

**Local Government
and Civil Society
in Haiti:**

**An Assessment of
Two Components of
USAID/Haiti's
Democracy
Enhancement
Project**

Prepared for USAID/Haiti, Delivery Order No. 806,
Contract OUT-AEP-I-806-96-00008-0

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December 1999



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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADF	America's Development Foundation
AMUS	Association of Mayors from the Southern Region
ARC	<i>Appui au Renforcement des Communautés</i>
ARD	Associates in Rural Development
ASEC	<i>Assemblée de la Section Communale</i>
CASEC	<i>Conseils d'Administration de la Section Communale</i>
CEDACs	<i>Centres d'Action Civique</i>
CEP	Provisional Electoral Commission
CLED	<i>Centre pour la Libre Entreprise et la Démocratie</i>
CNRA	National Commission for Administrative Reform
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
DEP	Democracy Enhancement Project
FENAMH	National Federation of Haitian Mayors
FGDCT	<i>Fonds de Gestion et de Développement des Collectivités Territoriales</i>
FNCD	<i>Front National de Concertation pour la Démocratie</i>
FONACAD	National Federation of CASECs
IRI	International Republican Institute
JDG	Justice, Democracy, and Governance (office of USAID/Haiti)
LG	Local Government
MEDA	Mennonite Economic Development Association
MICIVIH	International Civilian Mission in Haiti
MPP	<i>Mouvman Peyizan Papay</i>
MSI	Management Systems International
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
OAS	Organization of American States
OPL	<i>Organisation Politique Lavalas (or Organisation du Peuple en Lutte)</i>
OPSES	Organization for the Socioeconomic Promotion of St. Louis du Sud
PACTE	<i>Programme Appui aux Collectivités Territoriales</i>
PHAPDA	Plateforme Haïtienne de Plaidoyer pour un Développement Alternatif
PLB	<i>Parti Louvri Baryè</i>
SAET	Agro-Economic Enterprise of Torbeck
SHEC	<i>Société Haïtienne d'Épargne et de Crédit</i>
SNEP	<i>Service Nationale de l'Eau Potable</i>
SO	Strategic Objective
RP	Results Package

CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION

On September 15, 1999, USAID/Haiti contracted with Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI) to conduct an assessment and re-design of the USAID/Haiti Local Government and Civil Society Components of the Democracy Enhancement Project (DEP). The contract is divided into two phases: assessment and re-design. This document is the assessment report. The re-design will take place in 2000.

PURPOSE

The purpose of this assessment is three-fold:

1. Assess the current status of civil society and local government in Haiti;
2. Assess the effectiveness and impact of USAID-financed activities in civil society and local government from 1995 to 1999; and
3. Using lessons drawn from the experience of the last four years, prepare a concept paper that offers a vision and recommendations for a new USAID program of assistance in civil society and local government development.

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

The focus of the assessment was on two USAID projects that correspond to two of the three components of the DEP. One project is formally called, in French, *Projet Appui à la Société Civile*, but is more widely known as *Asosye*, a Creole word that means "partners." The other is formally called, in French, *Programme Appui aux Collectivités Territoriales*, or PACTE. The terms of reference in our contract also requested that the team assess a USAID-financed program called, in French, *Appui au Renforcement des Communautés* (ARC.) In addition, when the team arrived in country, we were asked to assess yet another activity, commonly referred to as the "Civic Education Task Order," that had begun after the terms of reference for the DAI contract were written.

The assessment was carried out by five-person team:

Craig Olson	Political Scientist and Team Leader
Sara Guthrie	Social Economist
Marc-Antoine Noel	Civil Society Specialist
Phares Pierre	Local Governance Specialist
Glenn Smucker	Anthropologist

Mr. Noel served on the team on a half-time basis. The other four team members were employed full-time for the duration of the assessment phase of the contract.

The assessment took place over a 6-week period that began on November 8, 1999 and was completed on December 18, 1999. The period from November 8 to November 30 was spent on data collection. The team consulted documents and interviewed a large number of beneficiaries and stakeholders in 5 of the 9 departments of Haiti. A complete list of persons interviewed is contained in Annex A. A complete list of documents examined is contained in Annex B.

On December 1 and 2, the team collectively analyzed and synthesized its findings. On December 3, 1999, the team presented and discussed a summary of its findings with the director and staff of the Justice, Democracy, and Governance (JDG) office of the USAID/Haiti Mission. The team submitted a draft report to the JDG mission on December 11. After receiving comments on December 14, the team revised the report and submitted it in final form on December 17.

STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

This remainder of this report is divided into six additional chapters. Chapter II describes the nature and problems of civil society and local governance in the years before the two programs began. Chapter III describes USAID's programmatic response to these problems – what USAID expected to accomplish through its assistance. Chapter IV analyzes the changes that have occurred in civil society and in local governance from 1994 to 1999 and the influence of USAID assistance on these changes. Chapter V consists of a thematic analysis; it responds to what USAID called "research" questions in the assessment scope of work. Chapter VI presents lessons learned from the assessment. Finally, Chapter VII presents prospects and scenarios for a new USAID program in civil society and local governance.

CHAPTER TWO CIVIL SOCIETY AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN HAITI PRIOR TO 1995

This chapter describes the nature of civil society and local governance in the years before the return of constitutional government in 1994. It describes the problems that the USAID programs were designed to address.

THE EVOLUTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN HAITI—1986 TO 1994

To properly understand the status of civil society and local governance in Haiti in 1994, a brief review of recent Haitian history is required.

The Establishment of Constitutional Government—1986 to 1990

On February 7, 1986, President-for-Life Jean-Claude Duvalier departed Haiti, marking the end of nearly thirty years of the Duvalier family dictatorship. The forced departure of President Duvalier resulted in no small measure from a burgeoning of popular resentment at the abuses of the dictatorship.

In March 1987, the Haitian people ratified a new constitution. This extraordinary document not only establishes the framework for democratic governance, but also constitutes the first time in Haitian history that the population at large had been given the opportunity to participate in the creation of its basic governing document. The 1987 constitution enshrines a number of important principles. It guarantees freedom of speech, conscience and assembly. It guarantees the right to work, to education, to information, to property, to health, to housing, to food, to social security, and to life (no death penalty). It creates a division and balance of powers within the central government. Of critical importance to this assessment, it also created a basic structure of participatory, elected local governance.

The 1990 Elections

The Haitian people were soon to learn, however, that the framing of a document does not lead automatically to the exercise of its provisions. A first attempt to hold elections in November 1987 was aborted after representatives of the armed forces massacred a number of citizens at polling stations. After three stormy years, elections were finally held in December 1990. These elections resulted in the investiture of Jean-Bertrand Aristide as President of the Republic. Also elected were members of the two-chamber National Assembly (Chamber of Deputies and Senate), members of 565 Conseils d'Administration de la Section Communale

(CASEC), which is the smallest sub-national unit of governance in Haiti, and the mayors of 133 communes.

The 1991 Coup d'Etat

Constitutional governance was not, however, long-lived. On September 30, 1991, just seven months after officials elected in 1990 took office, the military again intervened. President Aristide was overthrown by a *coup d'état* and forced to leave the country. Haiti was once more thrown into a period of turbulence and illegal governance. Several elected officials, including deputies, senators, mayors and members of CASECs abandoned their posts and went into hiding. Those with means fled the country. Others took refuge with friends and family in the hills, much as their ancestors had done in fleeing colonial rule in the 18th century. For three years following the *coup*, the Organization of American States (OAS) and other representatives of the international community made a number of attempts to restore the legitimately elected government. But the military government systematically rejected each of these initiatives.

The Return of President Aristide

Finally, in September 1994, the military government, faced with the threat of an invasion by a United Nations military force, agreed to step down. On October 15, 1994, Jean-Bertrand Aristide returned to Haiti and was reinstated as President. He would serve out the remainder of his elected five-year term. Because the constitution prohibits presidents from succeeding themselves immediately after the end of their term, President Aristide did not run for re-election. In November 1995, he was succeeded as President by the election of his former (1991) Prime Minister, René Préval.

The return of constitutional government was welcomed overwhelmingly by the Haitian population. Formerly elected officials came out of hiding. Civil society organizations re-emerged. The period of *de facto* rule from 1991 to 1994 (and, indeed, most of the preceding political history of Haiti) had, however, created an atmosphere of popular wariness. Certain segments of the population, notably the business elite, the military, and some members of the religious hierarchy, were, moreover, far from enthusiastic about the return of President Aristide.

CIVIL SOCIETY IN HAITI IN 1995

What was civil society like in Haiti in 1995? What were the issues and the problems that USAID wished to address in the civil society component of the DEP?

For most of Haitian history, civil society has had little room for maneuver (the Haitians call this lack of "space") in the political arena. In the late 1970s, however, President Duvalier, under pressure from the international community and in response especially to the human

rights initiative of President Jimmy Carter began to allow for some freedom of expression and association. Although another crackdown occurred in the early 1980s (after the election of President Reagan), a number of events combined to provide civil society with sufficient strength eventually to force the departure of President Duvalier in 1986. These included the worsening of economic conditions, mounting unemployment, the advent of liberation theology, the visit of Pope John Paul II, pressure from exiled Haitians, and increasing revulsion at the brutality of the military. A defining moment was the unprovoked shooting of two school children in the town of Gonaives in 1985, a photograph of which made the international press.

Although the end of the Duvalier dictatorship ushered in a new era of constitutional government, it did not change the socio-economic structure of Haitian society. Haiti was still dominated, to a large extent, by a business and professional elite, which was frequently disdainful of popular expression. The elite practiced a system of social and economic exclusion, a system that has dominated the political and social life of the country since its independence. Some Haitian intellectuals (such as Professor Jean Casimir, former Haitian Ambassador to the USA) have not hesitated to characterize this system as apartheid.

In 1986, civil society began to wage desultory warfare against this entrenched political and social system. A variety of civil society organizations (CSOs) began to feel increasingly empowered to become involved in civic action and to support political movements. Haitian CSOs became increasingly involved in social and political protest. These included unions, professional associations, socio-professional groups, human rights organizations, rural groups, neighborhood committees, and grassroots ecclesiastical communities (such as Ti Kominote Legliz, a group that served as an important base of support for President Aristide).

After 1986, the rules of the game seemed to change. Even some segments of the private sector, which had been a beneficiary of the traditional system, appeared ready to cooperate within the new constitutional framework. In 1991, representatives of the private sector presented the newly elected government with a "White Paper," which proposed certain changes in the investment code and business and customs taxes. The idea was to create some order and predictability that would benefit both the State and the private sector.

All this changed again, however, with the September 1991 *coup d'état*. The military regime that took power was under few illusions about the threats posed by civil society. The military regime was able to manipulate the traditional elite through corruption and relatively gentle pressure. But they went after civil society with a vengeance.¹ It is estimated that some 300,000 CSO representatives and other activists were hunted down. About 5,000 were killed. Dozens of CSO leaders fled into exile. Others were bought and corrupted, transformed into internal spies or "agents of confusion."

¹ According to a report of the International Commission on Human Rights published in 1993, "since the coup in Haiti, the human rights situation has continued to deteriorate. The commission has been informed of severe repression by the military against the Haitian population. Numerous persons have been illegally detained, executed, mistreated and tortured by members of the armed forces, the police and civilians who collaborate with them." (Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Haiti, Chapter 2, page 21).

By 1994, civil society in Haiti was in thorough disarray. Although the majority of citizens had kept their aspirations for democratic freedoms, the dismantling of grassroots organizations and the general atmosphere of fear and confusion prevented any concerted action.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN HAITI IN 1994

In 1994, local government as prescribed in the 1987 constitution did not exist. Although elections were held in 1990, the era of *de facto* government from 1991 to 1994 effectively erased whatever marginal achievements had occurred in the late 1980s and in 1990 and 1991. If anything, the situation of local government was worse in 1994 than it was in 1991.

The Constitutional Structure

The 1987 Constitution created three layers of sub-national government. The smallest is the "communal section" of which there are 565. Three residents of the communal section are elected by popular vote as members of the "Conseil d'Administration de la Section Communale" (CASEC). The CASEC is to be "assisted" by a popularly elected communal section assembly.

The next layer is the "commune," of which there are 133. Three residents of the Commune are elected by popular vote to become members of a "municipal council." One of these individuals becomes the "mayor" or "titular mayor." The others become "assistant mayors." The municipal council is "assisted" by a municipal assembly, which is composed of representatives from each communal section and the town center. The Constitution requires that the municipal council "report" to the municipal assembly on its management of communal resources. It also states that no "transaction" of the municipal council concerning state-held private land ("domaine privé de l'état) is valid without the consent ("avis préalable") of the municipal assembly. The municipal assembly must also "report" to the departmental council (see next paragraph).

The next layer is the department, of which there are nine. Each department is managed by a departmental council, which is selected by members of a departmental assembly. The departmental assembly is, in turn, composed of one representative from each municipal assembly. The departmental assembly "assists" the departmental council in its governance tasks.

The central government also appoints a "delegate" to each department. The "delegate," who has the status of a minister, coordinates the activities of the deconcentrated central government ministries in each department. The delegate usually has a staff of ten or more employees under the supervision of a "secretary general." The functions of the delegate are not, however, operational. Aside from a car and driver and a small expense budget, the delegate's office has no operations budget.

Another very important structure prescribed in the constitution is the interdepartmental council, which is composed of one representative from each of the nine departments. The interdepartmental council "assists" the executive branch of government and the council of ministers in the central government in planning decentralized development projects. In so doing it serves as the liaison between the departments and the executive branch of government and plays a "deliberative" role (*voix délibérative*) in meetings of the council of ministers.

Constitutionally, this structure of decentralization represented several important departures from the past. First, the individuals managing local government were to be elected rather than appointed. Second, there were to be deliberative, as well as executive, bodies (i.e., assemblies) at each level. Third, the communes and the departments (although not the communal sections) were to be financially and administratively "autonomous," (a term which means different things to different people within the Haitian political context.)

Legal Structure

The Constitution states that, at each level, the organization and functioning of these sub-national units of government will be regulated by "law." The constitution itself provides little detail on the attributions or responsibilities of these units. It says nothing, for example, about how the operations of these units are to be financed. All this would, in theory, be provided for in various laws to be passed by the National Assembly. By 1994, no such laws had been passed. This meant, in effect, that CASECs, mayors and assemblies had little or no legal guidance or legal authority to govern. This legal void created a great deal of confusion as well concerning relations between territorial collectivities and relations between councils and assemblies.

Legally, the only law in effect describing the attributions and responsibilities of local governance dated back to 1982, before the adoption of the 1987 constitution. The only help available to mayors was through a handbook based on this law entitled "Guide to Communal Administration," which was published by the Department of Interior.

Fiscal Policy

In 1994, none of the sub-national units of government had any basis for being able to create a budget because they had no regular and predictable income. Communes had no legal authority to modify local taxes or to impose new taxes. They also had no legal authority to collect local taxes or to incur or recover debt.

Local governments received budget allocations from the Department of Finance through the Department of Interior. In 1994, the total allocation to sub-national units of government was 80 million gourdes, which amounted to about 2 percent of the total public expenses of the

government.² When divided among the nine departments, 133 communes, and 565 communal sections, it is readily apparent that this allocation was in no way sufficient to satisfy the needs of local governance. Distributions were, moreover, not transparent. The formula used to provide communes and communal sections with revenue was known only to the Ministry of Interior.

Administrative Capacity

The 1991 local elections resulted in the investiture of a new generation of mayors, vice-mayors and CASECs. As a group, they had little or no experience in public administration. Their governing capacities, given their lack of experience and the legal void in which they operated, could only be described as quite low. By 1994, none of this had changed given the nature of the *de facto* government.

Associations of Elected Representatives

Despite these conditions, some mayors had, by 1994, been able to combine their resources to create associations in four of the nine departments. CASEC members had also created a national organization. These associations were, however, new and relatively powerless. There did not, exist, in other words, any solidly organized constituency of locally elected officials that was capable of advancing the cause of decentralization.

Capacity to Provide Goods and Services

The budgets of local governments were barely sufficient to pay salaries. Most local governments were able, therefore, to provide only a minimum of services, most notably street cleaning (limited, where it existed, to the town centers of large towns.) Local governments had no investment budgets at all. For investment projects, they relied entirely on the budgets of deconcentrated government agencies, such as the National Water Authority (Service Nationale de l'Eau Potable or SNEP) or on international donors or non-governmental organizations (NGOs). For the most part, basic infrastructure, as well as essential goods and services, were severely lacking.

² The gourde is the official Haitian currency. It is exchanged freely with the U.S. dollar at rates that change, often daily, according to the market. In December 1999, the exchange rate was about 17.5 gourdes to the dollar.

CHAPTER THREE USAID/HAITI'S PROGRAMMATIC RESPONSE TO THESE ISSUES

To address these issues in civil society and local governance, USAID Haiti designed and initiated two activities within the framework of its bilateral agreement with the Government of Haiti. The bilateral agreement is known as the Democracy Enhancement Project.

THE DEMOCRACY ENHANCEMENT PROJECT

The current Democracy Enhancement Project (DEP) was originally authorized in May 1991 following the election of President Aristide. It was designed to finance institutional strengthening activities in the National Assembly, political parties, the electoral commission, civil society and local government. Following the *coup d'état* in September 1991, all activities with the exception of those aimed at strengthening civil society were suspended.

Following the return of constitutional government, a revised DEP was signed on July 3, 1995. Its goal was to assist the Haitian people build a participatory, accountable, responsive democracy and to establish the basic conditions for sustainable and equitable growth. Its purpose was to increase the capacity of public and private institutions and individuals to facilitate broad-based participation in democratic decision-making and respect for the constitution.

To accomplish this purpose, the DEP's strategy was to work simultaneously on institutional development and the strengthening of civil society, as related, in particular to decentralization. The grant agreement specified that the project's activities in institutional development were to be carried out in two areas. One was strengthening of the capacity of both Chambers of the National Assembly and non-partisan assistance to political parties represented in the National Assembly. The second was capacity building of selected local government entities as well as to a national association of elected officials.

In civil society, the DEP was to support participatory activities in several areas. These included civic education, advocacy, labor issues, local level mediation and conflict resolution, and the sponsorship of national level dialogs on democratic and social issues.

The DEP specified its intent to implement these activities through contracts with private consulting firms. This assessment focuses on the effectiveness and impact of two such contracts, one that focused primarily on local governance, the other on civil society. This assessment does not cover the parliamentary assistance activities of the DEP except to the extent that certain activities in the local governance contract were to focus on decentralization legislation.

THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT COMPONENT—PACTE

Implementation of the DEP local government (LG) component began in September 1995 with the award of a four-year contract to Associates in Rural Development (ARD). The original completion date for the ARD contract was September 1999. The contract was amended in September 1999 to extend the project completion date to April 2000. Although the contract was, strictly speaking, a component of the larger DEP project, for practical purposes and in the view of most participants, it was seen as a separate project, which is referred to as ARD/PACTE, or simply PACTE.

Objectives

Evaluations normally proceed by comparing actual achievements to planned objectives. This evaluation will, in fact, do so. This task is not, however, straightforward because PACTE objectives have changed, if not entirely in substance, at least in presentation, packaging and emphasis.

Originally, PACTE's primary objective was expressed, in logical framework terms, as a "purpose." It was to "enhance popular participation in local democratic processes and to improve the capacity of local governments to respond to constituent needs, especially those of women and other vulnerable groups." Within the first year, however, the project's objectives began to be repackaged to conform to the Mission's emerging results framework. In 1996, for example, Strategic Objective (SO) No. 1 for USAID/Haiti was "More effective and responsive democratic institutions and empowered communities." Within this SO, PACTE was to contribute to results package (RP) No. 3: "Improved private/public partnerships for resolving problems."

Currently, the SO is slightly different: "More genuinely inclusive democratic governance attained." RP 3 has, moreover, been replaced by intermediate result No. 3: "More responsive governance by elected officials."

Expected Results

Within this framework and to adjust to shifts in the Haitian political landscape, PACTE has repackaged its internal results.

The expected results contained in the original contract were as follows:

- All elected bodies in Haiti's territorial administration were to be functioning in accordance with legislation that clearly established their roles and responsibilities.
- At least 300 CASECs and 50 Communes were to have adopted new or improved administrative systems and procedures, introduced participatory mechanisms for

identifying communal needs, and received training and practical experience in designing and implementing small local development projects.

- There was to occur an increase in the involvement of grass-roots organizations, especially those that target women and other vulnerable groups, in discussing community development problems with the local governments targeted by the project.
- The project was to improve the capacity of regional and/or national foundations or associations that would address and articulate the needs and interests of elected officials.
- The project was to facilitate the establishment, either through new legislation, or through improved operations of the existing program, of a guaranteed revenue base for communal councils, and a transparent and participatory process of working toward a resolution of the question of financial independence for those communal bodies.

In 1996, PACTE completed a "Local Government Assessment." The assessment presented a detailed analysis of local governance in Haiti and proposed specific sets of activities for addressing local governance issues. In early 1997, PACTE repackaged the presentation of its activities into four components that more closely reflected USAID/Haiti's results framework. Activities were re-organized into four components:

1. Policy and Legislation
2. Associations of Local Authorities
3. Local Government Performance in Management, Accountability, and Transparency, and
4. Local Government Performance in the Provision of Public Goods and Services.

In 1998, PACTE work plans and performance reports reflected changes in the emphasis to be given to each of these components. These changes were made largely in reaction to difficulties encountered in working with the government of Haiti. Since the contested elections of 1997 and the resignation of the prime minister in June of that year, Haiti has been in a protracted political crisis. With no prime minister until late 1998 and with a dysfunctional National Assembly, the central government was unable to move forward with decentralization legislation or even to appoint counterparts to work with PACTE. This meant that PACTE's efforts to work directly on decentralization legislation (component #1) was effectively blocked.

In early 1999, relations between the project and the central government (as well as between USAID and the central government) took a turn for the worse. Local government and National Assembly elections that were scheduled to take place in November 1998 were postponed. In January 1999, President Préval announced that the terms of local officials and parliamentarians elected in 1995 would end. Later that month, the president appointed most of the formerly elected officials to their same offices with the status of "interim executive agents." USAID, however, decided that PACTE could not work directly with these officials because of their non-elected status. This effectively put an end to PACTE's work in components 1-3 because all of them required direct assistance to elected officials. Even in component four, the rules changed as will be described in Chapter IV of this assessment.

Officially, PACTE's expected results are still expressed in terms of the four components presented above. The expected results do not differ greatly in substance from the results in the original terms of reference. They do differ, considerably, however, in scale. The number of communes that would receive direct institutional assistance in component four, for example, was decreased from 50 to 18. The numerical target for communal sections was eliminated although the project was supposed to work with all communal sections in the 18 communes.

Current indicators and the specific activities that were carried out will be presented and analyzed in Chapter IV.

THE CIVIL SOCIETY COMPONENT—ASOSYE

Implementation of the Civil Society Component of the Revised DEP began in December 1995 with the award of 3.5-year contract to America's Development Foundation (ADF). This contract came to be known as Asosye I. A second contract, known as Asosye II, was awarded to Management Systems International (MSI) in July 1999.

Asosye I

Original Purpose

As stated in the project agreement between USAID and ADF, the purpose of the Civil Society component of the DEP was to increase the capacity of private institutions and individuals to facilitate broad-based participation in democratic decision-making, and to promote and enhance respect for the Constitution.

The objectives specified in the contract were to encourage key segments of society, including the elite, youth, labor, urban and rural poor, and other groups in society, to exhibit increased understanding of the rights and responsibilities of citizens; tolerance and respect for the rights of others; and increased participation and collaboration in problem solving in peaceful fora.

Expected Results

The general end of project status for the Civil Society component was that all sectors of society exhibit increased participation in democratic fora, and an increased understanding of citizen rights and responsibilities. It was anticipated that the contract would strengthen 10-15 non-governmental organizations and an additional 4-5 labor organizations which enhance democratic values and pluralism in Haiti.

There were four "outputs" specified in the ADF contract:

1. National and local civic education campaigns carried out such that Haitians at all levels of society have greater understanding of their rights and responsibilities in a democratic society; the importance of respect and tolerance for the rights of others; and, through a better knowledge of governmental organizations, are more active and effective participants in their society.
2. Through participation in non-partisan fora, Haitians from all sectors of society have come to understand that they have open channels of communication and dialogue and have developed greater tolerance and respect for different points of view on issues affecting everyone, such as social reconciliation, the role of government, and decentralization.
3. Local level organizations act in concert with their communities to articulate and address common problems, and to develop greater mutual trust and respect in each other and in their government.
4. Labor organizations have increased their capacity to frame and present issues to their government within a democratic context of compromise and negotiation.

Principal Activities

The scope of work for Asosye I recognized the evolving nature of the Haitian political climate. It referred to the changing and fluctuating commitment to democracy of key sectors, coupled with weak and almost untested democratic institutions. To allow for a degree of programmatic flexibility during implementation, the tasks outlined in the ADF contract were stated in quite general terms. These tasks included:

- An assessment of the general awareness of Haitian citizens of their rights and responsibilities; confidence in local government and non-governmental organizations; overall level of citizen understanding of national issues such as the role of government and social reconciliation.
- Establishment of a Haitian Advisory Group to provide direction, to review and assess yearly work plans and on-going activities, and to initiate and evaluate proposed modifications to the contract, if necessary. The Group was to include representatives from USAID, the Embassy, the government of Haiti (GOH), the contractor, and the private sector.
- Civic education activities implemented through sub-contracts and grants. As stated in the project agreement, major activities would include:
 - a) Information campaigns to educate and inform all sectors of the population about the rights and responsibilities of citizens; tolerance and respect for the rights of others; non-violent dispute resolution; and the 1987 Constitution of Haiti.

- b) National dialogue forums to encourage tolerance, dialogue and debate among groups which may consider their interests to be unrelated, or which hold differing viewpoints on important issues. The contractor would bring together respected, non-partisan organizations from business, labor, rural and urban interests (and others) to discuss and make presentations on topics that would include social reconciliation, the justice system, education, health, the economy, transportation, the environment, and decentralization.
- c) Establishment of a grants program to carefully selected NGOs for activities to reinforce civic education messages on tolerance, rights and responsibilities.
- d) Support the development of Haiti's 4-5 labor confederations through a grant to a selected labor organization. This organization was to work with local labor groups on activities that instill democratic principles in union members, including such concepts as negotiation, compromise, good citizenship, voting, and the role of unions in a democracy.

Asosye II

In July 1999, a follow-on contract with MSI to continue Asosye activities was approved by USAID. This 18-month contract allows time for an assessment of all aspects of the DEP and development of a long-term project that takes into account the current situation and projections for civil society and democratic governance in Haiti.

The Asosye II agreement was prepared in light of the successes and the evolution of different program elements of Asosye I (which are discussed in detail later in this report). Asosye II has as its overall objective (under USAID's new strategy) that civil society organizations positively influence public policies. As stated in the project document, expected results of the 18-month Asosye II project are:

- Through participation in non-partisan fora, a sampling of Haitians from all sectors of society will discuss and reach consensus on fundamental policy issues confronting them.
- Selected civil society organizations will have an increased capacity to function democratically (e.g. elect their leadership, obtain formal legal recognition, regularly elicit opinions from membership).
- Selected civil society organizations will have an increased capacity to frame and present issues to their government within a democratic context of compromise and negotiation.
- Selected local-level organizations will articulate and address common problems.

The statement of work for Asosye II mentions three activity areas: Capacity Building, Advocacy Building and Democratic Fora. Planned tasks to carry out the project include:

- Reestablish a Haitian Advisory Committee which will provide direction, review and assess the workplan, ongoing activities, and initiate and evaluate proposed modifications to the contract, if necessary.
- Conduct an inventory and analysis of civil society organizations.
- Organize National Dialogue Forums throughout the country to allow widespread participation in democratic debate.
- Build the capacity of targeted civil society organizations to participate in and to influence social economic and political processes. Specific activities will relate to institutional development, advocacy skills and locally-based initiatives.
- Public Information Activities to assure broad-scale coverage and sharing of information generated by project activities.
- A small grants program for civil society organizations that will contribute to project objectives.

In addition to the overall strategy for Asosye II, the current insecure political climate, attributed to the scheduled upcoming elections, has led to a proposed Short-Term Strategic Objective for Asosye II. This objective is to “increase the informed and well-organized participation of citizens in a non-violent electoral process (as voters, monitors, candidates, advocates, and technical resources)”. The program activities for the next few months have been planned in light of this Short-Term Strategic Objective and within the planned tasks outlined above.

RELATED ACTIVITIES

As mentioned previously, the assessment terms of reference requested that the DAI team assess the accomplishments of a related activity, *Appui au Renforcement des Communautés* (ARC). An oral request, made after the contract was signed, was that the DAI team also look at the activities of a recently signed Civic Education Task Order.

ARC

ARC is a grants program administered directly by USAID. Similar programs preceded ARC from 1968 to 1994, including the former Ambassador’s Fund and a program entitled Special Development Activities. The criteria and procedures for ARC are based on the lessons learned and experience of those earlier programs.

ARC was originally approved in February 1998 and is currently entering its third year (FY 2000, October 1, 1999–September 30, 2000). The purpose of ARC is to promote local community groups’ self-help efforts in small infrastructure, income generating,

environmental, and/or civic activities. It enables USAID to respond to requests for assistance that fall within USAID/Haiti's strategic objectives, but are not within the mandate or geographic area of any ongoing project. It also enables USAID to interact directly with local recipients and gain more visibility in rural areas.

ARC is funded by the four sectoral offices within USAID/Haiti, and final decisions on grants are taken by an Intersectoral Committee. Recipients are expected to provide funds or in-kind services that constitute 25 percent of project costs. Maximum USAID funding for each project is the equivalent of US\$ 25,000. Administrative oversight of ARC (and its predecessors) was handled by the USAID Program Office until early 1999 when it was moved to JDG. The possibility of reviving ARC to make it supportive of JDG objectives is being considered by USAID. There is particular interest in how ARC might make a greater contribution to building social capital and to reinforcing decentralization and local governance.

ARC was designed to fund NGOs, PVOs, and other local groups. Individuals or new organizations are also eligible for grants to implement innovative ideas that promote community participation or that demonstrate leadership and creativity. The objective of the activity must be to improve the quality of community life and fostering community involvement. The types of projects considered appropriate for financing by ARC are, in order of priority:

1. Renovation/rehabilitation or construction of schools already operating (i.e. for which teachers salaries are already guaranteed)
2. Small-scale economic infrastructure work such as small dams, culverts, and gabions
3. Small income generating activities (credit activities excluded)
4. Small irrigation or potable water systems
5. Environmental activities such as wells, cisterns, and drains clearing
6. Other innovative activities that promote community participation or that demonstrate leadership and/or creativity.

Some project criteria not mentioned above include:

- The support of the community must be demonstrated, including the approbation of three recognized leaders
- The activity must be beneficial to a significant number of the target population
- Geographic distribution throughout Haiti, with priority to rural areas
- A completion schedule of less than 12 months

- Sustainability (recurrent costs, if any, associated with the activity clearly identified and plans to meet them described)
- Religious affiliation organizations are eligible, but they must certify that ARC activity will be available to all community members
- Churches, political parties, police and government institutions are not eligible.

The Civic Education Task Order

This task order was awarded to Associates in Rural Development in July 1999. It is scheduled to be carried out over a nine-month period. It has two objectives:

- Foster greater awareness of decentralization issues to make voters (in upcoming local elections) aware of their role in making decentralized governance work; and
- Develop an informed consensus and a plan for implementing decentralization policy and legislation reforms through dialogue with interest groups (civil society, media, prominent opinion leaders, and the private sector).

The task order is meant to complement the work of the two larger programs—PACTE and Asosye. Its short-term objective is clearly to influence participation in the elections that have now been postponed until March 2000.

CHAPTER FOUR

CIVIL SOCIETY AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN HAITI IN 1999

This chapter traces the changes that have occurred in civil society and in local governance in Haiti from 1995 through 1999. It attempts to determine what the impact of USAID programs have been on these changes and what other factors have been important in explaining these changes.

The chapter begins with an overview of significant changes. It then discusses changes specific to local governance and to civil society.

THE EVOLUTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN HAITI 1995-1999

During the three years of de facto military rule (1991-1994), democratic initiatives halted, went underground or into suspension. Military rule ended with the return of President Aristide in October 1994. For much of 1995 and 1996, several significant events gave rise to great optimism in Haiti.

First, in 1995, President Aristide dismantled the Haitian armed forces (Forces Armées d’Haiti), and created a national police force, trained under United Nations auspices and placed under civilian command. This was a significant event in that the Haitian army had long been the final arbiter of political destiny. Historically, armed force has nearly always been the decisive element of political control. (In keeping with tradition, armed force was also the determining factor in Haiti’s return to constitutional government and civilian rule in 1994.)³

Second, the renewal of civilian government in the mid-1990s was accompanied by a significant decline in government repression, the re-emergence of free speech and of party politics, and the launching of an active electoral process. In 1995, Haiti held elections for municipal councils (mayors), CASECs, the National Assembly, and the presidency. The election of civilian local officials in Haiti’s communal sections in 1990, and then again in 1995, was an historic innovation since rural Haiti had always been ruled as a military jurisdiction without the benefit of civilian local government. When President Aristide passed on the reins of power to his democratically elected successor, President René Préval, in February 1996, it was a also remarkable event, virtually without precedent in Haitian political history.

Two other developments in 1995 and early 1996 are worth noting. In September 1995, the President created the Office of Citizen Protection, an ombudsman role mandated by the constitution. In late 1996, the President created the National Commission for Administrative

³ See the volume edited by Rotberg (1997), especially the article by Robert Fatton, “The Rise, Fall, and Resurrection of President Aristide,” and Stotzky (1997), *Silencing the Guns in Haiti: The Promise of Deliberative Democracy*.

Reform (CNRA). Significantly, however, CNRA's mandate did not, at first, include decentralization. The National Assembly, in fact, withheld approval for a separate commission on decentralization; the failure of the National Assembly to create a decentralization commission caused the Inter-American Development Bank to withhold approval of a \$3 million decentralization loan. In April 1999, President Préval added decentralization to the CNRA mandate (in lieu of creating a separate commission.)

Overall, recent events have been disheartening. Despite clear progress in reinstating constitutional democracy in Haiti in the mid-1990s, the electorate has shown a declining interest in elections (see text box).⁴ Since 1997, the National Assembly has been deadlocked by a growing political crisis, which began with accusations of fraudulent elections for certain seats in the National Assembly and for local assemblies. The crisis led to the resignation of Prime Minister Rosny Smarth in April 1997. At the end of December 1998, the fourth prime minister designate proposed by the president was finally ratified by parliament.

Turnout for Elections		
	%	
11-90	75	Aristide won 67% of vote
06-95	51	Parliament, mayors, CASEC
12-95	28	President
04-97	5	Contested elections - ASECs, senators, a deputy

By this time earlier electoral alliances had broken down. The OPL (*formerly Organisation Politique Lavalas*, renamed *Organisation Peuple en Lutte*) had the largest number of parliamentarians but did not command a majority. Other party affiliations in one or another of the two houses of parliament included the PLB (*Parti Louvri Baryè*), the FNCD (*Front National de Concertation pour la Démocratie*), and independents.

The electoral law of 1995 and the electoral *arrêté* of January 1997 foreshortened parliamentary and local government mandates in order to reestablish the constitutional electoral calendar short-circuited by the *coup d'état* of 1991. These measures were taken on the assumption that the government would organize and conduct parliamentary and local elections in November 1998. These elections have, however, been postponed three times.

As a result of the protracted political crisis, Haiti has been deprived of a constitutionally legitimate government since mid-1997 and of a parliament since January 1999. On January 11, 1999, President Préval announced the end of elected mandates for parliamentarians and local government officials. In a presidential decree on January 25, 1999, the president replaced the elected mayors and CASECs, retaining most of the former mayors and CASECs as interim agents appointed by the executive; however, the presidential decree also made changes to 41 of Haiti's 133 municipal councils. The National Mayors Federation (FENAMH) opposed the presidential decrees although most of the former mayors agreed to stay on as interim agents of the executive.

⁴ SOURCES: Stotsky (1997, 27-28) on 1990 presidential elections, and Nelson (1998) cited in Maguire (1999), in a chapter (in press) for the forthcoming area study on Haiti to be published by the Library of Congress.

Haiti is presently scheduled to hold long-delayed local and legislative elections in two rounds, March 19 and April 30, 2000. In these elections, officials will be elected to the 83-seat chamber of deputies, 19 seats in the 27-seat senate, 133 municipal councils, 565 communal sections, and hundreds of local assemblies. Some 63 parties are registered at the Ministry of Justice, and 17 formally recognized.⁵ Even if these elections take place on schedule, there are likely to be accusations of fraud by those not elected. One reason for this is that the Provisional Electoral Commission (CEP), which is organizing the elections, although technically autonomous, is not truly independent since the president appoints its members.⁶

In other developments, the National Commission of Truth and Justice issued a report in 1995, *Si M Pa Rele*⁷, with recommendations on political crimes committed during the *de facto* government period. These recommendations deal with reparations to victims of the regime, sexual violence against women, institutional and judicial reforms, and pursuit of the perpetrators of political crimes. Acting on these recommendations could help restore credibility to a government tarnished by violations of the constitution; however, few of the report's recommendations have been implemented, and none systematically.

In addition, the OAS/UN International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) recently reported that polarization and tension linked to forthcoming elections have had an adverse effect on human rights in 1999. The OAS/UN Mission reported that police officers carried out summary executions in early 1999, and that a number of police officers have also been killed. Violent disruption of a peaceful rally (May 1999) and violent street demonstrations have contributed to a sense of insecurity in relation to the political process.⁸

Despite evidence of strong interest in decentralization at the communal and sectional levels, a broad range of interviewees in this assessment – parliamentarians, candidates for office, local government authorities, and civil society representatives – question the overall commitment to decentralization by the central government and the political parties. The former president of a parliamentary commission on *collectivités territoriales* reported an absence of support among parliamentarians for passing legislation pertaining to decentralization. Except for an April 1996 law on the organization of communal sections, and two laws on financing local government, the former parliamentarians made little progress in passing the enabling legislation required to carry forward the agenda for decentralized governance. In fact the now defunct parliament passed very little legislation of any kind.

In sum, the late 1990s have been characterized by a severe and protracted political and constitutional crisis. This has stifled further progress in creating an adequate legal framework

⁵ See Agence Haitienne de Presse (4/22/99) on elections, and Norton (Associated Press, 10/6/99), "Haiti Announces Election Dates."

⁶ Members of the current CEP were named by the president, using non-partisan criteria for selection, in the wake of negotiations with the Espace de Concertation, a coalition of four political parties.

⁷ The title, *Si M Pa Rele*, literally "if I don't cry out" in Haitian Creole, refers to a proverb, *Si m pa rele map toufe* (if I don't cry out, I'll choke), meaning in this case, "if I don't cry out or speak up or protest, I'll die."

⁸ *Human Rights Review*, April-June 1999, a quarterly report by the OAS/UN – Mission Civile Internationale en Haïti.

for decentralization and implementing the institutional framework of assemblies, departmental and inter-departmental councils required by the constitution.

LOCAL GOVERNANCE

This section discusses changes in local governance over the last five years and the impact of PACTE and other factors on these changes.

Changes in Local Governance from 1994 to 1999

What changes have occurred in local governance in Haiti since 1994? In some ways, little has changed (*Plus cela change, plus c'est la même chose*), but, in other ways, there have been some profound changes.

Structural Changes

With some exceptions, there has been little structural change.

Legal Structure. The legal structure of local government has changed little. The National Assembly passed only three laws affecting decentralization. One prescribed modalities for the organization and operation of the communal section. A second created a special local government fund (to be described below) and a special commission to manage the fund. A third specified the taxes that would be earmarked to finance the special fund.

Huge gaps still exist. There is no law on division of responsibilities between sub-national units of government, no law providing authority for local governments to impose or modify taxes, no law on prescribing modalities for the operation of the communal assemblies.

Perhaps the most glaring gap is the absence of laws, policies or regulations covering the interactions between local executive and deliberative bodies. This gap has, moreover, been exacerbated by the political crisis.

As mentioned previously, elections were held in 1995 for communal councils and communal section councils (CASECs). These elections did not include, however, the communal section assemblies (ASECs). This was a significant and unfortunate omission. As explained in the last chapter, municipal assemblies can only be created if communal section assemblies exist. Similarly, departmental assemblies can only be created by municipal assemblies. Finally, interdepartmental councils can only be created by departmental assemblies. Thus, the absence of ASECs deprived each sub-national unit of government of one-half of its constitutionally chartered structure. The absence of communal assemblies was particularly significant since these assemblies must approve a certain number of mayoral transactions.

Although elections for ASECS did take place in June 1997, voter turnout was sparse and the results were contested. The terms of these local legislators only lasted, however, for about 18 months since their mandates were ended by the presidential decree of January 11, 1999. Even during this period, there was little or no cooperation between ASECs and CASECs or between municipal assemblies and mayors. Most mayors considered assemblies a nuisance. Worse, if the assemblies were, or were perceived to be, dominated by an opposition party, the mayors considered them enemies. When assembly members tried to make their voices heard, they were either usually either ignored or worse. One assemblyman told us that when he had requested that the mayor show him the commune's budget, the mayor had him arrested.⁹ For all practical purposes, deliberative bodies never really functioned in most jurisdictions.

Source of Income for Local Governments. Until 1996, local governments did not know the source of their income, nor could they predict how much they were going to receive from year to year. Throughout Haiti local government income was woefully inadequate.

To make ends meet, mayors frequently traveled to Port-au-Prince to beg like paupers on the doorsteps of the Ministry of Interior to receive the subsidies to which they were entitled. If a mayor was not held in high regard by the central government, he might wait for quite some time to receive this subsidy.

In 1996 Parliament passed a law creating the *Fonds de Gestion et de Développement des Collectivités Territoriales* (FGDCT)—the "Fund for the Management and Development of Territorial Collectivities." This fund provides local governments with a reliable, if still inadequate, source of income. The fund consists of an annual allocation of 100,000,000 gourdes plus earmarked proceeds from a variety of taxes. A subsequent law earmarks specific percentages of tax receipts from a variety of sources, including airline tickets, cigarettes, automobile licensing, and salaries, to finance the FGDCT. The amounts thus collected are distributed to the local governments and their institutions through modalities that are supposed to be agreed upon between the local governments themselves and the central government.

Local governments now also receive 100 percent of local taxes collected, which consist mainly of a property tax and a tax on professional and commercial activities (*patente*.)

The 1996 law also created an 11-member commission to administer the distribution of the FGDCT. Nine members of this commission are supposed to be selected by departmental councils, the other 2 from the central government. In theory, this means that the Fund should, for practical purposes, be managed by the local governments themselves. This provision of the law constitutes a major change since previously local governments had practically no say in the division of local government resources. The problem, of course, is that, because the departmental councils do not exist, neither does the commission. Thus, mayors and other

⁹ According to the assemblyman, the mayor trumped up a charge against the assemblyman of attempted murder. The judge apparently dismissed the charge.

local government officials still have no say in how the proceeds from the Fund are distributed.

Another change is that, in 1998, each municipality was allowed to open its own bank account. Most municipalities have, in fact, done so and receipts from local taxes as well as the contribution from the FDGCT are now deposited in these accounts.

Notwithstanding these changes, the absolute amount of resources made available to local governments is still far from adequate.

Communal Management. We have little information on the status of communal management systems before 1995. Our observations in the sampling of communes we visited (eight in all) indicated, however, that, in 1999, there is a near total absence of systematic management. None of the mayors, for example, was able to show us a budget or any semblance of an accounting system. Files, to the extent they were kept at all, consisted of papers strewn about in boxes and cabinets. Offices were generally unoccupied, either by paper or personnel. None of the mayors had any formal mechanisms for informing the population about communal decisions or events of communal importance.

Our visits to the mayors' offices in West, Southeast, South, and Northeast Departments led us to the conclusion that, in spite of the manifest good will of the mayors, communal administration is archaic, badly organized and inoperative

Behavior or Attitudinal Changes

Changes in behavioral and attitude were far more positive.

Awareness of Professional Responsibilities. Our many interviews with mayors and CASEC members revealed a profound shift in attitude. Previously, mayors had little reason to feel a sense of responsibility or accountability to the population because they were nominated by the central government. Now, many of our respondents, especially if they were formerly elected officials, expressed a genuine sense of obligation to their constituents. They often expressed frustration at not being able to satisfy the needs of the population. In some cases, they even expressed a reluctance to seek re-election, so as not to lose the respect of their neighbors.

Some office holders appeared, to be sure, to like holding office for its own sake. But most evinced an understanding that they had responsibilities to those who had elected them.

The Relationship between Local Government and Civil Society. A long tradition of mistrust and fear characterized the previous relationship between local authorities and the population. In rural Haiti, communal sections were governed by "section chiefs" appointed by the army. These individuals acted as police officers as well as judges and ruled with absolute authority. Most part section chiefs were feared and avoided. The population knew that it had little chance to influence local authorities, either individually or collectively.

Much of this has now changed. Because mayors and CASECs are now selected by the population itself, they are considered a great deal more approachable. The population has begun, moreover to form associations to articulate and exchange ideas or to plan and carry out activities in collaboration with local authorities. As will be detailed in a subsequent section, the work of PACTE has helped develop a positive framework for civil society-local government collaboration.

Collaboration among Elected Officials. Before 1995, mayors and section chiefs were generally isolated from one another. They took their orders from above and had little reason to work together. The dictators and military regimes that ruled did not, in any case, tolerate resistance or protest.

Since the 1995 elections of mayors and CASECs, local officials have begun to make their voices heard collectively. An association of mayors from the South (AMUS) has actually been in existence since 1991 and three other regional associations and a national association of CASECs (FONACAD) had been created in name. Now there are 10 regional associations of mayors and a national association of mayors (FENAMH) plus FONACAD. (Each department except Grand-Anse has one regional association; Grande-Anse has two associations because the problems of road communication have effectively divided the department into two regions: east and west.) Six of the ten regional associations plus FENHAMH and FONACAD have obtained legal recognition. Two others have applied for recognition.

Since holding its first congress in March 1998, FENAMH, in particular, has become a major actor in decentralization. Its resolutions and pronouncements make headlines and both the Executive Branch and the National Assembly have consulted with the organization on several decentralization subjects. It has met, for example, with the Ministry of the Environment on environmental action plans, with the Ministry of Interior on disaster planning, and with the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports on the establishment of sport committees at the communal level.

Provision of Goods and Services. Local governments provide very few services directly. This has changed little, if at all, since 1994. Resources are used mainly to pay salaries. Some townships provide services in street cleaning, burial of paupers, and the organization of celebrations on patron saint days. For the most part, however, mayors and CASEC members act as intermediaries to deconcentrated central government agencies, to donors or to NGOs to obtain services (water, electricity, road repair) for their constituents.

Most mayors seem resigned to this situation. They bemoan their lack of resources and count on the beneficence of outside sources to help them meet the needs of their populations. Yet, in many communes, we found indications that the fiscal resource base is ample to finance a great deal more in the way of services and development initiatives. (See Chapter V for an analysis of this point.) What is lacking is the authority and the political will to tap into these resources.

The Impact of PACTE on Local Government Development

The last section identified important changes that have occurred in local governance in the last four years. What impact did PACTE have on these changes?

The following sections attempt to answer this question. The first section deals with PACTE's achievement of its internal objectives. Subsequent sections deal with PACTE's broader impact as well as on the impact of non-project factors.

Did PACTE achieve its objectives?

PACTE achieved some of its objectives in each of the project's four components, but did not achieve the totality of its objectives in any one of the components. PACTE's strongest impact has been in its work with associations and in the arena of improved delivery of goods and services. In contrast, PACTE has had less impact in the policy and legislation arena or in the area of improved local government management.

The following table presents in summary form a comparison of actual PACTE results to expected PACTE results. The baseline data and the expected results are taken from a combination of the original contractor scope of work and the original contractor work plan.¹⁰

Table 1: Comparison of Expected to Actual PACTE Results

Baseline	Expected Results	Actual Results
Policy and Legislation		
1. No guaranteed revenue base for communal councils and CASECs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Communes and CASECs have the legal authority to modify existing local taxes or their rates or levy new taxes • Communes have the legal authority to collect local taxes • Communes have the legal authority to incur debt • Communes and CASECs are able to retain local tax collections • About one-half of local revenue flows from locally collected taxes, one-half from government subsidies • Business tax rolls are updated • Property tax rolls are updated 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No such authority • Most taxes are still collected by the central government • No such authority • Communes retain 100 percent of the property tax and business tax although they do not collect these taxes directly. • About 89 percent of local government revenue comes from central government subsidies, which is a larger percentage than in 1995. • No update • Some communes have done cadastral surveys and have partially completed revaluations and reassessments

¹⁰ As mentioned in Chapter III, expected PACTE results have been, to some extent, modified and re-packaged over the life of the project.

Baseline	Expected Results	Actual Results
<p>2. Lack of transparent and participatory process for allocation of revenues to communes and communal sections</p> <p>3. Commune budgets are used mostly (90 percent) for payroll</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clear set of allocation criteria established and disseminated to all communes • Commune budgets are allocated 60 percent for payroll, 30 percent for operating expenses, 10 percent for investments 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A July 1996 law established a special fund to be used exclusively by local governments and an 11-member commission composed mostly of representatives from nine departmental councils to manage the fund • A September 1996 law earmarks certain taxes to be used exclusively for local governments. Most communes and CASECs are made aware of it • The 11-member commission, although created, has never established formal criteria for distribution of funds among the various local government entities • Few communes have even prepared budgets; budgets that have been prepared are unrealistic; allocations from the central government are used almost entirely for payroll.
Associations of Local Authorities		
<p>1. Only 4 regional associations of elected authorities exist</p> <p>2. Associations have no secretariat, offices or financial resources</p> <p>3. Local elected officials do not engage in collaborative policy advocacy</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Associations cover all departments • Associations have permanent staff, offices and sustainable financial resources • Local elected officials lobby the central government to obtain greater authority and more resources 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regional associations, in fact, created in all 9 departments • A national association of mayors is created • FONACAD obtains official recognition • No associations, except FONACAD, have permanent staff, offices, or sustainable resources • The national mayors association (FENAMH) has drafted legislation and adopted resolutions to increase communes' authority and resources • FENAMH adopted resolutions rejecting the January 11, 1999 decision of the government to end their terms of office • As a result of the lobbying, mayors received additional resources (such as bank accounts), but no greater authority • The national association of CASECs (FONACAD) has also lobbied, but has received less direct assistance from PACTE than has FENAMH
Improved Performance of Local Governments		
<p>Weak management capacity among elected officials and commune staff</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 300 CASECs and 50 communes will have adopted new or improved administrative systems and procedures 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 62 communes have received formal training in a variety of areas (budgeting, preparation of municipal by-laws, etc.) as well as <i>à la carte</i> training, and follow-up training

Baseline	Expected Results	Actual Results
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 30 elected officials participated in overseas study tours and attended the annual meeting of the Interamerican conference of mayors • Little of this training has actually been applied to improve communal or communal section management
Improved Performance in Delivery of Goods and Services		
<p>1. Few formal mechanisms for citizen interest and group participation in provision and production of public goods and services</p> <p>2. Public goods and services non-existent or inadequate</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Operational stakeholder groups, including elected officials, exist with action agendas and plans in all target communes for key public goods and services • Increased satisfaction of citizen demands for public goods and services 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 17 communes have established formal mechanisms for identifying and prioritizing community needs; • 17 communes have developed 5-year, sector-specific action plans • 10 communes have received PACTE grants for a specific project identified as a priority. • No formal measures of satisfaction exist; interviews in selected communes, however, indicate a high level of satisfaction with the PACTE process and the outcomes • The "good" provided in these communes is provided by an artificially created entity, not through the commune itself.

For the most part, factors beyond the control of the project explain the reason for the many gaps between expected and actual results. These factors are explained in a subsequent section.

The Four PACTE Components

Which PACTE activities were most successful, which least?

As mentioned in the previous section, the most successful PACTE components were in its work with associations of elected officials and in its work with communes and CASECs in the delivery of goods and services. In contrast, its work in policy and legislation and in improved performance of local governments was less successful. The following sections analyze the activities and achievements of PACTE in each of these areas.

Policy and Legislation. One objective of PACTE was to help communal councils and CASECs increase their revenues through policy and legislation.

Tax and Tax Collection Authority. This was to be achieved, in part, through the passage of laws providing to these sub-national units of government the power of taxation and of tax collection and the authority to incur debt.

None of these objectives was achieved. Communal councils and CASECs still do not have the authority to impose or modify local taxes. All taxes are still collected, moreover, by the Revenue Service (Direction Générale des Impôts) of the Ministry of Finance. Neither can communes legally incur debt.

Some progress was made by the communes concerning their ability to retain locally tax proceeds. Existing laws provide that 80 percent of the proceeds from property taxes should stay in the commune and the remaining 20 percent should go to the central government. It also states that 90 percent of the proceeds from local business taxes should stay with the local government, while the remaining 10 percent should go to the central government. The central government decided, however, even without an amendment to the law and with some lobbying from the mayors' associations to give 100 percent of the proceeds of both taxes to the local government.

The decision to provide the entirety of local tax proceeds to the Communes was made, perhaps, because of the relatively small amounts that are collected from these local taxes. In 1996, PACTE proposed, as an indicator of success, that about 50 percent of communal tax proceeds should be raised from internal taxes, while 50 percent would come from central government contributions. An examination of Ministry of Finance reports for fiscal year 1997-1998 reveals that 89 percent of Communal income comes from central government contributions, and 11 percent from local taxes. The percentage of communal income derived from local taxes is actually lower than it was in 1996.

The Local Tax Base. Local commune taxes are derived mainly from two sources: a property tax and a business tax. In order to increase income from these sources, the first requirement is an updating of tax registries.

We found no evidence that communes had attempted to update business or professional registries. The result is that most registered businesses and professional associations have no incentive actually to pay the taxes they are required to pay. A very large number of businesses operate in the informal sector and are not registered at all.

Some work had been carried out in some communes on updating property tax registries, but these updating exercises were still works in progress. Communes that have attempted to re-evaluate and re-assess property values are using forms that were provided by UNDP. We noted that many of these forms were incorrectly completed.

The property tax is called, in French, "Contribution Foncière des Propriétés Bâties – CFPB." Unlike in the United States, the CFPB is not levied on the re-sale value of a property, but on its rental value. Our examination of a sampling of forms in two communes revealed that the rental value of many properties is grossly under-valued.

One example was the assessment on a hotel in a large city. The 31 rooms in that hotel rented for an average of \$80 a day. The occupancy rate was about 45 percent. Gross annual income from the rooms (not counting the restaurant and the bar) could, therefore, be estimated at about \$400,000. Perhaps the bar and restaurant brought in another \$100,000, bringing gross

income to about \$500,000. The annual rental value for this hotel on the UNDP form we examined was 60,000 gourdes (about US \$3,333). The assessment was 12 percent of this amount or 7200 gourdes (about \$400).

It took little more than a cursory examination of communal accounts (or the lack thereof) for the evaluation team to conclude that there is a great potential for increased income from local taxes. Increasing revenue would not even require new taxes or an increase in the rates of existing taxes. Revenue could be greatly increased simply by increasing tax collection and by making more realistic property tax valuations.

Transparency in the Distribution of Income to Communes. One of the positive changes that has occurred over the last four years is an increase in transparency concerning the methods used for allocating income to communes. In the past, the way funds were distributed was known only to central government authorities. Now because of the three laws previously described, mayors and members of CASECs have a great deal more knowledge about the process involved. In theory, moreover, they participate, even manage, the process through their membership in the 11-member commission. (The commission only actually functioned for 3 months – October through December of 1998; it was dismantled because of the Presidential decree of January 11, 1999.)

PACTE contributed, at least indirectly, to these changes, mainly through its assistance in the organization of mayors (see next section.).

Use of Budgets by Communes. At the beginning of the project, most communes' budgets were being used mostly to meet payroll expenses. PACTE was supposed to work with communes such that only 60% of the budget would be used for payroll, 30% for services, and 10% for investments. As mentioned previously, most (in some cases the entirety of) communal budgets is still being used for payroll.

In reality, most communes do not have budgets. There is no budget preparation or approval process. Allocations to communes are based largely on the previous year's allocations.

Some of the more well-heeled communes are providing some services. We found, for example, that larger communes provide some street cleaning in the town center. Some building inspections were occurring in Jacmel. The Commune of Cabaret was contributing to the operations of 12 schools. But these examples are exceptions to the overall finding that most communes are providing very few services.

Communes also have no investment budget. What most mayors are doing is acting as fund-raisers. They see their jobs as intermediaries between their communes and external sources of income, such as the central government or donors.

Associations of Elected Officials. One of the clear-cut successes of PACTE was in its work in strengthening mayors' associations. As mentioned previously, in 1995, there were only four regional associations of mayors and a national association of CASECs. By the end of 1998, there were 10 regional mayors associations, a national mayors association and the

national CASEC association. Six of the ten regional associations plus FENAMH were created with PACTE assistance.

The National Association of Haitian Mayors (FENAMH). FENAMH, which PACTE helped create in August 1997, has been an especially powerful organization advancing the cause of decentralization. FENAMH was instrumental, for example, in getting the central government to pass the revenue-related laws mentioned earlier in this section. Pressure from FENAMH also helped communal governments obtain additional resources from the central government (an additional contribution in 1997-1998, for example) and their own bank accounts.

In 1997, the Senate of the National Assembly passed a law to clarify the general authorities of, and the relationships between, sub-national units of government. (The law stopped short of prescribing specific responsibilities and fiscal authorities.) The law was then sent to the Chamber of Deputies for discussion. In the meantime, FENAMH took issue with a number of the articles in this law and prepared alternative texts to these articles. The association produced a document that presented the Senate version of the law alongside the FENAMH version. A FENAMH delegation was received by the Interior Committees of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies to discuss these differences. In the end, however, no law, was actually passed because, shortly after the meeting between FENAMH and the two parliamentary committees, the country's political crisis effectively paralyzed the National Assembly.

In addition, in March 1998, following its General Assembly, FENAMH adopted six resolutions concerning the relationship between local governments and the central government and between civil society and local governments. The resolutions were prepared prior to the Assembly by FENAMH committees. The resolutions were on the following topics:

- Relationship between the Central Government and Local Governments
- Financial Resources of Local Governments
- Local Governments and Agricultural Reform
- Local Government and Women in Development
- Investment Promotion in Local Governments
- International Cooperation and Local Governments

These resolutions were published in five issues of the daily newspaper "*Le Nouvelliste*." Because of the country's political crisis, FENAMH has not been able to use these resolutions for lobbying. They remain, however, potent documents that can still be used in future advocacy campaigns.

FENAMH also adopted resolutions rejecting the January 11, 1999 decision by the President to put an end to the terms of elected officials. These resolutions and follow-up meetings had a clear influence on subsequent central government pronouncements. On January 25, 1999, for example, the President decreed that most former mayors would be retained but that they would become agents of the executive branch of government. Shortly thereafter, the Minister

of Interior, reacting to pressure from FENAMH, explained that the mayors would, notwithstanding their change in title, retain their administrative and financial autonomy.

FONACAD has also exercised some pressure on the central government to obtain more power and resources. This association has, however, received less support from PACTE than has FENAMH.

Associations' Sustainability. PACTE was to help provide the regional associations, FENAMH, and FONACAD achieve administrative and financial sustainability. One success in this regard is that FONACAD, FENAMH and six of the regional mayors associations have obtained official recognition. They also have internal statutes and boards of directors. However, with the exception of FONACAD, which has its own office, none of the associations has offices, staff, or independent budgets. FENAMH has been using ARD facilities for its meeting place. The regional associations do not have their own offices.

The political crisis has, of course, made it impossible, for the time being, for these associations to function since, legally, Haiti no longer has any locally elected officials. Once elections are held and new mayors and CASECs take office, the new USAID program should build on the successes of the current program to continue its work with these associations.

Local Government Performance in Management, Accountability and Transparency. The vast majority of mayors and CASEC members who took office as a result of the local elections of June 1995 had little or no experience in governance. The same was true for most of the professional staff in the communes. Most elected officials and commune staff had never prepared a budget, had no experience in planning, had never issued an ordinance. There was a vast need, therefore to prepare elected officials and their staff for the responsibilities of governance.

PACTE's principal strategy for responding to this need was to prepare and deliver formal training to large numbers of elected officials and professional staff in communes and communal sections. The idea was that this training would be applied to improve communal management.

Training. To this end, PACTE prepared six training modules, each of which contained a handbook for participants as well as a trainers guide. These handbooks and guides were all prepared in Créole, which, since 1987 has, along with French, been recognized, constitutionally, as an official language in Haiti.

The six modules are as follows:

1. **Communicating in Créole.** Virtually all Haitians speak Créole as their first language. Not all Haitians, however, are able to read and write the language. This is especially true when it comes to familiarity with the written vocabulary of governance. Few mayors, for example, were, in 1995, able to write correctly in Créole such terms as fiscal year (*ane fiskal*), municipal council (*konsèy minisipal*), or minutes of a meeting (*pwochè vèbal*).

2. **Budgeting.** Before 1995, municipal budgets either did not exist or were prepared by the central government. Virtually none of the newly elected officials had even rudimentary experience with budgeting techniques.
3. **Preparation of Municipal Ordinances.** The authority for mayors to prepare ordinances (*arrêtés*) stems from a 1982 law when communes were still run by presidential appointees. Virtually none of the newly elected officials in 1995 had any experience in the preparation or writing of ordinances.
4. **Project Design.** Most communes and CASECs, especially in rural areas, see their main jobs as promoting economic and social development. Traditionally, the principal vehicle for development is investment projects, most often with external financing. This module was designed, therefore, to train mayors and commune staff in such skills as project identification, project planning, the preparation of feasibility studies, project implementation, project monitoring, and project evaluation.
5. **Effective Leadership.** As mentioned, local governance had, in the past, been exercised through the arbitrary and sometimes brutal command of appointed mayors and section chiefs, who were appointed by the army. The purpose of this module was to train mayors and CASEC members in modern methods of leadership, involving such skills as consensus building, motivation and supervision of personnel, delegation of power, and problem identification and resolution.
6. **Municipal Administration.** The elections of 1995 created a new generation of mayors most of whom had no experience in public administration. The module prepared contained lessons in such subjects as personnel administration, file management, payroll, performance evaluation, and preparation of official memoranda.

By December 1998, PACTE had conducted 59 training seminars in 62 of Haiti's 133 communes. The following table presents data on generic training through December 1998.¹¹

Fifteen percent of the participants in these training sessions were women. This is actually a larger representation of women than in the training pool because only seven percent of the mayors elected in 1995 were women.

¹¹ Associates in Rural Development. *Third Annual Work Plan*. October 1998, page 23. There is no accurate figure on the total number of participants because many mayors and CASEC members participated in more than one seminar.

Table 2: Generic Training Activity Levels and Outputs (through 1998)

Module	Certified Trainers	Communes	No. of Participants Trained		
			Male	Female	Total
Municipal Ordinances	9	47	189	19	208
Leadership	7	49	246	45	285
Créole Communication	10	30	121	33	154
Budget Preparation and Management	13	35	164	27	191
Project Design and Management	16	7	30	4	34
Municipal Administration		6	6	29	35

By late 1998, PACTE had also begun preparation and testing of another module called – "meetings and participation." The events of January 1999, caused PACTE to stop work on this module. The entire training component, in fact, was halted by USAID's decision that PACTE could no longer work directly with mayors and CASEC members after the January 11, 1999 decision by President Préval that ended their elected terms of office.

PACTE also planned to conduct what it refers to as "*à la carte* training" and "sustained interventions." The former would consist of training in response to emerging needs in target communes. The latter would consist of provision of information through radio programs and a local government newspaper, post-training workshops, and overseas study tours.

The ARD quarterly reports contain no specific reporting on "*à la carte* training." Before the training component was halted, there did occur five post-training workshops on municipal ordinances and on budget preparation. The workshops on municipal ordinances helped a certain number of mayors actually prepare ordinances. PACTE also worked with FENAMH to publish two newsletters. In addition, several radio broadcasts were made to publicize PACTE activities.

PACTE also financed the participation of some 30 Haitian mayors in the Interamerican Conference of Mayors in Miami in 1996, 1997 and 1998. Nine mayors, including 3 women, attended the 1998 conference. The mayors who attended these conferences participated in extended study tours that provided them with an opportunity to visit selected cities in Florida, meet with mayors and municipal staff, and discuss issues of common interest.

Application of Training. The interviews that the evaluation team conducted with mayors and other commune staff indicated that the PACTE training sessions were extremely well received. All respondents indicated that the training was well done and that they had learned a great deal.

On the other hand, evidence that the lessons learned from the training had been applied to improve communal management was, at best, uneven. Overall, the evaluation team concluded that, over the last four years, there has been little discernible improvement in local government management that resulted from the training.

A partial exception is in the preparation of **municipal ordinances**. In St. Louis du Sud, for example, the mayor indicated that he had passed ordinances prohibiting stray animals, the dumping of construction equipment along roadways, and the use of state lands for public utilities. Altogether, nine communes have prepared a total of 17 such ordinances. The training provided by PACTE in Créole communication would certainly have been of assistance, moreover, in drafting these ordinances.

There is considerable uncertainty, however, about the legality and enforceability of these ordinances. Some believe a pre-constitutional 1982 law is sufficient for current mayors to issue municipal ordinances. Others argue that since the National Assembly has never passed legislation providing for the functioning of communes, no acts taken by the communes have the force of law. Still others argue that the 1987 constitution provides that municipal ordinances be approved by municipal assemblies before they are legal. Since municipal assemblies were only established (more strictly created from the elections of ASECs) in 1997, no ordinances passed prior to that time could be considered legal. Moreover, even after the elections of 1997, none of the ordinances issued by the mayors were actually approved by municipal assemblies. Since the elections of 1997 were contested, most mayors refused, in any case, to cooperate with municipal assemblies. For these reasons, it is doubtful whether the ordinances that have been issued by mayors have been or could be enforced.

Some mayors interviewed indicated that they had prepared **budgets** using the lessons acquired through PACTE training. But only one mayor had bothered to submit his budget to the central government. When asked what happened to it, he indicated that it had remained "in a drawer." In no case had budgets ever been debated or discussed by municipal assemblies. There is no evidence, moreover, that budgets are actually used to manage communes.

As mentioned, most municipal budgets are used for personnel. The city of Jacmel, for example, employs 86 personnel. According to the mayor, there is no money for services. When asked what the 86 personnel do, the mayor could not answer. The only service that was semi-regularly provided in the larger communes was street cleaning. Some communes also provide permits for special events and provide occasional services such as burials for paupers. It would not be too much of an exaggeration to conclude that in many, if not most, communes services are simply not being provided at all and that the principal function of communes is employment creation.

Evidence of the application of training in **leadership** and **project design and management** is most applicable to the component to be discussed in the next section.

Local Government Performance in the Provision of Public Goods and Services. The overall finding in the last section was that communes are providing very few services to their constituents. There is, however, a very important qualification to this finding. Although most communes are not providing services directly, some have, in fact, increased their capacity, through the work of PACTE, to provide services indirectly.

Of even greater importance, the services that are being provided in these communes are directly responsive to citizen demands. The result is that, in these communes, there has occurred a demonstrably greater increase in collaboration between citizens and local governments and in citizen confidence in local government. In a word, there has occurred a qualitative improvement in governance.

Strategic Approach. From the beginning, PACTE has had a very clear and distinctive approach to the implementation of activities in this arena. The approach emphasizes the creation of partnerships between citizens and public authorities to identify and resolve community problems. The approach is designed to address directly an important underlying problem of governance, a lack of collaboration and trust between citizens and local authorities.

As mentioned previously, local governance in Haiti had previously been characterized by the arbitrary and sometimes brutal rule of appointed mayors and section chiefs. Because these local officials were appointed, they had little incentive to be responsive to citizen demands or to govern in a transparent manner. The PACTE approach was to capitalize on the fact that the post-1995 elected status of local officials provided them with an incentive to be responsive to constituent demands.

The PACTE approach focused on engaging public authorities and civil society in a collaborative process of problem identification and problem solving that would eventuate in the improved provision of goods and services. The most important outcome of this process was not so much the particular set of goods and services provided, but the institutionalization of an inclusive and democratic process of problem solving involving all stakeholders. Included among these stakeholders would be elected officials, representatives of deconcentrated central government agencies, community leaders, private sector actors, and citizens at large.

The implementation of this approach involves several concrete steps:

- **Orientation.** The PACTE approach is described in a meeting of elected officials and community leaders. It is important to note that participants in this initial meeting include representatives of each of the communal sections in the commune.
- **Institutional Inventory.** The inventory covers community organizations as well as an institutional analysis of local government resources and services.
- **Vision Workshops.** These workshops are conducted in each communal section. Their purpose is to get CASECs and community leaders to identify and prioritize their problems and needs.
- **Synthesis Workshop.** This workshop brings together representatives of the commune and communal sections (elected officials and community leaders) to discuss the results of their vision workshops. The result of the synthesis workshop is two-fold: (1) a vision for

a five-year development plan for the commune and (2) the selection of a single sector (domain) to receive priority.

- **Election of a Communal Committee.** A committee is elected to oversee the implementation of the plan.
- **Project Identification and Feasibility Study.** The committee decides on a single project and hires a firm to undertake a feasibility study.
- **Project Implementation.** The committee applies to PACTE for a grant to finance the project and implementation begins.
- **Creation of a Management Institution.** The communal committee creates a formal organization and elects a management committee or board of directors. In theory, the institution is formally created by a municipal ordinance and obtains official recognition by the central government. The institution is responsible for identifying, planning, and implementing other investment projects (as part of the 5-year plan) on behalf of the commune.

Achievements and Impact. Originally, PACTE was to initiate this process in 50 of Haiti's 133 communes. Later the target was scaled down to 18 communes. To date, the process has been initiated in 17 communes. Eleven of these had reached the grant stage prior to the political crisis of January 1999. Of these 11, 10 proceeded into 1999.

The evaluation team was able to visit 5 of the communes in which this process had progressed to a relatively mature stage (Torbeck, Cavaillon, St. Louis du Sud, Maniche, and Cabaret). The following observations are based on the team's direct observations in these communes plus its examination of documents and its interviews with participants and PACTE staff.

Perhaps the most important observation is that the activities in this component of PACTE have been very successful in creating improved democratic governance in the targeted communes. The approach has increased collaboration between civil society and government officials aimed at community problem solving. The approach has been consciously participatory and inclusive. It has consciously emphasized responsiveness and transparency.

The difference between this approach and previous modes of governance is stark. Previously, local government officials had virtually no experience in governing in collaboration with civil society. Conversely, civil society had had virtually no experience in engaging local government in a systematic fashion to seek ways of addressing and resolving community problems. PACTE activities in this component have demonstrated the value of governance based on partnership and collaboration rather than hostility and mistrust.

The impact of these activities has, to be sure, been limited. The process has reached only 17 of 133 communes. Its concrete achievements have also, as will be discussed below, fallen

short of its intentions. Before discussing these shortcomings, however, it is important to emphasize the evaluation team's principal conclusion


Our principal conclusion is that the overall model is sound. It is a model that, with certain adjustments, can and should be used in future local governance assistance programs. The key to the success of the approach is that it strengthens governance through concrete problem solving. It takes the virtues of good governance—participation, responsiveness, inclusiveness, and transparency—out of the classroom and into the arena of civic action. Government officials and community participants learn the value of democratic governance through their application to the resolution of problems that are of immediate concern to their communities.

The approach as actually applied also had a number of shortcomings:

- It was lengthy. The evaluation team attended the official opening of a project that was financed by PACTE in the commune of Cabaret (two water kiosks). The opening of the faucets that day took place fully 3 years after the initial orientation meeting in that commune. One of the consequences of this lengthy process was that many of the participants lost interest.
- It did not create within the communal government itself an institutionalized capacity to provide services. The institutions that were established in the targeted communities were not government institutions. Rather, they were private or cooperative civil society organizations created outside the structure of government.
- Some of the organizations that were created to manage the process had dubious legal or institutional legitimacy. Few had actually benefited from creation by municipal ordinance or had been recognized by the central government. This in turn raises questions about their sustainability.
- In the eyes of many participants the real value or pay-off of the process was the concrete project rather than improved governance. In St. Louis du Sud, for example, the communal committee had initially decided that the community's priority should be in the education sector and, more specifically, the establishment of a vocational training center for women. When the price tag for this center was established, however, and when the committee learned that the PACTE grant would only cover about one-half of its cost, the committee abruptly changed its priority to agriculture and the financing of a more affordable project—namely a rice, corn, and sorghum mill.
- The approach did not require participants to take financial risk. Most of the financial contribution came from PACTE rather than from local government or from other civil society. Participants' contributions were almost entirely in kind rather than cash.
- The approach did not include a long-range view of how income from the initial project might be re-invested in additional projects in the five-year plan.

What Factors Contributed to the Success or Lack Thereof of Pacte?

As in any project, successes or failures are determined by a combination of factors – some internal to the project, some external. The model can be illustrated as follows:



In general, the evaluation team believes that PACTE has been quite successful when the weight of external factors is taken into consideration. The following sections discuss each of these sets of factors briefly.

Internal Factors. The overall design of the local government component of DEP (i.e., the PACTE project) was sound. The project was designed to strengthen local governance by working at two levels: directly with local government on institutional strengthening and more indirectly with central government to influence decentralization policy.

In retrospect, however, project designers underestimated the difficulties inherent in working to change decentralization policies in Haiti. One factor that was underestimated was the resistance to decentralization by the country's economic and political elite; this will be discussed in more detail in Chapter V. Another factor that was underestimated was the impact of restrictions contained in U.S. foreign assistance legislation—namely the Dole-Helms amendment—on the ability of the local government component to achieve its objectives.

The future program should not fail to learn the lesson that support from the central government is critical to the success of any local governance program. This means that decentralization projects must work directly with central government institutions, such as the National Assembly, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of the Interior, that play key roles in decentralization. The new program must also be cognizant of potential constraints contained in U.S. legislation.

On balance, the strategic approach employed in component four was more successful than the approach used in component three. Both were aimed at improving the performance of local government, component three in management, component four in provision of services. The approach in component three was largely that of broad-based training, while that in component four was an approach of action-based training. The difference is, we believe, critical. Broad-based (generic) training is too often dissipated if participants find no immediate application of the training.

Communal mayors and staff who received training in budget preparation, for example, will likely lose much of the value of this training for lack of an opportunity (due to external factors) to apply it immediately. If and when circumstances allow for communes to prepare and manage their own budgets, moreover, it is not unlikely that new mayors will have been elected who will not have received this training.

The approach in component four, on the other hand, used an experiential approach to learning. The approach provided incentives for participants to learn based on a desire to address and resolve problems that were of immediate concern. The governance lessons learned by participants were, moreover, reinforced by immediate application.

External Factors. Several external factors contributed positively to project achievements.

The most obvious was the reinstatement of constitutional democracy beginning with the return of President Aristide in October 1994. This event, coupled with the orderly passing of the reins to a new president in 1995, created a climate that promoted freedom of speech and association and the exercise of democratic rights, thus encouraging the resurgence of civil society. It provided the new government with the legitimacy needed to motivate citizens and attract donor assistance. The dismantling of the army also helped decrease incidences of political violence.

These circumstances helped create a new wave of donor and NGO assistance directed at strengthening democratic governance. In addition to USAID, important donors included UNDP and the European Union. The UNDP, for example, helped design the forms being used for cadastral surveys and property valuations and helped train commune staff in completing these forms.

A number of external factors also created major obstacles to the success of PACTE. The most obvious is the deepening political crisis. For much of the life of the project, Haiti was operating without a functioning parliament or government. Political parties have been positioning themselves for the presidential elections in 2000, paying little attention to local issues. The paralysis of government meant that much of the legislation needed to provide the legal framework for decentralization has yet to be passed.

Of more recent import, the events of January 1999 effectively halted project activities for two months. More precisely, USAID/Haiti applied the provisions of the Dole-Helms amendment to the foreign assistance act to temporarily close down the project. (Application of the Dole-Helms amendment also adversely affected PACTE's earlier attempts to cultivate relationships with the National Assembly and the executive branch of the central government in Haiti.) It was not until March 1999 that USAID provided PACTE with instructions about what it could and could not do. For all of 1999, PACTE has been prohibited from working directly with the former mayors, now "executive agents," because of their non-elected status. This meant, in effect, that only component four could be continued and even with that, PACTE could work only with civil society, not directly with local government.

Are The Local Government Objectives as Described in the DEP Still Valid? How Should They Be Changed?

The broad local government objectives of the DEP are to strengthen the capacity of selected local government entities at the communal section, commune, and departmental level and to create a national level association of elected commune officials. These objectives are still valid. However, as mentioned above, central government institutions and policies cannot be ignored, because of their importance for decentralized governance.

Of critical importance, moreover, is to insure that all the institutions needed for constitutional legitimacy of local governance are in place. This includes deliberative bodies at all levels: ASECs, municipal assemblies, and departmental and interdepartmental councils. The latter is especially important because it has a constitutionally prescribed role to play in determining the allocation of resources among sub-national units of government.

Of equal importance is to insure that a basic body of laws is created that provides a legal basis for the functioning of all local governance bodies. At present, a law exists that covers CASECs and ASECs. But there is no similar law for communes. In practical terms what this means is that PACTE has been attempting to strengthen commune governments without these government having any legal basis for operations.

Thus, while DEP local government objectives are still valid, they are not complete. Added to them must be objectives relating to the creation and legal empowerment of sub-national units of government.

Were There Unintended Consequences and/or Effects of USAID-Funded Local Governance Activities?

In Component 4, PACTE has developed an effective methodology for promoting collaboration between various segments of civil society and among civil society, locally elected officials, representatives of deconcentrated central government services, community leaders.

While many of the expected results in this component have been achieved, as detailed in a previous section, there were also some unexpected results.

The Creation of Private, Rather than Public, Services. In the 17 communes in which PACTE has initiated activities in component four, it has created new organizations. These organizations, which have names like the Agro-Economic Enterprise of Torbeck (SAET), Organization for the Socioeconomic Promotion of St. Louis du Sud (OPSES), or Committee for the Socioeconomic Development of the Commune de Cabaret, were created to manage the five-year development process, not just the single project financed by PACTE.

It was expected that these organizations would have a public character or would be public-private in nature. The unintended consequence is that all these organizations are essentially

private. Although mayors and some CASEC members were in all cases instrumental in helping establish these organizations and are still, to varying degrees, active in them, the organizations themselves cannot be considered departments or extensions of the commune governments.

This unintended consequence has both a negative and a positive side. On the one hand, the organizations clearly cannot be counted in any balance sheet of government assets. They do not, in and of themselves, strengthen the ability of communes to provide services.

On the other hand, the organizations and the service (or services) they will provide were clearly created with public assistance. In some cases (Torbeck, for example), commune money was contributed. In all cases, the mayor or mayors in the commune played a pivotal role in their establishment. In a sense, the mayors were gaining largely unexpected experience in the promotional side of municipal or economic development. The mayors were, in effect, acting as heads of small municipal economic development departments.

It remains to be seen to what extent these organizations will continue to promote other social and economic initiatives. Clearly, their chance of doing so will be enhanced by the continued support of public authorities.

Grantsmanship. A closely related point is that, in the eyes of many of the participants in the communal organizations that PACTE helped create, the main purpose for creating the organization was to receive funding for the project. Many of the founders and managers of these organizations are well aware that the organizations have goals that go beyond the PACTE-funded project (the tractors, the rice mills, the water kiosks). But our interviews revealed little concrete interest in pursuing these larger objectives. Few members of these organizations were able to discuss any plans that went beyond the immediate project. It is hard to avoid the conclusion, therefore, that the organizations are seen by many, perhaps most, participants mainly as vehicles for receiving grants from NGOs and international donors.

CIVIL SOCIETY

This section discusses changes in civil society during the past five years and the impact of ADF-Asosye and other factors on these changes.

Changes in Civil Society from 1994 to 1999

The return of constitutional order created new “space” for civil society actions. Somewhat timidly at first, civil society went about restructuring grassroots organizations. This was a difficult task due to the rapid pace of change in the overall political context.

New Space

There was one positive consequence of the *coup d'état*. After three years of intense repression, a broad range of social sectors were sensitized to the need for citizen involvement in national issues, and the renewed importance of civil society.

Many new civil society organizations (CSOs) emerged. Some CSOs, such as PHAPDA (Plateforme Haïtienne de Plaidoyer pour un Développement Alternatif), organized around public sector concerns. The private sector took new initiatives via organizations such as CLED (Centre pour la Libre Entreprise et la Démocratie), an association of young professionals and entrepreneurs supporting democratic development; the Chambers of Commerce, and the SOGEBANK Foundation in the financial sector. MEDA (Mennonite Economic Development Association), an international non-governmental organization (NGO), founded SHEC (Société Haïtienne d'Épargne et de Crédit), a savings-and-loan institution comparable to a commercial bank. Many grassroots organizations have been very active in the economic sector including small enterprise development, cooperatives, and savings-and-loan associations. For instance, the Caisse Espoir in Gros Morne has successfully brought together 16 small savings-and-loan associations with a total capital base of 19 million gourdes.

Obstacles to Reconstruction

Despite these initiatives, other factors have had a dampening effect on Haitian civil society. Between 1986 and 1994, civil society was actively involved in the political process, organizing around one major objective—the return of legitimate government. After 1994, the rapidly changing political situation left little margin for civil society to regroup.

In addition, party politics quickly imposed itself on civil society. As a result, civil society has had difficulty sustaining itself as an independent force. For example, the two most important rural movements in Haiti—the *Mouvman Peyizan Papay* (MPP) and *Tèt Kole Ti Peyizan*—have been unable to shed an image of political partisanship acquired in recent times. As a result of this politicization, many civil society organizations have had difficulty retaining the support of traditional constituencies.

There is a broad-based perception in Haiti that politics and government are corrupt. This perception stems from the prevalence of patron-client relations in politics, suspicion of vote buying and of paying people to demonstrate, “paid” journalism, and the use of public position for personal and partisan advantage. These are old patterns of political behavior. The present atmosphere of intense partisanship invites suspicion of any campaign perceived as “political”—including civic actions unrelated to support for particular candidates and parties. NGOs that supported grassroots groups during their first 15 to 20 years of existence have become very cautious due to the influence of party politics.

Older CSOs are confronted with a crisis of leadership and credibility. Grassroots organizations have twice offered up their leaders as candidates for public office; however,

once in office such leaders have proved unable to bring about significant change and have sometimes been corrupt. Consequently, many grassroots leaders have been discredited and lost the confidence of their traditional constituency.

The traffic in drugs has been a corrupting influence, generating a negative view of government officials in general, especially the police. In some areas, such as the Southeast Department, some civil society organizations have reportedly ceased to operate due to the divisive influence of the drug trade.

Under these fragile conditions, civil society has tended to have a declining influence on public officials. Many current officials came to office from civil society organizations. As a result they may be less subject to CSO pressures. This applies to all levels, from the presidency down to the CASEC.

The Impact of Asosye on Haitian Civil Society

Asosye focused on *advocacy training* and several forms of civic education, especially *national dialogues*. The *grant making* and *public information campaigns* were tools that supported these primary program areas. Asosye introduced significant modifications into its program during the last two years of operation. By the end of the funding cycle, the revised program had added two major sets of activities:

- Capacity building
- CSO civic action centers or CEDACs (*Centres d'Action Civique*)

These changes flowed from an internal Asosye program assessment, which concluded that:

- CSOs were not planning and carrying out advocacy campaigns as intended
- Many CSOs had weak organizational structures and lacked certain skills

In response to these problems, *Asosye added capacity building (training) prior to doing advocacy training with CSOs deemed unable to carry out advocacy campaigns*. The new emphasis on capacity building included new training modules in democratic leadership, board management, financial management, and conflict resolution.

Secondly, *Asosye decentralized its operations to regional centers*. The project added an entirely new program element in the latter months of the contract: *civic action centers* (CEDACs) in provincial towns and cities where national and regional dialogues had been carried out. The CEDAC program was intended to promote civic action at the regional level by creating a physical space for meetings and office facilities. The presence of CEDACs also made it easier logistically to organize additional training programs and regional dialogues (*mini-débats*) supported by Asosye.

The first three CEDACs (Jacmel, Gonaïves, Cap-Haïtien) were established in May 1999, just prior to the end of the ADF contract. During the period of project evaluation presently

underway, additional CEDACs are opening in Cayes, Ouanaminthe, Fort Liberté, St. Marc, Petit Goave, and Croix des Bouquets, for a total of nine by the end of the calendar year.

Did Asosye Achieve Its Objectives?

Key Findings. CSO customers of Asosye have demonstrated a significant degree of resilience, and a willingness to engage in open debate of important national issues.

CSO customers have been less willing or able to act upon these debates in practical ways.

CSO expectations of external financing to underwrite the cost of CSO advocacy campaigns have undercut the goal of facilitating CSO campaigns.

Critical targets advocacy, such as policy makers in central government, require strong advocacy at the center as well as at the periphery.

Shifting Strategy. Discrete program areas rather than an inter-linked package of interventions tended, at least initially, to hamper the project. To its credit, the project sought to rectify these problems by introducing changes midstream. The project “strategy” has been a moving target within the shifting sands of Haitian politics. The current language of project documents suggests an emergent, more coherent methodology. This emergent strategy is only now being tested in the field.

Key Elements of Change:

- Reduced emphasis on generalized advocacy training for CSO groups in general
- More emphasis on focused training in lieu of a scattershot approach
- Training of “affinity groups” – for example CSOs interested in education
- Promotion of coalitions as a strategy for more effective advocacy
- Decreased use of grants
- More emphasis on technical assistance
- CSO self-financing
- Program decentralization
- Basic skills training as a prelude to advocacy training
- Inter-linkage of project components.

The project has begun to emphasize the need for CSO self-financing rather than skills in grantsmanship. At present, the project is not advertising its grant fund to the general public, nor soliciting competitive proposals. This is significant in light of the politically charged atmosphere in which CSOs operate, especially in Port-au-Prince and other major urban centers. Field interviews suggest that the grants program has been a bone of contention, generating resentment among CSOs whose grant proposals did not fulfill project criteria, or attracting charges of political favoritism.

The project still has a national focus, but it has shifted away from an emphasis on Port-au-Prince in favor of a more decentralized program touching regional centers. There are drawbacks in de-emphasizing Port-au-Prince. Only parliament can pass the enabling legislation required for decentralization. The project does not have sufficient resources to be a truly national program. Therefore, it may be impossible to foster a “critical mass” of CSO advocates on the national level. Instead, Asosye should focus its efforts on key pressure points, more capable CSOs, and influential sectors.

Overall, project components have tended to become more closely inter-linked. This emergent methodology has not yet proved itself. Will it result in the self-financing of CEDACs, as planned, and the emergence of coalitions able to carry out specific, self-financed campaigns of civic action, resulting in genuine policy change? Has conflict mediation training been applied independently of Asosye? Have CSOs mounted civic action campaigns. These should be key indicators. Asosye should facilitate or provide technical assistance to specific campaigns.

In keeping with its overall purpose, the project has diffused a great deal of civic information to the citizenry through national dialogues and radio broadcasts, including knowledge of government and democratic values. The National Survey of Democratic values (1997) verifies the importance of radio as by far the most important medium of mass communications in Haiti.

As the project decentralizes its program, it should make better use of the network of community radio stations. This rapidly growing network is an important innovation of the 1990s, and should be used to target geographically focused audiences, including women and the rural poor. Community radio stations are commonly used to communicate personal messages and are therefore a potential communications link for CEDAC member-associations or for regional coalitions.

Media campaigns would be more effective if linked to specific advocacy campaigns, incorporating public media into concrete action plans carried out by CSOs. At the national level, media campaigns should be coordinated with CSO lobbying of parliament on decentralization issues or revision of the law on associations. At the local level, CSO links with local government and public services should be supported by local radio.

Social Sectors. In terms of targeted sectors, the project’s mass media campaigns touched all social sectors. Dialogues and the CEDACs have drawn in private sector CSOs, especially Chambers of Commerce in Cap-Haïtien and Jacmel. Youth are well represented in dialogues, mini-debates, training and the CEDAC program. Women’s groups participate in project activities; however, *greater effort should be made to recruit women’s groups, including groups engaged in economic ventures.* Savings and loan associations have a growing strength in many rural areas but are less well represented in Asosye activities.

The project has provided services to labor unions but this is an under-served sector due to the perceived “politicization” of unions. The urban poor appear to be under-served by the

project. Urban *quartiers populaires* tend to have a greater number of “politicized” pressure groups deemed unable to engage in non-partisan forums; however, *urban grassroots organizations should be given a higher priority for program outreach*. For example, water committees in slum neighborhoods have amply demonstrated their ability to engage in local advocacy campaigns focused on concrete issues such as potable water.

The team has successfully brought together the private sector and other social sectors to discuss concrete issues (tourism, environment, potable water). For example, the team noted a tendency for Chamber of Commerce representatives in Cap-Haïtien to dismiss virtually all grassroots organizations as inconsequential and potentially violent “OP” (*organisations populaires*); however, these same individuals showed themselves open to collaborating with CEDAC member-associations—all of whom were grassroots organizations. This speaks well of the Asosye strategy.

Results. The project revised its outputs in keeping with the USAID Results Framework introduced after the project was implemented. How does it measure up against anticipated results?

Anticipated result: Increased number of opportunities for CSOs and government to engage in non-partisan, non-exclusive consultation on issues of policy-making, legislation, etc.

The program has created increased opportunity for CSOs to meet together for such consultation, including CSO/government consultation. There is no evidence that consultations have resulted in pertinent legislation (an unattainable result in 1999 due to the dissolution of parliament, and an unlikely result in 1998 due to the inability of this parliament to pass any laws).

Anticipated result: Increased effectiveness of civil society organizations engaged in advocacy, civic education, and the mobilization of constituencies

This result requires specific indicators. One indicator would be active campaigns. By this measure, the CSOs have not been successful; however, there is strong evidence that CSOs are better informed and have been able to mobilize constituencies for training and discussions.

Anticipated result: Active representation of un(der) represented sectors of the population, including women, rural poor, and urban poor.

Asosye activities have incorporated these traditionally underrepresented sectors. Women’s groups are represented but should be recruited on a larger scale. The rural poor are represented in some measure. The urban poor are under-represented, especially in the teeming slums of Port-au-Prince.

Anticipated results: Increased practice of civil journalism including better coverage of the issues, consultation and or collaboration between civil society and the state, and CSO actions.

The national dialogues have successfully increased civic journalism via media coverage and radio programs. Coverage of CSO concerns and CSO/government consultation is inadequate due to the absence of parliament and elected officials, but also—and perhaps more importantly—to the absence of CSO advocacy campaigns. Asosye is presently continuing its program of national dialogues, and helping CEDAC member-associations to organize monthly radio programs.

Anticipated result: Increased tolerance and respect for differing opinions, as well as a sense that working within the system works.

The “system” has proved unreliable and without credibility in the eyes of most citizens. A broad range of interviewees in this evaluation—including local government officials—expect little from the system; however, local officials express openness to collaboration with civil society organizations. Furthermore, CSO members interviewed use the language of “tolerance” and demonstrate an ability to work together despite differing political party affiliations. They have demonstrated an ability to engage in “open debate” in a “non-partisan” setting. They show knowledge of “citizen rights and responsibilities, and tolerance toward others.” There’s ample evidence of “participation and collaboration” in peaceful forums supported by the project. These are impressive achievements of the Asosye program.

Which Asosye Activities Were Most Successful, Which Least?

National Dialogues. This program area has been the most successful of Asosye activities. During Asosye I, three major themes were treated in all departmental capitals, and twice in Jacmel, Cap-Haïtien, and Gonaïves (Asosye is presently organizing around a fourth theme). In each case a final dialogue at the national level followed the regional dialogues:

- Decentralization and Citizen Participation (Nov 1997-March 1998)
- Economic Growth and Poverty Alleviation (June-October 1998)
- Environment (November-December 1998)
- Civil Society and the Electoral Process (July 1999 - ongoing)

The regional dialogues brought together representatives of local government (communes, CASECs), deconcentrated government (departmental representatives of the ministries of agriculture, public works, public health, etc.) and hundreds of civil society organizations representing virtually all communes and communal sections at the regional level.

These consultations between civil society and government are virtually without precedent in Haiti. Notably, the dialogues were able to accommodate political party representatives in a

non-partisan forum of open discussion. This is a very significant accomplishment in the Haitian context.

The dialogue series on economic growth and poverty alleviation brought together representatives of the private sector as well as civil society, central and local government, political parties, and donors. In dialogues dealing with the environment, the Ministry of Environment was a joint sponsor. In the aftermath of dialogues on decentralization of government, the texts of CSO resolutions were subsequently shared with other civil society sectors, including the national congress of peasant organizations affiliated with Papaye (MPP). In addition to the national dialogues, Asosye has also provided technical assistance to smaller local dialogues, including sessions with individual CSOs on decentralization, local justice, poverty and economic growth.

The dialogues provided useful analysis of problems, needs, and causes, but inadequate identification of practical measures to respond and solve these problems – despite preparation of “action plans.”

The potential for CSO negotiation with government is exemplified by actions undertaken by a Ft. Liberté CSO in the aftermath of a dialogue on decentralization. The problem was the cutoff of electricity to the city, and the absence of local government to represent the city’s interests. The city has had no functioning communal government for an extended period – no mayors and no replacement of mayors since January 1999. In a vacuum of local government, a local CSO negotiated with the regional representative of EDH (Electricité d’Haïti), the state electric utility whose closest representative was based in Cap-Haïtien. As a result of CSO negotiation, EDH restored electricity to Fort Liberté. In this case, civil society rose to the occasion and solved a “public” problem – supplanting the role of local government.

In general, however, there has been no programmatic response, monitoring of results, or follow-up to the national dialogues – except for the emergence of CEDACs as a space for CSOs to have their own debates (follow-up was not a stated objective under Asosye I). Asosye should build on its strengths. The national dialogue program has been successful, but the potential for follow-up remains unfulfilled. The mere opportunity for free expression is not enough. The follow-up requires technical assistance in order to complete the model – consultation among stakeholders, government and civil society – followed by concrete actions and problem solving.

Advocacy. SO customers of Asosye have not generally carried out advocacy campaigns. If this is the primary indicator of success, the advocacy program of Asosye has not (yet) been successful.

In the past, CSO action plans and “coalitions” were organized as “projects” in the hope of funding from Asosye’s democracy fund.

Asosye’s past advocacy training increased awareness of civic action and communications between CSOs; however, the training has thus far had no measurable impact on bringing about policy reform or social change.

The advocacy model is drawn from advocacy campaigns and lobbying practices in countries with well defined rights of citizenship, clearly defined public services, political parties that promote policy goals, and “lobby-able” bodies of government. **These conditions and underlying assumptions for advocacy are not present in Haiti.**

The advocacy component is defined by training and the training of trainers. Between November 1997 and May 1999 Asosye trained 11 advocacy trainers and carried out 24 advocacy workshops for CSOs, including three workshops composed of CSO coalitions. In the wake of advocacy workshops, CSOs organized coalitions or planning sessions around the following themes:

Gonaïves	Civic education and electoral observation Civil society role in proposing laws Traffic problems with the opening of school
Jacmel	Civil society and oversight of public affairs Distributing school supplies to public and private schools Justice, police, and security Tourism and the environment
Cap-Haïtien/Ouanaminthe Bellefontaine	Cross-border trade with Dominican Republic Implementing decentralization laws

The “advocacy” model has been redefined by Asosye as “civic action planning.” It distinguishes “political action” (elections, political parties, candidates) from “civic action” – policies, lobbying, coalition building, skills that promote change in government policy and services.

This distinction is not justifiable in a conceptual sense; however, it is a tactical distinction that responds to the intense partisanship, and perceived “corruption” of party politics in Haiti. The distinction between “advancing an issue” and promoting a “candidacy” is readily blurred in the Haitian context. *The Project should avoid any impression of “partisanship” in supporting candidates for office, but it should actively support and advise issue-oriented civic action campaigns.*

Direct application of US-style advocacy is ill adapted to the Haitian political context. The classical lobbying option is limited. US-style advocacy assumes that valid interlocutors are present and have the authority to respond. To a great extent, this is not presently the case in Haiti.

Haiti’s political tradition does not jealously guard the rights of citizens. Individuals in Haiti are more akin to “subjects” of the state than to citizens. Haitians attain “rights” by virtue of entrepreneurial success or a position within the apparatus of state. The state provides few public services, and most such services are based in the capital city. As individuals, Haitian citizens have few or no legitimate channels to demand services. The limited public services

in urban areas cannot readily be “deconcentrated” into rural areas. Local public services must therefore be created, perhaps by CSOs or CSO partnerships with local government.

As far as local government services are concerned, communal government has literally no tradition – or legal obligation – to provide public services beyond street cleaning, and supervising the marketplace and cemetery. The organization of periodic elections is essential but not a sufficient tool to ensure transparent, accountable governance at any level of state government in Haiti. In this political context, civil society organizations are providers of “public” services and also provide some measure of protection for their members. There is safety in numbers. There are few or no legitimate channels for grievance in relation to the state. How then does civil society in Haiti lobby for change?

Asosye has gone through a series of changes in confronting these issues and redefining “advocacy” in the Haitian context. Mediation of conflict has come to be a key component of Asosye training in advocacy. Another is building coalitions and targeting “affinity groups” for training. Fostering CSO partnerships with local government—thereby creating local public services—should also be an important strategy. As noted earlier, “capacity training” has come to be a prerequisite for advocacy training—enhance the basic organizational skills of CSO customers, then do advocacy training. The presumed goal is for CSOs to plan and carry out campaigns.

Capacity Building. The above paragraphs describe the evolution of capacity building (i.e., training activities). Asosye acknowledgement of CSO weaknesses, and subsequent reorientation of its program activities, are to be commended.

In retrospect, an offer of basic training at the beginning of the project might have had less success in drawing clients than the issue-oriented activities that took place. The interest and enthusiasm generated by the dialogue and advocacy programs has undoubtedly motivated participating CSOs to take advantage of training in “capacity building.”

CSO members interviewed in the field stressed the importance of capacity building and a desire to strengthen the internal structures of their own organizations and others. Asosye should continue to monitor closely the organizational needs of CSO customers and especially the membership base linked to CEDACs. It is also important to maximize the capacity building benefits of the project including Training of Trainers. The evaluation team notes a need for greater knowledge across the board – in basic administrative and financial management and local planning – as well as conflict resolution, advocacy and civic education.

CEDACs

CEDACs were not originally envisaged as an ASOSYE activity or end product. They emerged recently as member-managed meeting places.

The idea for CEDACs derived from a need to carry out and channel future Asosye activities. Given the fact that CEDACs are only a few months old, it makes little sense to evaluate their success in contributing to Asosye's overall program objectives. It is more useful to analyze their program potential.

CEDACs appear to be a logical complement to the Asosye program. Project activities, particularly the national dialogues, had high levels of participation and produced interesting resolutions; however, under Asosye I, national dialogues were not geared to generate advocacy campaigns, and they did not have that effect. Asosye is now actively seeking to link national debates and civic action campaigns. CEDACs are a potentially useful tool in forging this link.

In the wake of national dialogues, CSOs did not maintain continuing exchanges among themselves nor develop follow-on activities. One reason was the lack of physical meeting places. The creation of the CEDACs therefore responds to local CSO interests. For Asosye, CEDACs are member-managed meeting places and a tool for experiential civil education. Organizations assemble in the CEDACs to learn about membership, leadership, statutes, general assembly meetings, accountability, and elections.

Artificial character of CEDACs. Asosye does not view CEDACs as CSO federations. Asosye sees them simply as member-managed, non-partisan meeting places for Asosye training and technical assistance. Asosye did not help create them explicitly to regroup and reorganize civil society. On the other hand, collaboration of member-associations in managing these centers creates a rich opportunity for CSOs to practice democratic methods in spite of differing political opinions. They are also potentially useful bases for planning and carrying out civic action campaigns and other activities

At the level of member organizations. The organizational capacity of member-associations, the building blocks of CEDACs, has not been carefully audited. Most member-associations have only existed for a relatively short time, raising questions about their durability and level of internal organization. Given how rapidly the CEDACs were organized, it is unlikely that much effort went into consolidating member organizations in terms of internal functioning.

CEDAC members show great diversity in terms of different types of organizations with varied objectives. This is a positive feature of CEDAC member-associations; however, the members are geographically isolated from one another and do not form a natural community of interest. It seems somewhat unlikely that CEDAC member-associations will choose to join together around other issues.

At the level of structure and operation. The rules governing the relationships among members and operations of CEDACs are formal, general and abstract. The nature of the contract or mutual commitment among member organizations is not well defined. It seems somewhat unlikely that meetings of members-associations will take place outside of Asosye programs for training and technical assistance.

CEDACs as a space for participation. Nevertheless, it is intriguing to explore the potential of CEDAC member-organizations to organize around other issues besides managing the CEDAC. In field interviews, the team encountered no instances where CEDAC members had organized themselves around issues pertaining to public authorities, deconcentrated public services, or local governments.

On the other hand, the team encountered representatives of CEDAC members-associations who expressed an interest in organizing around other issues. For example, Ft. Liberté representatives expressed an interest in inviting local candidates for public office to meet at the local CEDAC, present campaign issues, and field questions. They also expressed an interest in organizing around local public services, especially in view of one member-association's success in lobbying for restoration of electricity (noted earlier). CEDAC committee members in Cap-Haïtien noted that they made use of their Asosye training to mediate a dispute between Ft. Liberté and Ouanaminthe over the siting of a new CASEC. Cap-Haitian CEDAC committee members also reported that CEDAC members had expressed an interest in mounting a civic education campaign, with support from municipal government, to post signs and billboards pertaining to traffic flow and garbage pick-up. Cap-Haitian committee members also expressed an interest in organizing joint activities together with the Chamber of Commerce.

These examples illustrate the potential for CEDAC member-associations to organize around other issues. In some cases, CEDAC members may choose to organize around the organization of local public services. *If CEDAC members-organizations show an interest, exploration of CSO partnerships with local government should be a key feature of Asosye training.* CEDAC member-organizations or a subset of such members may wish to organize themselves as a local coalition or association beyond the life of the Asosye project. Asosye should not hesitate to respond to emergent interests along these lines, including closer attention to CSO relations with ASECs, CASECs, and regional representatives of deconcentrated government services.

Relations among CEDACs. The project seeks to promote a formal network of relations among CEDACs. It is therefore necessary to build a solid foundation for such a network. It has already been necessary to organize a mediation council to oversee relations between CEDACs in the rival towns of Ft. Liberté and Ouanaminthe. Creating CEDAC networks should be done very carefully. CEDACs located in departmental seats of government (*chefs lieux*) should not be viewed as having a hierarchical function. Rather, existing CEDACs might serve as a point of contact for CSOs to establish other self-governing CEDACs in the area if there is sufficient CSO interest. The process of establishing additional CEDACs should take into account CSO sensitivities to domination by other organizations. This sensitivity is also a major obstacle to coalition building.

CEDACs vision for the future. Given the current potential of CEDACs, and assuming they can be adapted to local realities as a successful tool for advocacy, CEDACs should provide space in which training and technical assistance can be provided in response to CSO interests as follows:

- To strengthen member organizations and facilitate attainment of member objectives
- To reinforce member organization capacity for civic action
- To promote joint action with other CSOs
- To help CSOs provide information to assemblies of different local jurisdictions and to deconcentrated government services
- To facilitate prospective CSO efforts to monitor or co-manage public services to local populations
- To facilitate prospective CSO initiatives to build ties with other national and international partners
- To facilitate prospective CSO interests in developing a legal framework to codify practical modes of operating local public services.

What Factors Contributed to The Success or Lack Thereof of The Civil Society Component?

Factors Internal To The Project. In general, Asosye was far more successful at civic education than advocacy training. The National Dialogues were particularly successful as a non-partisan forum for free expression of ideas from a range of viewpoints. Media coverage reached an audience estimated in the millions. Factors in success include the following:

- *The inter-linkage of the debates and media, ensuring a broad base of interest in society.* The dialogues gained credibility as a result of positive press coverage, especially mass market radio time both regionally and nationally.
- *The quality of the Haitian Advisory Committee.* The committee made a thoughtful selection of themes with a broad base of interest. The selection of committee members lent credibility, including members drawn from a range of sectors.
- *The events drew upon a wide range of stakeholders ensuring a genuine encounter between various public sectors, both local and national, and a broad base of civil society organizations.*

- *The ADF staff itself was well organized and included competent moderators. The organizers and moderators successfully “depoliticized” the forum despite the presence of political party representatives.*
- *The timing was perhaps helpful since dialogues were not held during polarized periods of political campaigns preceding elections. The strategy of holding an initial series of regional meetings culminating in a national dialogue in the capital city built momentum over time.*

The advocacy program has not been successful for good reasons:

- The advocacy methodology imported by ADF was not well adapted to the Haitian context.
- The overall framework of program activities was not a well-integrated package. This is in large part a design problem.
- The grants program became the more important focus of CSO preoccupations and drew attention away from the inherent value of campaigns.
- Changes in ADF personnel detracted from program continuity.
- The ADF strategy was to train in general rather than focusing on particular CSOs, particular problems, and specific geographic targets.
- The advocacy program has been constrained by the organizational deficits of CSO customers.
- The program did not have the benefit of a coherent joint strategy between the civil society project (Asosye) and the local government support project (PACTE).

In retrospect, the training should have focused on the following:

- Concrete, practical outcomes from the very beginning
- Providing technical assistance and partnership throughout the entire cycle of needs identification, key stakeholders, and the crucial implementation phase of civic action campaigns
- Building directly onto the national dialogue program as a follow-up activity.

Factors External to the Project. Positive factors include the following:

- Return of constitutional government in October 1994 and a reduction of state violence due to the dismantling of the army
- Interest in democracy due to an atmosphere favoring freedom of speech and association
- Resurgence of civil society organizations
- Return of NGO support for civil society organizations: This is having a positive impact similar to NGO/CSO partnerships in the period before and after 1986.
- Impact of donor support for civil society including the European Union via decentralized programs of assistance, micro-projects and rehabilitation projects; UNDP support for municipalities and civil society; and USAID assistance via Asosye and PACTE:
- *Donor assistance has accelerated the resurgence of civil society.*

Negative factors include the following:

- Despite signing the DEP bilateral agreement, the government has resisted carrying out concrete activities and decisions in the field. Civil society has debated and presented a proposed law on participation, following the restoration of constitutional government. Neither the National Assembly nor the Executive Branch has responded with appropriate actions.
- The contested elections of 1997 and the changed status of elected officials after January 11, 1999, created barriers to successful consultation between local government and civil society. For example, Fort Liberté has no communal government due to its categorical rejection by local citizens.
- Assemblies that sought to function after 1997 lacked an adequate framework for dialogue with the local population and CSOs. *This difficulty should be addressed in any new civil society and local government support program. CEDACs appear to be an ideal forum to address these issues.*
- The media have given little attention to themes of participation or decentralization although public opinion is heavily dependent on the media—the primary source of non-formal training to Haitian citizens. Unfortunately, media reporting tends to reinforce the notion of highly centralized government, especially in reporting on the central government. Asosye's civic journalism program has sought to rectify this problem, but it alone cannot meet the needs in this area.
- Severe problems of the economy have had a significant impact on citizen involvement in grassroots organizations, as noted in the ASOSYE survey of CSOs: "According to the

data collected during focus groups and workshops, generally, the poorest class of the population does not join the organizations of civil society."¹²

Are Civil Society Objectives As Described in The DEP Still Valid? How Should They Be Changed?

The basic purpose remains valid; however, a single project such as Asosye cannot hope to work closely with a critical mass of CSOs or sectors to attain overall objectives. The statement of objectives should focus more closely on critical sectors, such as the following:

More attention should be paid to civic journalism and the promotion of a higher level of journalistic professionalism and open and informed discussion of important themes. Media campaigns should be continued.

More sustained attention should be paid to the role of civil society in promoting decentralization of government—especially at important centers of decision making (the capital, the central government, private sector CSOs).

More attention should be paid to promoting concrete civil society/government partnerships in problem-solving—especially at local levels (communes, communal sections). Civil society initiatives should directly address the potential role of ASECs as an interface between civil society and local government.

A civil society component should support civil society in active, targeted campaigns for enabling legislation, implementation of assemblies as provided by the constitution, and consultation and lobbying on behalf of decentralization as a policy.

Civil society should actively engage lawmakers in promoting a law on associations that ensures freedom of association and pluralism, and facilitates attainment of legal status by CSOs. More attention should be paid to promotion of CSO self-financing and economic independence. Some attention should be paid to targeting savings and loan associations as a pivotal sector for civil society activism.

Democracy enhancement should operate along the following channels within a coherent framework:

- Civil society should establish concrete, problem-solving partnerships with local government.
- Civil society should actively campaign for key policies, both locally and nationally, to the extent feasible (lobbying conditional upon availability of interlocutors).

¹² Executive summary, 11/10/99, page 4.

- More effective democracy enhancement will require much closer coordination of local government and civil society projects, both conceptually as well as practically in the field.

Were There Unintended Consequences and/or Effects of USAID-Funded Civil Society Activities?

The grants program has been self-defeating. It has supported pertinent activities; however, the program has not been part of an integrated package of interventions. The grants program has tended to promote dependency and grantsmanship, especially on the part of less well organized CSOs served by Asosye. The hope of funding has been a barrier to newly formed coalitions of local CSOs seeking to implement civic action campaigns. In such cases, the grants program has undercut project goals of CSO self-sufficiency and independent initiative. The grants program has also generated resentment on the part of CSOs refused funding due to their inability to meet criteria for funding. This has engendered (falsely) a perception of political favoritism at odds with the project's language of non-partisan dialogue and collaboration.

In general, work in civil society has to do with values, democracy as an ideology, and therefore politics. This is a delicate sector for an external donor or contractor. This has on occasion given rise to the *perception of external "intervention" in Haiti's domestic affairs*, or to competition for project support and recognition by competing political factions:

One unintended consequence is the notion that civic education has to do specifically with elections assistance rather than a broader range of long term goals – civic journalism, democratic institutions, citizen rights, and a broad base of citizen participation in governance. Another unfortunate perception is that the Civil Society Component is somehow a tool for assistance to political parties, promotion of opposition parties or particular political tendencies, or is an affiliate of IRI (International Republican Institute) or NDI (National Democratic Institute).

RELATED PROJECTS

ARC

The ARC Program has provided an additional avenue for USAID to positively support the development of civil society in Haiti. Although not specifically designed by or for the JDG sector, some aspects of the ARC program relate to the goals and themes of the DEP. It complements mission strategy in that its guidelines encourage greater community participation in development and civic activities.

However many of the organizations assisted were already well established and a number of them had been implementing activities in their communities for some time. In some cases

Table 3: ARC Projects - 1998 and 1999

1999		# Years	Contributions in US\$			Percent Local	
Location	Name of Organization	Existing	Local	USAID	Total	Contribution	Activity
S.E., Jacmel, Lavanneau	Union Popul. St. Antoine	13	1,338	4,131	5,469	24%	Engine for manioc mill and training in operation and maintenance
S.E., Jacmel	Union du Bloc Raquette Devel.	12	9,428	25,082	34,510	27%	Concrete pavement (complementary to drainage wk paid by ASSET Proj.)
South, Fond des Blancs	Haitian Christian. Devel. Fund	18	2,941	8,941	11,882	25%	Cistern, sanitary system, propane stoves at school
South, Fond des Blancs	Com. de l'Ecole Exper. Parla Foi	15	9,118	25,118	34,235	27%	School construction to replace community school built in 1984
G.A., Torbec Fond Rouge	Assoc. Coop. Tet Ansanm	13	3,560	6,005	9,565	37%	Building for manioc mill, storage, mtg. room (Mill, tng. from CARE/PLUS)
G.A., Anse du Clerc	Chaine Solidar. Dev. Anse d Clerc	9	3,882	11,763	15,645	25%	Generator (8.96 kw), elect. posts, cable inst. And 2 40w bulbs each family
G.A., Bonbon	Assoc. Electricite Bonbon	11	7,511	22,652	30,163	25%	Generator (14kw), elect. cables, 2 40w bulbs each family
G.A., Jeremie Ste. Helene	Cons'l. d Fabriq Parois. Ste. Hel.	15	8,413	25,118	33,530	25%	School Rehabilitation (roof, walls, plastering, elect. installation, paint)
West, Cx Bqt, Ganthier	Assoc. Main d'Amour Devel.	18	6,765	23,529	30,294	22%	Construction of a professional school for girls
Artib., St. Marc, Drouette	Petit Conseil Communataire	7	4,853	19,739	24,592	20%	Irrigation cistern construction to irrigate 500 ha
Artib., Gonaives, Trou-Sable	Ass. Dev. Evan. Ed.Social Artib	7	8,922	25,118	34,039	26%	Primary school construction in slum area near Gonaives
Center, Ti Lory	Comm. Citoyens Concernes Ti L.	1	6,059	22,433	28,492	21%	School construction to replace old school destroyed by Hurr. Georges
N.E., Bois de Laurence	L'Amitie Jeunes Bois de Laurence	3	8,353	25,235	33,588	25%	Potable water system rehabilitation - spring cap, 4 fountains, replace pipes.
1998							
South, Camp Perrin	Org. Plante Mayou Gaete Twarak	6	38125	6,881	45,006	85%	Manioc mill machinery and equipment
West, La Gonave	Bon Samaritan Cooperative	5	10,604	31,938	42,542	25%	Construction of building to house co-op bank and provide meeting locale.
West, La Gonave	National School Zabricot	2	9,063	31,325	40,388	22%	School construction
West, Petit Goave	Foyer Nouvelle Vie	7	25,625	30,680	56,305	46%	Oven construction for bakery at an orphanage
West, Kenscoff, Fermathe	Afe Neg Konbit	24	19,869	26,875	46,744	43%	Machinery and equipment for bakery
West, Kenscoff	National School of Kenscoff	NA	30,752	31,416	62,168	49%	School roof construction, rehab. of roof and toilet facilities
West, Kenscoff	Community Health Center	NA	16,563	30,656	47,219	35%	Rehabilitation of health center
North, Pignon, Bohoc	Cte. d'Eau Potable Bohoc,Gd.Latan	2	18,735	21,934	40,669	46%	Potable water system construction
							Exchange Rate: 1999: US\$1.00 = 17 Gdes, 1998: US\$1.00 = 16 gdes

there was a lack of broad participatory involvement of the community, an important element in the development of social capital.

Civil society organizations are the recipients of many of the ARC grants, and the USAID review and feedback process has helped some of them to strengthen their planning and advocacy skills. Many of the recipients, especially in 1998, contributed considerably more than the minimum target of 25% established by USAID. In addition, to receive a grant, organizations need to enlist the support of the mayor who must be a signatory to the grant agreement signed by the recipient.

The ARC projects have been widely dispersed in 8 of Haiti's nine departments as shown below.

Geographic Distribution of ARC Projects—1998 and 1999

South East	2
South	3
Grande Anse	4
West (Includes 2 on La Gonave)	7
Artibonite	2
Center	1
North	1
North East	1
North West	0
Total	21

A review of the organizations and activities funded by ARC since it began in 1998 is provided in tabular form on the following page. Additional comments and recommendations relating to ARC and grants programs overall are included in the following sections of this report (Chapter Five, section H; Chapters Six and Seven).

The Civic Education Task Order

The Civic Education Task Order has two components plus an internal evaluation activity. At the time of this evaluation (November 1999), the task order had been operational only four months. Following is a brief description of accomplishments to date:

Component One: Training in Civic Education

The objective of this component is to provide training in civic education to 2800 Haitian opinion leaders drawn from various sectors or civil society. The training is aimed specifically at increasing the understanding of decentralization in Haiti. Topics to be covered include, among others:

- The structure of decentralization: composition and functions of ASECs, CASECs, mayors, and departmental assemblies;
- Issues that these sub-national units of government might typically face
- Fiscal operations and budgeting in communes
- Rights of citizens: voting and communication with elected officials

This training is to be provided through 70 separate 5-day seminars to be held from September 1999 to March 2000 in various localities throughout the country. Opinion leaders are expected to re-transmit this information to the members of their organizations.

Progress as of mid-November, 1999 is as follows:

- Training materials have been developed and trainers have been trained
- 12 seminars have been held in Port-au-Prince and nearby cities: Delmas, Carrefour, and Pétionville.

Component Two: Decentralization Policy Reform

The objective of this component is to facilitate the development of a consensus on decentralization reform and the development of a work plan to implement the reforms. The consensus is to be developed through a series of conferences or debates among highly placed opinion leaders. The participants in these discussion groups are to be the leaders of "decentralization-oriented" civil society organizations as well as representatives of the private sector, the press, and other opinion leaders.

The outputs of the conferences and debates include technical studies on decentralization topics, the transmission by radio and newspapers of the outcome of the conferences, especially the eventual "consensus" that is reached, and a strategy for lobbying and implementation of the consensus.

To date, only one meeting of opinion leaders has been held. The meeting was attended mainly by representatives of the private sector, one representative from FENAMH, and a number of technical specialists.

Internal Evaluation

A subcontract has been concluded with the University of Florida to do a pre-test and a post-test of the results of the task order. This internal evaluation will concentrate mainly on the first component. It is designed to test knowledge acquired as well as attitudinal changes.

A consultant from the University of Florida has designed the instruments to be used in the evaluation. The consultant was supposed also to have pre-tested the instruments and to have carried out baseline testing. He was not able to accomplish these latter two tasks during his first visit. We have been informed that they have, however, been subsequently completed.

Comments and Observations

Work on this task order is not yet mid-stream. As such, there are no "results" to evaluate. Some preliminary observations can, nevertheless, be made:

The task order is meant to complement the work of the two larger programs – PACTE and Asosye. Because the contract was awarded to ARD and because it focuses on civic education in decentralization, the manager of this task order maintains an office in the ARD-PACTE headquarters and reports to the chief of party of the PACTE project. The participants and beneficiaries of the task order, however, are closer in kind to those with whom the other project, Asosye, has been working. Asosye is in fact tasked with providing civic education training. For this reason, there should be a convergence of interests and work planning between this task order and Asosye.

An implicit short-term objective of the task order appears to be to educate voters for participation in the local elections that were originally scheduled to take place in 1998 and are now scheduled to occur in March 2000. Component One's first training sessions were viewed by some as "political manipulation," reflecting the heightened degree of political polarization six months before elections are scheduled, and before the formal opening of electoral campaigns (December, 1999).

The difficulties encountered in organizing the meetings for Component two may also be partially attributable to the political climate. Some "highly placed" civil society leaders scheduled to participate in these meetings are already engaged in electoral campaigns; several are almost certainly candidates for office.

The evaluation team harbors some skepticism about the effectiveness of broad-based training strategies unless they are followed up with technical assistance and a program for practical applications. The need for civic education in Haiti is uncontestable. Whether the strategy of broad-based training being used in this task order will be effective remains to be seen.

CHAPTER FIVE THEMATIC ASSESSMENT

The preceding chapter of this assessment was programmatic. It examined the results and impact of USAID/Haiti's principal local government and civil society projects.

This chapter is thematic. It responds to the specific questions contained on pages 10 and 11 of the assessment scope of work.¹²

POLITICAL COMMITMENT

What is the nature and extent of political commitment to decentralization in Haiti? The answer to this question varies by groups of stakeholders.

There are four large groups of stakeholders with a direct interest in the decentralization process. The first group consists of elected officials and office holders in the central government. The second consists of (formerly) elected officials and staff in sub-national units of government. The third consists of political parties or political alignments. The fourth consists of civil society organizations.

The opinions and viewpoints of the members of these groups are not necessarily homogeneous. There is also, of course, a great deal of overlapping membership between representatives of political parties, civil society and office holders at the two levels of government. For analytic purposes, however, a certain number of statements about the viewpoints of these groups can be safely advanced.

Central government officials generally have a low level of interest in and commitment to decentralization. Their commitment has, in fact, probably declined over the past four years. The 1987 constitution commits the Haitian State to a decentralized structure of governance. By action, by statement, and by attitude, however, central government officials have shown little interest in advancing decentralization.

The most salient pieces of evidence to support this conclusion include the failure of the central government to hold scheduled elections in 1998, the decision by the President to terminate the mandates of elected local government office holders, and the failure of Parliament and the Executive to create the legislative framework for decentralization. The assessment team also interviewed several government officials whose statements betrayed a strong attitude of condescension toward local government officials. One top official, for example, characterized local governments as "apprentices." Others flatly stated that local governments were not ready to exercise or could not be trusted with greater authority.

¹² Some of the questions on pages 10 and 11 of the SOW were more programmatic than thematic. These questions were addressed in Chapter IV.

Local government officials, on the other hand, are, not surprisingly, strongly committed to decentralization. The many mayors and CASEC members we interviewed were eager to govern but complained, often bitterly, about the lack of support for decentralization from the central government. The strong support and involvement of Haiti's mayors in FENAMH and the political risks they took to oppose Parliament and the President on several occasions is testimony to their strong commitment to decentralization.

As is the case throughout the world, **political parties**¹³ in Haiti focus on securing political power. Because power in Haiti is heavily concentrated in the central government, it is not surprising that Haitian parties are generally more interested in supporting and financing candidates for office in the center rather than at the periphery. This means that candidates for local government office must align themselves with candidates for central government office, particularly the presidency, in order to secure support for their local government candidacies. The need for local candidates to secure this support¹⁴ vitiates, to some extent, their need to be responsive to local constituencies and reinforces the tendency toward centralization at the expense of decentralization.

Civil society organizations in Haiti are generally interested in local, rather than national, issues. To this end, they are, at least theoretically, natural allies of decentralization. In reality, however, CSOs seek support for their causes wherever such support can be obtained. Because local governments are still exceedingly weak in Haiti, this means that CSOs look first for support to NGOs, international donors, or the central government, rather than to local governments. (It is in this context that the partnerships forged between communes and CSOs through the PACTE project can be seen as a significant, if limited, breakthrough.)

Both PACTE and Asosye were, to varying degrees, instrumental in strengthening and deepening support for decentralization in local government and in civil society. PACTE's work with FENAMH and the regional mayors' association was especially important in this regard. Asosye's impact on decentralization is more diffuse and difficult to measure. Through its national debates, Asosye has certainly increased awareness of decentralization issues. This is especially true of the debate in Port-au-Prince, which brought together, for the first time in Haiti, stakeholders in central government, local government and civil society to discuss decentralization. It can be hypothesized, moreover, that these debates as well as some of Asosye's training activities have increased the demand for decentralization. We cannot, on the other hand, conclude that this generalized demand has had any concrete results.

What is clear is that, for the moment, the forces resisting decentralization in Haiti are stronger than are its proponents. This is especially true within the central government, which, in any case, would have a natural inclination not to share power with sub-national units of

¹³ It is more accurate to refer in Haiti to political movements or political alignments since political parties in the Western sense of that term do not really exist. See Bernard Dietrich, "Haiti: Stabilization and Political Parties," Remarks prepared for Delivery to a Conference on the Political and Economic Reconstruction of Haiti, University of Puerto Rico, September 24, 1995. Dietrich calls Haitian political parties "tap-taps," referring to Haiti's colorful jitneys. He argues that aspirants for political office generally ride political tap-taps to power, but, when elections are over, they discard the parties like "dirty disposable diapers."

¹⁴ Political scientists refer to this phenomenon as "clientelism."

government. On the other hand, the decentralization genie has emerged from and will not likely return to the bottle. Within civil society, and especially among locally elected officials, there now exists a strong demand for decentralization. The challenge for the new program will be to capitalize on this demand.

RELATIONS BETWEEN SUB-NATIONAL UNITS OF GOVERNMENT

What Is the Division of Responsibilities among the Various Levels of Sub-National Government?

The constitution creates three Territorial Collectivities:

- The Communal Section
- The Commune
- The Department.

The constitution prescribes that:

At the level of the communal section, the government has the obligation to establish in each the structures for social, economic, civil and cultural development of its population.

The municipal council manages its resources in favor exclusively of the municipality and is accountable to the municipal assembly that, in turn reports to the departmental council.

The departmental council prepares, in collaboration with the central administration, the development plan of the department. It must manage its financial resources in favor exclusively of the department and be accountable to the department assembly that, in turn, reports to the central administration.

A three-member council, assisted in its function by an assembly, is charged with the management of each sub-national unit of government. A body of laws is supposed to define the organization and operation of these sub-national units of government. The absence of such laws (with the exception of the law on the operation of communal sections) has created a great deal of confusion with regard to responsibilities at each level. For example, if a crime occurs in a communal section, the CASEC is supposed to prepare an arrest warrant. We encountered one case, however, in which an arrest in a communal section was made after the communal mayor issued the arrest warrant. A judge subsequently dismissed the case on the grounds that the mayor did not have the authority to issue the warrant.

Has the Strategy of Focusing on the Commune Level Achieved Project Objectives? If Not, Why Not?

A major objective of PACTE was to strengthen decentralized governance.

To this end, PACTE's work plan of November 1996 presented a strategy of direct intervention centered on two levels:

Selected communes and communal sections

National institutions (central ministries, the National Assembly and the yet to be created deliberative bodies at the national, regional and local levels).

Circumstances prevented PACTE from working with national institutions and with deliberative bodies. As a result, a decision was made to focus interventions mainly on the communal level, as well as inter-communal networking through FENAMH and regional mayoral associations.

This change of focus was, to a large extent, unavoidable. It was forced on the project by the failure of parliament to pass enabling legislation and by the contested 1997 elections.¹⁵ But, whatever the reasons, this narrower focus prevented PACTE from achieving its principal decentralization objectives. The institutions involved in local governance in Haiti (ASECs and CASECs, communal councils and assemblies, departmental councils and assemblies, and the interdepartmental council) must work together to make the entire system function. By focusing on the commune level and by working with only two of the institutions of local governance (communal councils and CASECs), PACTE was unable to address the needs of the system as a whole.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOCAL COUNCILS AND LOCAL ASSEMBLIES

The Nature of the Relationship between Local Assemblies and Local Councils

In most cases, local councils and local assemblies have not had close working relationships due to the political crisis that ensued following the contested elections of April 1997, and the ambiguous mandate of local assemblies.

The Provisions of the Constitution and of the Law

The constitution provides little detail on the relationship between assemblies and councils. Articles 63.1, 67 and 73 state:

¹⁵ These external factors are described in detail elsewhere in this document (especially in Chapter IV).

At the level of the communal section, "the CASEC is assisted in its task by a communal section assembly..."

At the level of the commune, "the municipal council is assisted in its task by a communal assembly..."

The municipal council manages its resources for the good of the municipality and is accountable to the municipal assembly, which in turn reports to the departmental council.

The nature of assembly assistance to the council is not defined by the constitution. The law of April 4, 1996, on the communal section, provides some additional detail:

Article 6: "The Assembly deliberates and decides on all matters of local interest. The CASEC executes decisions of the Assembly for the general good, within the limits of the present law."

Article 10: "The communal sectional assembly deliberates and decides on matters of strictly local interest. During the first regular session, it votes on the budget for the communal section, prepared and submitted by the CASEC."

Article 11: "The communal section assembly has the following responsibilities, among others:

To approve and ratify the development policy of the communal section as prepared and submitted by the CASEC;

To ensure implementation of decisions of local interest taken by municipal and departmental assemblies and councils, within the limits of the law;

To receive and approve the CASEC activity report, and submit it to the supervisory authority..."

Seven other points follow. Together, the provisions of Article 11 make it clear that ASECs are supposed to be at the center of local decision making.

There are no laws defining the responsibilities of assemblies at the other levels – commune and department. A former municipal assembly president in Croix-des-Bouquets told us that he had used the 1996 law on ASECs to help define responsibilities for the municipal assembly.

Application of The Law

The evaluation team encountered no cases where these provisions of the 1996 law were implemented. There are several reasons for this:

As noted earlier, the April 1997 elections were contested. The president, in fact, launched an investigation of the elections. This made it difficult for newly elected ASEC members to function. In the meantime, CASEC members had already served two years without assemblies or oversight of any kind. When ASECs were created, there was a tendency on the part of the CASECs to resist ASEC efforts to advise or control CASEC operations or management.

In many cases, ASEC members took an aggressive stance in relation to CASECs, inciting most CASECs to resist any form of collaboration with ASECs. As a result, ASECs were never able to function according to the provisions of the law.

The Principal Constraints and Opportunities for More Effective Local Governance in the Future, Especially with Respect to Transparency, Accountability and Oversight

The political crisis and the ambiguous status of assemblies make it difficult to define constraints and opportunities. Improvements in local governance will require, at a minimum

Credible elections with high voter turnout, in which the legitimacy of elected officials is not greatly contested.

A central government that is committed to decentralized governance and that is able to define clear operational roles for sub-national units of government.

A well-informed civil society that is able to exercise an influence, through assemblies, on the operations and management of executive councils.

The last is the most likely to happen. It is not clear whether or not there will be credible elections or good voter turnout. A new National Assembly may not be committed to decentralization. The judiciary and executive branch may not be supportive of local governance. Consequently, support to civil society should be a high priority in any new governance program.

COOPERATION VERSUS CONFRONTATION IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT

The Pros and Cons of Cooperative versus Adversarial Modes of Local Governance in Haiti

Civil society should reserve the right to exercise both these options, as needed, in its relations with local government although cooperation should, of course, be the preferred option. Adversarial relations with local government are generally counterproductive. There is a pressing need to re-invent local governance and combine resources to solve local problems and provide local public services. This cannot be accomplished without active collaboration

between local government and civil society. This collaboration is limited to the extent that representatives of both sectors are not open to partnership in a common endeavor. Local authorities contacted in this evaluation have generally been more than willing to collaborate if they are not put on the defensive by antagonistic demands.

Local authorities command relatively few resources. Advocacy campaigns should therefore seek first of all to establish local partnerships in problem solving, including mixed public-private committees for particular problems or services. Civil society should actively help to define the roles of ASECs and municipal assemblies, and the content of decentralization—working locally in partnerships, and lobbying nationally for policy implementation, and enabling legislation.

What Opportunities Exist to Establish a New Social Contract between Citizens and State at the Local Level?

The opportunities are greater at the local level than at any other level of government. This requires collaboration among different CSOs, and a willingness to work with local officials. Local CSOs are the breeding ground for local elected officials. ASECs are a key institution and can play a crucial role in the development of a new social contract. Many ASECs have positive working relationships with local grassroots organizations. This is a valuable resource and should be the point of departure for inventing local public services and more responsible governance. The implementation of decentralization is an important element of this equation; however, CS/LG partnerships do not require formal implementation of decentralization in order to create practical working relations at the local level. Positive working relationships locally can be used as a tool to promote formal decentralization as a national policy.

SOCIAL CAPITAL

Has Social Capital Been Built through Asosye, PACTE And ARC? If So, How? If Not, Why Not?

ARC projects are generally well managed. It appears that ARC projects have been useful in expanding local “public” services and economic ventures, but they have not contributed to the emergence of new forms of social capital. ARC has tended to subsidize already well organized and well established organizations. ARC grants have generally covered the majority of the costs of a project, thereby limiting the level of local risk and local “ownership” of the project – key elements of social capital creation. Such grants may have the unintended effect of reinforcing local leaders who have good grantsmanship skills, rather than instigating more self-reliant social capital development.

Asosye did not identify social capital development as its grants objective. Such grants have generally promoted civic education and the development of educational materials and resources. The existence of the grants program has in some measure squelched social capital

development. Asosye staff members and CSO customers, independently of each other, have noted a tendency for CSOs to defer to Asosye and its grants program as the decisive factor in CSO willingness to undertake action campaigns. Asosye grants have not tended to foster self-financing, local risk and ownership, and long range goals. In another sphere of activity, Asosye has helped to promote positive conditions for social capital development through its modeling of non-partisan fora, open expression of ideas, inter-sectoral consultation, and CSO management of CEDACs.

The PACTE methodology appears to take very seriously the process of promoting social capital. Accordingly, there is evidence of social capital formation in communes such as Torbeck (agricultural machinery), St. Louis du Sud (grinding mill), Maniche (grinding mill), and Cabaret (potable water works). The key to social capital formation is the institutional framework for such projects, the degree of risk undertaken by stakeholders, the prospects for local revenues to sustain the project, and a clear commitment to long term goals beyond the immediate “project.” These issues are only partially addressed by the PACTE methodology. Furthermore, the process has not been underway long enough to assessment the concrete activity (mill operation, tractor) funded by the project.

The PACTE process of commune-wide consultation, including local authorities as well as CSOs in all communal sections, has been very positive. This process has identified key stakeholders, generated a consensus on priority investments, and set the stage for civil society partnership with local government. There has been a significant investment of time and other in-kind contributions; however, direct local financial investment has been limited. This could be problematic since direct financial risk inevitably raises the stakes for local ownership and commitment.

A second constraint in PACTE social capital development is beneficiary preoccupation with short-term projects (mill, tractor, etc.) to the exclusion of longer-term goals. Long term goals would include plans for reinvestment of revenues, and other follow-on projects or services. Long term goals are a feature of the PACTE methodology; however, the team’s interviews indicated that beneficiaries were not always aware of long term goals, or plans for reinvesting revenues.

PACTE has also promoted social capital development through its support for associations of local officials. PACTE was instrumental in creating the national federation of mayors (FENAMH). It helped to secure legal recognition for six regional associations of mayors, plus two additional associations in process, interrupted by the January 11 decree. PACTE also helped the national federation of CASECs to gain legal status.

MAYORS ASSOCIATIONS

How Effective Has USAID Assistance Been in the Organizational Development of FENAMH and the Regional Mayor's Associations?

The regional mayors associations began to organize during the early days of implementation of the PACTE project. FENAMH was created in 1998, with the support of ARD/PACTE. This support took several forms:

- Assistance in the formation of the institutional structure
- Technical assistance and legal monitoring
- Financial assistance
- Assistance for the inaugural conference
- Support to institutional development
- Support in logistic, secretariat and communication

These contributions facilitated the foundation, organization and development of the associations. The local elected officials we met in the communes were unanimous in recognizing the importance of the mayors associations. Indeed, thanks to this component:

Mayors are no longer isolated, they can count on the strength of a national federation

They can develop partnerships and pairing with foreign colleagues

They have access to foreign forums and participate in meetings such as the 4th Annual Inter-American Conference of Mayors and the 72nd Annual Conference of Towns League in Miami

They can exercise pressure in an articulate and effective manner to influence the decentralization policies of the central government

What Are the Next Steps for These Organizations?

From 1995 to now, mayors have passed through some important stages in their own development, and the development of their associations. Haitian mayors are now regrouped in a National Federation that, since 1998, has had legal status. This makes it eligible to benefit from advantages and privileges provided by law.

In addition, the mayors associations have acquired experience and self-confidence in their role as lobbyists to promote decentralization. They have established contacts abroad; some mayors have signed agreements and established partnerships with foreign colleagues. The next steps should be to:

Consolidate their attainments to date

Ensure the continuity of their activities and continued development.
 Ensure the funding of their activities through members' contributions
 Open offices with support personnel and offer services to members.

ADVOCACY

Distinguishing Characteristics of Organizations Interested in and Effective at Pursuing Advocacy Work

There is evidence of increasing interest in advocacy (civic action) on the part of a substantial number of civil society organizations. The activities of Asosye have augmented this interest and enabled a large number of CSO members to learn, or learn about, skills needed to be successful advocates. However, their ability to carry out sustained, organized and effective advocacy campaigns has not yet been demonstrated

In order to suggest which types of organizations would likely be most effective in pursuing advocacy work, it would be useful to review systematically the various types of Haitian CSOs. The table on the next two pages shows 12 categories of CSOs, their characteristics and suggested level of potential for, and interest in, advocacy

This categorization and ranking should not be used to exclude participation of organizations in promoting civic action. It can suggest, however, the types of organizations to seek out in planning activities and developing coalitions as suggested in the next section.

It is also interesting to note some preliminary findings of a recent survey on CSOs and Political Advocacy in Haiti.¹⁶ Certain variables showed high and low correlation with reference to the advocacy index used for the study. The study noted that the percentage of literate members of a CSO correlates with higher advocacy capacity and that rural groups have systematically higher advocacy scores than urban groups. Factors that were clearly not related to advocacy capacities: the sex of group leaders and geographic differences.

Main Obstacles to Greater and More Effective Advocacy by CSOs; What Can Be Done to Overcome Them

For individual members of society, effective advocacy requires knowledge, commitment and eloquence. Two types of knowledge are crucial: about technical aspects of issues, as well as how to communicate concerns. General discontent can (although does not always) develop into commitment as individuals gain the types of knowledge mentioned. Eloquence, on the other hand, can be considered more of a personality trait, which may have limited scope for development.

¹⁶ Smith, Zeric Kay, Political Advocacy and CSOs in Haiti – Baseline Data and Preliminary Progress. 1999

Table 4: Typology of Civil Society Organizations

Characteristics	Classification					
	Unions	Cooperatives	Business Associations	NGOs and Foundations	Cause- Or Issue-Oriented Orgs.	Professional Associations
GOAL	Organize, mobilize workers Defend worker interests Protect worker rights	Share resources and means in order to increase the investments and income of members	Insure the hegemony of the sector Regulate and develop opportunities at the level of the investment sector	Develop, defend and promote a cause	Defend and promote a specific cause	Defend and promote interests of profession,
ORGANIZATION MODELS	Union of public and private enterprises Union of independent workers National union	Cooperative for production, marketing and credit Federation and/or union of cooperatives	ADIH ANADIPP Chambers of Commerce	HAVA – AOPS – COHAN – FONHEP – ASSODLO	Organization for the defense of women rights Organization for the protection of the environment	Rotary, AMH (Ass. Medicale Haiti) ANDAH (Agronomes) Ordre des avocats
SOCIAL CATEGORY	Urban workers	Small and medium-sized (Peasants/Entrepreneurs) Some disadvantaged categories of urban middle class	Medium-sized and large enterprises	Upper urban middle class	Upper urban middle class Popular class categories	Upper urban middle class
LEGAL STATUS	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
PERIOD OF EMERGENCE	1940-1950	1960-1970	At all times, but mostly in the early 1980s	1970-1980	1986-1991	At all times
STRUCTURE	Existing statutes and regulations Sometimes informal operation	Statutes and internal regulations Statutory operation	Stable Well structured Existing statutes and internal regulations	More or less stable More or less structured Sometimes informal operation	More or less stable More or less structured Existing statutes and internal regulations	Stable Statutes and internal regulations

REMARKS	Political parties and the government have initiated a process of co-optation Demobilization of members	Very few public initiatives toward development Relatively independent	Important weight in national decisions Oligarchy insufficiently represented Tension and conflict with union and cooperative sector	Structural financial dependency Affiliation to the central power Competition with some state entities	Dependency in regard to external funding Demobilization of members	Relatively independent Stable
POTENTIAL FOR ADVOCACY	Moderate	Low	High	Moderate	High	Moderate
	Classification					
Characteristics	Popular Organizations	Cultural Associations	Religious Associations	Peasant Groups	Socio-Political Associations	Traditional Organizations
GOAL	Mobilize the popular sector Become the legitimate and natural representatives of the sector	Promote and develop culture, sports, and recreational activities	Promote a life style and social values based on religious beliefs	Develop their community Organize the peasantry Defend their interests	Regroup and coordinate the organizations of the popular sector Control the political institutions	Defend the interests of agricultural workers Regulate and satisfy demands in agricultural work
ORGANIZATION MODELS	Neighborhood committee Youth movement Committee for defense or resistance in cities	Sports club Recreation association Cultural association	Grassroots ecclesiastic community Voodoo association Protestant association	Peasant movement (MPP/Tet kole, ..) Group of local peasants	Regional resistance movement (KOREGA) Group of intellectuals Regional platform	Corvée/Escouade/ Kombit Mazenga Traditional recreational organization (Rara/Pinge)
SOCIAL CATEGORY	Popular class categories Some lower middle class (Cities/borough)	Different categories of middle class and popular class Some upper middle class	Different categories of middle class and popular class	Small and medium-sized farmers	Different categories of popular class and middle class	All categories of farmers, but mostly agricultural workers, farmers and tenants
LEGAL STATUS	No, but tacit recognition by the government	No, but tacit recognition by the government	Variable	No, but tacit recognition by some local governments	No, but informal recognition by the government	No, marginalized by the judicial system and the government

PERIOD OF EMERGENCE	1986	At all times	At all times Evolution from 1980	1976	1986	1850 – 1860
STRUCTURE	Unstable Weak structure Operation on non-statutory basis	Very stable Some structure Statutes and internal regulation	Weak structure More or less stable Absence of statutes and regulations	Relative stability Statutes and internal regulations Operations on non-statutory mode	Unstable Weak structure Periodic or cyclic operation	Stable Some form of structure Highly graded (hierarchy) Non-written regulation
REMARKS	Over-politicization Claim autonomy and independence from the government and the political parties Demobilization of members	Independent from political parties and the government	Competition and tension among them More or less independent from the government and political parties	Base of the work of the NGOs Competition and tension with the traditional groups Competition among them	Competition with political parties Demobilization of members Most dynamic in the confrontation with government	In competition with peasants groups Endangered in the areas of interventions of large development projects
POTENTIAL FOR ADVOCACY	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	High	Low

Source: Adapted from Charles Mathelier, *Réalité Socio-organisationnelle en Haiti*, Asosye, 1999

With regard to civil society organizations, there is a theme which has come forward consistently throughout the assessment. It is the need to strengthen their organizational structures and management capacities. Effective advocacy within an organizational context also involves planning and coordination—skills that are not evident in most organizations. Additional problems confronted in Haiti at the present time are: 1) a lack of interlocutors who are in a position to respond to public requests and who can be readily addressed by concerned citizens, and 2) isolation of individual organizations, particularly in rural areas.

Thus the major obstacles to greater and more effective advocacy are ignorance, the lack of local power structures to which campaigns can be directed, and the need for more effective and stronger coalitions among those with common interests. Other serious obstacles that interfere with the development of coalitions: a lack of communication and transport systems within Haiti, as well as a lack of access to and knowledge about advocacy organizations in other countries that may have relevance here.

These obstacles have been recognized and addressed in ongoing project activities. Efforts to assure that elections do indeed take place, and the types of training now under way and planned within the Asosye project are efforts that are geared to overcoming the obstacles. Some earlier efforts were seen to be less effective than anticipated. The current activities, for the short term, have taken these difficulties into account. Longer term planning for the future will need to reconsider the overall context and take into account the political realities that can develop.

GRANTS

The Assessment team has reviewed the grants made by PACTE, Asosye and USAID's ARC. Overviews of Asosye and PACTE grants are provided in this section. ARC grants were described in earlier sections of this report. This section assesses the grants in each project in terms of clarity of goals, problems encountered, results, and, for ARC and PACTE, sustainability. The future role of grants programs is considered at the end of the section.

PACTE

PACTE grants were planned as an element of a local government/community collaborative process. This process incorporated a review of community concerns and issues, development of consensus on priority needs and selection of one sector on which to focus, preparation of a long-term plan for that sector, identification of discrete activities to undertake, and the design of a detailed plan for an initial activity. A PACTE grant to support this activity was seen as an integral part of an overall process to strengthen local government's ability to deliver goods and services and to work with members of the community.

PACTE grants were meant to reinforce the interest and the ability of members of local government and civil society to work together to achieve a common goal; and to provide the means to initiate a long-term, sustainable process of local initiative and development.

PACTE project staff understood that the grants were meant to be a catalyst to facilitate achievement of broader PACTE goals.

The initial PACTE design called for grants in 50 communities. However, the initially authored budget was sufficient to fund a maximum of 28 activities at an average cost of US\$25,000. The problems that affected other PACTE interventions made it impossible even to attain this number. In the end only 11 projects, which had been designed and approved prior to January 11, 1999, received grants. One of these has not moved forward due to political circumstances in the commune; the other 10 are under implementation and are nearing completion. A table summarizing these projects is included below.

Table 5: PACTE Grants

Department and Commune	Activity	Grant Amount	Per Cent Disbursed
West - Arcahaie	Road improvement	US\$24,775	80
West – Verrette	Potable water	US\$19,478	90
West – Cabaret	Potable water	US\$21,7310	100
North – Port Margot	Potable water	US\$18,852	90
South – Camp Perrin	Agricultural inputs	US\$22,439	93
South - Torbeck	Agriculture – motorized tillage	US\$24,786	100
South - Cavaillon	Agriculture – fruit tree nursery, grafting	US\$20,307	72
South – Roche à Bateau	Commercial credit – Women’s Caisse	US\$19,501	100
South – St. Louis du Sud	Cooperative – machinery, building	US\$18,571	100
South - Maniche	Cooperative – machinery, building	US\$16,566	100

PACTE grants have resulted in well planned and implemented activities. Field visits to projects and discussions with individuals involved indicate that PACTE grant have provided needed and valuable services. However a major element of the program’s goals was not achieved. Rather than being viewed as a part of a long-term development process, the projects carried out have tended to be seen as ends in themselves. This preoccupation with a single project raises questions about the likelihood that the communities will implement the long-term development plans that were so carefully constructed.

An aspect of this program that should also be considered carefully for the future is the way that priority sectors and projects are selected. The projects selected in many communities, such as agriculture and cooperatives, are not in sectors that are commonly under the aegis of government administration.

The discrete LG/community activities have been subject to detailed planning to assure long term management and economic sustainability. The committees established to carry forward the management are in place. However there will be a need for continued technical assistance and monitoring. Further follow-up will also be needed to verify economic sustainability.

Asosye

The Civil Society Democratic Initiatives Component of Asosye I had as its purpose to provide technical and limited financial support to individual civil society organizations, and groups of CSOs, for program initiatives that would contribute to the overall objectives of Asosye.

The specific objectives (related to all of Asosye's program components) included:

Support competitively selected civic **education, advocacy and consultative** initiatives of civil society organizations

Support efforts of NGOs, advocacy groups and others to stimulate the creation of base groups in relatively underdeveloped sectors of Haitian civil society (e.g. women, peasants, the urban poor, and handicapped) and assist them in the process of aggregation and wider expression of common interests. Grants of this category were referred to as **"Voice for the Voiceless"**

Deepen the understanding and attachment of CSO members to democracy by supporting initiatives to improve their **democratic governance** and practices.

Asosye received requests for grants in three ways: direct inquiries from organizations, referrals from USAID, and, for two grants, in response to newspaper advertisements. One of the latter was for the development and publication of the CSO kit: *Guide Pratique, Création d'Organisations de la Société Civile* (to Mediacom). The other was for training on legal status and rights for women (to the *Cabinet de Formation, de Consultation et d'Assistance Légale-COFAL*).

For unsolicited inquiries, organizations were asked to provide details on the objectives, expected results, and impact of their activity. Applicants were also asked to provide a detailed budget for the activity proposed. A maximum of US\$25,000 was allowed. If the budget exceeded \$25,000, Asosye staff worked with the applicant to reduce the budget or to advise that another source should be found for the additional funds needed. A grants committee met monthly to review completed proposals.

Once approved, Asosye staff worked closely with a grant recipient on implementation. A recurring problem related to difficulties in obtaining adequate documentation of expenditures (both projected and actual). In response to this difficulty, Asosye staff provided hands-on training that enabled the organization to meet Asosye's requirements for documentation and also strengthened the recipient's ability to handle funds in a responsible and transparent manner.

To monitor and provide for follow-up, a representative of Asosye attended each function funded by a grant. In addition, recipients were informed that participants in workshops should be included in subsequent activities, and that they should share the knowledge they had gained in the funded training. (However the diversity of organizations, and their lack of

ongoing relationships with the project, made it difficult, if not impossible, to determine the impact of the grants.)

The table on the next two pages summarizes information on Asosye grants awarded. The categories of grants noted on the table are the same as the bold face components described above. Based on this categorization, distribution of grants were:

<u>Grant Category</u>	<u>No. Grants</u>
Civic Education	7
Advocacy	2
Consultative	5
Voice for the Voiceless	3
Democratic governance	1
Two or more categories	4

A total of 22 grants were awarded from 1996 to the end of Asosye I in 1999. These included 11 in the range of US\$2,000 – US\$12,000 and 8 between US\$12,000 and US\$25,000. The smallest grant was US\$374 and the largest US\$97,000. Figures for the first grant in 1996 were not given.

One of the problems encountered in the administration of the Grants program had an unintended benefit, e.g. the informal training that took place in response to the financial reporting problem discussed above.

The broad objectives of the Asosye grants program enabled a flexible approach to the allocation of funds based on evolving project priorities. However, the lack of clarity (or focus) in goals resulted in a grants program that was not part of a coherent strategy. No grant program is able to respond to all of the requests it receives. It appears that the lack of clear criteria and coherence may have engendered a higher level of resentment and charges of favoritism than would be expected in a more narrowly defined program.

Another problem identified is that the effectiveness of the grants is hard to evaluate since the recipients had no ongoing relationship to the project. On the other had, the diversity of recipients can be seen as a success for the grants program in that it enabled Asosye to have an impact on a larger number and wider range of civil society members than would otherwise have been possible.

ARC

Information on ARC, including the purpose and objectives of the program, criteria for grants, and a review of grants in the last two years, is included in Sections III and IV of this report. In this thematic assessment of the grants activities, some information on the clarity of goals, problems, success and sustainability is provided

Table 6: Asosye I—Summary of Grants

Recipient	Amount (\$U.S.)	Year	Activity	Participants/Impact
COFAL – Cabinet Formation, Consult., Assistance Légale	25,000	1999	3 day conference – Vital Voices Group Women for Effective Leadership	100 women nationwide attended Promotion of women's rights
OGITH– Org. Gén. Indépend. des Travailleurs Haitiens	21,925	1998	Advocacy campaign training for unions and the private sector	Pressure govt. and politicians, in 9 depts. to find solution to pol. crisis
Service Chrétien d'Haiti	2,400	1998	International Conf. in Washington on Justice, Human Rights, & Governance	Create a worldwide network for young entrepreneurs
UPEDA- Union Progressistes pour le Devel. de l'Arcahaie	374	1998	Mini-debate on Econ. Growth, to identify needs of Arcahaie	120 organizations debated and learned about advocacy strategies
FETRAP – Federation des. Travailleurs Plateau Central	14,732	1998	Training in civic education, admin. and finance for federation members	8 Agric. Organizations representing 150,000 peasants
CEDI – Centre d'Etudes et de Développement Intégré	24,126	1998	Training to reinforce women's orgs. in North & Northeast departments	140 women representing approximately 15000 women
KOP – Coordination des Organisations Populaires	14,685	1998	Project management seminar for community leaders	200 leaders trained, to work closely with ASECs and CASECs
AMAD – Association Main d'Amour Développement	18,271	1998	Training, regional coalition building, Democratic and admin. procedures	300 participans representing 20,000 women in 10 localities (Ganthier)
MEDIACOM	4,451	1998	Research and development for a civil society organization kit	CSP kit – 5,000 organizations representing 1.5 million persons
COFAL	22,520	1997	Training on legal status and rights for women	120 women trained representing approx. 10000 women
FOPROBIM – Fond. Pour la Biodiversité Marine	17,975	1997	Training on advocacy, networking/ Coalition of fishermen and women	Strengthen fishing communities 15,000 fishermen nationwide
FONAKAD – Féd. Nationale des CASECs Démocratiques	4,700	1997	Seminar on civic education for CASECs (joint activity with PACTE)	800 CASECs, nationwide
STAS – Syndicat des Travailleurs Agric. de Savanette	6,555	1997	Three day gen'l. ass. on civic educ., org. and admin.. for STA members	1000 participants
Centre Petion Bolivar (3 Grants – each US\$1,062)	3,187	1997	Three roundtables on decentralization	Regional participation
HSA – Haitian Studies Association	6,000	1997	Publication of proceedings of HSA conf. on just., democ. and the economy	600 copies each of 5 publications
Fondation La Ruche	4,973	1997	Printing of practical guide to Haitian media – Répertoire 97	1000 copies
Info Services	5,045	1997	Printing of manuals on journalistic ethics, investig. & interview techniques	1000 copies
COFAL	2,531	1997	Printing of manuals on legal rights in Creole	1000 copies each of 3 publications in Créole
CNEH – Confédération Nat'l des Educateurs Haitiens	97,500	1997	Training on decentralization and on AZEC and CASEC elections	6000 participants representing 100,000 persons
Fondation La Ruche/HSA – Haitian Studies Association	Not Available	1996	To partially support first Haitian-American studies conference in Haiti	Enabled widespread participation of civil society representatives

The program objectives and the criteria for funding provide clear guidance for potential grantees. The process give applicants an opportunity to refine their requests and improve their program plans in terms of the priorities and requirements of USAID.

As mentioned earlier, the goals and implementation procedures are designed with all of the sectoral programs of USAID in mind. Because one of USAID's goals is to gain more visibility through ARC, the result of an ARC project must be a physical entity. Presumably an ARC project would thus need to be identified with at least one of the sectors other than JDG. A perceived problem with ARC then, that has nothing to do with the grantees, is that it is accorded low priority by other sectoral offices within USAID. This may have increased since the administration of ARC has been moved from the Program Office. The internal USAID procedures for funding of ARC projects have not been reviewed in detail by the assessment team, but it is understood that sectoral offices, with tight budgets, may be reluctant to fund activities that are not part of their primary program activities.

ARC is considered to be expensive to administer. Because the grantees usually have no relationship to other USAID programs, there is considerable staff time and effort expended in determining the qualifications and worthiness of applicants and assuring adequate supervision and follow-up.

Under current operational guidelines, ARC has not contributed in a major way to the strengthening of civil society. Although ARC encourages greater community participation in development and civic activities, many of the organizations that have received grants are long established. It appears that their more traditional leaders would not be particularly interested in the type of activism and advocacy promoted in DEP.

It is important to recognize, however, the positive benefits to the communities involved and the economic value of the projects funded. A wide range of activities and geographic areas has been included during the two years just completed. Economic sustainability has been determined for most of the projects, although some of the documentation needs to be more complete. Future review of the projects' impact over time could be useful in preparation for revising ARC's operation and strategies.

Future Grants Programs

The Assessment Team has met at length with the staff involved with grants policy and management for PACTE, Asosye and ARC. There were also several opportunities to visit recipients and see the output of grants under PACTE and ARC.

Before moving to a broad recommendation for grants relating to the civil society and local governance sectors, the team has some observations relating to the existing grant programs.

In almost half of the communes where the PACTE grants program was implemented, the choice of sectors for LG/community action were not those for which government is traditionally considered to be responsible. Therefore, if the major focus of a program is

improved provision of goods and services by government, it would be advisable to limit the choice to sectors such as roads, electricity, water, education, and health.

The current funding for grants activities in Asosye II has been programmed to cover the costs of the CEDACs and related debates and workshops. Based on the experience of Asosye I, and the opinions of project staff, the provision of grants to individual organizations in a program seeking to develop strong civil society organizations creates inappropriate dependencies and relationships between the implementing agency and the recipients.

If there is a desire on the part of USAID to put emphasis on strengthening civil society through ARC, there should be greater consideration of the types of organizations and potential for growth in this regard when projects are selected. It might also be useful to consider synergies that could be explored with the widespread dispersion of organizations that have been involved in Asosye activities.

The assessment team is cognizant of the importance civil society organizations attach to funding from outside agencies. Many of them consider it crucial to their existence. However the team also recognizes the dampening effect that such dependency exerts on initiative and self reliance. Careful consideration of the needs and concerns of all interested partners has led to an important recommendation for future grants programs in Civil Society and Local Governance programs. **It is recommended that the mechanism for funding the discrete activities of client organizations be lodged in a project external to that responsible for the implementation of civil society and local governance activities.**

If it so desires, USAID could establish a separate mechanism, perhaps similar to ARC, for providing grant assistance. The criteria for eligibility for grant assistance from such a mechanism should, nevertheless, be tightly linked to beneficiary performance under the new USAID governance program. In addition, grant recipients should bear the majority of the financial risk for any investment. This means recipients should make a financial contribution of at least 50 percent of the investment costs.

There is another question to be considered as well—whether avenues for funding should be made available at all, even as a corollary activity, through external sources. There are examples of successful governance and civil society projects in other less developed countries where there is no grants component. These examples will be examined in detail and considered in the development of the new project design.

NATIONAL DIALOGUES

Impact of the National Dialogues

In terms of potential impact, the dialogues touched millions of people via radio networks. The national dialogues created new standards for non-partisan discussion and open debate of issues and policies. It created opportunities for a broad airing of important national issues due

to its bridge to the mass media. This is an important achievement in civil journalism, particularly in a media context too often based on polemic, a hidden agenda, unreliable information, “paid” journalism (a common practice in Haiti), and perceived bias in favor of particular presidential candidates or parties.

The national dialogues also created unprecedented opportunity for representatives of civil society, the private sector, local and national government, and political parties to meet together on common ground. It has great potential to build and reinforce the conditions for consultation rather than conflict, and for airing and channeling conflicting views in an open forum. To the extent that this can be replicated, it generates modeling behavior for other formats and other civil society encounters with government outside the project. In this case, the medium is indeed the message, and a legitimate goal in and of itself.

How Should They Be Continued?

This type of consultation is very unusual in the Haitian context and should be continued. It is important to maintain the media link and the method—consultation among different sectors. It is important to do this at national as well as regional or local levels. It should be perceived as a key element of civil society engagement in public policy. There should be greater efforts in the future to build upon dialogues in concrete ways—perhaps working groups or steering committees actively promoting issues (i.e., campaigns) such as decentralization or the promotion of civic journalism and other issues carefully selected by stakeholders and civic activists.

In effect, the national dialogues should be one element of a unified democracy enhancement strategy utilized by civil society, local government, and parliamentary components. This type of consultation has proven itself to be adaptable at different levels. It is a proven strategy for bringing people together in the secondary cities programs (e.g., tourism in Jacmel). At the local level, there would be a certain convergence of interest with the methodology of PACTE in reinforcing local government services.

Ultimately, the methodology serves two categories of goals: (1) it supports citizen participation in policy development, and outside consultation in relation to public sectors; (2) in its most local, concrete manifestation, it is applicable as a practical tool for CS/LG partnership—to plan and implement specific public services, such as potable water.

At the national level, this type of consultation—with media support—has the potential to generate a broad base of support—a critical mass – to promote national level policy changes, such as decentralization. This would require carefully planned follow-up of national dialogues via direct contact with parliament, FENAMH, and other pertinent sectors of government. Follow-up was the missing link in the national dialogues of Asosye I. This process would more closely resemble external models for advocacy (lobbying) that are otherwise poorly adapted to the Haitian context. At the national level, lobbying skills have a legitimate application in Haiti—when and if there is a National Assembly and a government.

COALITION FORMATION

Impediments to Coalition Formation

Within the context of Asosye's outreach activities, the program has not addressed sufficient time and energy in support of coalitions. The hope or promise of external funding has tended to undercut the process of coalition formation (no grant, no campaign). Asosye's strategy emphasized training in general rather than targeted technical assistance in support of specific advocacy campaigns. Asosye and its CSO clientele did not promote a follow-on stage of concrete action in the wake of otherwise successful national dialogues. PACTE and Asosye did not seek to harmonize their outreach strategies either conceptually or in practice in the field, except in an ad hoc way. A coherent joint strategy could have been more effective in supporting the process of coalition building.

Have Any of Them Been Overcome? Which Remain?

1. The Asosye team has become quite disillusioned with its grants program and has expressed a desire to re-orient it or perhaps to do away with it entirely. In any case, the grants program is clearly becoming less of an issue – although the evaluation team detected an ongoing concern for funding expressed by CSO clients in the field. In a related manner, Asosye is very interested in supporting a growing degree of financial self-sufficiency within CEDAC networks.
2. Asosye has not yet defined, conceptually, a long-term strategy for the national dialogues in terms of following the syntheses with advocacy, and longer-term coalitions.
3. CEDACs have been one follow-up to the dialogues. CEDACs make Asosye more focused and efficient in providing services to regional CSO networks; While it could be hoped that CEDAC members will, in time decide to create a federation, the future of the CEDACs (after Asosye) is not being planned or formally directed by Asosye.
4. The training program has evolved away from training-in-general, but the Asosye animation strategy is not yet focused on supporting specific campaigns—perhaps the key to coalition building.
5. Asosye and PACTE readily collaborate on an ad hoc basis. The directors of those projects also consult with each other frequently. On the other hand, their program staff does not have regular contact with each other, nor have the two projects worked out a unified strategy to maximize synergy of effort or geographic focus. Both projects are fully committed to local CS/LG encounter, but the two CS/LG projects don't have a systematic strategy of joint action in the field. (See also Chapter V, Project Cross Fertilization)

MOTIVATIONS FOR CIVIC ACTIVISM

What Motivates Haitians to Engage in Civic Activism? To Commit to a Campaign?

To answer these questions, it is important to decide which Haitians and what type of activism we are talking about. Here we refer only to Haitians who are committed (or want to be committed):

to sustained, regular and active promotion of training, information dissemination, an organizing for civic objectives, rather than to confrontational, disruptive protest marches;

through operational structured organizations, not to intermittent groups who are paid to lead or participate in street demonstrations for strictly political purposes.

During the years since the return of President Aristide and the re-emergence of civil society several factors have motivated Haitians toward civic activism:

Religious Affiliation. Commitment to civic action during the 1980s was associated with churches, at first the Catholic Church¹⁷, then Protestant churches. Radio Soleil, a radio station operating under the control of the Episcopal Conference of Haiti, was, for example, a very influential force in molding public opinion.

Community Links. During the Duvalier regime many community-based organizations began working on concrete projects (generally of social infrastructure).¹⁸ Later, these organizations progressively adopted civic and political objectives under different associative labels.

The Call to Civic Duty. Direct appeals to civic duty began with the fall of the Duvalier regime. These appeals found a response as profound as the frustrations and injustices suffered by the population for 30 years. Numerous political organizations were formed (such as organizations for the defense of human rights, youth, women, workers, consumers, and civic organizations), all with a common dream of changing living conditions in the country. At the time commitment to these organizations required costly financial contributions, which the members were most often willing to give. Patriotic sentiments found expression through participation and generous action.

Political Action. The fall of the Duvalier regime also provided the opportunity for political agendas, which had been suppressed during the time the opposition was living clandestinely or in exile, to come to the fore. Appeals for political action mobilized the population, although not as much as those for civic action. This was a time for the

¹⁷ The Conferences of Latin-American Bishops of Medellin and Puebla provided legitimacy by endorsing the Grassroots Ecclesiastic Communities, which took the name of TKL (Ti Kominote Legliz) in Haiti.

¹⁸ Some of these organizations were, however, used by the Duvalier regime as extensions of its rural police network.

emergence or resurgence of political parties and politicians of all kinds. People preferred to join what was called "movements" of which they were less distrustful than they were of political parties. It was in the name of a movement, more than by the formal support of a political coalition, that Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected President of the Republic in 1990.

Social Aspirations. Appeals for greater equality and social justice were also strong motivators of civic action. One of the most powerful demonstrations of the last 15 years was to protest the "disappearance" of a well-known literacy teacher of the Mission Alpha literacy program of the Catholic Church. To this day, literacy campaigns still have as much appeal as do, for example, campaigns of compensation for the victims of the military coup.

Some of these same incentives obtain today although they have been weakened by the political crisis.

More recently, donors have been attempting to reinforce these incentives. They have recognized the value of giving people a voice through open and free expression of opinion. In particular, donors have sought ways to couple civic activism with the promise of a concrete product (services, goods, or a legal or institutional structure) or with financial support. Both PACTE and the European Union's Program of Decentralized Cooperation have had some success in bringing together local government and civil society to plan and provide services. The promise of financial support is sometimes more implicit than explicit, but participants have been conditioned to expect it. As such, financial support is a two-edged sword. It can serve as a short-term incentive to civic activism, but it also reinforces dependency.

How Effective Are the Incentives Provided within ASOSYE to Encourage Activism?

The most effective incentive used by Asosye is quite simply the opportunity to engage in open and free expression of opinion, whether through national dialogues, debates, mini-debates, or more formal training. The problem is that engagement in debates has not led automatically to civic activism. It is difficult to move from the acquisition of knowledge to the use of it for civic activism without additional incentives.

What Other Incentives Might Be Effective?

Achieving immediate results from a campaign carried out in difficult conditions would be one of the best incentives. This will require assistance focused on real issues and on promoting advocacy campaigns that have some promise of producing results.

TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND OVERSIGHT

What Progress Has Been Made Toward Greater Transparency and Accountability of Local Governments?

There is little evidence of a marked increase in transparency and accountability in local government operations. Some communes have demonstrated a willingness to work with civil society. Some CSOs have gained an understanding of the need to hold local governments accountable for their actions. But little has changed concretely.

What Has Been the Role of Citizens and CSOs in Haiti in Assuring Greater Accountability, Transparency and Oversight in Local Governance?

Much of the energy spent by civil society since 1986 has focused on rejecting the individuals and groups symbolizing the former regime rather than rejecting its governing practices. Civil society has not placed a premium on accountability and transparency in local governance. As noted in other contexts, until now civil society pressures or contacts with local government have not taken the form of advocacy campaigns, whether for immediate concerns or more fundamental policy issues, and never in any systematic way.

On the other hand, during the past four years citizens have come to recognize that they must exert pressure for improved governance, especially on local governments. The next group of elected officials will probably not escape this pressure. However, continued efforts, and greater emphasis on this aspect of improved governance are called for. If ASECs and other local assemblies are in place, the quest for greater transparency and accountability will be facilitated.

PROJECT CROSS-FERTILIZATION

Cross-Fertilization between Asosye and PACTE

Some joint activities and collaboration took place between the two projects, and one or both of the projects cooperated on a few occasions with other USAID funded programs. The more important of these are noted here:

PACTE, Asosye Collaboration

Asosye funding for a group of civil society leaders identified by PACTE to attend nonviolence training at the King Center in Atlanta in 1999

A joint Asosye/PACTE Seminar on Civic Education for CASECs Nationwide (800 CASECs) which was funded through an Asosye grant to the Fédération Nationale des CASECs Démocratiques (FONACAD) in late 1997

On advocacy campaign issues in early 1997

Asosye, PACTE and ASSET Collaboration

Secondary Cities initiative—participated in assessment of Bassin Bleu for tourism development

Social Capital study—a review and analysis of social capital in Haiti, and its implications for civil society growth and economic development

Asosye led dialogues on the environment—including also the Ministry of Environment. The focus of the dialogues was the National Environmental Action Plan.

Other Collaboration

There has been other cross-sectoral cooperation. The most recent is a civic action campaign by farmers in Belle Fontaine. This developed following an invitation to Asosye from ASSET to meet with 13 farmers associations for conflict resolution training in anticipation of difficulties in water management in a new irrigation system. The farmers involved demonstrated their ability in the meeting to resolve this matter on their own. However in discussion with the trainer they became very interested in issues relating to environmental management and the lack of needed regulations. This has evolved into an ongoing civic action campaign.

Asosye collaborated with the PRET Project for a special workshop on artisans and artisan associations. This took place during the Jacmel dialogue on Economic Growth, to which Port-au-Prince based artisans and buyers/exporters were invited.

Impact of Cross-Sectoral Initiatives. Did They Enhance or Detract from Achievement of DEP Project Results?

Common interests and similar goals of PACTE and Asosye would suggest that cross project activity could be of mutual benefit. The feedback from the collaboration that took place has been very positive. It is felt that these efforts represent important contributions to each project. In fact, staff members have expressed a strong interest in closer working relationships between the two projects on a regular and ongoing basis.

How Cross-Project or Cross-Sectoral Initiatives Might Be Made More Effective in the Future

A strong potential exists for much greater collaboration between the two projects, and with other activities of USAID and other donors as well. The team found that there has been little or no communication at the field level between the ARD IQC training activity and Asosye. For example, the trainers at Cap-Haitian the last week of November were not aware of the CEDAC, or Asosye's activities in that area.

It would seem particularly useful from a public relations point of view, but also to avoid duplication, to coordinate with, or at least inform, other projects when activities are started in a new location. A first step toward better cooperation would be to communicate with other projects regularly to inform them about project activities and plans. This could be done, perhaps weekly, via e-mail or fax. The dissemination of the information at each project office would also need to be assured.

Although project managers meet together with USAID, it would be useful if project staff were also to have opportunities to meet. Regular get togethers, perhaps on an informal basis, of staff members could provide valuable cross-fertilization between projects. It has been noted that the project staff of both projects are very capable and committed individuals. If provided the opportunity to collaborate, it is expected that they could develop some valuable ideas for effective cross-project initiatives.

Should ARC Be Linked with Civil Society and Local Government Programs? If So, How?

The assessment team was asked to consider the possibilities of aligning ARC more closely with the civil society and local government programs, and to suggest a different administrative arrangement that would reduce demands on the core staff of USAID/Haiti.

The team, and those affiliated with the projects, are of the opinion that the availability of grant funds directly through civil society and governance programs such as PACTE and Asosye leads to greater dependency and stifles the initiative which the projects try to engender. As discussed in the Grants section (V.H.4 above) the assessment team is not recommending direct linkage of the ARC program with the civil society and local government programs.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIVIL SOCIETY AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

The assessment scope of work asked two sets of questions related to this topic. Have PACTE and Asosye succeeded in promoting a fruitful relationship between civil society and local government? And how successful were the PACTE community management committees?

In general, civil society in Haiti remains deeply distrustful of and/or uninterested in government. More specifically, the Haitian population in general has little understanding of decentralized local government. Because of the overall weakness of local government, Haitians have, in fact, little reason to have dealings with communes or CASECs. The most telling indicator of this lack of interest is the downward trend in voter turn-out in the last three elections, culminating in a turn-out of less than 5 percent of the electorate for the 1997 local assembly elections.

Neither PACTE nor Asosye has been successful in bridging this gap on a nation-wide basis. Asosye's activities have not really focused on this particular task. PACTE has had some success on a localized level at building partnerships between civil society and local government. As described previously in this report, PACTE's work in facilitating the creation of community management committees (activity arena 4) has been instrumental in developing good working relationships between civil society organizations, CASECs and commune governments in 11 communes. Still, 11 communes constitutes less than 10 percent of communal governments.

The Civic Education task order awarded to ARD in July 1999 was, to some extent, aimed at addressing this issue. In recognition of the existence of this gap, the task order has two objectives: (1) to foster greater awareness of decentralization issues and (2) to develop an informed consensus and a plan for implementing decentralization policy. It is too early in the implementation of this task order to be able to measure results, but the commitment of USAID funds to this task order is, itself, an indicator that a great deal of work remains to be done to build a fruitful relationship between civil society and local governments.

FISCAL AUTONOMY AT THE COMMUNAL LEVEL

What Are the Prospects for Fiscal Autonomy of the Communes?

Article 66 of the Haitian constitution provides for administrative and financial autonomy of communal government; however, most communes do not have the economic potential for complete financial autonomy. Therefore, the central government must take steps to ensure that local governments are able to offer the services to which each citizen has a right. This would be a major step since the central government has always favored the metropolitan area over all other areas of the country. For example, the national budget for 1996 included 42 million *gourdes* for garbage collection; however, instead of dividing this fund among 133 communes, the Ministry of Interior chose to use the entire national fund for Port-au-Prince alone.

With certain exceptions, it is clear that most communes cannot be completely financially self-sufficient and still fulfill their role and commitment as a responsible local government. The central government will have to underwrite the cost of providing basic services at the commune level by redistributing tax revenues and allocating subsidies to the poorest

communes. At the departmental level, the government should reallocate revenues from larger communes and departmental capitals (*chefs lieux*) to poorer communes within the region.

The assessment team reviewed the DGI annual report for fiscal year 1997-1998. The team also reviewed a report of the Ministry of Interior, noting subsidies allocated to local governments. See the table below for a summary of this information.

**Table 7: Commune Revenues (FY 1997-1998)
(in gourdes)**

Department	Average Revenues from Local Taxes	Average Revenue from Central Government Transfers	Percentage of Revenues from Local Taxes	Percentage of Revenues from Central Government Transfers
North	171,540	871,000	20	80
Northwest	107,324	820,000	13	87
Northeast	23,032	814,759	3	97
Artibonite	187,047	785,379	24	76
Center	NA	731,651		
West	NA	714,378		
Southeast	NA	819,837		
South	118,020	819,187	14	86
Grande-Anse	81,690	800,000	10	90

Categorization of Communes in Terms of Their Potential for Future Self-Sufficiency

The four communes in and around the capital. The preceding table does not include the four communes of the metropolitan area (Port-au-Prince, Pétionville, Carrefour, and Delmas) because these communes do not receive transfers from the FGDCT. With the exception of their share of a central government budget subsidy (a total of 100 million gourdes), all their revenues come from local taxes. In this sense these communes are close to being "financially self-sufficient." However, most public services in these four cities are provided by the central government. An official of the Ministry of Finance stated, "...the central government contributes more to the communes than the anticipated subsidy of 100,000,000 gourdes. For example, we are currently maintaining and rehabilitating the parks of Port-au-Prince. The government also takes care of trash collection, sewers, road repair, etc." If these four cities had to foot the bill for these services, they would be unable to do so with their current level of income.

The departmental capitals. The other departmental capitals (*chefs lieux*) -- Port-de-Paix, Cap-Haïtien, Fort Liberté, Gonaïves, Hinche, Jacmel, Cayes and Jérémie -- as well as some of the larger towns that are not departmental capitals have the potential to be financially self-sufficient if they improved their local revenue collections and their administrative and financial management. Every town we visited, for example, had inadequate systems and

procedures for registering businesses, assessing property values, and collecting taxes. An examination of the accounts in these cities showed that most businesses, especially in the informal sector, were not registered on the tax rolls; many of those were not paying or were underpaying their taxes (*patente*). The books also revealed that the rental value on most properties was undervalued and that the property tax was, in any case, infrequently collected. There is also reason to believe that department capitals have the economic base for substantial increases in fiscal revenues. Visits to the markets and to local retail businesses revealed that a large quantity and variety of goods were being bought and sold, which indicates that the economy in these cities can probably support a higher level of local taxes, especially if the population perceived that the taxes would be used to increase services.

Other communes. Most of the country's 133 communes, however, will probably not be able to provide for themselves for the foreseeable future. They do not have the economic base to increase taxation greatly. These communes will continue to rely on central government transfers for some time to come.

Support of the GOH for Communal Self-Sufficiency

In 1996, parliament passed a law creating the Fund for the Management of Territorial Collectivities (FGDCT). As described earlier the FGDCT is funded through a number of earmarked taxes. The exact amount available through the FGDCT will, therefore, vary each year depending on the amount of money collected from these taxes. An optimistic estimate suggests that the Fund has the potential to collect 120,000,000 *gourdes* per year. In addition, the central government provides a subsidy to local governments of 100,000,000 *gourdes* from the national budget. Thus, the total funding available from the central government for local governments is 220,000,000 *gourdes*.

Although the creation of the FGDCT was a significant advance in municipal finance, the team's on site assessments suggest that the funding available from the central government is simply insufficient to cover the costs of communal operations.

Recommendations

It is unlikely (and perhaps undesirable) that the central government will greatly increase its funding of local governments. In the long run, communes will have to rely on their own resources to provide the services that the population will increasingly require. This will require, in turn, basic improvements in financial and administrative management at the commune level. In the short run, the best the communes can probably hope for from the central government is greater transparency and more efficient procedures in the distribution of funding to local governments.

Both of these requirements—better local financial management and more transparent transfers—will require enabling legislation from the National Assembly and a functioning institutional framework. The legislation should provide communes with greater authority and

flexibility in their power to levy and collect taxes. The institutional framework must include a functioning interdepartmental council as well as the commission of local government officials that the 1996 law authorizes to oversee the distribution of central government transfers. It must also include uniform local government budgets that are used not just as wish lists but as management tools.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

The assessment scope of work contained the following question: Can local democratic governance be strengthened in the absence of improved economic opportunities for the rural poor?

The question is not answerable, however, by a simple yes or no. The more important question is: What is the relationship between economic opportunities and local democratic governance?

A large part of the answer to this question lies in the experience of the PACTE project in activity arena 4. The original purpose of this component of the project was to improve the performance of local governments in providing goods and services to the community. As the activities in this component unfolded, it became apparent that what most communities were interested in was economic improvement. Few of the sectors by the communities were in service areas that are traditionally the responsibility of government. Rather, they were in economic sectors, notably agriculture and agricultural processing.

The communes in which PACTE worked did well to respond to the priority concerns of the population even if they were not traditional public service areas. Most of the mayors, in fact, did not seem at all concerned about the fact that the institutions established to manage the economic development projects that emerged from this process would not be managed directly by the commune governments. In this sense, they viewed their jobs as economic boosterism. They were happy to take their share of credit for providing economic opportunities for their community.

Several mayors were very explicit on this point. They did not see their jobs as providing services directly to the population. Rather they viewed themselves as intermediaries between the community and other institutions—the central government, NGOs, or international donors—that were in a better position to provide services directly or provide economic opportunities for the community.

Given the current status and resource situation of local governments, this is a very realistic point of view. In the United States, many cities and towns have full-fledged economic development departments whose primary mission is to attract investment. These departments are usually recent add-ons to the more traditional city service departments, such as police, fire protection, or sanitation. What the mayors in towns like Cavaillon, Torbeck, and Maniche have been doing is, in effect, reversing the usual process of local government

development. They have, with the assistance of PACTE, been developing their capacities to operate fledgling economic development departments before they have developed the capacity to provide more traditional services.

These economic development initiatives by elected officials should not be discouraged. They should, in fact, be encouraged because they are directly responsive to popular concerns. The challenge for a new program, however, will be to help locally elected officials develop more well rounded capacities for service provision as well as economic boosterism. We believe that many communes have the financial potential to do so.

Clearly, a stronger economic base is essential for improved local democratic governance and better public services. Public-private partnerships are a critical element in strengthening the economic base of local governments.

CHAPTER SIX LESSONS LEARNED

This chapter provides a summary of the lessons we have learned from our assessment.

LEVELS AND EMPHASES

The original intentions of the DEP with respect to levels and emphases was sound, but its implementation became unbalanced.

- The Haitian people made a decision to decentralize 12 years ago (at the time the Constitution was written). There remains, however, a great deal of indifference or even resistance to decentralization within the central government and among the social, economic and political elite. Further advances in decentralization will require a revival of interest in and support for decentralization among those who are now indifferent or hostile.
- Decentralized governance cannot be effective in the absence of laws and regulations that clearly define roles and responsibilities. Local government entities that do not exist (ASECs and other deliberative bodies) or that do not have clear operational instructions cannot be strengthened. USAID must address this concern squarely by working directly with the central government and with national level civil society organizations to ensure that sub-national units of government have a legal framework in which they can comfortably operate.
- PACTE was designed to work with the central government as well as with local governments. Asosye was designed to work with national level CSOs as well as grassroots organizations. This balance was sound. Both projects gravitated, however, toward working more at the grassroots level than at the national level. Labor unions, political parties, parliamentarians, national-level CSOs, private sector organizations, and urban community organizations are, for example, underrepresented in the Asosye program.
- It is important in this context to revive a Haitian-led CCH as consultative body for Asosye and to seek its guidance on work plans, program activities, and the needs of civil society in a changing political context. The CCH should be representative of different sectors of civil society, including pertinent sectors that are not traditional clients of USAID/Haiti.
- A large part of the reason for the projects' tendencies to work more at the periphery than the center stemmed from reasons beyond the control of the two projects (the Dole-Helms Amendment, for example). Decentralization programs should, of course, avoid positioning themselves to be controlled by central government or by powerful urban

elites. Still, the projects' relative inability to engage national-level power brokers, both within and outside government, seriously impeded the possibilities of achieving DEP objectives.

TRAINING STRATEGIES

Both PACTE and Asosye provided a good deal of training of various kinds and to a variety of participants. From our observations of these experiences we have concluded that:

- Training is more effective when it can be applied immediately to a particular activity. Generic training that cannot be immediately applied tends to get dissipated over time. Much of the PACTE training in areas like budgeting or the Asosye training in advocacy are examples of training that has not been put to good use for lack of immediate opportunities to apply what was learned.
- Training directed at elected officials is risky because the application of the training depends on how long these officials stay in office. For technical training like budgeting, it may be better to provide training, and follow-up technical assistance, to staff (as long as they have some protection from political dismissals) rather than elected officials.
- Many civil society organizations do not have the capacity to absorb and effectively apply advocacy training. Some CSOs should receive more fundamental capacity building assistance before being expected to participate effectively in advocacy campaigns.
- Capacity building training should focus on creating financial viability and sound management skills and should avoid training in grantsmanship.
- To avoid the perception that civic education training is being used for political purposes, civic education training should not be limited to periods preceding elections. Asosye as well as the civic education task order should avoid being identified primarily as vehicles for increasing voter turnout.

THE USE OF GRANTS

Both Asosye and PACTE contained grants components. These components were meant to complement other project components. However:

- Project participants often focused on grant assistance at the expense of more fundamental benefits. When there occurred long delays between the start of a program and the signing of a grant agreement (two years in Cabaret, for example), many participants lost interest.
- In the long run, development is better served if civil society organizations and local governments work within their own means. PACTE would have done better, for example,

to have organized participants to conduct and self-finance a larger number of smaller activities rather than focusing on one large externally-financed project.

- In Asosye, CSOs often evinced greater interest in receiving funding for their projects than in advancing advocacy campaigns.
- PACTE beneficiaries were also often more interested in funding than in capacity building. To avoid this, PACTE grants should not have been provided until community organizations fully financed and implemented at least 2 small projects with their own funding.

ADVOCACY

Advocacy as understood in the United States, is a foreign concept in Haiti, as indeed it is in many other countries. There is, in fact, no good single-word translation for the term advocacy, either in French (*plaidoirie? revendication? action civique?*) or in Creole. Thus:

- USAID should re-conceptualize its notion of advocacy to adapt to the Haitian context. The operational implications of this re-conceptualization must be thoroughly examined.
- Whatever the outcome, advocacy training should focus on issues of concern to stakeholders. Training should, in other words, focus first on issues. Methods are also important, but participants must first thoroughly understand the issue.
- External methods of lobbying and advocacy training cannot simply be transposed onto the Haitian scene. Advocacy methodologies and assumptions must be revised and adapted to the Haitian political, social, and cultural context.
- The National Dialogues sponsored by Asosye were highly effective in bringing together disparate groups from different sectors to debate issues in a neutral setting. The resolutions that emerged from these dialogs are articulate and pithy. Unfortunately, there has been no action-oriented follow-up to these resolutions. One possibility for recovering the investment in these dialogs would be to use the nascent CEDACs as catalysts for initiating advocacy campaigns or creating issue- and action-oriented partnerships between interested stakeholders.
- In the Haitian context, it is probably unavoidable that advocacy training will be perceived in some quarters as political interference. The distinction between advocacy campaigns (advancing an issue) and political campaigns (promoting a candidacy) is easily blurred, if not entirely lost, in the highly volatile and politicized Haitian context. USAID programs should not, of course, be partisan (backing a particular party or political candidate). Neither, however, should they shy away from taking on issues. The best way to teach advocacy is to get participants actually involved in an advocacy campaign.
- Advocacy campaigns must be financially self-sustainable.

THE NEED FOR INTER-PROGRAM SYNERGIES

The programs we assessed have overlapping and complementary interests and objectives. They often work with the same groups toward the same ends. Greater convergence must be a hallmark of a new program.

- PACTE and Asosye have, for example, a convergence of interest in the role of assemblies. At the grassroots level, ASECs are the immediate intermediary between civil society and government. For this reason, the new program should place a premium on re-invigorating assemblies at all levels.
- Both programs as well as the civic education task order work directly with civil society. Directly or indirectly all three programs are engaged in civic education. There is a need for conceptual and operational convergence among the programs, especially with respect to civic education activities.
- PACTE and Asosye need especially to find ways to integrate their activities at the grassroots level. In Cayes, for example, some of the civil society organizations with which PACTE was working were members of the CEDAC that Asosye helped create. Yet, the PACTE staff were unaware of the CEDAC and the CEDAC manager was unaware of PACTE'S work with the members of his organization (the CEDAC and the PACTE offices in Cayes were located only two blocks apart.)
- Because of these convergences of interests and opportunities, consideration should be given to merging the two programs operationally.

CHAPTER SEVEN

PROSPECTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the lessons learned from this assessment, this chapter introduces some thoughts and potential orientations for a new USAID-financed governance program. We would like to emphasize, however, that the new program should be developed in a participatory manner with input from broad segments of the Haitian population. These include senior government officials, representatives from communes and CASECs, representatives of the business community, the heads of political parties, and civil society leaders.

The thoughts in this chapter reflect the consensus of the five-person assessment team. A broader and larger number of stakeholder must be consulted in the design of a new program.

OVERALL ORIENTATIONS

1. The new program must be constructed on the basis of a holistic view of the elements of effective, decentralized governance in Haiti. These elements should include, among others:
 - An agreement on a framework for decentralization, meaning an understanding of the responsibilities and boundaries of decentralized units of governance;
 - A commitment to participatory governance, meaning an understanding of the role of civil society and the rules of engagement for decentralized executive and deliberative bodies;
 - A commitment to the financial viability of decentralized units of governance, with an understanding of what that will require.
2. To ensure that an adequate legal, regulatory, and financial framework is in place for decentralization activities, it will be essential that the new program work directly with the National Assembly and the Executive Branch of the Central Government.
3. The resources available in the current DEP are inadequate to cover the needs of nine departments, 133 communes, and 565 communal sections or to reach a critical mass of CSOs. The new DEP should, therefore, have more focus. Consideration, for example, should be given to
 - Targeting national-level and department-level opinion leaders and power brokers whose views and decisions are important for decentralization
 - Concentrating resources in Port-au Prince, the two secondary cities (Jacmel and Cap-Haïtien) and the sub-national units of government in the departments of these three cities.

4. Effective and responsive governance requires cooperation, even partnership, between civil society and government officials. The encounter between civil society and government should take at least two forms: (1) policy consultation, (2) partnership in planning and providing clearly identified, discrete public services
5. The overall planning of the new USAID program must engage representatives of both civil society and the government. Within a single commune, the new USAID program(s) should be planned and implemented with the participation of strategically important groups. These should include representatives of the business sector (chambers of commerce, perhaps), NGOs and grassroots organizations, labor unions, the media, government officials, and CSO federations.
6. For this same reason, USAID-funded civil society and local government activities must be planned together, not separately. The operational decision about whether there should be two or more separate contracts does not obviate the need for the two programs to be planned at the same time.
7. The new program(s) should provide technical assistance and training. It should not provide grants. Rather, USAID should, if it so desires, establish a separate mechanism, similar to ARC, for providing grant assistance. The criteria for eligibility for grant assistance from the ARC-like mechanism should, nevertheless, be tightly linked to beneficiary performance under the new program(s). Grant recipients should also bear the majority of the financial risk for any project. This means recipients should make a financial contribution of at least 50 percent of the project's costs.
8. At the CASEC or commune level, effective collaboration between civil society and government officials is essential. The work of PACTE in 17 communes has proved that such collaboration is feasible and workable. Two improvements on the PACTE model should be considered. One, as mentioned above, is that it should not include a grant element. Two, the partnerships forged through the approach should be action-oriented from the beginning. Within the context of a long-term development plan, each commune should collaboratively plan, implement, and self-finance multiple small community development activities – 25 or more over a two-year period – rather than a single externally funded project. This means about 4-5 activities per communal section plus an equal number in the town. The emphasis should be on learning while doing, not learning while planning.

SOME SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

Civil Society, Advocacy and Communications

1. A valuable, but, at present, underutilized asset that Asosye has helped create are the CEDACs. To make better use of these CSO-member organizations, Asosye should

initiate a process of planning and reflection with CEDAC members with a view to defining objectives, creating action plans, and moving toward financial self-sufficiency. CEDACS could, for example:

Be provided with the task of making use of the assets created by Asosye through its National Dialogues. Specifically, CEDACs could become catalysts for advocacy campaigns or the creation of action-oriented agreements between the various institutions that took part in the National Dialogues.

Be used to organize coalitions for monitoring or co-producing local public services, or negotiating with deconcentrated government services and assemblies.

Organize non-partisan, issue-oriented forums for CSO meetings with political parties and candidates for elected office. These forums could be modeled after the sessions organized by the League of Women Voters in the United States.

2. A great deal more use should be made of rural radio to publicize program activities, to announce events of community concern, and for advocacy.
3. Civic education and advocacy work plans should explicitly take into account the electoral calendar in planning activities, due to the impact of elections on civil society organizations. Some normal activities may be inappropriate or misinterpreted during campaign periods.
4. It would be useful for Asosye to follow up its program of conflict mediation training and report on specific CSO applications of such training.
5. Asosye program indicators should include CSO applications of conflict mediation training, and CSO planning and implementation of specific civic action campaigns.
6. Financial issues are a hindrance to CSO investment in civic action campaigns. Financial issues should be addressed in training and workshops devoted to financial sustainability and fund raising.
7. Asosye should build on its success in civic journalism and the promotion of open and informed discussion of important themes. Media campaigns designed by Haitians should be continued as an adjunct of other program activities.
8. More attention should be paid to promotion of CSO self-financing and economic independence. Some attention should be paid to targeting savings and loan associations as a pivotal sector for civil society activism, and as a village bank for other CSOs.

Training

1. Most training should be experiential, not generic. It should be oriented toward the resolution of problems of real and immediate concern to participants.
2. Training should be linked to technical assistance to apply the lessons of the training, whether it be for a community development project or an advocacy campaign. The focus of assistance should be technical and action-oriented.

Grants

1. As mentioned above, the new program should be grant-less. The civil society/local government partnerships pioneered by PACTE should feature multiple small projects, all internally funded, within each locality, to be followed up, potentially, with a larger grant from an external source of funding.
2. The Asosye grants program should be revised to eliminate grants because they are seen as an impediment to coalitions and campaigns

Program Synergies and Collaboration

1. PACTE and Asosye should work out a joint strategy, including shared calendars and consulting among component leaders and staff within both projects, especially for secondary city interventions in Jacmel and Cap-Haitian.
2. The two programs should jointly plan campaigns of consultation and lobbying on behalf of decentralization policy. They should mobilize civil society in active, targeted campaigns to promote enabling legislation and the establishment of local deliberative bodies as provided by the constitution. Specifically, these campaigns should directly address the potential role of ASECs as an interface between civil society and local government.
3. The two programs should jointly engage lawmakers in promoting a law on associations that ensures freedom of association and pluralism, and facilitates attainment of legal status by CSOs.
4. At the local level (communes and CASECs), the two programs should join forces to promote concrete civil society/government partnerships in problem solving.

PROGRAMMING OPTIONS

The design of a new program will probably have to contain at least two options. One option would be used if elections take place, as scheduled, in March and April 2000. The other would be used if elections do not occur, especially if they are indefinitely postponed.

If Elections Occur

If elections occur, a full-fledged program can be implemented. As recommended above, we believe it essential that the new program contain a component that works directly with the National Assembly and the Executive Branch of the Central Government. If the provisions of the Dole-Helms Amendment or other U.S. foreign policy concerns prevent U.S. assistance from being provided directly to the central government, even if elections do occur, USAID should understand that short-term objectives dealing with the strengthening of sub-national units of government will be impossible to achieve.

If Elections Do Not Occur

If elections do not occur, if the National Assembly remains dysfunctional, or if the provisions of U.S. foreign assistance legislation (e.g., the Dole-Helms amendment) make it impossible for USAID to work directly with the central government on a decentralization framework, USAID should work only with civil society. The civil society program should be directed mainly at capacity building, secondarily at issue-oriented advocacy. The long-term goal of such a program should be to prepare civil society to engage government on issues of concern. USAID should have modest short-term expectations, however, because it will be difficult for civil society to engage local governments that are operating without proper legal, regulatory, and financial underpinnings.

ANNEX A
PERSONS CONTACTED

PERSONS CONTACTED

Name	Organization	Title	City
Department of the South-East			
Guy Massé	Commune	Mayor	Jacmel
Jackson Bellevue	Commune	Deputy mayor	Jacmel
Pascal Raymond	Hotel manager and school teacher	Candidate for Mayor	Jacmel
Hughes Paul	Businessman	Candidate for mayor	Jacmel
Joël Jean-Baptiste	Former member, ASOSYE Haitian Advisory Committee	Member	Jacmel
Ericarme Joassaint	CEDAC Council, Kodination Fanm sidès	Member	Jacmel
Glainiy Chanlatte	CEDAC Council, Action pour le Développement du Sud-Est	Member	Jacmel
Manita Malvois	CEDAC	Manager	Jacmel
Jacques Khawly	Chambre de Commerce	President	Jacmel
Jean Kalinsky	Association du bon berger	Coordinator	Marbial
Prosper Louis	Association du bon berger	Member	Marbial
Jn-Claude Bernard	Association des Jeunes de Mont Ogé pour le Développement	President	Mont Ogé
Josette Ernest	Association des Jeunes de Mont Ogé pour le Développement	Secretary	Mont Ogé
Jacqueline Ernest	Formation des Evangeliques	Membre	Mont Ogé
Honoré Espero	Comité de Developpement bas la route	Membre	Cap Rouge
Department of the North-East			
Pierreb Joseph	CEDAC council, Rassemblement des Jeunes Patriotes de Fort Liberté	Member	Fort Liberté
Jackson Pierre	CEDAC Council, Comité d'Initiative pour Unité en Développement commune Fort Liberté	Member	Fort Liberté
Eliane Ménélus	CEDAC Council, Organisation des Femmes de Fort Liberté pour le Développement	Member	Fort Liberté

Name	Organization	Title	City
Wesky Fleriko	CEDAC Council, Comité de Réhabilitation et de Développement pour la Circonscription de Fort Liberté	Member	Fort Liberté
Jemima Charles	CEDAC Council, Groupement Educatif Femmes Fort Liberté	Member	Fort Liberté
Adèle Mondestin	Groupement Educatif Femmes Fort Liberté	Secretary, also Ex-Mayor of Fort Liberté-1991	Fort Liberté
Emmanuel Charles	Organisation des Masses pour le Développement de Ouanaminthe	President	Ouanaminthe
Wilter Pierre	Commune	Mayor and Delegate to FENAMH	Terrier Rouge
Jean-Baptiste Rolex	Commune	Mayor	Trou du Nord
Suzete Exantus	Commune	Adjunct Mayor	Trou du Nord
Jacquelin Pierre	CEDAC Council, Fédération des Écoles Privées indépendantes du Nord	Member	Cap Haïtien
Monlien Louis	CEDAC Council, Fondation Ti Moun Se Lespwa	Member	Cap Haïtien
Walter Bussenius	Chamber of Commerce	Member	Cap Haïtien
John Stanm	USAID Secondary Cities Project	Staff	Cap Haïtien
Jacqueline Joseph	ARD, Civic Education Task Force	Trainer	Cap Haïtien
Irio Toussaint	ARD, Civic Education Task Force	Trainer	Cap Haïtien
Bernard Jules	ARD, Civic Education Program	Participant	Plaine du Nord
Edrice Damintace	ARD, Civic Education Program	Participant	Plaine du Nord
Saintila Julsainte	ARD, Civic Education Program	Participant	Plaine du Nord
Desorme Guillian	ARD, Civic Education Program	Participant	Plaine du Nord
Marjorie Milfont	ARD, Civic Education Program	Participant	Plaine du Nord
François Reynaud	ARD, Civic Education Program	Participant	Plaine du Nord

Name	Organization	Title	City
Department of the West			
Alix Fils-Aimé	National Assembly, Chamber of Deputies	Ex-President of the Interior Commission	Kenscoff
Michel Gayard	Espace de Concertation	Candidate for Mayor	Port-au-Prince
Thony Cantave	Comision Nationale pour la Réforme Administrative	Member	Port-au-Prince
Ronald Beaudin	Ministry Of Finance	Director General	Port-au-Prince
Rév. Père Carré	Paroisse de Kenscoff	Parish Priest	Kenscoff
Bertrand Laurent	ASOSYE II	Chief of Party	Port-au-Prince
Ira Lowenthal	PACTE	Chief of Party	Port-au-Prince
Michèle Romulus	PACTE, Civic Education Task Force	Director	Port-au-Prince
Felipe Mantega	EG/USAID/Haiti	SO Team Leader	Port-au-Prince
Richard Forbes	ASOSYE II	Staff	Port-au-Prince
Socra Antenor	JDG/USAID/Haiti	Local Government Program Coordinator	Port-au-Prince
Sharon Bean	JDG/USAID	Inclusion Team Leader	Port-au-Prince
Erin Soto	JDG/USAID	SO Team Leader	Port-au-Prince
Danielle St. Lot	PACTE	Staff (also candidate for mayor of Pétionville)	Pétionville
Paul Thomas	PACTE	Staff	Port-au-Prince
Frantz Théodat	Direction Générale des Impôts	Director General	Port-au-Prince
Mathias Sacout	Afe Neg Kombit Bakery	Supervisor	Kenscoff
Carles Matelier	ASOSYE II	Staff	Port-au-Prince
Henri Hogarth	ASOSYE II	Staff	Port-au-Prince
Thanya Bastien	ASOSYE II	Staff	Port-au-Prince

Name	Organization	Title	City
	Commune	Mayor	Cabaret
Lionel Jacques	Comité de Développement Socioeconomique du Commune du Cabaret (CODESECA)	Secretary	Cabaret
Franklin Sanon	CODESECA	Director of Public Relations	Cabaret
Department of the South			
Leonor Jn Amour	Commune	Mayor	Torbeck
Joseph Odner Benoit	Asosyasyon Viktim 30 Section 91	President	Torbeck
Belas Benissel	UFADESCH	Treasurer	Maniche
	Commune	Adjunct Mayor	Cavaillon
	Commune	Mayor	St. Louis du Sud
	Commune	Adjunct Mayor	St. Louis du Sud
Mme Paul Janvier	Organisation pour la Promotion Socioeconomique de St. Louis du Sud (OPSES)	President	St. Louis du Sud
Saül	Commune	Former Mayor	Maniche
	Commune		
Moïse Maxilorme	CEDAC	Manager	Cayes
Jean Raymond Lucilien	Asosyasyon Fanm Vanyan Chalet	President	Torbeck
Charles Wilson	OPSES	Founding member (OPSES)	St. Louis du Sud
Seven Staff Members	PACTE	Staff	Cayes

ANNEX B
DOCUMENTS EXAMINED

DOCUMENTS EXAMINED

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