



**USAID**  
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

# PPC IDEAS ANNUAL REPORT

**OCTOBER 1, 2005 – SEPTEMBER 30, 2006**

USAID CONTRACT NO. EDG-O-00-02-00037-00

CENTER FOR INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE INFORMAL SECTOR  
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND  
2105 MORRILL HALL  
COLLEGE PARK, MD 20742  
TEL: 301-405-3110 | FAX: 301-405-3020

OCTOBER 2006





# PPC IDEAS Annual Report

## October 1, 2005 - September 30, 2006

---

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....	1
OVERVIEW: INTELLECTUAL LEADERSHIP AGENDA SUPPORT, OR PPC IDEAS .....	1
PPC IDEAS ACTIVITIES .....	1
REQUEST 2005 – 06: ADDITIONAL WORK UNDER FRAME .....	1
DAC/OECD Service Delivery Meeting in New York City, September 23- 24, 2005 .....	1
Develop a User Friendly Draft of FAST .....	2
Framing Paper for Issues of Service Delivery in Fragile States .....	2
Scope of Work for Service Delivery Field Studies .....	2
Final Guinea Fragile States Assessment .....	2
Governance, Livelihoods and Food Security Workshop .....	3
OECD/DAC Health & Education Workstream Meetings on Service Delivery .....	3
Edit Fragile States Working Paper Series .....	3
Service Delivery Policy Paper .....	4
Resilience in Fragile States .....	5
Education Case Studies in Non-Conflict Fragile States .....	5
Brown Bag – Elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo .....	5
E-BULLETINS .....	6
COPYRIGHT POLICY .....	7
APPENDIX A: SUMMARIES OF REQUESTS AND EVENTS .....	8
APPENDIX B: SUMMARY OF E-BULLETIN ARTICLES .....	60
Issue XXIV – Nanotechnology and Development .....	60
Issue XXV – WTO and Development .....	60

Issue XXVI – Energy and the Poor.....	61
Issue XXVII – The 4 <sup>th</sup> World Water Forum .....	62
Issue XXVIII – Aid in Africa .....	63
Issue XXIX – China in Africa.....	63
APPENDIX C: PPC IDEAS WEBSITE .....	65
APPENDIX D: USAID MANAGEMENT OF PPC IDEAS .....	66
APPENDIX E: IRIS MANAGEMENT OF PPC IDEAS.....	68
APPENDIX F: CONTRIBUTORS AND EVENT SPEAKERS .....	71
APPENDIX G: SUMMARY OF PARTICIPATION IN THE PPC IDEAS PROJECT .....	75
APPENDIX H: ATTENDEES OF PPC IDEAS EVENTS.....	76
Attendees (by Name) .....	76
Attendees (by Affiliation).....	79

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

---

The Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination (PPC) seeks to become a “center of ideas,” a leading voice for new thinking on the future of foreign assistance. The Center for Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector (IRIS) at the University of Maryland, via the PPC IDEAS project, helps PPC achieve this goal. IRIS makes top-notch expertise—individuals and their prepared ideas—on international development and foreign policy issues from around the world available to assist USAID staff. IRIS, together with other appropriate experts, also produces research papers to inform policy papers and policy briefs. It also organizes and conducts seminars, workshops and other events to provide intellectual support for USAID’s policy agenda. The sum of this work is to help PPC identify, consider and use appropriate cutting-edge development policy ideas generated by academics, think-tank professionals, other development practitioners and other policy makers.

In its fourth year of activity, from October 2005 through September 2006, PPC IDEAS:

- Sponsored, conducted, or actively participated in 3 events. These events included a workshop to consider linking the concepts of governance and livelihoods to service delivery in fragile states (January 10<sup>th</sup>, Washington D.C.); a follow-up meeting for the OECD-DAC workstream on service delivery in fragile states (December 19<sup>th</sup>, Washington D.C.); and a talk by Dr. Suliman Baldo on post-election priorities in the Democratic Republic of Congo (July 11<sup>th</sup>, Washington, D.C.)
- Developed a user friendly version of the Fragile States Assessment Tool (FAST). The new version offers USAID staff improved usability via a new layout, additional examples and a introductory chapter.
- Redrafted the Service Delivery Framing Paper to incorporate language and concepts consistent with U.S. policy.
- Revised the Guinea Fragile States Assessment to address comments from the Mission, include recent events and conform it to the most recent version of FAST.
- Edited and added additional content to the Fragile States Working Paper Series such as a introductory paper and a paper which incorporates concepts and ideas from the justice and security service delivery literature.
- Worked with the Fragile States Group of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to produce a Service Delivery Policy Paper to guide international donor policy on service delivery in fragile states.
- Commissioned a cutting-edge paper on resilience in fragile states. The paper fills a critical knowledge gap in understanding patterns of resilience, a key entry point in bringing about positive outcomes in fragile states.

- Collaborated with Creative Associates International, Inc. to produce two education studies, one on Nepal and one on the Philippines (Mindanao), which helped USAID policymakers reflect on experience in designing and delivering education services effectively in fragile states.
- Responded to requests for high-impact, quick turnaround projects such as a review of the most relevant contemporary literature on development issues and a database of capacity-building institutions headquartered in developing countries around the world
- Distributed 6 eBulletins to USAID on relevant topics such as energy and the poor, aid in Africa and the 4<sup>th</sup> World Water Forum.
- Involved 81 development practitioners, scholars and policy experts in PPC IDEAS activities during the October 1<sup>st</sup>, 2005 – September 30<sup>th</sup>, 2006 reporting period, including 56 USAID officials and 25 outside experts.

IRIS continues to disseminate ideas showcased by PPC IDEAS activities, principally through the IRIS Web site. Informal feedback indicates that USAID staff and others are using the ideas and other outputs generated by the PPC IDEAS program in their work.

## OVERVIEW: INTELLECTUAL LEADERSHIP AGENDA SUPPORT, OR PPC IDEAS

---

The PPC IDEAS project supports the development, production, and dissemination of policy related products by the Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination (PPC) in USAID. PPC seeks to become a “center of ideas,” a leading voice for new thinking on the future of foreign assistance. The Center for Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector (IRIS) at the University of Maryland, via the PPC IDEAS project, helps PPC achieve this goal. IRIS makes specialized expertise—individuals and their prepared ideas—on international development and foreign policy issues from around the world available to assist USAID staff.

IRIS, together with other appropriate experts, also produces research for policy papers and policy briefs. It organizes and conducts seminars, workshops and other events to provide intellectual support for USAID’s policy agenda. The sum of this work and coordination of global expertise by IRIS is to help PPC identify, consider and use appropriate cutting-edge ideas generated by academics, think-tank professionals, development practitioners and other policy makers from around the world for policy and strategy development.

## PPC IDEAS ACTIVITIES

---

The following requests were carried out during the fourth year of the PPC IDEAS Program, from October 2005 through September 2006:

### Request 2005 – 06: Additional Work Under Frame

---

**Request Description:** IRIS continues to work with USAID to understand the role fragility plays in developing countries. Specifically, IRIS organized events and produced written analytic products to assist USAID in moving the Fragile States Assessment Tool into a practical assessment guide and also explored additional policy areas. Activities under Request 2005-06 included:

#### **DAC/OECD Service Delivery Meeting in New York City, September 23-24, 2005**

This activity took place in the annual reporting period for fiscal year 2005 (October 1, 2004 - September 30, 2005). Please refer to the 2005 Annual Report for further details.

## **Develop a User Friendly Draft of FAST**

**Description:** Following a meeting on September 13<sup>th</sup>, 2005 to discuss ways to improve the usability of the Fragility Assessment Tool (FAST), USAID requested that IRIS redraft FAST into a user friendly and accessible guide for Mission staff to develop strategic approaches to fragile states. Drafting meetings were held at IRIS involving USAID officials and IRIS staff throughout this activity.

**Deliverable:** The redraft required substantial changes to the layout and content of the previous version of FAST. IRIS worked with Dr. Tjip Walker (USAID/CMM), to help write a new introduction chapter entitled, “How FAST Works”, incorporate new examples and stories to convey key concepts, and provide a comprehensive link between FAST and broader U.S. national security goals.

## **Framing Paper for Issues of Service Delivery in Fragile States**

**Description:** In December 2004, the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD/DAC) Fragile States Group (FSG) commissioned a work-stream on service delivery in fragile states. USAID, through its Bureau of Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (DCHA/CMM), and UNICEF. The overall objectives of the workstream were to provide guidance on how to deliver services in fragile states more effectively and how service delivery can be used more effectively to address patterns of fragility. The FSG commissioned IRIS to identify good practices and develop practical guidance and recommendations for effective work in this area. The resulting working paper, “*Service Delivery in Fragile States: Framing the Issues*” by Patrick Meagher (Associate Director, IRIS) frames the issues involved with delivering services in fragile states by drawing on the fragile states, public goods, service delivery, and political economy literatures.

**Deliverable:** The first draft of the framing for service delivery in fragile states was produced primarily for an international audience of donors and included concepts and terminology used by donors other than USAID. Wanting to use this working paper as an internal guide, USAID commissioned the IRIS Center to redraft the paper to include language consistent with U.S. policy.

## **Scope of Work for Service Delivery Field Studies**

This activity took place in the annual reporting period for fiscal year 2005 (October 1, 2004 - September 30, 2005). Please refer to the 2005 Annual Report for further details.

## **Final Guinea Fragile States Assessment**

**Description:** Continuing the Fragile States Assessment and Guinea/West Africa Assessment work that PPC IDEAS produced for USAID (please refer to the 2005 Annual Report), PPC IDEAS re-analyzed the Guinea Assessment, in terms of revised editions of the FAST and recent in-country events, to create an assessment more meaningful to the

Guinea Mission and also provide a real-life example of what a FAST assessment looks like.

**Deliverable:** PPC IDEAS addressed previous Guinea Mission comments, updated the report with recent events, and edited it to conform to the current structure of FAST.

### **Governance, Livelihoods and Food Security Workshop**

**Description:** Many of the world's poor are deeply influenced by food availability (access and utilization) and by the susceptibility of their countries to events that deepen food insecurity. Conditions in fragile states exacerbate the intensity and importance of livelihood insecurity for the poor. To determine the value of using the USAID service delivery model as a way to integrate and improve responses to livelihood and food insecurity in fragile states, USAID tasked IRIS with preparing a half-day workshop on the topic.

**Deliverable:** PPC IDEAS organized a half-day workshop on January 10<sup>th</sup>, 2006 at USAID's Development Information Services Facility for USAID staff and outside participants from the World Bank, World Food Programme, U.S. Department of State, among others. To frame the discussion, IRIS, with input from Dr. Stephen Commins, UCLA, prepared a brief paper on how USAID could apply the service delivery approach to livelihoods by building on sound USAID governance and food security work already being done. A summary of the workshop's discussion, prepared by IRIS staff, was subsequently circulated to all workshop participants.

### **OECD/DAC Health & Education Workstream Meetings on Service Delivery**

**Description:** As part of its continuing work to understand how to deliver services in fragile states more effectively, and how service delivery impacts on fragility, the OECD/DAC Fragile States Group Service Delivery Workstream held two workshops on December 19<sup>th</sup>, 2005 to apply a common analytical approach to two strategic service delivery sectors: health and education. The framework for a common analytical approach was already agreed upon at an earlier OECD/DAC meeting.

**Deliverable:** IRIS organized the two workshops – one on health and one on education – on December 19<sup>th</sup>, 2005 concurrently at two locations in downtown Washington D.C. The day culminated with both groups coming together to discuss further action. The result of the meetings served as a reference for Workstream participants as they commenced work on the terms of reference for additional service delivery work.

### **Edit Fragile States Working Paper Series**

**Description:** Drawing from the work and research of USAID and PPC IDEAS staff and outside experts, IRIS developed a Fragile States Working Papers series. The purpose of the series was to provide USAID staff with a more in-depth understanding of a selection of institutional dynamics involved in fragile states. In addition, the Working Papers series

provided information to enrich USAID staff's understanding of critical themes and issues in fragile states.

To date, IRIS, working collaboratively with USAID staff, has produced five working papers:

- “Strategy Framework for the Assessment and Treatment of Fragile States”
- “State Capacity: the Dynamics of Effectiveness and Legitimacy in Government Action in Fragile States”
- “Diagnostic Assessment of Fragile States”
- “Rebuilding Constitutional Order”
- “Service Delivery in Fragile States: Framing the Issues”

**Deliverable:** USAID decided that further editing was required on the Fragile States Working Paper Series. At USAID's request, IRIS prepared an introductory working paper which combined and summarized the key ideas present in the original working papers.

### **Service Delivery Policy Paper**

**Description:** The OECD/DAC Fragile States Group Service Delivery Workstream begun in December 2004 is being carried out in three phases. Phase 1 – Development of a concept note and framing paper; Phase 2 – Applying the common analytical approach to four strategically important service delivery sectors; and Phase 3 – Policy guidance on service delivery in fragile states. Phase 3 provides overall guidance on more effective service delivery by synthesizing the outputs from Phases 1 and 2 and other relevant work into DAC policy and field guidance on establishing effective and accountable service delivery systems in fragile states. As part of Phase 3, USAID, on behalf of the Fragile States Group, asked IRIS to prepare a Service Delivery Policy Paper to help guide donor policymakers in this area.

**Deliverable:** IRIS helped USAID and the other international donors prepare a policy guidance paper for donors on how governments, non-state actors, local authorities and civil society can be supported to deliver services in fragile states more effectively and how service delivery in these contexts can be used to address patterns of fragility. Dr. Stephen Commins of UCLA, Dr. Tjip Walker of USAID, and Dr. Clare Wolfowitz of IRIS contributed substantially to this effort. The guidance paper was based on the good practice developed in the four sector papers of Phase 2 of this workstream as well as drawing on innovative thinking from other relevant work (e.g. community based approaches), country case studies based on field visits, desk reviews and other documented examples of service delivery support in fragile states.

## **Resilience in Fragile States**

**Description:** In USAID's Fragile States Assessment Tool (FAST), fragility and resilience are identified as key patterns which can undermine or improve stability and livelihoods. Patterns of fragility have received significant attention. However, patterns of resilience within the context of fragile states have received less attention and analysis. USAID needs more information about patterns of resilience. It also needs to know more about how it can influence these patterns to address the needs of reforming and other states. USAID commissioned IRIS to prepare a paper to help USAID define the concept of resilience in fragile states.

**Deliverable:** Working with Ami Carpenter, an expert on community resilience from George Mason University, IRIS prepared a paper to expand USAID's understanding of resilience in fragile states. The paper explores the relationship between resilience, social capital and conflict management capacity of local communities, provided examples to USAID of resilience in response to specific patterns of fragility and fragility situations and helped USAID identify ways to strengthen patterns of resilience in fragile states.

## **Education Case Studies in Non-Conflict Fragile States**

**Description:** As part of the overall DAC Fragile States initiative and for application within the Agency itself, USAID wanted to reflect on experiences in designing and delivering education services effectively in fragile states. The purpose was to confirm the hypothesis that investment in education contributes to development and political stability in fragile states. USAID asked IRIS to prepare two education case studies using the service delivery framework and typologies already developed to derive lessons learned, strategic guidance, and practical recommendations for application.

**Deliverables:** IRIS contracted with Creative Associates International, Inc. to produce two education case studies for USAID. The case studies were focused on the countries of Guinea and the Philippines/Mindanao and covered a time period of three to five years. Each case study provided a discussion of the nature of the fragile political environment and its impact on basic education services, service delivery response to the fragile environment and, finally, a summary of key trade-offs and a conclusion.

## **Brown Bag – Elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo**

**Description:** The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is key to peace and regional security in sub-Saharan Africa, given its size and central location in the continent. For years, the DRC has been plagued with conflict, weak government, and humanitarian crises. Since 2002, a fragile peace, brokered by the United Nations, has been in place which has led to the withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan forces and the disarmament of Rwandan Hutu rebels. On July 30<sup>th</sup>, 2006, the DRC's first free elections in 40 years were to be held and, if successful, could offer the opportunity for a lasting peace in that war-torn country. USAID asked IRIS to arrange for Dr. Suliman Baldo, Africa Program Director for the International Crisis Group to speak with USAID employees on July 11, 2006 about the then upcoming elections.

**Deliverables:** IRIS supported a brownbag at which Dr. Baldo spoke about the parties involved in the elections, potential spoilers, and ways the international community could support a peaceful outcome. USAID employees from the offices of Democracy and Governance (DG) and Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) attended the event.

## E-BULLETINS

---

**Description:** E-bulletins are PPC IDEAS compilations of relevant articles from academic journals, think-tanks, the public record and general news sources. They cover topics highly relevant to shaping USAID strategy and policies. PPC IDEAS distributes the e-bulletins via email to high-level USAID policy makers to provide easy access to selected key work developed by others. E-bulletins are also available publicly on the PPC IDEAS web site at [http://www.irisprojects.umd.edu/ppc\\_ideas/bulletins.htm](http://www.irisprojects.umd.edu/ppc_ideas/bulletins.htm)

To date, PPC IDEAS has distributed 29 E-bulletins. For the period of October 2005 to September 2006, PPC IDEAS produced 6 E-bulletins, a brief description of which can be found below:

### *Issue XXIV – Nanotechnology and Development*

This E-bulletin provides numerous articles that examine the potential impact of nanotechnology on development.

### *Issue XXV– WTO and Development*

This E-bulletin examines the potential impact of the Doha Trade Round, negotiated under the current WTO regime, on development.

### *Issue XXVI – Energy and the Poor*

This E-bulletin examines the impact high energy prices will have on the poor in developing countries and what the global community can do to cushion the shock.

### *Issue XXVII – The 4<sup>th</sup> World Water Forum*

This E-bulletin provides numerous articles published during and immediately following the 4<sup>th</sup> World Water Forum held March 16<sup>th</sup> – 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2006 in Mexico City.

### *Issue XXVIII – Aid in Africa*

This E-bulletin provides some of the main topics of discussion and debate regarding aid in Africa.

### *Issue XXIX –China in Africa*

This E-bulletin examines China's growing influence in Africa and what impact it will have on traditional development assistance and Western donors..

## COPYRIGHT POLICY

---

PPC IDEAS has secured copyright permission for each article linked directly to the PPC IDEAS website. To accomplish this, PPC IDEAS has developed a process, which includes permission requests and copyright research through the Copyright Clearance Center.

## APPENDIX A: Summaries of Requests and Events

---

### **Request 2005-06: Additional Work Under FRAME DAC/OECD Service Delivery Meeting in New York City, September 23-24, 2005**

This activity took place in reporting year 2005. Please refer to the 2005 Annual Report for further detail.

# Develop a User Friendly Draft of FAST

## --Executive Summary--

### A Different Approach for a New Set of Problems

**Fragile states** pose a different set of problems than do states in the process of transformational development. A combination of weak governance, unmet needs, and insecurity — if not violent conflict — create a hostile environment for traditional development programs. These environments lack the levels of stability and certainty that make it feasible for people to undertake the savings and investments that are the prerequisites for transformational development.

The role of international assistance in fragile states is to work with in-country partners, both inside and outside the government, who are committed to constructive change in order to strengthen governance, deliver services, and provide the security of people and property necessary to build the foundation for sustained development. In order to play this role, USAID needs to know:

- What are the persistent patterns of fragility in a country that undermine stability and prevent the government and civil society from working together to stimulate growth or improve livelihoods? Are there patterns of resilience? If so, how can they be strengthened?
- Who are the key actors? Are they potential allies committed to constructive change, promoting stability, and advancing reform, or are they defenders of the status quo and opponents of change?

At the same time it is important to recognize that effecting change in fragile states is difficult.

Typically there is a mismatch between the depth of the problems they confront — social fragmentation, endemic corruption, and persistent poverty — and the capacity of their governments to manage them.

Moreover, weak governance makes it difficult to introduce change. Processes to achieve a broad consensus on what needs to be done are often lacking and the ability to institute new policy is constrained by feeble administration and enforcement. As a consequence, international engagement with fragile states must be tightly focused and well-coordinated

— tightly focused on shifting a limited number of key patterns of fragility and well-coordinated, both across the U.S. Government and with other international actors, to make fullest use of available entry points and ensure a consistency of purpose. In order to design sound strategies for **fragile states**, USAID needs to know:

- What are the conditions facing a country that are placing the most “stress” on it?

#### OECD/DAC: Fragility & principles for international engagement

The concept of fragile states and the need to develop specific strategies to respond to them enjoys broad support among the international community. On that basis, a Fragile States Group has been established within the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC).

The FSG is coordinating joint work among its members in four areas. One, which USAID co-leads, focuses on improving the effectiveness of service delivery in fragile states. Another workstream is developing Principles of Good International Engagement in Fragile States. This draft set of 12 principles is being piloted in nine countries. USAID has approved the Principles and is co-leading the application of them in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

More information on the work of the FSG, including the Principles, may be found at: <http://www.oecd.org/dac/fragilestates/>.

- How — and how well — is the country governed? How can existing governance institutions be enlisted to advance reform?
- What strategies guide the engagement of other international actors, both governmental and non-governmental?

The need to promote change in fragile states — and the challenges to doing so — also means that international engagement with them must be nimble and politically astute. Strategies need to be crafted to capitalize on those rare windows of opportunity when it may be easier to facilitate change. They also need to identify ways to support and promote those actors within the country who are working for change while simultaneously blunting the impact of those that resist it. And as fragile states are often chaotic places, programs need to be flexible to adapt to changing political dynamics, combining a capability to pursue short-term objectives (such as rehabilitating key ministry offices) with support for sustained reform. In order to ensure that its strategies are proactive, USAID needs to know:

- When are windows of opportunity — or vulnerability — likely to occur and what effects they are likely to have?
- What types of programming or program modalities are needed to engage proactively with reformers and spoilers and support short-term and long-term objectives simultaneously?

This *Fragility Assessment Tool* (FAST) is designed to lead an analytic team through a series of nine steps that will generate answers to these questions — and in the process develop the analytical-grounded and tightly focused strategy necessary for engagement with fragile states. (See Figure 1. The FAST roadmap.) These steps are organized into three major tasks: (1) diagnosing the current situation, (2) identifying entry points, and (3) defining program priorities. Working through these tasks provides crucial details about the dynamics of fragile states and how programming within them needs to be different — which will help the assessment team select the most appropriate partners, strategies, and tactics to effect change.

#### Box 1. FAST & National Security

The locus of national security threats has shifted to the developing world, where poverty, oppression, injustice, and indifference are exploited by international terrorists and criminals. The 2006 *National Security Strategy* positions foreign assistance as a vehicle to implement *transformational diplomacy* — defined as working with international partners to help build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. In this context, FAST can be used to:

1. Understand specific sources of political alienation that feed global terrorist networks
2. Prevent the growth of ungoverned areas and the establishment of safe havens
3. Design more strategic conflict prevention and reconstruction efforts
4. Promote responsible sovereignty and increase local capacity for reform and development (by providing a framework to analyze actors, opportunities, and underlying dynamics in order to understand who to work with, when, where, and how)
5. Think about what kind of external incentives may bolster unstable, vulnerable, and weak states
6. Develop an integrated, “whole-of-government” response that also accounts for international coordination mechanisms and actors

## USAID's Principal Diagnostic Tool

FAST is designed to serve as USAID's principal diagnostic tool in fragile states, guiding analysis and providing the foundation for a more strategic and unified programmatic response — as outlined in USAID's *Fragile States Strategy*.<sup>1</sup> While FAST builds on existing tools, both inside and outside the Agency, it focuses attention on the central issues confronting fragile states and incorporates recent insights and trial applications in several countries. FAST also feeds into USAID's strategic planning process and will generate the information that USAID staff need to prepare a *Operating Unit Strategy Statement*, as outlined in ADS 200-203.<sup>2</sup>

The aim of this tool is to operationalize the *Fragile States Strategy*. It will be accompanied by a training module, a procedures guide, and templates — all available via an online resource center. Together, all of these components make up USAID's fragility assessment methodology, which is designed to:

- Promote a standard approach to analyzing the political, economic, social, and security dynamics within fragile states
- Provide a platform for an integrated response by generating the information that USAID mission and headquarters staff (as well as other donors, aid organizations, and private-sector partners) need to craft a plan to work together effectively
- Be consistent with existing tools — serving as a foundation for other analytic frameworks, especially the Conflict Analysis Framework and the Democracy and Governance Assessment Framework
- Focus on action — help users think strategically and make programmatic decisions that make the best use USAID resources and capabilities
- Be used iteratively in a volatile environment, thus providing an effective means for monitoring evolving situations and adapting programmatic responses




<sup>1</sup> The Fragile States Strategy (USAID, January 2005) lays out USAID's approach to reversing decline in fragile states and advancing their recovery to a stage where transformational development is possible. It is available at [http://usaid.gov/policy/2005\\_fragile\\_states\\_strategy.pdf](http://usaid.gov/policy/2005_fragile_states_strategy.pdf).

<sup>2</sup> The term "Operating Unit" refers to field missions, regional entities, and Washington offices (including the Global Health Bureau, which functions as a single Operating Unit) that expend program funds to achieve approved objectives (including program support objectives).

It is also important to clarify what this assessment methodology was *not* designed to do. First, FAST is not a comprehensive program design guide. Rather, it is a framework for understanding the interactions between the state and key actors that produce patterns of fragility or resilience. Using FAST will enable the assessment team to clarify how USAID can participate effectively in the process of recovery, focusing on changing overall patterns rather than on detailing specific activities. FAST will help identify programmatic options and priorities, but more in-depth technical expertise, as well as other tools, will be needed to design specific program elements. Second, FAST is not intended to classify a state as fragile. While it can be used to analyze the patterns that give rise such a classification, there are other tools, such as the *Conflict/Fragility Alert, Consultation, and Tracking System (C/FACTS)*, designed specifically to classify states. Finally, FAST is not a finished product. The fragility assessment methodology will be updated and modified based on user feedback, in-country experiences, and new insights. An online resource center will be established where practitioners can submit comments and learn about new developments.

**Figure 1. The FAST roadmap**



# Framing Paper for Issues of Service Delivery in Fragile States

## *--Executive Summary--*

Fragile states present special challenges for donors seeking to improve standards of living for poor people. Providing services, such as health, education, security, water and sanitation, seems a logical and worthwhile way to benefit the poor. Such actions help protect vulnerable populations from further deprivation, improve human development outcomes, and support specific poverty reduction goals. The choices donors face in terms of how to accomplish the production and provision of such services in fragile states are not so clear, however, given the wide variety of conditions faced in different countries as well as the numerous means of delivering the various types of services.

In non-fragile states the government may play a major role, supplemented by non-state entities such as businesses, churches, charities, and community-based organizations. Beneficiaries or clients also have various ways to participate in or at least influence decision-making about the services they receive in these states.

In fragile states the government lacks the effectiveness and legitimacy necessary to deliver services adequately, and relationships between the government and non-state entities to enhance service delivery are weak. Donors must account for these conditions in their efforts to foster better service delivery in fragile states, and they may be tempted to rely exclusively or mostly on non-state providers, especially when immediate humanitarian needs are pressing. Avoiding a weak or failed public sector is understandable, but doing so without some clear strategy for rebuilding a responsive and effective state misses a critical opportunity to accomplish more than addressing the immediate needs of the poor. Furthermore, non-state providers cannot substitute in the long term for citizen/government relations of accountability, and donor choices in the short-term must recognize this basic constraint if they are to reach their overall objectives.

The options for how to organize the delivery of services and the subsequent consequences for development are very different in fragile states, those where government is “failing, failed, or recovering”, public authorities are “unable or unwilling to adequately assure the provision of security and basic services...and the legitimacy of the government is in question.”<sup>3</sup> USAID’s strategy in these states aims to integrate the provision of service delivery with the development of new and improved relationships between citizens and state, relationships that embody accountability and good governance: implementing this strategy requires meeting short-term service delivery needs in fragile states in ways that also advance longer-term governance objectives.

---

<sup>3</sup> USAID Fragile States Strategy (2005).

This document provides a conceptual framework to help USAID implement its fragile states strategy by carefully considering the problems and possibilities faced in programming service delivery within the conditions that prevail in these countries. The framework highlights constraints and opportunities in working with countries facing severe economic and/or political crises, or which are emerging from levels of conflict. It integrates the specific issues of service delivery—the intrinsic nature and the possible range of services such as education, health, sanitation, and security—with analysis of the fundamental relationships between various parties involved in service delivery given the special context of a fragile state. Looking at various models of service delivery in the context of the range of specific conditions that can characterize fragile states helps answer the central question, “which type of service delivery model works best in which circumstances?”

Several critical lessons emerge from the framework:

- The issue of service delivery is more than a problem of public administration. Failure to produce services is a function of fragility. Fragility can be addressed in the process of developing accountable service delivery systems.
- The impact of fragility on service delivery will depend on both the type of fragility scenario and on the ‘public goods’ characteristics of the affected services.
- There are numerous service delivery options in fragile states. They can be classified according to the extent to which they depend on engagement with the state, include capacity building for state service policy makers/providers, service producers, and clients, and insulate service delivery from inappropriate governmental politics and financial management practices.
- In settings of severe fragility such as in post-conflict periods, the need to prioritize service interventions, and to capture synergies among services through bundling, becomes paramount.
- Decentralized government or non-state entities can provide services. To be successful, the administrative, political and financial components of these approaches must be carefully planned and implemented. For example, they should account for the extent to which an unwilling central government can exert control, the likelihood that local constituents will favor service packages with more private than public goods, and similar factors.
- Information flows and client perceptions must be kept carefully in mind. The politics of services, and of aid to services, will turn on the ability of clients not only to exercise voice but also to link their choices to the performance of those actually responsible for service outcomes. Thus, political dividends from policy and aid decisions depend heavily on outreach, visibility, and accountability.
- The trade-offs inherent in this field must also be kept in the foreground. Most important is the dynamic trade-off between current investments in governance and services provision, which can have a significant impact on stability, development, and

investments in service delivery in the future. Consideration of the institutional frameworks for self-enforcing governance, economic progress, and social policy are critical in this regard.


### A Conceptual Framework for Understanding Service Delivery in Fragile States

Problems with service delivery lie at the heart of what constitutes a fragile state. States display their fragility to the extent that they are unable or unwilling to provide basic services, such as personal safety, basic health care and education, or adequate water and sanitary services to all their citizens. Ineffective or nonexistent services will undermine citizen confidence in and support for those in power. Furthermore, citizens who mistrust authorities will resist interactions with affiliated service providers, making service delivery more difficult for those who do want to address public needs, and this outcome only reinforces the conditions of fragility. Such a downward spiral can be reversed, however, if improvements in service delivery also address governance relationships. It is only as the state is seen to be making serious efforts to provide basic services equitably and efficiently that it will engender the broad popular support needed to support a vigorous development agenda.

The task of this paper is to provide a framework for considering a major aspect of donors’ engagement in fragile states: support for the provision of basic public services. This set of issues lies at the intersection of several threads of international policy discussion and analytical literature – on fragile states, on service delivery, and on the related areas of governance and aid effectiveness. The objective here is simply to be a useful guide to the issues, one that is practical and tailored to support policy decisions.

A conceptual framework for understanding service delivery in fragile states is illustrated in Figure 1. At the center lies the basic question: “Which type of service delivery model works best in which circumstance?” To develop a full and careful answer, there is a need to consider several fundamental characteristics of both service delivery and fragile states and then examine the inter-connections between these characteristics. The report works through a series of issues corresponding to the rings in Figure 1, working from the outside towards the center.

**Figure 2: Conceptual Framework**



Part 2, below, starts with a fairly basic question: “What is the scope of a service sector?” Defining the specific set of different services to be addressed is an important first step where the state has failed to such an extent that no one is sure who does what kind of activity. More generally, Part 2 starts by recognizing that service delivery in any sector usually entails a range of different, but related, activities which need to be coordinated to some extent. Once a specific sector, or combination of services, has been identified, one can proceed to the next issue, identifying the categories of ‘players’ who interact and the nature of their interactions.

Part 3 addresses ‘the political economy of service delivery’, or the institutional arrangements that mediate between the interests of different groups involved in the delivery of a package of services. Although these groups may have some shared wants or preferences, they also inevitably have some competing interests that must be accommodated or reconciled if services are to be delivered effectively. For example, consider a hypothetical situation where parents and students want one set of topics taught but teachers prefer another; how then is the curriculum determined? In general, social norms and formal institutions – the incentives, the “rules of the game”, and the governing organizations that make and enforce them – shape the interactions and the relationships between groups, addressing disputes such as the example suggests. Some processes and institutional patterns are better than others at helping antagonistic interest groups resolve their disputes in ways that are perceived as “fair” or lead to more stable outcomes. Analyzing these norms and institutions and their impact on the quantity and quality of service delivery helps donors devise more successful interventions.

Part 4 explores the third circle which corresponds to the impact that conditions found in fragile states have on service delivery. This section looks particularly at four typical fragility scenarios and draws out the implications for improving outcomes in these situations. Some fragile states are “deteriorating”, with the state recently losing both effectiveness and legitimacy, while others have suffered from low levels of both characteristics for some time, so that their development can be labeled as ‘arrested’. The label of ‘post-conflict’ describes situations where a state has recently reached the nadir of violent failure, while ‘early recovery’ refers to a situation where a governmental structure has started to form or re-emerge in the aftermath of a natural disaster, an economic meltdown, or an armed conflict.

#### EVOLUTION OF THE SERVICE DELIVERY PAPER

Originally commissioned in May 2005 by the Service Delivery Workstream of the Development Assistance Committee’s (DAC) Fragile States Working Group, “Service Delivery in Fragile States: Framing the Issues” was written to help donor agencies understand the relationships between service delivery and fragile states. The paper identified ways service delivery could be improved in fragile states and ways fragile states could be improved by service delivery. The paper drew upon ideas developed by USAID, the World Bank, DFID, the University of Maryland, and other organizations.

The paper underwent several revisions. Members of the Service Delivery Workstream used the initial paper to shape exploration of donor experience delivering education, water and sanitation, health care, and public safety in fragile states, including ways these services addressed causes of fragility. A revised paper sharpened the issues and was used for detailed planning of research and field work by the Service Delivery Workstream in these four service delivery areas.

USAID commissioned the present version based on earlier drafts to guide service delivery programming in fragile states specifically by USAID staff.

Part 5 explores the differences in service characteristics between key sectors. The discussion focuses on four key sectors (education, health, water, public safety) and utilizes concepts from public goods theory to help identify which service delivery model can be expected to work and under what circumstances. The classic distinction between private goods – only one person can benefit from consumption – and public goods – once the good is provided, any one can benefit without detracting from others – is expanded to consider six different categories of services.

In Part 6, donors’ experiences with service delivery in fragile environments are reviewed in light of the conceptual framework, identifying useful approaches and lessons. The discussion here deals with appropriate conditions and forms of cooperation with central and local governments, and with alternative delivery models such as co-production and markets. Part 6 also addresses ways of tailoring the ‘package’ of public services, for example, bundling complementary services and recognizing client rights.

## **Scope of Work for Service Delivery Field Studies**

This activity took place in the annual reporting period for fiscal year 2005 (October 1, 2004 - September 30, 2005). Please refer to the 2005 Annual Report for further details.

# Final Guinea Fragile States Assessment

## --Executive Summary--

This report documents the first field test of the new USAID Fragile States Assessment Tool (FAST), itself a hybrid combining many elements of USAID's long-standing "democracy/governance assessment" and the Agency's newer "conflict vulnerability assessment." In contrast to these earlier assessment frameworks, the FAST methodology incorporates a sharper focus on security issues – the role of police and military forces in exacerbating state fragility or promoting state stability.

The FAST methodology is organized into three major tasks: diagnosing the current situation, identifying entry points, and defining program priorities. The first task involves two steps: 1) identification of *patterns of fragility*, i.e., recurrent forms of interaction among the state and society that shape outcomes and also perceptions of effectiveness and legitimacy, and 2) analysis of the context, including both structural factor and governance arrangements, that gives rise to these patterns. The second task also includes two steps: 1) a *stakeholder mapping* (analysis of relevant stakeholders and their interests in changing or maintaining current outcomes); and 2) identification of "windows of opportunity" – likely events or circumstances when reform could be successfully introduced in the near future. The final task leads to an overarching strategy and set of recommendations, or at least options, for programs that mitigate crises, support recovery and stabilization, and lay the groundwork for transformational development.

The Guinea application of FAST was conducted by a seven-person team, three drawn from USAID/Washington, three from the Mission, and one external consultant. The team reviewed documents, interviewed knowledgeable individuals in Washington and throughout Guinea, and produced a draft Fragile State Assessment (FSA) to which Mission personnel responded. The novel elements in this FAST exercise included (in addition to pilot use of the applied fragility analytic framework) an Agency-wide round table of experts and partners and the development and administration of an expert survey, both to the round table participants and to a broad range of technical staffers in USAID/Guinea. At the end of the in-country mission, the team organized feedback sessions with Mission staff. Comments from the Mission and the Africa Bureau have been incorporated into the current version.

The report's structure diverges modestly from the way the assessment was conducted. It begins with a review of the context surrounding and contributing to observed patterns of fragility. Structural factors include significant instability in neighboring countries, an aging, ailing president whose succession is uncertain, and a historical legacy of repressive authoritarian governments that shapes currently held expectations of how government should act. In terms of key elements of democracy, Guinea's governance structures are weak, lacking both rule of law and effective competition for political office.

Secondly, the report presents findings on the patterns of fragility. The team gathered and synthesized data on outcomes as well as perceptions of the government in Guinea, as offered by officials, citizens, and other interlocutors. Key questions in these interviews

highlighted the perceived legitimacy and effectiveness of government performance in four distinct sectors: political, economic, social and security. These perceptions both result from and contribute to five patterns of interaction between the state and society. These five persistent and pervasive patterns of behavior are summarized as: 1) rent seeking (the dominant pattern that links the other four together and reinforces their pragmatic logic); 2) protection of territorial integrity; 3) intermittent reform and counter-reform; 4) respect for traditional authority; and 5) popular disengagement and risk aversion.

The analysis then highlights people who could be expected to support reform as well as those who likely will oppose. It also identifies windows of opportunity to affect Guinea's patterns of fragility and of resilience. The country is currently at a critical juncture, as once again reform efforts have been launched. Donors seem unanimous in their conclusion that it is important to seize this opportunity to reestablish working relationships with the Government of Guinea (GOG), provided that the GOG meets specific performance criteria. It appears clear as well that the inevitable succession—President Lansana Conté is aged and in ill health—will pose problems. Partly because of the insecurities that succession will generate in a system where the president has played a determining role for decades, the team anticipates that reform efforts will be put on hold until such a time as the succession outcome becomes clear, i.e., who ends up in power and on what terms. If the succession is civilian-led and follows constitutional provisions, current reforms might well be easier to revive. If, on the other hand, the military dominates the succession, it seems likely that reforms will be more difficult to reactivate.

The text box below provides definitions of terms used in FAST. Figure 1.1 illustrates the dynamics that link the elements of the fragile states assessment. Table 1.1 captures the results of the Guinea fragility assessment.

#### **FRAGILE STATES ASSESSMENT: TERMS AND DEFINITIONS**

**Structural Factors:** Key political, economic, social and security-related characteristics of the country in question that are difficult or impossible to change in the short term by policy changes. Of particular interest are those that might incite or inhibit conflict, as well as external influences (e.g., cross-border, regional or global sources of conflict, and influences on commodity and other export prices).

**Governance Arrangements:** Both formal and informal institutions that establish incentives — the “rules of the game” —and influence human behavior by both state and non-state actors. Governance arrangements mediate structural factors and the interactions between state and society and thus play an important role in determining whether a state is stable or fragile. For example, having ethnic diversity does not automatically make a country fragile; governance arrangements shape how well or how poorly different groups co-exist.

Together, structural factors and governance arrangements make up the context within which patterns of fragility and resilience operate.

**Outcomes:** Objective indicators in terms of society's well being across the political, economic, social, and security dimensions.

**Perceptions of Effectiveness and Legitimacy:** Subjective views held within society as to (1) the state's performance in terms of ability to produce desired outcomes, and (2) the extent to which the state's authority is exercised in a fair and just way.

These perceptions are important because they inform stakeholder thinking and decision-making in future rounds of action, and so influence behavior relevant to state fragility or resilience in positive or negative ways.

**Patterns of fragility and resilience:** Persistent and pervasive interrelationships between outcomes, perceptions of effectiveness and legitimacy, and state-society interactions. When state-society interactions are positive and produce outcomes that enhance state effectiveness and legitimacy, they can create patterns of resilience that bolsters recovery, as people seek out yet more interactions with the state. Alternately, negative state-society interactions produce outcomes that diminish perceptions of effectiveness and legitimacy, which creates patterns that increase the state's fragility; people seek to avoid or damage the state.

Figure 3.1: FRAGILITY DIAGNOSTIC CONCEPTS AND DYNAMICS




FIGURE 1. A PATTERN OF FRAGILITY OR RESILIENCE (IN RED) AND ITS CONTEXT (IN BLUE, COMPOSED OF STRUCTURAL FACTORS AND GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS)

**FINDINGS:** When applied in the March 2005 Guinea fragility assessment, and using the concepts and definitions presented above, the fragility diagnostic produced the results that appear below.

TABLE 1.1 GOVERNMENT OF GUINEA EFFECTIVENESS AND LEGITIMACY: SUMMARY VIEW

"PESEL" Dimensions of State Activity	Indicators of State Fragility	
	Effectiveness	Legitimacy
Political	Orange	Orange
Economic	Red	Red
Social	Orange	Yellow
Security	Orange	Orange

**Key:** Green = High, Yellow = Moderate, Orange = Low, Red = Critical

**Bottom Line:** Guinea is a Fragile State, vulnerable to further decline in outcomes, although violence is not likely in short-term.

# Governance, Livelihoods and Food Security Workshop

## *--Executive Summary--*

Tjip Walker opened the workshop, reminding attendees that the goal of the day was to discuss whether or not there is anything to gain from combining ideas concerning governance, livelihoods, and service delivery in fragile states.

Tim Mahoney began by stating that USAID has not done a good job of linking these concepts into its programming strategies, despite the focus on households and household assets as important to understanding poverty, and program enhancement.

While the livelihoods approach began in the late 1990s, with DFID, interest quickly waned in Europe due to the difficulty in designing and implementing practical strategies at the household level. As a result, the focus has stayed on the interaction between households and institutions.

Households are important to understand; focusing on poverty can remove roadblocks, such as how households relate to markets, or how households can better link with markets, or how those markets are governed. Sometimes, households are brought into markets through a process known as “adverse incorporation”—that is to say, all the cards are stacked against them.

Understanding livelihoods is also important, because actions at the household level have national implications, especially in terms of risk and vulnerability. Oftentimes, households are constrained by their ability to take risk. In their attempts to self-insure, households often engage in low risks activities that tend to therefore produce minimum returns. Thus, livelihood protection and risk are very important in conflict situations. The critical concept is protecting the assets that people have (labor, land, access to land, and access to markets). The livelihoods approach has to protect current livelihoods, and to promote future livelihoods.

Finally, in terms of political or social capital, most poor households are multi-locational, and for these households to engage with multiple institutions that impact their lives, we must understand the significance of sociopolitical capital. Unfortunately, many households lack the ability or the institutions to understand their own interests. Once people identify their own interests, they will have the incentive to promote and protect them. Thus, the main question remains how to empower households to engage with these broader processes?

Tjip Walker introduced the conceptual framework of service delivery in fragile states. In fragile states, the key is understanding the relationship between the state (or government) and citizens (this includes civil society, individuals, NGOs, and the private sector). In effective, capable states, this relationship is based on mutual trust and accountability. In fragile states, the relation is broken due to mistrust and conflict; the relationship is ineffective and illegitimate.

Services and service delivery are the most important way that citizens and the state interact. While donors have limited ways to engage with society to improve the situation and improve fragility, donors can effectively improve service delivery in fragile states by improving services, and in turn the government's effectiveness credibility will be built, which in turn leads to a virtuous cycle—leading to further legitimacy, and ultimately, allowing the country to get out of fragility.

Current USAID work in service delivery began about 13 to 14 months ago, both internally and through the DAC fragile states group. USAID concentrated on four areas (health, education, public safety and justice, and water and sanitation). These four areas represent areas of consensus, because they are essential services that all donors are engaged in, and they are all services in which the state provides them to people. Thus adding work on livelihoods might be a nice compliment to service delivery work.

In fragile states, there are five considerations when determining how to deliver services:

1. The choice of service delivery model:

The basic model is composed of three elements: clients, policy makers (the government), and providers (also the national and local government, the private sector, and community). Issues of concern are: how clients influence the quality and nature of services, as oftentimes the clients lack voice; and how do policymakers hold providers accountable? There are two types of accountability options: the long route and the short route of accountability.

2. The nature of the service:

There are a variety of combinations, and not all require the state to be involved. Essentially, fragility impacts the service delivery model by raising questions of voice and impact. Client power only exists to the extent providers are interested in what clients have to say. There is no one size for all; the nature of the service will influence the delivery options.

3. The effect of the fragile environment:

The common factor throughout fragile states is that there are weak governments, and as a consequence, the accountability relationships are weak. There is a tendency to rely on non-state actors to fill the void.

4. The political economy of service delivery:

There are different interests, institutions, and groups of people in services. What is the nature of the relationship between them? The farmer wants something different than a business owner. Who wins and who loses? Of course the poor lose, so what can we do to build up access and entitlement?

## 5. The scope of the sector:

Public safety and justice is less intuitive to donors than say, health and education. Does it make sense to think of things in terms of a sector? Is food security a more narrow term? Is it about agricultural services?

Next, Dr. Stephen Commins spoke on engaging livelihoods through a service delivery in fragile states lens. At core in discussing livelihoods and service delivery is the issue of accountable institutions. The service delivery model puts politics at the center, and moves away from thinking of services only at a technical level. Politics is central, because it determines how resources are allocated.

In fragile states, there is a lack of accountability between the poor and the government and the poor and donors. NGOs are not accountable either. In terms of livelihoods issues, there are different types of accountability (procedural accountability: how do they follow rules, outcome accountability: how citizens judge service delivery), and responsiveness to changing conditions. This framework of accountability is critical. Donor policies and aid modalities strongly affect these relationships. Donors can either strengthen or weaken these relationships.

Commins introduced the “two-track problem”: the humanitarian imperative is to get people services, but governance takes a long time. While livelihoods is not a service, there are public roles that are critical for providing livelihoods. It is important to develop conceptual links about how the public sector relates to livelihoods.

In a recent FAO report, there is the concept of a “policy gap”—that point to donor policies on food aid and the wider problem of food livelihoods. When donors dump food, this creates dependence and this can undermine livelihoods. While food aid is good, we should keep in mind that current agricultural efforts are supply-driven and are “poorly anchored in an understanding of what rural people are trying to achieve”.

Livelihoods, accountability, and governance work together. Governments regulate and manage key institutions (currency, banking, public security and judicial systems are vital). It is tremendously important for government to have a role in rebuilding livelihoods and supporting markets. Putting markets in center of livelihoods is important. Thus it is critical to build the environment around the markets. For community monitoring of how these services are delivered, local government is important.

While Commins noted the advantages of a demand-driven livelihood approach, he noted that resource capture by powerful actors and counteracting ineffective institutions act as major sources of tensions. Markets are skewed to work for very few actors, thereby reinforcing existing inequalities.

In closing, Commins offered a few additional points. First, he reminded the workshop of the importance of the gender aspects of livelihoods. Second, he noted the question about financing in terms of financing and timeframes. Last, he identified an analytical deficiency: in both the 2004 World Development Report (WDR) and USAID analysis, political parties are not mentioned.

## **Panel Discussion: Will Such an Approach Improve Programming in Fragile States?**

### **Reaction from a Service Delivery Perspective:**

Patrick Meagher echoed that the two-track and the chicken/egg problem are a constant theme, which requires sustained attention and research. Livelihoods, markets and accountability and working together is an important implication being brought out.

Meagher emphasized the bottom-up approach. He offered insight into his current work on service delivery, sharing that at present, he is looking at the interrelationships at this level between services, livelihoods and microfinance. For example in banking, the challenge is to get banks and licensed financial institutions to provide services to small communities, especially in fragile states where there maybe chaos. Other issues include the use of information technology to overcome geography and unstable circumstances. This involves enabling local service providers to enable small-level services, to bring in institutions that households encounter and that local providers encounter. There is a richness of institutional issues, which can be implemented in small, modest ways in countries that suffer from weak arrangements, where things are figuratively and literally falling apart.

### **Reaction from a Governance Perspective:**

Carol Sahley stressed that looking at relationship between governance and root causes of food insecurity is innovative and complex work, and noted that a distinct advantage in studying livelihoods is that it can help USAID overcome its stovepipe. Sahley then discussed ways in which livelihood work is new and compliments ongoing work on service delivery in fragile states. Accountability and service delivery are a subset of broader issues that USAID is working on. Accountability gets to heart of democratic governance. In service delivery, effectiveness is important, but so responsiveness. Improving services improves the legitimacy of state. The value of the service delivery model concept is that is has to do with democratic governance and about responsive state institutions.

While the model is useful because it focuses programmers on the end-user by identifying the relationships and politics at play between three important actors, Sahley was concerned about where the donors fit into the model (in accountability relationships or in political relationships?). She offered that the service delivery model may not be a triangle, but a square. To illustrate the point, Sahley offered the example of Malawi, where donors restricted the ability of state to determine what services would be provided.

In terms of the two-track problem, Sahley considered the service delivery model a useful tool to bring together humanitarian assistance and long term governance. The DG assessment framework reminds us that these actions take place in a broader legal, institutional environment. Broader structural constraints are important to solving problems. End-user accountability is one tool to get overall accountability. The short term programs with a humanitarian imperative are on a separate and parallel track with long term governance objectives. Humanitarian activities intersect with fragility and long term

development. However, Sahley noted that while humanitarian assistance can take pressure off of states in crisis, it can also reduce tensions in conflict.

### **Reaction from a Food Security Perspective:**

Tom Marchione emphasized that although food security and food aid are related, food security is more complex and broader: food security does not mean food aid. Rather, food security is context-specific, based on the entry point. Marchione noted that improving food security is tied to livelihoods, especially in deeply food insecure situations.

The problem with food aid is that it is supply-driven; dominating at the project and programming levels because it is a resource available, resulting in its overuse. In emergency situations, the first response is to supply food. In situations with nutrition crisis, cash can also be included in humanitarian aid.

Humanitarian assistance to save lives does prolong government inability to respond to chronic problems. It can also sustain and feed a problem. The Office of Food for Peace has recognized this dilemma between relief provision and long term development problem. There is a new concept, called “development relief” which recognizes that there are two prongs to service delivery.

In conclusion, Marchione stressed the importance of thinking of service delivery as an overlap between livelihoods and humanitarian management. Food aid provision can delay problems related to longer term development, what is called the “long route to accountability” in the service delivery model.

### **Reaction from a Livelihoods Perspective:**

Kim Maynard suggested that breaking down the fragile states environment into typologies as a first step allows for an analysis of issues of legitimacy, capabilities, international attention, and provides a frame of reference of food insecurity or no governance whatsoever. The political economic perspective allows donors to deal with causes, not symptoms to balance urgency with long terms sustainability. While the prevention notion is in there, the evolution from fragility to sustainable is a long process.

Maynard also brought up the impact of food aid and the presence of foreign contractors on livelihood and accountability, especially in terms of wage inflation and learning and labor opportunities for local staff. In a number of countries, this is valuable way to improve accountability and linking up service provision from non-state providers to some type of government at the local level.

If the local government suggests services, this allows for local voice and accountability. This helps bring in the service delivery triangle to play. It is important to link the local economy with national economic plans. If standards are set at the beginning, we can make link between accountability of demand and regulations with government as it emerges.

A recent World Bank/ ILO report emphasizes the importance of providing credit from the beginning of interventions in post-war environments, to establish the livelihoods connection. In these environments, donors should encourage farming, fishing and construction and see how livelihoods engages in these three sectors, because they have multiplier effects. This will allow people to capitalize and build on skills and enhance food security as food aid goes away.

# OECD/DAC Health & Education Workstream Meetings on Service Delivery

## *--Executive Summary--*

The overall objective of this workstream is to provide practical guidance on how to deliver services in fragile states more effectively. This guidance will be derived from a combination of innovative thinking and documented examples of service delivery systems in fragile states that are both effective and responsive to the needs of the poor. Work under this workstream will be carried out in three phases. Phase 1 produced a Concept Note that provides the basic analytical foundation and identifies key issues that arise in delivering services in fragile states. Based on this note, USAID commissioned a Framing Paper that elaborates on the core issues in the Concept Note and provides analytical background. Other aid institutions including the World Bank, UNDP, and DFID have also produced useful background studies. In Phase 2, teams will apply the common analytical approach to several strategically important service delivery sectors to examine the key issues, identify important lessons and distil best practice. In Phase 3 these sectoral studies will then be synthesized into DAC guidance on delivering services. The purpose of these Terms of Reference is to provide specific guidance to the sector teams during their Phase 2 work.

## **Background**

Service delivery is at the heart of state fragility. States display their fragility to the extent that they are unable or unwilling to provide basic services, such as personal safety, basic health care and education, or adequate food and water to the majority of their citizens. Ineffective or nonexistent services undermines citizen confidence in, and support for, those in power while breeding the mistrust or disengagement that makes service delivery all the more difficult. This vicious cycle leads to greater fragility and potentially to political instability and civil conflict. Reversing this vicious cycle and turning it into a virtuous cycle that leads to recovery and sustained development also passes through service delivery. It is only as the state is seen to be making serious efforts to provide basic services equitably and efficiently that it will engender the broad popular support needed to support a vigorous development agenda.

In recognition of the central role of service delivery in terms of diagnosing and responding to state fragility, the Senior Level Forum on Fragile States called on the Fragile States Group (FSG) to undertake a workstream focused on the topic. USAID and UNICEF volunteered to co-lead the workstream. They developed a Concept Note outlining a proposed approach for taking the work forward. The approach was approved by the FSG at its meeting on May 27, 2005.

Procedurally, the Concept Note specifies that the workstream will proceed in three phases:

- *Phase 1: Grounding and Framing* the workstream through development of a Framing Paper that will provide a common analytical framework for examining service delivery in fragile states.
- *Phase 2: Capturing Lessons Learned and Distilling Good Practice* through the application of the analytical framework to key service sectors.
- *Phase 3: Developing Guidance* that is practical and field-focused based on the products of the previous two phases.

Analytically, the Concept Note establishes three guiding principles. The first is that the analytical approach should be grounded in the basic service delivery model developed by the World Bank in the *2004 World Development Report*. The second is that workstream should make the fullest use possible of existing research in this area, especially that undertaken by DFID and the UN agencies. The third is that given the significant variety among fragile states it was necessary to focus the efforts of the workstream on a limited number of fragile operating environments. Ultimately, four such environments were identified:

- Deteriorating Governance
- Post-Conflict Transition
- Arrested Development and
- Early Recovery.<sup>4</sup>

These settings were selected because while each describes a type of fragility, each poses a specific set of policy and operational challenges for delivering services. Thus these setting should be seen as an aid to advancing this workstream and not as a rival to typologies used by the DAC or its member agencies.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> These settings are described more fully in the Framing Paper and the Annex to this document.

<sup>5</sup> Specifically, questions have been raised about the relationship of the fragile operational settings used in this workstream and the three-fold typology of fragile states mentioned in the “Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States” (DCD (2005)8/REV2): (i) countries recovering from crisis, (ii) those in declining governance environments, and (iii) those in a situation of collapse. It is important to note that there is no inconstancy between these two approaches. The only difference is that for the service delivery work it is helpful to divide the Principles category of recovery in two: post-conflict and early recovery. However, we are aware that some of those involved in this workstream still find it preferable to use the context descriptions from the Principles document. Thus while this Terms of Reference and some of the products developed under this workstream will use a four-fold typology, other products will use a three-fold one. Since it is straightforward to map the one typology into the other synthesis in Phase 3 will not pose a problem as long as work products clearly identify which typology they are using. In any case, the final outcome of this work stream – the Phase 3 synthesis report – will present the findings of this workstream in a way that supports and advances the Principles.

Structurally, the Concept Note identifies a Steering Committee to assist the co-chairs and the DAC/FSG Secretariat in coordinating the workstream.<sup>6</sup> In addition, the Concept Note calls for the creation of several sub-teams from among interested FSG-member agencies with each team taking responsibility for the Phase 2 sectoral reviews.<sup>7</sup> One member of the Steering Committee will serve on each sectoral team to promote information flow and ensure consistency of approach.

With the adoption of the Concept Note, the focus of effort shifted to developing the Framing Paper and these Terms of Reference. A draft of the Framing Paper, entitled *Effective Service Delivery in Fragile States: Framing the Issues*, has been distributed to the FSG for their information and use. The Framing Paper has not been adopted formally, but it provides background analysis relevant to these Terms of Reference. A summary of the Framing Paper appears in the Annex to these TORs.<sup>8</sup>

## Objective

As noted above, the objective of Phase 2 is to collect lessons and distil best practice in delivering services in several critical sectors when the state is fragile. By “good” or “best” practice, we mean providing effective services to all members of a society while addressing the weak governance and limited accountability that lead to fragility. Each of the sectoral reviews should capture any insights with respect to trade-offs, sequencing, and cross-sectoral linkages. They should also provide comment on the Principles of Good International Engagement in Fragile States as they relate to the sector and service delivery.

## Conceptual Framework

The Framing Paper (and the Annex) makes this essential point about service delivery interventions in fragile states: the approach needs to reflect the fragile setting (scenario) being addressed, the public goods characteristics of the services, and the political economy of services within the relevant setting. This can be captured graphically as follows.


---

<sup>6</sup> As of September 1, 2005, the Steering Committee consisted of DFID, the World Bank, UNDP, and the Secretariat of the Higher Level Forum on the Health MDGs in addition to the co-chairs (UNICEF-USAID) and the DAC Secretariat.

<sup>7</sup> As of December 1, 2005, four sectoral teams have been formed with the following membership: 1) **Education**: UNICEF, DFID, USAID, World Bank; 2) **Health**: World Bank, HLF, WHO, BMZ, UNDP, USAID; 3) **Policing-Prosecution-Prisons**: DAC Secretariat, UNDP, USAID, AUSAID, CIDA, DFID; 4) **Water**: NORAD, DFID, BMZ

<sup>8</sup> These Terms of Reference also reflect input given at a meeting of FSG members hosted by UNICEF in New York, September 22<sup>nd</sup> and 23<sup>rd</sup>.

## Service Delivery in Fragile States



### Approach

Each sectoral team is expected to examine the delivery of services within its sector, focusing attention on the key types of fragile environments. Specifically, each sectoral team should address the following key issues and associated questions in order to identify examples of good practice and where there are gaps.

#### *Types of services comprising the sector:*

Public services sectors often comprise a diverse array of goods and services, so that it may be difficult to generalize about the “public goods” dimensions of the sector. For example, healthcare could include primary and secondary care, immunizations, public health programs such as vector control, etc. In practice, what are the key components of the service sector in question? How would you characterize these services in terms of their public and private goods characteristics (see the relevant text in the Annex or Framing Paper)? What are the main delivery models used for each of these services, and what forms of oversight and public accountability are mainly used?

#### *Impact of state fragility on the sector:*

A fragile environment will likely weaken or disrupt service delivery in several ways, with policy coordination and oversight being especially vulnerable. In some cases, loss or flight of personnel, displacement of populations, destruction of facilities, and disruption of travel and communications may create especially severe problems. Fragility-related problems will vary across sectors and fragile environments (see the Framing Paper).

What are the main impacts of state fragility, and of each of the four types of settings, on the sector at issue? What specific problems did this pose in terms of service delivery and governance of the sector? Which of these problems proved most difficult for clients, providers, policymakers, and donors? Relate the nature of the problems to the public goods characteristics of the services, and to the fragility scenario.

*Addressing fragility challenges – service delivery adaptations:*

Conditions of state fragility often require changes in standards, models, and indicators normally used in the sector being addressed. For example, traditional health sector indicators may not be applicable, or may be too difficult to track. Approaches to schooling may need to be modified in order to make accelerated learning possible for displaced pupils. Severe problems of security and public safety may require a shift in focus away from activities normally conducted by police forces in stable environments, towards establishing secure spaces and enabling basic economic and service functions. Models of potable water provision may likewise need to be adjusted. What are the specific adaptations that have been made to the sector, in the team's experience? Was capacity or integrity the key issue to be addressed in these states? What were the respective roles of central and local state agencies in provision? Of state versus non-state actors<sup>9</sup> and of hybrid approaches? How was fragmentation of provision minimised? How were providers made more responsive and accountable to users? What were the responses to human resource and other capacity constraints? How was access maintained, especially in conflict? (To the extent possible, please relate these experiences to the four scenarios and the delivery models presented in the Annex and the Framing Paper).

*Key components of service adaptations:*

Learning lessons from service delivery adaptations require some analysis of core features of the models used. For example, the nature of state fragility in a given setting may call for decentralized, market, or community-based approaches. Some approaches combine discrete service elements, sometimes from different sectors, into a single package. There may be a need to set priorities among service needs in particular fragile scenarios, and to sequence service delivery interventions. This is an area where agencies may need to coordinate across sectors. What were the key elements of the service delivery adaptations used in the sector under consideration? In which types of fragile environments were they successful, and in which were they unsuccessful? (See the Table in the Annex and Framing Paper.) How did successful adaptations address the specific impacts of fragility? (See the delivery options presented in the Annex and Framing Paper.) Were service delivery interventions prioritized or sequenced in a particular way? Was there potential for bundling high priority complementary services into a single package? How was exclusion from services addressed? What accountability mechanisms have worked best and why? How was financing handled, e.g. grants, user fees? What monitoring and

---

<sup>9</sup> Includes NGOs, Faith Based Organisations, the private sector, and community-based organisations.

evaluation methods were used?

*Addressing governance and sustainability:*

Changes in policy and service delivery are endogenously driven by political-economic factors in the society. Fragility indicates an alignment where political leadership has insufficient willingness or capacity (or both) to ensure broad-based service delivery. Even if there is some exogenous shock such as a natural disaster, weak governance is often part of the causal chain leading to fragility. External interventions and local innovations may improve delivery in the near term, but do not necessarily address willingness or capacity. Also, it should be recognized that international donor agencies and initiatives have their own limitations of capacity and willingness.

What has the experience been in the sector at issue, across the four fragility scenarios? In particular, what methods have been used for ensuring aid effectiveness, sustainability, and capacity-building – or at least avoiding the undermining of existing systems, including those of government? (Approaches include forms of alignment with government, ‘adoption’ of ministries, hand-off of freestanding programs, and donor coordination and harmonization – see the Framing Paper.) With what results? Please discuss the extent to which the approach taken amounted to a coherent and long-term approach to developing in-country capacities for delivering basic services. What kind of sectoral interventions have promoted broader reform? Where non-state actors took on an oversight and monitoring role, how was planning and capacity building for handover to different levels of the state built in (for state administrators or service providers)? What approaches proved most successful in ensuring donor harmonization, effective local-international partnership, and domestic ‘ownership’ of programs and processes? Are there lessons concerning long-term persistent programmatic approaches that are able to ride-out short term crises and upheaval? Are there any indications here of how the transition from humanitarian to developmental aid could be more coherent and strategic? Last, what do the experiences here tell us about how to address service delivery in fragile states that are aid donor “orphans?”

*Key trade-offs:*

Aid interventions in fragile states must balance the allocation of direct aid to service delivery against longer-term investments in improved governance (willingness and capacity). In situations of severe fragility, this means deciding whether to work in partnership or alignment with government, or to seek strict financial accountability through ring-fencing or parallel systems. In the weakest environments, donors face the choice of extending assistance to unwilling governments or rebel movements, versus withholding or conditioning aid to avoid legitimizing the authorities. In the sector experiences under review, what were the trade-offs between supporting governance reform or capacity development on the one hand and responding to the urgent imperatives of delivering essential services? How were key political economy issues assessed and taken into account? Where non-state actors were donors’ preferred partners, what were the benefits in terms of services, and the costs in terms of long-term government capacity? What were the benefits and costs of aid to institutional reform and

capacity development at different tiers of government? What guidance can you give on which emphasis is more fruitful in a given scenario? In terms of finance, how was fiduciary risk managed when aid was channelled through the state? Which aspects of service delivery were financed and with what results? How was dependence on parallel, unsustainable structures minimised where financing was provided outside of the state? Also, how have donors dealt with affordability, cost control, and cost-sharing? What particular instruments for financing and delivering capacity-building support proved effective? (Please refer to the discussion at the end of the Annex and Framing Paper.)

#### *Lessons:*

What are the key lessons from the sector experiences under review? On the basis of these lessons learned, please provide strategic guidance and practical recommendations to the DAC Fragile States Group on approaches to this service sector in fragile states. The lessons should be presented in such a way that they can help generate, in Phase 3 of the workstream, and action-oriented agenda.

#### **Service Sectors**

In addition to these general issues and questions, each sectoral team should, incorporate the following special considerations into their work in the respective sectors (see also the discussion of sectors in the Framing Paper).

#### *Health:*

The focus here should be on basic services such as primary healthcare and public health programs. State fragility can disrupt healthcare services in numerous ways. Facilities may be destroyed, health professionals are sometimes killed or forced to emigrate, supplies are likely to be scarce and of low quality, health indicators may be difficult to monitor reliably, and the coordination of health policy and vertical programs such as immunization may be entirely disrupted. International donors and INGOs come to play central roles as providers and administrators. The sector itself may be a target or arena of conflict.

The team should discuss how these and other challenges have been addressed in fragile states. Approaches to be considered include prioritization, such as the creation of basic health service packages and maintenance of a small number of dependable health facilities; interventions such as radio broadcasts and distance education that provide service to insecure areas without the need for a physical presence; and the fostering of neutral service delivery initiatives (e.g. “immunization days”) or spaces (e.g. community-owned or charitable facilities) that extend services and help disentangle healthcare from conflict (or actively encourage peace-building and social capital). In turn, fragility, conflict, and the disruption of healthcare systems give rise to special health concerns, including the re-emergence of diseases that had been under control, IDPs living in unsanitary conditions, malnutrition, and special physical and mental traumas. Also, absorptive capacity issues may be especially severe in this sector, given the high priority placed on it by many international donors.

### *Education:*

The emphasis in this sector should be on ensuring basic literacy and primary schooling. As in the health sector, fragility may disrupt education policy, planning, and oversight; decimate professional staff through fatalities or flight; destroy facilities; and leave behind lingering problems. Fortunately, local community- or market-based initiatives can revive at least rudimentary education services until systems are restored. But, schooling is perhaps the service most vulnerable to suppressed demand. Families in fragile settings often need to divert children's efforts to livelihoods; or special problems in health, security, or infrastructure may make it difficult for them to access the schools. The team should analyze responses to these and other challenges. Among the innovations that should be discussed are the kinds of "neutral space" and reconciliation activities mentioned above, cross-sectoral approaches such as "safe schools" programs, the use of radio and distance learning, and special accelerated learning programs for IDPs and others affected by the loss of schools. Also, education system disruption creates such further problems as masses of inadequately schooled youth, scarcity of qualified teachers, and devolved approaches to curricula that may or may not be desirable. As in health, absorptive capacity often becomes an issue, with funding responses outstripping available professional and managerial skills, and quantity increasing without regard to the quality of schooling. The team should identify successful strategies and coping mechanisms here.

### *Policing-Prosecution-Prisons (3P):*

We define this area as dealing with the fundamental security of persons and property, including protection from violence in major public spaces such as roads, markets, schools, and health facilities. In addition to the basic functions of control and monitoring of public spaces, this sector is defined as including justice functions that support security – the arrest and prosecution of offenders, and imprisonment and other punishments. This basic security functions can be carried out by police or military forces, or through other arrangements such as citizen patrols and militia. In fragile states, special problems may include indiscipline, violence, or racketeering on the part of security services; insufficient police presence, requiring the prioritization of local public safety needs; discrimination in the provision of police and justice services to different regions, localities, or demographic groups; continuing conflict and consequent domination of security activities by national armies that are not attuned to public safety issues; or a security void that may need to be filled through some form of community action or co-production. But note that, unlike in other sectors, the use of informal methods – while helpful in some circumstances – dilutes the state monopoly of violence, sometimes with ill effects.

Responses to these and other challenges identified by the sub-task team should be the core of the team's work. The team should also consider the extent to which 3P is a service like the others addressed here, and how it interacts with those other sectors. Given the tight nexus of policing and justice with state power and state fragility, this sector in some cases poses special dilemmas of "taking sides" (e.g. government versus insurgents). The team should suggest strategies for dealing with this in the different fragility scenarios. Also, the donor community has significant gaps in its capacity for addressing

this sector. Last, the team should take into account broader law enforcement issues that have particular relevance to the maintenance of public safety. These include campaigns against trafficking in persons, weapons, illegal drugs, and conflict diamonds; educational efforts regarding prostitution and drug abuse; combating criminal syndicates and gangs; and legal steps at national, provincial, and local levels to address these issues.

#### *Water:*

The focus here is on supply of potable water in all its forms. The sub-task team should address the distinctive investments, governance issues, and risks involved in water provision. In fragile states, water is subject to pollution from violence, lack of maintenance, deliberate sabotage, inadequate construction of water systems, and – if water is being drawn from a running stream – from the use of streams by others for disposal of sewage, watering of livestock, or runoff from agricultural land uses. Piped water and wells require a fixed investment – fixed in place and time – which can create local “natural monopolies.” This also means that water systems can be “captured” by either side in a conflict or by patronage networks, and access rationed. Water is hard to transport, and so it cannot be distributed in bulk very far from the tap. Water systems, no matter how small, require maintenance, which is difficult in fragile states. At the same time, charging for water is difficult for a variety of reasons, including income levels of users, management problems for those collecting for the water, and weak governance. The team should analyze ways in which these challenges have been addressed. In addition to the creation and maintenance of water systems in fragile states, the team should also address relevant governance, ownership, and management issues affecting water provision, and the responses to these issues (e.g. mixed-ownership tube wells and pipes, and shared maintenance).

#### **Methods**

Each sectoral team will be responsible for determining how best to examine the issues and answer the questions listed above in light of existing work and available resources. It is to be expected that varying levels of relevant pre-existing work and levels of resources will result in different types and volumes of work across sectors. Depending on analytical needs and available resources, sectoral teams might consider literature reviews; surveys of the experience of bilateral and multilateral donors as well as NGOs; case studies (either desk studies or involving field visits); or workshops. Whatever the method inquiry, it’s expected that the sectoral teams will seek input from agencies or organizations outside those represented on the team.

Wherever possible, sectoral teams are encouraged to work together to pool resources and capacity. Members may decide to commission certain parts of the work, to have one member lead on drafting with support from others, or to pursue lines of enquiry independently before coming back together to produce a final document.

In addition, wherever possible the sectoral teams should focus on the nine countries where DAC members are piloting the draft Principles on Good International Engagement in Fragile States.<sup>10</sup> For example, these countries may be appropriate sites for case studies or test beds for piloting new approaches to service delivery. To the extent that two or more sectoral teams choose to undertake case studies, there might be analytical advantage to settle on a common set. Such an approach would provide opportunities to make cross-sectoral comparisons and consider cross-sectoral linkages.

---

<sup>10</sup> Currently these are DRC, Haiti, Guinea Bissau, Nepal, Somalia, Sudan, the Solomon Islands, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

# **Edit Fragile States Working Paper Series**

## *--Executive Summary--*

### **STATE CAPACITY: THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT, ELITES, AND POPULAR GROUPS**

State failure is a matter of states losing — or never having acquired — the capacity to respond to relatively normal problems of fiscal management, internal conflict, or political succession. States do not fail simply because of causal factors having reached some overwhelming or critical level. Thus, while states like Argentina and South Korea were able to ride out a massive financial collapse, and Jamaica and India have maintained decades of democracy despite poverty and internal violence, such promising countries as Cote d'Ivoire and Nepal have descended into guerilla and civil wars without being spurred by any striking economic collapse or other obvious critical pressure.

States with high capacity to manage both the routine and exceptional problems of governance, therefore, seem a necessary ingredient for avoiding state failure, which is in turn essential to maintain economic progress and build stable democracies. Although social scientists have come to use the phrase “state capacity” to describe the ability of states to cope with varied issues in governance, it should be realized that state capacity is not just a matter of characteristics of the state, or government, by itself. Rather, high state capacity represents a situation of resilience, adaptability, and confidence in the relationships among the government and elites, among the government and varied popular groups, among elites and segments of the populace, and among varied sectors of society and flows of people, products, and pressures from the international arena. One of the reasons that it is often difficult to build state capacity is that it requires paying attention to multiple relationships among varied actors, rather than merely putting in place a set of institutions or standards.

### **THE FOUNDATION OF DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH**

Strong state capacity, while it may yield political stability, is not sufficient for either democracy or economic growth. Chile under Pinochet was stable and economically successful, but not democratic. The same could be said of the Soviet Union in the 1950s and 1960s, or Korea and Taiwan under authoritarian rule. Other states — such as India and Jamaica, mentioned above — have been democratic and stable, but have spent decades as consistently poor performers in economic growth. Saddest of all are states that had durable governments but enjoyed neither democracy nor economic improvements, such as Togo, Zaire, or Cuba. In short, building state capacity is not the same as building democracy or fostering economic development. But neither of these goals is attainable without it.

## **A FOCUS ON POLITICAL DYNAMICS AND INSTITUTIONAL RULES**

State capacity is hard to define more precisely, difficult to measure, and even more difficult to create where it is lacking. A recent evaluation of state-capacity building efforts in Africa by the World Bank, “Building State Capacity in Africa: New Approaches, Emerging Lessons”, edited by Brian Levy and Sahr Kpundeh (2004), points out that simply aiming to deploy modern management approaches in state administration is not enough. This study notes:

Undifferentiated, “best practice,” cookie-cutter approaches are doomed to failure. Any efforts to strengthen administrative and accountability systems will have to fit country-specific constitutional structures and patterns of political, social, and economic interests.

If Africa is to have a well-functioning public sector there needs to be a paradigm shift in how to analyze and build state capacity. Specifically, African governments and their partners should move from a narrow focus on organizational, technocratic, and public management approaches to a broader perspective that incorporates both the political dynamics and the institutional rules of the game within which public organizations operate.

But this new paradigm — focusing on the “political dynamics and institutional rules of the game” — is difficult to implement. The rules of the game differ between countries, as do popular expectations, political traditions, elite relationships, the character of central authority, and cultural foundations. Analysts seeking ways to build state capacity need to be able to interpret the details of a given country’s political and social conditions with regard to how they affect state capacity.

## **EFFECTIVENESS AND LEGITIMACY**

Research on state capacity by the Political Instability Task Force and the World Bank indicates that there are two primary dimensions of state capacity:

- Effectiveness — how well the government is able to translate resources into actions to achieve desired policy outcomes
- Legitimacy — whether the outcomes achieved, and the methods used to achieve them, are considered credible, fair and reasonable by local societal standards of the population

These definitions are inherently country specific — they require that the analyst determine what policy outcomes are desired by popular and elite groups, and whether those desires are being met. Outcomes that are considered unsatisfactory in certain societies (such as failure to provide universal and gender-equal primary education) may be accepted in others. Or outcomes that were tolerated at one time (an absence of long-term growth in per-capita incomes) may seem wholly unacceptable at different times. They also require that the analyst determine whether the outcomes and methods pursued by the government violate the expectations of credible, fair, and reasonable behavior held by various groups in society. This factor also may be driven by changes in either

government behavior or changes in prevailing standards of reasonable behavior (changes in attitudes toward corruption, for example).

## **USING THE FOUR DOMAINS OF GOVERNANCE**

To help analysts determine the level of a government's effectiveness and legitimacy, it is useful to examine each of the four basic domains (or functions) of governance:

1. Security — providing protection against violence and acute privations (e.g., homelessness, drought, famine). However, societies vary widely in the amount of security that governments — rather than families, local communities, or fate — are expected to provide.
2. Political and Judicial — providing means to select political leaders, choose policies, and implement them, including law enforcement and judicial proceedings. Again, societies differ widely in the range of means that are acceptable. There are variations in the degree to which such methods are expected to be representative, how much is reasonable to extract in taxation, and how judicial systems are expected to operate.
3. Economic — providing means and opportunities for people to support themselves and their families, pursue careers, and make material gains. Societies vary widely too in what kinds of economic opportunities, distribution, and outcomes are desired.
4. Social and Cultural Services — providing means and opportunities for people to obtain education, health care, sanitation, transportation, access to communications, spiritual and cultural practices, and other public goods. Societies differ not only in the kind and degree of such services that are expected, but also whether such provision should be state-provided, state-regulated, or privately or market provided.

For each of these domains, a given society can be rated on whether the desired outcomes of various social groups are being achieved by the government (or other providers), and whether the actions of government (or other providers) in pursuit of these outcomes are considered credible, fair, and reasonable.

Where most people, most of the time, perceive that the outcomes they care about are delivered in a reasonably fair manner across the majority of the domains of governance, we can say that such societies have high capacity and are likely to be stable. These are the fortunate and easy cases. Conversely, where most people or many important elite groups perceive that their desired outcomes are not achievable — due to government action or inaction — or believe that government actions are oppressive, discriminatory, or blatantly unjust, state capacity is weak and stability is precarious.

The degree of differences among societies requires that analysts be open to a host of possibilities. States may appear unfair because they are breaking rules (engaging in corruption or arbitrary justice, for example), or because they are enforcing rules that are inherently unfair (such as racial, caste, or gender discrimination). States may appear ineffective because they lack the resources to achieve desired ends, or because

government is neglectful of responsibilities or unable to agree on pursuing those ends. It is therefore important to work backwards from identifying specific deficits in effectiveness or legitimacy within each of the domains of governance, to locating the particular obstacles or causes for those deficits. Only then can interventions be developed to remedy the deficits.

## **CHANGE REQUIRES POLITICAL WILL**

It must be emphasized, however, that aside from diagnosing state capacity problems, effective interventions depend on the political will of the country in question — and the will of its rulers to undertake change. Just as a doctor diagnosing a patient with obesity or high cholesterol can prescribe remedies and lifestyle changes ultimately depends on the patient to adopt healthier behaviors, so too diagnosis and prescription for state reform must be met with a willingness to accept change by a country if assistance is to be helpful. Rulers who cling to power by illegitimate means, or who monopolize economic opportunities, are not likely to make good partners in efforts to improve state capacity. Where intervention is still desired, donors need to incentivize assistance — a long-term program of graduated aid that rewards governments and leaders for actions that promote reform may be more effective than up-front grants or loans. In the case of debt relief, for example, tying debt relief to changes in governance and capacity-building measures is likely to produce a more beneficial outcome than debt relief that leaves in place precisely those relationships that mired states in low growth or led them to assume excessive debts.

## **MOST PROMISING: COUNTRIES TRANSITIONING TO DEMOCRACY**

The most promising partners in efforts to improve state capacity through donor interventions are countries that are either transitioning or recently transitioned to democracy (and thus are seeking broad legitimacy with their population), and that do not have active insurgencies or major civil conflicts (and thus have minimal security problems). In such cases, programs targeted at developing and improving democratic procedures, increasing the efficiency and adherence to rule-of-law of government officials and agencies, improving economic opportunities and material well-being, and increasing provision of social services, can tap existing aid and assistance capacities and expertise to strengthen state capacity.

The long-range goal of such assistance is to build up trust in state institutions (as argued by Francis Fukuyama), or an accepted “constitutional order” (as argued by Karol Soltan), in which elites and popular groups come to believe that state institutions will generally provide desired outcomes by reasonable and fair means, and thus come to support the institutions themselves, regardless of periodic economic or political crises. It is this set of relationships among the governing and the governed that fosters resilience and provides long-term stability in high-capacity states.

## **MOST DIFFICULT: STATES WITH ONGOING CONFLICT AND LOW LEGITIMACY**

Conversely, the most difficult cases for building state capacity are situations in which large-scale conflicts are ongoing, or in which state leaders have already lost legitimacy with much of the population. In such societies, traditional donor assistance is likely to be ineffective unless combined with military and diplomatic interventions to stabilize conflicts and impact elite behavior. In these cases, a more integrated, inter-agency task-force approach, involving a combination of military, diplomatic, and donor agency interventions and assistance, is required to prevent state failure and build a foundation for sustained development. Only when threatened or actual military intervention or assistance has improved security, and when diplomatic pressures have resulted in willingness to change rulers' or elite's behaviors to provide more effective and legitimate politics and justice, are donor efforts to promote better governance and economic development likely to contribute to building state capacity.

# Service Delivery Policy Paper

## *--Executive Summary--*

**Fragility has a major impact on service delivery. At the same time, programs to improve service delivery systems and outcomes have the potential to help reduce state fragility.**

The World Development Report 2004 observes that services in general are failing poor people, in terms of access, quality and outcomes. The failure of services is particularly notable in fragile states; indeed, part of the DAC definition of fragile states is the inability or unwillingness of a state to deliver services to its people, or to ensure their delivery. Improving service delivery is at the core of reducing fragility; and, conversely, long-term improvements in service delivery will only occur with changes in the political economy of services.

Donors have recognized that fragility has a major, negative impact on service delivery, reflecting several factors. These factors include: loss of financing for services; increased social insecurity due to violence; exclusion of disempowered groups; endemic corruption; and the failure or misuse of security and justice systems. In particular, skewed budget allocations that favor particular ethnic or religious groups—along with systematic exclusion of women, minorities, and disabled individuals—undermine the foundations of public service delivery systems.

Thus, service delivery systems can be seen as representing fragility at the local level, reflecting political as well as technical inputs and constraints. The broad social patterns of fragility are accordingly “mapped” in the delivery of particular services. Moreover, and importantly, the technical aspects of service delivery provide an entry point for donors to find ways to address political and governance issues as well.

There is extensive evidence that programs designed to improve service delivery can also generate significant improvements in governance and, ultimately, some reduction in fragility. Such programs need to be carefully adapted to the specific context, as well as designed with a long-term horizon:

1. Service delivery support programs must be based on sound political and economic analysis of contexts—including conflict analysis—addressing the broad political context and the overall public sector as well as the specific service sector. In general, donors should avoid the imposition of vertical programs that tend to set external goals without adequate regard to context.
2. Programs must be reviewed in terms of tradeoffs, priorities and sequencing, in particular balancing short-term objectives with longer-term opportunities and risks. The long-term perspective must rest, again, on an analysis of the economic, social, political, and service delivery dynamics in the particular fragile context.

3. Programs and policies will, accordingly, require a longer time frame. Flexible long-term planning (not a long-term plan) should include ways to link further improvements in services with demonstrated improvements in governance.

The linkages between fragility and services (notably around relationships of accountability) create the opportunity for donors to address both service delivery and governance through integrated or linked approaches.

**The various fragile states frameworks that have been developed over the past few years share a common emphasis on the central importance of context.**

Fragile state contexts are dynamic, not static; donors need to continually monitor and adapt their policies and approaches. Fragile states can be categorized as improving or deteriorating, or at a transition point, and it may be difficult on the ground to analyze the rate or direction of change.

This paper focuses broadly on three distinct types of fragility situations:

- Improving contexts may reflect governance reforms or post-conflict opportunities.
- Deteriorating contexts may reflect bad governance, increased conflict, or government indifference.
- Violent conflict may require particular attention from donors and non-state actors.

Deteriorating contexts entail especially difficult challenges, when the failure or perhaps the hostility of the state works against basic services. In some cases, human rights sanctions may create an isolated or ‘pariah’ state. Donors can seek to reverse deteriorating conditions, but in some cases their only option may be to provide short-term humanitarian assistance. In contexts where it is not feasible to work with government agencies, donors may make use of multi-sectoral funds, distributed through local community mechanisms. In deteriorating contexts, it is particularly important for donors to coordinate humanitarian, development, and security planning.

- Contracts with front-line service providers will need to address capacity and sustainability issues from a development perspective.
- Donors may need to provide consistent (longer-term) financing to develop sustainable systems.
- Donors need to be wary of putting in place short-term service delivery systems that cannot be maintained over the longer term.

In violent contexts, donors need to work with humanitarian operations to establish potential links to transition points, as well as to address issues of social cohesion. Donors will need to negotiate the possible tensions between humanitarian and human rights goals, or between humanitarian service delivery and long-term development assistance,

with a careful view to identifying opportunities and priorities for post-crisis transition. Donors can build greater engagement with organizations that have brought together conflict, humanitarian and development experiences in their work.

In improving contexts, donors can invest in transition planning, in ways that build from existing service delivery arrangements to wider and deeper reforms in both services and governance. This requires careful attention to sequencing: in a specific set of circumstances, what order of programs and what priorities are appropriate? Decisions on sequencing programs must take into account the benefits and costs of alternative service delivery mechanisms. Decisions on tradeoffs may require reviewing short-term objectives (i.e., MDGs or stability?); accordingly, donors may need to develop revised approaches to measuring results.

In a transition context, donors need to consider how to plan a shift between primary aid systems or sets of aid modalities—for example, from humanitarian systems to development modalities—with awareness of the implications for aid mechanisms and for relations with the national government. They may need to design specialized transition mechanisms, to avoid rushed or forced outcomes. In particular, the donor community needs to give serious consideration to the impact of humanitarian standards (as enunciated in the Sphere Charter) on the transition to development assistance and state provision of services.

**In general, there are no quick fixes or "short cuts to progress." Donors need to be shielded from internal political demands to achieve a fast turnaround.**

More research is needed regarding the opportunities and pitfalls entailed in service delivery programming in fragile states.

Some of the lessons to be drawn from the fragile states "workstream" on service delivery point to a range of opportunities for helping to improve governance, strengthen public sector institutions, and reduce conflict.

- In particular, work in security and justice service delivery has been shown as both possible and necessary, even in exceptionally difficult circumstances.
- As some fragile state governments lack legitimacy or workable accountability ("long route") mechanisms, donors can support various community level approaches linked to civic capacity building.

A central question in any given case is whether the government can function as a partner—with donors, with Non-State Providers (NSPs) and with their own civic organizations.

- If government entities can serve as a partner, donors should focus on alignment, i.e., designing aid systems and processes in ways that parallel, and can be linked with, existing or emergent government systems.

- If the government cannot be a partner, donors should create an external service delivery "cabinet" to provide a co-ordination mechanism, both by sector and for overall service arrangements, meanwhile encouraging continuing contextual assessment for institution-building.

Donors need to address issues of political and service exclusion, within the contexts and constraints of each setting. The current fragile states literature is weak on the spatial dimension of services and politics—urban, peri-urban, small city, or rural—as well as on the broad gender implications of fragility. Further work needs to be done on how donors can address urban/peri-urban/rural service dynamics, as well as such complex factors as gender, ethnicity, and religion, and their relations to both services and political processes.

There is significant, but still preliminary, evidence of the social cohesion and peacebuilding potential of such service-delivery programs as community water initiatives and the re-establishment of schools. In contexts of violence, as well as in countries emerging from conflict, donors might give priority to service arrangements that promote conflict reduction and establish essential security and justice mechanisms. The potential for improved cohesion and stabilizing impacts will not be equal across sectors or within sectors; with limited resources, donors may choose to promote approaches that emphasize cohesion outcomes in preference to impacting human development or MDG indicators.

Donors need to give more attention to the challenges of working with diverse providers. A central fact of fragile states is that the majority of services are delivered by various types of Non-State Provider; donors therefore need a more substantial base of information on overall NSP contracting and, especially, how NSPs can fit in to longer-term state-building approaches, avoiding a sharp and often false dichotomy between state roles (regulating, policy making, financing, as well as provision) and non-state roles.

The choice of service delivery mechanisms, and of providers, is a key decision point for donors. Particularly in rebuilding service delivery, investing in long-term technical capacity may compete with various political imperatives. The use of NSPs needs to be carefully considered, assisted by tools for mapping service arrangements well as indicators designed for rapid assessment of services.

More consistent attention needs to be focused on evaluation, lessons learned, and sharing of information. As donors innovate funding mechanisms, they need to be able to track how their contracts are performing and how sectoral initiatives are spreading. Multi-agency information-sharing programs are needed to share lessons from fragile states with donors, governments, and providers.

Donors must recognize the centrality of the security and justice sector to normalcy and reduction of fragility. A special challenge, in this context, is to find ways to engage with multiple providers, which may include 'traditional' groups and particular sources of law (Koran, Bible, local belief systems). Another challenge is addressing the complex roles of violent opposition movements, which may provide public services as a route to establishing their own political legitimacy, and which may be part of a peace settlement.

Finally, in conflict or post-conflict situations, a focus on second-chance opportunities for young people may influence the design and sequencing of programs.

Further work needs to be done on enhancing the accountability of both donors and service providers to citizens in fragile states. Where feasible, new forums may be an avenue for citizen groups to promote transparency and information exchange as a step toward accountability.

A key lesson to be drawn from the work accomplished so far is that, even in exceptionally difficult circumstances, there are potential opportunities and levers for change.

**In order to improve aid effectiveness, donors need to deepen their commitment to mutual co-ordination and policy coherence.**

In fragile states, donors need to be more coherent in several areas: in the ways they fund service delivery, on potential connections between provision and state building, in the decisions on how to partner with government entities and when and how to contract with NSPs . Donor agencies need to be more coherent specifically about the ways in which they fund both non-state actors and governments, based on country strategies, and about requiring non-state programs to demonstrate their contribution to state-building. Donors also need to develop and coordinate country-specific transition strategies, including contracting services and integrating service delivery into broader national poverty reduction and service strategies.

Improving donor harmonization has been identified consistently as a priority, in both general aid assessments and reviews of fragile states experiences. Fragile states provide an opportunity for deepening joint analysis and approaches with regard to context assessments, co-ordination of humanitarian actions, and the development of "light but firm" indicators. At a larger scale than for individual countries, donors need to commit themselves over the long-term to an ongoing work and research program on services in fragile states. Such a work program would:

- Develop guidelines on good practice, building upon previous sectoral research.
- Organize meetings to bring together fragile state governments (where appropriate) with international Non-State Providers, local civic organizations, and peacebuilding organizations, and humanitarian agencies.
- Address issues of capacity-building.
- Provide new forum for exchange of experiences.
- Link with Turn around lessons documenting how donors and providers have gained traction for improved governance and services. Even in exceptionally difficult circumstances, there are potential opportunities and levers for change.

Donors should invest further in candid assessments, seeking both internal and external critiques of donor policies, aid modalities, and service delivery roles.

Several themes emerge consistently in the context of fragile states experience:

- Fragile states are not static: the flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances needs to be built into program design—a consistent weak point of donor agencies.
- Donor practices emphasize the internal design of programs and projects, tending to over-engineer the endogenous factors while paying too little attention to external factors which may be decisive.
- There is an organizational overemphasis, within donor agencies, on uniform standards of good technical design, and a reluctance on the part of staff and leadership to address political factors.
- Without a clear focus on the importance of political context, the lessons from recent experience and the insights from the fragile states workstreams will not become adequately integrated into donor practice.

# Resilience in Fragile States

## --Executive Summary--

“Resilience is probably the second instinct, after survival, of all species.” - Stockholm Environment Institute

Generally speaking, resilience refers to the ability to rebound, maintain or strengthen functioning during and after a disturbance; or to cope successfully in the face of extreme adversity or risk. Resilience is both a metaphor for the durability, strength or adaptive capacity of particular things (people, ideas, institutions, societies, ecosystems) and a theoretical framework for studying the dynamics of this durability, strength, or adaptive capacity in relation to those objects.

A great range of research has pushed beyond the metaphor, to clearly define resilience, and identify its characteristics and dynamics. Likewise, this chapter uses resilience in its latter capacity – as a framework for studying the dynamics of positive adaptation in fragile states.

### **I. Unbundling Resilience**

To understand why this framework is useful, we need to unbundle the term “resilience”. What does it mean? Why do we use it? What relevance does it have for the field of development, particularly regarding fragile states? Before exploring particular patterns of resilience which emerge in response to a wide range of vulnerabilities, we need to simply figure out what resilience is and why it matters.

We start this unbundling by looking at three different ways that resilience has been studied or applied with regard to fragile or vulnerable states. Comparing these different frames gets us closer to defining our own specific interest: the resilience of what to what?

#### *Economic Resilience*

Briguglio’s work on the so-called “Singapore Paradox” highlights the seeming contradiction (which Singapore represents) of a country that is highly vulnerable yet consistently attains high levels of GDP per capita. Singapore’s vulnerability consists of two elements: a high risk of exposure to external shocks, and high susceptibility to these shocks.

Briguglio explains this paradox by referring to resilience as “man-made measures which enable a country to withstand or bounce back from the negative effects of external shocks” such as saving, and capital formation in response to a situation of vulnerability. Thus in Briguglio’s research, the resilience of what to what = the resilience of the economy to external shocks. Resilience is conceptualized both as an outcome (measured in high GDP) and as processes (man-made measures) that signify adaptive capacity: forward looking actions that enable Singapore to prepare for and mitigate risk.

### *Institutional Resilience*

Pranab Bardhan uses a different frame to explore the resilience of the democratic polity of India. Democracy is somewhat counter-intuitive in India, because the developmental and demographic vulnerabilities (widespread poverty, a largely rural and uneducated civilian population, and weak civic institutions) typically undermine both effectiveness and legitimacy of democratic governance. Bardhan wonders, what accounts for the resilience of this institution despite these vulnerabilities?

He hypothesizes that its survival is rooted in its perceived functional value “as an accepted mode of transactional negotiations among contending groups in an extremely heterogeneous society.” As to the question of why it is accepted, Bardhan proposes that democracy persists in India because of its perceived legitimacy. He notes that this legitimacy of democracy has less to do with economic performance (the majority of the world’s poor live in India, and a large part of the funds allocated for anti-poor programs never reach the poor) as it does with faith in the efficacy of the political system for giving voice and potential upward mobility to particular groups. Here, resilience of what to what = resilience of the political system to internal vulnerabilities. Resilience is conceptualized as longevity of institutions, which he links explicitly to their perceived (not objective) performance.

### *Systemic (Regime) Resilience*

A related line a research has to do with the longevity of particular regimes. In research on systems (electrical, biological, political) a regime simply refers to existing state of affairs – or more specifically the components of that existing state such its boundaries, or established types and level of control over the way the system works.

In countries, the system or regime of concern is the prevailing set of governance arrangements, both formal (state organizations, laws, political parties) and informal (social norms, traditions, codes of honor). As previous chapters have described, a “fragile state” is one which is significantly susceptible to crisis in one or more of its subsystems – that is, it is vulnerable to internal and external shocks, and to violent conflict.

By contrast systemic (or regime) resilience refers to the ability of dominant or reigning institutional arrangements (whatever they may be) to withstand internal and external shocks and risk factors for violent conflict. Regarding this definition, Soltan’s first commandment regarding fragile states, thou shalt not forget violence, death and destruction, is worth highlighting along with his reminder that “it is violence, destruction and war that constitutes fundamental breakdown, not decline in school enrollment or per capita GNP.” (See Chapter 6).

In fragile environments, violence can be triggered by the decline of mediating institutions, decline (or complete lack) of preexisting structures of credible commitment (trust), or “the impact of built-in disincentives of electoral and constitutional systems” which can generate the breakdown of ethnic compromises. So what accounts for cases

where vulnerabilities and risk factors are high, but the fundamental breakdown has not occurred?

Both USAID and the World Bank have explored this question respectively in the case of Guinea and Haiti. Guinea, despite being surrounded by five countries who have succumbed to civil wars (Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Guinea Bissau, and Senegal), and despite exhibiting four risk factors for conflict itself (ethnic heterogeneity, pervasive economic decline & unemployment, a youth bulge, and “lootable” commodities), has not only maintained internal stability, but has been able to adapt and absorb the impact of refugees and returnees from nearby conflict regions.

Likewise Haiti is described as a resilient society because rural communities in particular have developed coping mechanisms in response to a legacy of underdevelopment and political instability. “Especially in fragile states, the ability of communities and householders to work and live together is essential to maintaining people’s livelihoods, security and welfare...robust cohesion on the community level has been crucial in preventing Haiti’s institutional-political crisis from deteriorating into broad social collapse or civil war.”

In all of this research, the resilience of what to what = the resilience of the prevailing set of governance arrangements to key vulnerabilities. The emphasis is on the capacity of societies to absorb large shocks without system (regime) collapse. Whereas for Soltan the fundamental measure of collapse is violence, destruction and war, here the fundamental measure of resilience is absence of violence, destruction and war.

Let us pause for a moment. Thus far, the discussion of how resilience is used to frame particular inquiries raises some interesting questions. Does it make sense to conceptualize resilience as the longevity of performance (like Briguglio), as the longevity of institutions (like Bardhan), or the as the absorptive capacity of regimes/systems to external shocks? What kinds of institutions/structures/ systems can be resilient to particular sources of fragility? Does resilience imply avoidance of violence, or adaptation in general? Does resilience mean economic growth?

#### *Our Frame – Patterns of Resilience*

The short answer is that resilience is not itself a ‘good’ quality – after all, corruption is a very resilient institution. Likewise, the resilience of particular regimes (Stalin’s, for example) does not correlate with the characteristics required for development to move forward.

Resilience is simply a property of systems, based on particular features of those systems. Furthermore, the adaptive coping strategies already mentioned (which we will talk much more about) tend to be highly localized and emergent. We cannot assume inherent goodness in either the case of resilience or the related term “adaptive capacity” which refers to coping, nor should we assume that resilience is some sort of panacea for

vulnerability. There are enormous challenges facing internal and external actors involved in fragile states.

We really have two sets of interests regarding resilience in fragile states analysis. The first is to pinpoint, as accurately as possible, the correlates and components of resilience in general – and that includes undesirable patterns like corruption. The following Section II, Conceptual Background, provides this overview drawing on research from fields of psychology, sociology, disaster research, and ecology.

The second interest is somewhat more normative in scope: to identify desirable patterns of positive adaptation which might serve as entry points when the goal is to enhance those particular features. This interest (defining patterns of resilience) requires a broad analytical framework for importing this concept into fragile states analysis. The analytical framework identifies what we mean by “desirable” and gives us a general idea of what kinds of “patterns” we might be looking for. This framework is described in detail in Section III however we note here its three general components:

- Positive Adaptation

Instead of talking about the resiliency of economies, institutions, or states, we refer to resilience as a pattern of positive adaptation. One can find patterns of positive adaptation to any number of situations – in fragile states analysis, we are chiefly interested in positive adaptation to the correlates of fragility: insecurity, poverty, corruption, resource scarcity, environmental degradation, and so on.

- Cooperation and Risk Mitigation

As it turns out, the ability to adapt and change depends on the ability to act collectively and resolve conflict among members at any level of analysis. In the language adopted by the Fragile States Group and USAID, it requires a particular constitutional order: mechanisms to manage violence and create/integrate components of neutral ground in political and social life. It just so happens that most of these mechanisms are non-state, local, and often emergent.

- Institutions

In other words, adaptive capacity depends on institutions (norms, rules, laws, belief systems, and so on) which have a positive benefit for cooperation and risk mitigation. These institutions take a variety of forms. As with specific coping mechanisms for cooperation and risk mitigation, the institutions supporting these mechanisms tend to emerge in context.

To better understand these components, we turn now to an overview of resilience research over the past four decades.

# Education Case Studies in Non-Conflict Fragile States

## *--Executive Summary--*

This study is designed to help USAID policy makers and program designers reflect on experience in designing and delivering education services effectively in fragile states. We use the term “fragile state” as shorthand for a period of fragility in a country’s political/economic history. Fragility is a temporary condition; it may be short, and it may endure for decades. The events that lead to fragility may be sudden or they may be gradual.

The root cause of fragility can be traced to governance issues. The legitimacy of a nation resides in its ability to deliver essential services to its population. When a fragile state is unable to deliver essential services such as education, either privately or publicly, the government of that nation loses legitimacy. Although basic education has been declared a human right, and investment in education is positively associated with long-term economic growth, fertility reduction and child health, a principal reason for investing in education in fragile states is that it lends short-term stability and legitimacy to weak governments and strengthens civil society.

Governments that have lost the will and/or the capacity to deliver education services require assistance from the international community in providing those services. The study analyzes four cases to derive lessons learned, strategic guidance, and practical recommendations for application within USAID and as part of the overall OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) fragile states initiative.

This study is not only about the achievement of educational outcomes in various types of fragile states; it also examines whether investment in educational activities can mitigate fragility through improved service delivery or other means. Political and social scientists have been paying more attention recently to the delivery of education services as a key factor in a government’s effectiveness and legitimacy. In addition to contributing to a stronger civil society, better governance, and economic growth, the delivery of education services, through either public or private channels, enhances the legitimacy of government, both local and national. When families in a post-crisis environment have access to schools, teachers and books, they credit government and feel some security. In a deteriorating environment, the decay of good schools signals that government is failing.

Education’s effectiveness is also beginning to be judged in terms of its contribution to the alleviation of patterns found in fragile states. Activities in the education sector can have a positive effect on reducing patterns of fragility. Such activities have been shown to do the following:

- Help to reduce or eliminate corruption in schools;
- Mitigate exclusion of some groups of people as a result of elitism or factionalism or ethnic rivalry;

- Extend services to ungoverned spaces where governments have lost control;
- Mitigate violence and insurgency;
- Target reasons for public disengagement from government services and forums;
- Mitigate effects of a sudden or gradual economic shock;
- Overcome the impact of a pandemic;
- Reduce the level of trafficking in humans or in drugs.

Interest in where and how education leads to these effects is recent, and most evidence of such effects is anecdotal and not systematically explained. Thus, they are not the focus of the case studies described herein, though such anecdotes do appear in the cases.

### **Short- Versus Long-term Effects**

The effects of education interventions that are described in the preceding paragraph are short-term. They are valuable in fragile states where immediate results are critical in order to improve government's legitimacy and effectiveness. This paper straddles analyses of short- and long-term effects of education. It looks at education programs designed with long-term benefits in mind through a lens of events and their shorter-term consequences.

It may be useful to provide a brief background on the long-term benefits of basic education. Social science research has shown that educating men and women enhances governance, strengthens civil society and builds legitimacy. Improvements in the population's health status is related to growth, and a growing body of research literature reveals a positive relationship between education, particularly girls' education, and healthy families, prevention of HIV/AIDS, and women's security, including reduced domestic violence, and their role in the family's economy. Economists have established a correlation between education and economic growth, but a correlation is not a cause-and-effect relationship. Does economic growth lead to greater investment in education, or does more and better education stimulate economic growth? It's probably a bit of both.

### **Types of Fragile States**

USAID characterizes fragile states as those that lack the capacity and/or the willingness to deliver on their core functions. Fragility is associated with four different types of conditions:

- Deterioration;
- Post-conflict transition;
- Arrested development; and

- Early recovery.

The four cases in this study cover each type of conditions:

- Afghanistan, a state in a post-conflict situation since 2002;
- Guinea, a chronically fragile state, moving toward collapse;
- The Mindanao region of the Philippines, a region in arrested development; and
- Uganda, a state with a recent history of recovery.

The types are not neatly divisible, however, so some cases spill over into other categories. Guinea seems to fit best into the “deterioration” type, though the development of the education sector has also been “arrested” for the past decade. Uganda is clearly in “early recovery,” though at the beginning of this case history, it was in a “post-conflict transition.” Mindanao, in the Philippines, is a case of “arrested development,” though “internal conflict” is a critical factor. Afghanistan, our case of “post-conflict” was also in a state of “arrested development” for years prior to the most recent conflict.

USAID sponsored these case studies in an effort to apply the lessons they teach to recent advances in research on social service delivery in fragile states. It is important to note that all of the case studies contained in this report pre-date the service delivery research and do not easily lend themselves to questions pertaining to the role of education in mitigating fragility. Although the case studies detail how these activities responded to a variety of fragile environments in order to deliver quality education to children, we attempt to extrapolate lessons learned on investing in education as a means of enhancing legitimacy, and, thereby, reducing fragility.

### **Questions of the Study**

Each of the four case studies describes how the basic education sector—the government education system, communities, private entities, NGOs, and international agencies—adapted to a fragile environment. The cases are limited to the provision of basic education, because this has been the focus of most governments during the past 15 years. Each study addresses the following questions:

- During the period of fragility, what were the predominant models of service delivery used to improve provision of basic education services: Central and/or local government? Non-governmental organizations (NGOs)? Communities? International agencies? How did these change or evolve?
- Who were the key actors in the sector and what were the dynamics among reformers and spoilers?
- How did international agencies intervene or adapt?

- In what ways did the government revise policies and priorities in order to restore and improve education services?
- What changes developed in accountability relationships among learners, families and communities, service providers, and policy makers?

The study concludes with a summary of lessons for the international community about working within fragile states to revive or sustain basic education services. The fundamental set of trade-offs it addresses is the need to build government capacity and willingness to provide sustained basic education services, on the one hand, versus the urgent need to educate children, especially poor children, on the other.

# Brown Bag – Elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo

## *--Executive Summary--*

Congo's election invites superlatives. It's the biggest ever conducted by the United Nations, with a \$500 million budget, 50,000 polling places and 25 million voters. Building on an end to a ghastly civil war, the outcome could stabilize Africa's geographically biggest nation -- and its decidedly unstable neighbors.

Or not. Just as possible is the exact opposite of such rosy predictions. Violence could taint the results, and a shaky truce could unravel into more killing. The winners here would be cross-border armies, corruption and a murderous economy that exports diamonds and gold and imports AK-47s and mortars.

The ballots may take weeks to count. That's because the country, now called the Democratic Republic of Congo after shedding the name of Zaire years ago, is both far-flung and politically untested. One of history's greatest thieves, former dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, creamed off billions from its mineral-rich economy for more than 30 years. Congo's future was channeled into Swiss bank accounts, not schools, clinics or water systems.

His overthrow in 1997 led to a father-then-son duo of strongmen and a civil war that killed 4 million. That's more than died in Bosnia, Sudan, Rwanda and Iraq put together -- though, at the time, the world paid scant notice.

Congo is almost too big. An arc of nine countries surround it, with armies and militias free to raid villages or chase rivals in regional conflicts. The nation is the size of Western Europe, yet has only 300 miles of paved road. How can it possibly be governed?

The answer is Congo can mend itself, though slowly. Civil war dimmed after a 2002 truce, which led to a vote on a new constitution last year that set the ground for this weekend's elections. The United Nations and aid groups have poured on the resources. The United Nations' largest peacekeeping force -- 17,000 troops -- is stationed there. Thousands of relief workers and election organizers have arrived, including poll-watchers from the Carter Center, established by former President Jimmy Carter.

But how will voters react? Already, the main rival to Joseph Kabila, the military-uniformed president, has refused to take part in the election. Some Catholic leaders also are snubbing the election. Minor parties are fearful of losing power and may disown the results. The campaign, media and government machinery appear weighted toward Kabila, the odds-on favorite to win the top post.

Still, there are positive factors. Nearly 70 percent of the country has registered to vote. Slightly more than half of those signed up are female, a noteworthy number in a male-dominated society. More than 3,000 candidates are running for various offices -- so many that the paper ballots weigh in at 1,800 tons.

In U.S. elections, there's a famous phrase: All politics is local. In Congo's case, it's only partly true. What happens after the vote will have huge influence on the heart of Africa. It will also build -- or weaken -- the image of the United Nations, which has expended so much in advance of the vote. Congo's vote will be a test of Africa's future as well as its own.

## APPENDIX B: Summary of E-bulletin Articles

---

### Issue XXIV – Nanotechnology and Development

- Meridian Institute. “Nanotechnology and the Poor: Opportunities and Risks” January 2005.
- “Nanotech’s ‘Second Nature’ Patents: Implications for the Global South” ETC Group, June 2005.
- “Atomtech: Technologies Converging at the Nano-Scale” ETC Group, January 2003.
- Barret, Randy. “Tiny Particles Pose Major Problems” *National Journal*, September 26, 2005.
- Maclurcan, Donald C. “Nanotechnology and Developing Countries, Part 2; What Realities” in AZoNano- the *Online Journal of Nanotechnology*, October 2005.
- "Our Common Interest" Chapter 4: Getting Systems Right: Governance and Capacity Building. *Report of the Commission for Africa*, March 2005.
- “CSIO Develops Nanotechnology for TB Diagnosis Kit” Times of India, 3 January, 2004.
- “Efficient Filters Produced from Carbon Nanotubes” Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Press Release, 11 August, 2004.
- “Top 10 Biotechnologies for Improving Health in the Developing World” *Nature Genetics*, Vol. 32, October, 2002.
- Salamance-Buentello, Persad, Court, Martin, Daar, and Singer. “Nanotechnology and the Developing World” *PLoS Medicine*, April 12, 2005.

### Issue XXV – WTO and Development

- Baker, Dean, Mark Weisbrot and David Rosnick. “Poor Numbers: The Impact of Trade Liberalization on World Poverty” Center for Economic and Policy Research. November, 2004.
- Doney, Malcolm and Martin Wroe “Trade Matters in the Fight Against World Poverty.” UK Department for International Development. December, 2005.
- Matthews, Alan. “Special and Differential Treatment in the WTO Agricultural Negotiations” Institute for International Integration Studies, University of Dublin, Trinity College. January 2005.
- “Progress at Last.” The Economist Global Watch. May 2005.

- “Agricultural Trade Reforms Key to Reducing Poverty.” The World Bank. January, 2005.
- “US Farmers Look Ready to Upset the Apple Cart.” Taipei Times. December 8, 2005.
- ”Bound and Tied: The Developmental Impacts of Industrial Trade Liberalisation negotiations at the World Trade Organisation.” ActionAid.
- Shafaeddin, S.M. “Trade Liberalization and Economic Reform in Developing Countries: Structural Change or de-Industrialization” United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. April, 2005.
- Yang, Yongzheng. “Africa in the Doha Round: Dealing with Preference Erosion and Beyond” International Monetary Fund. November, 2005.
- Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. “ Trade Capacity Building : Critical for Development” *OECD Policy Brief*. August 2003.
- US Chamber of Commerce. “Priorities in the Doha Development Agenda.” November, 2005. “ Trade Capacity Building : Critical for Development” *OECD Policy Brief*. August 2003.
- Braga , Carlos A. Primo and Kjersti Brokhaugi. “Services and the Doha Development Agenda.” The World Bank, 2005.
- Shafer, Jeffrey R. “The Doha Round and US Service Sector Interests.” Statement on behalf of the Coalition of Services Industries before the US Senate Committee on Finance Subcommittee on Trade. October 27, 2005.
- Mattoo, Aaditva and Sacha Wunsch. “Securing Openness of Cross-Border Trade in Services: A Possible Approach.” Center for International Development, Harvard University. January, 2004.
- Balasubramaniam, K. “Globalisation and Liberalisation of Healthcare Services: WTO and the General Agreement on Trade in Services.” Malaysian Peoples Health Assembly. March 2005.
- Wallach, Lori. “Testimony of Lori Wallach, Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch, European Union Parliament, Committee on International Trade, Hearing on the ‘ Doha Development Agenda.’” *Public Citizen*. October, 2005.

## **Issue XXVI – Energy and the Poor**

- Bush, George W. “2006 State of the Union Address” The White House, February 20, 2006.
- Porter, Adam. “Is the World’s Oil Running out Fast?” BBC News, June 7, 2004.

- Lovins, Amory et al, *Winning the Oil Endgame*. Rocky Mountain Institute, 2005.
- Saghir, Jamal. “Energy and Poverty: Myths, Links, and Policy Issues.” Energy and Mining Sector Board, The World Bank Group, May, 2005.
- Karekezi, Stephen. “Review of Poverty and Energy in Africa.” *Energy Policy*. 2002.
- Pershing, Jonathan and Jim Mackenzie. “Removing Subsidies: Leveling the Playing Field for Renewable Energy Technologies.” The World Resource Institute. March, 2004.
- Schafer, Sarah. “China Leaps Forward.” *Newsweek International Edition*, February 6, 2006.
- Gross, Robert and Dr. Matthew Leach and Dr. Ausilio Bauen. “Progress in Renewable Energy.” Imperial College Centre for Energy Policy and Technology (ICCEPT), September, 2002.
- Martinot, Eric et al. “Renewable Energy Markets in Developing Countries.” *Annual Review of Energy and the Environment*. 2002.
- Moreira, José Roberto. “Sugarcane for Energy – Recent Results and Progress in Brazil.” *Energy for Sustainable Development*. Volume IV - No. 31 , October, 2000.

#### **Issue XXVII – The 4<sup>th</sup> World Water Forum**

- International Institute for Sustainable Development. “World Water Forum Bulletin” March 21st, 2006.
- “Tapping the World” *Christian Science Monitor*. March 22nd, 2006.
- “Opening the Tap for a Thirsty World” *Christian Science Monitor*. March 22nd, 2006.
- “Public Water for All: The Role of Public-Private Partnerships” The Transnational Institute and Corporate Europe Observatory. March 2006.
- “Pipe Dreams” World Development Movement & Public Services International. March 2006.
- “As Experts Ponder World Water Crisis, Teenagers Show Creativity” *Christian Science Monitor*. March 22nd, 2006.
- “Annual World Water Forum Disappointing to Indigenous Peoples” *Indian Country Today*. April 10th, 2006.
- “Activists, Global Forum do not see Eye to Eye” Inter-Press Service News Agency. March 17th, 2006.

## **Issue XXVIII – Aid in Africa**

- Loyn, David. "Africa's 'aid year': Was it worth it?" BBC News, December 2005.
- Sachs, Jeffrey. "Why aid does work." BBC News. September 2005.
- Erixon, Fredrik. "Why aid doesn't work" BBC News. September 2005
- Oxfam Briefing Note. "Gleneagles: what really happened at the G8 summit?" Oxfam International. 29 July, 2005.
- Der Spiegel. Thielke, Thilo "For God's Sake, Please Stop the Aid!" July 4, 2005.
- Kraay, Aart and Claudio Raddatz. "Poverty Traps, Aid, and Growth" World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3631, June 2005.
- Mistry, Percy S., "Reasons for Sub-Saharan Africa's Development Deficit that the Commission for Africa Did Not Consider." *African Affairs*. September, 2005
- Bianchi, Stefania. "A No-Trust Fund for Africa" Inter Press Service News Agency. February 2006.
- Ellis, Stephen and Gerrie ter Haar. "Religion and Development in Africa" Commission for Africa , 2004.
- Inter Press Service. Atarah, Linus. "Africa Needs Crops, Not Money" November 2, 2005.
- de Renzio, Paolo. "Scaling Up versus Absorptive Capacity Challenges and Opportunities for reaching the MDGs in Africa" ODI Briefing Paper, May 2004.
- Erixon, Fredrick. "Aid and development: will it work this time?" International Policy Network, June 2005.
- Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI), The Hague . Achterbosch, T.J., H. Ben Hammouda, P.N. Osakwe, F.W. van Tongeren. "Trade liberalisation under the Doha Development Agenda: Options and consequences for Africa " June 2004.
- Kennedy, Kevin C. "The Incoherence of Agricultural, Trade, and Development Policy for Sub-Saharan Africa: Sowing the Seeds of False Hope for Sub-Saharan Africa 's Cotton Farmers?" *Kansas Journal of Law & Public Policy*. 2005.

## **Issue XXIX – China in Africa**

- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China . " China 's African Policy" January 2006.

- Thompson, Drew. “China 's Soft Power in Africa: From the ‘ Beijing Consensus' to Health Diplomacy” in *The Jamestown Foundation's China Brief* newsletter, Volume V, Issue 21, October, 13, 2005.
- “ANGOLA : China Entrenches Position in Booming Economy” IRINNEWS.org, April 17th, 2006.
- Lombard, Louisa. “Africa's China Card” *Foreign Policy Magazine*, online, posted April 11th 2006.
- Blair, David. “Oil-Hungry China takes Sudan under its wing” *The Telegraph*, April 4th, 2005.
- Watts, Jonathan and Meldrum, Andrew. “Mugabe find succour in Beijing deals” *The Guardian*, July 27th, 2005.
- Draper, Peter. “Africa-China Relations Require Reality Check” *Business Report*. March 9th 2006. Located at The South African Institute of International Affairs website ([www.saii.org.za](http://www.saii.org.za))
- Goldstein, Andrea et al., “China and India: What's in it for Africa?” OECD Development Center, May, 2006.
- Kaplinsky, Raphael and Morris, Mike. “The Asian Drivers and SSA; MFA Quota Removal and the Portents for African Industrialization?” Prepared for “Asian and other drivers of change” conference in St. Petersburg, January, 2006.
- “Southern Africa: Textile industry undone by globalization” IRIN News.org, July, 2005.
- Thompson, Drew. “China's Emerging Interests in Africa: Opportunities and Challenges for Africa and the United States” *African Renaissance Journal*, July/August 2005. Referenced from [www.csis.org](http://www.csis.org).
- Brookes, Peter and Shin, Ji Hye. “China's Influence in Africa: Implications for the United States” *Heritage Foundation*, February 22nd, 2006.
- Lyman, Princeton . “China 's Rising Role in Africa” Presentation to the U.S. - China Commission, July 21st, 2005.

# APPENDIX C: PPC IDEAS Website

Website address: [http://www.irisprojects.umd.edu/ppc\\_ideas/](http://www.irisprojects.umd.edu/ppc_ideas/)

The screenshot shows a Mozilla Firefox browser window displaying the PPC IDEAS website. The browser's address bar shows the URL [http://www.irisprojects.umd.edu/ppc\\_ideas/](http://www.irisprojects.umd.edu/ppc_ideas/). The website header features the PPC IDEAS logo in green and black, with the tagline "Strengthening USAID's role as a center of ideas and a global leader in addressing development policy issues." and the IRIS logo. A navigation menu includes "About", "Activities", "E-Bulletins", and "Experts".

The main content area is titled "Intellectual Leadership Agenda Support for the Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination at USAID". The text reads: "Through the IDEAS program, the IRIS Center assists USAID's Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination (PPC) in strengthening its role as both a center of ideas and a global leader in addressing development policy issues. IRIS brings cutting-edge ideas and scholarship to help the bureau critically contemplate policy issues and shape appropriate responses. IRIS also helps USAID policy makers prepare research and policy papers and foster dialogue through seminars, workshops, and other events with professionals from a wide array of intellectual disciplines and government agencies."

A "What's New?" section lists several eBulletins and an event summary:

- [PPC IDEAS eBulletin - China in Africa](#)
- [PPC IDEAS eBulletin - Aid in Africa](#)
- [PPC IDEAS eBulletin - The 4th World Water Forum](#)
- [Event Summary - The Politics of Education in the Arab World](#)

The right sidebar, titled "DEVELOPMENT NEWS", contains several news items:

- [Should developing countries accept aid for trade?](#) Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP)
- [Job: Altair Asesores is recruiting for European Commission funded projects in India and Nepal](#) Jobs Listing, Eldis
- [Towards an alternative policy framework for ensuring positive impacts of globalisation on gender equality](#) International Labour Organization (ILO)
- [Differing analyses of the poverty reduction rate in South Africa](#)
- [... More General news from Eldis](#)

The footer of the website features the University of Maryland logo.

## APPENDIX D: USAID Management of PPC IDEAS

---

USAID's Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination provides direction and oversight of the PPC IDEAS project and its activities. The Cognizant Technical Officer (CTO) for the project is Dr. Ann Phillips. Also providing technical direction for certain activities is Dr. Tjip Walker, Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation.

### **Ann L. Phillips, Political Economy Policy Analyst, Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination**

Dr. Phillips is the lead manager for the PPC IDEAS activity, where she shapes the IDEAS program to provide effective support for USAID's policy agenda. In addition, her substantive work at PPC focuses on several aspects of USAID's overall strategic focus, such as fragile states issues, Muslim world governance, donor coordination (e.g., transatlantic views of development strategy as sound bases for economic growth and poverty reduction) and institutional foundations for economic growth. From 2000 to 2002, Dr. Phillips was an American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAS) Diplomacy Fellow at PPC. Before joining USAID, Dr. Phillips served as a Fulbright Professor in political science at the Friedrich Schiller Universität in Jena, Germany, where she taught European politics. Prior to that, she taught courses on system transition, democratization, and Central-East Europe transition, as well as European comparative politics at American University. Dr. Phillips holds a Ph.D. from Georgetown University, an M.A. from The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and a B.A. from Denison University. Her most recent publication is *Power and Influence after the Cold War: Germany in East-Central Europe*. Her works include several articles and book chapters on Central-East European democratization, German unification and political parties and a book on Soviet Policy toward East Germany.

### **Tjip Walker, Senior Adviser, Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation**

Dr. S. Tjip Walker brings a combination of extensive field experience and advanced analytical skills to address problems of political economy, democratization, and conflict management in developing countries. In his 23-year career as a development professional, Dr. Walker has been an active participant in efforts ranging from developing a methodology for assessing democratic governance to reviewing the effectiveness of USAID's support to disarmament/demobilization/reintegration programs to articulating the agency's first policy statement on conflict. His overseas assignments have included managing a privatization and market reform program also in Cameroon and directing the Office of Transition Initiative's (OTI) program supporting the democratic transition in Nigeria. He presently leads the Warning and Analysis Team in the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation and is a member of USAID's Fragile States Task Force.

Dr. Walker holds an MPA from the John F. Kennedy School at Harvard University and a Ph.D. in political science from Indiana University, where he was a research fellow at the Workshop for Political Theory and Policy Analysis. His dissertation, *Both Pretense and*

Promise: The Political Economy of Privatization in Africa applied institutional analysis to understand the effectiveness of various privatization strategies. Dr. Walker also taught in the Political Science Department at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte for five years before rejoining USAID.

## APPENDIX E: IRIS Management of PPC IDEAS

---

The PPC IDEAS project is managed full-time by IRIS' Deputy Director, Dennis Wood. Dr. Wood is supported in his work by a full-time program manager, Michael Reeves. A number of students, working part-time, also provide administrative and research support to the project.

### **Project Director**

*Dennis Wood*

Dr. Wood is a lawyer and an economist who specializes in policy analysis and institutional reform in developing countries. He is IRIS' Deputy Director and has served as Chief of Party for the Job Opportunities and Business Support (JOBS) Project in Bangladesh, Director of IRIS's program in Indonesia, and Director of IRIS's \$25 million SEGIR-LIR IQC. Dr. Wood has also worked on public and private sector issues for the World Bank, USAID and private firms in the U.S., Africa, Asia and Latin America. He served in the White House, the Executive Office of the President of the United States, the U.S. Department of State in Washington, D.C., on the staff of Arthur D. Little, Inc. in Cambridge, Massachusetts and with Devres, Inc. Dr. Wood was an elected member of the Council of the Town of Chevy Chase, MD for 12 years, including two years as Mayor. He is a member of the Bar in Massachusetts and Washington, D.C.

Dr. Wood received his Ph D. from the University of Maryland, his J.D. from Harvard Law and a B.S. from Oregon State University.

### **Program Manager(s)**

*Michael Reeves*

Mr. Reeves received an M.P.P in Public Policy from the University of Maryland where he focused on international security and international development. He also holds a B.A. in Political Science from the University of Florida. Mr. Reeves currently works as a Program Manager at the IRIS Center, managing the day-to-day operations of the PPC IDEAS project which provides research and policy support to USAID's Policy and Program Coordination Bureau. He previously worked for the IRIS Center as a Research Assistant where he conducted research in support of USAID's Fragile States Assessment Tool and a paper on service delivery in fragile states. Mr. Reeves has also worked on short-term projects for the Center for International Security Studies at the University of Maryland and the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX).

*Victoria Taugner*

Ms. Taugner joined IRIS in May 2004 as a Program Manager for the Peru Justice Sector and Commercial Justice System Modernization Programs, funded by USAID. Prior to joining IRIS, she worked for the World Bank where she contributed research input,

writing and data analysis for the Investment Climate Assessment for Peru. She has also worked for Chemonics International in Cochabamba, Bolivia where she set up field offices, maintained administrative and financial oversight of project activities and managed grant contracts with local NGOs. Ms. Taugner served as a Business Studies Instructor with the U.S. Peace Corps in the Solomon Islands.

Ms. Taugner holds an M.A. from Columbia University and a B.A. from Rhodes College.

## **Students**

### *Amanda Balderston, Research Assistant*

Ms. Balderston joined PPC IDEAS in April, 2005 as a Research Assistant. She is a second year graduate student at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy, where she is focusing on International Economic Policy and Economic Development. She holds a B.A. in International Studies from the University of Washington in Seattle. Ms. Balderston enjoys studying Arabic and focuses her academic interests on North African economic development.

### *Lucas Bossard, Research Assistant*

Lucas Bossard joined PPC Ideas as a Research Assistant in 2005. He is a second year graduate student at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy, concentrating on International Security and Economic Policy. He also works as a research assistant to Economics Professor Carmen D. Reinhart. Prior to starting graduate studies, he was an engineer for Martin Marietta. His academic interests include microeconomic development in the third world and energy/environmental policy.

### *Travis Bradley, Research Assistant*

Mr. Bradley joined PPC Ideas as a Research Assistant in March 2006. He is a first year graduate student at the University of Maryland's School of Public Policy, concentrating on International Security and Economic Policy and International Development. Mr. Bradley's professional interests include public services privatization issues, energy policy, and the relationship between security and development.

### *Tina Cheng, Financial Assistant*

Ms. Cheng joined PPC IDEAS in September, 2005 as a financial assistant. Originally from Hong Kong, she is majoring in accounting at the Robert H. Smith School of Business at the University of Maryland. Before joining PPC IDEAS, she was an administrative assistant with the Justice Sector Modernizing Program in Peru project, which ended in August 2005. She enjoys playing the piano in her free time.

### *Jael La Touche, Financial Assistant*

Ms. La Touche joined PPC IDEAS in April 2006 as a financial assistant. She is pursuing a B.S. in Business at the University of Maryland's Smith School for Business.

*Ebrahim Mohseni, Research Assistant*

Ebrahim Mohseni began working at IRIS in May, 2005. He is a second year graduate student at the Maryland School of Public Policy, concentrating on International Security and Economic Policy. He holds a double major BA in Economics and Government and Politics from Maryland as well. Mr. Mohseni is particularly interested in issues pertaining to development, petroleum endowment, and the effects of money laundering on the financial management of developing countries. Besides English, Mr. Mohseni is fluent in Farsi, Turkish, and Azeri.

*Denise Odie, Program Assistant*

Ms. Odie is currently a senior Government and Politics major concentrating in Comparative Politics and International Relations. She is also pursuing a Certificate with the Department of Women's Studies where she has applied feminist theory to international women's issues such as Feminine Genital Mutilation and Honor Killing. She has both US and overseas experience working with the governmental and business sectors of the Republic of Guyana. She will be attending law school in the Fall.

*Iryna Waddill, Financial Assistant*

Iryna Waddill has been working as a Financial Assistant with PPC IDEAS since September 2005. She is currently a full-time, second-year MBA student in the Robert H. Smith School of Business and is concentrating her studies in Finance. Her hobbies include reading books, Ashtanga yoga, and she is an active member of European club at the Robert H Smith School of Business.

## APPENDIX F: Contributors and Event Speakers

---

### *Contributors and Event Speakers from USAID*

**Elisabeth Kvitashvili** is Director in the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, United States Agency for International Development. She is a career foreign service officer with tours in Afghanistan, Russia, and Honduras. She has also spent significant time in the Caucasus, Nepal, Philippines, Bosnia, Rwanda, Burundi, Ethiopia and Eritrea working primarily on humanitarian and conflict-related programs. She previously served 3 years as the director of the Disaster Response and Mitigation Division in the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and one year in the Office of Transition Initiatives as a senior program officer. She holds a Masters Degree in Near East Studies from the University Of London School Of Oriental and African Studies and a Diploma in International Relations from Paris University School of Political Science. She is fluent in French, Spanish and Russian.

**Tom Marchione** has a Ph.D. in nutritional anthropology and currently serves as Food Security Nutrition Advisor and Evaluation Officer in the Bureau for Humanitarian Response in USAID. Previously, he directed an economic advocacy project in the U.S. and served as staff sociologist at the Caribbean Food and Nutrition institute. He has held faculty positions in the medical anthropology program at Case Western Reserve University, the Institute for Nutritional Research at the University of Oslo, Norway. And the World Hunger Program at Brown University.

**Carol Sahley**, Ph.D. is a Senior Fellow at USAID's Office of Democracy and Governance under World's Leading Democracy Fellows Program. In addition, Dr. Sahley undertook numerous international assignments for the International NGO Training and Research Centre.

**John Tsagronis** is a Deputy Assistant Administrator with the Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination with USAID.

**Dr. S. Tjip Walker** brings a combination of extensive field experience and advanced analytical skills to address problems of political economy, democratization, and conflict management in developing countries. In his 23-year career as a development professional, Dr. Walker has been an active participant in efforts ranging from developing a methodology for assessing democratic governance to reviewing the effectiveness of USAID's support to disarmament/demobilization/reintegration programs to articulating the agency's first policy statement on conflict. His overseas assignments have included managing a privatization and market reform program also in Cameroon and directing the Office of Transition Initiative's (OTI) program supporting the democratic transition in Nigeria. He presently leads the Warning and Analysis Team in the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation and is a member of USAID's Fragile States Task Force.

### *Contributors and Event Speakers from outside USAID*

**Suliman Baldo** is the Africa Program Director for the International Crisis Group. Dr. Baldo develops and directs all of Crisis Group's activities across the continent, managing staff members and overseeing the work of three field offices. Together with the three project directors, he guides the research, analysis, policy prescriptions and advocacy activities in relation to the Africa region, and he acts as a point of contact for the media on all African issues. His areas of expertise include: African affairs, conflict prevention and resolution, development and emergency relief, and international advocacy. Before joining ICG, Dr. Baldo was a Senior Researcher at Human Rights Watch from 1995-2002, where he led research on the Democratic Republic of the Congo & the Horn of Africa. From 1992-1995, he was a development consultant at the Al-Fanar Centre for Development Studies in Sudan, and from 1988-1992, he was the Field Director for Oxfam America in the Sudan and the Horn of Africa.

**Ami Carpenter** is a certified mediator and instructor. She has designed and conducted trainings in Appreciative Inquiry and Dynamics of Conflict Resolution, and taught Principles of Human Communication at New Mexico State University for two years. She is currently a second year Doctoral candidate at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (ICAR) at George Mason University.

Ami's expertise includes dialogue facilitation, international mediation and negotiation, and cross-cultural mediation. She is interested in Appreciative Inquiry as an alternative to the dominant problem-solving models of international conflict resolution, and also for its potential to catalyze large-scale social change. In October 2002, Ami presented a paper entitled "Appreciative Inquiry and Social Conflict" which explored the intersection of AI and conflict resolution in violent conflicts. In November 2002, she conducted an Appreciative Inquiry training for visiting Ukrainian students, hosted by the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution. She has also been working closely with the Community Resilience Dialogue Project, which brings together diverse segments of the community to discuss a broad range of topics in a context shaped by the events of September 11, 2001.

**Stephen Commins** works in areas of regional and international development, with an emphasis on Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and International Finance Institutions, especially the World Bank. Commins was Director of the Development Institute at the UCLA African Studies Center in the 1980s, and then worked as Director of Policy and Planning at World Vision International. Presently, he is a Senior Human Development Specialist for the Human Development Network of the World Bank. In his work with NGOs, Commins was a member of NGO-World Bank reviews of structural adjustment, privatization, civil society dialogues and girls education programs. His work has also included policy and institutional studies of responses to Complex Humanitarian Emergencies. Dr. Commins worked in 1998-99 on a project with the World Bank on the social costs of the Asia financial crisis. His work at the World Bank has included "Managing Dimensions of Economic Crisis: Good Practices for Policies and Institutions," the creation of the Bank's children and youth cluster, and a survey of service delivery programs of civil society organizations. Commins was one of the co-authors of

the World Bank's World Development Report 2004, "Making Services Work for Poor People". Following the Report's publication in 2003, he managed several initiatives on service delivery in post-conflict countries and the relationships between political reform and improved services.

**Kim Maynard** has a unique combination of extensive field experience and academic research, which enables her to apply cutting edge thinking and innovation to challenging transition conditions in the field. She has worked in conflict-affected countries in Africa, the Balkans, Central America, Central Asia, and East Asia for over two decades with the World Bank, US Agency for International Development, UN agencies, the Red Cross movement, international NGOs, and private entities. Her broad expertise in designing and managing operational programs to support the transition from war to peace include the use of participatory and community-driven approaches, conflict and program impact assessment, peace building methodologies, program strategy and design, reintegration and humanitarian issues, context analysis, and monitoring and evaluation. In addition to her practitioner background, Dr. Maynard has conducted considerable research on conflict, community-level recovery, and intervention strategies and approaches, which has earned her the reputation for transferring knowledge to practical application in field-based programs. She has a Ph.D. in international affairs, teaches graduate classes in practical approaches to conflict recovery, and has numerous publications, including *Healing Communities in Conflict: International Assistance in Complex Emergencies* (Columbia University).

### *Contributors and Event Speakers from IRIS and the University of Maryland*

**Patrick Meagher** has been an Associate Director of IRIS since 1994, and serves as Co-Director of the Governance Institutions Team. His research and advisory work deals with decentralization, regulatory reform, anti-corruption mechanisms, and institutional frameworks for medium- and small-scale finance. His writings have appeared in several journals and books on economics, development, and law. He holds a Juris Doctor from Harvard University, and has practiced law and lectured on comparative law, financial reform, and aspects of public sector governance. At IRIS, Mr. Meagher has worked in Africa, the various regions of Asia, the Middle East, Central and Eastern Europe, and Latin America. His recent projects include the design of a program to spur competitive regulatory reform using local and provincial governance ratings, an in-depth comparative study of anti-corruption agencies, empirical research on the effects of decentralization on public sector governance and performance, and a series of case studies dealing with systems of corruption and responses to them.

**Dennis Wood**, Deputy Director of the IRIS Center, is a lawyer and an economist who specializes in policy analysis and institutional reform in developing countries. He has served as Chief of Party for the Job Opportunities and Business Support (JOBS) Project in Bangladesh, Director of IRIS's program in Indonesia, and Director of IRIS's \$25 million SEGIR-LIR IQC. Dr. Wood has also worked on public and private sector issues for the World Bank, USAID, and private firms in the US, Africa, Asia and Latin America. He served in the White House, the Executive Office of the President of the United States, the US Department of State in Washington, DC, on the staff of Arthur D.

Little, Inc. in Cambridge, Massachusetts and with Devres, Inc. Dr. Wood was an elected member of the Council of the Town of Chevy Chase, MD for 12 years, including two years as Mayor. He is a member of the Bar in Massachusetts and Washington, DC.

## APPENDIX G: Summary of Participation in the PPC IDEAS Project

---

### **Number of individuals involved with the project:**

- 24 from USAID
- 10 from IRIS
- 1 from the University of Maryland
- 30 from outside of USAID, IRIS and the University of Maryland

### **Number of contributors and event speakers:**

- 5 from USAID
- 2 from IRIS
- 1 from the University of Maryland
- 4 from outside of USAID, IRIS and the University of Maryland

### **Number of attendees of PPC IDEAS events:**

- 24 from USAID
- 9 from IRIS
- 1 from the University of Maryland
- 29 from outside of USAID, IRIS and the University of Maryland

## APPENDIX H: Attendees of PPC IDEAS Events

---

### Attendees (by Name)

<b>Name</b>	<b>Affiliation</b>
Balderston, Amanda	IRIS Center
Baldo, Suliman	International Crisis Group
Baroudy, Hassan	USAID
Berry, Chris	DFID
Berzan, Evghenia	IRIS Center
Brown, Courtney	USAID
Busza, Eva	UNDP
Cohen, Sarah	USAID
Commins, Stephen	UCLA School of Public Affairs
Corle, Daniel	USAID
Downes, Mark	OECD-DAC CPDC Secretariat
Fife, Paul	NORAD
Gillies, Ali	World Bank
Gutierrez, Martha	GTZ
Hogg, Steve	DFID
Hoxeng, Jim	USAID
Hryshchyshyn, Michael	USAID
Hulshoff, Paul	UNICEF
Waddill, Iryna	IRIS Center
Janovsky, Katja	World Bank
Johnson, Michael	IFPRI

Leader, Nick	DFID
Lexow, Janne	NORAD
Lotz, Christian	World Bank
Mahoney, Tim	USAID
Marchione, Tom	USAID
Maynard, Kim	Independent Consultant
McLaughlin, Margaret	Creative Associates
Meagher, Patrick	IRIS Center
Morcos, Karim	OECD-DAC FSG Secretariat
Moses, Dick	Australian Federal Police
Moushey, Allyn	USAID
Nakatsuma, Alfred	USAID
Nolting, Armin	GTZ
Ortiz, Lisa	USAID
Osterman, Allison	Amex International
Penh, Borany	USAID
Phillips, Ann	USAID/State
Pivat, Paolo	WHO
Polski, Margaret	USAID
Powell, Clydette	USAID
Prefontaine, Christine	IRIS Center
Reeves, Mike	IRIS Center
Robinson, Judith	USAID
Sahley, Carol	USAID
Shamas Jiwa, Farouk	CIDA

Smith, Natasha	AUSAID
Swift, Sarah	USAID
Terrones, Carlos	USAID
Tsagronis, John	USAID
Vanderslice, Lane	USAID
Vedeld, Marit	NORAD
Victoria Taugner	IRIS Center
Walker, Tjip	USAID
Watson, Carol	UNICEF
Wolfowitz, Clare	IRIS Center
Wood, Dennis	IRIS Center
Abbou Rahman, Carl	USAID
Meites, Peggy	USAID
Schwartz, Ute	BMZ
Hundburt, Anja	Human Rights
Klemp, Ludgera	BMZ

## **Attendees (by Affiliation)**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Affiliation</b>
Osterman, Allison	Amex International
Smith, Natasha	AUSAID
Moses, Dick	Australian Federal Police
Schwartz, Ute	BMZ
Klemp, Ludgera	BMZ
Shamas Jiwa, Farouk	CIDA
McLaughlin, Margaret	Creative Associates
Berry, Chris	DFID
Hogg, Steve	DFID
Leader, Nick	DFID
Gutierrez, Martha	GTZ
Nolting, Armin	GTZ
Hundburt, Anja	Human Rights
Johnson, Michael	IFPRI
Maynard, Kim	Independent Consultant
Baldo, Suliman	International Crisis Group
Balderston, Amanda	IRIS Center
Berzan, Evghenia	IRIS Center
Waddill, Iryna	IRIS Center
Meagher, Patrick	IRIS Center
Prefontaine, Christine	IRIS Center
Reeves, Mike	IRIS Center

Victoria Taugner	IRIS Center
Wolfowitz, Clare	IRIS Center
Wood, Dennis	IRIS Center
Fife, Paul	NORAD
Lexow, Janne	NORAD
Vedeld, Marit	NORAD
Downes, Mark	OECD-DAC CPDC Secretariat
Morcos, Karim	OECD-DAC FSG Secretariat
Commins, Stephen	UCLA School of Public Affairs
Busza, Eva	UNDP
Hulshoff, Paul	UNICEF
Watson, Carol	UNICEF
Baroudy, Hassan	USAID
Brown, Courtney	USAID
Cohen, Sarah	USAID
Corle, Daniel	USAID
Hoxeng, Jim	USAID
Hryshchyshyn, Michael	USAID
Mahoney, Tim	USAID
Marchione, Tom	USAID
Moushey, Allyn	USAID
Nakatsuma, Alfred	USAID
Ortiz, Lisa	USAID
Penh, Borany	USAID
Polski, Margaret	USAID

Powell, Clydette	USAID
Robinson, Judith	USAID
Sahley, Carol	USAID
Swift, Sarah	USAID
Terrones, Carlos	USAID
Tsagronis, John	USAID
Vanderslice, Lane	USAID
Walker, Tjip	USAID
Abbou Rahmaan, Carl	USAID
Meites, Peggy	USAID
Phillips, Ann	USAID/State
Pivat, Paolo	WHO
Gillies, Ali	World Bank
Janovsky, Katja	World Bank
Lotz, Christian	World Bank

## APPENDIX I: PPC IDEAS Accrual Basis Financial Report

For the period Beginning October 1st, 2005, ending September 30th, 2006				
Task Order	Description	Task Order Budget	Expended 10/1/06 - 9/30/06	Remaining
Clin 3	Senior Development Specialist Support	\$ 269,642.24	\$ 269,642.24	\$ -
2005-06*	Additional Work under FRAME	\$ 179,962.00	\$ 179,962.00	\$ -
Activity 1	Participate in Multi-donor Service Delivery Meeting	\$ 5,425.63	\$ 5,425.63	\$ -
Activity 2	Prepare User Friendly Draft of FAST	\$ 55,809.11	\$ 55,809.11	\$ -
Activity 4	Develop a Final Draft of the Service Delivery Paper	\$ 8,893.12	\$ 8,893.12	\$ -
Activity 6	Create Redraft of SOW for Service Delivery Policy Guidance Paper	\$ 4,862.00	\$ 4,862.00	\$ -
Activity 7	Complete the Guinea FAST report	\$ 8,717.73	\$ 8,717.73	\$ -
Activity 8	Workshop to Consider the Food Security Paper	\$ 11,114.10	\$ 11,114.10	\$ -
Activity 10	Service Delivery Meeting - December 19th	\$ 2,519.19	\$ 2,519.19	\$ -
Activity 11	Fragile States Working Paper Series Editing	\$ 8,552.66	\$ 8,552.66	\$ -
Activity 12	Service Delivery Policy Paper	\$ 38,697.33	\$ 38,697.33	\$ -
Activity 13	Additional Evidence on Service Delivery in Non-Conflict Fragile States	\$ 35,371.13	\$ 35,371.13	\$ -
2006-01	1st Quarter Senior Development Policy Expert Administrative Support	\$ 36,484.86	\$ 36,484.86	\$ -
2006-02	2nd Quarter Senior Development Policy Expert Administrative Support	\$ 36,345.59	\$ 36,345.59	\$ -
2006-03	3rd Quarter Senior Development Policy Expert Administrative Support	\$ 36,704.40	\$ 36,704.40	\$ -
2006-04	4th Quarter Senior Development Policy Expert Administrative Support	\$ 36,016.69	\$ 36,016.69	\$ -
<b>Total</b>		<b>\$ 595,155.78</b>	<b>\$ 595,155.78</b>	<b>\$ -</b>

\* Activities 3, 5 9 were removed from Task Order 2005-06 after amendment



**The IRIS Center**

University of Maryland, Department of Economics  
2105 Morrill Hall, College Park, MD, 20742, USA  
Phone +1.301.405.3110 • Fax +1.301.405.3020 • [www.iris.econ.edu](http://www.iris.econ.edu)