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Final Report
September 2000 to June 2004

Nigeria Corruption Survey Task Order

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The arrival of a Casals & Associates, Inc (C&A) team in Nigeria on September 2000 marked the beginning of the Task Order (TO). In Lagos, the C&A team met with Ms. Ravi Aulakh, the COTR, to review the objectives of the Task Order and with Mr. Aman S. Djahanbani, the Regional Contracting Officer, to discuss requirements to assess the Institute for Development Research (IDR) capacity to pre-qualify for award of USAID contracts.

From Lagos, the C&A team went to IDR in Zaria where, over a two-day period, meetings were conducted with IDR and Ahmadu Bello University academic and administrative officials. The purpose was to ascertain the capability of IDR and the University to manage USAID funds as a condition of the TO was that C&A contract the research consortium led by IDR (it also included NCEMA/NISER, Ibadan; Department of Economics, University of Port Harcourt; Institute for Development Studies, University of Nigeria, Enugu campus; and Centre for Development Studies, University of Jos), to conduct the survey. Information obtained at the meetings was supplemented by materials reviewed while on site and examination of others provided for our files, such as IDR's Organizational Chart and university accounting and procurement manuals. On the basis of the assessment, C&A concluded that IDR had the institutional capacity to manage USAID funds. Accounting, reporting and internal audit systems, as well as management organizational structure, were found to be adequate; IDR and the University more generally counted with qualified staff and had appropriate systems of internal control as well as a demonstrated ability to properly manage subcontracts in accordance with Section 44.000 of USAID's Procurement Regulations (Subcontracting Policies and Procedures).

Later, and while in Abuja, together with World Bank representatives, C&A met with several Nigerian government officials to inform them about the forthcoming survey and seek their input. Officials met included Prince Vincent Exe Ogbulafor, Minister of Economic Matters (The Presidency); V.S.C. Azie and J.E. Okotie, both directors of audit at the Office of the Auditor General for the Federation; Mr. J. K. Maiyeju, Accountant General for the Federation; and Ms. T.O. Akerele, Solicitor General of the Federation and Permanent Secretary. C&A also contacted U.S. Embassy Public Affairs staff to gather background materials pertaining to the country's print and electronic media with a view towards the eventual planning of the IEC campaign to be implemented following the surveys.

A workshop (financed under the TO) was also convened at IDR September 26-28 to review survey implementation procedures, such as sampling design, adaptation of questionnaires to Nigerian conditions, translation of portions of the questionnaires into various languages, analytical approach, and time-table. In attendance at the workshop were representatives from all but one (Institute for Development Studies, IDS-Enugu) of the survey research consortium's participating institutions, as well as from USAID and the World Bank. Exchanges during the workshop, attended by some 20 researchers, were generally professional and constructive. The consortium team assembled by IDR seemed quite capable of producing a quality survey product within the allotted budget. While coordinating the overall effort, IDR also assumed the responsibility for data processing and drafting the national survey report. Regional institutions were to provide input for the national report and generate regional reports. The proposed breakdown of interviews that were to be conducted by each consortium institution by zone, type of survey and location is shown below, as is a summary of the total number of interviews (aside from those to be done as part of pilot testing the questionnaires) by institution.

**Survey Interviews to be Conducted by Each Consortium Institution
by Zone, Type of Survey, and Location**

Institution	Zone	Total Number of Interviews	Household Survey	Urban	Rural	Public Officials	Business Enterprises
IDR	North-East	758	395	198	197	203	160
IDR	North-West	758	395	198	197	203	160
CDS/JOS	Middle Belt	758	395	198	197	203	160
IDS/Enugu	South-East	758	395	198	197	203	160
NISER/NCEMA	South-West	758	395	198	197	203	160
NISER/CEMA	Federal Capital Territory	452	130	130	-	282	40
South-South	U.of Port Harcourt/U. of Uyo	758	395	198	197	203	160
Total		5,000	2,500	1,318	1,182	1,500	1,000

Total number of Interviews by Consortium Institution

IDR	1,516
CDS/JOS	758
IDS/Enugu	758
NISER/NCEMA	1,210
U. of Port Harcourt/ U. of Uyo	758

Under IDR's leadership, and with technical support from the World Bank and C&A, the research consortium team was to finalize and document the survey methodology. In early October, C&A was to forward to IDR a subcontract specifying what was expected from IDR, specify a timetable and schedule of deliverables, and describing reporting requirements. IDR promised, in turn, to forward to C&A the first set of deliverables that were to be specified in the sub-contract. These were the project's proposed management structure, revised preliminary versions of the questionnaires as modified to meet Nigerian conditions (on the basis of the

discussion held at the workshop), and a proposed survey implementation timetable. Once the revised questionnaires were reviewed by C&A and World Bank staff, the IDR-led consortium was to continue finalizing the English version of the questionnaires and begin to assess issues related to the translation of selected questionnaire portions into Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba.

Other deliverables to be submitted during survey implementation included description of sampling frames, size of samples, sampling techniques to be used, questionnaire translation issues, analytical plan, data collection and pilot testing procedures, and preliminary and final reports. It was anticipated that the survey, including final report, could be completed over a six month-period, with IEC activities to follow. This timetable proved to be far too optimistic for several reasons. Delays repeatedly occurred given the coordination logistics challenge faced by IDR as it was leading a national consortium that included five other research institutions representing all major regions of the country as well as the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). Institutional weaknesses and poorly equipped facilities also contributed to delays, as did issues associated with donor coordination and political sensitivities associated with the nature of the survey and related follow-on activities.

The following table summarizes the deliverables and the survey's timetable.

Deliverable One	Proposed schedule of activities for the conduct of the survey, preliminary versions of the survey questionnaires as adapted to conditions in Nigeria, and a proposed survey implementation management structure.
Deliverable Two	Survey sampling design, data collection (including sequencing) and proposed survey data analysis plan, and survey questionnaire translation (selected portions into Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo).
Deliverable Three	Interview training protocol approach and guidelines for field work data collection procedures (including measures to be implemented to ensure data quality) for interviewers.
Deliverable Four	Written report describing survey data collection results, a data-entry code book, and clean data files for the three survey components in SPSS and/or Microsoft Excel Office 97. The data files to be transmitted to C&A via e-mail as well as on diskettes.
Deliverable Five	Preliminary survey report providing national, as well as regional, analysis of the data.
Final Deliverable	Final survey report.

As anticipated, in the last quarter of 2000, C&A, working with the Regional Contracts Office in USAID/Ghana, finalized a subcontract that was issued to IDR for the conduct of the survey. IDR, in turn, entered into formal second tier subcontracting relationships with the other Nigerian research institutions in the survey consortium. Once C&A and the World Bank reviewed the first set of deliverables and made recommendations, IDR was to complete the final versions of the questionnaires (including translating relevant sections into Hausa, Yoruba and

Igbo), pre-test them, and finalize sampling and data collection procedures, as well as analytical plans.

After a delay, in mid-January, the IRD submitted to C&A revised versions of the questionnaires (households, public officials, enterprises). The revised versions were jointly reviewed by C&A with World Bank staff in Washington. Joint C&A/World Bank recommendations for further modifications to the questionnaires were forwarded by C&A to IDR in early February, with IDR and collaborating institutions agreeing to the proposed revisions by late February. Upon receiving concurrence from IDR regarding the latest proposed changes, C&A released the first payment for the conduct of the survey. By March 2001, C&A was waiting for the second set of deliverables.

In June 2001, the pre-test of the Governance and Corruption Survey was completed by representatives in all six geopolitical zones, as well as the FCT. In late June-early July, a C&A team traveled to Nigeria to assist the consortium prepare a pre-test report and attend an interactive video teleconference during which pre-test results were discussed with World Bank Institute technical staff in Washington, D.C. The team also met with members of the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) to begin talks about how the TO's public awareness component should proceed, conducted interviews with potential long-term Cooperating Country National (CCN) resident survey coordinators, and briefed the COTR and other key USAID staff. By late June, C&A was still waiting for the second set of deliverables which were finally provided by IDR in July.

Further TO implementation delays resulted shortly thereafter as due to Muslim/Christian violence in the cities of Kano, Kaduna, and Jos - resulting in part from the USG's reaction to the 11 September attacks - C&A staff was denied U.S. Embassy clearance to travel to Nigeria in September and October. During this time, however, the TO was modified and additional funds were added to the budget. The additional funding was to be used to contract a CCN to monitor survey implementation, conduct an expanded public awareness campaign, design and implement survey workshops, manage a small grants program to involve civil society and local organizations in the campaign, conduct investigative journalism workshops, and continue to build a relationship with the ICPC.

In October, C&A staff began preliminary work on the design of the anti-corruption information, education, and communications (IEC) campaign designed to inform civil society about the costs of corruption and the results of the survey. C&A was pleased to learn that the World Bank Institute adopted (with minor adjustments) the IEC strategy developed by C&A for the Nigeria Service Delivery and Corruption survey as a model for its own survey dissemination efforts in other African countries. During this time, C&A also conducted research about potential civil society and local organizations with whom it could work during TO implementation.

In November, C&A finally received country clearance from the U.S. Embassy for a team of three C&A staff to embark on a two-week mission to Abuja and Lagos between 9 December and 23 December 2001. During this trip, C&A met with several potential local partners who could support the development and implementation of the IEC campaign, including

representatives of television and radio stations, public relations firms, production studios, and CSOs. To ensure continuity in USAID anti-corruption programming and to encourage the continued involvement of organizations already active in the anti-corruption arena, C&A met with several organizations that during the transition to democratic rule had received USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) anti-corruption grants. While in Nigeria, the C&A team conducted further interviews with potential CCNs and decided to offer the position of RPM to Mr. Adebayo Oba Adelodun, a prominent and highly recommended Ilorin attorney. Mr. Adelodun was to be responsible for monitoring implementation of survey-related activities, coordinating the IEC campaign with C&A's local partners and Government of Nigeria (GoN) entities, in particular the ICPC.

In order to acquire appropriate background data and coordinate the IEC campaign with other U.S. Government entities and the international donor community, C&A also met with representatives from the USAID mission, the U.S. Information Agency, the U.S. Department of State, and the U.K. Department for International Development (DFID). During this trip, C&A also met with IDR staff to discuss survey related issues. C&A was informed by IDR that the field work had been completed and data analysis was underway. As 2001 ended, C&A was still waiting for IDR to submit a written report describing the survey data collection results, a data entry code book, and clean data files for the three survey components (Deliverable 4), as well as a preliminary survey report providing national and regional analysis of the data (Deliverable 5). Due to these delays, the survey implementation timetable continued to fall behind schedule.

By December 2001, C&A was analyzing the information it had gathered from potential local partners and was contemplating the award of subcontracts and grants to the most qualified of these organizations, with C&A planning to submit a detailed plan for how the IEC campaign was to be conducted to the USAID mission for approval. C&A was also considering initiating work on the project's proposed web site, making preliminary logistical arrangements for investigative journalism workshops (eventually eliminated from the SOW through mutual agreement with the Mission), and preparing for another mission to Nigeria in early February 2002.

In January 2002, the C&A Washington team drafted a formal IEC strategy document while continuing discussions with potential local implementation partners. It also began the preliminary design and secured the domain name (www.accountabilitynigeria.org) for a web site that was to be used for sharing information about anti-corruption efforts in Nigeria. As these efforts were underway, C&A's RPM began to develop functional working relationships with other senior attorneys in the ICPC. As the lead GoN entity in the area of anti-corruption, ICPC's participation was deemed to be crucial to the future of international donor assistance in the area of anti-corruption in general. C&A's RPM also continued to monitor the activities of IDR. Mr. Adelodun was in close contact as well with Nigerian organizations involved in the IEC effort and participated in numerous donor coordination activities.

In February, a team of three C&A staff and consultants embarked on a two-week mission to Abuja, Lagos and Zaria. During this trip, C&A continued discussions with local partners who potentially could support development and implementation of the IEC campaign to assess their interest in and capability. One of the most important meetings was with a broad cross-section of

the Zero Corruption Coalition (ZCC) in Lagos. They expressed interest in supporting the IEC campaign, including serving as co-sponsors of the survey results dissemination effort. While in Abuja, C&A briefed Embassy staff on the status of the survey and related IEC campaign. Concern was raised about the timing of the IEC, particularly with regard to the upcoming Presidential election, and how the campaign and release of the survey results could be perceived by the GoN and the public at a sensitive time in Nigeria's fledgling democracy. C&A was authorized to continue with the development of the IEC campaign, but was advised that the timing for actual implementation of the IEC campaign would have to be carefully calibrated to prevent the appearance of interference in Nigeria's domestic affairs.

During this trip, C&A received from IDR the data files for the three survey components (Deliverable 4). After returning to Washington, C&A spent a significant amount of time cleaning the data files and placing them in a usable format so that they could be delivered to the World Bank Institute's technical staff, as prescribed by the SOW for the TO. In March C&A was waiting for the World Bank Institute's technical review report of the survey data. C&A was also waiting for IDR to submit the remaining sections of the written report describing survey data collection results, a data entry code book, and the preliminary survey report providing national and regional data analyses (Deliverable 5).

March 2002 brought a significant setback for TO implementation. Results of the Afrobarometer survey on Nigerian attitudes toward democracy, funded by USAID and implemented by Management Systems International, were made public. The Nigerian press incorrectly reported that the survey results indicated that the USG was accusing the GoN, particularly the President's Office, of engaging in corrupt activities. As a result, the Embassy asked that C&A's planning for the IEC be put on hold until the political sensitivities associated with this incident subsided. C&A, however, was authorized to continue supporting analysis of survey results. This event underscores the sensitivity and complexity of the corruption issue in the Nigerian context.

Despite earlier problems, during the second quarter of 2002, significant progress was made in the implementation of the TO. In June 2002, a team of two C&A staff visited Abuja and Lagos. Preliminary work by C&A's Washington staff and the RPM culminated in a series of meetings between C&A, USAID, and ICPC, during which the Chairman and other key ICPC staff agreed to adopt C&A's proposed IEC approach. The next step in the IEC process, which was agreed to by USAID and the ICPC, was to produce pilot media products, including television vignettes, in conjunction with Channels Television, and adapting the "Tight Rope" anti-corruption drama television series to radio. "Tight Rope" was initially funded by USAID/OTI and produced by Media International and WODEF. During these meetings, C&A also unveiled the "Corruption Must Go" campaign logo. The logo, recognizable by all Nigerians, was conceptualized with support from MO&U Public Relations. By the end of the month, C&A's Senior Media Advisor arrived in Lagos to begin providing technical support for the production of television products.

C&A continued discussions with the ZCC. A final decision on the ZCC's involvement with the public outreach effort was not to be made until after the final survey analysis was completed and further consultations made with the ICPC. Prior to this two-week trip, C&A

received the World Bank Institute's technical review report of the survey data. C&A also received from IDR a preliminary survey report providing national and regional analysis of the data (Deliverable 5). These were among the issues discussed via video teleconference with World Bank Institute technical staff, C&A, and members of the IDR-led consortium. C&A and the World Bank Institute technical staff made several recommendations on revising the survey report and analysis. IDR committed to making the revisions and submitting a final version to C&A within four weeks.

In early July 2002, the C&A Project Director traveled to Nigeria to determine what was causing further delays with the completion of the revised survey report and present to the Mission, Embassy and ICPC the pilot products for the proposed IEC campaign, developed during the prior reporting period in Lagos under the guidance of the C&A media consultant, Ms. Maria Siccardi, with input from Channels Television and other production staff. During the trip's first stop in Lagos, meetings were held with Ms. Siccardi, the media consultant, who had already been in Lagos for two weeks, and other production staff. At the time, they were engaged in the in-country post production of the two pilot vignettes and PSAs after having successfully completed the shoots, adapted the scripts, worked on visual effects, etc. To achieve these goals, the production crew filmed numerous scenes in different Lagos locations. Some of the footage was eventually used as background material for the "Dreaming Nigeria one Dream at a Time" vignettes and other media products.

While in Nigeria, the Project Director and the RPM traveled to Zaria to meet with Professor Kwanashie and other members of the IDR survey team to discuss the problems being faced. After discussing them for the best part of a day, Kwanashie and his associates promised to complete revisions within a month and submit the final report. Most of the discussions revolved about the household surveys and the approaches the IDR team was implementing to minimize or explain sampling biases. Their efforts in particular were been directed towards addressing the issue of whether or not to weight the household sample to adjust for the overrepresentation of the well educated. It was agreed that this was neither feasible nor advisable since there is no reliable yardstick or standard with which to adjust the figures. While the 1991 census, the latest in Nigeria, provides the distribution of individuals by educational attainment, no such distribution is available for household heads, the subject of the household survey. While it might be possible (by utilizing some heroic assumptions) to estimate a distribution of household heads by educational attainment, the resulting distribution in many respects would be arbitrary and, if utilized for adjustment purposes, could potentially introduce a greater (but indeterminate) bias than the one the procedure would be intended to correct for.

The IDR team had given a great deal of thought to why the sample ended up with such a large bias (over 40% of household heads interviewed alleged to have completed college or a higher degree when in 1991 the actual figure was closer to 5%, whereas only 19% were recorded as illiterate, the actual figure being closer to 50%). While admitting the bias, they concluded that it was less significant than suggested by the sample educational distribution. This was so for several reasons, most of them arising from the inability to obtain an accurate and current sampling frame. The first was that the first stage of the sample design was purposive since it was decided to include in every case state capitals where presumably the educational distribution was likely to include the better educated. This approach was followed - with World Bank

Institute concurrence - since the vast majority of rural residents do not receive services of any kind and do not have any contacts with the authorities, and thus would have been unable to respond to most questions in the household schedule (this was also done to reduce field work costs since by definition most public officials had to be interviewed in state capitals). In fact, most of the questions in the schedule would not have applied to them.

Then there were other even more important factors that may have contributed to the bias. These have to do with the nature of the extended Nigerian family and that in such extended families the better educated often act as household heads. The researchers also felt that the categories used for coding the educational data were too broad and thus portray an inaccurate picture of the sample's true educational distribution. They also agreed that another contributing factor arose out of interviewer bias. This may have occurred since field interviewers apparently were paid per completed interview, a perverse incentive if interviewers became frustrated by their inability to locate interviewees who could respond to their questions (almost certainly illiterate interviewees would have fallen into this category). At least in some instances, the suspicion arose that the way out was to find interviewees capable of completing the questionnaire, even if by doing so sampling guidelines were bent. This, plus a common tendency to avoid the most difficult to reach localities, may in part explain the bias. These problems are not uncommon in survey research, unless very exacting field procedures are adapted and closely monitored. Other proposals to conduct the survey proposed budgets several times larger than that proposed by IDR, an indication of Nigeria's sampling limitations. Kwanashie and his associates feel that the value of the household survey as a yardstick with which to measure changes over time will not be compromised as long as follow-on surveys follow a comparable sampling approach to the one utilized by IDR in the initial survey.

The discussion also included a review of revision recommendations and how the original draft report could be improved by following suggestions made by C&A and the World Bank Institute. It was encouraging that IDR had managed to obtain a reasonably functional portable computer, with the necessary software, and that it was being supported by a competent data management consultant capable of effectively manipulating the three data sets. IDR had taken to heart the suggestions offered and was hard at work revising the draft report. To expedite survey report revisions, C&A restated its offer of support from its Washington office. Concerns remained, however, about Professor Kwanashie's commitment to finalize the survey within a few weeks given past delays. C&A's RPM was asked to follow up with Professor Kwanashie regarding developments.

A significant development occurred in Abuja when the Project Director, the RPM and two USAID officials met with Justice Akambi, the Chairman of the ICPC, to provide him with a survey update and an overview of the proposed media campaign. The aim of the meeting was to obtain ICPC's commitment to act as a formal sponsor of the IEC campaign and as a facilitator of the proposed dissemination workshops. For purposes of the media briefing, Ms. Siccardi, John Momoh, CEO of Channels Television, the media group responsible for the media series and Chief Tunde Oloyede of Media International, Director of the television vignettes, as well as producer of the Tight Rope radio program, were asked to travel from Lagos to Abuja. Chairman Akambi and his staff were shown the media products. They were pleased with their content and tenor. The Chairman agreed that the ICPC would sponsor the IEC campaign and designated his

Public Relations office to act as liaison for finalizing details and providing input. The Chairman also made a formal request to USAID to provide financial support through C&A so that the ICPC could continue with its television media public education efforts.

On occasion of the visit, the Project Director and the Media Consultant also briefed Mission staff, including the Mission Director, as well as the Embassy. At both briefings the pilot media products were shown and authorization received to continue with the full development of the thirteen part TV and radio series. The Tight Rope Television series adaptation into radio was to be completed during the next quarter, both in English and Hausa. Work for the remaining scripts for the television vignettes were to commence during the quarter, all scripts to be completed during the year's final quarter. Channels Television projected initiating production of the remaining eleven television vignettes by November 2002, hoping to have the series completed and ready for broadcast by the end of the year. Finally, while in Abuja, the C&A Project Director met again with General Williams of the ZCC to inform him about the status of the survey project

During the quarter ending December 31, 2002, IDR finally submitted the long awaited revised survey report. While the revised document represented a considerable improvement over the original report, it still needed some refinement before being finalized. The revised draft was transmitted to the World Bank Institute for evaluation and comments, but by the end of December, C&A was still waiting for feedback. While waiting for completion of the survey report, work continued on the development of the components of the media campaign. By late December, the radio adaptations of the OTI-financed television Tightrope anti-corruption series were completed. Both series, each (in English and Hausa) consisting of 13 half-an-hour programs were to be provided to the ICPC. ICPC was to approach the Nigerian broadcasting authorities to request free time in one or more of the government-owned radio networks, while Casals continued to explore other alternatives to broadcast the series through other venues.

Production of the television anti-corruption vignettes and related public service announcements (PSAs) was also underway. During the last quarter of 2002 preliminary scripts for the remaining 11 vignettes were drafted by the C&A media consultant. Some were used by Channels Television to produce five additional vignettes. These were to be reviewed in Abuja in early 2003. Plans called for Channels to complete production of the six remaining vignettes during the first quarter of 2003. Completion of the series of 13 TV vignettes and associated PSAs were to include modifications requested by ICPC and the Mission. With more than half of the vignettes finalized by February, discussions were underway to launch the media campaign early in the year. Coordinating details were to be addressed by Channels Television and the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA), the state-run network, as well as the ICPC as the official campaign sponsor, as to timing, which vignettes to use each week, etc., as the campaign was to be simultaneously broadcast by both networks over two 13-week cycles.

In early 2003, ICPC negotiated with NTA rather favorable terms, obtaining deep discounts, to reactivate the program during two television airing cycles (26 weeks), while securing a commitment from NTA to repeatedly broadcast the anti-corruption campaign's PSAs at times other than when then ICPC program was to be aired. As part of the understanding, ICPC agreed to include in the TV news weekly program the "Corruption Must Go" theme and

associated identifiers and products (e.g., logo, music, effects, story teller concept, vignettes). Casals also agreed to provide ICPC with additional campaign theme materials such as bumper stickers, t-shirts, lapel buttons, and caps imprinted with the ICPC name and the campaign's theme. The intent of the campaign was to highlight the importance of the policy initiatives being developed to deal with corruption, the price Nigeria pays for widespread malfeasance, and the role of the ICPC as the lead Nigerian institution in the anti-corruption agenda.

Given that Presidential elections were scheduled for April, survey findings dissemination and policy workshops were postponed. In light of continuing delays, C&A requested and the Mission approved a no cost TO extension through August 2003. During the first quarter of 2003, progress continued to be made on the survey and IEC components. C&A dedicated much effort to re-drafting sections of the report to ensure technical accuracy and proper format, in accordance with recommendations made by the World Bank Institute and C&A staff. Once these revisions were made, the next step was to seek approval for the release of the revised version of the final report. As part of the revision process, C&A also began drafting four different Survey Summary Reports that were to be used to disseminate survey results in an easily understood and concise manner, given the size and complexity of the overall survey report.

During 2003's second quarter, several public awareness activities got underway. Production of the final television anti-corruption vignettes and related PSAs continued as the first sets began to be broadcast numerous times per week under the sponsorship of Channels Television in Lagos and, on a more limited basis, through NTA (the latter with nationwide coverage and widely viewed in the North), in part in connection with the ICPC weekly broadcast. To complement these efforts, and support the ICPC's continued public outreach campaign, C&A provided the ICPC with more than 10,000 "Corruption Must Go" buttons, stickers, T-Shirts, and baseball caps.

During the second quarter of 2003, the Nigeria survey team submitted to C&A the final revised draft of the survey report. Since the revised report was available, Mr. Adebayo Adelodun, C&A's Nigeria RPM traveled to Washington in early May, to support headquarter staff with the editing and preparation of the final version of the report, as well as to discuss the format, logistics and timetable for the workshops being planned to disseminate the surveys results across Nigeria. During Mr. Adelodun's visit, meetings were also held with Mr. Tunde Durosini-Etti, Manager of Support & Management Service, Ltd. (SMS), a Nigerian logistics firm, to discuss issues related to locations and workshops' costs. Several alternatives were assessed, final details to be worked out according to the recommendations made by a Workshop Dissemination Steering Committee that was to be established in Abuja to manage and conduct the workshops.

In keeping with C&A's mandate of making the survey project completely a Nigerian initiative, C&A only made editorial changes to the main survey report, introducing changes in format only when this proved to be technically necessary. As originally proposed, C&A also began drafting, with Mr. Adelodun's support, the four survey-based summary reports. These consisted of an overall summary report, integrating into a single document results of each of the surveys (households, enterprises, and public officials), as well as individual reports for each of the surveys. The four reports, by design brief and with a common format emphasizing graphic

presentation, highlighted surveys' findings policy implications. To preserve the power of different perspectives in the presentation of survey results, individual survey reports when necessary provided summary highlights of other surveys' results. For example, the household survey summary report incorporates highlights from the enterprise and public official survey if the information helps validates a household perception of a concern.

Once drafts of the various documents were completed, a C&A team traveled to Nigeria to address several issues, including completing the document preparation process, setting in motion the workshop dissemination process, and attending to the ongoing television public awareness campaign. On its way to Abuja, the C&A team visited Lagos where it met with John Momoh, Channels TV Managing Director, to review the status of the campaign and assess the status of the remaining vignettes and PSAs being produced. During the meeting, arrangements were made to conduct two focus groups to determine the TV products cultural acceptability and effectiveness. The focus groups were scheduled for two weeks later so that the C&A team could observe them just before departing Nigeria. C&A was also informed that the remaining TV products had already been completed and soon would go into final editing.

The C&A team brought along edited versions of the survey report and summaries for review and approval by the Nigerian research team. The latter made minor editorial suggestions, but were quite pleased with the result. Once those changes were made in Washington, final versions were zipped and forwarded to Abuja for printing. While in Abuja, the C&A team met with Professor Mike Kwanashie, leader of the survey team, and several of his associates, as well as Director of the Independent Policy Group (IPG), the think tank providing policy advice on economic and social matters to President Obasanjo. The team also met with Justice Akambi, Chairman of the ICPC, and General Ishola Williams, head of the Nigerian chapter of Transparency International (TIN) as well as President of ZCC. The meetings provided the opportunity to discuss the survey reports, as well as participation of their organizations in the workshops. Several meetings were also held with NTA officials to discuss the public awareness campaign, as well as the broadcast of the ICPC weekly television show. Chairman Akambi was most grateful for the timely USAID assistance since it gave the ICPC the opportunity to reach the people of Nigeria at a time when the very survival of the ICPC, threatened by powerful Congressional interests, was at stake. Fortunately, opposition from several sectors of Nigeria's political class, with civil society support, managed to beat the challenge. A major judicial ruling also served to strengthen the ICPC.

The Congressional challenge to the ICPC had a silver lining regarding the workshops' sponsorship. Initial attempts seeking to have the ICPC and the ZCC jointly sponsor the workshops were not eagerly embraced by the ICPC for unknown reasons. C&A assumed they had to do with Nigerian politics and perhaps to past disagreements between both organizations. When the ICPC was under fire, however, General Williams and the ZCC were among the ICPC's most visible and staunchest supporters. This experience changed ICPC's attitudes. Both organizations - together with TIN, the IPG, and the university and research centers survey consortium - agreed to co-sponsor the workshops. This was a very significant development as a government entity and prominent CSOs joined hands to work together on an important anti-corruption initiative.

On June 10, 2003, the Steering Committee convened a meeting at the IPG to discuss the nature and organization of the workshops. The Steering Committee, chaired by Mr. Adelodun, included Mr. Ibrahim Pam, ICPC; Ms. Lillian Ekeanyanwu, ZCC; Professor Enoch Ayodele, IDR, in representation of the survey consortium; Mr. Matthew O. Idowu, TIN; and Professor Mike Kwansahie, IPG. During this initial meeting, it was agreed that a minimum of 20 workshops would be scheduled to cover Nigeria's six geopolitical zones and the FCT in Abuja. Plans called for small grants to be provided to the ZCC and the individual institutional members of the university consortium to support their participation in the workshops. The ICPC and the IPG were to rely on their own resources to finance their involvement. A contract was also to be negotiated with a specialized firm to provide logistical support.

C&A also renegotiated with NTA the terms of its broadcasting agreement as the latter was failing to broadcast the PSAs as often as it had promised. During the negotiation - compliance with its conditions was made a condition for further payment - NTA agreed to broadcast the PSAs five times per week during and outside its national news report, aside from continuing with the broadcast of the ICPC weekly program. Channels TV, meanwhile, broadcast the vignettes 25 times per month on average during the months of May and June, and the PSAs 150 times per month, or five times daily. This coverage provided great exposure to the anti-corruption message - reaching as many as ten million households - given NTA's national coverage and the wide reach of Channels TV in the heavily populated Lagos/Ibadan/coastal area. On departure from Nigeria, the C&A team observed the two focus group discussions (FGD) hosted at Channels TV to evaluate the vignettes and PSAs. The results of the FGDs were generally positive. They are summarized in the attached report.

The project was once again delayed due to concerns expressed by the World Bank about the political ramifications of making the politically sensitive survey results public. However, after several consultations with the USAID Mission Director and communications between her office and the World Bank, the decision was made to release the survey reports and proceed with the workshops. C&A also began to negotiate a grant to the ZCC, as together with the ICPC, they were to co-host the workshop series, with support from the survey research institutions. The latter were to offer support in the geopolitical zones where they had conducted survey field work.

To facilitate the conduct of the workshops, C&A conducted a procurement competition to select a specialized firm to provide logistics support to organize and manage them, including site selection, pre-workshop arrangements, transportation and per diem requirements, in-site support, and follow-up activities, including preparation of post-workshop financial reports. In compliance with USAID requirements, C&A drafted Request for Proposals (RFP) detailing the Scope of Work (SOW) for the subcontract and circulated it on September 16, 2003, to three firms known to provide these services. Aside from providing potential bidders with the SOW, the RFP provided instructions for proposal preparation, including budget, indicated that the contract would be issued on a fixed-price (to prevent cost overruns), and that the proposals had to be submitted to C&A headquarters in Alexandria, Virginia via e-mail by COB on September 26, 2003. The RFP also provided the criteria whereby proposals would be evaluated. Bidders were also provided with the contact information of the RPM to request clarifications regarding the SOW. In response to the RFP, three proposals were received.

As the logistics competition was underway, the anti-corruption television campaign executed by Channels Television and the NTA continued. C&A gathered transmission logs from Channels Television and NTA to assess the scope and reach of the NTA campaign. These data were used to prepare a consolidated campaign reach report (attached). By the end of September 2003, C&A was still exploring alternatives for the placement of the radio programming. The firm also delivered additional print public awareness materials, including additional caps and t-shirts with the "Corruption Must Go" logo. C&A also duplicated in Abuja thousands of copies of the four summary reports after obtaining printing bids from Abuja- and Lagos-based print shops and selecting the one that offered the best value.

As bids were prepared, the Workshop Steering Committee continued refining the workshops' nature and objective, identify localities where they would be held, and compiling lists of potential invitees. With the selection of Support Management Services (SMS), as the logistics firm, the workshops locations were agreed to and a final list of invitees completed. The goal was to have at each workshop an average of 25 participants to encourage a broad airing of survey findings and generate policy recommendations. In anticipation of the workshops, invitation letters were circulated and as potential invitees confirmed participation they were provided with survey summary reports in advance of the workshops. The workshops were designed to last from four to six hours.

As planned, the twenty workshops were hosted within a three week period - between November 18th and December 12th. In the South East Zone they were held in Enugu and Owerri, while in the South South Zone they were convened in Port Harcourt and Calabar. Six workshops were hosted in the South West Zone, both in Lagos and Ibadan, Nigeria's most populated region and also the country's center for commerce and intellectual life. Yola and Maiduguri were the workshop sites for the North East Zone while Sokoto and Jos were for the North West Zone. Two other workshops were held in Kaduna and Ilorin, with the final four in Abuja, all six within the North Central Zone.

As 2003 came to a close, workshop summary reports were being drafted and were being posted on the project's website. These reports were to be the basis for the final policy recommendations report that should be available by February 2004. Also, C&A finally managed to negotiate with the Nigerian Radio Corporation the terms of a contract to broadcast in English and Hausa the anti-corruption Tightrope radio series. The series will be broadcast under the sponsorship and as part of the ICPC's national education campaign beginning in late February 2004, complementing other efforts conducted via television.

The Task Order's completion date, extended once again to February 15, 2004, was extended still one more time to May 31, 2004 to allow for the finalization of remaining products and administrative matters. These include dissemination of the policy recommendation reports, carry out the TO's evaluation, and broadcasting the Tightrope radio series.

The Task Order came to a close with the broadcast of the Tightrope radio series in English and Hausa and the final evaluation of the Task Order, both completed during the second quarter of 2004, the last episode of the radio series being transmitted on June 10th.

The results of the evaluation (attached) were quite positive, the evaluation report noting that “Overall ... the objectives of the TO were largely achieved.” It goes on to note that good-quality survey results and reports were produced while the workshops that were held, as well as the media products that were broadcast, were of high quality and effective. The evaluation, conducted by a Nigerian evaluator, examined:

The effectiveness of both the design and the execution of **TO** activities against the bench-marks set by the literature and best-practices as they concern this kind of activities. In particular, in evaluating the **TO** programme, the study examined the nature and quality of its major deliverables, drawing on the accumulated knowledge in statistics and best practices governing the conduct of surveys, analysis of survey results, writing of the associated reports, the conduct of workshops and media campaign. Furthermore, interviews were held with 50 randomly selected television viewers – consisting of 10 persons from each of the cities of Lagos, Ibadan, Port-Harcourt, Kaduna and Ilorin – to determine whether or not the media campaign was effective. Also, discussions were held with 6 key persons that were involved in implementing **TO** activities to determine whether or not the **TO** objectives/goals have been realized and identify challenges to its implementation.

The assessment of the effectiveness of the media campaign was very positive, with 90 percent or more of the television viewers interviewed reporting that they found the media messages helpful/very helpful and 94 percent claiming the timing of the messages was very appropriate. Only when the interviewees were asked about the appropriateness of the frequency of the media message, did the positive assessments dropped below 80 percent.

Television Viewers’ Assessment of the Media Campaign

Questions	Helpful/ Appropriate as % of Total	Very Helpful/ Very Appropriate as % of Total	Helpful/ Very Helpful/ Very Appropriate as % of Total
Were the media messages helpful to you in understanding better the nature and scope of corruption in Nigeria?	50	40	90
Were the media messages helpful to you in understanding better the magnitudes of the costs of corruption in Nigeria?	52	36	86
How appropriate is the frequency of the media messages?	60	16	76
How appropriate is the timing of the media messages?	70	24	94
Overall, how do rate the media messages?	52	36	88

The evaluator also contacted 20 randomly selected participants of the policy workshops to assess their views regarding the usefulness and appropriateness of these events. The results are summarized in the following table.

Participants' Assessment of the Workshops

Questions	Helpful/ Effective as % of Total	Very Helpful/ Very Effective/ Wonderful as % of Total	Helpful/ Very Helpful/ V. Effective/ Wonderful as % of Total
Was the workshop helpful to you in understanding better the nature and scope of corruption in Nigeria?	70	25	95
Was the workshop helpful to you in understanding better the magnitudes of the costs of corruption in Nigeria?	70	25	95
Was the workshop helpful to you in understanding better what set of policies are appropriate in reducing corruption in Nigeria?	80	5	85
Was the workshop helpful to you in identifying other persons /institutions that are involved in anti-corruption activities in case you need to work in partnership with them?	75	25	100
Overall, how do you rate the effectiveness of the workshop(s)?	75	25	100

The evaluations were equally positive as nearly every participant interviewed was satisfied, every one of them rating the workshops as effective both in terms of content and as venues for identifying other individuals concerned with the extent of corruption in Nigeria.

The evaluator also noted several issues - already highlighted by the contractor and referred to in this final report - related to the quality of the survey data. They largely arose from the challenges posed by working in the Nigerian-poor statistical environment and by the decision of the Mission to engage a consortium of universities representative of Nigeria's regional and ethnic diversity for the conduct of the survey. This decision posed significant coordinating difficulties due to differential institutional capacity. These difficulties, and political sensitivities, also accounted for delays in project implementation.

Attachments:

- Focus Group Report – Dreaming Nigeria
- Consolidated Nigeria TV Anti-Corruption Campaign Reach Report
- The Nigeria Governance and Corruption Survey and Corruption Awareness Programme – An Evaluation