Sponsors report that farmers who undertake study tours to other *woredas* or other regions can, on return, relate observations made during the tours and share ideas. At the same time, they enable the Cooperating Sponsors and government extension to interact with a larger number of people thereby reducing costs and increasing efficiency.
- In the case of credit and savings groups, they enable collective savings to be undertaken which can then be used to revolve credit. Particularly poorer farmers are able to thus access cheap, flexible credit for a variety of social or economic needs. Interest earned remains within the group assisting in further building up group capital.
- They assist in empowering villagers who can over time realise their potential and, as a group, undertake bigger projects in the future even without the assistance of the Cooperating Sponsor

However, the extent of the effectiveness of social mobilisation varies from Cooperating Sponsor to Cooperating Sponsor. In some areas, groups are actively saving and revolving funds, in others the amounts saved is meagre and no utilisation of it has been planned. This appears to be a reflection of the degree of assistance provided to the savings group by field staff.

Social mobilisation does take time as communities have to develop an attitude to work together on a common economic activity: responsibilities are determined and duties assigned; bye-laws are made and applied

and internal disputes have to be settled. At the same time, savings and regular meetings begin; internal lending and development of collective enterprises ensues. All this is to say that nurturing of groups takes time and it has been observed that the two-year period of SPSNP is too limited to enable groups to mature to their potential. In social mobilisation efforts around the world, it has been generally observed that it can take five years or more before groups can begin functioning independently.

Successful Social Mobilisation for Credit

The credit and savings groups in Lay Gayint stood out as being remarkably effective. In that system, 'Savings Advisors' (more progressive than average farmers), assist in the introduction of new technologies to the groups. Around twenty of the 104 Savings Advisors are women. So far, in that *woreda*, 592 groups have been formed with 10,222 members and the estimated total savings are ETB298,500.

The groups save a small number of ETB each month and provided easily accessible credit to members from group savings. Around twenty of the 104 Savings Advisors are women. According to the Cooperating Sponsor, the credit and savings groups are effective entry points enabling it to reach the most vulnerable households better.

On the other hand, groups nurtured by other Cooperating Sponsors were poorer. Inappropriate advice meant that they were lagging in revolving their funds or in saving as efficiently. No training in internal lending was provided in the courses that group leaders attended. It is recommended that USAID in future make social mobilisation a key prerequisite for the Cooperating Sponsors it funds. It should also encourage the building of the capacities of staff in the field in social mobilisation both through classroom training and exposure visits.

Questionnaire Data

Of the 440 beneficiaries interviewed using under the quantitative survey, 146 stated that they had received assistance in forming savings groups and 167 stated that they had received assistance in cooperative formation. (Some of them may have received assistance in both).

424 respondents replied to the question whether they had, as part of the activity/ies, joined a group or association promoted by the NGO. Two thirds or 75% stated they had. Of these 71% stated that their group was regularly saving. A quarter or 25% of these stated that on average members saved less than 1.25 ETB, 33% between 1.26 and 2 ETB and 42% over 2 ETB. Of the 424 respondents,

Of the 274 respondents who answered whether the group was undertaking any credit activities, 24% stated that it was. Only 30 members reported that they had taken credit from the group. 23% stated they had taken less than 47.5 ETB, 43% stated that they had taken between 47.5 and 100 ETB and 33% stated they had taken over 100 ETB.

In some cases, social mobilisation is either not envisaged within the project or is lagging behind other interventions. Some Cooperating Sponsors who had envisaged the establishment of Farmer Field Schools or Savings Groups early in their work-plans have still to begin the formation of such bodies. Ideally, it should have been one of the initial interventions because it takes time to develop strong groups. This lack of attention to it points to a lack of capacity amongst Cooperating Sponsor staff and/or inappropriate planning and placement of different interventions.

4.2. Performance of Revolving Funds

It was observed, particularly in Tigray, that some Cooperating Sponsors have used assets purchased under the SPSNP program to established revolving funds. Equipment or livestock, for example, is purchased and given to a household, which is supposed to repay over a number of years. The funds built up from repayments are then, ideally, to be used to service other households in similar or different activities. This is a good mechanism to enable poor households to build assets or undertake an income-generating venture. Because they have to repay, there is a much better chance that they will have a greater sense of ownership and be more responsible. Simultaneously, it enables the Cooperating Sponsor to service a greater number of households with limited funds than would have been the case if grants had been given.

The attitude adopted to this revolving mechanism by some beneficiary groups and Cooperating Sponsors has been over-flexible. Significant-sized loans have been given for relatively large periods (3-5 years) to beneficiaries without emphasis on timely repayment. This attitude fails to instill financial discipline in loanees and repayment records were observed to be poor (<70%).

There are a number of reasons for such an attitude. First, the Cooperating Sponsor is under no obligation from USAID to return any credit that is repaid to it. USAID gives grants, not loans under SPSNP. The Cooperating Sponsor revolves or plans to revolve the funds, but with no pressure on it to make itself part-sustainable, it has no incentive to insist on timely repayment of principal and interest from its beneficiaries. Secondly, at least in the field sites visited, that while the lender is the Cooperating Sponsor, the beneficiary has to return the loan to the *woreda*/kebele administration or to his/her savings group or a committee consisting of the Cooperating Sponsor, *woreda* official and head of the department of agriculture and rural development. Observations indicated no strong sense of ownership of this money, and consequently the responsible body has little incentive to chase up defaults. Thirdly the capacity of Cooperating Sponsor field staff in micro-finance management is often limited and low exposure to successful micro-finance models has meant that an overly tolerant or paternalistic attitude has been accepted possible as a means of encouraging uptake.

In other parts of the world, it has been witnessed that such a lax attitude will ultimately lead to not only high defaults, but also to a breaking of the partnership and trust between the Cooperating Sponsor and the

village households. It will also harm the credit-worthiness of beneficiaries making it difficult for them to access funds from other sources.

The performance of revolving funds might be enhanced through a more intensive monitoring process that would first look for specific principles in the project design in terms of the revolving fund repayment process. These would include how interest rates and repayment conditions are determined, procedures in the event of default, the anticipated level of repayment (hopefully between 90 and 95%) and repayment period. In addition, the project design should clearly indicate the ownership of funds. If funds are provided to a group, the basis on which individuals participate in the group ownership process and what happens to funds revolved in the event that the group is dissolved. Finally, project design should indicate the purpose to which revolved funds should be put, including whether the first beneficiaries can be eligible to draw new loans (on the basis of sound performance) or the funds are to be specifically revolved to new beneficiaries. If such information is supplied in the project design or inception report, then a quarterly report for each loan project should include details on disbursement rates, recovery rates, reinvestment levels, percentage of non-performing loans, and absolute default rates, including reasons for any variation from original expectations. It is accepted that the Cooperating Sponsors might receive funds as a grant, but if it is offered to beneficiaries as revolving fund then both the beneficiaries and the Cooperating Sponsors must treat it as such – as a key part of the development process.

Linkages with micro-finance institutions such as WISDOM or with government banks, which lend to rural businesses or farmers were not witnessed in any *woreda* visited. Currently, businesses and income generating activities are at early stages and gaps in finance are filled from group savings or from the Cooperating Sponsor but as businesses start becoming bigger, institutional links will be required to formal institutions and all CSs have so far been weak in promoting such links.

4.3. Ownership and management of group assets

The performance of revolving funds accumulating repayment for assets received by individuals or groups contrasts markedly with the performance of revolving funds in savings and credit groups. In the first instance, the financial commitments were not always well understood by beneficiaries and ownership of the revolving finance tended to be unclear. In the second case, each member of the savings and credit group was well aware of the repayment terms (since they had decided this themselves), knew who had received loans and could exert peer pressure to ensure repayment. There was a clear sense of beneficiary ownership and self-determination in the latter case, which tended to be lacking in the former.

This sense of ownership, or lack of it, extended to group assets (such as milk marketing outlets or honey extractors) that had been provided to producer groups and for which individual members were committed to make repayments. While the CS was aware of the responsibilities of group members, it was not always apparent that individual beneficiaries knew what was expected of them. It appeared that management and oversight by the CS was crowding out the development of business acumen and a sense of responsibility amongst beneficiaries.

It is recommended that both the Cooperating Sponsor and USAID undertake more rigorous monitoring of revolving funds initially offering small loans with short repayment periods and using peer pressure to ensure timely repayments. USAID is also recommended to encourage the capacity-building of Cooperating Sponsor and *woreda* officials in micro-finance models through classroom training and exposure visits. The volume of ODA to Ethiopia may shrink over the coming years, and sustainable microfinance systems are one mechanism through which the Cooperating Sponsors and Ethiopia as a whole can reduce their dependency on external assistance.

4.4. Market development

Cooperating Sponsors indicated in their work plans that market linkage development was crucial to the activities they were undertaking. This, according to them, is also one of the hardest activities. A few Cooperating Sponsors are actively developing such linkages and are expecting to deepen market linkages further in their areas of operation. For example, market linkage activities have been undertaken for pottery, honey and silk producing Asset Building Groups or ABGs, where the Cooperating Sponsor has played a facilitating role in displaying products at events in Addis Ababa, as well as in regional markets, fairs and hotels. Assistance has also been provided in one *woreda*, to a ginger marketing ABG comprising 60 women and to the development of a market linkage between a silk buyer in Addis Ababa and its silk producing ABGs. During the second quarter of 2006, over 15 kg of silk was sold by two groups in Meskan alone. The next step in the market development process would be the federation of ABGs into KMAs or Kebele Marketing Associations.

The above response is well suited to a beneficiary community situated in a relatively accessible area with a developed marketing structure. A contrasting methodology has been developed in the northern part of the country where, in order to tackle poor market systems and market information systems, the Cooperating Sponsor has:

- formed honey and milk cooperatives which are trained and then assisted to become self-managed,
- built storage and distribution centres for these groups and provided them skills and equipment, and
- organised trainings for *woreda* officials and extension staff in marketing.

With these exceptions however, most Cooperating Sponsors have not placed significant emphasis on market development. This is due not only to an apparent lack of skills and capacity on their part but also to the fact that produce from SPSNP-sponsored activities such as honey or vegetables can either be consumed locally or that no marketable output has so far been produced. ORDA, for example, states that it has struggled with marketing and currently limits its role to only facilitating the provision of information in marketing through what it calls ‘market nodes’.

Questionnaire Data

Of the 440 beneficiaries interviewed using under the quantitative survey, only just over 10% reported receiving assistance in marketing.

Almost all Cooperating Sponsors have lagged in the promotion of off-farm activities (with the exception of production-related activities such as sericulture or apiculture). Where such activities were proposed, they were of the traditional variety: training of men and women in pottery, masonry, carpentry and weaving for example or as blacksmiths. Even in these vocations, beneficiaries have found it difficult to find gainful employment. The output of weavers e.g. has to compete with better quality imported products, which are modestly priced. It is difficult, however, to see what other or new activities could be undertaken in the economic setting of rural Ethiopia where purchasing power is low and demand for marketable goods and services limited.

4.5. Appropriate technology usage

It was observed that in almost all aspects of all projects, appropriate technologies had been used that could be easily replaced or repaired by beneficiaries. In some instances, where inputs had initially been sourced externally, local manufacture by had been encouraged allowing integration with other projects (e.g. In Tigray, a group of carpenters had been organized to produce frames for modern beehives).

Circumstances were observed where the sourcing of replacement parts required the intervention of the CS, thus drip irrigation technology can now be sourced within Ethiopia, but this is beyond the current capacity of most individual beneficiaries who do not have access to the distant markets where the

necessary materials are available. Equally it was indicated by CS field staff, that some of the more complex spare parts in technology provided to beneficiaries would be fabricated in their own workshops (as opposed to private sector manufacture) raising the question not of appropriate technology but of management towards sustainability. This was a consistent element of the more complex integrated projects- not that the technology used was inappropriate, but that its management did not always anticipate or develop interaction between beneficiaries and the private sector at all levels.

4.6. Gender

Forty four per cent of questionnaire respondents were women, and all responses could be disaggregated by gender, allowing a useful assessment of gender related issues. The original RFA placed some emphasis on gender sensitive interventions. In practice it was evident that Cooperating Sponsor projects were generally well compliant with gender issues and that most interventions were equally distributed between genders. Some exceptions were noted: Poultry farming in particular was more common amongst women, while more men undertook small-scale irrigation, (Table G37). A larger proportion of men were provided with beehives, seed and seedlings, while more women were provided with poultry sheep and goats. (Table G40) However, it is notable that these were the only areas where differences appeared significant. One significant and important difference observed was the smaller proportion of women undertaking study tours (Table G42). Although it is recognized that social conventions may work against this, it is nevertheless recommended that particular attention be paid to the inclusion of women in study tours in future projects.

Interestingly in both cases (cash and food) a larger proportion of women reported large increases. Equally significantly however, more women reported using the additional cash to purchase assets and fewer women reported any increase in the diversity of diet as a result of the successful interventions (Tables G50 and G51).

The participation of women in savings groups was equivalent to that of men, although women tended to both save and borrow smaller amounts (Tables G62 and G64). In terms of credit it was notable that where respondents had borrowed money to finance activities, no differences were seen between male and female access to credit. Again, while as many women as men expected to expand their small businesses, women anticipated access to credit to the same degree as men. These results suggest that within the context of the SPSNP projects, gender is not a factor with regard to access to credit. This is an unexpected response and merits further investigation.

The anticipations of women with regard to the achievement of sustainable food security were equivalent to those of men (Table G52) In both cases the modal expectation was that food security would not be achieved within at least three years, less than half of both men and women expected to graduate within a five-year time frame (from the onset of PSNP) and less than 10 % expected to achieve food security within the time frame of the original SPSNP program.

Generally the tabulated results show little differences between the disaggregated data sets. This is not unexpected. Cooperating Sponsors have had long exposure to gender issues in Ethiopia and have developed appropriate responses. In addition, the proportion of female-headed households in the targeted communities is relatively high (in some cases over 50%) so that targeting of female beneficiaries was high.

5. KEY FACTORS AFFECTING PROJECT SUCCESS

5.1. Integration of different interventions

Because projects were so wide in their compass, many beneficiaries took part in only one intervention (as described in section 3.4). In some cases, this proportion was as high as 80%, in others almost all beneficiaries took part in at least two and sometimes three different interventions. This had a clear effect upon food security. Isolated interventions had little discernible impact upon food security and assets acquired in the course of those interventions were more vulnerable as a result. Most beneficiaries indicated that at least three interventions are required to achieve sustainable food security. These interventions need not necessarily be fully integrated and indeed an element of diversification would help mitigate future risk. However, it was clearly reported and observed that greater impact was achieved if interventions were provided within the scope of an integrated community-based program.

The concept of the integrated rural development program has been well tested and found to be effective in some areas (such as immediate local impact), but lacking in others, particularly in terms of sustainability. Experience has shown that development within a selected community should be community driven if it is to continue once support has been withdrawn and requires a supportive environment in terms of government capacity if it is to be emulated elsewhere. Interviews with both *woreda* and *kabele* officials and with Cooperating Sponsor field staff suggest that while government policy may be supportive of SPSNP interventions, actual capacity to initiate parallel interventions in other *woredas* may be very limited.

Nevertheless, although the concept of integrated rural development solution may be less than adequate to meet the current development challenge (especially given the limited resources available), it is considered more effective to focus SPSNP interventions within specific areas and communities than to attempt to cover a greater number of beneficiaries over an entire *woreda*. This integration can be considered from two aspects. On the one hand, integration can take place within the context of an overall development plan. The typical example being the watershed development model developed by WFP and widely utilized in Tigray. Such a plan allows considerable synergy between different elements. Thus, beekeeping benefits from closed grazing areas, which also increase groundwater percolation and raise the water level in hand-dug wells, while enclosed areas also provided fodder for dairy cattle and shoats on a cut and carry basis during the dryer months³. On a different level, field staff emphasized that the integration of programs within a common “software” environment (i.e. imparting a consistent philosophy of self-help and business development) is essential to the success and sustainability of all diversification initiatives.

The integration of SPSNP interventions with PSNP programs was also observed to be a positive factor. In those communities where community water supplies had been created, time available for fieldwork and other activities had been substantially increased. PSNP-developed soil conservation measures protected water collection cisterns from excessive silting and enhanced the value of hand-dug wells. Further synergies might exist if PSNP community works could be realigned to support household asset development, in which case the frequency of individual household water collection structures might be significantly increased.

³ Despite the integrated nature of the Watershed Development Plan, it was noted that two frequent elements are inherently contradictory. On the one hand, large structures are developed by communities to collect run-off for subsequent household and livestock use. On the other, bunds, cisterns and land closure devices are employed to maximize infiltration and percolation to the water table. If these latter devices become effective then the former will fail.

5.2. Attitudinal Development

Field staff unanimously emphasized the importance of developing a positive beneficiary attitude in order to achieve sustainable development. Such attitudinal development was not well described, but could be assessed as an increased “self-help” mentality, increased business acumen, reduced donor dependence, increased self determination and a sense that the future need not be worse than the present. It was also universally recognized that such change can only be a gradual process and it may take five years or more before it can pervade an entire community. Nevertheless, such change or “software development” is essential to the developmental process. Without an attitude of self-determination amongst target households, replication will not occur, sustainability will be limited and new business initiatives will not begin.

The development of a positive attitude can be enhanced by three key interventions:

- Training – both technical, vocational and commercial.
- Exposure to success – “seeing is believing” was a phrase heard at every field visit.
- Provision of opportunity – generally the inputs necessary to begin new income generating activities.

These three elements are all essential if a positive attitude is to be successfully developed. It is trite, but effectively true that:

<p>Attitude without opportunity= frustration Opportunity without attitude= non-sustainability Attitude + opportunity= sustainable development</p>

To a considerable extent, all CS hardware and technical training interventions are effectively providing a “framework of opportunity” within which attitudinal development must take place. The significance of this approach cannot be overemphasized. Interventions that achieved limited commercial impact (such as savings and credit groups) nevertheless had a substantial positive impact upon beneficiary attitude, which was undoubtedly stimulating replication and self-determination. Those beneficiaries who had benefited from such groups could be expected to be effective recipients of future, more complex interventions.

It was clear that while all field staff recognized the significance of a positive attitude, few could define it clearly or describe ways in which it could be stimulated. There is a definite need to examine this area of development more closely and for Cooperating Sponsors to design and undertake programs with attitudinal development as a primary focus.

It is also clear that since the necessary changes are slow, a two or three year intervention will not be adequate to promote the required impact. Moreover, change can be expected to be even slower in those situations where interventions are diluted by being spread over a wide area or amongst a large number of beneficiaries. These observations were supported by most field staff and have clear implications for future initiatives.

5.3. PSNP/SPSNP Complementarity

SPSNP interventions are based upon the assumption that the PSNP will successfully protect individual household assets and will assist household development through the development of community assets. Experience has shown that these assumptions (and particularly the former) were largely justified. Although the PSNP was subject to a range of administrative and logistical problems, and continues to be suffer from capacity constraints at the local administrative level, the program was indeed successful in its

primary goal of protecting household assets and with the exception of some areas of Amhara, food security in PSNP *woredas* was largely sustained. This impact was judged by beneficiaries and CS field staff to be critical to the success of SPSNP interventions. On the one hand, field staff reported that beneficiaries would not have been able to participate in SPSNP interventions if they had been obliged to try and support themselves. On the other beneficiaries reported that without the PSNP, heads of households would have migrated out of the family area looking for temporary work.

In its second goal, the PSNP has resulted in the construction of community assets such as the construction or rehabilitation of a range of infrastructure including roads, bridges, terracing works and soil conservation, water channels, water harvesting reservoirs and dams. In this respect the PSNP has had more mixed success and shown mixed relevance to the SPSNP. Thus, vehicle-worthy roads have been less relevant for subsequent activities initiated under SPSNP largely because market development and the production of a surplus is still in its infancy amongst SPSNP beneficiaries so that most produce can be brought to market on the back of donkeys. At the same time, it was learned that limited coordination and capacity at the *woreda* level had resulted in some poorly defined PSNP projects that were not well integrated with any overall development plan. The Evaluation team also learned that in some cases, the development of infrastructure was undertaken not because there was a need for it, but to create man-days of employment for PSNP target beneficiaries.

On the other hand, other infrastructure, particularly the terracing works and water structures, can be seen as a necessary pre-condition upon which subsequent SPSNP activities have been built (although some of these structures had been created prior to either the SPSNP or PSNP programs). Many SPSNP activities could not have been undertaken at all or their output would have been less had this PSNP infrastructure development not preceded them. Water structures of storage and channeling in particular have enabled water availability for horticulture, animal husbandry and improved cereal variety cultivation. Equally, the undertaking of Food/Cash for Works, if implemented by the same CS that undertook SPSNP enabled both the CS and the beneficiaries to develop a deeper relationship with and understanding that benefited the implementation of SPSNP activities. This was not always the case; in some *woredas*, Cooperating Sponsors are only implementing SPSNP and did not benefit from program integration to the same extent.

With regard to food security, the universal opinion of both Cooperating Sponsors and beneficiaries was first that the PSNP as it is currently practiced will not result in the achievement of household food security in the foreseeable future. Secondly, that SPSNP interventions, when properly integrated could enable households to become food secure. However, the time period of two years for SPSNP was too short to achieve food security, (especially given that the first few months of most programs were spent in negotiation and were essentially planning phases). Even the expected third year extension was not considered enough; a longer period of between 5-10 years of sustained interventions was generally agreed to be necessary for any meaningful sustainable impact to be observed. Although these responses may be considered to exhibit a degree of “donor dependency”, the evaluation team agrees with the observation that a two or three year program is not long enough and that a time frame of at least five years is necessary to ensure lasting success.

There is one further aspect of the PSNP program that is very relevant to SPSNP initiatives – namely that experience has now shown that the PSNP does effectively provide a mechanism to mitigate malnutrition amongst destitute communities, as a result of which, SPSNP-type initiatives need not be driven by an over-riding urgency to assist all beneficiaries. The need to achieve universal coverage is largely met by the PSNP, allowing development programs to be more focused and to target for success without risk to the most vulnerable. This is perhaps the most important aspect of the PSNP from a developmental perspective – that it allows a paradigm shift in Cooperating Sponsor targeting mechanisms. It does not appear that this has yet been fully appreciated by all stakeholders.

5.4. Replication

Given the limited resources available for SPSNP interventions, it is important that interventions should be easily replicated wherever possible. Experience in this area is very variable. The evaluation team found evidence that replication is happening in some areas and with regard to some interventions, although given the limited period of implementation, it is difficult to determine the extent of such replication. Generally, the lower cost, immediate impact interventions appear (not surprisingly) to be most replicable. Thus backyard vegetable production was one area where replication was clearly observable as its tangible benefits could be quickly appreciated. Similarly, the number of credit and savings groups organized by farmers themselves was rapidly increasing as non-beneficiaries approached the Cooperating Sponsor to provide bye-laws and to assist with registration. The provision of shoats that were revolved on an in kind basis is another example of a readily replicable intervention.

Frequently however, the evaluation team did observe complex and integrated interventions, especially those involving high initial capital costs or a significant degree of organization/administration that would not easily be replicated by small communities or individual households. It is difficult to see how a village community could undertake water diversion works of the complexity and to the standards observed in Enderta, or how individual households could construct⁴ or water cisterns without the facilitation of organizations such as the Cooperating Sponsors. The provision of shoats on a cash basis, where repaid funds were meant to be revolved was an example of a less replicable intervention by virtue of its high start-up cost and lax fund management.

In general, the interventions with the greatest immediate impacts were higher cost and less replicable. Those with lesser (albeit immediate) impacts were more replicable. Interventions with longer-term impacts were intermediate in this regard. It was notable that no replication of vocational training inputs was reported – i.e. no trainees had been approached to pass their skills on to others.

In addition to these constraints, replication was frequently reported to be limited by the high turnover amongst government staff in local departments in Ethiopia. This means that those officials with whom the Cooperating Sponsor has developed goodwill and who have been sensitised to plan and implement activities in a participatory, bottom-up manner can be relocated and new Development Advisors (DAs), unaware of the approach, take their place so that sensitization must begin again. It is noted that the government accepts that in order for replication to be effective resources will have to be allocated to capacity building of DAs in participatory planning and in concepts such as watershed management and market development. Most participating Cooperating Sponsors do organise training courses for *woreda* officials and extension staff in their own SPSNP *woredas* but these are a fraction of the total *woredas* in the country. On a larger scale, WFP in collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development is in the process of training up Development Agents at the *woreda* and *kabele* levels.

Finally, possibilities for effective replication are constrained by the attitude prevalent amongst some Cooperating Sponsors whereby inputs are provided and activities undertaken without any financial contribution by the beneficiaries. Cooperating Sponsors have justified this by stating that these are pilot activities requiring incentives for cautious beneficiaries to adopt them. In other cases, it has been argued that the cost of procurement of some equipment or input is beyond the financial capacity of the individual beneficiary or group e.g. milk selling centers or post-harvest storage centers. However, while these arguments may hold some weight, little attempt by the Cooperating Sponsors has been observed to shift this relationship towards one where beneficiaries are contributing more once the demonstration has been

⁴ Although no replication of hand dug wells was observed at the project sites visited, the authors learned of a project at Shere where an initial 15 six metre deep dug wells had been increased to 125 through unsupported replication by individual households.

successful and borne positive results. Where cost sharing has been encouraged e.g. by the provision of ruminants on credit, the credit periods are long, the credit amounts significant and repayment discipline poor.

As result of the circumstances described, there are few resources available to replicate successful initiatives. It may be too early for households to be expected to provide contributions for development activities as the project at this stage is barely 18 months old. However Cooperating Sponsors do not appear to have begun even planning how their relationships will evolve with their beneficiaries over the coming years. Under such management the level of replication will continue to be low.

Questionnaire Data

Of the 440 beneficiaries interviewed using under the quantitative survey, 433 answered whether they knew if other households had replicated their activity/ies. 22% replied that yes, many households had replicated, 40% replied that a few households had replicated while 37% replied that no households had replicated.

27% of men reported that their activities had been replicated by many households compared to a lower 15% of women.

In general it was observed that the level of replication of interventions was limited and that little consideration had been given to this element of the program in most cases, especially in the more complex, integrated cases (which tended to show the greatest impacts).

5.5. Linkages with Government

Interviews with field staff and local administrators indicated that all Cooperating Sponsors have developed good working relationships with government at the grass roots level (i.e. DAs and Producer Association (PA) administration). This includes the forging of practical working relationships with PAs for planning and targeting interventions, defining who can be classified as a beneficiary etc and with DAs for disseminating extension messages, training and transferring technology. Indeed, throughout most of the evaluation field visits, DAs generally accompanied Cooperating Sponsor staff wherever the evaluation team went.

However, relationships with *woreda* and zonal level administration were less consistent. Some Cooperating Sponsors were implicitly linked with government at all levels and experienced no difficulty in becoming fully integrated into the local planning process. Indeed, the balance of resources appeared to be such that these Cooperating Sponsor were augmenting or even substituting for limited local planning and administrative capacity. In other areas, limited capacity at the *woreda* level meant that PSNP interventions and community asset development projects were not well planned and it was difficult for Cooperating Sponsors to achieve the necessary degree of integration with the planning process.

Generally however, the *woreda* administrations have welcomed the SPSNP interventions seeing them as complementing PSNP activities while Cooperating Sponsors have filled resource gaps where needed. In addition some Cooperating Sponsors were well linked to research institutions and used both results and material to develop SPSNP interventions. Nevertheless, effective linkages with government are not helped by limited local administrative capacity and a shortage of DAs. It was repeatedly noted that while each PA is supposed to be served by at least three DAs, there is rarely more than one available and even these are frequently recalled for “retraining” purposes. This aspect of development could be improved; in order to further strengthen linkages with government, it is recommended that Cooperating Sponsors undertake study tours and exposure visits of *woreda* officials to sites where participatory bottom-up development has been operated by the Cooperating Sponsor for longer periods so that they can observe the impact of such efforts themselves.

5.6. Private Sector Linkages

It was noted that in specific circumstances, interventions had been designed to incorporate linkages to the private sector, both in the sale of produce such as milk, honey or haricot beans, silk, woven goods or pottery. However, in most other general interventions, the private sector was limited to the role of buyer. There was little observed attempt to involve private sector participation in other roles such as seedling nursery management, inputs supply, repairs to equipment or out-grower schemes. This is very much in keeping with the prevailing philosophy that farmers are better served by cooperatives rather than by individual traders, but unless such cooperatives are well and competitively managed, such an approach requires continued input from the Cooperative Sponsor and limits the sustainability of the interventions. In particular, only limited evidence was observed of Cooperating Sponsors linking groups or individual households to public sector financial institutions to secure micro-credit. Given that both the Cooperating Sponsor's and community's financial resources are limited, efforts need to be made identify channels of credit which, as the nascent businesses and business cooperatives start planning to expand or improve, will be needed to cover resource gaps.

The introduction of the private sector provides new roles for the Cooperating Sponsor and assists in achieving an effective exit strategy with an increased probability of sustainable development. Thus the CS could promote private sector participation by inviting private sector players into the project as "Lead Farmers" or Lead Businessmen". The CS would then play two key roles: first in selecting and introducing the most appropriate private sector partners and secondly as an arbiter to avoid any element of exploitation in negotiations between the private sector partners and PSNP beneficiaries. Once a sound business relationship had been established, the CS could progressively withdraw from the arrangement, leaving the private sector partner with the commercial incentive to ensure the sustainability of the beneficiary enterprises.

6. OVERALL IMPACT ASSESSMENT

6.1. Attribution of Impact

It was noted that in almost every case, SPSNP interventions were being undertaken in *woredas* and *kabeles* that had been subject to previous interventions by the CS. This meant that the interventions could not be considered as discrete initiatives, but rather as the culmination of a series of events extending back over several years prior to the SPSNP intervention. In particular, where Cooperating Sponsors had been working over a lengthy period, a more responsive attitude could be developed amongst beneficiaries (although it was equally possible for a more entrenched paternalistic attitude to be developed by the Cooperating Sponsor).

This historical effect was evident not only in attitudinal development, but also in technical training and in watershed management program development, where it was commonly observed that beneficiaries had been subject to interventions over a significant period before the SPSNP programs had begun.

This raises the issue of "development perspective" as a key aspect of this evaluation. From the perspective of a donor, USAID/Ethiopia has viewed SPSNP interventions as discrete activities, funded from particular sources, which can be evaluated as having specific and measurable impacts. This however is not the view of those who work with or benefit from these resources.

From the perspective of a CS, many of the SPSNP interventions have been part of Cooperating Sponsoring programs that the CS has been carrying out with finances from different sources according to availability. Thus World Vision International has what are called Area Development Programs (ADPs)

into which the SPSNP and the activities undertaken under it have been adjusted. Similarly, in the case of REST, SPSNP is a subset of its existing 5 year plans.

From the perspective of many beneficiary households, the SPSNP initiatives are part of a continuum of assistance, which may be subject to changing conditionalities, but which nevertheless represents a gradual progression (albeit with an end that is not always clearly defined).

It is therefore difficult to identify the specific impacts of SPSNP interventions per se. Many of the benefits observed could not be attributed to these programs alone, but to the gradual development process that had evolved from partnerships between Cooperating Sponsors and beneficiary communities established over more than the two-year period under consideration. Such integration of programs over time may promote synergism, but it tends to confound the accurate analysis of impact.

6.2. Progress towards Sustainability

The sustainability of interventions will depend upon the degree of alignment to beneficiary needs as well as how much it contributes to income. The evaluation team noted that producer groups whose objective seemed to be solely to support the provision of assets (such as shoats) lacked any form of inherent sustainability and once the supervision of the CS was withdrawn, beneficiaries who had received shoats would have no incentive to remain within such groups. This contrasted with groups such as savings and credit groups where the beneficiaries all stood to gain from the efficient functioning of the group as a whole.

Crop production conditions over the last three years have been above average and this can be expected to have created an environment favoring the sustainability of interventions. However, current observations suggest that actual sustainability is limited by the short implementation period of SPSNP interventions. Since in many cases a number of months in year one were taking up in negotiation, planning and start-up activities, implementation periods in most cases are no more than 18 months. Thus groups may have been formed but are not functioning at their optimum. Revolving funds for ruminants have not been strongly institutionalized at the community level – they have gone through one or at most two cycles. Activities such as drip irrigation have seen only one harvest and in some cases, such as fruit trees, none at all. A longer implementation period would have enabled more benefits, both attitudinal and physical, to have been realized thus ensuring greater sustainability.

In general however, most of the household level interventions for which infrastructural work had been completed could be considered to be potentially sustainable. Where inputs had been provided the benefits could generally be sustained; water-harvesting structures required little maintenance and backyard gardens could be repeatedly cultivated on a profitable basis. Nevertheless, such sustainability appeared less certain in the case of the more complicated group intervention. In particular, interventions that required the supervision of the CS to ensure repayment of loans and to assist in the marketing of produce and repair of equipment would clearly require such continued input on an ongoing basis for at least another twelve months and possibly more before they might be considered self-sustaining.

Questionnaire Data

When asked what their future plans were regarding the activities they were undertaking, 34% stated that they wanted to improve them and 52% stated they wanted to expand them. Only 1 respondent was thinking of stopping the activity while 13% stated they wanted to merely maintain the activities at the present level and in the present state.

Sustainability in this regard is intimately linked to the development of the necessary “software”, i.e. the business skills and attitude that will allow beneficiaries to make the correct decisions to ensure the success of marketing cooperatives and to guarantee the repayment of loans. As reported by all field staff,

such attitudinal change is a gradual process, developed by the provision of suitable opportunities and enhanced by success in those ventures. Once attitudinal change has been achieved, its sustainability will depend upon a favorable business environment that offers further opportunities for development, but such changes cannot be expected to occur within the 18 months that have elapsed for most interventions.

In general the evaluation team was not able to assess the actual sustainability of interventions. It noted with concern that major group interventions required continual CS input at this stage, however, those interventions that provided discrete support to individual households did indeed appear to be potentially sustainable.

6.3. Overall Impact Assessment

The evaluation team found plenty of evidence on the ground to assess that overall, despite shortcomings, the impacts of both SPSNP interventions have been positive:

- The formation of savings and credit groups has enabled people to access credit on improved terms. Beneficiaries no longer have to obtain credit on tough and usurious conditions and can “get a foot on the first rung of the micro-finance ladder”. At the same time, their own savings in the groups are building up and they can develop small businesses of their own choosing.
- The promotion of vegetable production has empowered female-headed households in particular who now grow vegetables to eat and sell. The diet within the household has diversified and small amounts of income are being earned from selling at home or within the local market.
- Water pumps have reduced the time taken and distance travelled by women and children to fetch water.
- Animal husbandry has led to the greater production of milk, increased income and restocking of family assets.
- The formation of production and marketing groups has enabled the earning of greater income and lowering of costs as well as the introduction of appropriate, low-cost technology. The groups are taking the first steps towards building more productive businesses.
- The closer interaction of villagers with Development Agents, facilitated by the Cooperating Sponsors, has enabled knowledge and skills to be transferred and also vaccination campaigns of livestock to be more effectively carried out.
- Through all these activities, beneficiaries are developing a positive mindset of self sufficiency, self-determination and business skills.
- Women are participating more and expressing themselves more actively despite cultural inhibitions in almost all of the areas visited.

Questionnaire Data

Of the 440 beneficiaries interviewed using under the quantitative survey, 431 beneficiaries answered whether the activities they had undertaken under SPSNP had resulted in increased production of food for their own consumption. Of these 87% of both male and female respondents replied yes they had and of these 37% stated that livestock production/rearing had led to the most production of food for own consumption, followed by horticulture and poultry rearing at 15 and 14% respectively. Other notable answers were small-scale irrigation at 10% and beekeeping at 7%. Of those who stated that production of food for their own consumption had increased, 16% stated that the increase was large, 67% stated it was moderate and 17% stated it was insignificant. Gender segregated, 12% of men and 20% of women stated that the increase was large.

Observations supported the statement of a management member of one Cooperating Sponsor: ‘A year and a half after SPSNP, there is a lot more hope than I had before. There is a convergence of thinking and vision.’ SPSNP has enabled Cooperating Sponsors to move beyond handouts and short-term solutions and to experiment with developing sustainable livelihoods. Even if SPSNP were not extended, it will have

introduced positive models of livelihood development that other donors and the government could strengthen and replicate given adequate resources.

However, there are constraints, which hinder impact:

- The impact of such interventions will be limited if other issues impinging upon economic development in Ethiopia are not tackled too. One such issue is the high population growth. Not only does this have an effect on amount of nutrition available per capita and on division of land, high fertility also negatively affects working mothers' health and productivity. Although this problem was frequently mentioned by field staff, the number of activities being undertaken by Cooperating Sponsors under family planning and contraception is negligible under SPSNP.

- Impact has also been limited where Cooperating Sponsors have spread themselves too thinly geographically. This was undoubtedly the most significant observed constraint upon impact and has meant that activities have been dispersed

and complementary activities may not have been undertaken due to resource constraints. Reasons for spreading thinly include donor pressure as well as local government pressure that the CS must have presence in each kebele. This pressure is not homogenous throughout the country it appears as some Cooperating Sponsors were observed to be working in all kebeles in some *woredas* and only in a select few in others, depending upon the demands of the particular *woreda* authorities. Where the CS has been able to concentrate its activities, impact has been significantly more obvious. This was particularly noticeable in the case of REST, which has been able to integrate several activities in a limited number of watershed sites e.g. terracing, erosion control and percolator trenches (under PSNP) with water harvesting, apiculture and vegetable production. Such sites serve as powerful demonstrations which can be effectively used for study tours and exposure visits for farmers from neighbouring *woredas*.

- It is significant that the number of potential beneficiaries in each *woreda* or *kebele* is much higher than the actual number of beneficiaries that have been reached. Lower outreach is chiefly due to a limitation of resources, otherwise Cooperating Sponsors report that the number of people interested in, e.g., taking up sheep and goat breeding is much more than can be serviced.
- Finally, most Cooperating Sponsors indicated the time scale of the initiative is too limited and that the work is only half done – even where infrastructural development projects are complete, positive attitudes of self-determination still need to be fostered.

Questionnaire Data

429 people responded to the question whether the activities they had undertaken under SPSNP had resulted in increased cash income. Of these, 83% stated that it had. Around 40% of these stated that the largest increase was due to livestock fattening/rearing, 17% stated it was due to horticulture, 14% said it was due to poultry, 9% due to small-scale irrigation and 6% due to beekeeping. Of those who stated that cash income had increased, 12% stated that the increase was large, 77% stated that the increase was moderate and 11% stated that the increase was insignificant.

Of the 351 respondents who answered what the increase per month in their net income had been, 25% stated that it was below ETB16, 27% stated it was between ETB16 and ETB50 and 48% stated it was over ETB50.

Two thirds or 74% of those whose cash incomes had increased used it to buy food and 66% used it to buy household assets. Of the 426 people who responded to whether their household's diet had diversified due to SPSNP activities they had undertaken, 80% stated that it had.

Notwithstanding the above remarks, it should be noted though that in most cases, it is difficult to attribute any impact associated with an SPSNP activity solely to that USAID-financed intervention. Because the Cooperating Sponsors have been working in the *woredas* for several years prior to SPSNP and with

resources from other donors, SPSNP must be seen as the culmination of a series of activities, building on earlier efforts. It is possible that SPSNP interventions undertaken without preceding work might have less impact.

Nevertheless, it is also quite clear that although the PSNP has been effective in its primary goal of protecting household assets and preventing food insecurity, neither beneficiaries nor those working in the field anticipate any significant progress towards the achievement of sustainable household food security unless additional interventions are put in place to develop household assets. In this regard, the SPSNP intervention can be assessed to have shown significant impact, albeit at a lower level, over a longer time frame and amongst a more restricted target group than originally anticipated. It can also be expected that this impact will have a degree of sustainability, although again this is limited by the high degree of reliance upon cooperating sponsors that the more complex group interventions require.⁵

Overall therefore, SPSNP interventions have demonstrated significant benefits under particular circumstances. These benefits are limited in impact and will continue to be restricted unless the resources of either the Cooperating Sponsors or the local administration are significantly increased.

7. EVALUATION OF BEST PRACTICES

As stated in other sections of the report, the time period for the implementation of activities may be too short to judge whether a practice has been good. At the same time, some activities were clearly successful in some areas or under certain management but less successful in other areas or under different management. Nevertheless some general principles can be established and these are noted below:

7.1. Traditional Elements

Amongst the more traditional interventions, three activities stood out as being both well accepted, replicable, and generally sustainable. These were the facilitation of savings and credit groups, provision of shoats and establishment of household water supply systems. Each of these interventions had different strengths and was most appropriate in certain areas:

Savings and Credit Groups – were most relevant in the very poorest areas where beneficiaries had no means to access micro-finance institutions. They had the advantage of self-determination – beneficiaries formed their own groups, which they managed themselves and they were able to use loans for whatever business interest they wished. The group had a strong cohesion maintained by peer pressure and good loan performance. Although the impact of these groups was small, they nevertheless made a significant and immediate difference to the lives of those who participated in them.

Provision of Shoats – this was the most widespread intervention and was applicable to both crop and livestock production areas, although in crop areas, some beneficiaries indicated that ultimately they

⁵ It is useful to compare the SPSNP interventions with the current household development program undertaken by the Government to complement the PSNP. This consists primarily of micro-credit facilities that are to be made available to PSNP beneficiaries. FSCB administration noted that the program suffered from a lack of trained personnel with the result that the amount of funds disbursed had been limited. More significantly however, the program required significant collateral before loans could be given and this was reported by SPSNP field staff to be beyond the capacity of the majority of SPSNP beneficiaries. The conclusion drawn by the evaluation team was that this program had been pitched at a higher level of development than most SPSNP beneficiaries had yet attained. In this regard, interventions such as savings and credit groups, which could be accessed by the very poor, were particularly useful in providing “intervening rungs” on the “developmental ladder”.

wished to trade their shoats for oxen. Nevertheless, as an intervention, small ruminant production was well suited to the limited grazing areas available, provided useful additional household income and could (provide the ruminants were repaid in kind) be replicated easily. The main disadvantage of this intervention was that it is susceptible to drought and might not be sustained through environmental shock. The questionnaire responses showed that this intervention was highly rated by beneficiaries, especially female headed households as a means of increasing income.

Establishment of Household Water Supply Systems – this was the most desired intervention, particularly in those areas such as in Tigray, where drought has been a recurring problem. Although the cost of the initial infrastructure was high (and this places a severe constraint on replication by individual households), the advantages to a household were immediate and included not only supplementary crop irrigation, but enhanced backyard gardening, including the development of household drip systems, stock watering and even provision of household drinking water in extreme situations.

Study Tours – the practical value of study tours was repeatedly emphasized by beneficiaries. Visiting successful microprojects both incentivized other beneficiaries and allowed first hand experiences to be passed from one beneficiary to another. In a situation of limited resources, where replication is essential if benefits are to be spread over a wider area, study tours deserve to be a key element of all SPSNP projects as a primary means of disseminating information. The survey data reported that only 26% of trainees had been taken on study tours⁶ (Table G10). This is regrettable since beneficiaries have clearly indicated that they are the best means of understanding just what a particular intervention requires and what it can mean in terms of benefits. Study tours allow the “software” to be developed, including both technical knowledge and the necessary incentive to achieve comparable success. Future SPSNP initiatives should seek to include study tours as an integral component of every intervention such that once a given intervention had been successfully established then that success should be exploited to the maximum by demonstration to as many other beneficiaries as possible.

7.2. Innovative Activities

Although there were no innovative activities in the sense that they had not already been tested in neighbouring countries or elsewhere in the world, there were some activities observed by the evaluation team that were innovative to Ethiopia or to the area/*woreda* in question.

- CRS has introduced in Ethiopia and other neighbouring country what are called ‘seed fairs’ and ‘livestock fairs’. These fairs give several buyers and sellers the opportunity to interact in one place simultaneously. Buying beneficiaries are given vouchers using which they can buy the seed, tools or ruminants of their choice – both the variety and the type. At the end of the day, CRS pays cash to the sellers to the value of the vouchers they have collected. A brief evaluation undertaken on behalf of CRS of the seed fairs gave a generally positive assessment.⁷ CRS states that this method encourages the growth of local markets as local sellers get an opportunity to sell their products. Though not a primary purpose, CRS uses these fairs to disseminate information on HIV, nutrition and sanitation too.
- Watershed development in Tigray by REST has been an innovative activity if seen in the national context. Within a given watershed, several activities at community and household level are

⁶ Significantly fewer women (18%) undertook study tour than men (33%). Given the significant proportion of female headed households in the survey, this aspect requires particular attention.

⁷ Bramel P.J. and Remington T, CRS Seed Vouchers and Fairs: A meta-analysis of their use in Zimbabwe, Ethiopia and Gambia (undated)

undertaken which complement each other including the harvesting of water, horticulture and drinking water for livestock. The terracing and rehabilitation of land and gully reinforcement allows for beekeeping, agro-forestry and livestock rearing to then take place – SPNSP activities at the household level being built on previous PSNP activities at the community level. REST states that water harvesting has been an incredible trigger especially considering that effective water management was ‘appalling’ in the area. The CS introduced a range of new water harvesting structures.

There is no systematic sharing of best practices or lessons being learnt by the various Cooperating Sponsors under SPNSP around the country. The progress reports submitted regularly by the Cooperating Sponsors to USAID also lack documentation of lessons learnt. Such sharing should be actively encouraged by USAID if mistakes are to be avoided and good practices adopted.

7.3. Less Relevant Interventions

Two areas of activity stood out as being of limited relevance under the current circumstances. The first of these was vocational training. This was clearly successful in terms first, of imparting skills to a selected group of individuals and secondly, of moving those individuals very rapidly towards household food security. However, the approach proved relatively costly and limited in both the number of beneficiaries that were assisted and the circumstances where skills could be applied so that beneficiaries were not always able to find ready markets for their skills. This was a disappointing observation given the obvious need to diversify household incomes away from traditional agricultural activities, but it would appear that such diversification requires a market that has not yet been developed in most rural areas and that such skills might be more appropriate to peri-urban areas.⁸

The second area of limited relevance was in the marketing of traditional agricultural produce. In practice, Cooperating Sponsors had placed less emphasis on this aspect of development than had been generally indicated in initial proposals. However, it was observed that at current levels of production, such emphasis was in fact unnecessary and with the exception of honey, milk and some specific artisanal products, most production generated by SPNSP activities could be readily disposed of in rural markets without difficulty or additional assistance being required.

7.4. Underlying Principles

There are a number of underlying principles that would appear to determine the most effective practices, the first of which being the importance of an integrated approach. Where interventions were integrated with local administrative development plans (such as watershed development plans) and where they built upon PSNP interventions then impacts were greater and sustainability was more probable. Secondly, and arising from the need for integration was the ability to limit interventions to selected areas and specific target groups, including particularly those who would be able to make the best use of interventions. Such a concentration of resources allows the development of communities who can move together towards food security in a sustainable way as opposed to isolated households whose future development would be much less certain. Thirdly, the effectiveness of practices appeared to be determined not only by the intervention itself, but also by its relevance to the beneficiary community and in particular by the manner in which it was implemented. The capacity of field staff as project managers and extension agents was observed to make a fundamental difference to the success or failure of interventions varying from savings and credit schemes to backyard gardens.

⁸ It is important to note that 41% of beneficiaries surveyed received PSNP Food Aid only while only 25% received cash only, and 33% received both (Table G4). This may indicate some bias toward areas where markets would be less developed and market-based interventions less effective.

Finally and perhaps most critically from the aspect of sustainability there is the need to coordinate with local administration and in particular to build capacity at the DA level so that successful interventions can be both sustained and replicated elsewhere. This need was recognized by all Cooperating Sponsors who also recognized that limited capacity in this area was a nation-wide shortcoming of local government. In some cases, Cooperating Sponsors have tried to avoid this shortcoming by taking on the role of the local administration, but this fails to recognize that ultimately local government capacity must be developed if the needs of the PSNP beneficiaries are to be met.

Limited capacity at the local administrative level is perhaps the biggest issue facing the successful implementation of SPSNP or any subsequent development initiative. Cooperating Sponsors have in the past taken on a role that to a considerable extent substituted for local administration in the distribution of relief. Such a role is not appropriate to the promotion of sustainable development. In the development arena, resources are limited and it is impossible to achieve the universal coverage of beneficiaries that might be the target of a relief exercise. Instead the best that can be hoped for is the creation of successful examples that can be replicated by other beneficiaries or by the local administration.

The creation of successful examples should be one of the two underlying targets of the SPSNP exercise, and interventions should be integrated and focused to achieve this goal. The second target - of achieving successful replication of sound interventions depends upon the availability of local resources, and complementary programs will/are definitely required to facilitate this.

8. ROLE OF COOPERATING SPONSORS IN SPSNP DEVELOPMENT

8.1. Nature of SPSNP Development


It appeared to the Evaluation Team that most of the interventions undertaken by Cooperating Sponsors fell short of the original expectations of those who had drafted the initial SPSNP RFA in the sense that most interventions repeated previous agriculturally-focused programs and relatively few introduced new concepts or methodologies such as vocational training or other off-farm income generating activities. However, it was also clear that the traditional interventions were in fact more appropriate to the level of development of both individual households and the surrounding economic environment.

This does not imply that the solution to graduation is to achieve diversified agricultural-based livelihoods on drought-prone, small fragmented, degraded parcels of land. Rather that the non-traditional and off-farm income generating activities tried so far have limited relevance on a wide scale and will be less effective in achieving sustainable household food security in the majority of current economic environments. To be more generally successful, these interventions will require increased private sector interest and investment in rural economies to exploit the non-traditional skills and products.

It was evident that the traditional interventions helped effectively destitute households to generate food and/or cash resources in various ways so that they could move towards household food security. In most cases this involved the production of food for the household with the possibility of a small surplus that could be marketed locally. In a few cases, there was a much greater emphasis on marketing (eg. the export of pottery or marketing of white pea-beans), and it would appear that in these cases, the beneficiary households had already moved beyond subsistence production to a position where much greater emphasis could be placed on cash crops or industries. These interventions appeared to be a second phase of intermediate development that is not yet appropriate for the majority of PSNP beneficiaries

because the economic environment is not conducive to such interventions (e.g. there may be no ready market for the goods or services). This is simplistically represented diagrammatically below:

Figure 1. Spectrum of interventions



The evaluation team concluded that the interphase between relief and market-orientated interventions (that are more typical of development) involves at least two stages. In the first, beneficiaries are assisted to achieve sustainable household food security with occasional surplus production. In the second, they are assisted to develop a consistent commercial surplus for the market with direct oversight and assistance from the Cooperating Sponsor. It is at this second phase of intermediate development (Phase 2b) that more market focused interventions are relevant. These might be associated with economies of scale (including organized groups or formal cooperatives) and the development of linkages to markets, finance and commercial technologies. If this second phase can be achieved, then more traditional developmental approaches become relevant whereby sustainable development without oversight is promoted. It would appear however, that the more market orientated second phase interventions are not appropriate until the first stage of achieving sustainable food security has been successfully met and only then if appropriate economic conditions (chiefly an adequate market) are available. Most SPSNP interventions are working at this first stage and this appears to be generally appropriate to the economic environment and conditions of the beneficiaries. The Government household development micro-credit program would appear to be more appropriate to “Phase 2b” of development and to be less relevant to the majority of PSNP beneficiaries.

8.2. Role of the Cooperating Sponsors

It would appear that Cooperating Sponsors will play a role in rural development in Ethiopia for the foreseeable future. In this context it is helpful that all Cooperating Sponsors have established good working relationships at the local administration (PA) level and most have good relationships at the *woreda* level. In general they have been accepted as stakeholders in the national development process to supplement limited local capacity. However within this context, it was observed that the role expected of Cooperating Sponsors by local administrations (and indeed the role which Cooperating Sponsors appear to have broadly accepted) is one that attempts to achieve too much with too limited resources

The resources required to facilitate and oversee the process of economic development are generally greater per beneficiary than those required to distribute relief. They are also quite different in terms of skill sets. Hence, within the development context of SPSNP programs, it is not realistic to expect Cooperating Sponsors to target each and every household within their *woreda/kebeles* of operation, since both financial resources and manpower are inadequate to achieve this.

All parties should accept that the role of the Cooperating Sponsors in development is limited (by capacity, resources and by national mandate) to that of assistance and demonstration or the establishment of pilot models that government can replicate and take to scale. To attempt to adopt a wider or more ambitious

role would be to usurp the function of government as the primary development institution in the country. This view was a consistent theme in discussions with donors including CIDA and WFP.

The Cooperating Sponsors do appreciate their limitations. They indicated that they would prefer to consolidate their work and be enabled to undertake activities in a concentrated manner in order to have a bigger impact. However, with pressure from government (and donors⁹) to spread extensively, they state that they cannot work as intensively as they would like.

In one specific case, a Cooperating Sponsor had indeed been able to work in a concentrated manner and had achieved significant impact as a result. The ability to achieve such focus appeared to be primarily derived from the close relationship between the CS and local government – to the extent that it appeared to be an integral part of the local administration itself - and the high standing in which the CS was held.

This approach deserves further comment. On the one hand, the approach was definitely effective in terms of integrating with wider development initiatives and in terms of impacts achieved. On the other hand, under this approach, the Cooperating Sponsor adopted a role of continued involvement and supervision with no apparent intention to move on from the targeted areas other than through the expansion of its own resources. As such, the CS definitely appeared to be substituting for, rather than supplementing the role of the local administration in development. Moreover, the integrated nature of the interventions meant that the Cooperating Sponsor played an all-encompassing role that largely excluded private sector involvement in marketing or service support.

Such an approach implies a degree of overall control that might be fraught with political undertones, especially in the arena of local (*woreda* and *kabele* level) politics. It is probably not the open model of development that proponents of liberalized markets and private sector economics would envisage, and it raises issues of paternalism, control, and freedom of choice. It also raises issues of fundamental policy – would such an integrated approach countenance off-farm income generating activities? or would it concentrate the bulk of its resources on the increased intensification of agricultural production?) However, despite these concerns, this integrated CS/local government approach appears the most effective way of working at this level of development.

This is not to say that such an overall level of control would be appropriate at the next stage of development, where commercial concerns are of greater significance, but at what is essentially subsistence level agriculture, producing small and occasional surpluses for local sale, the integrated model appears to have greatest impact. How such an approach would be able to address subsequent stages of development as communities become more commercially mature remains to be seen.

It must also be noted that other less directly engaged development models adopted by other Cooperating Sponsors were also effective in achieving impact, albeit in a less concentrated or integrated manner. In the long term, these other models may be more appropriate to sustainable commercial development, but at the stage where households are attempting to move from chronic impoverishment to sustainable food security, such commercial concerns are largely secondary. In the initial stages of development, the concentration of resources amongst Cooperating Sponsors that can demonstrate a high degree of integration and linkage with local government can be expected to have the greatest short-term impact.

⁹ Although the RFA for SPSNP was quite specific in its description of intensive and extensive targeting, Cooperating Sponsors still indicated perceived pressure to report large numbers of both *woredas/kabele* covered and beneficiaries targeted.

8.3. Interaction between Cooperating Sponsors

The RFA for the SPSNP indicated that Cooperating Sponsors should liaise and learn from each other in terms of best practices. This was not observed to be happening. Instead, it was noticed that while a given intervention might be well undertaken in one area, a different Cooperating Sponsor undertaking a very similar intervention in close proximity might nevertheless achieve a much lower success rate. The main reasons for observed differences appeared to be small differences in implementation practice, which could easily be resolved if experiences were more readily shared.

In fact, instead of the cooperation that USAID/Ethiopia would have preferred, some Cooperating Sponsors indicated a reluctance to share experiences and knowledge on the grounds that they were in fact competing for funds and to allow another CS to gain insight into successful practices might result in the loss of “competitive edge” and consequent reduction of funding available.

This situation is regrettable since it is only the beneficiaries who suffer under such circumstances. Its remedy lies in the hands of USAID/Ethiopia who have to convince Cooperating Sponsors that funds are allocated on the basis of beneficiary need not on the basis of competitive excellence.

8.4. Cooperating Sponsor Exit Strategies

It must be recognized that most Cooperating Sponsors have been in Ethiopia, working often in the same *woredas* for years before SPSNP was developed. For example, Catholic Relief Services has been working in Ethiopia since the late fifties and REST since the late seventies. Similarly, ORDA was set up in 1984 as an emergency response to famine in the northern part of Amhara region. From this perspective, a two or three year program such as SPSNP does not appear to justify the development of a CS exit strategy.

If sustainability is to be achieved (and sustainability is indeed an essential element of all SNPSP interventions) then some form of exit strategy is required. However, none of the Cooperating Sponsors appeared to have an exit strategy in place and nor was this an issue they mentioned or indicated that they had thought about.

Under the specific circumstances of the SPSNP interventions, such a long-term attitude on the part of the Cooperating Sponsors is understandable. Although the original proposals anticipated a high level of success in moving beneficiaries towards food security, experience has shown that a longer time-frame than the originally specified two-year period is required and this has been consciously or unconsciously reflected in the CS attitude to this work. It would not be realistic to expect to leave beneficiary communities within a two-year time frame and Cooperating Sponsors have made no provision to do so. The development of an exit strategy would be relevant within the context of a five-year program concentrated over a specific group of beneficiaries and if an exit strategy is required then the SOW should be adjusted accordingly.

However, given the limited resources available to carry out SPSNP interventions, it is necessary that Cooperating Sponsors should develop the capacity to relocate their programs once development has reached an appropriate stage in a given area. It will therefore be necessary to develop a longer-term outlook, considering how their relationship with beneficiaries should evolve to the point where they are managing more and more activities themselves, forging linkages with extension and the private sector independently of the Cooperating Sponsor. At present this aspect of the development process has not received adequate attention.

9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The primary conclusion drawn by the evaluation team is that the SPSNP interventions assessed had resulted in positive impacts which, if continued (in the case of the SPSNP interventions) could be expected to result in sustainable increases in household food security. Different interventions had met with varying degrees of success but impact was as much related to the detail of implementation as to the nature of the intervention itself. In almost every case however, impacts had been diluted by excessive coverage and could be expected to be constrained by the limited implementation period. Nevertheless, where focus has been achieved, tangible progress has occurred which would not have been possible under the PSNP alone. **It is therefore recommended that consideration should be given to extending SPSNP interventions over a minimum five year (in total) implementation period, during which time, interventions should be focused on a limited target group of beneficiaries.**

The targeting of beneficiaries was observed to follow traditional relief processes including a focus on the poorest of the poor and to have been influenced by local administrative considerations. As a result resources have not been most effectively utilized. **It is recommended that in future consideration should be given to the targeting of those who can make the best use of interventions so as to provide effective demonstrations of the potential benefits to others. In this regard, the use of study tours and demonstrations was universally acknowledged to be effective in the field and deserves greater attention (as demonstrated by: a) specific project budget lines and, b) greater participation of women in study tours) in future.**

It was recognized that the development of a positive self-help attitude amongst beneficiaries is critical to the success and long-term sustainability of interventions. It was also recognized that this could take at least five years to pervade a community. **It is recommended that greater attention be given in programs to the development of a positive, self-help attitude, first by identifying and placing greater implementation emphasis on the processes involved in attitude change and secondly by using “hardware interventions” to support and enhance these process.**

Beneficiaries clearly indicated the need for at least two and preferably three interventions per household if sustainable food security were to be developed. Even under these circumstances, it was not expected that food security would be achieved in less than five years from program initiation. **It is recommended that programs be designed to allow for the integration of interventions to provide a truly diversified source of income or production, utilizing two or more interventions per household and that targeting be restricted to achieve this.**

On the basis of the field observation, it would appear that assisting a chronically impoverished household to achieve a position of sustainable food security would require a minimum investment of \$400. This implies a total investment of \$400 million to support the graduation of five million PSNP beneficiaries (assuming that two million PSNP beneficiaries will be inherently unable to participate in the graduation process). This is substantially greater than the amount of funds available to the Cooperating Sponsors or GFDRE for such development. **It is therefore recommended that consideration be given to inviting other donor institutions to adopt or support similar SPSNP programs to increase the degree of coverage and speed at which household food security may be achieved.**

Allowing for different circumstances and implementation techniques it was evident that the provision of household water resources was the most successful intervention with the greatest and most immediate impact. However, this was a generally costly intervention that could not be easily replicated by individual households. Besides this, the provision of shoats was widely accepted, generally low cost and easily

replicated if revolved in kind, while backyard gardening was an effective activity for income diversification that could also be readily replicated. Off-farm income generating activities were significantly more limited in their marketability and appropriateness to rural beneficiaries in general. It was evident that the most successful and widely applicable interventions were those that built upon traditional production activities and did not exceed the absorption capacity of local rural economies. Off-farm income generating activities required greater assistance by the CS in developing markets.

This latter conclusion highlights the difficulties inherent in developing a truly diversified economy that is not completely dependent upon the weather in the rural areas. It suggests again that an integrated approach is required in which every aspect of economic development is developed simultaneously. The individual interventions undertaken by Cooperating Sponsors to develop such activities as blacksmithing, weaving or pottery had limited relevance to rural economies and may experience difficulties in terms of sustainability in the future.

Savings and credit groups were recognized as being powerful interventions that allowed beneficiaries a high degree of self-determination, were both replicable and sustainable and promoted the development of a self-help attitude. Although they did not have a great impact in financial terms, they nevertheless provided a first rung on the credit ladder and were particularly appropriate in the poorer areas. **While savings and credit groups may not be relevant under every circumstance, it is recommended that all Cooperating Sponsors become aware of the performance of the groups facilitated by ORDA/CARE in Laye Gayint as examples of a successful, low cost intervention that has had significant impact.**

It is recognized that both micro-finance and commercial sources of credit can provide useful assistance in economic development. However, in many cases, SPSNP programs were encouraging lax credit procedures that were not conducive to good loan management by beneficiaries and which would reduce the chances of successful participation in more stringent micro-finance or commercial credit systems in the future. **It is therefore strongly recommended that where funds are denominated as loans they should be treated as such and proper loan management procedures should be enforced. If less stringent conditions are appropriate then matching or pure grants should be provided rather than encourage the abuse of credit.**

In this regard it is also recommended that CS field staff be provided with further training in financial and particularly revolving fund management.

There was little evidence of private sector participation in most interventions beyond the role of purchaser of produce. No significant attempts appeared to have been made to involve commercial sources of finance or to involve the private sector as service providers to individuals or producer groups. This may have been because the scope of development is too small to attract private sector interest, but **it is nevertheless recommended that the private sector be involved in initiatives wherever possible as a means of ensuring commercial viability and sustainability. The role of the Cooperating Sponsor under such circumstances would be to introduce suitable partners and ensure the maintenance of equitable arrangements between all parties.**

Beneficiary responses indicated that the extent of community participation in the SPSNP planning process had been limited in some instances and as a result some interventions were either misplaced or irrelevant. This is a fundamental error that should be avoided. At the same time, it was apparent that not all beneficiaries were aware of the responsibilities that they were committed to when taking parting group activities that could have significant impact upon future sustainability. **It is recommended that the financing and implementation of interventions should be contingent upon demonstrable community**

involvement in the planning process and that all beneficiaries be made fully aware of obligations entered into when becoming members of producer groups.

Cooperating Sponsors appreciate the value of study tours to inform, sensitize and motivate beneficiaries. However, there is little or no interaction between Cooperating Sponsors to share lessons learned or best practices. In fact some Cooperating Sponsors appear unwilling to share information on the basis that they are competing for USAID resources. **It is recommended that USAID/Ethiopia develops a more proactive system of information sharing amongst Cooperating Sponsors while working to develop an attitude of trust between Cooperating Sponsors on the basis that they are operating for a common good and can work more effectively through cooperation. In particular, USAID might request a report on “lessons learned” from each CS at regular intervals throughout the program**

The role of the CS in the development process is very different from the role undertaken in the provision of relief. In particular, resource limitations require that CS interventions be of limited duration in a given area and that successful interventions should then be repeated elsewhere. Current philosophies of Cooperating Sponsors do not reflect such an approach. Instead there is a tendency to remain active in a given area for an extended period, becoming in some cases as much a part of the local administration as the administration itself. **It is recommended that this situation be reviewed and the existing policy of support to local government be strengthened so that Cooperating Sponsors can work to strengthen and supplement local administrative capacity rather than substituting for it. This may require the revision of CS proposals to indicate quite clearly the roles that local administration is expected to play in implementing development programs and the support (both technical and financial) that will be provided to them in order to facilitate this.**

No exit strategies appear to have been considered or developed. This situation is untenable given the scope of the development problem and the resources available to deal with it. It cannot be expected that Cooperating Sponsors will continue to facilitate development in a given area *ad infinitum*. Neither however can it be expected that Cooperating Sponsors would be able to achieve sustainable food security and leave beneficiary communities within a two-year time frame. The development of an exit strategy will only be realistic within the context of a minimum five-year program concentrated over a specific group of beneficiaries. **It is therefore recommended that while ongoing and future interventions should be revised to include clearly defined CS exit strategies, such strategies should be set within the context of longer-term and focused programs that have a realistic chance of achieving sustainable success.**

The Evaluation Team was tasked with recommending best practices in the light of observations made at the twelve project sites visited. This was not possible on the basis of observations alone; specifically because it was very clear that effectiveness depended less upon the nature of the interventions practiced than upon the care and professionalism given to project management. In most cases, this was determined more by specific individuals rather than principles or practices of any one intervention or CS. Nevertheless, a number of recommendations can be made that might contribute to improved design and selection of livelihood interventions:

- 1. Recognizing that resources for development are normally provided within the context of a limited (3-5 year) envelope, project designers should assess whether or not it is practicable to achieve development across all members of a target area and if not how best to achieve effective replication of interventions by non-beneficiaries.**
- 2. Project designs should identify criteria for targeting beneficiaries on the basis of (1) above – if effective replication is desired, then targeting for aptitude, attitude and capability becomes more important than targeting for need.**
- 3. Project designs should make particular reference to study tours and the encouragement of the replication of successful interventions.**

- 4. Project designs should clearly identify the level of development of targeted beneficiaries and whether traditional activities (Phase 2a) or more market-based interventions (Phase 2b) are appropriate according to that level.**
- 5. SPSNP projects should seek to provide at least two and preferably three different types of intervention per household.**
- 6. Project designs should include an effective exit strategy. If an exit strategy cannot be included then the validity of the project must be reassessed.**
- 7. Project designs should be shared with local administration and their buy-in to the concept of restricted and successful interventions serving as examples for effective replication should be obtained, prior to implementation.**
- 8. SPSNP projects should pay particular attention to the development of a self-help positive attitude, recognizing first that this takes at least two years and more probably five years to achieve throughout a community and secondly that the physical interventions effectively serve as a framework that supports the development of such an attitude.**
- 9. Projects should be selected on the basis at least in part of cost effectiveness. Project designs should include an estimate of the investment that will be required on a per beneficiary basis to achieve success.**

10. ANNEXES

Annex A. Description of Common Interventions

The entire list of interventions provided by Cooperating Sponsors is extensive (more than 20 different initiatives were observed in different areas). The following paragraphs describe the most commonly observed interventions in terms of cost, impact, sustainability and ease of replication. In most cases, interventions were generally sound in basic concept and their success or failure depended to a considerable extent on individual circumstances, especially the extent to which Cooperating Sponsors provided initial and/or ongoing support. Detailed implementation procedures appeared to be critical and were not always effectively implemented. In such cases, a fundamentally sound concept would appear flawed, and it is important to recognize that given the limitations of this evaluation, the value of a practicable and effective intervention might be obscured by specific circumstances, including the capabilities of individual field staff.

PROVISION OF INPUTS

Provision of Shoats

Many Cooperating Sponsors provided sheep or goats to beneficiaries as a means of generating both food and income. The number of animals provided varied between six (five ewes and one ram) and one animal between two households. The most acceptable number of animals varied between four and six. Some households indicated that they could not manage more than six animals (due either to social pressure or to lack of grazing).

The cost of shoats was approximately ETB 150 per animal. The mechanism for provision to primary beneficiaries varied considerably. In some cases, households purchased their own livestock at “livestock fairs” using vouchers. In others, the beneficiaries advised project staff which animals they wished to purchase at local markets. In other cases, projects staff purchased animals without reference to beneficiaries. The first and second options were clearly preferred by beneficiaries who in the third case complained that they could have bought better and cheaper if they had been allowed to negotiate themselves.

In every case, the intervention contained a revolving element, although this also varied. In one instance, the primary beneficiary kept the first crop of lambs/kids and passed the adult stock on to a secondary beneficiary. This had the advantage of allowing a new beneficiary to receive shoats every six months. In another instance, the primary beneficiary passed the first crop of young stock to the secondary beneficiary after weaning, and kept the old stock. The secondary beneficiary would then sell surplus males and buy new ewe lambs with the proceeds. However, this meant that subsequent beneficiaries had to wait at least a year before they could receive young stock. Finally, in another area, the primary beneficiary was required to pay back the cash value of the livestock that had been provided into a “revolving fund”. The fund was notionally owned by a sheep and goat group, which would then decide who would receive the next shoats and purchase new livestock when sufficient funds had been returned. In practice, repayment of the loans was no more than 60% and subject to delay for various reasons. Moreover, no new purchases had been made although some funds had accumulated in the revolving fund account. In this instance it appeared that the first mechanism of revolving the adult stock had clear advantages in terms of replication.

Acceptance of this form of intervention amongst beneficiaries appeared to be high. Sheep were preferred in highland areas and goats in the lowlands. In most cases, the animals were kept for fattening and sale as yearlings when they might fetch ETB 150 each. In terms of impact, few beneficiaries intended to increase their flock size beyond approximately six animals and were happy with the regular income that such a flock might provide. This would be equivalent to ETB 1,200 if eight young stock were sold each year. No problems were experienced in marketing the fat animals, which could without exception be absorbed by local markets.

In every case, beneficiaries were provided with appropriate training in shoat rearing.

Under appropriate management, this intervention is highly replicable, sustainable, uses appropriate technology, generates significant impact at the household level and is widely accepted by beneficiaries. The disadvantages of such an intervention are that it can only be applied to households with access to grazing, potential overgrazing (although this would not occur at the low level at which shoats are currently provided) and susceptibility to drought. On balance however, this appears to be a useful and cost effective intervention if properly applied.

Provision of Beekeeping Inputs

Assistance with beekeeping was a common intervention particularly in the northern half of the country. Wide variation was observed in the degree of assistance provided, interventions universally included training, but might also include the provision of Kenyan top-bar beehives or complete modern beehives, new stock, frames, extraction equipment, formation of cooperatives, buildings for extraction and storage of honey, and assistance with packaging and marketing.

This intervention was particularly suitable to households without access to land and was well accepted by beneficiaries. The capital cost of the intervention might vary from ETB 400 for the provision of a Kenyan top-bar hive, to in excess of ETB 2,000 for those households who were provided with a complete modern beehive and full support in the form of extraction equipment and buildings for extraction, storage and marketing. Annual returns varied between 20 and 40 kg of honey, valued at ETB 40 per kg, i.e. ETB 800-1600 per year.

The degree of replication of this intervention was not high – the capital cost formed a significant barrier to entry (although in one instance, local carpenters had been trained to manufacture the new design of frames). Sustainability was not an issue, neither was the appropriateness of the technology, which could all be repaired locally. However, in the extreme case where extensive support was provided throughout the value chain, beneficiaries appeared unaware of their financial obligations (in terms of repaying goods and group assets provided on loan), and there was no apparent exit strategy on the part of the CS.

Provision of Fruit Trees

This intervention was frequently integrated with backyard gardening and comprised both highland fruits (apples, pears and plums) and lowland fruit trees (oranges, mangoes and avocados). In each case, beneficiaries were supplied with suitable fruit trees. In some cases, trees were provided as a grant while in others cash repayment was required over time. Tree seedlings were produced by the Cooperating Sponsors out of nurseries where local rootstocks were raised and imported material grafted on to them. The trees were provided as grafted seedlings and would generally take another two years to bear fruit in any significant quantity. Beneficiaries were provided with training in fruit tree management and it was anticipated that eventually assistance would also be provided in marketing fruit.

The cost per tree was not excessive (ETB50 each). It was expected that a reasonable yield of fruit would give an annual return of at least ETB 100 per tree, but there had been little market analysis beyond the brief scrutiny of domestic markets to confirm demand and price and it is possible that if this intervention were to be widely employed, then prices might fall as supply rose beyond immediate local demand. However, there was no evidence that sufficient trees had been deployed in any given area for this to be a significant consideration at present.

Beneficiaries were happy to receive fruit trees and observation indicated that trees that had been planted in backyard gardens were generally well cared for. However, the fact that this intervention cannot achieve any significant return for at least two years does limit its impact within the scope of this evaluation.

This intervention gave rise to two major issues of concern. First, the lack of sound market research for the specific varieties being disseminated meant that there was no guarantee of sustainable markets for the produce. Secondly, although the cost of each tree seedling was low, and although appropriate technologies were used to produce the trees, there was no indication that the intervention could be replicated without the continued presence and input of the CS. It would be necessary for nurseries to be independently managed and commercially operated for this intervention to be effectively replicated.

Provision of Dairy Cows/Milk Marketing

This intervention was not widely practiced except in Tigray. It varied in scope from the provision of high yielding Holstein Friesian dairy cows (with appropriate training in management and milk production) through assistance in the formation of milk production cooperatives (using locally bred animals) to the construction of milk sales outlets, including the provision of cream separation and butter making equipment. The basic intervention was costly (in excess of ETB 4,000 per cow) and was always associated with the creation of milk marketing groups. Additional costs were incurred by the group through the provision of assets (milk marketing outlets and processing equipment), although it was not always clear whether assets were being provided on a demonstration basis or as part of a business transaction.

Although the intervention was expensive, it appeared to be financially viable in that, with proper management, the Friesian cows would produce in excess of 4,000 litres per annum with a retail value of ETB 4 per litre, i.e. an annual revenue of ETB16,000, although there were significant costs to be deducted from this amount. The cows themselves were repaid at a total value of ETB5,000 at ETB1,000 per year for five years. Other assets were paid for by each producer group, using revenue from milk sales (purchased from members at three ETB per litre and sold at four ETB per litre). A producer group of 20 members would retail approximately 300 litres per day and could therefore expect an annual income of approximately ETB100,000. Local demand for milk appeared to exceed supply, although surpluses were anticipated in the coming fasting periods, when it was intended to develop the processing lines (especially butter)

Not surprisingly, a considerable number of beneficiaries wished to be provided with improved dairy cows, although the intervention was limited to those with adequate fodder production capacity to support such an animal. In addition, a number of farmers also wished to join the producers group, selling milk from their own (locally bred) cows through the milk marketing outlet.

This intervention can be viewed not so much as an individual household asset diversification exercise (although it does achieve this), but as a group business development initiative. The producer group had been provided with (and would eventually pay for) substantial assets to assist in the marketing of their produce. The economies of scale allowed for the employment of staff at the marketing outlet and the business appeared to be providing a good return to all group members. As such, it provided a good example to other members of the community of what could be achieved using the cooperative business model.

Sustainability of livestock supply was apparently possible using local DA's trained in AI, who would be able to supply straws of Holstein Friesian semen

Although the intervention appeared remarkably successful, the evaluation team noted a number of concerns. First, the high capital cost, largely precluded replication without the assistance of a CS, or access to micro-finance, which in most cases is beyond PSNP beneficiaries. Secondly, the key asset (the dairy cow) is vulnerable to drought and required continual high-level management to be productive, thus this intervention carries a higher element of risk than most. Thirdly, when interviewed, some group members did not appear to understand the extent of their financial obligations through the group. Most significantly however, there was an underlying concern that the group businesses were relying to a considerable extent on the support of the CS both in the management of the group and its financial responsibilities and in the technical aspects of the business. Repairs were to be referred to the Cooperating Sponsor's workshop, sales negotiations with potential supermarket customers were undertaken by the CS and the proposed packaging for cream and butter was also to be provided by the CS.

On balance therefore, this appeared to be a cost intensive, higher risk intervention, which, while financially viable, relied to a considerable extent upon continual input by the CS. As such it could not be considered to be either replicable or sustainable as it stood at present. More work would need to be done both in terms of project design and in training, before the group members could be expected to run a milk production and marketing business without further support. Nevertheless, considering the short time frame in which the observed progress had been made, the results appeared impressive.

Backyard Gardening Equipment (Including Seeds)

This intervention covered a range of inputs, including drip irrigation equipment, improved vegetable seeds (including new crops), simple pumps (treadle and rope washer), and extensive training. The training was expected to cover marketing, but in practice this had hardly been necessary. In many cases, backyard gardening was integrated with the provision of water resources, either through hand dug wells or water collection cisterns.

Seeds were provided either directly as such, or through the distribution of vouchers that could be redeemed at seed fairs. The advantage of a seed fair being that the sellers had been pre-selected by the CS as supplying good quality seed at reasonable prices. The concept of a seed (or livestock) fair was appreciated by the beneficiaries and the evaluation team could find no evidence of collusion to redeem vouchers without providing seeds (i.e. to effectively monetize the vouchers).

Drip irrigation equipment was installed using small elevated tanks to hold the water supplying up to ten drip lines (bucket drip). Drip piping was either imported or sourced locally. Drip technology is now readily available within Ethiopia, although it might be beyond the capacity of individual households to replace or repair.

The extent of training varied considerably and the results in terms of production reflected this. It was noticeable that while some backyard gardeners could demonstrate plots that were well laid out, carefully weeded, thinned and clearly productive serving as encouraging examples to other beneficiaries, other gardens were poorly laid out, and much less productive – even in some cases showing signs of water shortage despite the installation of hand dug wells. Although the poorer gardens might have increased the productivity of the household, they did not serve as good examples of the introduced techniques for other beneficiaries and in this respect, they fell well short of the standard that is necessary if limited resources are to have maximum impact. It was evident that adequate training, (which is essential if the resources provided are not only to assist one household to become more productive, but also to encourage other households to adopt new techniques) is critical to the success and replication of this intervention, but is not always provided.

The provision of pumps was always associated with hand dug wells or water cisterns. In all cases, pumps were of appropriate technology and easily repairable. In some instances however, the availability of pumps seemed to have precluded the use of even simpler systems such as gravity flow or siphon.

The marketing of backyard gardening produce was listed as an area requiring assistance in some proposals. In practice however, at the levels of production achieved to date, marketing has not been an issue, since all produce has been readily absorbed by local markets.

Sericulture

This intervention was more commonly practiced in the southern part of the country. As with beekeeping or milk production, the industry has been introduced as an integrated intervention including training, provision of inputs (including both silk worms and processing equipment) and assistance with processing and marketing. Although the venture appeared technically sound, a significant proportion of beneficiaries involved in silk-worm rearing stated that the hours worked did not justify the financial returns. It is therefore doubtful that the industry would be sustainable under current economic conditions, and the degree of replication is expected to be low. Although silk products could be exported or sold on the tourist market, local demand appeared to be limited so that marketing was restricted and required the ongoing assistance of the CS.

This intervention, although technically practicable appeared to suffer from a number of disadvantages such that it would be difficult to justify its expansion through donor-driven programs unless there were sufficient private sector participation to ensure economic viability and sustainability.

INSTALLATION OF HOUSEHOLD WATER HARVESTING TECHNOLOGIES

This intervention included both water cisterns collecting run-off and hand dug wells. In each case, the installation was designed to supply enough water to irrigate an area of 20m x 10m throughout the year, so as to provide at least three crops of vegetables. The installations required extensive manual labor and could be most effectively undertaken using PSNP resources. This is currently only possible in specific instances (i.e. for severely disadvantaged households), but might deserve wider application in the future.

The cost of constructing a water storage cistern was at least ETB1,000 (120 man days plus materials) so that this intervention is not easily replicated by a single household, although a community could construct a series of such cisterns over time. Costs of a hand dug well are of a

similar order, although this will of course depend upon the depth to the water table. The effect of a regular and consistent water supply is to allow the production of at least three crops of vegetables each year, with a market value in excess of ETB 800. In this respect, the water cistern or hand dug well is a valuable household asset, which can allow the development of a significant income stream. The water can also be used for livestock during extreme periods.

Significantly, a number of households with water harvesting technologies were using their land to grow cereal crops and in some cases providing supplementary irrigation from their wells. It was difficult to assess whether or not this was the most cost-effective use of the investment, although it might have been most practical from the standpoint of food security. It is recommended that this usage be reviewed further.

This intervention is generally readily sustainable, requiring little maintenance other than the removal of silt. The technology is simple, low risk and well accepted by beneficiaries, in fact in the northern part of the country, this intervention was the most popular and frequently requested.

SAVINGS AND CREDIT GROUPS

Facilitation of the formation of savings and credit groups was not a widespread intervention, but was well received by beneficiaries where it was practiced. Groups were formed by 15-20 close associates and were not necessarily linked to a particular type of production. Most but not all group members were PSNP beneficiaries. The CS advised group members on how much they should save (normally between ETB 2 and ETB 4 per month) and how to manage the accumulated savings. The group decided which members should benefit from the use of the funds and the level of interest that should be paid on the money provided. The CS also assisted in the formulation of bye-laws and general group management.

This intervention, (where it was well managed) appeared to be extremely successful and the number of savings groups was increasing rapidly as other beneficiaries learned of its advantages. When asked to explain why it was so attractive, beneficiaries noted that it provided access to finance for those who would otherwise have been unable to access traditional micro-finance, due to a lack of collateral, while allowing them to share in the interest earned. Beneficiaries were able to decide what activity they wished to finance; activities included petty trading, such as the purchase and sale of beer or grain, the purchase of seed for backyard gardening, or the purchase and fattening of livestock and allowed funds to be repaid within a short period (less than six months). Repayment rates appeared to be close to 100%.

The system allows a significant degree of self-determination. It encourages the development of small business skills and provides a first rung on the ladder of access to credit and business development. As an intervention, it is both sustainable and highly replicable. It is most appropriate to the very poorest communities where it is enthusiastically received and appears to result in significant empowerment.

It should be noted however that the success of savings and credit groups will depend upon the quality of advice provided to them. In one instance the evaluation team noted successful groups revolving accumulated funds through a wide range of small business channels, while in an adjacent area, similar groups were less successful. It appeared that the less successful groups had been poorly advised and were attempting to accumulate large amounts of money before making loans available and in one case, the financial goal would not have been achieved for 12 years. This meant that funds were not revolving rapidly and one of the most important aspects of the

intervention – its credit component and stimulating effect on micro-enterprises – was largely ineffective.

INFRASTRUCTURAL INVESTMENT

This intervention was observed as an OFDA initiative, although it might equally well have been financed under SPSNP. It comprised the construction of large-scale water diversions and canals capable of supplying irrigation water to 60 ha in one instance and 80 ha in another. The cost of the investment was considerable (in excess of ETB 600,000 in the first instance), although it could potentially increase the productivity of 300 households (the CS estimated a density of five households per hectare).

Given the high cost per household, it is extremely unlikely that such an intervention could be replicated without the intervention of a CS or local authority. However, once installed, the gravity flow system appeared to be highly sustainable. The technology was simple and easily maintained and since it would allow year-round intensive cropping of fruit and vegetables, it could bring significant increases in productivity and profitability if effectively managed.

In the examples seen, while initial construction had been well done, subsequent CS follow-through in terms of water management and cropping advice was not of an equivalent standard. Water initially delivered through concrete canals was allowed to reach final beneficiaries through earth channels and seepage losses must have been high. There appeared to be little improvement in individual irrigation practices and drip systems, although feasible given the observed head of water in one area, were not used.

Observed vegetable and fruit tree cropping practices were not of a high standard and it is very doubtful that the full potential of the investment was being achieved. Perhaps as a result of low output, the marketing of produce was not a problem; all vegetables produced could be marketed locally.

The CS acknowledged the additional input required, particularly in the area of business development, but indicated that they had been unable to concentrate on the “software” aspects of the development due to the incremental nature of the OFDA funding. They indicated that this was the next priority.

VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND ASSISTANCE

This was not a widespread intervention, and comprised mainly blacksmithing, carpentry, masonry, pottery and weaving. Beneficiaries received training in key skills, together with tools and in some cases, suitable premises from which to operate. Training in business management was also provided. These inputs were provided on a grant basis in the case of training and as a loan to be repaid over time in the case of tools and premises. In general the terms of repayment were well understood.

Beneficiaries targeted to receive training were commonly from specific “castes” in village society and, as village traditions change, would otherwise lack employment opportunities. They indicated that they were happy to be given the opportunity to develop new skills, but it was quite clear that the available market for those skills were limited in most cases. Most beneficiaries receiving carpentry, blacksmithing or masonry skills had difficulty finding subsequent commercial employment. Despite participation at marketing fairs, beneficiaries were most commonly

employed by the Cooperating Sponsors themselves or by the local administration. Blacksmiths also reported difficulty in obtaining suitable steel from which to manufacture farm implements.

Those beneficiaries who had been trained and assisted in pottery or weaving were able to produce good quality products cost effectively, but were unable to compete in local markets, which required cheaper and lower quality materials. They were therefore obliged to source either tourist or export markets. While these are potentially sustainable markets for a limited number of producers, the market for the large-scale manufacture of these products is neither large nor easily accessible and appeared to require the ongoing support of the CS to ensure that a consistent supply of goods found effective markets.

As one of the few interventions promoting off-farm income generating activities, vocational training might be expected to be a key aspect of a national income diversification program. However, the evaluation team noted that, as currently practiced, vocational training does not guarantee effective income diversification. It would appear that the supporting economic infrastructure both in terms of inputs (such as steel) and in terms of a ready market for the skills or products is simply not adequately developed in the rural areas where such projects operated to allow for either replication or sustainability.

The evaluation team was forced to conclude that while individual examples might be quoted as success stories, there are as yet no grounds to suggest that vocational training of rural SPSNP beneficiaries in traditional disciplines can significantly contribute to household income diversification on a general basis. Instead it would appear that vocational training might be effective in where particular skills fit specific circumstances, or that such training should take place in those areas (possibly peri-urban areas) where the supporting economic infrastructure, including a ready market, is more developed.

TECHNICAL TRAINING IN BASIC VETERINARY SKILLS

This intervention was limited in its application, but served a very necessary purpose in supporting other interventions in the livestock sector. Beneficiary communities selected one or more individuals who were trained in basic livestock health care, including castration, hoof trimming, vaccination, spraying and dipping, and other practices. These trainees were also provided with tools (e.g. bloodless castrators) on a credit basis to be repaid over time. After training, trainees were expected to undertake some tasks (such as hoof trimming) free of charge but were able to charge for other services at pre-agreed rates.

While the skills acquired provided valuable support to livestock rearing interventions, as an intervention itself, such training had only limited scope since the number of trainees required by each community was small. Moreover, the controlled pricing of activities raised concerns over the provision of such supports as a sustainable business. The evaluation team concluded that this intervention had limited potential and would need to be restructured to become replicable and sustainable.

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Annex C: Productive Safety Net Support Program- RFA

INTRODUCTION

The program described herein establishes the objectives and operating principles for the USAID/Ethiopia's Support to Productive Safety Net Program (SPSNP), a two-year Cooperative Agreement designed to protect and build household and community assets. The USAID SPSNP will target selected areas of Ethiopia that are repeatedly affected by climatic and economic shocks which strip productive assets, and render populations unable to meet basic food and non-food needs for an entire year. The USAID SPSNP is part of a broader Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (GFDRE) – Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP), targeting 5-7 million chronically food insecure individuals in 242 *woredas* in 8 regions (Tigray, Amhara, Oromiya, SNNP, Afar, Somali, rural Harari and Dire Dawa). USAID/Ethiopia will award one or multiple Cooperative Agreements, with a total award value of \$16 million. Depending upon resource availability in future years, the award value may be increased and or the duration extended. After the two-year period, USAID/Ethiopia expects the combined efforts of Recipients granted awards under this Cooperative Agreement will:

DECREASE THE NUMBER OF PERSISTENTLY POOR REQUIRING FOOD OR CASH ASSISTANCE TO MEET BASIC NEEDS

Thus, the purpose of this request is for Applicants to demonstrate how cash resources obtained through this Request for Application – RFA as support and compliment to the GFDRE Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) will contribute to that goal.

[USAID RESERVES THE RIGHT TO FUND ANY OR NONE OF THE APPLICATIONS SUBMITTED.]

C.1. 1. STRATEGIC CONTEXT

USAID/Ethiopia is pursuing an Integrated Strategic Plan (ISP) with the short-term goal of establishing the foundation for *reducing famine vulnerability, hunger, and poverty* that will contribute to the long-term goal of a *more peaceful, prosperous and healthy Ethiopia*. The Support to Productive Safety Net Program (SPNSP) reflects USAID/Ethiopia's intent to work towards that goal through this competitive solicitation (RFA) designed to provide cash resources to fund capacity building and livelihoods diversification and expansion.

Resources under this RFA will be utilized to provide support to the GFDRE's Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP). USAID/Food for Peace (FFP) will also provide Title II resources to be programmed in support of the GFDRE PSNP. Simultaneous to the issuance of this RFA, guidelines for related Title II program proposals will be issued as, Developmental Relief Guidelines for an Ethiopia Productive Safety Net Program. Linkages between SPSNP and Title II Productive Safety Net proposals are encouraged. This commitment demonstrates USAID's contribution to the implementation of the broad, multi-donor funded PSNP, aimed at providing consistent, multi-year assistance to 5-7 million predictably vulnerable Ethiopians in 242 food insecure *woredas*.

USAID/Ethiopia's ISP 2004-2008 furthers this commitment through its five-year strategic goal: *Foundation Established for Reducing Famine Vulnerability, Hunger and Poverty*. The protective and productive elements of the PSNP described herein are central to that goal and based on the

hypothesis that predictably vulnerable individuals require predictable assistance so they may protect and/or rebuild assets. Through the provision of consistent, multi-year assistance to vulnerable households and in ways which strengthen their (and their communities') coping abilities, targeted beneficiaries have potential to re-attain and maintain food security in the long-term. The PSNP is designed around two basic transfer mechanisms: Public Works and Direct Support for the labor poor. The two mechanisms are described in greater detail in Section C. 2. 2.

C.1.2. BACKGROUND

In five of the past seven years, Ethiopia has had large structural deficits in its food supplies, requiring substantial emergency aid to fill the gap. Over the past five years USAID alone has provided \$882 million in food aid to Ethiopia. This has largely been food-related humanitarian assistance. Even in years with bumper harvests, local incentives to produce food have been sabotaged by poor-performing markets that cut the bottom out of farmers' prices. Over the last 20 years, the emergency relief cycle has repeated itself again and again. With each drought emergency, the overall number of hungry and destitute has risen, in addition to increases in human suffering, disease, social unrest and conflict. If current trends continue, by 2010 food deficits will nearly triple, significantly expanding the need and cost for humanitarian assistance; the number of malnourished children, already 50% of the current child population, will increase by 10% (to 34% by 2020); and per capita income, currently the lowest in Africa, will remain at today's level or decline further.

The people of Ethiopia have suffered tremendously despite efforts the impact of these repeated emergencies, and there is no question that saving lives during crisis periods is the first priority. However, the unfortunate outcome of repeated crisis is that due to finite resource availability, the resources necessary for livelihood development programs - crucial for household asset protection and productivity - are frequently redirected towards humanitarian assistance interventions. Currently, Ethiopia is one of the largest recipient of relief resources in sub-Saharan Africa, but the smallest recipient of development resources. As several significant changes must occur for this trend to be reversed, the most important being reform of selected government policies, USAID/Ethiopia has recognized that its programs must also undergo change. Food aid, crucial to saving lives in the immediate, does not save livelihoods in the long-term.

Over the past few years, USAID/Ethiopia has actively sought creative operating modalities which could potentially shift the emergency relief cycle. Through previous FFP Development Assistance Programs (DAPs), USAID/Ethiopia strove to combine Title II food aid assistance with Development Assistance (DA) resources, whereby the entirety of communities' needs would be met through complimentary sectoral programming. Although DAP Cooperating Sponsors' programs show positive results, the DAPs have failed in their breath and scope to adequately address the fundamental causes on the emergency relief cycle; thousands are reached, but millions are not.

In an effort to build upon positive outcomes and ideas in DAP programs, USAID/Ethiopia, through a grant to Save the Children/UK, initiated the Relief to Development Program (or R2D) in Amhara Regional State in late 2002.

The R2D program combines development and relief resources into a multi-year funding mechanism whereby household and community assets are protected and restored to stabilize participant food needs. Unlike DAP programs which primarily focus on the beneficiaries

themselves, central to this program is the strengthening of community, institutional and local government capacity. Self-sufficiency of individuals alone will not result in resiliency; local governments and institutions must also do more to protect and build their communities. The R2D program has contributed positively to the recipient communities.

RFA Applicants should review R2D program implementation principles to gain from Save the Children/UK's experiences in designing their interventions. However, shortfalls in the R2D program have become apparent, such as food and cash resource imbalances, lack of complementary sector activities in health and nutrition, and issues with effective beneficiary targeting. USAID strongly requests that Applicants and, more specifically, selected Cooperative Agreement Recipients learn from the R2D program, both in terms of the positives and the negatives. The R2D program should not be used as a model for the SPSNP, but should be looked upon as a beginning framework. (Applicants may contact USAID/Ethiopia for copies for of the R2D program description.)

C. 2. THE PSNP FRAMEWORK

The operating framework in which Applicants are requested to develop their programs for the SPSNP will vary from previous integrated cash and food development programs in a variety of ways. Principally, Applicants are requested to partner with government institutions responsible for the GFDRE PSNP, specifically focusing on the regional and *woredas* levels.

Section C. 2. briefly outlines how the USAID SPSNP fits within the GFDRE PSNP and the USAID ISP. Subsequently, major objectives of the PSNP will be discussed, followed by a more detailed discussion on PSNP resources, geographic targeting, and partner roles and relationships.

C. 2. 1. GFDRE PRODUCTIVE SAFETY NET PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION MANUAL

The GFDRE Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) Implementation Manual (PIM) (see Attachment 1) to this RFA description outlines the program guidelines that all partners either directly implementing or indirectly supporting the PSNP must follow. The PIM outlines the program objectives as providing transfers to the food insecure population in chronically food insecure *woredas* in a way that prevents asset depletion at the household level and creates assets at the community level (resource transfers in exchange for the creation of productive assets). The PSNP will thus address immediate human needs while simultaneously (i) supporting the rural transformation process, (ii) preventing long-term consequences of short-term consumption shortages, (iii) encouraging households to engage in production and investment, and (iv) promoting market development by increasing household purchasing power. The PSNP consists of two components: (i) a labor-intensive public works component; and (ii) a direct support component to ensure support to those households who have no labor at all, not other means of support and who are chronically food insecure. (See p. 7 GFDRE PSNP PIM, Attachment 1.)

Specific examples of activities eligible for both direct support and public works are listed in the GFDRE PSNP PIM. Activities should be driven by the local planning process in order to identify community needs and prioritize activities based on those needs. Public works activities can include improved land productivity and soil fertility restoration, increased land availability, improved market infrastructure, improved access to drinking and irrigation water, increased availability of fodder, improved school and health facilities and improved child care crèches. Some direct support beneficiaries will be able to participate in community activities such as community managed child care centers, child nutrition and growth promotion classes; and adult literacy and numeracy classes. However, other activities that fit within the Program

Implementation Guidelines (PIM) where agreed upon by the *Woreda* implementation body can also be implemented.

The PIM includes 242 chronically food insecure *woredas* in 8 regions (Tigray, Amhara, Oromiya, SNNP, Afar, Somali, rural Harari and Dire Dawa) that have been a recipient of food aid in each of the last three years. The PIM states that a household is considered chronically food insecure if it is located in one of the 242 chronically food insecure *woredas* that have been assessed by a mix of administrative guidelines and community knowledge to have faced continuous food shortages (3 months gap or more) in the past three years and received food assistance. This also includes households that suddenly become more vulnerable as a result of a severe loss of assets and are unable to support themselves and any household without family support and other means of social protection and support.

The PIM states that the PSNP should utilize and benefit from the participation of non-governmental actors having relevant capacity, experience and expertise. It further mentions that the PSNP is a social security intervention over which the Government has primary responsibility, CS resources should be additional to Government safety net resources and Cooperating Sponsors should abide by the Government's PIM. Given that the nature of the PSNP is to guarantee transfers to chronically food insecure households, it is important that PSNP capacity and administrative costs is kept to the program norm of 20%. The PIM states that the Government welcomes CS participation in the PSNP if they meet the above mentioned criteria, and even if they cannot meet the above criteria, the Government welcomes CS participation in other Food Security Program interventions (See p. 24 GFDRE PSNP PIM, Attachment 1.)

The PSNP is a component of the Government's Food Security Program (FSP), and as such, is an integral feature of a coherent food security investment strategy for chronically food insecure *woredas* of the country. The *Woreda* Food Security Task Force has the responsibility of facilitating the integration of the PSNP into *Woreda* food security programs. As graduation from food insecurity is a key goal of the PSNP, it can only be achieved if the PSNP is objectively linked to ongoing and future food security and livelihoods programs in these areas. (See p. 7 GFDRE PSNP PIM, Attachment 1.)

In addition to capacity building, USAID considers livelihood diversification and expansion to be an important support to the implementation of a PSNP. It is only through the livelihood diversification and expansion that creates more opportunities for the chronically food insecure to make a living. With more opportunities, beneficiaries of the safety net program will be able to become self-reliant and thus graduate from the program. For example, rather than relying on rainfed agriculture alone, diversification would allow families to acquire livestock or begin petty trade to increase their income opportunities.

Thus, the USAID SPSNP as outlined in this RFA will address the two program components outlined in the PIM (resource transfers and community asset building) through its capacity building component and will further assist PSNP beneficiaries to graduate from the program through its livelihoods diversification and expansion component. The latter component is not part of the GFDRE PSNP but provides an important complimentary element. Applicants are encouraged to link program submitted for this award to Title II Safety Net Programs.

C. 2. 2. USAID/ETHIOPIA INTEGRATED STRATEGIC PLAN 2004-2008

The PSNP is both the basis and an outcome of USAID/Ethiopia's Integrated Strategic Plan (ISP), with a long-term goal of a *More peaceful, prosperous and healthy Ethiopia*. That goal cannot be

attained however if several aspects of the foundation of both government and civil society are not properly developed and strengthened. As such, USIAD/Ethiopia's five-year strategic goal during the US Fiscal Year (US FY) 2004 – 2008 planning period is: *Foundation Established for Reducing Famine Vulnerability, Hunger and Poverty*. Under this five-year goal, USAID will address four strategic objectives (SO) and one program support objective (PSO)¹⁰:

- SO 13:** Capacity to Anticipate and Manage through Shocks Increased
 - SO 14:** Human Capacity and Social Resiliency Increased
 - SO 15:** Capacity for Good Governance Increased
 - SO 16:** Market-led Economic Growth and Resiliency Increased
 - PSO 17:** Knowledge Management Coordinated and Institutionalized
- (See USAID/Ethiopia's Integrated Strategic Plan summary, Attachment 2.)

USAID, in close collaboration with its governmental and non-governmental partners, expects to achieve these SOs/PSO through a number of intermediate results (IRs). As elaborated in the ISP, these objectives are bound by two cross-sector approaches: communities as a focal point, and women's economic and political empowerment. In addition, SO 13 and PSO 17 will influence intermediate results in all SOs. An additional theme of particular importance to USAID/Ethiopia, and reflected in the ISP document, is water resource security - which entails improving a population's access to potable water, water for agriculture and livestock, and sanitation and hygiene. The five objectives and corresponding IRs that are expected to contribute towards the achievement of the five-year goal are presented in Figure 1.

The Program described in this RFA contributes to USAID's IRs and SOs/PSO, and incorporates the above with particular attention to integrating resources into a comprehensive household and community with interventions centered on the themes of protecting assets, building assets and expanding and diversifying livelihood options to increase resiliency at the community and household level. USAID/Ethiopia requests Applicants to place particular emphasis on the importance of capacity building in communities, government, local institutions and partners, essential to meeting both the ISP and PSNP goals. Additionally, traditional gender roles in Ethiopian society limit the country's ability to move forward; women's participation in the development agenda and the SPSNP should be paramount.

Figure 1: USAID Ethiopia US FY 2004-2008 Results Framework

SO13: Capacity to Anticipate and Manage through Shocks Increased

- IR 13.1: Integrated early warning systems strengthened*
- IR 13.2: Government and partner response capacity improved*
- IR 13.3: Selected crisis mgmt policies reformed and implemented*
- IR 13.4: Effective coordination mechanisms strengthened*

SO14: Human Capacity and Social Resiliency Increased

¹⁰ A Glossary that defines key USAID terms such as "Strategic Objective," "Special Objective," "Intermediate Result," and related terms is found at www.usaid.gov, USAID Policies and Procedures, ADS Glossary.

- IR 14.1: Use of high impact health, family planning, and nutrition services, products, and practices increased*
- IR 14.2: HIV/AIDS prevalence reduced and mitigation of the impact of HIV/AIDS increased*
- IR 14.3: Use of quality primary education services enhanced*

SO15: Capacity for Good Governance Increased

- IR 15.1. Accountability by Regional and Local Governments Improved*
- IR 15.2. Civil Society Capacity to Engage Government Strengthened
- IR 15.3. Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention and Resolution Improved
- IR 15.4. Women's Participation in Political Processes Expanded and Enhanced

SO16: Market-Led Economic Growth and Resiliency Increased

- IR 16.1: Selected essential policy reforms implemented
- IR 16.2: Selected input and product markets strengthened*
- IR 16.3: Natural resource management and agricultural productivity improved*
- IR 16.4: Livelihood options for the food insecure protected, expanded and diversified*

PSO17: Knowledge Management Coordinated and Institutionalized

- IR 17.1: Collaboration and coordination for support to strategic decisions enhanced*
- IR 17.2: Ethiopian and international institutions contributing to decisions to reduce vulnerability, increase resiliency and promote growth*
- IR 17.3: Information needed to manage shocks timely and appropriately disseminated*
- IR 17.4: Rapid analysis and evaluation supports Mission program*

Activities conducted by SPSNP Recipients will contribute to the goals and objectives set forth by each SO of the ISP; however, the SPSNP will primarily be reflected within IR 4 of SO 16:

Livelihood options for the food insecure protected, expanded and diversified

USAID/Ethiopia's SO 16, IR 4, is based on the premise that the more than 5 million people who regularly require food aid assistance for at least part of any given year are symptomatic of Ethiopia's lack of economic growth and resiliency. They are among the most vulnerable to famine since their resistance to shock has been eroded over time with the destruction of their productive assets. In addition, the yearly needs of these chronically food insecure drain the international, national and local community as limited resources are consumed to keep people alive without affecting their long-term survival.

The provision of assistance to the chronically food insecure has until now been provided as part of the emergency appeal process, reaching the intended beneficiaries only after they have depleted any productive assets that might allow for recovery in subsequent years. The purpose of this IR is to meet people's basic needs in a predictable manner that will reach them before they lose crucial assets. It is also important to provide different options to allow people diverse livelihoods and to enable them to meet their food needs throughout the year. These actions will provide a foundation upon which they can begin to participate in activities aimed at economic

growth. By protecting livelihood systems and increasing opportunities to diversify livelihood options, USAID/Ethiopia's SO 16, IR 4, contributes to overall economic growth by enabling the chronically poor to participate in the market and production-based activities. The economic resiliency of the chronically poor will be achieved when they are able to rely on diverse livelihood strategies during times of both abundance and hardship, surviving the next shock with no outside assistance and without depleting their productive assets. The shrinking number of chronically food insecure people will lessen the diversion of resources away from the economic growth goal of this SO as community, government and international resources are used to promote growth rather than provide emergency relief.

Under this IR, by the end of 3-5 years, it is anticipated that sustainable increases in livelihood diversification opportunities will exist in all targeted *woredas*. In three years, success in protecting assets, while increasing the capacities and opportunities of the persistently poor to participate in rural growth, should result in the stabilization of the numbers of Ethiopians regularly requiring food assistance and within five years these numbers should begin to decline.

The success of this IR is directly linked to the social protection, capacity building, and resiliency strategies undertaken in each of the Strategy's other SOs. This reflects the interdependence of chronic poverty, lack of access to education and health services, lack of access to potable water and sanitation, lack of capacity to anticipate and manage through shock as primary factors contributing to the cycle of famine in Ethiopia.

While nearly all Ethiopians are poor as defined by income and productive assets, their access to food is most relevant to how USAID defines food insecurity and is the basis upon which USAID and Applicants to this proposal should respond to the challenge of preventing famine. The challenge is how to develop a sustainable system which protects, builds, and diversifies assets, such that the resiliency to manage through shocks is achieved. A robust economic growth strategy is of course necessary, but at the same time a new approach to engaging with the chronically vulnerable is required. This new approach will not just provide safety nets, but will assist them with innovative asset protection and productive expansion opportunities so that the number of chronically food insecure are reduced over time, thus increasing the self-reliant population that is not dependent upon foreign assistance for survival each year.

C. 2. 3. PSNP OBJECTIVES

The overarching goal of the programs implemented under this SPSNP RFA is to:

DECREASE THE NUMBER OF PERSISTENTLY POOR REQUIRING FOOD OR CASH ASSISTANCE TO MEET BASIC NEEDS

USAID/Ethiopia expects Recipients to reach that goal by concentrating on activities that contribute to the GFDRE PSNP along two program components: 1) building the capacity of the GFDRE to implement a PSNP and 2) livelihoods diversification and expansion activities. The first component should focus on building the capacity to implement technically sound and growth enhancing labor based public works, skills transfers, and social investment activities through a sustained relationship between the recipient and their government counterparts at the regional and *woredas* levels. The second and major component should focus on providing livelihood diversification, employment and income generation strategies and the opportunity for small holders and herders to try new technologies and or make the investments necessary to increase their productive asset base.

Applicants should develop their proposals to reflect the two program components based on the premise that reducing food insecurity requires:

Protecting Assets

The primary goal of the PSNP is to protect assets by meeting the basic needs of the food insecure through timely and targeted direct resource transfers that will prevent the sale or irreversible loss of productive assets.

Building Assets

Safety net resource transfers (food or cash) will be made in exchange for building productive assets. Direct resource transfer is provided in exchange for labor or actions that will build assets important to future economic and social resiliency. Work on infrastructure and public works (i.e. market places, roads, bridges, ponds, water source development and protection, pasture rotation, and environmental rehabilitation that will promote markets and economic growth) can all be considered. If deemed appropriate by the *woredas* implementing the program, households receiving direct support can also participate in enhanced social outreach programs that will transfer valuable skills that will facilitate asset creation for these families.

Livelihood Diversification and Expansion Activities

To enable the chronically food insecure to become self reliant, activities to diversify and expand livelihood options in an environmentally sustainable manner will be an important element in building productive assets. Building upon assets protected and expanded by timely resource transfers to the food insecure, diverse and expanded livelihood options will increase resiliency to shocks and will pull people further up the economic ladder. Livelihood diversification means that families have several means by which they get by over time. In good times, this results in many different ways to bring in resources (agriculture, petty trade, livestock, etc). In difficult times, families can shift their focus to those activities that have been the least hard hit during the shock.

A wide range of possible activities for livelihood diversification exist including agro-forestry, adoption of new drought-resistant crops, efficient irrigation technologies, seed nurseries, bee-keeping, improved livestock marketing or training in the range of new value-added businesses expected to emerge as a result of other activities under this SO.

In order to build on the experience of many of the Recipients, USAID/Ethiopia will be concurrently running a market led livelihoods for vulnerable populations (MLVP) development activity. This activity will utilize in-country (local hire expatriate or Ethiopian) expertise and short-term expatriate technical assistance to assess the overall situation and capacity to develop and deliver market-led livelihood packages in 242 chronic food insecurity *woredas* as identified in the PIM. Working with Cooperating Sponsors (including the Recipients) and other entities the MLVP contractor will then propose “livelihood packages” with a special focus on market forces.

The livelihood packages will be designed for implementation by partners who will incorporate these packages into their programs under the USAID SPSNP, which has a primary objective of decreasing the number of persistently poor requiring resource transfers. The contractor may also implement the livelihood packages in selected pilot programs in order to ground truth and gain additional insight which will be conveyed to the SPSNP partners. Additionally, the MLVP contractor will provide continued technical assistance to the SPSNP partners as they implement the wider PSNP in coordination with the GFDRE. A further element of the MLVP technical assessments will be to suggest what public works projects, under the GFDRE program, would be

most beneficial to improving the market linkages which will ultimately support the proposed livelihoods.

When designing the livelihoods portion of the proposal Applicants should indicate how they will integrate the MLVP program. They should also indicate how they will consider cash for livelihood transfers, as well as gender division in livelihood strategies. As mentioned above, this livelihoods component to the GFDRE PSNP will be a major focus of this award.

C. 2. 4. PSNP RESOURCE MECHANISMS

To reduce chronic food insecurity - food access, availability, and utilization – must collectively be addressed on a sustainable basis and not relegated to the sidelines during crisis periods. The provision of food commodities alone serves only to protect lives and does not contribute to protecting assets or building livelihoods. Thus, food commodities must be distributed with a secondary objective in mind. Any resource transfer, whether food or cash, must facilitate the building of assets in households and communities, and serve to increase connections and interactions between the two. New assets may be created or present assets protected, built upon and expanded; assets may be physical, intellectual, or organizational in form. The only prerequisite being that whether individually or collectively, those targeted are better able to withstand the shocks of natural and/or man-made crises through timely resource transfers or targeted asset protection mechanisms.

The Recipient will focus its activities through this RFA on support to the entire PSNP including the design and implementation of both labor based public works and direct support transfers as well as livelihood activities.

Simultaneous to the issuance of this RFA, FFP will be posting Developmental Relief Guidelines for an Ethiopia Productive Safety Net Program. Applicants are encouraged to link their programs submitted under this RFA to a parallel Title II Productive Safety Net Program application.

2. 5. SPSNP PARTNER COLLABORATION

USAID/Ethiopia believes greater synergy and improved outcomes will result from coordinated activities in each targeted region, as defined by the PIM. As stated previously in Section C, Applicants are expected to work with each other and the respective regional government to develop coordinated proposals. Individual agreements can be signed with USAID; however, consortia are encouraged. However, after the issuance of Cooperative Agreements resulting from this RFA, the GFDRE requires a separate agreement be signed between the implementing CS and each Region prior to program implementation. To increase cooperation among SPSNP partners in each region, USAID expects Recipients to sign only one consortia agreement per region. The Recipient that acts as the primary signatory for each region will operate as the principle operating partner, coordinator, and communicator with relevant government institutions. USAID/Ethiopia also considers that a regional consortium operating modality will improve cooperation and coordination amongst partners, and serve to improve communication between *woreda*, regional and federal levels.

USAID/Ethiopia requests Applicants to prioritize and propose programs in the designated SPSNP *woredas* based on the following criteria: 1) existence of other USAID programs; 2) level of need (percent chronically food insecure, access to health services); 3) potential for impact; 4) prior Applicant programming/investment in the area; and 5) evidence of *woreda* willingness/desire to integrate Applicant programming into the PSNP and the broader FSP framework. Recipients not

currently working in one of these regions may still be considered for support from USAID if they demonstrate significant impact on USAID/Ethiopia's five-year goal of reducing famine vulnerability.

Intensive and Extensive targeting: The recipient is expected to *intensively target* the two activity components of 1) capacity building and 2) livelihood diversification and expansion in *woredas* where they will be working closely with *woredas* officials with the aim to innovate effective PSNP elements with high rates of success.

Through a focus on improving systems that reach beyond *woredas* of intensive targeting and by working closely with regional governments, it will be important for recipients to extend their reach by *extensive targeting*. A focus on systems might improve marketing or improved seed availability for many *woredas* in a zone, thus working to improve the livelihood options for a much larger area. Furthermore, a close working relationship with regional officials responsible for PSNP will enable lessons learned to be disseminated through the regions to safety net *woredas* in the entire region, and will allow for the recipient to positively influence the design and implementation of the broader program.

C. 2. 6. PSNP WORKING PARTNERS: ROLES AND RELATIONSHIPS

Applicants should ensure that program activities are programmed as part of the GFDRE's Food Security Coordination Bureau (FSCB) Safety Net Program. Rather than operating as independent organizations, the Recipient will operate as an integral member of the GFDRE PSNP (managed by the FSCB; under the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, MoARD), programming in collaboration and building the capacity of their government partners to independently program safety net and livelihood activities at the end of the program. This award will be made to Recipients who have best demonstrated how their proposed program will significantly contribute to and be part of the overall GFDRE PSNP. The PSNP is a Government-led program that will require all partners including the Recipient to operate in accordance with the GFDRE PSNP Program Implementation Manual (PIM). Furthermore, it is anticipated that the capacity building component of this award will require significant involvement in regional and *woreda* level planning for the program, by which the recipient will have to operate under as the program is implemented. The PIM (Attachment 1) must be used in the design of any proposal submissions. Livelihood activities are not considered to be part of the PSNP and thus will not be included in the PIM. However, livelihoods activities should be programmed in collaboration with the program.

Applicants are strongly encouraged to develop informal partnerships with other USAID/Ethiopia partners or international organizations implementing programs in the selected target areas. This will serve to complement application objectives and maximize resource use to improve program coverage. For example, livelihood program components must be closely coordinated with USAID/Ethiopia agriculture and economic growth programs to benefit from their program activities. In particular, the programs are encouraged to collaborate with and disseminate lessons learned from USAID/Ethiopia's Seeds and Fertilizer Input Systems Program, Agribusiness and Markets, and Irrigation programs. Applicants addressing any SO or IR under this RFA should consult that section in the USAID/Ethiopia ISP 2004-2008 and plan accordingly with relevant partners. (See Attachment 2)

The ability to protect assets and prevent destitution depends on flexibility and the ability to rapidly expand program coverage to those newly at risk. This approach is consistent with

USAID's emphasis on developmental relief. Activities supported by under the Applicant's program will serve as a means to reduce vulnerability over the longer-term and not merely as an end in themselves, even in an emergency environment. Proposals should reflect both short- and longer-term objectives. These include the use of cash and food resources for immediate impact, such as protecting lives and smoothing consumption, while addressing longer-term objectives by enhancing community and household resilience to shocks, helping people build a more durable and diverse livelihood base (restoring and enhancing assets, resources, services and infrastructure), and enhancing the capabilities of individuals through a focus on health, nutrition and education.

Recent reforms involving the GFDRE FSO and the DPPC have divided the responsibility of the food insecure between the chronic (FSCB) and acute (DPPC). Thus, while safety net activities should be programmed and implemented in collaboration with the FSCB, unpredictable or emergency needs are still the domain of the DPPC. Contingency planning to scale up must consider the distinct but interrelated roles of both the DPPC and the FSCB and how they will interact in times of crisis. Capacity building and contingency planning at the *woreda* and regional levels will be critical to the success of safety net programming and should be included in the proposal.

Overall, USAID/Ethiopia expects that it will work to improve relationships at the federal level and will of course be present and involved if any major policy changes change Recipients' status or relationship with regional level bureaus. The future Recipients are expected to work intimately with the regional level and down, as capacity strengthening is a central component to achievement of the PSNP. This includes however, improving communication and ensuring dialogue is more frequent between regional, *woreda*, and community level government offices and officials. In addition, however, the Recipient will be instrumental in ensuring the communication and dialogue between regional and federal levels are strengthened, as this is a central component to assessing needs, early warning and contingency planning.

C. 3. PSNP SECTORAL ACTIVITY COMPONENTS

The two modes for distributing cash and food resource transfers, direct support and public works, are built around two program elements, 1) capacity building and 2) livelihood activities in various sectors, modeled by selected USAID/Ethiopia's ISP SOs. Additionally, PSNP goals and objectives are ambitious and the timeline allowed brief; thus, it is strongly requested that Applicants share best practices from each others' previous experiences and areas of expertise. One component of the overall evaluation criteria will consider Applicants demonstration of this request.

Applicants are encouraged to identify synergies between and among activities that may combine into more appropriate conceptual and/or organizational components for their own strategic management purposes. That is, the Recipient's program components do not have to replicate one or more of USAID/Ethiopia's SOs/PSO, they simply must demonstrate convergence with them. It is expected, however, that all Recipient programs have components addressing the cross-cutting themes, communities as a focal point and women's economic and political empowerment. Within the Program components, Recipients are expected to identify and undertake activities with explicit milestones and targets to achieve defined outcomes.

However the Recipient defines its own components, outcomes, milestones, and targets under this Agreement, the Program overall is expected to make a demonstrable contribution to achievement of USAID/Ethiopia's five-year goal of *reducing famine vulnerability in Ethiopia*, and to one or

more of its SOs/PSO and selected IRs as reflected in Figure 1, with appropriate consideration of USAID/Ethiopia's cross-cutting themes throughout Program implementation. Additionally, as stated previously in the document, Applicants are requested to focus on water resource security as USAID/Ethiopia feels this is central to the establishment of long-term food security and resiliency in Ethiopia. As such, it is strongly recommended Applicants read over the USAID/Ethiopia ISP 2004-2008 to ensure goals are clearly understood and maximum complementarities are reached.

Annex D: Scope of Work for the Evaluation

663-T-06-013

Statement of Work

Evaluation of Livelihood Interventions funded through USAID Famine Fund Support to the Productive Safety Net Program and OFDA 2005 Livelihood Annual Program Statement

PURPOSE

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) mission to Ethiopia seeks to evaluate livelihoods interventions in Ethiopia funded through the Famine Fund and OFDA Annual Program Statement. This evaluation will focus on the appropriateness, sustainability, and overall impact of the activities and will seek to provide USAID with recommendations on future directions in their support to chronically poor populations. USAID/Ethiopia's Assets and Livelihoods Transition (ALT) Office seeks one or more experienced professionals to conduct research in the field and Washington over an estimated period of 43 days.

BACKGROUND

Successive and cumulative climatic shocks, combined with the effects of economic losses in agricultural and livestock markets, as well as the collapse of many livelihood systems and long-term cumulative vulnerabilities have eroded the asset base and coping strategies of millions of Ethiopians and resulted in unsustainable coping strategies by those most affected. The effects of the current crisis have caused suffering and widespread food insecurity across a broad area of Ethiopia resulting in massive humanitarian requirements simply to meet the minimal needs of approximately nine million people

USAID programmed a total of \$26.4 million for livelihood interventions and capacity building activities in 2005 as follows: (1) \$0 million for one-year programs through the Annual Program Statement of OFDA and (2) \$16.4 million for two-year programs under the Support to the Productive Safety Net Program. Both programs have objectives related to restoring and building household assets.

In five of the past seven years, Ethiopia has had large structural deficits in its food supplies, requiring substantial emergency aid to fill the gap. Over the past five years USAID alone has provided \$882 million in food aid to Ethiopia. Even in years with bumper harvests, local incentives to produce food have been sabotaged by poor-performing markets that cut farmers' prices. Over the last 20 years, the emergency relief cycle has repeated itself again and again. With each drought emergency, the overall number of people hungry, destitute and vulnerable to disease has risen. If current trends continue, by 2010 food deficits could nearly triple, significantly expanding the need and cost for humanitarian assistance; the number of malnourished children, already 50 percent of the current child population, will increase by 10 percent by 2020; and per capita income, currently the lowest in Africa, will remain at today's level or decline further.

The people of Ethiopia have suffered tremendously despite efforts to address the impact of these repeated emergencies; and there is no question that saving lives during crisis periods is the first priority. However, the unfortunate outcome of repeated crises is that due to finite resource availability, the resources necessary for livelihood programs - crucial for household asset protection and productivity - are frequently redirected towards humanitarian assistance interventions. Currently, Ethiopia is one of the largest recipient of relief resources in sub-Saharan Africa, but has been one of the smallest recipient of development resources. As several significant changes must occur for this trend to be reversed, the most important being reform of selected government policies, USAID/Ethiopia has recognized that its programs must also undergo change. Food aid, crucial to saving lives in the immediate future, does not save livelihoods in the long-term.

Over the past few years, USAID/Ethiopia has actively sought creative operating modalities that could potentially shift the emergency relief cycle. Through previous FFP Development Assistance Programs (DAPs and R2D), USAID/Ethiopia strove to combine Title II food aid assistance with Development Assistance (DA) resources, whereby the entirety of communities' needs would be met through complementary sectoral programming. USAID/OFDA has actively promoted and financed interventions which seek to help households recover from drought and transition to longer-term recovery.

FAMINE FUND SUPPORT TO THE PRODUCTIVE SAFETY NET PROGRAM

In 2005 the Ethiopian Government launched the Productive Safety Net Program. The objective of the Productive Safety Net Program is to provide transfers to the food insecure population in chronically food insecure woredas in a way that prevents asset depletion at the household level and creates assets at the community level. The Productive Safety Net Program consists of two components: a labour-intensive Public Works component; and a Direct Support component to those households who have no labour at all, no other means of support, and who are chronically food insecure. Transfers can be made in either food or cash, with USAID a major food donor to the program.

USAID has been a strong advocate for the argument, widely accepted, that safety nets alone will not help people to transition out of poverty. Transfers are set at a level to meet minimum food needs, there is no provision within the PSNP to build household assets and, while it can be hoped that community assets will improve livelihood options, community assets will have a limited impact on the income of individual households. USAID also recognised the numerous studies which showed that food insecure households are risk averse and often un-reached by mainstream government service delivery. USAID therefore decided to complement its funding of the PSNP with financing, from the Famine Fund, to support household asset building and livelihood diversification. The Famine Fund Support to the PSNP, therefore, enables building of household assets that are not addressed in the PSNP itself, yet are crucial for the achievement of food security. In addition there was a capacity building component aimed at increasing government and community capacity to maximize the benefit of the PSNP.

Results expected through the life of activity:

- Household assets built and livelihood options diversified for 1 million people
- Structures to ensure effective implementation of safety nets in place
- The number of chronically food insecure decreased by 20 percent.

OFDA LIVELIHOODS FY2005 ANNUAL PROGRAM STATEMENT

USAID/OFDA's mandate is to save lives, alleviate human suffering, and reduce the economic impact of natural and human-made disasters worldwide. In order to achieve this goal, USAID/OFDA's strategy in Ethiopia in FY2005 was to meet the critical needs of populations affected by the ongoing complex food insecurity crisis and increase household level resilience to climatic, economic, and health shocks resulting in humanitarian crises. Livelihoods recovery initiatives were intended to support or reestablish household level coping strategies in order to improve current humanitarian status and increase future resilience to climatic, economic, and health shocks. Interventions with explicit or implicit linkages to other sectors by improving access or availability to services, especially health, were encouraged.

The broad goals of the OFDA Livelihoods APS are to:

- Provide emergency, life-saving assistance to those populations most at-risk from food insecurity;
- Assist affected populations in the recovery process to promote self-sufficiency and minimize dependence on external assistance;
- Increase the capacity of households and communities to cope with recurrent drought, economic, and health shocks to reduce the need for large emergency interventions in the future; and
- Inasmuch as it is possible, prepare communities to transition to longer-term development initiatives that will further reduce vulnerability to food insecurity by addressing its root causes.

SCOPE OF WORK

This evaluation will focus on the household asset building and livelihood components of the Famine Fund financed Support to the Productive Safety Net and the OFDA livelihood APS. The following series of questions will be addressed:

Program Assumptions

A number of assumptions went into the design of the famine funded support to the PSNP. The evaluation will review some of these assumptions and the extent to which they remain relevant in program implementation. Assumptions include:

- That livelihood diversification can assist the poor to graduate from food insecurity;

- That there are synergies between the transfers provided under the PSNP and household asset building and livelihood diversification activities financed through the Famine Fund which will enable people to graduate from poverty
 - That such a combination enables households to overcome their averseness to risk and to benefit from livelihood interventions
 - That a combination of household asset protection and household asset building has greater impact.
- Are we seeing a difference in impact between Famine Fund and OFDA financed interventions because of these assumptions?

Impact and Effectiveness

- Are households making progress in achieving food security:
 - Increasing household incomes/food production
 - Increasing resiliency
 - Adopting/learning new skills that reinforce resiliency and provide opportunities for diversified livelihood options
- Which approaches are having the most impact in this regard?
- Were any implementation methods less effective because of the short amount of lead time? Which approaches dealt best with the short lead time?
- What are the varying social and economic effects of the various projects on individuals, communities, gender groups, age groups, and local institutions?
- Which approaches seemed preferred by beneficiaries? Why?
- What are the key policy or institutional constraints that limit the effectiveness of adopting interventions?

Sustainability/Connectedness

- Are the impacts of the livelihoods recovery projects likely to continue after USAID funding is withdrawn?
 - Will the improved productivity, increased income potential be sustained through moderate shocks?
 - Have beneficiaries developed skills and experience which better enable them to engage in the economy and/or benefit from other interventions or service delivery provided by the government or financed by other donors?
- Are some approaches more sustainable than others?
- How critical is the complementarity of PSNP and other livelihood or food security programming?
- How well coordinated are USAID, government, and other donor funded livelihood interventions synergized?
- How well are livelihood programs linked into demand driven private sector economic opportunities?
- Identify which woredas benefited form longer term development programs over numerous years (DAPs, R2D, and other assistance) as compared to woredas that have only been under assistance for two or fewer years with livelihood interventions.
- What are the linkages with other food security program interventions and how critical are these to successful diversification of beneficiary.

METHODOLOGY AND ESTIMATED TIMELINE

The notional start date for the evaluation is on/about May 2006. The evaluation should start within 15 calendar days of the award of the task order. The evaluator will conduct the evaluation and complete the report in approximately 43 days.

Key informant interviews and document review in Washington, DC (3 days). The evaluator should meet with staff from USAID, the State Department, international NGOs, donors, and other knowledgeable parties. S/he may review strategic assessments, grant documents, situation reports, and other relevant documents.

Field work and data collection in Ethiopia (25 days). The evaluator will meet with representatives of the U.S. Government, other donors, international NGOs, local NGOs, UN organizations, other relevant agencies, and beneficiary populations, both in the capital and in project implementation areas. The evaluator will also visit seed fairs, if possible. USAID/Ethiopia ALT office staff and the OFDA Program Officer will assist with facilitation as necessary, but the evaluator is expected to be as independent as possible. A total of ten Support to Productive Safety Net Program (SPSNP) implementing woredas (covered by eight NGOs) are randomly selected for the field visits. Two woredas in Tigray (Degua Temben & Aheferom), three woredas in Amhara (Lay Gayint, Tach Gayint & Habru), two woredas in Oromia (Dodota Sire & Chiro) and three woredas in SNNPR (Sodo Zuria, Kedida Gamella and Meskan) and two OFDA program implementing woredas will be covered.

Writing report (10 days). The evaluator will draft the report over 10 days at a location to be determined. The evaluator will debrief USAID staff in Addis Ababa after completion of the field work.

Final report revisions and printing (3 days). Following the final oral briefings and taking into account any new information obtained, the evaluator will prepare and publish a final version of the evaluation report.

Contractor's Profile

The contractor should possess the following set of skills:

- Experience carrying out two or more major humanitarian evaluations for a major donor, international NGO, or international organization;
- Specific training of post graduate level and extensive practical experience in humanitarian agricultural relief interventions, preferably in Ethiopia;
- Specific training and/or extensive practical experience in developing or implementing activities aimed at sustaining local livelihoods;
- General familiarity and sound knowledge with the humanitarian context in Ethiopia, particularly over the past 3 years;

- Experience implementing humanitarian relief programs in complex emergencies in various geographic regions around the world, preferably from several perspectives (UN/IO, NGO, donor); and
- Basic understanding of procedures for grant management.

DELIVERABLES

The consultants are expected to deliver the following to USAID/Ethiopia on timely basis:

Work Plan:

- One week is allowed for the consultants to propose and submit their detailed plan of action for approval by USAID/Ethiopia. The work plan should briefly describe your understanding of the statement of work, the overall approach and how you propose to carry out each phase of the work.
- Bi-weekly progress report, and
- Draft and final report – The report should have an executive summary that clearly and concisely addresses each aspect of the terms of reference, outlines relevant findings and makes clear and manageable recommendations.
- The final draft evaluation report should have the following format:
 - The report format should be “Times New Roman” with 12 -font size;
 - Executive Summary (not more than three pages);
 - Findings, recommendations and other contents of the main report (not more than 25 pages); and
 - Annexes that include background and technical information (\leq 10 pages).

The evaluation shall document the findings, conclusions and recommendations. The evaluator will be expected to work closely with USAID/ALT office and USAID/OFDA.

USAID/Ethiopia will provide comments within two weeks of receipt of the draft. Within 15 working days of receipt of comments, the evaluator will provide USAID/Ethiopia with the final version of the report, after incorporating feedback on the draft. The contractor will also send one copy of the final report to PPC/CDIE/DI, in order to make the document available in the USAID library and database.

Prior to departure to the field, the evaluator will provide to USAID/Ethiopia a 2-3 page written strategy detailing how the evaluation will be completed, for review and approval. The work plan will include a list of potential interviewees, a draft list of interview questions, and a description of any other data collection instruments (e.g., surveys) to be used. The questions and instruments should be tailored to individual categories of respondents such as implementing partners, beneficiaries, government officials, and other donors.

Field Debrief: Upon completion of research in Ethiopia, the evaluator will provide a verbal debrief of preliminary findings to USAID staff in Addis, and will request preliminary feedback which may be incorporated into the final report.

Written Report: The evaluator shall write and present for review a first draft of the evaluation report at least one week prior to the final oral briefings (below). The report will include an executive summary, brief overview of the humanitarian agricultural context in Ethiopia over the focus period, description of methodology, and a detailed description of the evaluation's findings and recommendations. Additional information including evaluator itinerary, interviewee lists, questionnaires, surveys, and bibliography should be included in annexes. The report should be no more than 25 pages, excluding annexes. Following the final oral briefings and taking into account any new information obtained, the evaluator will prepare and print a final version of the evaluation report, with the number of printed copies to be determined.

Final Oral Briefings: At least one week after distribution of the written report to OFDA and FFP, the evaluator will conduct two oral debriefs to present findings, one with USAID senior management and the other to a broader audience from both inside and outside USAID, to present study findings and obtain feedback.

Local Staff Requirement

Economist: 24 days @ \$183 + \$70 out of town per diem

Data Collector/Analyst 20 days @ \$144 +\$70 out of town per diem

Two Interviewers each : 20 days @ \$100 +\$70 out of town per diem

Logistical Assistant: 20 days @ \$72 +\$70 out of town per diem*

*May not apply

Total Fees: \$12,712

Annex E: Key Questions and Cross Referenced Responses

Key Questions	Responses (Section No.)
Are households making progress in achieving food security: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Increasing household incomes/food production ○ Increasing resiliency Adopting/learning new skills that reinforce resiliency and provide opportunities for diversified livelihood options	6.3, 6.2, 7.3
Which approaches are having the most impact?	7.1, 7.2, 7.4
Were any implementation methods less effective because of the short amount of lead time? Which approaches dealt best with the short lead time?	7.3, 2.5
What are the varying social and economic effects of the various projects on individuals, communities, gender groups, age groups, and local institutions?	6.3
Which approaches seemed preferred by beneficiaries? Why?	7.1, 7.4
What are the key policy or institutional constraints that limit the effectiveness of adopting interventions?	5.5, 8.1, 8.4
Are the impacts of the livelihoods recovery projects likely to continue after USAID funding is withdrawn?	6.2
Will the improved productivity, increased income potential be sustained through moderate shocks?	6.2
Have beneficiaries developed skills and experience which better enable them to engage in the economy and/or benefit from other interventions or service delivery provided by the government or financed by other donors?	8.1
Are some approaches more sustainable than others?	6.2
How critical is the complimentarily of PSNP and other livelihood or food security programming?	5.3
How well coordinated are USAID, government, and other donor funded livelihood interventions synergized?	5.2, 5.5
How well are livelihood programs linked into demand driven private sector economic opportunities?	5.6
Identify which woredas benefited form longer term development programs over numerous years (DAPs, R2D, and other assistance) as compared to woredas that have only been under assistance for two or fewer years with livelihood interventions.	6.1
What are the linkages with other food security program interventions and how critical are these to successful diversification of beneficiary.	5.1

Annex F: Beneficiary Questionnaire

Note: Interviewer has to be make sure that the respondent identified by the NGO is a beneficiary of USAID's SPSNP.

Date of completion: ____/October/2006

Name of interviewer: _____

Name of woreda: _____

Name of kabele: _____

Name of NGO operating in area: _____

1. Gender of respondent? a) male b) female

2. Number of household members _____

3. Has your household received food or cash or both under PSNP since you started participating in it? a) food b) cash c) both

4. Has your household received this benefit in exchange for work or direct transfer or both? a) work b) direct transfer c) both

5. Nature of productive or income generating activities (undertaken under livelihood support)

Note to interviewer: these are activities supported by the NGO which does not include Cash for Works or Food for Works. These income generating activities could include e.g beekeeping, silk making, livestock development, small-scale irrigation, poultry, horticulture, kitchen gardening etc

(a) _____

(b) _____

(c) _____

(d) _____

6. What sort of assistance have you received in developing these activities?

- a. Provision of inputs
- b. Training
- c. Assistance in savings groups
- d. Assistance in marketing
- e. Assistance in cooperative formation
- f. Other: Specify _____

7. Which type of assistance in q.6 was the most helpful in developing these activities?

8. Inputs provided by CS (*e.g. seeds, hives, plants, tools, sheep, vaccinations, trees etc*)

Input	Month/year input given
(a) _____	_____
(b) _____	_____
(c) _____	_____
(d) _____	_____

9. Training provided with support of Cooperating Sponsor (*e.g. training in bee-keeping, agricultural production, weaving, marketing, cultivation ,etc*)

Training	Month/year training given
(a) _____	_____
(b) _____	_____
(c) _____	_____
(d) _____	_____

10. As part of the training, did you undertake any study tour? a)Yes b) No

11. Have the activities resulted in increased production of food for your own consumption?
a)Yes b) No

12. Which activity in q.5 has resulted in increased food consumption? _____

13. If yes to q.11, has this increase been? 1. Big 2. Moderate 3. Insignificant

14. Have the activities directly increased the amount of cash received by the household?
a) Yes b) No
15. Which activity in q.5 has resulted in most increased cash income? _____
16. If yes to q.14,
- a. Has this increase been ? 1. Big 2. Moderate 3. Insignificant
 - b. Has the increased cash been used to buy food? a) Yes b) No
 - c. Has the increased cash been used to purchase household assets
a) Yes b) No
17. Because of the activities, what have been the average increase in net household cash income in ETB per month? ____ ETB
18. Has the increase in production and/or increase in cash resulted in increased diversity in terms of nutrition? a) Yes b) No
19. How long do you expect to remain a beneficiary of the PSNP?
a) less than one year
b) 1 more year
c) 2 more years
d) three more years
e) longer than three more years.
20. Have the activities resulted in extra labour demands upon the household?
a) Yes b) No
21. If yes,
- a. have these extra demands been met easily? a) Yes b) No
 - b. have these extra demands affected other income generating activities? a) Yes
b) No
22. Have the activities required extra financial resources to undertake it?
a) Yes b) No
23. If yes, what is the source:
- a. NGO
 - b. MFI
 - c. Relatives/friends
 - d. Own
24. What are your future plans:
- a. Stop the activities
 - b. Maintain the activities yourself
 - c. Improve the activities
 - d. Expand the activities

25. If improve or expand the activities, how? (*Do not prompt. Can tick more than one*)
- Own resources
 - Credit
 - Others. Specify _____
26. Do you know if any households in your area have started similar activities following your example, without NGO support?
- Yes, many
 - Yes, a few
 - No
27. As part of the activity, did you join a group or association promoted by the NGO? a) Yes b) No
28. How many male and female members of the group are there? ___ Males ___ Females
29. Does the group regularly save? a) Yes b) No
30. If so, how much does each member save per month? ___ ETB
31. Does the group undertake credit activities? a) Yes b) No
32. If so, have you borrowed any money? a) Yes b) No
33. If yes, how much have you borrowed so far in total? ___ ETB

Annex G: Tabulated Results

Table: G1. Levels of Project Coverage

Cooperating Sponsor Woreda of Operation		Save UK Habru	Save UK Gubalafto	Save UK Dehana	Save UK Sekota	CARE Grawa	CARE Kurfachell	CARE Lay Gayini	CARE Gemechi	CARE Chiro	CARE Doba
1	Number of Kebeles in the Woreda	30	35	32	45	45	18	26	33	39	33
2	Number of target Kebele	6	13	5	19	36	11	26	25	28	24
3	Total HH in Woreda	38205	50461	26652	33501	41197	16670	52067	7032	8568	8985
4	Total HH in Targeted Kebele	7885	15511	6232	17509	31657	9055	47659	6101	6453	7198
5	Total PSNP HH in Woreda	9302	17539	9006	11939	10137	4559	17688	5121	5939	6971
6	Total PSNP HH in targeted Kebele	2037	6257	1696	6248	10137	4559	17688	5121	5939	6971
7	Total SPSNP HH in Woreda	1081	2614	1228	3700	7013	3451	9809	3482	4038	4740
8	% of SPSNP HH which are female -headed	32%	20%	26%	22%	23%	19%	4%	12%	12%	9%
9	Total Budget Under SPSNP for household diversification NOT PSNP capacity development	\$149,131	\$136,253	\$166,559	\$219,079	\$144,962	\$85,130	\$592,840	\$74,159	\$85,989	\$100,933
	Budgeted Spend per Household	\$138	\$52	\$136	\$59	\$21	\$25	\$60	\$21	\$21	\$21
	Percent of PSNP households targeted within k	53%	42%	72%	59%	69%	76%	55%	68%	68%	68%
	Percent of PSNP households targeted within V	12%	15%	14%	31%	69%	76%	55%	68%	68%	68%
	Percent Kabeles within a Woreda	20%	37%	16%	42%	80%	61%	100%	76%	72%	73%

Cooperating Sponsor Woreda of Operation		W Vision Sodo Zuria	W Vision Humbo	FHI Simada	FHI Wadla	FHI Tach Gayir	CRS Dire Daw	CRS Gorogutu	CRS Meta	CRS Kersa	CRS Dodota Sere
1	Number of Kebeles in the Woreda	44	36	36	27	15	30	30	43	35	26
2	Number of target Kebele	20	20	12	25	11	21	13	25	20	18
3	Total HH in Woreda	41182	20957	50090	25847	27826	76800	25400	46807	32970	30313
4	Total HH in Targeted Kebele	18719	10263	50090	24294	16189	19600	10892	10300	10184	11624
5	Total PSNP HH in Woreda	6851	17283	18667	8657	16189	10522	5038	8154	5742	7380
6	Total PSNP HH in targeted Kebele	4185	7691	18667	8657	16189	10522	5038	8154	5742	7380
7	Total SPSNP HH in Woreda	2152	946	2200	2000	2081	2058	5038	8154	5742	3750
8	% of SPSNP HH which are female -headed	30%	17%	47%	68%	50%	21%	20%	19%	20%	25%
9	Total Budget Under SPSNP for household diversification NOT PSNP capacity development	\$287,673	\$293,340	\$469,806	\$485,401	\$463,904	\$74,695	\$182,849	\$295,941	\$208,400	\$242,565
	Budgeted Spend per Household	\$134	\$310	\$214	\$243	\$223	\$36	\$36	\$36	\$36	\$65
	Percent of PSNP households targeted within K	51%	12%	12%	23%	13%	20%	100%	100%	100%	51%
	Percent of PSNP households targeted within V	31%	5%	12%	23%	13%	20%	100%	100%	100%	51%
	Percent Kabeles within a Woreda	45%	56%	33%	93%	73%	70%	43%	58%	57%	69%

Cooperating Sponsor Woreda of Operation		REST Degua	REST Tembian	CHF Inticho	CHF Dalocha	CHF Kedida	CHF Gar Meskan	CHF Silti	CHF Mareko	Mean	Per Person
1	Number of Kebeles in the Woreda		18	28	26	27	41	38	24		860
2	Number of target Kebele		18	12	26	27	15	25	21		522
3	Total HH in Woreda		23356		25480	28612	21158	30478	25504		816118
4	Total HH in Targeted Kebele		23356		25480	28612	8566	20052	23205		466686
5	Total PSNP HH in Woreda		7620	16025	6243	7479	4823	20052	9206		274132
6	Total PSNP HH in targeted Kebele		7620	7000	6243	7479	4823	20052	9206		221301
7	Total SPSNP HH in Woreda		1372	2725	536	1373	587	538	424		82832
8	% of SPSNP HH which are female -headed		55%	53%	65%	33%	40%	40%	48%		414160
9	Total Budget Under SPSNP for household diversification NOT PSNP capacity development		\$1,300,000	\$1,300,000	\$200,000	\$200,000	\$200,000	\$200,000	\$200,000		\$8,359,608
	Budgeted Spend per Household		\$948	\$477	\$373	\$146	\$341	\$372	\$472		\$101
	Percent of PSNP households targeted within K		18%	39%	9%	18%	12%	3%	5%		37%
	Percent of PSNP households targeted within V		18%	17%	9%	18%	12%	3%	5%		30%
	Percent Kabeles within a Woreda		100%	43%	100%	100%	37%	66%	88%		61%

Financial Data for Rest and CHF are estimates based on interviews with Head Office Staff.

Questionnaire Data Analysis
Table G2

List of woredas and kebeles visited and name of NGO operating in the area

No.	Woreda	Kebele	NGO
1	Chiro	Horemata	CARE
2	Chiro	Wachu Horemata	CARE
3	Chiro	Yeabedo Bobasa	CARE
4	Habru	No. 6 PA	CARE
5	Habru	No. 7 PA	CARE
6	Habru	No.6 PA	CARE
7	Habru	No.7 PA	CARE
8	Lay Gayint	/Damot /04/	CARE
9	Lay Gayint	01/Mokabia/	CARE
10	Lay Gayint	02/Mokabia/	CARE
11	Kedida Gamela	Abonsa	CHF
12	Kedida Gamela	Dega Kedida	CHF
13	Kedida Gamela	Taza Agara	CHF
14	Meskan	Anseno Ousume	CHF
15	Meskan	Ansino Agume	CHF
16	Meskan	Bati Foto	CHF
17	Meskan	Beche Bulchano	CHF
18	Meskan	Enseno Ousome	CHF
19	Sodo Zuria	Abonsa	CHF
20	Dodota Sire	Alelu Gsela	CRS
21	Dodota Sire	Ebesata Hudega	CRS
22	Enderta	Chelekot	CRS
23	Enderta	Maygenet	CRS
24	Enderta	Metkel	CRS
25	Hintalo Wejerat	Metkel	CRS
26	Tach Gayint	Kebele 02/Afere Mamashe/	FHI
27	Tach Gayint	Kebele 02/Agaye/	FHI
28	Tach Gayint	Kebele 02/Arogye Gebeya/	FHI
29	Tach Gayint	Kebele 02/Donsa/	FHI
30	Tach Gayint	Kebele 02/Eger mesek/	FHI
31	Tach Gayint	Kebele 02/Enjete/	FHI
32	Tach Gayint	Kebele 02/Kebe nich/	FHI
33	Tach Gayint	Kebele 02/Mesealemy Gote/	FHI
34	Tach Gayint	Kebele 08	FHI
35	Tach Gayint	Kebele 08/Amba ras/	FHI
36	Tach Gayint	Kebele 08/Anbo/	FHI
37	Tach Gayint	Kebele 08/Aroge gebeya/	FHI
38	Tach Gayint	Kebele 08/Daro Wenze/	FHI
39	Tach Gayint	Kebele 08/Jaje Mariam/	FHI
40	Tach Gayint	Kebele 08/Wyera Mender/	FHI
41	Tach Gayint	Kebele 13 /Agate/	FHI
42	Tach Gayint	Kebele 3 /Kote mender/	FHI
43	Tach Gayint	Kebele 8 /Aroge Gebeya/	FHI
44	Aheferom	Feresmay	REST
45	Degua Temben	Adi Azmera	REST
46	Degua Temben	Ayinmbrkekin	REST
47	Degua Temben	Hagereselam	REST
48	Degua Temben	Ketema /Zone 1/	REST
49	Degua Temben	Ketena 2/ketema/	REST
50	Degua Temben	Tekul	REST
51	Sodo Zuria	Bosa Kacha	WVE
52	Sodo Zuria	Ofa Sire	WVE

Table G3

Name NGO operating * Gender of respondent Crosstabulation

			Gender of respondent		Total
			Male	Female	
Name NGO operating	CARE	Count	78	42	120
		% within Name NGO operating	65.0%	35.0%	100.0%
	CHF	Count	24	59	83
		% within Name NGO operating	28.9%	71.1%	100.0%
	CRS	Count	49	31	80
		% within Name NGO operating	61.3%	38.8%	100.0%
	FHI	Count	23	17	40
% within Name NGO operating		57.5%	42.5%	100.0%	
REST	Count	50	30	80	
	% within Name NGO operating	62.5%	37.5%	100.0%	
WVE	Count	24	13	37	
	% within Name NGO operating	64.9%	35.1%	100.0%	
Total	Count	248	192	440	
	% within Name NGO operating	56.4%	43.6%	100.0%	

Table G4

Name NGO operating * Has the HH received food or cash? Crosstabulation

			Has the HH received food or cash?			Total
			Food	Cash	Both	
Name NGO operating	CARE	Count	52	0	66	118
		% within Name NGO operating	44.1%	.0%	55.9%	100.0%
	CHF	Count	2	55	15	72
		% within Name NGO operating	2.8%	76.4%	20.8%	100.0%
	CRS	Count	33	36	7	76
		% within Name NGO operating	43.4%	47.4%	9.2%	100.0%
	FHI	Count	3	0	34	37
	% within Name NGO operating	8.1%	.0%	91.9%	100.0%	
	REST	Count	79	0	0	79
		% within Name NGO operating	100.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
	WVE	Count	4	15	18	37
		% within Name NGO operating	10.8%	40.5%	48.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	173	106	140	419
		% within Name NGO operating	41.3%	25.3%	33.4%	100.0%

Table G5

Name NGO operating * How has HH received this benefit? Crosstabulation

			How has HH received this benefit?			Total
			In exchange for work	Direct transfer	Both	
Name NGO operating	CARE	Count	111	0	5	116
		% within Name NGO operating	95.7%	.0%	4.3%	100.0%
	CHF	Count	49	21	6	76
		% within Name NGO operating	64.5%	27.6%	7.9%	100.0%
	CRS	Count	60	11	6	77
		% within Name NGO operating	77.9%	14.3%	7.8%	100.0%
	FHI	Count	35	0	2	37
	% within Name NGO operating	94.6%	.0%	5.4%	100.0%	
	REST	Count	79	1	0	80
		% within Name NGO operating	98.8%	1.3%	.0%	100.0%
	WVE	Count	32	5	0	37
		% within Name NGO operating	86.5%	13.5%	.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	366	38	19	423
		% within Name NGO operating	86.5%	9.0%	4.5%	100.0%

Table G6

Name NGO operating * Type of productive or IG activities carried out under PSNP? Crosstabulation

			Type of productive or IG activities carried out under PSNP?																	Total
			Bee keeping	Silk making	Livestock production	Poultry farming	Horticulture growing	Small scale irrigation	Vegetable growing	Sheep production	Goat production	Crop production	Improvted seed	Handicraft	Enset	Coffee production	Trade	Metal work	Saving	
Name NGO operating	CARE	Count	9	7	80	48	62	34	0	7	3	18	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	271
		% within Name NGO operating	3.3%	2.6%	29.5%	17.7%	22.9%	12.5%	.0%	2.6%	1.1%	6.6%	1.1%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
	CHF	Count	8	3	11	28	19	3	0	9	0	2	0	13	7	1	1	5	3	113
		% within Name NGO operating	7.1%	2.7%	9.7%	24.8%	16.8%	2.7%	.0%	8.0%	.0%	1.8%	.0%	11.5%	6.2%	.9%	.9%	4.4%	2.7%	100.0%
	CRS	Count	2	2	49	19	9	3	0	0	1	9	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	96
		% within Name NGO operating	2.1%	2.1%	51.0%	19.8%	9.4%	3.1%	.0%	.0%	1.0%	9.4%	2.1%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
	FHI	Count	14	0	13	1	23	16	1	1	0	13	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	82
		% within Name NGO operating	17.1%	.0%	15.9%	1.2%	28.0%	19.5%	1.2%	1.2%	.0%	15.9%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
	REST	Count	23	0	64	32	4	34	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	160
		% within Name NGO operating	14.4%	.0%	40.0%	20.0%	2.5%	21.3%	.6%	.6%	.6%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
	WVE	Count	17	7	21	2	17	0	0	11	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	76
		% within Name NGO operating	22.4%	9.2%	27.6%	2.6%	22.4%	.0%	.0%	14.5%	.0%	.0%	1.3%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	73	19	238	130	134	90	2	29	5	42	6	13	7	1	1	5	3	798
		% within Name NGO operating	9.1%	2.4%	29.8%	16.3%	16.8%	11.3%	.3%	3.6%	.6%	5.3%	.8%	1.6%	.9%	.1%	.1%	.6%	.4%	100.0%

Table G7

Name NGO operating * Assistance HH received in developing productive/IG activities? Crosstabulation

			Assistance HH received in developing productive/IG activities?					Total	
			Provisions of inputs	Training	Assistance in savings groups	Assistance in marketing	Assistance in cooperative formation		Other
Name NGO operating	CARE	Count	71	101	57	11	42	1	283
		% within Name NGO operating	25.1%	35.7%	20.1%	3.9%	14.8%	.4%	100.0%
	CHF	Count	48	68	45	15	53	0	229
		% within Name NGO operating	21.0%	29.7%	19.7%	6.6%	23.1%	.0%	100.0%
	CRS	Count	25	36	4	15	15	0	95
		% within Name NGO operating	26.3%	37.9%	4.2%	15.8%	15.8%	.0%	100.0%
	FHI	Count	40	37	40	7	40	0	164
		% within Name NGO operating	24.4%	22.6%	24.4%	4.3%	24.4%	.0%	100.0%
	REST	Count	71	79	0	0	17	0	167
		% within Name NGO operating	42.5%	47.3%	.0%	.0%	10.2%	.0%	100.0%
	WVE	Count	36	30	0	0	0	0	66
		% within Name NGO operating	54.5%	45.5%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	291	351	146	48	167	1	1004
		% within Name NGO operating	29.0%	35.0%	14.5%	4.8%	16.6%	.1%	100.0%

Table G8

Name NGO operating * Which type of assistance was most helpful? Crosstabulation

			Which type of assistance was most helpful?														Total	
			Provisions of inputs	Training	Assistance in savings groups	Assistance in marketing	Assistance in cooperative formation	Small scale irrigation	Beekeeping	Sheep production	Goat production	Poultry	Vegetable	Animal husbandry	Silk production	Metal work		Sebel Merete
Name NGO operating	CARE	Count	34	39	17	2	21	2	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	117
		% within Name NGO operating	29.1%	33.3%	14.5%	1.7%	17.9%	1.7%	.0%	.9%	.0%	.9%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
	CHF	Count	13	33	2	7	3	1	1	3	0	11	2	1	0	2	0	79
		% within Name NGO operating	16.5%	41.8%	2.5%	8.9%	3.8%	1.3%	1.3%	3.8%	.0%	13.9%	2.5%	1.3%	.0%	2.5%	.0%	100.0%
	CRS	Count	13	29	0	6	12	0	0	2	2	1	1	4	0	0	0	70
		% within Name NGO operating	18.6%	41.4%	.0%	8.6%	17.1%	.0%	.0%	2.9%	2.9%	1.4%	1.4%	5.7%	.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
	FHI	Count	3	1	5	0	30	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	41
		% within Name NGO operating	7.3%	2.4%	12.2%	.0%	73.2%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	4.9%
	REST	Count	42	28	0	4	0	2	1	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	80
		% within Name NGO operating	52.5%	35.0%	.0%	5.0%	.0%	2.5%	1.3%	1.3%	2.5%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	WVE	Count	14	12	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	0	5	13	2	0	0	50
		% within Name NGO operating	28.0%	24.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	6.0%	2.0%	.0%	.0%	10.0%	26.0%	4.0%	.0%	.0%
Total		Count	119	142	24	19	66	5	5	8	4	13	8	18	2	2	2	437
		% within Name NGO operating	27.2%	32.5%	5.5%	4.3%	15.1%	1.1%	1.1%	1.8%	.9%	3.0%	1.8%	4.1%	.5%	.5%	.5%	100.0%

11. TABLE G9

Name NGO operating * Inputs provided by CS Crosstabulation

			Inputs provided by CS																	
			Improved seed	Beehives	Seedling	Farm tools	Sheep	Goats	Vaccination	Chicken	Livestock	Cow	Vegetable seeds	Horticulture seeds	Cash	Silk worm	Ox	Tools	Potato	Total
Name NGO operating	CARE	Count	66	5	70	7	45	20	34	25	4	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	282
		% within Name NGO operating	23.4%	1.8%	24.8%	2.5%	16.0%	7.1%	12.1%	8.9%	1.4%	.0%	.0%	2.1%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
	CHF	Count	8	6	15	0	13	0	3	20	0	0	0	0	3	3	1	21	0	93
		% within Name NGO operating	8.6%	6.5%	16.1%	.0%	14.0%	.0%	3.2%	21.5%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	3.2%	3.2%	1.1%	22.6%	.0%	100.0%
	CRS	Count	13	0	10	7	28	26	6	14	3	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	108
		% within Name NGO operating	12.0%	.0%	9.3%	6.5%	25.9%	24.1%	5.6%	13.0%	2.8%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.9%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
	FHI	Count	38	11	9	0	12	0	3	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	24	2	103
		% within Name NGO operating	36.9%	10.7%	8.7%	.0%	11.7%	.0%	2.9%	.0%	.0%	.0%	1.9%	1.9%	.0%	.0%	.0%	23.3%	1.9%	100.0%
	REST	Count	21	24	6	3	13	21	0	29	16	29	5	1	0	0	0	0	0	168
		% within Name NGO operating	12.5%	14.3%	3.6%	1.8%	7.7%	12.5%	.0%	17.3%	9.5%	17.3%	3.0%	.6%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
	WVE	Count	2	12	9	0	19	0	1	8	2	0	0	2	0	6	11	0	0	72
		% within Name NGO operating	2.8%	16.7%	12.5%	.0%	26.4%	.0%	1.4%	11.1%	2.8%	.0%	.0%	2.8%	.0%	8.3%	15.3%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	148	58	119	17	130	67	47	96	25	29	7	11	4	9	12	45	2	826
		% within Name NGO operating	17.9%	7.0%	14.4%	2.1%	15.7%	8.1%	5.7%	11.6%	3.0%	3.5%	.8%	1.3%	.5%	1.1%	1.5%	5.4%	.2%	100.0%

12. TABLE G10

% Trainees undertaking Study Tours

			As part of the did you undertake study		Total
			Yes	No	
Name NG operatin	CAR	Coun % within NGO	28 24.8%	85 75.2%	113 100.0
	CH	Coun % within NGO	12 15.4%	66 84.6%	78 100.0
	CR	Coun % within NGO	3 4.3%	66 95.7%	69 100.0
	FH	Coun % within NGO	22 56.4%	17 43.6%	39 100.0
	RES	Coun % within NGO	44 55.0%	36 45.0%	80 100.0
	WVE	Coun % within NGO	1 2.9%	34 97.1%	35 100.0
	Total	Coun % within NGO	110 26.6%	304 73.4%	414 100.0

13. TABLE G11

Name NGO operating * Have the activities resulted in increased production of food for own consumption? Crosstabulation

			Have the activities resulted in increased production of food for own consumption?		Total
			Yes	No	
Name NGO operating	CARE	Count	105	13	118
		% within Name NGO operating	89.0%	11.0%	100.0%
	CHF	Count	58	24	82
		% within Name NGO operating	70.7%	29.3%	100.0%
	CRS	Count	58	17	75
		% within Name NGO operating	77.3%	22.7%	100.0%
	FHI	Count	39	1	40
		% within Name NGO operating	97.5%	2.5%	100.0%
	REST	Count	80	0	80
		% within Name NGO operating	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
	WVE	Count	35	1	36
		% within Name NGO operating	97.2%	2.8%	100.0%
Total		Count	375	56	431
		% within Name NGO operating	87.0%	13.0%	100.0%

14. TABLE G12

Name NGO operating * Which activity in Q5 has resulted in increased food consumption? Crosstabulation

			Which activity in Q5 has resulted in increased food consumption?																	Total		
			Beekeeping	Silk making	Livestock production	Poultry	Horticulture	Small scale irrigation	Sheep reproduction	Goat reproduction	Training	Assistance in marketing	Assistance in cooperative formation	Improved seed	Crop production	Animal fattning	Trade	Metal work	Handicraft		18	
Name NGO operating	CARE	Count	0	0	28	25	24	16	5	4	4	0	0	5	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	113
		% within Name NGO operating	.0%	.0%	24.8%	22.1%	21.2%	14.2%	4.4%	3.5%	3.5%	.0%	.0%	4.4%	1.8%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
	CHF	Count	1	3	6	23	6	0	3	0	4	2	3	1	1	0	2	3	10	0	0	68
		% within Name NGO operating	1.5%	4.4%	8.8%	33.8%	8.8%	.0%	4.4%	.0%	5.9%	2.9%	4.4%	1.5%	1.5%	.0%	2.9%	4.4%	14.7%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
	CRS	Count	0	0	24	3	1	0	2	1	7	3	1	2	8	3	0	0	0	0	0	55
		% within Name NGO operating	.0%	.0%	43.6%	5.5%	1.8%	.0%	3.6%	1.8%	12.7%	5.5%	1.8%	3.6%	14.5%	5.5%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
	FHI	Count	2	0	6	0	18	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	0	1	43
		% within Name NGO operating	4.7%	.0%	14.0%	.0%	41.9%	20.9%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	16.3%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	2.3%	100.0%
	REST	Count	11	0	49	6	1	18	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	87
		% within Name NGO operating	12.6%	.0%	56.3%	6.9%	1.1%	20.7%	1.1%	1.1%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
	WVE	Count	14	3	13	0	12	0	12	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	55
		% within Name NGO operating	25.5%	5.5%	23.6%	.0%	21.8%	.0%	21.8%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	1.8%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	28	6	126	57	62	43	23	6	15	5	4	9	18	3	2	3	10	1	0	421
		% within Name NGO operating	6.7%	1.4%	29.9%	13.5%	14.7%	10.2%	5.5%	1.4%	3.6%	1.2%	1.0%	2.1%	4.3%	.7%	.5%	.7%	2.4%	.2%	0.0%	100.0%

15. TABLE G13

Name NGO operating * If yes to Q11, has this increased been? Crosstabulation

			If yes to Q11, has this increased been?			Total
			Big	Moderate	Insignificant	
Name NGO operating	CARE	Count	7	64	39	110
		% within Name NGO operating	6.4%	58.2%	35.5%	100.0%
	CHF	Count	18	36	21	75
		% within Name NGO operating	24.0%	48.0%	28.0%	100.0%
	CRS	Count	9	45	9	63
		% within Name NGO operating	14.3%	71.4%	14.3%	100.0%
	FHI	Count	12	28	0	40
		% within Name NGO operating	30.0%	70.0%	.0%	100.0%
	REST	Count	17	63	0	80
		% within Name NGO operating	21.3%	78.8%	.0%	100.0%
	WVE	Count	1	35	1	37
		% within Name NGO operating	2.7%	94.6%	2.7%	100.0%
Total		Count	64	271	70	405
		% within Name NGO operating	15.8%	66.9%	17.3%	100.0%

16. TABLE G14

Name NGO operating * Have the activities directly increased the amount of cash received by HH? Crosstabulation

			Have the activities directly increased the amount of cash received by HH?		Total
			Yes	No	
Name NGO operating	CARE	Count	84	33	117
		% within Name NGO operating	71.8%	28.2%	100.0%
	CHF	Count	58	23	81
		% within Name NGO operating	71.6%	28.4%	100.0%
	CRS	Count	61	13	74
		% within Name NGO operating	82.4%	17.6%	100.0%
	FHI	Count	40	0	40
	% within Name NGO operating	100.0%	.0%	100.0%	
	REST	Count	80	0	80
		% within Name NGO operating	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
	WVE	Count	34	3	37
		% within Name NGO operating	91.9%	8.1%	100.0%
Total		Count	357	72	429
		% within Name NGO operating	83.2%	16.8%	100.0%

Table G15

Name NGO operating * Which activity in Q5 has resulted in most increased cash income? Crosstabulation

Name NGO operating	Count	% within Name NGO operating	Which activity in Q5 has resulted in most increased cash income?																		Total	
			Beekeeping	Silk making	Livestock	Poultry	Horticulture	Small scale irrigation	Sheep production	Goat production	Assistance in marketing	Training	Assistance in cooperative formation	Improved seed	Improved crop production	Animal fattening	Daily labor	Trade	Metal work	Handicraft		Saving
CARE	21		0	0	21	20	22	7	7	3	0	0	0	6	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	88
			.0%	.0%	23.9%	22.7%	25.0%	8.0%	8.0%	3.4%	.0%	.0%	.0%	6.8%	2.3%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
CHF	4		0	3	4	25	6	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	2	3	10	2	59
			.0%	5.1%	6.8%	42.4%	10.2%	.0%	1.7%	.0%	1.7%	.0%	.0%	1.7%	.0%	.0%	1.7%	3.4%	5.1%	16.9%	3.4%	100.0%
CRS	28		0	0	28	5	1	0	5	0	3	6	1	1	7	1	0	0	0	0	0	58
			.0%	.0%	48.3%	8.6%	1.7%	.0%	8.6%	.0%	5.2%	10.3%	1.7%	1.7%	12.1%	1.7%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
FHI	6		2	0	6	0	22	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	40
			5.0%	.0%	15.0%	.0%	55.0%	17.5%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	7.5%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
REST	51		9	0	51	5	1	19	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	87
			10.3%	.0%	58.6%	5.7%	1.1%	21.8%	1.1%	1.1%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
WVE	14		14	2	14	0	13	0	13	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	57
			24.6%	3.5%	24.6%	.0%	22.8%	.0%	22.8%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	1.8%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
Total	389		25	5	124	55	65	33	27	4	4	6	1	9	12	1	1	2	3	10	2	389
			6.4%	1.3%	31.9%	14.1%	16.7%	8.5%	6.9%	1.0%	1.0%	1.5%	.3%	2.3%	3.1%	.3%	.3%	.5%	.8%	2.6%	.5%	100.0%

Table G16

Name NGO operating * How significant has the cash increase been? Crosstabulation

			How significant has the cash increase been?			Total
			Big	Moderate	Insignificant	
Name NGO operating	CARE	Count % within Name NGO operating	6 7.1%	57 67.9%	21 25.0%	84 100.0%
	CHF	Count % within Name NGO operating	7 12.1%	41 70.7%	10 17.2%	58 100.0%
	CRS	Count % within Name NGO operating	6 10.2%	49 83.1%	4 6.8%	59 100.0%
	FHI	Count % within Name NGO operating	11 27.5%	29 72.5%	0 .0%	40 100.0%
	REST	Count % within Name NGO operating	12 14.8%	66 81.5%	3 3.7%	81 100.0%
	WVE	Count % within Name NGO operating	1 2.9%	33 94.3%	1 2.9%	35 100.0%
Total	Count % within Name NGO operating	43 12.0%	275 77.0%	39 10.9%	357 100.0%	

Table G17

Name NGO operating * If yes to Q14, has the increased cash been used to buy food? Crosstabulation

			If yes to Q14, has the increased cash been used to buy food?		Total
			Yes	No	
Name NGO operating	CARE	Count	61	16	77
		% within Name NGO operating	79.2%	20.8%	100.0%
	CHF	Count	25	26	51
		% within Name NGO operating	49.0%	51.0%	100.0%
	CRS	Count	41	15	56
		% within Name NGO operating	73.2%	26.8%	100.0%
	FHI	Count	37	2	39
	% within Name NGO operating	94.9%	5.1%	100.0%	
	REST	Count	51	29	80
		% within Name NGO operating	63.8%	36.3%	100.0%
	WVE	Count	34	0	34
		% within Name NGO operating	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	249	88	337
		% within Name NGO operating	73.9%	26.1%	100.0%

Table G18

Name NGO operating * If yes to Q14, has the increased cash been used to purchase HH assets? Crosstabulation

			If yes to Q14, has the increased cash been used to purchase HH assets?		Total
			Yes	No	
Name NGO operating	CARE	Count	43	39	82
		% within Name NGO operating	52.4%	47.6%	100.0%
	CHF	Count	28	23	51
		% within Name NGO operating	54.9%	45.1%	100.0%
	CRS	Count	32	25	57
		% within Name NGO operating	56.1%	43.9%	100.0%
	FHI	Count	35	5	40
	% within Name NGO operating	87.5%	12.5%	100.0%	
	REST	Count	57	23	80
		% within Name NGO operating	71.3%	28.8%	100.0%
	WVE	Count	31	3	34
		% within Name NGO operating	91.2%	8.8%	100.0%
Total		Count	226	118	344
		% within Name NGO operating	65.7%	34.3%	100.0%

Table G19

Name NGO operating * Has the increase in production/cash resulted in nutrition diversification? Crosstabulation

			Has the increase in production/cash resulted in nutrition diversification?		Total
			Yes	No	
Name NGO operating	CARE	Count	96	20	116
		% within Name NGO operating	82.8%	17.2%	100.0%
	CHF	Count	28	53	81
		% within Name NGO operating	34.6%	65.4%	100.0%
	CRS	Count	59	13	72
		% within Name NGO operating	81.9%	18.1%	100.0%
	FHI	Count	40	0	40
	% within Name NGO operating	100.0%	.0%	100.0%	
	REST	Count	80	0	80
		% within Name NGO operating	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
	WVE	Count	37	0	37
		% within Name NGO operating	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	340	86	426
		% within Name NGO operating	79.8%	20.2%	100.0%

Table G20

Name NGO operating * How long do you expect to remain a beneficiary of the PSNP? Crosstabulation

			How long do you expect to remain a beneficiary of the PSNP?					Total
			Less than one year	1 more year	2 more years	3 more years	Longer than 3 more years	
Name NGO operating	CARE	Count	3	4	24	29	58	118
		% within Name NGO operating	2.5%	3.4%	20.3%	24.6%	49.2%	100.0%
	CHF	Count	10	12	24	19	16	81
		% within Name NGO operating	12.3%	14.8%	29.6%	23.5%	19.8%	100.0%
	CRS	Count	1	3	16	17	43	80
		% within Name NGO operating	1.3%	3.8%	20.0%	21.3%	53.8%	100.0%
	FHI	Count	9	17	0	3	11	40
		% within Name NGO operating	22.5%	42.5%	.0%	7.5%	27.5%	100.0%
	REST	Count	13	16	45	3	6	83
		% within Name NGO operating	15.7%	19.3%	54.2%	3.6%	7.2%	100.0%
	WVE	Count	0	3	8	2	24	37
		% within Name NGO operating	.0%	8.1%	21.6%	5.4%	64.9%	100.0%
Total		Count	36	55	117	73	158	439
		% within Name NGO operating	8.2%	12.5%	26.7%	16.6%	36.0%	100.0%

Table G21

Name NGO operating * Have the activities resulted in extra labor demands upon the HH? Crosstabulation

			Have the activities resulted in extra labor demands upon the HH?		Total
			Yes	No	
Name NGO operating	CARE	Count % within Name NGO operating	15 12.6%	104 87.4%	119 100.0%
	CHF	Count % within Name NGO operating	13 16.3%	67 83.8%	80 100.0%
	CRS	Count % within Name NGO operating	40 50.0%	40 50.0%	80 100.0%
	FHI	Count % within Name NGO operating	17 42.5%	23 57.5%	40 100.0%
	REST	Count % within Name NGO operating	9 11.3%	71 88.8%	80 100.0%
	WVE	Count % within Name NGO operating	0 .0%	37 100.0%	37 100.0%
	Total	Count % within Name NGO operating	94 21.6%	342 78.4%	436 100.0%

Table G22

Name NGO operating * If yes to Q20, have these extra demands been met easily? Crosstabulation

			If yes to Q20, have these extra demands been met easily?		Total
			Yes	No	
Name NGO operating	CARE	Count	23	11	34
		% within Name NGO operating	67.6%	32.4%	100.0%
	CHF	Count	12	2	14
		% within Name NGO operating	85.7%	14.3%	100.0%
	CRS	Count	28	9	37
		% within Name NGO operating	75.7%	24.3%	100.0%
	FHI	Count	16	1	17
		% within Name NGO operating	94.1%	5.9%	100.0%
	REST	Count	8	1	9
		% within Name NGO operating	88.9%	11.1%	100.0%
Total		Count	87	24	111
		% within Name NGO operating	78.4%	21.6%	100.0%

Table G23

Name NGO operating * If yes to Q20, have these extra demands affected other IGAs? Crosstabulation

			If yes to Q20, have these extra demands affected other IGAs?		Total
			Yes	No	
Name NGO operating	CARE	Count	5	29	34
		% within Name NGO operating	14.7%	85.3%	100.0%
	CHF	Count	4	11	15
		% within Name NGO operating	26.7%	73.3%	100.0%
	CRS	Count	3	37	40
		% within Name NGO operating	7.5%	92.5%	100.0%
	FHI	Count	3	16	19
	% within Name NGO operating	15.8%	84.2%	100.0%	
	REST	Count	0	9	9
		% within Name NGO operating	.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	WVE	Count	0	1	1
		% within Name NGO operating	.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	15	103	118
		% within Name NGO operating	12.7%	87.3%	100.0%

Table G24

Name NGO operating * Have the activities required extra financial resources to under take it? Crosstabulation

			Have the activities required extra financial resources to under take it?		Total
			Yes	No	
Name NGO operating	CARE	Count % within Name NGO operating	27 23.3%	89 76.7%	116 100.0%
	CHF	Count % within Name NGO operating	25 32.1%	53 67.9%	78 100.0%
	CRS	Count % within Name NGO operating	26 35.6%	47 64.4%	73 100.0%
	FHI	Count % within Name NGO operating	2 5.3%	36 94.7%	38 100.0%
	REST	Count % within Name NGO operating	30 37.5%	50 62.5%	80 100.0%
	WVE	Count % within Name NGO operating	2 5.4%	35 94.6%	37 100.0%
	Total	Count % within Name NGO operating	112 26.5%	310 73.5%	422 100.0%

Table G25

Name NGO operating * if yes to Q22, what was the source of the extra finance? Crosstabulation

			if yes to Q22, what was the source of the extra finance?				Total
			NGO	MFI	Relatives/ friends	Own	
Name NGO operating	CARE	Count	4	12	10	7	33
		% within Name NGO operating	12.1%	36.4%	30.3%	21.2%	100.0%
	CHF	Count	6	2	4	19	31
		% within Name NGO operating	19.4%	6.5%	12.9%	61.3%	100.0%
	CRS	Count	10	5	1	11	27
		% within Name NGO operating	37.0%	18.5%	3.7%	40.7%	100.0%
	FHI	Count	0	1	1	3	5
	% within Name NGO operating	.0%	20.0%	20.0%	60.0%	100.0%	
	REST	Count	0	24	2	8	34
		% within Name NGO operating	.0%	70.6%	5.9%	23.5%	100.0%
	WVE	Count	0	0	1	1	2
		% within Name NGO operating	.0%	.0%	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	20	44	19	49	132
		% within Name NGO operating	15.2%	33.3%	14.4%	37.1%	100.0%

Table G26

Name NGO operating * What are your future plans? Crosstabulation

			What are your future plans?				Total
			Stop the activities	Maintain the activities	Improve the activities	Expand the activities	
Name NGO operating	CARE	Count	1	33	73	82	189
		% within Name NGO operating	.5%	17.5%	38.6%	43.4%	100.0%
	CHF	Count	0	27	42	40	109
		% within Name NGO operating	.0%	24.8%	38.5%	36.7%	100.0%
	CRS	Count	0	10	39	54	103
		% within Name NGO operating	.0%	9.7%	37.9%	52.4%	100.0%
	FHI	Count	0	3	22	40	65
	% within Name NGO operating	.0%	4.6%	33.8%	61.5%	100.0%	
	REST	Count	0	4	22	73	99
		% within Name NGO operating	.0%	4.0%	22.2%	73.7%	100.0%
	WVE	Count	0	2	9	26	37
		% within Name NGO operating	.0%	5.4%	24.3%	70.3%	100.0%
Total		Count	1	79	207	315	602
		% within Name NGO operating	.2%	13.1%	34.4%	52.3%	100.0%

Table G27

Name NGO operating * If improve or expand the activities, how? Crosstabulation

			If improve or expand the activities, how?			Total
			Own resources	Credit	Others	
Name NGO operating	CARE	Count % within Name NGO operating	45 38.1%	72 61.0%	1 .8%	118 100.0%
	CHF	Count % within Name NGO operating	53 67.9%	24 30.8%	1 1.3%	78 100.0%
	CRS	Count % within Name NGO operating	47 59.5%	31 39.2%	1 1.3%	79 100.0%
	FHI	Count % within Name NGO operating	38 95.0%	2 5.0%	0 .0%	40 100.0%
	REST	Count % within Name NGO operating	53 59.6%	36 40.4%	0 .0%	89 100.0%
	WVE	Count % within Name NGO operating	34 97.1%	0 .0%	1 2.9%	35 100.0%
	Total	Count % within Name NGO operating	270 61.5%	165 37.6%	4 .9%	439 100.0%

Table G28

Name NGO operating * Do you know if any HHs in your area have started similar activities following your example? Crosstabulation

			Do you know if any HHs in your area have started similar activities following your example?			Total
			Yes, many	Yes, a few	No	
Name NGO operating	CARE	Count	12	44	61	117
		% within Name NGO operating	10.3%	37.6%	52.1%	100.0%
	CHF	Count	2	25	56	83
		% within Name NGO operating	2.4%	30.1%	67.5%	100.0%
	CRS	Count	14	42	23	79
		% within Name NGO operating	17.7%	53.2%	29.1%	100.0%
	FHI	Count	19	21	0	40
	% within Name NGO operating	47.5%	52.5%	.0%	100.0%	
	REST	Count	48	25	7	80
		% within Name NGO operating	60.0%	31.3%	8.8%	100.0%
	WVE	Count	1	18	15	34
		% within Name NGO operating	2.9%	52.9%	44.1%	100.0%
Total		Count	96	175	162	433
		% within Name NGO operating	22.2%	40.4%	37.4%	100.0%

Table G29

Name NGO operating * As part of the activity, did you join a group or association promoted by NGO? Crosstabulation

			As part of the activity, did you join a group or association promoted by NGO?		Total
			Yes	No	
Name NGO operating	CARE	Count	111	7	118
		% within Name NGO operating	94.1%	5.9%	100.0%
	CHF	Count	72	11	83
		% within Name NGO operating	86.7%	13.3%	100.0%
	CRS	Count	40	29	69
		% within Name NGO operating	58.0%	42.0%	100.0%
	FHI	Count	40	0	40
	% within Name NGO operating	100.0%	.0%	100.0%	
	REST	Count	36	43	79
		% within Name NGO operating	45.6%	54.4%	100.0%
	WVE	Count	19	16	35
		% within Name NGO operating	54.3%	45.7%	100.0%
Total		Count	318	106	424
		% within Name NGO operating	75.0%	25.0%	100.0%

16.1. Table G30

Name NGO operating * Does the group regularly save? Crosstabulation

			Does the group regularly save?		Total
			Yes	No	
Name NGO operating	CARE	Count	56	39	95
		% within Name NGO operating	58.9%	41.1%	100.0%
	CHF	Count	75	4	79
		% within Name NGO operating	94.9%	5.1%	100.0%
	CRS	Count	1	39	40
		% within Name NGO operating	2.5%	97.5%	100.0%
	FHI	Count	39	1	40
	% within Name NGO operating	97.5%	2.5%	100.0%	
	REST	Count	31	5	36
		% within Name NGO operating	86.1%	13.9%	100.0%
	WVE	Count	16	3	19
		% within Name NGO operating	84.2%	15.8%	100.0%
Total		Count	218	91	309
		% within Name NGO operating	70.6%	29.4%	100.0%

Table G31

**Name NGO operating * Does the group undertake credit activities?
Crosstabulation**

			Does the group undertake credit activities?		Total
			Yes	No	
Name NGO operating	CARE	Count	49	35	84
		% within Name NGO operating	58.3%	41.7%	100.0%
	CHF	Count	10	60	70
		% within Name NGO operating	14.3%	85.7%	100.0%
	CRS	Count	1	33	34
		% within Name NGO operating	2.9%	97.1%	100.0%
	FHI	Count	4	35	39
	% within Name NGO operating	10.3%	89.7%	100.0%	
	REST	Count	1	31	32
		% within Name NGO operating	3.1%	96.9%	100.0%
	WVE	Count	0	15	15
		% within Name NGO operating	.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	65	209	274
		% within Name NGO operating	23.7%	76.3%	100.0%

Table G32

**Name NGO operating * If so, have you borrowed any money?
Crosstabulation**

			If so, have you borrowed any money?		Total
			Yes	No	
Name NGO operating	CARE	Count	23	52	75
		% within Name NGO operating	30.7%	69.3%	100.0%
	CHF	Count	5	27	32
		% within Name NGO operating	15.6%	84.4%	100.0%
	CRS	Count	0	5	5
		% within Name NGO operating	.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	FHI	Count	0	10	10
	% within Name NGO operating	.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
	REST	Count	2	8	10
		% within Name NGO operating	20.0%	80.0%	100.0%
	WVE	Count	0	7	7
		% within Name NGO operating	.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	30	109	139
		% within Name NGO operating	21.6%	78.4%	100.0%

Table G33

Name NGO operating * Household size Crosstabulation

		Household size			Total	
		<= 4 persons	5 - 6 persons	>=6 persons		
Name NGO operating	CARE	Count	56	36	25	117
		% within Name NGO operating	47.9%	30.8%	21.4%	100.0%
	CHF	Count	9	34	40	83
		% within Name NGO operating	10.8%	41.0%	48.2%	100.0%
	CRS	Count	32	28	16	76
		% within Name NGO operating	42.1%	36.8%	21.1%	100.0%
	FHI	Count	5	23	12	40
	% within Name NGO operating	12.5%	57.5%	30.0%	100.0%	
	REST	Count	17	26	37	80
		% within Name NGO operating	21.3%	32.5%	46.3%	100.0%
	WVE	Count	9	15	13	37
		% within Name NGO operating	24.3%	40.5%	35.1%	100.0%
Total		Count	128	162	143	433
		% within Name NGO operating	29.6%	37.4%	33.0%	100.0%

Table G34

Name NGO operating * Average increase in net HH income (birr/month) Crosstabulation

			Average increase in net HH income (birr/month)			Total
			<=16 birr	16.01 - 50.00 birr	>=50 birr	
Name NGO operating	CARE	Count	21	43	11	75
		% within Name NGO operating	28.0%	57.3%	14.7%	100.0%
	CHF	Count	37	15	8	60
		% within Name NGO operating	61.7%	25.0%	13.3%	100.0%
	CRS	Count	3	6	53	62
		% within Name NGO operating	4.8%	9.7%	85.5%	100.0%
	FHI	Count	0	14	26	40
	% within Name NGO operating	.0%	35.0%	65.0%	100.0%	
	REST	Count	1	9	68	78
		% within Name NGO operating	1.3%	11.5%	87.2%	100.0%
	WVE	Count	26	9	1	36
		% within Name NGO operating	72.2%	25.0%	2.8%	100.0%
Total		Count	88	96	167	351
		% within Name NGO operating	25.1%	27.4%	47.6%	100.0%

Table G35

Has the HH received food or cash? * How has HH received this benefit? Crosstabulation

			How has HH received this benefit?			Total
			In exchange for work	Direct transfer	Both	
Has the HH received food or cash?	Food	Count	163	6	1	170
		% within Has the HH received food or cash?	95.9%	3.5%	.6%	100.0%
	Cash	Count	80	21	4	105
		% within Has the HH received food or cash?	76.2%	20.0%	3.8%	100.0%
	Both	Count	119	8	13	140
		% within Has the HH received food or cash?	85.0%	5.7%	9.3%	100.0%
Total		Count	362	35	18	415
		% within Has the HH received food or cash?	87.2%	8.4%	4.3%	100.0%

B. Analysis by Gender

Table G36

Gender of respondent * Has the HH received food or cash? Crosstabulation

			Has the HH received food or cash?			Total
			Food	Cash	Both	
Gender of respondent	Male	Count	108	54	78	240
		% within Gender of respondent	45.0%	22.5%	32.5%	100.0%
	Female	Count	65	52	62	179
		% within Gender of respondent	36.3%	29.1%	34.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	173	106	140	419
		% within Gender of respondent	41.3%	25.3%	33.4%	100.0%

Gender of respondent * How has HH received this benefit? Crosstabulation

			How has HH received this benefit?			Total
			In exchange for work	Direct transfer	Both	
Gender of respondent	Male	Count	224	13	5	242
		% within Gender of respondent	92.6%	5.4%	2.1%	100.0%
	Female	Count	142	25	14	181
		% within Gender of respondent	78.5%	13.8%	7.7%	100.0%
Total		Count	366	38	19	423
		% within Gender of respondent	86.5%	9.0%	4.5%	100.0%

Table G37

Gender of respondent * Type of productive or IG activities carried out under PSNP? Crosstabulation

			Type of productive or IG activities carried out under PSNP?													Total	
			Bee keeping	Silk making	Livestock production	Poultry farming	Horticulture growing	Small scale irrigation	Sheep production	Goat production	Crop production	Improved seed	Handicraft	Enset	Metal work		Saving
Gender of respondent	Male	Count	33	0	109	12	28	28	10	3	9	1	6	1	4	1	245
		% within Gender of respondent	13.5%	.0%	44.5%	4.9%	11.4%	11.4%	4.1%	1.2%	3.7%	.4%	2.4%	.4%	1.6%	.4%	100.0%
	Female	Count	13	8	76	41	21	10	9	0	3	1	7	2	0	0	191
		% within Gender of respondent	6.8%	4.2%	39.8%	21.5%	11.0%	5.2%	4.7%	.0%	1.6%	.5%	3.7%	1.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	46	8	185	53	49	38	19	3	12	2	13	3	4	1	436
		% within Gender of respondent	10.6%	1.8%	42.4%	12.2%	11.2%	8.7%	4.4%	.7%	2.8%	.5%	3.0%	.7%	.9%	.2%	100.0%

Table G38

Gender of respondent * Assistance HH received in developing productive/IG activities? Crosstabulation

			Assistance HH received in developing productive/IG activities?					Total
			Provisions of inputs	Training	Assistance in savings groups	Assistance in marketing	Assistance in cooperative formation	
Gender of respondent	Male	Count	170	52	8	5	2	237
		% within Gender of respondent	71.7%	21.9%	3.4%	2.1%	.8%	100.0%
	Female	Count	120	49	4	1	10	184
		% within Gender of respondent	65.2%	26.6%	2.2%	.5%	5.4%	100.0%
Total		Count	290	101	12	6	12	421
		% within Gender of respondent	68.9%	24.0%	2.9%	1.4%	2.9%	100.0%

Table G39

Gender of respondent * Which type of assistance was most helpful? Crosstabulation

			Which type of assistance was most helpful?														Total	
			Provisions of inputs	Training	Assistance in savings groups	Assistance in marketing	Assistance in cooperative formation	Small scale irrigation	Beekeeping	Sheep production	Goat production	Poultry	Vegetable	Animal husbandry	Silk production	Metal work		Sebel Merete
Gender of respondent	Male	Count	71	74	15	10	41	2	5	2	1	2	1	8	0	2	1	235
		% within Gender of respondent	30.2%	31.5%	6.4%	4.3%	17.4%	.9%	2.1%	.9%	.4%	.9%	.4%	3.4%	.0%	.9%	.4%	100.0%
	Female	Count	48	58	9	9	25	3	0	6	1	11	3	10	2	0	0	185
		% within Gender of respondent	25.9%	31.4%	4.9%	4.9%	13.5%	1.6%	.0%	3.2%	.5%	5.9%	1.6%	5.4%	1.1%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	119	132	24	19	66	5	5	8	2	13	4	18	2	2	1	420
		% within Gender of respondent	28.3%	31.4%	5.7%	4.5%	15.7%	1.2%	1.2%	1.9%	.5%	3.1%	1.0%	4.3%	.5%	.5%	.2%	100.0%

Table G40

Gender of respondent * Inputs provided by CS Crosstabulation

			Inputs provided by CS													Total		
			Improved seed	Beehives	Seedling	Farm tools	Sheep	Goats	Vaccination	Chicken	Livestock	Cow	Vegetable seeds	Cash	Silk worm		Ox	Tools
Gender of respondent	Male	Count	72	20	29	3	42	15	8	10	7	18	2	0	3	12	241	
		% within Gender of respondent	29.9%	8.3%	12.0%	1.2%	17.4%	6.2%	3.3%	4.1%	2.9%	7.5%	.8%	.0%	.0%	1.2%	5.0%	100.0%
	Female	Count	31	7	16	2	50	14	4	27	8	6	0	2	5	2	6	180
		% within Gender of respondent	17.2%	3.9%	8.9%	1.1%	27.8%	7.8%	2.2%	15.0%	4.4%	3.3%	.0%	1.1%	2.8%	1.1%	3.3%	100.0%
Total		Count	103	27	45	5	92	29	12	37	15	24	2	2	5	5	18	421
		% within Gender of respondent	24.5%	6.4%	10.7%	1.2%	21.9%	6.9%	2.9%	8.8%	3.6%	5.7%	.5%	.5%	1.2%	1.2%	4.3%	100.0%

Table G41

Gender of respondent * Training provided with support of CS Crosstabulation

			Training provided with support of CS																	Total		
			Bee keeping	Agricultural production	Marketing	Extension	Livestock	Poultry	Horticulture	Goat production	Silk making	Sheep production	Use of improved seed	Nursery operation and management	Saving	Animal fattening	Pottery	Metal work	Forestry		Vegetable	Natural Resource
Gender of respondent	Male	Count	44	60	0	13	33	11	6	3	2	14	1	3	0	6	2	0	1	1	201	
		% within Gender of respondent	21.9%	29.9%	.0%	6.5%	16.4%	5.5%	3.0%	1.5%	1.0%	7.0%	.5%	1.5%	.0%	.5%	3.0%	1.0%	.0%	.5%	.5%	100.0%
	Female	Count	10	34	1	3	36	34	0	3	7	15	0	0	2	5	0	1	1	0	152	
		% within Gender of respondent	6.6%	22.4%	.7%	2.0%	23.7%	22.4%	.0%	2.0%	4.6%	9.9%	.0%	.0%	1.3%	.0%	3.3%	.0%	.7%	.7%	.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	54	94	1	16	69	45	6	6	9	29	1	3	2	11	2	1	2	1	353	
		% within Gender of respondent	15.3%	26.6%	.3%	4.5%	19.5%	12.7%	1.7%	1.7%	2.5%	8.2%	.3%	.8%	.6%	.3%	3.1%	.6%	.3%	.6%	.3%	100.0%

Table G42

**Gender of respondent * As part of the training, did you undertake any study tour?
Crosstabulation**

			As part of the training, did you undertake any study tour?		Total
			Yes	No	
Gender of respondent	Male	Count	76	154	230
		% within Gender of respondent	33.0%	67.0%	100.0%
	Female	Count	32	150	182
		% within Gender of respondent	17.6%	82.4%	100.0%
Total		Count	108	304	412
		% within Gender of respondent	26.2%	73.8%	100.0%

Table G43

Gender of respondent * Have the activities resulted in increased production of food for own consumption? Crosstabulation

			Have the activities resulted in increased production of food for own consumption?		Total
			Yes	No	
Gender of respondent	Male	Count	210	31	241
		% within Gender of respondent	87.1%	12.9%	100.0%
	Female	Count	164	25	189
		% within Gender of respondent	86.8%	13.2%	100.0%
Total		Count	374	56	430
		% within Gender of respondent	87.0%	13.0%	100.0%

Table G44

Gender of respondent * Which activity in Q5 has resulted in increased food consumption? Crosstabulation

		Which activity in Q5 has resulted in increased food consumption?																		Total	
		Beekeeping	Silk making	Livestock production	Poultry	Horticulture	Small scale irrigation	Sheep reproduction	Goat reproduction	Training	Assistance in marketing	Assistance in cooperative formation	Improved seed	Crop production	Animal fattnning	Trade	Metal work	Handicraft	18		
Gender of respondent	Male	Count	19	0	67	20	37	28	8	1	8	4	2	3	8	1	0	3	6	0	215
	% within Gender of respondent		8.8%	.0%	31.2%	9.3%	17.2%	13.0%	3.7%	.5%	3.7%	1.9%	.9%	1.4%	3.7%	.5%	.0%	1.4%	2.8%	.0%	100.0%
Female	Count	4	4	53	34	16	13	9	2	6	1	2	5	7	2	2	0	4	4	1	165
	% within Gender of respondent		2.4%	2.4%	32.1%	20.6%	9.7%	7.9%	5.5%	1.2%	3.6%	.6%	1.2%	3.0%	4.2%	1.2%	1.2%	.0%	2.4%	.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	23	4	120	54	53	41	17	3	14	5	4	8	15	3	2	3	10	1	380
		% within Gender of respondent	6.1%	1.1%	31.6%	14.2%	13.9%	10.8%	4.5%	.8%	3.7%	1.3%	1.1%	2.1%	3.9%	.8%	.5%	.8%	2.6%	.3%	100.0%

Table G45

Gender of respondent * If yes to Q11, has this increased been? Crosstabulation

			If yes to Q11, has this increased been?			Total
			Big	Moderate	Insignificant	
Gender of respondent	Male	Count	27	158	39	224
		% within Gender of respondent	12.1%	70.5%	17.4%	100.0%
	Female	Count	37	112	31	180
		% within Gender of respondent	20.6%	62.2%	17.2%	100.0%
Total		Count	64	270	70	404
		% within Gender of respondent	15.8%	66.8%	17.3%	100.0%

Table G46

Gender of respondent * Have the activities directly increased the amount of cash received by HH? Crosstabulation

			Have the activities directly increased the amount of cash received by HH?		Total
			Yes	No	
Gender of respondent	Male	Count	198	41	239
		% within Gender of respondent	82.8%	17.2%	100.0%
	Female	Count	158	31	189
		% within Gender of respondent	83.6%	16.4%	100.0%
Total		Count	356	72	428
		% within Gender of respondent	83.2%	16.8%	100.0%

Table G47

Gender of respondent * Which activity in Q5 has resulted in most increased cash income? Crosstabulation

		Which activity in Q5 has resulted in most increased cash income?																				Tot
		Beekeeping	Silk making	Livestock	Poultry	Horticulture	Small scale irrigation	Sheep production	Goat production	Assistance in marketing	Training	Assistance in cooperative formation	Improved seed	Improved crop production	Animal fattening	Daily labor	Trade	Metal work	Handicraft	Saving		
Gender of respondent	Male	Count	23	0	66	13	35	21	10	2	3	3	1	4	7	1	0	0	3	6	0	100
	% within Gender of respondent		11.6%	.0%	33.3%	6.6%	17.7%	10.6%	5.1%	1.0%	1.5%	1.5%	.5%	2.0%	3.5%	.5%	.0%	.0%	1.5%	3.0%	.0%	100
Female	Count	1	4	52	36	20	9	9	2	1	3	0	3	5	0	1	2	0	4	2	100	
	% within Gender of respondent		.6%	2.6%	33.8%	23.4%	13.0%	5.8%	5.8%	1.3%	.6%	1.9%	.0%	1.9%	3.2%	.0%	.6%	1.3%	.0%	2.6%	1.3%	100
Total	Count	24	4	118	49	55	30	19	4	4	6	1	7	12	1	1	2	3	10	2	100	
	% within Gender of respondent		6.8%	1.1%	33.5%	13.9%	15.6%	8.5%	5.4%	1.1%	1.7%	.3%	2.0%	3.4%	.3%	.3%	.6%	.9%	2.8%	.6%	100	

Table G48

Gender of respondent * How significant has the cash increase been? Crosstabulation

			How significant has the cash increase been?			Total
			Big	Moderate	Insignificant	
Gender of respondent	Male	Count	21	152	23	196
		% within Gender of respondent	10.7%	77.6%	11.7%	100.0%
	Female	Count	21	121	16	158
		% within Gender of respondent	13.3%	76.6%	10.1%	100.0%
Total		Count	42	273	39	354
		% within Gender of respondent	11.9%	77.1%	11.0%	100.0%

Table G49

**Gender of respondent * If yes to Q14, has the increased cash been used to buy food?
Crosstabulation**

			If yes to Q14, has the increased cash been used to buy food?		Total
			Yes	No	
Gender of respondent	Male	Count	145	40	185
		% within Gender of respondent	78.4%	21.6%	100.0%
	Female	Count	103	47	150
		% within Gender of respondent	68.7%	31.3%	100.0%
Total		Count	248	87	335
		% within Gender of respondent	74.0%	26.0%	100.0%

Table G50

Gender of respondent * If yes to Q14, has the increased cash been used to purchase HH assets? Crosstabulation

			If yes to Q14, has the increased cash been used to purchase HH assets?		Total
			Yes	No	
Gender of respondent	Male	Count	130	62	192
		% within Gender of respondent	67.7%	32.3%	100.0%
	Female	Count	95	55	150
		% within Gender of respondent	63.3%	36.7%	100.0%
Total		Count	225	117	342
		% within Gender of respondent	65.8%	34.2%	100.0%

Table G51

Gender of respondent * Has the increase in production/cash resulted in nutrition diversification? Crosstabulation

			Has the increase in production/cash resulted in nutrition diversification?		Total
			Yes	No	
Gender of respondent	Male	Count	202	36	238
		% within Gender of respondent	84.9%	15.1%	100.0%
	Female	Count	136	50	186
		% within Gender of respondent	73.1%	26.9%	100.0%
Total		Count	338	86	424
		% within Gender of respondent	79.7%	20.3%	100.0%

Table G52

Gender of respondent * How long do you expect to remain a beneficiary of the PSNP? Crosstabulation

			How long do you expect to remain a beneficiary of the PSNP?					Total
			Less than one year	1 more year	2 more years	3 more years	Longer than 3 more years	
Gender of respondent	Male	Count	21	36	66	33	89	245
		% within Gender of respondent	8.6%	14.7%	26.9%	13.5%	36.3%	100.0%
	Female	Count	15	18	50	40	65	188
		% within Gender of respondent	8.0%	9.6%	26.6%	21.3%	34.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	36	54	116	73	154	433
		% within Gender of respondent	8.3%	12.5%	26.8%	16.9%	35.6%	100.0%

Table G53

**ender of respondent * Have the activities resulted in extra labor demands upon the HH
Crosstabulation**

			Have the activities resulted in extra labor demands upon the HH?		Total
			Yes	No	
Gender of respondent	Male	Count	50	192	242
		% within Gender of respondent	20.7%	79.3%	100.0%
	Female	Count	44	148	192
		% within Gender of respondent	22.9%	77.1%	100.0%
Total		Count	94	340	434
		% within Gender of respondent	21.7%	78.3%	100.0%

Table G54

**Gender of respondent * If yes to Q20, have these extra demands been met easily?
Crosstabulation**

			If yes to Q20, have these extra demands been met easily?		Total
			Yes	No	
Gender of respondent	Male	Count	50	13	63
		% within Gender of respondent	79.4%	20.6%	100.0%
	Female	Count	37	11	48
		% within Gender of respondent	77.1%	22.9%	100.0%
Total		Count	87	24	111
		% within Gender of respondent	78.4%	21.6%	100.0%

Table G55

**Gender of respondent * If yes to Q20, have these extra demands affected other IGAs?
Crosstabulation**

			If yes to Q20, have these extra demands affected other IGAs?		Total
			Yes	No	
Gender of respondent	Male	Count	6	61	67
		% within Gender of respondent	9.0%	91.0%	100.0%
	Female	Count	9	42	51
		% within Gender of respondent	17.6%	82.4%	100.0%
Total		Count	15	103	118
		% within Gender of respondent	12.7%	87.3%	100.0%

Table G56

Gender of respondent * Have the activities required extra financial resources to under take it? Crosstabulation

			Have the activities required extra financial resources to under take it?		Total
			Yes	No	
Gender of respondent	Male	Count	63	174	237
		% within Gender of respondent	26.6%	73.4%	100.0%
	Female	Count	49	134	183
		% within Gender of respondent	26.8%	73.2%	100.0%
Total		Count	112	308	420
		% within Gender of respondent	26.7%	73.3%	100.0%

Table G57

Gender of respondent * if yes to Q22, what was the source of the extra finance? Crosstabulation

			if yes to Q22, what was the source of the extra finance?				Total
			NGO	MFI	Relatives/ friends	Own	
Gender of respondent	Male	Count	13	24	9	23	69
		% within Gender of respondent	18.8%	34.8%	13.0%	33.3%	100.0%
	Female	Count	7	19	10	20	56
		% within Gender of respondent	12.5%	33.9%	17.9%	35.7%	100.0%
Total		Count	20	43	19	43	125
		% within Gender of respondent	16.0%	34.4%	15.2%	34.4%	100.0%

Table G58

Gender of respondent * What are your future plans? Crosstabulation

			What are your future plans?				Total
			Stop the activities	Maintain the activities	Improve the activities	Expand the activities	
Gender of respondent	Male	Count	1	37	101	103	242
		% within Gender of respondent	.4%	15.3%	41.7%	42.6%	100.0%
	Female	Count	0	42	77	73	192
		% within Gender of respondent	.0%	21.9%	40.1%	38.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	1	79	178	176	434
		% within Gender of respondent	.2%	18.2%	41.0%	40.6%	100.0%

Table G59

Gender of respondent * If improve or expand the activities, how? Crosstabulation

			If improve or expand the activities, how?			Total
			Own resources	Credit	Others	
Gender of respondent	Male	Count	155	75	3	233
		% within Gender of respondent	66.5%	32.2%	1.3%	100.0%
	Female	Count	108	65	1	174
		% within Gender of respondent	62.1%	37.4%	.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	263	140	4	407
		% within Gender of respondent	64.6%	34.4%	1.0%	100.0%

Table G60

Gender of respondent * Do you know if any HHs in your area have started similar activities following your example? Crosstabulation

			Do you know if any HHs in your area have started similar activities following your example?			Total
			Yes, many	Yes, a few	No	
Gender of respondent	Male	Count	66	98	78	242
		% within Gender of respondent	27.3%	40.5%	32.2%	100.0%
	Female	Count	29	77	83	189
		% within Gender of respondent	15.3%	40.7%	43.9%	100.0%
Total		Count	95	175	161	431
		% within Gender of respondent	22.0%	40.6%	37.4%	100.0%

Table G61

Gender of respondent * As part of the activity, did you join a group or association promoted by NGO? Crosstabulation

			As part of the activity, did you join a group or association promoted by NGO?		Total
			Yes	No	
Gender of respondent	Male	Count % within Gender of respondent	180 76.9%	54 23.1%	234 100.0%
	Female	Count % within Gender of respondent	137 72.9%	51 27.1%	188 100.0%
Total		Count % within Gender of respondent	317 75.1%	105 24.9%	422 100.0%

Table G62

Gender of respondent * Does the group regularly save? Crosstabulation

			Does the group regularly save?		Total
			Yes	No	
Gender of respondent	Male	Count % within Gender of respondent	112 65.1%	60 34.9%	172 100.0%
	Female	Count % within Gender of respondent	105 77.2%	31 22.8%	136 100.0%
Total		Count % within Gender of respondent	217 70.5%	91 29.5%	308 100.0%

Table G63**Gender of respondent * Does the group undertake credit activities? Crosstabulation**

			Does the group undertake credit activities?		Total
			Yes	No	
Gender of respondent	Male	Count	39	108	147
		% within Gender of respondent	26.5%	73.5%	100.0%
	Female	Count	26	100	126
		% within Gender of respondent	20.6%	79.4%	100.0%
Total		Count	65	208	273
		% within Gender of respondent	23.8%	76.2%	100.0%

Table G64**Gender of respondent * If so, have you borrowed any money? Crosstabulation**

			If so, have you borrowed any money?		Total
			Yes	No	
Gender of respondent	Male	Count	18	52	70
		% within Gender of respondent	25.7%	74.3%	100.0%
	Female	Count	12	57	69
		% within Gender of respondent	17.4%	82.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	30	109	139
		% within Gender of respondent	21.6%	78.4%	100.0%

Table G65

Gender of respondent * Average increase in net HH income (birr/month) Crosstabulation

			Average increase in net HH income (birr/month)			Total
			<=16 birr	16.01 - 50.00 birr	>=50 birr	
Gender of respondent	Male	Count	42	54	104	200
		% within Gender of respondent	21.0%	27.0%	52.0%	100.0%
	Female	Count	46	41	62	149
		% within Gender of respondent	30.9%	27.5%	41.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	88	95	166	349
		% within Gender of respondent	25.2%	27.2%	47.6%	100.0%

Table G66

Gender of respondent * Members Average saving (birr/month) Crosstabulation

			Members Average saving (birr/month)			Total
			<=1.25 birr	1.26 - 2.00 birr	>=2 birr	
Gender of respondent	Male	Count	25	33	53	111
		% within Gender of respondent	22.5%	29.7%	47.7%	100.0%
	Female	Count	29	38	37	104
		% within Gender of respondent	27.9%	36.5%	35.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	54	71	90	215
		% within Gender of respondent	25.1%	33.0%	41.9%	100.0%

Table G67

Gender of respondent * Amount HH borrowed so far (birr) Crosstabulation

			Amount HH borrowed so far (birr)			Total
			<=47.50 birr	47.51 - 100.00 birr	>=100.00 birr	
Gender of respondent	Male	Count	3	9	6	18
		% within Gender of respondent	16.7%	50.0%	33.3%	100.0%
	Female	Count	4	4	4	12
		% within Gender of respondent	33.3%	33.3%	33.3%	100.0%
Total		Count	7	13	10	30
		% within Gender of respondent	23.3%	43.3%	33.3%	100.0%

Table G68

Activities carried out under PSNP ? Assistance HH received ? Crosstabulation

			Assistance HH received in developing					Total
			Provisio of	Trainin	Assistanc in group	Assistanc in	Assistance cooperati formati	
Type productive IG carried unde PSN	Bee	Cou % within Type productive or IG carried out under	57 60.7	22 36.1	2 3.3	0 .0%	0 .0%	61 100.0
	Silk	Cou % within Type productive or IG carried out under	8 72.7	2 18.2	0 .0%	1 9.1	0 .0%	11 100.0
	Livestock	Cou % within Type productive or IG carried out under	11 53.1	83 39.0	7 3.3	6 2.8	4 1.9	21 100.0
	Poultry	Cou % within Type productive or IG carried out under	24 22.4	66 61.7	4 3.7	2 1.9	11 10.3	10 100.0
	Horticulture	Cou % within Type productive or IG carried out under	41 41.4	35 35.4	14 14.1	5 5.1	4 4.0	99 100.0
	Small scale	Cou % within Type productive or IG carried out under	26 33.3	25 32.1	15 19.2	4 5.1	8 10.3	78 100.0
	Vegetable	Cou % within Type productive or IG carried out under	0 .0%	2 100.0	0 .0%	0 .0%	0 .0%	2 100.0
	Sheep	Cou % within Type productive or IG carried out under	14 56.0	10 40.0	0 .0%	0 .0%	1 4.0	25 100.0
	Goat	Cou % within Type productive or IG carried out under	1 50.0	1 50.0	0 .0%	0 .0%	0 .0%	2 100.0
	Crop	Cou % within Type productive or IG carried out under	9 39.1	9 39.1	2 8.7	1 4.3	2 8.7	23 100.0
	Improvted	Cou % within Type productive or IG carried out under	2 50.0	2 50.0	0 .0%	0 .0%	0 .0%	4 100.0
	Handicr	Cou % within Type productive or IG carried out under	10 76.9	2 15.4	1 7.7	0 .0%	0 .0%	13 100.0
	Ense	Cou % within Type productive or IG carried out under	1 16.7	0 .0%	4 66.7	0 .0%	1 16.7	6 100.0
	Metal	Cou % within Type productive or IG carried out under	3 60.0	1 20.0	1 20.0	0 .0%	0 .0%	5 100.0
	Savin	Cou % within Type productive or IG carried out under	1 50.0	1 50.0	0 .0%	0 .0%	0 .0%	2 100.0
	Tota	Cou % within Type productive or IG carried out under	29 44.5	26 40.1	50 7.7	19 2.9	31 4.8	65 100.0

Type of productive or IG activities carried out under PSNP? * Which type of assistance was most helpful? Crosstabulation

Type of productive or IG activities carried out under PSNP?			Which type of assistance was most helpful?												
			Provisions of inputs	Training	Assistance in savings groups	Assistance in marketing	Assistance in cooperative formation	Small scale irrigation	Beekeeping	Sheep production	Goat production	Poultry	Vegetable	Anim. husband	
Type of productive or IG activities carried out under PSNP?	Bee keeping	Count	11	16	4	2	7	1	5	1	0	0	0	0	7.
		% within Type of productive or IG activities carried out under PSNP?	21.6%	31.4%	7.8%	3.9%	13.7%	2.0%	9.8%	2.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	
	Silk making	Count	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	25.
		% within Type of productive or IG activities carried out under PSNP?	50.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	
	Livestock production	Count	55	55	10	10	25	1	0	4	1	1	2	5.	
		% within Type of productive or IG activities carried out under PSNP?	31.6%	31.6%	5.7%	5.7%	14.4%	.6%	.0%	2.3%	.6%	.6%	1.1%		
	Poultry farming	Count	12	24	1	1	2	0	0	0	1	11	1	1.	
		% within Type of productive or IG activities carried out under PSNP?	22.2%	44.4%	1.9%	1.9%	3.7%	.0%	.0%	.0%	1.9%	20.4%	1.9%		
	Horticulture growing	Count	14	13	4	0	12	0	0	0	0	1	4	2.	
		% within Type of productive or IG activities carried out under PSNP?	28.6%	26.5%	8.2%	.0%	24.5%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	2.0%	8.2%		
	Small scale irrigation	Count	9	12	3	0	10	3	0	0	0	0	1	.	
		% within Type of productive or IG activities carried out under PSNP?	23.1%	30.8%	7.7%	.0%	25.6%	7.7%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	2.6%		
	Sheep production	Count	10	5	1	0	2	0	0	3	0	0	0	.	
		% within Type of productive or IG activities carried out under PSNP?	47.6%	23.8%	4.8%	.0%	9.5%	.0%	.0%	14.3%	.0%	.0%	.0%		
	Goat production	Count	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	.	
		% within Type of productive or IG activities carried out under PSNP?	.0%	66.7%	.0%	.0%	33.3%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%		
Crop production	Count	1	2	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	.		
	% within Type of productive or IG activities carried out under PSNP?	9.1%	18.2%	.0%	.0%	63.6%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%			
Improved seed	Count	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.		
	% within Type of productive or IG activities carried out under PSNP?	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%			
Handicraft	Count	2	6	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.		
	% within Type of productive or IG activities carried out under PSNP?	15.4%	46.2%	.0%	38.5%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%			
Enset	Count	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.		
	% within Type of productive or IG activities carried out under PSNP?	.0%	.0%	.0%	50.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%			
Metal work	Count	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.		
	% within Type of productive or IG activities carried out under PSNP?	.0%	75.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%			
Saving	Count	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.		
	% within Type of productive or IG activities carried out under PSNP?	100.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%			
Total	Count	119	139	23	19	66	5	5	8	2	13	8	4.		
	% within Type of productive or IG activities carried out under PSNP?	27.6%	32.3%	5.3%	4.4%	15.3%	1.2%	1.2%	1.9%	.5%	3.0%	1.9%			